Impact of Measurement
And Accountability on
Non Government Organisation
Social Work Practice

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ABSTRACT

This is a study of a Non Government Organisation’s (NGO) experience of funding contracts with the government to provide social services.

In a general situation of increasing NGO frustration with narrowly based financial silo contracts, this community based NGO was able negotiate a new form of an outcome based, integrated contract. In contrast to conventional liberal, welfare state or third way (‘partnership’) theories such integrated contracts required an expanded form of broad based multiple accountability, to all stakeholders. The achievement of such accountability was explored in focus group interviews with the Otago Youth Wellness Trust (OYWT) to examine the experience of the NGO stakeholders and the resulting successes and frustrations.

The NGO was able to create a new model of contract but ultimately frustrated in carrying this contract through into the performance of accountability relationships. Analysis identified the importance of power analysis in explaining this outcome. While a unified professional viewpoint was able to establish the leverage to initially develop the contractual relationship, it has struggled to sustain it in a situation of sole accountability to the government as funder.

It is argued that integrated accountability must rest on shared accountability to all stakeholders and mutual accountability between them. Specific broad and multiple forms of audit are required to implement such accountability. It is categorically recommended that the NGO actively engage with its community stakeholders to develop such shared accountability mechanisms and processes.
PREFACE

My interest in this study was to develop some practitioner research that looked at how the influence of funding and auditing impacted on social service delivery in the Non Government Organisation (hereafter referred to as NGO) sector.

My background has been one of working in community service social work delivery for the last 13 years. Over this time the impacts of obtaining Government funding on delivering social services in the community sector has become more evident to me. This has led to a series of personal questions about the impact of funding and accountability on how social work is defined, how to remain true to organisational philosophy and to whom the work should be accountable. The accountability model that seems to exist currently is an expectation of fiscal accountability in one direction to funders - but not to the social service clients.

The organisation for which I currently work has been involved in developing an integrated contract with the New Zealand Government in order to minimise the impact on service delivery of producing multiple reports on the same sets of outcomes to essentially the same funding body (i.e. Government). The aim of the organisation that impressed me was their philosophy of social service practice as the basis for developing the funding and framework of their contract; rather than funding being the determining factor of service delivery of the organisation. I was also curious to see if the same thinking, of philosophy determining service delivery versus funding requirements, was operating from practitioners, managers and the board of this NGO in accordance with their differing roles.

In reading Fook’s (2001) work on reflexive critical theory in research and social work my attention was drawn to engage in research that observed current social work practice – in particular examining influences in social work practice. This research provided a way to explore the growing theme in the social service sector of the influence of funding and accountability (e.g. auditing) on social service delivery. In this area I was interested in the growing NGO capacity and increased skills and resources in the community. Specifically I was interested in an emerging theme that Government seems to be more and more reliant on this NGO capacity to deliver essential services. The power dynamics in these
relationships seem to be coming increasingly important in determining the future of NGOs and consequently the services they deliver.

In connection with this research, a big question was emerging regarding the influence of funding and auditing on social work practice and the accountability flow of this work. As noted above, there appears to be plenty of fiscal accountability upwards to funders (as seems reasonable) but not so much accountability downwards to community and clients. How does this misalignment get addressed when the people holding NGOs accountable do not seem to have the expertise or experience required to audit work in this area of community social services? What are the power dynamics at work and what is the place of collaborative, partnership work where the Government wants these relationships with community organisations to deliver services they do not directly provide but need to have working? Beyond this the ultimate question remains: how do these power dynamics affect the people and communities the Government and NGOs seek to serve?
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter One</strong> Otago Youth Wellness Trust: A Non Government Organisation in Context</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context and Background</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Overview</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Era for NGO</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactions to Neo-Liberal Policy on NGOs</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding For Outcomes</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Challenges</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OYWT and Its Development</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginnings</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational Development</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Philosophy of OYWT</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Funding Contracts</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration versus Competition and Accountability</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Outcomes’ for Maori</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter Two</strong> Understanding Accountability and Power</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature Review</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty Context</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aotearoa/New Zealand and the Treaty Partnership</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining Accountability</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Accountabilities</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability of Community Agencies</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and Social Capital</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theories of Governance and Forms of Accountability</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Society Theory (1935-1980): Grant Funding</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Theory (1980’s- 2000) and Contracts</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Third Way (2000-): Partnership Agreements
Marxist/Socialist/Critical Theory:
   Class Accountability
   ‘Alternative’ Postmodern/Constructionist Theory:
      Participation
Assessment of Theories
   Impacts of Accountability
   Feasibility of Options
   Ethics and Accountability
   Constructivist as Most Useful Theory
Implementing a Constructivist Research Agenda
   for OYWT
   Operationalising Power
Formulation of Final Research Questions
Conclusion

**Chapter Three**  **Methodology of Research**  66

**Introduction**  66

**Research Aims**  66
   Insight and Depth Through Qualitative Methodology
   Interactive Engaged Research
   Kaupapa Maori Research

**Research Design**  70
   Case Study

**Sampling**  70
   Cross Sectional Case Study Research Design
   Sample
   Data Collection Techniques
   Focus Group Questions

**Research Process**  74
   Drawing the sample
   Focus Group Interview Process
   The Focus Group Interviews
   Data Analysis
   Interpreting Data for This Thesis
   Themes

**Credibility and Plausibility**  78

**Conclusion**  80

**Chapter Four**  **Results: Reflection on a Process**  81

**Introduction**  81

**OYWT Philosophy and Integrated Contracts**  82
INTRODUCTION

This research was designed in order to analyse NGO funding and its relationship with services and practices. Does funding shape the work or can the work shape the funding? Does the form of funding permit the development of effective community social work or does it involve the imposition of a Government institutional view, and is this less effective for social work? This thesis is about an emerging suggestion, based on a NGO experience, that social work practice and perceived community need are in conflict with what funders are endeavouring to account for. It appears that, in part, this conflict may be related to the aims of this particular NGO that are wider than what currently is able to be accounted for in traditional accounting funding terms. It is also likely that this NGO is not alone in this experience and so the lessons learned from this NGO will have wider implications.

This study aims to provide a representation of an experience by a NGO in managing an integrated service contract and the ways this does, and perhaps does not, work. This information will be useful in a number of ways; being able to provide a particular funding story and its implications for social work practice and pull out practical elements for use by other community organisations for funding contract development. Not least, this could also identify practical elements for use by Government departments in looking at funding community groups, funding design in community organisations, and the use of NGO expertise in evaluating programmes.

The study is carried out through a case study of an innovative and locally developed social service agency, the Otago Youth Wellness Trust (hereafter referred to as OYWT). The first chapter begins with an historical overview of how and why the organisation came about and examines the political and social context that enabled such a community organisation to develop. Secondly, in light of that, it examines the OYWT organisation’s development of a distinctive social work model. In this model there is a focus on collaborative work in all areas from administration to social service practice delivery to clients and how this affects its views of funding applications and funding evaluation. This resulted in the development of an innovative form of contracting with Government.

In Chapter Two there is a review of literature on accountability and power that identifies what influences the background of OYWT, funders, contracts and the impact on social service practice delivery. This chapter looks at the relevant literature covering the
accountability relationship of NGOs with its funders to theorise the approach and refine the initial research questions for community NGOs in a Treaty Context. Out of the consideration of a range of theoretical and empirical approaches to such accountability the chapter constructs an approach through the constructionist theorisation of accountability. This constructionist approach suggests that changes need to be based on multiple stakeholder input and control to be effective in meeting community NGO goals. The research questions for this study are based on ‘testing’ this approach specifically for OYWT.

Chapter Three looks at the methodology used to look at these questions of power and accountability as explored through a qualitative case study of the experience of OYWT in implementing and managing its funding contracts. The methodology of the research is also influenced by the culture of OYWT in terms of the value placed on collaboration and narrative explanations of data gathering to gain a human sense of how people are affected. This philosophy influences all that OYWT does, from contract development, board and management decisions to social service delivery and client experience. The OYWT gave permission at the Trust Board level for this research to be carried out. This is significant as the information sought ranged across the whole agency at an organisational level and not that of individual practice.

In order to achieve these aims a set of standard questions was developed and explored through a series of focus group interviews. The research method was intended as collaborative participative research in terms of a qualitative methodology. Participants’ permission was sought for this project, with involvement being voluntary. Again, as part of the collaborative methodology, participants’ review of information in the research has been sought and opportunity given to critique the information as the thesis has been developed.

Although a single case study, this research aims to illuminate processes that also may have wider applications. As part of the ethical approval for this research the Ngai Tahu Research Consultation Committee has suggested results may be of use to relevant funding organisations and themselves. The research attempts to highlight issues of relevance, where appropriate, that may be of use for these groups.
Chapter Four presents the discussions from focus group interviews that highlight the experience of OYWT in having an integrated contract and the issues around implementing and accounting for this work. The essential aspect of the research was to identify the impact that such funding approaches and audits have on actual service delivery to clients in terms of the research participants’ perspectives. From this review I wanted to see what recommendations could benefit other community and Government organisations in their respective areas. The findings of Chapter Four then provide the basis for proposed changes in NGO accountability.

A secondary consideration was to also evidence the OYWT journey towards integrated contract development with Government – its success and frustrations up to the point OYWT is now at in its work with this contract. From this point the research looks to see what is needed to keep such an integrated funding approach dream alive and developing to the next level. The potential answer to this may lie in the philosophy OYWT was developed from, and how the integrated approach and community support OYWT had in conception, can move from the contract development phase to the accountability (measurement/auditing) phase with funders.

In Chapter Five the responses from the interviews of Chapter Four have been combined and conclusions drawn from this information. The data was also explored to see if the vision of OYWT appears at all levels of operation, as this shared understanding across an organisation seems key for success, and the level of congruency of thought and practice is explored from the OYWT responses. In Chapter Five the results of the study are also discussed and analysed in terms of the research questions and seek to provide some guidance as to how more complete accountability might be achieved in the service of integrated practice.

The final, concluding chapter summarises the whole study and makes specific recommendations for changes in the systems of NGO accountability.
CHAPTER ONE

OTAGO YOUTH WELLNESS TRUST:
AN NGO IN CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a context around the development of Otago Youth Wellness Trust (hereafter referred to as OYWT) and its relationship with Government, in terms of the forces that currently shape Aotearoa New Zealand and the political climate. The focus is on Government funding approaches and the impact of these on social service delivery. In order to introduce the study and provide the necessary context this chapter provides the background to the changing political and funding environment in which contemporary Non Government Organisations (hereafter referred to as NGOs) now find themselves. It starts at the conception of OYWT to get a sense of the historical and political climates that preceded its formation and then follow the OYWT journey through the development of the organisation and its origins and aims, noting the experience of the NGO OYWT as part of the development of the ‘Integrated Contract’ and ‘PricewaterhouseCoopers’ model for Government/community partnership social service delivery.

CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

Historical Overview

To paraphrase Karl Marx, ‘people make history but they make it in terms not of their own choosing’. Behind the OYWT and its colleague organisations lies a history of the development and interaction of NGOs in a heavily state-led society such as New Zealand. An important background factor to Aotearoa New Zealand was the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. Processes of colonisation clearly have a direct impact on how this country has been shaped and have been closely associated with the development of the welfare state and the form of social assistance developed in Aotearoa/New Zealand (King, 2003). In respect to OYWT, the Treaty provides it with a base framework for practice in social service delivery.
Especially significant in this connection were the development of the strong central state and the abolition of provincial Government from the 1870s on. In the 1870s-1880s compulsory and free secular primary education was instigated (Brooking, 2004). As part of the same process, legislation was developed concerning the care of children from the 1880s-1890s (King, 2003) that led to the limiting of children’s working hours and safeguarded their right to education, controlled and managed through the central Government department of Education. Prior to this the charity model had been the most important source of services, through primarily religious charities, with an emphasis on moral and social value.

Alongside the changes relating to care of children came the suffrage movement and implementation of universal suffrage and the development of national citizenship entitlements (Brooking, 2004). The Widow’s pension was introduced along with an Old Age pension (Brooking, 2004). Some voluntary bodies continued and a few new ones developed, such as Plunket (Brooking, 2004), however the trend was for the voluntary sector to only operate around gaps in nationally provided state services. Such key political acts in the late 1800s and early 1900s give an idea of the historical influences that background such agencies as the OYWT. There has been a historical expectation created in this country that society will support those in need and the Government will have the key and leading role in this. This was a position unchallenged for almost 100 years, until the 1980s. The Treaty of Waitangi, by providing a constant (if not always recognised) reminder of the obligations of the Government (‘crown’) to the rights of Maori, also served to underpin the focus on central Government.

The societal expectation of support continued after WWI in 1914-1918 and through into the so called ‘great depression’ of the 1930’s with rationing, Returned Soldiers’ pensions and various supportive grants. From the 1935 election of the first Labour Government, the central state’s role was further developed into the formalised development of the Welfare State through the Michael Savage era (Brooking, 2004). Throughout the whole period however, NGOs developed in areas not covered by the state, and resulted in the development of groups such as the Crippled Children’s Society and the Intellectually Handicapped Children’s society. Also it was at this time that the Maori Women’s Welfare
League came into prominence. A major part of the role of these groups was to advocate for greater state support for their clientele.

The second wave of feminism in the 1970s was, as in the 1890s, a catalyst for further central state provision, including the Accident Compensation Act, the Domestic Purposes Benefit – a benefit for single parents, and a major review of the Social Security system seeking improved levels of state provision. Significantly, in the context of increasing recession in the late 1970’s, there was an increasing visibility in terms of Maori action for recognition of their rights under the Treaty. There was a land march to Wellington to highlight their concerns and later the Waitangi Tribunal was established (Brooking, 2004).

**New Era for NGOs**

In Alistair Barry’s documentary “A Civilised Society” (2007) he examines the mid-1980’s: the New Zealand (NZ) Labour Party coming to power and, paradoxically, the inaugurated neo-liberal policies that came into play under a leading minister of finance whose name was used as an identifier of their policies of ‘Rogernomics’. Deregulation became a catch phrase and the language of market forces and price efficiencies entered politics (Barry, 2007). Alongside this the Maori ‘cultural renaissance’ developed further. This was the first major reversal of growing central state provision since the 1890s and, continuing into the 1990s, neo-liberalism and the concept of user pays continued to grow as a political standpoint. In what was called the “mother of all budgets” the succeeding National party Government instigated massive cuts in benefit payments (Brooking, 2004). It also resulted in a deconstruction of Government control with many state owned services either becoming ‘state owned enterprises’ (to operate as private commercial operations) or going directly into private ownership (Craig & Larner, 2002).

In the social services a major impact resulted from the development of a ‘new managerialism’ approach to monitoring services - this was where services were awarded to the lowest bidders, but monitored via contract performance by Government (Craig & Larner, 2002) – the ‘big brother’ oversight. Many NGOs, formerly not directly responsible for delivery of services, and new NGO’s now became purchasers of the right to deliver services. Government provision was wound back and NGO development encouraged, with social services now being run as businesses. Many small organisations developed to the
point of running from contract to contract even though they were enterprises that traditionally have not earned on a profit basis, having come from a charity model of revenue. It is in the shadow of this political and service development background that, in 1996, OYWT was formed and has grown to the present.

Until the mid-1970s, the welfare model in Aotearoa/New Zealand was an interaction of Government with community and an idea of partnership. Craig and Larner (2002) assert that what happened next, in the introduction of the neo-liberal model, led to significant damage to existing models of partnership with Government. From the late 1990s many NGOs that diversified to utilising Government contracts were counting the cost of such a shift. This was due to an expectation in such contracts that money will come from the community as well as Government in order to fund services. In these contracts it is often not clear whether the Government funding will be sustainable or sufficient to run services. As Craig and Larner (2002) suggest, the expertise and responsibility for managing social issues has been transferred from Government and is now contracted out to NGOs. These organisations began to operate in a privatised manner, different to many of their charitable, not for profit origins. NGOs realise that information and social services are a commodity and adages such as ‘community’ or ‘social capital’ are gaining strength and fiscal recognition. There is a growing realisation also that the Government needs information and services from NGOs in order to be able to deliver the services Government has been elected to oversee.

**Reactions to Neo-Liberal Policy on NGOs**

Craig and Larner (2002) suggest that the beginning of neo-liberalism was devastating for the existing collaborative initiatives in the community. A clear result of this, they claim, was a legacy of fragmentation, interagency suspicion and short term contracting which affected the long term collaborative approach to services. They see the Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party Report, of 2002, as a key document to voice the outrage and bitterness of the community/voluntary sector towards Government and the neo-liberal influence of its policy directives. There was shared feeling, as identified by Craig and Larner, about the negative impact of competitive short term contracting approaches by Government. OYWT, as part of the voluntary/community sector, was one of these voices
that welcomed the resulting formal statement of intent from Government. This statement set out attitudes and behaviour principles expected of Government. However while this report outlined these principles there is no sense, from within the community sector, of experiencing improving attitudes – even now, seven years on from the original report.

The result of the neo-liberal, capitalist environment is that private organisations (NGOs) are putting pressure on contracts with Government. This view seems to assert that if a service is wanted the money needs to be invested. This further leads to the view that adequate pay is needed to maintain skilled workers and desired outcomes – these outcomes therefore cannot be gained on under funding.

Ironically, within the development of this New Public Management and contractualism Craig and Larner (2002) show that the seeds were sown for local partnership. Craig and Larner (2002) claim that, within the new ethos of neo-liberalism, ideas of audit, contractualism, terminology of ‘consumer’, ‘client’ and ideas from the corporate world of human resource principles and performance criteria, that individual contracts took over from collectives, unions and grassroots initiatives and were antagonistic to ideas of partnership and Government responsibility. “Silo operations” gained in prevalence with further delineation of work in public servant roles through ideas of managerialism from direct elected government management. This seemed to result in a lessening of abilities to work across departments as a resulting growing of bureaucracy and ‘fiscal patch protection’; while in the community sector there was an emphasis on the importance of generic knowledge and collaborative skills to be involved in working in the community. This seems to suggest that there was increased movement of specialist people between private and public sectors. Craig and Larner use Robert Reich’s (2001) definition to define these professionals as “strategic brokers who combine the knowledge of what’s possible with knowledge about what clients might need” (2002: p14). As they bartered their knowledge, the public sector lost generic knowledge across sectors which left the community sector being the dominant holders of this knowledge (Craig & Larner, 2002).

These people and community groups had moved through the 1980s and 1990s and gained political experience and knowledge power through the 1990s to emerge as ‘professionals in local partnerships’. This put the professionals in local partnerships in the position of
having the knowledge to mediate, facilitate and manage the complex areas of negotiation between Government and community (Craig & Larner, 2002: pp14-26). There appears to be a view, from such documents as the Community and Voluntary Working Party (2001), that it is seen as necessary by community to bring back social accountability of Government to the communities and society it was there to serve. A way to do this is through the expertise gained by these ‘strategic brokers’. OYWT's experience seems to reflect this idea of growing expertise in an organisation through gaining political knowledge and stamina, and growing from community need and action. Since the formation there has been a need to keep lobbying at a political level to have policy and funding address the issues in a sustainable and realistic fashion. Partnership models have also been seen as a force for the promotion of rights of Maori as tangata whenua (Craig & Larner, 2002). This has led to an arena of political power that brings back into focus the Treaty of Waitangi and rights of implementation, not only nationally but locally. Craig and Larner (2002: p20) claim this has enabled further moves away from the “assimilationist and integrationist assumptions of earlier social policy formulations” (Larner, 2001) regarding Maori.

**Funding For Outcomes**

Now with a growing sense of political power and knowledge in the third sector (community) there is a gathering emphasis and insistence, through local partnerships with Government, that qualities such as ‘honesty, trust, recognition of diversity, integrity, compassions and caring’ (Craig & Larner, 2002: p21) are part of the contractual arrangements between the varying participants, Government included. The idea of building relationships now becomes a key part of the language and measurement of outcomes, and contractual arrangements begin to focus on a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative methods of evaluation (Craig & Larner, 2002: p21). With that Craig and Larner (2002: pp21-22) urge caution in the power construct of these partnerships. It seems to this researcher that although local communities have more knowledge, power and experience, their systems may be less sustainable and more fragile than those of the bureaucratic silo model which has existed for longer.
Craig and Larner (2002) see difficulties in the interface of local partnerships and silos because the philosophies are so far apart. At the end of the day they wonder that if tensions are not resolved and departmental demarcations not removed or made more flexible, then technical mandates and vertical accountabilities may drive the best intentioned collaborators back to the silo form. This is a central question in this thesis assessing the OYWT NGO experience, since having good intentions to collaborate may not be enough to make an integrated model work. In many respects all these concerns come to a head around the new integrated Funding for Outcomes project (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004). If this project is successful and able to be applied widely to overcome many of the issues identified above then it could be a significant advance.

In the 2000s Government policy has been moving towards a 'Devolved Service Delivery' model. Buchanan and Pilgrim (2004) discuss the effects of this model and the merit of collaboration of Government and NGO initiatives. The key concern of their paper is the transparency and accountability of NGOs to the primary funding provider (i.e. Government) and the accountability Government has to the public for distributing public resources to support the nation. It does not consider, at all, accountability to clients and the requirements for professional and effective services to meet client needs.

Buchanan and Pilgrim (2004) identify the State Sector Act of 1988 as key to the dismantling of the centrally controlled Government systems as it was seen Government could not continue this system due to the expense. In the 1990s Buchanan and Pilgrim point to the deliberate move of Government to involve the private and voluntary sectors in service delivery of essential services that the Government no longer had the ability or infrastructure to provide. The difficulty identified at this point by the authors is that NGOs were increasingly concerned at the effect on service delivery of the contracting model. The focus of purchase of services, accountability and the outputs of services put severe strain on the infrastructure and core business of a NGO (Buchanan & Pilgrim, 2004).

Concerns were being raised with regard to the cost of compliance and measurement as accountability methods appears to be coming to the point of outweighing the amount of money being spent on the actual delivery of service. The idea seems to be that the cost of
delivery is transferred to the community as the Government cannot afford it. However these are essential services that the Government cannot afford not to have delivered.

Buchanan and Pilgrim (2004) note that in December 2001 the Government made an agreement with the community in signing a Statement of Government Intentions for Improved Community – Government Relationships that would support “strong and respectful relationships between Government and community, voluntary and iwi/Maori organisations” (2004: p6). Buchanan and Pilgrim also note that, because of the bad feeling left by Government after the 1980 and 1990 reforms around cutting benefit supports, narrowing benefit support criteria and contracting out aspects of Government social services without 100% funding, Government needed to demonstrate support for the community and voluntary sector. Collaboration is seen to be the best way to develop partnership with the community sector to deliver services the Government is no longer able or willing to perform, although they raise the concern that there is no clear evidence as yet that collaboration is the best way to meet the Government ends in terms of outcomes (Buchanan & Pilgrim, 2004). Their main focus is on the need for measurement and enforcement of contractual obligations by services contractees to avoid misappropriation of public monies and they seek to deal with this by utilising the law of contract so that funding entities can safeguard their own interests by:

- Apportioning risk in respect of service delivery;
- Specifying delivery standards;
- Imposing accountability obligations;
- Building in performance incentives (e.g. by providing for payment by instalment conditional upon performance and satisfaction of accountability measure); and
- Tailoring other enforcement measures to suit the particular requirements of the funding arrangement

(Buchanan & Pilgrim, 2004: p12)

They look at two case studies of NGOs that have been found to have not met their contractual obligations and suffered from a lack of the accountability and transparency. Both cases seem to involve people also acting in Government capacities (Donna Awatere Huata MP and the Ministry of Health lobbying contracts). Buchanan and Pilgrim (2004)
advocate the need for a risk-based approach to contract monitoring to provide better effectiveness in managing a devolved social service delivery. They suggest that a more intensive contract specification and monitoring mechanism concentrated in the areas of greatest risk will also address transaction cost problems (i.e. compliance costs re auditing and so on). Of note, the two examples used to justify the need for such monitoring and resource investment seem to be about Government agents acting outside their Governmental roles and not understanding their own Governmental processes and ethics of practice which, in the end, compromised the aims of the assistance they were trying to give. This, in the end, compromised the contract set up by Government with community/NGO groups and potentially negatively affected the public and misappropriated the use of public monies. It would seem, from these examples, that it is not the monitoring of NGOs that requires greater scrutiny and accountability but rather the monitoring of Government departments and those in public office.

Arguably this highlights a lack in Government performance and not the community sector. As demonstrated in the Community and Voluntary Working Party (2002) the community is very aware of these concerns and the need to have clarity and accountability – perhaps in a more actioned way than Government. The issue could be seen in terms of funding and accountability; that the issue has been that the Government is not at the same level of understanding as the community sector in terms of knowing how to successfully put services into operation. There seems a need for greater collaboration and partnership from Government bureaucracy with the community sector to develop contracts that can address the whole issues of accountability dealt with by this sector.

Most recently this has been highlighted by the establishment of the Building Better Government Engagement reference group (2008) from the Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector (OCVS). In December 2008 they put forward a discussion paper to respond to the concerns identified in 2002 from the Volunteer Working Party document and expanded on its themes. They identified that Government needed to put in significant work to build its capacity to engage with community:

“Government agencies need staff skilled in building active relationships and employing appropriate techniques across the inform-consult-partner-empower participation spectrum (see Figure 2: A Spectrum of Public Participation). However, there are a number of challenges facing agencies. For one thing, not everyone is good at engaging. Support is particularly needed by staff with limited experienced in working with communities in order for them to build external networks, develop confidence, and deal with the “messiness” of engagement.” (OCVS, 2008: p13)
In order to better engage the OCVS reference group identified the following standards that need to be incorporated into Government departments to effectively engage with communities – to go beyond ‘consultation’ to create ‘engagement and partnership’. (OCVS, 2008: p9)

Standards For Effective Engagement

The reference group has developed standards for effective engagement to guide Government agencies in developing and monitoring their engagement practices. These can be found at www.ocvs.govt.nz. The standards are outlined under five headings.

1. The agency defines the principles by which it engages (the reference group recommends the ten OECD Guiding Principles for Engaging Citizens).
2. The agency is clear why it is engaging.
3. The agency builds and maintains active relationships.
4. The agency chooses the appropriate way to engage (taking into account the inform-consult-partner-empower spectrum, see Figure 2).
5. The agency tests the quality of the engagement.

(OCVS, 2008: p22)

Current Challenges

For OYWT, an outcome of the political forces that have influenced OYWT are documents such as the Report of the Community and Voluntary Sector Working Party (2002). This report was designed by Government to consider the relationship between Government and Iwi/Maori, community and voluntary organisations. The report was compiled by sampling opinions on this topic from across the country, resulting in opinions from a vibrant community of organisations. There was also, however, a strong level of cynicism from the community regarding the Government and its commitment to restoring an open and inclusive working relationship critical in building a ‘civilised society’.

Writers of the working party report (2002) identified some areas of improvement needed in the voluntary sector, namely the need to strengthen their own interactions and processes. However, it was clear in the working party report that a major part of this was the work Government needed to do to restore trust and respect and to be explicit in their valuing of the sector that requires long term commitment from all participants. Craig and Larner (2002) suggest that the neo-liberal influence had gone a long way to destroying this
partnership relationship, or the conditions necessary for it, and there was a long pathway ahead to regain this. As a result, this report signalled that it was not yet time to create an overarching agreement between Government and community and smaller steps were needed first by Government to get its own house in order to begin restoring the relationship.

More specifically, the report noted that it was not enough for Government to attempt to engage with Iwi as simply a community group and reiterated that, together with the crown, Iwi are Treaty of Waitangi partners and this relationship needs to be recognised as such at the highest levels. The lack of resolution of Treaty issues needed to be addressed for Government to move on in establishing purposeful relationships with its treaty partners in governance.

It was felt by participants that there was a growing gap in terms of the Government’s promotion of participatory democracy. This perception added to the sense of exclusion of the volunteer sector from interaction with Government – a sense that was only enhanced by various state sector reforms. This impact reiterated what Craig and Larner (2002) identified as a suspicion and mistrust that had arisen from such reforms. The Working Party Report identified the distance of policy advisors and Government decision makers from community organisations while also ‘subjecting groups to an increased operational scrutiny (Working Party Report, 2002: p viii). It advocates for acknowledgement and valuing by Government of people who have the cultural, local and leadership/professional knowledge needed to lead and facilitate the interaction of Government and community – this links with the ‘strategic brokerage’ role outlined above by Craig and Larner (2002). The report advocated a need for Government to seek instead a collaborative approach with the voluntary sector in contractual development and a co-determination of needs and solutions for quality service provision. They see a function of a healthy and democratic society being dependent on community and Government having the capacity and resource to work together for ‘mutually beneficial outcomes’.

A way forward for Government, as outlined in the Working Party Report (2002) is, firstly, to rebuild its relationship with the voluntary sector and Iwi. Secondly, the Government needs to put forward a statement of intent with a clear commitment to building
relationships along with a statement of the principles and values on which Government agency attitudes and behaviours will be based.

There needed to be work from Government to look at:

1. Developing participatory democracy;
2. Reviewing resourcing and accountability by Government to voluntary sector and Iwi;
3. Strengthening the community sector; and
4. Improving ability of central Government to understand how to work with community organisations.


For Maori/Iwi it was seen that a similar process needed to occur but to be more specific to the partnership of Government with Iwi through the Treaty of Waitangi.

The Working Party Report (2002) is significant for OYWT in that it outlines the effects of new managerialism and neo-liberal policy on partnership relations within the community. It emphasises the need for developing effective and cohesive contractual partnerships to deliver the social services that the Government considers necessary. The report gives an outline of a plan and framework the Aotearoa New Zealand Government bureaucracy could use to address the issues raised by the consultation the working party did around the country with the community/voluntary groups and Iwi. It is hoped the work in 2008 with the OCVS may further advance the 2002 ideas – there are clear strategies but, as in 2002, the result will be in the implementation. For OYWT the issue remains, however, about the value of the ‘Funding for Outcomes’ approach. If Government agencies can be upskilled to properly deliver on their collaborative rhetoric will it then be fully implemented?

**OYWT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT**

OYWT has echoed elements of the above debate about the funding for outcomes philosophy and stance throughout its history.
**Beginnings**

The organisation grew from a community need and provides a service, which also has a social action component, aiming for change in systems that were letting down the community they (the systems) were there to support.

The OYWT was established in 1994 through the collaboration of key community representatives in Dunedin. This was done under the auspices of the Dunedin Council of Social Services (DCOSS, 1994) who held a meeting to address growing community concerns about the needs of young people in Dunedin city. These concerns particularly related to issues of mental health and a perceived growth in crime rates amongst younger citizens (OYWT, 2006). Other, deeper, difficulties were identified at the meeting as underlying the behaviours and actions which had initially prompted the gathering, such as the needs of those with disabilities, Maori and Pacific Island cultures, detached (from family, whanau and community) youth, personal problems, sexual health issues, difficulties at home, difficulties at school and poverty (OYWT, 2006).

Out of these initial discussions a Working Party was developed which included representatives from many relevant sectors in Dunedin, including the Dunedin City Council, and people from the Health, Schools, Police and Judiciary, Care and Protection, Community Social Services and Business sectors. There was a strong commitment to coordinated joint action and an overarching belief of those present was that “a community gains a soul when it unites to support its vulnerable and it certainly gains strength when all of its different sectors embark on an agreed course of action” (OYWT, 2006: p7). One important aim of this group was to develop a way to achieve

…a reduction in recidivist youth offending, an improvement in sexual health, a reduction in teenage pregnancies, improved physical and mental health, improved school attendance addressing the problem of truancy, reduction in drug and alcohol abuse, improvement in family functioning and fostering healthy relationships within a community framework. (OYWT, 2006: p7).

A ‘Homelink’ project was developed which linked with the Dunedin Multi-Disciplinary Health and Development Research (DMHDR) Unit at the University of Otago (OYWT, 2006). This research, along with intense involvement from the Police Youth Aid team, identified truancy as a prime indicator of further need. There was a clear indication that
workers who were skilled in meeting multiple and complex needs among youth were needed.

An outcome of the research was the development of the Community Intervention Project. An assessment tool was developed during this time to measure simultaneously the often separated areas of home, school, health and social functioning (OYWT, 2006). To go along with the developing collaborative philosophical stance, staff were employed from multidisciplinary backgrounds, as it was becoming evident that this was an effective way to address the multiple needs of clients and their family/whanau that were presenting to the agencies.

The OYWT developed from the Community Intervention Project and became an independent enterprise. At this stage the basis of the work needed from the Trust’s point of view was,

…a belief in the principle of equity, of the provision of opportunities for the most disadvantaged; recognition that the barriers to that end needed to be broken though intensive integrated interventions; and that our local community was asking for a holistic service which could respond to the needs of the young people in our city. (OYWT, 2006: p9)

Organisational Development

As the OYWT developed so did the internal structure of the organisation. A manager and practice manager were appointed, along with casework, assessment and tangata whenua teams. Alongside this there was ongoing development of systems (including database and technical systems), supervision, and professional development programmes. Importantly, a generic ‘wraparound’, strength-based, professional reflective practice framework was formulated’ (OYWT, 2006).

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1 Wraparound service – Wraparound care utilises a planning process that results in an individualised set of services and supports to help them and their family improve their situation (Paccione-Dyszewski, 2002: pp5-6). This planning involves the young person and family and the wraparound concept is considered a philosophy of care, a process, a modality and an intervention (Paccione-Dyszewski, 2002: pp5-6). For OYWT the wraparound philosophy defines the type of framework used to assess and develop a plan with the young person and their family to best support the multiple areas in their lives in which they may be needing support, including education, health (inclusive of mental health and addiction as well as physical), family/whanau needs, isolation and dislocation from within their communities/networks (Munro, 2007: p 8).
The developing OYWT emphasised the need to build strong links to the community, particularly those who first supported its establishment. To that end formal links were developed through Memorandums of Understanding (hereafter MOU) with Government organisations and primary health care services. Close ties with other NGOs in the youth sector were also given priority. Evidence of the importance placed on community links are the Trust’s roles in Strengthening Family initiatives, Health Advisory Committee and Safer Schools, plus regular liaisons with secondary schools, the Secondary Schools Partnership, providers for Alternative Education, Police Youth Aid, Family and Youth Justice coordinators and Youth Court (OYWT, 2006: p11).

**Basic Philosophy of OYWT**

One of the key principles of the Trust was, and remains, its commitment to its community roots and the belief that focusing on establishing positive working relationships is a key element of the work with clients and their family/whanau. Collegially, the community and Government funders are pivotal to the services delivered by OYWT staff. Today OYWT employs 20 employees from nursing, teaching, psychology, occupational therapy, social work, outdoor therapy and management training backgrounds.

The frontline staff are backed by a board of 10 members who come from backgrounds of law, politics, commercial business, social service development and management, teaching and health. The board provides governance for OYWT and advocates in this role to keep OYWT true to its philosophy and aims of service to the community. OYWT continues to provide what is considered a ‘wraparound service’ using a holistic approach. As noted above, the ‘wraparound’ service emphasises casework utilising strengths within a young person’s sphere, using appropriate social work, occupational therapy and education strategies to help them further develop already existing potential. This work takes place within the context of family and community hence the OYWT mission statement:

“We believe in the intrinsic tapu of young people, the right to equal opportunity, well being and participation, within their community and society.”

(OYWT, 2006)

Alongside this ‘wraparound service’, as it was now defined, other services such as “Project K” and the Learning Centre were also developed, adding to the ways young people could
reach their potential. Project K\textsuperscript{2} worked through the conventional schools in a formalised programme and the Learning Centre operated through provision of schooling for a small number of students who had significant learning needs which were not able to be catered for within the traditional, overstretched schooling frame (OYWT, 2006: p16). Unfortunately, due to the lack of sustainable funding both programmes have had to be stopped, and it has been noted that “the community now feels this gap” (OYWT, 2006: p16).

**Integrated Funding Contracts**

From its beginnings, the OYWT demonstrated collaboration in its development, and placed emphasis on forming a funding framework that would successfully support this philosophy and the service delivery envisaged. In order to achieve this, the idea of a co-funded contract for an integrated service was developed that would involve the contributing Government sectors of Education (through the provision of the District Truancy Service contract), Health, Police and Justice, and Child Youth and Family Services (OYWT, 2006: p11). The hope was to reduce the impact of silo\textsuperscript{3} driven funding and output focused requirements that did not always enable practitioners to work with the whole young person and address their overall situation (OYWT, 2006: p12). The political climate of the 1990’s meant that OYWT was founded at a time when it was subjected to Government policies from both National and Labour Government initiatives. Roger Sowry, Minister for Social Welfare under the National Government, originally supported the development of a collaborative and integrated contract, in accordance with the above philosophy of the OYWT, and his successor in the new Labour Government, Steve Maharey, followed this through in the early 2000’s (OYWT, 2006).

\textsuperscript{2} Project K – a youth development programme for 14-15 year olds, established by Graeme Dingle and Jo-anne Wilkinson, with the aim of helping youth maximise their potential. The three core components, Wilderness Adventure, Community Challenge and Mentoring, facilitate students learning self reliance, team building, self confidence, perseverance, goal setting and good health and life skills (http://www.projectk.org.nz 10/08/2008.)

\textsuperscript{3} Silo funding – sectoral, vertical structure of functional management of money and resource accountability in Government (Craig & Larner, 2002).
This type of contract was seen in 2002 by the new Labour Government, in the context of dissatisfaction with competitive contracting discussed earlier, to be a potential way for other communities to develop services in a collaborative fashion and achieve longer term substantial outcomes over short term output measurements. Thus a “Funding for Outcomes” unit at the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) was established and OYWT used as a case study. In the contract, developed by OYWT, the Government saw a workable vehicle for their “whole-of-Government”\(^4\) style policies as it provided reporting, not only on the necessary statistics, but also identified trends, strengths and barriers to successful outcomes (OYWT, 2006).

The work of OYWT has led to an involvement in supporting Government to examine the way it funds community agencies. An example of this is the Funding for Outcomes Project with the Ministry of Social Development (hereafter MSD). This project was designed to provide a format or structure to develop a service delivery price guide template for use by community organisations and Government agencies. The basis of this template was to illustrate how a ‘joined-up funding agreement’ (also called an ‘integrated contract’) could look (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004: p3). In order to do this the MSD formed a ‘Funding for Outcomes’ project to “clarify funding responsibilities and accountabilities among the participants of joined-up funding agreements” (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004: p4). This, in part, lead to the development of the MSD integrated contract unit\(^5\).

PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004, pp5-6) suggested that the template for funding had to be developed first from a ‘client/user’ outcome focus in order to accurately identify the resources needed and therefore the costings of providing such a service. Most other measures they found did not allow for the true costs to be realised nor view the resources required to deliver a service as a whole (i.e. Government departments may have said what they could offer within a certain ‘guesstimated’ budget and what could be contributed to a

\(^4\) **Whole of Government policy** - Government departments working in a collaborative manner across policy and finance to provide an integrated service delivery, working across ‘silos’ and partnering with community (Snively, 2002).

\(^5\) **Ministry of Social Development Integrated Contract Unit** - Unit for managing contract in social services for New Zealand (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004).
specific programme). What was often not considered was the whole outcome required to in fact achieve a ‘met need’.

As part of the integrated contract the aim was to have an integrated auditing or measurement system of accountability. This meant, in terms of accountability, that there would be one report back to funders versus multiple siloed reports that took valuable resources away from working with clients. It was envisaged that the holistic reporting may also enable funders to better see trends and identify gaps within services in this integrated format (i.e. increase collaboration across silos).

A Funding Allocation System (FAS – appendix 2) for outcomes (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004: pp7-10) was developed by PricewaterhouseCoopers from work initiated by OYWT. This framework gave measurable areas in which to develop outcome aims so Government sectors could begin working out what they needed to contribute to achieve the aims. The Government sectors could then still see what they individually contributed for the overall outcome but instead of having individual reporting on each siloed segment, a single overall report could evaluate if the outcome was achieved. The OYWT vision was to extend the FAS framework to achieve a ‘joined-up’ (integrated) contract where all contribution was determined by the percentage benefit to each sector of the outcomes achieved. OYWT used an adaptive HHEADSS\(^6\) framework to model how the FAS framework could be further developed into a measurable accountable integrated contract.

The participation in the ‘Funding for Outcomes’ project was a culmination of the OYWT vision to see collaboration taking place across the whole process, from contract development to service delivery (is in practice with clients). The aim was to have sectors relating across silos as well as in their vertical stream (i.e. across sectors as well as internally within the sector) to deliver a holistic, integrated service to young people and their family/whanau.

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\(^6\) HHEADSS – acronym for Home, Health, Education, Adolescent offending, Drugs and Alcohol, Sexuality and Suicidality (Munro, 2007, p12). Fleming, McClintock and Watson (2001) describe this assessment as a psychosocial assessment tool to help health professionals in a more accurate and comprehensive way to screen health issues in adolescents and engage them more effectively.
OYWT hoped that this FAS model could be adapted by Government, community groups, organisations and agencies to help funding effectively meet client needs in a sustainable fashion. The model is designed to enable Government to be able to see how the money can be allocated and utilised in a ‘whole Government’ approach in contrast to the current ‘silo’ model, with its inflexible fiscal measures horizontally relating to separate departments. Social services OYWT believes, are best delivered, or most effectively delivered, in the ‘whole person’ approach, such as the HHEADSS framework, used by OYWT in service delivery.

For OYWT a key part of the work is relating to other agencies. This interaction, while seemingly simple, can turn out to be very complex. An important part of this complexity is the social and political context in which the organisations operate.

**Collaboration versus Competition and Accountability**

Collaboration is seen as more efficient as it is increasingly seen that having one infrastructure for several similarly orientated organisations is a more efficient model than several small social service providers doing similar work separately. There was a dawning realisation that the focus of services providers needs to be on people and their needs, versus the money management of audits. Outcomes do not necessarily equate to money given and spent – in some respects the sum of the parts is greater in many cases than the simple dollar ‘parts’ themselves (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004).

Unsurprisingly, given the leadership role granted to the multi-national accountancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWHC) this emerging collaboration ethos was also emphasised by the funding for outcomes unit representative Suzanne Snivley. In her (2002) keynote address to the Community Trust of Otago she advocated the Government’s Funding for Outcomes approach. At this time the Government was developing policies to promote and implement closer Government and community relations. These aims lead to the work between the Funding for Outcomes Unit of MSD and the project with PricewaterhouseCoopers. The key words used by Snively are ‘collaboration’, ‘whole of Government’, ‘inter-sectoral’ and ‘capacity building’. In her speech, Snively was promoting the varying policies, reports and projects that were attempting to bring together varying sectors within Government and the community to provide a united front to address
service delivery areas and the gaps that exist. Her point is that the community sector can achieve the outcomes it does because it knows its clients, is focused on achieving effective outcomes, and is selfless, that is, not driven by profit, to achieve a better New Zealand. She stated that the community/not for profit sector contributes to the quadruple bottom line of sustainability- economically, environmentally, socially and culturally, and, in real terms, the outcomes the sector provides adds value far greater than the sum of the inputs.

This, Snively (2002) claims, puts the community sector in a good leverage position with Government and there needs to be a reporting (by both community and Government) on its capability and size of actual contribution to New Zealand. In something of an ironic statement Snively (2002: p4) identifies the not-for-profit sector as being the only way to assist Aotearoa New Zealand to “increase its productivity fast enough to move our economy into the upper half of the OECD countries in the next 10 years”. This statement is interesting considering the impact of current policy and the overhanging pervasiveness of the neo-liberal market force that threatens to submerge the ‘not-for-profit’ sector. In the latter there does not appear to be a place for something as fluid and evolving as the ‘not-for-profit’ sector.

However, in contrast to this rhetoric, it is worth noting that in reality working with the bureaucracy of Government at a funding level there are tight accountability procedures over finance with many paper trails, cross references and checks. From a practitioner view the emphasis is on proof, quantifying, clear time accounting, multiple bureaucratic reviews, assessments and reports to control the use of resources. The focus is money, how much is spent on a specific action with little room for change, development, flexibility, individuation of resources or creativity. If not spent on allotted action the money cannot be spent and must be returned and negotiated for again to go back to the same recipient but from a slightly different sector for the same overall outcome. While policy levels, such as those at Snively’s level, seem to be talking ‘whole of Government’ approaches the implementation may be a somewhat different story.

‘Outcomes’ for Maori

The same applies to the impact of the historical, social and political context for Maori service users/organisations and the emerging Kaupapa Maori models of social support. With the new ‘capacity building’ and ‘collaborative’, ‘whole of Government’ theologies is
there now a flexibility or way to work alongside existing Tangata Whenua models and acknowledge/view outcomes in an other than monetary sense? Is there now able to be a vision by Pakeha of long term value of approaches and recognition of cultural significance? One such group that has been looking at this area is the Community Sector Task Force Aotearoa New Zealand for Sustainable Funding and Accountability within Communities. The Community Sector taskforce was created to gather together a group of people from varying sectors in the community to look at funding, sustainability and accountability for the work done in the community (Awa, H., Coote, P., Hawea, H., Poananga, A., Spelman, T., Chen W. K., Gatenby, B., Henderson, D., Sefuiva, S., Torstonson, S. & Pahau, I., 2007). One of the biggest foci of this work was to look at the philosophies and principles that undergird this sector and highlight the competencies and strengths that allow this sector to do the work they do. The document starts with the basic tenets of the work - which is the emphasis on relationship between people and groups (Community Sector Taskforce, 2007). They see, as part of this, the partnership model in the Treaty of Waitangi as being one of the key cornerstones to this work.

The Community Sector Taskforce (2007) view philosophy, functions and processes as the three ways accountability can be broken down, and comment on these three areas for the community sector. They suggest several models of operation that could be used to best collaborate on methods of accountability with Government to have reasonable accountability measures – these being agency theory, stewardship theory and the Treaty. The Taskforce (2007) describes agency theory as individualistic, control and self serving, stewardship theory as collective, organisational serving and collective and the Treaty as a model of shared partnership and care of resources (land/whenua, environment, spiritual health, physical health and people) through this.

In concluding, the Taskforce (2007) identifies the need for Government to work with the sector and not in competition or control of it. It also identifies a reciprocal attitude that the community needs to be able to act in good faith with the Government, believing that agreements and shared partnerships will be honoured and respected as they work together. From this researcher’s view, this will take quite some commitment on both sides and again comes down to attitude and values of working together as much as having a formula or method of accountability precisely worked out. It seems that the idea of human and social
capital inherent in this paper is the key resource to whether or not this way of working can be successful. To have people collaborating and being prepared to respect and have confidence in the following framework would allow the accountability and sustainability of funding in the community sector to occur.

The key structure the Taskforce sees to managing accountability is as follows:

*Philosophy*

- Driven by relationships not law
- Committed to leadership not compliance
- Works holistically not in segments

*Processes for funding service delivery and being of service*

- Identifying need
- Organising work
- Managing issues
- Reporting value

(2007, p19)

This philosophy and process are the same key points on which OYWT bases its contracting framework and service delivery.

**CONCLUSION**

The above gives a general picture of examples of events and policies that have played a part in creating the current context of OYWT. The issues this gives rise to in this study are the concerns with the form of funding and accountability and the influence of this on the autonomy and performance of OYWT. OYWT started as a response to community need and was set up to work collaboratively with the community and cross sectorally across Government sector. Hence the descriptive language of ‘joined up services’ and ‘wraparound models of practice’. This integrated contract model was seen as the best way to combine resources and deal with a whole issue rather than segmentising problems and dealing with problems in parts as can occur when working with multiple individual Government departments. The idea of collaboration instead of competition in providing services is becoming more popular in Government with a “Whole of Government” (Snively, 2002) approach being adopted at policy level; it appears, at face value at least, to
be in conflict with a market/liberal approach at funding level. The key of this work was identified by OYWT as being able to form relationships with young people and their families. This requires a collaborative partnership with Government.

The concern in setting up OYWT was that young people were not having a place in their community, or being able to participate in their community, leading to further isolation and disenfranchisement – this was evidenced by difficulties with truancy, offending and education gaps. Having a community base to work from was seen as the best way to address the wider issues that Government was also trying to provide services for.

OYWT set up an integrated contract to have philosophy of practice combined into contract outcomes and evaluations. After having some years in operation of an integrated contract a question is being asked, by funders and fundees alike, if this integrated contract is working.

This thesis aims to explore how this experience has been for OYWT – is this framework working as intended? An important part of the success of an integrated contract is the accountability of Government to the contract, as well as to NGOs. Is this collaborative, integrated framework of contract effective in showing outcomes; and is it able to be evaluated to show outcomes? Is the Government silo framework of funding flexible enough to work with an integrated contract? What are the theories influencing the Government’s silo funding construct and ability and skills necessary to administer such contracts? What are the theoretical influences for NGOs, such as OYWT, that are influencing their development and practice?
CHAPTER TWO

UNDERSTANDING ACCOUNTABILITY AND POWER
LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

This chapter looks at the relevant literature covering the accountability relationship of NGOs with its funders to theorise the approach to the issues of Chapter One and refine the initial research questions. The chapter will construct an approach to the theorisation of the study through the following steps:

Step 1. Treaty Context:
As this is the context for everything in Aotearoa/New Zealand (A/NZ) – all NGOs need to have a partnership with mana whenua and this means, in A/NZ, accountability to them as well and never just solely to the Crown. This must be in terms of the Treaty articles of acceptance of Government, full autonomy and self direction and the rights of citizenship. Thus accountability to the mana whenua is “constitutionally” inscribed into the A/NZ context.

Step 2. Accountability - the nature, extent and forms of accountability:
Discussion of the literature about concept and ideas behind accountability.

Step 3. Accountability of “Community Agencies”:
Application of this concept to agencies which operate under a community aegis.

Step 4. Theories of Accountability:
The differing social theories and the proper forms of accountability they would prescribe for NGOs.

Step 5. Assessment of the Theories:
Leading to the choice of constructionism as the most useful approach.
**Step 6. Research Questions:**

Constructionism suggests that changes which are not based on multiple stakeholder input and control will not be effective in meeting its goals. The research questions based on this for this study are based on ‘testing’ this specifically for OYWT.

**TREATY CONTEXT**

**Aotearoa/New Zealand and the Treaty Partnership**

Although much of the accountability literature is overseas based, especially the UK (being seen by the researcher as most closely relevant to the Aotearoa/New Zealand situation) the literature used is weighted towards Aotearoa/New Zealand specific conditions. The Treaty of Waitangi has a central place in this regard as Munford and Walsh-Tapiata (2001: pp12-13) highlight the importance of the Treaty of Waitangi and the relevance of this partnership model to the here and now. They claim, as do other writers (such as Durie & Selby, cit Munford & Walsh-Tapiata, 2001), that the Treaty of Waitangi is a relevant document for today. The framework the Treaty provides is an important example of partnership where, for example, community and Government can make meaningful collaborative agreements together. This type of example is relevant for how NGO’s can form arrangements with Government and gives a pattern that can be followed for successful collaborative working.

The Treaty of Waitangi covers provision of social services through Government services - it can be seen these services should be accessed as part of Article Three ‘mainstream’ provision and not funded by individual Iwi. However the focus of Article Two, on independence and self direction from a kaupapa Maori frame, can inform and guide mainstream provision of services rather than be a token ‘add-on’. In connection with Article Two, Charlotte Paulin (2007: ch43) notes that the use of Waitangi Tribunal settlement money is focused on long term sustainability and care of Iwi members in a holistic fashion, that is: culture, education, health, economy, welfare and so on, with all having an equal weight.

In terms of Article Three, an Otago District Health Board (ODHB) report (Draft Whanau Ora Feasibility Study, 2005: p6) seeks to implement this in an intention to bring together
services from both Government and community to provide an overall collaborative and interactive set of services that enable Maori to access health services and support from a wide range of avenues. As part of this the framework was to include the (Article Two) rights and obligations of Kai Tahu and Mana Whenua\(^1\) who would provide a foundation for the model for both Government and NGOs, who must then always work themselves to develop Treaty relationships independent of the Crown. It is also noted that the Central DHB has undertaken a review and found that there are gaps in service provision. These gaps related to an over reliance on mainstream western frameworks and a lack of consideration of local community and the tikaka, “local solutions for local problems” involved in relationships with the mana whenua. It was also highlighted that this work was inconsistent with a ‘whanau ora’ approach and the Treaty of Waitangi partnership principles (Draft Report Whanau Ora Feasibility study, 2005: p11).

In order to redress this situation the recommendations of this draft report were to redesign the ‘whanau ora’ and Maori health service specifications:

\[\text{…to fit Te Ao Maori constructs by addressing gaps in the Maori health service specification paradigm… to align services specifications with he korowai oranga and whakataataka directions and work together with iwi, hapu, Maori communities and Maori health providers to ensure that services are delivered in ways to enable whanau to take greater control of their own lives.} \]


For this to be successful it was clearly identified that the lead in defining this work had to happen from the early development of methodology in service specification selection for achieving the desired whanau ora outcomes for Otago.

For Maori there is huge significance for community groups, Iwi and Maori communities in all forms, to have clear Treaty based input and control from the funding through to service development and provision. This document highlights how crucial it is that the specifications development incorporates a Maori frame (specific for the Ngai Tahu and Mana Whenua for manaaki manuhiri) in order to best be able to reach Maori and deliver effective positive service in health. Given Treaty of Waitangi obligations there seems to be a definite need for services to be worked not from a delivery end, necessarily, but from a funding philosophy direction in order to have them delivered appropriately.

\(^{1}\) “Mana whenua in a broad sense refers to the iwi whose territory you are in. They are tied to the land and have authority within their geographical boundaries” (Eketone, Anaru & Shannon, Pat, 2006).
The Otago DHB and kaupapa Maori services are to report to, and be accountable with, mana whenua (ODHB, 2006: p25). This takes accountability from the compliance and financial frames to a wider social, community and cultural forum where the outcomes are actually lived out (and to where the focus of service provision funding is meant to be benefiting). The same needs to apply to all NGOs and community services.

To redress this balance Bishop et al (2003) examine Maori concepts that would, through the Treaty rights of Article Two, implement this and set the scene for the positive engagement of Maori Tino Tangatiratanga – relative autonomy/self-determination.

“Literally it means chiefly control and increasingly it has taken on its figurative meaning of self-determination, that is the right to determine one’s own destiny, to define what that destiny will be and to define and pursue means of attaining that destiny”. (Bishop et al, 2003: p12)

They cite Bruner (1996) who states participation on one’s own terms therefore brings commitment and Applebee (1996) who extends this to say that commitment therefore brings learning.

Article Two Taonga Tuku Iho – cultural aspirations. Bishop et al (2003: p12) “literally means treasures from the ancestors.” They say this concept teaches respect for the tapu (specialness) of each individual child and to acknowledge mana (their potential for power).

“Above all this message means that Maori language, knowledge, culture and values are normal, valid and legitimate, indeed are a valid guide to classroom interactions.” (Bishop et al, 2003: pp12-13).

Ako – reciprocal learning. Bishop et al (2003: p13) outline this as meaning to teach and learn – “the teacher does not have to be the fountain of all knowledge, but rather a partner in the ‘conversation’ of learning”.

Kia Piki Ake I Nga Raruraru O Te Kainga – mediation of socio-economic and home difficulties. This is seen by Bishop et al (2003: p13) as participation in the schools reaching into Maori homes. This brings whanau into school activities thus helping parents to be connected in the education of their children (partnership and participation not directed by school) and eases transitions between home and school.

Whanau – This, says Bishop et al (2003: p14), gives emphasis in the classroom to whanau type relationship where commitment and connectedness is paramount and responsibility
for learning of others is fostered. This then allows the participation in decision making processes of learning through collaborative storying (Bishop et al, 2003: p14).

Kaupapa – collective vision and philosophy: “students achieve better when there is a close relationship between home and school in terms of aspirations, language and cultures” (Bishop et al 2003, p14).

In short, in New Zealand all agencies must, through the Treaty, have accountability to both Treaty partners, not just the Crown. It is important now to examine and define what such accountability might consist in.

**DEFINING ACCOUNTABILITY**

Accountability has been defined as:

“A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct”. (Schedler, 1999: p13)

It is a concept with several meanings and is often used synonymously with such concepts as answerability, enforcement, responsibility, liability and other terms associated with the expectation of account giving. As an aspect of governance, it has been central to discussions related to problems in both the public and private worlds.

In leadership roles, Mulgan (2000) and Mattei (2007) agree that accountability is the acknowledgment and assumption of responsibility for actions, products, decisions, and policies including the administration, governance and implementation within the scope of the role or employment position and encompassing the obligation to report, explain and be answerable for resulting consequences.

Most approaches to accountability, as Mulgan (2000) notes, are based around controlling an organisation from outside. Mattei (2007) suggests that the mechanism of political accountability operates precisely in the opposite direction to that of delegation to regulatory agencies of broad decision-making powers. Mulgan (2000) has argued the core sense of accountability entails three main features: external scrutiny, social exchange, and rights of authority. As for the third feature, accountability thus implies that those calling
for an account are asserting rights of superior authority over those who are accountable, such as demanding answers and imposing sanctions.

The meaning behind accountability has expanded, no longer just revolving around being answerable for your own actions. Mulgan (2000) states that it has been applied to internal aspects of official behaviour and that in contemporary times, the term has been normalised to mean that someone has been called into account to some higher authority for their actions.

This form of accountability has a number of features that define it:

- Firstly, it is external in nature. Meaning that the person is accountable to someone or something else, notably with the object of our accountability being an outsider element;
- It requires social interaction and exchange. This tends to be when one side seeks out answers and rectification on something while the other responds to them;
- Rights of authority are also implied. Here, someone has asserted their rights of superior authority over those individuals who are accountable. Additionally, these rights of authority constitute the ability of insisting that answers are sought out and that they have the right to impose sanctions if required.

(Mulgan, 2000: p555)

Within the democratic context, the concept of accountability is between the general public and those in public office that had been elected, and finally between those elected and the supporting bureaucracy.

Core accountability has thus commonly covered issues such as voters making elected representatives answer for their policies and accept electoral retribution, how legislators can scrutinize the actions of public servants and make them answerable for their mistakes, and how members of the public can seek redress from Government agencies and officials (Mulgan, 2000: p556)

Mulgan (2000) goes onto state that this leads to questions about the different means of accountability and their relative means, notably around the balance between answerability
and efficiency. It also allows for a difference when defining political and managerial accountability. Thus public accountability means more.

Public Sector Accountability:

Traditionally the private sector has a ‘bottom-line’ approach to accountability to boards and shareholders and Slim (2002) adds that, in the western tradition, charities have followed this well-worn way of accounting that has long historical pattern. Many western charities have traditionally reported in a similarly minimalist vein to the business enterprises of the numerous merchant philanthropists who founded or supported many of them. In other words, “charities have mainly been asked to report on the money raised and spent, the number of poor people reached, and the administrative cost of raising and spending the money”. (Slim, 2002: p 9)

However, there are significant changes occurring:

This mercantile tradition of accountability has long roots in western capitalism but has now been challenged by progressive business people, NGOs and others who demand that corporate accountability become deeper and broader. Moving beyond a single financial ‘bottom-line’, companies are now being urged to account for a ‘triple bottom-line’ that also encompasses social and environmental accounting. (Slim, 2002: p 8)

Consequently, adds Zadak (2001, cit Slim, 2002), ethical business is increasingly being understood in terms of ‘corporate citizenship’ that makes companies openly liable for wider ‘public good’ (Slim, 2002: p 8).

In the public sector the two elements of control and responsiveness can, at least partially, be separated. Like its controlling counterpart, responsiveness refers to the notion of making governing authorities’ accord with preference of the people. But similarities end there. Mulgan (2000) says that the difference here is that public servants and those in office are compliant to popular demands and expectations, for whatever motive:

Just as accountability is such a powerful means of imposing that it has sometimes been identified with control, it has also been seen as so important in encouraging responsiveness that the two concepts have on occasion been merged. (Mulgan, 2000: p566)

According to Mulgan (2000), responsiveness has also been identified as having two components:
• Public agencies are expected to be responsive to outside influences and monitoring groups within the political system, notably to elected officials aiming to control their activities. This means that the agencies have to be adaptive to the ever changing political climate (Saltzstein, 1992; Romzek & Dupnick, 1994: p 266 cited in Mulgan, 2000: p566)

• Agencies provide services to the public are called on to be responsive to the needs of those who access their services, just as the private sector is in tune with the needs of the consuming public (Hughes, 1994: pp236-237 cited in Mulgan, 2000: p566).

In both situations, those in a position of authority are answerable directly to the general populace and not merely via their representatives.

The above are indicators of external accountability. The other is internal accountability, being answerable within. According to Mulgan (2000), this is evident within the many professional frameworks on how we as individuals conduct business and conduct ourselves. On the other hand, he goes on to suggest that these guides of professional answerability function with both internal and external components.

Day and Klein (1987) investigated the idea of accountability of members of the public being elected into supervisory positions that overlooked the professionals, with both wanting to know to whom or what these elected individuals were answerable to (cited in Mulgan, 2000: p561). A kind of stakeholder accountability, if you will.

General consensus is there are two variations:

• Many who had been appointed or elected onto boards that oversaw professionals saw themselves as being accountable to the general public;

• Others in turn saw themselves answerable to the authority that appointed them.

Nonetheless, those [non-professionals] who end up in these monitoring entities that oversees conduct within the professional field completely agree that no matter to whom they may be accountable to, they were just as equally accountable to themselves and their

Accountability is in essence grounded in the philosophy that agents and subordinates act in accordance with the wishes of who and whatever placed them where they are (Mulgan, 2000). In other words, we all are answerable to someone else; whether they are our employers, parents, teachers and even those that we may be responsible for.

**Multiple Accountabilities**

As well as receiving funding/grants from the state, many voluntary organisations solicit donations and grants which are tax deductible for the givers but bring them publicity and a reputation as being charitable (Rose, 1993). The existence of multiple stakeholders who require benefit from the organisation is a key, if poorly understood feature, of voluntary organizations, which, as Ellis (1994, cited by Stansfield, 2001) observed, complicates accountability. Whereas no voluntary agency is totally state funded it is important that donations solicited from the public actually go to the cause that is promoted as the organisation’s key goal.

Whereas the state, quite legitimately, demands accountability for funding, the needs of the clients, the reason for the funding, should also be met and accounted for (O’Brien, 2001). It was Martin’s (1995) opinion that although fairness, justice and due process were the hallmarks of best practice in public organisations, such values were not necessarily held by the bodies with which the Government contracted. He felt that it was possible for the pursuit of efficiency and the delivery of preferred outcomes to take priority over questions of responsibility and accountability.

Thus, the Government’s efforts to respond to demands for greater transparency and accountability in its own dealings, by increasing access to information, may not be enhanced through contracting where private contractors wish to keep their contractual conditions and accounts confidential. Therefore, while partnerships have a range of stakeholders - the participants or staff, the community or clients, and the management and Government to whom, arguably, they should be accountable - financial competition may inhibit this and prevent stakeholder and community access to information (Martin, 1995).
Some voluntary agencies set up through church or other authorities are accountable to those authorities, their point of origin. Others which do not represent such groups, such as ‘community-based’ agencies, have much more diffuse accountability but one would expect that responsiveness would demand some form of accountability to the ‘community’ itself – however defined – as well as broader stakeholders like the clients. Arguably a more democratic approach to regulation must rely more on self-regulation within organisations and consumer and client involvement (Tilbury, 2007).

In a bureaucratic approach, for example, the Office of the Ombudsmen was set up so that people who did not feel that they had been treated fairly by state bureaucracies had an avenue in which to have their grievances heard, and whereby the state could be held accountable, and performance problems addressed. However, this Office is not available to those receiving a service from a voluntary agency and there is nowhere for citizens to call voluntary agencies to account, to demand explanations and remedies, or to impose sanctions (Mulgan, 2000).

In summary, the three key elements of accountability are: external oversight, interaction and exchange and rights of authority to demand reporting. More recently it has been noted that the traditional financial ‘bottom-line’ reporting to the shareholders approach has been broadened to include ‘triple bottom-line’ accounting – including social and environmental accounting as well as the financial position. In addition, within professional groups, there has been ‘internal’ accountability to the profession itself and meeting the requirements it sets.

In the public sector the element of control has also the added requirement of responsiveness, both to the political system and those who provide resources and to the clients – the latter element, of course, often claimed as met through the internal accountability to the profession. However, as NGOs are responsible to the groups which set them up there would seem to be at least three possible authorities to which the NGO might be accountable:

- Government funders (public officials and then, in turn, elected politicians)
- Legitimating authority (auspices)
- Under responsiveness – to their clients
ACCOUNTABILITY OF COMMUNITY AGENCIES

In the case of NGOs set up as ‘community’ agencies, where the auspices of the agency is a broad community legitimation of the agency (presumably represented by the governing board), the NGO must be responsible to that as well. This latter case would seem to be the situation with OYWT and requires some discussion of the specific nature of accountability for such an agency – what is in the Aotearoa New Zealand context a relatively ‘new’ form of agency compared to the religious or interest group agencies of the past.

Community and Social Capital

‘Community’ is a widely contested term, with many definitions. Although often defined geographically, perhaps the most useful way to approach the idea is through one of the interpersonal links between people is that of their ‘social network’ - which may be in one place or may not.

“... the immediate social environment of urban families is best considered not as the local area in which they live, but rather as the network of actual social relationships they maintain, regardless of whether these are confined to the urban area or run beyond its boundaries.”

(Bott, 1957: p99)

The ties of such networks can be many but in using the idea of community we look at the way in which we join to others who have something in common with us. The key here is a web of relationships and shared interests. The importance of such community networks and cohesion is that they can be seen as a resource which gives people power and thus the ability to improve their lives; indeed it can be seen in this study as the resource which gives rise to the OYWT and the positive impact it can make to improve peoples’ lives.

Recently such community relationships have come to be called ‘social capital’, seeing social networks as a resource alongside financial, physical, human and political capital. The origins of social capital, according to Coleman and Putnam (cit. Putnam, 2002: p4) begin with Hanifan (1916) who coined the term ‘social capital’ - “the goodwill, fellowship, sympathy and social intercourse among individuals and families who make up a social unit...”. But ‘social capital’ as a term was further extended by the sociologist Bourdieu (1994) who gave it a somewhat negative focus by using the idea (as ‘cultural capital’) to indicate how the middle class have been able to dominate the schooling system.
Recently it has become popular again as an American political scientist, Putnam, studied economic success in Italy and saw it as based around the involvement of people in (lots of) local groups and networks such as choirs an football clubs. The rationale for this argument is summarised by Francois (2002: p9)

“The notion behind the terms ‘social capital’, ‘generalized morality’, ‘locus of trust’, ‘rationality limiting norms’ and ‘generalized reciprocity’, is that for markets to function effectively, and for capitalist economic development to occur, the pursuit of self-interest must somehow be restrained.”

Francois (2002: p9) quotes Fukuyama (2000) in defining social capital as “an instantiated set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits them to cooperate with one another”. To further clarify, Francois moved from observable networks to more intangible ideals that he thought produced social capital and the benefits it may bring to an economy: “trustworthy individuals are believed to refrain from opportunism even when no such verbal, or even conscious, promise has been obtained” (Francois, 2002: p10). Francois (2002) concludes that trustworthiness is needed for entrepreneurial forces to survive. If there is a higher demand for trade with anonymous networks this can force out those with trustworthiness to be solely governed by market forces. This in the long term can damage an economy, as entrepreneurs are not willing to take the risks needed to keep an economy developing. Even then Francois (2002) is still not sure why it makes a difference to have trustworthiness. He notes that “a stylised fact seems to be that in egalitarian societies, social capital levels tend to be high” (2002: p114). It also seems that egalitarian societies have bigger economies (in general) than others.

Krishna (2002: p2) suggests that social capital as described by Putnam as “…features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and social trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.” (1995: p67) seen to reflect benefit in many areas of a society – better social harmony, economy and political participation. He looks at the use of social capital from the angle of developing countries and the rhetoric which would argue that developing social capital would make the developing country better off. Krishna concludes (2002: p185) by arguing that social capital is useful so long as there are capable agents to mediate the effective use of social capital to benefit a locality. Indeed it would seem again that relationship and ability to network and facilitate communication and action is needed to make gains where social capital may exist. This idea of needing action
lies behind Kay and Bernard’s argument (2007: pp61-63) that Putnam (and other such writers’) use of social capital has become an encompassing term without critique, being simplistically laid down as the saviour of developing nations/economies/communities. In particular it can be noted that there is no analysis of the basis on which social capital develops or does not develop. They wish to see an approach more akin to Bourdieu’s class based work around social and cultural capital. In this view, developing the social capital idea has spread from an analysis of resources gathered through relationships to Coleman’s introduction of social actors and forming networks to transfer and obtain resources.

They look at the areas of formation of coalitions, ghettoization (which exclude social actors) and disenfranchisement, and community enhancement (which include social actors) in social capital and its exclusion or inclusion in the benefits social capital may or may not have for people. However this approach is quite superficial as it does not examine the basis of networks and how different groups relate to each other – simply seeing it as a ‘good thing’.

What is probably most useful is to return to the ideas of Bourdieu (1984), but seeing it more neutrally as the way social networks can be a resource for people to empower themselves. What seems important is to actually understand, in detail, how it can be developed and used. Here, adopting a more systematic approach as in the work of Healey, de Magalhaes et al., (2003) is useful. They have operationalized the definition as a formulation of three major forms of resources – knowledge, relational and mobilization (political) capacity – as three forms of ‘social capital’. They define these resources in detail as follows:

- **Knowledge resources** are the range of knowledge resources to which participants have access; the frames of reference that shape conceptions of issues, problems, opportunities and interventions. The extent to which range and frames are shared among stakeholders, integrating different spheres of policy development around place qualities; the capacity to absorb new ideas and learn from them (openness and learning).

- **Relational resources** are the range of stakeholders involved in the issue or in what goes on in an area; the morphology of their social networks, in terms of the density (or thickness) of network interconnections; the extent of integration of the various
networks; the location of the power to act, the power relations between actors and the interaction with wider authoritative, allocative and ideological forces.

- Mobilisation capacity is the opportunity structure; the institutional arenas used and developed by stakeholders: the repertoire of mobilization techniques that are used to develop and sustain momentum; the presence, or absence, of critical change agents at different stages. (Healey et al., 2003: p65)

The implications of this validate the ‘knowledge’ of any community, including cultural knowledge, and not just that of the ‘establishment’ or what the Government thinks is important. ‘Bonding’ people together, building their relationships, the second element, depends on sharing knowledge – and, finally, the third element ‘bridging’, or linking across communities, depends on the ability of that community to mobilize the power to have their ideas accepted by other groups and not to be submerged or dominated by some overall ‘official’ view.

For OYWT, this is the type of role where agents in the form of social workers can facilitate these connections for people to develop and make use of their own forms of social capital to have improvements in their life, creating community change.

This idea of social/human capital is what makes organisations such as OYWT valuable to the communities they exist in and, in turn, gives them their legitimation. The structure of OYWT allows for participation and advocacy of young peoples value beyond a dollar definition. NGOs, and the not for profit sector, often allow for wider definition of capital than in a neo-liberal capitalist setting. By working with a wider definition of value, and ways of participation, allows for community/collective growth of resource. This would seem to be a useful way to approach the ‘community’ accountability of OYWT; it would thus need to be accountable to the distinctive knowledge and perspectives of the Dunedin community it seeks to represent (as based on the networks that exist or can be developed). Controlling the OYWT on the basis of such community social capital would be one example of mobilising and using such social capital.

For groups such as OYWT the knowledge resources, relational resources and mobilisation capacity of their social capital are crucial in the ability to support the people and community they work with. The aims of groups, such as OYWT, to support the people
they work with to access community, have participation and contribute, are part of what makes the work successful. This is the use of social capital as a resource to address power imbalances and the issues that have been affecting that group in regards to disenfranchisement, poverty, exclusion and isolation.

THEORIES OF GOVERNANCE AND FORMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

To this point this thesis has explored a historical context and alluded to varying theoretical approaches that have influenced the relationship of accountability and measurement of NGO services by government to date. This section aims to broadly name these theories that influenced through social service development from industrial society/welfarism, to liberalism, alternative/constructivist theory and marxist, socialist, critical theory. From this theoretical contextualisation of (a brief) social service history in Aotearoa New Zealand the most appropriate theoretical framework is identified to explain how accountability could best developed. The aim is to provide the base effective collaborative and accountable practice in social service delivery in the NGO sector.

What has been exceptional in recent years, as noted in Chapter One, is the development of theoretical and policy instability in the way at least three of them have suddenly become current and have contended to replace each other after relatively long periods when one theory has held dominance. This was industrial society/ social democratic theory and indeed, Ewalt (2001) indicates that this approach of comprehensive, functionally uniform, hierarchical organisations governed by strong leaders who are democratically responsible and staffed by neutrally competent civil servants who deliver services to the general public (New Zealand’s old Government department services?), are long gone. Again as noted in Chapter One, they have been replaced by an organisational society in which many important services are provided through multi-organisational programmes.

These implementation structures operate within a notion of governance about which a surprising level of consensus has been reached. There is a pervasive, shared, global perception of governance as a topic far broader than 'Government'; the governance approach is seen as a "new process of governing, or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed." (Stoker, 1998: p17 cited in Ewalt, 2001: p2)
As indicated throughout this and the previous chapters, there are a number of levels of welfare implementation. Accordingly, welfare is essentially administered at either the state level (centralized administration) or at the local or county level - decentralized administration (Ewalt, 2001). In the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, the reality was that for most states, there was very little involvement from employment-related public agencies in implementing welfare programs (Ewalt, 1998; Ewalt, 2001) and in “The current environment, local welfare implementation involves a host of public and non-profit organisations. It is irrelevant if the organisation is centralised or decentralized, a variety of agencies are contracted with to provide basic services such as eligibility assessment, needs assessments, job training, employment training, education, transportation, child care, job retention, and rehabilitation”. (Ewalt, 2001: p11)

We can discuss the recently supplanted theory first and work towards its competing policy perspectives.

**Industrial Society Theory (1935-1980): Grant Funding**

Grant funding, without detailed performance measures, was the conventional form of Government funding from 1900 to the 1980’s and fitted with Weberian, Welfare state society theory (Martin, 1995). Shannon and Young (2004: p30) define this as ‘industrial society’ theory operating through state direction of technology representing the individual citizen. This means, in order for society to work and manage technology developments and change, ‘expert knowledge’ is required to direct and control these mechanisms. This fits in the theory of modernism and science where the experts have the knowledge and specific skills to govern a society – in order to have status and power this expert role is desired. Where individuals fail to gain some kind of expertise there needs to be a safety net for those individuals who will never be independent or contributing to society.

Craig and Larner look back to the development of the Welfare state under this theory, which they see as more of an “ethos than a completed set of institutions” (2002: p7). Under the idea of the Keynesian Welfare State the state was closely linked to both production and welfare (Craig & Larner, 2002). As a result, these authors identify that there were distinctive forms of governance and that they were organised on a ‘silied’ sectoral, specialised structure, which to this researcher seems an accurate description, not only of the traditional structure but also of the recent (post 2000) funding structure that has
affected social service delivery. This gave rise to vertical management, bureaucracy and specialised, hierarchical positions which enforced territories and domains, for example health, education, justice, welfare economics, social administration and so on. They see the welfare state as framed by ‘social’ and ‘social problems’ and organised in ways that are discrete and segmented versus the more plural and contested forms of the current day (2002: p9). Craig and Larner identified that this led to there being very little political engagement between institutions of the public service and the society they served. Funding was by allocation of grants and accountability mostly worked downwards through social democratic political processes, but upwards accountability was very vague.

Liberal Theory (1980’s- 2000) and Contracts
Liberal theory had been a significant influence in accountability and contracting in New Zealand prior to the 1930s and, importantly, was revived between 1984 and at least 2000. Midgley and Ochao-Arias (2004: p80) identify the liberal viewpoint as the vision of the individual with capacity for free choice. This view sees capitalism providing an economic practice by which individual capacity to choose (freedom of choice) is exercised in production and consumption. Community in this context, it is claimed by Midgley et al (2004), is therefore part of the free choice individuals have – if they choose to belong at all or exclusively or to multiple communities of choice. Under a capitalist system help comes in the form of a minimal welfare state that may deal with those who are disadvantaged, with market and financial accountability being through contracts. As noted earlier, the move, in the 1980’s, from Grants to Contracts as a way of providing financial support to voluntary organisations, had quantitative accountability as a focus. An organisation entering into a contract with the state has its actions defined by the contract. Therefore, when contracting to provide a service an organisation is obliged to meet certain outputs, and for this they are accountable to the funding body.

Datson, representing such an approach, stated that he was “firmly convinced that the voluntary sector in New Zealand can fulfil the role of the main provider of welfare services in New Zealand” (Datson, 1998: p85) and that the contracting approach that the Government had adopted, with “precise indicators for judging whether organisations are achieving agreed outputs ... has spurred volunteer organisations to focus their efforts on the achievement of results...” (Datson, 1998: p85).
It also considered that clients and service delivery recipients should accept a higher level of user charges while New Zealanders as a whole should accept that philanthropy is an important human activity. However, outputs as ‘precise indicators’ usually refer to numbers/frequency rather than the more difficult to assess quality of service. Under the Liberal regime of the New Right, and contracting when organisations are called to account, the focus is mostly on their financial accountability and measurement of outputs. Whereas organisations, whether private, or public, not-for-profit or profit driven, state funded or profit from sales, are expected to return annual accounts, such accounts do not encompass all levels of accountability.

The development of such regulation has been seen as distinctive of the ‘regulatory state’ (Hoggett, 1996) or ‘audit society’ (Power, 1997) with the development of complexity, intensity and specialization of regulation. Common problems with such regimes are resistance, purely ritualistic compliance with outside forms, difficulties in collecting data, collusion between regulators and subjects and a focus on “conformance rather than performance” (Tilbury, 2007). Critics have pointed out that actual quality for clients is often lost and, with respect to workers, contracting out to the voluntary sector in order to cut costs often means lower wages, more of the work becoming part time and less job security (Mahon, 2002); and in general, since the voluntary sector has a predominantly female workforce, women are affected most.

In Aotearoa/New Zealand the repeal of the Employment Equity Act and then the passing of the Employment Contracts Act in 1991 also made it more difficult for workers in voluntary organisations to have pay and work conditions improved. Therefore, women became the invisible victims of these changes, women as workers and women as clients (Kelsey, 1993). Shifting the provision of services from the state to voluntary organisations does not necessarily increase consumer choice or provide equal access to good quality services (Boston, 1999).

**Third Way (2000-): Partnership Agreements**

So-called ‘third way’ theory, seeking to work between Liberal and Industrial Society theories, has been the source of the rise of partnership as a form of social governance in
Aotearoa/New Zealand, while the deficiencies of grants led to contracting – problems in the latter too, have led to more cooperative, ‘partnership’ forms especially based around the somewhat looser ‘memorandum of understanding’ (Craig & Larner, 2002). The concept of partnership, whereby the voluntary organisation and the state have a reciprocal relationship and the organisation is accountable to the state, seeks to represent this new point of view. Government policies that have resulted in reform and the purchaser/provider separation were said to have enhanced accountability and improved responsiveness to the public; however, such claims must be treated cautiously (Mulgan, 2002). For although the providing agency may be more directly and transparently accountable to the Government (as purchaser), it may not necessarily be more accountable to its clients or other stakeholders.

Partnership in voluntary organisations can be considered in two ways – partnership with the funding body, or partnership between organisational stakeholders. The concept of partnership with other stakeholders is one of a commitment to achieve common goals, of a shared vision of what the partnership is aiming to achieve, a focus on the real issues and achieving tangible outcomes.

Critics state that partnerships do not necessarily address unequal power relations (Craig & Larner, 2002; Walker, 2007), nor issues of representation and democratic legitimacy. Partnerships rely on a consensus of goodwill and enthusiasm and without accountability and answerability to the community this may not be sustainable. From a regulator point of view, partnerships may “fail due to accountability issues” (Ministry of Social Policy, 2002: p12).

**Marxist/Socialist/Critical Theory: Class Accountability**

A Marxist view sees the state and/or those in power, i.e. those who control capital wealth, as a way of oppressing the many for gain by the few. Midgley et al (2004: p83) quote figures of 5-6 billion world inhabitants living in poverty today through the boom and bust cycles of capitalism. This results in massive social consequences of unemployment and poverty. They quote Marx and Engels (1888) in seeing capitalism as the end of feudalism but see the communist/socialist response to this to be the poor uniting for a common good against minority resource controllers to achieve common ownership so all could have a fair
share. For this to happen Marx and Engels (1888) speculated there needed to be a time of law in a transitional phase so the people could see the benefit of common ownership. Law was needed to enforce that this would occur – once this was achieved there would be no need for laws to regulate economics i.e. the utopian society. In this structure they claim the working class would therefore be the community; all production and primary resources are then shared and equitable.

Critical theory, is a current more modern version of Marxism, identified by Munford and Walsh-Tapiata and characterised by “differences arising out of conflict between the powerful and the powerless” (2001: pp20-21). They express it through the summary of critical theory provided in the work of Fay (1987) who sees the way out of class powerlessness as helping people gain a true understanding of their situation and working towards change. Munford and Walsh-Tapiata describe this as happening through a process of understanding or becoming aware of a false consciousness, a crisis where the false view is highlighted then education to help an individual/group to enlightenment (reality of situation) and lastly transformative action (i.e. where action is taken).

In terms of accountability in providing resource, the accountability is to those who do not have the class power versus those that have that power. Prior to the transformative action (revolution) education to ‘true’ consciousness will lead to a situation where accountability will presumably be to the ‘people’ (at least those with ‘true’ and not ‘false’ consciousness). In the current contractual construct this is a challenging view as to how contracts are constructed and accounted for and, if implemented, would presumably mean accountability downwards only, no ‘upwards’ accountability.

‘Alternative’ Postmodern/Constructionist Theory: Participation
This view of theory sees the world as socially constructed, with social phenomena the result of the imposition of meanings. In this approach society and communities are constructed by implicit socially shared meanings that take time to form (Midgley et al., 2004: p89). The use of traditions and history is essential and provides a forum from which a community gathers and operates, so that the good of the community comes before the good of the individual. The focus of this model is the social virtues and duties taking precedence over individual rights. The emphasis is on the power of participation in
decision making to regenerate community cohesion and a commitment to genuine community participation (echoing the socialist values of equality of all but not restricting it to purely economic class forms of power). Shannon and Young (2004: p33) observe such ‘empowerment’ or ‘alternative theory’ to start at the point of holism - where social life is seen as a group or collective, in essence, community. They see the “mechanism of social development and change as reciprocal participation and control of decision-making” (2004: p33).

Midgley et al (2004) categorise three elements to this approach:

1) Participative Democracy – local small scale participation so it is meaningful and manageable i.e. empowerment - everybody involved in decision-making.

2) Historical ‘Communitarianism’ – need to know community values, the way the community has been before we try to develop, various stakeholders, belief that as a result of capitalism there is not a shared understanding of community, need to know what it is we are aiming for before trying to create this community – how will we know where we are going? Whose views are dominant, how they became dominant and how that can be changed.

3) Politics of Ecology - This looks at the idea of sustainable communities, to live within the means of the ecology. The view here is that capitalism has destroyed social values and led to exploitation and destruction of our environment. There is also a need to have strong communities to save the world’s ecology as well as morality.

This theory is the positive response to theories of Postmodernism. Postmodernism, as seen by Nash (2005), includes many perspectives, truths and sees knowledge as contextually based, subjective and uncertain. Postmodernism, thus fits with seeing people as co-creators of differing knowledges and of interpretations of knowledge or ‘discourses’. The ideal is that all take part, power being in the Foucauldian sense a resource open to all, definable by all. In being able to identify the technologies of power (i.e. analyse the power dynamics) it is easier for people to then bring about change and affect this in their lives. For NGO’s this means owning the definition of the work (i.e. contract definition) and gaining funding and having accountability to the organisations philosophical aims – not those solely of the funding resource

For NGOs, such as OYWT, this collective stance is what allows power and social capital to be utilised for group’s aims. In order for an NGO to hold firm to the reason for their
formation this realignment, reinterpreting of resource and power is essential. Otherwise, from this researchers view, the power is defined as the money resource being obtained to make an organisation work and therefore this determines the outcome of the work – not the organisational philosophy.

From a constructionist point of view, certainly regulation needs to remain but attention needs to be given to what has been called the ‘smart model’ (Walshe, 2003) of regulation where values of quality and accountability to clients have to become paramount – accountability ‘downwards’ instead of ‘upwards’ (Ashworth et al., 2002; Sanderson, 1998; Tilbury, 2007; Walshe, 2003).

Broad based stakeholder involvement seems to be the key to this. Regardless whether the Government gives grants, forms partnerships or contracts with voluntary agencies to provide health care or welfare services, there are no built in safeguards to ensure that all citizens are treated equally.

While responsibility and accountability start at the level of the Board, people involved in non-profit organisations deal with a far greater variety of stakeholders and constituencies than the average business executive (Drucker, 1990), and this complicates accountability (Stansfield, 2001).

Stakeholders are defined as “individuals or organisations that stand to gain or lose from the success or failure of a system” (Boutelle, 2004: p1). He said that Freeman (1984) introduced the term ‘stakeholder’ to remind management that, even in the private sector, it was in the long-term interest of an organisation to pay attention to the interests of those who have an impact on or are impacted by the activities of the organisation. However, this is even more the case in non-profit organisations. Hubbard, an expert in the non-profit management field, said that the Board of a voluntary agency needed to be thought of as a partnership between the Board and the professional staff (Drucker, 1990).

Although the Board was, in one sense, its owner, that concept of ownership was not one of having absolute power but an ownership shared with others who have a vested interest, such as other members, paid staff, the recipients of the service and the community. The Board members are not stockholders, as with private companies, they are stakeholders. So
clearly professional staff members and clients in a voluntary organisation are stakeholders and should have rights in the organisation.

The relationship with an organisation’s stakeholders, and with whom it primarily relates to, influence an organisation’s culture. This is the way it treats its employees, the quality of the service it provides, and the account it takes of the needs and wishes of its clients (Makrydemetres, 2002). It also guides individual and professional behaviour. Such qualities make up the framework that supports and promotes trust, integrity and respect (Hubbard, 2001). In such an organisation accountability would require that each member of the organisation, volunteers and paid staff alike, would know clearly and specifically what results s/he is promising to achieve. In the last analysis such visions cannot be achieved in a sustainable way unless power relationships are such that they support fully participatory democracy. In terms of OYWT, funding and accountability this framework allows thinking for contracting to go wider and funding/accountability designs to be devised in a holistic manner, across Government sectoral silos meeting multiple departmental aims within a community setting (for example, a forum for this is the wrap around casework from OYWT). For NGO’s this means owning the definition of the work (i.e. contract definition) and gaining funding and having accountability to the organisations philosophical aims – not those solely of the funding resource.

ASSESSMENT OF THEORIES
This step is to assess the theories and the forms of accountability. Liberal theory proposes market accountability through competition for contracts and contract performance. Industrial society theory provides allocation through grants – once allocated then little formal accountability beyond normal political processes. Third way theory suggests two party agreements so resources come through formation of partnerships and performance of agreed outcomes. Alternative/constructivist theory similarly suggests negotiated agreements and evaluation but now in terms of multiple stakeholders. This assessment will be undertaken around the impacts and viability and feasibility of each form.
Impacts of Accountability

*Liberal Theory:*

In much current discussion the ideas of new managerialism, liberal and competitive market driven models, are contrasted to the more collaborative forms of the other three theories. It is suggested that in the Liberal model ‘The Right Way’ is put forward and roles and labels are assigned with emphasis put back onto individuals clearly identifying who is doing what and none of the pieces keep moving or changing shape. When so many societal beliefs, values and cultures are being challenged and changed a concrete, right/wrong model that does not change can have a certain appeal, especially to those in control!

However, the effects of the market model have been alleged, as noted in Chapter One, to have led to fragmentation in the social services sector. An example is academic institutions. Davies and Petersen (2005) look at the impact of the neo-liberal discourse on them and claim that through the use of neo-liberal technologies, the traditional work of academic institutions in being the home to critical thinking has shifted to emphasising individuals’ performance of “higher levels of flexibility, productivity, and co-operations with national economic objectives” (2005: p1). Higher education is reconstituted as “a market in which private clients purchase private goods for private benefit”. Universities are now viewed as ‘knowledge industry’ with fee paying students coming from overseas thus boosting the economy and becoming “crucial export goods” (Davies & Petersen, 2005: p1). What concerns the authors most in this paper is the loss of purpose of universities as “critical incubators of intellectual life” (Davies & Petersen, 2005: p2).

Through the use of new managerialist (its legitimacy is in the neo-liberal theory field) strategies of restructuring and reorganising the culture, structures and practices in existence are broken up. With their loss is also the loss of institutional memory of how things were done, why and the values of how an area was managed. New sets of knowledge’s that have no authoritative memories attached are then established (Davies & Petersen, 2005: p3). Davies and Petersen (2005: p3) cite Coady (2000a: p24) and his observation of this process in which he observes that universities have sustained a crucial loss of those “intellectual and cultural traditions” that “guide and shape the difficult work
that lies at the heart of intellectual endeavour” (2000: p24). As a result they seem to indicate that anxiety, survival and competitiveness take over from the objectives that used to inform academia. Thus one objection that their work identifies is that a purely market-based approach distorts the work of the non-profit institution to which it is applied.

Third Way Theory:
‘Third Way’ theory has been increasingly invoked in Government policy in recent years. In recent times Cheyne et al (2008: p77) note the ‘Third Way’ brand has been championed by the 2000-2009 Labour Government and Social Development Minister Steve Maharey, with his intent to operationalise the brand through new technologies for prosperity, transforming education, challenging inequality, Government and public sector reshaping and renewing democracy.

It has also involved the use of the concept of ‘social capital’ seen as a way to define intangible concepts such as ‘trust’ and ‘relationship’ into quantifiable, measurable units that ultimately indicate the capacity of groups to work with Government to benefit the stability of a society and its economy. This has led to typically ‘Third Way’ interaction between neo-liberal development and Government action. Cheyne, O’Brien and Belgrave (2008) identify the ‘Third Way’ as a new form of political economy that attempts to marry capitalism and socialism. They observe that critics of this view see it as achieving nothing as it has no central theme and that diffuses its value. Advocates of the ‘Third Way’ however see it as including community, responsibility, accountability and opportunity (Cheyne et al., 2008) and Shannon describes the ‘Third Way’ as having the following characteristics:

- a focus on paid work (human capital) supplemented by social capital (social cohesion),
- construction of the population as active citizens, in a situation of social diversity both demographic and in terms of permissive moral attitudes,
- the State seen in terms of a "networked bureaucracy" (joined-up Government),
- the focus of action being the "community", specifically targeting the disadvantaged community,
- outcomes sought as "local solutions to local problems",
- structures of partnerships as equal relationships with a range of stakeholders,
  (a unified state sector, local bodies [TLA's], NGO's, community groups etc.),
His concern with the ‘Third Way’ form is the potential it has to give a pretence and feeling of having consulted and participated with community while never actually taking any notice of the results if they do not ‘fit’. There is danger of the ‘Third Way’ being a method to devolve difficulties down to the community and away from Government without a clear accountability path back to Government. This is particularly unfair where the problems may not even have originated in the community that is being asked to be responsible for the ‘issue’. Shannon (2006) identifies that the essence of doing this work is to address and give meaning to the power sharing and resourcing of a community not to make it responsible for solving all the problems without the resources to do so or asking it to solve much wider problems.

In Britain, the home of the ‘Third Way’ difficulties in Government collaboration and fair sharing of power and resources also has arisen. Sutton (2000) talks of a project undertaken in Britain to help Government agencies work more closely. The project participants were required to collaborate where areas of health, social services and justice were found to overlap. Partnerships also needed to be established as part of a crime reduction strategy. In order for this to work it was identified that collaboration was needed at a management level as well as an individual worker level. There needed to be recognition by top levels of the organisations of the importance of collaboration. This then needed to translate into the development of strategies and corporate approaches. This meant, in the United Kingdom, that community health agencies had to work with a narrower group of families and local authorities had to broaden the remit of families they worked with. Central Government had to come on board and promote interagency coordination and raise the status of such plans.

However the rhetoric alone did not work. In reality, Sutton suggests that what was needed was that health and social services and education had to have joint needs assessment, joint agreements as to the needs to be addressed and the extent of the need and priority defined. The plans for families had to include family support, agency role and funding to be specified from each sector. Parents needed to be regarded as partners and were involved as the agencies worked with them jointly to produce the strategy and operational
agreements. In short, without sharing power and control with all stakeholders, as suggested by alternative constructivist theory, collaboration did not work.

Work management also had to carefully consider the multiple skills that were needed for their multidisciplinary teams. Traditional professionally defined workers were among the barriers to such multidisciplinary work. There needed to be some education of the professionals involved so that they knew how to work together. In addition it was shown that a lack of administration support could scuttle plans and professionals needed to have an understanding of how to work with each other and the family. There could be difficulties in terms of recognition of the work being done. Pay, holidays, training days etc. may not reflect either the work being done or the actual training needed while working on the same project, while professional differences could lead to differences in approach to these categories. Last, but certainly not least, was the competitive market that agencies existed in and the resulting competition for recognition and funding. This did not always enable the multidisciplinary teams to work together, particularly if one area did not have a capacity to give permission for resource release.

A major conclusion Sutton (2000) explores as fatal to the ‘Third Way’ is that despite the idea of collaborative work coming from Government, the financial distribution of funds was through a competitive and restricted model. Therefore money was ring fenced and divided rather than being in an available pool. This meant it was not always possible to adequately follow through on the collaborative model’s stated intent due to the funding level. The irony in this is that both collaborative work and funding models essentially originate from the same source, Government, but the power remains all one-way. The question for OYWT is, for example, does the FAS model discussed earlier go far enough in demanding quantified and accountable integrated funding by Government departments.

Sutton found that in order for collaboration to work there needs to be significant power and decision-sharing, as suggested by alternative theory. Thus there needed to be a clear statement of aims objectives common to and acknowledged by participants, clear strategy roles and responsibilities agreed between agencies. As well as clear lines of responsibilities, decisions were needed including the tasks of collaboration. Sutton (2000) finishes with the focal question that if agencies (local and Government) are to collaborate both parties need the ability to understand and implement the necessary tasks.
Feasibility of Options

In general, collaborative work is understood to be a ‘best model of practice’ for social work, from all but the neo-liberal approach, but is it idealistic and unrealistic? This next section looks at how collaborative work can be developed, the specifics that are needed, the optimal conditions and the theories influencing these models.

The first issue lies in clients having information in what is a very complex picture. The Joseph Rowntree Foundation (1995) identified that it is essential if many of the difficulties faced by parents in the United Kingdom when trying to access what could be a bewildering range of services, the purposes of which were not clear. From their research they observed that this often lead to parents experiencing an extreme crisis before managing to activate any support. It was also found that parents and young people were not always aware of their rights and responsibilities in these situations. Because of the often complex interactions of agency systems and therefore the long length of time taken for organisations to respond there may have been no work done with the young person when they were at a critical help seeking point. This could result in the client being transferred between systems and services and connections being lost between referrers and referees (Rowntree, 1995).

Rowntree (1995) identified that while agencies do often agree cooperation is needed, the challenge is to focus the work. Things that were found to get in the way of cooperative working were:

- viewing situations as individual or specific agency failure or personal problem versus structural or systemic issues;
- a lack of support given to form integrated and cooperative practice;
- difficulties in agencies defining roles and services they can offer in relation to other services;
- difficulty with agreeing on joint procedures for each agency to action;
- difficulty in relating what skills agencies can offer;
- fear over funding and distribution of resources (i.e. worried agency will be ‘ripped off’); and
- legal contradictions between state services – legally can’t take action until other agency takes action etc. (Rowntree, 1995)
Rowntree (1995) made suggestions of what would then allow for good integrated and cooperative practice:

- the use of informal networks to start with trust and goodwill;
- the need to formalise informal networks in order to maintain roles and clarify how practice is working together;
- role definition;
- establishing a shared language of work jointly done;
- agreed assessment forms and evaluations;
- formal commitment and support from senior management and at political to practitioner level;
- formal meetings to discuss ethics, legislation, practice, gaps in services (generic), information sharing and short and long term strategies;
- collective ownership of problems with the focus on the client;
- mechanisms to exchange confidential information;
- agreed framework for data and statistical information;
- joint evaluation of service; and
- joint training so agencies can better understand professional roles.

The strategies outlined from Rowntree's research can be summarised as the need to formally share and agree on decisions – thus also serving to increase the understanding by practitioners, managers and the political system as to what collaboration actually means in concrete terms, in short a shared vision and then having the mobilisation ability to implement it. This, of course, again fits more clearly with the approach of alternative theory.

In a similar frame Craig and Larner (2002) discuss, in the Aotearoa/New Zealand context, the communication and power sharing requirements of partnership and collaboration between Government and social services, with social services being involved in a social governance/decision-making role. In looking, at the genealogy of local partnerships in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Craig and Larner suggest that part of what has led to the rise of the networks that have formed these local partnerships is the development in communications and information technologies that link with the emphasis on “collaboration, trust, shared
knowledge and diversified functions in economic social realms” (2002: p 6). They see the local partnership role as integral to the new and developing form of social governance but point out that it is very new and fragile in form. They observe that while partnerships at this stage look as though they work and seem beneficial, the way they are working is not always as expected. The relationship between the silo model and that of local partnerships are a concrete example of modernist (traditional) versus post-modern (constructivist) models. The modernist model of a structured, hierarchical, rule based form has a way of remaining very focal and constant in the face of flexible, evolving and morphing needs.

Again, as noted above, while it appears partnership is favoured to deliver social services by Government, this appears to often be in conflict with the fiscal accountability required.

**Ethics and Accountability**

Mellahi and Wood (2003) discuss why, in business, ethics are becoming an increasing part of contract, compliance evaluation and business strategy. They identify, along with Vinten (2000, cit. Mellahi and Wood, 2003), that firms secure their roles as “vibrant creative parts of society over the medium and long terms” (p 6) by giving greater attention to ethical concerns. This was highlighted in what Mellahi and Wood (2003: p6) identify as the excess of the 1980’s “pure neo-liberal economy play” where the focus of business was solely competitive and had a disastrous end for the community. From this they saw the value in having an underlying cooperation model of practice to sustain successful business. Indeed it seems that Mellahi and Wood (2003) are suggesting that without an ethical responsibility to the community there is no future for business. If a result of excessive competitiveness is the end of the community, there is no context in which business will continue. To this end they quote Solomon (Mellahi & Wood, 2003: p6) “without a sense of community and cooperation there would simply be no firm”.

A business style management from the neo-liberal stance has dominated Aotearoa/ New Zealand’s delivery of Government policy and contracts in the past 20 years (see section on historical context of OYWT development). This has resulted in a particular environment of social service contract acquisition, delivery and evaluation.
Mellahi and Wood (2003) also explored a developing area in business - the idea of Social Partnership. Social Partnership, they say, can only be realised through stakeholders making appropriate contributions for mutual benefit and that is only possible through an environment of constructed relative equity and fairness (Rubin, 1993 cited in Mellahi & Wood, 2003). They note that Waddock (1988) cautions that implementing partnerships (or as discussed earlier collaboration) can only succeed if key issues take into account the anticipated fragility of any deal made, the time needed to develop partnership, the degree of cooperation present, staff support and the expectations of various partners. Mellahi and Wood also observe that the traditional social partnership concept between competitors and company and employees, now is regarded in a wider frame of corporate, state and community partnership. This is where an NGO may find itself located in establishing a collaborative integrated partnership with the state and all the complexity and constant mediation this appears to require. Mellahi and Wood (2003) seem to indicate that while this ideal is valuable and potentially even essential it is an extremely complex process to establish and maintain when fundamentally based on intangible concepts like trust. They suggest that gaining this ideal requires more than just a formal or contractual partnership agreement even though it appears to have the most all round benefit for all parties in the end. An example is accountability in terms of the ‘triple bottom line’ – a combination of financial information, qualitative non-financial information and narrative descriptions in auditing (Dellaportas et al., 2005).

*Risk Version versus Trust:*

In fact there are strong arguments that ‘Third Way’ attempts at partnerships are inherently flawed when power and decision-making is not shared. Milligan, Kyle, Bondi, Fyfe, Kearns and Larner (2008) identify common strands across nations that identify how new expressions of governance encourage or discourage voluntary sector activism. Research by Milligan et al. (2008) further noted the growing body of literature that highlights the impacts of neoliberal models on the ability to provide a positive environment for real partnership and collaboration of work across sectors. On the one hand they identified the ability to cross sectors and spread knowledge that was once captured in rigid structures or institutions has greatly increased enabling the community and voluntary sector to have wider expertise and skills at their disposal. On the other hand a lack of universal understanding of partnership and the actions and specific mechanisms and environment required, to sustain and nurture real partnership, has been a problem. As a result they note
that things such as risk aversion results in going back to traditional sector boundaries, where partnerships without relationship building breed protectionism, breaking down necessary communication and trust and so a lack of mutual respect grows. Very similar results were also discovered in a series of case studies of partnerships within Aotearoa/New Zealand – notably involving Maori (Walker, 2007).

This has the further impact of the statutory sectors failure to follow their own guidance documents and retreat to short term funding solutions. What, then, promotes the positive working of partnership if the factors of fostering environments that trust, mutual respect and having shared agendas falls away (Milligan et al., 2008)? An example they give for Aotearoa/New Zealand of a partnership that defines how partnership is viewed is the Treaty of Waitangi as a blueprint from which partnerships are developed in governance in this country. This result, however, has been, and continues to be, hard fought through Maori social and political power to provide a strong frame for the collaborative development of how groups of people work together here.

Weinstein et al. (2003) talk of collaboration as the active process of partnership. Partnership is the agreement and establishment of relations between departments or organisations to work together. One of the difficulties of collaboration that Weinstein et al. (2003) identified was the balance of roles. This is the weakness in the model that Weinstein et al. (2003) observed. With the competitive market model still in place and the influence of new managerialism under this, resources again can become scarce and organisations and managers are back to protecting their own areas of accountability. Once competitive models enter the collaborative process the aims of a collaborative intent can be skewed. Weinstein et al. (2003) observes success in multi-agency collaboration comes through management of:

1. Commitment and willingness to be involved;
2. Understanding of roles and responsibilities by all parties;
3. Common aims and objectives;
4. Effective communication and information sharing strategies;
5. Leadership and motivation to work in this manner and to be able to negotiate and resolve conflict;
6. Involve relevant personnel; and
7. Access and sharing of resource key.
Clearly, again, it is the need for collaborative power and decision-making which is required. In this respect the framework and the philosophy behind a partnership or organisation is essential to the shape of the work delivered.

“….we would argue that it is the ‘why’ (or the organisational philosophy) that determines the tasks that an organisation undertakes and creates internal coherency for the organisation that carries out a range of activities….the ‘why’ of their being will influence the ‘what’ that they choose from a range of possible responses……”

(Matthews & Gasson, 2002: p179)

Matthew and Gasson (2002) identify the difference in social service and social action in terms of ‘what’ they choose to focus upon in service in the community. Social services relate to being the ambulance meeting practical needs, whereas social action involves a systemic challenge and identification of issues, beyond the individual to a collective responsibility and concern. One without the other potentially leaves a social service with no direction and a tendency to patch up problems without leading to social change. Social change work, on the other hand, can leave people isolated and worn out from a long fight with no end in sight. Matthew and Gasson see the two approaches as needing to coexist for best effectiveness and add to this the idea of community action. This gives a voice to, and encourages participation by, those being helped. This is to allow for change within a supportive network. A final element in the feasibility of alternative collaborative work is whether tools exist under which it can be undertaken.

Certainly in the rhetoric of reference groups such as the OCVS (2008) there are more concrete and specified methods for Government to partnership with community and Iwi groups. Again the challenge lies in moving rhetoric to reality.

*Techniques for Evaluation*

Some researchers/practitioners have developed frameworks to incorporate social as well as fiscal accountability and a measurement of the success of outcomes, which helps identify the overall impact of social service delivery. Pearce sees that the core business of a social service or community organisation is to achieve a form of social, community or environmental benefit (2001). Financial sustainability/profitability is essential to this, but secondary to its purpose. Social accounting aims to provide information so that agencies know their purpose, values and relevance to clients.
Pearce quotes Geddes’ (1992) definition of what social auditing entails:

“Social audit is best understood as a reaction against conventional accounting principles and practice. These centre on the financial viability and profitability of the individual economic enterprise. By contrast, social audit proposes a broader financial and economic perspective, reaching far beyond the individual enterprise….Social audit posits other goals as well as, or instead of, financial profitability….Moreover social audit attempts to embrace not only economic and monetary variables but also – as its name suggests – social ones, including some which may not be amenable to quantification in monetary terms.”
(Pearce, 2001: p13)

Social accounting/audit is a framework that allows an organisation to build up existing documentation, reporting and process development to account for social performance. From here an action plan can be developed to improve and measure the impact on community and be visibly accountable to the community it is serving (Pearce, 2001).

Social accounts includes attention to such details as asking how well have we done what we said we would do and what is its impact on the community, gaining the views of stakeholders on a services objectives and values (are we doing the ‘right’ things, ‘walking the talk’). Included is a report on the environmental impact of what we are doing (living lightly, minimising resource consumption), a report on the implementation of equal opportunities (social inclusion) and lastly a report on the services compliance with statutory and voluntary procedures and quality standards (Pearce, 2001: p9).

As a quick 'how to guide', Pearce (2001: p10) uses a ‘Benefits and Snags’ or a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis as potential tools in a social audit. The key principles of a social audit that Pearce (2001: p11) identifies are:

- “Gaining a multi perspective of all stakeholders involved with the organisation
- Comprehensive reports on all aspects of organisations work at the one time.
- Regular reporting so that the concept of the social audit is embedded in practice and culture of the organisation.
- Comparatives – can compare performance on year by year basis and have benchmarks to achieve a comparison to other similar organisations.
- Verified, that is audited by suitably experienced person(s) with no vested interest.
• Disclosed – social audit accounts are disclosed to stakeholders and wider
community in the interests of accountability and transparency.”

(Pearce, 2001: p11)

He outlines the development of the social audit through the 1970s. Issues relating to the
impact of corporations and other institutions on people, local communities and
environment were becoming part of investigative evaluative reporting tools. This
emphasis was illustrated by the work of groups such as trade unions who looked at the
impact on local communities of restructuring and then in the 1980’s corporations looked at
the environmental impacts corporations they were having. Pearce (2001: p13) also
identified the growing interest in ‘ethical investment’ that has resulted in communities,
local authorities and society wanting to examine wider issues rather than simply immediate
financial accountabilities. He suggests that this has lead to movements of corporate social
responsibility, a move from ‘doing good’ to embracing the notion of the improved
accountability of stakeholders, i.e. moving on from only being concerned about the
immediate companies health.

The purpose, Pearce (2001) maintains, of the social audit is for accountability to
stakeholders of organisations, not the other way round. Social accounts (Pearce, 2001:
p40) can then be used during the year by the organisation to act on and review stated
objectives, examine organisational activities and reflect on values. This information may
then be used to set targets and modify practice.

Along with models of auditing that can help view the work of community organisations
more holistically, collaborative models of working between agencies are also important in
order to have effective service delivery. This type of model is advocated by the OYWT
philosophy in terms of having the integrated contract and needing to work within
community for better access for those OYWT works with. As has been alluded to by
authors in this section collaboration can be a simple model but complicated to implement
if those working together do not have strong, shared understandings of the elements
required in collaborative work.
Constructivist as Most Useful Theory

In summary, the above discussion has identified the alternative/constructivist approach to accountability is the most useful approach to understand the issues raised in Chapter One. The literature supports the views in Chapter One, that Liberal theory and competitive contracting has had a negative impact on services. More importantly, the more recent ‘Third Way’ attempts to move beyond those problems, through suggesting ‘partnerships’ and collaboration in situations when power is unequal and largely one-way, have been shown to have major flaws. The evidence has shown that collaboration requires sharing power and decision-making. As well as being necessary it is also feasible with instruments available to develop it.

IMPLEMENTING A CONSTRUCTIVIST RESEARCH AGENDA FOR OYWT

In terms of the situation of the OYWT and the development of the integrated contract, as an example of a ‘Third Way’, constructionism suggests that changes which are not fully based on multiple stakeholder input and control will not be effective. This view can allow community organisations to have a way to identify and operationalise their power resources (in the case of community, the human and social capital) to gain leverage with other power cultures (e.g. funders).

The research questions based on this for this study are based on ‘testing’ this specifically for the illustrative case of OYWT.

Operationalising Power

Where the discussions of power link with OYWT is in the number of networks and relations that exist. Within a multiple contract framework the Government would traditionally try to limit power to particular silos and one-way transference of power (downwards). What OYWT has wanted is a singular contract that brings together all the funding silos in Government and has upwards accountability to all of the separate silos at once. Constructivist theory would suggest that for this to be successful in terms of full collaborative practice OYWT needs the leverage and power which comes from full engagement of all its stakeholders. This power resource as ‘social capital’ could then be the basis on which a fully collaborative outcome could be developed. For measurement
and accountability of service this means accountability must be both downwards as well as upwards with the practice of OYWT having many points of accountability. For OYWT this is accountability to the community, families and young people that use the service, employees, board members, other agencies as well as varying Government and non-Government funders. Multiple accountability and multiple connections are seen as the best way to create change for the community, young people and families who work with OYWT. Power is required to achieve such change.

Power in this approach can be defined in traditional terms as specific resources (Smart, 2003) with social capital and human capital (skills of its staff) being the resources of OYWT (compared to the financial and political capital of Government). However it is important to also take account of the major contribution of Foucault’s ideas that power is a flow rather than an object of control (Danaher et al., 2000: p80). Thus power is defined both as a resource (capital) and as a process of using that resource to achieve goals. This is the position with an integrated contract framework driven by an NGO in which the OYWT finds itself.

For the OYWT seeing itself as representing a locational community view (i.e. Otago/Dunedin) and thus trying to incorporate all stakeholders in defining and structuring their work would be the theoretically proposed approach. In terms of social capital, as defined earlier, the recommended process through which they are able to realise and maximise their social capital – is by working from the unique community knowledge to building the networks and mobilise these as leverage. This is the social capital and power NGO’s can have to influence in their communities in terms of providing service and retaining workers.

**FORMULATION OF FINAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The research questions of this study therefore are quite traditional in terms of the theoretical hypothesis that fully collaborative and integrated partnerships and accountability cannot be achieved and implemented without fully shared decision-making. In the light of the above discussion and the choice of an alternative/constructionist/empowerment theory as the superior approach to funding accountability for cooperative, collaborative services – the research questions are:
1. To what extent has the OUTCOMES funding approach been able to be implemented in a situation where there is a sole funder and accountability to them alone? Alternative theory would suggest that such a one-way power relationship would involve the construction of the funder being imposed.

2. In a negotiated empowerment approach there needs to be accountability downwards as well as upwards and specific mechanism embodied to achieve that. What meaningful form(s) can this take?

3. What leads can Government take from community and Tangata Whenua in successfully implementing accountable models of practice focused on outcomes?

4. How can multiple stakeholders’ views be accounted for and responded to with the focus remaining on the outcomes for those using social services?

5. What ways are there forward in light of neo-liberal influence and empowerment/community models of practice to provide successful models of multiple accountability for the future (i.e. the power flow being between varying groups versus over)? The positives and the pitfalls.

This case study of the OYWT seeks to assess whether the integrated contract form (a local partnership) will continue to stand and being effectively implemented. The challenge, for this research as Craig and Larner (2002) see it, is for community groups and their professional activists to upscale their political contest as ‘strategic brokers’ and be critically aware of funders and policy makers when contracting to avoid the “steamrolling, undercutting and appropriation by political economy that local partnership are vulnerable to if not holding that political power” (2002: p 32). They do not, however, indicate how such strategic brokers can be successful.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has worked from the initial issues raised in chapter one, about the most effective forms of accountability for community NGOs. In doing this it has examined the literature in a series of steps, initially from defining issues of accountability in a Treaty-based nation, to the basis of a ‘community’ NGO being in its social capital. The fourth step then interrogated social theory about the range of possible approaches to how accountability could be implemented – covering Industrial Society (Keynesian Welfare State), Liberal (Economic rationalist), ‘Third Way’ (Compromise), Socialist (Critical) and
Constructivist (alternative) forms. These were then assessed in terms of research and analysis in step five, leading to the conclusion that the constructivist alternative approach was the most useful for indicating the requirements for fully collaborative accountability and practice. Finally, this analysis was applied to the situation of the OYWT and the research questions were based on it formulation. It is now possible to discuss how to undertake this study in terms of methods used.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION
This chapter will explain how the research questions have been addressed. It will cover the research aims and conceptual framework of the research, its design and process. From this point the discussion will move to data analysis and discussion of the validity of the study and its outcomes.

RESEARCH AIMS
Insight and Depth Through Qualitative Methodology
The research methodology stance that has been taken for this research follows the collaborative and reflective practice theoretical emphasis outlined in the literature review. My aim in this research is to test the hypotheses of alternative/constructivist theory that fully collaborative practice in a community NGO, in both design and implementation, requires the interactive engagement of both ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’ accountability.

Davidson and Tolich (2003,) discuss the preference of researchers to use qualitative or quantitative methods for gaining information. The key, they say, is whether the researcher wants to know ‘how much’ i.e. the breadth of a situation versus the qualitative ‘personal story’ or depth of an area of interest (i.e. a lot about a little). Similarly Kitzinger (1995) suggests that quantitative research is the best for finding out the ‘how many’ as opposed to qualitative research which looks for the ‘how and why’ of an idea and/or process. This research is aiming to look at the how and why of accountability and thus at face value alone– qualitative forms are best to gather this type of data.

Moreover, going beyond data collection Davidson and Tolich (2003) see qualitative research as a tool for use in interpretation and contextualisation, but not a way to generalise about a wider group (as you could in quantitative methods). This type of research values personal involvement and subjectivity, versus the deductive designs of quantitative methods where the researcher aims to prove a hypothesis right or wrong.
Neuman (2000) talks of similarities of qualitative and quantitative research. Both methods infer from social life –

“…pass judgement, use reasoning and reach a conclusion based on evidence, …both methods involve a public method or process by which data is collected, described and examined, both compare data – looking for patterns, similarities and differences and finally, both strive to avoid errors, false conclusions, and misleading inferences….seeking the more authentic, valid, true or worthy among them.” (2000: p418)

Qualitative data analysis is less standardized and is less distinct as a final stage, with analysis occurring all through data collection. Neuman (2000, p418) states researchers in qualitative research may colour or illustrate a piece of evidence to show a theory as correct or plausible. He notes the qualitative researcher may be closer to the data gathered and involved in the manipulations to identify patterns and generalisations versus the quantitative researcher that is removed by numbers. Therefore qualitative analysis is less abstract and closer to raw data – citing Collins for this point:

“...words are not only more fundamental intellectually; one may also say that they are necessarily superior to mathematics in the social structure of the discipline. For words are a mode of expression with great open-endedness, more capacity for connecting various realms of argument and experience, and more capacity for reaching intellectual audiences.” (Neuman, 2000: p419)

Qualitative research thus also suits the post-modern, participative and collaborative theories that this research is using to analyse the subject matter. OYWT appears to work from a framework of inclusion, holistic care and wellbeing that contexts best in the post-modern participative theories of understanding knowledge.

Fook (2001: p118) identifies qualitative research as “messy, complicated and time consuming” but as having the ability to gather a lot of new information in difficult and complex areas. She notes, however, that although qualitative research has this unique way of gathering hard to gain information it is seen as too costly in this increasingly financially driven environment.

However, while opening up more flexible options, qualitative research does not always take them. Fook (2001: p122) quotes Nelson et al (1992: p4) in looking at the qualitative field of research:

“Qualitative research embraces two tensions at the same time. On the one hand it is drawn to a broad interpretive, post modern, feminist and critical sensibility.
On the other hand it is drawn to more narrowly defined positivist, post positivist, humanistic and naturalistic conceptions of human experience and its analysis.”

In implementing the former option, during her research Fook moved to incorporating a reflexive frame for her research. Her reasoning for this was that she saw reflexivity as “the ability to recognise the influence of the researcher’s whole self and context (social, cultural and structural) on every aspect of research, and the ability to use this awareness in the research act itself” (Fook, 2001, p127). This is another way of looking at the participant observer role in research where there is conscious, transparent and clearly stated use of the researcher in the research.

**Interactive Engaged Research**

Part of the decision to use qualitative data collection is based on the ideas of interactive research (Neuman, 2000). This means, as the researcher, I have made a conscious point of positioning myself as both researcher and fellow worker in the research, which requires collaboration in both the research design and its implementation. Fook (2001: p129) argues that the self-reflexive practitioner/researcher recognises that the self is the lens through which the world is viewed, therefore this lens is part of the view and frame for gathering data. This means the lens needs to be identified and noted as part of the research process, which can be difficult given the lens’ ‘tacit’ nature, without this reflexive practice in doing research as part of social work practice on their own practice the ‘social work profession will lack major material from which to develop critical and responsive practices’ (2001: p131).

The role of participant observer can be used in this type of research and Dooley (2001: p248) says this indicates the involvement of the researcher in the setting. The advantages of this approach says Dooley (2001) mean the observations can be direct and relatively unobtrusive and data collection can appear more spontaneous and open-ended, giving it an appearance of less structure and control than quantitative research approaches. For this researcher, this allows an ability to gather what people are thinking and not be seen as directing the participants in their thinking. However, this study seeks to go beyond that and engages the researcher and subjects in interactive dialogue. Such an approach locates both the researcher and participants as interactively engaged in the research so that the
participants are an active part of findings, solutions developed or uncovered and tested. The idea is that participants gain empowerment from being involved and this follows the philosophy of OYWT. They have a voice and opinion that is heard and given a political meaning. In terms of this research it is hoped that the knowledge and expertise of all involved can contribute to the articulation of a way to understand how funding and practice may be linked and the implications this may have in the community the organisation works in, and for the clients to whom they provide services. The research is designed to elicit participants’ critical thinking of the organisation, its philosophies, the impact this has on the organisation and its design and intent of service to clients.

This fits with the paradigm that suggests we are not free from our values when observing reality around us (Morris, 2006: p131). Therefore this theory demands researchers embrace and promote these values in the research rather than deny or hide the existence and influence of these factors (Morris, 2006: p131). This view and the ability to recognise the researcher’s own position in the research is why a critical reflexive position has underpinned the methodology for this thesis.

For this research the researcher has a role of participant observer using the reflexive stance that Fook (2001) is referring to. The idea for the topic and the development of the research was only able to be constructed from the personal experience and questions the researcher had from being involved in the OYWT organisation.

**Kaupapa Maori Research**

This research has also been asked to include Maori interest groups during the ethics approval stage (Appendix 1). In looking at appropriate forms for Maori research the work of Jahnke and Taiapa (2003) was examined. Jahnke and Taiapa (Eds. Davidson & Tolich Ch 4, 2003) are clear that a strong frame of Maori system of ethics and accountability are needed to justify methodologies used in research for Maori and this is crucial for the meaningfulness of such projects. They focus on three principles for Maori-centred approach to research drawn from Durie’s writings (1997: p10):

- **Whakapiki Tangata** – the aim to enhance the position of Maori, or enables control of aspects of lives (empowerment principles),
- **Whakatuia** – integrating and links the “interactions between past and present; the individual and the collective; the body, mind and soul; people and their

- Mana Maori – power and control over research process, which includes intellectual property rights.

The research in this study has not been composed from a strictly Maori based philosophy and it has been made clear at the outset that the research has not specifically been designed to do so. However, it should be noted that the theoretical approach chosen, based around the need for multi-stakeholder participation in control of both NGOs and research, is close to the (Maori) research subject control suggested above. In this respect it is hoped the information may be useful and is respectful of the issues for Maori and how their knowledge, hopes and visions can become the basis of accountability.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Case Study

A particular interest of this research is in the relationship between Government and non-Government groups; the funding that is accessed and how ‘funding outcomes’ are seen by Government funders, from the view of the non-Government recipients.

The research required must be holistic and total, focused on the interaction between participants. The value of case studies, perhaps the paradigmatic form of social research (Flyvbjerg, 2000) is that they strive towards a holistic understanding of cultural systems in action, but in a defined and managed fashion. In this study, it is most useful to do this through a case study of a community agency. The important advantage of such a case study is that participants will have an opportunity to express their feelings and their situations that can be compared with other similar contexts in the future.

Data from open-ended interviews are a common form of case study evidence. Such interviews employ a ‘conversational’ mode and require the researcher to have a sound prior knowledge of the subject matter (Yin, 2004).

SAMPLING

The first issue in sampling was the choice of the case study itself. In this case, OYWT was chosen because of the unique vantage point it had in developing an integrated funding
contract. OYWT was, as part of this, attempting to establish a ‘partnership’ with Government, to effect closer collaborative working both within Government and between Government and NGO’s and their community of context. OYWT can therefore serve as a most demanding test case. Given the in-depth requirements of qualitative analysis (Punch, 2005: p187) within the case – i.e. OYWT purposive sampling is appropriate. This sampling method uses pre-determined characteristics where the researcher selects the sample based on information about the issues. This information is best accessed by consultations and enquiry with those involved in a face to face context such as focus group interviews. This approach is hypothesised (at this stage) to reflect how work is done with those using the organisations services and with the researcher being involved in the work is familiar to those involved in the research.

**Cross Sectional Case Study Research Design**

This design is cross sectional and non-experimental - a snapshot at one point in time, albeit one which seeks to explore the discourses and understandings of the effects of funding on social service delivery.

**Sample**

The sample group is the workers, management and board members who volunteered to be part of this research. The groups that formed the focus group interviews were chosen (voluntary participation) from caseworkers (9), management (5) and board members (4) of OYWT. This is the best fit of research approach as the organisation's workers, managers and trustees have the best knowledge as to why and how their approach of work and auditing best suits the service delivery and outcomes they are working for – with their clients and community. The opportunity to be involved in the research was extended by the researcher to these groups with the emphasis being that participation in the research was voluntary. From the position of people being able to self select and be available for the focus group interviews there were nine case workers, four board members, five management/senior practitioners voluntarily involved in the focus group interviews.

**Data Collection Techniques**

There are many ways to look at qualitative data collection but for the purposes of this research the most appropriate method was a semi-structured focus group interview
For this research I have chosen to use a qualitative approach using a focus groups interviewing style of data collection. A qualitative focus group interview technique should best elicit information to answer the questions I have formulated. For the purposes of this thesis a focus group method was used to elicit information from OYWT staff and board members to look at the influence of Government funding practices on social service delivery in NGOs.

In using OYWT as a case study the researcher decided on an open-ended interview style which employs a ‘conversational’ mode and fits with, in fact can require, the researcher to have a prior knowledge of the subject matter (Yin, 2004). This has been enabled in this research to occur through the researcher being a participant observer and gathering data through this focus group interview style, which encourages participants in this conversational mode identified by Yin (2004).

Melinda Lewis (2000) cites Kreuger in defining a focus group discussion as a “carefully planned discussion designed to obtain perceptions in a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-threatening environment” (1988: p18). Lewis (2000) also observes the work done by that the use of focus groups can be for:

1. Obtaining general background information about a topic of interest;
2. Generating research hypotheses that can be submitted to further research and testing using more quantitative approaches;
3. Stimulating new ideas and creative concepts;
4. Diagnosing the potential for problems with a new program, service or product;
5. Generating impressions of products, programs, services, institutions, or other projects of interest;
6. Learning how respondents talk about the phenomenon of interest which may facilitate quantitative research tools; and
7. Interpreting previously obtained qualitative results.

(Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990: p15)
Patton (1990, cited in Lewis, 2000) sees focus groups as essential for evaluation before, during, and after programmes (or services) to gather perceptions from participants to view outcomes of the programme (or service). For this study, focus groups are being used to gain information on the organisation. Within the focus group specific experiences of workers involved in all facets of the organisation are identified to ascertain if accountability structures of the service effect/influence their work.

There is variation amongst authors on the required numbers required for a focus group. Morgan (1988, cited in Lewis 2000) is in favour of 3-4 participants, but having a number of focus groups to compare so the researcher is not just serving group dynamics, while Kreuger (1988, cited in Lewis 2000) believes 4-6 is a good number and Lewis (2000) claims most are between 6-12 people. Stewart and Shamdasani (1990) however are less clear, stating that the number of participants is dependent on the research objectives (Lewis, 2000).

**Focus Group Questions**

For this research design questions of ‘What, How and Do You Believe…’ (Lewis, 2001) were used in a set of seven questions (see Appendix 2). These questions involved asking the 17 interviewees their impressions of the purpose of a collaborative funding structure, methods of evaluation for this funding, the influence of this on their practice, differences noticed in practice between community and Government institutions, and how workable this structure of working with Government was, and benefits for clients.

These were structured questions presented in an open-ended frame that allowed participants to put out their views. This fits with what Lewis (2000) observes as being the aim of a focus group: to establish safety for participants, allowing them to feel the interviewer is interested and able to facilitate conversation. The role of interviewer (or moderator) is key as there are different roles (note taker, clarifier, mediator and so on) they may have to play during interview. As Scott (citing Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990: p70) suggests, “moderators have a difficult task of dealing with dynamics that constantly evolve…” the moderator must also be able to build rapport with the group (Lewis 2000). Lewis (2000) also focuses on the attributes writers such as Kreuger (1988: p75) and
Glesne and Peshkin (1992: pp79-85) identify as key to a successful interview. These include, but are not limited to, the interviewer being:

…mentally alert, free from distraction, anxieties, pressures, disciplined in listening to others in groups, memorise question frame, able to listen and think concurrently, anticipatory to participants, establish rapport, naïve, analytical, dominant but submissive, non-reactive, non-directive, therapeutic, probing, good with time management, able to keep topic moving. (Lewis, 2000: p18).

Lewis (2000) recommends tape recorders as useful tools for focus group interviewing – remembering that they will pick up background noise and people may talk over top of one another. Lewis (2000) identifies notes as important as a back up to recording failure but also as a way to reflect on what has happened in the group that will facilitate data analysis.

From my own history and experience in social work it has been important to me to have a research approach that is collaborative and contributing to the people/organisation I am working with. My social work experience has been based in the community setting and influences a great deal of my social work practice and frame. Working alongside people, partnering in work and being aware of the political and systemic influences that affect this work are strong parts of the social work frame I operate in. Thus focus groups, participation of respondents and feedback to those contributing have had a great deal of emphasis in the execution of this research.

**RESEARCH PROCESS**

**Drawing the Sample**

The process of asking these groups to be involved required the researcher to first gain permission and interest from the management of the organisation - that this research had meaning and value for the organisation and clients it serves. This was done through letters to management and meetings to discuss the possibility and implications of such research and weighing up the pros and cons of it being carried out. Once this permission was gained there was also a formal approach to the Board of the organisation outlining the research and what would be required of the organisation. This permission was also granted. At this stage the potential focus group participants were approached with information sheets on the research and the research questions to be involved in the interviews. At this point participants self selected their involvement.
Participants were informed by both the researcher and information sheet that they would not be explicitly identified in the research but understood that, in a small city and working in an identifiable organisation, complete anonymity could not be guaranteed. As already noted above, having nine caseworkers, four board members, five management/senior practitioners voluntarily involved in the focus group interviews resulted in four focus group interviews, consisting of one caseworker group interview, one management/senior practitioners group interview and two Board member group interviews. The groups were in their familiar areas of working, so that they would be able to feel comfortable to say what they thought from their perspective and to give a comparison to other groups involved in OYWT.

**Focus Group Interview Process**

A set of seven questions had been developed by the researcher that covered the areas of collaborative funding approaches, influence of funding on social work practice, influence of funding on interrelations with other social service agencies, ways of evaluation of social services by funders and the impact these methods may have and the benefit of the OYWT funding and practice framework for clients.

This set of questions was given to the focus group participants before the interviews in order that they could come prepared to the sessions and ask any clarifying questions they needed of the researcher and/or the organisation before committing to being part of the research. The information sheet given on the research also outlined issues of access and storage of information, how the information would be gathered and how participants could read over and change their information after the interviews had been held and their transcripts written up.

**The Focus Group Interviews**

The interviews were scheduled to a 1½ hour time with the opportunity for the groups to meet again for another 1½ hour time if they felt it necessary, to go over the transcripts written from the information that they gave during the interview. The information from the focus group interviews was recorded digitally on an MP3 player and stored on computer, while hand written notes were taken in the interview time.
The transcripts were transcribed by the researcher as soon as possible after the interviews. From the transcripts participants were able to read back their words and make corrections and or changes as they saw fit to better explain their points of view. Some participants took this opportunity at this time, while others did not and stated they were happy for the researcher to use their information as was necessary for the research.

**Data Analysis**

Thomas (2003) outlines the use of an inductive approach for qualitative research. He says the use of inductive approach is to assist researchers “identify frequent, dominant and significant themes from raw data” (2003: p2) – this raw data being the scripts or text gathered from interview processes by the researcher. The purpose of this approach is to:

1. To condense extensive and varied raw data into a brief, summary format.
2. To establish clear links between the research objectives and the summary findings derived from the raw data and to ensure these links are both transparent (able to be demonstrated to others) and defensible (justifiable given the objectives of the research).
3. To develop of model or theory about the underlying structure of experiences or processes which are evident in the text (raw data).

(Thomas, 2003: p2)

In deciphering qualitative information Neuman (2000: pp420-423) looks at the use of coding and themes to make sense of gathered data. He cites Miles and Huberman (1994: p56) in identifying codes as “tags or labels for assigning units of meaning” to organise words, phrases, paragraphs into meaningful themes. This gives order to the gathered data and identifies patterns in the raw data, which gives the work meaning.

Neuman (2000: pp420-423) looks at a three-phase approach to coding involving open coding (first pass through information looking at broad emerging themes), axial coding (further detailed looking at data breaking down further coding) and lastly selective coding (third pass through reorganising previous themes in further coding for specific themes that are now being looked for). For this research this method of coding has been an effective and efficient way to pick out themes and categorise narratives gathered from the focus
group interview. This system of coding and recoding has enabled the information given by participants to be organised and collated into the relevant themes explored in this thesis.

In line with Thomas’s (2003) approach, coding was used to identify and develop themes from the raw data of the focus group transcriptions. From this data themes were developed from category labelling as Thomas describes them and then linked together. Categories that overlapped as described by Thomas (2003) were then combined and further refined down to 3-8 categories.

The findings have been written up using the inductive approach such as Thomas (2003) describes using summary or top-level categories as main headings with specific categories being subheadings. Text, Thomas (2003) says, is used to illustrate the points gathered from the categories (themes) identified. Therefore a common format of qualitative reporting in the inductive style is to have a label for the category, researcher's description of this category, followed by an illustrative text quotation from the raw data.

Since focus groups are a facilitated, organised and voluntary group of people who agree to participate in answering questions relating to a topic in a session, the data is in the form of a transcribed interview that becomes a permanent record that can be shared (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990: p102). From this base a ‘cut and paste’ analysis was used as described by Stewart et al. (1990: p104).

This meant identifying themes that were relevant to the research questions, and classifying the major topics and issues as they became clear in the transcript. Stewart et al. (1990: p104) say coded material (through use of colour and/or code) topics can be phrases, sentences or long exchanges between individual respondents - the only requirement being the material is relevant to the category.

Once coded, the transcript can be literally cut apart (or computer cut and pasted) so relevant material can then be pieced together with each topic given a brief introduction (Stewart et al., 1990: p105). These pieces of transcription are then used as supporting materials and meshed into an interpretive analysis – this coding can be done by more than one analyst to further assess the reliability of coding for major themes and issues (Stewart et al., 1990: p105).
Interpreting Data for This Thesis

At the point of the information being transcribed this data (from this thesis) then became the basis of the presentation of the results from the focus group interviews. In line with Thomas (2003), this information was assessed to identify broad relating themes. It was then reassessed to narrow down the themes identified, reviewed again to pick up correlations between these themed groups. The results were then gone through a third and fourth time to pick out any themes previously unnoticed. From here themes were refined further so that there was a clearly identified group of five key areas of interest from the participants’ focus group information. At the point of the five key areas being identified and parts of participants' transcripts being used to illustrate these key areas the researcher again went back to the participants to clarify that what they were being quoted as saying was what they intended. The participants again had the opportunity to review the material and change their comments where needed. Some participants made changes while others were happy to leave the quotes as they were.

Themes

From the themes gathered by the coding the researcher was able to gain a strong impression of the issues and concerns effecting OYWT staff and board members in carrying out the work they do. The researcher was in a unique position to obtain this information as she also works in the organisation and the information gained is from this participant research lens. As discussed earlier the use of reflexive practice, critical theory, practitioner research and qualitative influence are part of combination of theoretical input that can elicit valuable data and views that are needed to examine such areas as the impact of funding on social service provision and practice.

CREDIBILITY AND PLAUSIBILITY

Flexibility and personal involvement in qualitative research as Dooley (2001) notes is seen as a strength of this method, rather than being a threat to reliability and validity as quantitative forms of research may argue. Thus the issues around the value of the research differ from the traditional issues in quantitative researchers.

Lincoln and Guba (1985) define qualitative research as involving credibility or truth and having transferability of results (being able to apply the design of research to other
settings). Qualitative research needs to have (as does all research) dependability so that the research can be repeated elsewhere and lastly it needs to be able to prove confirmability – that is that the study is shaped by respondents and not researcher bias. They observe that bias is something of concern with qualitative research and to deal with this issue they challenge the notion of neutrality (that the researcher should keep out any part of their own bias or voice from the research) that is often talked about as being necessary for credible results. Lincoln and Guba (1985) challenge this notion of neutrality by using the idea of reflexive theory and the need to be transparent about the researcher’s own bias and point of reference for the research. This is seen to give an ‘honest’ report of the agendas around what has been discovered and reported on. This idea of reflexive research is described by Malterud (2001: pp483-484) as “a systematic attending to the context of knowledge construction that affects the researcher and therefore the research process.” Indeed, as Malterud (2001: p484) notes that “Preconcepts are not the same as bias unless the researcher fails to mention them.”

This is in a similar line to Fook’s (2001) work where she sees reflexive practice in research as a key component to provide most transparent way to observe and disseminate knowledge. This is because the reader has the context and position in the world of the researcher clearly outlined.

Part of reflexive practice as noted by Lincoln and Guba (1985) is the use of a reflexive journal, clearly stating research perspectives, positions, values, aims and desires for the purposes of transparency. Research notes taken by the researcher of their experience of the research journey can be used from interviews conducted, reflection on focus groups, recordings of interviews both digital and written. Trustworthiness is another area addressed by Thomas (2003) over the validity of the findings of the research from such an approach. Thomas outlines varying ways the findings can be evaluated from consistency checks, stakeholder checks to comparisons with other like research. These tools allow the researcher to reflect on their own perceptions and articulate them clearly in the research. Lincoln and Guba (1985) also suggest techniques such as audit trails being used as reflexive material. The audit trial is the raw data, data analysis of coding themes, process notes the diary of researcher along the way and instrument development of forms – how permission forms and information sheets and so on have been developed along the way. These forms were used in this thesis and are available for inspection.
CONCLUSION
For this research, in order to gather results that can take into account the depth, insight and social interaction of the effects of contracting on respondents, an overall qualitative method was chosen. This provided a reflexive engagement between researcher and research participants in a case study of the OYWT. The researcher’s aim in using a qualitative approach to information gathering and analysing was to get more personal and specific information from an organisation. A sample, chosen as a cross section of staff of the agency, engaged in interactive focus group interviews. From the interviews, thematic analysis was used to get an accurate description of the views of respondents on the personal and specific impact to OYWT that funding approaches and social work practice frameworks have. These impacts were identified in themes for the organisation, practitioners and for clients. The findings of this research follow.
CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS: REFLECTION ON A PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on the data analysis of the focus group interviews. The themes are identified by using a three step progressive analysis and are based on the qualitative methods outlined in the previous chapter.

The major themes identified in the data are:

- The holistic/integrated philosophy of OYWT
- Development from OYWT philosophy to integrated contracts contrasted with silo contracts
- The relevance for Maori of holistic and integrated funding
- The issues around the reporting process to funders in relation to criteria
- Frustrations of the attempts to work with central Government
- Success and blocks for OYWT progress in dealing with an integrated contract

The chapter will present these themes with illustrative quotations.

The first two sections of the results chapter look firstly at the themes revealed related to holism in social service practice versus silo funding influences and then secondly at how OYWT integrated their philosophy into the contract with Government as part of outcomes measures for their work.

The third section extends this from a community agency to look also at the relevance for Maori of a holistic perspective in funding and accountability.

The fourth main section follows the reporting process of OYWT to funders and the data collection and use of narrative reporting by OYWT to evidence the theme of holistic practice from client engagement to funding reporting.
The fifth section contains significant themes identified from the focus group interviews. These themes refer to the general frustration of OYWT in dealing with Government and bureaucracy in an integrated funding contract and the partnership of this work with a community agency.

The final (sixth) section reviews the progress and success for OYWT, in having an integrated funding arrangement and their views on the need for funder accountability.

**OYWT PHILOSOPHY AND INTEGRATED CONTRACTS**

**Holism versus Silos**

At a wider macro level Board members, managers and case workers clearly identified the silo approach of Government funding and accountability as a hindrance to effective working with whanau, family and young people. This contract was a way to have a ‘whole of Government’ or inter-sectoral collaboration policy focused on outcome based results (versus input-output models) in order to buy more ‘bang for your buck’ services, which focused on client and family as a whole – from philosophy of organisation to funding to practice. It was hoped that in having a collaborative funding approach it would be possible to cut out unnecessary middle management and paperwork and work across all sectors.

*Collaborative framework:*

In the macro setting the purpose of the collaborative funding model was seen to bring Government sectors together and alongside a community group in order that everyone could collectively see what needed to be achieved, who was contributing what and where the gaps might be in service delivery:

> It was to give the opportunity for the group that is applying for the funding to negotiate with different Government groups in front of the other groups, so the other groups know what is happening, that nothing is happening behind closed doors and I think the Government was very keen that it was going to streamline the situation. (Board Member)

One focus group also identified that the aim of the contract was to mirror the philosophy of OYWT and the service delivery emphasis of practice. In essence this meant to have the funding follow the reasons for the service establishment, not the service to follow the type of funding:
It's targeted at young people with multiple problems so therefore it allows them, the young people, to have funding agencies to look at the issues holistically and it reflects the methods and approach to the young people. (Board member)

The reason for having funding following practice rather than the reverse was highlighted in the difficulties in practice when working with opposing funding frames:

So OYWT are trying to work collaboratively on a plan with a young person and still, because they (other agencies) are about the stats and the numbers and what they have on and off their caseload then it becomes a problem – we can’t do a collaborative (plan) because they’re like ‘well no we can’t do that because we are not paid for that so that’s your job’ – which then again still doesn’t help our client and is immensely frustrating… (Interviewer)

That whole [funding] framework is what determines how people are allowed to practice... if you were to go into say a health setting like the hospital then the medical model very much determines what happens... it is one of the few times when a professional framework rightly or wrongly is what determines how something works... (Managers)

**Integrated Contract: Influencing the Funders**

The managers' focus group described how Government funders came to be involved in the integrated contract. This was through personal contact and forming a relationship with key people (politicians, professionals, community member, Government [local and national]) and bringing them to the physical location of the OYWT centre. Initially key people brought the community together and key funders helped start the OYWT. To continue it on and develop it further in terms of collaboration of sectors required national as well as local support. In order to engage at a national level, politicians in key roles in Wellington were kept informed by OYWT:

…but its things that are as simple as, he (Maharey) sat round the table and met people who he could actually have an intelligent conversation with, who were practitioners… (Managers)

…when people come from that level of power (MP’s/Government officials from Wellington) they actually realise the staff, the board, the management are all talking the same speak. [For staff at OYWC] it’s not a philosophy that people have had training in, it’s people who are walking the talk and it just comes across - people listen… (Managers)
As a result of this advocacy of the integrated contract and demonstration of its use OYWT has been instrumental in influencing Government delivery of contracts to the community or third sector. The model of funding developed was used to help establish the Funding for Outcomes unit, in the MSD in Wellington. This was a response to the difficulty of keeping momentum caused by, it seems, the rapid change of personnel in Government areas. This means that historical knowledge of how and why an organisation and their contract has evolved is lost.

*It is a difficulty – personnel change is a difficulty, however spearheading it now is a unit that has been set up, so funding was appropriated from Government to MSD in order to set up a unit to advance this model and that's happened. The co-funding model has been advanced so yeah, that unit has remained pretty stable but the trouble is that when, at the grassroots when personnel change the historical knowledge goes with them. So they've (Government) used our centre as the model for this - I mean it wouldn’t have happened if it hadn’t been for the Wellness Centre. (Board)*

**Community Base, Flexibility of Response**

The focus groups identified varying ways in which the practice in an NGO or community environment was perceived to be different to that of a statutory setting. Not all of the differences were seen as negative and varying participants noted the way the two systems – state and third sector – could work effectively for a shared positive outcome. It was seen there were two roles – the community playing a longer term influence and state being in the crisis, emergency or last resort role when there were no other options. Because of the community base there was seen to be a more flexible way to meet clients issues rather than in a statutory setting.

*The first big difference is that Otago Youth Wellness is community based. State agencies are not. Because it is properly community based its response is*  
1) Quick; and  
2) A response that involves the community.  
*State agencies have either a waiting list or huge delays....and sometimes people are waiting for a long time so the moment is passed. A community response responds to the family or extended family as well as the young person in crisis. The State they respond to the total thing as well but they respond within a system that is fixed. That is the difference between the flexibility in the community base and the inflexible method of response [of a state response]. (Board)*
One reason why it was seen to be easier to keep individuals at the centre of the work in a community setting as opposed to a state setting, was the more natural accountability there could be in the community. In a state setting it was seen that large systems meant the possibility of misdirection of the focus of work to system and administration demands rather than the needs the service was established to act on:

*I think what the difference is, is that we, everyone involved here, have not lost sight of the fact that one individual is important. Now in a large institution, for example like a hospital, great care is required. Large organizations become bureaucracies and again in those institutions it becomes 'have I ticked off the lists I have to do, and that bloody patient they are annoying me because I have a job to do'. So the focus becomes management of the organisation. (Board)*

From a casework, ‘micro’ view, a community setting again allowed more flexibility and time to focus on the reason for the work. It allowed a greater chance to do the work most people trained to do:

*...you’re looking at working with more of a preventative sort of way rather than being reactive. [For Government agencies] it [the young person’s situation] has had to get to a certain level to be bad enough for them to work with them. And just being able to kind of spend enough time, building up that relationship with that young person and do a proper assessment of their needs. (Board)*

*...[in state agencies] there’s a lot of constrictions on the role it’s quite prescribed…so 3 months and then they’re out. I guess they are dealing with the crisis stuff so probably can’t do that preventative stuff…we can be a bit more proactive with being more mobile [in service delivery]. (Caseworker)*

As a result of this difference in practice the focus groups identified that OYWT enjoys a large amount of community support:

*...it’s meeting the needs of the young people in the community and the supporters, the trusts, the council, the schools, the police, health all see the efforts are being put into Dunedin youth and they support it totally.....it is meeting the needs of our children....it’s interesting you can talk to parents and they’ve heard of the trust ‘oh one place that’s been suggested to me is the ‘Wellness Trust’....the ‘Wellness Centre’, the word is out there, its one place you can turn to for help.... (Board)*
Board members and managers saw the point of difference of practicing in this community model that existed from an integrated contract. It enabled the Trust to secure qualified staff that practice to a high degree and specifically chose this place to work:

A community based organisation has the ability to attract highly qualified and highly motivated staff who come here to work because they want to serve the community. Agencies have not got the same appeal unless it is for money. So the dimension that we’ve got is almost an altruistic service. Whereas the Government agency workers don’t look upon it as a service they look upon it as a job… When you are working with Government agencies they tend to think that anybody who works in a community base has poorer qualifications and fewer skills, they are just ‘do gooders’. (Board)

In fact the reverse is true:

This centre is pretty unique though in that it has got a superb structure it’s got superb leadership…people see it as a worthwhile place to come and work… (Board)

It is part of the positive accountability relationship:

That’s right, because it’s community based there is almost a kind of feeling or that the community deserves the best so you try to put in your best systems. You try to put in your best methods of working. You try to give all these quality things, not because what the community demands but its because their support is there and they value it. You feed it back by giving it value. (Board)

Managers in identifying the NGO flexibility of practice also noted the restriction of state settings and the difference in ability to influence an organisation in a community setting:

It’s that systemic stuff if something comes up, crops up we can have that discussion and we can be creative and we can go to management and say what about this, there are ways of solving things. And I think that happens here from the ground up really, and I think there’s a real willingness and openness and its not that situation of power, where… you are… told the way to work… (Managers)

There’s a capacity to isn’t it, it’s not just a willingness and an openness, but we are actually able to. (Managers)

A bonus identified by the manager focus group was having a non-risk averse environment which enabled better client service. People were confident to practice and practice safely as they did not feel they would be left to deal with situations on their own and take the blame if things went wrong:
...you have no sense here that people practice risk averseness. Now that isn’t the same as being reckless... what I keep saying is that if you have a really tough situation, take the one that’s in the best interest of the kid and we’ll worry about the rest... Providing we’ve made sure s/he’s not in an unsafe living situation... we’ve been able to do is use [workers] skill and professionalism so that we are as sure as we can be that it’s a risk worth taking and if we get it wrong well ... but hey... we just have to go out on a limb for [the clients] sake… (Managers)

FROM OYWT PHILOSOPHY TO INTEGRATED CONTRACT

This section will cover the ideas around Integrated Contracting and also about auditing and accountability in a community agency.

The Integrated Contract and Auditing a Community Agency

In order to help funders evaluate the integrated funding approach, measures were introduced by OYWT from other experiences:

I brought a model from my other world [of working] that says well we’ve got a strategy to check what we are doing and evaluate it – often it was said you can’t do that... and I said no we’re going to do it holistically and they said no you can’t measure that... and there are dangers in measuring it [the work] of course but there are more dangers in not measuring... how do we know if we are wasting our time or doing a good job?... if you have a holistic approach it [the measurement] might be how many people are involved in social justice issues [for example]... (Managers)

One of the aims of having a comprehensive model of single reporting to all Government departments was to manage the impact of reporting and auditing requirements on service delivery. That is, to ensure that employees and board members time was not spent only on meeting funding requirements.

...we are measuring our outcomes pretty well really... we certainly know where they (the young people) come from... what really bothers me is that we don’t get bogged down in the reporting for the sake of it as that takes us away from doing the job. When you are a small agency with limited funding and staff...you can end up over reported… (Managers)

The integrated framework of the contract had built in space for proactive actions as well as looking at what has happened from the work. There was, from an OYWT point of view, an opportunity to look at preventative measures and trends that could inform wider policy making across Government sectors, as well as service delivery by OYWT or other community organisations. Part of the methods of a triple or quadruple bottom line audit
and evaluation could include wider implications of data gathered to address issues at ‘micro’, ‘meso’ and ‘macro’ levels:

*It also looks at potential risk. You are assessing the risks and maybe through our work the risks are being reduced and not just waiting for something to happen… [for example] basically referring to a mental health service and having to wait to see [if the young person can be ‘bad’ enough to be picked up] - but working with it in more preventative way.* (Caseworkers)

The original idea was that by joining across sectors the social service work could be reduced (by reducing duplication of services) and clearer outcomes achieved because the left hand would know what the right hand was doing:

*…the original dream was that actually by bringing those things together that we could get some common ground that we were all working towards the outcomes…* (Managers)

The caseworkers’ view of silo funding and integrated contract was similar to that of the management and board:

*My understanding of the purpose of that kind of collaborative funding was that it meant rather than reporting to separate agencies and spending a fair amount of time doing that, we were able to simplify that by having a collective set of outcomes that we were reporting to. So my understanding was if we are talking about putting the individual at the centre then to put them into funding silos simply doesn’t go with our philosophy.* (Caseworkers)

The idea of the integrated contract was, from a case work perspective, to enable more time with clients and necessitate less on paperwork for paperwork sake as in previous forms of the multiple contracts with:

*Lots of reporting to do... Lots of tick boxes…* (Caseworkers)

**Mutual Accountability**

The integrated contract bought agency, workers, funders and clients together as visible members of the service delivery. The underlying philosophy, besides the providers of the service having accountability, is that funders are also:

*…accountable to each other in some ways!!* (Caseworkers)
If OYWT had not driven the formation of the contract and held to their philosophy in the shaping of the contract, the uniqueness that allows OYWT to deliver a social service to the clients/community, in the way it does, would have been lost.

...because if we didn’t drive it [the integrated funded contract] that’s what we would have got [lots of individual reporting to separate departments with overlapping information that isn’t seen together] and that’s what I’m talking about…. in the end you can’t practice if you have a manager standing over going “I need that report and you haven’t filled out your last weeks worth of 5 minute phone calls so sit down and do it” cause then that starts to dictate how somebody performs…  (Managers)

The contract was developed with a qualitative reporting frame, as there were problems from the OYWT point of view with solely quantitative measurements. The use of narrative and qualitative explanations in reporting was needed by caseworkers:

...because that’s where it comes to tick boxes, because you sit there and say well now that person hasn’t engaged but I want to explain why and I can’t explain why [in this quantitative record keeping]...  (Caseworkers)

Before collaborative, integrated funded contracts everything had to be recorded for the auditing purposes of the funders. All interactions had to be detailed, and this itself shaped practice for clearly the wrong reasons:

...what the topic was on the phone, or what time, who it was, was it professional or was it client.

...so you spend a lot of time on paper work...

...and you’d be inclined to make it up... 

...and you’d be inclined not to make phone calls....  (Caseworkers)

In order for the funding influence to be moderated, OYWT have taken an active role in writing the integrated contract to help keep the focus of the auditing within a holistic and collaborative frame rather than separated out:

But something they [auditors] won’t be aware of is that we’ve pretty much written this last contract. Albeit that’s built on what’s in the first two and while one funder went through and edited bits and pieces in the end other funders had some input. Which is where we came back to some of that more specific health stuff. But its nothing like what it would have been [if OYWT had had no input in the design and form of the contract development].  (Managers)
Part of the reason for the struggle to get Government funders on board was the change in thinking it required from traditional contract formats. As one respondent suggested it was a huge ‘ideological’ shift in thinking. However some focus group participants did note that the extra effort required for funders, especially when they were in control:

*I don’t understand what is in it for the funders themselves for them to work together for the contract. Why would they?* (Caseworkers)

Other focus group members saw some benefits for Government funders:

*...[in the] long term things will be easier and its been harder for them, they’ve got these reports they are not used to, they are not just statistics, we’ve got statistics in there as well but that’s been a big shift for them... and some funders are saying this is the right way to work they’ve managed to rally other people in other areas to buy into it...* (Managers)

One of the major benefits focus group participants saw for Government funders participating in an integrated contract was that they could achieve outcomes they could not afford to fund individually but could collectively. The benefits for the clients were seen to be greater also:

*It’s also that the sum is greater than the parts too... having them all work together is going to be more effective and have more benefit than if you tried to work more separately. ‘Cause we are working with the same young person, so the same young persons got issues with education and issues with mental health or drug and alcohol. If you were to put money separately or have different services to work with that same young person then there’s a lot of money being wasted. There’s also a lot of people the young person is expected to form relationships with to work with different professionals - whereas we can be one worker helping to facilitate the services and help get the needs meet...* (Caseworkers)

There were influences in practice that affected the funding approach. A key aim of the Trust Board and managers was to limit negative impact for caseworkers and clients so they could get on with doing the work that will make a difference to clients and their family/whanau lives.

**MAORI PERSPECTIVE**

Thinking more broadly outside their own agency, respondents also explored the issue of the funding process and its benefits to the wider community. There was a view that the changes are especially important in terms of providing appropriate services for Maori within partnership frames and meaningful ways for Maori clients:
I often wonder if we had separate funding what would that mean for Maori...but also because we are not a kaupapa Maori organisation, we are ‘mainstream’, and therefore unable to access those specific funds and this has implications on our young people. (Caseworkers)

What sort of implications? (Interviewer)

...there won’t be a lot of money for Maori funding basically... not compared with how many clients we work for... so when you think about it... To have that [an integrated contract with resources for Maori inclusive] in the contract is quite a big deal and maybe with the profiling this might show people the type of work we do, more positively. (Caseworkers)

So this style [of funding] is more inclusive? (Interviewer)

And more holistic too... it can show more Maori concepts and that belief that person is not just an individual and that they impact on the world and the world impacts on them. (Caseworkers)

So that taking account of those cultural needs is it in a safer way? (Interviewer)

...not only that but it shows that funding – most funding things you don’t see that at all its just tick box or paper but this because its holistic it can actually show what people are like, and what they are doing...

I think it comes through from that funding level down to the practice that we are looking at the holistic....that when you are working with Maori that they are not seen as an individual only but within the context of family and that funding is not about the individual only as well. (Caseworkers)

**Advocacy for Maori through Contract**

Through the integrated contract the OYWT board has tried to use the information gained to advocate on policy that is impacting negatively for Maori. By using this forum it is another way to advocate for a significant client group in the Government arena where their needs may not always be given appropriate focus:

...there has been a particular trend around Maori that has been going on for however many years and its something that the board has been and management level have identified as well... and have been trying to do something about... (Caseworkers)

Trying to raise awareness...(Interviewer)
...yeah with some kind of focus group, or plan, strategic planning around the issues for Maori... as an agency... we were able to look at how we were addressing these or put into... specific action, plans with the type of profiling what we could... work out was, especially around offending, there was actually a core group who were offending. Whereas with statistics you wouldn’t know which ones were the same ones impacting in the areas in education, drug and alcohol issues as well. When you’ve got separate tick boxes in funding they could be separate people and you wouldn’t know but we’ve got that collaborative approach and can identify that there is actually this particular core group of kids that we’ve got and we can reach and work with...

It also allows us to show the complexity, I guess, of people’s lives as well...

Its not that they just can’t get to school... There’s good reasons why often its really hard for them to go to school and its not just knowing whether they go to school or not but some if its in the family some of it comes down to talking about the family, their culture...which is something I don’t think you can pick up in a tick box about culture. And the young people we work with culture has been a impact in one way or another and you can’t show that in a tick box and that goes throughout the family, their education, who they are as a person, their mental health... it goes right through. (Caseworkers)

Collaborative Framework and its ‘Fit’ for Maori

This part of the interview gave good insight into the value of collaborative work across cultural world views and how it allows people to work more naturally from their world view – in this case from a Maori world view:

...mmm and I think its fits within that Tapa Wha model as well you know that holistic approach it enables us from a Maori perspective to do our job from a culturally sensitive way as well, culturally appropriate way maybe.

To have the Maori Hau Ora contract as part of the funding that’s a big thing, I don’t think we’ve ever had Maori funding as part of the contract.

...no, its always been separate...and not just that but all the other health money is separate contract base like smoking cessation and diabetes is quite specific and yet we’ve got this other contract that’s been brought into our co-funding one so its holistic and wraparound.... I remember going to that meeting....and being able to talk from this is the approach we use, this holistic, collaborative way of doing it.

...but we believe in the way this is funded and we can talk about it and work it and feel confident this supports what we do and most other places can’t really say that about their funding and contract.
Working with Maori you are able to go out into their family and if it is beneficial for the young person and their family you can work with wider whanau. I have provided support for younger and older siblings who are not on our books because if there is a need or it is beneficial for the whanau there is a need to be flexible. (Caseworkers)

INTEGRATED CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION

...the overall funding approach impacts by us endeavouring, in collaboration with the team at wellness centre, to not let it impact too much (obviously it impacts a bit) and that has been a struggle. Funders want to count numbers and we want to count outcomes/results. So if we had succumbed to them we would be number counters and it would have been a great cost. The influence has been quite debilitating but we haven’t let you (OYWC staff) know the frustration of continuously trying to effect change. (Board)

Part of managing the impact of funding was to be involved in constructing the integrated contract:

...because what we did literally, you know, is go through that line by line [of the integrated contract] and go if we agree to this what will happen? We have to record against it and we’ll get audited against it, and how will it impact on the fact that people actually have to be held accountable in terms of their practice. So I’d say to you that probably unlike most organizations, we have looked right from when the contract has been drafted and drafted a lot of it ourselves. Specifically bearing in mind that:

a) how could it impact negatively on our practice and our framework; and
b) how would we account for it if we actually got challenged on it, so we’ve gone in with a very much with a heads up on this.

But I would suggest to you that most organisations don’t have either the foresight or understanding that they need to do that and they just get presented with a final document they’re expected to sign. (Managers)

The influence from the contract was very apparent when one of the sector funders (education) withdrew from the integrated contract but retained a separate independent contract. This placed a tension on the management of education within the OYWT frame for both management and workers. Part of the tension of having a sector funder outside the integrated contract involved the inability to share trends across sectors.

I think one of the missing things in education, for us, [is a] capacity to dialogue… Now those reports will go to police and the health.... they actually don’t go to [Ministry of] education. Yet the decisions that ministry [education] makes is having a huge impact on people’s lives… (Managers)
At a meso level the casework focus group noted the positive introduction of a HHEADSS framework into practice, to help demonstrate the holistic influence for the integrated contract. At a micro level of caseworker to client interaction, the HHEADSS framework provided the base of 1:1 work, record keeping and profile reporting of each case. As mentioned earlier, HHEADSS is an acronym for the categories of Home, Health (physical and mental), Education, Adolescent Offending, Drug and Alcohol, Sexuality and Suicidality with Culture and Spirituality weaving through all the categories. HHEADSS provides the frame from which casework assessment, planning, evaluation and reporting are derived:

…our whole practice framework is based on that funding approach isn’t it - that’s where HHEADSS came from. So it hugely influences practice... now we are looking at our assessment process to put that in a HHEADSS framework as well... yeah that’s quite a good example of how one has been influencing the other. (Caseworkers)

It became clear from a practice perspective that OYWT needed consistent, holistic assessment and evaluation for both funders and clients, with HHEADSS providing this. The old ways of reporting and assessing were appropriate for their time but with funding needing to follow philosophy, from an OYWT perspective, reporting outcomes and assessing clients needed to come from that same perspective:

…yeah we’ve been able to look at where its not working, and I mean that’s having an impact on the work that we do as an agency. We’ve said well this doesn’t fit with our philosophy, our funding, our practice - so now we’ve re-jigged it [the assessment]. If you’re going on that quantitative thing then you are more likely to make it up with the tick boxes... like you say... If you’re going on the qualitative you can explain the reasons why they might not have engaged in services or whatever and I think that makes a big difference... (Caseworkers)

Very clearly managers, board members and caseworkers all saw this type of funding approach had valuable and real benefits for clients. There were also benefits for workers and the board in managing bureaucracy and paper trails that could be overwhelming and distract from the purpose of the work of OYWT.

Holistic Approach:
Board members and managers agreed the benefit of the integrated funding approach was primarily in the ability to treat people as whole people. This meant addressing all aspects
that may be negatively influencing a client and their family/whanau life and reporting back that measurement and evaluation of outcomes in a whole way in context of that client's life. This had other positive flow-on effects in terms of reducing administration on multiple reports. However, this was tempered with some caution that the benefit in this area not being as great or as pervasive as was originally hoped when OYWT was first established:

...well the type of co-funder [contract] fits the holistic methods, so that can’t be anything other than beneficial. And secondly it does the whole thing as a unit so that must be of benefit. It takes away the pressure of having to respond to 9, or it might have been 11, different accountability measurements for contracts. So it takes away that pressure therefore it releases administrative pressure. And therefore, in releasing administrative pressure, more time can be put into the young people and I think that’s important. (Board)

OYWC Philosophy/Values:
The benefit for clients having a funding approach that was philosophy driven was seen by the board as being able to promote a community based response to need. The reason of course is that the agency saw the funding as secondary to the practice goals:

I think this centre is driven by the ideas that have been well thought out, well founded, that it must be a holistic approach and then this centre and the trust has gone to the funders and said this is the way it’s got to be and um, so its not driven from the collaborative funding but it was this centre and trust that pushed the collaborative funding... (Board)

The ability to have a voluntary relationship with clients was more effective in addressing social concerns as a result. The biggest question that was raised was: why have a vision and philosophy of working that was not part of your contracting framework – how could that possibly work if the contract compromised the integrity of practice?

Why would you have a philosophy and a vision and a contracting framework that required you to practice in a way that is contrary to your philosophy or vision? Because if you went back and said its OK we’ll make it work, what you are actually saying is that the organisation is more important, keeping the organisation is going is more important than what you believe it is there for... (Managers)

Proactive Practice:
Further benefits that have been seen by OYWT in this integrated funding approach and philosophical stance are the encouragement of proactive practice:
1. To be preventative in the work, being able to act before a crisis occurs;
2. To give flexibility of practice by workers to meet client need; and
3. To address longer term issues such as generational impacts.

Social work practice then moves beyond seeing ‘problems’ to looking at solutions and strengths of clients, family/whanau and community:

…so you get to be proactive rather than trying to catch up? (Interviewer)

…well the generational problem is mentioned on a regular basis. That if you deal with this generation that it’s not going to be the same problem in the next generation. (Board)

I think it allows the workers to be flexible, it allows for flexibility of thinking and finding solutions really…. (Manager)

USING THE INTEGRATED CONTRACT

Tools and Skills

Developing an integrated contract like the OYWT Holistic Framework for Outcomes has led to the need to have a wider set of tools to evaluate the performance of the organisation in delivering the outcomes contracted for. For auditors, the contract is the base from which a tool is developed to measure compliance adherence by organisations. In this particular circumstance, OYWT is asking for more than a compliance measurement or evaluation of a programme. It is also looking at the social and environmental impacts of the service and the outcomes that are also happening in these arenas. This is part of the overarching holistic approach that encompasses client, contract and community interactions:

…we’ve produced the tools... we’ve tried to educate them as to how they should measure this and we are talking of outcomes… in the first meeting we had (with the funders) we were saying we want to do it properly and measure for outcomes and they said why do you want to do that for and make your life a misery – we are happy to measure you for outputs – the ministry of education was not set up to measure for outcomes... (Board)

Figures could be replaced by ‘stories’:

…and you can go to the bit in our contract that says 20 profiles (narrative reporting) because we wanted to focus attention on the fact that all of this is driven by individual needs of individual kids, all exhibiting multiple disadvantage. (Board)
Again the purpose and the usefulness of the collaborative funding formula was to give a way the funders could interact together and see the outcomes for services they were purchasing:

*I was just fascinated by the reporting, you know you do that wonderful 6 monthly co funding report, which so much energy and time goes in with the wonderful narratives and client profiles plus the trends which will hopefully go forward to funders and hopefully would inform policy.*  (Managers)

However in discussing whether trends identified from profiles in reporting from the contract are used by funders to inform policy development it appears this is not the case currently. So again real information from the contract data that could be used across all the funding sectors has the potential to fall through the cracks because of a seeming lack of understanding of its use by some of the co-funding contractors.

**Power Relationships**

Longer term outcomes versus short term measurable items as outputs is part of a wider methodology of evaluation or measurement of funding to evidence what is being achieved through the work done at OYWT. For NGOs like OYWT this outcomes based funding has implications for future funding and the viability of such a model of operation. It demonstrates the need for consistent and sustainable funding to keep meeting the desired outcomes of funders yet it does not shift the power:

*…isn’t that a problem that the trust faces though, that we are backed into a corner to chase funding and the difficulty is manipulating things to get what we need… that’s the difficulty I see… with those (Government agencies) who see this group working very well and they want to move on and put funding into something else, so they want to draw back… and expect the trust to continue on without their support. And education the same with their truancy funding – oh well truancy is going along alright in Dunedin but we are changing it elsewhere so we are going to change it in Dunedin as well…*  (Board)

Part of the use of social auditing or triple bottom line methods of measurement or evaluation of services is to move beyond deficit funding and clearly outline the viability of the third sector and recognise officially the impact this third sector area has on the health and wellbeing of our communities:

*…so [when a programme is working successfully] we will take more money out of Dunedin [because the money is not needed i.e. ‘bad trends’ are not happening] and that’s the difficulty. That will only happen where NGOs are*
looked at as a 3rd sector and that they are valued [NGO work and outcomes] in the whole scheme of [Government] things… (Board)

These power relations applied to attempts to develop integrated funding further, as in the use of social auditing. The focus groups saw it as useful for the organisation in terms of development of services, identifying gaps and observing trends and future implications for a local community. What was not so clear was the value Government or bureaucracy would see in such a way of measuring outcomes.

...in theory it is, but this sector (the third or community sector) will have to drive it, bureaucrats won’t drive it, it’s not something that will sit well with them...

...if you looked at social auditing from our perspective the...whole question is how you influence and change things...? A social audit looks at the social values and you’re doing a lot more things, like how it affects clients, how it affects workers so that can be communicated amongst NGOs, so it’s a good reflective tool for your organization...

...social audit would probably be quite good... just thinking about the time and energy that would take but sounds like you would get a really clear picture of how you were seen by your client base but also by other groups.  (Managers)

One of the key benefits of collecting social auditing data was to use this information gathered over time as a way to challenge and defend your position on social concerns:

...if you said to me tomorrow what would be the single reason that you would put yourself under that pressure to pick it up [social audit]...in the short term you’d use it as a defence, until you get strong enough that you can actually challenge [funders/Government]... and I guess that’s one of the things the contracts given us in the third reiteration is the strength to actually hold our position where as we couldn’t have done that otherwise.  (Managers)

Agency Recording

Client Focus: Using a Narrative Reporting Process:

The focus of OYWT reporting is on outcomes and accountability to clients versus bookkeeping output measurements of auditing and accountability. The significance of the tools and reporting methods developed by OYWT is the ability to tell what is working in clients' lives and the achievements they are making as a result of the support they can gain from OYWT. In the narrative profiles developed the young people are able to see their potential and see the process as them realising their potential, which again is what the OYWT mission statement promotes:
It also shows the strengths of how these young people and their families have actually managed to survive and get through to where they are today. They can see all the cool things that they have done as well - that’s a nice strength based part. (Caseworkers)

Challenging the Power System:
Part of the significant impact this integrated funding approach has had for the board is the degree to which funders have needed to be educated as to the integrated contracts purpose. This has needed to happen not just once but continuously:

…the only way to change this is to get people to challenge and buy in to the contract and collaborative contract process and take ownership of it. (Board)

…it’s because it’s about power isn’t it? …when you go to the table you feel that, because it feels like you’re still under scrutiny, that they’ve still got the power, you know it’s quite hard to come up against that… what worries me is the funders do not know how the grass roots work. So their mental attitude is still in a straight jacket and they still want to see those kids as a number only. What we are trying to do is educate them really and to bring them face to face with the issues. (Board)

…so do you think that we are educating them through this evaluation tool? I guess that you have to have hope… that you are modelling the processes… (Managers)

Although the collaborative contract aims are to reduce the accounting workload, a lack of bureaucratic understanding in the funding arena leads to an increased workload by management of OYWT to keep the contract on track:

… it’s a balance of being able to pick your fights and to still keep on challenging without wearing yourself down… (Managers)

For caseworkers again the philosophy and culture of the NGO allow for a more tailored response to individuals and their contexts versus following a bulk policy that may not match the need being presented by clients. Again this illustrated the interaction between social work practice, contract development and funding:

So what does that mean for you guys in your practice? (Interviewer)

…flexibility… less constraints as opposed to what you may do in a state organisation because you can be more flexible about what work you are doing and how you go about doing that work… you can be responsive to need as it arises… (Caseworkers)
Over time these emphases of responsiveness to client need and being flexible in practice to client/community need, have become integral to practice and this has led to continued development of practice in the models of social work practice that can be implemented:

...through the funding stuff... we’ve come up with HHEADSS [framework]. And we do work in a lot more in depth framework now because we are more aware of particular areas... (Caseworkers)

Outputs versus Outcomes Measurements:
The current method used by Government funders to evaluate the service has been limited to systems/compliance approaches. This approach has limited the ability to view outcomes. Outcome focused evaluation is seen as important to the agency with the wider implications of trends and information gathered over time. The narratives (called profiles by OYWT) give specific information on what is and isn’t working in service delivery for individual clients and also at a wider level in policy across the sectors:

So the [original] audit hadn’t changed to looking at outcomes and the way that those outcomes were achieved. It was still a number audit, a tick box audit... we’ve got to fight for the tool to measure outcomes that they all agree on and this is a big learning curve for (Government) agencies... (Board)

An implication for community/NGOs is that output or compliance measurements in the end can have a dishonest or unintended effect of limiting service delivery to particular areas and a glut of service provision because that is where the funding is arbitrarily defined to go, not because identified need in the area has been identified:

...if they could only understand this leads to dishonesty [tick box audits and purely quantitative analysis] – whether they needed it for that purpose or not so they manipulated their own way of working in order to get funding from different sources. They are not focusing on the issue and how best to deal with it, they are chasing the money and I just think that is dishonest, I think there is a lot of wastage in that. That by coming together and by looking at outcomes they wanted and by funding for those outcomes altogether it was likely not to be the same wastage. (Board)

Compliance auditing seems to set up community groups to be evaluated on how quickly they can fit in with an auditing body and not on the use of a tool for education, improvement or observing what actually happens on a day to day basis:

...with health driving this one [audit about to occur at agency] you’ll get 3 weeks before we get the [audit] tool and its like again reinforcing the whole
power thing. We’ve got it [power] and we won’t tell you until three weeks beforehand…

…to catch you out… and therefore what’s the purpose [of the audit]?

…it’s [the way the audit is handled] very power orientated… (Managers)

For the community or NGO sector the use of narratives in auditing and reporting on services delivered has an added advocacy stance for clients at all levels. It gives an individual a way, through an organisation, to voice needs and opinions that otherwise may have gone unheard to key Government people. These perspectives and understandings are very valuable to the ongoing positive shape of society:

The profiles it allows the young people and their families a voice and [a way to] be seen as real people rather than what we were talking about before and be seen as just a number.

It’s interesting because with the co-funding you get the people, their stories and with the statutory auditing you get process, money, structure not to say one is better from the other but its interesting the emphasis. (Interviewer)

I think that with real people coming through….there are also wider themes and issues for our particular community that get noted as well – barriers... (Caseworkers)

**Overall Success of Change**

The impact for OYWT and its relationship with Government funders has been a mixed one. While there is plenty of evidence at the frustration OYWT has felt at the ongoing working out of the integrated contract and lack of bureaucratic understanding there is an acknowledgement by key Government politicians (and advocacy from some of them) in enabling the contract to go ahead. One major benefit was to use this contract as a base to start up a unit for the expansion of integrated contracts (‘Funding for Outcomes unit’ within MSD). Participants saw two systems at work within Government. One system is for the advancement and integration of new policy and new ways to involve community further in meeting gaps and needs of the people in those communities. With this there are key politicians and bureaucrats that are strongly advocating this model of intervention. The other system is the broader established financial bureaucracy that exists, almost it seems beyond time and space, which impacts heavily on the new policy implementation systems:
...because Government funded ministry of social development up to replicate this co funding, they showed they had a commitment to it. And because MSD set up a unit to advance this and implement their policy that also shows that agency has a commitment to it. What that agency has to do, that is the MSD, is to educate the ministry of education, CYFS and so forth. (Board)

There seems to be a tension or even conflict in the Government agency understanding (from an OYWT perspective) around collaborative work, what this specifically means and how this can work. Some of the Government agencies have taken on a ‘whole of Government’ approach and are attempting to work in an ‘Intersectoral’ response but it seems to be becoming evident that parts of the bureaucracy are not at this level of understanding yet. What the hope of OYWT is that within Government the agencies will be able to educate each other rather than having external forces of community being the only advocates of this approach:

...but I think you’ve got a [Government] agency educating a [Government] agency, rather than a NGO educating agencies, which is much more helpful in the scheme of things. And secondly, I think, also it is Government policy to emphasise outcomes rather than through puts. So Government’s policies are changing the way they work. (Board)

The Funding for Outcomes unit was established and OYWT used as one of the first test cases in developing potential formula for Government to use in determining how to collaboratively go about dividing up funding in a collaborative manner, to get the best joint outcomes. There still remains much education that continues to have to happen for there to be a sustained belief by the Government funders and bureaucracy to get the collaborative thinking into their long term memory – part of the hard circuit of corporate knowledge/history that gets passed on:

I mean they have the whole funding from outcomes unit in Wellington as a result.

... it’s a long game isn’t it but certainly it seems to be supporting educating them.

... and certainly when it got set up, it got set up because they were curious really... what was this about (OYWC and funding for outcomes) and could it work elsewhere and I think what it really uncovered was... what the barriers are within the funding group. (Managers)
It has taken OYWT time and persistence to keep the integrated contract approach at the fore of the relationship with funders. This effort to keep the integrated contract on track has highlighted the influence of existing silo funding from the market economy model on Government funding and implementation of policy:

_I think it also shows you the degree of brainwashing, the degree that people are so used to actually thinking in the silos as opposed to seeing the people, bigger picture... as someone said actually for this to really have benefit the thinking has to be in the water supply. The thinking has to be second nature, we spent a long time learning how not to see the whole person._ (Managers)

The casework focus group identified very specific benefits for clients in the use of a HHEADSS framework that gave the holistic approach a very concrete way to be reported and measured. In the new narrative profiling form it was seen clients could be represented very clearly to Government funders and this frame allowed their voice to be heard in settings that they (clients) may have restricted access to in the normal run of life. There is still some caution about the value of this reporting as it is felt by OYWT that Government funders have often disregarded this part of reporting and struggled to understand the significance of the information they are given through narrative profile reporting:

_It’s certainly made us think more broadly about how we meet the different areas of a young persons’ life through the HHEADSS framework... you are seeing the client as a whole rather than a bit, you see them within the structure of their own family, within the wider environment – that’s got to be more beneficial for them._ (Caseworkers)

Again the casework focus group picked up the importance of relationship and engagement with clients being central to the ongoing wellbeing of the young person and them participating in society. This was seen as further benefit of the funding approach in that social work practice was endorsed by the contract and the practitioner could practice as they had been trained to:

_The funding approach allows you to build a relationship with the young person and their family which I think is the biggest, key factor for engagement and continued work that other funding approaches may not allow you to do._ (Caseworkers)

Part of the influence of the funding approach was also the inclusion of beliefs and values in the contract. Having these as concrete representations in such a document meant they
played a key role in the way people worked at OYWT and in the culture of the organisation. This in turn had emphasis on how clients were able to experience the organisation and realise the changes they want to make in their own lives:

...because the fundamental beliefs and philosophies of the wellness centre go hand in hand. If you didn’t have those same belief systems then it would be harder to work with that framework maybe… (Caseworkers)

Part of this funding approach was also the role of advocacy at meso and macro level systems that may not otherwise hear clients and their family/whanau views:

Giving a voice a different ‘pitch’ you know that sort of idea that these young people do have voices but it’s not heard because it’s in a different ‘pitch’ to what other adults may hear… (Caseworkers)

**Key Change Agents**

It was strongly noted by one of the focus groups that OYWT had a particular atmosphere in its workplace that is hard to create, maintain and replicate anywhere else. This was seen to be a very positive thing but something of a mystery as to how it had become so and a great desire was expressed to see it remain so:

I think one of the things about the Wellness Trust that is special – how many times do you get to work in that kind of environment, you guys (OYWC staff) are so privileged to have that kind of environment and be able to maintain it. It probably is unique what you have managed to achieve there and keep on happening without being ground down with all that happens around you, that could make it really difficult in a different place and (people may say) we can’t do this anymore...

I don’t know… you guys have created something that is really special from a whole bunch of different reasons and the really interesting thing is that when you do replace one or two you still manage to maintain those core values… I hate to say this but the manager will one day move on as we as governors are going to have to be really careful about what we do to keep that culture. Because it is as much about the person who is leader as well and we have been really lucky… (Board)

**Other Factors in Having a Successful Organisation**

…within reason I can’t remember anybody here who was a cynical practitioner in terms of their own frame work and you know how you’ll often get that in an organisation. You get people who are really cynical about their own work or what they thought they were going to be, or whatever, and even of the people who have been here a while you don’t detect that, that retention or cynicism… it’s more about that frustration that you can’t get about systematic or systemic
changes, that actually no body sits and bitches on about the professional framework they are trying to use and where they come from because there’s not that sense that...for me that has been one of the biggest rewards about operating this place - I think having the sense that people do feel they are actually using, to the best of their ability, using what they thought they were training to do... (Managers)

Caseworkers noted what made OYWT unique was the value of persistence that seemed to indicate an energy that kept workers keeping on with clients even after most others may have given up on them. It is seen as one of the key strengths:

...we convince them (laugh)...

...we persist....(laugh)...

I think that’s one of our key strengths…. (Caseworkers)

FRUSTRATIONS IN THE CONTRACTING PARTNERSHIP

This section looks at the frustrations felt by varying groups in OYWT. This gives some insight into the experience of working as an NGO with Government and managing funding and accountability concerns.

Silo Funding versus Outcome Based Funding

In this focus group a participant was putting into context the historical political background of the development of the contract into its collaborative form. They outlined the dilemma between the silo funding models and outcomes based funding that exists within Government currently:

...we talked to Michael Cullen and he said this fits into the whole of Government policy, which was just beginning to be rolled out. Prior to that Roger Sowry imposed this (integrated contracting of sectors) on the funders and from my experience they did not want this to happen. So my first experience of this was of obstacles and difficulties that were thought to be insurmountable.

I think it’s [the purpose of the integrated contract] to have the group avoid having to go to several different sources and negotiate independently.

...the other important thing is that it is outcome based so that each of those funding agencies (Government) have to make an adjustment in the way they act. Their accountability measurements have been throughputs and inputs, now they are focused on outcomes. (Board)
One of the developing themes of the focus groups was the growing ambivalence in relation to the workings of the collaborative funding approach. This appeared to develop not because participants did not think there was value in the approach, but because of an increasing frustration with working with Government who displayed a continuing attitude of non-understanding. This pervaded the bureaucracy and seemed to undermine the potential success of such a model:

I’m not convinced in practice that it [collaborative funding] works because of the continuing ...um determination shall we say of the Government departments, in particular, to keep working in silo’s. So even though there is a nice idea behind the collaborative approach I’m not sure that its translating into real changes on the ground in terms of the relationships we have.....we did it so that there was an integrated approach so we didn’t have to be reporting 30 times or something wasn’t it. I’m still not actually sure that the Government agencies have made the shift to work collaboratively so that’s probably the thing that would concern me the most.

...that’s the way of the contract... this funding approach impacts on us, its supposed to avoid some of that silo approach but yet we are still required to do that, report back, and even still now be asked by individual departments to provide further additional information above and beyond what we are contracted... (Managers)

Also obvious in terms of significant factors relating to this funding frame was the impact of a party withdrawing from the integrated contract. The following discussion showed the impact felt by workers on practice and delivery of service when having to manage the education party withdrawing from the integrated contract. This had a definite impact on social work practice:

...we did have a change with the truancy when we had the truancy contract and that impacted.

...that was education pulling out of the contract that made it really a lot harder...

It compromised your belief in it [the point of an integrated contract]...

... it meant [truancy] was harder to approach in the way we wanted to approach it... (Caseworkers)

It also seems to be a hope of OYWT to share the positives of the work with funders. In order to do this reporting on outcomes has used a narrative frame to tell individual stories.
This method of reporting differs from the more common quantifiable measurements of outputs employed in auditing circles. While a bureaucracy or Government may be wanting to keep a step removed from people's personal concerns, this approach is based on relationships and the meaning of outcomes through these more intangible, narrative and personal reports. This type of accountability can be uncomfortable for the uninitiated as people may personally feel the impact of the work:

... the frustration can be so overwhelming [in this work] – [so] I think that we all want to share the kids and the success stories. (Managers)

In terms of other NGOs and their understanding of OYWT’s integrated contract, it seems (from the perspective of OYWT) that there may be varying degrees of understanding. This again could be related to the impact of continued competitive silo funding to community agencies over the past 20 years. A way of funding has been established that has created a culture of potential dependence on Government and certainly an influence from Government on the way community services are delivered. This in the end affects social work practice and changes the nature and culture of the work particularly in the third sector role in New Zealand. At this point in time there may well be a generation of practitioners that do not have the social justice or political frame of reference in their practice due to this influence. A question this can leave is where the community gets to have its voice and needs heard through independent advocacy:

I don’t know that they [other agencies] actually understand it to be honest...

...a lot of people have heard of the name, the term, integrated contract gets used...

I wonder if it’s a little bit like when you first came, here and you sort of might have heard of it but its almost like not until you’re in here that you understand it....

…the truancy contract has always been associated so strongly with us there are still a lot of people who think we just do education. (Managers)

**Outcomes Funding Philosophy versus Outputs**

The board and manager group further specified the obvious tensions observed in philosophy and implementation process where the two were not aligned as has been observed within Government funding circles:
\[\text{...because it was so obvious, and it was obvious to me that if it were funded properly, as a unit, it would be less costly. Because if health put their dollar in and education put their dollar in and so forth \-- each dollar was supporting the other agencies dollar so that, but if you looked at it just one area that needed more funding per person.}\\\]

\[\text{...and they think it's accurate... and you get all these forms and you start ticking all these boxes but don't worry because whoever is collating it is not really interested, they're just interested in the tick box!}\\\]

\[\text{...whereby pushing it to the outcome we really are also preventing that kind of thinking - but it needs educating. I thought it would happen much more quickly, cause I thought that people who worked in bureaucracies were there because they had a conscience but I soon found out that numbers of them work there because the need the money, because it’s a job!}\\\]

\[\text{...but you see again funding has not been so easy to get for prevention and that is a pity, that's sad. It seems that you fund for crisis rather than to prevent a crisis and that’s because of measurement... (Board)}\\\]

From the various focus group perspectives of the participants there seemed to be little consistency by funders in developing the integrated contract and then putting together auditing tools for the integrated contract. Even after some time it appeared the organisation had little faith the Government agencies are managing to meaningfully engage in the co funded contract philosophy and what this means for clients of the services they are purchasing:

\[\text{...the difficulty there was no consistency in the way that agencies (Government) fund community organisations. Each has their own method and it was quite obvious that not one agency (Government) understood the other so right at the beginning they had to learn how the methods that each used worked...}\\\]

\[\text{[not looking at the whole picture is]... kind of frustrating us - the outcome focus is what we want and again you get that argument about whether or not they understand what the outcomes are. I’m still not convinced that Government agencies have actually got their heads around that even after how many millions of years they have been talking about it... (Board)}\\\]

Some of the concerns held related to the ways in which outcomes and outputs were measured. There is a question regarding just what was being measured in the service delivery:

\[\text{... [for example] Are we making any sales here are we achieving anything? The answer was we are very careful not to - and I said hang on a minute the}\\\]
measurements are all wrong! Its not how many calls you make, its how – do we want to get economic development, do we want to get 10 more jobs? So shouldn’t we be measuring the number of jobs we are creating….they said well we don’t want to do that – that’s very dangerous. I said why? Because the auditor might say that we’ve failed. We’ve said we’re going to get 10 jobs and we got 8, but if we say we’re going to make 10 calls – there is no failure there. So if I have 10 clients that I’m going to reintegrate into the system, I’m going to just measure the fact I’ve seen the 10 clients and not measure whether they have reintegrated back and whether they are engaging in education – the 10 clients are going to be fine aren’t they but can you guarantee you’re going to reintegrate those 10 into education, you can’t! You only get 8 – the worry is that someone is going to come up and say ‘ah hah hah, you’ve lost your bonus because you didn’t achieve your target’… which is wrong… bad incentives, perverse incentives really… (Board)

This idea of perverse incentives in funding was also a concern raised by other focus group participants. It is another example of funding process taking away from the core business of what a service delivery is about.

There were two levels of frustration expressed at this point. One was the fact of having an integrated contract model that was not being understood by the bureaucracy, even after much time and effort. The second was a feeling of delivering the outcomes required but still not being greatly valued:

…it is frustrating, it feels, I mean I’ve been involved in the trust since 1999… I just can’t believe that we still have the same sense of frustration that we had then and nothing seems to have changed even though we have got this wonderful new model I still think that frustration is there and I don’t think it’s lessened really… really at all… and that’s disappointing for the kids sake… (Board)

A third level of frustration was with the loss of opportunity in relation to the data gathered because of seeming difficulties for the funding bureaucracy to understand or even pay attention to the information they are being given:

…we are gathering amazing information in our reporting, and you only need to read one or two of our reports to see the trends that are coming through. And then you’ll go to one of those meetings and they are not even aware of the trends - which suggests they are not even reading the reports that take huge amounts of staff time to create. And I mean that adds to my sense of frustration that if they looked at what we can show them over a 10 year period there are very clear indicators of what are going on in this community and probably a wider community and it’s just like we are putting it into a big black hole really. (Board)
Again a level of frustration comes through about the lack (at times) of bureaucratic and Government understanding of following through the methodology of an integrated contract:

... the problem is how long is this learning curve been going on for, um, and that’s the problem isn’t it. It seems almost impossible to get a consistent ongoing approach...you see is the problem that a lot of their other funding is provided in a non-collaborative way and therefore their evaluation systems can’t keep up... (Board)

This sense of frustration seems to be again related to having a contracting system that opens up communication and collaboration but feeling that much of the time the opposite is happening. This gives rise to questions from OYWT regarding the purpose of putting all this energy into having such a system:

I say to her [the manager]... lets make changes around the back door rather than... the front door. She’s quite right she says we have got to hammer and hammer and hammer it [at the front door] or they [funders] will never hear the story [of the young people – clients]. (Board)

Management questioned the value of the outcomes OYWT currently achieved. The point made was the outcomes are in part linked to the willingness of contracting partners to join and understand the work they are contracting from community groups:

... the outcomes are about as good as they get when you’ve got unwilling partners. Mmm. To me what that represents is lost opportunities I think. (Managers)

**The Reason OYWT Carries on Despite the Perceived Difficulties and Frustrations**

So where does that leave the wellness trust long term? I mean, keep batting your head against the wall for another 7 years or..?

...yep. Because you are clear about why you are doing it really. (Managers)

Despite the gains of such a funding model there is the recurring frustration that in areas of Government funding and bureaucracy there still remains an attitude of misunderstanding of the implications for community in having a collaborative integrated funding model:
... to me it seems so clear that I sometimes struggle to find why people in bureaucracy don’t understand... its basic fundamental science of health services... you have got 2 problems so you treat 2 problems... you went in with multiple health problems so there is not a lot of use to not deal with the multiple health problems... so the wrap around holistic system is not treating symptoms it is treating the disease... (Board)

While this frustration remains at the slow pace of change in the bureaucratic circle there is concession that there may be some shift from Government funders and now the young people the organization is set up to serve are increasingly being seen as whole people:

... you see my frustration at sitting at that table is that they (funders) don’t always get the young person. But I don’t feel now in that forum that we are having to break the kids up, or the practice up, into bits to justify it. (Managers)

I had come out of Government and was working in the private sector and it more than ever emphasised for me the stupidity of that output driven model... I think we know that this (outcome integrated contract model) can work despite the bureaucrats and that is probably something that is quite encouraging. (Board)

Challenge the System:

Benefits are, then, seen for the clients in this integrated collaborative funded approach. A tightening of the number of reports needed, being able to report on clients as whole individuals and contexted in their community were some of the specific benefits seen. There was also a gradual and at times seemingly painfully slow, change happening with Government funders but there was a general concession (by OYWT) that this funding approach had long term benefits for communities.

The long term benefits were looked at by the OYWT participants in the focus group. They were asked: How long can this integrated approach last and is there any way for the contract to be broken into compartments again in the future?

No. I think it’s gone way past that. Well, put it this way, I’d go so far as to say now that - and particularly if I’m still the manager if that ever happened - if we were to be told if we are to continue to operate we have to go back to individual contracts. I’d do 2 things:
1) I’d make a recommendation to the board that we stopped delivering the service
2) And the second is that I’d resign.
Because I actually don’t think the thing you’d have is what the wellness trust is. So how can you reconcile the two? Why would you have a philosophy and a vision and a contracting framework that required you to practice in a way that is contrary to your philosophy or vision?  ( Managers)

Continuing Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy seemed to be an emerging theme in dealing with Government funders for the integrated contract. Although Government actors at individual points in time were often interested and very willing to support the idea of an integrated contract, once the idea was translated into the bureaucratic system there seemed to be a restraining of the ideal and the momentum became lost in the system:

… ahhh the bureaucracy I don’t know how you get anything done…. they [advocates of the integrated contract within Government] had all the best intentions in the world but the bureaucracy is bigger than that and that’s what it comes to…

…and they can outlast the minister because they come and go…. 

… the reality check as well – those people are not necessarily in touch with what’s actually happening in the real world – its almost like a surreal environment because you’re not connected to what’s really happening on the ground so you have these people setting policy who have never seen the kind of kids you work with on a daily basis they wouldn’t have a clue what those kids lives are really like. They can read all the reports in the world but they can never understand unless they really have an interaction with them… (Board)

Within the problems identified in working with bureaucracy there was also a ray of hope for the future of bureaucracy:

… oh and that’s what gives me hope you know, within a generation we will have a new kind of bureaucrat hopefully, that is much more open to that, I mean the systems won’t change overnight but you will hopefully have people who will be much more aligned with what we are trying to provide. (Managers)

Some could see the third sector as a sector gaining in power and influence within a social service setting:

…as this sector gets more powerful and I think you’ll find people will leave the bureaucracies and join the third sector, I mean that’s already happening. (Managers)
However, some developments that could impede the third sector development of community agencies were also noted:

… the biggest threat now actually is from the third sector itself and what I see is increasing bureaucratisation of the third sector. So what people are doing, lots of people are going out of the bureaucracy into the third sector but unfortunately there’s also a section going out of the bureaucracy that are bureaucratising the third sector. So they are moving out of their Wellington office and the public sector life and into a Wellington office in their third sector life and there’s quite a bit of money trading hands around that so you’ve got some very questionable, um, alliances and liaison around advisory groups and so on representing the third sector interests and that’s starting to develop - that are no closer to the likes of us than, you know, the bureaucrats you are having to work with. That is what I see happening and that makes me a bit wary…

(Managers)

**Reflection On An Integrated Contract**

**Progress of Community and Government Partnerships:**

The questions was raised in the focus groups as to why Government agencies may struggle to go from theory base of changed policy (i.e. outcomes policy) to having actual working contracts with the flexibility to accommodate actual people within the accountability structures of Government funding:

*Why do you think it is they (Government agencies) struggle to move from that theory base, or it seems like a theory base – that stats base to seeing the people? (Interviewer)*

*I have a theory, because they don’t want to be involved in a decision making process – they have a book they have boxes in them and they tick the boxes and everything is very safe and they can’t make a mistake because if they follow the routine its not their mistake. And they don’t want to be involved in anything innovative. That’s very cynical isn’t it… (Board)*

The Board was asked: What would it take for the bureaucracy to change and adapt to the collaborative versus silo approach of funding?

*Start again. Because there’s too many people that... will say ‘but we’ve always done it like that’ – they don’t know why, they know they are doing things that don’t make sense but they don’t know how to change it, they’re not brave enough to change it, they’re not brave enough to question... you have to be careful because it’s all politics… (Board)*

To examine why an integrated contract is useful requires discussion of auditing of contracts. Part of any funding process involves auditing processes to monitor how money
is spent and what ‘value’ that money has bought. The benefit of an integrated contract is to reduce the resources that may otherwise be spent trying to meet audit demands (i.e. administration structures set up for audit purposes) rather than directly benefiting client service:

…we couldn’t have done this, we could not practice the way we practice without that co funded contract… we would get audited to bits and we’d lose it… (Managers)

Thus it seems contracts can become too costly to maintain for an NGO holding multiple contracts because of multiple accountings of essentially the same service. The money spent keeping paperwork and resourcing for audits can end up being as much as the money spent on delivering services, which is why OYWT went for an integrated contract that requires a single integrated accounting which fits its collaborative approach to practice. Difficulties arise when one of the funders withdraws from the arrangement. In this instance the Ministry of Education withdrew from the integrated contract for the purely ‘bureaucratic’ reason that they could not continue to sign a contract committing to a longer than 12 month time period, because an internal education review was being conducted:

… so it reflects our practice doesn’t it, a collaborative approach to funding reflects the way we practice... say an individual, when they come into an organisation such as here, they choose to work here because their personal values align in some way with the organisational values... On paper seems to me to be an aligning somehow but yet it’s actually not necessarily really the case. Or if you take out, like you say education or, if you actually take that out of the equation entirely, how does that align with our values or our delivery of who we are?

…but even that education aren’t in there (the contract) formally the outcomes are still educational outcomes... we’ve still kept them in we’ve just carried on regardless... haven’t we... because its so much part of what we do... (Managers)

So even though a funder had withdrawn from the contract, the spirit of what they would have been addressing is left in to keep the holistic focus with the other funders:

Because if you were working in a holistic framework you couldn’t say I am spending my health dollars doing this - you may focus entirely on health for one young person but that in order to meet the educational needs then everything is tied into together. And if they are saying this is the health bucket but you didn’t do enough health work that is divisive in seeing a young person as a whole person… The way I understand it is that our collaborative funding
policy means it goes right from funding to practice the way we work with the young person is reflected in the way we fund it. We have to work across all of those areas um, yeah. So I guess its sort of like a direct relationship the way we think about young people. (Caseworker)

Conclusion: Significant Success and Frustrating Blocks

Because of the opportunity to work at a macro level with this integrated contract a result of the funding approach has been to enable change in other parts of the country for other NGOs. It has enabled community groups to be considered for funding and communities to have a precedent where they can approach Government for an integrated contract to save on the expense of multiple reporting and auditing:

We’ve changed a lot of things in the system around the country as a result of the OYWT philosophy... so I think that’s an illustration that if you keep on pushing you do make a difference.

...the opportunity to make even more change – while it eludes us it is still there as a possibility... (Board)

The influence on practice of seeing macro level changes encourages practice to go beyond the micro and to focus on working the organisation ‘out of business’ as it were:

... we could put ourselves out of [social service] business...

... that’s right – lets do this, lets use Dunedin as a pilot study, lets talk to the OYWT and other people who are working in a similar way and identify amongst ourselves what it is we need to only have 5 families left in 5 years who are still creating chaos... or whatever the figure may be... after that stage we will deal with those. I am absolutely convinced it can be done as is the manager because it is a small city... it would just be so wonderful to be able to do that and that is what keeps us here. (Board)

One purpose of the collaborative funding process was a reduction in the amount of paperwork to be done. Another was the reporting back to funders in a qualitative as well as quantitative method, in order to tell the clients' own stories. This reduced the time spent on multiple reporting of the same information to separate departments. There is also the accountability of the Government departments themselves having to work together. The focus group participants felt the integrated contract process increased awareness and credibility of their work:

I think to on some levels that give us credibility. (Caseworkers)
So validity from the community in what we do? Is that what you mean? (Interviewer)

That’s how I see it. We’re seen as professional and delivering a unique service that is working. (Caseworkers)

From the micro level of social work practice the collaborative funding model also had a benefit:

… it also makes the clients real and their families because you can see them as real people in the profiles and not just that but that style of reporting is much more useful for us. The tick box one was what we had to do and our kids didn’t really fit in... the profiles are something that we can use in our case work as well as it shows the tale of our kids...

And it keeps us accountable as well...

...yeah it shows the gaps real easily as well. (Caseworkers)

There is clearly a need for evidence of the success of the collaborative process wanted by Government. Again it is identified by the focus groups that the idea is good and the outcome based results are good for the client, in terms of the NGO point of view. But it is felt that Government needs evidence of the collaborative process working for them also:

The Government is wanting collaborative approaches and it is really hard to show collaborative approaches with separate funding, whereas now they have a co-funding contract example they can show yes we can do that...

… there were a number of reports that are out and about that sort of thing the collaborative coordination of services. (Caseworkers)

There are questions in respondents’ minds about the usefulness of the collaborative frame of funding. There is seen by the respondents as recognition by some funders in the benefit of the model - but not as a Government funding collective, which is the aim of the Trust:

I think practice has had some influence on funding. It’s allowed for greater communication across the sectors which has brought them in, continuing to say yes we will continue to support this contract because it allows both groups to come together for common objectives and this has been driven and fought for [by the Trust]. (Caseworkers)

When a Government funding sector pulled out of the integrated contract the amount of community understanding of and belief in OYWT work was crucial to the ongoing positive relationship with those local organisations/structures concerned:
... what really showed it up for me was when the ministry [of education] pulled out - then we had to explain that. You could just feel it that it just seemed ridiculous to other agencies. It was embarrassing to explain it; they [schools/community agencies] understood that it wasn’t obviously our choice. But it still has quite an impact on our contact with schools and other agencies, yeah...

If we didn’t have such a good working relationship with particular agencies and schools out there... there may have been quite a bit of damage done and left us having to justify ourselves...

...because you see other community's agencies and you can see what damage when they don’t necessarily have a good reputation in the community because their funding approach doesn’t actually make sense. The funding approach that we had when we were obviously all together did make sense. And it was seamless and you didn’t necessarily have to explain now we do have to do this because of...

... however it did raise, where people in the other agencies and schools within the community were starting to go 'oh no' what happens if OYWT lose this truancy contract ... how will that work because this has actually worked quite well over the last how many years... (Caseworkers)

**Continued Efforts**

Despite the frustration with bureaucracy, it was seen as worth it to keep persevering with the integrated contract despite the struggle:

...you guys (OYWC staff) and seeing the outcomes for the kids that we hear about in the reporting (the narrative profiles) make keeping on this role worthwhile. The manager will bring something to the table that reminds us about why we do this... I’ve always said that I feel really humble that I’m involved but I feel like I wish there was more I could do, you know?... that is what it is all about – what you guys (OYWC staff) actually do with these kids and you see the issues they are dealing with and you feel at least you are doing a tiny wee bit and we can help you guys do your job. For a trust of this age there are a lot of people that have been here from the start - which is unusual. You usually have a drop out rate and people get worn out and tired. There have been times as a board when we have thought what on earth are we going to do next? But we keep on coming back and I think that’s a testament to what has been achieved and what can continue to be achieved... because I think we share that strategically and that’s what we would love is to get ourselves out of this business... (Board)

OYWT keeps holding to philosophy driving the integrated contract development and through the evaluation and measurement of outcomes:
... it’s about how we balance and hold our ground isn’t it. I mean we get individual funders who still come from their silo (and health is one of the main ones I guess) that require particular things around our practice. I think that does get in caseworkers heads some times because they know they are going to be looked at in terms of smoking or obesity or whatever. I think that’s a good example of them influencing our practice but it’s trying to hold your ground so you are seeing the bigger picture rather than just the specifics. (Managers)

Although it was acknowledged that bureaucracy was required to some degree, no matter whether you were state or community based, the key point seemed to be what power the bureaucracy possessed. The feeling from the focus groups was that once bureaucracy had the upper hand in determining action it was very difficult to wrestle that back to focus the work on the individuals an organisation was established to serve. In the state setting, the very need to organise such a system unfortunately lends itself to bureaucratic and systemic control. This control is not always able to be individually responsive, even when workers are advocating within a system. It was seen that those practitioners in the Government sector needed to have a very strong practice frame to be able to keep true to their training and accountable to their aims for a client:

Do you need some bureaucracy? (Interviewer)

…that’s right it is just when that becomes the be all and end all and becomes the total focus if you are not careful…e.g. public versus private hospital – it’s the same people, they move freely between one place to the other. But you change the environment and the culture so they adapt to the environment of the culture wherever they are... (Board)

CONCLUSION

From the first section we can see the strong emphasis OYWT has had on forming its work around the principles of holism and collaboration. From the comments gained from the focus groups there is a clear conscious approach from management, Board and workers, to have the work forming the funding direction, not the funding forming the work. In all focus groups it has been an unexpected outcome of the groups to notice the congruence in thought apparent in the independent interviews. In the second section, community is highlighted and specifically the benefits for working with Maori in a more culturally relevant and appropriate manner due to client context; a holistic approach and ability to incorporate varying world views allow the work to match client rather than ask or direct the client to match the organisation framework.
This insistence of collaborative work has led to Government being encouraged to further develop inter-sectoral ways to fund holistically versus the silo funding of the past. The aim clearly is to have work funded in a way that is more efficient than silo funding (as seen by OYWT) and has multiple accountabilities. It is also clear that this has met with mixed success. In sections three, four and five there appears to be movement and understanding by Government funders on why and even how the work can be funded and accounted for collaboratively and holistically, but it was all hard work. It appears from what the respondents say that a lot of modelling and revision of why the contract is set out and how it can be worked efficiently, transparently and with appropriate accountability has to be repeated again and again at funder meetings.

The points gathered from Board, workers and management lead to a conclusion that while dealing with funders, bureaucracy and the power relationships is a significant demand. However, there is still seen to be a positive purpose in pursuing integrated contracts. Progressive movement is identified towards the benefits of working collaboratively and holistically that ultimately support the wellbeing of clients in their community. This seems to be part of an ongoing need, as key change agents, to keep challenging systems or bureaucracy, to balance out the power. This leads to the idea that accountability is not just one way but to multiple points between funder, client, organisation and workers and involving the community through engagement and broader auditing for the power leverage required.
CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION: TOWARDS INTEGRATED ACCOUNTABILITY

DISCUSSION

The choice of an alternative/constructionist/empowerment theory as the superior approach to both explaining and justifying funding accountability for holistic, cooperative, collaborative services became the basis of the research questions for this research. These questions centre on the extent to which the outcomes (integrated) funding approach, embodying a collaborative and holistic approach, was actually implemented in the case of the OYWT. By examining the experience of the OYWT this research investigates a sustained attempt to develop and use such an integrated funding approach in a situation of sole Government funding, including why it is used and how this impacts social work practice. There was a null hypothesis as the theory suggested that a fully successful integrated approach was incompatible with accountability to the Government funder alone (‘upwards accountability’). The theory would suggest that without the countering power of community accountability (‘downwards accountability’) such holistic, cooperative, collaborative services could not be achieved. This study has explored OYWT opinion, based on the above experience, about accountability and the need for upwards as well as downwards accountability.

The research explored five areas (see questions in appendix 2) to find out the understanding of practitioners, managers and Board of OYWT of their experience of the integrated contract and the use of collaborative funding models and the influence of this in practice. Secondly, what methods of evaluation of this funding design could best identify the outcomes achieved by OYWT (for example using social auditing to identify these outcomes). A third area for exploration was the influence on practice of this type of contracting and then the impact on social service delivery – is this the same type of practice as in a Government agency? Lastly, what is the benefit of this funding model, for clients, from the varying workers perspective of the organisation?

After summarising the results of the OYWT experience this chapter then goes on to analyse these results in terms of both what was and was not achieved. On the basis of a
power analysis of what is a mixed outcome, it is suggested that agencies need integration around a unified philosophy to support integrated contracting and shared accountability to both funders and community. Some specific suggestions and mechanisms for progress are suggested including the development of an infrastructure and tools in Aotearoa/New Zealand able to support this.

THE OYWT EXPERIENCE
The research questions asked in the focus group interviews were designed to find out the OYWT experience of funding and influence on practice.

Community Agency Philosophy Challenging Silo Funding
Silo funding was identified by all levels of those interviewed (i.e. case workers, managers and Board members) as delivering disjointed services. The interview participants were clear on the need to have integration in funding and accountability of contracts. It was seen that, by having an integrated funding approach, a holistic service delivery was provided and this was believed to be the best practice model for clients. A holistic service from funding contract to delivery of service was seen as giving a cohesive approach, meeting client need in a tailored and real manner. An example of how this could be identified was the use of the HHEADSS framework that allowed areas across a client's life to be supported. The key in this process was a focus on the young person themselves, their intrinsic tapu and participation in community, and all aspects including family/whanau that allow their potential to be met, rather than a specific institutionally defined need. From discussion groups, it seemed the key difference in doing this work in an NGO was the ability to work to client strengths and having an organisational philosophy that created a difference between such community work, compared to Government practice. All focus groups felt this was successful because of the strong connection between funding and practice at all levels of the organisation.

Implementing OYWT Philosophy in the Integrated Contract
In particular, the OYWT Board saw political and funding influence as highly involved in forming social services. From the interviews it was clear the OYWT board had a strategy of deliberate contribution to, and physical development of, the contract so the delivery
specifications of the services met OYWT philosophy and aims. The key from the interviews was that contract definition needed to be focused on:

a) Outcomes for clients and not outputs for financial accountability  
b) Outcomes defined by the organisation not by funding contractors

**OYWT Influence and the Experience of an Integrated Contract**

OYWT sought to educate funders so they would understand what an outcomes approach means for OYWT, and why such a definition of service is so important.

There seems little doubt here that, in the OYWT case, both the organisation and it’s the Government funders, did the best they could to develop an integrated contract. There was real interest and commitment on both sides to develop a new form of funding as indicated in the data and, indeed, as noted in Chapter One, even the intent in Wellington to make this a ‘model’ contract for the future. The outstanding issue for OYWT is the ability of the PricewaterhouseCoopers and Funding for Outcomes Unit FAS models to be directed internally within Government in an across sector model that funds specifically to outcomes. By this OYWT meant to expand the FAS model from a HHEADSS framework service delivery model (where sectors come with a set resource) to instead start at the point of the outcome required and then matching sector resource to that requirement. By having outcomes for a target group leading the distribution of resource the FAS model could then demonstrate the short, medium and long term benefits for the varying Government sectors. This emphasis of starting with the outcome requirement in the FAS model, and then working the resource from sectors backwards from the outcomes, is then able to demonstrate (in measured and specified quantities) the benefit of the collaborated work to that particular sector. OYWT see that this type of FAS model would be successful; where sectors are directed to collaborate horizontally across the silos as the only means of accessing a ring fenced resource to deliver a holistic, collaborative, integrated service.

**Views on Success of the ‘Model’ Contract and Benefit to Clients**

Has the integrated contract as drafted been a success? In light of the hypothesis of this study it would seem that the integrated contract incorporated the features sought by the OYWT. These were features which they saw as defined by its community and the role defined by the agency. From the focus group results there certainly seem to be benefits and
challenges. One of the key issues to consider is how this contract influenced social work practice. The HHEADSS practice framework of the agency embodies a holistic and culturally sensitive approach, and has been seen by caseworkers, managers and Board to have the ability to produce a much more effective community based practice. Because of the flexibility in this framework, caseworkers found they could better work within their own approaches to develop effective work. From focus group discussion the benefits of this framework was identified by practitioners as allowing them to meet individual and whanau need and also, to more accurately highlight the gaps that might exist in service provision so training and development of services could be carried out. Specifically, with regard to the integrated contract, OYWT caseworkers noted that having such an integrated contract gave a validity and consistency to practice. This has been enabled through the knowledge that the work is heading for outcomes based on the NGOs philosophy, linking contract development to social service delivery.

However, it is clear from agency perspectives at least, that there has been some difficulty in the implementation of the integrated contract and collaborative arrangement with Government from the OYWT view. Despite all the goodwill and good intent, contradictions come into focus through auditing procedures that seemed to focus only on the measurements of outputs of services provided but not their functions and longer term outcomes. Two views seemed to compete within Government for what was required from NGOs. On the one hand the policy arm of Government, which had worked to develop the integrated contract, sought the holistic, cooperative type of service. On the other hand, the financial accountability arms of that same Government grouping seemed to have a diametrically opposed position, demanding conventional, fragmented, financial Key Performance Indicators and so on.

This left the NGO in the middle trying to make sense of the conflicting perspectives and demands of essentially the same institution (Government). This was illustrated by OYWT focus group observations that there was, on one level, an understanding, desire and assistance from certain levels of Government to have the ‘integrated funding model’ work as a working collaborative model. However, on another level there was a struggle to convert this system back into narrowly defined and quantified ‘outputs’ and therefore ultimately undermining the ‘integrated contract’ process. Through the focus groups at OYWT there was a very direct link to this line of thinking in the observation that there
appears to be two political systems at work. Responses were consistent in this respect across all the different roles within OYWT - caseworkers, management and Board. This indicates a strongly held conclusion across all levels of the organisation, and a shared concern, that the Government sectors difficulty in following through on a ‘whole of Government model’ threatens the approach sought by this community agency.

The failure of the various funding sectors to consistently follow the integrated contract format came up regularly in the interviews as a point of concern and frustration. It seemed very important to staff across all levels to keep challenging the Government funders and the bureaucracy to follow the integrated contract through to having an integrated approach and work interdepartmentally with respect to monitoring and accountability. In discussing the integrated contract in focus groups it seemed the next area to explore was evaluation and using something like a social audit tool to cement for funders why the integrated contract worked and how outcomes could be identified. While this was seen as tiring work, which came at a big energy cost to the organisation, it was seen as the key to be able to work to the philosophy that drives OYWT. The culture and energy of OYWT was the reason cited again and again for why many worked at OYWT.

In summary, as indicated in the previous chapter, all the staff of the OYWT agreed on the need for a collaborative, integrated contract and indeed, had been able to demonstrate considerable success in persuading Government officials of its value – to the extent that not only was an integrated contract granted to OYWT but a whole new Government section was set up to develop the model and apply it to other Government funding arrangements. There was thus unprecedented success, yet ultimately this struggled to be fully implemented, with auditing requirements returning to the old, fragmented, ‘disintegrated’ approach. In addition, one department was able to simply pull out of the funding coalition without penalty for reasons within its own organisation, which were completely unrelated to contract performance. Thus the hard fought agreement seemed to be without ‘teeth’ – to actually be carried through.

ANALYSIS: TOWARDS ROBUST INTEGRATED CONTRACTING

From the focus groups there was an emphasis that there needed to be greater consistency in Government between the policy development and implementation divisions to the fiscal
accountability divisions but how this was to be achieved, in the face of the brave effort involved by all parties to the integrated contract, is a real challenge. It is important therefore to explore the implications of this study.

**Theorising the Struggle of Integrated Contracting**

Integrated contracting was the response to the deficiencies of previous models of funding. Earlier discussion of both theories and empirical studies indicated that both in theory and clearly in practice the 1980’s neo-liberal approach to accountability, by measuring of specific calculable quantified outputs in a competitive environment, was not consistent with broader and more intangible goals, such as increasing wellbeing, participation and so on.

In theoretical terms the development of seeking new approaches to funding around partnerships from 2000 involved, at least partially, a different theory. In essence, this was one based on a combination of industrial society/welfare state theory with the neo-liberal in the new, so-called ‘Third Way’ approach, where incorporating the views of the community and professionals in service delivery level are accepted and implemented by civil service officials. In brief, instead of the ‘grant’ funding and weak accountability typical of industrial society theory (dominant through the welfare state period prior to accountability systems associated with neo-liberal market approaches) – the neo-liberal approach is still being used. Now, however, alongside market financial criteria there was some recognition of the value of other criteria – notably community ‘felt’ needs (demands) and professional social service expertise. While this could be registered in agreements – and indeed is seen as a major breakthrough – in the end it has not reached the full envisioned potential. It seems therefore that the integrated contract, and its support, lacked the power, at this time, to be fully enacted in the face of ongoing bureaucratic dominance.

Dominance indeed seems critical. The issue of where power rested to make these decisions, and in whose best interests, is one that is central to the analysis of this case. As the focus group data indicates, while the negotiations with Government were initially able to define service delivery, this power was negated by the ability to reimpose contradictory audit requirements and bureaucratic imperatives.
Power Analysis

Alternative theory, where a community driven organisation wishes to direct its work in accordance with the mandate given by the community, suggests that, despite these views being superficially accepted in collaborative partnership arrangements, they cannot be implemented by civil service officials acting in dominant positions.

However the success initially achieved by OYWT in both gaining an integrated contract and even having it embedded as an ‘officially preferred’ option, is at least a partial denial of that hypothesis. The longer term difficulties, however, seem on the other hand to confirm it.

The constructionist/empowerment theory, however, still appears to be a most suitable explanation for this theoretical and practical contradiction. In the end the reason, both for the initial success and the longer term instability and fragility of the integrated contract, lies more deeply and crucially in the power relationships involved.

Initial Success of OYWT

In both Liberal and Industrial society theory the power rests with central Government as the contractor or funder, whether this happens through competition on price for specified contracted outputs or grant funding allocated to broad outcomes. In this case the ability of OYWT to lobby and persuade central Government (which had already been ‘softened-up’ by widespread NGO criticism) to change its approach was arguably based on the commitment throughout the whole organisation, from governance to management and service delivery, to a common and shared philosophy. This certainly came through in the focus groups and represents the use of considerable ‘social capital’ by the OYWT staff stakeholders – as they were able to mobilise their professional and community knowledge in coherent networks for maximum leverage. The first major lesson of this study is therefore, the necessity for this to happen for agency empowerment.

Long Term Sustainability

However the above achievement did not alter the fact, attested by the focus group results, that the final decision and management of the relationship in the long term remained dominated by central Government official concerns. The decisions on monitoring and
accountability were ultimately controlled by central Government officials. Some possible explanations of why they went back to fragmented mechanisms could simply be that they decided to, for whatever reason, perhaps because it is required by the (liberal) State Sector Act, because it was easiest or, in the case of Ministry of Education, because it suited the Ministry and the endemic restructuring and reviews of bureaucratic systems. They may also have seen it as the only effective way to enforce accountability, or perhaps, a lack of creative thinking. Whatever the reason – the key issue is that they decided and had the power to do it.

If the above situation is the case, why was there initial acceptance of an integrated outcome process by a range of Government departments who then revert to silos for accountability? Some of the answer to this might lie in the much promoted ‘third way’ rhetoric as identified by Shannon (2006) and Cheyne et al (2008). While a form of unification and working across sector by the framework of the ‘third way’ has been identified, the essential steps to do this have not been identified. As Sutton (2000) suggests, the ability to collaborate and steps required, once seen, may be too overwhelming and challenging for bureaucracy to properly follow through. This leads to the next best operational option for bureaucracy which appears to be a silo mechanism of distribution and accountability of resource.

While this might be somewhat outside the scope of this study, there are some grounds for seeing this silo dominance as inevitable. Are silos endemic to central Government? An enormous amount of effort and resources, both within New Zealand and overseas, have been devoted to ‘joined-up’ Government or ‘whole of Government’ approaches, especially in recent years with a major ‘review of the centre’ in Wellington. Shannon and Walker (2007) suggest there are clear indications in the continued and clear failure of all attempts to functionally integrate silo-ed Government. From their view this suggests that it is simply structurally impossible to achieve. There are grounds for suggesting that sophisticated modern Government requires a functional division of labour to perform its tasks and implement the allocated budgets. If this is so, then the decisions need to be removed from being solely their responsibility.
TOWARDS SOLUTIONS

Power Analysis

Why previous models of accountability have not been effective seems to be explicable in power terms. The development of third sector and community expertise in providing services implements a shift of power from welfare state and market frame, to a community frame. Under the alternative or constructionist theory the idea of accountability is re-routed back to the community where an organisation exists and from where it draws its mandate. In order to maintain the value and core of why an agency provides the service it does, there has to be determined and focused measures taken to preserve the unique natures/cultures of such agencies. Therefore a community agency has to have a community culture, which is reflected in the work.

Constructivist theory also notes that in practice the truths and perspectives that ‘count’ and are implemented are those with power. This allows for different types of partnerships where power sharing is negotiated and current hierarchies broken. Perhaps a clue as to what is required lies in mixed successes of another central Government defined programme, Strengthening Families. Some significant achievements have occurred in local level integrated programmes, with the key to this being the development of significant local involvement in governance and local ‘rights’ to funding (Shannon & Walker, 2007). This seems to be the ability to exercise local level power because the Government needed local agencies to participate and this gave them leverage.

The constructivist approach would similarly suggest in the current case that such an integrated and holistic contract, and appropriate accountability, could be achieved if the full range of stakeholders of the OYWT could participate fully in contract definition and accountability measures. In the interactive power relationship model of constructionist theory, it is possible in this way to have accountability ‘downwards’ and use such a ‘social capital’ resource of community support to negotiate and gain leverage in support of the NGO as countervailing power to the dominance of central Government.

In developing such an interactive approach, the ‘transaction sociale’ model of decision-making is useful (Smith & Blanc, 1997). The basic idea of the social transaction is that
society is made up of actors who undertake transactions with others, in situations of real inequality and conflict. These transactions blur distinctions between consensus and conflict, permit ambiguity and all sorts of provisional ‘working’ compromises which are unstable and always open to revision. Such transactions occur at each level of governance and also between levels. In their discussion of the development of effective local participation and inclusion, Smith and Blanc argue for a tripolar system of transactions between the different principles of legitimacy in national governance between representative Government (elected representatives), expert knowledge (state bureaucracy) and participation (local residents) (See Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Interactive Governance**

![Interactive Governance Diagram](image)

(Smith & Blanc, 1997)

The social transaction perspective suggests that instead of seeking one ‘final answer’ in such relational transactions, any answers are both contingent and changeable. The logic involved is that of trialectic logic; a logic of wholeness and relationships. Rather than a third factor being an ‘answer’ or ‘solution’ to the problem of relating two opposed factors, as in most absolutist logics, it is merely one more factor. This trialectic logic (Kelly & Sewell, 1998) holds ongoing different perspectives in dynamic tension without having to have any permanent and final resolution or ‘answer’. In this view there is no ‘solution’, just ongoing negotiated relationships and contingent answers which are all that the old ‘disintegrated’ contracts could provide in any case.

Why previous models of accountability have not been effective seem to be explicable in power terms as they permit one pole to be dominant – usually in binary, two party relationships. Constructivist theory notes that the truths and perspectives that ‘count’ and
are implemented are those with power. This allows for different types of partnerships where power sharing is negotiated and current hierarchies broken.

Herein may lie the key for OYWT in terms of managing accountability of central Government funding to NGOs. Clear community backing based on evidence of outcomes may provide the locally-based power leverage to further develop and sustain the integrated contract. This might be able to embed integrated accountability measures negotiated in a counterbalanced situation of both upwards as well as downwards accountability. In terms of social capital as defined earlier, this is where the more developed definition of distinctive knowledge being built into networks to create power or leverage becomes relevant. In this sense identifying power, as linked with knowledge, with dominated groups being able to mobilise their knowledge networks to achieve outcomes becomes possible. This in the constructionist theory allows for more than one party to have power and participate in defining the realities of contracts or other social phenomena.

**Interactive Power Sharing**

An interactive approach to power sharing suggests that change, from a constructionist point of view, is only likely to occur if there is real sharing of decision-making power and this requires any NGO developing the leverage (utilising power) in some way to participate not only in defining outcomes but also in their assessment and measurement of performance. This is not the invocation of an idealistic bottom-up position as it is simply not realistic to assume that Government funding, or indeed any public money of any type and level, will be gained without accountability ‘upwards’ to the funders. Rather, it suggests that in the interactive power relationship model of constructionist theory, it is possible to also seek accountability ‘downwards’ and use such a ‘social capital’ resource to negotiate and gain leverage in support of the NGO, as long as it also builds and sustains relationships with all its stakeholders – as demonstrated by the following diagram.
More generally it could be argued that this provides a key to wider solutions as well. This has been brought into picture through a focus on stakeholders – as a broader responsibility than to shareholders (or in this context, Government officials) alone. Mellahi and Wood (2003) investigate the notions of a balanced business, competitiveness and community accountability of business. If the community is not cared for and an ultimate part of shared success, the health of the people needed to make business successful will be reduced – therefore the ability of the business to survive and progress is affected.

What this embodies is what Midgley et al (2004) saw as central in the constructivist agenda, the participation of community in decision-making (participatory democracy). In terms of this research it seems vital that NGO and community power and the accountability of funders to NGO’s and community be recognised. In terms of successfully working collaboratively there needs to be energy, commitment and accountability in all directions of the contracted relationship not just upwards.

**INFRASTRUCTURE AND TOOLS FOR EMPOWERMENT**

The next part of this analysis is to assess how such balanced accountability could be developed for an NGO such as OYWT – who are the parties, what power do they hold in their relationship and to whom is the NGO accountable?

i) What should be the form of accountability of service delivery and why?

ii) If wider stakeholders need to be empowered, is a method such as social auditing a valuable, workable tool to use to provide community accountability?

Who has the power to define service delivery and why do they have the power?

**Infrastructural Forms**

In terms of a community based NGO, such as OYWT, it can be argued that the ‘community’ needs to be defined in such a way that it can hold OYWT (and funders) accountable and be in a position to use this accountability as leverage on the form and nature of contracts and on their performance. Such power defines how services are developed and who has direction of them and for whose benefit. Neo-liberal theory developed only mono-directional accountability - from the funders down. The ‘Third Way’ approach, despite the rhetoric of partnerships and the like, seems only superficially different, reverting in the end to funder controlled ‘partnerships’. In this view, a solution to the frustrations experienced by an NGO, such as OYWT, in seeking a permanent
integrated contract, requires the building of shared meanings, participatory decision-making of stakeholders and the building of appropriate forms of organisation and management to counter funder dominance and permit both broader community and professional (within the agency) accountability. Such solutions require both structural changes in decision-making systems, as noted above and the recognition of new forms and measurements, which can effectively measure achievement of the more holistic and integrated human outcomes.

**Building Shared Meanings in Collaborative Structure with Stakeholders**

At an empirical level, researchers such as Sutton (2000) talk of the use of collaborative models of partnership to help provide holistic support to clients and therefore greater accountability of work. These models have a basic need for people to want to work together and to hold the same philosophies of the work they are doing, and who will benefit from it for success to be given. Work undertaken locally on the development of strategic models for participatory democracy in partnerships, stresses both the importance of involving all relevant stakeholders and the need to build a common vision (Shannon & Walker, 2006b, 2007). This highlights the need for concept and vision to be clarified in terms of collaboration and then put into contracts in order for success of outcomes to be delivered. In terms of the integrated contract scenario this means skilled practitioners in collaborative work are needed to develop these structures. Considerable effort is required for this to happen and, as a practitioner has recently noted, “it is rocket science” (Naughton, 2008).

**Mechanisms for Accountability and Collaboration**

Similarly, once the common commitment and contract has been developed, accountability has to be exercised in a shared and collaborative fashion, using agreed tools and mechanisms in an openly negotiated process. From the research conducted it would appear that the skills of negotiating in an open and collaborative fashion have been neglected. In the evaluation tool phase of this development the skills in the area of social and environmental auditing practices have been identified as missing with the result that, however inappropriately, fiscal outputs are the often the only ones examined in audits.

A tool that is able to account for social and environmental impacts of an organisation as well as fiscal accountability seems to be an even more necessary and important advance.
Pearce (2001) gives an example of a model of social auditing that can keep that accountability to community, clients, and the environment as well as the fiscal aspect of accountability. In accountancy terms this has been defined as a ‘triple bottom line’ form of accounting and some mechanism to achieve this in the social services could be used to develop measures that go beyond easily quantified dollar amounts. Social audits, as measures of integrated performance, can be a useful mechanism to use to assess such performance but will still require the development of links with other sources of leverage. Possible options for this include other social services in coalitions, iwi and local bodies.

Collaboration requires the skills of trust building with both OYWT and the wider stakeholder network. Pearce (2001), Mulgan (2000), Rowntree (1995), Mattei (2007), Shannon (2006), Mellahi and Wood (2003), OCVS (2008), to name a few, give comprehensive methods and principles that can be utilised to gain a clear foundation for sustainable mechanisms of collaboration.

Value in this model for Maori
Models that are of value for Maori have been attempted to be delivered through such vehicles as ODHB 2005 Whanau Ora feasibility study. The use of collaboration and partnership, from models based on the Treaty of Waitangi, has also been used to implement support for services to care for needs of Iwi. Paulin (2007) notes the existence of a framework drawn from the Treaty of Waitangi for Iwi settlements and the use this has for delivering services and meeting needs for Iwi. Within the Treaty of Waitangi frame there is a way for accountability to be more than about fiscal responsibility, being also about social, environmental, and spiritual responsibilities that cover a much wider group of ‘stakeholders’. There is interest that this model can become much more than an alternative way of organising partnership and collaboration, becoming a standard for accountability and collaboration. Walker (2007) notes achievement of such a partnership with Dunedin law centres and, in a sense, the existence of iwi, hapu and local runanga makes such ‘community’ accountability almost easier for Maori. However more broadly, such structures for ‘community’ accountability need to be built also for all NGOs. For OYWT there is, based in their philosophy, a practice of collaboration that works appropriately with the Treaty of Waitangi and this has been identified in the focus groups results.
THE LESSONS OF THIS CASE STUDY

Agency Integration

The first lesson is that collaborative work does not ‘just happen’. The methods and considerable effort used by OYWT to be integrally involved in contract development and work alongside funders with mutual accountability is emphasised by the findings.

What seem important in the initial achievement of the integrated contract were the clear, shared goals with everyone, at all levels of organisation, ‘on the same page’ (no great governance/manager/worker separation). There also needs to be commitment from all working in the organisation. In 2008 the OCVS has acknowledged there is a considerable way for Government to go to be more appropriately skilled to work alongside and deliver a collaborative, ‘joined-up’, ‘interagency’, partnership with community. In their document they outline the steps needed to build capacity for Government departments and in the community. Specifically they noted:

“Government agencies need staff skilled in building active relationships and employing appropriate techniques across the inform-consult-partner-empower participation spectrum (see Figure 2: A Spectrum of Public Participation). However, there are a number of challenges facing agencies.

For one thing, not everyone is good at engaging. Support is particularly needed by staff with limited experienced in working with communities in order for them to build external networks, develop confidence, and deal with the ‘messiness’ of engagement.”

(OCVS, 2008: p13)

What is encouraging in the OCVS document is an acknowledgment and admission within Government agencies that engagement with community and community organisations can be done differently. Central to this understanding is the education and upskilling needed within Government agencies and the impact the lack of the skills needed in collaborating has had on NGO service delivery. High compliance requirements, fear of losing control, too much Government agency dictation on process can in the end hamstring an NGO in their valuable roles of advocacy, policy development and even service delivery (OCVS, 2008: p11).
Community Integration

Secondly, for this to ‘count’ long term it is likely to be critical that NGOs build strong relationships and support with their mandating ‘community’ – which are fully involved in the formation of integrated contracts and can then be an important source of power and leverage.

This then provides the power and dynamism to achieve some of the ‘wish list’ arising from collaborative research that will always remain on the shelf unless the power to implement it is identified. This includes findings such as those from Rowntree (1995) who lists a number of ways this collaborative work can be shaped from workers to management and funding divisions and also including sharing of information and joint evaluations of services and joint training with services.

Integrated Accountability

Thirdly, accountability itself needs to be integrated to go along with the contract. The ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’ accountability should be joined into the one forum involving all the stakeholders as recent research has indicated (Shannon & Walker, 2006). Developing such forums may require looking further at local bodies such as councils, district councils of social services, safer community groups or strengthening families forums whereby Government and local groups have equal say in terms of distributing and accounting for resources given to run such social services. There may also be a combination of both approaches. In whatever form it takes, it involves giving greater accountability downwards as equally relevant and significant to the current accountability up to funders and for this to happen in a shared way where three way accountability, as in Figure 1, operates. This would address frustrations felt by OYWT in developing their integrated contract and address the issue of lack of accountability by funders to service providers. Such broader forums could then develop more adequate tools than the narrow fiscal measurements current now. For example, more scope could be given to community groups in local areas to disseminate and account for outcomes in their communities, especially in terms of broader social audits.

Value for Social Work Practice and Development

Management at OYWT see the ‘fit’ of organisation to practitioner as an important influence in retaining skilled staff. Nash (2005) supports this view that where
professionals feel part of the work as a stakeholder and contributing to the development of their work in a mutual arrangement with the organisation their skills will be retained. The professionals in turn must relate their professional human capital with the social capital and needs of the community – especially their client community. A style of agency that focuses on collaboration and community development models, where practitioners are involved in the formation and evaluation of an organisation and able to practice in a form that is comfortable for them, becomes a very attractive place to work.

CONCLUSION

This study has identified a new model of funding developed by an innovative organisation in the light of a major national shift to social service delivery by NGOs and the failure of competitive contracting for quantified outputs. In light of extensive analysis and theorising about NGO accountability mechanisms, a constructionist perspective was developed which suggested that such a new model of funding would require accountability ‘upwards’ to funders, and ‘downwards’ and ‘outwards’ to clients and community. This research sought to test such an approach through investigation of the success of the initiative from the point of view of OYWT.

Constructionist theory suggests that integrated contracts are impossible without full accountability upwards and downwards (integrated accountability) – so it would suggest that the OYWT experiment would struggle.

The experience of OYWT suggests the centrality of an integrated contract for effective practice and embodying the philosophy of the agency. This structure seems to give the best base to honour stakeholders, community who give the mandate for the NGO and the staff that work within the NGO. Key to the success of the integrated contract is seen in the integration within the NGO of all staff and the strong professional leverage that has resulted.

However, the frustration and struggle to sustain or fully implement the integrated contract suggests that ultimately the power of funders to decide forms of accountability are determinant as constructionist theory predicted. Moving beyond this means that power must be shared. An interactive view of power indicates the need to bring the community stakeholder itself (as the aegis of the agency) into the power relationship, so accountability downwards too.
For this to be effective accountability for an integrated contract must itself be integrated and needs the development of integrated forums for accountability to go with an integrated contract. Research suggests that such forums and forms of accountability must be based upon:

1) Involvement of all stakeholders;

2) Negotiated and shared commitment to an integrated contract;

3) Shared interactive accountability measures involving all stakeholders using appropriate tools; and

4) For OYWT, the need to develop a community forum, involving funders, through which such accountability could take place and appropriate tools for measuring.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION
This final chapter summarises the lessons of the study. It retraces the argument from the context shaping the beginnings of OYWT, the theories and approaches to accountability, the OYWT experience in an Integrated Contract and the potential future development arising out of the OYWT experience. To action this, the following will be addressed:

1) the context of OYWT and Integrated Contract development
2) the findings of the focus groups and analysis of these findings
3) recommendations for OYWT and NGO’s

OYWT History

OYWT Funding and Accountability
For the social services in New Zealand actual implementation of funding initially took the form of discretionary grants awarded by Government under industrial society/welfare state approaches – actual reporting very loosely defined within broad parameters up until the 1970s. More recently, implementation of liberal theory led to competitive contracting and the use of rigorous contractual, financial accountability to Government funders. Most recently of all, as noted above, difficulties with contractual accountability has led, since 2000, to so-called ‘Third Way’ attempts to develop partnerships between funders and NGOs which seek to undertake jointly defined services within a framework of agreed accountability to Government.

OYWT and Integrated Contracting
OYWT began from a community project in 1994. Concerned members of the community came together through a local community group, the District Council of Social Services, to put in place a way to address supporting a growing number of young people who had needs related to health issues, mental health, education, crime, isolation/disenfranchisement from community and poverty. This led to the establishment of OYWT with support from many community groups, including the district council, schools, police, health, judiciary, care and protection, community social services and business sectors.
OYWT’s aim has been to meet gaps in the community for support for young people and have them be able to participate in, and belong to, the community that supported them. As a community based social service agency, with a clear holistic and multidisciplinary focus, OYWT currently has caseworkers, administration staff and supporting management staff to carry out integrated and holistic work with young people.

At the time of the OYWT’s development, previous neo-liberal influenced Government contracts had come to dictate the form of practice in the social services rather than vice versa. This had led to increasing third sector demands for more effective arrangements for funding of social services. The key for OWYT was to be focused on major overall outcomes not specific measurable outputs. A collective and collaborative approach to contracting was seen to be best practice covering the needs of the young people from all sectors. Contracts would be granted and services requested and developed from a philosophical level, because a specific approach is desired in a particular locality. However, Government funding of services also required auditing from a financial compliance perspective, over the results the money had purchased.

OYWT took an innovative approach in developing the integrated contract coordinating Government funding in contrast to the dominant Government silo funding mechanism with its negative implications for service outcomes (Craig & Larner, 2002). With the introduction of ‘Third Way’ Government from 2000 a new FAS system was developed between PricewaterhouseCoopers, MSD and OYWT as a credible way to have an integrated contract that accurately reflected the holistic philosophy of practice from OYWT and its focus on integrated outcomes for clients.

In a community organisation it can be very difficult to balance the almost opposing forces of these two philosophies, which at face value seem at least partly contradictory. The study, therefore, seeks to explore these issues through examination of the OYWT experience.

**Theorising Community Accountability**

*Accountability, Social Capital and Power*

Traditional understandings of mechanisms of accountability have been those for control from outside of an organisation, often by a ‘higher authority’, covering internal aspects of
behaviour. This highlights the external nature of accountability, the social interaction and exchange involved and the rights of an ‘authority’ to impose accountability by being superior to the individual or organisation that is accountable.

Fiscal or financial accountability, the ‘bottom-line’ approach, has been the traditional form but recently this view has been widened to include ‘triple’ and even ‘quadruple’ bottom-lines, incorporating accountability to fiscal, cultural, environmental aspects – even spiritual and social impacts of a service or action taken. In a Treaty-based nation such as Aotearoa/New Zealand broad ideas of accountability must be placed in the context of Treaty responsibility and a dual focus on meeting the requirements of the articles of the Treaty of Waitangi. Integral in this understanding of accountability is the responsiveness of funders and organisation to stakeholders. That is, accountability and responsiveness of both funder and organisation goes beyond a dialectic relationship to multiple accountability through mechanisms such as triple or quadruple bottom lines.

Community Accountability
In an NGO that derives its warrant from a community aegis, the notion of responsiveness requires reference to:

1) Outside influences and monitoring groups within political systems; and
2) Provision of services to the local community and public who access services.

Therefore such NGO’s are not only answerable to representatives of an elected Government as funders but to the community and clientele as well.

Community and Social Capital
Approaching the community was undertaken in terms of ‘social capital’, that is the networks of goodwill, fellowship, sympathy and social intercourse that creates such social units. Most usefully this can be defined in terms of the knowledges, networks and mobilisation capacities, which constitute active community. Accountability to community therefore carries a responsibility to be answerable to the knowledge and views of the relevant community mobilised by that community in some mechanism.
Theories of accountability

It is possible to identify a number of approaches to governance and forms of accountability – Industrial Theory, Liberal Theory, ‘Third Way’ partnerships, Marxist/Critical or Constructivist. These major social theories define the relevant mechanisms for governance of society and referents of accountability. For Marxism or Critical theory accountability in class terms exists under capitalism as a form of oppression of the powerless class by the powerful and thus calls forth resistance. In Liberal theory, bottom line financial accountability in contract terms is the relevant form; while that of Industrial society theory and the welfare state is by political accountability to the representatives of elected Government. In contrast, Constructivist theory sees accountability as socially constructed according to the power of social groupings to define relationships of control. Ideally accountability should be based on full participatory democratic mechanisms.

The constructivist approach was chosen as the most useful to assess community accountability. It would suggest that seeking integrated and holistic accountability through agreement with Government funders would not be successful without equal participation in decision-making of all the stakeholders of OYWT.

A qualitative methodology was utilised in this study for the case study analysis of OYWT and the reflected lived experience of OYWT members with respect to the attempt to develop a holistic, integrated funding contract. A voluntary sample of OYWT members were interviewed in focus groups to gather their reflection on the integrated funding experience. This study has enabled a unique view from research using a reflexive approach of this work from within the industry versus work done from ‘removed observation of’ or ‘onto’ industry.

The OYWT Experience

*OYWT philosophy and the use of integrated contract:*

The OYWT philosophy was the starting point. The staff and governance members of the organisation agreed that an integrated contract was the most effective way to fund and account for a holistic social service with the aims of OYWT. OYWT saw it was the most effective way for Government funders to account for services they wanted delivered also
and would enable Government sectors to work cross sectorally for best services for the community.

**OYWT and the Treaty-based community:**
The focus groups saw the integrated contract as a best way to represent community need and give accountability to the community of the service delivered. From the focus groups it is seen the community base of setting up OYWT was a key part in providing validity in the work carried out by this service. Community support and accountability is essential to the practice of OYWT. Since it was a Treaty-based community, the focus group responses identify that the philosophy and intent behind the contracted work allows for work to be carried out in a biculturally relevant and appropriate way.

**Key Agents of Change:**
Much of OYWT focus on the development of a model integrated contract was perceived to achieve some measure of success in the assisted development of the funding for outcomes unit. Over time however questions arose from OYWT about the effectiveness and ability that Government sectors may or may not have to follow through on this agreement. The OYWT groups identified that, while individuals within the Government sector may be enthusiastic and supportive of the integrated contract and working for accountability of all partners, it seems the bureaucratic system overall may be too powerful and result overall in a return to prior ‘silied’ and quantitative accounting. This led to debate within OYWT as to the best methods of evaluating and influencing the power relationships with all stakeholders/participants.

**Success and Blocks:**
Reflections on holistic practice, and continued efforts of collaboration by OYWT with Government funders acknowledged both the successes and the blockages. However frustrating and disappointing interactions had been in this area, noted by all focus groups in the case study, there still seems to be a belief and determination in OYWT that the integrated contract approach and further development of collaborative practice is the best way ahead. This collaborative approach from the OYWT is still seen as the best form of accountability and as a platform from which to continue to do the agency work in supporting its clients, community and achieving positive outcomes for all - clients, agency and Government funders.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

The aim of the study was to test the hypothesis of alternative/constructivist theory that fully collaborative practice in a community NGO, in both design and implementation, requires the interactive engagement of both ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’ accountability.

Development of Integrated FAS Model

This was partially disconfirmed as the agency, in a purely ‘upwards’ accountability framework, was able to achieve an independent integrated agreement and, indeed, have it set up as a model for other such agreements. It is suggested here that that is an example of the strength and leverage an NGO has to work with if a positive, coherent and integrated internal professional culture is established in an agency. The common philosophy and unity within the agency, throughout governance, management and service delivery levels, their mobilised ‘social capital’ of professional knowledge, seems to be the basis of the considerable success achieved.

What remains essential to the success OYWT has achieved is the ability OYWT has had to insist the contract principles remain true to OYWT philosophy, strong vision that produces a congruence of practice across the organisation. This strength of practice and commitment to purpose of the agency is something other NGOs can take from the OYWT experience.

Implementation of the Model

However, the developmental success of the integrated contract and collaborative work between OYWT and Government has been only partial. This attempt has succeeded further than other models to date but the effect of siloed accountability and outputs in a bureaucratic system continues to undermine new ways of operating. Of the frustrations experienced by OYWT it can be said the perceived strength of bureaucracy and silo approach is seen to limit the ability to fully develop a collaborative relationship.

Therefore, ultimately, it is clear that purely ‘upwards’ accountability to Government funders alone has not been successful in fully implementing the integrated contract, despite the best of efforts and skill from OYWT.
**Power Analysis and Explanation**

However, on the positive side, the theory can also plausibly suggest remedial action. Why previous models of accountability have not been effective seems to be explicable in power terms. Constructivist theory notes that the truths and perspectives that ‘count’ and are implemented are those with power. This allows for different types of partnerships where power sharing is negotiated and current hierarchies broken. The constructivist approach would suggest that such an integrated and holistic contract and appropriate accountability could be achieved if the full range of stakeholders of the OYWT could participate fully in contract definition and accountability measures. In the interactive power relationship model of constructionist theory, it is possible in this way to have accountability ‘downwards’ and use such a ‘social capital’ resource of community support to negotiate and gain leverage in support of the NGO as countervailing power to the dominance of central Government.

This fits with the use of trialectic logic (Kelly & Sewell, 1998) as the ability to hold ongoing different perspectives in dynamic tension without having to have any permanent and final resolution or ‘answer’. In this view there is no ‘solution’, just ongoing negotiated relationships and contingent answers which are all that ‘disintegrated’ contracts could provide in any case.

Since the community is both the origin and the aegis of the OYWT it is important for this and other NGOs to use networks, relationships with funders and community at large to keep Government funder accountability a multidimensional dynamic. There is ultimately, though, a way needed to develop trust with funding ‘collaborators’ in order for collaboration to be effective. For OYWT, and other NGO’s working in this manner, the essence of success is the ability to leverage power and keep strong stakeholder networks in place to counterbalance funders’ power.

Finally, however, if this trialectic accountability is to be achieved there needs to be a sustainable mechanism for these relationships to continue and be accountable to each other. Therefore all stakeholders need to be involved and have active input into the accountability relationships. This has started with OYWT being involved in integrated contract development and implementation but needs further enhancement through the
accountability by funders to the process. Using the basis from the OCVS (2008) Reference Group recommendations the accountability of the integrated contract could have better downwards accountability from Government funders. Within this further accountability could be required to community stakeholders to further cement the value to the community a service such as OYWT delivers. Tools for evaluation could then be implemented with wider accountabilities incorporated. Central to this is the fact that collaboration requires the skills of trust building with both OYWT and the wider stakeholder network. Again researchers and writers such as Pearce (2001), Mulgan (2000), Rowntree (1995), Mattei (2007), Shannon (2006), Mellahi and Wood (2003), OCVS (2008) supply comprehensive methods and principles that can effectively be tools to achieve the foundation and forward movement for realised collaboration. Without trust and integrity to honour multiple relationships, these aims will remain unrealised.

The following recommendations seek to embody these lessons for OYWT primarily, although they can also hold lessons for other NGOs.

**Recommendations for OYWT:**

- It needs an explicit, independent community group to whom OYWT is accountable and which can give leverage with Government funders. This was the success and key of the development of OYWT and there is a need to return to its ‘grass roots’ development (for example this group might be a community group such as the Dunedin Council of Social Services (DCOSS) [the origins of the OYWT] or some other board e.g. District Truancy Service board (judge, DCC, community groups, consultancy group).
- Explicit mechanisms should be developed whereby the OYWT is accountable to this group in concert with accountability reporting to Government funders.
- OYWT gives attention to the ongoing sustainability and maintenance of power networks to keep Government accountable in integrated contract.
- Use of social audit and community forum with all stakeholders to give a wider accountability base and tools for OYWT and for Government.
Recommendations for NGO’s:

- Congruence within the organisation – unforced collective professional understanding of the role of work and belief in work/vision.
- Importance of support links built on the social capital [knowledge (skills), relationships and networks, power mobilisation] of the group under whose aegis the NGO operates.
- Strong explicit and formal community base or other mandate needed.
- Concrete shared understanding with collaborative partners and roles and the skills to develop this.
- One joint shared accountability process and reporting to all stakeholders – so that accountability works upwards and downwards within the same agreed and negotiated process.

CONCLUSION

In summary this study has both celebrated the success of OYWT in breaking new ground, arguably by having an organisation united around a common philosophy and kaupapa, and noted its failure in not being able to sustain its achievements. It can, however, point the way to resolve the ongoing frustrations. This is especially important at this stage in the development of social services in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

In the research the OYWT focus groups identified the influence funding accountability can have on practice and the need for community groups to be directive and deliberate in their approach to contracting in light of the neo-liberal influence that has governed contract development over the 1990’s and into 2000’s. Along with this they saw integrating the philosophy of the NGO into contracts as important to retain the spirit and focus of a NGOs aims. Along with this has been the discovery of auditing and accountability practices of funders and how this is the next area that needs to be addressed by philosophy of the organisation in order to keep true to OYWT aims. From the findings it is clear the OYWT view is that funding has a significant influence on the way social work in practiced and social services are developed. This, under the alternative or constructionist theory, requires re-routing the ideas of accountability back to the community where an organisation exists.
In order to maintain the value and core of why an agency provides the service it does, there has to be determined and focused measures taken to preserve the unique natures/cultures of such agencies. Therefore a community agency has to have a community culture, which is reflected in the work.

Professional philosophy and theory informing practice are key instruments to keeping true to the mission of an agency in serving its client base. The development of third sector and expertise in the community in providing services implements a shift of power from welfare state and market frame, to a community frame. This also has significant implications for services for Maori and recognition of knowledge and delivery of services in a kaupapa Maori tradition. There is much room for research and recognition of the importance and value of kaupapa Maori service delivery that is more fitting to be analysed by Maori for Maori. From this there is also much to be gained by all citizens in the effective delivery of social services from within kaupapa Maori principles.

The integrity of the professional role is also significant. It is important for social work development that community aspects of practice and the role of the generic social worker is not lost by over specification of role in contracts formed by bureaucrats. Part of the significance of the integrated contract with OYWT is the ability of the intangible and immeasurable professional aspects to be contracted for and reported back on. These aspects (the tacit measures, that are; relationship, engagement, cultural awareness/connectedness, and wellbeing) are all examples of the core qualities and frames needed to deliver an effective service. A crucial element of success for OYWT that has becomes evident from the focus group interview is the congruence of belief in the professional task between caseworkers, management and the trust board.

For community organisations there are enormous amounts of frustration and the observable and growing lack of experience within Government bureaucracy which is leading to an inability to keep up with community demand around contract service development and delivery – often the education and initiation of these practices is originating now from the community versus Government. If central Government is based around functional silos of responsibilities then the funding delivery and accountability either must follow such silos or NGOs deliberately target Government departments as silos, building integration independent of such departments and maybe even using their
differences as leverage. As identified by OYWT, a further option for Government to manage silos is to ring-fence resource to work in a specified integrated frame. This would give leverage to integrated contracts with NGO’s to direct Government departments to work across the silo in order to access financial resource.

There seems to be a need identified for Government workers to be forced to acknowledge changing developments in community expertise; particularly in regard to social auditing, outcomes focused delivery of services, kaupapa Maori service delivery. The growing frustration at Government incongruence between policy development and fiscal implementation and accounting seems irresolvable without countervailing sources of accountability.

**Value of This Type of Research**

A question that has emerged from doing this research is the value of this type of practitioner-developed research. In using Fook (2001) and her description of reflexive practice this type of research gives a unique ‘slice of life’ view that might not otherwise be seen from independent research. This type of research gives a unique perspective from the coal face. By using the focus group interview process the information gathered is personal and experiential and gives an inside perspective that validates the work done. Lastly this research allows participants space for reflection on practice.

The research of the experience of OYWT is very illuminating but future research is needed into specifics of evaluating outcomes in holistic fashion – fiscal accountability inclusive of social, cultural, environmental, physical wellbeing. Already there is plenty of evidence and description – but there needs to be much more research, especially action-research, into how to develop positive alternatives.

The challenge stands even more so for those in the profession of social work to come to grips with the ideas of their professional social and human capital and not lose sight of the reason for carrying out this work. All resources and ways of best supporting clients and communities may not primarily be through fiscal resource – crucial are the ways power is worked in community and how communities are empowered to support their members. This requires personal thought and critical reflexive practice as discussed by researchers such as, amongst many others, Fook (2001), Munro (2007), Nash (2000), and Shannon and Young (2004). Having this view of power and reflection on practice in social work and
community development models brings the purpose of the work to the fore. When this comes to the question of how outcomes in practice are evaluated or measured we are then in a much better position to be looking for the outcomes communities and people using our services are looking for versus falling into the vortex of fiscal dissection around resources.

For social work teaching there is highlighted a need for there to be political and critical thinking to be emphasised social work training. As suggested by Davies and Petersen (2005) with the education system in Aotearoa/New Zealand having been so influenced by neo-liberal influence in curriculum delivery, students are arriving in tertiary institutions without the skills to understand the importance of this way of thinking and analysing actions. Social justice, empowerment, and values could become empty terms without the ability to critique and analyse power in all its forms. This includes the acknowledgment and respect for those intangible matters that keep a society civil, maturing, taking care of each other, including members in all their abilities. The role of community work and community development becomes even more crucial in this environment and understanding how the varying systems impact and influence and the social work role within this.

Conclusion
The OYWT is a beacon and guide to the future of practice of collaborative work in integrated contracting and the lessons of its experience are important. Two central themes have clearly revealed themselves in this research. Firstly, the importance of professional’s knowledge, inclusive of social work, as valuable social capital for influence in forming integrated contracts. For social work the ability to critique systems and power and view clients in a holistic manner provides a strong basis to action collaborative integrated contracts. The skills required for real collaborative process are essential to quality social work delivery. Where professionals are skilled in this an NGO has an important and powerful resource for effective service delivery.

Secondly, the accountability of integrated contracting starts and ends with the ability to have accountability shared both ‘up’ and ‘down’. However this power comes to be shared, the fact remains, to have effective service provision the sharing and trust has to be
developed between funder and service deliverer. The OYWT experience has placed the search for such integrated accountability firmly on the agenda.
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APPENDIX 1

This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee

Collaborative Funding: The Otago Youth Wellness Trust Experience

INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS

Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate we thank you. If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you of any kind and we thank you for considering our request.

What is the Aim of the Project?
This study is being undertaken as part of the requirements for a Masters of Social Work. Its basic aims are:
1) To use focus group interviews with research participants to explore what understandings there are within the OYWT of the purpose and outcomes of its funding approach.
2) To explore with these participants their experiences of the actual funding process and how their practice informs their involvement in this process.
3) To explore how OYWT may use tools such as social auditing to understand government evaluations of the outcomes of the services provided.

What Type of Participants are being sought?
The participants sought are all connected with the Otago Youth Wellness Trust. The participant groups will be the Trust Board, the case workers and the manager and practice manager. The reason for this range of participants is that views are sought from the varying groups involved in the agency.

What will Participants be Asked to Do?
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be given an information sheet and consent form. You will also be given a copy of the specific questions that will form the basis of the focus group interviews (see attached). This will allow you to reflect upon your responses to the questions prior to the interview. Once you have agreed to take part in the research you will take part in one focus group interview (1 – 2 hours long) and one follow up session. Each participant will be given a transcript of the interview that they were involved in to change, delete or add to their personal input. The purpose of the follow up session is to allow for verbal conformation of the content and meaning of the initial interview by the group concerned and to ensure that the information recorded is accurate. The researcher will be available to you at all times to provide further information or to talk through any issues that may arise as a result of the research process. Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind.

Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project?
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind.
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee

What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it?

Due to the fact that all participants work at an agency that is identified in the research strict confidentiality will be difficult to maintain. It is emphasized that the information being sought is not of a personal nature.

This is a collaborative research process. It is not concerned with gathering personal information about you but rather seeks to gain an understanding of the nature and impact of funding processes carried out by Otago Youth Wellness. Measures will be taken to ensure that the information gathered from you and used in the final thesis does not contain any information that you do not want made public.

The researcher works within OYWT. As this is a collaborative research process this is seen as an asset to the nature of the research. However, an emphasis will be placed on ensuring confidentiality is maintained during the research process at the stage where you have not yet had the opportunity to delete any information that you feel is personal or not accurate from the interview transcripts. It is again emphasized that this research is not concerned with collecting personal information.

No information provided by you in the course of the interviews which you do not consider to be relevant to the aims and purpose of the research will be included in any published or documented form other than in transcripts. The information being gathered will be used in the process of exploring issues relating to funding partnerships between NGOs and Government.

In the first instance only the researcher and participants will have access to the information collected (Participants will have access to transcripts of the focus group interview they were involved in). The supervisor (Marg Madill) will have access to the information once participants have had the chance to delete or change information relating to their personal input.

This project involves in depth focus group discussions. Although specific questions will be asked of you (of which there will be a copy of prior to the interview) the discussions may develop further from these. In the event that a line of discussion develops with which you are uncomfortable you may decline to take part in the discussion and also may withdraw from the research process at any time without any disadvantage of any kind.

The results of the project may be published and will be available in the library but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity.

You are most welcome to request a copy of the results of the project should you wish. The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only those mentioned above will be able to gain access to it. At the end of the project any personal information will be destroyed immediately except that, as required by the University's research policy, any raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for five years, after which it will be destroyed.
APPENDIX 2

Focus Group Questions

1) What purpose do you think a collaborative funding approach serves for a community social services agency such as the Otago Youth Wellness Trust? What is your understanding of the funding formula and do you find it a useful approach?

2) What methods are you aware of that are used to evaluate this approach to funding (i.e. social auditing)? What do you think about these methods of evaluation in terms of a community social service agency such as Otago Youth Wellness?

3) How does this funding approach influence your practice at Otago Youth Wellness? How do you think it impacts upon the overall work this agency does?

4) What do you think are the significant factors of this approach to funding for your particular team/panel or position in the agency?

5) Do you believe there are differences between social work practice in environments such as that of Otago Youth Wellness and that which is practiced in state institutions? If so what are these differences?

6) How workable do you find this finding approach in terms of the agencies relationship with government? How workable do you find this funding approach in terms of your contact with other agencies?

7) Do you believe there are benefits for clients as a result of this funding approach? If so what do you think these benefits are?
In this example, two funding scenarios have been developed to demonstrate the flexibility of the framework. Scenario One has five co-funders and Scenario Two has six co-funders. This is an excellent example of how this framework could work to facilitate joined-up thinking between the government sectors that will increase cost-effectiveness in funding and contracting as well as in service delivery.

**SCENARIO ONE:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOMES</th>
<th>FUNDER</th>
<th>SHORT TERM</th>
<th>MEDIUMTERM</th>
<th>LONG TERM</th>
<th>% BENEFIT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved family functioning and reduction in dysfunctional relationships limiting the need for CYFS involvement</td>
<td>CYFS</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MOE/TEC</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MSD</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HEALTH</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>POLICE</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Learning outcomes that facilitate employability including the life skills and social competencies necessary for transition to independent living</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improved physical and sexual health status including self-management, access to primary care and engagement with appropriate specialist services</td>
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<td>Reductions in frequency/severity of offending and improved social skills and behaviours for those at risk of offending</td>
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<td>Improved mental health and increased resilience to risk behaviours. Including reduction in suicide attempts and excessive drug/alcohol use.</td>
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*The Price Waterhouse Funding Allocation System Model has been used to determine the % benefits. (Appendix II)*