The Promotion of Place: Immigration Policies, Citizenship and Economic Reform in New Zealand

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Abstract

This thesis examines three distinctive phases of immigration policy in New Zealand. This includes the early European settlement of New Zealand characterised by the emergence of a local citizenship existing within a larger supranational pan British identity. The second phase is the post World War II period where ‘New Zealand Citizenship’ is established legally and the idea of the ‘nation’ was actively promoted. The third phase is marked by the reforms carried out during the 1980s by the Fourth Labour Government, which has helped transform the ideological and regulatory environment that immigration policy occupies. Incorporating mixed methodologies and ethnohistory, this work persistently crosses the boundaries between history and anthropology. Incorporating the approaches of these two disciplines through critical engagement with law, politics, and economics this research integrates information obtained through interviews with public servants, in addition to archival material whereby documents are treated as a forum of material culture just as much as repositories of truth and polices.
Acknowledgements

Though my name bares the authorship of this text, the fact of the matter is this project would not have been possible without the help of many people along the way. This thesis would not have been achievable without the loving support of my parents. I would also like to thank Mark Anderson and Gopal Balakrishnan for their encouragement to further my education in New Zealand. A very special thanks to Greg Rawlings for his enduring patience and for his support of my project throughout this endeavour. I would also like to thank the various individuals associated with these New Zealand organisations: the Department of Labour, the New Zealand Treasury, the Department of Internal Affairs, Members of Parliament, and the Department of Immigration who generously agreed to share their time and insights with me during my research for this thesis. Thanks to the officials from the Irish, Malaysian, Canadian, Hong Kong, and Swiss governments for their helpful insights regarding their countries respective immigration policies.

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Notes on Referencing

This Master’s thesis uses the Harvard system of referencing for secondary sources. However, because it incorporates a substantial volume of archival material, footnotes are used to cite and reference primary sources including parliamentary debates, newspaper articles, court judgments, legislation and multilateral agreements and declarations. This referencing system combining primary and secondary sources is based on conventions established in ethnohistory and is employed in journals such as *History and Anthropology*. 
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<td>Army Education Welfare Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERS</td>
<td>Education Retaliation Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNWI/s</td>
<td>High Net Worth Individual/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMSED</td>
<td>International Migration Settlement &amp; Employment Dynamics</td>
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<td>NZIS</td>
<td>New Zealand Immigration Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDF</td>
<td>Sugar Industry Diversification Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>Trans-Pacific Partnership</td>
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<td>TTTA</td>
<td>Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
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Introduction

If there is any realism left here, it is a ‘realism’ which springs from the shock of grasping that confinement and of realizing that, for whatever peculiar reasons, we seem condemned to seek the historical past though our own pop images and stereotypes about the past, which itself remains forever out of reach


Immigration policy changes frequently, so one must reject any aggrandizing notions which would endorse any universalising *a priori* immigration policy framework which is timeless and unchanging. Such a view cannot account for change. Like the quote states above, we appear to view the past though the lens of our own existing experience. What I am arguing in this thesis is that a new paradigm has emerged which has profoundly altered a ‘pre-Rogernomics’ developmental state immigration agenda. The primarily catalyst of this change was the adoption of a ‘free-market’ world view, which allowed for the intellectual basis of what would become a framework which fostered the promotion of economic deregulation during the 1980s in New Zealand. This in part helps to explain the broader cultural changes which have indirectly led to a policy framework which has laid the foundation of a more ethnically diverse population in New Zealand, by opening opportunities for increased numbers of potential migrants from ‘non-traditional’ regions.¹

Immigration policy both publicly and privately in New Zealand has proven political and at times controversial (Farmer 1996). During the 1990s in particular, a plethora of opinions were being voiced with respect to immigration, as is noted later in the thesis. However the policies themselves along with the sanctioned immigration advertisements in the following chapters invite the viewer to come to their own conclusions as to what was being ‘officially’ endorsed visually and textually. Immigration related documents and their circulation have played a subtle role in migrant consciousness. For those who came into contact with the documents, and whether or not they were the deciding factor in every migrant’s decision to move is

¹ This is not to deny that other important factors were involved in the shifting immigration polices of New Zealand, such as the spread of human rights discourse globally (Kymlicka 1995; Pearson 2001; Kivisto 2002; Joppke 2003).
almost beside the point. These were artefacts meant to be consumed. They served their role as advertisements for potential emigrants during the time period of their production. What matters is their content and aesthetic appeal, because there is much to be discerned from their design and content given the historical, social and economic changes which have taken place over the last 150 years in New Zealand. What they reflected and promoted over the various eras can tell us many things about the past and also the present.

**Figure 1.0:** Immigration New Zealand Logo. Source: INZ 1007, 2010. Used with permission by the Department of Labour.

Immigration is a crucial part of New Zealand’s economic and social polices. It represents an important aspect of the political, as well as economic debates in New Zealand society; past present and future. Immigration can ‘build’ a society, whether it is thought of as a broader nation or a collection of individuals. That is why it is important to synthesise what I see are distinctive phases which have affected immigration policy in New Zealand. These begin with the European settlement of New Zealand whereupon a burgeoning local citizenship came into existence with a prevailing sense of a supranational pan British identity.

Prior to the Treaty of Waitangi and British sovereignty in 1840, there were no legal restrictions to immigrate to New Zealand in the European judicial sense. In the early 1800s there were only a relatively small amount of Europeans, a hundred individuals living semi-permanently in Māori communities along the coastal areas of
New Zealand. The people who came to New Zealand during this time period did so before the formation of legal restrictions regulated the entry of persons into Aotearoa. No known immigration policy is thought to have been formalised before the Treaty of Waitangi. Five years prior to the Treaty of Waitangi the 1835 Declaration of Independence in New Zealand legally established a ‘state’ in international law. This is significant because it gave protection to Māori and local Pākehā who controlled ships in the Tasman from repercussions associated with not flying a sovereign flag. While still acknowledging the existence of the 1835 Declaration, the Treaty of Waitangi is considered by many, to be the foundation of New Zealand as a colonial nation-state, with a 'sovereign authority' and the institution of an agreed upon form of 'Civil Government' (Orange 1987: 40).

However to understand nascent foundations of immigration and citizenship in New Zealand at the time also requires an understanding of what was going on in Great Britain. The arrival of European settlers during the 19th century coincided with the land reforms taking place in Britain. This was a catalyst and an influential push factor for many emigrants migrating from the United Kingdom to New Zealand and abroad which is discussed in Chapter two. The urbanisation process during the 1800s in England brought about in part by the country’s industrialisation was amplified by the Poor Law Reforms. These engendered successive waves of formal and informal emigration from Europe to New Zealand during the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century coinciding with the economic changes and punitive legal measures. The emergence and foundation of New Zealand’s Westminster based legal political system, in addition to state institutions which have gone on to form the political structures which are still in operation to this day.

The migrants who legally came to New Zealand represented a number of social classes. Some had financial means; others were children, who went abroad seeking a better life and more opportunities. Chapter two also highlights the legal barriers which were placed on non-British subjects such as Asian migrants. Unlike revolutionary societies such as the United States or France, within the British Commonwealth there was a lack of a clear constitutional basis for distinguishing British subjects. New Zealand as a member of the British Empire did not have a formal constitution, and there was no legal basis for differentiating between British subjects when it came to immigration procedures. Nevertheless New Zealand sought autonomy in its own domestic affairs, which in practice implied applying a distinction
regarding the ability to manage the movement of persons into and out of New Zealand. This thesis is concerned with the relationship between citizenship and immigration policy.

In the British context, ‘subjecthood’ was in its historical origins and meaning, markedly distinct historically to that of ‘citizenship’ in its current understanding (McMillan 2004:268). The development from subject to citizen was a rather gradual process whereby over time political and legal rights typically associated with modern citizenship were ‘grafted’ on to much older feudal notions relating to the joint responsibilities between monarch and subject (Vincenzi 1998:280). To have such a ‘citizenship’ would be to call into question the significance of colonial setup at the heart of the British Commonwealth system. Eventually as is described in Chapter one, this came to a head after World War II when in 1948 Canada decided to introduce its own national citizenship, which had repercussions in New Zealand and throughout the British Empire. Rather then dealing with questions surrounding migration, the British reaction to the Canadian legislation was in reality a maneuver to retain a consistent definition of subjecthood in response to Canada’s independent adoption of its own citizenship, keeping with the historical commonwealth framework based upon affiliations between the United Kingdom and its various Dominions. While London tried to retain a universal British subjecthood, in effect there was an implicit distinction set up between upper and lower case ‘Dominions’. Lower case ‘dominions’ in de jure terms were the non-British settler states within the empire, whereas when capitalized ‘Dominions’ refers to the older, whiter settler commonwealth societies (Fransman 1989:25).

Immigration and notions surrounding citizenship have historically gone hand in hand. New Zealand has had a long history of distinguishing British subject’s versus non-British subjects however. This is reflected in the legal distinction between “British Subjects” and other people labeled as “Aliens.” This legal distinction continued to be differentiated until it was subsequently removed upon the passage of the Citizenship Act of 1977. Before this, acts such as the Undesirable Immigrant Exclusion Act of 1919, which remained valid until the beginning of the Immigration Act of 1964 effectively gave preferential treatment to certain groups. The motivation for the British Nationality Act 1948, which consequently impelled New Zealand to adopt legislation arose due to voluntary actions carried out by the Canadian government. This is crucial because it marks the beginning of the legal foundation of
formal New Zealand citizenship. Before 1948 New Zealanders were strictly British subjects. After 1948 they were also New Zealand citizens. Within the British Commonwealth, ideas surrounding ‘social citizenship’ were rather distinct from what is often conceived of today as citizenship representing nationality (Marshall 1963). Canada’s embrace of the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946 became problematic for the colonial technocrats and parliamentarians in London because it effectively called into question the prior arrangement between the monarchy, the state, and the people.

New Zealand was one of the few colonies that took exception to this global colonial trend. While New Zealand passed a citizenship act, the move was an unhappy one for many in New Zealand as is discussed in Chapter one. This is reflected in the very title of the citizenship act adopted rather reluctantly by the New Zealand government as the British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act 1948. The act retained the term ‘British Nationality’. The various countries that collectively made up the Commonwealth before the Citizenship reforms in the late 1940’s help highlight what was an emerging basic tension regarding British subjecthood. As members of the Commonwealth, as a group of countries, they all enjoyed a direct relationship to the monarchy without mediation by concepts like, national or local citizenship. However Canada’s move to establish a Canadian citizenship caused an existential crisis.

Unlike the United States and more recently in Australia, the idea that citizenship marks national identity gained little traction in New Zealand (Green 2009). Formal New Zealand citizenship is only 63 years old. An allegedly common culture and ethnicity associated to Britishness were at one time seen as being just as important if not more so in binding ‘the nation’ together than a shared formal legal citizenship (Gellner 1983). Ethnicity has also played a major role in New Zealand society (Pearson 2001). These historical and cultural legacies have gone on to help shape New Zealand’s institutions today. However as will be explained further, the current neoliberal era has put immense pressure on these arrangements.
Model Migrants?

Another major segment of this thesis has to do with the post World War II period. This involved promoting ‘citizenship’ and ‘the nation’ in the attempt to create a society of ‘new New Zealanders’ out of ‘model migrants,’ principally from and of Europe origin. Because this thesis is concerned with immigration policy both in the present and historically, immigration takes precedent in this analysis of government policy even though nation-building is not limited to immigration. Even though I treat the post World War II period as marking a historical break, it is true that before the first Labour government enacted the Social Security Act in 1938, considered by most as leading the way for state involvement in economic management, social reforms were underway which reflect the government playing an active role in society. One of the things New Zealand had going for it was that it was an attractive destination for working class immigrants, and this was reflected by the state playing an active role in society. A defining characteristic of New Zealand policy from its initiation has been the idea that New Zealand is egalitarian. As described in Chapter three laws were passed supporting egalitarian ethics in public policy social life and economic organisation. What all of these laws have in common is that they reflect a nation-building ideology which privileges the state playing an active role in society.

While often overlooked, there was also a cultural policy officially in place in New Zealand which framed immigration and citizenship. In a government report issued in Havana at an United Nations conference in 1956, New Zealand declared that ‘the government would not tolerate the importation into New Zealand of polygamy, polyandry, prostitution or illegal forms of gambling’ irrespective of the legality of these practices in the emigration countries. In addition to this, a sufficient knowledge of the English language was considered essential and the ‘basis of integration and of ultimate assimilation.’ English language proficiency was viewed in New Zealand as ‘a sine qua non of cultural integration and of avoidance of alien grouping.’ In the 1950s, even ‘the type of immigration planned was strongly selective

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so far as racial stock, social background, education, personal character and potential fitness for citizenship were concerned, though some exceptions were made for elderly displaced persons on humanitarian grounds.

There were formal and informal organisations supported by the government that reflected ‘nation-building’ aspirations in New Zealand during the post World War II period. As described further in chapter three (Brickell 2010), these government administered programs provided in part not only a venue for the presentation of government policies, but they also doubled as a forum where civic engagement was encouraged. Such publicly funded ventures illustrate that meaningful nation-building exercises were occurring with the help of the New Zealand government prior to the economic reforms of the 1980s. The Citizenry was being brought to life though active civic and social engagement. Additionally another tangible exercise taking place was renewing a government subsidised assisted migration programs after World War II. World War II centred public attention and debate around the need for a substantial population for national defense purposes, in addition to economic arguments in favour of an increased rate of immigration to New Zealand (Morrell 1950:21).

The Labour Department was responsible for managing the assisted immigration scheme which with the help of the government-appointed Immigration Advisory Council was responsible for counseling the government on the amount of immigrants ‘required’ during the post-war period. This scheme was expanded to take in people from the Netherlands and other European countries in 1950 and in 1964. The Dutch were considered a desirable reservoir of labour which would be beneficial to New Zealand in view of the ‘high Netherlands’ birth-rate.’ However according to the Dunedin Branch of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, it was not recommended that ‘[C]ontinental Europeans should compose a majority of the total number of immigrants in either assisted or unassisted classes’ (Morrell 1950:19). The post War assisted immigration program continued until 1973.

These immigration programs were taking place during an era where the New Zealand State was responsible for the management of goods and services as it attempted to meticulously regulate many aspects of the country’s national economic activity. Healthcare, education and social welfare were all universally available,

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funded by general taxation. Regulations were used to control the prices of basic goods such as electricity, bread, telephones services and milk (Dalziel & Lattimore 1999:13). The state attempted to promote an ‘egalitarian’ society through various means including supporting an industrial relations system predicated on strong occupation-based trade unions in addition to there being a general wage system structure. As discussed in Chapter three, the New Zealand Government managed in varying degrees the production of goods and pricing, on top of being in charge of distributing welfare benefits for those who were considered eligible. Domestically during this time (prior to the fourth Labour Government) in New Zealand, policies were still promoted and the political will and ideological support was still publicly acceptable for there to be support for social spending and funding which helped advance the human condition of many materially.

**Economic Reform**

The third era with respect to immigration policy is distinguished by the market reforms in New Zealand during the 1980’s, and the degree to which they have had implications for New Zealand’s current immigration policies. Within a mounting climate of fear about the state of the New Zealand economy, the Labour party caucus during the early 1980s began to find some support for further trade liberalisation and economic restructuring. ‘Rogernomics’ is the common name which is given to describe the range of fundamental economic reforms carried out during the Fourth Labour government in New Zealand under the direction of Sir Rodger Douglas who was at the time the Finance Minister in New Zealand. These policies affected the overall structure of markets through deregulation in various areas such as external trade, the financial markets, commodities and state industries all of which were ‘liberated’ and ‘enhanced’ with the goal of increasing competition by furthering the role of the market in the workings of New Zealand society.

Such a world view and policy positions has and continues to have a direct bearing on immigration policy and citizenship. Based in large part on free market understandings and public choice theory, many of the principles guiding economic policy in the United States and in Britain during the time of Margaret Thatcher and
Ronald Regan would become part of the same ideological repertoire of the New Zealand state. Immigration policy in New Zealand in 1984 effectively corresponded with what at the time was still part of a long established view that New Zealand had a rather limited capacity to take in large numbers of new migrants and that immigration broadly speaking was there to serve the needs of supplementing the work force when there was a shortage of labour (Farmer 1985). By contrast after and during the economic reforms of the 1980s neo-liberal polices coincided with radically new immigration policies, dispensing with preferences based on cultural and historical ties and embracing skills, capital and mobility. The coupling of ethnicity with the state has served historically to support restrictive immigration policies, at least in Western countries including New Zealand and Australia from the late nineteenth century into the early second half of the twentieth century. In the post war period with the spread of the conception of ‘universal human rights,’ ‘nation-building’ projects have to a degree become self-limiting in that liberal norms have constrained what Western states can do in the domain of immigration and citizenship policy (Joppke 2003). In this way neoliberalism as an ideology can be viewed as a liberalising force, in that it has helped to undermine the ideological foundation for race based ‘discriminatory’ racial preference for migrants and citizens. And its scope has been accelerated through the economic changes of the 1980s in New Zealand through the Rogernomics reforms. During this period immigration policies have been introduced specifically to attract wealthy individuals through business investor schemes, as discussed in Chapter three and Chapter five.

The changing forms of representation related with different documents associated with promoting immigration to New Zealand which have targeted potential migrants in various quarters over the last one hundred and fifty years have varied immensely. The study of documents has become an area of growing interest recently in anthropology, as more scholars have applied richer and more nuanced analyses (Harper 1998; Riles 2000; 2006; Biagoli 2006; Reed 2006; Miyazaki 2006; Strathern 2006; Rawlings 2011). This represents an important addition to the growing scholarly literature on documents. However while greatly informative in their own right, they do not take into consideration older anthropological and sociological notions once associated with document analysis such as the visual and textual study of aesthetics and semiotics popularised in cultural studies (Burgin 1976; Barthes 1977; Berger 1977). Considering that each author’s trajectory is different this is understandable and
not necessarily an issue of concern, however for the sake of this thesis and the immigration related documents there is much to be gained from an investigation of the ‘visual culture’ involved in the representations of the documents in question (Evans and Hall 1999).

Critical analyses of documents share synergies with visual anthropology. Historians have recognised the visual imagery of photographs as ‘documents’ (Hales 1984; Mejia 1987; Levine 1989; Trachtenberg 1989) as have sociologists (Wagner 1979; Harper 1987; Schwartz 1992). This is of importance also to anthropologists because documents and the use of photography within them can play an important role if the document can ‘inform viewers ethnographically’ (Scherer 2003:201). The following commentaries on the immigration related documents of New Zealand should help to highlight the seemingly ever changing rationale and ideologies behind the various polices being promoted by the state, and privately actors who produced the subsequent documents. The most striking feature of this immigration montage is the difference visually and textually between the documents in terms of the representation of potential migrants before and after the economic deregulation of the 1980s under the Forth Labour government.

Documents today, in their multitude of forms represent an important component of our material culture. This thesis addresses some of the changing forms of representation related with multiple advertisements associated with promoting immigration to New Zealand which have targeted potential migrants over the last 150 years. The academic discipline of anthropology takes on many forms. Some anthropologists have studied the symbolism associated in Bali with cockfighting (Geertz 1975), while others focus their energies towards deciphering aesthetic features of documents, such as recommendation forms produced by funding organizations (Brenneis 2006). Documents are increasingly being seen as ‘artefacts of modern knowledge’ (Riles 2006). This is increasingly the case with respect to the interest surrounding the changing character of ‘documents’ in light of the current and emergent information age and the further dissemination of digitized materials (Riles 2006:6; Megill 1997:25).

By treating documents as cultural objects possessing political, ideological and cultural values associated with them, they can be powerful repertoires of information, even when at times they may appear on the surface to be rather mundane and mechanical. Regardless of the documents physicality- all be it posters such as those
covered in the chapter on Organised Migration and Nation-Building, which date as far back as the 1840s, or the relatively recent ethereal digital advertisements promoted by the New Zealand Department of Trade and Enterprise over the internet during the 2010 Shanghai World Expo (Figure 2.1) documents are an important item of inquiry in that they are as products of cultural production, a major part of social relations and an ever omnipresent feature of contemporary society. This thesis provides an analytical framework for linking the New Zealand government’s involvement in the cultural production and distribution of immigration related documents with the broader transnational networks involved over time in facilitating the movement of people, or ‘clients’ and their wealth into New Zealand.

All of the New Zealand immigration advertisement documents discussed in this thesis have their own epistemologically embedded logic associated with their initial physical and cultural production. This in and of itself makes problematic ‘objective’ comparisons between each document given that the temporality of each of the artefacts produced in this chapter came into being in different eras. According to Fredrick Jameson, an expert on historicizing contemporary society, principal ruptures between periods do not typically involve total changes of substance but rather the reorganization of a definite number of elements which when specified distinguish features that in an earlier period were once secondary, usually become established, while features that had been prevailing in turn tend to become secondary (Jameson 1991(1983):18). This is an important theme that runs throughout this thesis.

As will be further elaborated in the first two sections of this thesis, New Zealand in 1848, during the time of the Wakefield Company Poster as portrayed in (Figure 1.2) is not the same New Zealand as represented in the brochure produced in 1971 (Figure 1.8). Granted both objects promoted immigration in the same geographical location: New Zealand. Each document was in fact produced in different decades by different authors, in different locations, for different reasons. But each document is an artefact which represents a snapshot none the less of the dominant ideology manifested at the time and promoted by the ‘same’ state during the time of each document’s initial production and subsequent circulation shortly there after. The unifying theme that unites all of the documents in this section is that they all promote various forms of permanent and/or temporary migration to New Zealand. They are involved in the production of transnational mobility to and from New Zealand and this leads us to one of the reasons why documents are of value to social
scientists interested in cultural historicism. Like laws which are created in different settings for different reasons over an extended period of time, dependent upon the political consensus and various situations taking place at the time of legislation, immigration related documents also represent different historical moments and social realities which can be an insightful way of learning about the past and the present comparatively. Just as ‘cross-cultural’ (Ember and Ember 2009) comparisons can be insightful and informative, so too can immigration documents from different eras over the course of New Zealand’s modern history.

The point of this analysis of the representations of immigration related documents in New Zealand is to come to grips with the fact that each immigration document is in itself a rather piecemeal and fragmented representation. They are not automatically transferable or always applicable necessarily outside of the setting upon which they were originally designed. Nevertheless all disjointed or ‘discrete’ cultural analysis involves on some level an underlying ‘repressed theory of historical periodization’ (Jameson 1991:3). Therefore each document is an important ‘snap shot’ of the policies promoted at the time of the documents initial circulation. They are a window for the viewer into a past we have not necessarily experienced first hand- where these immigration documents are none the less still an insightful tool in furthering contemporary understandings of the prevailing policies within the immigration apparatus, at the time of production. Upon closer examination, these materials in New Zealand illustrate the dynamism that exists within immigration and the creation of a citizenry.

This project on immigration and its material representations as documents helps bring to life the historical realities which existed and still exist with respect to immigration policies in New Zealand. The historical and legal foundations of immigration policy in New Zealand will be addressed, however, a visual and textual analysis of the following sets of ‘artefacts’ in the form of immigration related documents represents an important component in broader ideological positions during the eras of their original production. The way in which the documents portray the various types of representations of what ‘ideal’ migrants ‘should be’ is instructive. Some of the older documents in this thesis acknowledge the historical fact that anti-‘asiatic’ immigration legislation existed in New Zealand during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century either directly or indirectly. A decade into the twenty first century, the existing New Zealand government funded an outreach program during
the Shanghai World Expo in 2010, where one of the purposes was to further attract Chinese interest in living and travelling to New Zealand. In both cases material culture is actively being made, with the encouragement of the state, however under a profoundly different political climate than what was going on a hundred years ago. The fact that policies change over time is not very profound. The changes in policy which led to the end of race based discrimination in New Zealand’s immigration process are a historical fact. However it would be too simplistic to consider it simply a ‘natural’ development in New Zealand’s ‘inevitable’ march towards a progressive bicultural multiculturalism (Pearson, Spoonley & Macpherson 2004). Drawing from Althusser (2006), much more is at work, including changes culturally and ideologically in New Zealand surrounding the ‘state apparatus’. A crucial element that coincided with major immigration reforms in New Zealand which in turn laid the foundation for the entry of more ethnically diverse migrants were the economic market reforms talking place in the 1980s.

Immigration policy in New Zealand is not entirely linear in terms of cultural values, economic or migration policies. To understand the ever changing policies in New Zealand requires historical and anthropological engagement. That is why there is much to be discerned with the help of deciphering what I see as deeper structural shifts occurring in New Zealand’s government in lieu of there being continuous immigration polices in place spanning many decades. Because change does not typically occur in a vacuum it is important to explore the underlying political realities at the time of regulatory change to try and account for the varying representations which come into being materially in the form of new laws and documents. This is where anthropological engagement can bring into focus sharper and more reflective cultural insights.

I am treating documents as cultural objects possessing political, ideological and cultural values associated with them. In this respect documents can be powerful repertoires of information, even when at times they may appear on the surface to be rather mundane and emotionless. The fourth Chapter helps bridge and bring to life the historical situation which existed and still exists with respect to immigration policies in New Zealand and explores the ways in which imagery and text interact with representations of who ‘model’ migrants are. Though many documents appear uncomplicated enough, these immigration ‘artefacts’ require a commitment to critical ethnographic engagement. This in turn gives them a use value which is often an
overlooked feature of contemporary market based societies. As a totality these documents collectively represent a montage of historical and culturally important information which inform our own understandings of the past and how New Zealanders see themselves today, as citizens and migrants.

These changes in material culture also mirror the financialization of the world economy which has led to fundamentally new understandings of who ‘model migrants’ are. Thus the policies put in place during the fourth labour government marks a profound shift, characterised by the end of the nation-state (as a nation-building project), and the beginning of a ‘market-state’ (Bobbitt 2002). The resulting forms of neo-liberal citizenship and transnational migrations taking place in the ‘post-Rogernomics’ era represents a deliberate state strategy whereby permanent residence and the provision of ‘nationality of convenience’ represents an emerging theme both domestically and internationally.

These transformations are mirrored in the documentary form, especially the state's ability to promote these visions of migration and citizenship through media promotions and advertising. This represents specific ideas of New Zealand vis-à-vis citizenship and migration in what has been historically thought of as a pioneer country of ‘white settlers’ (Belich 2009). The industrial welfare state guaranteeing the livelihoods to all has been transformed into the post-1984 neoliberal market state, whereby formal legal citizenship and more specifically ‘permanent residency’ is variegated and indexed to the demands of capital (Rawlings pers comm. 2011). Interpreting the cultural and financial prerequisites to legal residency, and other visa schemes, such as the business and investment immigration streams, contextualises the concept of citizenship within contemporary New Zealand. As New Zealand’s raison d’être has changed, so too as the government’s immigration policy.

Aihwa Ong uses the term ‘flexible citizenship,’ as a means of articulating how some individuals employ strategies of mobility by explaining the way mobile managers, investors, technocrats, and professionals seek to both circumvent and benefit from different nation-state regimes by selecting different sites for investment, work, and family relocation (Ong 1999:112). Her acknowledgement of the interplay between ‘Chinese kinship,’ the ‘regime of the nation-state,’ and the ‘regime of the marketplace’ is vital in a globalised era. Most governments even play an active role in helping facilitate transnationalism, as is the case in New Zealand, which constantly refines its immigration laws to try and draw capital rich subjects while in the process,
sets up visa regimes to manage and limit the entry of ‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled’ workers. Similarly, Australian and New Zealand trans-Tasman accords which promote ‘Closer Economic Relations’ represents an agenda spurred on by market deregulation where the two governments have tried to craft a more transnational arrangement whereby the rights of citizenship and responsibilities can cross their state boarders interchangeably (Pearson 2005:92).

This thesis therefore rejects the idea that the New Zealand state’s sovereignty is being undermined through more liberalised immigration options created during the historically recent neoliberal phase that swept the world at the end of the 20th century. Rather the state is still playing, as it had in previous periods, an active part in the creation and management of visa categories which are still monitored and adjusted from time to time due to economic and political pressures both locally and globally. This fusion of the nation-state with the marketplace, and the implications this has on questions surrounding the commodification of citizenship and national culture more broadly is explored further in this thesis. Therefore to fully comprehend the changes that have occurred in New Zealand over the last 25 years to 2011 requires revisiting the historical record and helping to bring the past to light.
Chapter 2: Organised Migration, Nation-Building and Citizenship

Rarely are people in possession of all the facts from which to make an informed judgment, and often for very good reasons these facts cannot be given to them.
- R. J. Mardle, Chief Research Officer, Department of Labour N.Z., 1967.

Immigration law and policy is very much still the jurisdiction of the New Zealand state. The ability of the New Zealand state to regulate the movement of foreigner’s potential rights of entry and perceived rights to remain in New Zealand have not been eroded by globalisation. If anything border controls at locations such as airports and seaports have become increasingly enhanced though material and technological innovations, many of which are responsible for the very ‘space time compression’ that is credited for being the catalyst of globalisation in the first place (Harvey 1989:240). Even bilateral and multilateral treaties which New Zealand has agreed to participate in represent voluntary choices on the part of the government of New Zealand. Therefore even though such arrangements could curtail the states legal ability to restrict certain groups’ mobility, in the end the state is the last arbiter and such agreements are arranged with the consent of sovereign government (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999; Beaverstock 2002; Agamben 2005; Wood 2005). While it can be argued that such arrangements weaken political sovereignty, as government’s recourses to action are ‘eroded’ in accordance with international treaty obligations, the fact of the matter is that countries who are a part of such agreements ‘voluntary’ consent to them and the state still exercises agency even when confronted with globalisation.

There was a time in New Zealand history where the Immigration Restriction Act of 1908 stipulated that Asians living in New Zealand were now required to submit a thumbprint on their certificate of registration before leaving New Zealand, if they ever wanted to be granted a re-entry permit (Beaglehole 2009:1). The aim was to prevent such a permit from being used by other individuals attempting to come into New Zealand. However during this time period only the Chinese were subjected to such procedures. This is an illustration of the role the state has played in regulating the mobility of foreigner’s entry into New Zealand at one point in history.

By the 1980s in New Zealand, racially discriminatory immigration policies such as the Immigration Restriction Act of 1908 had long been abolished. This is in
line with most countries around the world, many of which actively promote human rights and government non-discrimination. The most recent immigration Acts passed in New Zealand in 1987 and 2009 respectively reflects this progressive shift which does not privilege individuals by their nationality or race (Tennent 2010). The reason why this is significant is that it shows how in reality the state is still very much in control of its immigration policy in New Zealand even today, through national or international legal frameworks binding and non-binding. A hundred years ago it was obvious that the state was mediating who could migrate to New Zealand or not. The same is still the case today; however international frameworks are increasingly incorporated into local immigration régimes which shows the way in which globalisation is having an impact on policies. Local policies usually reflect international norms, but in the end, they are tailored to domestic political concerns just as often as the state still unequivocally has the final say when it comes to immigration policy.

The concept of citizenship adds to debates and analyses of migration (Mead 1986; King 1987; Vernon 1988; Young 1989; Barry, 1990; Heater 1990; Macedo 1990; Oldfield 1990; Plant 1990; Andrews 1991; Fierlbeck 1991; Rustin 1991; Vogel and Moran 1991; Alexander 1992; Habermas 1992; Modood 1992; Okin 1992; Beiner 1995; Kymlicka 1995; Castles and Spoonley 1997; van Gunsteren 1998; Ong 1999; Balibar 2004; Bosniak 2006; Sassen 2006; Nguyen 2007). It is ‘one of the most ambivalent though busily utilized and expanded entries in the contemporary social science lexicon’ (Joppke 2003: 429). However, in this thesis ‘citizenship’ is conceived of as a legal status both ‘signifying national belonging as an identity and metaphor for participation in society’ (Rawlings 2011 pers. comm). In his seminal work, Citizenship and Social Class (Marshall 1950), T. H. Marshall argued that citizenship incorporated civil, political, and social elements which have developed over the last two centuries. This has lead some, including the scholar Michael Mann to the understanding that tensions between economic inequality and the spread of claims for popular participation, corresponded with the ascent of capitalism throughout the world (Mann 1987:340). Based on universal assumptions of human

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4 Such historical race based policies does not correspond with what would become decades later Article 7 of the United Nations Declaration on Human rights which states that: “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.” Ibid. Article 7.
rights, citizenship has also been conceived of as a cultural relationship regarding notions of nationhood, as has been formalised in civic and ethnic contexts (Brubaker 1992). Yet there is reason to believe as some critics such as Turner (1990: 195) have argued that:

The problem with Marshall’s theory is that it is no longer relevant to a period of disorganized capitalism since it assumed nation-state autonomy in which governments were relatively immune from pressures within the world-system of capitalist nations.

This would mean that on the one hand, despite globalisation the nation-state has remained resilient in terms of gate keeping citizenship as a legal category, while on the other hand culturally and politically Marshallian social citizenship aspirations have been slowly eroded through the help of neo-liberal reforms.

There are two popular conceptions of citizenship which at times can be conflated in discussions. First there is citizenship-as-legal-status, which means membership to a specific political community. Anthropologists Galanter (1981:1) and Griffiths (1986) echo this and view citizenship as a ‘legal centralist’ or ‘formalist’ model of law as opposed to a more holistic interpretation of ‘citizenship’ as a form of participation. Other theorists consider citizenship to be a desirable-activity, where the ability and value of one’s own citizenship is effectively a function of one’s civic participation in that group and society. This definition has been put forward by Kymlicka and Norman (1994:353). Though classical and more contemporary approaches to contemporary citizenship theory have focused on lived experience in the Marshallian sense, citizenship conceived of as a status in law are often excluded from anthropological discussions and remain unassessed due to the rejection of legal instrumentalism in social science. The two are not mutually exclusive dichotomies (Rawlings pers. comm. 09 June 2011).

This is unfortunate because there are aspects to decipher about the production and reproduction of legal symbols and customs associated with citizenship as a legal status. This is connected to immigration because in the absence of New Zealand having developed ‘any sense of a de jure independent citizenship until the 1940s’ Pearson (2004:295) in practice there was only really a weak demarcation between locally born citizens and newly arrived British denizens after World War II. However as the New Zealand economy became more liberalised during the 1980s, the New
Zealand government helped modify naturalisation, dual citizenship and permanent residency rules in order to help accommodate in part the flow of new capital and labour demands brought about by a broad array of neoliberal reforms. Such immigration reforms have paved the way to a more ethnically diverse New Zealand landscape in the process.

This critique has lead some to believe that the solution is to use terms that more adequately describe the current historical moment, in lieu of the reality posed by perceived multiculturalism (Joppke and Lukes 1999; Kymlicka 1995). This is why multiple scholars have emphasised “cosmopolitan citizenship,” (Somers 2008:17) or what Bosniak (2006) refers to as a “denationalized” citizenship, as a means of recognising the effects of transnational migration. Isin and Turner 2002 highlight multiple hyphenated citizenships such as “cosmopolitan”, “cultural”, “ecological”, and “sexual.” Anthropologists have even used the term “therapeutic citizenship” in an attempt to broaden “biological” and biopolitical notions of “citizenship” (Nguyen 2007:126). Despite these various applications of the term citizenship, citizenship ultimately represents, legally devoid of all the hyphenated forms, membership of a state. Citizenship is an acknowledgement of state membership, and quintessentially a status. It is not necessarily a set of rights or an identity (Joppke 2003: 431).

**Studying the State**

The legal anthropologist Laura Nader fittingly suggested that anthropologists attempt to study up (Nader 1972). Nader was one of the first to advocate the study of ‘the colonizers rather than the colonized, the culture of power rather than the culture of the powerless, and the culture of affluence rather than the culture of poverty’ (Starn 1994: 13:18). And it is in this vein that my project is an attempt to take up that challenge. However it is easier said then done considering the ‘physics of presence’ necessary (Shore 2002:10), or as Gupta (1995:376) referred to it, the ‘ontological imperative’ of ‘being there’ - which creates a significant hindrance to the project of studying up when one is looking at government elites - from the outside looking in. Immigration is a controversial and politically contentious issue in many countries around the world, and access to the officials that police its polices mirrors Cris
Shore’s (2002:10) observations that at times: “[O]ne cannot simply pitch one’s tent in the board room of the World Bank or the Pentagon, or unobtrusively observe the bargains being stuck at a European Council of Ministers’ meeting.” This is one of the reasons why anthropologists have had to create nonconformist methods and approaches to engage in fieldwork and practice participant observation in and outside of public institutions which at times includes elaborate interviews, interning and analysing documents produced by the government. These artifacts are in their own right material goods which are an important part of society.

Methods of Investigation

During the course of my research in addition to caring out archival and museum research I spent five weeks in Wellington contacting immigration agents, Members of Parliament, Treasury officials, the Department of Labour and Internal Affairs regarding immigration policy. Though most of my participants in Wellington tried to be and were quite helpful, the spaces that those who wield power occupy are not well tailored to university students to carrying out ethnographic field work. I was informed through a research participant at the Department of Labour that many of the policy decisions with respect to immigration come down directly from ministerial level. So some questions such as how were and are the investor migrant minimum investment figures calculated would have been nice to know, but formally they were never officially answered (see Chapter four).

While it is not difficult to show how government polices effect cultures and societies, in localised contexts, what is challenging to discern are the institutional cultures and agency amongst the various individual actors who occupy the multiple corridors of government power. Though symbolic and material culture is produced and endorsed by the state in the forms of passports, parliamentary debates, birth certificates, language requirements for potential migrants, permanent residence, citizenship oaths, flags, even national anthems are all products of the state, and its policy makers as they have emerged over time. These artifacts are of crucial importance to social anthropologists who study the state and are interested in learning about societies.
Policy questions such as how much money an investor migrant should have to be in possession of to be allowed permanent residence through an investor migrant program in New Zealand is usually carried out in private, dominated by forms of statistical data only known publicly via reports and information sanctioned by the government. Their implementation and validation though press releases speak to broader ideological currents within the state apparatus, which in itself are part of the cultural fabric of contemporary society. Documents, especially documents produced by the government are a case in point. Documents are special ethnographic subjects in that they are also ‘paradigmatic phenomena’ in the world, artifacts (Riles 2009:6). To study them is also an exercise in ethnography, because their methodological and analytical structures, in addition to the actual content itself in part take on ethnographic significance I believe when viewed cross-culturally and juxtaposed historically. This is important because it helps give an ethnohistory which has gone on to become today’s framework which shapes policy legally and culturally. In a broader sense, it also helps provide evidence to the argument that ideological changes have taken place when focusing on citizenship, immigration and nation-building in New Zealand. As will be discussed in the section on regulatory control in New Zealand, changes were happening during the 1980s in New Zealand, under the leadership of the Fourth Labour Government.

**Historical Background**

Up until the Immigration Act of 1964, immigration policy in New Zealand was an amalgamation of various pieces of legislation and amendments. Nevertheless there were tangible principles underlying administrative practice at the time. Certain groups were encouraged to migrate to New Zealand, notably white Europeans. This was reflected formally in the Undesirable Immigrant Exclusion Act of 1919, which remained valid until the beginning of the Immigration Act of 1964. There was also a legal distinction between “British Subjects” and other people who were labeled as “Aliens.” This legal distinction continued to be differentiated until it was removed with the passage of the Citizenship Act of 1977. The two relevant pieces of legislation which governed this distinction were the British Nationality and Status of
Aliens Act of 1928 (in New Zealand), and the British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act of 1948.

The 1928 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act amended a prior piece of legislation passed in 1923, which reiterated that all people who were naturalised or born in the crown’s dominions that made up the British Empire were classified as British Subjects. The introduction of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens (in New Zealand) Act, 1928 effectively brought New Zealand in line with the rest of the British Empire. This imperial arrangement, referred to as the common code, was applied throughout the British Empire. It was articulated in the United Kingdom formally in 1914 under the British Nationality and Statutes of Aliens Act, upon which the Dominions- New Zealand included, adopted. This pan-British nationality status predated citizenship as a formal legal status in New Zealand.

For New Zealand and the broader British Commonwealth, 1948 turned out to be an important year. The British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act of 1948 was a significant development in the country’s history. Like the British Nationality Act of 1948, the New Zealand’s Citizenship Act of 1948 was a reflection of the political realities following the end of the Second World War. This was when Canada decided that it would introduce its own national citizenship, which caused some uncertainty within the commonwealth of nations. For those who were responsible for drafting and endorsing the British Legislation, which was a reaction to Canada’s Act, immigration was peripheral to the fundamental constitutional issue: the desire to maintain the homogeneity of British subjecthood, by allowing equal rights and privileges to all British Subjects in the Commonwealth and British Empire (Hansen 1999:69).

In 1945 the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, publicised his government’s intention to introduce an act that would define Canadian citizenship

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5 British Nationality and Status of Aliens (in New Zealand) Act 1923, s 2(1).
6 The 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act had more to do with immigration than did the 1948 British Nationality Act. The need for labour was still evident domestically in Brittan, and New Zealand workers along with other ‘old’ commonwealth countries such as Canada, Australia and Ireland were subsequently excluded from the newly imposed immigration restrictions placed on migrants coming from countries who had not historically migrated in large numbers to Britain. To echo David Pearson (2004:297): ‘In a world climate of spiraling self-determination and human rights claims, Britain had to appear to be discriminating against all in order to achieve the exclusion of a few’. So jus sanguinis through genealogy become the mechanism for what at the time was preferential mobility. Up until this point, the British government had no formalized rationale, no articulated reason for immigration controls other than the supposed ‘non-assimilability’ of new immigrants (Hayter 2007:23).
though statute and declare that all such citizens would from then on possess British subject status in consequence of their possession of Canadian citizenship. As innocuous as this legislation appeared, it was a marked departure from what historically was a centuries-old definition of British subjecthood (Hansen 1999:69). Rather then addressing questions surrounding migration, the British reaction to the Canadian legislation was in actuality part of an effort to retain a consistent definition of subjecthood in response of Canada’s independent adoption of its own citizenship, keeping with the historical commonwealth framework based upon affiliations between the United Kingdom and the various Dominions. Within the discourse in the House of Lords at the time, the very astute Lord Altrincham observed:

I also feel, as I think most of us must feel, that the term "citizenship" is inconsistent with what constitutes the true basis of loyalty in the Colonial Empire. After all, the allegiance of the King's subjects within the Colonial Empire is not to any political system; it is quite simply to the King in person. That is what they feel. I spent five years of my life in Africa and I know how strong that sentiment is throughout the African Colonies. I do not believe that any noble Lord who has experience of this matter can doubt the truth of that statement. The Colonial troops who fought so magnificently during the Second World War fought as subjects of the King. They fought for the King, and they believed that they were fighting for the King. They understand that; but allegiance to a political system is something which means absolutely nothing to them. Why, then, sacrifice a title, the title of "British subject," which millions have been and are to-day proud to bear and under which millions also have fought and died for their Sovereign?  

Lord Altrincham’s sentiment whether true or not reflects a paradoxical take on the Marshallian sense of social citizenship while at the same time rejects the concept of “citizenship” as a legal status while articulating a sense of a shared cultural affinity with the ‘subjects within the Colonial Empire.’ This represents an important ethnohistorical caveat. The motivation for the British Nationality Act 1948, which consequently impelled New Zealand to adopt legislation arose due to voluntary actions carried out by the then Canadian government. This is an important point of

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7 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1948/jun/21/british-nationality-bill-hl#S5LV0156P0_19480621_HOL_37
departure because it marks the beginning of the legal foundation of formal New Zealand citizenship. Before 1948 at least within the British commonwealth for example, ideas surrounding ‘social citizenship’ were rather distinct from what is often conceived of today as citizenship representing nationality (Marshall 1963). The following account by Viscount Maugham in the House of Lords on the drafting of the British Nationality Act illustrates how citizenship was not as of yet, attached to concept of nationality in the way that it is commonly understood to mean today:

As a lawyer, my complaint is that I do not know what the word "citizen" means; it is not denned. It is perfectly improper for it to indicate nationality. The people who are citizens of a country are, amongst others, those who have lived there most of their lives, who have a home there and have sent their children to school there—people who have a domicile, a permanent home, in that country. Those are "citizens" according to common parlance. But this word "citizen" is used here with a kind of meaning of "a national." It does not say so. I venture to say that never in any Act of Parliament has the word "citizen" been held to mean a national of a country. The citizens of London comprise many nationalities but they have never been thought necessarily to be British subjects. They are not necessarily nationals at all, and I suppose 10 per cent of them are not nationals. Therefore this word is wholly inappropriate except as a new invention. I do not object to people inventing a new meaning for the word "citizen," but for heavens' sake let them define it! 8

The Viscount’s understanding of citizenship further problematizes contemporary understandings of citizenship which commonly views nationality and citizenship as one in the same. 9 Coming from a common law tradition, subjecthood (which predated

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8 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1948/jun/21/british-nationality-bill-hl#S5LV0156P0_19480621_HOL_71

9 Calvin (1608), a case brought before an English court in 1608, is recognized as the foundation of allegiance in English common law (Hansen 1999: 70; Jones 1956: 51; Perry: 1957). Before 1608, Scots were considered aliens in England. In Calvin’s Case (1608) an English court ruled that the Scottish child, Robert Calvin was not an alien, but an English Subject because Scotland was within the realm of King James. Those born in Scotland before King James’ reign however were still considered aliens. It is worth recalling that in this pre-industrial era, allegiance in this context was relational to the then monarchy, as opposed to the modern affinity with allegiance to the nation state. As Randall Hansen (1999:70) succinctly states: ‘Allegiance’ implies two conditions: first, the bond is a direct, unmediated relationship between King and subject and, second, any privileges attached to one’s status as subject are granted by the sovereign and are exercised at his pleasure; they are not claimed by the subject against his sovereign. These features distinguish a ‘subject’ from a citizen”; the latter enjoys his
It is evident that the free movement of subjects was supposed to be guaranteed throughout the entire British Empire. In practice, however, the free movement of subjects did exist. But those who benefited the most were the Britons themselves. Non-European British subjects in the colonies supposedly enjoyed the same free rights of movement throughout the empire (Hansen 1999:71). However, over time this empire-wide freedom of mobility became ever more restricted as various colonial immigration laws were created, implementing restrictions on free mobility and in the process demarcations were created between British subjects (Dummett and Nicol 1999:123-4). The ‘Dominions’ as Fransman (1989:25) refers to as the ‘white settler states of the British Empire’ such as Canada were becoming more flexible with the notion of a common British status throughout the British Commonwealth circa 1948. Countries within the commonwealth were beginning to affirm a level of autonomy but the overall logic still typically reflected a framework that derived from Britain. Canada, for instance, decided to create its own citizenship which was largely in response to pressure from a vocal and substantial French-speaking population’s aspirations to be acknowledged as ‘Canadian citizens’ (Adams 1947; McMillan 2004).

Hence Canada’s adoption of the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946 became problematic for the imperial parliamentarians in London. Though New Zealand took exception to this colonial trend towards localised citizenship, and this is reflected in the very title of the citizenship act adopted rather reluctantly by the New Zealand government, the British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act 1948. Australia for example, passed the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948, which later was renamed the Australian Citizenship Act 1948. What makes the New Zealand Citizenship Act 1948 unique is that the words “British Nationality” were included in the title of New Zealand’s own citizenship act. Even though all these people were status through membership in a community enjoying the same status and makes claims against the state based on this membership.
still British subjects in the broader sense, the fact that the term “British Nationality” would be included on a New Zealand Citizenship Act shows the seeming reluctance to pass such an act and the continuing cultural affinity with the United Kingdom. The renowned anthropologist Ernest Gellner reaffirmed this view, on his reflection of New Zealanders (1983:134-5):

Most New Zealanders and most citizens of the United Kingdom are so continuous culturally that without any shadow of doubt the two units would never have separated, had they been contiguous geographically. Distance made the effective sovereignty of New Zealand convenient and mandatory, and the separation does not provoke resentment in anyone’s breast, notwithstanding the technical violation of the national principle…

The obvious answer seems to be that the international standing and general position of the English and of the New Zealanders does not suffer significantly from their failure to present themselves to the world as one unit. In fact, their standing does not suffer from this fact at all, and the inconveniences of the alternative arrangement would be very considerable.

The countries, territories and colonies that made up the Commonwealth before the Citizenship reforms in the late 1940’s collectively represent a group, whose statuses were called into question through Canada’s voluntarily creation of its own citizenship within a broader British subjecthood. The white settler state members of the commonwealth collectively enjoyed a direct relationship to the Crown without any mediation by concepts like, local citizenship.

Had Canada not adopted its own citizenship act voluntarily, it is questionable as to whether or not New Zealand would have decided to pass its own citizenship act at all. The then Member of Parliament Hon. Mr. Wilson, explained during the third reading of the British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Bill that: “As far as New Zealand is concerned, this Bill would probably not have been before this Council except for what has happened in another of the dominions. … I did not care whether they called me a British subject or a New Zealand citizen, and I think that is the general opinion throughout New Zealand”10 (Wednesday, 1st September, 1948). This

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would help support the impression that it terms of New Zealand’s domestic political class at the time locally, ‘citizenship’ as a legal category was not that imperative.

The idea of national citizenship as being mediated through subjects and their relationship to the nation-state called into question the significance of commonwealth system, in lieu of the actions carried out by the Canadian Government. This realisation was apparent to Lord Altrincham who acknowledged during debates about the passage of the British Nationality Act that:

In the first place, citizenship appears to us in this context to be an inappropriate and unhistorical term. It is inconsistent with the facts of the Colonial Empire and I think in many ways it must be repugnant to sentiment both here and there. After all, the word in its proper sense implies the common enjoyment of equal civic rights and the acceptance of equal civic responsibilities; that is the meaning of the word "citizenship". It may be applied to great cities or to great countries, such as France and the United States of America. In its historical context this term of "citizen," at any rate in those countries, is republican.¹¹

Some such as the government archivist David Green believe that unlike the United States and more recently Australia, the notion that citizenship marks national identity gained little traction in New Zealand (Green 2009). This view echoes Ernest Gellner’s interpretation that in the case of New Zealand, common culture and ethnicity were seen as more important in binding the nation together than a shared formal citizenship (Gellner 1983:134-5). The current New Zealand government claims on one of its websites that: “There has been no New Zealand counterpart to Australia’s campaign in the late 1990s to encourage long-term residents from New Zealand and Britain to take up Australian citizenship” In 1960, New Zealand’s secretary for internal affairs commented appears to reaffirm this view that:

[There] is no economic and little social pressure on aliens to become New Zealand citizens, nor does New Zealand seek to influence or persuade aliens in this matter. It is considered better that resident aliens should themselves decide freely and at leisure whether or not they wish to be New Zealand citizens.¹²

¹¹ http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1948/jun/21/british-nationality-bill-hl#S5LV0156P0_19480621_HOL_32
Considering the cultural and historical context during the 1960s in New Zealand, including its ethnic make-up and its relationship to the Crown, the statement above reflects the policy environment of the 1960s. This coincided with New Zealand’s post war assisted migration policy which also overlapped chronologically with New Zealand’s ‘formal or informal’ White Immigration policy. The minister’s statement is not that out of the ordinary.

Unlike revolutionary polities such as the United States or France, within the British Commonwealth there was a lack of a clear constitutional basis for distinguishing between British Subjects. While there have always been elements of nationalist fervent within non-independent British settler societies, Lord Altrincham’s remarks over six decades ago continue to influence citizenship policy in New Zealand. Though there are undeniably national identities in New Zealand (Pearson 2001; Liu 2005; McCreanor 2005; McIntosh 2005; Teaiwa and Mallon 2005), the word *citizenship* is not really invoked in New Zealand the same way it is in other countries mentioned above. Even domestically in public discussions surrounding foreign ownership of farm land the term “citizen” or “citizenship” is absent. Terms such as “foreign owned” and “kiwi owned” are used instead of “New Zealand citizen.” It is not uncommon to hear quotes in American political discourse such as this one made by President Barack Obama in August 2010: “As a citizen, and as president, I believe that Muslims have the same right to practice their religion as anyone else in this country” (Colvin and Mason 2010), or in the French context, President Nicolas Sarkozy inducing citizenship (Sarkozy 2009): “Je m’adresse à vous en tant que citoyens, en tant que Français” (I am speaking as a citizen, as a French person).

Therefore, given New Zealand’s development historically and culturally, it is apparent that unlike their American or French companions, New Zealand’s leaders do not invoke even ‘citizenship’ with the same level of frequency. Addressing the New Zealand parliament in 1948, the Hon. Mr. Wilson told a story about when flying from Canada to the United States he was informed that he had filled his declaration form out incorrectly because there was no such thing as New Zealand nationality, which was indeed true prior to the passage of the British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act 1948.  

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13 New Zealand Parliamentary debates September, 1948 P. 1891
zeal in New Zealand surrounding formal citizenship during that era. This can only be understood as such given the close historical relationship of New Zealand and Great Britain. While such a claim cannot be quantified, it might help to understand why comparatively, the term citizenship appears to be used less frequently in New Zealand than in countries such as the United States and France. Comparatively, the practical effects of the lack of emphasis on formal citizenship are far reaching.

New Zealand is one of only a small minority of countries that allow permanent residents full voting rights in the legal sense, the distinction between legal ‘residents’ and legal ‘citizens’ in New Zealand is rather weak comparatively in terms of ‘entitlements’. In most countries including the United States, Canada, and Australia permanent residents do not have full voting rights. In New Zealand permanent residents typically have the same ‘rights’ or ‘entitlements’ as New Zealand citizens do.\textsuperscript{14} This does not appear to be a political issue, and that demonstrates the infrequency of nationalist sentiment coveting the legal definition of citizenship in New Zealand.

\textit{Building the Nation}

In some countries such as the United States, official models of naturalisation presume that immigration consists of leaving one society and joining another (making a “clean break”; cf. Smith 1998; Yngvesson 1997) and in this sense naturalisation is a means of building equivalent and generic citizen-subjects (Coutin 2007:311). In New Zealand, a booklet was issued by the Department of Education in 1953 entitled \textit{Alien to Citizen}. It was written as a way of helping new migrants adjust to their new life in New Zealand, in addition to helping describe the procedure for legally becoming a naturalized citizen. In it, the following was stated:

\begin{quote}
[Y]ou have an obligation to your own nationality. Until recently we have not seen many Europeans in New Zealand. New Zealanders are interested to see how you behave, what sort of people you are; your behaviour is our guide to what nationalities settle down best in New
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} There are minor differences such as that fact that Permanent residents cannot run for parliament and can be deported.
Zealand. Your country and your people will be judged on how you act and live.

And last, you have an obligation to pass on to us what is best in your own culture. Thoughtful New Zealanders know that they have much to learn from other countries. We wish to give you what is good in our way of life. We ask you to settle down and live with us, to regard us as friends. Your influence on New Zealand depends on the extent to which you take part in the life of New Zealand.15

In 1974, the Minister of Immigration F. M. Colman proclaimed: “A factor to be taken into account would be the immigrant’s intention to identify with New Zealand and he would be encouraged to take out citizenship.”16 So the question inevitably arises, what happened between 1960 and 1974 to cause such a paradigm shift with respect to new immigrants and their relationship to the New Zealand State?

The statement by the Minister of Immigration in 1974 took place at the end of the implementation of what was called the *Entry of Persons of British or Irish Birth and Wholly of European Ancestry*. In this context, ‘the immigrant’s intention to identify with New Zealand and [that] he would be encouraged to take out citizenship’ is identified. At this point immigration policy still gave preference to European migrants. Migrants from other countries were almost completely excluded from a public policy perspective, even though the Minister’s statement was coinciding with significant immigration from countries in the Pacific region.

The *Alien to Citizen* booklet as mentioned above is an important cultural document because it illustrates how this government produced information kit emphasised the value of cultural exchange between newly arrived foreign nationals and New Zealanders in contributing to an emerging sense of national identity. Official models of naturalisation do not always presume a total rejection of old identities, and adherence with a new- legally sanctioned, national imagination. The immigrants who were given the opportunity to migrate permanently to New Zealand were eurocentrically selected on the basis of perceived ‘assimilatability’. Still, this *Alien to Citizen* booklet can be thought of as an anti-essentialist piece because in effect the document was supporting the idea that immigrants have an, ‘obligation to

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15 Alien to citizen: a bulletin for new settlers. 1953. Wellington: Department of Education,

16 HANSARD NZ, Control of the Entry of Persons of British or Irish Birth and wholly of European ancestry. May 7th 1974 p. 24.
pass on to us what is best in your own culture’. If the point were to be building equivalent and generic citizen-subjects (Coutin 2007:311), then they would not have stressed the importance of an emerging New Zealand identity where cosmopolitanism had a role to play in the society’s overall development. That said, assimilation and integration have played roles within public policy in New Zealand.

![Image of New Zealand Citizenship logo](image)

**Figure 1.1**: This logo was taken from the Department of Internal Affairs website, commemorating 60 years of New Zealand Citizenship. Reproduced by permission of Crown copyright fair use terms and conditions.

According to one official at the Department of Internal Affairs interviewed for this research, the one “out reach” program he was aware of was *The Year of Citizenship* which celebrated 60 years of New Zealand Citizenship. It took place in 2009. According to Richard Worth of the Department of Internal Affairs in a press release issued in January 2009, the goal of the *60 years of New Zealand Citizenship Anniversary* was first and foremost to embark on ‘celebrating our shared citizenship - the common bond that makes us a nation’ which is something, ‘truly worth celebrating,’ and ‘the aim of these initiatives is to raise awareness of the meaning, importance and benefits of citizenship.’¹⁷ I did not interview Richard Worth, though my research participant at the department questioned the effectiveness of the anniversary’s celebration in terms of its public outreach, claming that he, ‘didn’t think the message left the office building.’ The fact that the bureaucratic festivities took place in the first place says something about the nature of the reproduction of state symbols in New Zealand, within the state bureaucracy.

Before British sovereignty in 1840, there were no legal restrictions on immigration to New Zealand, although individual iwi had control over who could and could not dwell in the areas they owned and exercised sovereignty over. At the time, only Nova Scotia, Cape Breton, and Prince Edward Island had drawn a regular influx of British immigrants during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries within the colonies under British control (Johnston 1972:7). In 1810, it is estimated that in the whole of eastern Australia there were hardly more than 400 settlers who had arrived as free men and women (Madgwick 1937:30). Ten years later in New Zealand in 1820, it was thought that there were only around 100 sealers and deserters from ships who were living semi-permanently in European-Māori communities on the coasts of southern New Zealand (Philips 2009:1). Britain at this point exercised no effective sovereignty over these settlers’ whalers and traders during this period. Although Captain James Cook showcased ‘the English colours’ by raising the flag and taking ‘formal Possession of the Place in the Name of His Majesty,’ his proclamations laying claim to New Zealand for George III was not officially recognised in Britain (Beaglehole 1968:204). In 1817, New Zealand in addition to Honduras and Tahiti were specifically excluded by the British Parliament as not being ‘within His Majesty’s Dominions’ (Ballantyne 2009:101).

Foreigners who were born outside of New Zealand, in the western legalistic sense were free to enter the country pending local iwi consent; however it was not until 1840 that Britain claimed to have sovereignty over New Zealand. After the Treaty of Waitangi, British subjects could migrate freely to New Zealand, with the crown willing and able to preserve, promote and enhance their property rights, often to the detriment of Māori. There were also no legal objections to aliens (people born outside the British empire such as France and the United States and Germany) living in the Queen's dominions following the Treaty of Waitangi, but British nationality law at that time did not permit them to own or inherit land within the domain of the crown (Fransman 1989). While non-British subjects enjoyed the freedom of mobility in and out of the country, their property rights were insecure if they had been established prior to British sovereignty. Reforms began to be made in order to recognize the property rights of non-British subjects after complaints from German and French
settlements. Starting in 1844, aliens were allowed to voluntarily decide to become ‘natural born subjects of Her Majesty [Queen Victoria]’ in New Zealand through proclamations by the governor which would eventually be replaced by ordinances (Green 2009c). These ordinances came into effect in 1854, when an annual naturalisation act superseded the governor's proclamations started in 1844.

In 1835 a confederation of Māori iwi issued a Declaration of Independence in New Zealand. This gave protection to Māori ships crossing the Tasman while the declaration of independence legally established a state in international law. However, the treaty of Waitangi is considered the foundation of New Zealand as a colonial state, with a 'sovereign authority' in the form of a settled 'civil government' (Orange 1987:40). In 1838 a group of settlers formed the Kororarika Association. This was to protect their interests in an environment which they viewed as being ostensibly anarchic as they attempted to bring about what they perceived to be a sense of law and order (Ballantyne 2009:102). If one views a state’s ultimate legitimacy in the Weberian sense as the monopoly over the means of violence, then when the state was non-existent in the eyes of the settlers, as was the case with the Kororarika Association prior to the Treaty of Waitangi, the monopoly over the means of violence was effectively created in the absence of a formalised state.

It was only when New Zealand formally became a British colony in 1840 during the Treaty of Waitangi that British law came into effect. Those who were living in New Zealand became British subjects, giving anyone living in New Zealand who was born within the British Empire the same legal rights in New Zealand as they would have possessed throughout the empire, at least in theory. The Treaty of Waitangi granted Maori British citizenship as subjects of the crown; the same status as settlers possessed. “Legally,” Māori gained ‘all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects’ under Article Three of the Treaty of Waitangi (Green 2009c:1). Increasingly frustrated settlers, who resented the unbridled power of the governor in New Zealand, presented various petitions for reforms to New Zealand's system of administration. Modeled on the British Westminster system, reforms took shape in 1852 with the passage of the Constitution Act which established an elected parliament. The first elections were held in 1853, and Parliament sat for the first time in 1854. The right to vote was granted to males who owned individual property, so

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18 This did not preclude local practices of discrimination based on race, gender and indigeneity.
Māori who possessed their land communally were restricted from voting for Parliament. Although technically the 1852 legislation provided for native districts that allowed for some form of temporary, local self-government for Māori, none were established.\footnote{\textit{Treaty events 1850-99 - Treaty timeline}, URL: http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/politics/treaty-events-1850-99-treaty-timeline, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 26-Feb-2010} When the status of Māori British subjecthood was challenged due to questions surrounding communal forms of land tenure, their status as British subjects was nevertheless upheld by the Native Rights Act of 1865. However, to understand the forces at work domestically in New Zealand, also requires a deeper understanding as to what political forces were underway in Great Britain at the same time. In order to understand the relationship between citizenship, migration policy and the emerging making of the New Zealand nation, it is necessary to examine conditions in the United Kingdom in the mid to late nineteenth century.

\textit{A Revolution in Colonial thought?}

One aspect that is often over looked with respect to immigration in New Zealand were the legal reforms taking place in Britain during the 1830s. This became a driver and a powerful push factor in nineteenth century migration to New Zealand. The urbanisation process during the late 1830s in England brought about by the country’s industrialisation was exacerbated by the Poor Law Reforms Act of 1834 (Brundage 2002). The recommendations by the Royal Commission into the operation of the Poor Laws in 1832 headed by Edwin Chadwick sought to bring an end to what was termed \textit{outdoor relief}, which had been established in 1601 with the Elizabethan Poor Law. This older, nobler form of social security acted as a means of assistance for the impoverished. Its administrative unit was the localised parish, as apposed to a more centralised government administration.

Between 1815 and 1819 a gap existed between what the British Colonial Office intended to accomplish and what it was prepared to do in terms of assisted emigration. The British government slowly began to see emigration as a weapon against poverty which was feared bred radicalism and revolt, but the political establishment was unwilling to grant its approval for substantial expenditures to assist and subsidize free emigrants to the colonies before 1819. Over a thousand emigrants
received help from the government to facilitate their passage out of England, while tens of thousands left on their own accord. This was not orchestrated as a means of furthering a British ‘national interest,’ with Britain consciously benefiting domestically from the exodus of Britons (Johnston 1972:10). In the early nineteenth century the size and spontaneity of unassisted emigrants (especially from Northern Ireland) was initially unregulated. However it was facilitated by tacit government approval. A report published in 1817 by the Select Committee on the Poor Laws, included a passing reference on the prudence of removing ‘obstacles’ that prevented the movement of labour to the colonies.20 This highlights the ever changing policy prescriptions that change over time as ideologies shift, tactically endorsing emigration at times when it was viewed as a remedy to Britain’s perceived ills. There have been periods in past state attitudes that have not been enthusiastic about emigration (Johnston 1972:14).

Previously many British did not believe that there was a justification for assisted emigration as a desirable outlet for a ‘redundant population.’ Such a concern was rather non-existent (Johnston 1972:10). Some critics such as Patrick Colquhoun the philanthropist and social philosopher acknowledged that there was still huge uncultivated expanses of lands in the colonies in 1814, when he clamed that, “[N]o nation ever possessed such resources for the beneficial employment of a redundant population as Great Britain at the present moment” (Colquhoun 1814:16). It really was not until 1819 that government policy really started to support the exodus. This manifested itself in 1819 when the Poor Law Committee that year spoke not only of removing ‘obstacles’ to emigration, but actually of giving ‘encouragement and facilities’ for the project.21 By this time the number of books published in Britain with the words ‘emigration’, ‘emigrants’ or ‘settlers’ in their title had grown to at least 20 and even this is thought to be quite a conservative figure (Belich 2009:147).

The British Poor Law reforms in 1834 however, helped centralise parish authority into centres to provide workhouses in addition to restricting the practice of outdoor relief. This effectively forced those who would not other wise choose to enter into at times, appalling working conditions to do so in order to claim relief and survive. The net effect of such reforms caused large numbers of dispossessed persons to be more and more concentrated in vast urban centres such as Landon, Manchester

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21 Parl. Pap. 1819, ii (529) 10.
and Birmingham. The Poor law reforms, in addition to land reforms underway in the context of England’s industrialisation resulted in improvised living conditions in the United Kingdom for many. It is assumed that by the early 1830s the ‘pool of surplus employable labour’ was one in six of the total population in urban and industrial England (Hobsbawm 1962:152). During the same period the figures for ‘surplus employable labour’ were 1 in 20 in France and Germany, 1 in 25 in Austria and Italy, 1 in 30 in Spain, and 1 in 100 in Russia (de Villeneuve Bargemont 1834:3). These other European societies’ did not have the same levels of capitalist industrialisation which may account for the ever growing group of British pamphleteers advocating emigration.

In 1825 the first New Zealand Company was founded in the United Kingdom to facilitate European settlement in New Zealand. This private company headed by John George Lambton, sought to send an expedition to New Zealand looking into the potential for commercial trading prospects in the country. On 24 March 1825, members of the committee representing the company met with the Colonial Secretary, Earl Bathurst regarding the proposed endeavour. Though the company initially sought armed assistance, it was made clear that the British government would not support the company militarily. Upon learning of the government’s lack of political will for military involvement E. J. Littleton, a British MP, and shareholder of the New Zealand Company, acknowledged that the venture was against any notion of conquest in New Zealand and that their intentions were purely commercial (Burns 1989:18). Undeterred by the imperial government’s lack of material support, the businessmen of the New Zealand Company repeatedly tried to obtain exclusive trading rights in New Zealand. After a few more failed attempts to attain exclusive trade rights via the crown, the members of the company reverted back to their original commercial plans and sent two ships to New Zealand without official endorsement. A few minor land acquisitions took place, but the venture was cancelled after it was decided that resulting exports would not meet the expectations of the company. In the end, the whole venture ended up costing the company £20,000 (Burns 1989:19). This occurred in an era where it was common practice for companies to receive state backed charters allowing private corporations to embark on colonisation schemes.

22 This was an era of trading companies with sovereign rights, such as the East Indian Company.
The first *successful* European group to organise large scale migration to New Zealand was the New Zealand Company in 1839. This second New Zealand Company was established when the New Zealand Colonisation Company and the New Zealand Land Company both merged with the 1825 New Zealand Company in May 1839 to form the New Zealand Land Company. This entity subsequently became known shortly thereafter as the *New Zealand Company*. This new organisation lead by Edward Gibbon Wakefield played an important role in facilitating assisted migration of British Settlers in New Zealand when the colony was in its infancy.

It is impossible to quantify the influence individuals like Edward Gibbon Wakefield and his compatriots at the new New Zealand Company and the Colonisation Society had in shaping practices, ideas and policies within Britain regarding emigration to New Zealand. Wakefield undoubtedly played a large part in talking up and facilitating British Settlement of New Zealand during the early years of settlement, though Wakefield was also riding a wave of public opinion, not simply creating it (Belich 2009:147). Wilmot Horton, for example was a principal advocate of the use of state aided emigration. He came before Wakefield, though he was less successful in realising his grandiose plans in the early part of the nineteenth century. Thomas Malthus was another vocal advocate calling for emigration in 1817, “[I]t is precisely under these circumstances that emigration is most useful as a temporary relief; and it is in these circumstances that Great Britain finds herself placed at present” (Malthus 1992:37). These theorists predated Wakefield, but they all supported the same broader ideology that viewed colonisation as a remedy to domestic social, economic and political problems.
The image displayed above is a poster produced and circulated in Britain in 1848 by the New Zealand Company. Produced eight years after the Treaty of Waitangi, it is one of the earlier examples of European immigration related documents or ‘artefacts’ produced explicitly for promoting emigration to New Zealand. While this is not technically an advertisement produced by the New Zealand government, it still gives a material example of the roll individuals and organisations like Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s company played in promoting the population of New Zealand with Pākehā’s during the nineteenth century. The Wakefield Company was a private company, and its influence in early New Zealand history was immense. Before the ‘settled government’ was established in New Zealand, private enterprise (in this case the New Zealand Company) was engaged in state like activities in encouraging and managing immigration to New Zealand. Documents like the figure above (Figure 1.2):
1.2) represent one of the original material documents advocating emigration to New Zealand. It also helps aesthetically to paint a broader picture of what the rationale was for the documents production and circulation at the time. This is important because it allows for the comparison of other immigration related documents throughout New Zealand’s history. While the Wakefield Company’s venture was designed as an investment for the proprietors, its ‘success’ was built upon the combating uncertainty about taking the risk in moving to New Zealand during a time in England when many migrants were considering moving to a destination overseas with dreams of a better life abroad.

In terms of the scale of the operation furthered by the New Zealand Company’s pamphleteering, of the 18,000 migrants who arrived in New Zealand from Britain between 1840 and 1852, it is thought that around 14,000 were brought to New Zealand by the New Zealand Company or its successors (Philips 2010:3). This document from 1848 and others like it helped to create an awareness and in the process helped establish a style of immigration promotion in Australasia which would go on to be carried out by the provinces in New Zealand who had control over their immigration polices until 1870s, as did future governments under a unified centrally controlled New Zealand. The text is bold and leaves noting to hide- there is no discernable humour as is the case in future immigration related advertisements displayed in later chapters such as that advocated by Britannia Financial Services in 2010 (Figure 2.0), just specific requests for ‘mechanics,’ ‘farm labourers’ and ‘domestic servants’ of ‘good character’. While earlier New Zealand Company schemes offered free passages for some of the initial Pākehā settlers of New Zealand, by 1848 these fares were still being advertised on a conditional basis, usually based on age and occupation.

While this thesis is on New Zealand specifically, it is important to realize that within the emerging capitalist industrial society of Britain, a balancing act was required in the 1830’s in terms of public policy. This is relevant because the reforms and polices underway in Britain had consequences which affected migration flows to New Zealand in the proceeding decades. On the one hand in Britain, the state had a vested interest in helping sustain a propertyless population which effectively had no other means of survival when work was nonexistent. There was a real need for the owners of the means of production to maintain a sufficient ‘reserve army’ of workers ready to soak up any productive demand for labour in the newly industrialising
country. The poor law reforms sought to accommodate this. The state also had to act to ensure that ‘escape routes’ were regulated and that means of survival other than wage labour for capital were not so readily available as to liberate propertyless workers from the coercion required to sell their labour when it was needed by capitalists in periods of economic growth (Wood 2005:18). These effects were felt for decades, as the Colonial Magazine in January 1850 observed on the conditions at the time:

The tide of emigration is rolling on year after year, and we have no power had we the wish, to stop it. Men will fly from starvation to the uttermost ends of the earth; and from our villages and towns thousands after thousands find their way to the seaports, knowing and caring little where or how they go, provided only they are taken away from a country which refuses to support them in honest industry.23

Every immigrant had their own story for coming to New Zealand, as do new migrants today. Most hoped for a better life abroad, as would most confronted with such miserable living conditions as was the case in many places in Europe. ‘In one of these courts,’ wrote Friedrich Engels commenting on Manchester in the mid 1800s, ‘[R]ight at the entrance where the covered passage ends is a privy without a door. This privy is so dirty that the inhabitants can only enter or leave the court by wading through puddles of stale urine and excrement’ (Davis 2006:137). Decades later, the English-born businessman Cecil Rhodes promoted emigration to the colonies as a solution for the ‘social problem’. More generally Rhodes felt that in order to save the ‘40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war,’ ‘we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced by them in the factories and the mines’ (Woodley 2009:114). Some of those affected by the Poor Law Reforms inevitably ended up in New Zealand seeking a better life.

23 Quote from Colonial Magazine, January 1850 as on display in the Canterbury Museum, Christchurch, January 2010.
The graph above (Scofield 2011), charts net ‘official’ emigration leaving England excluding Monmouthshire, between 1796 until 1870. It is conceivable that numbers leaving the country were even higher. As is illustrated, the statistical data shows increasing net emigration out of the United Kingdom during the decades of the industrial revolution. Between 1871 and 1913, net emigration from the United Kingdom measured as the balance of outward and inward passenger movements of United Kingdom citizens totaled 5.6 million. The annual average was 131,000 or 3.4 per thousand of the United Kingdom population. The vast majority of these emigrants went to other parts of the English speaking world, including New Zealand. Of the total represented, 53.8% went to the United States, 25.4% to Canada and 16.5% went to Australia and New Zealand combined (Hatton 1995:407).
As for the individuals themselves, the migrants who came to New Zealand were drawn from a number of social classes in Britain throughout the nineteenth century. Some had funds and capital to buy small businesses or farms. Others were the children, usually male, who due to inheritance procedures were unlikely to benefit from parental estates and chose to move abroad with small amounts of capital, though this was not the case for the majority who left. However, it was not just the immigrants who pondered the effects of emigration. Allegedly there was a genuine fear within affluent capitalist circles in England that if there was a debasement of the workers who had to work in the work houses and factories due to the opening up of channels for emigration, wages would necessarily be forced up in Britain to the detriment of the profit seeking class:

…taught by certain economists to believe, that profits rise when wages fall, and fall when wages rise, that the prosperity of the capitalist is consistent only with the misery of the labourer, the late ruling class in England would have set their faces against any project of colonization which had seemed fit to raise wages (Wakefield 1833:104).
Within the circles of power there were antagonisms and tensions within this elite. Merchants, manufacture’s and the government were united by a common interest in maintaining the security of their property by preventing the political upheaval and or revolutionary change that at the time, was sweeping through Europe (Hobsbawm 1962). Domestically, they were confronted with a growing population of discontented people, even more disillusioned by the introduction of the poor law reforms. The sense of crisis helped the ruling classes become more self conscious, in lieu of emerging threats such as the Luddites. Between 1780 and 1832, these elites gained more cohesion as a ‘class interest’. The majority of British working people came to feel an affinity with themselves as a ‘class,’ more and more removed from an affinity with their employers and overlords (Thompson 1964:11).

This is epitomized by what Karl Marx observed about Wakefield’s frustration in his account of the Swan river colonisation debacle in which a ‘Mr. Peel’ brought with him to Australia 3,000 working class migrants, in addition to £50,000. After arriving at his destination with some 500,000 acres in hand, he was subsequently abandoned ‘without a servant to make his bed or fetch him water’ (Marx 1990:931-40). Dejected, this Mr Peel provided for everything except the export of English relations of production. Without the coercion of private property relations in new ‘unoccupied’ lands, Mr. Peel’s workers like so many new migrants sought their own 40 acres and a mule,24 liberated from the domineering property relations and of European class hierarchies. This goes to show how removed (literally) the workers felt from their employers when given the viable option to actually opt out of selling their labour. Much of this accumulation was achieved through the dispossession of land from many Indigenous peoples. For settlers, colonisation in Australasia like North America too, transformed the rigidity of class hierarchies locally which at the time were still well and truly entrenched throughout Europe. Inequality and mobility were much more fluid in ‘the new world’.

However despite this fluidity by the middle of the nineteenth century, the South Island of New Zealand was becoming increasingly stratified, relative to the North Island. A minority of the people owned the bulk of the property, much of it locked up in large estates and sealing stations. Landowners held most of the property in Canterbury and Otago. The whaling stations and sealing bases had given way to

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24 See Sherman's Special Field Orders, No. 15
farmlands that were increasingly being controlled by a few. In the Nelson districts, 50 or so resident large proprietors held almost all the land, aside a number of small farmers and labourers. About 90 percent of male steerage passengers who arrived in the Nelson area around 1850 were servants, labourers or artisans. In Canterbury the greatest complaint of landowning families such as the Bowens was ‘how tired they got of eating quail,’ where as in Nelson some were so hungry that they dug up and ate their seed potatoes, while others ‘used to sit and cry’ for lack of food (Eldred-Grigg 1980:19). The vision of abundance and equality for from Britain, was not always the reality that new immigrants in New Zealand experienced in the first two decades after the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. In the second half of the 19th century however, a series of concrete policy initiatives would be put in place to correct the initial exceptionalism of the South Island and its provinces.

**Nation-Building**

The New Zealander and Australian go on to say that they do not desire so many people. Frankly, he might like to be a bit richer, but there is a limit to what he is willing to pay for wealth. One thing he will not pay. He will not trade his national unity and his fundamental national character. These peoples have a very definite goal of national achievement. Having set themselves a national purpose, their immigration policy has been relentlessly formed to suit that purpose.

- Frank Born, the American Federationist, 1923.

New Zealand was an attractive destination for working class immigrants, and this was reflected by the state playing an active role in society. Policy from the beginning, stressed a common egalitarian sense of citizenship, despite South Island exceptionalism. Nation-building like nationalism, took on many guises. Immigration policies can and do help play a part in a larger policy framework and cultural logic where nationalism or nation-building is promoted in some capacity. These concepts at times show themselves as expressions of an idealised group, as is illustrated by immigration documents throughout this thesis over the various eras of immigration and citizenship making in New Zealand. The quote above taken from a visiting American in the 1920s speaks to the perceived ‘national unity and … fundamental national character [of the New Zealander’]. Even before the first Labour government
enacted the Social Security Act in 1938, which is commonly thought to have set in motion the egalitarian reforms New Zealand was famous for during the twentieth century. Decade’s earlier policies were beginning to take shape which stressed the importance of a more socially just society. The Truck Act 1891 for instance required that all wages be paid in legal tender as opposed to being paid in kind, and the Shops and Shop-assistants Act 1894 regulated the shopping hours and working conditions of shop employees on the behalf of workers.

Throughout the nineteenth century the majority of the emigration taking place from Europe was voluntary. Even in the 1890s there still was a ‘rooted belief’ in many European elites that the new world was made by ‘providence for the purpose of absorbing all the waste matter and morbid excretions of the old,’ and that the new world was merely common plots upon which the ‘rubbish of the old world is to be shot’ (Reeves 1895:41). This ideology attempted to justify European colonisation by suggesting that domestic pressures could be relived by settling ‘surplus’ populations across empire.

The New Zealand Electoral Act of 19 September 1893 made New Zealand the first country in the world to grant women the right to vote in parliamentary elections. Other laws such as the Shipping and Seamen's Amendment Act in 1894 defined the proportion of skilled seamen necessary in ships at sea, the Factories Act 1894 outlawed the employment of children under 14 and established maximum hours that women and minors over 14 could work in New Zealand (Sinclair 2007). What all of these laws have in common is that they reflect a nation-building ideology that privileged the state as playing an active role in society and citizenship being constructed with a clear view of rights and obligations. The late Hon WP Reeves, a Minister of Labour and Education who was instrumental in these reforms in New Zealand once wrote in his defense of an unsuccessful Bill meant to exclude ‘undesirable immigrants’ in 1895 that (Reeves 1895:40):

> If the conditions of modern industry are to be regulated at all, the so-called ‘law’ of supply and demand must not be allowed to override everything…the socialistic experiments of New Zealand will have the result of making it a happy, comfortable, and enviable land that I have come to see the necessity of unusual safeguards.
Figure 1.5: This political cartoon which was published in 1917, depicts a British politician trying to unlock a door that the New Zealand government had closed with respect to would-be Indian immigrants (Glover 1917), reproduced courtesy of the Ministry for Culture and Heritage / Te Manatū Taonga.

Though Reeves held criticism of ‘Asiatic labour’ which found resonance among many in New Zealand at the time, his Undesirable Immigrants Bill in 1895 proposed a £20 per head entry fee, a very considerable amount of money at the time. The Bill did not end up passing but ‘race’ based prejudice, discrimination and exclusion continued to be voiced in media commentary. Public and private debates about migration policy played out in society as the cartoon above exemplifies. Passages like this one from the New Zealand Herald published on 26 March 1910 illustrate the fundamental tensions surrounding ideas of ‘the nation’ during that time in New Zealand (Sinclair 1986: 79):
‘Home’ means that we have transplanted to these alien lands and seas the national ideals of the North, the racial vigour and aspirations of our sires … we have tried and are trying to be true to type, to keep our blood clean and pure, to preserve our past traditions, to be worthy of our great history, to progress undeviatingly and steadily along the lines instinctively taken by the heroes and leaders of our ancestral people. In a word, we seek to make of New Zealand a Better Britain.

Racism formed part of the ideology and practices of early Pākehā settlement, and tensions emerged in national legal contexts with respect to universal British subjecthood (Hansen 1999:71). New Zealand as a member of the British Empire did not have a formal set of rules set out to legally differentiate British subjects as being white or non-white with respect to immigration procedures. Nevertheless New Zealand sought autonomy in its own domestic affairs, which in practice meant applying a distinction regarding the ability to manage the movement of persons into and out of New Zealand. This phenomenon became apparent in the 19th century when a global movement of Indian labour throughout the Empire was obstructed by various Dominion’s rather restrictionist polices on the entry of people (Deakin 1969:78). During New Zealand parliamentary debates on 26 June 1896 a Member of Parliament observed that:

It has been said that those clauses of the Bill which exclude Her Majesty’s Asiatic subjects come into conflict with Imperial interests, and that we are precluding from such legislation. But we must bear this in mind: that in a self-governing colony like ours it is possible that the interest of the colony may at times be in conflict with Imperial interests.

As a member of the British Empire, New Zealand like other internally self-governing member states was expected to conform to bilateral treaties which were agreed upon by the imperial government in London. For example, agreements were made between London and other countries like Japan and China (Fong 1959:23). Such pacts allowed for the free movement in the British Empire and vice versa for aliens, while British subjects were allowed passage to foreign countries that also had treaties with the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, acts were brought forth and passed in the self-governing colonies which at the same time restricted or prohibited the movement of aliens and attempted to restrict non-British British subjects’ full mobility. The passage of the New Zealand Asiatic Restriction Act of 1896 saw to it that all
‘Asiatics’ outside the movement of natives within the empire should be limited. This excluded ‘natives’ of British territories and protectorates in British controlled areas in the Indian Empire (Seuffert 2006: 56-9). Such distinctions obviously complicated the notion of a pan-national British subject, when there were racial restrictions in place. New Zealand has never had an unequivocally stated ‘white immigration policy’ however the use of ‘ministerial discretion’ was successful in regulating the entry of unwanted aliens into New Zealand (Pearson 2009:38).

Immigration policy within the Empire was seen principally as being the responsibility of the self-governing colonies, while foreign affairs and defense administration was largely exercised by the appointed governor whose job was to direct polices in line with the interests of the United Kingdom. Practically speaking, the parliamentarians in London and Wellington understood that the Australasian Colonies were going to arrange their own affairs:

Among many other things agreed to between the Chinese and British Empires, there was an agreement that the subjects of each empire should have free entry into the territory of the other, and there was no doubt that in consequence of that a large number of English traders, merchants and others were residing in the seaport towns of China … there was very little to be apprehended in reference to the treaty arrangements. He felt perfectly satisfied that the British Government would leave the Australasian Colonies to arrange their own affairs in this matter, and let them legislate for their own defense as they pleased.25

Before 1920, there were many earlier pieces of restrictionist immigration legislation. The 1908 Immigration Restriction Act for instance created a new class of persons known then as “restricted immigrants”. This broad sweeping category affected those considered aliens, who were thus required to make an oath of allegiance to the laws of New Zealand. It also regulated the entry of Chinese migrants, infirm persons, and others the then Cabinet saw fit to monitor. Infirm persons were referred to as “imbecile passengers” and included, “lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, or infirm.”26 These people were deemed likely to become a ‘burden’ on public institutions. By restricting who was allowed in, the government was actively involved in demarcating the boundaries of citizenship by letting in those who suited

25 (26 June 1896) 92 NZPD 381-82.
26 Immigration Restriction Act 1908, s 4.
the ‘needs’ of the administration. It was formal policy to discriminate and by extension some groups were privileged over others. The Immigration Restriction Act of 1908 also specified that any owner or master of any vessel which was bringing in any of these categories of individuals, was liable to pay a bond to the Crown of £100 for each passenger who met these exclusionary qualifications (Tennent 2010:3). In addition to this, the owner or master of the vessel bringing in unwanted migrants, was further discouraged from doing so due to legal repercussions such as having to pay any or all other costs associated with the upkeep of such a ‘dependent person’ either directly or by paying the necessary fees to a charitable institution willing to take responsibility for such a person within New Zealand.27

In 1920 the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act was passed. This 1920 Immigration Restriction Amendment Act formalised who would and would not be allowed to enter New Zealand. Though technically there was never been an official ‘white New Zealand policy,’ the then New Zealand Prime Minister William Massey argued that this act was, ‘the result of a deep seated sentiment on the part of a huge majority of the people of this country that this Dominion shall be what is often called a “white” New Zealand’ (Massey 1920:905). This policy was effectively in place until the 1974 immigration policy review. In the 1960s however, the groundwork was being laid towards a less discriminatory immigration policy. Under the 1961 Immigration Amendment Act, British and Irish immigrants in addition to other non-New Zealand citizens, with the notable exception of Australians who were entitled to free entry were all ‘required’ to have a permit before entering New Zealand. In practice however, the permit was only a formality for Britons and Irish, they were issued with permits on arrival (Beaglehole 2009a:1). Regardless of the ease to which some groups received permits, the 1961 act placed British and non-British people on the same level with the requirements for permits to enter New Zealand.

By the end of 1918, William Massey’s government reintroduced a pre-war immigration scheme and began advertising for migrants in Britain. This was one of the first systematic attempts at major assisted immigration after World War One. It was also part of a focused plan to persuade overseas settlement by white British ex-service men. In all, New Zealand took some 13,000 of these migrants before the scheme was halted at the end of 1922 (Morrell 1950:7). It was replaced by the Empire

27 Immigration Restriction Act 1908, s 6.
Settlement Act of 1922. Like many other countries, the economic collapse in 1929 wretched havoc on New Zealand, discouraging many potential immigrants during the depression of the early 1930s. By this time the assisted immigration scheme was to all intents and purposes non-existent, although domestic servants were still given assistance until 1931. Less then 200 people were assisted to move to New Zealand between 1932 and the declaration of war in 1939. During most of the period of World War II between 1942 and 1946, there was no government assisted immigration to New Zealand at all (Martin 1996:387).

That fact that there have since 1840, been various restrictions in place in New Zealand to limit some individuals from permanent entry into the country is not unusual. However by looking back considering prior policies, it becomes apparent that immigration agents and government officials actively played a role in the creation of New Zealand society through their gate keeping. The restrictions put into place many decades ago were a conscious act on the behalf of the governments in power at the time to restrict the entry of non-whites. I have compiled the following list of legal restrictions put in place chronologically with respect to Chinese nationals in New Zealand and summarised their scope:
Table 1.0 Chinese Exclusionary Measures between 1881 to 1974.

Though such blatant discriminatory practices with respect to ethnic origin are notably absent in today’s immigration policy, all governments practice forms of exclusion, inclusion and control. In 2011, sufficient health requirements and for some potential migrants, capital are required to be granted visas into New Zealand. This is important to acknowledge because although overt racial preference is on the wane, financial requirements are becoming more commonplace. All governments take into consideration domestic and international interests and this is expressed in their own immigration policies today as they have in the past. Just like in the late nineteenth
century when it was believed that managed migration could alleviate domestic pressures, this view came back into popularity a half century later with the passing of the Empire Settlement Act in 1922. Though not directly related to race, the Empire Settlement Act of 1922, which was passed after World War I was a rather ambitious British Government run scheme designed to assist in managing settlement, primarily war veterans, throughout the British Commonwealth.

The Act granted the United Kingdom up to £3,000,000 a year in co-operation with Dominion Governments or private organizations in assisting ‘suitable emigrants’ to settle in the Dominions (Morrell 1950:7). This is important because war veterans were settled in New Zealand as a result of this British government run immigration scheme. This scheme would go on for many years until it officially came to an end when the Commonwealth Settlement Act was passed in 1972 (Page & Sonnenburg 2003:480). It is a demonstration of the active role played by the British and New Zealand governments in fostering population growth. So immigration policy is both a local and a global, public policy issue. In New Zealand during a speech delivered in Auckland in 1966 by the chief research officer at the Department of Labour, R. J. Mardle where he made the following admission:

Many advocates of a more liberal Asian or African immigration policy infer that, in saying that such groups are more difficult culturally and socially to integrate or assimilate, the Government is saying something about the colour of their skin. There are some people admittedly who confuse a reason with a prejudice, but the Government has declared itself as being concerned with one ‘c’ and not the other-with culture (and associated factors) and not with colour. Whatever may have been the attitude in the Victorian era of patronizing colonialism, few reasonable people in New Zealand now believe in discrimination against Asians on the sole grounds of ethnic origin (Mardle 1967:38).

After World War II the New Zealand government started to emphasise distinctions based on culture. There was a cultural policy officially put in place. The government of New Zealand stated formally that ‘the government would not tolerate the importation into New Zealand of polygamy, polyandry, prostitution or illegal forms of gambling’ irrespective of the legality of these practices in the emigration countries’ (UNESCO 1956:4). In addition to this, a sufficient knowledge of the English language was considered essential and the ‘basis of integration and of ultimate
assimilation’ (UNESCO 1956:4). English language proficiency was viewed in New Zealand as ‘a sine qua non of cultural integration and of avoidance of alien grouping.’ In the 1950s, ‘the type of immigration planned was strongly selective so far as racial stock, social background, education, personal character and potential fitness for citizenship were concerned,’ UNESCO (1956:2) though some exceptions were made for elderly displaced persons on humanitarian grounds.

Historically, the role of ethnicity has played a role in a society’s affinity with the ‘nation-state’ (Smith 1988; Kaufmann 2005; Pearson 2009). In the Marshallian sense, ‘citizenship’ is more than just a legal term, and this is reflected in the way that historically civil institutions have aligned themselves with ‘shared ethnic sentiments’ (Pearson 34:2009). Nation-building therefore includes the acculturation of the public though institutional forms either through assimilation or restriction of the perceived community.

During and after the Second World War, organisations such as the Army Education Welfare Service (AEWS) and the Education Retaliation Service (ERS) set out to facilitate the active involvement of men and women in the military becoming more civically engaged with domestic and international issues, by helping to, create and spur on debates and discussions about the future direction of New Zealand’s emerging post war society (Brickell 2010). These government administered schemes provided among other things, a meaningful platform for the presentation of government policies, in addition to orchestrating and fostering dialogues and discussions between civically minded soldiers and state planners with respect to questions surrounding post war citizenship. Such programs as Chris Brickell contends, ‘epitomised [the] confluence of the state, the society and the individual citizen’ (Brickell 2009:382). These actions give credence to the view that there were in fact meaningful nation-building exercises occurring with the help of the New Zealand government prior to the economic reforms of the 1980s. One of the most tangible exercises of this was actually ‘growing’ the nation by renewing the government subsidised assisted migration programs after World War Two.
Though Refugee intake is not considered part of assisted migration, one of the first major transnational migrations from Europe to New Zealand after the Second World War were “displaced persons” sanctioned by the New Zealand Government with the agreement of the International Refugee Organisation during 1949 to 1953. The major groups involved in the scheme based upon the countries of origin or last residence were: Romania, 918; Poland, 847; Latvia, 545; Yugoslavia, 504; Czechoslovakia, 336; Hungary, 280; USSR, 275; Lithuania, 242; Bulgaria, 199; Estonia, 189; and Ukraine, 179. This is in addition to Austrians, Albanians, and Germans. All in all, arrivals in the official drafts totaled 4,584 people and, on top of this there were also 250 fare-paying and sponsored people admitted into New Zealand (McLintock 1966). This refugee intake was proceeded by assisted immigration that officially resumed in New Zealand following the end of the Second World War.
Good Jobs, Good Pay, Good Living

How we interpret recent immigration literature and imagery can change perceptions of older more antiquated modalities of thought and representations associated with older documents such as is the case with the previously discussed Wakefield Company Poster (Figure 1.2). This can have consequences not only for thinking about future policies for the New Zealand government, but it also calls into question the notion that the past cannot be changed, or at least reinterpreted in lieu of developments that shed new light on old ways of viewing the past.

Figure 1.7: An advertisement used in 1949 in large-circulation British Sunday newspapers such as this one from the News of the World. Courtesy of Archives New Zealand: Ref. L 1, 22/2/14, part 1.

For advertisements such as Emigrate to New Zealand there is a genuine attempt to facilitate managed emigration to New Zealand. The announcement’s success ultimately rests on its ability to make the viewer of the content become
marginally dissatisfied with their current way of life in the United Kingdom. Like the older, more historical immigration advocacy throughout the 19th century, such as the New Zealand Company poster, the thought of a ‘better life’ overseas had much appeal throughout New Zealand’s history. When confronted with the option of ‘good jobs, good pay’ and a ‘good living,’ the advertisement does not necessarily invoke a critique of British society, but it does make the viewer confront their own position within their society given the opportunity to ponder the merits of life overseas. The document’s ultimate success or failure however, depended on whether or not what the British single male or female viewer in 1949 viewing the advertisement believed. Did what was on offer represent an improvement or not with respect to their own position within British society at that time?

What the advertisement is effectively ‘selling’ is self transformation for the potential migrant: “New Zealand has a place for YOU in her future development.” Targeting the working class specifically, British builders, engineers, domestic and office workers were all being recruited in the name of ‘national development,’ and were offered free and assisted passages made available upon enquiry as is stated above, with the help of the New Zealand government offices in London. There are similarities between what was taking place earlier in the Wakefield Company advisement of 1848 (Figure 1.2), although they are clearly from different temporal eras. Emigrate to New Zealand is important symbolically because as a post war poster it represents a tangible form of material advantage through mobility which reflects the nation-building aspirations of developmental state planning in New Zealand in the late 1940s, decades before the ‘Rogernomics,’ or ‘market-state’ economic and immigration reforms of the 1980s called into question the ideological assumptions popularised during the first labour government in the 1930s.

This goal of assisted immigration was further expanded with the help of new and emerging media technologies during the post war period such as inexpensive colour photography which helped to produce more government administered products for consumption for potential migrants. And unlike the New Zealand Company poster which was a non-governmental and solely a for profit enterprise, the impetus of this state produced immigration flyer Emigrate to New Zealand, was not primarily to turn a profit in the ‘free market’, but to build a nation.

World War II focused public attention and debate around the need for a larger population for national defense purposes, in addition to economic arguments in favour
of an increased rate of immigration to New Zealand (Morrell 1950:21). Taking into consideration the belief that there was a housing shortage in New Zealand, the Government at the time favoured a ‘natural increase’, which was fostered by the implementation of a ‘family benefit’ allowance (Philips 2009:2). There were fears in 1949 by some New Zealanders and Australians in policy circles that the developing powers of the United Nations would eventually enable it to legislate over states sovereignty. If this were to happen it was said in the *New Zealand Herald*, that New Zealand may have an Asian population forced upon it, therefore the only way to avoid such a problem was to populate the nation by choice and policy.28

In April 1947, Bert Bockett was appointed Secretary for Labour, and later that year an assisted scheme for immigrants from Britain was introduced, in addition to people arriving under their own initiative.29 The Labour Department was responsible for managing the assisted immigration scheme with Bert Bockett at the helm, chairing the government-appointed Immigration Advisory Council which was responsible for counseling the government on the amount of immigrants required at the time, in addition to recommending changes to policy as the council saw fit. This post-war scheme was expanded to take in people from the Netherlands and other European countries in 1950. In 1964 the Secretary for Labour was even awarded the Oliver Van Noort medallion by the Dutch government for services to the Netherlands.30 The Dutch were considered a desirable reservoir of labour which would be beneficial to New Zealand in view of the ‘high Netherlands birth-rate’. However, according to the Dunedin Branch of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, it was not recommended that ‘Continental Europeans should compose a majority of the total number of immigrants in either assisted or unassisted classes’ (Morrell 1950:19). Despite this, the post War assisted immigration program continued until the 1970s.

On the eve of the end of New Zealand’s assisted immigration program a recommendation adopted by the Immigration Advisory Council in 1974 regarding future immigration policy highlighted the need to achieve the right blending of ‘economic and social objectives’ and that the aim should be to select migrants in a way that would promote ‘harmonious settlement though assimilation and

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integration.’ The recommendations also implied the responsibilities of civic duty in that, ‘the individual migrant must display recognition of the responsibilities of citizenship.’ Government assisted immigration was discontinued in 1975, although as the then Prime Minister Bill Rowling made it clear, ‘while New Zealand had a growing identity and new allegiances in the Pacific, it was a stance that in no way rejected long term friends in Europe, particularly the United Kingdom.’

Unconfident in a ‘Pacific identity,’ the 1970s were still marked by nationalist episodes, reflecting public perceptions about New Zealand and new migrants, especially from the Pacific region. While the 1974 immigration policy review reaffirmed open access to New Zealand for those born in the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, it also confirmed that Western Samoa held ‘a special place in the policy’ (Beaglehole 2009b:1).

Pacific Citizenship?

At the same time, the demand for Pacific Island labour diminished due to the economic recession, and officially tolerance towards migrant workers on temporary permits from countries like Western Samoa, Tonga and Fiji faded. The 1974 immigration review attempted to make an obvious distinction between migrants with a legal right to stay in New Zealand permanently, as opposed to those who had overstayed in New Zealand after entering on a visitor or temporary permit. And it was the enforcement of this distinction which led to the dawn raids, affecting mostly Pacific Islanders in the greater Auckland region. The Police Minister at the time, Allan McCready was quite blunt about the situation: “We made it clear in our election manifesto that we’d clean up the illegal immigrants… I suppose it has happened in Auckland because there are so many of these people. If you have a herd of Jerseys and two Friesians, the Friesians stand out.”

One of the underlying principles with respect to immigration legislation in New Zealand prior to the 1964 Immigration Act was to establish a clear distinction

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31 HANSARD NZ, Control of the Entry of Persons of British or Irish Birth and Wholly of European Ancestry. May 7th 1974 p. 33.
33 NZ Herald, 28 October 1976.
between British subjects and other people who were labeled as ‘aliens’ (Tennet 2010:2). This distinction remained in place until the Citizenship Act 1977 came into effect, effectively replacing New Zealand British Subjecthood, as understood under the British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act 1948 with New Zealand citizenship. In July 1982, the Privy Council ruled that Falema’i Lesa, a Western Samoan who was facing deportation in the New Zealand courts under the Immigration Act of 1964 was, under prior legislation, a natural-born British Subject and a New Zealand citizen (Macdonald 1986:73). The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1928 included Western Samoa as part of her “Majesty’s dominions and allegiance” despite its status as a League of Nations mandated territory. Section 7 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1928 (New Zealand) specified that Western Samoa should be treated as if it were a part of New Zealand, mandated and administered by the New Zealand Government. Because of this, the Privy Council ruled that persons born in Western Samoa during the duration of the Act were New Zealand citizens. The consequence of the Privy Council’s interpretation of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1928 was that all people born in Western Samoa (and their descendents up to two generations removed) for that matter from the time of the 1928 Act (until Samoa gained its independence in 1962) on were New Zealand citizens.

This Privy Council ruling caused significant political angst across the domestic political spectrum with considerable reactions from both the Labour Party and the National government led by Sir Robert Muldoon (Tennett, 2010). Immediately, approximately 100,000 Western Samoans or around two-thirds of Western Samoa’s population were deemed New Zealand citizens (Macdonald 1986:73). This is despite the fact Western Samoa’s own laws restricted dual citizenship at the time. Due to the Privy Council’s ruling in the Lesa Case, a hurried piece of legislation was pushed though the New Zealand parliament which went on to become known as the Citizenship (Western Samoa) Act 1982. This recognised Lalema’i Lesa as a New Zealand citizen, but other people in the same situation as her, had their claims to citizenship instantly nullified. The 1982 Act granted New Zealand citizenship to all Western Samoan people who were in New Zealand on the

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34 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1928, s 7.
35 Lesa v Attorney General [1982] 1 NZLR 165 at 175.
day before the act came into force it to eliminated the status of ‘citizenship’ for those who qualified under the Privy Council’s ruling who were not at that time living in New Zealand.  

What the 1982 act passed by Parliament did was to overturn the Privy Council’s decision and reinstated the situation as it had been understood to exist in practice before the Privy Council’s decision. The 1982 Act effectively denied automatic citizenship to those Western Samoans living outside of New Zealand when the Act came into being, who were born in Western Samoa between 13 May 1924 and 31 December 1948 whom the Privy Council had declared to be citizens. No formal distinction was made between those Western Samoans who were living legally or illegally in New Zealand (Tennet 2010:6). Section 5(1)(a) of the Act invalidated the convictions of those Samoans who had been in New Zealand illegally, by means of over staying their visas. This directly affected over 750 Western Samoans who were already in the immigration system, many of whom were in the same situation as Lesa. It also overturned deportations made between 1968 and 1982 and abolished prohibitions from immigrating to New Zealand legally.  

The point of all this is to demonstrate that had the New Zealand Government simply followed the orders of the Privy Council, there would not have been the 1982 Citizenship (Western Samoa) Act. One explanation therefore as to why the Act came into being in the first place is that there was angst within New Zealand’s body politic, where by a large number of New Zealanders did not accept what appeared to be unregulated Pacific migration from Western Samoa into New Zealand. Unconfident in a ‘Pacific identity,’ the nation’s identities were being contested through the context of immigration. The 1982 Citizenship (Western Samoa) Act was a nationalist manifestation set out to regulate the nation’s citizenship boundaries by superseding the Privy Council’s decision. As this legal saga highlights, by the 1980s there was an inherent connection between immigration and formal and informal practices of New Zealand citizenship.  

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37 Citizenship (Western Samoa) Act 1982, s 7.
The year 1973 became a defining one for New Zealand in terms of its international relations. The country’s affinity and status came under pressure, due in part to policies undertaken in Great Britain. As Britain entered the European Economic Community, New Zealand in effect lost its preferential treatment in terms of trade, in addition to losing what was previously the unlimited rights of the ‘old common wealth’ to visit their, ‘ancestral home’ (Pearson 2009:41). This helped play a part in the shifting worldview which made up Pakeha national identity during the 1970s in lieu of the separation from what was historically New Zealand’s premier trading partner, and mother country. However I would argue that this shift does not represent a break in terms of thinking about New Zealand as a ‘nation-state’. Politically ‘egalitarianism’, in addition to the compelling of ethnicity to the state, all be it bi-culturally or Pakeha dominated, represents a continuation of the same broader polices brought about by the first Labour Government, if not earlier. Full-employment, the belief in state owned assistance, state support for strong labour unions and preferential trade tariffs still represented a broader worldview where society was thought to be more than just a collection of individuals.

The scope of the reforms carried out by the Forth Labour Government in New Zealand however during the early 1980s is in my opinion much more substantive. Not only did the policies revolutionise the political agenda in post-war New Zealand, but they have affected the ideological role of the state from one that attempted to play an active role in the affairs of its residents to one that has become much more passive. In this way it is important to elaborate on the features of the politico-economic order before and after the Fourth Labour Government to help make this point as clear as possible. These shifting economic and social policy frameworks have helped to shape the broader ideological agenda upon which immigration policy is understood and practiced today. Thus this chapter depicts the various ways the state has been involved historically in New Zealand’s society and helped to manage the domestic economy. To further bring this point into clearer focus, by highlighting the polices between the pre and post ‘Rogernomics’ economic reforms illustrates how a ideological shift was underway in New Zealand. This includes principally a marked
transition, I argue from a ‘nation-state’ to a ‘market-state’ (Anderson 1991; Bobbitt 2003). 38

Between 1933 and 1984, the New Zealand State was responsible for the management of goods and services in addition to painstakingly regulating many aspects of the country’s national economic activity. Healthcare, education and social welfare were all universally available, funded by general taxation and regulations were used to control the prices of basic goods such as electricity, bread, telephones services and milk (Dalziel & Lattimore 1999:13). The state attempted to promote an egalitarian society through various means including supporting an industrial relations system predicated on strong occupation-based trade unions in addition to there being a general wage system. The New Zealand Government managed in varying degrees the production of goods and pricing, in addition to distributing welfare benefits for those deemed eligible. Domestically, in the post-war period, policies were still promoted and the political will was there to advance the human condition materially for a majority of citizens and residents, including many resent immigrants. The standard of living in New Zealand was comparatively high. 39 This was reflected in welfare structures which were maintained and created over the early and middle part of the twentieth century.

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38 By the term ‘Rogernomics’ I am referring to the market-led economic restructuring of the New Zealand economy carried out under the leadership of Roger Douglas, the Finance Minister during the Fourth Labour Government in New Zealand during the 1980s.
In May 1971, a brochure was produced entitled: *A New Life in a Young Country: New Zealand* as displayed above. At the time the New Zealand government operated two migration schemes from the United Kingdom. A subsidy scheme helped
New Zealand employers wishing to bring workers to New Zealand do so through financial assistance towards the cost of the passage to New Zealand. The New Zealand government was also subsidising an assisted passage scheme which was intended to help ‘skilled workers’ in certain occupational categories, obtain assisted passages into New Zealand. Like the Emigrate to New Zealand advertisement from 1949, what the New Zealand Government was promoting though their migration schemes was also in line conceptually with the continuation of a ‘developmental state’ style planning framework. This is reflected in the document both textually and visually.

Textually, the brochure promotes New Zealand as enjoying one of the highest standards of living in the world, where ‘meat, fruit and dairy products’ were ‘reasonably priced and freely available in excellent supermarkets, chain stores and shops.’ The New Zealand brochure offered the new migrant a new life in a young country, where there were ‘jobs for all, high wages’ and generally, ‘unlimited opportunities in the employment of your choice.’ Social Security was mentioned as a potential selling point, where it was declared that health and welfare benefits from ‘birth to old age’ and ‘from full employment to retirement’ was available. Age benefits for men and women were payable at 60, and at 65 superannuation was universal. Invalids and widows were entitled to assistance, and free hospital treatment was available to everyone. In New Zealand according to the brochure, a ‘high value’ was also placed on education, with a system in place which had compulsory education from 6 to 15 years of age. The education system in New Zealand offered free primary, intermediate and secondary levels of education. While ‘wide and equal opportunities for everyone at all levels of income’ were provided for so that young people would have ‘a solid basis on which to build the foundation of a rewarding future.’

Visually, photographic images can carry with them a multiple number of alternative meanings in general. This is no exception in A New Life in a Young Country. Victor Burgin refers to this photographic phenomenon as ‘polysemic’ where by and large an image is controlled by its juxtaposition with a verbal text (Burgin 1976:48). This is an apt way to situate the cover of the immigration document displayed on the previous page given its visual and textual appeal. With respect to the writing and the font, Roland Barthes has recognized two distinct functions which text can adopt in relation to images; which he refers to as anchorage and relay (Barthes 1977). The text on the cover of A New Life in a Young Country adopts a function of
‘anchorage’ when, considering the initial multitude of connotations possibly inferred by the image itself - a young white couple happily prancing on the beach, (presumably Wellington’s Oriental Parade) while the text acts as a means to channel the viewer.

Without the text, the couple on the beach could be confused with or imagined to be in South Africa, Australia or the south of France for all the viewer knows. However with the text, the viewer is aware that he or she is looking at New Zealand, and if they feel inclined to join or be that ‘couple on the beach’ then they can consider immigrating to New Zealand. The apartments in the background also arguably add a ‘sense of cosmopolitanism’ Rawlings (2011), something some observers felt New Zealand was seen to be missing at the time (Ausubel 1965; Morton 1976). Prior to the substantial philosophical, political and cultural changes introduced in New Zealand during the era of the Rogernomics reforms in the 1980s, ‘monoculturalism and assimilation’ was dominant and reflected what many, but obviously not all members of New Zealand society felt (Byrnes: 2005:92). In this respect, A New Life in a Young Country as a document produced and circulated in 1971, helps to portray and situate New Zealand in a larger and broader context during the halcyon days of the Country’s post-war developmental state. New Zealand was represented as being a natural playground, highlighted with the help of the colour image on the cover of A New Life in a Young Country portraying a warm sandy beach and a developed ‘modern’ western styled skyline.

Conceptually, John Berger attempted to sketch a systematic way of viewing ‘publicity’ or consumer oriented advertising, in light of the prevalence of mechanical reproduction made available though advances in capitalist production techniques ubiquitous today in modern society. He found it particularly striking the way typically ‘Western’ advertisements depended so heavily upon what he saw to be the visual language of oil paintings (Berger 1977:138). For Berger, oil paintings originally stood primarily for the celebration of private property, personifying the idea that you are what you have. While modern forms of ‘publicity’ or consumer advertisements often appear nostalgic, attempting to sell the past to the future (Berger 1977:139). 1970s colour photography like oil paint before it, was not widely available in 1848 or 1949 but it was a highly tactile means to play upon the viewer’s sense of possessing the ‘real thing’ in 1971. Here, for the first time, compared with the older immigration material, the potential migrant has the ability to see photographic images such as the brochure cover with the couple on the beach. This is
an innovation which was previously not readably available. This adds to more options and innovation in portraying the merits of immigration to New Zealand.

While it is safe to assume Oxley Press Limited, which printed the *A New Life in a Young Country* brochure in 1971, had no intention that their product would ever be hanging in a museum like an oil painting, what Berger eludes to is insightful. This way of viewing the document gives a point of reference upon which to better understand what was going on with this government document printed in the early 1970s. There is also an implicit similarity between the ‘dreamy’ use of nature aesthetically to create a place where innocence or ‘purity’ can be re-imagined. Such an affinity with the natural world, and connection to the land more broadly speaking, will and has gone on to become as *Queenstown* (Figure 2.1) highlights, an ever growing part of ‘New Zealand’s psyche’ as a nation-state, and of commercial importance in New Zealand’s self promotion as a tourist destination (True 2005), in the era of the market-state.

The beach scene on the cover of the brochure arguably uses nature, in this case the water of the ocean, to elicit tranquility and quite literally a new beginning. A *New Life in a Young Country* is a rather focused assemblage of what the New Zealand government wanted promoted in its own self image during the early 1970s. In addition to the photos, inside the reader discovers that: ‘Ninety per cent of the population is of British descent and 8 per cent is Maori. The remainder come mostly from European countries. The language is English. The Maori people, while retaining much of their tradition and culture, have the same opportunities, work at the same jobs, play the same games and in every way are part of the same community as their fellow New Zealanders.’

The romantic cover of, *A New Life in a Young Country* is in my estimation rather compelling, however it was not meant to be ‘glamorous’ per se. Compared with today, the New Zealand of 1971 was a lot more egalitarian, and that is also reflected aesthetically in the brochure. Most of the social democratic hallmarks of a strong welfare state were acknowledged as selling points within the brochure, which was principally targeting working class British migrants. The cover is notably absent of consumer goods which would indicate opulent luxury. The stances and attire of the

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40 A marketing tool that will be further promoted decades later during the 100% Pure New Zealand advertisement campaign primarily targeting tourists, but also implicitly used for immigration purposes.
male and female on the cover do not explicitly convey excessive wealth, as they would have had they been adorned with luxury, items particularly those associated with a bourgeois or aristocratic milieu (Bourdieu 1984). Viewed forty years on, this absence of extravagance is logical given New Zealand’s then localised state of affairs. The government was actively nation-building through a targeted immigration program, not promoting consumption based cosmopolitan sojourning. The government was actively promoting a developmentalist state program, where egalitarianism was the impetus of social policy, not social stratification.

Individual freedom in New Zealand is well-known, granted there was also expectations of social conformity. This is among other things reflected in the high rates of home-ownership which was publicised with pride in A New Life in a Young Country: ‘There is a trend now toward owning your own flat, particularly in near-city areas, where you can see many fine new apartments, complete with every modern facility.’ However actively promoting status symbols which champion ‘individualism’ per se would be counter to the welfares-state oriented cause of the times. It was not in the government’s interest to cause overt class conflict.

The way in which sense perception is arranged, is dependent upon the environment but also the local historical circumstances at hand as well. When viewed in 2011 through the eyes of a native Californian given the prevalence of the ‘cultural industry’, Adorno and Horkheimer (1972), in both the United States and also to a degree in economically liberalised New Zealand, it becomes clear that the dominant ideologies of today are noticeably absent in the immigration brochure document produced of 1971 (Figure 1.8) which attempted to attract new migrants to New Zealand. There is no mention of mansions on Lake Wakatipu, or yachts in Auckland harbour in 1971, though these attributes would be of interest to various individuals with large amounts of capital today: the very individuals governments the world over currently covet as will be elaborated in the next chapter on the rise of the market-state and the commodification of citizenship, where the commodification of citizenship and residency policies is enacted via government promoted capital investment schemes.
Egalitarianism No More?

To have portrayed the ‘heterosexual’ couple differently on the cover of *A New Life in a Young Country* with respect to outward expressions of material wealth would have been to potentially endorse class difference. This would have been in opposition to the egalitarianism New Zealand was actively trying to promote circa 1971 through documents such like *A New Life in a Young Country* though its state centric developmental policies during the post war period. ‘Glamour’ as understood by Berger as a notably contemporary capitalistic aesthetic used in consumer oriented advertising is discernable in *A New Life in a Young Country* in a rather egalitarian kind of way. The imagery is elegant, but not ‘luxurious’ enough to upset ‘tall poppy sensitivities’ prevalent in Australasia historically (Handcock 1930; Peeters 2003; 2004). As a society sharing much with that of Australia in this respect, New Zealand had at the time a very strong social democratic society to be proud of in which the assumptions of egalitarianism at least in Australia ‘produced a society in which the cutting down of ‘tall poppies’ became an automatic reflex’ (Wilkie 1977:15). In this respect there is an important cultural distinction between the United States, a country where institutionally less of an influence has been placed historically on egalitarian based social democratic traditions and intuitions, as opposed to New Zealand which has a richer history of active government involvement in its society socially.

When compared to New Zealand, the United States does not have a sovereign wealth fund like New Zealand’s superannuation fund, nor does America have a universal health care system like New Zealand. These tangible examples support the view that New Zealand has historically had more support on an institutional level in helping to foster an egalitarian society. The very term “tall poppy” is foreign, noticeably absent in America where comparative vanity and materialism is not as stigmatised in the public sphere, either historically or contemporaneously. According to historian Amy Henderson at the Smithsonian’s National Portrait Gallery, ‘celebrity’ would go on to become in America a barometer of success in ‘a culture preoccupied with personality’ (Henderson 2005:42). More recently, the displaying or flaunting of ‘ice’ (expensive jewellery) such as gold chains and automobile wheel covers are also considered ‘normal’ in various milieus in America today. In New Zealand in comparison, I have heard stories about relatives of a colleague being subjected to
verbal harassment for driving a Mercedes through Christchurch in the 1980s. Such ‘tall poppy’ sentiment coming out of a historically egalitarian society has had and continues to have qualitative cultural effects which still to a degree differentiates New Zealand from the United States even in 2011 given the continued dissemination of American media and celebrity globally (Gettas 1990; Morley 1992; Spitulnik 1997; Liebes and Katz 1990; Michaels 2002). As for New Zealand and its representation of potential new migrants, visually though the creation and circulation of documents, there would be no point in promoting through a government assisted immigration program, representations of individuals which would jeopardize or undermine the very egalitarian social structure New Zealand was trying so hard to create, during its post war pre-Rogernomics ‘developmentalist stage’. And this is in fact the case when one looks at the various images associated with the *A New Life in a Young Country* document (*Figure 1.8* and *1.9*).

*Figure 1.9*: ‘Multi-storeyed building’ from *A New Life in a Young Country*. 1971. New Zealand Dept. Labour Immigration Division, courtesy of the Hocken Collections, University of Otago. OEE N.

All three New Zealand immigration related documents discussed thus far in this chapter, *The Wakefield Company Poster* (*Figure 1.2*), the *Emigrate to New Zealand* advertisement (*Figure 1.7*), and *A New Life in a Young Country* (*Figure 1.8*), are implicitly about social relations. Over time this has been promoted more and more so materially, with the help of visual aides such as colour photographs to attract
various potential migrants and more recently, capital to New Zealand. Interestingly enough, one image unadorned with textual ‘anchoring’ on the image itself inside of, *A New Life in a Young Country* is figure (Figure 1.9) displayed on the previous page.

It is stated inside the brochure that New Zealand is a ‘modern, industrial nation,’ where ‘multi-storeyed buildings give a high-rise look to the main cities and many fine factories.’ Photographic images of familiar objects can carry many different meanings, depending on where the viewer is situated within society in addition to one’s own acculturation with the subject material. Granted this image was included in a document that attempted to attract a selective set of people: *British* migrants to New Zealand, so the target audience was quite selective to begin with. Nevertheless, cameras in and of themselves maybe ‘politically deficient,’ in that photographs such as this one of the office building do not tell the viewer anything about the economic forces effecting the people who work in it. The architecture of the building also appears quite *sovietesque* in addition to being ‘multi-storeyed’ and having a ‘high-rise look’ (Rawlings pers. comm.). Some scholars claim that the knowledge and technologies of architecture were ‘in themselves’ a crucial part of creating the ‘socialist state’ in addition to promoting a ‘culture of improvement and civilization through material means’ (Carroll & Burke 2002:79-80). Given this insight and the accompanying set of imagery, I witnessed handling the brochure in the Hocken Library where an original copy of the document is housed, I believe that the building (Figure 1.9) inside of the *A New Life in a Young Country* brochure, aesthetically reflects a broader egalitarian quality that is quite appropriate to highlight given the state of New Zealand society in 1971 and the ideological foundation of the then state apparatus. As New Right economic theory began to seep into New Zealand it helped transform the state during the early 1980s. During this period of economic turmoil, New Zealand society and the government’s immigration policy subsequently became ever more captured by the ideology of the market-state, and seduced by the culture of capitalism.

Changes began to take place within a mounting climate of fear, especially among treasury officials about the state of the New Zealand economy, as the Labour party caucus during the early 1980s began to find some support for further trade liberalisation and economic restructuring (Easton 1989:114). This was furthered by Roger Douglas, an influential member of the Labour party who would go on the be Minister of Finance, who grew to see it as contradictory and irresponsible to promise
tax cuts and high social spending in the face of economic uncertainty. So strong was Douglas’s conviction that he almost resigned his candidacy for the Manurewa electorate, only to be dissuaded not to do so by Labour Party leader David Lange between 1985 and 1989, who promised the finance portfolio to him in a future Labour government (James and Sallee 1986:17-21). As the reform chorus grew within the Labour caucus there was still uncertainty as to whether solely market outcomes would be enough to secure a socially desirable outcome (Roger 1984). Some MPs like Mike Moore even went so far as to claim that the free trade was part of a socialist agenda (Oliver 1989:35). In a memo to the Caucus Economic Committee in February 1984, Labour MP Stan Roger, on receiving the draft economic policy proclaimed: ‘I am appalled at the content of the document … If comprehended by the electorate I feel the measures would be unacceptable to the electorate and would probably lead to our defeat at the next General Election’ (Oliver 1989:43). Though touted as necessary economic reforms, these reforms had in fact changed the ideological apparatus of the policy framework which would go on to influence contemporary immigration policy.

**The Fourth Labour Government: Birth of the ‘Market-State’**

While both major political parties were vague publicly during the 1984 election campaign with respect to their economic visions, the New Zealand public was in for a surprise starting with the devaluation of the New Zealand dollar which began the Labour party’s drastic economic program. The history of ‘Rogernomics'- the name popularised by the economic reforms carried out in large part by the Labour Minister of Finance Roger Douglas, and officials from the Department of Treasury, has been articulated in great detail (Bollard 1994; Easton 1989, 1997; Dalziel and Lattimore 2004; Kelsey 1997; Quiggin 1998; Silverstone et al. 1996; Starke 2008). ‘Rogernomics’ represented a range of fundamental transformations. The overall structure of markets were substantially modified through deregulation in various areas such as external trade, in the financial and commodity sectors in addition to state industries, all of which were effected and ‘enhanced’ as a means to increase competition by advancing the role of the market in the workings of New Zealand
society. I argue that is can also be extended into migration policy and transformations of what it means to be a citizen of or in New Zealand in the early 21st century.

One of the characteristics that distinguish New Zealand’s experience with that of other countries was the sheer speed of the neoliberal economic reforms which were undertaken, most of which took place in the first three years of the Fourth Labour government’s two term administration. After winning a snap election on 14 July 1984, the very next day the Reserve Bank closed the foreign exchange market as a result of a strong outflow of funds during the previous four weeks. Wage and price controls were removed, the New Zealand dollar was floated and the finance sector liberalised. Import controls were removed over time, major restructuring began taking place in the public sector in addition to substantial alterations to the tax system as a marked transition took place from a closed economy, to a more competitive and deregulated open market economy (Boston and Holland 1987:1).

Social Citizenship’s Coup d’état

The American constitutional lawyer, and former director of Intelligence on the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton, Philip Bobbitt, has argued that President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher were ‘among the last nation-state leaders’ in that they offered radically innovative policies which appealed to the same basis on which to judge those policies- for example, whether they ‘improved the welfare of the peoples as did their grand welfare-state predecessors’ (Bobbitt 2003:222). Where as President Bush and Prime Minster Blair on the other hand, were ‘among the first market-state leaders, for their appeal was to a new standard, whether or not their policies improved or expanded the ‘opportunities offered to the public,’ and that this is the new yardstick upon which the neoliberal state ultimately derives its ‘legitimacy’ (Bobbitt 2003:222). The same phenomena appears to be the case in New Zealand. Speaking in 2005 on New Zealand economic policy over the previous 20 years, the governor of the Reserve Bank reflected on the policies undertaken during the Fourth Labour government (Bollard 2005:80):

The new approach rejected traditional theories of market failure, social equality, and nationalistic arguments for policy, direct provision of service and direct regulatory controls. Its theoretical drivers were modern American micro-
economic thinking based on the theories of Hayek and Coase on property rights, Buchanan and others on public choice theory, and Williamson and others on principal-agent theory... There was some learning available from Thatcherism and Reaganism.

These had profound effects on migration preferences and policies and how citizenship was imagined. Such a world view and policy positions has and continues to have a direct bearing on immigration policy. When a reserve bank governor openly states that the dominant government policy for the last twenty five years rejects ‘nationalistic arguments for policy,’ there is no denying that the state as an institution was morphing into something less egalitarian in the Marshallian sense, and into something which was ‘post-national’ in character in certain respects. With the de-privilegling of the “nation” in the eyes of the neoliberal state, there is an antagonism regarding interventionist polices which would see to it the promotion of egalitarianism among other things. Allan Bollard acknowledges that ‘social equality’ was rejected, and this was a consequence of the reforms taking place during the 1980s and 1990s. A governance regime which no longer claims to up hold ‘nationalistic arguments for policy’ cannot substantively support or promote “nation-building” in the ethnic, social, racial, religious, gendered, or linguistic sense as past regimes could and would. Even if it were to, those identity subject positions would be subordinate to the ‘laws’ of the capitalist market.

A governance ideology that preaches the merits of the free market typically does not covet or privilege any specific group, granted class power is and could be empowered though economic deregulation. To attempt to promote a defined cultural set of values when the social welfare of the public at large is relegated to the mercy of the ‘free market’ has appeared to be a lost cause. To do so would be to interfere in the market-state’s ‘essential indifference to culture’, which could prove problematic in terms of the operation of the state (Bobbitt 2003:230). This in theory could prove problematic for a government body potentially, in so far as the people of New Zealand or any other society no longer feel that their government champions their cultural values. That is to say, polices which predated ‘Rogernomics’ such as the 1974 immigration review which sought to promote ‘harmonious settlement though
assimilation and integration,\textsuperscript{41} or other programs which have been touched on in previous chapters such as assisted immigration programs where Dutch migrants were privileged soon lose their legitimacy in a neoliberal arena.\textsuperscript{42} The ideological foundation for policies which would support ‘integration’ or ‘assimilation’ begins to break down if one starts to view society as just a collection of individuals. That is not to deny that economically liberalised societies do not promote cultural values, because they do. Even a secular democratic country that respects human rights and freedom of expression represents a theoretical set of ‘cultural values’, but it nevertheless is identity politics neutral in terms of public policy.

In the post war era of ‘universal human rights,’ nation-building has become self-limiting in that liberal norms have constrained what states can do in the domain of immigration and citizenship policy (Joppke 2003:437). This can lead one to conclude that ‘neoliberalism’ as an ideology is not a detriment, but rather a ‘progressive’ force when teamed up with policies acknowledging human rights. Arguably it has helped to undermine the ideological foundation for race based ‘discriminatory’ racial preference in terms of immigration. Even countries such as apartheid South Africa which appeared on the surface to have been neo-liberal in terms of economic policies, were not neo-liberal from the perspective of cultural difference. The apartheid government was still framing policy through nationalistic arguments for policies built around ‘race’. So the decoupling of ethnicity from the idea of ‘nation-building’ never really took shape, even though in the economic sphere apartheid South Africa could be classified as neo-liberal economically. Culturally it was still nation-building. The form of governance which began during the Fourth Labour government in New Zealand on the other hand, necessitates in this way a marked denationalisation of what historically has been seen as ‘national’ (Sassen 2006:39). Therefore we are witnessing in New Zealand a transition from what I am calling a ‘nation-state’ where by notions around integration and assimilation have given way to a more applicable policy and term- the ‘market-state’ whereby there is a decoupling of government policy from what historically has been a policy in support of egalitarianism, and overt and subtle racial discrimination.

\textsuperscript{41} HANSARD NZ, Control of the Entry of Persons of British or Irish Birth and Wholly of European Ancestry. May 7\textsuperscript{th} 1974 p. 33.
\textsuperscript{42} This would have ramifications for ‘bi-culturalism’ though many NZ government documents openly use the term ‘multicultural’ anyway.
The Intellectual Impetus of the New Right Revolution

While neoliberalism today may be considered in many corridors the ‘commonsense of the times’ (Peck and Tickell 2002:381), this was not always the case. Hayek, Friedman, and Buchanan are considered three of the most important free market liberal intellectuals in the history of the ‘New Right’. Each received the Nobel Prize for Economic Science: Hayek in 1974, Friedman in 1976, and Buchanan in 1986 respectively. This is in addition to playing an important role in driving innovation in American economic thinking.43

From the beginning these free market liberals set out to replace orthodox Keynesian economic and social policies with new ‘rules’ which had to be unleashed. They understood that for this to happen a major change had to occur not just in the government sphere but also in the economic and political culture in which policies could be implemented. In a 1945 lecture on political themes entitled Individualism: true and false, Hayek stated that: “it is with the system which forms the alternative to socialism that I shall be concerned” (Hayek 1948:3). Two years later he helped found the Mont Pelerin Society, which is an international organisation dedicated to the propagation of free market ideas (Marginson 1992:4). Hayek advocated intellectual political activism to bring about ideological change so that the reforms he wished to bring about could be adopted far and wide. In 1948, he told those at a Mont Pelerin conference:

It is more than likely that from their point of view the practical politicians are right and that in the existing state of public opinion nothing else would be practicable. But what to the politicians are fixed limits of practicability imposed by public opinion need not be similar limits to us. Public opinion on these matters is the work of men like ourselves, the economists and political philosophers of the past few generations who have created the political climate in which the politicians of our time must move (1948: 107-108).

Given the prevalence of ‘free-market’ thinking and policy in New Zealand, it is important to discuss the theoretical impetus of these drivers of change briefly in order to further highlight the political and economic approach these individuals consciously helped promote in America, and internationally which New Zealand ended up eventually adopting during the 1980s, all of which has had implications on current immigration policy and the making of New Zealand citizens (Hayek 1948; 1960; Friedman 1962; Buchanan & Tullock 1962; Buchanan 1979; Buchanan & Tollison 1984).

43
For Hayek the post war period was not the time for ideological passivity. Economists and political philosophers were required to ‘be the brains’ of the bourgeoisie (Marginson 1992:4). Hayek the free market advocate would go on to write that: “The propertied class, now almost exclusively a business group, lacks intellectual leadership and even a coherent and defensible philosophy of life” (Hayek 1960:128). Hayek’s scholarly project and activism, has been widely adopted around the world. His politically driven economic framework has made inroads in many countries around the world including New Zealand and its influence can be felt as far as immigration policy and the making of citizenries.

Hayek discussed ‘freedom’ and ‘coercion’ in terms of the relationship between individuals and the state, or between the market and the state. A dualism between the state and the market helped to mold Hayek’s view about power and politics and his view on the role of economics (Marginson 1992:18). In affect, Hayek’s theories would lead one to conclude that he saw the world as if a reduction in coercion by the state equated to a reduction in coercion per se (Hindess 1987). This is why for libertarians who define power as being exercised by government or by bodies subordinate to a ‘government’, they never have to address the simple fact that their very terms of reference preclude the idea that power could in fact derive from control over economic resources (Sawer 1982:25). That is to say for all the ‘oppression’ and inefficiency of state control, private sector monopoly or supremacy, class power or mafia style coercion is by definition not a possibility in the dream world that is a classical liberal’s utopia. The only time a problem arises is when a formalised, ‘state’ is involved.

Another important actor in the foundation of what would go on to become the ‘New Right’ in New Zealand should also be mentioned, and that is Milton Friedman. Milton Friedman was a significant figure in the ‘Chicago school’ of economics, a group based at the University of Chicago which was famous for propagating a free market approach to economics against the then hegemonic Keynesian orthodoxies in government’s around the world. Friedman’s popularity both in and outside of the academy helped elevate his views on wider economic and social issues. *Capitalism and freedom*, published in 1962 by Milton Friedman, went on to become an influential book both domestically in the United States and internationally, inspiring much of the
later critique of ‘big government’ (Heald 1983:8), a discourse which would find itself echoed in New Zealand during the 1980s.

James Buchanan like Milton Friedman was also a free market economist from the Chicago school of economics. He specialised in the application of economic methods to political decision-making, and would go on to become the intellectual leader of public choice theory which as Allan Bollard mentioned, was instrumental in New Zealand. This is relevant to questions around immigration and citizenship in New Zealand because such a prospect does away with categories such as racial preference which is outside of the realm of economic or market forces. In essence public choice theory applies the tools and methods of an economic approach that were developed in sophisticated ways analytically in economic theory, and attempts to apply these tools and methods to the political or governmental sector, politics and the public economy generally (Buchanan and Tollison 1984:13).

Like economic theory, the public choice theory attempts to relate the behaviour of individual actors in various roles in the attempt to offer an understanding of the complex institutional interactions that go on within the political domain. Public choice theory attempts to break up the idea that models of government are monolithic, distinct from individuals acting individualistically like traditional economic theory would leave one to believe takes place ‘naturally’ in the market place. For Buchanan, “[O]ne of the great advantages of an essentially economic approach to collective action lies in the implicit recognition that political exchange, at all levels, is basically equivalent to economic exchange” (Buchanan 1962: 250). The chief assumptions and conclusions of public choice theory were adopted by both Friedman, Hayek and many other free market liberals, including prominent in the government and the Treasury, during and after the Fourth Labour government. Its legacy is as strong as ever and therefore it is hard to under emphasise the impact public choice theory has had on the economics and especially the politics of the public sector (Marginson 1992:5). Once it gained support, it among other things essentially weakened the standing of the public sector across the board. Aware of the cultural ramifications of the policies he was championing James Buchanan would go on to acknowledge that:

Public choice theory, along with complementary empirical observation, has defused enthusiasm for collectivist solutions to social problems. In this negative sense, public choice has exerted, and continues to exert, major ideological impact (Buchanan 1979:271).
This omission demonstrates that one of the major proponents of public choice theory, acknowledges the fact that it has weakened the standing of ‘collectivist solutions to social problems’. That is why it is unsurprising to see Buchanan channel Nietzsche years later in believing that ‘we were now looking at some aspects of our world, and specifically our world of politics, through a different window’ (Buchanan 1984:11). Many scholars claim to see the ‘nation-state’ as being based on a principle of egalitarian solidarity (Rokkan et al., 1970; Flora and Kuhnle 1999, Lane and Ersson 2003). Yet contemporary government policy which has embraced neoliberal protocols and reforms- as is the case in New Zealand since the 1980s, poses a big challenge to traditional understandings of the ‘nation-state’ given the practical rejection of egalitarianism as a policy priority. This is why the Marshallian conception of social ‘citizenship’, grounded in an egalitarian ‘nation-state’ popularised during the post war period, has in many ways ended up giving way to the ‘market-state’.

Given Hayek’s status, and his political commitment to promoting a system which was an ‘alternative to socialism’ Hayek (1948:3), it is not without historical irony that the ideological front of American society’s hard fought war against communism and the Soviet Union may inadvertently have eroded the meaningfulness of the term “American society” itself (Amadae 2004:4). Much like the idea of the ‘nation-state’ being based on a principle of egalitarian solidarity, the idea of society itself and its make up has had implications on notions of citizenship in the neoliberal era. Given that the model of economics which New Zealand chose to adopt during a time of economic crisis during the 1980s was largely designed at the University of Chicago, such a paradigm shift has had huge implications on New Zealand society, not least the very bureaucratic structures of governmental departments including the Department of Labour, which deals with processing immigration matters.

Intellectually ‘free market’ ideology has transcended the realm of economics and has cultural implications for all societies it effects, including New Zealand. Economic rationalism has led to a form of competitive individualism which has influenced historical notions traditionally associated with liberal democracies. One of the tangible consequences of the rigorous adoption of individualist rational choice polices has been the de-legitimisation of the theoretical underpinnings of a “general will,” as a growing ideological skepticism has grown over the inherent
meaningfulness of notions such as “the public,” “public interest,” or “general welfare” are questioned. According to Paul Spoonley, in New Zealand there has been a ‘devaluing [of] the welfare state and economic rights that were seen by T.H. Marshall as an important part of citizenship, and which were accepted as central to the provisions of a welfare state’ (Spoonley 1998:22).

Singapore is an example of a country where even in a neoliberal era, ‘free market’ fundamentalism has not completely over ridden the ‘public interest’ in preserving Singaporean privilege in their domestic labour market. The state plays an active role in setting economically oriented fees which are used to ‘micromanage’ the inflow and employment of temporary migrant workers in a way that charges employers a tax per migrant employed. This is achieved in a way so that the taxes represent the ‘marginal external cost’ per migrant worker (Ruhs 2008: 411). The rationale is that the revenue from such taxes from foreign workers could be used to cover social costs as well as compensate resident workers for their perceived income losses through foreigners penetrating the domestic labour market. Like a tax on tobacco, this innovative policy incorporates a belief in a ‘national interest’.

In a world of scarcity, it would also advantage the local labour market through the privilging of the domestic worker over the foreign worker economically. In 2008, for instance the monthly levy in Singapore for employing a skilled migrant in Singapore’s construction sector was S$150; whereas the corresponding levy for employing an unskilled construction worker from abroad was S$470, which when calculated equates to nearly 20% of the average monthly wages in the construction sector (Singstat 2008). Such a tax policy if incorporated in New Zealand could prove politically advantageous given the likely support such a policy would receive among the population at times of higher unemployment nationally. However such a move would also require an ideological shift for the state to take an active role in the management of the labour market like it did before the Rogernomics reforms. In practice this would also be easier to do in the case of dealing with short as opposed to long term migrants, because fully legal citizens and residents should not legally be subject to any form of discrimination. Nevertheless, in a country competing globally for talent, and one that relies on filling critically needed skills though targeted skilled migration, taxing foreigners might be an option for policy makers in New Zealand to consider, though more evidence would be necessary to make an informed decision.
Such a role reversal could offer an important avenue for more research, as well as political debate more generally as New Zealand looks to shape its own future.

**Neoliberal Immigration Reforms**

Immigration policy in New Zealand in 1984 effectively corresponded with what at the time was still part of a long established view that New Zealand had a rather limited capacity to take in large numbers of new migrants and that immigration broadly speaking was there to serve the needs of supplementing the labour force when there was a shortage of labour (Farmer 1985). However this soon started to change as far reaching economic reforms began to take shape. In 1988 in a booklet entitled *Blueprint for change*, addressing employees at the Department of Labour it was explained by the Secretary of Labour that the department was attempting to deal with a more diverse group of clients, and was doing so in a rapidly changing economic, social and political climate. Some of the key changes which were highlighted directly included the deregulation of the economy and the subsequent pressure to reduce government spending, in addition to the introduction of “user pays”. The net benefit of the state intervening in the economy openly came into question, and there was also an acknowledgement of changes in industrial relations legislation. These free market driven ideological convictions still make up the framework which underpins immigration policy today in 2011. This is especially true with respect to business and investor migrant residency programs in New Zealand which I believe were a category enhanced and further sanctioned via legislation made possible by the neoliberal reforms first undertaken during the Fourth labour government.

**Business Migration and the Beginnings of Commodified Citizenship**

Starting in 1978 a policy was introduced which made it possible for overseas entrepreneurs of ‘proven ability’ who wished to invest in an established business in New Zealand the right to apply and potentially migrate permanently to New Zealand
irregardless of age, occupation or national origin in so far as they met other immigration criteria and brought to New Zealand skills and capital for what was perceived to be of benefit to the country at large. This was reflected in a statement in 1978 by the department of immigration addressing current immigration policy with respect to business migrants:

In general, the business proposed should be a manufacturing, horticultural/agricultural, tourist or other enterprise constituting an additional unit of production, or it should involve the significant expansion of an existing one … “passive investments” (eg. in real estate/property development) are not acceptable under this policy.

The quote above shows how these policy goals continued to reflect interventionist policies where the government played an active role in choosing, or at least channeling what sectors of industry potential migrants would be allowed to invest in. It is also worth noting that prior to market deregulation and the floating of the New Zealand currency, passive investments were not considered acceptable measures upon which to obtain permanent residency in New Zealand. In the first seven years during which time this entrepreneur migration scheme was in operation, 225 people, not including dependants were approved entry to New Zealand. The investment capital brought by these new migrants totaled NZD$106,866,000 (Burke 1986:19). This would equate to roughly NZD$475,000 per immigrant.

Of those 225 applicants, the four countries that made up the majority of new migrants through this policy were the United Kingdom with 52 applicants involving capital totaling NZD$18,037,000, the Federal Republic of Germany with 46 entrepreneurs with NZD$19,905,000 worth of capital, the United States with 33 applicants and a total of NZD$11,035,000 capital and Hong Kong, with 21 entrepreneurs bringing in a total of NZD$18,165,000. A statement by the Department of Immigration also explained that despite the increasing flexibility with which this entrepreneur immigration policy had been administered in the first seven years of operation, it as a policy had not ‘succeeded’ in capturing the attention of ‘more than a few’ of the potential investors globally (Burke 1986:20). The report acknowledged that potential investors were actively being sought by other foreign countries such as
The report also stated that more of an emphasis would be placed on entrepreneur and business migration.

A review in August 1986 also emphasised that immigration policy was concerned principally with New Zealand’s domestic, regional and international interests and would focus on key objectives. These included regulating immigration so that it was consistent with current Government economic and social policy, by enriching the ‘multicultural social fabric of New Zealand society’ through the selection of new settlers principally on the strength of their potential personal involvement to the future well-being of New Zealand, in addition to encouraging and facilitating the full participation in New Zealand society of the new residents (Farmer 1996:55). These changes also reflected a marked departure away from informal race based preferences and distinctions.

In response to a policy which was perceived to be positive for New Zealand, where upon the entire economic environment within which previous policy guidelines were framed were in the process of being changed. A consequence of the restructuring and deregulation embarked upon by the government, included the removal of exchange controls made some of the pre-Fourth Labour government immigration requirements ‘irrelevant’ and also inconsistent with the new direction of the government’s overall economic strategy. No longer was it preferable to seek out and channel overseas investment into certain ‘preferred’ economic sectors. Resource allocation through the function of market forces was seen as being fundamental for investments to be made where entrepreneurs identified growth and profit opportunities. As the government’s ideology shifted, it became reflected in policy whereby it was increasingly thought that there was no logical basis on which to rule out entrepreneur participation in the service sector or other particular areas since greater efficiency and productivity would contribute equally to what was thought to be a benefit to the nation as a whole (Burke 1986).

The Fourth Labour government decided that the main focus of entrepreneur immigration should be changed from selecting proposals to selecting people and that greater emphasis would have to be placed on different avenues for immigration to New Zealand. Therefore the broad category of ‘Business Immigration’ was given a higher standing alongside the existing arrangements for occupational entry.

44 This was also echoed repeatedly in discussions with research participants associated with the government.
Prospective migrants who wished to establish themselves in New Zealand as self-employed business people or investors were assessed according to the ‘potential contribution’ they could make to New Zealand’s economy and society. No general attempt was made to channel immigrant energies into particular sectors or areas and the new guiding assumptions were that good people with good business sense should be left to select their own niche in the economy on their own terms. However, a new factor which was taken into consideration was the amount of investment capital available to transfer to New Zealand but no specific threshold figure was initially specified. Prospective business migrants were required to have funds in the order of NZ$150,000 readily available for transfer to New Zealand to meet housing, living and personal establishment costs in their first year.

These shifting policies had an impact almost immediately upon their implementation. In the first full year in which data was made available following the August 1986 policy review (which is 1 April 1987 to 31 March 1988), there was a noticeable increase in the number of successful migrants from Hong Kong and Malaysia which is consistent with the liberalisation of the business migration policy (Trlin 1992:12-19). The changes that were made to further the temporary entry of travelers from both ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ source counties is also indicative of the larger structural changes which were being made to deregulate the New Zealand marketplace in the attempt to make it more economically ‘efficient.’ Fees reflecting user pay policies were also introduced for visa applications in 1987, ranging from NZD$80 for a work visa, to NZD$200 for lodging an application for permanent residency, in addition to changes from NZD$100 to NZD$900 for migrants seeking business visas to live in New Zealand on the basis of specific investment proposals (Department of Labour 1987). In the year 1 April 1988 to 31 March 1989, 3,252 migrants were granted permanent residence in New Zealand under the Business Immigration Program which was introduced in August of 1986 (Ministry of Commerce 1989:4). This accounted for approximately 12 percent of the 27,462 migrants approved for residence by the New Zealand Immigration Service, which is an increase compared to previous years where for example only about one percent of the 8,268 applications approved for residence in the year to 31 March 1987 were in the Business Immigration program (Farmer 1996). The increase in applications had come largely from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Malaysia, and to a lesser extent, Fiji and
the United Kingdom with the vast majority of Asian migrants settling in and around the Auckland region (Ho and Farmer 1994:215-232).

In September of 1989 a new minister headed the immigration portfolio, Roger Douglas who had been instrumental in bringing structural changes to New Zealand’s economy as the Minister of Finance between 1984 and December 1988. The policy changes that Roger Douglas suggested in November 1989 included linking immigration to the country’s long-term ‘interests’ over a 20 to 30 year horizon. He also established a target annual net migration inflow of 10,000 people a year in contrast to the net outflows common during the 1980s. Roger Douglas was also instrumental in floating the idea behind a points based system of immigration selection, whereby a potential migrant can calculate his or her chances at meeting the minimum requirements to migrate under a standardized rubric, in addition to promoting the active recruiting of new immigrants from Europe in an attempt to ‘balance the influx from Asian and Pacific countries’ (Farmer 1996:5). He also advocated a new policy to encourage immigrants to settle throughout the whole of New Zealand. Douglas however lost the ministry of immigration following the defeat of the Fourth Labour Government at the end of 1990.

On 21 March 1990, it was announced that the National led Government was implementing a new immigration policy which ‘aimed at increasing the population by 10,000 predominantly highly skilled people a year’. This quota of 10,000 was raised in November 1991, to approximately 20,000 people per annum. A job offer was no longer considered a prerequisite for residency. Instead applicants would be approved under a point-system, either through the general category, or the business investment category. Little change was made with respect to entry into New Zealand on a temporary basis, or on family or humanitarian grounds (Farmer 1996:5). The new general grant category replaced what was previously an occupational category, and the new system awarded points based on age, employability and various other settlement criteria irrespective of ethnic or nation background (NZIS 1991:1).

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46 ‘Immigrant selection uses point system to bring in skilled’, *New Zealand Herald*, section 1, 21 March 1990, p.4.
47 To achieve a net intake of 20,000 persons a year it was suggested that it would be needed to grant residence to 25,000 people each year to achieve the target of 20,000.
48 The then Minister also made reference to a ‘regional quota’ that was designed to disperse immigrants throughout the country but he stated that this ‘would not be stated in a published schedule’ *Waikato Times*, 5 November 1991, op. cit.
The changes to immigration policy in 1991 in New Zealand are important because it marks a shift away from what was then an occupational, short term or ‘gap-filling’ approach to immigration policy which became a more long-term, human capital approach to looking at immigration (Farmer 1997:1) which was a further move away from a solely British-based preference. While humanitarian, family and refugee immigration streams remained more or less uninterrupted, the move towards a more targeted immigration policy was designed to draw in a larger quantity of ‘quality immigrants’ through the general and newly created business steams which were now framed though a points based system also helped to expand the pool of countries potential permanent migrants could be selected from. The details of the new residence policy in New Zealand were published by the Immigration Service in a manual which confirmed the Minister of Immigration’s target of achieving an annual net migration gain of 20,000. This according to the minister was ‘based more on a judgment regarding the ability of New Zealand’s economy and society to absorb migrants than on an overall population goal’ (Birch 1995:14). Between 1 July to 30 June 1992-93 and also 1993-94 the net annual migration target was 25,000 residence approvals, though in reality this was a soft cap that could be exceeded (New Zealand Immigration Service 1992:1-7).

The ability for new migrants to automatically pass and obtain residency via the points system, given that they achieved enough points through the point scheme in addition to passing the necessary health and character requirements, soon proved to be politically problematic as the volume of individuals automatically qualifying for residency soon substantially exceeded the initial target, notably in 1995. Even as the point threshold was raised again in December 1994 and July 1995 respectively, the numbers approved did not significantly abate (New Zealand Immigration Service 1995: 41). To put that into perspective, in the first two years of the ‘targeted’ immigration policy between 1992-93 and 1993-94, the total number of individuals approved for residence in New Zealand totaled 28,465 and 30,887 correspondingly.49 This represents a slight increase from the 1988-89 year which was previously the largest intake year since the beginning of the ‘Rogernomics’ reforms in 1984, when 27,462 people were approved for residence. However the total numbers of approvals increased by 51 per cent in 1993-94 and again by 23.3 per cent between 1994-95 and

49 This includes all categories of permanent migrant streams all be it the general, business investment, family or humanitarian and refugee.
1995-96 (Farmer 1997: table2). In the 1995-96 year alone, 14,438 Taiwanese nationals were approved residence, representing just over a quarter of the 57,520 people approved for residency, a total which is considerably larger than the then immigration target of a net migration gain of 20,000 migrants a year.\textsuperscript{50}

The automatic approval process for those with enough points via the point system effectively undermined the government’s ability to manage total control over its residency approval levels. Therefore on 30 October 1995, adjustments were implemented in the expectation that there would be better management of migrant numbers, in addition to encouraging a ‘broader mix of skills,’ continuing to attract people with a ‘genuine commitment to New Zealand’ (New Zealand Immigration Service 1996:2). Subsequently the target immigration quota became no longer so elastic, as a yearly ‘global immigration target’ became established on a year by year basis (New Zealand Immigration Service 1995b).\textsuperscript{51} Also in 1995, the general skills category became the ‘general category’ and what was the business investment category became the business ‘investor category’ (New Zealand Immigration Service 1995b). A new assessment criterion was applied to both the general skills and business investor migrants, which required that new migrants had a ‘modest command of English’ which was defined as reaching a minimum standard of English, demonstrated by passing the ‘General Module of the Intermediate English-Language Testing System’ or IELTS at level 5 (Farmer 1997:11). In addition, non-principal applicants aged 16 years and older who would not be able to meet IELTS level 5 ability were required to pay a NZD$20,000 bond which would then be refundable upon the completion of level 5 proficiency if it was reached within the first year of the applicant’s arrival in New Zealand. This policy actually resembles the bonds which were in place during the 19th century which affected Asians in the form of poll taxes as has been discussed in Chapter two. It was also required that applicants in the business investor category had to now have at least NZ$750,000 to NZ$1,750,000 worth of direct investment funds and they had to be invested in New Zealand for at least two years. These reforms had a marked effect.

Compared with the 1,088 business applications lodged in the first three months of 1995, only 70 business applications were submitted in the first part of 1996.

\textsuperscript{50} To see a full comprehensive breakdown of residence approvals by migration category in New Zealand and major nationalities, 1992-93 to 1995-96 see table 3 in (Farmer 1997) for unpublished Department of Immigration data.

\textsuperscript{51} The quota system only targeted general category and business migrants.
and for the first five months of 1996 the business investor category saw a decline of 96 percent. On 27 June 1996, the Minister of Immigration declared that the target immigration quota would be raised to 35,000 people a year, with a designated cap of 500 people set aside for the business investor category (New Zealand Immigration Service 1996:1). In 1996, immigration was hotly debated in the public sphere, and most political parties had their own immigration policies in the run up to the first MMP election. The founding member of the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT) political party was created in 1994 by the former Labour Finance and Immigration Minister, Roger Douglas. At the time his political party went so far as to campaign on an immigration platform which included making the business migrant scheme a revenue earner by literally allocating a set number of places and auctioning them off to the highest bidders (Farmer 1997:13).

Though such a policy has not been adopted yet, it quite literally personifies the commodification of citizenship, which has been made possible through the sweeping economic and ideological reforms undertaken in New Zealand beginning during the Fourth Labour government which still frames New Zealand’s immigration policy today. While no country has gone so far as to literally auction immigration visas off to the highest bidders, the idea has been floated around in economic circles (Ruhs 2008). It is viewed as a way of attracting migrants who are more likely to be larger producers or higher income earners, while at the same time considered to be adding to tax base of the country, which in the process could be used to help mitigate any fiscal losses from immigration and or compensation to residents whose incomes were viewed to be lowered through the increased completion of new migrants joining the work force (Simon 1989; Freeman 2006; De Voretz 2008).

By the time Helen Clark won the 1999 election as head of the Labour Party, the economic reforms and immigration changes implemented in the previous 15 years were well-entrenched. Some New Zealand neoliberalism theorists have questioned the idea that there was even a ‘coherent neoliberal program’ in the first place in the sense that they believe that the Clark government represented a break in the pattern, even though many rightfully acknowledge that the Clark government did not mark a ‘return to the nation-state-centered understanding of the postwar period’ in which economy and society were understood to be interdependent (Larner: Le Heron: Lewis

2007:229). Although these authors reject neoliberalism as a label applied by the fifth Labour government they also acknowledge that during Helen Clark’s period in office there was a continuation of ‘highly economic language’ demonstrating multiple political projects which would run against the neoliberal grain. In some areas it could be said that the Fifth Labour Government’s administration represent a ‘new governmental strategy’ ‘undermining the neoliberal project.’ However when it comes to immigration, this is debatable. Lip service was paid to the death of neoliberalism in New Zealand. When visiting the London School of Economics in 2002, Prime Minister Helen Clark stated that neoliberalism in New Zealand ‘was over’ (Clark 2002). Whether or not this was the case in practice is open to debate, given that there does appear to be essential continuities of a sustained neoliberal framework which continue to frame government policy in New Zealand as a whole, even to this day (Curtis 2002; Kerr 2002, Scofield 2011).
Chapter 4: Commodified Citizenship in the Market-State

Brands, like nations, evoke an emotional response.

In 2011, there is a global competition underway as governments around the world compete to attract high net worth individuals (HNWIS). This was expressed to me by an informant at the Department of Labour in Wellington in 2010. Before New Zealand’s economic deregulation during the 1980s, capital rich migrants or investors were not so actively sought after in New Zealand to the extent as they have been since the Fourth Labour government. This is a good place to start to distinguish what sets A New Life in a Young Country (Image 1.3) apart from later immigration related documents produced after the economic liberalisation reforms of the 1980s, such as I Love NZ. So does my UK pension (Image 1.5) and Hong Huang in Queenstown (Image 1.6) pictured below.

Figure 2.0: “I love NZ. So does my UK pension.”
Pension transfer advertisement courtesy, The Dominion Post August 4, 2010.
The document displayed on the preceding page, *I Love NZ. So does my UK pension* (Figure 2.0) represents both a continuation of prior immigration trends, in addition to highlighting what I feel is an important ideological shift. There is a continuation in that the advertisement is targeting individual pensioners principally from the United Kingdom, which has been the largest group historically associated with migrating to New Zealand over the last hundred and fifty years. Such British affinity is made apparent in various ways such as the iconography of the Union Jack in the background, the name of the company: *Britannia Financial Services*, the use of the term ‘stonking,’ and the use of humour in the image with a reference to a ‘UK pension specifically. The pre-Rogernomics immigration literature as showcased in this chapter focused on emphasising a social democratic society rooted in a strong tradition of labour relations though the representations of New Zealand as having ‘high wages’ as illustrated in *A New Life in a Young Country: New Zealand* (Figure 1.8), and ‘Good Pay’ in *Emigrate to New Zealand* (Figure 1.7). This more contemporary immigration advertisement from 2010, highlight’s the ease of capital mobility, and the international transfer of wealth, as opposed to selling New Zealand as a workers paradise. The same is true for the Wakefield company poster from 1848, offering assisted passage which prompted labourers to make the journey to New Zealand (Figure 1.2), whereas this immigration related document: *I Love NZ. So does my UK pension* (Figure 2.0) is not promoting ‘work’ in any form.

The active recruitment and promotion of overseas retirement schemes has been an emerging theme in both the private and public sectors of many countries around the world including New Zealand, in the last twenty five years. This represents a shift, albeit slight in the thinking of many immigration regimes from around the world. Historically in the New Zealand context, ‘model’ migrants were actively selected on their perceived ability to contribute to society in terms of being an asset to the emerging workforce, in addition to their perceived assimilability (see discussions regarding the United Nations meeting in Havana (UNESCO 1956:2-4) in Chapter two). In the twenty first century, the recent polices such as the newly established New Zealand retirement visas have helped cater to and facilitate legal immigration channels for retirees to move to New Zealand. Introduced on March 10, 2010, the two new relatively recent retirement visas are meant to increase investment
and also to help stimulate the wider New Zealand economy. In the words of the current Minister of Immigration Jonathan Coleman:

The new Immigration Retirement Package delivers on one of National’s manifesto promises by enabling high income people of retirement age to come and live in New Zealand … This government is committed to the ongoing review and improvement of immigration to ensure we are maximising immigration’s contribution to economic growth (Coleman 2010:1).

In this way thinking about retirement packages as a means of attracting foreign investment represents a creative development in the history of New Zealand’s immigration policy. The ‘Rogernomics’ reforms during Fourth Labour government helped play an important part in facilitating and framing a broader economic policy which has had knock on effects such as the government sanctioned market-deregulation and with it the further propagation of capital mobility through new and flexible immigration régimes. This has increasingly led to an emerging theme in immigration circles which have begun to cater to individuals with large amounts of wealth and disposable income. This marks a substantial shift in the underlying ideological assumptions which have under pinned immigration historically in New Zealand.
Queenstown (Figure 2.1), as displayed above, is a document that among other things reflects a rather ‘postdevelopmental’ state strategy. It was produced by the New Zealand Department of Tourism, and displayed by New Zealand Trade & Enterprise through their website in conjunction with the Shanghai World Expo in 2010. This is a visually illuminating illustration of what I would consider to be an example of the post-Fourth Labour Government era. As the New Zealand state has ceded more of the instrumentalities associated with developmentalist protectionism, which served historically to protect collective aspirations which in the past were overtly marketed such as ‘high wages’ and ‘good pay’ so too have the documents changed. As has been highlighted in previous chapters and in examples of earlier documents, such as A New Life in a Young Country: New Zealand, and ‘Emigrate to New Zealand, a much more flexible contemporary programme is taking shape while the state still maintains control over immigration policy and national sovereignty.
In his essay, “The Rise of the Brand State,” Peter Van Hamm (2001) makes the point that states, cities, and various regions are now choosing to market themselves professionally through aggressive sales strategies to attract investment and business. Image and reputation become increasingly important as countries attempt to leverage their ‘brand’ in a truly global political economy. Countries such as New Zealand are increasingly representing themselves in niche ways, such as promoting New Zealand as a “pure,” clean, green country (Tarrant and Kirk 2010:23). In this respect nationalism as a marketing aesthetic is not only well-suited with liberal capitalism in the case of New Zealand; it can help facilitate its expansion into new and emerging sectors and societies (True 2005:204). Queenstown (Figure 2.1), does just this. It represents the further commodification of New Zealand as a place with the ‘best environment’ for would be migrants, holiday makers and investors. The fact that this document is also being used in conjunction with the Shanghai World’s Expo and is explicitly targeting ‘Chinese’ nationals is of historical significance in its own right. As far as I can tell, no government document comparable to this one has ever been produced in New Zealand for immigration purposes which actively sought to attract Chinese migrants before the Rogernomics reforms, the Review of Immigration Policy (Burke 1986) and the passing of the 1987 Immigration Act. This is in itself significant given the historical restrictions put in place against ‘Asiatics’ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Neoliberal New Zealand and the de-Ethnicisation of the State

The neoliberal reforms in the 1980s in the course of the economic restructuring and the adoption of ‘free-market’ principles have helped play a significant role in shaping the regimes that regulate and promote immigration in New Zealand. The state’s ideology has shifted, and this has had consequences on questions surrounding citizenship in New Zealand. Arguably these changes could be seen as a ‘progressive force,’ in the sense that when it comes to someone’s ethnic origin or nationality, ‘race’ is no longer necessarily a detriment or a prerequisite. And given the omnipresence of the ‘market-state’ today after the Rogernomics reforms, it compels us to rethink the categories of the ‘nation-state’, ‘culture’, ‘identity’, and
even ‘modernity’, in terms of the current political and ideological climate given way to new and emerging possibilities. The imagined community that is New Zealand is being produced and reproduced under a fairly recent economic climate where the forces of global capitalism are having an impact on immigration policy.

Selective immigration policies and ethnically based citizenship laws, which were for a time quite prevalent throughout Western states between the late nineteenth century into the early second half of the twentieth century were key instruments of the developmentalist or ‘high modernist’ state (Scott 1998:87-102). Governments sought to recruit and construct similar arrangements as part of a larger nation-building exercise (Joppke 2003:437). This is highlighted by the fact that a government report was issued on the Cultural Integration of Immigrants in New Zealand which was presented in 1956 in Havana, at the Conference on the Cultural Integration of Immigrants which supports the idea that a ‘nation-building’ process was talking place (UNESCO 1956). With the emergence of the post-war era and the spread of universal human rights the high-modernist state’s basis came under threat in many regions. Nation-building became self-limiting and liberal norms helped play a larger role in constraining what states could do legally in the immigration and citizenship policy arena. In the New Zealand context, the Rogernomics reforms during the 1980s also coincided with the introduction of a points-based immigration system which also official ended preferential treatment of peoples of British decent or nationality. This represented an important turning point because it marked a ‘de-ethnicisation’ of the state (Joppke 2003). The decoupling of ethnic nation-building as an official priority helped to play a ‘self-limiting’ role with regard to the state’s ability to ‘nation-build’ in a liberal state framework (Kymlicka 2001). And this is reflected in immigration materials produced after the Fourth Labour Government.

When it comes to the landscape aesthetics of Queenstown (Figure 2.1), it can be assumed that ‘race’ is considered irrelevant to individual preference; unless it could be shown that there is some meaningful cultural affinity which corresponds to the specific viewer in a meaningful way (Bourassa 1991: 97). Queenstown (Figure 2.1) relies heavily on the use of a ‘pure’ picturesque landscape to situate the viewer, in addition to showing a map of New Zealand with a precise location of Queenstown. Familiarity with a setting or place can be an important factor in influencing perception. The same can be said about A New Life in a Young Country: New Zealand as has been discussed in Regulatory Control in New Zealand. This is
especially the case when the specific location in question elicits an affinity with the viewer, granted different groups of people can perceive things in different ways.

During the 1980s, a study was conducted on the preferences for Virgin Islands landscapes where upon it was discovered that the Virgin Islanders did not necessarily think that hotels or apartment buildings detracted from the scenic quality of sandy beaches (Zube and Pitt 1981). Like pollution or rubbish, other groups in the same study such as Yugoslavians and Americans perceived such man made structures unfavourably. This would support the notion that different groups can have dissimilar perceptions when viewing the same landscape. Given that cultural differences can take shape, it does appear that the ‘dimensions of familiarity’ and or ‘expertise’ involved in landscape aesthetics and buildings captures by and large the majority of what is most significant about cultural variations in the first place (Bourassa 1991: 109). One of the ‘selling points’ of Queenstown (Figure 2.1) is that the scenic image does not even assume or rely upon the viewer having experienced Queenstown first hand. Anyone with access to the internet can scour the world-wide web for information. And such armchair experiences, either done virtually or materially experienced through travelogues or at displays at a World Fair, all help to produce indirect knowledge of locales.

Thus the iconography of Queenstown (Figure 2.1), appears to have a global appeal, one which likely appeals to many people, including the actor in the Queenstown travel advertisement who would like to move to Queenstown one day if she ever left Beijing because it has the best environment of any place she has ever been. One does not have to be an ‘insider’ in so much as they have literally experienced first hand a physical connection with the landscape to have formed a sense of what it means to be familiar to a place given the ability to produce ones own indirect knowledge materially. Anyone can have their own opinions, yet seldom is there an attempt to analytically link actual intuitions of state power such as the Department of Labour, Tourism, Foreign Affairs, with the larger ideological forces at play. Capitalism, the state and the transnational networks which help facilitate the movement of people and money like Britannia Financial Services, and the Department of Labour, aid and create forms of cultural reproduction of the ‘nation’ through their documents. These historical ‘documents’ play an important and illuminating role in deciphering cultural history in New Zealand.
Recent Developments in the Market-State.

The marketing of our business migration package will target key OECD markets including the United Kingdom and the United States. We’re also looking at the major developing markets in India and Southeast Asia. - Hon. Dr. Colman, Minister of Immigration: *Govt makes it a lot easier for the rich to get NZ passports.* New Zealand Herald. May 7, 2011.

A prominent and reoccurring theme throughout this work has been the notion that the reforms carried out during the Fourth Labour Government during the 1980s has helped to play a role in a larger ideological shift within the broader governmental framework of New Zealand. This has been documented widely with respect to economic and social polices (Bollard 1994; Easton 1989, 1997; Dalziel and Lattimore 2004; Kelsey 1997; Quiggin 1998; Silverstone et al. 1996; Starke 2008). However such changes have had substantial effects indirectly on contemporary immigration policy with consequences for the making of a citizenry, as the quote by the current Minister of Immigration illustrates compared to the developmentalist phase of the post-war period. The government of New Zealand is actively marketing migration packages overseas in the hopes of enticing migrants to New Zealand’s shores. While this relatively recent trend is very much geared towards what I would call the a neoliberal ‘market-state’, there are other immigration streams which still reflect pathways to residency whose impetus is not so obviously economically driven.

As was made clear to me repeatedly during my fieldwork in Wellington interviewing immigration officials, 60 percent of new migrants come from the skilled migrant stream, 30 percent are part of family reunification deals where English language requirements are not required, and 10 percent come from the business and investment stream. Nevertheless, even skilled migrants which make up the largest group of new immigrants on a year by year basis still conform to an overall policy framework that takes into consideration the domestic labour market and other economic factors. This gives the impression that the overall immigration policy is more or less politically cohesive. In December 2003 a selection system for skilled migrants was introduced in New Zealand to screen prospective immigrants and this came into effect in 2004. On 1 July 2003 in the following statement, the Hon. Lianne Dalziel, the then Minster of Immigration announced that it would be, ‘the most
significant change in immigration policy for more than a decade’ (Dalziel 2003:1). During the Minister’s remarks she summed up the new skilled migrant category with the following remarks Dalziel cited in (Bedford and Ho 2010:6-7):

Instead of lodging applications for residence, potential migrants will, in the future, register an expression of interest, based on the existing pre-requisites of health, character and English language. In order to register, a minimum number will be expanded to include bonus points, for example by meeting a specific skill shortage or having a skilled job offer in a region outside of Auckland. This does not mean Auckland misses out either. It means that Auckland’s needs drive skilled migration to Auckland.

Those who register their interest will be pooled, and those achieving the highest level of points will be invited to apply for residence. Where no invitation to apply has been issued by the end of the registration period, the registration will lapse. This will probably occur quarterly.

Once an application for residence is lodged, two streams will emerge. The first stream will consist of those who have already demonstrated that they can settle and do well here. For example, they may have successfully studied or worked in New Zealand, or they have a skilled job offer, which demonstrates that a New Zealand employer has made that assessment. People in this stream will flow through residence.

The second stream will consist of those who have not yet demonstrated their ability to settle in New Zealand, as in the first steam. The majority of these will be managed through a two year work-to-residence programme, rather than gaining residence outright. This will enable them to demonstrate their ability to settle and gain relevant employment. This essentially means that they carry the risk of not achieving this outcome rather than the New Zealand welfare system that has had to meet the cost of
failure until now. … The most significant aspect of these changes is that those potential migrants, who best meet New Zealand’s needs, will be at the top of the list for the invitation to apply, and those with the demonstrated ability to settle here, particularly those with a skilled, relevant job offer, will have a fast track to residence.

The minister’s comments are important because it shows that within the skilled migrant steam, there is still in this neoliberal era an active government role being played in the management or governmentality of new migrant applicants during the immigrant vetting process. In the words of the Department of Labour (2008:9), the reforms ‘shift[ed] immigration policy from the passive acceptance of residence applications to the active selection of skilled migrants’ (Bedford and Ho 2010:2). Thus, the term ‘market-state’ in this unfolding neo-liberal era is still applicable given that market demand is a major factor in the skilled migrant residency approval stream. Even though there is increasingly an impetus being placed on labour market performance, there is still a legacy which has a collectivist undertone, a ‘nation-based’ precedence per se within the migration streams. Proportionately, the majority of skilled migrants, international humanitarian refugees and family renunciation deals make up the majority of new migrants to New Zealand on an annual basis. Yet refugees and dependant family members do not typically personify model economic migrants. So the fact that these streams are open signifies that there are other factors at play besides strictly economics. Cultural and political factors do still play a role in immigration policy.

A History of the Business and Investor Migrant Schemes

Given the importance economic logic plays in current government policy, it is now quite apparent that market-based admission polices govern immigration procedures. Before 1978, New Zealand’s immigration policy targeted immigrants who came primarily from Britain, and immigrants with needed labour skills were the driving impetus of immigration policy. The first formal business policy was introduced in 1978 and intended to establish a mechanism for immigrants who wished
to invest in the country, providing a clear way to establish a business regardless of their prior country of origin (Clydesdale 2008:129). Since 1978, immigration policy in New Zealand has been adjusted and modified on multiple occasions. Key reforms regarding business migration have taken place since its introduction in 1991; and again in 1995, 1999 and 2005.

![Table 2.0 2007, Immigration Act Review: Active Investor Migrant Policy, p.3-4. By permission of Crown copyright fair use terms and conditions.](image)

The 1991 legislation introduced a new migration category specifically for the business migration stream. This created the first official immigration ‘investment category’. It was meant to foster and attract potential migrants who could add to New Zealand’s ‘human capital’ and in the process help to contribute to New Zealand’s overall economic growth. In 1995 a review of the relatively new investor migrant scheme concluded that roughly 85% of the investments in this category were passive investments (NZIS 2002: 15). Politically, the early nineties also gave rise to xenophobic outbursts over a perceived ‘Asian invasion’ (Farmer 1996). One notable area of political debate were the so-called “astronaut” immigrants who brought their children to New Zealand, but returned themselves to their home country, thus ‘depriving the nation’ of the skills or human capital that the immigration policy was designed to attract and assumed they were meant to be contributing domestically (Ho 2002; Clydesdale 2008). These political issues would eventually lead to further
restrictions being imposed on new investor migrants which included a stronger demonstration of English language requirements for potential residences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Māori</th>
<th>Pacific Peoples</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Total NZ population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2,879,085</td>
<td>523,374</td>
<td>202,236</td>
<td>173,502</td>
<td>3,618,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,871,432</td>
<td>526,281</td>
<td>231,801</td>
<td>238,176</td>
<td>3,737,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,609,589</td>
<td>565,329</td>
<td>265,974</td>
<td>354,549</td>
<td>4,027,947</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% change (1996-2006) -9.4% 8.0% 31.5% 104.2% 11.3%

Table 3.0 Badkar, J. and Tuya, C. 2010. ‘The Asian workforce: a critical part of New Zealand’s current and future labour market.’ Department of Labour, Wellington: Table 1 by permission of Crown copyright fair use terms and conditions.

The Global Competition for High-net Worth Individuals

The more restrictive English language requirements adopted during the middle of the nineties went on to be softened during a succession of changes in 1998, 2000, and 2001 (Clydesdale 2008:130). This was all taking place during a profoundly new geo-political era, of great competition internationally for a finite number of prospective business migrants, and high net worth individuals. States around the world have started competing with one another to attract as many ‘high-end’ migrants as possible. An increased competition from other countries such as the United States, Canada, South Africa, Singapore, Australia, and Ireland among others, helped in part to influence New Zealand policy makers and stakeholders to be more competitive in attracting wealthy business migrants (NZIS 2002). This global perception of competition has helped to modify policy in order to increase the perceived opportunities afforded to the New Zealand state. Such a policy priority is furthered materially and economically by the production of documents, advisements, and increasingly flexible visa regimes which help to attract and enticed ‘suitable’ investment migrants to come to New Zealand. This has implications because it is changing the way that governments feel ‘a sense of competition’ between other countries in the international arena. Rather than the New Zealand state playing a passive role during this period of ‘globalization’, it is playing an active role in the
recruitment of targeted migration programs, and the business migrant schemes are a good example of this.

With respect to the investor migrant category specifically, between 1999 and 2002, this group accounted for the largest number of migrant arrivals in the business immigration stream into New Zealand. There were in total 6,216 people and 1,822 applicants who came under this business category (Clydesdale 2008:131). Only six percent of those who applied were declined, and many immigration agents saw this programme at the time as one of the simplest routes for residency in New Zealand for those migrants who had the means to simply “buy residence” (NZIS 2002:122). The majority at this time were migrants from China and Taiwan. However as the table below highlights, of all the residency categories offered, investor migrants had the highest rates of non-arrivals to New Zealand, roughly 18% between 2002 and 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence approval category</th>
<th>Approvals</th>
<th>Non-arrivals</th>
<th>Non-arrival rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skilled/Business</td>
<td>179,888</td>
<td>4,951</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investor</td>
<td>7,743</td>
<td>1,369</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>196,725</td>
<td>6,504</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International/Humanitarian</td>
<td>30,353</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent and Sibling/Adult Child Stream</td>
<td>36,322</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncapped Family Sponsored Stream</td>
<td>63,344</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>326,744</td>
<td>9,296</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3 People approved for residence who did not arrive in New Zealand to take up residence, by residence approval category, 2002/03-2008/09.

Table 4.0 Migration Trends & Outlook 2009/2010. IMSED Research: Department of Labour, Wellington. Reproduced by permission of Crown copyright fair use terms and conditions.

The arrival of business immigration in New Zealand and its spread globally onto the world stage over the last thirty odd years marks a period in which many states around the world are actively participating in the management of global flows of migrants through their competitive business and investment immigration policies. Whereas historically at least in New Zealand like many other countries race, ethnicity and mobility nationality had at one time been the basis of discrimination or privilege,
in this globalised era, with globalised financial linkages and vibrant human rights discourse, outright legal discrimination has been increasingly abolished in many countries around the world.

In an interview with an official in 2010 at the Department of Internal Affairs, when asked about the distinction between a permanent resident and a citizen in New Zealand given the visibility of both in the early part of the twenty first century, I was told that in his estimation there is essentially, ‘no difference for most people’ (Interview, Wellington, July 2010). He went on to say that, ‘in Australia, they want you to be a citizen or bugger off,’ where as in New Zealand, ‘the government does not care because no one is fussing’. The people who do go on after being a permanent resident in New Zealand for five years or more who choose to become New Zealand citizens do so, ‘for the heart, or for the wallet’. In the judgment of this government employee, migrants who came to New Zealand during the 1950s ‘did not care about citizenship’ in the legal sense. He acknowledged that global travel patterns have changed recently and remarked that, ‘In the past it was quite difficult to travel to New Zealand, so the ones that came, stayed.’ More recently a trend has been for individuals to obtain formal New Zealand citizenship as a means to go to Australia. The government looks down on this course of action, while acknowledging that it is hard to police even though the New Zealand government considers it a form of deception.

One of the more interesting observations from the statistical data on the Investor migrant stream in New Zealand is the rapid decline in terms of the volume of investor migrants between 2005 and 2009, as the following tables emphasize. The figures have increased to some extent between 2009 and 2010. Between 2009 and 2010, 56 investors gained residency through the investor migrant stream (IMSED 2010:70). This represents an increase of nearly 70%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,958</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,236</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number who gained residence</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,494</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,101</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,361</strong></td>
<td><strong>538</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
<td><strong>87</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Labour
A Growth Industry?

The movement of people in New Zealand is big business. Annually it is thought that new migrants add $1.9 billion, tourists approximately $9 billion and international students more than $2 billion in foreign exchange on average. According to the current Minister of Immigration, ‘Given these compelling figures, my number one priority has been to ensure immigration is contributing to the Government’s economic growth agenda’ (Tan 2011:1).

When I asked an official at the Department of Labour if there was an explanation for the drop off in investor migrants I was told that 2005 was an important year because the Labour Government in power during this period made it harder for business migrants because the government at the time, “had an ideological issue with buying residency,” whereas the point was made that such fears were, “not an issue with the National Party” in the successor government (Interview, Wellington, August 2010). This was achieved through the tightening of the English language requirements and increasing the level of capital for business migrants. Contemporary
immigration changes are not always completely economically driven. Under the John Key led government ‘buying residency,’ in the words of the government employee ‘is not an issue with the National Party’ (Department of Labour, August 2010). Another plausible explanation for the reduction in investor migrants over the last five years could be that more and more countries have begun to introduce similar migrant programs and this has lead to increased competition among governments for this limited quantity of capital rich migrants.

In New Zealand there are currently two investor migrant categories. The investor 1 category: “Investor Plus” and the investor 2 category: the “Investor” group. Someone wishing to obtain residency in New Zealand through the investor 2 category is required to be 65 years of age or under. They must also have a minimum of three years business experience, have NZ$1.5 million worth of funds invested in New Zealand over the period of four years, come from an English language background country or demonstrate a score of 3 or more on the International English Language Testing System (IELTS) in addition to spending 146 days in the country in each of the last three years of the four year investment period. This is in addition to health and character requirements. Someone with more capital wishing to obtain residency in New Zealand through the Investor Plus scheme has no age requirements, no business experience requirements, no English language requirements and applicants only need to spend 44 days in New Zealand in each of the last two years of the three-year NZ$10 million investment period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Permanent Residency</th>
<th>Visa Type</th>
<th>Proof of Assets*</th>
<th>Investment Required*</th>
<th>Voting Rights*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Subclass 165</td>
<td>$1,166,292.58</td>
<td>$778,029.98</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>IMM 4000</td>
<td>$1,652,454.79</td>
<td>$831,254.80</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Admin Scheme</td>
<td>$14,262,027.37</td>
<td>$14,262,027.37</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>CIES</td>
<td>$1,296,413.44</td>
<td>$1,296,413.44</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Admin Scheme</td>
<td>$427,854.56</td>
<td>$427,854.56</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>MM2H</td>
<td>$195,122.39</td>
<td>$395,077.54</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Investor 2</td>
<td>$1,158,444.12</td>
<td>$1,158,444.12</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Investor Visa</td>
<td>$160,000.00</td>
<td>$160,000.00</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>GIP</td>
<td>$793,386.41</td>
<td>$793,386.41</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
<td>Yes + Citizenship</td>
<td>SIDF</td>
<td>$350,000.00*</td>
<td>$350,000.00*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>B Permit</td>
<td>$539,857.43</td>
<td>$539,857.43</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Tier 1 Investor</td>
<td>$1,633,145.81</td>
<td>$1,224,856.87</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EB-5</td>
<td>$500,000.00</td>
<td>$500,000.00</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.0 Residency though Investment © Scofield 2011.

http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/kits(guides/4000E.PDF
http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/WP09000012

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The chart above *Residency through Investment* (Scofield 2011), represents the commodification of citizenship and residency taking place globally in 2011. This highlights the way in which countries are actively competing to attract investor migrants. These figures are constantly being amended and altered to fit domestic political agendas; however the fact that so many migration options on the chart occupy a price range of around USD$500,000 to USD$1,200,000 leads this author to conclude that the dollar figures reflect in part, broader international trends and prices.\(^{53}\) New Zealand is unique in that it is one of a relatively exclusive group of countries that allows investor migrants who obtain permanent residency full voting rights. This potential selling point was not a reform carried out at a means to entice migrants; rather it is a unique product of New Zealand’s historical background as discussed to in Chapter one. It is worth remembering that there is great diversity within government policy internationally. Some countries do not have residency programs you can literally ‘buy’. Other countries do not even allow for dual citizenship. In an era of global economic deregulation, states still have and exercise their agency. New Zealand does not ‘sell’ passports to the degree some other countries do, such as St. Kitts & Nevis where a USD$ 200,000 donation to the ‘Sugar Industry Diversification Foundation’ buys a legal passport with citizenship in 90 days (SIDF 2011:1).

The possession of capital has increasingly become more and more important as countries regulate foreign citizens’ freedom of movement which can effect the chances at legal foreign travel or settlement. Gone are the days of substantial subsidised or free government assisted passages. This is especially true in wake of a post-9/11 political climate where boarder security is ever more regulated. The

\(^{53}\)Like tax arbitrage, ‘value for money’ would appear to be a ‘push and pull’ factor for investor migrants.
Immigration Act of 2009, the largest revision of the 1987 Immigration Act is a testament to enhanced boarder security measures. That is not to say that one needs to necessarily ‘be wealthy’ to move abroad given that there are in New Zealand family immigration schemes, refugee quotas, and skilled migrant channels available. But by and large, ‘skilled migrants’ and obviously ‘investor migrants’ will be required to have a certain level of funding either for their education or the processing fees associated with their residency application, and this will effect some peoples ‘choices’. Fee structures have increased over the years as user pay systems have pushed the cost increasingly on to ‘clients’. One of the points mentioned to me in an interview with an immigration representative of a political party in New Zealand was that arguably the move to a points based immigration system has in actuality helped marginalize the legal opportunity of many migrants from the Pacific region who do not have the educational background to be eligible to move to New Zealand under the ‘skilled migrant’ stream. So while the new points based system is ‘more fair’ in that there is no formal preferencing taking place with respect to nationality, class has become a deciding factor that is often overlooked when assessing regulatory regimes.

As the state attempts to lure ‘homo economicus’ (Ley 2003:437) with the snare of residency or citizenship in return for their capital or entrepreneurial activity it is also engaging actively with the culture of the market. Potential migrants or ‘clients’ as they are referred to in many New Zealand bureaucratic agencies, optimise neoliberal globalisation. The state is not being ‘sidelined’. The state remains a prominent figure and a centre of the immigration process, helping to negotiate the legal terms and conditions between the free movement of capital and the capacities of countries and their citizens and non-citizens alike.
Conclusion

Immigration policy in New Zealand has undergone many changes since the Treaty of Waitangi. Describing in detail each and every policy was not the goal of this research. Collectively these changes have affected not only the meaning of ‘citizenship’ and immigration policy in a legalistic sense, but also the aesthetic components of immigration related documents produced both by the state and the private sector over the decades. How the state promotes ‘model migrant’s’ and conceptions of ‘the nation’ historically though immigration literature becomes increasingly interesting when they are viewed as reservoirs of cultural history. New Zealand’s unique history has helped to shape it in a distinctly kiwi fashion, and this is reflected visually and textually through the multiple immigration related documents displayed throughout this work.

What began as rather sporadic early European settlement of New Zealand soon went on to become for some an attractive business venture for capitalists, speculators, and individuals seeking a more promising life abroad. Given this, New Zealand witnessed the emergence of a local citizenship, which generally speaking can be said to have existed within a larger supranational pan British identity (Gellner 1983; Pearson 2004). Even though formal legal ‘citizenship’ did not come into existence in New Zealand until after the Second World War (Hansen 1999; McMillan 2005), in the cultural context, there was a de facto linking of British-ness in the ‘ethnic’ sense with that of the state (Kaufmann 2005). This was effectively decoupled during the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s, when preferential treatment of selected foreign nationals came to an end and a points system was introduced. Before these reforms, and it was largely the labouring classes which were being promoted and recruited to come to New Zealand via advisements and emigration posters. Spurred on by posters such as the (Image 1.1), ‘Emigrate to New Zealand, on the AJAX’ put out by the Wakefield Company in 1848, many emigrants made the long journey. Although both public and private emigration schemes that were designed to ‘help’ populate New Zealand, this also reflected an active ‘nation-building’ project quite literally, by promoting the populating of New Zealand with Europeans migrants.

The allure of receiving a good job, good pay and a good living were still being represented in government produced immigration documents even after the post
World War II period when ‘New Zealand Citizenship’ was established legally and the idea of the ‘nation’ was actively being promoted through programs such as army education programs which promoted civic engagement (Brickell 2010). The documents were ‘selling’ self transformation. The advent of color imagery greatly facilitated this visually in addition to technological innovations which have helped lead to more creative and cheaper ways of creating and distributing immigration related imagery and information.

As described in Chapter 3, the reforms carried out during the 1980s by the Fourth Labour Government played a major role in the transformation of the ideological and regulatory environment that immigration policy occupies in New Zealand. Not only did the economic reforms have profound effects on the economy, but they also had major implications on social well being and the overall culture of New Zealand. The neoliberal reforms helped directly (Hayek 1948) or indirectly (Buchanan 1979) in shifting the terrain of government policy away from looking at society through a developmentalist world view, where egalitarianism and social welfare were a motivating factor, to a more market-based system where the government attempted to play a substantially less active role in the day to day intervention of the national economy. As immigration policy has changed over the decades in New Zealand so too has there been a reorganisation of elements within the immigration policies of the state. This has had implications on immigration policy and notions of citizenship.

Sentimental Citizenship

During interviews with research participants in government, quite often references would be made to the various ‘streams’ which immigrants and tourists alike are channelled in terms of visa categories. This is a good analogy because like streams, questions of identity, political persuasion and worldviews surrounding identity all take on many different guises depending on the individual in question (Pearson & Sedgwick 2010). In the New Zealand context, just as the populace has changed legally from subjects to citizens in a rather gradual way, the rise of the permanent resident too has come to be seen in some quarters as being almost
interchangeable with that of formal citizenship in the beginning of the 21st century. Since the passing of the New Zealand Citizenship Act 1977, which still remains in effect as of 2011, the main obstacle to membership in the New Zealand political community has been immigration, not formal citizenship (McMillan 2004:280).54 The neoliberal reforms which began during the Fourth Labour Government have also brought about new immigration visas and streams which sought to actively attract business and investor migrants. This represents a new development in the history of New Zealand’s immigration policy and potently calls into question the primacy of formal legal citizenship in New Zealand. This apparent ‘commodification of citizenship’, or at least the ability for foreign nationals to affectively purchase residency, raises pertinent questions about the power of the state and the people who are associated with it as New Zealand moves forward into the future.

54 There are some minor differences, such as only New Zealand Citizens can run for parliament.
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