The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Improving Coherence and Coordination?

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Abstract

With changes in the international landscape occurring in the years following the Cold War, new and different types of conflict flared up. Wars between states became less frequent, while the number of conflicts within states increased considerably. The states in question were commonly among the poorest in the world, and many were considered to be failed states, having lost the ability to maintain order or advance their own socio-economic development. These states were viewed as a significant threat to regional and global stability.

The UN began a process of reform, searching for ways in which the organisation could be adapted to meet the realities of this changing international environment. A High-Level Panel convened by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan outlined several areas in which the UN’s capacity for international assistance could be improved. One of these lay in the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which would fill what Annan described as an ‘institutional gap’ in the UN’s peace and security architecture. Recognising the fact that around half of all states that emerged from civil war in the new international setting were likely to fall back into conflict within five years, the international community approved the establishment of the PBC. Its chief responsibility was to organise the multitude of international actors who inevitably become involved in peacebuilding operations, and in doing so, improve levels of coherence and coordination. These two problems have been identified as the most significant impediments to the success of previous international peacebuilding operations.

This thesis evaluates the role and effectiveness of the PBC. It asks whether the use of Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies (IPBSs) by the Commission has resulted in improved levels of coherence and coordination in their two foundation cases. This study provides an historical analysis of the evolution and development of the PBC, followed by specific case studies of the two foundation mandated missions, Sierra Leone and Burundi.

The Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies, in their original form, have failed to improve levels of coherence and coordination. The thesis argues that a re-conceptualisation of their key role as an instrument of engagement rather than a strategic framework will provide more effective support to peacebuilding operations, thereby enhancing their effectiveness. The thesis outlines how this shift in emphasis within the IPBS will improve levels of coherence, coordination, and post conflict humanitarian assistance.
Acknowledgements

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Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ i
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................ iii
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ vi
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................. vii
Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................... viii
Research Background ...................................................................................................................... 1
Research Questions .......................................................................................................................... 4
Hypotheses ....................................................................................................................................... 5
Methodology and Rationale for Case Study Selection ................................................................. 5
1. The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: A Literature Review ...................... 7
   1.1. Contemporary Conflict Dynamics ............................................................................... 7
   1.2. The Life-Cycle of International Conflict ................................................................. 9
   1.3. Defining Peacebuilding ............................................................................................... 11
   1.4. The Post-Conflict Role of the UN: the Creation of the Peacebuilding Commission ................................................................................................................................. 13
   1.5. Post-Conflict Necessities: Context-Specific Operations and Local Ownership ................................................................................................................................. 14
      1.5.1. Conflict Sensitivity ........................................................................................... 14
      1.5.2. Local Ownership ............................................................................................. 15
   1.6. High Hopes: Expectations of the PBC .................................................................... 17
   1.7. Coherence and Coordination: .................................................................................. 21
   1.9. Organisational Learning ............................................................................................ 26
2. The “Missing Link”: The Creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission .................... 28
   2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 28
   2.2. Post-Cold War Peacebuilding ..................................................................................... 29
   2.3. An “Institutional Gap”: Peacebuilding and the Process of UN Reform ................... 32
      2.3.1. The High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change ......................... 32
      2.3.2. The World Summit 2005 ............................................................................... 35
   2.4. The UNPBC: Mandate and Structure ....................................................................... 36
2.4.1. UNPBC Mandate ........................................................................ 36
2.4.2. UNPBC Structure .................................................................... 39
2.5. Tools of the Trade ....................................................................... 41
  2.5.1. The Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy .................................. 41
  2.5.2. The Country-Specific Configuration ...................................... 43
2.6. Selection of Cases ....................................................................... 45
3. The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Organisational Location .... 48
  3.1. Introduction ............................................................................. 48
      Intra-Organisation Factors ......................................................... 54
  3.3 .................................................................................................... 54
    3.3.1. The Nature of Being a UN Body ......................................... 54
    3.3.2. Obstacles to Integration: The Lack of a Culture of Coordination .... 56
    3.3.3. Tension, Turf Battles and the Tussle for Power .................... 58
  3.4. The PBC and the Big Three: Relations with the Security Council, General
      Assembly, and ECOSOC .............................................................. 60
    3.4.1. The Security Council .......................................................... 61
    3.4.2. The General Assembly and ECOSOC .................................. 66
4. Exploring the Case-Studies: Sierra Leone ........................................ 69
  4.1. Causes of Conflict ................................................................... 71
    4.1.1. Historical Antecedents: The Legacy of Colonialism ............. 71
          Contemporary Sierra Leone: Key Issues and Stakeholders .......... 73
    4.1.2. .......................................................................................... 73
    4.1.3. A Bad Neighbourhood: Proximate Causes of Conflict .......... 79
  4.2. Civil War: The RUF Revolt ....................................................... 80
  4.3. UN Involvement in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL and the PBC .......... 83
  4.4. The Sierra Leone Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy ................... 86
  4.5. An Agenda for Change ............................................................. 92
  4.6. Sierra Leone: A Mixed Success? .............................................. 104
5. Burundi .......................................................................................... 106
  5.1. Causes of Conflict ................................................................... 108
    5.1.1. Historical Antecedents: The Social, Economic, and Political Pyramid 108
    5.1.2. Historical Antecedents: The Legacy of Colonialism ............. 109
    5.1.3. Contemporary Burundi: Key Issues and Stakeholders ............ 111
    5.1.4. A Bad Neighbourhood: Proximate Causes of Conflict .......... 117
  5.2. Civil War: Hutus, Tutsis and the Cycle of Violence ...................... 118
5.3. Ceasefire: The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi. 122
5.4. UN Involvement in Burundi: ONUB, BINUB and the PBC .......................... 123
5.5. The Burundi Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy ....................................... 124
6. Comparisons and Conclusions ............................................................. 138
   6.1. Coherence in Sierra Leone and Burundi: An IPBS Analysis ............... 140
   6.2. Coordination in Sierra Leone and Burundi: An IPBS Analysis .......... 144
   6.3. The PBC’s Added Value: Higher Levels of Coherence and Coordination? . 148
   6.4. Coherence and Coordination in IPBS Implementation: Factors for Success.... .......................................................... 150
      6.4.1. Sequencing............................................................... 150
      6.4.2. The Security / Development Nexus .................................. 152
      6.4.3. The Relationship between New York and the Field............... 155
      6.4.4. Local Ownership: A Balance of Internal and External Strategies .... 158
      6.4.5. Major Donor Commitment ............................................ 160
   6.5. Organisational Learning .................................................................. 162
7. Concluding Remarks ............................................................................. 165
   7.1. Summary: ................................................................................... 165
   7.2. Areas for Improvement .................................................................. 166
      7.2.1. Concept ........................................................................... 166
      7.2.2. Context: ................................................................. 167
      7.2.3. Cooperation................................................................. 167
      7.2.4. Change, rather than continuation: ................................... 168
   7.3. Implications for Hypotheses:.......................................................... 169
   7.4. Limitations: ............................................................................... 170
   7.5. Opportunities for further research: ................................................. 171
Bibliography ............................................................................................ 173
Appendix One: Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework ............... 198
Appendix Two: Introduction to the Sierra Leone Agenda for Change ............... 214
Appendix Three: Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi ............... 219
Appendix Four: Executive Summary of the First Burundi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) ............................................................. 236
List of Tables

Table 1 ~ The Life Cycle of Conflict. .................................................................................. 10

Table 2 ~ Programmes and Policies Developed in Line with the Joint Vision for Sierra Leone 2009-2012................................................................. 104

Table 3 ~ PBC Performance in Burundi. ........................................................................... 133

Table 4 ~ Evaluation of Levels of Coherence in PBC Performance in Sierra Leone and Burundi. ......................................................................................... 143

Table 5 ~ Evaluation of Levels of Coordination in the PBC’s Performance in Sierra Leone and Burundi. ................................................................. 148
List of Figures

Figure 1.1 ~ Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946 – 2009. ......................................................... 8

Figure 2.1 ~ State Fragility Index 2001. ........................................................................ 47

Figure 3.1 ~ Structure and Organisation of the UN System............................................. 61

Figure 4.1 ~ Map of Sierra Leone. .................................................................................. 69

Figure 4.2 ~ UN Human Development Index: Country Profile of Human Development Indicators for Sierra Leone. ......................................................................................... 71

Figure 4.3 ~ Total Reported Violations During Sierra Leone’s Civil War. ......................... 85

Figure 4.4 ~ Sierra Leone Population Pyramids. .............................................................. 88

Figure 5.1 ~ Map of Burundi. .......................................................................................... 106

Figure 5.2 ~ UN Human Development Index: Country Profile of Human Development Indicators for Burundi. ........................................................................................................... 107

Figure 5.3 ~ Burundi’s Top Exports in 2008. ................................................................. 114
### Acronyms

**ACCORD** African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes  
**AfDB** African Development Bank  
**APC** All People’s Congress  
**BINUB** United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi  
**CAFOD** Catholic Agency for Overseas Development  
**CMI** Christian Michelsen Institute  
**CSC** Country-Specific Configuration  
**CSM** Country-Specific Meeting  
**DDR** Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration  
**DFID** (United Kingdom) Department for International Development  
**DPA** Department of Political Affairs  
**DPKO** Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
**EC** European Commission  
**ECOMOG** Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group  
**ECOSOC** (United Nations) Economic and Social Committee  
**ECOWAS** Economic Community of West African States  
**ESRG** Executive Representative of the Secretary General  
**EU** European Union  
**FAO** Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the United Nations)  
**FDN** National Defence Force (of Burundi)  
**FEWER** Forum on Early Warning and Early Response  
**FRODEBU** Front for Democracy in Burundi  
**GA** (United Nations) General Assembly  
**GBV** Gender-Based Violence  
**GDC** German Development Corporation  
**HDI** Human Development Index  
**IDP** Internally Displaced Person  
**IFAD** International Fund for Agricultural Development  
**IMF** International Monetary Fund  
**IOM** International Organisation for Migration  
**ISDB** Islamic Development Bank
ILO International Labour Organisation
IPBS Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy
IRF Immediate Response Facility
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
JVP Joint Vision Programme
KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Credit Institute)
MSF Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders)
NaCSA National Association for Child Support Action (in the United Kingdom)
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU Organisation for African Unity
OC Organisational Committee
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi
P5 Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council
PBC (United Nations)Peacebuilding Commission
PBCF Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework
PBF Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO Peacebuilding Support Office
PCG Partners Cooperation Group
PCS Peace Consolidation Strategy (of Sierra Leone)
PNB National Police Force (of Burundi)
PRF Peacebuilding Recovery Facility
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RUF Rebel United Front
SC (United Nations) Security Council
SF Strategic Framework
SLPP Sierra Leone People’s Party
SLST Sierra Leone Selection Trust
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR Security Sector Reform
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNIOSIL United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNIPSIL United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WB World Bank
WFP World Food Programme
WGLL Working Group on Lessons Learned
The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Improving Coherence and Coordination?

Research Background

It has been suggested that “the overarching challenge facing the growing number of international peace-building interventions is to achieve sustainable peace”.1 This is certainly an issue the UN has had to face up to in recent years. Reflecting a change in international relations dynamics, which will be discussed in the chapter to follow, peace operations undertaken by the UN experienced a quiet period during the 1990s.2 However, with the changes in the international political landscape that occurred in the years following the Cold War, and indeed the post-September 11 system of international relations, new and different types of conflicts flared up.3 Subsequently, the UN called for changes to several aspects of its operations. Searching for new ideas and ways in which specific areas of the UN could be adapted to meet with the realities of the international environment; Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a High-Level Panel to be convened. The report issued by this group illustrated several significant findings and contained a number of proposals for improving the capacity of the UN.4

The Panel found that, “with the recent start of complex peace missions in Afghanistan, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Liberia, and Sudan”5, there was a “need to fill a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery.”6 Accordingly, the Panel called for the establishment of a new UN body: the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The Panel suggested that the role of this Commission would be to

[...] identify countries which are under stress and risk sliding towards State

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5 Ponzio, “The Creation and Functioning of the UN Peacebuilding Commission,” 4
6 Ibid.
collapse; to organise, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary.  

In his follow up report to that of the High-Level Panel, *In Larger Freedom*, Annan gave his support to the proposed new body. He declared that the PBC would “fill an institutional gap in the United Nations.” Annan subsequently endorsed the need for a UN body which could organise the multitude of actors involved in peacebuilding operations. He declared that the UN had a “priority to make sure we succeed when we take on the task of building lasting peace in war-torn lands.”

Indeed, the success of peace operations undertaken by the UN and other agencies alike had been mixed up until this point, with “relative successes like Namibia, Mozambique, and El Salvador through partial successes like Cambodia, Bosnia and East Timor to abysmal failures like Angola and Rwanda.” Equally disturbing were the rates of conflict recurrence, with Collier and Hoeffler explaining that “around half of all civil wars are due to a breakdown of peace during the first post-conflict decade.” In *In Larger Freedom*, Annan suggested that “although over the last decade the international community has come to a much deeper appreciation of what it takes to win the peace, it still lacks a strategic focus for its work.” In his *Report of the Secretary-General in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, he explained that “when large scale violence ends, the challenges facing the leadership and people

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12 Annan, “In Larger Freedom”, 3
of the country are enormous. The situation is fluid, the peace is often very fragile and the needs of the people are far greater than the capacity to meet them.”

Also recognising this, the World Summit held in 2005 voted to establish the Peacebuilding Commission, along with a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). Together, the three would form the new UN Peacebuilding Architecture. The official website of the PBC states that

The Peacebuilding Commission should help ensure that countries are strengthened and supported sufficiently to endure the very difficult transitional years when the economy, rule of law and institutions of governance can be extremely fragile. If post-conflict countries on the PBC’s agenda receive sustained support and attention from the international community and do not relapse into conflict, we will have evidence that the Commission is succeeding in its mission.

The response of the international community to the creation of the PBC was, for the most part, favourable. A body which could potentially solve problems of coherence and coordination in international peacebuilding missions was recognised by most as being critical to future successes in post-conflict efforts. The potential value of such a body is undisputed, with inadequate levels of coherence and coordination having been identified as impediments to successful peacebuilding missions. In an attempt to improve efforts in the problem areas of coherence and coordination, the PBC decided to make use of two particular tools: the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy (IPBS) and the Country-Specific Configuration (CSC). These

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17 See, for example: Cedric de Coning, “Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions - A Norwegian Perspective”, (Oslo: NUPI, 2007), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots=591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=46185 (accessed March, 2010)
will be discussed in later chapters, but their utilisation has been identified as being the most important strategic decision made by the PBC.  

In 2010, the PBC marked its fifth year of operations. As had been agreed upon at its creation, a review of the Commission was undertaken. The members of the review board, including representatives from Ireland, Mexico and South Africa, concluded that the Commission had enjoyed a mixed success in its operations, with the foundation cases of Sierra Leone and Burundi being described as “generally positive experiences, resulting in some concrete benefits.”

Research Questions

This thesis will perform its own review, albeit on a much more specific basis. Namely, it will consider whether or not one of the purportedly most important strategic decisions made by the PBC has paid off. It will examine the PBC’s choice to use separate IPBSs for each country on their agenda and attempt to determine whether this has helped to improve coherence and coordination in those peacebuilding missions. In doing so, it will consider the following questions:

1) Has the PBC, through its use of Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies (IPBSs) managed to provide desirable levels of coherence and coordination in its mandated missions?

2) Appreciating the scale and complexity of peacebuilding operations, is the PBC a learning organisation? Can it learn from its past and manage its knowledge in order to turn potential failures into coherence and coordination successes in the future?

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20 Ibid. 12
While it is recognised that UN bodies generally move slowly, and are gradual in their adoption of new features, the five year mark does provide a suitable point from which to examine the PBC’s use of the IPBSs and their results so far. While Benner et. al. discuss the fact that “the issue of the UN’s (in)ability to learn ranks increasingly high on the agenda of policymakers in both New York and national capitals”\textsuperscript{21}, if the PBC was able to demonstrate that it was capable of learning from the preliminary uses of one its most strategic tools, the results would be significant. Demonstration of organisational learning by the PBC would mean strengthening not just the PBC, but the UN peacebuilding architecture as a whole. Both current and future missions would reap the rewards, benefitting from lessons learned in previous missions.

Hypotheses

It is hypothesised that:

1) The PBC has experienced difficulty in improving aspects of coherence and coordination. The agendas of organisations involved in implementing the IPBS (the core strategic document of the PBC mission) and the advisory nature of the Commission have both contributed to this.

2) The PBC has experienced difficulty in learning from the past, and becoming an effective learning organisation, because of a preference in UN culture to focus on immediate problem solving.

Methodology and Rationale for Case Study Selection

In order to answer these questions, and determine whether the hypotheses can be proven, an historical analysis of the evolution and development of the PBC will be undertaken, followed by specific case studies of mandated missions. Although the PBC had five countries on its agenda at the time of writing (Sierra Leone, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, and Liberia) only Sierra Leone and Burundi

were selected as case studies. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, these two are
the foundation cases of the PBC. They have been on the agenda since 2006, and, as
such, have developed through the peacebuilding process enough to allow a reasonably
in-depth analysis to take place. Guinea-Bissau was only added to the PBC agenda in
2007, the Central African Republic in 2008 and Liberia last of all in 2010.

In addition, despite some suggesting that Sierra Leone and Burundi were
selected as the first cases for the PBC to consider because they were so-called ‘easy-
wins’,
they have both proven to be reasonably complex situations. Both have fallen
back into some level of conflict since their initial ceasefire was agreed upon, and both
have experienced various local challenges to peacebuilding. The two are also in
different stages of the post-conflict environment, presenting the PBC with different
contexts in which they are required to operate. Sierra Leone signed a ceasefire in
1999, and while conflict broke out between 2000 and 2002, it has been relatively
peaceful since then, with both local and presidential and parliamentary elections
having taken place. Burundi, on the other hand, witnessed a ceasefire in 2000, but
has experienced violence on and off since that time. Attempted coups, rebel assaults,
and widely unpopular elections have all featured in the years since the Arusha
Accords were signed. The two cases provide the PBC with two very different
situations in which to function, giving the potential for varying results.

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22 Nicole Deller, “The Role of the UN Peace-Building Commission in International Peace and
(accessed March, 2010)
1. The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: A Literature Review

Improving the coherence and coordination of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in mandated missions is no easy task. While there is an abundance of literature available in regards to the Commission itself, there is very little which addresses these two problems in a comprehensive manner.

1.1. Contemporary Conflict Dynamics

The circumstances surrounding the establishment of the PBC only serve to add to the complexity of the situation. With the end of the Cold War came a change in conflict dynamics, and a subsequent change in what was required of the international community to help states which found themselves embroiled in conflict. The Human Security Report of 2005 notes that “from the early 1980s to the early 1990s the number of international wars declined. For the rest of the 1990s and the early years of the 21st century there have been almost no international wars.” Smith goes further, outlining that

Of the 118 armed conflicts which ensued from 1990 to 1999, ten can strictly be defined as inter-state conflicts. Although it is often these conflicts that dominate the headlines and shape the popular view of how contemporary wars are fought, today they account for only a relatively small proportion of overall war. Five can be strictly be defined as wars of independence [...] One hundred wars were largely, primarily or even exclusively internal conflicts.

As the graph below illustrates, wars between states became less frequent, while the number of conflicts within states increased considerably. This can be attributed to several factors. A change in the political landscape at the beginning of the 1990s is one of the most significant of these. With the end of the Cold War came a change in international motivations, situations, and behaviours. Indeed, Lund suggests that despite the confrontational nature of the conflict, it did serve to

[...] create or bolster systems that ordered domestic politics and restrained social discontent; rigidly disciplined and militarised societies and economies on the communist side and, on the other side, often highly autocratic Third World

regimes propped up by an array of military and economic supports from the West.\(^{27}\)

\[\text{Image removed for copyright reasons}\]

\[\text{Figure 1.1 ~ Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946 – 2009. Taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme}^{28}\]

However, once the Cold War ended, and this almost steadying influence had dissipated, certain states found themselves in difficult situations. These states often have worrying statistics in common. Firstly, they are frequently among the poorest in the world. Indeed, the two case studies to be examined later in this thesis, Sierra Leone and Burundi, rank 158th and 166\(^{th}\) (out of 169) in the United Nations Human Development Index, respectively.\(^{29}\) Moreover, these countries are often labeled ‘failed states’, having “lost all or most of their ability to maintain order, let alone forge policies to help their societies and economies develop.”\(^{30}\) The nature of these conflicts is also disturbing. Robert Kaplan labels them “mini-holocausts”\(^{31}\), referring to their extreme numbers of deaths (which often occur in a short period of time), the large numbers of internally displaced people; high incidences of rape and sexual abuse; and the horrifically traumatic nature of the both the conflict and its aftermath.

\(^{30}\) Charles Hauss, \textit{International Conflict Resolution: International Relations for the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century}. (New York: Continuum, 2001) 23
\(^{31}\) Ibid.
Hauss explains that these conflicts present the international community with many challenges. Among these are the “non-political aspects” which are often present in the conflict, and can make negotiation and mediation increasingly difficult. Equally worryingly, these states are “often seen as a major contributor to (or even the cause of) many global challenges including trafficking of all sorts, piracy, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, disease pandemics, regional tensions, even genocide, and more.”

Goodhand and Hulme explain that “changes in the nature of violent conflict, and the contexts within which it is set, have required concepts that are used to aid the understanding of contemporary conflict.” One of the concepts arising from this changing political landscape was that of peacebuilding. While the nature of the Peacebuilding Commission itself and how it came to be established as a UN body will be discussed in the following chapter; what the international community means by peacebuilding must first be considered.

1.2. The Life-Cycle of International Conflict

While it is reasonably obvious that not every international conflict will unfold as if from the same blueprint; some have suggested that there is a common life-cycle which most of these conflicts will share. Swanström and Weissman suggest that it is important to understand this cycle because only then can one gain “an understanding of how, where, and when to apply different strategies and measures of conflict prevention

32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
37 See, for example: Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: the Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999)
and management.” This life-cycle passes through five phases. Table 1 presents these stages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages of Conflict:</th>
<th>Situation:</th>
<th>Response:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crisis Creation</strong></td>
<td>Tensions deepen, potential for conflict increases.</td>
<td>Preventive diplomacy: States, NGOs and multilateral organisations try to preclude conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turning to War</strong></td>
<td>Conflict breaks out.</td>
<td>Humanitarian intervention: Help is given to those caught up in the fighting. Any harm inflicted is attempted to be alleviated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stopping the Fighting</strong></td>
<td>Conflict Ceases</td>
<td>Negotiation: International actors often serve as neutral third parties. UN Peacekeeping forces use this stage to move in and establish a mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Building Stable Peace</strong></td>
<td>Attempted Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>Peacebuilding: Efforts are made to address social, economic, environmental and cultural issues; as well as drivers of conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Crisis Creation</strong></td>
<td>Failed attempt at building stable peace. Tensions once again deepen, the potential for new conflict increases.</td>
<td>Preventive Diplomacy: Conflict dynamics and international responsibility loop back to stage one.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 “The Life-Cycle of Conflict. Adapted by the author from the work of Charles Hauss.”

It can be seen, then, that peacebuilding generally begins once the parties to the conflict have signed a ceasefire, and once peace, however unstable, has been established. It is the responsibility of peacebuilding to ensure that this peace becomes both stable and sustainable. However, the ways in which the international community envisages this happening differ greatly.

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1.3. Defining Peacebuilding

When UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros–Ghali first discussed the concept of peacebuilding in UN documentation seventeen years ago, chances are he was unaware of the confusion and multiplicity of understandings that would result in the international community. At the time, Boutros-Ghali recognised that the outbreak of intrastate conflicts had raised a whole new set of challenges for UN peace operations. These conflicts, particularly those occurring in failed states, involved the collapse of both administrations, and of institutions. Subsequently, he suggested that the involvement of the UN, and of other international organisations, needed to move beyond the traditional humanitarian and military sectors, and include the promotion of a resolution and the re-establishment of a functioning administration. In his report issued in 1995, Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict.” Since that time, however, multilateral organisations, NGOs, state actors, academics and practitioners have tried to expand upon this definition, and narrow down exactly what peacebuilding is, who does it, and how they are to do it. Not surprisingly, this has resulted in an element of conceptual confusion.

Barnett et. al. once commented that “peacebuilding is a concept that defies a single definition.” Making matters difficult for the PBC from the outset, this would seem to be true. Brinkerhoff explains that

Practically all bilateral and multilateral international development agencies have established units to address post-conflict transitions and socioeconomic rehabilitation, as complements to their longstanding humanitarian and emergency response programmes.

The problem is that these agencies have all developed different ideas of models of peacebuilding to accompany these new units. In a recent study, twenty-four agencies

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were reviewed, and it emerged that, although “peacebuilding is generically understood as external interventions that are intended to reduce the risk that a state will erupt or return to war”\(^{44}\), each of these bodies has established different terms and understandings of what they consider peacebuilding to be. Barnett et al. explain that

Different agencies use a wide variety of terms that are related to but are not necessarily synonymous with peacebuilding. Even more confusing, some use the same term, peacebuilding, in slightly different ways. Different groupings clearly emerge: the UN Secretariat, UN specialised agencies, European organisations, and member states.\(^{45}\)

It is perhaps understandable that this has happened, as each of the bodies in question, whether they are UN affiliated or not, possess their own goals, agenda, and mandate. What proves problematic, however, is the challenge to coherence and coordination that this multiplicity of voices can create. Indeed, “the understanding of peacebuilding has become a major challenge to the international community.”\(^{46}\) Cousens explains that the definitions in use by various agencies

[...] are so general as to include virtually all forms of international assistance to societies that have experienced or are at risk of armed conflict, some are more precise but show greater interest in clarifying international mandates than conditions for peace in a target country; others are more willing to ask tough questions about the comparative value of international efforts vis-a-vis one another and in contrast with domestic institutions.\(^{47}\)

As Call and Cousens explain, “conceptual breadth came at the cost of analytical and practical utility, compounding the more authentic challenge of assessing how to prioritise among a wide array of competing needs in particular post-conflict contexts.”\(^{48}\) If a common definition of peacebuilding and its priorities is not agreed upon from the outset, some, like Philpott and Powers, argue that a sustainable peace is not possible.\(^{49}\)

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\(^{45}\) Ibid.


\(^{48}\) Call and Cousens, “ Ending Wars and Building Peace,” 3

Recognising this danger, some academics have made it their goal to produce a comprehensive definition of what peacebuilding is. Lederach is chief among these scholars. He suggests that peacebuilding is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct.\(^{50}\)

Also importantly, he explains that the process of building peace must rely on and operate within a framework and a time frame defined by sustainable transformation - a sustainable transformative approach suggests that the key lies in the relationship of the involved parties, with all that the term encompasses at the psychological, spiritual, social, economic, political and military levels.\(^{51}\)

For the purpose of this thesis, Lederach’s concept of peacebuilding is perhaps the most helpful to use as a starting point.

1.4. The Post-Conflict Role of the UN: the Creation of the Peacebuilding Commission

While the late 1990s witnessed a diminution of the frequency of UN engagement in efforts to ease and control international conflicts\(^{52}\), the dawn of a new millennium saw the UN’s involvement in peace operations begin to increase once more. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan recognised that the international situation in which these peace operations would be undertaken would be vastly different to that of the preceding decade. With events such as September 11 changing the contemporary international landscape indelibly, he called for a review that would, at its conclusion, present a series of proposals for UN reform in those areas which needed it most.\(^{53}\) One of the most pressing UN priorities at that stage, he stated, was “to make sure we succeed when we take on the task of building lasting peace in war-torn lands.”\(^{54}\)


\(^{51}\) Ibid. 75

\(^{52}\) Ponzio, “The Creation and Functioning of the UN Peacebuilding Commission,”.3


\(^{54}\) Annan, “In Larger Freedom,” 68.
The resulting 2004 *UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* proposed the establishment of two new bodies: a United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and a Support Office for this Commission. Their purpose would be twofold: to help states avoid war and conflict, and to help states transition from conflict to stability and peace. On 20 December 2005, in accordance with the recommendations of the Panel, the Security Council and the General Assembly approved resolutions 1645 and 60/180 which saw the establishment of the new Peacebuilding Commission. The Commission, made up of members from the United Nations Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and the top-contributing Member States in military and budget capacities, was tasked with “providing a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and facilitating dialogue among key actors.”

1.5. Post-Conflict Necessities: Context-Specific Operations and Local Ownership

1.5.1. Conflict Sensitivity

As an actor in the international peacebuilding architecture, the PBC was expected to implement and include various elements in its work. The first of these was conflict sensitivity. The concept, which has “been at the margins of development practice since at least 1999,” is recognised as “an awareness of the causes of historical, actual or potential conflict, and of the likelihood of further conflict and it likely severity; and the capacity to work with all parties to reduce conflict and/or minimize conflict.” Barbolet et al. explain that it involves three aspects:

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56 Ibid.
57 ReformtheUN.org. “Peacebuilding Commission”
59 ReformtheUN.org. “Peacebuilding Commission”
63 https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:vu0ZvS63U2cJ:www.unssc.org/web1/programmes/rcs/cca_undaf_training_material/teamrcs/file.asp%3FID%3D269+unssc+applying+conflict+sensitivity+at+project+and+programme+level&hl=en&gl=nz&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESi31qqRNIaXOIFEGYDsKm0eOmr0Mc82moZ99dFZgYGdPSYm651m77RCUkRqiK5C8U1naduYfEtQZaerJgJhEc2cmr0s34_B4G8RYmQ14
- Appreciating the (conflict) context in which a peacebuilding operation is taking place;
- Understanding the interplay between the operations of the organisation in question and the (conflict) context
- Acting upon this knowledge to make sure any potential negative impacts are avoided, and positive impacts on conflict dynamics are exploited.\(^{62}\)

However, as with so many of the concepts involved in peacebuilding, that of conflict sensitivity is often misunderstood, or poorly defined. In this case, as the International Peacebuilding Alliance explains, one problem lies in the fact that many believe that the concepts of peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity are transposable. Woodrow and Chigas explain that

The distinction between conflict sensitive practice and peacebuilding matters, because the lack of clarity and prevailing confusion are now weakening many programmes [...]. All too often, one reason is that they are working on false assumptions about conflict sensitivity or peacebuilding or both.\(^{63}\)

They go on to make clear that

Peacebuilding is a type of programming with particular aims. It includes a wide range of programming modes with a common aim: they all aim explicitly to address the key drivers of conflict and, ultimately, change the conflict dynamics, with particular emphasis on reducing or preventing violence as a means of addressing political, social and economic problems and injustices.\(^{64}\)

Another concept which is key to the PBC’s success, but which is also commonly found lacking, is that of local ownership.

1.5.2. Local Ownership

As with conflict sensitivity, there are vast amounts of literature discussing the important of local ownership in peacebuilding operations. The 1990s saw local ownership take on “particular prominence in the policies of bilateral and multilateral development agencies.”\(^{65}\) Yet, as Saxby explains, “Local ownership shares with other

\(\text{Ry5z3SYY3yS1D448fGznmCAB8JWL}@\text{sig=AHLEbT1prBBiBkU2LCLR8xqfSx1aH8mpA}\)

(accessed March, 2010)

\(^{62}\) Adam Barbolet et. al. “The Utility and Dilemmas of Conflict Sensitivity,” 3

\(^{63}\) Peter Woodrow and Diana Chigas. “A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding” Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, (Cambridge: CDAINC, 2009) 12,


\(^{64}\) Ibid. 11


key concepts like ‘peace’, ‘governance’, and ‘capacity-development’ the characteristic of being analytically vague.”

In the past, the UN has outlined its commitment to missions and operations which embrace the concept of local ownership. In *UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, a document also known as the Capstone Doctrine, the UN states that

National and local ownership is critical to the successful implementation of a peace process. In planning and executing a United Nations peacekeeping operation’s core activities, every effort should be made to promote national and local ownership and to foster trust and cooperation between national actors.

As Van Brabant explains, allowing local ownership to be a part of a peacebuilding operation signals that an organisation, such as the UN, has respected “the dignity and confidence of a people of a troubled society, and for their ability to tackle difficult situations and find workable solutions”. It also shows respect for “the sovereignty of that society (not just the political elite) to decide how it manages its own affairs.”

As well as showing respect for the people of the conflict-ridden society, local ownership is said to result in greater efficiency, as local actors buy in to the operation, and believe strongly in the solutions they have produced. Locals are given credibility, and are allowed to take an active part in their own future. As Anderson and Olsen explain,

No one can make anyone else’s peace. People and societies must create the conditions and develop the processes for achieving and sustaining their own

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66 Ibid. 2
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.

Local participation is presumed to help foster not only the capacity but also the will for peaceful conflict management, by changing the calculations of local actors and helping to develop shared interests in the peace process.\footnote{Ibid.}

However, as mentioned above, the concept of local ownership does come with its problems. As Hansen explains,

While the principle of local ownership has rapidly found its way into the policy documents of international organisations and into donor principles, little thought has gone into how to ensure local buy-in and sustainability and how to transfer authority in the wake of a conflict.\footnote{Annika S. Hansen. “Local Ownership in Peace Operations” in Timothy Donais, Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, (Münster: Lit. 2008) 39, \url{https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:B2XmXMB66o0J:se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISBN9783825867674chaptersection_singledocument/FBA6C760-B48A-41DD-8548-C6E87A0E2C1/en/3.pdf+the+un+persists+in+adopting+an+approach+with+heavy+emphasis+on+local+ownership+&hl=en&gl=nz&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESg2y- jGFE8Ef6InUUtMhiQE2H9Ac65TT9B0xHtfBXNJRDIJ27ri0ELaGBeRCGCMIxxB91Ti3SZva7lcO25i2czLpaDHBcSBLwrGYvHQwexkgWbLCQxerzpsw01ux3xj_WFL9yB4&sig=AHIEtbTxqucdn0DIHrFIICd_uAum0WIAG} (accessed May, 2011)

Subsequently, efforts to respect local ownership, and to build on local strength, have been mixed. As with conflict sensitivity, more needs to be learned about how to implement the concept, and exactly what it entails. Only then can the relationship between internal and external actors improve, and the PBC have any real chance at success in improving coherence and coordination.

1.6. High Hopes: Expectations of the PBC

Reports on the establishment, the structure, and the official mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission are readily available. So too are contributions from academics, organisations, and governments concerning the expectations of the international community in regards to the actions of the Commission. In these reports,
there is arguably no expectation more emphasised than that of improved coherence and coordination in international peacebuilding missions. Studies such as those by Dahrendorf and Donini emphasise the need for enhanced coherence and coordination\textsuperscript{75}, while others go as far as singling out deficient coherence as the most significant impediment in attempts to establish sustainable peace.\textsuperscript{76} While literature which examines coherence and coordination in international peacebuilding may not be as widely available as that which concerns the establishment and expectation of the Commission, it is certainly an area in which research has been, and continues to be, undertaken. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the work of Cedric de Coning and Roland Paris in particular is instrumental.\textsuperscript{77} Their work helps to outline exactly what is understood by ‘coherence and coordination’ in peacebuilding missions, as well as the issues raised in relation to these aspects.

In 2010, the fifth year of operations, the United Nations undertook a year-long review of the Peacebuilding Commission and assessed its performance thus far. What is clear from the literature is that the general opinion of the Peacebuilding Commission’s effectiveness thus far is mixed. Jenna Slotin, of the International Peace Institute, for example, states that the Commission is “a promising, but so far, problematic, new UN organ.”\textsuperscript{78} The views of those within the UN itself are ambivalent and somewhat vague. Certain statements issued hail the Committee as a success, with current Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon stating that “in its short existence, the peacebuilding architecture has shown its worth.”\textsuperscript{79} Johan L. Løvold, chair of the Commission’s Configuration in Burundi, claimed that the “PBC has set a new standard in international partnership and


\textsuperscript{76} Smith, “Towards A Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding,”


honest dialogue.” Peter Wittig, Chairperson of the Commission’s Organisational Committee, was slightly less effusive, suggesting that “since its inception in December 2005, the organ had achieved encouraging results”. Then there are those such as Ali Treki, the President of the General Assembly who noted that “there is a general feeling that more should have been accomplished in the time so far, especially in terms of tangible results on the ground. Too much time has been spent on procedure and process [...] the performance and impact of the Commission have been mixed.”

Despite making these claims, very little is offered in the form of detailed evidence, whether it is in support of the positive evaluations, or of those which are less optimistic. Indeed, five countries find themselves on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission, yet there is reasonably little literature available which examines, in depth, the work of the Commission in these countries. It would seem that, with the exception of reports issued by the Commission itself, there is relatively research that comprehensively discusses and evaluates the action taken in these countries in recent years.

This thesis aims to pull some of the threads of these themes together. By undertaking a comparative case study, the question of whether the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission has improved coherence and coordination in international peacebuilding missions can be answered. Obviously, there are limits as to what can be examined in one thesis. To examine all five of the countries in which the Peacebuilding Commission is active would be too much of an undertaking, and would compromise the detail in which an examination could be carried out. Moreover, the ideas of coherence and coordination are wide ranging. Following the work of De Coning and Paris in

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82 UN News Service, “Ban Urges Continued Support”

particular, it is clear that limits will have to be placed on the definitions of coherence and coordination, and specific areas of focus will be identified.

As stated previously, while expectations of the Peacebuilding Commission, and the role it should play in the international system vary, it is clear from the literature that the one area in which virtually all international actors agree is that of the critical need for improved coherence and coordination. A round-table discussion on peacebuilding considered the increase in the current international system of “different organisations, with different mandates and requirements, working towards different goals”. Aning and Lartey state that “the critical aspect that keeps recurring as lacking in the UN’s overarching responsibilities in most post-conflict peacebuilding responsibilities is the overall strategic approach and coherence with which it applies resources in such operations to achieve the desired outcomes.” The United Nations itself recognised this, with the publication of the High Level Panel on UN System Wide Coherence, the aim of which was to “overcome the fragmentation of the United Nations so that the system can deliver as one.”

Coordination, too, is a recurring theme in relevant literature. Jessica Almqvist states that “the need for international coordination is key in peacebuilding.” Marc Sommers claims that “coordination lies at the heart of the international humanitarian enterprise.” In Sommers’ paper, an anonymous expert in humanitarian coordination argues that “there is no coordination system for the United Nations. Full Stop. None.” In order to be able to offer a body which is capable of satisfying both its mandate and the expectations of the international community, and by doing so improving coherence and coordination in peacebuilding, a clear understanding of the meaning of coherence and coordination is required.

89 Ibid. 2
While much of the literature surrounding the Peacebuilding Commission discusses the need for the Commission to improve coherence and coordination, relatively little of it goes into significant detail as to what is meant by this. As already discussed, however, there are two authors whose work does attempt to do this. Cedric de Coning and Roland Paris’ works on coherence and coordination are arguably the best available, and it is these authors’ works which this thesis will use both as a basis and springboard.

1.7. Coherence and Coordination:

According to De Coning’s definition, coherence can be understood as “the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, governance, development, human rights, humanitarian, rule of law and security dimensions of a peacebuilding system towards common strategic objectives.”

De Coning states that “pursuing coherence helps to manage the interdependencies that bind the peacebuilding system together, and coordination is the means through which individual peacebuilding agents can ensure that they are coherent with the overall strategic framework.”

Without coherence, “inconsistent policies and fragmented programmes entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, a lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals and, ultimately, reduced capacity for delivery, and thus impact.”

How then, does the UN endeavour to improve coherence? De Coning, along with Robert Picciotto, suggests that there are four areas in which coherence must be considered: Agency coherence refers to “consistency among the policies and actions of an individual agency”; whole-of-government coherence represents the “consistency among the policies and actions of different departments and agencies of the same

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91 De Coning, ”The Coherence Dilemma,” 85
92 De Coning, “Clarity, Coherence and Context,” 20
94 De Coning, Clarity, Coherence and Context, 20
government or multilateral institution”95; external coherence refers to “harmonisation of policies and actions among the external actors in a given country context”96; and internal/external coherence involves the “alignment of the policies and actions between internal and external actors.”97

Interestingly, in his discussions of coordination, Paris identifies four areas in which problems exist, and they correspond very closely to those of de Coning’s for coherence. Paris considers the field level, between the range of international actors involved; the bureaucratic level, between bureaucracies of the donor governments; at the UN system level; between organs in the UN itself; and at the headquarters level, between actors on the international stage and the governments supporting them.98 Uvin presents possible reasons why coordination has failed in the past, and in doing so, also alludes to a partial definition. He identifies

[…] the multitude of actors, often numbering in the hundreds […] the high cost in time and money that effective coordination entails; the need for donors to satisfy their own constituencies and serve their national interests; competition for influence and visibility between donors; and the general unwillingness of actors to limit their margin for maneuver by the discipline of coordination99

as problems in the international system. Having considered these works, then, the suggestion that coordination involves building strategies, deciding on goals, preparing, communicating, sharing tasks and marshalling supplies100 seems a good start towards a definition.

But getting much further becomes difficult. It is here that the work of de Coning and Paris becomes so valuable. They have both produced work that focuses on the so-called ‘coherence and coordination dilemma’. The literature is clear: the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission was brought into being to improve coherence and coordination in peacebuilding missions. It is explicitly stated in its mandate, and is a common expectation of the international community. The difficulty lies in measuring coherence and coordination: can there be too much of a good thing? De Coning and Paris certainly seem to think so. De Coning addresses the coherence dilemma, stating

95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Paris, ”Understanding the ‘Coordination Problem’”, pp 56-57
100 De Coning, “The Coherence Dilemma,” 96
that “the duality between independence and interdependence of the various programmes, agents and dimensions that constitute the peacebuilding system lies at the core of the coherence dilemma.”\textsuperscript{101} More specifically, the agents involved in peacebuilding exist both as individual actors, and members of a larger network. While, to a certain extent, they may have their own agendas and supplies, they depend on each other for the success of both their individual goals, and those of the wider community. When accounting for coherence, this must be considered. De Coning suggests that “tension cannot be resolved, only managed on a case-by-case basis taking into account the local context, and pursuing coherence is thus about managing interdependences at a specific point in space and time.”\textsuperscript{102}

Coordination is similarly complex. Paris states that “it is too easy to call for ‘stronger coordination’ without understanding that not all types of coordination are well-suited to the circumstances and needs of statebuilding. Too much, too little, or the wrong type of coordination could do more harm than good.”\textsuperscript{103} Paris draws on a similar idea to that of de Coning’s when he mentions the importance of being part of a network. He stresses that rather than concentrating on improving coordination, the focus should instead lie on “whether the Commission strikes the right balance as a coordination tool, namely, a balance between an overly rigid hierarchy and an under-organised network.”\textsuperscript{104}

So, in considering whether the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission has managed to improve coherence and coordination in mandated missions, coherence and coordination must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. That is to say, they must not be gauged in degrees, but assessed in line with the conditions to which they are being applied. They must also be narrowed down. To attempt to address every aspect of coherence and coordination in the missions of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission would be far too great a task to undertake without compromising depth and detail. It is apparent in the literature available that there are certain aspects of a peacebuilding mission that are vital to the control of coherence and coordination. Of these, this thesis argues there is none more significant than that of the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy, or IPBS.

\textsuperscript{101} De Coning, “Clarity, Coherence and Context,” 9
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} Paris, “Understanding the ‘Coordination Problem,’” 61

In a recent Security Council Report Special Research Report, it was stated that

The most important strategic decisions taken by the PBC since its inception have been decisions to divide its work into country-specific sections managed by country-specific configurations and to utilise integrated peacebuilding strategies as frameworks for progressing peacebuilding in different ways that respond to the needs of different countries on its agenda.¹⁰⁵

Literature in this area is much more readily available than that directly relating to coherence and coordination. Publications from organisations such as Security Council Report¹⁰⁶, Working Group on Lessons Learned¹⁰⁷, Reform the UN¹⁰⁸, World Bank Institute¹⁰⁹, and the International Peace Academy¹¹⁰ all deal with aspects of Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies and the Country Configurations whose task it is to help implement them.

In a briefing paper to the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Integrated Strategic Frameworks are described as

[... ] mutually accountable and time-bound agreements, between a government and international partners, for directing scarce foreign and public technical, financial, and political resources toward building national capacities to address the root causes of violent conflict.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.
The concept note on Integrated Strategies explains their importance clearly: they “provide a framework for the PBC’s continued relationship with the country”. Moreover, they present all actors involved with an “agreed framework for the government’s commitments and the international community’s overarching support to peacebuilding activities, ensuring greater coherence and coordination and addressing identified gaps.”

Current UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stresses that “for peace to be sustained, there must be an overarching strategy that unites the efforts of all United Nations actors and the international community, and that strengthens national capacity.”

The Working Group on Lessons Learned discusses the evolution of IPBS, charting their course from the late 1990s, when they were introduced in Afghanistan and Somalia, through to present day. Literature identifies aspects of integrated strategies that are instrumental to the desired coherence and coordination of missions. These include having a robust agreement where parties are equally responsible for reaching an end goal. As a part of this agreement, meaningful consultations, both in and outside of the national capital should take place; efforts to strengthen various aspects of the country in question should support each other; precise and quantifiable markers should be used to assess progress; anticipation of an eventual lessening in international involvement should see national leadership mechanisms being groomed from the beginning; and strategies should be connected to other development or collaborative networks. Put as simply as possibly, and as is emphasised in much of the literature, a clearly articulated IPBS is integral in controlling the coherence and coordination in missions.

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112 Reform the UN, Draft Concept Note
113 Ibid.
115 Working Group Lessons Learned, Lessons Learned from Peacebuilding Strategic Frameworks since the late 1990s, 2007.
116 Ibid.
Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies allow all four levels of de Coning’s model of coherence to be discussed, as well as the four fields in which Paris suggests coordination needs to be considered. Strategies are in place in all five of the countries on the Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda, and by examining two chosen strategies; one evaluation of coherence and coordination can be made.

1.9. Organisational Learning

While elements such as local ownership, conflict sensitivity, and improved levels of coherence and coordination are vital to the success of any peacebuilding mission, many, such as Campbell, argue that they are “insufficient without high levels of organisational learning.”

Despite having a long history in Social Sciences, organisational learning “is difficult to define, isolate, measure, and apply empirically.” As Adebahr explains, “what makes engagement in these theories difficult […] is that there is no common or in any way prevailing concept in the theory of Organisational Learning.” Rather, a “wide range of definitions exist, many emphasising different aspects of the learning process.”

Some suggest that organisational learning is “about identifying, and acting to correct, misalignment between an organisation’s aims and the outcomes of its activities in relation to those aims.” Others see it as a method through which “the individuals consciously interact with others through the process of education and as a result of experience.” It is perhaps Benner and Rotmann, though, who offer the most suitable definition of organisational learning. They suggest that it is “a process of cognitive change through the questioning of the means and/or ends of addressing problems.”


120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 Campbell, “When Process Matters,” 21


This practice “manifests itself in the development and implementation of new rules and routines guiding the organisations actions.”\textsuperscript{125} In short, learning organisations “revise doctrine and guidelines based on experience and new knowledge.”\textsuperscript{126}

The importance of such organisations, particularly in the peacebuilding field, is undisputed. As McCandless and Wyeth explain, “for any peacebuilding organisation, the challenge is being able to learn what works in terms of process and product, to adapt accordingly, and to integrate this learning into its routines.”\textsuperscript{127} Campbell agrees, stating that “a peacebuilding organisation’s learning process may be one of the most important factors determining its capacity to support the drivers and causes of peace.”\textsuperscript{128}

Despite the critical role organisational learning has to play in peacebuilding success, it has been identified as deficient in previous UN operations. A leading study in UN peacebuilding processes “asserts that learning has not […] been one of the strengths of the United Nations.”\textsuperscript{129} A later study concluded that “‘best practices’ and ‘lessons learned’ can and should be better distilled from past experiences.”\textsuperscript{130}

An organisational learning capacity is critical to the success of the PBC in improving levels of coherence and coordination through the use of their IPBSs. The extent to which the PBC has demonstrated this capacity will be considered in the chapters to follow. It is not only vital to coherence and coordination success, but to the future prospects of the Commission as a valuable and effective UN body.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Benner and Rotmann, “Learning to Learn?,” 44
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
2. The “Missing Link”: The Creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission

2.1. Introduction

Before undertaking an evaluation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s approach to issues of coherence and coordination in its mandated missions, it is important to consider the development and organisational design of the Commission. In attempting to give a full understanding of the way in which the Commission operates, this chapter will serve as a preface to those which follow by considering the context in which the Commission was established. After having discussed the creation of the Commission, it will then examine its mandate, structure and processes. Finally, the selection criteria for the first cases on the Commission’s agenda will be outlined.

In 2005, when the Commission was established, the concurrent resolutions issued by the Security Council and General Assembly actually outlined three bodies. The joint resolutions established the Commission itself, as well as “a small peacebuilding support office staffed by qualified experts to assist and support the Commission”\textsuperscript{131}, and a “multi-year standing peacebuilding fund for post-conflict peacebuilding”\textsuperscript{132}. This Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) allocates money to both countries on the agenda of the PBC, and to countries which are not. Funds are allocated through one of two bodies: the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) or the Peacebuilding Recovery Facility (PRF).\textsuperscript{133} Completing the circle of support, the PBF is managed by the aforementioned Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).\textsuperscript{134} Collectively, these bodies are widely referred to as the “UN Peacebuilding Architecture”\textsuperscript{135}. Naturally, the three have ongoing dealings with each other and interact on a regular basis. However, it must be noted that they are still independent bodies, each with their own


\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.

responsibilities. For clarification’s sake, this thesis will generally deal only with the Peacebuilding Commission, the foundation and “institutional lynchpin” of the United Nation’s peacebuilding architecture.

2.2. Post-Cold War Peacebuilding

As discussed in the previous chapter, in the years immediately following the Cold War period, an unexpected new risk to the international security environment began to gather global attention. Paris describes this threat as “pervasive and pernicious internal violence.” He states that Civil wars [...] accounted for 94 percent of all armed conflicts fought in the 1990s. From Africa to Central Asia, internecine violence and collapsing states became an unfortunate but familiar feature of the post-Cold War political landscape.

Despite this fact, the frequency of UN “action to contain and reduce internal conflicts” experienced a “brief lull”. It is suggested that this is in part thanks to the “ending of many existing wars through negotiated settlements.” While this may seem like a reasonably positive statistic, there was another trend becoming clear which to this day remains a cause for real concern. As Wallensteen explains, there exists

 [...] a tendency for post-conflict regions to re-emerge as war zones. Around 85% of civil wars are either occurring in marginalised countries or in post-conflict countries relapsing into new armed conflicts. Countries coming out of civil war face a 44% risk of relapsing into war during the first five years of transition.

What is more, as a report issued by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung suggests, “if only two peace agreements of the 1990s – the 1991 Biocesse Agreement for Angola and

137 Otobo, “A UN Architecture to Build Peace,” 46
139 Ibid.
140 Ponzio, “The Creation and Functioning of the UN Peacebuilding Commission” 3
141 Ibid.
142 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, “The UN Peacebuilding Commission,” 2
the 1993 Arusha Accord for Rwanda – had been successfully implemented, some two million lives would have been saved.”

In addition, the effects felt by nearby states, such as the flow of weaponry and displaced people, as well as economic hardships, could have been significantly lessened. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali saw an urgent need to act. In his report An Agenda for Peace, he discussed the need for peacebuilding, as well as peacemaking and peacekeeping. He defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” The newly emerging concept of peacebuilding was seen as “a significant instrument for securing and maintaining world peace.”

Subsequently, the post-Cold War period saw several traditional UN peacekeeping operations widen their mandates to include a broad range of peacebuilding projects. Existing peacekeeping missions to Namibia, El Salvador, Angola and Mozambique were among those expanded into peacebuilding projects. Gradually, peacebuilding missions on the UN’s agenda became more complex and involved, and by the end of the millennium, those included operations in Kosovo, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. These were eventually joined by some of the more high-profile and expansive pre-Peacebuilding Commission operations, such as those in Afghanistan, Burundi, Côte D’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Liberia, and Sudan. This was a significant strain to be placed on the UN. Indeed, Ponzio remarks that the peacebuilding missions of the late 1990s “constitute the largest number of concurrent, sizeable peacebuilding operations ever: by 2006, the United Nations had deployed over 90,000 military and civilian personnel in the field.”

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144 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. “The UN Peacebuilding Commission: Benefits and Challenges” 1
145 Ibid.
146 Boutros-Ghali,. An Agenda for Peace, 46
147 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
De Coning states that “the scale and complexity”\textsuperscript{154} of the missions undertaken in the post-Cold War era were “of a different magnitude”\textsuperscript{155} and accordingly, “no single agency, government or international organisation could manage evolving crises on their own.”\textsuperscript{156} A number of organisations began to formulate strategies for dealing with aspects of peacebuilding, but, in the absence of a coherent framework, began to work at cross-purposes to one another.\textsuperscript{157} De Coning suggests that this “lack of coherence in the international response significantly contributed to the overall poor success of peacebuilding to date.”\textsuperscript{158} Subsequently “the involvement of so many players in peacebuilding means that the coordination and integration of peacebuilding activities have emerged as significant concerns.”\textsuperscript{159} Indeed, the results of UN peacebuilding missions during the 1990s were less than convincing. It is suggested that “some missions were clear successes, (Namibia and Croatia); others were obvious failures (Angola and Rwanda). The remaining operations fell in between these two extremes.”\textsuperscript{160} Call and Cook comment that eighteen UN missions between 1988 and 2002 featured aspects of political organisation or state-building. Of these eighteen, thirteen were considered to have fallen to authoritarian regimes as of 2002.\textsuperscript{161} Schneckener and Weinlich concluded that it was

Especially evident that the UN is a long way from putting the peacebuilding concept into practice [...] the achievements of the ensuing period failed to match the expectations that had been awakened in the population and/or the ambitious goals of the international community.\textsuperscript{162}

The apparent weakness of the UN’s capacity to facilitate peacebuilding in post-conflict states was not going unheeded at the highest level of the UN. In 2003,

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{158} Ibid. 46
\item\textsuperscript{159} Ponzio, “The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Origins and Intital Practice,” 6
\item\textsuperscript{160} Paris, \textit{At War’s End}, 151
\item\textsuperscript{162} Schneckener and Weinlich, “The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Tasks, Mandate, and Design for a New Institution,” 3
\end{itemize}
after having stated that the UN had reached a “fork in the road”\textsuperscript{163} and was risking “erosion in the face of mounting discord”\textsuperscript{164}, Secretary-General Kofi Annan began a process of wider reform that would eventually see the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

2.3. An “Institutional Gap”: Peacebuilding and the Process of UN Reform

2.3.1. The High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

In September 2003, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan tasked a panel to “take stock of threats to international and human security and make recommendations to improve the UN response.”\textsuperscript{165} The High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change released its report of recommendations in November 2004.\textsuperscript{166} In the report, entitled \textit{A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility}, the Panel identified

[...] a key institutional gap: there is no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid state collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace. [...] today, in an era when dozens of states are under stress of recovering from conflict, there is a clear international obligation to assist states in developing their capacity to perform their sovereign functions effectively and responsibly. [...] Strengthening the United Nations capacity for peacebuilding in the widest sense must be a priority for the organisation.\textsuperscript{167}

Recognising that the UN had a “vital and irreplaceable role in peacebuilding, with unique legitimacy and comparative advantages that could not be replicated elsewhere”\textsuperscript{168}, the Panel recommended that the Security Council, after having consulted with ECOSOC, and acting in accordance with Article 29 of the UN Charter, establish a UN Peacebuilding Commission.\textsuperscript{169} The Panel’s broad vision for the Commission was laid out in the report. In brief, it recommended that the Commission

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item [164] Ibid.
\item [166] United Nations. \textit{A More Secure World}
\item [167] Ibid. 83
\item [168] Rugumamu, “Does the UN Peacebuilding Commission Change the Mode of Peacebuilding in Africa?,” 2
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
should be relatively small; it should consist of both a general body and of country specific configurations, and should be chaired for a period of at least twelve months by a Security Council approved member.\textsuperscript{170} In terms of membership, it should have representatives from both the Security Council and ECOSOC, as well as delegates representing the country concerned.\textsuperscript{171} The international community should also be represented, with emissaries from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, principal donor and military contributing countries, and regional organisations in attendance at meetings.\textsuperscript{172}

Annan agreed with the Panel’s findings when he released his own follow up report, stating that “at this very point there is a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace.”\textsuperscript{173} In accord with the High Level Panel, Annan proposed the creation of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. The Commission would be a

[...] forum in which representatives from donor countries, troop contributors, and the country being helped would sit together with leaders from other member states, international financial institutions, and regional organisations to agree on strategy, provide policy guidance, mobilise resources, and coordinate the efforts of all involved.\textsuperscript{174}

While Annan and the High Level Panel both saw the need for a Peacebuilding Commission to correct the existing deficit in the UN system, it has been noted that the two reports did differ slightly on their visions for the Commission. As Wallensteen explains, “while the High Level Panel links the Commission’s functions to an understanding of the dangers of state failure and would like to prevent these dangers from leading to war, the \textit{In Larger Freedom} points to post-conflict phases with the aim of avoiding relapses into war.”\textsuperscript{175}

That is to say, while the Panel thought that conflict prevention should be a part of the Commission’s role, Annan did not agree. He did “not believe that such a body

\textsuperscript{170} United Nations. \textit{High Level Panel}, 84
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{173} Annan, \textit{In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All}, 31
\textsuperscript{174} Annan. “\textit{In Larger Freedom: Decision Time at the UN},” 68
\textsuperscript{175} Wallensteen, “A UN Peacebuilding Commission” 3
should have an early warning or monitoring function.” Rather, he believed that “more relevant to the Peacebuilding Commission […] is the issue of risk reduction.” Annan commented that “there are other mechanisms in the United Nations for what has become known as “operational prevention.” This concept of operational prevention was introduced after a study by the Carnegie Commission on The Prevention of Deadly Conflict. In this study, a distinction between two types of conflict prevention was made: operational prevention, and structural prevention. Operational prevention is defined as “measures to address immediate crises (e.g. sending high-level diplomatic missions to mediate between parties, using economic tools such as sanctions, inducements, or collecting weapons and demobilising fighting units)”. On the other hand, structural prevention is explained as “addressing root causes such as poverty, political repression and uneven distribution of resources, which can, if left unattended, escalate into violence.” What is potentially interesting here is that Annan refers the fact that the UN already has operational prevention capabilities, but makes no mention of structural prevention. Operational prevention is much more short term, and structural prevention involves more long term projects. In exploring the previously discussed hypotheses, it will be interesting to consider in later chapters whether there has been more of short term focus by the UN, and whether this has impeded any ability to learn from past performances, and thus improve levels of coherence and coordination through the use of IPBS.

Also interesting are the reasons behind this decision to disallow the PBC to have any role in conflict prevention. Some have seen the decision as a suggestion that that Secretary-General was responding “presumably to concerns within the UN that the Commission might engage in prerogatives belonging to the Security Council, but also to pressure from governments wary that they might be the ones under scrutiny.” The Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI) suggests that efforts to instill

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176 Annan, In larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All, 32
177 Ibid. 1
178 Ibid. p.4
181 Ibid.
the Commission with preventative and early warning capacities were opposed because of a perception that “delicate mediation efforts could be undermined by too much global attention, and that it could subject countries to undue international intervention.”\footnote{CMI. “UN Peacebuilding Commission,” (Norway: CMI, 2010) \url{http://www.cmi.no/research/?un-peacebuilding-commission} (accessed June, 2010)} Restricting the role to post-conflict action has also been seen as an attempt “to avoid the Commission, once it was put on the table by the High-Level Panel, from absorbing what were considered to be too far-reaching powers and thus from being too large in scale.” The issue of a preventative capacity, along with that of the institutional situation of the proposed Commission within the UN, would become one of the major talking points in the final steps of the reform process.

2.3.2. The World Summit 2005

In September, 2005, international Heads of State and Government gathered at the UN World Summit.\footnote{United Nations. “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: 60/1,” 1} Falling on the 60\textsuperscript{th} session of the General Assembly, Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the Summit as “a once-in-a-generation opportunity for the world to come together and take action on grave global threats that require bold global solutions.”\footnote{United Nations. “The 2005 World Summit: High Level Plenary Meeting of the 60\textsuperscript{th} Session of the General Assembly,” (New York: United Nations, 2005) \url{http://www.un.org/summit2005} (accessed July, 2010)} There were several issues on the agenda, including a review on progress of the Millennium Goals, but one of the most significant results of the Summit was the consensus reached by the Member States to establish a UN Peacebuilding Commission.

The \textit{Outcome Document} of the Summit briefly described the role that the delegates saw as necessary for the Commission. They emphasised the need for a “coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to peacebuilding and reconciliation.”\footnote{Ibid.} In order to achieve this, they saw the main purpose of the Commission as gathering together all appropriate actors, organising resources, and recommending integrated strategies in post-conflict settings.\footnote{United Nations, “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: 60/1,” 24} The Commission’s focus, according to the Summit delegates, should be on institutional rebuilding as
necessary for recovery, as well as encouraging and assisting the aforementioned integrated strategies to facilitate sustainable development.\textsuperscript{188}

The need for the Commission to meet in various configurations was also mentioned. The \textit{Summit Outcome Statement} states that the Commission should include an Organisational Committee, which would deal with policy and general matters, as well as Country-Specific Configurations. Again, as with the High Level Panel and the \textit{In Larger Freedom} report, the Summit proposed that the Organisational Committee be made up of Members of the Security Council, ECOSOC, principal financial and military contributors to the UN, and representatives from International Financial Institutions.\textsuperscript{189} The proposed Country-Specific Configurations would include members of the Organisational Committee, as well as the country under consideration, neighbouring countries, and regional financial institutions.\textsuperscript{190} The Summit closed its recommendations by stating the Commission should “begin its work no later than 31 December 2005.”\textsuperscript{191} The \textit{Outcome Statement}, along with the other preliminary works, was discussed by sessions of the Security Council and General Assembly in December 2005. After much consultation, concurrent resolutions were passed, and the UN Peacebuilding Commission was finally established.\textsuperscript{192}

\section*{2.4. The UNPBC: Mandate and Structure}

\subsection*{2.4.1. UNPBC Mandate}

The official website of the Peacebuilding Commission states that the concurrent resolutions issued by the Security Council and General Assembly in 2005 mandated the Commission

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid. 25
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on the proposed integrated strategies for post conflict peacebuilding and recovery;

To help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment over the medium to long-term;

To develop best practices on issues in collaboration with political, security, humanitarian and development actors.\textsuperscript{193}

As with most foundation documents, there were significant points of interest in the mandate. It has already been noted that the High Level Panel did intend the Commission to have preventative and early warning capacities. The General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, however, were in accord with Kofi Annan’s suggestions in \textit{In Larger Freedom}. They decided against giving the Commission these responsibilities. Questions had also been raised as to who the Commission should report to. The High Level Panel seemed to suggest the Security Council, while Annan believed that sequential reporting to both the Security Council and ECOSOC was more beneficial.\textsuperscript{194} It could be suggested that this was an attempt on Annan’s behalf to ensure that the social, economic, and development sides of the UN were linked to the Security Council. Indeed, Annan himself states in his \textit{In Larger Freedom} report that “if the proposal for sequential reporting to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council is agreed, these two bodies would have to work together to identify the modalities for transition between the two.”\textsuperscript{195} In what will likely emerge as a common theme to be discussed later, this was an attempt to link the development and peacebuilding agendas for short and long term development and peace initiatives.

There were also initial suggestions that the Commission should have “operative powers, for example to control activities on the ground from the UN Headquarters in New York”.\textsuperscript{196} However, the eventual resolutions did not agree. The Commission was granted “only an advisory function.”\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{194} Annan, \textit{In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All}, 6
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{196} Schneckener and Weinlich, “The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission,” 6
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
While it is reasonably clear what is not included in the mandated responsibilities of the PBC, it is commonly remarked that it is not quite so clear exactly what is expected of the PBC. Despite the understanding that the PBC is intended to act as “a forum for calibrating and streamlining peacebuilding efforts”\(^{198}\), and is expected to “improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations to guarantee these pull together”\(^{199}\), an explicit outline of what this means and how it will be achieved seems to be lacking. Indeed, the International Peace Academy commented that despite their “laudable aims, the resolutions establishing the PBC are imprecise as to what the body will do and how it will function.”\(^{200}\) Moreover, “translating this mandate into concrete activity is complicated by the intergovernmental nature of the PBC and by its status as an advisory body.”\(^{201}\) This advisory status means the Commission lacks the status to act on its own impulses. Some, including Dr. Necla Tschirgi have remarked that this makes the PBC “an unusual and unique experiment”\(^{202}\) and potentially a “much less effective body than what many had wished for.”\(^{203}\) As Ponzio explains, “due to this lack of formal authority, even when consensus is reached, it might be difficult to achieve the level of coordination envisaged.”\(^{204}\)

While the conditions surrounding the decision to remove any decisional authority from the PBC are unclear, Annan does state that “in listening to the deliberations of Member States about the proposed Peacebuilding Commission, it seems clear that the Peacebuilding Commission should be advisory in nature.”\(^{205}\) In the months leading up to the establishment of the PBC, there were documented instances of certain players impeding proceedings. The most notable of these was John Bolton, U.S Ambassador to the UN. Bolton was described as seeking to “scuttle reform proposals”\(^{206}\), and as having “ignored opportunities to reach agreements of

\(^{198}\) Thallinger, “The UN Peacebuilding Commission,” 689
\(^{199}\) Ibid. 690
\(^{200}\) Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. “The UN Peacebuilding Commission,” 3
\(^{201}\) Ibid.
\(^{203}\) Ibid.
\(^{204}\) Ponzio, “The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Origins and Initial Practice,” 8
\(^{205}\) Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, 7.
The potential of this one delegate to impair proceedings was so great that British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, pleaded with his US equivalent, Condoleezza Rice, to “reign in John Bolton.” In an article in the *Guardian*, Bolton is accused of holding up the 2005 World Summit, the forum in which the creation of the PBC was to be voted on. He is said to have “thrown the reform negotiations in disarray by demanding a catalogue of late changes to a 40-page draft document which is due to go before the summit in New York on Wednesday.” Whether or not Bolton had anything to do with removing any decisional authority from the PBC, the extent to which the agendas of member states and their delegates have affected the operation of the PBC and their IPBSs is an interesting consideration.

Even with the potential setbacks discussed, it is still thought that the Commission can make a difference. Tschirgi states that

> It can still be a platform where stakeholders can come together, exchange views, develop common strategies. The commission can also be an arena where experiences, lessons learned, knowledge and information can be accumulated and disseminated.

Two elements which will arguably affect the productiveness and value of the Commission more so than any others are the Commission’s structure and the apparatus implemented to help realise the mandate.

### 2.4.2. UNPBC Structure

The founding resolutions of the Peacebuilding Commission outlined the structure the Commission would take. In keeping with Annan’s suggestion, they declared that the Commission would consist of a more general Organisational Committee as well as Country-Specific Configurations. The Organisational Committee, charged with dealing with issues of policy and the selection of countries

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207 Ibid.


209 Ibid.

210 Gibbons, “An Expert View” 1

211 See: United Nations. “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly. 60/180,” 2; and:

for PBC help, would consist of 31 member states. These states, which were to be elected on a two-yearly basis, would include

(a) Seven members of the Security Council, including permanent members […]
(b) Seven members of the Economic and Social Council, elected from regional groups […] giving due consideration to those countries that have experienced post-conflict recovery […]
(c) Five top providers of assessed contributions to United Nations budgets and of voluntary contributions to United Nations […] that are not among those selected in (a) or (b) above […]
(d) Five top providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions that are not among those selected in (a), (b) or (c) above […]
(e) Giving due consideration to representation from all regional groups in the overall composition of the Committee and to representation from all countries that have experienced post-conflict recovery, seven additional members shall be elected.213

In addition to the Organisational Committee, the Commission would have various Country-Specific Configurations. It is here that Kofi Annan envisaged that the “core of the work”214 would take place. As well as the members of the Organisation Committee, the Country-Specific Configurations would also include the country concerned, invested neighbouring countries, major financial, military and civilian contributors involved, a senior UN representative in the field, and representatives from relevant regional and international financial institutions.215 These configurations were to meet on an ongoing basis, as dictated by the requirements of the country concerned.216 The Country-Specific Configurations have drawn a lot of attention, along with one of the key strategies they have chosen to implement. According to the Security Council Report, the

[... ] most important strategic decisions taken by the PBC since its inception have been decisions to divide its work into country-specific sections managed by country-specific configurations and to utilise integrated peacebuilding strategies as frameworks.217

212 Deller, “The Role of the UN Peace-Building Commission,” 8
213 See: United Nations. “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly. 60/180,” pp2-3; and:
United Nations, “Resolution 1645 (2005),” 3
214 Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, 3
215 See: United Nations. “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly. 60/180,” 3
216 Deller, “The Role of the UN Peace-Building Commission,” 8
2.5. Tools of the Trade

2.5.1. The Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy

In the post-Cold War period, it was commonly agreed that “peace-building suffers from poor international strategy-setting at the highest levels.”\(^{218}\) Gareth Evans states that

Billions of dollars of assistance pledged at donors conferences have been poorly used, delivered according to the donors’ rather than the donees’ timetables or not delivered at all. Basic underlying causes of tension have gone unaddressed and countries have tumbled back into deadly conflict.\(^{219}\)

In an attempt to rectify this, the PBC decided to implement Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies (IPBSs) for each of the countries under its guidance. At the World Summit Conference in 2005, Jorge Sampaio, President of Portugal, outlined the necessity for the strategies. He told his fellow Heads of State that “only a coherent, integrated strategy can allow effective action in […] providing the necessary support to reconstruction and to the restoration of the capabilities of the State and institutions during the post-conflict period.”\(^{220}\)

The Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies are seen as an “agreed roadmap”\(^{221}\) which “set out both the ‘big picture’ and the specific areas where progress and/or change is needed over time, and the sequence in which interventions are required to bring about such progress or change.”\(^{222}\) By providing a “platform for joint-decision making”\(^{223}\), it is hoped that the strategies will ensure “greater coherence and

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\(^{218}\) Ponzio, “The Creation and Functioning of the UN Peacebuilding Commission,” 5


\(^{222}\) Ibid.

\(^{223}\) Ibid.
coordination in addressing identified gaps”\textsuperscript{224}, and will “achieve more coherent international support in peacebuilding contexts”\textsuperscript{225}.

Although the strategies are not explicitly detailed in the Resolutions establishing the PBC, there is a certain amount understood as to how they should be drafted. Perhaps the most important factor in the process of operationalisation is that of case-specific context. A Stanley Foundation study issued in 2009 states that “there is no ‘one-size-fits-all generic strategic peacebuilding plan.’”\textsuperscript{226} The Foundation echoes the opinion held by many, that the most successful framework is one that is “built on the particular background, situation and circumstances in the country as it approaches emergence from conflict.”\textsuperscript{227}

The Working Group on Lessons Learned identifies more specific aspects of integrated strategies which are instrumental to achieving the desired coherence and coordination in mandated missions. Chief among these is having a robust agreement where parties are equally responsible for reaching an end goal. As a part of this agreement, meaningful consultations, both in and outside of the national capital should take place; efforts to strengthen various aspects of the country in question should support each other; precise and quantifiable markers should be used to assess progress; anticipation of an eventual lessening in international involvement should see national leadership mechanisms being groomed from the beginning; and strategies should be connected to other development or collaborative networks.\textsuperscript{228}

Again, the role of the PBC in implementing these strategies is not made clear. Most, however, agree that the Commission’s role should not be to author these strategies, but rather to “inform the design of high quality strategies in partnership with national governments and experts in the field, and to promote their implementation by helping to mobilise a coalition of international interests around a country.”\textsuperscript{229} This was to occur after a series of country-specific meetings in New

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\textsuperscript{224} Working Group Lessons Learned, “Lessons Learned from Peacebuilding Strategic Frameworks,” 2
\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{228} Working Group Lessons Learned, “Lessons Learned from Peacebuilding Strategic Frameworks”
\textsuperscript{229} Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. “The UN Peacebuilding Commission,” 3
York, field missions, and meetings with government representatives, civil service employees, NGOs, and other interest groups in both locations had taken place.

2.5.2. The Country-Specific Configuration

In keeping with the country-specific focus of the peacebuilding strategies, it was decided to concentrate the work of the Commission in Country-Specific Configurations. These configurations are intended to “guide the Commission’s engagement with individual countries on its agenda” and “allow the PBC to focus attention and tailor its approach to the particular needs and developments in a country.”

The Together for a Better Peace project outlines the role of the Country-Specific Configurations clearly. Each configuration is to collaborate with respective national governments to

- Identify peacebuilding challenges and opportunities;
- Develop recommendations for better peacebuilding;
- Outline the commitments of various stakeholders to achieving sustainable peace;
- Mobilise support in the international community for these efforts;
- Monitor progress in peacebuilding and meeting commitments by various stakeholders.

As the project details, the working methods for the Configurations are not formalised. In this respect, much of the work done by the Configuration is dependent upon the style of leadership and of the agenda of the country-specific Chair. It is the job of this Chair, elected by the Organisational Committee, to ensure that the Configuration fulfils its responsibilities as detailed above. Debate has been

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231 Ibid.

232 Project of the World Federalist Movement, which according to its website “brings together peacebuilders from around the world to support, monitor and contribute to the work of the PBC”. See:

233 World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy, “Together For a Better Peace: Country-Specific Configurations”

234 Ibid.

235 Ibid.
raised about the fundamental challenge raised by what Murithi describes as the “machiavellianism that permeates and corrupts the relationship between UN member states in general.”

He explains that “there are concerns among many delegates to the UN about the way the Permanent-5 (P5) members of the Security Council ‘insinuated’ themselves into the Organisational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission”.

Their position on the OC gives them access to all Country-Specific Configurations. The worry is that these delegates will ensure matters they believe to be exclusive to the Security Council are not raised in the PBC forum, thus retaining their perceived power and prestige.

In terms of identifying challenges and opportunities, the Chair organises both formal and informal meetings and consultations. These meetings are held both at UN Headquarters in New York and in the country concerned. These get-togethers allow the Commission to determine where deficiencies in existing peacebuilding strategies lie. It is important to note that the idea of national ownership is emphasised. According to the Better Peace project, the national government is “largely responsible for articulating its priority areas for peacebuilding and its commitments to meeting key goals, with assistance from partners.” At the conclusion of these consultations, the Configuration must then generate its recommendations and outline the commitments of the various players involved. The integrated peacebuilding strategy is the result of these recommendations.

The Configuration Chair, along with national governments and other interested stakeholders, must then use the framework to fulfill the mandate of the PBC. As detailed previously, this includes marshalling resources, ensuring financing for both immediate projects and those taking place over mid to long-term, ensuring

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237 Ibid.


239 Ibid.

240 Ibid.
optimal collaboration with other involved actors, and ensuring sustained international attention is given to the country concerned. 241

The last detailed responsibility of the Commission is monitoring. The PBC must “closely monitor developments in the countries on its agenda.” 242 Alluding to the fact that it is intended to be a learning organisation, the Commission must review the progress of its “living documents […] semi-anually in the respective Country-Specific Configurations.” 243 Less formal meetings can also be called to address recognised risks to peace and stability, as well as significant events for the country concerned, such as those of imminent elections. 244

2.6. Selection of Cases

The resolutions establishing the PBC state that the Organisational Committee is to establish the agenda of the Commission based on “requests for advice” 245 from the Security Council. If the Security Council is not seized with the matter, ECOSOC and the General Assembly can also recommend cases to the PBC, provided they have the consent of the Member State in question. 246 In exceptional circumstances, the Member State itself can apply for consideration, or the Secretary-General can request advice. 247 Most important here is the fact the country concerned must voluntarily seek support. Carolyn McAskie, former Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding explains that “the Commission does not call countries before it. […] The Country has to want to do it. It has to be a two-way engagement.” 248

243 Ibid.
244 Ibid.
245 See: United Nations. “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly. 60/180,” 4 ; and:
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid.
General opinion is that the first cases to be taken into consideration by the PBC were always going to be smaller in scale, and easier to manage. Indeed, it has been suggested that the first selected were cases where the PBC “thought it could make an impact, unlike other needy cases which would be less manageable.” After suggestions the Commission would take on countries such as Haïti, Liberia, and Timor-Leste, the PBC added Sierra Leone and Burundi to its agenda in 2006. These were followed by Guinea-Bissau in late 2007 and the Central African Republic in 2008. While these cases are “small both in size of the country and in international financial commitments,” it is possible that they are not proving as easy to manage as might have been anticipated. Biersteker suggests that the foundation cases of Sierra Leone and Burundi are in fact proving to be difficult. Although peace agreements may have been in place for some time before the PBC took the countries onto its agenda, the reality is that they are still located in an extremely unstable part of the world. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the State Fragility Index of 2001, in the years leading up to their selection all four of the countries were located in either extreme or high risk areas of Africa. In addition to being volatile themselves, they exist in unstable regions with unpredictable neighbours unable to prevent the spread of conflict. In fact many of them are the source of sub regional conflict. These ‘bad neighbourhoods’ are characterised by regional gun running, drug smuggling and trafficking. The constant movement of displaced people within country and across borders constitutes further threats.

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249 Deller, “The Role of the UN Peacebuilding Commission,” 9
250 Ibid.
251 Thallinger, “The UN Peacebuilding Commission,” 704
256 Thallinger, “The UN Peacebuilding Commission,” 704
It is yet to be proven that the selection of these so-called smaller cases has been more manageable for the PBC or that they have resulted in the Commission’s work being any more successful than past international peacebuilding attempts. What is certain, however, is that the PBC’s performance in these four countries will significantly impact upon its future direction. In an attempt to establish exactly what impact the PBC is having, the following chapters will undertake an evaluation of the Commission’s approaches to the critical aspects of coherence and coordination in its two foundations cases. It is recognised that the conflicts are the results of very different historical, cultural, political and economic situations and that the peacebuilding projects in Sierra Leone and Burundi are at very different stages of implementation. As such, the case-specific Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies will be integral in the PBC gaining positive results. It is in this mechanism that the assessment of the PBC’s approach to issues of much-needed coherence and coordination will find its focus.

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258 Biersteker, “Prospects for the UN Peacebuilding Commission” 38

259 Ibid.
3. The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: Organisational Location

3.1. Introduction

As well as appreciating the process that led to the establishment of the PBC, it is important to understand the place that the Commission now holds within the UN. This organisational location will inevitably influence the nature of the Commission’s role and, subsequently, the effectiveness of the work it carries out.

In an article published to mark the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, Victor-Yves Ghebali wrote that

As far as organisational structure is concerned, the evolution of the UN system since 1945 seems to confirm the existence of sociological ‘law’ whereby no organisation functions exactly the way its founders had planned. This would seem to apply to all intergovernmental organisations.260

This would certainly seem to be true of the PBC. As discussed previously, the Commission was established as a result of concurrent resolutions issued by the Security Council and the General Assembly. As such, the Commission was to have a direct reporting relationship with these two bodies. Moreover, it was to have a non-subsidiary relationship with ECOSOC. However, it would seem that none of those three relationships have fully developed. Rather, the connection between the Commission and these bodies has been somewhat tenuous.

Indeed, it is agreed within the existing literature that the place of the PBC within the “UN institutional hierarchy is unclear, including its important relations with the Security Council and ECOSOC.”261 Along with these worrying statements

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come calls for the Commission to find “its niche within the UN labyrinth”\textsuperscript{262}, and occupy a more “central and strategic place […] within the overall UN architecture.”\textsuperscript{263}

Two reports issued by the Stanley Foundation are more explicit in their evaluation of the place the Commission holds within the UN system. The first notes that:

The PBC has yet to establish itself as the “central UN pillar” imagined at its founding. Participants agreed that the PBC has largely fallen short of expectations to maximise its political leverage; facilitate strategic coordination through an organic relationship with its parent organs and within the UN system; and produce attributable, value-added progress in the field.\textsuperscript{264}

While this assessment is from a conference report prepared by a rapporteur, and cannot be taken as the absolute view of all conference participants, it certainly reflects a generalised anxiety about the place of the Commission in the UN system.

The second Stanley Foundation report provides another perspective on the Commission’s place within the UN. In the second report, the same rapporteur notes that conference participants spoke of two hopes which existed for the Commission. The first was that it would complement “the work of other UN organs and agencies, and many other international actors, by filling the much-needed role of a flexible and fast provider of peace dividends in the early recovery period.”\textsuperscript{265} The second, and more ambitious hope was that the Commission would be one which

[...] informs the Security Council of needs and potential crises at a strategic level, mainstreams peacebuilding throughout the UN system, raises far more funds than is currently the case for peacebuilding needs, integrates peacebuilding with other existing “pillars” in the UN system (peacemaking, peacekeeping, development) and even acts as a top-down unifier of other global actors via the strategic peacebuilding plan produced by its own country-specific meetings (CSM) mechanism.\textsuperscript{266}

\textsuperscript{266} Ibid.
It is argued that while the second, and more expansive role described here was in fact the main motivation for establishing the PBC, the Commission would only seem to have fulfilled the first, rather more limited role.\textsuperscript{267}

In order to present a well-rounded consideration of the Commission’s attempts to improve coherence and coordination in its mandated missions, especially in relation to its Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies and Country-Specific Configurations; it is vital to understand any potential structural constraints. These may explain why the PBC may be operating on a restricted basis within the UN system. These structural constraints, while not recognised as being primary sources of potential powerlessness, will also be taken into account in the two case studies to follow.

\textbf{3.2. Internal Factors: The Wider Peacebuilding Architecture}

The first of the potential limitations are those which occur within the wider Peacebuilding Architecture itself. As is the case for many organisations and businesses; finances, human resources, and support services should all be considered.

It became clear at the Stanley Foundation conference on Peacebuilding Following Conflict that finance, or the lack of, is a real problem within the Peacebuilding Commission. Participants at the conference suggested that there were “no real finances available to support the Chair of the PBC.”\textsuperscript{268} Rather than having budgetary assistance to perform the job of overseeing and coordinating the work of the Commission, the Chair has to “rely on his own country’s resources to travel to places like Ethiopia, the EU, and Washington D.C.”\textsuperscript{269} It would seem that a body such as the Commission, which works on a purely advisory status, would rely on having the strongest possible relations with outside bodies in order to afford it credibility and standing in the international community. Leaving the Chair of the Commission to fund his own trips to visit with these states, actors, and organisations would seem at the very least to reduce the frequency with which these visits could take place, and

\textsuperscript{267} Tschirgi, “Escaping Path Dependency,” 18
\textsuperscript{268} Faisal Thaler., “Peacebuilding Following Conflict,” 25
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid.
could also communicate to potential cooperating bodies that the Commission and the UN in general does not place a high priority on these visits. Indeed, participants at the Stanley Foundation conference concluded that “one of the main member’s state priorities should be to raise funds to support the PBC Chair.”

The allocation of human resources within the wider Peacebuilding Architecture also seems to be problematic. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The intended functions of the PBSO are described as “supporting the PBC, managing the PBF (Peacebuilding Fund) and providing analysis of cross-cutting issues and best practices.” It has been noted that “it remains in the interest of the organisation for the PBSO to emerge as a truly interdepartmental, interagency pool of the best available talent to advise the Secretary-General and the PBC on overall peacebuilding strategy.”

In what looks like emerging as a common theme, however, the exact role of the PBSO is confused. It would appear that it has “not yet established a clear pattern of working with DPKO, UNDP, the World Bank, and other critical actors in shaping, setting, or monitoring strategy.” The PBC itself depends on the support offered by the PBSO, and if the Support Office is failing to fulfil its mandate, then the work of the Commission suffers.

One of the simplest ways in which the work of the PBSO could be improved would be to address the human resources issue. The role of the PBSO is not only critical to the functioning of the PBC; it is also somewhat involved in servicing the wider Peacebuilding Architecture. It is responsible for overseeing each of the Country-Specific Configurations; interacting with and advising other intergovernmental bodies such as the UNDP, the DPKO and the World Bank; and

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270 Ibid.
273 Ibid.
274 Ibid.
managing the work of the Peacebuilding Fund, among other tasks. Yet their staff remains remarkably small.

It was agreed at the inception of the Peacebuilding Architecture that representatives from various UN bodies, including the DPA, the DPKO, OCHA, and the UNDP, among others, would assign staff to the PBSO. However, this never happened, and the chance to cultivate a truly unified system was never realised. Requests made by the PBSO were never answered, thus weakening the Support Office from its very inception. In a worrying statistic, as of 2009, the PBSO had a meagre six staff. In 2010, the figures seemed to be slightly improved, with the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture noting that “the Office has 41 posts, of which 13 are classified as core posts, with the remainder temporary, seconded, extra-budgetary funded or PBF-funded.” However, the review notes that there still remains a problem. There needs to be a “significant upward adjustment in the ratio of core to non-core staff.”

With a greater number of core staff, the Office would be strengthened, as would the PBC in turn. This alone would not be enough, however. For, as the former Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding explains, the ability of the PBSO to lend the optimum level of support to the PBC “depends not only on its own leadership, but on the cooperation of the leadership of UN political, peacekeeping, development, humanitarian and human rights entities.” Indeed, there is one particular leader whose support is, arguably, the most important of all.

As the head of the organisation as a whole, the role played by the Secretary-General in the Commission’s operations is critical. The relationship that he holds with the PBC should be consistent and dynamic. Instead, the relationship has been

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275 Ibid.
276 Ibid.
277 Ibid.
278 Faisal Thaler, “Peacebuilding Following Conflict,” 24
280 Ibid.
described as “sporadic”.\textsuperscript{282} As a review commissioned by the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN notes

The PBC and the PBSO are instruments that the Secretary-General can use to drive coherent strategy across the organisation – Secretariat and agencies. To date however, there has been little involvement by the Secretary-General, a fact widely noted by members.\textsuperscript{283}

In his role as the “chief administrative officer”\textsuperscript{284} of the UN, the Secretary-General “could do more to ensure that the strategies emerging from the PBC, rooted as they are in intergovernmental decisions, were taken fully into account by all parts of the UN system.”\textsuperscript{285} In order for this to happen, however, the Secretary-General must be “convinced of the need for this instrument, both inter-governmental and inter-departmental.”\textsuperscript{286}

Both Secretaries-General appear to have fully endorsed the PBC thus far. Kofi Annan was instrumental in its very establishment, and considered the views of all relevant member states in the lead up to its unveiling. His previously discussed deliberation over where it should sit in the UN body as a whole, and who it should report to, also seem to support the view that he was convinced of the value for the Commission. Annan, in particular, saw the PBC as a vital link between security and development issues, and a mechanism which could potentially link bodies in the UN who fell on opposite sides of the security/development divide. Current Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has also displayed his support for the PBC. In 2009, he released the report \textit{Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict}. In this, he states that

The United Nations has deep capabilities in the fields of peace and security, human rights, development and humanitarian action, and successful peacebuilding requires the combined efforts of all of these “pillars” […] Each of them has different mandates, guiding principles, governance structures and financing arrangements — and different cultures and notions of how things should be done.\textsuperscript{287}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{282} Slotin and Jones, “Taking Stock, Looking Forward,” 24
\bibitem{283} Ibid
\bibitem{285} Slotin and Jones, “Taking Stock, Looking Forward,” 24
\bibitem{286} McAskie, Carolyn. “2020 Vision,” 26
\end{thebibliography}
He declares the Peacebuilding Commission to be a “key mechanism to ensure greater coherence in this regard.”

Intra-organisational factors currently impeding coherence, coordination and the progress of the PBC will be considered here and during the case studies to follow.

3.3. Intra-Organisation Factors

3.3.1. The Nature of Being a UN Body

The very nature of being a UN body carries with it several implications which have undoubtedly affected the PBC in its first five years of operation. The first is the seemingly inevitable vagueness that comes with the mandate of any particular body within the UN system. It has been remarked that one should not confuse the “shortcomings of the PBC with those of the United Nations’ broader peacebuilding architecture. The concept of peacebuilding, within and beyond the UN system, remains ill-defined.”

Indeed, as Thomas Biersteker comments, “there is no strong consensus on the definition of peacebuilding, let alone the best practices for achieving it.” Tschirgi goes further, noting that “despite concerted effort, it has proved difficult to define what peacebuilding is and how it can best be promoted. Thus, peacebuilding remains an elusive concept, and an equally elusive policy tool.”

Considering the reasons for which the PBC was established in 2005, the lack of an agreed upon definition of peacebuilding within the wider UN system seems particularly troublesome. If indeed the PBC is to become “a key addition to the capacity of the International Community in the broad peace agenda,” it needs to define clearly exactly what is meant by peacebuilding, and the best intended ways in which it should be practiced. However, there would seem to be no attempt at either of

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288 Ibid. 9
289 Faisal Thaler, “Review and Vitalisation of Peacebuilding,” 8
these statements in mandate of the PBC, or in its agenda. As discussed in the preceding literature review, the concept of peacebuilding has proved to be a difficult one for all organisations, practitioners, and academics. While it was recognised that Lederach’s definition came closest to that of a comprehensive explanation, it will be interesting to note whether or not conceptual confusion has affected the implementation of IPBSs in the two case studies.

In a potential justification of the PBC’s supposed shortfalls, Scott notes that “UN bodies, historically including the Secretariat and the Security Council, tend to evolve slowly as key actors gradually converge around a common understanding of the body’s role and political space.” Be that as it may, the fact that the Commission, and indeed the UN has yet to define peacebuilding in the operation of the Commission is inexcusable. If they are to ever improve coherence and coordination, particularly in integrated peacebuilding strategies and in the operation of the country-specific configurations, this needs to be remedied immediately.

The above offering from Scott must be considered, though. It suggests that shortfalls which have become obvious during the past five years are not to be treated as fail marks for the PBC. Rather, they should be seen as areas in which particular effort needs to be concentrated in the years to come. With the maturation of the PBC, and the suggested subsequent improvement in its operations, comes improvement in coherence and coordination. This must be taken into account during the following case study evaluations.

The other institutional factor which plays a part in PBC effectiveness is that of “UN-Building.” Murithi notes that “the UN system has a genetic propensity...
towards its self replication, multiplication and expansion.” He goes on to suggest that “there are a number of UN agencies that are providing functions and services that overlap and even replicate the activities of other bodies within the UN system.” He refers to this phenomenon as “UN-Building”. This is obviously problematic for the operations of the PBC, especially in relation to attempts to improve coherence and coordination. It is clear that the more bodies taking part in a particular operation, the harder the coordination and the difficulty of producing a coherent peacebuilding strategy. What further complicates matters is the subsequent emergence of another intra-organisational impediment; that of the difficulties in integrating UN bodies into a single forum.

3.3.2. Obstacles to Integration: The Lack of a Culture of Coordination

The PBC has been established within a UN system which is both “badly fractured and fragmented”, and “agency-dominated”. As identified by Carolyn McAskie, former Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding, “there is no monopoly over peacebuilding activities within the UN system.” Furthermore, various departments and groups have peacebuilding elements and directives as part of their mandates. In fact, according to the Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory issued by the UN, there exist “31 different entities involved in the peacebuilding process across 25 different sectors, from security sector governance to constitution-making, and from financial transparency and accountability to employment generation.”

These bodies exist within different areas of the UN; they have different structures of governance, different sources of financial support, different

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296 Ibid. 90
297 Ibid.
298 Ibid.
299 Faisal Thaler, “Peacebuilding Following Conflict, 11
300 Ibid.
301 McAskie, “2020 Vision,” 19
302 Ibid.
methodologies, and different administrations. This in itself challenges the successful integration, coherence and coordination of different peacebuilding missions. Complicating this is the fact that, over the years, each of these UN bodies will undoubtedly have forged partnerships and alliances with bodies outside of the UN. They will all have their own agendas and goals, and the likelihood they are willing to cede these to the PBC is, arguably, slim at best.

It has been noted that at the establishment of the PBC, many of the UN bodies with peacebuilding elements present in their mandates “questioned what their future roles would be in the context of this new creation.” Evidently, they were not satisfied with what they discovered; leading current Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon to bemoan the “lack of a ‘culture of coordination’” which would guarantee the gathering of all bodies, regardless of their nature in support of the PBC and any strategies or initiatives it may have developed.  

However, these bodies have remained distant. The PBC, according to McAskie, has yet to receive the “‘buy-in’ from the key players within the UN system whose regal assent is required to make initiatives work.” Most worrying, though, is the statement from Murithi, who notes that “there is a reluctance to consolidate or collapse aspects of the system, even if this might mean improving the lives of people on the ground.” Not only does this negatively affect attempts at improving coherence and coordination, it diminishes the precarious situations facing the UN on the ground in different conflict zones. Moreover, it signals the presence of tensions in PBC operations. Of these, none are more worrying than those which occur between governments; those bodies who should be working together in the various configurations within the PBC to ensure its success.

305 Ibid. 90
306 Murithi, “Peacebuilding or UN-Building?,” 91
307 Ibid.
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid. 91
3.3.3. Tension, Turf Battles and the Tussle for Power

In the Secretary-General’s report on *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, it was noted that there was “intense competition among the various UN entities for the lead role in peacebuilding”.310 Prior to the establishment of the Commission, member states became embroiled in negotiations which were “acrimonious and defined by brinksmanship between a range of competing national and regional interests.”311

The divide between security and development priorities was identified in the previous chapter as being a potential issue in this evaluation. Chief among the regional differences among UN member states is that of the North/South divide. Or, in the case of the PBC, the Security/Development divide. It would seem that those countries classified as developing found themselves resenting the apparent fixation the so-called developed countries had with issues of security.312 The prominence of the permanent members of the Security Council, in particular, did not sit well with the ‘developing countries’.313 As Scott explains, “‘development’ has become an emotive and powerful rhetoric as well as a very real interest.”314 For the developing countries, issues of development were being overlooked for power politics and issues of national security pertaining to the bigger, more powerful member states. They began to feel “disempowered and eager to exert influence through the intergovernmental bodies on which they are represented.”315 The PBC is one of these such bodies. It is important to note, however, that the PBC was intended to bridge this divide, and to bring together both sectors. If, after having considered the case studies, it is shown to still be an operational impediment, then it will be a very real challenge to the IPBS and the PBC’s attempt to improve coherence and coordination.

However, the so-called developing countries are not the only ones within the UN eager to exert their influence upon the workings of the PBC. Three of the principal UN organs began to vie for influence at the outset. The Security Council, the

310 Tschirgi, “Escaping Path Dependency,” 9
311 Murithi, “Peacebuilding or UN-Building?,” 91
312 Scott, “The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission,” 14
313 Ibid.
314 Ibid.
315 Ibid.
General Assembly, and ECOSOC were all in competition to be the body to whom the PBC reported. This contest delayed the establishment of the Commission, and went some way towards setting the tone for future operations. Indeed, the competition among these organs has continued, with the final 2007 PBC report being delayed as the Security Council and the General Assembly contested whose prerogative it was to place Sierra Leone and Burundi on the agenda of the PBC. Similarly, in the same year, Russia called for an open debate on the performance of the Commission “in the context of Security Council discussions on the UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) and the creation of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB).” One of the outcomes of the open debate was a call for the Security Council to include PBC contributions more regularly in its work. However, the General Assembly, among others, saw this as an attempt by the Security Council to exert influence and power over the Commission, and a separate evaluation was carried out. The two bodies were supposed to be working together, but were seemingly still in competition with one another for dominance in the work of the Commission. Meanwhile, ECOSOC was worryingly quiet.

As Murithi comments, the “initial objective of creating an institutional architecture to address the challenge of helping countries transition from war to peace became mired in the politics of power and patronage.” While acknowledging the fact that the UN is composed of sovereign states, it is prevented from doing its job if these states are not willing to act even moderately altruistically. An interesting point to consider in the case study evaluation will be whether certain global citizens are ‘better’ than others. If this is so, this could also link into the suggestion that the performance and agenda of the country chairing a Country-Specific Configuration, and subsequently implementing the IPBS, is extremely important to its success.

This struggle for power is unsettling enough, but the substandard relationships the PBC shares with these three organs, two of them its parent organs, makes matters worse.

316 Ibid.
317 Ibid.
318 Ibid.
319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
321 Murithi, “Peacebuilding or UN-Building?,” 91
3.4. The PBC and the Big Three: Relations with the Security Council, General Assembly, and ECOSOC.

As has been discussed previously, and as is illustrated in Figure 2, the PBC has direct reporting lines to both the Security Council and the General Assembly. It is a non-subsidiary body of ECOSOC, meaning it still has a relationship with this body, but is not expected to report directly to it. In her role as Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding, Carolyn McAskie told the Open Debate of the Security Council in 2007 that the “links between the Commission and the Security Council, the General Assembly, and ECOSOC are critical.” However, it is clear to see that, despite the fact these relationships are recognised as being vital to the work of the Commission, they are ill defined, and rife with problems.

Put simply, the “Commission reports to several masters.” While the Security Council is able to call for a Commission report at any time; the General Assembly, as well as controlling the finances for the Commission, only requires a report to be made once a year. Meanwhile, ECOSOC does not receive a report, but is tasked to work with the Commission, particularly in regards to issues of development. It is, then, hardly surprising that the relationships the PBC has built with the three principal organs are strained and not entirely effective. It would appear that the Commission is being pulled in various directions, with the nature of its intended interactions with each of the organs remaining unclear. This is potentially yet another impediment to the PBC improving coherence and coordination in UN peacebuilding missions.

323 Hunt, “Rocky Road Ahead for Peacebuilding Commission”
324 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
3.4.1. The Security Council

The suboptimal relationship between the PBC and the Security Council has long been acknowledged. In a conference earlier this year, it was noted that “the disconnect between the PBC and the Security Council is remarkable in light of the substantial membership overlap between the two bodies.” This deficient relationship has been identified by some as being “central to the challenge of fully integrating relevant approaches to peacekeeping and peacebuilding.” It is clear that if the PBC wishes to improve coherence and coordination in its mandated missions, particularly in the formulation and operationalisation of its integrated peacebuilding strategies, and in the work of the country-specific configurations, then it must work with the Security Council to improve the relationship they share.

While the resolutions that established the Commission intended the PBC to report directly to both the Security Council and the General Assembly, and to work

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327 Faisal Thaler, “Review and Vitalisation of Peacebuilding,” 17
328 Ibid. 16
closely with ECOSOC, Carolyn McAskie suggests that “the PBC must give up the fiction that the General Assembly and ECOSOC have the same role in managing peacebuilding as does the Security Council”. While she suggests that regular briefings of these two bodies should still take place, it is the Security Council which she sees as being critical in the work of the PBC. In McAskie’s opinion, a more assured relationship with the Council will allow “a greater understanding of the fundamental link between security and development (or rather the lack of development).” Moreover, it is suggested that, considering the decidedly political nature of approaches to peacebuilding, the involvement of the Security Council in the work of the PBC is critical to any progress being made.

There are, not surprisingly, a range of interpretations as to how the PBC should improve its relationship with the Council. In the case studies to follow, the relationships the PBC holds with other UN bodies, including the principal three, will be considered. After having completed these case studies, it will be more possible to evaluate these varying interpretations.

Most of these reviews focus on two aspects: the level and timing of the PBC’s interaction with the Security Council, and the type of dialogue they should be engaged in. It is clear that both organs could potentially benefit from an earlier engagement in certain circumstances. That is to say, rather than waiting until a nation state is placed on their agenda, the PBC may be able to benefit all by involving themselves in the work of the Council at any stage their expertise is applicable. The Stanley Conference on Peacebuilding Following Conflict saw participants voice the opinion that there should be more dialogue between the two at earlier stages, when the “PBC was in a position to provide advice on reconstruction and capacity building.”

Similarly, Dr. Peter Wittig, Germany’s Permanent Representative at the UN and the Chair of the PBC, suggests that it should be considered “how the Commission’s advice on specific issues could help the Security Council clarify and monitor progress

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330 Ibid.
331 Ibid.
332 Faisal Thaler, “Review and Vitalisation of Peacebuilding,” 17
333 Faisal Thaler, “Peacebuilding Following Conflict,” 26
in the implementations given to peacekeeping operations and special political missions.”

Those peacekeeping missions, in particular, could transition to peacebuilding missions at a later stage. To have already had PBC and the Security Council working together for some time to share their knowledge and practice would, arguably, be extremely beneficial. As mentioned previously, each organ and body at the UN works under a different mandate, with different funds, different partners, and often different agenda. To bring two of the key players together as early as possible would allow for Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies and Country-Specific Configurations which could benefit from a more seamless transition, increased context familiarity, and wider and more established relationships with relevant actors. These would all allow for a stronger peacebuilding foundation to be built, and would subsequently benefit coherence and coordination in the work of the PBC.

The need for increased interaction with the Security Council can be applied to the peacebuilding operation proper as well. The “disconnect” between the Commission and the Security Council has been noted. This disassociation has been described as being “remarkable in light of the substantial membership overlap between the two bodies.” As has been discussed previously, the permanent members of the Security Council (P5) negotiated their way onto the Organisational Committee of the PBC at the inception of the Commission. Despite their eagerness to be part of the Commission, “the participation of the P5, with the notable exception of the UK, has tended to be intermittent, and at a comparatively low level.”

It is worrying that this irregular participation would tend to give weight to Murithi’s suggestion that the Commission has become another setting in which UN organs are playing out their power struggles. Their involvement in Commission

335 Faisal Thaler, “Review and Vitalisation of Peacebuilding,” 17
336 Ibid.
337 Slotin and Jones, “Taking Stock, Looking Forward,” 19
operations is relatively low, but they maintain a permanent presence, and exercise what is described as a “pervasive oversight.”\footnote{Murithi, “Peacebuilding or UN-Building?,” 91} At the beginning of the establishment negotiations, a number of countries, including several African nations, were against the Commission having the P5 so involved.\footnote{Ibid.} Their fears appear to have been well founded. However, despite the fact that the P5 is prone to politics of power, a principled involvement could be of great benefit to the Commission.

The fact that the P5 sit on both meetings of the Organisational Committee and meetings of the Security Council could potentially signify to some that they “have a particular responsibility to ensure effective linkage between the PBC and Security Council.”\footnote{Slotin and Jones, “Taking Stock, Looking Forward,” 19} If this responsibility was to be met, the P5 could ensure that the judgements of the PBC could be disseminated at the Security Council meeting, thus helping to “ensure coherence.”\footnote{Ibid.}

As well as the nature of the involvement of the Security Council, in particular the P5, the frequency with which the PBC meets with the Security Council has been considered. Not surprisingly, there are differing views as to how often the two should meet, and what the nature of these meetings should be. There are several who believe that the “inclusion of the PBC in the formal Security Council debate process was insufficient to maximise the value of potential input from one body to another.”\footnote{Faisal Thaler, “Review and Vitalisation of Peacebuilding,” 17} Instead, it is suggested that the PBC and the Council interact on both formal and informal bases.\footnote{Ibid.} This suggestion would encompass earlier involvement on the behalf of the PBC in Security Council debates and meetings, as well as regular consultations on areas in which the PBC was interested, particularly those concerning potential future agenda countries.\footnote{Ibid.} It has been suggested that the Chair of the relevant Country-Specific Configuration should be granted observer status at meetings of the Council.\footnote{McAskie, “2020 Vision,” 26} Moreover, there are some who believe that the Commission should be able to use its own oversight to identify at-risk countries, and take this information to

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\item Murithi, “Peacebuilding or UN-Building?,” 91
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid.
\item Slotin and Jones, “Taking Stock, Looking Forward,” 19
\item Ibid.
\item Faisal Thaler, “Review and Vitalisation of Peacebuilding,” 17
\item Ibid.
\item McAskie, “2020 Vision,” 26
\item Faisal Thaler, “Peacebuilding Following Conflict,” 26
\end{thebibliography}
the Security Council. These increasingly open and frequent forms of communication would not only improve the quality of the undeniably important relationship between the PBC and the Security Council, but could also “enhance the PBC’s ability to provide independent advice.”

There is, of course, some debate as to whether these more informal modes of interaction are valuable, or indeed, wise. Some argue that the PBC needs to harness and fine-tune their formal interactions with the Security Council before trying to expand the parameters of the relationship. For instance, they could begin by more effectively using Security Council Resolution 1323, which “provides for the invitation of individual member states to give advice prior to council decisions.” Others are worried that a more significant and informal involvement on the behalf of the PBC, such as offering advice to the Security Council, would represent a “clear encroachment on the SC prerogatives granted by the UN Charter.” Given that the UN Charter grants “superlative authority” to the Security Council on dealing with peace and security matters, it is suggested that any attempt by the Peacebuilding Commission to involve itself in the Security Council’s agenda before it is officially approached for advice by the Council, would be “infringing upon its domain.”

In undertaking the case studies, these factors in the relationship the PBC shares with the Security Council may present themselves as factors affecting the attempts of the PBC to improve coherence and coordination. At that stage, a fuller evaluation of the relationship can take place. The relationships the PBC has established with the General Assembly and ECOSOC are less commonly discussed in the available literature. While they may not share the profile of the Security Council, or be expected to be as heavily involved in the work of the PBC, the roles they play are still significant.

346 Ibid.
347 Ibid.
348 Faisal Thaler, “Review and Vitalisation of Peacebuilding,” 17
349 Ibid.
350 Ibid.
351 Ibid.
353 Faisal Thaler, “Peacebuilding Following Conflict,” 26
3.4.2. The General Assembly and ECOSOC

The General Assembly is the principal “deliberative, policymaking, and representative organ of the United Nations.” As mentioned previously, the Assembly is given an annual report by the PBC, and is also in charge of authorising the budget of both the PBC and the PBSO. Although the PBC was created as a result of a concurrent resolution by the General Assembly and the Security Council, they do not share the same criteria for requesting advice from the PBC. The Assembly can request advice from the PBC on a country “at risk of lapsing into conflict” only in “exceptional circumstances.” The country in question must also not be on the agenda of the Security Council.

While opinion as to how the PBC should improve its relationship with the Security Council is readily accessible, and includes a variety of interpretations; the same cannot be said for the General Assembly. Views expressed on the relationship the PBC shares with the Assembly are brief, and generally vague. There are worries about the “exclusive relationship” that some are supporting between the PBC and the Security Council, emphasising that the PBC was created as a “creature of the Security Council and the General Assembly.” In this regard, proposals that the PBC and the Assembly should share a “more vibrant, dynamic relationship”, and that a “more coherent and mature” relationship needs to be built have been expressed. Moreover, the “central role of the General Assembly must be emphasised.”

However, suggestions as to how this relationship may be improved are not particularly forthcoming. At the Second Open-Ended Consultative Meeting on the PBC

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355 Ibid.
356 Ibid.
357 Ibid.
358 Faisal Thaler, “Peacebuilding Following Conflict,” 27
359 Ibid.
361 Ibid. 16
362 Ibid. 19
The representative of Peru stated that “the General Assembly needs to be more involved in the actual peacebuilding process. The majority of the General Assembly would need to determine how to become more involved.” Similarly, the delegate from India suggested that the General Assembly should “step up its dialogue and coordination with the PBC and its various constituents.” However, specific ways in which this may be achieved have not yet been agreed upon.

The potential improvements in the relationship between the PBC and ECOSOC are slightly more clear. While the PBC enjoys a non-subsidiary relationship with ECOSOC, the Council can still be of great help to the PBC. ECOSOC is responsible for “coordination, policy review, policy dialogue, and recommendations on issues of economic and social development.” They have the same criteria as the General Assembly for soliciting advice from the PBC, and like the Assembly, they elect seven members to join the PBC for terms of two years.

A closer involvement with ECOSOC would allow the PBC to improve two aspects of its operations. One of the hopes at the inception of the PBC was that it would manage to bridge “the substantive gap between the Security Council’s ‘security lens’ and ECOSOC’s ‘development lens’.” Yet, as made clear by one aspect of the intergovernmental tensions discussed above, it has not yet managed to do that. A closer involvement with ECOSOC would ensure greater integration and cooperation among UN players.

Secondly, it has been noted that one hindrance for the PBC has been the “near-absence of knowledge and best practice on devising ‘integrated strategies’ or integrating and sequencing security, development, rule of law, and other activities in fragile states.” Scott remarks that, in order to improve this, the PBC must “harness expert, substantive analysis on peacebuilding and country-specific issues such as national priorities, existing aid strategies and critical risks for peace.” The most
obvious way to do this must surely be to build a stronger relationship with ECOSOC. In this way, the PBC can tap into the knowledge banks of ECOSOC’s groups tasked with analysing and advising on countries emerging from conflict.\textsuperscript{370} Indeed, at the \textit{Open Inaugural Session of the Peacebuilding Commission}, ECOSOC President Ali Hachani made the value of ECOSOC clear, stating that it “had been integral in the development of Ad Hoc advisory groups on African Countries emerging from conflict – Guinea Bissau and Burundi – as well as Haiti.”\textsuperscript{371} Likewise, after the 2005 World Summit, it was commented that “ECOSOC will be able to draw on experience with ad hoc advisory groups it has established in recent years to consider humanitarian and economic needs in countries emerging from conflict.”\textsuperscript{372} Despite the evident value of ECOSOC, the association between it and the PBC is somewhat weak. More effective use of the ad hoc groups, in particular, could see the PBC improve its operations significantly.

All of the factors discussed must be considered while undertaking the case studies. Whether they are potential obstacles which occur within the wider Peacebuilding Architecture itself; or intra-organisational impediments involving competition and agenda; or whether they involve the PBC’s relationship with its parent organs who have not turned out to be “as caring or as attentive as one might have hoped”\textsuperscript{373}, they all have the potential to affect the PBC’s attempts at improving coherence and coordination, particularly in the operationalisation of Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies.

\textsuperscript{370} Faisal Thaler., “Peacebuilding Following Conflict,” 27
\textsuperscript{372} Hyvarinen, “The 2005 World Summit,” 10
\textsuperscript{373} World Federalist Movement: Institute for Global Policy. “Second Open-Ended Consultative Meeting,” 3
4. Exploring the Case-Studies: Sierra Leone

*Image removed for copyright reasons*

*Figure 4.1 ~ Map of Sierra Leone. Taken from the UN Cartographic Section Website.*

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In examining the levels of coherence and coordination the two relevant IPBSs have managed to inspire, it must be acknowledged that the integrated strategies “aim to contribute to building national capacities to tackle the root causes of conflict that impede sustainable peace.” It is therefore necessary to first consider the histories of conflict in the two foundation PBC countries. Only after doing so can a true evaluation of the PBC’s coherence and coordination capacities, particularly in relation to the IPBSs, begin.

Sierra Leone is often described as an “ironic tragedy”. The so-called irony lies in the fact that conditions in Sierra Leone “hardly presaged the pernicious civil war to befall it” during the 1990s. In fact, Sierra Leone was home to a “manageable population [...] a favourable political geography in terms of population distribution, resources and communications, [...] and a favourable social endowment.” In particular, it housed “a developed educational system boasting the first university in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Indeed, on a voyage through Sierra Leone, author Robert Young Pelton commented that “Sierra Leone had everything a country needed: minerals, forests, industrious people, and fish. The mountains, rain forest, beaches and wildlife would even make this country an ideal spot for a vacation.”

Despite the encouraging conditions present in Sierra Leone, it has consistently graded poorly in development statistics. Perhaps the most well known of these, the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), currently ranks Sierra Leone 158th of 169 countries, as shown below in Figure 4.2.

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377 Ibid.
378 Ibid.
379 Ibid.
380 Robert Young Pelton, *The Hunter, the Hammer, and Heaven: Journeys to Three Worlds Gone Mad.* (Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2002) 8
Its position on the HDI is driven by three principal indicators: health, education and income.\textsuperscript{383} Inadequacies in all three of these areas contributed to Sierra Leone's descent into civil war, along with various other features of Sierra Leonean life. In examining these, this chapter will consider historic, structural sources of conflict; more contemporary country dynamics, including key stakeholders contributing towards conflict and their key issues; proximate sources of conflict; and final triggers. An overview of the UN’s involvement in Sierra Leone, including the rationale for the PBC to become involved, will be given, followed by a breakdown of the Sierra Leone IPBS. After this, an evaluation of its apparent success thus far can begin.

4.1. Causes of Conflict

4.1.1. Historical Antecedents: The Legacy of Colonialism

Sierra Leone, like so many other African countries, was colonised in the 1800s. In this case, it was the British who ruled, from 1808 through until Sierra

\begin{figure} ~ \textit{UN Human Development Index: Country Profile of Human Development Indicators. Taken from the UNDP HDI Website.}\textsuperscript{382} 

\end{figure}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{382} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{383} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
Leone’s independence in 1961. Given colonial rule was so lengthy, it is perhaps unsurprising that “its impact was profound”. Indeed, in the Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), released in 2004, it was found that the roots of conflict in Sierra Leone could be traced “through the post-independence period and into the colonial period.”

In Sierra Leone’s instance, colonialism left as its legacy one aspect in particular which would contribute to, and indeed be directly reflected in the conflict arising in the late 1990s. It was the strategy of divide and rule. The TRC report states that

The Colonial Power in Sierra Leone deliberately created two nations in the same land, one in the colony and the other in the protectorate. The impact of separate development policies had far-reaching consequences, particularly in the fields of education, access to resources and in the social and political development of the two regions. The policies of the Colonial government led to the preferential development of the Colony at the expense of the Protectorate.

Instead of creating a unified state, the British divided Sierra Leone into two distinct areas. The capital of Freetown, referred to as the colony, and the considerably larger provincial regions, or the Protectorate. Freetown, or the Colony, was managed with a “direct and dominant” rule, whereas the Protectorate was governed indirectly, through the use of paramount chiefs. The TRC found that Sierra Leoneans living in the Colony “enjoyed vastly superior social, political, and economic development and access to vital resources such as education.” Meanwhile, those living in the Protectorate were at the mercy of the local chiefs, whose isolation allowed “local

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385 Tony Binns, Tropical Africa. (New York: Routledge, 1994) 5
386 Brian Thomson, Sierra Leone: Reform or Relapse? Conflict and Governance Reform. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007) 2
388 Ibid. 5
389 Office of External Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “Sierra Leone,” 1
390 Ibid.
391 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Witness to Truth, 5
despotism and unchecked abuses [...] that generated strong resentment.” Mamdani refers to this practice as “decentralised despotism”. This isolation of the rural population, and their disillusionment with their country’s administration would become a defining characteristic of the post-independence period, and was undoubtedly a contributor to the conflict.

To a lesser extent, the issue of weakened state institutions also began to emerge during the colonial rule. The practice of decentralised rule included an “exceptional insulation from a civil society denied organisational scope by repressive colonial representation”. As will be discussed in following sections, this legacy of weak state institutions was a factor contributing to the descent of the country into Civil War.

4.1.2. Contemporary Sierra Leone: Key Issues and Stakeholders

4.1.2.1. The Rule of Siaka Stevens

Although the civil war itself began in the 1990s, the motivation for insurgency must be acknowledged as beginning with the “personalised dictatorship” of Siaka Stevens. Stevens was in power from 1968 until 1985, and his rule has been described as a “seventeen year plague of locusts.” His time in power, Davies suggests, “produced proximate causes of war”, and “engendered deep-seated grievances widely believed to be the root causes of Sierra Leone’s rebel war.”

Up until 1967, Sierra Leone had a democratic government that was relatively successful. Two parties were dominant: the in-power Sierra Leone People’s Party

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392 Thomson, *Sierra Leone*, 2
394 Ibid. 27
395 Davies, “Sierra Leone: Ironic Tragedy,” 351
396 Ibid.
398 Davies, “Sierra Leone: Ironic Tragedy,” 351
399 Ibid. 352
400 Davies, “Sierra Leone Case Study,” 4
(SLPP), and their opposition, the All People’s Congress (APC). In 1987 however, the political and social situation declined when Sierra Leone experienced several coups after contentious elections. Immediately after the elections took place, the APC was encouraged to form a government. However, followers of the defeated Prime Minister rose up, and staged a military coup, which was to be followed by two subsequent revolts, the second of which saw power handed back to the APC. Siaka Stevens was declared Prime Minister once again, and began implementing his one-party state, which was finally declared in 1971. Fayemi describes the situation as a “period of oppressive and predatory rule”, with “an increasingly centralised government and the concentration of power in the capital.” To strengthen his administration, “the Siaka Stevens regime embarked upon a deliberate state-security weakening project.”

Stevens oversaw the disintegration of the range of democratic traditions he inherited. As Davies explains

All forms of civic and political dissent were repressed, often with the use of drugged underclass youths. Stevens was distrustful of the army, keeping its size low at between 2000 and 3000. That the army had staged three successful coups in about a year [...] may have been the reason for such distrust. [...] Violence and intimidation were used to ensure victory for the All People’s Congress at elections.

Moreover, moderating organisations and bodies charged with managing disputes, such as “civil society, the judiciary, and traditional rulers” were silenced as a “culture of fear” took over the country. The consequence of Stevens’ autocratic rule was evident not only in the lack of open speech or political contest, but also in the changing nature of the youth of Sierra Leone. Used by Stevens as tools for repression

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401 Ibid.
402 Ibid. 5
403 Ibid.
404 Ibid.
406 Ibid.
407 Ibid.
408 Ibid.
409 Davies, “Sierra Leone Case Study,” 5
410 Ibid.
411 Davies, “Sierra Leone: Ironic Tragedy,” 353
412 Ibid.
and intimidation, they grew into “disillusioned, drug-addicted youths acculturated to violence”.\footnote{Ibid.} In a country which has always had a relatively high population percentage under the age of eighteen\footnote{See, for example: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, “Child Soldiers Global Report 2008: Sierra Leone,” (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: 2009) \url{http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/content/sierra-leone} (accessed December, 2010); or: Division for Public Administration and Development Management and Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "Republic of Sierra Leone: Public Administration Country Profile," (New York, United Nations, 2004) \url{http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan023286.pdf} (accessed December, 2010).} this was a particularly dangerous precedent to set. Pushed away by the exploitation and the alienation they experienced in varying instances, these youths would go on to become a vulnerable recruitment ground for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) during the civil war.

### 4.1.2.2. Economic Mismanagement

Problems with Stevens’ rule did not end with undemocratic behaviour and an abuse of state institutions. As well as a culture of repression and violence, Stevens introduced and oversaw widespread corruption and economic negligence. The actions taken by Stevens during his rule are widely recognised as inducing “growth collapse and state failure”.\footnote{Davies, “Sierra Leone Case Study,” 5}

Under Stevens, corruption was “transformed from a simple chaotic activity to a well organised systemic activity.”\footnote{Gerald H. Smith, “The Dichotomy of Politics and Corruption in a Neopatrimonial State: Evidence from Sierra Leone,” \textit{Issue: A Journal of Opinion} 25, no. 1 (1997): 58, \url{http://www.jstor.org/stable/1166251} (accessed December, 2010).} He made use of money stolen from public finances, unlawful payments, and charges from economic misrepresentations in the costs of basic goods and services, and particularised exemptions from state laws.\footnote{Davies, “Sierra Leone: Ironic Tragedy,” 353} Lavish and unnecessary expenditures were a common occurrence, with Stevens buying oil at a vastly inflated price, and effectively spending the national budget on hosting the annual Organisation of African Unity conference in 1980.\footnote{Davies, “Sierra Leone Case Study,” 6} Furthermore, it has been suggested that under his rule, Sierra Leone became a “connectocracy rather than a meritocracy”.\footnote{Anatole Ayissi, and Robin Edward Poulton (eds) \textit{Bound To Cooperate: Conflict Peace and People in Sierra Leone}. (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2006) 27} Cases of “illegal dismissals”\footnote{Davies, “Sierra Leone Case Study,” 6} and unfair sidelining of
public servants and political staff were widespread.\footnote{Ibid.} Perhaps his most well documented instance of corrupt behaviour though, was his treatment of the diamond industry in Sierra Leone.

As discussed previously, diamonds are commonly recognised as Sierra Leone’s most valuable asset. In the years following the war, they provided the government with over half of its revenue.\footnote{Ibid.} However, in the years preceding the war, Stevens managed to turn the industry into “his personal preserve”.\footnote{Ibid.} In the run up to the 1967 elections, he vowed that he would ensure greater opportunities for subsistence mining, suggesting that diamond mining represented “the little man’s only hope for wealth.”\footnote{Ibid.}

Such speaking appeared to encourage illegal miners to flock to the diamond mining area. The company originally in possession of monopoly rights - the Sierra Leone Selection Trust, (SLST) - found itself under so much threat that they abandoned mining.\footnote{Ibid.} Stevens attempted to use this to his advantage, turning a blind eye to illicit mining, and manipulating the SLST’s aggravations in order to gain access to their assets and capital.\footnote{Ibid.} Under Stevens’ leadership, the corporate mining sector in Sierra Leone soon broke down.\footnote{Ibid.} It is suggested that in the years leading up to the war, the mining sector alone had contributed over seventy percent of Sierra Leone’s export revenue.\footnote{Davies, “Sierra Leone: Ironic Tragedy,” 353} At the hands of Stevens, one of the country’s greatest economic contributors had been immobilised.

The effects of Stevens’ corrupt behaviour were soon felt. GDP growth deteriorated from “nearly 4% in the 1960s to 1.9% in the 1970s and further to 0.5% in the 1980s.”\footnote{Ibid.} Correspondingly, income levels fell, unemployment figures rose, and
poverty was prevalent, particularly among the high numbers of youths present in the population.\textsuperscript{430} Youths were some of the most affected by Stevens’ oppressive regime. They found the adverse conditions of their country particularly harmful to their chances of finding gainful and reliable employment. In addition, they were significantly affected by the practice of social exclusion.

4.1.2.3. Social Exclusion

The rural population made up over seventy percent of the Sierra Leonean population as a whole in the years before the war.\textsuperscript{431} Moreover, agricultural revenue at the time accounted for approximately forty percent of national earnings.\textsuperscript{432} However, Stevens’ treatment of the rural populace did not reflect the value of the role they played. Instead his rule “aggravated isolation”.\textsuperscript{433} He achieved this isolation by

\text{[...]} under-pricing of export produce by the state monopsonist, the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board, exchange rate overvaluation, subsidies on imported food that implicitly taxed rural agriculture while subsidising urban consumption, and complete deprivation of the rural areas of electricity, piped borne water, telecommunication facilities, a developed road network and other facilities.\textsuperscript{434}

Isolating the rural population like this provided Stevens with two opportunities. The first was to take advantage of the support he enjoyed in the country’s capital, Freetown.\textsuperscript{435} More significantly, however, it allowed Stevens to implement his centralisation policy. The influence of the government in these rural zones became “minimal”\textsuperscript{436}, and “socio-economic development was confined to Freetown and a few other towns.”\textsuperscript{437} The work of the rural population funded this so-called development.

Rural areas found themselves becoming increasingly detached from the urban areas and poverty-stricken. Stevens had eradicated district government councils

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\textsuperscript{430} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{431} Davies, “Sierra Leone Case Study,” 7
\textsuperscript{432} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{433} Davies, “Sierra Leone: Ironic Tragedy,” 354
\textsuperscript{434} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{435} Ibid. 355
\textsuperscript{436} Ayissi and Poulton, \textit{Bound To Cooperate}, 20
\textsuperscript{437} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
completely, leaving chiefs as the only form of local authority in the area. However, the system of local chieftaincy was evermore government-dominated as well. Chiefs were still held in high esteem by the rural community, but many rural people began to feel that their opinion was not valued in an institution which had always been seen as functioning “to the benefit of a small elderly elite.” Ayissi and Poulton argue that none felt more abandoned than rural youth, many of whom joined the mass migration to the urban areas in an attempt to find a better life. Unfortunately, opportunities for employment were no more readily available in the city than in the country, and rural migrants “drifted into idleness and destitution”. They became disillusioned and bitter, and particularly disposed to taking “confrontational positions in crisis periods.”

The collapse of local government had another worrying consequence. Previously, firearm permits had been issued by local police after the local chief had vouched for the character of the applicant. With the decay of local government and related institutions, licences were no longer applied for, and firearms began to be distributed much more freely and easily, particularly in the areas near the border of Liberia. Indeed, the position of Sierra Leone in what is commonly referred to as the “bad neighbourhood” of West Africa undoubtedly contributed towards their descent into civil war.

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438 Davies, “Sierra Leone Case Study,” 7
441 Ayissi and Pouton *Bound to Cooperate*, 20
442 Ibid.
443 Ibid.
444 Ibid. 28
445 Ibid.
4.1.3. A Bad Neighbourhood: Proximate Causes of Conflict

While most of the factors leading to war were internal in nature, the situation of neighbouring countries and their subsequent dealings with Sierra Leone fuelled the conflict. Indeed, as Silberfein asserts, “from its inception, the war in Sierra Leone reflected the country’s position within a larger region.” Two countries in particular, Libya and Liberia, played a significant part in deteriorating conditions in Sierra Leone.

Abdullah explains that the Libyans crossed into Sierra Leone in the mid-1970s and started to infiltrate civil society as well as other secular channels. While they remained relatively inconspicuous, they established themselves in Sierra Leone over the years, and gradually established a subversive presence. They began to give financial support to various groups, including one of disillusioned youths who were rallying against the regime of the APC. It has been suggested that this was mostly used as a means by Libya’s President Ghaddafi of “spreading his messages and expanding his network of allies.” Indeed, “the “formation of the rebel movement was largely due to Libyan financial and logistical support”. Moreover, once the rebellion had begun, youths from Sierra Leone who had been forced out by Stevens’ rule were provided with training by Libya.

Liberia, too, played a major part in the conflict. Charles Taylor, the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) had previously warned he would target Sierra Leone as a punishment for allowing the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to use parts of their region as a station. He believed that the presence of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone and Liberia was directly

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449 Silberfein, “The Geopolitics of Conflict and Diamonds,” 218
450 Davies, “Sierra Leone Case Study,” 20
451 Ibid.
452 Ayissi, and Poulton, Bound to Cooperate, 15
impeding his rise to power in Liberia.\(^{453}\) Taylor, sensing the opportunity to benefit from a Sierra Leonean conflict, became involved in an “arms-for-diamonds trade”.\(^{454}\)

When the dissenters who had trained in Libya began to expand their forces and the Sierra Leone Revolutionary Front (RUF) began to take shape, Taylor provided support for RUF leader Foday Sankoh and his group. This support included “facilities for training in Liberia, instruction in guerrilla warfare, weapons and fighters from Liberia and Burkina Faso”.\(^{455}\) Making use of a variety of supply lines, Taylor provided the RUF with arms in return for a payment of diamonds they would have access to once they came into control of the mines.\(^{456}\)

A powder-keg of factors was present in the lead up to war: bad governance, economic negligence and misconduct, social exclusion, and foreign rebel aid. Stevens had managed to alienate his population so significantly that many became “radical and rebellious”\(^{457}\), and now had the means with which to stage their revolt.

### 4.2. Civil War: The RUF Revolt

In March 1991, after Siako Stevens had been replaced by President Joseph Momoh, the RUF began their first brutal attack to overthrow the administration.\(^{458}\) Claiming they were determined to “save Sierra Leone from its corrupt, backward and oppressive regime”\(^{459}\), the RUF, with Liberian trained Foday Sankoh as their leader, overthrew Momoh in 1992.\(^{460}\) While most hoped that the ousting of the government would signal the end of the conflict, their fall resulted in the intensification of violence.\(^{461}\)

The rebels stormed Freetown, and the war took on a new negative dynamic. The RUF cleared adults out of the villages, but “forcibly recruited children and young

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\(^{453}\) Ibid.

\(^{454}\) Davies, “Sierra Leone: Case Study,” 20

\(^{455}\) Silberfein, “The Geopolitics of Conflict and Diamonds,” 218

\(^{456}\) Ibid.


\(^{459}\) Ibid.

\(^{460}\) Ibid.

\(^{461}\) Ayissi and Poulter, *Bound to Cooperate*, 2
adults.”\textsuperscript{462} Richards suggests that the rebels had considered other African rebellions, and had concluded that youths made excellent guerrillas and would be able to adjust to life in camp.\textsuperscript{463} The movement, he suggests, became less of a political uprising, and more of a “children’s crusade.”\textsuperscript{464}

Indeed, youth factored heavily in both the Rebel Army and the Government Army. Both militias badly mistreated their soldiers. Now in pursuit of supremacy and dominance of the Sierra Leonean diamond industry, the RUF “terrorised a reluctant civilian population with mass amputations, mutilations, rape, sexual abuse, looting, and murder”.\textsuperscript{465} Child soldiers formed a large part of their fighting force. The Sierra Leone Government Army used similar tactics to motivate their own child soldiers in their hunt for rebel insurgents. Perhaps one of the best-known Government soldiers, Ishmael Beah, recalls that “killing had become a daily activity. I felt no pity for anyone.”\textsuperscript{466} After having competed in, and winning a sickening competition to see which child soldier was capable of killing prisoners the fastest, Beah comments: “the audience clapped as if I had just fulfilled one of life’s greatest achievements. I was given the rank of junior lieutenant [...] We celebrated that day’s achievements with more drugs and more war movies.”\textsuperscript{467}

Years of violence and “international incomprehension”\textsuperscript{468} followed, but in 1996, progress appeared to be made. General elections were held, with the Sierra Leone People’s Party being declared victorious.\textsuperscript{469} Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a former UN official, became the first President to be democratically elected in thirty years.\textsuperscript{470}

\textsuperscript{463} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{464} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{465} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{467} Ishmael Beah, A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier. (London: Fourth Estate, 2007) 126
\textsuperscript{468} Ibid. 125
\textsuperscript{469} Richards, The Political Economy of Internal Conflict in Sierra Leone, 16
Kabbah’s first act was to negotiate terms for a ceasefire with RUF leader Foday Sankoh. Later that same year, on the 30th of October, the Abidjan Accord was signed.

The Accord was signed by members of the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. The terms of agreement included the creation of a national Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, whose job it would be to oversee the realisation of the ceasefire. As a part of this, the Commission was to set up “a socio-economic forum; citizen’s consultative conferences; multi-partisan council; trust fund for the consolidation of peace; demobilisation and resettlement committee and a national budget and debt committee.” In a move to share power in Sierra Leone, the Commission was to be made up of members from both the government and the RUF. As well as declaring an amnesty, the agreement stated that

[…] the RUF/SL shall commence to function as a political movement with the rights, privileges and duties provided by law; and that within thirty days following that, the necessary conditions shall be created to enable the RUF/SL to register as a political movement according to law.

However, the RUF failed to meet the terms of the ceasefire, and it quickly fell through. In the years following the unsuccessful attempt, violence once again became a feature of the Sierra Leone landscape. It was not until 1999 that another attempt was made. Foday Sankoh, who was facing the death penalty for treason, was brought to Lome for talks. Along with four heads of state; representatives of the UN; members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU); members of the Economic Community

471 Ibid.
473 Ibid.
474 Ibid.
475 Ibid.
476 Ibid.
478 Aman, “Message as a Medium in Sierra Leone,” 239
479 Ibid.
of West African States (ECOWAS); and members of the Commonwealth; Sankoh and government representatives signed the Lome Agreement in July, 1999.480

The Lome Agreement was, in fact, quite similar to the Abidjan Accord. It offered an amnesty, and attempted to share power among the government and members of the RUF.481 Sankoh became the Vice-President, and other cabinet posts were reserved for RUF members.482 Various priorities were spelled out, including

[...] disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration [...] humanitarian, human rights and socio-economic issues including the release of prisoners and abductees and the voluntary repatriation and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons [...] post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction [...] and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission483

Additionally, the Agreement called upon the UN to send in military observers to oversee compliance from both groups.484

4.3. UN Involvement in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL and the PBC

In October 1999, the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).485 Tasked with cooperating with both the Government and the RUF; UNAMSIL was charged with assisting the Government in implementing their disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) scheme, being a visible presence at strategic locations throughout the country, supporting both parties in their efforts to foster trust and belief among the people, ensuring humanitarian aid could be delivered effectively, and supporting the country through a forthcoming election.486

481 Ibid.
482 Ibid.
483 University of Ulster, “The Transitional Justice Peace Agreements Database,”
484 Sierra Leone Web, “Peace Agreement,”
UNAMSIL was expanded on three occasions before “successfully completing its mandate in December 2005.”⁴⁸⁷ The United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) took over from them, and worked to help the country to secure peace, reinforce democracy, and maintain development.⁴⁸⁸ Despite their efforts, the disturbing legacy of the conflict was plain to see, and many of the causes of conflict remained.

Dr. Kaz de Jong, Mental Health Advisor with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) explains that “mental trauma does not disappear with the cease-fire. The war may continue in people’s minds for years, decades, perhaps even generations.”⁴⁸⁹ In early May, 1999, MSF carried out a survey in Freetown. The survey measured three aspects of traumatic stress: “exposure to traumatic events; the psychological impact of these events; and the number and frequency of non-specific health complaints”.⁴⁹⁰ They found, as did the Sierra Leone TRC, that almost everyone had been exposed to some aspect of the conflict. Figure 4.3 illustrates the extent of trauma in Sierra Leone.

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⁴⁸⁸ McCandless and Tschirgi, “Strategic Frameworks,” 27
In addition, by using the ‘Impact of Event Scale’, MSF found that the Sierra Leonean population was showing “very high levels of traumatic stress.” Denov discusses potential physical and psychosocial effects, listing physical injuries, loss of loved ones, disruptive memories of violence, feelings of guilt, stigmatisation, and marginalisation as major consequences victims and combatants alike live with. These traumatic experiences complicate the process of peacebuilding, and can present challenges for those attempting to establish a sustainable peace. As de Jong explains, “a population that is generally psychologically healthy can prosper and overcome the burdens of the past. Psychologically healthy people can also solve their disagreements in less violent ways.”  

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494 De Jong, et. al., “Assessing Trauma in Sierra Leone,” 10
The effects of the war and other potential complicating factors are not limited to the health and wellbeing of the population, however. A study commissioned by ActionAid, CAFOD and CARE International commented that

Youth unemployment remains widespread and governance issues continue to frame prospects for sustainable development and peace. Despite the creation of an Anti-Corruption Commission, challenges of accountability and transparency remain. [...] Marginalisation among the rural population remains a source of tension. 495

Because of its many interlined development and security problems, Sierra Leone became one of the foundation cases for the PBC. The Sierra Leone administration submitted a letter to the UN in 2006, remarking that

In spite of the remarkable progress in transition from war to durable peace and sustainable development, numerous formidable challenges remain in the way of the recovery process, for which we need the support of the Peacebuilding Commission. 496

The Security Council agreed, referring Sierra Leone to the PBC in June 2006. 497 The PBC held its first Country-Specific Meeting (CSM) later that same year, and followed that with a mixture of other meetings, both formal and informal, in order to identify peacebuilding priorities for the IPBS.

4.4. The Sierra Leone Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy

The first formal Country-Specific Meeting of the PBC was held in October 2006. In January 2007, the PBC agreed upon a three phase operation. The first phase, taking place from June to December in 2006, would see the PBC, along with the Government of Sierra Leone and other key stakeholders, attempt to identify priority areas for peacebuilding. 498 The CSM agreed upon the following: youth empowerment

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497 Ibid.

498 Ibid. 43
and employment; consolidation of democracy and good governance; justice and security sector reform; and capacity building.499

The second phase, running from January through until June, 2007, saw the CSC members use these priorities to develop a draft IPBS. Several meetings, in both New York and Freetown, took place during this process. Indeed,

Delegations from New York visited the country regularly to gain first-hand information about progress and challenges in the peace consolidation process [...] In Freetown, representatives of the Sierra Leone government, donor institutions, UN agencies and members of civil society took part in wide-ranging and flexible video teleconferences with New York.500

The purpose of these interactions was threefold: to allow the Committee to gather primary data about the current state of affairs in Sierra Leone, and identify challenges to peacebuilding; to talk with the government and other actors and together identify gaps in priority areas; and to disseminate the rationale and function of the PBC to relevant parties in Sierra Leone.501 Finally, in June 2007, a first draft of the IPBS was discussed.502 At this time, the Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) had been released, and was not the only strategic document in existence in Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leone Vision 2025, the Peace Consolidation Strategy (developed by the government and the UN Country Team in 2006), and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) had all been released and all described national plans for reconstruction efforts in Sierra Leone.503

The third phase began in June 2007, with the development and introduction of the PBC’s IPBS into a country already abounding in strategic frameworks and priority plans. Presidential and parliamentary elections disrupted the PBC’s efforts, though. It was not until December, 2007 that the IPBS was accepted. It identified “critical and inter-dependent priorities for risk reduction and peace consolidation in Sierra Leone.”504 These areas included youth employment and empowerment, justice and

499 Ibid.
500 Ibid.
501 Ibid.
502 Ibid.
security sector reform, consolidation of democracy and good governance, capacity-building, energy sector, subregional dimensions of peacebuilding, and gender equality and human rights.\textsuperscript{505} While some UN efforts have been accused of a ‘cookie cutter’ approach, where one plan is used in a multitude of situations, the priority areas identified by the IPBS were undoubtedly relevant and conflict sensitive.

As discussed previously, the alienation of youth in Sierra Leone was a significant factor in the escalation of conflict. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Council acknowledges that it is still a “threat to peace consolidation today.”\textsuperscript{506} As illustrated in Figure 4.4, the population distribution in Sierra Leone is still markedly weighted towards the lower age groups. That is to say, the majority of the population is still under the age of twenty.

\begin{center}
\textit{Image removed for copyright reasons}
\end{center}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image}
\caption{Sierra Leone Population Pyramids. Taken from the UN Website.\textsuperscript{507}}
\end{figure}

The Government of Sierra Leone itself considers youth to be any group of people between the ages of 15 and 35.\textsuperscript{508} This means that “approximately two million people out of a total population of about five million”\textsuperscript{509} can be considered as youths. Of this group, “close to two thirds […] are considered to be unemployed or underemployed.”\textsuperscript{510}

\textsuperscript{505} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{506} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{510} Ibid.
As a result of the war, joblessness is not the only obstacle these youths face, with inadequacies in education, access to land, community networks, and scarce funds all playing a part in their somewhat bleak outlook.\textsuperscript{511} Overcoming this youth alienation involves managing youth unemployment, and creating an environment where the young community has the means to develop and grow. It also means encouraging the younger members of the Sierra Leonean community, both male and female, to become more fully involved in the political life of the country.\textsuperscript{512} There was a particular emphasis placed on the need to involve young women in the political sphere.\textsuperscript{513} Several schemes already in place, such as the “National Youth Policy […], the National Youth Council, District Youth Committees and the […] Government’s Youth Employment Scheme”\textsuperscript{514} were referred to in the IPBS, along with an acknowledgement that a “more targeted”\textsuperscript{515} approach would be a primary concern.

Legal institutions were also significantly damaged by Siaka Stevens’ regime. Even with the progress the Sierra Leonean administration claimed had been made in the years following the cease-fire, these institutions were still not capable of supporting the people of Sierra Leone. The Strategy stated that the system is “plagued with outdated laws, inadequate personnel and logistical problems.”\textsuperscript{516} According to the IPBS, a comprehensive method of restructuring was required. Again, existing schemes were named: the “Justice Sector Development Programme, a Justice Sector National Policy Framework and a Justice Sector Reform Strategy”.\textsuperscript{517} In an echo of the PBC’s responsibilities, the Strategy stressed the need for these plans, and additions to the list, to be “closely coordinated”.\textsuperscript{518} Reform was also seen as necessary in the security sector, with “further training to improve police and community relations”\textsuperscript{519} made a priority. Again, improved coordination between all security organisations and the encouragement of discourse between various organisations, including civic and social establishments was of great importance.\textsuperscript{520}

\textsuperscript{511} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{512} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{513} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{514} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{515} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{516} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{517} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{518} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{519} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{520} Ibid.
The Strategy recognised that good governance would be instrumental in supporting Sierra Leone’s development and journey to a sustainable peace. The government of Sierra Leone also seemed to realise this, undertaking an “expansion of State authority and service provision to all parts of the country.”521 The Strategy suggested that further efforts are still needed to improve the state of governance in the country, and to ensure that all areas of the population are included in the system.522 National establishments such as the “Parliament, the National Electoral Commission, the Political Parties Registration Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the National Commission for Democracy and the Human Rights Commission”523 also needed to be made stronger. Again, an increase in dialogue and coordination was cited as being vital to the achievement of an enhanced capacity. Additionally, as a part of the emphasis on widespread participation, support and encouragement was to be given to youth and women’s groups, as well as those representing the civil services, to actively participate in civic life.

In addition to democracy and good governance, corruption was identified as one of the most problematic issues still plaguing Sierra Leone today. In a recent article in the Economist, it was stated that “in most African countries, the fight against corruption is deemed important but hardly a matter of life and death. In Sierra Leone it is exactly that.”524 The BBC goes further, describing a presidential audit report they obtained in 2007. According to the report, corruption is “the greatest impediment to the country’s development.”525 Accordingly, the IPBS stated that “additional concrete measures and political commitment are critical to combat corruption.”526 A number of potential ways in which this could be achieved were mentioned, including revising the Anti-Corruption Act.527

521 Ibid. 6
522 Ibid.
523 Ibid.
527 Ibid.
Another method of combating corruption was improving the “capacity-building of law enforcement institutions and the civil service as a whole.”

Capacity-building, as well as being identified in relation to specific sectors and priorities throughout the IPBS, was listed as a priority on its own. As stated in the Strategy, “progress on the identified peacebuilding priorities cannot be separated from capacity-building in its broadest sense and at all levels.” Although the “Institutional Reform and Capacity-Building Programme” has been put into action, further improvement is still needed. Civil service, in particular, is mentioned as being an area in which capacity-building is vital.

The energy sector and regional dimensions of peacebuilding were the last two priorities outlined in the Sierra Leone IPBS. It is readily agreed that the energy division in Sierra Leone is in crisis. In an informal thematic discussion on the matter Ambassador Majoor of the Netherlands, the Chair of the PBC, stated that “Sierra Leone’s energy crisis impedes progress on peacebuilding priority issues and represents a critical challenge for the country’s recovery and economic development.” The Strategy explained that the country needs a supply of 250MW, but current production stands at 10MW. In short, Sierra Leone needs access to a reliable and sufficient energy supply in order to provide its citizens with the necessary quality of life, and conditions in which a sustainable peace can be reached. The Strategy promised to “prioritise and address short-term emergency issues” in the energy sector.

Lastly, the subregional dimensions of peacebuilding were discussed. As outlined previously, the location of Sierra Leone has impacted negatively on its prospects for peace. Neighbours such as Liberia, in particular, have encouraged incursions, and provided support in the form of weaponry and training. The Strategy

528 Ibid.
529 Ibid.
530 Ibid.
531 Ibid.
534 Ibid.
emphasised the need for countries in the district, especially those in the Mano River Basin, to improve the levels of dialogue and trust.\(^{535}\) Again, cooperation was cited as being the means for achieving this, this time between groups such as the “Mano River Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union, and other regional and subregional organisations”.\(^{536}\)

4.5. An Agenda for Change

In time, Sierra Leone, like so many other post-conflict countries, turned its attention to development concerns. Subsequently, it released its second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSPII) in 2008. Entitled *An Agenda For Change*, it pledged the government’s “continued commitment to working with the people of this country and our development partners to ensure our growth, prosperity, and a better future for all the people of Sierra Leone.”\(^{537}\) At the December 2008 review of the IPBS, the PBC “recommended that future activities of the PBC should be undertaken in support of the implementation of the current PRSP.”\(^{538}\) The PBC stated that

Alignment of all international support with the Agenda for Change will be an important step in streamlining and refocusing the various separate strategies that have been developed over time and will lead to increased national ownership and the effectiveness of international development assistance.\(^{539}\)

Simultaneously, the PBC gave its backing to the *Joint Vision for Sierra Leone (2009-2012)*. This document was designed to align programmatically with the *Agenda For Change*, and is now the “peacebuilding framework of reference for the PBC.”\(^{540}\)

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\(^{535}\) Ibid.

\(^{536}\) Ibid.


\(^{538}\) Ibid. 101

The Joint Vision identifies one key priority for furthering peace in Sierra Leone: that of the “Consolidation of Peace and Stability”.\(^{541}\) This priority is then broken down into four so-called ‘programmatic priorities’:

- The economic integration of rural areas;
- The economic and social integration of the youth;
- An equitable access to health services;
- An accessible and credible public service.\(^{542}\)

These areas were chosen to “maximise the UN family’s contribution to the Government’s Agenda for Change within our respective organisational mandates, specialisation and expertise.”\(^{543}\) McCandless and Tschirgi comment that

> By putting its support behind the ‘Agenda for Change’ and the Joint Vision, the PBC signalled an important evolution in its own role in less than three years. [...] Recognising the existence of other frameworks and mechanisms that were already in place, it adopted a supportive role with a view to keeping its focus on a set of priorities that were considered essential for peacebuilding.\(^{544}\)

It would appear that this supportive role has paid off for the PBC thus far. While progress is always going to be slow, there is real evidence of policies and programmes developing in Sierra Leone. Table 2 is a collection of the schemes outlined in the Joint Vision document, and shows that Sierra Leone, with the help of the PBC, is beginning to make real progress in its journey towards reconstruction and security. The areas in which the Joint Vision Programmes (JVP) are situated correspond directly to those identified as peacebuilding priorities in the various existing strategic documents, including the PBC’s IPBS. Progress in these areas is critical to both security and development in Sierra Leone, and without advancement in these areas, a sustainable peace becomes an even more daunting and difficult prospect for the UN and their partner organisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Vision Programme</th>
<th>Agencies Involved:</th>
<th>Programme Brief</th>
<th>Evaluation of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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\(^{541}\) Ibid. 3
\(^{542}\) Ibid.
\(^{543}\) Ibid.
\(^{544}\) McCandless and Tschirgi, “Strategic Frameworks,” 30
## Access to Justice and Human Rights

**Lead Agency:** UNDP  
**Participating Agencies:** IOM, OHCHR, UNICEF  
**Development Partners:** DFID, Irish Aid, GDC

The programme is said to be improving the capacities of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Political Parties Registration Committee (PPRC).

### Progress report

- Component one of the programme is addressing justice for Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV). It is providing legal representation for victims so that they can access justice, as well as allowing law enforcement workers to put the Gender Acts into operation.

- Component two is providing support to human rights establishments (such as the Parliamentary Human Rights Commission) as well as building the capacity of other organisations to monitor human rights.

## Finance for Development

**Lead Agencies:** UNDP  
**Participating Agencies:**  

Progress is ongoing. For instance, the UNDP has pledged its support to the Agribusiness Initiative. This aims to establish an agribusiness centre in Newton, as well as twelve
| Development Partners: All development partners | satellite centres in the districts. These centres will create employment opportunities, and will improve the business environment in Sierra Leone. |

### (JVP 4) Smallholders’ Commercialisation Programme

| Lead Agencies: FAO WFP | Aims to reduce rural poverty and domestic food inadequacies, as well as strengthening the economy and increasing growth in the agricultural sector. |
| Participating Agencies: - | Commercialisation of smallholders’ farming is being promoted through the use of education, infrastructure, marketing, and the development of commodity chains. |
| Development Partners: AfDB Government of China DFID EC GDC IFAD Irish Aid ISDB Italian Cooperation JICA KfW USAID World Bank. | Results are visible in several areas: For instance, in the Kailahun, Kenema and Kono districts, farmers have joined together in three independent cocoa cooperatives. These help to combine exports, thus allowing them to compete with large companies. |
| | It also helps to promote a sense of ownership among indigenous Sierra Leoneans. |

### (JVP 5) Rural Industrial Growth and Renewable Energy

| Lead Agency: UNIDO | Aims to increase agricultural productivity, make available suitable tools and equipment, and increase marketing activities. |
| Participating Agencies: - | Results from the programme are visible in several areas and sectors. In the Bombali, Kenema, and Pujehun Districts, three industrial growth centres have been |

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refurbished. These will help provide grassroots support for the advances in industries other than those which are large scale. Now that they are up and running, these centres will provide training, processing, marketing, and sites for development of relevant technologies.

Also included in the programme is the development of small hydropower stations, as well as other sources of energy production. With the recent progress made in the Bumbuna hydroelectric project, which aims to quadruple Sierra Leone’s power generation capacity, prospects for energy development in the country are looking positive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Partners:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>GDC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irish Aid</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(JVP 6) HIV/AIDS and Malaria Programme

- **Lead Agencies:** UNAIDS, WHO

- **Participating Agencies:** Aims to support existing plans in working towards preventing the spread of HIV and in strengthening treatment and care

- Results are slow, but are emerging:

In the past, factors such as distance and cost has meant that some have been unable to receive

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead Agency:</th>
<th>Reproductive Child Health and Nutrition Programme</th>
<th>Aims to reduce child and maternal mortality rates (which have been amongst the highest in the world) and to lower levels of results are widespread! Springer-Verlag, 2011)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participating Agencies:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Partners:</td>
<td></td>
<td>for those already suffering. Also aims to work with health groups to develop services for control and treatment of Malaria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Fund Irish Aid KFW Roll Back Malaria Project (RBM) US Department of Defense</td>
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### School Feeding Programme and Primary Education

**Lead Agencies:**
- WFP, UNICEF

**Participating Agencies:**
- -

**Development Partners:**
- German Government
- JICA
- Saudi Arabian Government

**Aims to increase access to primary education for males and females, and to improve completion rates for both in order to balance roles in secondary schools.**

**Recent educational statistics are not available for Sierra Leone, but the trend over the last decade has been upward.**

The Minister of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs told a UN Session On Women that a “girl-child education strategy […] is yielding dividends and has ensured that the girl primary school enrolment is almost at parity with the boys.”

It is expected that, with the help of the PBC and their partners, enrolment statistics will continue to improve.

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Rights legislations have been enacted.  
As well as this, specific programmes, such as the Family Support Units (FSU) have been established. There are 40 of these nationwide, and they are the first stop for victims of sexual and gender-based violence.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(JVP 10) Reparation to War Victims</th>
<th>Lead Agency: IOM</th>
<th>Participating Agencies: OHCHR</th>
<th>Development Partners: -</th>
<th>Aims to guarantee the continuity of the reparations process for the more than 18 000 victims eligible for assistance.</th>
<th>With the help of the PBC, NaCSA is currently in the process of implementing reparations for war victims. These reparations included financial grants, education support, and medical assistance.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(JVP 11) Public Sector Reform</td>
<td>Lead Agency: UNDP</td>
<td>Participating Agencies: IOM, FAO, WHO, UNICEF</td>
<td>Development Partners: ADB, DfID, EC, OECD, WB</td>
<td>Aims to streamline civil service so that it is able to perform quickly, effectively and reliably.</td>
<td>The programme has helped with up-skilling civil servants, reconfiguring systems, introducing evaluation procedures, improving communication technologies, and providing support to the President in terms of strategy, policy and programme formulation and coordination. The programme has also helped by involving and considering the opinions and potential value of members of the Diaspora community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(JVP 12) Data Collection, Assessments and Planning</td>
<td>Lead Agency: UNFPA</td>
<td>Aims to determine the most valuable way to help groups which are in a weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Several UN bodies are currently undertaking assessments to guide UN and government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

555 Ibid.  
556 Ibid.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participating Agencies:</th>
<th>Development Partners:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>DfID</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td></td>
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<td>UNAIDS</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
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strategists. These bodies include the WFP, UNICEF, UNFPA and UNDP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead Agencies:</th>
<th>Participating Agencies:</th>
<th>Development Partners:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNODC, UNOPS</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>DfID</td>
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</table>

Aims to lessen the risks Sierra Leone faces from external actors who wish to use their country as a transit point for the distribution of drugs, and other illegal goods.

Results are becoming visible. The UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), along with other development partners, has helped to establish the Joint Drug Interdiction Taskforce. Together, they have made real progress in their efforts to fight trafficking and corruption.558

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| Participating Agencies: | FAO, IOM, UNDP, UNODC | competence and discipline of the Police Force, and to help reduce incidences of transnational organised crime. | At the local level, Chiefdom Security Coordinators are being certified; while at the national level, attempts are consistently being made to strengthen the Sierra Leone Police (SLP). At the time of writing, the SLP was undertaking training in election security ahead of the upcoming 2012 elections.  
559 |
| Development Partners: | DfID, EC, USAID |  |

| Lead Agency: | UNDP, UNIFEM | Aims to entrench democratic values in all areas of Sierra Leonean society. | Progress is gradually being made. Although corruption is still recognised as being rife in Sierra Leone, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is active. Rapid Response teams have been in action at ports in Freetown, intercepting containers destined for illegal export.  
560 In the health sector, the ACC has introduced Service Charters with two hospitals. These support transparency in relations with the public.  
561 The UN has also funded the new Public Broadcasting Corporation, which hit the airwaves in April, 2010.  
562 |
| Development Partners: | DfID, EC, WB |  |

| Lead Agency: | UNDP | Aims to help local councils to develop specific policies which make the most | Programme 18 was merged with this programme in January, 2011 in order to improve |
| Development Partners: |  |  |  |

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participating Agencies:</th>
<th>of available resources and which will provide the most benefits to local businesses.</th>
<th>coordination.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
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<td>UNCDF</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Partners:</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td></td>
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<td>WB</td>
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</table>

(JVP 17) Promoting Gender Equality and Women’s Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead Agency:</th>
<th>Aims to endorse policy and community development which sees women benefit from a wider range of rights.</th>
<th>The Minister for Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs states that real progress has been made in this area. As already discussed, the Health and Education sectors are making efforts to improve the status of females in Sierra Leone. The UN and Development Partners have also established the National Gender Strategic Plan, which focuses on areas in which females are underrepresented, or unfairly treated. One of these is participation in governance. In the last few years, the number of women participating in this area has increased. For instance, the Judiciary now has 9 female judges and 12 males. Four of the seven Supreme Court Justices are females. The Chairperson of the Electoral Council is a female, as are 20% of the national police force.</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participating Agencies:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The UN Gender Theme Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Partners:</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
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<td>Irish Aid</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
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<td>Oxfam</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
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(JVP 18) Rural Community Empowerment [Merged with Programme 16 in January 2011]

(JVP 19) Youth Development and Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead Agencies:</th>
<th>Aims to support existing donors work in three areas:</th>
<th>The Vision document notes that this particular project has become much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ILO, UNDP</td>
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563 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(JVP 20)</th>
<th>National Health Systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participating Agencies:</strong></td>
<td>UNAIDS, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNIDO, UNIFEM, WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development Partners:</strong></td>
<td>GDC, WB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lead Agency:</strong></td>
<td>WHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participating Agencies:</strong></td>
<td>UN Health Theme Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development Agencies:</strong></td>
<td>DfID, EU, Irish Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy and Strategy, Cash-for-Work, and Youth Entrepreneurship.</strong></td>
<td>Policy and Strategy, Cash-for-Work, and Youth Entrepreneurship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>more complex with the passing months. While some policies have been introduced, and partners have drawn together in support of the initiative, costs have risen, and new programmes have been developed. It very much remains a work in progress.</strong></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(JVP 21)</th>
<th>Environmental Cooperation for</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lead Agency:</strong></td>
<td>UNEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aims to support a more streamlined health system; with one healthcare plan, one method of funding, one mode of evaluation, and one procedure for reporting on results.</strong></td>
<td>Aims to support a more streamlined health system; with one healthcare plan, one method of funding, one mode of evaluation, and one procedure for reporting on results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>With the advent of the free care for pregnant and lactating mothers and under fives, this programme has taken on even more significance. Like the Youth Development and Employment Programme, its budget has vastly increased. Similarly, the programme continues to be a work in progress.</strong></td>
<td>With the advent of the free care for pregnant and lactating mothers and under fives, this programme has taken on even more significance. Like the Youth Development and Employment Programme, its budget has vastly increased. Similarly, the programme continues to be a work in progress.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participating Agencies:</th>
<th>they play no further role in potential future conflicts.</th>
<th>have supported the capacity building of the Sierra Leone Environmental Protection Agency. Currently, the Agency is investigating the activities of Addax, a petroleum company, in the Makeni region.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td></td>
<td>Allegations have been made that bodies of water in the region are being depleted, and access to water has been impeded during Addax’s time in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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<td>Development Partners:</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
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Table 2 ~ Programmes and Policies Developed in Line with the Joint Vision for Sierra Leone 2009-2012. Adapted by the author from the Joint Vision for Sierra Leone Document.564

4.6. Sierra Leone: A Mixed Success?

This chapter has considered the journey leading to the production of an Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy specific to Sierra Leone. As discussed, this strategy was developed in conjunction with the Sierra Leone government, key stakeholders, civil society groups, NGOs, and in-country teams. Its reign was short-lived however, with the introduction of a new PRSP, the Agenda for Change, in Sierra Leone. Seeing the value in gathering a group of partners and donors behind one core document, the UN chose to endorse this document, rather than its own IPBS. The programmes listed above are some of those which were developed to programmatically align themselves with the priorities and actions outlined in the Agenda for Change.

As illustrated above, some of these programmes, such as the Democratic Elections and Political Dialogue, the Smallholders’ Commercialisation Programme, and the Reproductive and Child Health and Nutrition Programme seem to have had demonstrable elements of success in recent months. Others, such as the HIV/Aids and


565 Ibid.

Malaria Programme, and the Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding Programme are making good progress. Both sets have made significant contributions towards improving conditions and establishing a sustainable peace in Sierra Leone. Others, such as the Youth Development and Employment Programme, and the National Health Systems Programme, are still being finalised. It must be acknowledged though, that the Agenda for Change and the subsequent Joint Vision Document issued by the UN are both relatively recent additions to peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone. Comprehensive programmatic success was never expected at this stage, and, like the peacebuilding process as a whole, it will take time, and will likely suffer setbacks along the way.

Just as the 2010 Review of the PBC concluded, the PBC does seem to have mixed success in Sierra Leone. Their original IPBS was not a perfect fit for the Sierra Leone case, neither in terms of coherence, nor in terms of coordination. However, their alignment with the Agenda for Change does seem to have had more desirable outcomes than in those places where local plans are not given as much prominence. The next chapter will consider the case of Burundi, and to what degree the introduction of an IPBS there has helped with levels of coherence and coordination. After having considered this, the two cases can be compared and contrasted. Elements previously discussed in this thesis, such as the struggle between security and development priorities, the relationship between the PBC and its parent organs, and the agendas of organisations partnering with the PBC can be more carefully considered. The extent to which these, and other aspects can and have affected the ability of the IPBS to improve levels of coherence and coordination can be evaluated. The degree to which the PBC has proven it is a learning organisation will also be discussed.
5. Burundi

*Image removed for copyright reasons*

**Figure 5.1** “Map of Burundi. Taken from the UN Cartographic Section Website.”

Like Sierra Leone, Burundi could be considered an ‘ironic tragedy’. Daley explains that Burundi represents one of the few nation states in Africa that, from the outset, possessed some of the basic elements for national unity in the post-colonial period. Unlike the majority of modern African states, it was a political and geographical entity in the pre-colonial period, and its people share a common socio-cultural and linguistic heritage.\footnote{Patricia Daley, “Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa: The Challenge to the Burundi State,” \textit{Political Geography} 25, (2006): 658, \url{http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629806000588} (accessed September, 2011)}


\textit{Image removed for copyright reasons}

\textit{Figure 5.2 “UN Human Development Index: Country Profile of Human Development Indicators for Burundi. Taken from the UNDP HDI Website”\footnote{United Nations Development Programme, “UN Human Development Index: Country Profile of Human Development Indicators for Burundi,” (New York: United Nations, 2010) \url{http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BDI.html} (accessed October, 2011)}.}
This chapter will consider various factors leading to the conflict in Burundi. It will begin with a reflection on some of the historical and structural sources of conflict in Burundi; followed by a consideration of more contemporary country dynamics, with a focus on key issues and stakeholders behind the violence and specific precipitants and triggers. An overview of the UN’s involvement in Burundi will be given, including the rationale for involving the PBC. Finally, the Burundi IPBS will be explored, leading to an evaluation of its role in improving levels of coherence and coordination to date.

5.1. Causes of Conflict

5.1.1. Historical Antecedents: The Social, Economic, and Political Pyramid

As in Sierra Leone, Burundi’s historical legacies have had a large part to play in the decline into conflict. Indeed, Weinstein states that “the endemic instability of Burundi is in part rooted in its history.”572 The most entrenched of these contributory historical factors is the traditional societal pyramid. Bentley and Southall explain that “the deeper roots of Burundi’s conflict lie in divisions which pre-date the colonial period and which were exacerbated under colonialism.”573 These divisions related to the Mwamidom which was the ruling system of power in Burundi prior to 1890.574

While the divisions in Burundian society have always been fluid there have been some long continuities. As Weinstein outlines, a collection of princes once ruled Burundi in a system which was similar to feudalism. The chief of these princes was known as the Mwami, hence the title of Mwamidom. The people of the Mwamidom were divided into four groups, each of which had their own place in the social pyramid. The ruling group of princes, the Ganwa, was at the top. Next were the Tutsi, who raised stock. Filling out the majority of the pyramid were the Hutu, who were

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574 Weinstein, “Conflict and Confrontation in Central Africa,”17
farmers. At the very bottom of the pyramid were the Twa, who were pygmy hunter-gatherers. Privilege and power flowed from location in the social system. Society was “divided into classes, defined by the ownership or not of cattle, bolstered by an hereditary and endogamous principle of class membership.” Lemarchand explains how Burundi was counted among a group of “ranked societies, which shared a vertical pattern of stratification in which the politically dominant group also controlled access to wealth, education, and status.” The Ganwa, who occupied the higher strata of the pyramid, enjoyed the most privilege. They “tended to select their wives among the better Tutsi clans and this Tutsi sub-group shared in the enjoyment of political privilege and status within the Mwamidom.” The Hutu, who formed around 85% of the Burundian population, and the Twa, who accounted for only 1%, enjoyed little in the way of social opportunity. Even before colonisation, ethnic and social cleavages were creating tensions among the Burundi population.

5.1.2. Historical Antecedents: The Legacy of Colonialism

As in Sierra Leone, colonialism in Burundi helped set the stage for conditions which would generate violence in later years. The Germans colonised Burundi in 1890, but “there was little effective European administration until the Belgians forced the Germans out in 1916.” When the Belgians arrived, they pursued a divide and rule policy based on labeling the three distinct groups of Tutsi, Hutu and Twa as tribes. Bentley and Southall explain how the perception of these so-called tribes and the position they were seen to each occupy in society led to the population being “bombarded with heavily value-laden stereotypes which inflated the Tutsi cultural

575 Ibid. 17-18
578 Weinstein, “Conflict and Confrontation in Central Africa,” 18
579 Ibid.
580 Ibid.
581 Ibid. 19
582 Bentley and Southall, An African Peace Process, 33
ego and crushed Hutu feelings until they coalesced into an aggressively resentful inferiority complex.”

These stereotypes were manifested in the method of rule. Ndikumana comments that ethnicity was introduced as a “primordial determinant of access to power.” The Belgians issued identity cards, which had the effect of “freezing Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa social identities into law and ethnic groups. Already identified with relative deprivation, Hutu and Twa became strongly associated with poverty and powerlessness.” On the other hand, the Ganwa and the Tutsi enjoyed power and authority.

One of the areas in which this became salient was the political arena. The Belgians used a system of indirect rule which “resulted in the domination of the political system by chiefs from the Tutsi ethnic group.” The Belgians had effectively “cast the Tutsis [...] in the role of a natural elite”, which marginalised the Hutu and worsened any feelings of inferiority already existing. Uvin explains that political, social and even economic relations became more rigid, unequal, and biased against the Hutu, while the power of many people of Tutsi origin greatly increased. The nature of the state changed. It became a conduit for the rule of the coloniser, imposing onerous legislation, taxes, obligatory cash crops, and compulsory labour, often abused by local Tutsi chiefs who, secure in the white man’s support, acted as rapacious quasi-warlords.

These conditions prevailed even after independence. Modern Burundi continues to be afflicted with these pre-colonial social economic, and political dynamics; all of which can in some way be linked to the historical tradition of ethnic division, and to the foundations that colonialism laid for Burundi.

583 Ibid., 34
586 Ndikuma, “Distributional Conflict,” 5
5.1.3. Contemporary Burundi: Key Issues and Stakeholders

5.1.3.1. Identity

At the heart of the Burundian conflict were three key issues: identity, governance, and resources. These three conflict dimensions are tightly interwoven, and difficult to separate analytically.

Central to all sources of conflict in contemporary Burundi was the issue of identity and ethnic manipulation. The rigidly stratified social system is a good example of what is known as ‘structural violence’ with grossly unequal patterns of inclusion and exclusion. Brachet and Wolpe describe a “culture of impunity, deeply ingrained inter-ethnic grievances, and mutual fear and distrust.”\(^{589}\) Lemarchand agrees, stating that “violence has consistently involved Hutu against Tutsi, inexorably pushing their societies towards polarisation, while prompting social actors to re-define their collective self-images in Manichean terms.”\(^{590}\) Gahama describes the tradition of “cyclical violence between the communities”\(^{591}\), which will prove to be significant in later analysis of the PBC’s efforts in Burundi. As can be drawn from the discussions above, the issue of identity is inextricably linked to the other factors contributing towards conflict, such as issues of poor governance and differing levels of access to resources.

5.1.3.2. Governance: The Ethnicisation of the Political Sphere

Schrami states that “ethnicity in politics […] is widely acknowledged to increase the propensity of further (violent) ethnic conflicts.”\(^{592}\) In Burundi, as has already been discussed in some detail; the political system was central to the manipulation of the ethnic division. Ndikumana explains that post-colonial regimes


\(^{590}\) Lemarchand, “Managing Transition Anarchies,” 589.


inherited a polarised state and faithfully continued the policy of ethnic exclusion.”\(^{593}\)
The Tutsi enjoyed privilege bestowed upon them by members of the ruling class, or Ganwa; while the Hutu and the Twa were isolated, and left to fend for themselves. In some ways, the situation can be compared to that of pre-conflict Sierra Leone. The Tutsi and the Ganwa would be the equivalent of those living in Freetown and enjoying access to resources and a higher quality of life, while the Hutu and the Twa would represent the rural population and the youth of Sierra Leone.

This ethnic politics contributed towards and helped sustain institutional failure in Burundi. The obvious imbalance in power that existed in Burundi, combined with inadequate governance systems inherited from the Belgian’s colonial rule, resulted in a set of state institutions which were incapable, ineffective, and from a Hutu perspective, illegitimate. The colonial and post-colonial political system did not enable the population to participate in their own system of governance; did not allow the majority to have any level of ownership, either directly or through a representative; provided little transparency; and resulted in a highly unequal justice system. This meant that the Government could not respond in a timely and appropriate manner to the concerns of the population; failed to treat the population in an equal and inclusive manner; and was neither effective nor efficient in their operations.\(^{594}\) Again, ethnic division was the most significant reason for institutional failure in Burundi. Ndikumana explains that:

> The Burundian state has degenerated into a private institution, which makes it unsuited for fulfilling its role of third-party enforcement agent in social exchange. Individuals, ethnic and regional entities that control the state are able to shape and influence the way in which the basic functions of the state – the provision of law and order – are designed and implemented. Specifically, political leverage allows privileged groups to mold and bend the law to facilitate accumulation of power and wealth.\(^{595}\)

The result of this “privatization of key institutions such as the military, the judiciary, and the educational system by ethnic and regional entities, has resulted in a divorce between state institutions and the population.”\(^{596}\)

\(^{593}\) Ndikumana, “Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi,” 33
\(^{595}\) Ndikumana, “Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi,” 40
\(^{596}\) Ibid. 29
Adding to Burundi’s problems was a very underdeveloped civil society. Lemarchand describes civil society in Burundi as characterised by “extreme weakness” attributable to civil “associations dominated by ethnic or ethno-regional particularisms, and more often than not, thoroughly unsupportive of democratic orientations.” This system of repression and oppression generated feelings of ill feeling among those who were under-represented and underprivileged. Lack of access to resources significantly contributed to these feelings of deprivation.

This system of ethnic and regional domination remains a key feature of Burundi’s political economy as a whole. As illustrated in the table below, the country is almost completely dependent on a single commodity: coffee. The African Development Bank (AfDB) noted that coffee alone is responsible for around 90% of export revenue in Burundi. Taking their information from the most recently available statistics, a study done by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) shows just how critical coffee is to Burundi’s export market. It is the most valuable export for the country, both in terms of how much revenue has been made from its sales, and in terms of its unit value.

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597 Lemarchand, “Managing Transition Anarchies,” 587
598 Ibid.
Nkurunziza notes that “from Micombero’s coup in 1966 until very recently, the presidents, key ministers and their advisors, managers of public firms as well as the army commanders, have mostly been from Bururi.” This domination by the southern elite is also a feature of the coffee market. A study done by the Institute for Security Studies describes this dynamic as a “kleptocratic and predatory form of state formation.” They go on to explain that

Control over the state and political power is synonymous with control over economic opportunity, individually and as an elite group. This conflation of politics, economics, and the power of coercion is a recipe for violence; and violence is a basic ingredient in its creation and maintenance.

In short, the political economy in Burundi suffers from a lack of separation between the political and economic sectors. Those who enjoy power in one area are subsequently dominant in others. By “putting the state at the centre of economic

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601 Ibid.
604 Ibid.
605 Ibid.
activity, the ruling elite have ensured that their hold on political power guarantees them total control over the economy and its rents.”

This lack of differentiation is one of the many factors leading to deep divides over unequal access to education, and land ownership. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Burundi is one of the poorest countries in the world, with 68% percent of the population living below the poverty line. In keeping with the patterns of ethnic and regional domination in other areas, income is, to a certain extent, also determined by aspects of ethnicity and regionalism. Nora Stel explains that regional and ethnic inequality is a real problem, with “specific southern provinces producing the political elite guarding access to state channels of social mobility and economic growth.”

5.1.3.3. The Claim Game: Unequal Access to Resources

As well as the civil society, political, and economic sectors, the dominance of Tutsis extends to the institutions of education, religion and to land access issues. Education in Burundi “was grossly manipulated to exclude Hutu from secondary schools and universities.” In International Alert’s report *Equal Access to Education: a Peace Imperative for Burundi*, Bill Yates, Executive Secretary of the Great Lakes Programme, states “the origins of exclusion lie in the colonial period when, for over half a century, the colonial power educated the Tutsi to form a local administrative caste.” Tony Jackson goes on to suggest that “the serious distortions in access to education lie at the heart of the problem of ‘exclusion’ in Burundi, and are one of the primary causes of conflict.”

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606  Nkurunziza and Ngaruko, “Why has Burundi Grown so Slowly?,” 2
609  Loft and Loft, “Background to the Massacres in Burundi,” 91.
611  Ibid. 25.
Education however, was not the only area from which the Hutu were excluded. The Catholic Church was another target for the Tutsi regime, and they subsequently closed the catechism schools “that in fact served as valuable literacy classes for adults and children.”612 As well as attempting to weaken a religious institution and the value it held for certain members of the population, the Tutsis had found another avenue of education to shut down.

Access to land has also proved to be another source of tension in Burundi. The South African-based civil society organization ACCORD has released several studies on land conflict and explains that land in Burundi is important both as a “factor of production and a matter of survival. Since agriculture is the only noteworthy form of economic activity and security, subsistence agriculture is critical to family security.”613 With 93% of the population coming from rural backgrounds, the extent of this dependence is significant.614

However, land in Burundi is typically acquired through “means of inheritance, purchase, gift, lease or individual and state expropriations, and competition for access to arable land is high.”615 With incomes in Burundi skewed in favour of specific ethnic groupings, and a government and state controlled by those same groups, it becomes increasingly difficult for other groups to acquire land. Subsequently, more than 80% of Burundian rural households have less than 1.5 hectares of land from which to make their living.616 For one group in particular, inability to access land has become a significant problem. For the Twa ethnic group, landlessness currently stands at 53%.617 Their chances of achieving any kind of sustainable livelihood are low. This inequitable access to land “contributes to poverty and grievances against the government and elite groups.”618

612 Loft and Loft, “Background to the Massacres in Burundi,” 91.
615 Kok et al., “Natural Resources,” 17
616 Ibid.
617 Ibid.
618 Ibid.
The issues of ethnic manipulation, poor governance, including the failure of state institutions and civil society, and a grossly unequal access to resources in Burundi all contributed towards civil war. There was also one external factor that had a significant role in catalysing the conflict: the location of Burundi in a so-called bad neighbourhood.

5.1.4. A Bad Neighbourhood: Proximate Causes of Conflict

As with the case of Sierra Leone, the geographic location of Burundi makes peace very challenging indeed. Burundi is a landlocked nation in a region of economic, social and political discontent. Rwanda in particular is to some extent the mirror image of Burundi in terms of ethnicity and instability.

As in Burundi, the Hutu in Rwanda constitute the majority of the population and yet are at the bottom of the social system. Ethnic tension between the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda has always existed, but was exacerbated in the years following colonisation.619 In the hours before conflict erupted in Rwanda, the President, Juvenal Habyarimana was killed when the plane he was travelling in was shot down in the skies above Kigali Airport.620 Habyarimana was a Hutu, and not surprisingly, the man blamed for his death was a Tutsi. That man, Paul Kagame, was the leader of a Tutsi rebel group, and has since assumed the position of Rwandan President.621 Kagame claimed that he had nothing to do with the accident, and that it was the work of Hutu extremists, creating a cover for their planned attack on Rwandan Tutsis.622

While historians may argue about responsibility for this assassination, the backlash was instant. Rwandan Hutus unleashed an attempted genocide of Tutsi. The official website for the Kigali Genocide Memorial, which was unveiled on its tenth anniversary, describes the conflict (from the Tutsi perspective) in graphic detail. It states that

620 Ibid.
621 Ibid.
622 Ibid.
The murderers used machetes, clubs, guns, and any blunt tool they could find to inflict as much pain on their victims as possible. It was genocide from the first day. No Tutsi was exempt. Women were beaten, raped, humiliated, abused and ultimately murdered, often in the sight of their own families. Children watched as their parents were tortured, beaten and killed in front of their eyes, before their own small bodies were sliced, smashed, abused, pulverised and discarded. The elderly, the pride of Rwandan society, were despised, and mercilessly murdered in cold blood. Neighbours turned on neighbours, friends on friends, even family on their own family members. Rwanda had turned into a nation of brutal, sadistic, merciless killers, and of innocent victims overnight.623

The genocide, which lasted 100 days, killed over 800,000 men, women, and children.624 At its end, 85% of the Tutsi population in Rwanda had been killed.625 Inevitably, the shockwaves from the conflict were felt across the border in Burundi. Understanding the similarities in their situations, and in the tensions that had existed before the genocide occurred, Tutsis living in Burundi were terrified a similar situation could occur in their country. Uvin explains how “violence […] produced a sort of distorted mirror, in which the people […] saw in the other their worst nightmare.”626

5.2. Civil War: Hutus, Tutsis and the Cycle of Violence

The decline into civil war began with Burundi’s independence from Belgium in 1962. Burundi was granted independence as a monarchy with King Mwambutsa IV as their head.627 Mwambutsa made his first strategic move when he refused to select a Hutu as his Prime Minister, despite the fact that the Hutus had won a majority in the elections.628 The Hutus attempted to launch a rebellion, but were suppressed by the

625 Ibid.
626 Ibid.
627 Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda,” 266.
628 Ibid.
army.\textsuperscript{629} Instances of ethnically manipulated violence again blighted the Burundian landscape, and forced thousands of Hutus to flee.\textsuperscript{630} In 1966, King Mwambutsa was supplanted by his son, Ntare V, who in turn fell in a military coup led by Micombero.\textsuperscript{631}

Six years later, in an attempt to return to the throne, Ntare was killed, and the monarchy was overthrown. The result was a series of reprisal attacks, which killed around 200,000 Hutus and 10,000 Tutsis.\textsuperscript{632} Coups were a frequent occurrence in the years to follow. Micombero was deposed by Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, a Tutsi, in 1976. Bagaza was in turn overthrown by Pierre Buyoya, also a Tutsi, in 1987.\textsuperscript{633}

After thousands of Hutus were killed in massacres taking place in 1988, Burundi held a referendum and voted to adopt a multiparty system.\textsuperscript{634} The polls which were held in 1993 saw the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) party win, and their Hutu leader Melchior Ndadaye assume power.\textsuperscript{635} Within months, Ndadaye was assassinated and years of violence followed. The BBC estimates that as a result of this wave of violence alone, 300,000 people, the majority of them civilians, lost their lives.\textsuperscript{636} 1994 saw the election of another Hutu, this time Cyprien Ntaryamira.\textsuperscript{637} However, he was killed in the same plane crash that claimed the life of the Rwandan President in 1994. The violence that ensued in Rwanda after this alleged assassination only served to heighten tensions in Burundi and renewed violence occurred in Bjumbura. Chief among the groups involved in these waves of violence was the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, a rebel Hutu group opposed to Tutsi domination.\textsuperscript{638}

\textsuperscript{629} Insight on Conflict, “Conflict Timeline,” (London: Peace Direct, 2011)
\textsuperscript{630} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{631} BBC. “Timeline: Burundi,”
\textsuperscript{632} Insight on Conflict, “Conflict Timeline”
\textsuperscript{633} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{634} BBC, “Timeline: Burundi”
\textsuperscript{635} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{636} BBC. “Country Profile: Burundi,“( London: BBC, 2011)
\textsuperscript{637} Ibid.
In a Commission of Enquiry set up by the UN Security Council, it was found that Acts of genocide against the Tutsi minority took place in Burundi after October 21, 1993 – the day President Ndadaye was assassinated. Some members of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) were found responsible, and leaders as high as the commune level were involved. Indiscriminate killing of Hutus was carried out by members of the Burundian Army and Gendarmerie, and by Tutsi civilians. No effort was made by the military authorities at any level to prevent, investigate or punish such acts.\(^{639}\)

As in Sierra Leone, the trauma of the civil war was far-reaching and long-lasting. Doctors without Borders noted that the movement of internally displaced people, the numbers of soldiers who had no place in an ever-changing social pattern, the negative economic outlook, the absolute degeneration of social norms, and the high incidence of matriarchal households led to a predominance of sexual violence.\(^{640}\)

During this time, the risk of genocide in Burundi was high. The United Nations sent in a country team, led by former Mauritanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah.\(^{641}\) As the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Ould-Abdallah was expected to “restore democratic institutions, facilitate dialogue between warring factions, and establish a commission of inquiry into the massacres that resulted from the coup attempt.”\(^{642}\) Although his initial mandate was for just three months, Ould-Abdallah remained in Burundi for three years.\(^{643}\) During this time, he “sought to boost the limited leverage available to a UN special envoy by bold action, personal example, and close coordination with the local diplomatic and NGO communities.”\(^{644}\) In coordination with groups such as Search for Common Ground and International Crisis Group, Ould-Abdallah endeavoured to “ensure that most of the mediation activities being undertaken in Burundi by NGOs


\(^{642}\) Ibid.


\(^{644}\) Ibid.
complemented his own efforts, and he apportioned the diplomatic workload according to his own strategy.” In his short time in Burundi, Ould-Abdallah is said to have “developed a practical method of cooperating and subcontracting between public and private sectors.”

Despite the path he paved, Ould-Abdallah remains concerned for Burundi. In a reflection of his time in on the ground, Ould-Abdallah commented that

A major problem in Burundi, and it has been the case since late 1994 – early 1995, is the multiplicity of external actors [...] external actors rushed to Burundi, all acting without coordinating among themselves and without consulting the designated UN representative.

Ould-Abdallah stated that the time had come “for the international community to assess the negative impact of uncoordinated external actors.” He suggested that one of those actors was, in fact, the UN themselves. He suggested that the “UN, especially as represented in the field, does tend to be inefficient and immodest in its dealings with the outside world.” In a statement which goes some way to endorsing the concepts of local ownership and context sensitivity, Ould-Abdallah wrote:

I am convinced that, as regards the crisis in the Great Lakes Region, the embassies of Belgium, France, the United States, and Germany have access to better information and higher quality analysis than does the United Nations Headquarters. [...] The United Nations must get into the habit of asking the concerned member states for all useful information on the countries in which it intervenes, even if it means delaying its own assessment. This is crucial for the effectiveness and credibility of the organisation.

Despite his concerns regarding aspects of coherence and coordination concerns, Ould-Abdallah’s work in Burundi helped to create conditions conducive to peace talks and progress towards an eventual ceasefire.

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646 Ibid. 146
647 Ibid. 2
648 Ibid.
5.3. Ceasefire: The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi

In 1998, the first attempts at a ceasefire were made. It was not until 2000, however, that any real progress was made. Eight heads of state in Africa, Bill Clinton, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Secretary-General, and the UN Deputy Secretary-General were among those who were present when thirteen of the nineteen parties involved gathered to sign the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. Nelson Mandela, who was convening the talks, was not happy that only thirteen parties agreed to sign, and delivered scathing criticism of those who had refrained from signing, accusing them of wanting to “reopen almost everything,” thus “sabotaging the agreement.” Mandela suggested that they were unlike any other world leaders, and that they had “no real empathy with Burundi people.” Bill Clinton supported Mandela, telling those present that he thought it “was absolutely certain that if you let this moment slip away it will dig the well of bitterness deeper and pile the mountain of grievances higher.”

Mandela and Clinton’s comments were apparently successful, with the remaining parties agreeing to sign the agreement in the days following the initial meeting. The Arusha Agreement explained that the parties to the Agreement were aware that “peace, stability, justice, the rule of law, national reconciliation, unity and development are the major aspirations of the people of Burundi.” In recognising this, the priority of the Agreement was

[...] to shape a political order and a system of government inspired by the realities of our country and founded on the values of justice, democracy, good governance, pluralism, respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, unity, solidarity, mutual understanding, tolerance and cooperation among the different ethnic groups within our society.

653 Ibid.
654 Kimani, “Burundi: Can the Arusha Peace Accord Bring Peace in Burundi?”
655 BBC, “Two Hutu Parties Sign Burundi Peace.”
657 Ibid.
Despite the signing of the ceasefire, sporadic violence continued in and around the capital of Bujumbura in the following years. It was only in 2004 that the UN decided to send in a taskforce.

5.4. UN Involvement in Burundi: ONUB, BINUB and the PBC

In May, 2004, the UN deployed the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). The mission was intended to “support and help to implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about national reconciliation, as provided under the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi”. The mandate of ONUB also included the tasks of

[...] contributing to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance, and facilitating the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced peoples, as well as contributing to the successful completion of the electoral process stipulated in the Arusha Agreement, by ensuring a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections.

ONUB was seen to have successfully completed its mandate at the end of 2006. The 5,364-strong peacekeeping operation withdrew “following a successful transition to peace and democracy” in Burundi. With regular outbreaks of violence and farcical elections taking place, this withdraw could arguably be seen as premature.

On the 1st of January, 2007, the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) took over. In implementing its mandate, the responsibilities of BINUB include:

- Peace consolidation and democratic governance;
- Disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reform of the security sector;
- Promotion and protection of human rights and measures to end impunity;
- United Nations agency coordination.

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659 Ibid.
660 Ibid.
As a part of this, BINUB “was focused, during its initial phase, on the establishment of an overall structure to ensure a cohesive United Nations approach to peace consolidation in Burundi.” Implicit in this task was the establishment of a “United Nations integrated peace consolidation support strategy for the period 2007-2008, incorporating the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for 2006-2007.” Priorities and focus areas of this strategy included implementation of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement; demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegation and reform of the security sector; small arms; and human rights. As will be discussed later, these priorities are mirrored closely in the IPBS of the PBC.

Around the same time that BINUB was introduced in Burundi, the country was added to the agenda of the PBC. In a presentation to the PBC in October 2006, the government explained that Burundi had already made significant progress in terms of security and the restoration of peace. All of these achievements could be undermined if support is not provided to the Government in its efforts to consolidate peace. Accordingly, Burundi joined Sierra Leone as a foundation case of the PBC in late 2006.

5.5. The Burundi Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy

The PBC first met to discuss Burundi on the 12th of October, 2006. A field mission was then undertaken early in 2007, during which the PBC team and the government decided to establish an IPBS to give direction to the PBC’s commitment

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665 Ibid.
666 Ibid.
668 McCandless and Tschirgi, “Strategic Frameworks,” 30
Several drafts were produced, and in June 2007, the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi was introduced. The Strategy, like that of Sierra Leone, was agreed upon after a series of meetings and consultations with a variety of stakeholders. The letters submitted to the PBC by the Chairman of the Burundi Configuration, and the Presidents of the Security Council, the General Assembly and ECOSOC mentioned “intensive consultations both at the country level and between partners in Burundi and the Peacebuilding Commission in New York.” As a result of both the field trip in early 2007 and the consultations, a series of priorities were agreed upon. It is important to note that Burundi, like Sierra Leone, had national strategies already in place and in the process of being developed at the same time the PBC’s framework was introduced. The UN’s framework drew on these, in particular the Burundi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). In discussing the PRSP, and its subsequent Priority Action Programme, McCandless and Tschirgi note that they

[...] were unusual and innovative insofar as they encompassed highly political issues. For example, Axis 1 (‘Strengthening Governance and Security’) called for negotiating a permanent comprehensive ceasefire with the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. It also called for managing disputes related to the past and conflict prevention, including: promoting reconciliation through the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission and a special court; settling land disputes related to the crisis; and promoting fairness in access to resources.

The nature of this PRSP, and the slight differences between it and the UN framework, will become significant later in the chapter. The UN framework identified the first peacebuilding priority in Burundi as the promotion of good governance. Burundi held elections in 2005 that saw Pierre Nkurunziza sworn in as President for a five-year term. The framework comments that “the culture of democracy expressed

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669 Ibid.
671 Ibid.
672 Ibid. 32
during the electoral process has still to be consolidated.” In order to do this, the framework explains the necessity of having “interaction and consultation between all actors of society (Parliament, locally elected authorities, the government, political parties, civil society, media, the private sector and religious communities).” The PBC subsequently promised to work to enhance dialogue between these groups. It does not, however, go into detail in regards to how the PBC will work with these institutions to strengthen them, and develop meaningful dialogues.

The second priority identified is that of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement between the Government of Burundi and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. In 2008, a comprehensive ceasefire agreement was signed between the government of Burundi and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. In its framework, the PBC recognises that some progress, such as the creation of “monitoring and implementation mechanisms” has been made. It also recognises, however, that significant challenges remain. Included in these challenges are the “demobilization and reintegration of FNL combatants and the integration of the FNL in some state institutions, including the police and the army.” The framework explains that any delay in the implementation of the ceasefire could create “political and security-related uncertainties,” as well as “military outbursts and uncontrolled clashes.” Despite this, no specific action or target for the PBC is outlined in the framework.

The third priority is that of restoring the security sector. Again, the framework states that there have been gains made in this area, but that there is still a way to go, specifically in the restructuring of the National Defence Force (FDN) and the Burundi National Police (PNB). Also critical to the restoration of security in Burundi is the reintegration of ex-combatants, who pose a threat to widespread “feelings of
insecurity” in society. Again, no course of action is outlined for the PBC involvement in this area.

Fourth in the list of priorities identified by the PBC and their consulting partners is that of justice, promotion of human rights and action to combat impunity. Unlike the priorities mentioned thus far, this fourth pillar of the Burundi framework does actually have a certain amount of detail given to it. The framework outlines that the “lack of independence of the judiciary prevents the state from tackling impunity and recurring violations of human rights, especially in regard to violence against women.” As was discussed above, the frequency of gender-based violence in post-conflict Burundi was particularly high for a number of reasons. The framework suggests that the impunity of this and other examples of criminal behaviour has been one of the “fundamental causes of the Burundian conflict. Moreover, the absence of mechanisms that would allow the people to recall various waves of violence that have swept Burundi is a barrier to national reconciliation.”

As such, the establishment of transitional justice institutions is discussed. These institutions, including a potential Truth and Reconciliation Commission, would be “conducive to national reconciliation and help put an end to impunity.” Although there is yet again little or no specific mention of proposed PBC activities in the area, there is at least a direction given to their work.

The fifth priority is the land issue and socio-economic recovery. As with so many other conflicts around the world, the civil war and genocide in Burundi produced a significant number of internally displaced people (IDP). At the time of writing, up to 100,000 of these IDPs were still living in purpose-made settlements in Burundi. Furthermore, the Ministry charged with overseeing reintegration estimates that there are around 260,000 IDPs who have returned to find their land has been occupied or has been sold. Hugues van Braban, the Associate External Affairs

685 Ibid.
686 Ibid.
687 Ibid.
688 Ibid.
689 Ibid.
Officer for UNHCR, states that “the issue of access and entitlement to arable land on which to undertake subsistence farming and of securing shelter [for the returnees] are among the most acute hurdles which continue to confront returnees” 692 The framework acknowledges that helping these people is increasingly hard given the negative economic conditions in Burundi. In its country brief for Burundi, the World Bank mentions a “slow economic recovery with a 3% average growth rate from 2001 to 2008, but stagnant GDP per capita.” 693 This in turn is a contributing factor to the dismal Human Development Index rating Burundi has achieved, as was discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The framework outlines the need for “immediate, large-scale, targeted interventions focusing on the most urgent rehabilitation needs, especially those of young people, women and other vulnerable populations.” 694 Yet, again, there is no mention of what these interventions might be, who they would work with, and what they would work to achieve.

Next in the priority list is the mobilisation and coordination of international assistance. As this is a key aspect of the PBC’s mandate, it would be expected to be an area of the framework that is reasonably comprehensively covered. Comprehensiveness may not have been achieved, but it is undeniably discussed in more detail than the majority of the priority areas. Recognising that international development partners can sometimes link their assistance to “political developments in the peace process” 695, the PBC suggests that the international partners need to ensure any aid they are giving is released as soon as possible. 696 As such, the PBC states that its responsibilities must see it “encourage the broadest participation of partners in all international forums in which support can be garnered for Burundi, and encouraging a broader donor base for Burundi.” 697 In addition, it must assist partners “in enhancing the quality of aid delivery to Burundi.” 698

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695 Ibid. 11
696 Ibid.
697 Ibid. 14
698 Ibid.
The subregional dimension of conflict is also seen as a priority area in which peacebuilding efforts should be focused. As was discussed previously, the neighbourhood in which Burundi is located has had a large impact upon conditions in Burundi, and vice versa. The framework states that recent events, including elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, have paved the way for better conditions in both Burundi and the wider neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{699} It goes on to outline its responsibilities, which include it working

\[\ldots\] towards integrating the subregional dimension of peacebuilding in the Great Lakes region in its commitment with Burundi, notably through cooperation with the secretariat of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and by encouraging all countries in the region to ratify the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region.\textsuperscript{700}

The last priority area is that of gender. As has been discussed already, the treatment of women in Burundi both during the conflict, and in the post-conflict phases, has been abominable. The Commission states that “Burundi has seen an unprecedented increase in violence against women, rape in particular.”\textsuperscript{701} The framework comments that “the full participation of women in decision-making, selection of priority actions and especially their implementation is not yet guaranteed.”\textsuperscript{702} Again, despite this, the PBC gives no idea of who it might work with in this area, and what they would try to achieve.

As the years have progressed, and the PBC’s involvement in Burundi has further developed, there has been additional documentation made available. In the Sierra Leone documentation, a series of programmes and policies were made available in the \textit{Joint Vision for Sierra Leone 2009-2012} document.\textsuperscript{703} Twenty of these programmes were outlined, including target achievements, timeframes, budgets, and partner agencies. At the time of writing, this information was still not widely available for the PBC’s work in Burundi. The Commission’s documentation does however outline general work being undertaken by the PBC and its development partners in the country, and this is presented in Table 3.

\textsuperscript{699}Ibid. 11.
\textsuperscript{700} Ibid. 14.
\textsuperscript{701} Ibid. 12.
\textsuperscript{702} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{703} United Nations, “Supporting the Implementation of the United Nations Joint Vision for Sierra Leone”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Area:</th>
<th>Actions Undertaken by PBC</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Promotion of Good Governance</strong></td>
<td>The PBC helped support elections in 2010; has endorsed the President’s zero tolerance policy against corruption; and has helped to develop the judiciary, with the help of the introduction of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, amongst other tools.</td>
<td>Although elections were held in 2010, and appeared to be reasonably peaceful, there is still a long way to go before Burundi’s governance mechanisms operate efficiently and effectively. In an interview with Elizabeth McClintock, founder and managing partner of negotiation and conflict management firm CM Partners, McClintock explained that the opposition was not happy with these elections, so removed themselves from the race. Although the polls may have been comparatively peaceful, the elections were essentially a one-party affair with an inevitable and non-democratic outcome. Corruption remains a huge problem in Burundi, and is rife in the government sector. Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index scores Burundi 1.8 out of a possible 10, ranking it 170th country out of a possible 178. In other words, according to the index, Burundi was the 9th most corrupt country in the world in 2010.</td>
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705 Elizabeth McClintock, interview by author via Skype, Dunedin, New Zealand, August 23, 2011.
706 Ibid.
708 Ibid.
| Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL | The PBC has supported the establishment and sustainability of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement between the government and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. They have supported “the African Union and Regional Initiative’s aim to see full implementation of the terms of the ceasefire agreement by the end of the year and […] met with the Ambassadors of South Africa and Tanzania in Burundi to discuss how the PBC can contribute to ensuring that talks between the government of Burundi and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL are successful. | Although the situation in Burundi is tenuous, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL no longer seems to be a major contributor to this. In fact, in April 2009, the FNL laid down their arms and officially became a political party in Burundi in a ceremony overseen by the African Union. |

| Security Sector | Progress has been made in the disarmament of ex-combatants and in the creation of a system for stockpiling weapons. The PBC has also loaned its support to the process of professionalising the defense and security forces. Attempts are constantly being made to increase transparency in the sector’s operations. | Some concrete gains have been made, with the PBC working on the drafting of the Blueprint and Defence Review, and the preparation of a Security Sector Reform Integrated Plan. However, McClintock still believes there are problems in the sector. She explains that the police are still politically tainted and the military still possess a large amount of the power. There is much progress still to be made in the separation of powers. |

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710 BBC. “Timeline: Burundi”
712 Elizabeth McClintock, interview by author via Skype, Dunedin, New Zealand, August 23, 2011.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Justice, Promotion of Human Rights and Action to Combat Impunity</th>
<th>A National Human Independent Human Rights Commission has been created and the PBC has promised to keep transitional justice as a key priority in its operations, which will see it marshalling support for the Human Rights Commission. As well as this, the PBC will endorse discussions around a possible Truth and Reconciliation Commission.713</th>
<th>Progress is slow in this area, and there is much still needing to be done. McClintock explains that despite the efforts of the PBC to endorse a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the population doesn’t have the desire for a gacaca-like creation. They fear that living in such close proximity to those who have perpetrated violence against them, and against whom they may have perpetrated violence will open up doors that can never be shut again. The inter-ethnic nature of the conflict, which, with the practice of reintegration and inter-marrying, has become intra-community, and intra-family, makes reconciliation an extremely complex process.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Land Issue and Socio-Economic Recovery</td>
<td>The Burundi Revenue Authority was established, which saw an increase in the collection of public revenues, and subsequent signs of an improving economy.714</td>
<td>While the economy may be improving slightly, the land issue is still very much a problem. The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada comments that “few people know their rights, and most of them cannot afford a lawyer.”715 Furthermore, there is still an ethnic dimension to the problem, with “most internally displaced Tutsis […] able to recover their belongings because they received preferential treatment from the mostly Tutsi authorities.”716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

714 Ibid.
716 Ibid.
| Mobilisation and Coordination of International Assistance | The PBC has continued to promote international support to Burundi, both from multilateral and bilateral partners.  
717 | The PBC has honoured its promise to marshal international support for Burundi, but 2011 has seen the decision of one major donor, DfID, to withdraw from Burundi altogether. According to McClintock, with each country and agency having its own timeframe and plan of action in place, it is increasingly difficult for the PBC to sustain international commitment to a country, especially given the current economic climate. |
| Subregional Dimension | Progress has been made in this area, with Burundi heading the East African Community in 2011, and taking its position as the Chair of the Summit of Heads of State and the Council of Ministers of East African Community. | Again, despite progress made, there is still a long way to go in this area. Peterson explains that “there appears to be little coordination of efforts among these countries. The continuing conflict in the DRC, the volatile collaboration of political parties in Burundi, and Rwandan threats to attack former génocidaires in the DRC all show that stability has yet to come to the Great Lakes region.” |
| Gender | In the time the PBC has been involved in Burundi, progress has been made in women’s representation and political participation, in particular. Parity has now been achieved in the Senate, and 43% of Cabinet members are women.  
719 | This appears to be one area in which real progress has been made. The International Medical Corps discusses an “increased number of reported cases to the health facilities, […] the reduction of stigma and […] positive attitude and behavior change to prevent GBV.” |

Table 3 ~ PBC Performance in Burundi. Created by author.

5.6. Burundi: A mixed success?

Although the same amount of detail cannot be given to PBC activities in Burundi as was given to those in Sierra Leone, there is still enough material available to perform an evaluation of the PBC’s efforts, in particular of the development and implementation of the Burundi IPBS and its effects on levels of coherence and coordination.

At the inception of the PBC, and its consideration of Burundi as an agenda country, Gareth Evans commented that “developments over the past four years have been promising, and give Burundi its best chance since independence to produce lasting peace.” However, it is difficult to argue that the results in Burundi have been as positive as those in Sierra Leone. Although progress has been made, there is still an enormous way to go before any kind of sustainable peace can be established. One potential explanation for this is the contribution of the Burundian IPBS, or the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework.

It must be noted that unlike Sierra Leone, Burundi has not enjoyed any meaningful degree of stable peace since the PBC took it on as an agenda country. Collier and Hoeffler’s so-called ‘five-year rule’ has been discussed previously. This rule refers to the fact that over half of countries emerging from civil war will fall back into conflict within five years of a ceasefire being signed. The fact that Burundi has not yet managed to remain conflict-free for five years means its chances of falling back into violence remain high. In a recent study undertaken by Crisis Group, it was noted that “Burundi is descending ever deeper into a political impasse that risks

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722 IPBS is a generic term, and certain countries choose to title their IPBS differently. In the cases of Sierra Leone and Burundi, the IPBS are referred to as Peacebuilding Cooperation Frameworks.

The study discusses the 2010 elections, which, as mentioned above, involved only one party; and warns that these farcical polls risk weakening the capacity of any democratic institutions in the country and encouraging the re-emergence of the rebellion witnessed during the civil war.\textsuperscript{725} It comments that

> Despite the deteriorating political and security context, attempts to defuse the crisis have been limited. Several local organisations and some international partners have called for dialogue and restraint, but for the most part, the international community has been slow to act, despite the leverage its aid provides.\textsuperscript{726}

In a follow-up report issued in July 2011, Crisis Group notes that

> The negative dynamics that were analysed continue to have devastating effects. Despite reassuring declarations from the government, the end of the Arusha consensus combined with the deteriorating political climate that followed the electoral boycott of 2010, have contributed directly to an escalation of violence and insecurity.\textsuperscript{727}

It seems that issues relating to timing and sequencing have been, and remain impediments for the success of the IPBS in Burundi. First and foremost, whether the PBC should have added Burundi to its agenda in the first place must be determined. Although an issue which is not discussed in detail here, the question of what constitutes a post-conflict society is a critical one. Burundi may have signed a ceasefire, but has experienced instances of violence and aggression regularly since the Arusha Agreement was signed in 2000.

Although helping to implement a comprehensive ceasefire agreement was identified as one of the priorities of the PBC, it may have been beyond the Commission’s capabilities ever to do so. As a purely advisory body, they hold no authority to control activities on the ground, only to offer recommendations and promote dialogue between relevant parties.


\textsuperscript{725} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{726} Ibid.

As was mentioned in a previous section, the framework was developed at a time when several national strategies were already in existence, and others were being produced. McCandless and Tchirgi refer to this as a “parallel track approach.” The negative effects of such an approach are clear in both Sierra Leone and Burundi. However, while Burundi persisted with a UN framework that produced considerable duplication, confusion between development partners and a less effective set of results, the Sierra Leone configuration adopted the national strategy *An Agenda for Change* as its new strategic document. As will be discussed in the next chapter, adaptation in Sierra Leone resulted in greater coherence and coordination.

After Sierra Leone adopted the *Agenda for Change*, concrete projects were described, with goals, timelines and the involvement of specific development partners outlined. As is illustrated in the table above, that level of detail and information is not yet available for Burundi. McCandless and Tschirgi recognise the shortfalls of the framework in Burundi, describing it as an “instrument of engagement rather than a strategic plan.” Forman is also critical of the framework, suggesting that “in its actual use, however, an independent SF, of the type used in Burundi, has little utility, and the process of its elaboration carries high transaction costs.” These costs manifest themselves in lowered levels of coherence and coordination. For instance, in Burundi, the parallel track development of the IPBS and the lack of added value it brought to peacebuilding efforts in Burundi “created considerable frustration on the part of the UN country team, since they did not see the difference between the IPBS and the ‘UNDAF Plus’ titled ‘Integrated Strategy for UN Support to Peacebuilding in Burundi’.” Furthermore,

[…] at the country level, there was little understanding of the relationship between BINUB, PBSO, the PBC, the Peacebuilding Fund, and the government. Moreover, developing the IPBS put considerable strain on both the government and BINUB, which were already engaged in the work around the PBF Priority Plan and the PRSP.

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728 McCandless and Tschirgi. “Strategic Frameworks,” 33.
729 Ibid.
731 Ibid.
732 Ibid.
The failures of the Burundi IPBS are also outlined in a study by the New York University Center on International Cooperation. In this, Forman et. al. state that

The underlying problem, of course, remains the relevancy, or lack thereof, of the Strategic Framework. Without an instrument of engagement that is linked to impactful processes – either the PRSP in terms of funding, or the Security Council mandate as the expression of collective political will – the logic of an additional review process will remain questionable.  

At the recent review process, there was suggestion that a move might be made to adopt the forthcoming version of the Burundi PRSP as the new strategic document for the PBC’s engagement. Despite her caveats illustrated in the above table, Elizabeth McClintock remains positive about the prospects for peace in Burundi. One of the potential reasons for this is the current drafting of the new Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, in which she has been involved, and the new and improved opportunities for coherence and coordination this could present in Burundi.

After having analysed the PBC’s IPBS in both foundation countries, a distinction in levels of coherence and coordination can be made between the Sierra Leone and Burundi operations. The following and final chapter in this thesis will draw on De Coning and Paris’ models of coherence and coordination introduced in the literature review. By directly comparing different levels of coherence and coordination in PBC operations in Sierra Leone and Burundi, conclusions can be drawn about the necessary elements for a successful IPBS, and peacebuilding operation.

733 Forman, Sorensen, and Chandran, “A Field-Based Review,” pp 8-9
6. Comparisons and Conclusions

As discussed in the literature review, the most comprehensive work done on coherence and coordination in peacebuilding missions is that of Cedric De Coning and Roland Paris. De Coning defines coherence as the

[...] effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, governance, development, human rights, humanitarian, rule of law and security dimensions of a peacebuilding strategy towards common strategic objectives.  

He outlines four specific levels of coherence in peacebuilding operations. The first is agency coherence, or “consistency among the policies and actions of an individual agency.” The second level is that of whole-of-government coherence, which represents the “consistency among the policies and actions of different departments and agencies of the same government or multilateral institution.” The third level, external coherence, describes “harmonisation of policies and actions among the external actors in a given country context.” Finally, internal/external coherence relates to the “alignment of the policies and actions between internal and external actors.”

De Coning also offers a definition for coordination, describing it as the building of strategies; the making of decisions in regards to goals; the preparation, communication, sharing of tasks; and the marshalling of supplies. What De Coning does for coherence, Paris does for coordination. He organises post-conflict coordination into four levels. The first is the UN system level, which considers coordination between the organs in the UN itself, while the second is the bureaucratic level, or the coordination of the bureaucracies of donor governments. The third and

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734 de Coning, “Clarity, Coherence and Context,” 20
735 Ibid.
736 Ibid.
737 Ibid.
738 Ibid.
739 de Coning, “The Coherence Dilemma”
fourth levels are the field and headquarters levels, respectively. These refer to the coordination of the range of international actors involved in an operation, and the levels of coordination between actors on the international stage and the governments supporting them.  

In order to draw meaningful and comprehensive conclusions about the implementation of the Sierra Leone and Burundi IPBSs, and their efforts to improve levels of coherence and coordination, De Coning and Paris’ models will be used as templates for the matrices illustrated below in Tables 4 and 5. These will enable a comparison of coherence and coordination between the two peacebuilding operations.

\[Ibid.\]
### 6.1. Coherence in Sierra Leone and Burundi: An IPBS Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. <strong>Level of Coherence</strong></th>
<th>8. <strong>Sierra Leone</strong></th>
<th>9. <strong>Burundi</strong></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agency coherence</strong></td>
<td>Until the introduction of the Agenda for Change as the PBC’s core strategic document, various agencies at the UN had lent their support to different strategic documents, and as a result, were continuing to work at cross purposes to one another. The PBF, for example, was working with its own strategy, as was UNIOSIL and the UN Country Team. With the adoption of the Agenda for Change, these agencies found both peacebuilding and security priorities, as well as those related to development, in a single, cohesive framework. The adoption of the Agenda for Change not only improved low levels of coherence and coordination; it demonstrated that the PBC does in fact have an organisational learning capacity. More about this will be discussed in the conclusions section.</td>
<td>As in Sierra Leone before the PBC’s adoption of the Agenda for Change, UN agencies in Burundi were often working at cross-purposes to one another. The PBF had its own priority plan, as did BINUB and the Country Team. Although talk has been heard of the Burundi Configuration’s decision to adopt the second PRSP as its new core strategic document, at the time of writing this still had not happened. The conclusion section will consider whether this reflects an instance of deficient organisational learning on the behalf of the PBC, or whether it is an issue of timing. While this adaptation resulted in improved coherence and coordination in Sierra Leone, it must be considered whether the same would necessarily have been true for Burundi.</td>
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### Whole of government coherence

The *Agenda for Change* started out as a national strategy. It was developed by the Sierra Leone government, and identified the priorities they and they alone considered the most important. In programmatically aligning its actions with the *Agenda for Change*, the PBC brought its own expertise and areas of ability to the national strategy. It did not try to produce a new strategy, but rather *supported the existing national framework* to the best of its ability.

Levels of coherence within the government have been reasonably positive in Sierra Leone. Various Ministries, such as the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, as well as leaders like Ernest Bai Koroma, have pledged their full support to implementing their national strategy, in partnership with development agencies and the UN. As well as the issues surrounding *political will and commitment*, the concept of *local ownership* must be considered.

In Burundi, a number of national strategies still exist, in addition to the PBC’s Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework. This makes whole-of-government coherence increasingly difficult.

The sense is that the PBC’s Cooperation Framework has “fallen short of delivering on its promise largely due to its inability to influence key actors either in terms of political action or decisions around funding allocations.”

The Burundian government is one of these key actors. Reluctant to pledge its complete support to the PBC framework, it splits its efforts between the multitudes of strategies still being used by various bodies.

The question of *political will and commitment* is relevant here, and will be discussed in the conclusion section.

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742 McCandless and Tschirgi, “Strategic Frameworks,” 34
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External coherence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Again, the adoption of the <em>Agenda for Change</em> as the core strategic document of</td>
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<tr>
<td>the PBC’s work in Sierra Leone has greatly improved external coherence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The presence of a single, cohesive strategy eliminates the possibility of external</td>
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<td>actors picking and choosing which strategies they wish to be a part of, for reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of <strong>national interest</strong> or <strong>agenda</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Also noticeable in the Sierra Leone instance is that certain donors and agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are more prominent than others. For instance, DfID (the United Kingdom Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>for International Development) had heavy involvement in fourteen of the twenty</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Joint Vision</em> programmes outlined in the new strategy. <strong>743</strong> What must also be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>considered in relation to internal and external coherence, or perhaps in a new</td>
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<tr>
<td>sub-group of this coherence level, is the **extent to which the coherence of a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strategy depends upon the organisational coherence of a major donor.**</td>
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</table>

Internal and external coherence

The adoption of the *Agenda for Change* gave international donors the opportunity to work with each other, the government of Sierra Leone and the UN under the auspices of one cohesive document. In analysing both coherence and coordination, the **balance of internal and external strategies** must be considered. If this balance is reached, it creates optimum conditions for all actors to operate within.

While the Sierra Leone configuration has managed to identify concrete programmes, actors, and goals, the Burundi Cooperation Framework has not made similar progress.

It has been suggested that the Burundi framework has added no value to peacebuilding efforts in the country.\(^\text{745}\) While that suggestion seems somewhat harsh, it must be acknowledged that, as with all other levels of coherence, Burundi lags behind Sierra Leone in internal and external coherence. DfID, identified as a major contributor, has recently announced its decision to withdraw completely from Burundi. Again, whether its **organisational coherence** was not compatible with the UN’s generic and somewhat vague Cooperation Framework will have to be considered.

| Table 4 ~ Evaluation of Levels of Coherence in PBC Performance in Sierra Leone and Burundi. Created by author. |

\(^{745}\) Forman, Sorensen, and Chandran, “A Field-Based Review”
9.1. Coordination in Sierra Leone and Burundi: An IPBS Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Coordination</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UN System Level</strong></td>
<td>The same UN system level coordination exists for both Sierra Leone and Burundi. Since the PBC was established, there has been debate over the parent organs, and the type of relationship the PBC should share with each. The Security Council has long advocated for a leading role in the operations of the PBC, and holds seats on the Organisational Committee and each Country-Specific Configuration. However, there has been debate over their motivation for this, with some claiming that their effective involvement with the PBC ended as soon as they had achieved these positions, and that their real agenda was to ensure that issues of security were left solely to Security Council meetings. ECOSOC has had a minimal role with the PBC, with some suggesting its previous experience in ad hoc missions could see it help the PBC to adapt more quickly to individual contexts. A more significant role would go a long way towards bridging the gap between the security and development divide.</td>
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</table>
**Bureaucratic Level**

Again, the same coordination issues exist for the Sierra Leone and Burundi operations.

At the bureaucratic level, the most obvious consideration is the manifest altruism and agenda of donor countries. Some are more altruistic than others. Scandinavian countries, the UK, Germany and Japan, in particular, are all closely involved with the PBC and their frameworks. Other states, such as France and the US, keep a noticeably lower profile.

The issues of **will and agenda** are again raised, this time in relation to donor government’s bureaucracies and the PBC’s ability to coordinate these.
**Field Level**

The most significant issue affecting the ability of the IPBS to coordinate actors in the field is that of the **security and development divide**. In Sierra Leone and in Burundi, the proliferation of national strategies and UN frameworks saw international actors align themselves with the strategy which best reflected their priority.

In Sierra Leone, for example, the “Sierra Leone Vision 2025, the Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the Improved Accountability Pact are all primarily developmental in their approach”\(^\text{746}\) while the “Peace Consolidation Strategy (PCS) of 2006, the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework (PBCF) of 2007 and the Peacebuilding Priority Fund Plan (2007) are all peacebuilding focused.”\(^\text{747}\)

The fact that this divide has seemingly been overcome in Sierra Leone is a question of both **balance** and **timing**. As has been mentioned, the two are at very different stages of the post-conflict process, and this could affect the interplay of the two priorities.

In Burundi, the “PRSP, developed in 2006, was primarily developmental in focus, while the Strategic Peacebuilding Framework (SPBF) developed in 2007, guides peacebuilding activities such as the promotion of good governance, national dialogue, justice and human rights.”\(^\text{748}\)

Again, success in coordinating international actors must be seen as a combination of **balance in the representation of security and development priorities**, and of **timing**. Both of these factors will be discussed further in the conclusions.

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747 Ibid.
748 Ibid. 109
### Headquarters Level

At the headquarters level, there are two significant factors relating to the PBC and the relationship they have with the governments of their agenda countries. The first is a disconnect between New York and the field; the second is the influential role of key figures involved with the coordination of these two, such as the **Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ESRG)**

In both Sierra Leone and Burundi, a disconnect between the government and the UN has been felt. However, some suggest that this is not unique to the PBC, and is in fact a feature of any UN operation with government involvement.  

The contribution of key UN officials is also critical to coordinating international actors and agencies. The ESRG in Sierra Leone is described as being “the United Nations Resident Coordinator”. The present ESRG, Michael von der Schulenberg, has been reasonably active in this role, leading teams of

The disconnect has also been present in Burundi, but, as has been suggested, this is not unique to PBC operations.

The position of ESRG, however, has also been problematic in Burundi. In 2010, the national government requested the replacement of the ESRG in Burundi, citing changes in Burundi’s in-country UN representation as a reason for this. Some suggest that there have been hints of tension and that they are skeptical as to whether this is the real reason for the ESRG being asked to leave. Whatever the reason, the capacity of this individual to aid in coordination efforts was curtailed until a replacement could be agreed upon.

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749 This point was raised in interviews with Elizabeth McClintock, founder and Managing Partner of CM Partners in Cambridge, Massachusetts, as well as with Jina Moore, journalist for the Pulitzer Center for Crisis Reporting. The interviews took place on the 23rd of August 2011 and the 7th of June 2011, respectively.

“diplomats, leaders and officials”\textsuperscript{751} in their visits to Sierra Leone to view the progress of the Joint Vision programmes.

Table 5 ~ Evaluation of Levels of Coordination in the PBC’s Performance in Sierra Leone and Burundi. Created by author.

It must be remembered though, that De Coning and Paris both speak of coherence and coordination dilemmas. That is, they both suggest that not only are near perfect levels of coherence and coordination almost impossible to achieve, they are also undesirable.\textsuperscript{754} As discussed in the literature review, they refer to this as the coherence and coordination dilemma. However, this dilemma does not yet appear to be a consideration for the PBC. It is plain to see that the Commission has not yet reached levels of coherence and coordination which are in danger of being too high. Rather, the general opinion of the PBC’s performance thus far, both in regards to coherence and coordination, and in a general capacity, is underwhelming.

9.2. The PBC’s Added Value: Higher Levels of Coherence and Coordination?

Expert opinion of the PBC’s performance to date is less than flattering. Castillo believes that the Commission has done little to improve the situation of international peacebuilding as a whole, stating that “after more than ten years of practice, the international peacebuilding project is still experimental, amorphous, and tenuous in nature.”\textsuperscript{755} The Stanley Foundation review discussed in previous chapters suggested that the PBC has “yet to establish itself as the central UN pillar imagined at


\textsuperscript{753} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{754} de Coning, “Clarity Coherence and Context,”pp. 20-23

its founding”, and has “largely fallen short of expectations”. Despite this lack of institutional stability still being a concern for the PBC, the Commission has accomplished goals in other areas. For example, it has “demonstrated success in its mandate to sustain international attention and to broaden engagement and financial support for its agenda countries.”

In terms of specific benefits to the two case-study countries, it is agreed that both have benefitted to some degree from the Commission’s involvement. As illustrated previously, Sierra Leone’s justice sector has been reformed with the support of the PBC, with judges and magistrates receiving training as a part of peacebuilding assistance. The Stanley Foundation also describes progress in military training, economic development, human rights institutions, and local government administration, all of which have been supported and aided by the Commission and their partners.

Although Burundi is not seen as an equally successful case, it too has benefitted from the Commission’s involvement. There, the PBC has defused “escalating tensions between the national government and the International Monetary Fund, which was threatening a delay to a country review.” This delay would have halted aid distribution at a critical juncture.

In terms of coherence and coordination, results are again mixed. There have been some successes, but there are still vast improvements to be made. McAskie describes a “modest but encouraging start”. However, others are not so positive in their assessments, suggesting that the Commission still has to make significant improvements in its operations. McCandless states that “coordination performance is considered mixed, with the principal challenge lying in the multiple centres of

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757 Ibid.
758 Ibid. 6
759 Ibid. 7
760 Ibid.
761 Ibid.
762 McAskie. “2020 Vision,” 19
deliberation and decision-making around the PBC’s work.”763 Additionally, she suggests the “lack of clarity about the nature of a ‘peacebuilding strategy’ has been a major problem, exacerbated by the lack of best practice to draw from.”764 Jenkins’ review is also less than positive, suggesting that although the PBC’s strategy might be logically coherent, the Commission has yet to ensure its strategies contain goals that can reasonably be met by its partners, and are still unable to agree on attainable division of labour.765

The PBC, it is agreed, is at a “critical moment”.766 If the Commission does not learn from these shortcomings, and carve out a place for itself in the wider UN architecture, it must run the risk of being made obsolete. McCandless suggests that

[...] the focus on the immediate aftermath has submerged the critical focus of peace sustainability [...] beneath a sea of operational and procedural concerns focused on gap filling and assigning tasks, crowding out debates on what are the ingredients of an effective strategy.767

After having considered the cases of Sierra Leone and Burundi, it is possible to suggest that there are certain areas in which the PBC must improve its performance if it is to succeed in implementing its IPBSs and, in doing so, improve levels of coherence and coordination. Only after significant progress in these areas has been made can the Commission add value to the international peacebuilding project, and carve a niche for itself in the UN architecture.

9.3. Coherence and Coordination in IPBS Implementation: Factors for Success

9.3.1. Sequencing

The decision to transition programmes in Sierra Leone and not in Burundi indicates that sequencing is a critical element of success in the implementation of IPBSs. This element involves two aspects: the post-conflict stage of the country in

764 Ibid.
766 Carolyn McAskie. “2020 Vision” 26
question, and the level of development of the IPBS. As was discussed in the rationale for choosing Sierra Leone and Burundi as the two case studies, the countries have very different post-conflict environments. Sierra Leone has been relatively stable for some time, while Burundi has experienced violence on and off since the signing of the ceasefire and the Arusha Declaration. If a variation of the ‘five-year rule’ is applied, the longer a country has been out of conflict, the more stable it becomes, and prospects for establishing a sustainable peace can only improve. The fact that Burundi has experienced a series of violent incidents over the past 5 years indicates that it is not yet in a post-conflict phase and is therefore much more systemically unstable than Sierra Leone, which has managed to control organized violence over the same time period.

It has also been suggested that Sierra Leone “was too far along the post-conflict road” to be an appropriate case for the Commission. Sierra Leone, Jenkins suggests, was in fact a “post post-conflict” country. The added stability this situation provided Sierra Leone with may account for a certain degree of the success enjoyed by the Commission. Some, such as Castillo, have called for a more calculated approach to selecting and approving agenda countries. They believe that a country such as Nepal, which is currently in a transition phase, and “needs to establish a strategy for reconstruction as soon as possible”, would have been a much more suitable candidate for PBC engagement. Selecting a country such as Nepal, which is said to be at a more suitable stage, and ready for help from external actors, could help to improve levels of internal/external coherence, as well as levels of field level coordination.

The issue of sequencing is critically related to a clear understanding of where each nation stands in the conflict cycle. The question of strategic priority has an important impact on what kind of intervention will be deployed. A significant divide exists when it comes to deciding whether to give priority to development or

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768 The ‘five-year rule’, as discussed in previous chapters, refers to the commonly cited statistic that half of all countries emerging from civil war will fall back into conflict within five years.
769 Rob Jenkins. “ReEngineering the UN Peacebuilding Architecture,” 15
770 Ibid.
771 Graciana del Castillo. “Rebuilding War-Torn States,” 60
772 Ibid.
peacebuilding/security issues in a particular IPBS. In the two cases explored here some proposals gave priority to peacebuilding and security while others favoured aspects of economic and social development. Typically, the UN-based strategies favoured security concepts. These security concerns of the UN could be a reflection of their concerns for state and institutional stability. Country strategies however, tend to favour more developmental aspects. The development concerns of these countries could be seen to reflect their preoccupation with growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development. A range of issues flows from this divide, and it is another element which must be considered in more detail before adopting an IPBS.

9.3.2. The Security / Development Nexus

The first issue raised by the security/development divide is the fundamental problem strategies heavily favouring one of these aspects pose to international peacebuilding efforts. David explains that in the field of peacebuilding, there exist two schools: the exclusivists, and the inclusivists.\(^{773}\) While the exclusivists argue that the concepts of security and development should not be combined, the inclusivists believe that the two need to coexist for a successful peacebuilding strategy.\(^{774}\) Indeed, there are those who have expanded the concept of peacebuilding even further, arguing that it is synonymous with "development". This conception of peacebuilding has several variants. Some analysts maintain that peacebuilding is a natural by-product of effective development assistance; others view it as a pre-requisite of development, ranking it alongside environmental sustainability, good governance and gender as indispensable pillars of development assistance.\(^{775}\)

If an IPBS favours security or peacebuilding initiatives over those which are concerned with development, or vice versa, it must be seen as suggesting that either security is a result of successful development efforts, or that security must first be established before development policies can be implemented and have any value. There is, however, always the possibility that these aspects of peacebuilding, like so many others, are not able to be considered in a linear fashion, but rather are cyclical.


\(^{774}\) Ibid.

and closely intertwined. The challenge then, must be to find a favourable balance of security or peacebuilding initiatives and of development programmes in the IPBS. The best balance must be one which carefully sequences ceasefire arrangements, political agreements, emergency humanitarian assistance and long term development.

In this vein, the Agenda for Change, and the subsequent actions and commitments outlined by the UN in the Joint Vision document helped enhance coherence and coordination in Sierra Leone. Referring back to the programmes discussed in the Sierra Leone chapter, there was an appropriate balance between those which concentrated on security and peacebuilding priorities, such as the promotion of democratic elections; access to justice and human rights; public sector reform; mitigating external threats to security; security sector reform; and gender equality; and those which concentrated on more developmental projects, such as finance for development; the smallholders’ commercialisation programme; and the programmes for rural industrial growth and renewable energy. An appropriate balance of security and development priorities improves the likelihood that each of the various and diverse organisations involved with the IPBS will be able to identify elements of their own agendas and goals with those of the Commission. Levels of agency coherence, whole-of government coherence, and field coordination could be increased. Additionally, internal/external coherence could be strengthened. As will be discussed below, by expanding upon de Coning’s explanation of the internal/external level of coherence, it can be posited that the ability of an organisation to relate its own strategy to that of an actor such as the UN is critical to desirable levels of internal/external coherence.

In Burundi’s case, however, the PBC’s IPBS was vague, and was “hastily developed”. Calls to follow Sierra Leone’s lead and transition the PBC’s support to the Burundi PRSP have not yet been fruitful. As has already been suggested, this decision to wait may have been a good one. The original PRSP in Burundi is almost entirely development based. In the Executive Summary of the original PRSP, the “post-conflict economic difficulty characterised by insufficient production and incomes, low levels of international assistance and investment, as well as persistently

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776 McCandless and Tschrigi, “Strategic Frameworks,” 32
heavy pressure on the State’s cash flow” are discussed. For a country where neither development nor peacebuilding have made a significant amount of progress, an adoption of this almost exclusively economic strategy would have been potentially disastrous for the PBC.

The second PRSP, however, which is currently under development, includes several peacebuilding indicators and facets. Once this has been introduced in Burundi, then the PBC may think about transitioning and endorsing the PRSP as their core strategic document for engagement. Again, by endorsing a strategy that promotes issues of both peacebuilding and development, the PBC could not only attract a wider donor base in Burundi, but could also enhance levels of agency, whole-of-government, and internal/external coherence. Such a strategy would also provide for improved coordination conditions, particularly at the field level.

In considering how to achieve this appropriate balance of security and development priorities, it must be remembered that “there are as many definitions of peacebuilding as there are peacebuilders. Peacebuilding is not so much an activity in itself, neither is it a point on the spectrum following peacekeeping, but a methodology.” The key to the balance of security and development lies not in any one definition of peacebuilding and what it entails, but must depend on the country concerned. In the end, context is the key. De Coning explains that while a peacebuilder may view road construction (typically considered an aspect more closely related to development) as a low priority for a country recently emerged from violence, this ultimately depends on the context of that specific country. Indeed, construction of roads may be regarded as an important element of a larger peacebuilding framework. It may create work, including for ex-combatants, it may stimulate local economies and improve livelihoods by providing access to markets, it may stimulate local contractor capacity, it may open up outlying

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778 From interview with Elizabeth McClintock, who acted as a consultant on the drafting of the second Burundi PRSP.
779 McAskie, “2020 Vision.” 5
780 de Coning, “Clarity, Coherence and Context.” 18
areas previously marginalized because of their inaccessibility, and assist in the extension of the authority of the state into these territories.\textsuperscript{781}

The interplay between security and development, then, is an extremely complex one, and must be considered on a case-by-case basis. One possible way for the PBC to improve its understanding of this issue is by fostering greater links with one of its parent organs: the Security Council.

As discussed in previous chapters, it was recognized early on that suboptimal relationships with the PBC’s parent organs could be impediments to its success. Currently, the Commission “lacks an organic relationship with the Security Council.”\textsuperscript{782} McAskie suggests that a more established relationship with the Council is “particularly important in developing a greater understanding of the fundamental link between security and development (or rather the lack of development)”\textsuperscript{783} Additionally, she argues that the Commission should “give up the fiction that the General Assembly and ECOSOC have the same role in managing peacebuilding as does the Security Council, but regular briefings of these bodies, and full (sic) fledged discussions can take place regularly.”\textsuperscript{784} An improvement in the relationship between the PBC and the SC would also improve levels of agency coherence, and levels of UN system level coordination.

The relationship the PBC shares with the Security Council and its other parent organs is not the only one vital to its success. The relationship between UN Headquarters and UN Country Teams is also critical. Improved relationships in this area are crucial if the PBC wishes to enjoy future success in IPBS implementation.

\subsection*{9.3.3. The Relationship between New York and the Field}

Previously, the relationship between UN staff working in New York and those on the ground in agenda countries has not been strong. In the case of Sierra Leone, for instance, the UN had an integrated operation in place at the time the country was

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{781} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{782} Stanley Foundation “Review and Vitilisation of Peacebuilding..” 7
\textsuperscript{783} McAskie “2020 Vision.” 23
\textsuperscript{784} Ibid. 23-4
\end{flushleft}
added to the PBC’s agenda. This operation involved over 300 staff, yet when the time came to consider peacebuilding priorities for the Sierra Leone configuration, New York sent nine of their own staff on a field trip. As del Castillo explains, the existing UN team had the capacity to advise New York on priority areas for the country, yet was never given the chance. As the UN representatives who had been involved with the Government, civil society, ex-combatants, and civilians, it would have made much more sense for New York to consult with the integrated operation team. However, Herrhausen suggests that the relationship between the two is badly skewed, and that Headquarters staff are more concerned with “the political processes in peacebuilding”. They are focused on “empowering and disempowering certain political factions and navigating or shaping neighbouring and big power interests.” Field staff, on the other hand, have a more “practical outlook”. They tend to focus on “delivering food aid, running refugee camps, and facilitating the return of refugees”. Their concerns are more closely related to the humanitarian side of the peacebuilding process.

Issues have also been raised in regards to the Country-Specific Configurations (CSCs), which meet in New York regularly. Many are worried that the fact that these CSCs are so New York centric has encouraged “alienation from on-the-ground realities and efforts.” Being so far away from the environment in which their decisions become a reality means that “demands that are not always logical from a field perspective” are often issued. These demands may be “met with antagonism and resistance due to differences in priority setting.” Furthermore, the lack of regular consultation between New York and the field leads to “ill-aligned policy objectives and heightens frustrations among field-level personnel unable to operate under opposing sets of instructions.”

785 del Castillo, “Rebuilding War-Torn States,” 60
786 Ibid.
787 Anna Herrhausen, Organising Peacebuilding: An Investigation of Inter-organisational Coordination in International Post-Conflict Efforts, (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2009) 105
788 Ibid.
789 Ibid.
790 Ibid.
791 The Stanley Foundation, “Review and Vitilisation of Peacebuilding,” 10
792 Ibid.
793 Ibid.
794 Ibid.
The division of labour between headquarters and the field must be a focus for the PBC if levels of agency coherence, external coherence, internal/external coherence, field level coordination, and UN system level coordination are to improve. The Stanley Foundation suggests that there should be a “clear division of responsibility between New York and the field. At headquarters, the PBC should focus on coordination and marshaling political support and resources. It should not seek to drive strategy development best determined on the ground.”

One of the key individuals who could help with this improvement is the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). As the head of field-based UN country teams, the SRSG is crucial to the improved relationship between various branches of UN personnel. As Ahmedou-Ould Abdallah demonstrated in pre-PBC Burundi, the SRSG has the power to “convene all relevant actors from the development and donor communities in order to promote swift decision making that ensures that field-based priorities are met.” The SRSG also liaises with the CSC, although at present, the regularity with which he does this depends very much on the particular representative. The relationship between the two has the power to provide a reliable and effective link between New York and the field. It must be strengthened, and used to its full potential.

The strengthening of relationships seems to be a crucial area in which the PBC needs to improve. As well as strengthening and better understanding the links between security and development; between the Commission and its parent organs; and between New York and the field; the PBC must make a further effort to consider the relationship between internal and external actors. A better understanding and balance of local ownership is central to the success of the PBC and its efforts in agenda countries.

795 Ibid. 9
796 Ibid. 11
797 Ibid.
9.3.4. Local Ownership: A Balance of Internal and External Strategies

The adoption of a national strategy in Sierra Leone in lieu of a UN developed framework raises issues, namely the interplay between external and internal strategies, and the particular value placed on each by national and international actors. It is fair to say that the initial forays of the PBC into its foundation countries did not inspire a huge amount of confidence in the UN-developed IPBSs. However, no aspect of peacebuilding ever seems to be straightforward, and integrated strategies are no different. Rather than suggesting the fault lay with the CSC; the Country Team; or any other body involved in creating and implementing the IPBS; it could be argued that the real problem lay in a fundamental confusion over the role of the PBC and that of the strategy it was tasked with developing.

The PBC was always intended to be a support mechanism for countries emerging from conflict. There is a fine line, however, between support and imposition. Donais suggests that this “complex relationship between insiders and outsiders lies at the very heart of contemporary peacebuilding processes.”\(^{798}\) In turn, at the heart of this complex relationship lies the IPBS. The original frameworks in Sierra Leone and Burundi were nothing more than glorified collations of existing national strategies. As illustrated in the tables above, levels of coherence and coordination only improved in Sierra Leone after the adoption of the Agenda for Change as the core strategic document of the PBC. Burundi persisted with their cooperation framework, and is still experiencing many of the problems with coherence and coordination that Sierra Leone left behind when they programmatically aligned to the national strategy. There are several possible reasons why Sierra Leone’s adoption of the Agenda for Change was successful.

The first is that “in much the same way that genuine reconciliation cannot be imposed by outsiders, no amount of externally generated policy prescriptions can shift post-conflict societies from a culture of violence to a culture of peace.”\(^{799}\) Any external actor engaging in a post-conflict situation needs to discover a sense of


\(^{799}\) Ibid. 11
indigenous direction. It has been suggested that “locals remain, to a large extent, an
underexploited peacebuilding resource. The conflict resolution community has long
argued that local wisdom and local resources are essential element of
peacebuilding.»

The question is, again, how to achieve the desired balance between the local
and the external. Donais explains that “in the absence of effective mechanisms of
accountability, it is often an open question which of these sets of actors better
represent the best interests of post-conflict societies." The issue of legitimacy is key
here. Often, developing countries are subject to “pathologisation”, whereby they
are “framed alternatively as ill, traumatized, dysfunctional, irrational, or
immature”. External agencies consider it their responsibility to move in and dictate
strategy. This is problematic for several reasons. First,

Most outside peacebuilding interventions follow a donor-driven, bureaucratic,
institutional logic that conjures into existence a social field on which policies
can be imposed by experts defined not by their local knowledge, but by their
grasp of institutional imperatives.

They often have little to no expertise in the country in which they are operating, but
rather, are familiar with a “functionally specific area”. As Sending explains,

Because peacebuilders are seen to advance the ‘right’ objectives, and know
how to do it, there is no need for elaborate checks and balances, for review
and for accountability, of how they go about effort (sic) to reform a society’s
core institutions.

Obviously, to place peacebuilders in complete control of an operation is dangerous
and problematic. However, to turn the situation on its head causes similar problems.
Donais explains that the very idea of local ownership assumes a “coherence and
commonality of purpose among domestic political forces that is rarely present in post-
conflict contexts, and which glosses over the social complexity inherent in any

800 Ibid.
801 Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition,” 7
802 Ibid. 8
803 Ibid.
804 Ibid.
805 Ole Jacob Sending. “Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and Be Sensitive to Context,”
NUPI Working Paper 755 (Oslo: NUPI, 2009) 8,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FC2FEB9DD60A69274925765B0010A3BB-SIP-
Again, what is necessary is a balance. Like the security/development divide, the context of the country must be a key consideration in reaching the optimum balance.

External actors must calibrate their engagement in order to create space for national strategies to emerge, and then stand back and let local actors determine the priorities and how they might be implemented. When this is done, they can then align their own strategies in support with these national frameworks, creating improved levels of all four types of coherence identified by de Coning, as well as field level coordination, UN system level coordination, and headquarters level coordination. It can be seen that, rather than a strategic framework, the IPBS should be viewed as an “instrument of engagement.” If the local communities and governments build the fire, the job of the PBC is to blow on the flames, encouraging and helping to provide the necessary materials for the operation to thrive. After a false start in Sierra Leone, the Commission seems to have adapted this strategy. Only time will tell if Burundi, and indeed future PBC cases, follow suit.

There is one last aspect which this thesis argues is critical to the success of any IPBS, and the levels of coherence and coordination this helps to inspire in an agenda country: the involvement and ongoing commitment of a major donor.

9.3.5. Major Donor Commitment

In an attempt to improve levels of internal and external coherence, the value of having one major donor who commits to a holistic strategy is very important. As discussed above, a donor like DfID was instrumental in the implementation of the Joint Vision Programmes in Sierra Leone. DfID spent a total of £44.9 million in Sierra Leone between 2009 and 2010. 40% of this was in the governance sector, 24% was in the health sector, 19% in the growth sector, 9% in the other social services, and 8% in the education sector. In their brief for Sierra Leone, DfID also

806 Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition,” 11
807 McCandless and Tschrigi, “Strategic Frameworks,” 41
809 Ibid.
promised to pledge an average of £68 million per year until 2015. The ability of the Sierra Leone configuration to attract the attention and holistic support of such a significant donor has resulted in some encouraging progress for the country, as was detailed previously. This progress suggests that such overarching support would be a major contributor to success in future PBC configurations. The Sierra Leone integrated strategy has generated high levels of organisational and strategic coherence, which is something that de Coning does not consider in detail in his quadrangular model.

Using DfID’s involvement in Sierra Leone as an example, it can be posited that if a donor harmonises its organisational coherence with external multilateral strategic coherence then the implementation of an effective IPBS is more likely. Large donors can give real shape to an IPBS if they invest across the board. In a recent summary paper, DfID describes the targets they wish to reach by 2014 in Sierra Leone. These include:

- 45,000 girls (aged 12-15) in junior secondary school;
- 630,000 children in primary education;
- 170,000 women receiving health care during pregnancy and childbirth;
- 48,000 more women and adolescent girls with access to modern contraception;
- Over 3 million citizens supported to participate in peaceful and credible elections in 2012 by assisting national electoral bodies to perform effectively;
- Increased access to finance for business, creating additional job opportunities;
- Sustainable and effective use of natural resources for the benefit of the whole country.

Clear parallels can be drawn between DfID’s priorities and those of the PBC as outlined in the Vision for Change document. Aspects of the school feeding programme; the reproductive child health and nutrition programme; the democratic elections and political dialogue programme; finance for development programme; and various agriculture-based programmes are directly reflected in DfID’s priorities. This high level of organisational and strategic coherence has been a significant factor in the relative success of the PBC and its re-conceptualised IPBS in Sierra Leone.

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811 Ibid.
As discussed, the PBC has vast improvements to make if it ever wishes to become a meaningful part of the UN and fulfill its aspirations to improve levels of coherence and coordination in international peacebuilding missions. The areas discussed above are those in which it must develop and strengthen. The only way in which it will be able to do this, however, is if it has the ability to learn from its past.

9.4. Organisational Learning

In the past, it has been argued that peace operations carried out by the UN have had little to no organizational learning capacity. Bariagaber suggests that the UN emphasises “continuity over change”.\(^\text{812}\) He proposes that this may be, in part, because of the bureaucratic nature of the UN.\(^\text{813}\) “Instead of case-by-case evaluations and responses, bureaucracies usually adopt standard operating procedures, whereby sets of prearranged responses are applied to possible future scenarios.”\(^\text{814}\) Bureaucracies like the UN suffer from a “pervasive weakness […] in learning, absorbing, applying, and sharing lessons.”\(^\text{815}\) The PBC, though, seems to have bucked this trend. Despite the fact that the Working Group for Lessons Learned is generally agreed to have “not achieved much”\(^\text{816}\), the Commission does seem to have taken lessons from certain elements of its foundation cases, and would even seem to be now applying this knowledge both to Sierra Leone and Burundi, but also to cases it has taken on more recently.

In discussing the decision to abandon its own IPBS in favour of the *Agenda for Change*, McCandless and Tschrigi note that

The Commission had “signaled an important evolution in its own role for itself within the context of Sierra Leone’s changing post-conflict environment. […] recognising the existence of other frameworks and mechanisms that were already in place, it adopted a supportive role with a

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\(^\text{813}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{814}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{815}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{816}\) McCandless., “In Pursuit of Peacebuilding.” 21

\(^\text{816}\) Ibid. 17
view to keeping its focus on a set of priorities that were considered essential for peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{817}

This ability to learn through engagement with local stakeholders undoubtedly contributed to the higher levels of coherence and coordination in Sierra Leone’s peacebuilding efforts. As Susanna Campbell notes: “to impact the causes of peace, peacebuilding organisations have to learn what works in each conflict context.”\textsuperscript{818} Tschirgi agrees, suggesting that “one of the persistent obstacles to more effective peacebuilding outcomes is the chronic inability of international actors to adapt their assistance”.\textsuperscript{819} In the context of Sierra Leone, a transition to the \textit{Agenda for Change} was feasible. For a variety of reasons it has not yet been so easy for external actors to adapt their assistance within the Burundian context, but moves are being made to adopt the PRSPII as the Commission’s core strategic document. The second draft of the Paper is currently being prepared. When it is finalised, and is deemed to include a more appropriate balance of security and development priorities, it is expected that the PBC will programmatically align with it.

By being conflict sensitive and going with the grain of locality the PBC saw an opportunity to enhance its engagement in Sierra Leone, and took it. This decision has yielded positive results. The fact that this strategy has thus far been resisted in Burundi indicates two things: firstly, that the PBC has managed to move beyond the “cookie-cutter approach”\textsuperscript{820} the UN has been accused of employing in Africa previously. Secondly, because the PBC is beginning to become much more contextually sensitive it is discovering that programmes which work in one place (e.g. Sierra Leone) do not necessarily apply in the same way in more complex environments such as Burundi As Helen Clark, the administrator of the UNDP explained, “we need to listen more and better to those we seek to help, and focus on support for country driven processes.”\textsuperscript{821}

\textsuperscript{817} McCandless and Tschirgi, “Strategic Frameworks,” 30
\textsuperscript{818} Campbell, “When Process Matters,” 20
\textsuperscript{820} Bariagaber, “United Nations Peace Operations,”
Progress here, as with any other area of peacebuilding, will be slow. However, there are already positive signs. In a highly encouraging move, the PBC has

[…] agreed to streamline the IPBS for future countries on its agenda […] The document will briefly spell out peacebuilding priorities, indicating mutual commitments and proposing frequency of periodic reviews of progress, and will be aligned with and build on existing national and UN frameworks.

Now the IPBS has been re-imagined in a more supportive role, it yields great power. If the areas discussed in this conclusion are similarly evaluated and re-conceptualised, levels of coherence and coordination will undoubtedly begin to rise in the years to come. The PBC may not have made great strides in its first five years, but the potential for it to make a significant contribution to post-conflict countries in the years to come make it too valuable a body to write off so soon. It has shown itself to have the potential to fulfill the role imagined for it at its founding, and become a critical external catalyst of more integrated global, regional and national strategies for effective peacebuilding and development.

Those of us interested in its success should work to ensure that the UN, regional organisations, nation states and peoples are able to be more intentional about ways of guaranteeing both development and peacebuilding in post conflict environments. In particular it is important that the current division of labour between the UN and all other actors be more responsive to locality and context so that locals can set realistic and plausible post conflict peace building agendas and outsiders can help in their realization.
10. Concluding Remarks

10.1. Summary:

In assessing the efforts of the Peacebuilding Commission to implement the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies in their two foundation cases, Sierra Leone and Burundi, it has become clear that the Commission has failed to significantly improve levels of coherence and coordination.

However, it would seem that with a re-conceptualisation of the IPBS, and of the role it and the Commission should play in peacebuilding operations, the performance of the PBC could improve appreciably. After having presented a review of the available relevant literature; having outlined the historical evolution of the PBC, and the position it holds within the UN body; this thesis presented two case studies, Sierra Leone and Burundi. Each of these studies examined the context of conflict and the implementation of the IPBS by the PBC. Finally, in the previous chapter, comparisons and conclusions were drawn. Areas in which the PBC could improve were outlined. An improvement in these areas, it is argued, will lead to more effective IPBSs, and greater levels of coherence and coordination. In the past, the UN has been accused of not operating as a learning organisation. However, it is argued that the PBC has shown evidence in its work thus far of being able to learn from its past, and make changes accordingly. If this learning is maximised, then prospects for the PBC are positive.

The areas in which it is suggested the PBC must improve can be grouped under the following headings:

- Concept
- Context
- Cooperation
- Change, rather than continuation
10.2. Areas for Improvement

10.2.1. Concept:

With the original IPBSs implemented in Sierra Leone and Burundi, the PBC “built upon and brought together the various existing tools, agreements, plans, and commitments under a single international framework.”\(^{822}\) The Commission did not, however, “offer any new analysis or strategy”.\(^{823}\) Coherence and coordination are undoubtedly threatened in the face of this kind of multiplicity and confusion. It is critical therefore that the PBC reconceptualise their IPBSs to support and strengthen the existing strategies in agenda countries. If future cases are to enjoy improved levels of coherence and coordination, the IPBS must be viewed as an “instrument of engagement, rather than a strategic framework.”\(^{824}\) They must support, and be aligned with existing strategies in agenda countries, and clearly outline their contribution to the priorities areas identified. Although the PBC has already recognised this, it will be a test of its true organisational learning capacity as to whether this reconceptualisation is fully implemented in cases to come.

The very idea of peacebuilding itself must also be re-imagined. If higher levels of coherence and coordination are to be achieved, then any confusion over what peacebuilding actually entails needs to be eliminated. As illustrated in the literature review, and in following chapters, there are countless definitions offered for peacebuilding. All of these differ in what they consider to come under the peacebuilding umbrella, and where they think peacebuilding operations should focus their energies. It is almost impossible to agree on one definition which fits every peacebuilding instance, and which is suitable for all partners involved. As such, McAskie’s suggestion that peacebuilding is not an activity, nor a point on the spectrum, but a methodology\(^{825}\), is a sound one. If peacebuilding partners were to approach each case with no preconceptions as to what their mission should involve, but rather to allow the situation of the country they are working in to set their

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\(^{822}\) McCandless and Tschirgi, “Strategic Frameworks that Embrace Mutual Accountability,” 29
\(^{823}\) Ibid.
\(^{824}\) Ibid.
\(^{825}\) McAskie, “2020 Vision,” 5
parameters for them, levels of conceptual confusion would decrease. Improved levels of coherence and coordination would doubtlessly stem from this.

10.2.2. Context:

Allowing the situation of the agenda country to dictate the type of contribution the Commission will make is critical to the PBC’s success. Context sensitivity is key to an operation that brings together suitable actors to work towards realistic and necessary goals. Heeding the context in which they are to be engaged is also critical in achieving the right balance of security and development commitments. As illustrated with Sierra Leone and Burundi, countries at different stages of the post-conflict timeline, and with very different causes of conflict, require different types of peacebuilding priorities. Some may need a greater balance of security-oriented projects, while others may find an even balance of security and development schemes is more suitable. Again, it is almost impossible to determine whether one of the two is more important, whether one should come before the other, whether one relies on the other, and which of the two peacebuilding should be more focused on. This is arguably because the answer to these questions depends on the country. Accepting that context sensitivity is integral to understanding the security development nexus will ensure that peacebuilding partners have a greater chance of agreeing on a coherent strategy, and coordinating with one another more successfully.

10.2.3. Cooperation:

The PBC has much ground to make up in the area of cooperation. First, it must improve its relationship with one of its parent organs: the Security Council. Despite the fact that the permanent members of the Council also serve on the Organisational Committee of the PBC, and on each of its Country-Specific Configurations, there is remarkably little overlap between the work of the two bodies. An improved relationship would allow information sharing, and could help with a more seamless transition between the peacekeeping operation and the peacebuilding project. As McAskie has suggested, it could also help to both bodies to better understand the link
between security and development, and the lack of development priorities in certain areas of the UN’s work at present.\textsuperscript{826}

The relationship between UN Headquarters and teams in the field also needs to improve. At present, imbalances in the division of labour and failures in communication between the two are seriously jeopardising the work of the Commission. A more logical approach needs to be employed, where field staff determine policy objectives, and headquarters is left to fulfil the first aspect of the PBC mandate: the marshalling of resources, and drawing sustained international attention to the plight of the countries on their agenda.

The relationship between the PBC and internal actors also needs to be refined. As identified in the literature review and following chapters, local ownership is a critical element in peacebuilding success, and one which the PBC does not appear to have mastered yet. The balance between support and imposition is a delicate one, and one on which the PBC needs to focus more energy and consideration. Imposing an external strategy on an agenda country creates enmity and distrust. Allowing an agenda country to determine their own peacebuilding strategy is equally dangerous, presupposing that the country is a body of people united in ideology and agenda. A balance must therefore be found. Perhaps the best way the PBC could do this is to allow national conversations to take place, from which peacebuilding priorities would eventually emerge. When these priorities have been made clear, the PBC could position its IPBS to align with these. The IPBS would be fulfilling its new mission: to support existing strategies, and to be an “instrument of engagement, rather than a strategic framework.”\textsuperscript{827} Coherence would be improved, and as collaboration strengthened, levels of coordination would also rise.

10.2.4. Change, rather than continuation:

Of course, all of these areas of improvement rely on one thing: the ability of the PBC to demonstrate a capacity for organisational learning. As has been discussed, although the Working Group for Lessons Learned has proven to be somewhat of a

\textsuperscript{826} McAskie, “2020 Vision,” 23

\textsuperscript{827} McCandless and Tschirgi, “Strategic Frameworks,” 41
disappointment, the PBC has still shown evidence it can be a learning organisation. Sierra Leone, in particular, could be hailed as a best-practice instance, with lessons learned from the PBC’s engagement there influencing the nature of ongoing and future PBC operations. More instances of this kind of behaviour are necessary if the Commission is to fulfil the aspirations of its founders and improve levels of coherence and coordination in international peacebuilding operations.

10.3. Implications for Hypotheses:

There were two hypotheses presented in the introduction to this thesis. It was hypothesised that:

1) The PBC has experienced difficulty in improving aspects of coherence and coordination. Agendas of organisations involved in implementing the IPBS (the core strategic document of the PBC mission) and the advisory nature of the Commission have both contributed to this.

2) The UNPBC has experienced difficulty in learning from the past, and becoming an effective learning organisation, because of a preference in UN culture to focus on immediate problem solving.

The first hypothesis has been proven. The PBC has experienced difficulty in improving levels of coherence and coordination. Both the agendas of organizations involved in implementing the IPBSs, and the advisory nature of the Commission have contributed to this. As has been discussed, IPBSs benefit most from agencies and organizations that are willing to make a holistic commitment to the goals and actions of an IPBS, rather than committing sporadically. Organisations that are willing to make this commitment are those who share organisational and structural coherence with the PBC; others, whose agendas and strategies differ, are less willing to commit, and make higher levels of coherence and coordination a much more difficult reality.

The advisory nature of the PBC also impedes its progress here. With no ability to operationalise programmes, and no real authority on the ground, organisations whose agendas and strategies differ are free to commit how and when they chose.
Hypothesis two has been proven, but to a lesser extent. The UN has experienced difficulty in learning from its past. It has been accused of having a pathologically short term focus, which impedes certain operations, some of which occur in the peacebuilding arena. However, the PBC does seem to be showing glimpses of organisational learning capacity, having tweaked its idea of an IPBS to better accommodate and help those living in its agenda countries. However, as discussed, there is still room for improvement. The areas outlined in the Conclusions and Comparisons chapter are those from which the PBC must learn, and subsequently adapt, if it wishes to be the organ envisaged at its inception.

10.4. Limitations:

There were several limitations in the production of this thesis. The first, and the most significant, was the difficulty in accessing detailed information regarding the work of the PBC on the ground in agenda countries. The Commission has only been in existence since 2005, and while there is a reasonable amount of literature available regarding the expectations and aspirations of the body, there is much less which concerns itself with performing detailed critiques of the Commission’s performance thus far. While there was some difficulty in getting in touch with those who have been involved in the PBC’s work in Sierra Leone and Burundi, a series of interviews and email correspondences helped fill some of these gaps.

Secondly, a thesis of this size somewhat limits the number of case studies that can be undertaken. The PBC currently has five countries on its agenda, yet only two are examined here. The slow nature of peacebuilding and the UN itself also means that conducting case studies on the three remaining agenda countries (Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, and Liberia) was not a realistic task. While Sierra Leone and Burundi have been on the Commission’s agenda for five years, the others are much more recent engagements for the PBC, and have not seen a similar level of progress as the two foundation cases.
10.5. Opportunities for further research:

This inability to consider all PBC agenda countries in a coherence and coordination comparison provides one area in which further research could be carried out. In the years to come, considering all five cases (and any others that had been added to the agenda and were at a suitable stage) would provide a more comprehensive picture of the Commission’s efforts in improving coherence and coordination through the use of the IPBS. Additionally, seeing as there was a decent gap between the foundation cases and the engagement in the next three countries, a comparative case study could further evaluate the Commission’s capacity for organisational learning. The extent to which the PBC has learned from its foundation cases could be more fully understood.

There are also four areas touched on in the thesis which, in particular, warrant further investigation. The first concerns the advisory nature of the PBC. While not discussed in detail, it has been identified as an impediment in the PBC’s work. A consideration of whether operational capacity would significantly improve the actions of the Commission, and whether it would be a realistic goal for the UN to aspire to, would be helpful in evaluating the future prospects of the PBC.

The second area is donor motivation. It was suggested that holistic commitment from donors, such as that of DfID in Sierra Leone, is critical to IPBS success. It was posited that organisational and strategic coherence are critical to donors pledging their holistic support to an IPBS. However, what is unclear is whether other factors come into play in this decision. Is it the attraction of an IPBS implemented in a country like Sierra Leone, where a degree of peace has been relatively stable for a number of years now, and where security and development programmes can be implemented with the realistic expectation of positive results? Or is it linked to the contribution of an individual, a leader or country representative who has an agenda, political or otherwise? IPBSs are nothing without organisations to implement the work they pledge to carry out in support of the agenda country. Attempting to more fully understand how and why these organisations get involved helps not only to make the IPBSs more successful, but gives a better chance of improving levels of coherence and coordination in the operations.
The third area is closely linked to the second. It concerns this new aspect of coherence that is not given detailed consideration in de Coning’s quadrangular model: organizational and strategic coherence. As stated above, it is suggested that if a donor harmonises its organization coherence with that of an organization such as the UN, for example, a more successful IPBS is likely to be implemented. This organizational coherence warrants further consideration. How is it achieved? Is it something which is already in existence, or can it be worked towards by way of collaboration between the two groups? If it is something which has to develop through partnership, to what extent do the above factors (security/development priorities, post-conflict stage of the agenda country, leader influence) affect the outcome?

The fourth area also concerns donors and their motivations. This time, though, it touches upon the suggestion that there are certain ‘good global citizens’, whose manifest altruism is a major factor in the success of certain strategies and programmes. In the case of the PBC, commitments from Scandinavia, Japan, the UK, and Germany are significant. Others, such as the United States and France, pledge reasonably little. Again, a deeper understanding of the dynamics of will and incentive in relation to international donors and multilateral agencies would be beneficial to the future success of the PBC and its IPBSs.

Undertaking further case studies, and considering the concept of donor coherence in more detail will help to provide a fuller picture of the Commission’s capabilities to improve coherence, and in turn, coordination in international peacebuilding missions. With more analysis such as this, and a commitment on the part of the PBC to maximise its capacity for organizational learning, the IPBS could become a valuable instrument for improving coherence and coordination, and could help the PBC to fulfil its expectations in the years to come.
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Appendix One: Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework
Appendix Two: Introduction to the Sierra Leone *Agenda for Change*

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Appendix Three: Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi
Appendix Four: Executive Summary of the First Burundi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)