Brand New Zealand: 
Media Governmentality and Affective Biopower

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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that in an age of brand identity and media governmentality, Brand New Zealand capitalizes on concepts of community, patriotism and nationhood to (re)frame Aotearoa New Zealand as a business enterprise, as Aotearoa New Zealand Incorporated. I claim that the branding phenomenon in general and nation-branding in particular represent, first, the (re)inscription and dominance of market imperatives on a global scale and, second, the rising influence of media governmentality as the predominant strategy of social control.

Media governmentality concerns, first and foremost, the constitution and organisation of affect, and branding is the structuring principle through which affect is appropriated and extracted. I coin the term ‘affective biopower’ to link Michel Foucault’s concepts of biopower and governmentality with affect and with the power inherent in productive sociality and in the human capacity for building a common. I characterize neoliberal government, not only in terms of particular economic policies and political rationality, but more precisely in terms of the production of subjectivity and the biopolitical regulation of the social through increasingly ubiquitous modes of media governmentality. At stake here is the problematic contradiction between direct forms of governance that address rational autonomous citizens of the neoliberal nation-state and indirect forms of governance that shape neoliberal subjectivity through the affective domains of brand identity and media culture. My specific contribution to this field of study consists in positing the concept of affective biopower as fundamental to brand logic and media governmentality and as key to governance in a neoliberal state.

My study highlights the commodification of the social and the articulation of the social bond in terms of capitalist enterprise and focuses on the promotion and marketing of Aotearoa New Zealand. I situate affective biopower as the vital mode of production in contemporary capitalist relations and claim media networks and brand technologies access and harness affective biopower for global capital. What is most significant and relevant about this critical-theoretical approach is that it forefronts the crucial role of affect and affective biopower in normalizing brand society, media governmentality and neoliberal capitalism.
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INTRODUCTION

Brand New Zealand

This thesis situates the brand as one of the most significant social developments of the neoliberal era and claims that Brand New Zealand capitalizes on concepts of community, patriotism and nationhood to (re)frame Aotearoa New Zealand as a business enterprise, as Aotearoa New Zealand Incorporated. It argues that the branding phenomenon in general, and nation-branding in particular, represent, first, the (re)inscription and dominance of market imperatives on a global scale and, second, the rising influence of media governmentality as the predominant strategy of social control.

Brand New Zealand, with its emphasis on image and reputation and production of carefully crafted marketable identities, has become the hallmark of a strategically well-managed neoliberal state. Brand-states channel natural resources and social productivity into narratives of marketing and globalization, and not only disavow responsibility for growing social deprivation and inequities, but also utilize totalitarian surveillance and security measures to control the population and protect the image of the nation brand. In short, brand-states characterize present-day liberalism by situating the market as the measure of all things, and by insisting that the dynamics of free markets and free trade preclude the need for interrogative and antagonistic politics. Brand-states facilitate profit for corporate oligarchies which control the world’s resources and which utilize global mediascapes to shape subjectivity, manage populations and normalize neoliberal capitalism.

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1 Aotearoa is the most commonly used Māori name for New Zealand and, as official signage is increasingly bilingual, I use both names when referring to the nation-state; Brand New Zealand is a generic term for situating the nation-state as a country brand.

2 I elaborate on the concept of media governmentality later in the Introduction and again in Chapter Two.
Brand New Zealand epitomizes the form of nation brand that is produced and managed within a hierarchy of brand states to serve global capital and facilitate neoliberal globalization but my study is much more than a political critique of neoliberal governance. My claim is that neoliberal society is the product of affect manipulation, brand power and media governmentality and that brands function by infiltrating circuits of social life, in both media-generated and face-to-face contexts, to attract affective investment and secure cultural value. My approach draws together a wide range of thought and links media and cultural studies with branding and a neoliberal political economy in a way that has not been undertaken before in the Aotearoa New Zealand context. Sue Curry Jansen provides a point of departure for this study when she argues that nation branding facilitates globalized market fundamentalism and claims it can only be “the apparent simplicity and superficiality of place branding” that accounts for “its relative neglect by academic researchers” (2008: 131). Stephen Turner also affirms my approach when he comments on Toby Miller’s account of the Aotearoa New Zealand All Black rugby team as “an instance of processes of globalization, governmentalization, Americanization, televisualization, and commodification” (2004: 101). Turner claims such critique needs to also address “the logic and structure of affective affiliation, or in a local case, the work of representation in promulgating a settler society and promoting its economy” which, as he argues, “is no less an aspect of globalizing capital” (2004: 101). My thesis utilizes an eclectic mix of

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academic scholarship and exemplary moments across different sites to explore brand identity in Aotearoa New Zealand, and focuses not so much on the economic rationale of market capitalism but more on the production of affective investment and control of the social through the medium of the brand.

My research highlights both the reiterative processes at play in changing modes of (neo)liberal governance and the multifarious modes of governmentality that shape and control a brand society. It explores the historical conditions informing the evolution of a brand-based, market economy in Aotearoa New Zealand while also focusing on the interactive and globalized media structures that dominate and shape everyday life. It draws from, and is inspired by, Michel Foucault’s insightful discussion on the concept of governmentality. As Foucault states, an interrogation of the concept of governmentality requires us to “create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subject” (1982: 777). And, as Foucault states, such an undertaking implies critical thought, “constant checking” of “the historical conditions which motivate our conceptualizations” and “an historical awareness of our present circumstances” (1982: 778). To engage in such an inquiry I combine historical accounts and political analysis with media and cultural scholarship. I also highlight the importance of rugby in constructions of national identity and nation brand (McGee, 1995; Hope, 2002; Perry, 2004; Turner, 2004; Lewis & Winder, 2007). I link the evolution of market fundamentalism with capitalist hegemony, and situate tourism, All Black rugby and the management of indigenous Māori as fine exemplars of the reiterative practices that inform our present circumstances. These issues are a recurring theme throughout this thesis and work both to background and illuminate this analysis of media culture and neoliberal capitalism in Aotearoa New Zealand. Jeffrey Sissons highlights the management of Māori communities, for example, when writing in 2004, he makes the point that all strategies of government and narrations of nationhood have been grounded in “the simultaneous individualization and tribalization of Māori society since the late 19th century” (2004: 19).

It was Foucault who made the point that “the state’s power (and that’s one of the reasons for its strength) is both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power” (1982: 782). The history of Māori subjugation serves to establish the overall trajectory of branding as a

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management technique and situates the nation brand as a “matrix of individualization” and thus a key strategy of social control (1982: 783).

My empirical resources range from magazines, newspapers and advertising campaigns to film archives and a play, but mostly my study focuses on television: documentaries, news and current affairs programmes and especially reality TV programmes (Ouellette and Hay, 2008; Hearn, 2006, 2008; Kavka, 2004). It is important to note that television, and the reality TV genre in particular, does not necessarily elicit from viewers the desired responses structured by the genre itself. However, viewers are invited to participate in a televsual community that not only invokes a national identity but also works to establish personalized responsibility in a risk society (Osuri, 2006). Reality TV enacts a highly visible form of market-based social welfare and circulates informal guidelines for living based on image, brand identity and consumerism. The power of brands is insinuated in Reality TV’s consumer culture and the notion of lifestyle; through lifestyle, brands serve to manage, control and ‘style’ life itself. Lifestyle is a paradoxical social force which emulates strategies of state power by functioning to individualize while simultaneously having a totalizing effect, thus underpinning and consolidating the nation brand’s ‘matrix of individualization’ (see Foucault above). Brand marketers utilize modes of media governmentality to shape conduct and are instrumental in fuelling the relentless demand for self-improvement and image-based identity that informs lifestyle culture.

This study also includes analysis of the emergence and development of branding as a system of meaning-making, of identity-building and of social control. It compares the celebratory accounts of brand marketers (Olins, Anholt, van Ham) with the work of cultural studies scholars (Jansen, Holt, Mosco, Aronzcyk) and utilizes the scholarship of Zygmunt Bauman, Nikolas Rose and Pierre Bourdieu, for example, to critique the lifestyle politics and consumer culture branding mechanisms valorize and advocate. What comes through in this thesis is the seamless interweaving of media-generated social interaction and face-to-face sociality in the production of subjectivity, whether at individual, corporate or national level and the relentless imposition of brand value as social value. In summary, I draw from a wide-ranging collection of case studies to demonstrate how interactive modes of media governmentality and increasingly ubiquitous systems of self-surveillance normalize consumerist, brand identities and deploy exclusionary tactics in order to secure brand states for global capital.
Brands function in conjunction with digital technology and advanced communication systems as a crucial device for narrating social identity and for generating neoliberal subjectivity. The brand not only utilizes interactive systems of communication for effect, it is itself a production of media technology and key to new modes of governance in a mediated world. As Melissa Aronczyk and Devon Powers state, the multiple capabilities of the brand “to frame relationships both economic and social; to represent, communicate and circulate forms of value, and to create and capture modes of attention – make for striking parallels with the digital technologies that currently dominate and assimilate the mediated environment” (2010: 18).

The brand, is a media object, an interface, and a medium of exchange between producer and consumer, and has become one of the key cultural forces of our time and one of the most important mechanisms of a globalized economy. Celia Lury incorporates the work of media and cultural theorists to locate her study of brands within a broad analysis of “the implications of the use of information, image and media in the integration, co-ordination and organisation of the economy and everyday life” (2004: 18). Citing Brian Massumi (2002), for example, she states that one of the most significant characteristics of the brand is that it is an object that is designed so that it may be otherwise; that “the brand is an example of transitivity, of the introduction of possibility into the thing” (2004: 151). In other words, brands “exist in a state of indetermination, a situation of (un)control” and, as Lury points out, it is this that makes them “an increasingly important object-ive of contemporary capitalism” (2004: 151). However, as Lury explains, while brands inject a measure of “objective uncontrol, a margin of eventfulness, a liveliness” into processes of production, they also tend to tie “object and subject together in what are often coercively predictable ways” (2004: 159). Lury concludes: “it is important to remember that the brand is not simply a machine for the production or consumption of information; it retains margins of indeterminacy, and the activities of consumers can extend these margins” (2004: 162). My study expands on Lury’s study by exploring the ways brands mediate margins of indeterminacy to accommodate the activities of consumers and by examining how such consumer creativity is channelled and coerced. My claim is that it is the power inherent in affect, in affective investment and in productive sociality that is crucial to the function and profitability of a brand and that brand power is, therefore, constituted in and through the socialization of affect.
Affective Biopower

Brian Massumi signals the importance of affect to brands and branding mechanisms when he explains affect as “a way of talking about that margin of manoeuvrability, the ‘where we might be able to go and what we might be able to do’ in every present situation” (2003: 2). In short, affect refers to power, the power to act and to affect, or to be affected. Massumi quotes Spinoza to talk of the body in terms of its capacity for affecting or being affected; he makes the point that these two capacities are not different, they always go together (2003: 2-3). Every affect then is a “doubling,” an affecting-being affected, redoubled by an experience of the experience, which “gives the body’s movements a kind of depth that stays with it across all its transitions – accumulating in memory, in habit, in reflex, in desire, in tendency” (2003: 3, emphasis in original). Each individual is a composite of drives and affective states and our conscious knowledge is never a complete or adequate reflection of those states. Affects inform our consciousness, animate our experience and without our full awareness, underpin ways in which we act, react and feel.

Affect as a whole then is the “virtual co-presence of potentials” and, as Masumi makes clear, “in affect, we are never alone”:

Affects in Spinoza’s definition are basically ways of connecting, to others and to other situations. They are our angle of participation in processes larger than ourselves. With intensified affect comes a stronger sense of embeddedness in a larger field of life – a heightened sense of belonging, with other people and to other places (2003: 4).

In his Foreword to Antonio Negri’s text on Spinoza, Michael Hardt also makes the point that “power is always organizing itself in a collective dimension” (1991: xi, emphasis added). Hardt cites Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise and parts III and IV of Ethics as central texts in understandings of the transmission of affect because these texts:

Develop an analysis of the real, immediate and associative movements of human power, driven by imagination, love and desire. It is through this organizational project of power that the metaphysical discussion of human nature enters the domain of ethics and politics (1991: xi).

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5 Spinoza writes “By emotion [affectus] I understand the affections of the body by which the body’s power of activity is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, together with the ideas of these affections” (2002: 278).
Spinoza emphasises both the associative tropes of human power and its crucial underpinnings within the affective domains of imagination, love and desire. This means that social power is engendered and legitimated through the constitution and manipulation of structures of affect. As Massumi explains, to move in an ethical direction, from a Spinozan point of view, is not to attach positive or negative values to actions according to a “pre-set system of judgment” but to assess actions according to “what kind of potential they tap into and express” (2003: 6). Ethics, in this sense, is “always situational” and “completely pragmatic”; it happens between people, in the social gaps, and is about “how we inhabit uncertainty, together” (2003: 6). For Massumi, “the ethical value of an action is what it brings out in the situation, for its transformation, how it breaks sociality open” (2003: 6). Massumi cites Spinoza to claim there is still a distinction between good and bad even if there’s not one between good and evil: “Basically the ‘good’ is affectively defined as what brings maximum potential and connection to the situation. It is defined in terms of becoming” (2003: 6).

The value of the brand is directly correlated to its ability to attract and appropriate affective investments and to capitalize on human capacities for generating ethical surplus and for building a common. Hardt distinguishes between two types of ‘common,’ the first, closely associated with 17th century English usage of ‘the commons’ (with ‘s’), refers to “the earth and all the resources associated with it” and the second, as I use it, refers to “the results of human labour and creativity, such as ideas, language, affects, and so forth” (2010: 7). A ‘common’ as defined by Massumi is “what brings maximum potential and connection to the situation … becoming” (2003: 6). Brand value is based on its ability to infiltrate the circuits of social life and to become a symbol of commonality among the identities, affiliations, fantasies and aspirations that social life generates. By inviting consumers/citizens to actively participate and engage with producers/politicians in constructing meaning and context for products, places, services and experiences, brand marketers become arbiters of taste, style, ethics and values and so come to dominate both the production of self and the organization of social collectives. Brands function to produce desire, to shape and guide affective investments and thereby inform and dominate both the production of ‘self’ and the management of society as a globalized marketplace. Brand management is based less on direct understanding and promotion of a productive process and more on indirect influence on patterns of consumption and on access to the affect value inherent in human sociality. The important point here is that brands in
themselves, inherently, do not possess power; brands are the catalysts through which power operates and brands must work to capture the affect value produced in social connections and “the virtual co-presence of potentials” (2003: 6).

Both branding and nation-branding are inextricably linked with affective affiliation, with collective aspirations and with what Benedict Anderson (1991) calls “imagined communities”. Hardt and Negri pick up on Anderson’s formulation adding that, in their terms, the conjuring of a national imaginary is “another way of saying a deployment of the common” (2009: 163). They define “the common” as both “the common wealth of the material world” and, more importantly, “those results of social production that are necessary for social interaction and further production, such as knowledges, languages, codes, information, affects and so forth” (2009: viii). They explain that “when we band together, when we form a social body that is more powerful than any of our individual bodies alone, we are constructing a new and common subjectivity” (2009: 180). Hardt and Negri stress that capitalist production relies on what “the common” produces and that a capitalist political economy is “an enormous apparatus for developing the common networks of social cooperation and capturing their results as private accumulation” (2009: 162). Hardt makes the point:

Although the production of the common is increasingly central to the capitalist economy, capital cannot intervene in the production process and must instead remain external, expropriating value in the form of rent (through financial and other mechanisms). As a result the production and productivity of the common becomes an increasingly autonomous domain, still exploited and controlled, of course, but through mechanisms that are relatively external (2010: 10).

This thesis invokes the term ‘affective biopower’ to encapsulate the production and productivity of the common and claims that the brand is neoliberalism’s prime mechanism for accessing and exploiting this autonomous domain. Michel Foucault speaks of biopower “to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life” (1978: 143). He points out that “it is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility” and taking charge of life through continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms (1978: 143). Foucault uses the term “biopower” to refer to the systematic production of a social norm and claims, “a normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centred on life” (1978: 144). In other words, as Foucault describes it, power is productive,
and it works to produce not so much repressions as predictable paths, regularities and social norms.

Although this thesis focuses on the affective production of regularities and social norms, it also asserts that affective biopower can never be fully captured or contained and is, therefore, always an inherently political force producing constant social struggle and resistance. I draw attention to instances of anti-capitalist resistance in chapter one, for example, when I discuss the influence of Colin Scrimgeour’s national radio broadcasts during the 1930s depression, and again later when I describe a local campaign against the building of an aluminium smelter at Aramoana, Dunedin, Aotearoa New Zealand. Scrimgeour was marked as a political activist when his critique of poverty and socioeconomic deprivation struck a chord with listeners, built him a nation-wide following and provoked political change. The resistive response to the building of an aluminium smelter near the tidal mudflats in Otago harbour was a small, local affair but in this case, also, people came together in a movement of affective relationality and shared purpose against the dominant order. What comes through in analysis of resistant movements is that dominant hegemonies utilize affective domains to bolster norms, to construct a unified social imaginary and to deflect, absorb and re-inscribe resistive potential as manageable difference. As Massumi argues, “capitalism is the global usurpation of belonging” and although affective biopower is massively potentializing, “the potentialization is just as massively delivered to proliferating spaces of containment” (2002: 83, emphasis in original).

In the workings of contemporary capitalism, brands have become the weapons of choice for motivating and manipulating affect, for informing and generating social norms and so for “distributing the living in the domain of value and utility” (1978: 143). Brand marketers target affective investment in order to produce brand loyalty; brands work to fabricate affective attention and, as cultural nodes come together around a product, “the product gets used more and more to create social networks that radiate out from it” (Massumi, 2003: 12). Massumi makes the point that individual consumers are being “inducted” into brand networks rather than “being separated out and addressed as free agents who are supposed to make an informed consumer choice as rational individuals” (2003: 12). He claims “it’s a fiction that there is any position within society that enables you to maintain yourself as a separate entity with complete control over your decisions”
Massumi argues that it is crucial to take stock “of the affective way power operates” and to interrogate both the “socialization of capital and the new functioning of the mass media” (2003: 18). Drawing on the work of Spinoza and Deleuze and Guattari, Massumi identifies affect as central to an understanding of twenty-first century, image-based capitalist culture and to the relations of power through which individuals are made subject and nation-states control the social.

Other Media and Cultural Studies scholars also recognize the importance of affect in the production and organization of neoliberal society. Jeremy Gilbert, for example, citing Deleuze and Guattari claims “their language of ‘desiring-machines’ and ‘rhizomes’ is precisely designed to describe patterns of experience in terms which wholly refuse to assume that either the individual or some traditional form of collective agent (‘class’, ‘nation’) is the basic unit of experience” (2004: 25). He argues that “competitive individualism has emerged across a vast range of sites as the hegemonic ideology of contemporary neoliberalism, working against any notion of collectivity, of public good, of shared experience” and that “it is surely one of the tasks of cultural studies today to work against this hegemony” (2004: 27). Gilbert concludes, “To think affect is to think the social, and nothing is more important right now” (2004: 27). Anna Gibbs cites Silvan Tomkins (1962-1992) to situate affects as “the primary human motivational system” and to claim that “affect contagion” should be “of particular potential importance to Cultural Studies” (2002: 337). Gibbs highlights the link between media and affect, arguing “that what is co-opted by the media is primarily affect, and that the media function as amplifiers and modulators of affect which is transmitted by the human face and voice, and also by music and other forms of sound, and also by the image” (2002: 338).

Clare Hemmings, however, challenges the recent Cultural Studies uptake of affect arguing this “affective rewriting flattens out poststructuralist inquiry by ignoring the counter-hegemonic contributions of postcolonial and feminist theorists, only thereby positioning affect as ‘the answer’ to contemporary problems of cultural theory” (2005: 548). For Hemmings, Cultural Studies scholars tend to situate affect outside social meaning and to

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6 Gibbs explains: “Affect contagion falls within the domain of ‘sympathetic communication’. Sympathetic modes of communication involve form-sharing, especially sharing of movement and affect, and they not only persist alongside linguistic modes, but inhabit and actively shape them” (2005: 338). She continues: “It is in this broad context, then, that we might begin to think about the means by which biological capacities for affective response, mimetic communication and cross-modalization are co-opted in and by the cultural world and to formulate a new view of the relationship between media and audiences” (2005: 338).
focus on the transformative potential of affect thereby downplaying its equally powerful normative tendency which manifests as “a central mechanism of social reproduction” and social organization (2005: 551). Hemmings appraises Massumi’s turn to affective autonomy as a misreading of Deleuze’s description of the relationship between body and mind and invokes Tomkins to counter argue that “it is the reinvigoration of previous affective states and their effects, rather than affective freedom that allows us to make our bodies mean something that we recognize and value” (2005: 564). Hemmings elaborates on Deleuze’s “maps of intensity” to claim that affective cycles can be described in terms of an “ongoing, incrementally altering chain – body-affect-emotion-affect-body – doubling back upon the body and influencing the individual’s capacity to act in the world” (2005: 564). Hemmings pursues this interpretation of Deleuze’s “maps of intensity” further, claiming “these affective cycles form patterns that are subject to reflective or political, rather than momentary or arbitrary judgements” (2005: 564). According to Hemmings, it is on these terms that reflective or political judgment provides an alternative to dominant social norms, and it is in this way that affect might be valuable “precisely to the extent that it is not autonomous” (2005: 565). While Hemmings is correct to argue that affect might be valuable to the extent that it is not autonomous, it must be noted that Massumi makes the same important point and is very aware of the normative tendency inherent in the forces of affective connection. Here, I refer again to the 2003 interview in which Massumi stresses affect’s interactive, never entirely personal, contagious capacity:

When you affect something, you are at the same time opening yourself up to being affected in turn, and in a slightly different way than you might have been the moment before (2003: 3).

Massumi points out that the body is defined by the always-changing capacities it carries as it goes along and that every affect is a doubling. Following Spinoza, Massumi explains how the feeling of affect is the first part of a two-sided experience. The experience of being affected by affect’s intensity is accompanied by “experience of the experience” (2003: 3). It is in this way that the body accumulates traces of affect in memory, habit, reflex, desire and in propensity (2003: 3). Massumi refers again to the autonomy of affect in this interview but he does so to argue “that there is no such thing as autonomy and decisive control over one’s life in any total sense … autonomy is always connective” (2003: 19). Although Massumi recognizes the potential for manoeuvrability in affect he also acknowledges its constraining capacity:
Wherever you are, there is still potential, there are openings, and the openings are in the grey areas, in the blur where you’re susceptible to affective contagion, or capable of spreading it. It’s never totally within your personal power to decide (2003: 19).

It is clear, thus that Massumi does not situate affect as “autonomous and outside social signification” as suggested by Hemmings (2005: 549). On the contrary, he claims that socially, the individual is now “a checkpoint trigger and a co-producer of surplus-values of flow” and that “there is no distance anymore between us, our movements and the operations of power, or between the operations of power and the forces of capitalism” (2003: 15). Massumi notes that it is Deleuze and Guattari who call this kind of capitalizing on movement “surplus-value of flow” and explains that what characterizes the “society of control” is that “the economy and the way power functions come together around the generation of this surplus-value of flow” (2003: 14). In an era of informational capitalism, surplus-value of flow is generated affectively through the media and, as Massumi argues, “mass media are not mediating anymore – they become direct mechanisms of control by their ability to modulate the affective dimension” (2003: 15). This thesis affirms the usefulness of affect theory as a critical-theoretical resource and utilizes it in conjunction with Foucault’s work on biopower and governmentality to claim that everyday sociality is always political and that neoliberal government concerns, first and foremost, the governmentalization of affect.

Media Governmentality

Liberal governments have always utilized media systems in order to uphold civil society and mobilize national identity but with the arrival of television, digital communication and the internet, the affect value inherent in media culture becomes a predominant source of value for capital accumulation. Media governmentality is a concept that works to link networks of social power, both technologies of domination and strategies of the self, with media power and with the interactive systems of communication that infiltrate and influence all aspects of neoliberal society. It is not only the case that today’s dominant world economy is represented, or epitomized, in the mediatized production, circulation and accumulation of images but also, that these basic economic processes (production, circulation, exploitation and accumulation) are actually accomplished in and through the
media. As Jonathan Beller contends, “we have passed, in the course of the past century, from an industrial mode of production to a mediatized one”. Beller explains how, just as workers add value to commodities produced in an assembly through a serial process, our participation in the expressivity of commodities (that is, image commodities) increases their “social viability and, therefore, their power and value” (2006b: 184). He builds on the hypothesis that “to look is to labour” by pointing out that spectators not only give their affective potential, or sensual labour, “over to the production of a world objectified as exchange value (or “reality”), they also re-tool themselves” (2006b: 184). According to Beller, media make available an ever-changing array of postures, tastes, desires, attitudes, dispensations and interchanges that correlate with the market itself (what to buy, what to desire, how to behave at work, how to be beautiful) and that feed the market and capitalist production generally. For Beller, “the subjective affects disseminated by the mass media and experienced by the spectator are nothing less than behavioural software” (2006b: 184).

When Beller describes the ability of the media to shape and direct affective subjectivity in terms of “behavioural software” he could also be speaking of the purpose of brands and calls to mind Foucault’s conceptualization of new forms of pastoral power. Foucault points out that this form of power, which for centuries had been linked with Christianity, spread out into the whole social body and “found support in a multitude of institutions” (1982: 784). Instead of a pastoral power and a political power, more or less linked to each other, more or less rival, there emerged an “individualizing ‘tactic’ which characterized a series of powers: those of the family, medicine, psychiatry, education, and employers” (1982: 784). As this series of powers took hold in secular contexts and dealt with issues of “health, well-being (that is, sufficient wealth, standard of living), security, protection against accidents … it was no longer a question of leading people to their salvation in the next world but rather ensuring it in this world” (1982: 784). In other words, “behavioural software” is no longer construed and monopolized by church authorities; instead, it is disseminated through multiple media networks and institutions and negotiated in the interactive spaces of brand production, marketing and consumption (2006b: 184). There are conceptual parallels between pastoral power, biopower and Foucault’s notion of governmentality and these are drawn together by Foucault when he conceptualizes technologies of power in terms of a triangle: “sovereignty, discipline and governmental management which has population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism” (2007: 107-108). In other words, disciplinary, regulatory and
pastoral forms of biopower co-exist and interact in micro and macro formulations of governmentality to inform the biopolitical management of life itself. Foucault’s notions of biopower, biopolitics and governmentality provide the conceptual architecture for linking affect and affective sociality with media culture, the production of subjectivity and governance of neoliberal nation states.

David Nolan (2003) coins the term media governmentality when, writing from an Australian context, he describes a confluence of media and journalistic practices that are increasingly informed by “a neoliberal understanding of the public as a body of sovereign individual consumers exercising choice within a market” (2003: 1372). Nolan focuses his argument on two defining features: the first is that journalism “has become increasingly reliant on quantitative measure of public opinion as a basis of its legitimacy” (2003: 1372). This means that audience size and ratings have gained increasing primacy and a vital element of media expertise now concerns the “ability to change tack, or refocus stories altogether, in response to perceived shifts in public opinion” (2003: 1372). Nolan’s second point is that the neoliberal ethos takes what was an understanding of expertise as institutionally produced techniques of thought and action and resituates it as “the rhetorical claims of individuals competing within a market” (2003: 1372). Within this milieu, politicians become both “acutely conscious of” their media profile and “dependent upon forms of media practice” and journalistic practice, in turn, shifts to accommodate this form of “populism” as “the predominant discursive framework through which a wide range of problems are articulated” (2003: 1373). In Australia, for example, the modes of media governmentality adopted by John Howard (Prime Minister of Australia 1996-2007) have been described as “Howardism” and describe a particular rhetorical framework that identifies the national interest with “the mainstream,” is personified in the figure of the “battler,” and is defined against “elites” and/or “special interests” (2003: 1373). For Nolan, media governmentality concerns a form of media-driven “mainstreaming” which involves the active construction of norms and standards “to which various marginalized are pressured to aspire and to assimilate” (2003: 1373). Nolan makes the point that it is these same norms that also provide the basis upon which problematic individuals and groups tend to be publicly identified, disciplined and punished” (2003: 1373).

Writing also from an Australian context, Goldie Osuri (2006) examines the media reception and persecution of marginalized individuals in a post-9/11 pro-American
nationalist mediascape. She focuses on the experience of Mamdouh Habib, an Egyptian-born Australian citizen once detained in Guantanamo Bay on suspicion of involvement in terrorism, as a case in point. Osuri uses the terms “media governmentality” and “media necropower” to refer to “contemporary media practices which reconfigure the politics of race and assimilability by making racialised bodies culturally intelligible in the war against terrorism” (2006: 1). Osuri states that the production of Habib’s body through nation-state practices of “necropower” and “newsmedia governmentality” illustrate the manner in which “the war against terrorism is not merely an organising narrative, but achieves the status of a discursive formation within which the management of racialised populations requires new forms of assimilability by the nation-state, but also by media worlds and dominant white identities” (2006: 4). I refer to Osuri’s important insights again in Chapter Five when I situate the war on terror in the context of Aotearoa New Zealand and discuss media governmentality in terms of the 2007 anti-terror police raids. Although the raids targeted individual political activists in various locations, it was the Tūhoe people of the Urewera region who were traumatized en masse and constituted as a local version of “racialised bodies culturally intelligible in the war against terrorism” (2006: 1). Both Nolan and Osuri utilize the term ‘media governmentality’ to refer to the symbiotic relationship between national mediascapes and neoliberal governance and to highlight the processes of inclusion and exclusion involved in articulations of nationhood.

Similarly, national television in Aotearoa New Zealand articulates nationhood, generates social cooperation and normalises both business-style politics and brand logic in the social imaginary. In other words, it participates in the process of media governmentality, a process well exemplified in a 2011 reality television series called Make the Politician Work. According to TVNZ’s website, this show takes well-known politicians and challenges them to experience “the real coalface where the impact of their decision-making is felt”.

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7 TVNZ’s website describes Make the Politician Work as “Simply an intrepid journey into their [the politician’s] heartland – their constituency – their portfolio. It’s not a dry, political series – but a light-hearted attempt to find out who the person behind the policy really is” (Make the Politician Work, 2011).

8 Television New Zealand (TVNZ) is a limited liability company wholly owned by the Crown and bound by the requirements of the Television New Zealand Act 2003 and Charter performance requirements based on these themes: “an informed society, national identity/citizenship, Māori, Diversity, New Zealand talent, Innovation and High Standards”. Television New Zealand is partially Government-funded but a large proportion of its revenue comes from advertising and it is expected to perform as a profit-making enterprise.
on a dairy farm in the Waikato region. This match-up is significant on several levels. Firstly, because Locke is described as a political activist, renowned for his critical stance against intensive dairying, it promises to disturb perceptions of the harmonious relationship between politics and business. Secondly, because dairy farming methods are under the media spotlight it threatens to expose the country’s most profitable industry as a problematic environmental disaster area. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, such negative media exposure could be very damaging to the nation’s ‘clean,’ ‘green’ and ‘100% pure’ brand image. However, this is not how the programme plays out. After spending the day working on this “sustainable” dairy farm, Locke is shown how effluent is stored in tanks and returned to the farm as fertilizer, how the waterways are fenced and how sustained riparian planting is not only protecting but also improving the environment. In answer to Locke’s remark, “Perhaps the cleanliness of this catchment is a bit of an example to the other farmers around the country too,” the farmer, Martin, replies, “There’s a lot of this work happening in a lot of catchments throughout the country too”. He then makes the point, “From a dairy farmer’s perspective, it’s pretty hard to get a good news story out about the dairy industry. People like to knock the dairy industry as much as they can and we should be really proud of our dairy farms, our dairy farming system and Fonterra and what it’s achieving for this country”. This call to be ‘proud’ of ‘our’ dairy farms and of what Fonterra is achieving for this country is an appeal for affective investment in the notion of a nation-brand and especially in the idea that it has the people’s best interests at heart. By the end of this programme Locke is upholding the importance of dairy farming to the economy of Aotearoa New Zealand and praising this particular dairy farmer for his admirable farming methods and attention to environmental sustainability and pollution prevention methods. In other words, this reality TV programme makes “the 

9 I refer to the TVNZ series, May-June 2011, Series 1, Episode 7, 5 June 2011, TV One, 7-7.30 pm.

10 Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited is the world’s leading exporter of dairy products, is responsible for approximately 30% of the world’s dairy exports and with revenue exceeding NZ$19.87 billion, is Aotearoa New Zealand’s largest company. Fonterra is owned co-operatively by 11,000 New Zealand dairy farmers. Fonterra’s website informs: “In addition to being one of the top producers of base dairy nutrition for export, including milk powders, cheese and butter, we have substantial interests in consumer branded businesses across Asia, Latin America, Australia and our home market of New Zealand” (Fonterra Co-operative Group, [online] Available at: http://www.fonterra.com/wps/wcm/connect/fonterracom/fonterra.com [Accessed 10.03.12]. Fonterra is discussed again in Chapter Three, with reference to its Mainland Cheese brand, and also briefly in Chapter Four regarding its Telethon sponsorship.
politician work” by re-framing political critique as largely misinformed and by affirming the business/political partnership that works to serve and maximize the nation brand. In this particular case, the reality TV genre ensures the harmonization of even the most disparate forms (business, entertainment, leisure) and generates social cooperation and brand loyalty while advancing a neoliberal agenda and neutralizing (if not discrediting) any potential for political critique.

Gilles Deleuze alludes to the crucial role of affect value and affective capture in brand marketing techniques when he warns, “We’re told businesses have souls, which is surely the most terrifying news in the world” (1995: 181).11 Deleuze finds the idea that ‘businesses have souls’ terrifying because businesses exist to make a profit at all costs and, although brands work to evoke affective affiliation and to enact a sense of community, a business entity is never equivalent to its owners, directors, shareholders or customers. Deleuze’s comment affirms my claim regarding the farmer’s defence and promotion of Fonterra (above) but also calls to mind the work of Joel Bakan who claims that business corporations function as legal entities with a psychopathic personality. Bakan points out how corporations “are required by law to elevate their own interests above those of others” and how this “unbridled self-interest victimizes individuals, the environment, and even shareholders, and can cause corporations to self-destruct”.12 As Bakan also points out, despite this requirement to prey upon and exploit others without regard for legal rules or moral limits, “governments have freed the corporation from legal constraints through deregulation and granted it ever greater power over society through privatization”. Brands mask this amoral, exploitative agenda by providing a product line or corporate entity with a simulated history, personality and values system thus eliciting affective investment and generating ethical surplus for the sake of profit. In a world dominated by media culture and neoliberal capitalism, brand logic permeates the social imaginary and now plays a key role in narrations of nationhood and in expressions of cultural and social identity. Brand culture correlates with consumerist ideology and with the image-based and affect-laden

11 Simon Anholt affirms Deleuze’s claims when he makes the following statement regarding the marketing of Brand New Zealand: “If a country wants to improve its reputation, build personality, increase its brand, increase its footprint on the global mentality it has to create a culture of innovation in every area of national life: in civil society, in companies, in the public and private sector, in NGOs and in schools, most importantly” (Anholt, S., 2009).

12 This information is taken from a website about Bakan’s book, The Corporation, and the film The Corporation, by Mark Achbar, Jennifer Abbot and Joel Bakan (Bakan, 2009).
imperatives of celebrity-style politics, social networking and the pervasive and persuasive narratives of lifestyle culture. Brand culture culminates in processes of nation-branding that work to comprise and inform the brand-state which is articulated (inter)nationally for the purposes of a capitalist political economy. In other words, Brand New Zealand epitomizes the globalizing and systematic uptake of brand logic as the means by which individuals, populations and countries are now constituted, categorized and governed.

**Thesis Structure**

The central concern of this thesis is two-pronged. It is located, first, within the concept of the brand and concerns the crucial role of media culture and affective affiliation in the production of subjectivities and brand identities. It is also located within the liberal paradox that seeks to reconcile liberal principles with a capitalist political economy. This fundamental contradiction posits constant critique of government as the necessary condition of liberal democratic freedom while situating the capitalist agenda of a sovereign state beyond criticism. Although liberalism has always been concomitant with a capitalist political economy and with the expansionist policies of free market principles, Foucault argues that there is a major difference between older forms of liberal philosophy and current neoliberalism. He points out that the initial formula of liberalism constituted the state as the organizer and regulator of the free market and argues that this has been completely turned around by neoliberal principles that “adopt the free market as organizing and regulating principle of the state” (2008: 116). Furthermore, as Foucault also points out, in neoliberal society it is not the exchange of commodities that serves as the regulatory principle, it is the mechanism of competition (2008: 147). It is this shift in regulatory principle that provokes profound transformation in liberal subjectivity and that generates the entrepreneurial, self-centred individual appropriate for neoliberal market capitalism. At stake in this study of liberal governance is the problematic relation between economic and state powers and the crucial role of informational capitalism and media culture in the constitution of the social and the manipulation of the social bond.13 Rather

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13 Adam Arvidsson defines ‘media culture’ as “the culture of modern mass mediated communications” or “the intertextual web of meanings, symbols, images and discourses diffused by (mostly commercial) media like television, magazines, film, radio, the internet, and, most importantly perhaps, advertising”; he claims “Media Culture works as a productive infrastructure that is put to work in the construction of a common social world” (2006: 35).
than situate market, state and society as taken-for-granted or given entities, this study will invoke Foucault’s concept of governmentality to examine and interrogate those relations of power through which such concepts are discursively constructed and normalized.

After stressing the importance of the idea that the state’s very legitimacy is founded “on the guaranteed exercise of an economic freedom,” Foucault claims that “liberal economics could only ever be, and was in fact only ever a tactical instrument or strategy for some countries to obtain an economically hegemonic and politically imperialist position over the rest of the world” (2008: 107). He goes on to declare “in clear and simple terms, liberalism is not the general form which every economic policy must adopt. Quite simply, liberalism is English policy; it is the policy of English domination” (2008: 108).14 My study utilizes the “astonishing topicality” of Foucault’s analysis of liberalism to claim not only that Aotearoa New Zealand is the product and disciple of British imperial policy but also that it epitomizes the uptake of neoliberal notions of freedom and security that now legitimate and enforce global capitalist hegemony (2008a: 116). The problem being addressed here is neoliberal hegemony and the rampant proliferation of an imperialist doctrine that claims freedom, democracy and capitalism are equivalent and compatible and that politics need only concern the upkeep and dissemination of free markets. Adam Ferguson, writing in the 18th century, warned that capitalism was necessarily accompanied by inequality and that, regardless of any pretension to equal rights, “the exaltation of a few must depress the many” (1966: 186). Ferguson argued that it is not political conflict that is problematic but political indifference, brought on by a situation in which men [sic] devote their whole attention to the pursuit of material betterment:

The first predisposing condition of political corruption is a commercial society in which the pursuit of wealth engrosses men’s attention so exclusively that they become wholly self-centred … the second predisposing condition of fatal corruption is the actual achievement of liberty, security and the rule of law (Forbes, citing Ferguson, 1966: xxxvii).

14 Jacques Donzelot was “struck” with the “astonishing topicality” of Foucault’s analysis of liberalism and with the way Foucault was able to demonstrate “how the power of the economy rests on an economy of power, both at the time of the emergence of liberalism at the end of the eighteenth century as well as at that of neo-liberalism between 1930 and 1950” (2008a: 116). Donzelot also states: “In the two volumes of his lectures of 1978 and 1979, we see Michel Foucault making a major intellectual change of direction, moving away from an analysis of power as the formation and production of individuals towards an analysis of governmentality, a concept invented to denote the ‘conduct of conducts’ of men and women, working through their autonomy rather than through coercion even of a subtle kind” (2008b: 48).
Ferguson’s predisposing conditions for ‘political corruption’ and ‘fatal corruption’ come about when “a selfish scramble results in which men become incapable of combining for any purpose whatever” and when wealth and desire for security of property “may serve to support a tyranny” (1966: 239 and 261-262). It is my contention that neoliberal nation-states support globalized exploitation and secure self-centred, entrepreneurial subjectivity within an ethos of good conscience and a presumption of liberty and freedom that Ferguson so vehemently warns against.\(^{15}\)

Anthony Burke follows Levinas to argue that this concept of freedom, one that is a distinctive feature of the modern sovereign state and especially of states with imperial and settler-colonial histories, is “unhindered by any memory or remorse” and has an ethic of action fuelled by an unrestrained “good conscience” (2007: 213). While Burke explains how this refusal of historical complexity and moral ambiguity is relevant to contemporary American imperialism and its war on terror, I contend that Aotearoa New Zealand, under the liberal banners of freedom and democracy, has always understood itself to be morally, politically and historically of “good conscience” (2007: 213). In Foucault’s analysis of the age of Enlightenment, he claims it reveals not the progress of reason but “how ‘minor’ knowledges were disqualified in order to promote the centralization, normalization, and disciplinarization of dominant knowledges” (2004: 288). He describes confrontations between knowledges as a “history-battle” that “developed out of the race struggle, as opposed to natural right” 2004: (288). He argues that the transformation of this struggle during the nineteenth century caused a problem: “that of the biopolitical regularization of behaviour, the problem of recent memory and of the near future, of the birth and development of racism and facism” (2004: 288). All liberal notions of freedom, democracy and good conscience emerge from a history of conquests and domination, from the normalization of dominant knowledges and from the biopolitical regularization of behaviour.

The central concerns of my thesis converge in liberal democratic nation-states where capitalist agendas channel and guide the relations of affect that inform social bonds and underpin all social life. This is precisely why the thesis is organized in the way that it is:

\(^{15}\) Foucault describes Ferguson’s work as “the most fundamental, almost statutory text regarding the characterization of civil society” and situates it as “the political correlate, the correlate in terms of civil society, of what Adam Smith studied in purely economic terms” (2008: 298).
Chapter One reviews the development and reiterative processes of a capitalist political economy in Aotearoa New Zealand and Chapters Two and Three examine the connections between affect, media and brands and the production of brand identities in neoliberal mediascapes. In Chapters Four and Five, the thesis draws the two concerns together in an analysis of the nation brand and the modes of media governmentality that secure a brand state. The aim is to interrogate neoliberal governance in Aotearoa New Zealand and, by utilizing Foucault’s conceptualization of “a bio-politics of the population,” explore the production of the social through the prisms of brand identity and media culture (1978: 139, emphasis in original).

Chapter One uses rugby and the staging of the Rugby World Cup 2011 to situate Aotearoa New Zealand, not only as a British dominion, ideal for settlement and development, but also as an exotic and unspoiled tourist destination thereby heralding and foreshadowing the ‘100% pure, clean, green’ image that would become the unique selling point of the nation-brand. Chapter One then examines the deleterious effects of liberal governance on Māori peoples, thus setting a platform for the examination of biculturalism, colonial tourism, Māori television brands and racialized marginalization that feature in Chapters Two, Four and Five especially. The 1980s turn to neoliberalism in Aotearoa New Zealand did not occur in isolation and reflects the global impact of both Thatcherism in Britain and Reaganism in the United States of America. It replicates the rejection of Keynesian social welfare and the uptake of radical reforms that encouraged de-regulation, privatization and the championing of market competition and entrepreneurial enterprise. In the local context, its implementation faced few institutional constraints and transpired in and against an autarchic economic regime of import substitution industrialism, a continuously interventionist state and, more specifically, the authoritarianism of Sir Robert Muldoon. He served as both Minister of Finance and Prime Minister between 1975 and 1984 and, as Alan McRobie explains, his interventionist policies “took him along a socialist path signposted by universal superannuation and other generous social welfare policies, subsidies to exporters and tariff walls to protect inefficient local industries” (1992: 393 and 394). Muldoon’s extreme interventionism and “increasingly arrogant demeanour repelled
an increasing number of liberal middle-class voters including many National Party activists” and while the 1984 election result can be read as resistance to, and rejection of, Muldoon and the National government, it also showed general disillusionment with both major parties rather than a clear mandate for Labour to govern (1992: 401).

The 1984 election result, in other words, demonstrated that the terms and conditions under which the National and Labour parties were constituted had lost social relevance. To paraphrase Jacques Donzelot, rather than condone critique of and resistance to the liberal democratic state, the “economy of power underwriting the power of the economy” ensured that the economic failure and injustices inherent in capitalist democracy are re-construed as a failure of too much government and obstructive political interference (2008a: 116). Robert Jones used exactly this platform when in 1983 he formed the New Zealand Party for the explicit purpose of ousting Prime Minister Muldoon and attacking the policies of the National government. Jack Nagel describes Robert Jones as “a libertarian in personal philosophy” who was already well known as a self-made millionaire property developer, writer, commentator and patron of ballet and boxing, and whose money, colourful personality and blunt talk made the New Zealand Party an instant success (1998: 239). To paraphrase Jeffrey Nealon, Robert Jones’ New Zealand Party provided the “idea” and the “hook or enticement” for altering the everyday practices of voters in traditional bi-partisan elections, the unanticipated outcome being that the Labour Party constituency transmogrified from that of working-class people to that of affluent classes (2008: 40). 17

McRobie contends that the real significance of the 1984 election was that generational change had taken place and that a government whose basic attitudes had been moulded by the traumas of the great depression and the second world war had been supplanted by a “leadership whose attitudes and values had been moulded by the events of the 1950s and finally lifted in February 1984 – after inflation had dropped to 4.7 per cent on an annual basis – the wage freeze was kept in place until tripartite wage talks between the Government, employers, and trade unions had reached a satisfactory conclusion. When interest rates failed to match the fall in inflation, Muldoon threatened, and then intervened directly, to regulate the level of interest rates for home mortgages. By May 1984 the infrastructure of economic controls was clearly disintegrating” (1992: 399).

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17 Nagel compares the 1935 and 1984 Labour governments this way: “In the overwhelmingly professional 1984 caucus, nineteen MPs (34 per cent) had been teachers or university lecturers and ten (18 per cent) had law degrees. The composition of cabinet mirrored that of caucus. In contrast, the first Labour cabinet in 1935 had only one professional among its twelve members; most of its leaders had been self-educated manual workers” (1998: 235).
1960s, notably economic prosperity and anti-war sentiments” (1992: 402). While Jones’s free-market policies were important, it was the fact that he represented a new upwardly mobile, materialistic generation and an emergent, entrepreneurial “economy of power” that had the greatest impact on the social imaginary (Donzelot, 2008a: 116). The rejection of Robert Muldoon’s state-led, protectionist policies and the victory of Robert Jones’s individualized, free-market policies demonstrate how changing values and expectations infiltrated political institutions to co-determine a new relationship between the individual and the nation-state.

Arjun Appadurai points out how, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, nation-states had to face dual pressures; the first was to comply with Thatcherism and Reaganism and “open up their markets to foreign investment, commodities and images” (or brand marketing) (2006: 65). Additional pressure concerned struggles over cultural rights as they related to national citizenship and issues of belonging. As Appadurai explains, nation-states had also to “manage the capacity of their own cultural minorities to use the globalized language of human rights to argue for their own claims for cultural dignity and recognition” (2006: 65). Chapter One examines, therefore, the parallel emergence of neoliberal and bicultural narratives in Aotearoa New Zealand and the transformation of political activism from anti-capitalist, environmental campaigns and Māori rights movements to anti-state sentiment and cultural or identity politics. In the context of a wider global agenda, neoliberal ideas infiltrated and transformed the social imaginary so that it was (re)shaped and (re)normalized to fit and facilitate the marketing of a bicultural brand state. This transformation is examined by reviewing both the sociocultural and economic reforms that characterized the neoliberal turn, focusing first on the Te Māori exhibition and then on the 1989 Reserve Bank Act and the 1991 Employment Contracts Act to typify the incremental implementation of market logic and entrepreneurial, individualized subjectivity as the undisputed social norm. It is also in this chapter that I link Bourdieu’s theories of social power with Foucault’s concept of biopower to discuss my conceptualization of affective biopower and to make the point that it is the manipulation of affective biopower in an era of media governmentality and brand marketing that is the focus of this thesis. Affective biopower refers to the power of social bonds, of affective affiliation and the human

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18 The Prime Minister and his deputy were aged 41 when they assumed office in 1984 and no member of the new government’s front bench was older than 49. As Levine and McRobie inform, “few members of Labour’s caucus were able to recall at first hand the seminal experiences of depression and war that dominated and dictated the direction of New Zealand politics for nearly two generations” (2002: 142).
capacity to build a common. It refers to the affect value or ethical surplus generated by these communicative, co-operative processes and to the way they work to not only shape and normalize subjectivity but also to prompt reaction and resistance to social conformity. Although political resistance to the state’s radical turn to neoliberalism did prompt electoral reform in the 1990s, the market imperatives of a new global order have taken hold and have spread to infiltrate all sectors of society. Under neoliberalism, a new social order is leading a revolution, not against capitalism and racism but against bad lifestyle choice and ‘wrong’ ways of governing ‘self’.

Chapters Two and Three discuss the constitution and manipulation of neoliberal subjectivity and the increasingly important role of media culture in the production of that subjectivity and in the subsumption of all aspects of everyday life to the logic of the brand. Chapter Two affirms affective biopower as the communicative, cooperative force informing social (re)production and then, following Hardt and Negri, claims that it is ‘affective labour’ and the immaterial production of ideas, knowledge and co-operative sociality that now comprises capital’s prime mode of production. It discusses the transition from Fordist to post-Fordist society and claims that neoliberal media culture constructs middle-class ‘values’ and artificial social realities round notions of self-conscious consumerism and individualized entrepreneurialism. The Chapter argues that in an increasingly mediated world, the production of social identities through consumerism, brand identities and life-style choices, and the exponential growth of interactive media technologies, are not simply linked but crucially interwoven. Reality TV plays a key role in commodifying ‘immaterial labour’ and this chapter links Laurence Pope, a real estate speculator, with reality TV home improvement messages that acclaim speculators and entrepreneurs and encourage participants and viewers to see their homes, first and foremost, as capital investments. The Chapter also examines the content and ethos of lifestyle intervention and makeover reality TV programmes before arguing that ‘self-branding’ is the epitome of a neoliberal discourse that narrates image as identity, ‘self’ as human capital, and controls social productivity by continually (re)inventing requisite or ideal identities, desires and values.

Chapter Three focuses on how branding works to give products and services an image or reputation with which people can and wish to identify, and demonstrates how brand marketing targets and appropriates the fundamental desire in people to belong, to share
being-in-common and to generate affect-value and ethical surplus. Neoliberal modes of
governmentality narrate community and subjectivity by linking affective potential and
sociality with market values thereby re-inventing and rejuvenating the middle-class myth
that underpins and legitimizes the liberal democratic state. This Chapter utilizes the work
of Nikolas Rose and Pierre Bourdieu to examine health, body image and the stylization of
life, especially as they are portrayed in media culture and as they are addressed by experts
and authorities who proffer self-help initiatives for self-branded, image-based identities. It
also turns to Zygmunt Bauman whose fine insights link growing social disparities with
aesthetic consumerism and a proliferation of pseudo-communities. Bauman claims that
contemporary expressions of ‘community’ may be prolific but, rather than emerging as the
expression of shared lives or of actual conditions of existence, the neoliberal ‘community’
et epitomizes a calculated ethic of self-enterprise and enacts a means of manipulating the
feelings of others for self-actualization or commercial advantage. The chapter draws
together and interweaves the concepts of affective biopower, ethical surplus and etho-
politics; it then examines the brand-marketing tactics that align the language of community
(totalizing strategies) with practices of the self (individualizing strategies) in order to
capitalize socially-produced surplus value.

Chapter Four examines the production of community at a national level, noting strong
parallels between the affective affiliations that underpin nationhood and the affective
affiliations that underpin loyalty to a product brand. It begins by reviewing the concept of
nation-branding from a marketing perspective and cites various branding gurus who claim
that nation-brands now dictate identity, image and reputation, and that nation-states can
only benefit by adopting a corporate identity and unique brand image for a global stage.
The Chapter then situates brands, branding mechanisms and nation-branding as key
technologies in the national production of affect and as linchpins in the dominant modes of
representation which now inform all cycles of production and underpin globalized
informational capitalism. However, it also reiterates that the marketing of people and place
is not new to Aotearoa New Zealand and turns to two official accounts of the evolution of
tourism to demonstrate how some form of Brand New Zealand has always aimed to attract
trade, tourism and overseas investment. The Chapter then links the ‘100% Pure New
Zealand’ logo and image with a global hierarchy of branded nation-states and with a wider
neoliberal agenda before examining internal productions of nationhood as enacted through
reality TV. This Chapter ends by addressing the concept of charity TV and argues that a
national Telethon, for example, works to circulate affective connections and to generate ethical surplus, but only within the parameters of feel-good communal entertainment, and on terms that benefit corporate sponsors and contribute to the image of the nation-brand. Notions of nationhood, national identity and Brand New Zealand converge through modes of media governmentality and, while positing notions of collective solidarity and shared responsibility, combine to perform only as conduits of affective investment for brand value and corporate profit.

The final Chapter examines the contradictory interplay between notions of freedom and strategies of security which, as Foucault claims, characterize liberal government and which entail both the production of freedom and the establishment of limitations, controls and forms of coercion (2008: 64). Chapter Five argues that a brand-state secures legitimacy by idealizing individual and collective investment in the brand image while simultaneously excluding and/or criminalizing the victims and critics of the neoliberal global network. It begins by linking Brand New Zealand with neoliberal multiculturalism, biculturalism and globalization and claims they all work together to shape subjectivity and manage populations. It draws on the work of Sue Curry Jansen to describe globalization as a macro-myth through which nation-brands like Brand Estonia, Cool Britannia, Magical Croatia, Incredible India and 100% Pure New Zealand promote their respective micro-myths and stake their claims for recognition and market viability. The Chapter then returns to a study of biculturalism and examines the constitution of the Māori Television Service both as crucial marker of bicultural nationhood and as signifier of uniqueness in the marketing of Brand New Zealand. It also discusses Māori Television’s emerging role as prime public service broadcaster and as advocate for global indigenous media systems and interactive networks. It concludes that the Māori Television Service makes an important contribution to the national mediascape and has the potential to provoke incremental change, but is also closely constrained by neoliberal systems of media governmentality. The Chapter then turns from brand-building to the issue of state security and the deployment of exclusionary tactics that mirror America’s war on terror and serve to protect the brand state for global capital. In summary, this thesis argues that a capitalist political economy underpins state sovereignty; that brands and branding mechanisms now function to manipulate and control social productivity; and that globalized mediascapes play a crucial role in the government of the social or, in brand society parlance, in human resource management.
CHAPTER ONE

Brands, Biculturalism and Neoliberal Government

I think this idea of a legitimizing foundation of the state on the guaranteed exercise of an economic freedom is important. … The economy produces political signs that enable the structures, mechanisms, and justifications of power to function. The free market, the economically free market, binds and manifests political bonds (Foucault, 2008: 83, 85).

This Chapter links brand identity and biculturalism in Aotearoa New Zealand with media governmentality, and claims that all modes of liberal governance prioritize and facilitate global capitalism whether that governance is articulated in terms of colonialism, welfarism or neoliberalism. It situates governance as the biopolitical management of a population and focuses on the affective connections that produce social bonds, that inform notions of national identity and that underpin the sovereignty and legitimation of a nation state. In his analysis of neoliberal government, Foucault states that it is the guaranteed exercise of an economically free market that is the legitimizing foundation of the liberal state and that the free market, the economically free market, “binds and manifests political bonds” (see above). But free market imperatives are not conducive to building affective bonds and to sustaining the forms of affective and collective solidarities that nurture nationhood and comprise the social. Liberal theory addresses this problem by conceptualizing a socio-political ideal wherein ‘civil society’ is contrasted with government and ‘civil society’ comprises a natural social domain of interacting individuals that must be governed. As Burchell explains, “it is by reference to already existing society that the state’s role and function has to be defined, and it is the natural, self-producing existence of this society that the state has to secure so that it functions to optimal effect’” (1991: 140). The state’s legitimizing function is premised also, therefore, on its ability to forge a link between the

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19 Enlightenment thinkers like Adam Ferguson conceptualized society in terms of a “natural” social order in which “ egoistic, economic interests” find their place and function within a “spontaneously unifying framework” of non-egoistic interests (Burchell, 1991: 135). Ferguson claims that egoistic, economic interests ( interested passions) and non-egoistic, collective interests (disinterested passions) co-determine individual subjectivity and that both can be spontaneously cohesive and divisive. As he sees it, the non-egoistic, disinterested passions “produce localized unities and allegiances,” while the egoistic, economic interests “tend to sever social bonds” and create other, abstract and non-localized relations (cited in Burchell, 1991: 135, emphasis in original). While the notion of an always-existing natural ‘civil society’ is problematic, I would argue that Ferguson’s understanding of subjectivity and social bonding is both insightful and pertinent to the thrust of this thesis.
economic and the social or between state, society and notions of national identity. Foucault rejects the notion that ‘civil society’ is a ‘natural’ domain in which relations of power already exist, and argues instead that as a correlate of political power, ‘civil society’ enables the development and extends the parameters of techniques of liberal governmentality (Burchell, 1991: 141). Foucault argues that there can be no actual distinction between ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ and that the civil society/state split should be seen, not as an “historical universal that allow us to examine all the concrete systems” but as “a form of schematization characteristic of a particular technology of government” (2004: 204). For this reason, a study of liberalism is also a study of biopower and the biopolitical management of a population. Foucault conceptualizes biopower as “the power of the emerging forces of governmentality to create, manage and control populations – the power to manage life” (Hardt, 1999: 98).

While Foucault focuses on biopower as power to manage life, Michael Hardt modifies and expands on this by characterizing biopower as “the power of the creation of life” and by situating “the creation of life precisely in the production and reproduction of affects” (1999: 98, my emphasis). My concept of affective biopower not only links the production and management of social power with the production and management of affects but also emphasises the crucial connections between affective sociality, brand identity and neoliberal modes of media governmentality. Because affective biopower functions primarily to form social bonds and to build a common world, it also functions to shape and normalize. I argue, therefore, that (neo)liberal governmentality has as much to do with the constitution of subjectivity and the management of affective affiliation, as it has to do with free market economics and political rationality. Subsequent Chapters will situate affective biopower as the prime mode of production and means of social control in an era of media governmentality and brand marketing. This Chapter links affective biopower with media

governmentality, with production of the social and with what Adam Arvidsson refers to as media culture. Arvidsson describes media culture as “the culture of modern mass mediated communications” and as “the intertextual web of meanings, symbols, images and discourses diffused by (mostly commercial) media like television, magazines, film, radio, the internet, and, most importantly perhaps, advertising” (2006: 35). For Arvidsson, “Media culture works as a productive infrastructure that is put to work in the construction of a common social world” (2006: 35). It is the growing influence of media culture in shaping subjectivity, constructing national identity and securing loyalty to the state through changing socio-political conditions that is the focus of this Chapter.

**Media Governmentality and Brand New Zealand**

Media culture and brand value derive from productive sociality, from communicative construction and from the human capacity for producing a common social world. Arvidsson (2008) explains that the building of a common social world produces an ethical surplus and it is this that marketers target and appropriate in order to generate surplus value and/or brand value. Forces of affective biopower inform and underpin both the building of a common social world and the generation of ethical surplus and although affective affiliations are always contingent and susceptible to manipulation, the forces of affective biopower can never be fully appropriated or dominated. Affective biopower is always external to and in excess of any particular communicative construction and is always both creative and resistive. This study focuses on the symbiotic relationship between brands, brand marketing and media culture and argues that, in an era of media culture and brand marketing, the human capacity for affective connection, for building a common and producing surplus value, has become a key factor in economic production and capital growth. When brand marketers link national identity with brand identity they tap into the articulation of a national imaginary and exploit this identity-building social collective for its ethical surplus and economic value. Brand states transform identity politics, re-inventing national identity as a marketable commodity and as a rich source of the affective investment and deeply ingrained loyalty that builds brand value. One of the most effective and enduring symbols of national identity in Aotearoa New Zealand is the All Blacks rugby team. This team’s image is the epitome of successful media promotion
and brand marketing; it is recognized not only as one of the most distinctive brands in international sport but also as the flagship of Brand New Zealand.

![Figure 2 Adidas All Blacks advertisement, 2008](image)

The staging of the Rugby World Cup in Aotearoa New Zealand in 2011 provides an excellent example of how corporate brands increase market share and build brand value by being linked with national sports teams and, therefore, with the intense affective investment and patriotic fervour international competition motivates. It also demonstrates how such globalized media events advance the processes of neoliberal globalization and normalize parameters of nationhood in which corporate logos perform alongside national flags as symbols of shared purpose and national unity. When the International Rugby Board promoted the 2011 Rugby World Cup it leaned heavily on the tradition, legends and symbolic images associated with international rugby teams and especially with the host nation’s team, the All Blacks, as is demonstrated in its official promotional video (Rugby World Cup, 2011). This video is loaded with nostalgic, affect-laden and patriotic symbolism and incorporates many of the marketing strategies used to generate investment in, and loyalty to, Brand New Zealand. For example, the Māori motif used on all World

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Cup merchandise, commissioned by an Australian advertising agency, creates a unique logo and links Aotearoa New Zealand symbolically with the World Cup event. This choice of Māori motif is significant because it mirrors the tattoos becoming increasingly popular with rugby players and so demonstrates how brand marketers seek inspiration for effective branding in emerging cultural trends, in what Stuart Hall calls new exotica. Brand marketers, like Adidas, pick up on deeply embedded cultural tradition and the Māori haka, long associated with the All Blacks and international rugby competition, has also been utilized as unique marker of the All Black and New Zealand rugby brand. In an era of new media technologies, as Lewis and Winder claim, the haka has been “rejuvenated and professionalized into spectacular entertainment” and “represents a reworking of national and rugby identities – commodified, jazzed-up, assertive, media-centred and re-indigenized” (2007: 211). The All Blacks’ haka works effectively for Adidas to make the All Black brand instantly recognizable and distinct from any other national sports team. However, it also attracts ongoing controversy specifically because it represents the mediatized, commodification of indigenous cultural practices.

Lewis and Winder explain that ‘haka’ is “the generic name for Māori group dance or performance, a composition played by many instruments: hands, arms, feet, legs, body, voice, tongue and eyes (Karetu 1993)” (2007: 210). They also explain “the All Blacks’ haka after the national anthems at rugby internationals is performed as a challenge, to proclaim their strength, fearsomeness and fearlessness, and to seek to intimidate the opposition” (2007: 210).

Lewis and Winder cite Maclean, 1999, and Jackson and Hokowhitu, 2002, when pointing out that controversy “has long swirled over the ownership and use of the Ka Mate haka performed by the All Blacks, its meaning for particular groups, the nature, quality and meanings of its performance and the fraught politics of identity expressed and or suppressed in its use” (2007: 210). In 2005, the All Blacks introduced a new haka, Kapa o Pango, and this is the haka the All Blacks performed at the final of the 2011 Rugby World Cup. This haka, as Lewis and Winder explain, was “composed explicitly for the All Blacks in an era of new media technologies” and “is more fearsome and spectacular than Ka Mate (2007: 211). However, it contained a controversial “throat-slitting gesture” that Lewis and Winder describe as adding “new bite to the colonial othering of the black uniform” (2007: 211). The NZRU hired a public relations firm to conduct public opinion polls and, in response to negative feedback, had the haka changed. As Lewis and Winder point out, this illustrates not only “the sensitivity of brand values to controversy and of authorities to threats against them” but also “the new conduct of the politics of identity” (and of media governmentality, see Nolan, Introduction) (2004: 211).
While the haka is a key feature of the IRB’s promotional video, other images emphasize the scenic beauty of Aotearoa New Zealand, and reiterate New Zealand Tourism’s ‘100% pure’, clean, green image. The combination of music, images and imagery is also strongly evocative of mythical ‘Middle Earth’ and the *Lord of the Rings* trilogy (2001, 2002 and 2003) that was, of course, filmed in this country. For example, one image portrays kayakers paddling a lone canoe on a river flanked with impenetrable bush while background music invokes the theme music from *The Fellowship of the Ring* (part one of the trilogy). The next image superimposes the face of an ancient Māori carving on a shadowy background of native bush and is followed immediately by a clip of the All Blacks performing a haka. Other images include jet boating, bungy jumping, yachting and sand surfing. Such images are not directly associated with the Rugby World Cup, but they do link the event with adventure tourism and with the overall concept and promotion of Brand New Zealand. Rugby match flashbacks and glimpses of supporters wearing various national colours and waving national flags in massive, colosseum-like stadia set the Rugby World Cup as a major quest, as war by another name, and the World Cup itself, depicted at the end of the video as the ultimate prize, the Holy Grail, or golden chalice, symbolically elevates this event to the realm of legend. The overall image portrayed in this video is one of masculinist identity, of warriors, battle and heroism and, underlying all this, is the sense that rugby reiterates British colonial traditions and that, especially in Aotearoa New Zealand, rugby, national identity and tourism are inextricably linked. It is an image that is both deeply flawed and deeply embedded.

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In their analysis of All Black rugby and its enduring brand value, Lewis and Winder claim “there can be little doubt that sport is a feature of New Zealand and New Zealandness, or that rugby figures prominently in the making of national identities” (2007: 208). They compare the 1905 All Black tour with the 2005 All Black tour and claim that tropes of British colonialism, white patriarchy and cultural commodification are at play in the staging of both events and that such tropes have also always characterized articulations of national identity. In other words, notions of pioneering manhood and British entitlement, embedded in the colonial and liberal eras, continue to inform the social imaginary and underpin the contemporary marketing of a bicultural brand state. This is not to say that there exists a discoverable New Zealand identity dominated by a “male, white-settler other” or “forged by rugby” but, as Lewis and Winder argue, “this imaginary is prominent in the performance of culture and economy as well as politics, be it in aspirations towards or resistance against this identity” (2007: 211). All Black rugby identity is a political, economic and cultural construction, “more than a game, but also more than a business”; the game itself, plus the memories, legends and social histories linked with it create economic and cultural value and it is this value that is captured to enhance the All Blacks brand (2007: 213).

The development of All Blacks rugby has always been intimately interwoven with notions of national identity and with the articulation and promotion of a global brand identity. In a paper examining the links between All Black rugby, national identity and global media capitalism, Wayne Hope points out, for example, that the 1905 tour was seen as “a patriotic crusade and as an extension of New Zealand foreign policy” (2002: 240). As Hope explains, Premier Seddon, deputy Joseph Ward and opposition leader William Massey were all present to “officially farewell” the team and Seddon arranged “for London High Commissioner William Pember Reeves to report back to New Zealand on the tour’s progress” (2002: 240). Official cablegrams were relayed from Wellington to post offices throughout the country, weekly match results were displayed in each provincial town and “the New Zealand press carried effusive reports of the team’s prowess” (2002: 240). The team was later welcomed home as conquering heroes, linked forever with national gallantry and, in an early example of place marketing by affective association, “featured in newspaper advertisements for new settlers” (Lewis and Winder, 2007: 206). As Lewis and Winder contend, Premier Dick Seddon expected to gain political capital at home and abroad and, although contributions to the New Zealand economy were minimal,
“Seddon must have hoped that All Black muscle would sell lamb and butter” (2007: 206). In short, the 1905 ‘Originals’ All Black team set the template for a romanticized “nationalist rugby identity” which celebrates a dominant Pākehā masculinity while marginalizing or glossing the presence, contributions and alternative identities of many others (2007: 210). The All Blacks rugby team is discussed again later in this Chapter (and again in Chapter Four) because it so well exemplifies the ongoing and crucial links between affective biopower, production of cultural capital and the construction of Aotearoa New Zealand’s nation brand.

Colonial entrepreneurs were not slow to utilize the concept of the brand in promoting the colony, as Christine Whybrew affirms in her study of Burton Brothers, a 19th century photography business, based in Dunedin. Whybrew notes, first, that the term ‘brand’ has existed as a signifier of commercial production since the mid-nineteenth century and has been “in popular usage in association with consumer goods in New Zealand from the 1840s” (2010: 72). She points out that newspaper advertisements were promoting branded products by the mid-1860s in Aotearoa New Zealand and thus, “demonstrating the early development of brand marketing in New Zealand” (2010: 72). Burton Brothers began photographing Aotearoa New Zealand in 1869. Their circulation of “picturesque” landscapes mirrored processes of colonization, which Whybrew claims, worked to “conceal the cultural layer that defined and mediated the natural scene” while making “remote locations familiar and conceptually accessible” (2010: 104). In 1877, for example, Burton Brothers teamed up with Thomas Bracken and the Union Steam Ship Company to “woo the pleasure-seeker to our shores” with two publications, The Southern Guide which focused on the thermal area of the North Island and The New Zealand Tourist which promoted the “whole colony” (2010: 132). Their photographs were integrated into

26 Links between rugby, politics and promotion of a national identity continue. In 2005, the NZRU (New Zealand Rugby Union) invited Helen Clark, the Prime Minister, to fly to Dublin and head their bid to host the 2011 Rugby World Cup. When the NZRU succeeded in securing hosting rights, as Lewis and Winder note, “the brand managers at All Blacks Inc. moved quickly to paint the success in Dublin as a national victory” (2007: 213).

27 Pierre Bourdieu coins the term “cultural capital” to describe those non-economic sources of social value that he explains are linked to the body, to the connection between power and education and to the social power inherent in embodied affect (1986: 47-48). Cultural capital is, therefore, closely connected to my notion of socially-produced affective biopower and is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

28 Whybrew explains: “The Burton Brothers studio of Dunedin, the most renowned of New Zealand’s colonial photographers, was among the first to present photographs of colonial New Zealand to international audiences. From 1866 to 1898 this studio produced a stock of photographic images that recorded the industrial, social and political progress of the colony” (2010: iii).
the publications as evidence of both the “sublimity and grandeur” of New Zealand, as well as its “resemblance to English models of domestic and commercial architecture received as a sign of prosperity and material progress” (2010:132).

Whybrew also draws attention to the early interest of Government in the lucrative potential of tourism. She notes that parliamentary debates preceding the introduction of the Fine Arts Copyright Act 1877 and the Photographic Copyright Act 1896 “emphasized the role of photography to serve the interests of Government in the promotion of New Zealand’s natural scenery to international audiences” (2010: 91). Burton Brothers catered for tourists, for example, through the publication of a series of pocket-sized photograph albums entitled “Land of Loveliness, New Zealand” which contained ten small promotional prints and which was produced from the late 1870s and throughout the 1880s (2010:139). Such early representations of unspoiled scenic landscapes served to establish the romantic vision that informs contemporary promotional material and is presently perpetuated in Tourism New Zealand’s ‘100% pure’ brand image and logo (see Chapter Four). Early colonial advertising campaigns had the same political objectives as contemporary marketing campaigns, utilizing print media and emerging photography technology, to represent and promote the country to prospective immigrants and tourists. In other words, Aotearoa New Zealand has always been an object of promotion and a target of appropriation and exploitation for entrepreneurial enterprise and expanding capitalist economies. According to Whybrew, the title page or frontispiece of many of these “Land of Loveliness” albums contained “the studio’s first ‘Māori Land’ montage” and functioned to “introduce the packaged assemblage of New Zealand’s exoticism” (2010: 139). James Belich captures both the promotional role of print media and the ethos and expectations of the colonial era in Aotearoa New Zealand when he claims, “much of the early literature on New Zealand was in fact part of two great advertising campaigns” (1998: 327). He explains, the first campaign involved “the effort to obtain support for missionary activity and to cast its achievements in the best possible light” (1998: 327). This meant ensuring that Māori be seen as “neither too ignorant nor too savage to be made the subject of the saving and sanctifying influence of the Gospel” (1998: 327). The second objective concerned the effort “to attract settlers to a young and distant colony in competition with better-known fields of immigration such as North America where land was cheaper and the voyage out shorter” (1998: 327). This objective relied on careful construal of Māori subjectivity, requiring they be seen as harmless and useful collaborators in the work of colonization,
providing not only “a market and labour force” but also adding “a freshness and piquancy to the country” which would encourage emigrants to choose New Zealand” (1998: 327-328). Central to both campaigns was the need to portray “an appropriate portrait of the Māori” and humanitarian notions of Māori equality influenced missionary philanthropy as well as colonial legislation (see discussion of the Treaty of Waitangi later in this Chapter) (1998: 327). The objectives of both campaigns concern the formation and transformation of individual subjectivity as well as the normalization and management of a social body, a population.

While micro-processes of power work to gain access to the bodies of individuals, to their attitudes and modes of everyday behaviour, macro-processes of power are also at work administrating, controlling and directing the population as a whole. This is significant because it is the individualizing and totalizing tactics of pastoral power that underpin the biopolitical management of a population and that inform liberal political rationality. Pastoral power, for Foucault, refers to the Christian technique of shepherding or guiding a flock while nurturing the individual conscience through techniques such as self-examination and confession. As discussed in the Introduction, Foucault conceptualizes technologies of power in terms of a triangle: “sovereignty, discipline and governmental management which has population as its main target and appurtenances of security as its essential mechanism” (2007: 107-108). Disciplinary, regulatory and pastoral forms of biopower co-exist and interact in the micro and macro formulations of governmentality by which an individual turns himself (or herself) into a subject and by which the consciousness of the subject develops under the influence of a particular social context (Bevir, 1999: 71). There is always space within any social context for a subject to perform as agent, to exercise individual agency, but following Foucault, this is never as autonomous or ‘sovereign’ agent.29 This point is well exemplified by Tony Ballantyne

29 In distinguishing between autonomy and agency, Bevir points to Foucault’s argument that our view of the subject as an autonomous agent “derives from our having so internalized the technique of confession that we see it falsely as a way of unlocking our inner selves rather than rightly as a way of defining ourselves in accord with a social formation” (1999: 67). An autonomous or ‘sovereign’ subject would be able to reason, to act and to have experiences outside all social contexts and it is this notion of autonomy that Foucault profoundly rejects. However, as Bevir argues, although individuals are made subject by the knowledge/power regimes at work in any particular social context, “different people adopt different beliefs and perform different actions against the background of the same social structure, so there must be at least an undecided space in front of these structures where individuals decide what beliefs to hold and what actions to perform” (1999: 68). Agents are creative beings and power/knowledge regimes do not determine the experiences they can have but, as Bevir also makes clear, “their creativity occurs in a given social context that influences it” (1999: 67).
who, in a study of print, politics and Protestantism in colonial New Zealand, compares the attitudes of younger Māori with those of their elders (2001: 169). He explains how younger Māori were often happy to use their literacy skills to record various tribal traditions and genealogies for government officials and amateur ethnographers and so earn money or secure free lodgings (2001: 169). However, this behaviour was frowned upon by many Māori elders who not only believed such knowledge was *tapu* (sacred) but also that sharing it with Pākehā would undermine its *tapu* status and perhaps even cause illness and death (2001: 169). In effect, the new print medium was problematic for the elders because it ‘disembodied’ knowledge, thereby rupturing the traditional power/knowledge regime that had been the sole preserve of wise elders and *tohunga* (religious specialists) (2001: 169). Under this new regime, as Ballantyne explains, “Pākehā and Māori of all ranks could read and reflect on these new ‘fixed’ versions of tradition at their leisure” (2001: 169).

That is to say, the authority implicit in British colonial ‘print’ culture destabilized and usurped the forms of authority that had informed and evolved in traditional Māori ‘oral’ culture. The notion of ‘disembodied’ knowledge is important because it explains how the circulation of printed material serves to inform a social imaginary and so construct notions of nationhood. The distribution of daily newspapers epitomizes the ritualized, repetitive routine whereby thousands of ‘disembodied’ individuals knowingly share the same fictive world as thousands of other readers and, as Benedict Anderson informs, are “continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life” (1991: 35-36). It is this principle that continues to inform media culture today. Print media played a crucial role not only in the biopolitical regularization and amalgamation of Māori tribal groups but also in constituting the fictional “community in anonymity” that characterizes the nation state (1991: 36). Foucault describes biopolitical government as a means of “distributing the living in the domain of value and utility” and it is my contention, following Foucault, that Māori subjectivity is already being manipulated and utilized in the colonial period to inform and enhance the equivalent of a nation-brand (1978: 143).

Here I return to All Blacks rugby and, more specifically, to early Māori participation and representation in the development of the All Black brand and pick up on Hope’s point that “from about the 1880s, an imagined sense of New Zealand-ness, mass communication, and the game of rugby took shape together” 2002: 235). Hope explains, first, that this “triangulated field of social forces” did not emerge in a planned and orderly fashion and, at various times in history, has been both “ideologically constructed and subject to
conflicting interpretations” (2002: 235). He then explains, as example, how the legendary status attributed to the ‘Originals’ All Blacks (1905-6) effectively “erased from national memory the extraordinary exploits of the 1888-9 New Zealand Native team” (2002: 235). Although rugby was a social feature for British settlers in the 19th century, rugby was also played in exclusively Māori clubs which formed “as expressions of tribal, local, and cultural solidarity” (2002: 237). At secondary school level “the game blended with local traditions of Māoritanga” and “the team haka performed at each game was a reminder that Māori trained together for warfare in the days prior to rugby” (2002: 237). In 1888, when the growth of rugby in Great Britain opened up financial opportunities for the organization of a New Zealand tour, “acrimony among provincial unions meant that only Māori rugby networks could form the basis of a national team” (2002: 238). This team was not exclusively Māori, however, and when the tour began in October 1888, “it was soon apparent that the Native team did not fit the post-savage ‘black-fellow’ stereotype. Only a few players were of dark complexion, everybody could speak English, and top hats were commonly worn” (2002: 238). Consequently, in Hope’s words, “the ‘old boy’ establishment and the London Press perceived these natives as a rugby team. They exemplified the achievements of a colonizing process in which the indigenous peoples of Empire could be taught British games” (2002: 238-239, emphasis in original).

It was this 1888-9 New Zealand Native team that first performed a haka and it did so, according to Lewis and Winder, “when tour promoters sought to bolster crowds by adding extra entertainment values and capitalizing on British infatuation with live and exotic exhibits from the colonial world (Ryan 1993)” (2007: 211). Although this tour lasted 10 months and the team played 107 matches against England, Scotland, Wales, Australia and New Zealand, its accomplishments were “devalued by the inauguration of the New Zealand Rugby Football Union in 1892” (2002: 239). Hope believes three main points of contention overshadowed the Native team’s on-field accomplishments and claims they continue to pervade modern All Black rugby. These are, “the racial composition of the team, amateurism versus professionalism, and authenticity of national representation” (2002: 238). Key events in the history of Māori rugby show, for example, that in 1921

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30 Lewis and Winder further inform: “Performed in costume before and after games and at local town hall concerts, it often involved elaborate performances with mats and spears. Although its box-office value was questioned and it was branded unconvincing and non-Corinthian and eventually abandoned on the 1898 tour, the haka stuck as tradition. In recent years, the performance of the haka has been rejuvenated and professionalized into spectacular entertainment, and its identity politics renegotiated” (2007: 211).
when a NZ Māori rugby team played a South African team in Napier, a reporter travelling with the Springboks was outraged that the spectators supported “coloured men” against “members of their own race”. In 1949, despite protests, Māori players were not considered for the tour of South Africa and in 1970 three Māori players (and Samoan Bryan Williams) toured South Africa with the All Blacks and were treated as “honorary whites” by their hosts. (I discuss the impact of the 1981 South African springbok tour of Aotearoa New Zealand later in this Chapter and the issue of professionalism versus amateurism in Chapter Four.) At stake here is the shaping and re-shaping of subjectivity in terms of a racialized, colonial and nationalist discourse, orchestrated by capitalist interests and articulated through a British Press network. Individual agency plays a role in the uptake (or not) of cultural trends (like club rugby) but dominant knowledge/power regimes work to influence and contain that agency.

**Colonial Governance and the Deterritorialization of Māori Communities**

There is a contradictory juxtaposition between the nationalist, symbolic enfranchisement of Māori as exotic other and the imperialist, disenfranchisement of Māori communities in colonial land grabs. The British approach, though postulating Enlightenment principles and humanitarian ideals, was fundamentally paternalistic and autocratic. Alan Ward argues that a humanitarian policy of racial ‘amalgamation’ was never implemented, first of all, because British policy was “highly ethnocentric” and, secondly, because to satisfy the settler demand for land, “the law was continually framed to deny Māori more than a minor share in state power and control of resources” (1995: ix). Most colonial politicians

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31 These examples and quotations are all sourced from “Māori rugby timeline,” New Zealand History, Ministry of Culture and Heritage, [online] Available at: http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/culture/maori-rugby [Accessed 22.05.12]. Such instances continue, as for example, in the racist remarks directed at Samoan-New Zealander Blues coach, Pat Lam, in the wake of the team’s poor performance” during the 2012 interprovincial rugby competition. For further reading see, for example, “Samoan tweeter slams racists in NZ rugby,” [online] Available at: http://www.stuff.co.nz/sport/rugby/news/6729402/Samoan-tweeter-slams-racists-in-NZ-rugby [Accessed 22.05.12].

32 Foucault identifies a fundamental problem with Enlightenment notions of “reasoned agreement” as Mark Bevir explains: “The enlightenment view of knowledge encapsulates a faith in a neutral reason going to work on pure experience. … Modernity represents itself, following the enlightenment, as based on universal and objective knowledge of the world. … Modernity, therefore, enshrines a faith in an autonomous subject who can avoid local prejudices and who can be freed from social constraint”. For Foucault “the subject cannot be autonomous, so modernity is masquerading as something it is not” (1999: 69).

33 Alan Ward’s book explores in depth “the building in New Zealand of a bureaucratic machinery of state” (1995: 3). As Ward explains, “amalgamation” refers to an official and humanitarian policy followed by
were landowners and/or speculators and they nurtured their own interests and ensured continued electoral support by providing settlers with a steady flow of Māori land. 34 Governor Grey, for example, implemented a ‘flour and sugar’ policy through which chiefs were treated to generous hospitality and gifts of flour mills, livestock, harness, ploughs and food, but the underlying intention was to detach chiefs from their provincial sources of power and to encourage land-selling (Ward, 1995: 86-87). 35 As Ward points out, “very deep-seated notions of racial and cultural superiority, and the competition for land” tended to overwhelm and subsume “any genuine attempt to engage the Māori in the main stream of politics and administration” (Ward, 1973: 86). 36 Qua Foucault, Ward is suggesting that Enlightenment notions of racial and cultural superiority reveal, not the progress of reason, but the disqualification of “minor” knowledges and the “centralization, normalization and disciplinarization of dominant knowledges”; in effect, the “biopolitical regularization of behaviour” (Foucault, 2004: 288). The nature of the social bond in the colonial state was patronizing and patriarchal and, as Ward explains, humanitarian ideals were concerned with bringing the Māori under the rule of law and propelling them “into the new order, at a pace dictated by the paternalistic officials, rather than by the Māori themselves” (1995: 62). 37 The social bond was defined in terms of historical mission, of social right and of society’s progress.

British colonial authorities at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. Although its liberal principles were ambivalent and paternalistic, it did attempt a “balance between concern to avoid dislocating Māori society too abruptly and concern to assist the Māori to participate in the encroaching European order” (1995: 34-35).

34 Mai Chen substantiates this claim, stating “the Government’s real purpose in alienating the Māoris [sic] from their land, and in undermining their communal system, was self-interest” (1988: 10). She argues, “Most of the politicians were property owners or land speculators, and moulded their legislative programs and economic policies to serve their private interests” (1988: 10). Chen provides these examples: “Domett, New Zealand premier in 1862, and Fox, Native Minister in 1861 and 1863, both speculated in land. And D. McLean, Native Secretary in 1856-61, was one of the first to take up land in Hawkes Bay” (1988: 10).

35 The story of Governor Grey’s life and times are the subject of a 1970s television drama, The Governor. This production broke new ground not only by highlighting local history but also by re-enacting events from a Māori perspective. It is discussed in detail later in this chapter.

36 Ward, writing in 1973, refers to a growing number of young Māori activists whose political views are well reflected in a contemporary painting by Selwyn Muru. As he explains, this painting “depicts a phalanx of white soldiers, with the Christian cross in the background, trampling the prostrate body of a Māori: the title of the painting is Kāwanatanga – Government” (1973: 308). The publication of Ward’s book coincided with the emergence of ‘Nga Tamatoa’ and other movements by young Māori seeking cultural redress, the revitalization of their language and the honouring of the Treaty of Waitangi.

37 Ward further explains, “If the economic conflict for land and official alignment with the settlers gave a particular impetus to the policy of suppressing Māori independence, the Māori were in a deeper sense the victims of British ethnocentrism and racial prejudice. For the former of these qualities at least was as evident among the humanitarians as among the settlers. ‘Amalgamation’ – that is, integration – of the Māori people
The Constitution Act passed by the British Parliament in 1852 established a central Parliament to control native affairs. As Olssen and Stenson explain, a constitutional franchise based on property meant that only 20 out of every 100 men in New Zealand were on the electoral roll, that women could not vote and that Māori males, because they did not own land as individuals, were effectively excluded (1989: 143). In order to gain access to the Māori land they coveted, the settler parliament passed the Native Lands Act 1862, which subsumed the Crown’s pre-emptive right to purchase Māori land and effectively rendered Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi null and void. The Native Lands Act 1865 also effectively quashed any chance of communal ownership by stipulating that only certain individuals qualified as landowners and must be named on certificates of title. By further ruling that inherited estates must be divided equally among “all children of either sex, resident or absent” it effectively ensured the division and disintegration of communal holdings (1995: 17).

Land Court policy originally required that ten (usually chiefly) owners be named on the certificate of title but, as Jeffrey Sissons points out, the 1873 Native Land Act required judges to list the names of all individuals found to be owners on a Memorial of Ownership (2004: 23). This meant that would-be purchasers could acquire several titles from separate owners and then apply to the Court to partition off their interests thus leaving remaining holdings fragmented and uneconomic (Gilling cited in)

38 As Olssen and Stenson explain, to the settlers, provincial affairs were more interesting than national issues and because local public works, education, immigration and land policy were more important in their daily lives, most identified with their local community rather than with Aotearoa New Zealand as a whole (1989: 143). It is worth considering here how Ferguson defined “civil society” in just such “local” terms but by 1876 provincial rule is abolished and is replaced by a unified “state” (1989: 157).

39 Article II of the Treaty reads: “Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession; but the Chiefs of the United Tribes and the individual Chiefs yield to her Majesty the exclusive right of Preemption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate at such prices as may be agreed upon between the respective Proprietors and persons appointed by Her Majesty to treat with them in that behalf” (Orange, 2004: 280). The Treaty of Waitangi ambiguously recognizes then usurps indigenous Māori land rights, enshrining a double movement that entrenches British law and characterizes the constitution of the liberal State.

40 Hapū leaders are “leaders of landholding kin groups whose members trace descent from a common ancestor through male and female links” (Sissons, 2004: 23). Whereas access to land was once mediated by allegiance to hapū and their leaders, the Native Lands Act rendered such allegiances meaningless (2004: 23).
Sissons, 2004: 23). This process of “individualization” caused bitter feuding and produced a “winner-take-all situation, quite the opposite of one that encouraged Māori to respect each other’s interests in a spirit of aroha” (Ward cited in Sissons, 2004: 24). The crucial point here is that when macro-processes of power apply a general strategy of regulation and control, micro-processes of power also come into play to influence and alter the attitudes and behaviours of individuals. The Native Lands Act encouraged a system of ruthless competition and disrupted existing Māori social networks. Sissons cites Ballara (1998) to describe 18th and early 19th century Māori society as continually contingent, as “a dynamic mosaic or kaleidoscope of hundreds of hapū which were forming, disappearing, dividing and forging numerous alliances with each other” (2004: 24). The point is that hapū constituted and characterized a particular political reality. Power permeated Māori social systems or hapū through the concept of mana; that is, in forms of prestige and authority earned by leaders and elders and always/already vested in land. By the turn of the twentieth century, the mana of the land had passed into settler hands and the mana of the people was being displaced and transformed by Western values and ideals.

Once the Native Lands Act had formalized Western concepts of individual ownership and rendered hapū leadership effectively meaningless, the Government set about re-structuring the Māori ‘race’ as a ‘population’ of iwi [tribes], hapū [sub-tribes] and whānau [extended families]. Using individualizing and totalizing biopolitical techniques, the state enacted

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41 For further reading see Ballara, A., 1998.

42 Colin Gordon, 1996, points out that the Scottish thinkers’ conception of civil society is an act of political invention, the instrument or correlate of a new technique of government. As he explains, “‘Civil society’ no longer means for them, as it did for Locke, the political dimension of society. Instead it signifies the denser, fuller and more complex reality of the collective environment in which men as economic subjects of interest must be located, in order to govern them. The problem of the foundation of power is dissolved, or rather dispersed, into a space of historical immanence. Men effect their division of economic and political labour through a natural and spontaneous historical process; the dialectic of interests causes society to ceaselessly unmake and remake itself, through a dynamic of ‘self-sundering unity’; passing historically through its successive forms of organization, governmental rationality participates in the corresponding transformations of society in general” (1996: 257-258). Perhaps this ‘self-sundering unity’ characterizes a Māori form of civil society comprising hundreds of hapū ‘forming, disappearing, dividing and forging numerous alliances with each other’. Colonial governance did not countenance the possibility that ‘civil society’ already existed in Aotearoa New Zealand.

43 G. V. Butterworth describes mana as: “Influence, standing, prestige. In pre-European times it had been closely associated with Māori religion and the whole system of tapu that was the social cement of the Māori community. Mana was a form of psychic power that depended initially upon each individual’s descent lines since it was held to come from his ancestors. It could be increased or diminished during one’s lifetime by one’s actions. Mana could also be transferred directly from one individual to another. It was thus intimately associated with social standing” (1969: v).
‘official tribalism’ by elevating only ‘friendly’ hapū leaders to the status of ‘tribal chiefs’ thereby forcibly reducing the number of official iwi and constructing a disciplined totality within the state structure (Sissons, 2004: 23). This practice of forcing large numbers of hapū into a single ‘official’ tribal body was later extended to formulate tribal trust boards which provided the only official avenue for dealing with land claims (2004: 28). So, while Colonial government promoted a policy of ‘amalgamation’ in which individualized Māori could freely participate, the sale and distribution of Māori land took place in terms of contrived tribalism. This form of governance is not power sharing and it is not self-government. It is a form of paternalistic governmentality that structures the possible field of action of others under the auspices of the State and applies the individualizing and totalizing forms of power described by Foucault as a “matrix of individualization or a new form of pastoral power” (1982: 783). The Native Lands Act, as constructed and amended between 1862 and 1909, was justified on the grounds that free trade in land would expose Māori to the healthy play of individual competition. J. C. Richmond, as head of the Native Department, for example, argued that settlers were not being greedy or grasping in their demand for land but were “indulging in the healthy wish for the spread of civilization” (Richmond (1865) cited in Ward, 1995: 187). The link being made between ‘individual competition’ and ‘civilization’ demonstrates how bodies, desires and thoughts can be gradually influenced, how subjects are progressively constituted and how, in this instance, mechanisms of power worked to denigrate and displace Māori social systems.

**Liberal Governance and the Welfare State**

Aotearoa New Zealand, as constructed by a settler parliament comprising ‘politicized businessmen and businesslike politicians’, adheres to the Ordo-liberal principle of economic liberty as state legitimation and to the idea that the state and the market economy

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44 Sissons cites Ballara to explain “that official listings of tribes became progressively shorter from 1874 onwards. In Kaipara, North of Auckland, for example, the eight ‘tribes’ listed in 1870 are reduced to two by 1881. Thus six tribes were officially made to disappear” (2004: 24).

45 As Sissons also points out, when increasing numbers of Māori moved to cities for work, it was they who were subjected to assimilatory and individualizing forces, while those who remained in rural areas came to identify with and maintain the structures of newly institutionalized tribal identities (2004: 28). Individualized dispossession goes hand in hand with the development of official tribalism and together they demonstrate how individualizing and totalizing biopolitical strategies work, as Foucault claims, to normalize, to discipline and to make subject (1982: 783 and 784).
mutually presume the existence of the other. The main difference between 19th century liberalism and the *Ordo*-liberal view is that, under classic liberalism, market forces produce intrinsic laws that the art of government must bear in mind and respect whereas, according to the *Ordo*-liberal view, the market is not a natural economic reality but must be kept active by dint of political intervention (Lemke, 2001: 193). That is to say, liberal government is not the articulation of an ideal or doctrine of liberalism, but works instead to situate the State as mediator and manager of the social ramifications of a free market economy. The focal question of politics is not the justification of state action but the governmentality of the social or, as Jacques Donzelot declares, “the state itself is no longer at stake in social relations, but stands outside them and becomes their guarantor of progress” (cited in Gordon, 1991: 34). Donzelot explains further, the State works to control “that invisible expression of the invisible bond” that unites members of society and, rather than being agent of a deliberate transformation of the structure of society, operates to maximize affective bonds of solidarity within the existing structure (1988: 403). The history of liberal government in Aotearoa New Zealand is a history of governance of the social and the biopolitical management of a population in forms that maintain a compliant and malleable workforce but which, at the same time, operate to dissuade and delimit political dissidence.

Both the Liberal Government of 1890 and the Labour Government of 1935 came to power in Aotearoa New Zealand after years of severe economic depression or, as Sinclair puts it, “in 1890 and 1935, parties of ‘state socialists’ were at last granted office by great and enthusiastic majorities” (1980: 239). It was, therefore, a Liberal government that set in place those tangible expressions of egalitarianism and ‘social justice’ that, according to Sinclair, shaped the future history of the country and informed notions of national identity (1980: 188). However, although Seddon’s 1890 Liberal government managed a social ‘revolution’ and was instrumental in introducing legislation for improving working conditions in factories, shops and offices, its agenda was not socialist (2007: 70). Liberal government sought to advance and control a capitalist state through arbitration and conciliation. It tolerated and managed unequal class divisions in the name of market

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46 Although ideas of compulsory arbitration were discussed in England, Australia and the United States of America, it is only in Aotearoa New Zealand that they were actually implemented and, as Hamer notes, it was as a consequence of this that Aotearoa New Zealand became known as the “social laboratory of the world” (1963: 101). This is noteworthy because the term is re-applied in 1984 when a reforming government decimates the welfare state and implements forms of *laissez-faire* liberalism that are also extreme and unprecedented.
forces. Rose and Miller identify a fundamental difference between liberalism and welfarism when they point out that pre-war Liberal techniques of government were confined to “the surveillance and regulation of the social, familial and personal conduct of the problematic sectors of the population” and emerged in specific locations and organizations, as for example, “the courts, the reformatories, the schools and the clinics” (1992: 192-193, my emphasis). In contrast, the welfare state used state planning and high levels of economic and social intervention to address the effects of world-wide depression and to ensure full employment, economic progress and social security. As Savage declared in Aotearoa New Zealand in 1934, “Social justice must be the guiding principle, and economic organization must adapt itself to social needs” (Begg, 2006: 152). However, as Rose and Miller contend, this mode of government could well be described as “less the birth of a new form of state than a new mode of government of the economic, social and personal lives of citizens” (1992: 191). To paraphrase Lemke, this is not so much an abstract shift in the basis of government as the product of historical transformation in governmentality and the continuity of liberal principles under changed social conditions (2001: note 7, 205).

This liberal reality is finely drawn and elaborated through the memories of two men who played divergent but important roles in shaping political thought before and during the emergence of the Welfare State in Aotearoa New Zealand. Their retrospective observations are especially relevant here because they highlight the role of media (and especially the affective capacity of media) in constructing social consent and winning political consensus. John A. Lee, “an extraordinarily gifted communicator and author” was, by the early 1930s, universally acknowledged to be one of the Labour Party’s most effective MPs and, according to Trotter, “by far its most talented propagandist” (2007: 144).
Colin Scrimgeour was the first Controller of Commercial Broadcasting and as an “evangelical advocate of welfare in a world of illfare” in the 1930-40 period “was the first free voice with a mike, the first to build a great New Zealand microphone audience” (Lee, 1976: ix). In their retrospective discussion, both men recount that they were brought up in a time of severe economic hardship and emphasise that the Depression was not caused by the collapse of Wall Street, but was, as Scrimgeour puts it, “a creeping affair” that “came with a terrible gradualness” (1976: 19). Scrimgeour explains that he first saw “the underbelly of our society” when he worked as a social worker and established the Methodist Central Mission in Auckland in 1926 to aid the chronic down-and-outs (1976: 6). However, as he also explains, by 1930 half the community was on the breadline and “we were overwhelmed with despairing people” (1976: 1-7).

It was in 1932, when Scrimgeour set up a Radio Church (the first of its kind in the world) that his following grew to unprecedented levels (1976: 18). As Lee observes in discussion with Scrimgeour, “Radio was the new toy – the new soapbox, and you soon had an audience that reached from end to end of New Zealand. No one in New Zealand ever had

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47 This image is from Te Ara, the Encyclopedia of New Zealand website, and depicts Colin Graham Scrimgeour, (1903-1987), Methodist missioner and radio broadcaster who, “better known as ‘Uncle Scrim’, rose to fame during the 1930s as host of a popular radio programme, ‘The Friendly Road’, which explored religious, political and social ideas,” [online] Available at: http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/4s16/1/1 [Accessed 09.08.11].
your audience; no one will again” (1976: 19). Although he never converted to Christianity or joined a political party, “Scrim” used religious metaphor to convey a profoundly political message. In the 1930s context, radio was state controlled and, as Scrim notes, “the rules of Broadcasting positively forbade political broadcasts – in fact forbade the use of the mike for any controversy whatever, so we had no outlet within the rules” (1976: 2). Scrim, therefore, embedded political critique in a Christian context, in “the politics of the Carpenter,” and challenged the validity of an “economic system which willed that people must want amid abundance” (1976: xi). Scrim’s message had an enormous impact because many of his listeners were in desperate socio-economic circumstances and felt affective affinity with his message. It is, as Veyne and Foucault suggest, “when we are called upon to change our relation to government that we are also required to change our relation to ourselves” (cited in Burchell, 1991: 146). As John A. Lee observes, both the first Liberal Party and the first Labour Party had their “great breakthroughs” when the economy was in crisis and “the country was ready for great constructional changes” (1976: 110). In the years leading up to the 1935 election when Scrim was most popular, for example, in a population of just over one million people, one hundred thousand were out of work, there was no unemployment pay and fifty percent of farmers could not meet their debts (1976: ix). Both the established Press and the Government saw Scrim’s broadcasts as threatening and politically subversive. The Press viewed commercial or independent radio as a threat to its monopoly of the public sphere or as Scrim puts it, “the press didn’t want anyone to be able to dispute what they said” (1976: 42). He makes the point, “It’s probably hard for many people to believe this but a newspaper could kill a politician by not saying anything – not even mentioning his name” (1976: 42). Because Scrim’s broadcasts had made him “seem a member of the hungering denied families in most homes,” the government sought to silence his voice but, as Lee points out, they delayed until the audience was “so vast they didn’t dare a direct act of suppression” (1976: 40 and 47). Instead, just before the 1935 election, Scrim’s broadcast

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48 Lee also observes: “Scrim’s voice was the vocal phenomenon of the times. Every Monday dozens asked: ‘Did you hear Scrim last night?’ People were interested in the new medium, held in a spell by the message” and although others were urging the same sort of change, at best they were speaking to a meeting of a few thousand while Scrim had half a million listeners each Sunday night (1976: 20).

49 This power of the press to ‘kill a politician’ relates directly to Goldie Osuri’s notion of “media necropower,” and to media practices and forms of representation that function to maintain unequal relations of power and that, in the 21st century, function to kill off particular subjects, in the name of security and America’s war on terror (2006). Osuri’s concept is discussed further in Chapters Three and Six.
was “jammed” or muffled by deliberate interference but, rather than serve to suppress his influence, the resulting furore only consolidated Scrim’s popularity and worked to ensure an electoral victory for the Labour government. Technologies of power are playing out here through the new and pervasive influence of broadcast radio. The affective, collective response of listeners to a seditious message serves both to verify the changing relations of people to themselves and to government and also to presage the emerging influence of media culture as a social force. In discussions of the impact of the first Labour government and of its social welfare policies, Lee makes two points. First, he claims that the Labour Party “probably did as much for the common man as any democratically-elected government in the world has ever done” and that “its ameliorative legislation was marvellous” (1976: 110). However, he also claims that the Labour government ended up “only shifting the furniture round … only building on the foundations laid by the Liberal Party” and that although “it should have been a great Party of Innovation” it squandered the opportunity” (1976: 110, emphasis in original).

In summary, the welfare state did not solve the liberal paradox because, in its attempt to reduce economic risk and to create collective security, the State extended rather than limited governmental intervention. In his 1975 essay on civil liberties in New Zealand, Walter J. Scott warns against the apathy of the majority of New Zealanders who, he thinks, “believe that the battle for freedom of speech and action has long been won” (1975: 58). He explains, for example, how less than two years after its re-election in 1938, the Labour government introduced war emergency regulations that severely curtailed freedom of speech and action – harsher than the British government in a more threatened situation – and these were accepted without question by the great majority of citizens. Although these regulations were repealed after the war, they were re-enacted in almost the same form six years later (1951) by the National Government, to enable it to deal with a domestic matter – the waterfront dispute (Scott, 1975: 56). Not only was this drastic curtailment of the

Scrim makes the point that he had no intention of endorsing any political party and that it was the knowledge he could broadcast poll results showing wide public support for independent radio that the Government feared. For whatever reason, the upshot was that Scrim was seen to have been “gagged” and as Lee reports: “The folk who’d heard you trying to make yourself heard against the interruption, and that must have been most of the listeners in New Zealand, had made up their minds. On the last night as we’d moved around making our final appeal, the jamming of Scrim had stolen the show. Certainly a wave of emotional protest dominated that last night” (1976: 47).

Chris Trotter explains that the 1951 Waterfront Lockout was a dispute “over unloading carbon black, the employers’ refusal to pass on the full amount of a 15 percent wage increase granted by the Arbitration Court,
ordinary liberties of speech and assembly accepted “with little demur by the people’”, the people showed their approval by re-electing the same Government when a special election was fought on this issue (1975: 56). Scott cites Hobbes to suggest that “most people fear freedom and their chief desire is for an orderly society and personal security” before claiming that “few of us realise how comprehensively and completely the laws of this Liberal government hedge us round, controlling and regulating our individual and collective behaviour” (1975: 57 and 59). The fact that twenty-first century ‘emergency regulations’ in the form of the post 9/11 Terrorism Suppression Act not only impinge on freedom of speech and action but are also used to deal with domestic matters will be dealt with in Chapter Five. My point is that the construction of Aotearoa New Zealand as a nation-state belies any myth of a history of democratic egalitarianism and enunciates instead a form of liberalism that sets about governing society in the name of the autonomous individual and the economy, characterizing in many respects the recent (re)turn to neoliberalism.

The Turn to Neoliberalism

In his analysis and comparison of German post-war liberalism and of the liberalism of the Chicago School, Foucault identifies a crucial conceptual shift whereby the economic is no longer confined to a firmly outlined and delineated area of human existence but comes to include all forms of human action and behaviour (Lemke, 2001: 198). The German or Ordo-liberal scheme maintains a split between the social domain and the economic domain, but within the Chicago School’s notion of liberalism every aspect of the social sphere is re-defined in terms of the economic domain. Under the Ordo-liberal scheme, “the market can be constituted and kept alive only by dint of political interventions” whereas according to the Chicago School, “government itself becomes a sort of enterprise whose

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the workers’ refusal to work overtime in protest and the employers’ construction of their refusal as grounds for dismissal” (2007: 196-197). Prime Minister Holland immediately “invoked the Public Safety Conservation Act and declared a State of Emergency” (2007: 198). He then organised the Waterfront Strike Emergency Regulations 1951 legislation which, among other things, authorized the state to: “sequester union funds, suspend industrial awards, arrest without warrant, enter and search properties without warrant and deploy members of the armed forces as strike-breakers” (2007: 198). Trotter points out that “the dispute lasted 151 days, that the watersiders did not fight alone, that the miners, the freezing workers and the seamen stood with them but, “the radio and the newspapers kept up the drum-beat of government propaganda” and eventually the state prevailed (2007: 200). As Trotter claims, the 1951 Waterfront Lockout and the smashing of Union solidarity marks a significant and crucial moment in the socio-political history of Aotearoa New Zealand (2007: 200).
task it is to universalize competition and invent market-shaped systems of action for individuals, groups and institutions” (2001: 197). A radical turn from German *Ordo*-liberalism to the liberalism of the Chicago school occurred between 1984 and 1993, both in Aotearoa New Zealand and across the Anglo-American world, and came to be known as neoliberalism. Jack Nagel describes this radical turn in Aotearoa New Zealand as a shift from what had probably been the most “protected, regulated and state-dominated system of any capitalist democracy to an extreme position at the open, competitive, free-market end of the spectrum” (1998: 223).\(^{52}\) He argues that “the social laboratory of democracy” in the 1890s and the “model welfare state in the 1930s” are early manifestations of the modes of Parliamentary executive power that would see the state reinvented as “the darling of the International Monetary Fund and the international financial community by the 1990s” (1998: 266).

The turn to neoliberal government in Aotearoa New Zealand has been referred to as the “New Zealand experiment” and as the implementation of “a coherent, top down, state initiated policy agenda based on a unified political philosophy” (Larner, 1998: 13). Jane Kelsey claims, for example, that “in the space of a decade a strong central state authority, operating with almost total disregard for democratic process and pluralist politics, and abetted by a private sector elite, revolutionized New Zealand’s economy and its peoples’ lives” (1995: 348).\(^{53}\) A “strong central state authority … abetted by a private sector elite” did implement swift and radical neoliberal reform in Aotearoa New Zealand but it did so through “the intense saturation of certain modes or practices” rather than through some centralized intention or design to totalize or dominate (Nealon, 2008: 100). As Foucault argues, power cannot be reduced to a structure of domination; state power and subjectivity are co-determined and “power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not

\(^{52}\) The one-party majoritarian Westminster parliamentary system played a crucial role in enabling swift, systematic and radical reform and central to this enabling power is the ruling party’s right of sovereignty over civil society. Mitchell Dean (2007) claims that sovereignty is a both a condition and a target of liberal democratic government. For Dean, the condition of sovereignty lies in the fact that it is only when a relatively pacified territory contains a civil society that it is possible for two parties to “take turns in operating the institutions of supreme power without civil strife arising” (2007: 145). Sovereignty is a target because it is the power to exercise sovereignty that is at stake in liberal political struggle (2007: 145). Dean contends that liberalism is a particular form of articulation of the “shepherd-flock game” and the “city-citizen game” and “of a pastoral power that takes the form of a biopolitics of the administration of life and a form of sovereignty that deploys the law and rights to limit, to offer guarantees, to make safe and, above all, to legitimate and justify the operations of biopolitical programmes and disciplinary practices” (1999: 132). All manifestations of liberal government, therefore, concern a continuation of ruling class ‘sovereignty’ articulated in biopolitical forms of governmentality.

\(^{53}\) For detailed explanation of the term ‘New Zealand Experiment’ see Kelsey, J., 1995.
reconstituted ‘above’ society as a supplementary structure” (1982: 791). The ‘New Zealand experiment’ resulted from growing social resistance to interventionist governmental strategies and to major economic recession, and the uptake of Chicago-style free-market policies involved the intense saturation of neoliberal practices and attitudes into every aspect of society. Richard Mulgan identifies four crucial changes that were instrumental in establishing Chicago-style neoliberalism in Aotearoa New Zealand. First of all, the influence of consultative politics had to be kept to a minimum “by swift and determined executive action” (1995: 88). Secondly, key state agencies had to be “protected from political interference” by being converted into state-owned enterprises. Thirdly, public interest had to be limited to the advice of financial advisers and, finally, popular consent had to be constructed after the event using the media and “particularly television” to “sell the value of the policies in terms of persuasive images” (1995: 88). (I will be picking up on television’s ‘persuasive images’ later in this Chapter).

The passing of the Reserve Bank Act 1989 exemplifies not only the swift and determined executive action that sidelined consultative politics and increased the power of private financiers but also the vital transformation of individual subjectivity. As Peter Miller contends, “it was increasingly accepted that economic calculation could shape social relations” as calculations of variances and departures from standards became inseparable from “notions of efficiency” and “a wider discourse of competitiveness” (2008: 59). Members of the New Zealand Business Roundtable played a crucial role in this social transformation and, in particular, in directing the conversion of state agencies into state-owned enterprises. A small but influential team of Treasury officials and businessmen grew more powerful as the government enacted a (re)turn to a liberal laissez-faire political economy. Roderick Deane, for example, de-regulated the financial system in his role as deputy-governor of Reserve Bank, before moving on to become, firstly, chairman of the State Services Commission, then CEO of Electricorp and, finally, CEO of Telecom (Jesson, 1999: 23). Not only did Deane have a vast influence on the country’s financial

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54 The New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBR), a lobby group consisting of 60 invited company directors and four associate members who each pay an annual membership fee of $40,000, has been described as “the most powerful [of the] driving forces of free market economic reforms transforming New Zealand” (Murray, 2006: 166-167). In his book The Hawk, for example, Allan Hawkins, a prominent Roundtable member, admits that “Equiticorp … had made a donation of $250,000 to the Labour Party or more specifically to Roger Douglas in recognition of the good work he had done in deregulating the New Zealand economy, something Equiticorp had benefited tremendously from” (Hawkins, 1989, cited in Jesson, 1999: 15).
policies and business structures, but, as Jesson contends, he wielded those vast amounts of power and influence without ever being politically accountable (1999: 24). As CEO of Electricorp and Telecom, it could be said that Deane was accountable to major shareholders, but this is profit-motivated accountability, not political accountability and, according to Jesson, Deane’s policies led to the gutting of Aotearoa New Zealand’s productive base and the takeover of the economy by speculative capital (1999: 24).

Between 1988 and 1991, nineteen major state owned assets were sold (through whole or partial ownership) to New Zealand Business Roundtable members, including Petrocorp to Sir Ron Trotter, New Zealand Steel to Allan Hawkins, Housing Corp to Sir Ron Trotter and Sir Roderick Deane, New Zealand Post to ANZ, New Zealand Railways to Michael Fay and David Richwhite, Telecom to Freightways directors and Fay Richwhite, and Air New Zealand to Brierleys (Murray, 2006: 169-170). Murray cites Gaynor (1999) to make the point that by the end of the 1990s many of these state assets had been re-sold for amounts far above their original sale price rewarding off-shore speculators as well as members of the NZBR; Michael Fay and David Richwhite, for example, realized a total gain of $410 million from Telecom, Bank of New Zealand and Tranz Rail share sales (2006: 170). Fay and Richwhite were also implicated in what came to be known as the Winebox Inquiry, which involved a number of shady and allegedly fraudulent dealings by some of the most powerful companies in the country using the Cook Islands as a tax haven. In effect, business elite dispossessed the state of public assets and disavowed any notion of social responsibility while amassing power in relation to and through the accumulation of capital (Harvey, 2006: 111).

Jesson cites Brian Gaynor to note that in September 1990 the New Zealand Government sold Telecom for $4.25 billion to Ameritech (45 percent), Bell Atlantic (45 percent), Sir Michael Fay and David Richwhite (5 percent) and Alan Gibbs and Trevor Farmer (5 percent). In December 1997 when Ameritech and Bell Atlantic sold their holdings, Gaynor estimated that “the two American telecommunication giants will exit New Zealand with an estimated total realization, including dividends, of $11.5 billion, compared with the original investment of just $3.8 billion” (Gaynor, 1997d, cited in Jesson, 1999: 173). Jesson describes this appropriation of local ownership and local institutions as “the colonization of the country by multinational finance” (1999: 180).


Murray provides an excellent analysis of ‘business elite’ and ‘ruling class’ as they have been and are constituted in both Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand. She argues that in Aotearoa New Zealand the ruling classes have moved away from directly involving themselves in the running of the state because they have “indirect control through their monopoly over the media and the power of finance” (2007: 57). The crucial role and influence of media is dealt with in detail in Chapters Two to Five of this thesis.
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 also played a key role in the neoliberal turn because it crushed unions, empowered corporate employers and worked effectively to discourage all collective bargaining and notions of social solidarity. Murray describes the Employment Contracts Act as the “ultimate NZBR achievement” because it adopted and implemented NZBR recommendations “to abolish the award system, diminish unions and promote individual contracts” (2006: 168). Although the Act purported to minimize state intervention and maximize individual autonomy or ‘freedom’, it actually worked to intensify state power and increase its hold over individuals. In neoliberal society, power functions by targeting life and lifestyles, by producing and classifying ever-increasing kinds of subjectivities that are regulated not so much in terms of the law but in terms of the norm (Nealon, 2008: 47). As Nealon sees it, subjects are identified in terms of “biopolitical normativity” and social delinquents are judged, not for their illegal transgressions, but by their abnormal personality (2008: 47). The Employment Contracts Act incorporates systems of state control but its prime purpose is to normalise individualized subjectivity and to make collective bargaining and ideas of solidarity, for example, translate as transgressive concepts, not illegal as such, but not normal. Biopolitical controls work to link ‘abnormal’ subjectivity with delinquency and place subjects who may or may not have done anything illegal or transgressive “outside the slippery slope of biopolitical normativity” (Nealon, 2008: 47). (The issue of delinquency is raised again in Chapter Four, in relation to Bauman’s ‘flawed consumers’ (2007) and the notion of illegal or transgressive subjectivity is highlighted in Chapter Five, with respect to the anti-terror raids in 2007).

According to Foucault, biopolitical strategies do not replace sovereign, disciplinary and pastoral technologies of power; rather they incorporate and intensify them, redeploying them less overtly, more effectively, to saturate all sectors of society. Foucault’s conceptualization of biopower is transversally linked to the Marxian concept of ‘real subsumption’ where “the capitalist means of production directly implicates itself in any and all other modes of production,” including subjectivity (2008: 84).58 As Nealon

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58 Lemke, following Foucault, emphasises the point that “the power of the economy was vested on a prior ‘economics of power’ since the accumulation of capital presumes technologies of production and forms of labour that enable putting to use a multitude of human beings in an economically profitable manner … labour power must first be constituted before it can be exploited: that is, that life time must be synthesized into labour time, individuals must be subjugated to the production circle, habits must be formed, and time
informs, “contemporary capitalism has not gone about setting boundaries on work, but rather has sought to increase work’s saturation into the very fibre of everyday life” (2008: 85, emphasis in original). Far from working to weaken or diminish the state, privatization and neoliberal processes actually function to extend state power. The social bond is defined in terms of a conflation between the economy and the social and every fibre of the social fabric is (re)constituted within economic parameters and administered through many and varied forms of “enterprise” policy (Nealon, 2008: 148). In Foucault’s words, “this multiplication of the ‘enterprise’ form within the social body is what is at stake in neoliberal policy … it is a matter of making the market, competition, and so the enterprise, into what could be called the formative power of society” (Nealon, 2008: 148). The turn to neoliberalism, therefore, involves the re-narration of the social bond across ever-widening parameters of capitalist market logic and an intensification of the biopolitical control that ensures the free flow of transnational capital.

The neoliberal turn heralded profound social change involving the demise of Fordist subjectivity, the emergence of post-Fordist subjectivity and a concomitant turn to individualized entrepreneurialism and new emphasis on cultural and identity politics. The terms Fordism and post-Fordism mark the shift from an economy characterized by the stable long-term employment typical of factory workers to one marked by flexible, mobile, and precarious labour relations. As Hardt and Negri explain, “flexible because workers have to adapt to different tasks, mobile because workers have to move frequently between jobs, and precarious because no contracts guarantee stable, long-term employment” (2004: 112, emphasis in original). The working day and the time of production have changed profoundly in the post-Fordist context and, as the stable, long-term employment typical of factory work declines and any clear division between work and the time of life blurs, new paradigms tend to “create not the means of social life but social life itself” (2004: 145-146, emphasis in original). Nagel marks this social shift in terms of two specific eras, describing the period from the 1930s until about 1970 as the “unidimensional” era, when “partisan competition in New Zealand was organized almost exclusively around economic

and space must be organized according to a scheme. Thus, economic exploitation required a prior ‘political investment of the body’ (1977: 25)” (2002: 58).

I use the terms post-Fordism and post-Industrialism interchangeably in this thesis and discuss in Chapter Two how the transformation from modern to post-modern culture parallels the economic transition from Fordism to post-Fordism.
issues and economic class divisions” (1998: 231). He contrasts that period with the fifteen years from 1970 to 1984 when “multi-dimensional” politics or “the intrusion of divisive non-economic issues” disturbed peaceful consensus and caused a major shift in the class composition of the two main parties (1998: 231).

Nagel describes protests against participation in the war in Vietnam, petitions for the protection of Lake Manapouri and marches for the recognition of Māori rights as divisive issues that helped destabilize New Zealand politics (1998: 240). He points out how “most of the young people who became politically active were well educated and although some were upwardly-mobile offspring of working-class families, others were from prosperous professional business or farming backgrounds” (1998: 234). This is a significant point because, as Nagel explains, “although this last group would normally have gravitated towards the National party for economic reasons, in the 1960s and early 1970s National was the party in power and protests over issues like Vietnam and Lake Manapouri were directed against its policies” (1998: 235). Changing social demographics and a new ‘preoccupation’ with foreign policy or environmental and cultural issues caused upheaval in political party loyalties and deflected resistance to Labour’s economic policy. Nagel cites Jack Vowles to claim that “incapacity or unwillingness to address sordid material issues on the part of many Labour voters has perversely allowed a new materialism to conquer New Zealand” (1998: 253). However, it is not that Labour voters had perversely allowed a new materialism to take over, but rather, that they no longer identified with a Labour/National binary but with growing resistance to state power and, in particular, to the environmental degradation associated with the state’s ‘think big’ policy.

At Aramoana near Dunedin, for example, a long-running Save Aramoana Campaign not only opposed the construction of an aluminium smelter in an ecologically fragile tidal estuary but also declared Aramoana an independent state with its own flag, passport and

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60 Nagel’s statistical evidence demonstrates, for example, that while professional, semi-professional, business and other white-collar people accounted for approximately 45% of Labour constituents in 1935, by 1984 that had risen to 85.7%. In comparison, manual workers, farmers and union officials accounted for 55% of Labour constituents in 1935 but this had dropped to 14.4% by 1984 (1998: 235).

61 Geoff Bertam explains how, in Aotearoa New Zealand, the ‘think big’ programmes of the early 1980s involved alliances between powerful development-oriented agencies from within the State apparatus (such as the Ministry of Works and Development, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry) and big corporate lobbyists from the private energy sector (Roper and Rudd, 1993: 47). Bertram’s description of alliances between bureaucratic and business elites demonstrates the increasing influence of business elites and signals incremental change in relations of power and the emergence of neoliberal modes of governmentality.
stamps. If we are to understand the economy of power relations from the perspective of resistance, we must always be aware that actions produce reactions and that resistance provokes responses. The Save Aramoana campaign provides a prime instance of what Foucault calls the “strategic reversibility” of power relations and demonstrates how governmentality as the “conduct of conduct” is interwoven with the history of dissenting “counter-conducts” (Gordon, 1991: 5). The Aramoana campaign, for example, was waged not only by those opposed to environmental degradation but also by those who believed government support for the smelter would mean more expensive electricity. In addition, although that smelter project was abandoned, supposedly indicating a triumph for the resistance movement, it could also have been declining aluminium prices at the time that forced the government’s decision. The Government eventually responded to the concerns of public interest groups like the Save Aramoana petitioners by enacting environmental protection legislation. However, corporate leaders also responded by creating whole networks of business groups to marshal political support and to reassert business dominance. The Aramoana campaign did target corporate agendas but, as Harvey explains, the anti-capitalist argument underpinning environmentalist campaigns was reinvented or re-narrated as also anti-freedom and anti-liberal (2005: 41-42). Demands for social transformation were redirected from anti-capitalist sentiment to anti-state sentiment and to a focus on social democracy and cultural or identity politics.

In his paper “The New Zealand Environmental Movement and the Politics of Inclusion,” David Downes contends that, “by ensuring the introduction of anti-nuclear legislation, Labour appeased an influential part of its constituency and so headed off a critical challenge to its legitimacy” (2000: 483). While the Save Aramoana Campaign was successful to the extent that the smelter was never built, environmental protection, as it is currently enunciated and implemented, may well represent the incorporation of the environmental activist challenge within what Downes refers to as “a state-managed, techno-corporatist discourse” (2000: 475).

Sharon Beder explains, for example, how a confrontation between President Kennedy and Roger Blough (chief of US Steel) in the early 1960s led to the founding of the Business Roundtable, the world’s most formidable business lobby group. When Blough broke an agreement with Kennedy and increased the price of steel, Kennedy retaliated by putting all steel companies under Federal investigation and by orchestrating a “ferocious public opinion campaign against the price rise” until Blough was forced to capitulate. Blough went on to be a key player in founding the Business Roundtable to make sure that business would stand united in its goals and never permit such a back-down again (2006: 10-11). Kennedy’s power to resist big business may be almost incomprehensible in today’s context, but in his day “the US president could denigrate business and put an industry in its place, and have his popular approval ratings soar as a result” (2006: 11). Kennedy’s resistance provoked an unexpected outcome by giving “rise to a roundtable of rebellious business knights determined to shape government policy to suit business interests and prevent government from meddling in business affairs” (2006: 11). Neoliberal government emerged, therefore, from forces of resistance and the mutation of power that had informed Keynesian forms of liberal governmentality.
David Harvey situates the emergence of identity politics and the dominance of non-economic issues in global context and points out that, by the end of the 1960s, the era of “embedded liberalism” or Keynesian government in which “market processes were surrounded by a web of social and political constraints” had broken down (2005: 12). He describes the 1970s as a time of economic downturn, unemployment and surging inflation or, in his words, “a global phase of stagflation” (2005: 12). According to Harvey, political debate was divided between those behind “social democracy and central planning” and those intent on “liberating corporate and business power and re-establishing market freedoms” (2005: 13). In his opinion, “By the mid 1970s the interests of the latter group came to the fore” (2005: 13). Harvey sums up the turn to neoliberalism in terms of the “construction of consent” and the emergence of a “neoliberal rhetoric” that not only insisted there was “no alternative” but also linked its “foundational emphasis upon individual freedoms” with “identity politics, multiculturalism and eventually narcissistic consumerism” (2005: 41). It is against this backdrop that I now situate both the turn to neoliberalism in Aotearoa New Zealand and the concomitant turn to identity politics and official biculturalism.

Neoliberalism and Biculturalism

Neoliberalism is the (re)implementation of a market-led capitalist economy and biculturalism, I argue, develops the complementary forms of affective investment and identity (re)construction that facilitate the marketing of a brand-state. Jane Kelsey (1995) argues that neoliberalism emerged in the 1980s, in the space of a decade, but it is also the case that changing social attitudes in preceding decades paved the way for the 1980s economic revolution. It was during the 1960s and 1970s, as Nagel and Harvey claim, that attitudes to Fordist regulation and the security of a welfare state shifted and a new

64 Harvey discusses the turn to neoliberalism from a global perspective and points out that financial and/or military coercion often produced “a fatalistic, even abject, acceptance of the idea that there was and is, as Margaret Thatcher kept insisting, ‘no alternative’” (2005: 40). He points out that the worldwide protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s combined demands for freedom from parental, educational, corporate, bureaucratic and state constraints with calls for social justice: “Pursuit of social justice presupposes social solidarities and a willingness to submerge individual wants, needs, and desires in the cause of some more general struggle for, say, social equality or environmental justice” (2005: 41). Harvey also makes the point, “It has long proved extremely difficult … to forge the collective discipline required for political action to achieve social justice without offending the desire of political actors for individual freedom and for full recognition and expression of particular identities” (2005: 41-42). He then asserts, “While neoliberalism did not create these distinctions, it could easily exploit, if not foment, them” (2005: 42).
generation began challenging established codes of authority. This incremental change is well captured in changing attitudes to the game of rugby, especially resistance to links with South African racist policies, which began in the 1960s and culminated in the political conflict that delineated and disrupted the 1981 Springbok tour. Nick Perry, in his analysis of changing media and the globalization of New Zealand sport, makes the point that between 1960 and 1980, several factors predicated change. Perry believes “the diffusion of aspects of second wave feminism, the political and cultural resurgence of Māoridom, and the expansion of an urban, purportedly more urbane (and hence explicitly more consumerist) middle class” contributed to cultural change (2004: 294). He sees these factors as “indications of an ever more visible gap between rugby’s social base and the characteristics of the society that it claimed to represent” (2004: 294). Perry notes other contributing factors; the first was that live telecasts of rugby tests began generating large TV audiences and attracting large corporate advertisers (national and multinational) who thus gained unprecedented influence (2004: 294). The other factor was “a gradual, but no less decisive, erosion of rugby’s hitherto taken-for-granted claim to occupy and to exemplify a nation-defining position” (2004: 294).

Hope, like Perry, makes the point that from 1905 to about 1960, rugby union equated with New Zealand’s national identity: “to actually play for the All Blacks was to enter national service” and in each encounter, as national press and radio coverage reiterated, “the reputation of New Zealand was at stake” (2002: 236). What comes through in these understandings of ‘national identity’ and ‘national service’ is the deeply embedded masculinist and racialized attitudes of British colonial imperialism. In a 2010 review of the history of Māori rugby, for example, Grahame Armstrong explains that Māori were excluded from tours to South Africa in 1928, 1949 and 1960 and that during South Africa’s apartheid regime, “the NZRU selected All Blacks for our country’s top team to play South Africa on the grounds of race and colour, deliberately excluding any All Blacks of Māori descent”. It was during the 1960s and 1970s, in line with other challenges to cultural authority (mentioned earlier), that prevailing rugby traditions and concomitant

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65 Armstrong also makes the point that in 2010, “in the year celebrating 100 years of Māori rugby … the NZRU is refusing to apologise to former Māori players – and their families – for excluding them from past tours to South Africa on racial grounds, a position that has been dubbed arrogant by the Māori Affairs Minister” (Armstrong, 2010).
constructions of homogeneous cultural and national identity provoked increasing public debate and political conflict.\textsuperscript{66} Hope writes:

For activists against the Vietnam War, fighting for one’s country was not necessarily praiseworthy. For women’s liberationists, the institution of male mateship formed a system of patriarchy. A new generation of Māori activists saw the past in terms of colonial subjugation rather than national progress. And, a growing anti-apartheid movement catalyzed opposition to the rugby-media-nation homology (2002: 244).\textsuperscript{67}

In the face of anti-apartheid struggles, rugby lost its traditional grip as a symbol of national identity and cultural unity and became instead a symbol of national division and conflict. The New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) responded to social pressure by suspending all future All Black-Springbok fixtures and, as Hope notes, this enabled corporate sponsors to remould the All Blacks to promote rugby’s largest ever media event, the 1987 World Cup (2002: 236). Significantly, it was the arrival of television and, crucially, “the social and national centrality of television” that would prove to have the most profound and enduring impact on both the development of rugby and on new formulations of cultural and identity politics (2002: 236). During the 1970s and 1980s, the NZRFU capitalized on television’s potential by selling All Black international telecast rights to Television New Zealand (2002: 236). Television New Zealand could “deliver large test match audiences to major advertisers” and, in addition, television’s “national centrality” could (re)conjure affective investment and rejuvenate All Blacks rugby as a symbol of national identity (2002: 236). The rugby-media-nation homology was effectively restored in 1987 through the Rugby World Cup, around which international broadcasting rights are sold, and through which the All Black brand is marketed.\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{66} In Chapter Four, when rugby’s role in articulations of national identity is examined further, I invoke Greg McGee’s play \textit{Foreskin’s Lament} (1981) because it provides a fine overview of attitudinal changes concerning the game as they were emerging at that time and because it problematizes the deeply embedded political link between rugby and notions of national identity.

\textsuperscript{67} Hope explains how the anti-apartheid movement targeted rugby and rugby tours during the 1960s and when Labour Prime Minister Norman Kirk cancelled the upcoming Springbok tour in April 1973, his decision “split the country” placing the rugby-media-nation homology “under siege” (2002: 243). He also describes how anti-apartheid protests against the 1981 Springbok tour generated unprecedented spectacles of resentment and physical conflict, noting “there were more than 200 demonstrations in 28 centres involving more than 150,000 people” (2002: 244). On 25 July, evening television newscasts covered the invasion of the field by protesters at the Waikato-Springbok match and, according to Hope, by next morning when newspapers showed the physical effects of spectator violence against protesters, “the rugby-media-nation homology had been torn asunder” (2002: 244).

\textsuperscript{68} It was not until 1995 that rugby players turned professional and rugby unions sold test match television rights to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation to fund player contracts (2002: 236). I discuss this issue again in Chapter Four.
1995, both the All Blacks team and the haka had come to perform as brand signifiers and, in the image-based context of television and global mediascapes, worked to generate the forms of interest, intrigue and affective response that harness affective biopower and build brand value.

Perry (2004) uses the emergence of the Super Twelve rugby union competition in the late 1990s (involving South Africa, Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand) to link professionalized sport with global media conglomerates and television audiences. He points out how the different New Zealand franchises, taken together, “coincide with the spatial boundaries of the nation state; and the teams themselves provide the recruitment pool for the All Blacks as the national team” (2004: 74). However, according to Perry, the franchises do not correspond with or emerge from any “extant administrative or other distinctions on the ground” (2004: 74). Instead, the Super Twelve franchises are “a combination of virtual geographies and imagined markets, the product of branding strategies and media footprints” (2004: 74-75). The Super Twelve franchises may be created to build markets for global media but their virtual territories do align with pre-existing spatial boundaries because it is “historically grounded local loyalties” that generate partisan affiliations, affective investment and thus brand value (2004: 298). Brand marketers utilize local loyalties to ground and enhance prospective markets but there is no actual connection to local communities. Players and administrators represent a brand rather than any specific place or community. As Perry notes, teams once named Auckland Blues and Otago Highlanders, for example, are now marketed as the Blues and the Highlanders; original city-derived or regional prefixes are “deliberately muted” (2004: 298). Perry makes the telling observation that “with such a shift from the socio-political to the virtual-simulated,” there is an accompanying sense that the nation, like the past, “is now another country” and that a national icon like the All Blacks rugby team “will become someone else’s” (2004: 298). Furthermore, local audiences may continue to identify with and support a ‘local’ franchise, but they must pay subscriptions to overseas-owned satellite channels in order to view the games in real-time transmission. In this example, neoliberal deregulated markets appropriate residual notions of place-based, cultural identity and reinscribe them to manifest as a televisual spectacle for global capital. The game of rugby serves to demonstrate here how neoliberal market logic infiltrates all aspects of social life and how developing media technologies, especially television, play a crucial role in the turn to brand-based identity politics.
Neoliberal reform and the articulation of biculturalism are inextricably linked and signify a social turn to deregulation, privatized fiscal policy and to a cultural politics focused on recognition, rights and identity matters.\(^{69}\) Bicultural policies involve biopolitical management of a population and demonstrate how, in the face of Māori political activism, government strategies work to blunt, deflect and co-opt threats to state sovereignty and challenges to state legitimacy. Biculturalism was formally implemented as government policy in 1984 but it was incremental social change in previous decades that presaged and informed this (re)narration of the social bond and transformation of national identity.

During the 1950s and 1960s, when industrial expansion created a huge demand for manual wage labour, Māori were encouraged to leave their rural communities and move to urban areas for work. As Sissons points out, when increasing numbers of Māori moved to cities for work, it was they who were subjected to assimilatory and individualizing forces, while those who remained in rural areas came to identify with and maintain the structures of newly institutionalized tribal identities (2004: 28). Individualized dispossession goes hand in hand with the development of official tribalism and together they demonstrate how individualizing and totalizing biopolitical strategies work, as Foucault claims, to normalize, to discipline and to make subject (1982: 783 and 784).

By 1971, as Sissons also points out, 70.2 per cent of the Māori population was living in urban areas and just under 60 per cent of them were “engaged in manual labour in manufacturing, mining, transport and construction” (1993: 100). Sissons describes this “ethnic mobilization” as the “urbanization and proletarianization of Māori people” and claims it prompted a renewal of Māori activism “led, initially, by trade unionists and tertiary students, the latter adopting the name ‘Ngā Tamatoa’ [the Young Warriors]” (1993: 100). In her review of Māori protest action in the 1970s, Marilyn Lashley claims that “Ngā Tamatoa redefined Māori identity by drawing on the movements for US Civil Rights, American Indians, and women, as well as black power ideology, and attributed the marginal and unequal status of Māori to institutionalized white racism and oppression” (2000: 6). Ngā Tamatoa took a militant stance in advocating for the rejuvenation and use of Māori language as an official language as well as for return of illegally confiscated

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lands, settlement of treaty breaches and recognition of Māori rights according to the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi (2000: 6). Lashley also points out that the historic 1975 Māori Land March from Auckland to Wellington and the 1977 Bastion Point Protest and subsequent occupation were “pantribal protests organized by Ngā Tamatoa in conjunction with established Māori organizations representing a wide spectrum of opinions on Māori issues” (2000: 7).

Ngā Tamatoa drew attention to “ethnic inequality, particularly as it was reflected in lower school achievement rates and higher arrest, conviction and imprisonment rates for young Māori” (1993: 100). And, crucially, it was “ethnic inequality” and “social alienation due to a loss of cultural identity” that were pinpointed as major causes for “Māori underachievement” (1993: 100). It was envisaged that if Māori language and “traditional” culture were revitalized, affirmed and promoted, “ethnic inequalities might be effectively reduced and eventually eliminated” (1993: 100). To this end, as Sissons points out, “Language, marae, hui ceremony, beliefs and values were selectively appropriated and imbued with ethnic significance” and “cultural forms, already symbolic, were systematically re-articulated as hyper-symbolic expressions of Māori identity” (1993: 113). In other words, Māori traditional beliefs and values had to be selected and rationalized as components of a culture that would underpin “a distinctive Māori identity” and that would “readily signify difference between Pākehā and Māori” (1993: 111).

By 1973, according to Sissons, Māoritanga [Māori culture], including Māori language, was part of school curricula and, by 1976, government departments offered cultural

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70 Sissons also notes that “the emergence of urban Māori ‘gangs’ only served to underline the perceived urgency of the problem” (1993: 100). In 2010 the problems of lower school achievement rates, higher imprisonment rates and growing ‘gang’ membership continue unabated, testifying to the inadequacy of culturalized politics. This will be discussed again in chapter 6.

71 The marae is a sacred open meeting area, generally situated in front of the ‘whare rūnanga,’ communal meeting house, and is the place of greatest spirituality, the place in which Māori customs are given ultimate expression. People may be called to a ‘hui’ on the marae; the literal meaning of hui is to congregate, to gather together. As opposed to other meetings, hui are usually run according to Māori protocol (New Zealand in History, 2008), [online] Available at: http://history-nz.org/maori5.html [Accessed 30.03.12].

72 Sissons highlights, for example, difference expressed by “implicitly contrasting individuality and communality (aroha, manaakitanga, kotahitanga, whanaungatanga), materiality and spirituality (mauri, wairua, mana, tapu), and English language and Māori language (reo)” (1993: 111).
awareness training to all employees (1993: 104). Sissons claims the systemic uptake of Māori tradition had four main objectives: “the enhancement of Māori identity and self-esteem, improved ‘social harmony’, Māori self-administration, and the enhancement of the state’s corporate image” (1993: 113). As Sissons argues, in response to calls by Māori activists for a dismantling of colonial and monocultural structures, Māori cultural tradition was systematically (re)inscribed both as identity signifier and strategic resource (1993: 97). Retribalization, grounded in revivalist ideology, merges historical tribal identity with new capital-owning corporate identity to garner political authority and to gain socio-economic advantage. Furthermore, by binding the construction of culture to the fulcrum of capital, retribalization obscures widening social class differences among Māori. As Maaka and Fleras argue, demands for a “new social contract based on the constitutional principles of partnership, power-sharing and self-determining autonomy” produce an ineffectual form of recognition-in-difference that does not interrogate the inequitable political economy and replays essentialized notions of a social totality (2005: 31).

The (re)inscription of Māori cultural identity reiterates the appropriative art of liberal government and plays a crucial role in the (re)conceptualization of Aotearoa New Zealand as a brand-state.

Michael Bassett, writing in 2010, pinpoints one of the catalysts for the emergence of a bicultural discourse when he discusses the legislation that reclassified and redefined Māori identity. He points out first of all that, “prior to 1974, a Māori was defined as someone who was half-caste or more” (ODT, 09.08.10). He then goes on to explain that because it was becoming increasingly difficult for many Māori to stipulate their proportion of Māori blood for electoral, land and other purposes, the Māori Affairs Amendment Act (passed in 1974) redefined Māori as “a person of the Māori race of New Zealand; and includes any descendant of such a Māori” (ODT, 09.08.10). The point, as Bassett observes, is that this...

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73 Sisson writes: “Seminars and training sessions, including role-plays, were organized for personnel from Police, Justice, Social Welfare, Labour, Health and Education Departments” and “Increasingly throughout the decade these were held on urban marae” (1993: 104). He also notes that the Race Relations Office was established in 1972 and that “Throughout the decade staff delivered, with missionary dedication, literally hundreds of lectures and addresses to schools, church groups and community service clubs” (1993: 104).

74 For further reading on liberal and neoliberal re-tribalization of Māori communities see, for example, Rata, 2000; Poata-Smith, 1997, 2001, 2004 and Webster, 2002.

75 Michael Bassett is a historian, former cabinet minister, and was a member of the Waitangi Tribunal between 1994 and 2004. Bassett wrote this article in response to Hone Harawira’s comment that he wants his children to marry Māori. Bassett claims that Harawira’s “racial purity ruminations are about two centuries too late”. He also notes that during the debate on the Bill, one MP scoffed that the definition of a Māori now seemed so wide that “anyone who cycled past a marae could claim to be a Māori” (Bassett, 2010).
legislation “hugely widened the definition of who was a Māori” but it also “hugely widened” the proportion of the population for whom a bicultural discourse would become both timely and relevant (ODT, 09.08.10). The statistical reconfiguration of Māori identity reflects wider social transformation and a shift from Fordist forms of state-sanctioned identity to post-Fordist notions of cultural identity as a matter of image, individual choice and lifestyle option. It also exemplifies biopolitical management of a population and the knowledge/power regime that guides the conduct of conduct and shapes society by stipulating the parameters according to which census data will be compiled, collated and applied to state policy and government legislation. Narrations of identity and belonging, once bound in a discourse of cultural homogeneity and common citizenship, shift with post-Fordist social transformation to become matters of ascription and cultural particularity. This process is closely connected with the turn to neoliberalism, with the concept of social empowerment and ineluctably with the commodification of culture. John and Jean Comaroff (2009) corroborate this point, claiming that culture and capitalism are converging in resurgent narrations of ethnicity and that, as a result, we are witnessing the rampant commodification of all human identity. They link ethnic identity with an “exploitable” collective self and use the term “consumer nationalism” to describe “a new national identity” that sets out to “brand” itself and “to place an ethnic logo on that most universal of human qualities: life itself” (2009: 5, emphasis in original). Although Māori calls for social recognition and empowerment cannot be reduced to money, markets and branding, my argument is that official biculturalism works in conjunction with a market economy to classify, delineate and commodify cultural particularities and thereby to situate Aotearoa New Zealand as a unique brand, as bicultural New Zealand Inc.

Official biculturalism can be traced first to the passing of The Māori Affairs Amendment Act 1974 which addressed changing demographics by widening identificatory parameters but it was the passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 that would underpin and inform

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76 On the matter of Māori ethnicity see, for example, the work of Tahu Kukutai who states, “A recurring theme in this paper is that how ethnic group boundaries are defined and delineated is an intensely political process that is tied to resources and who can access them” (2004: 103). Kukutai claims that indigenous peoples such as Māori tend to figure prominently in national debates on race, ethnicity and resources because “their claim as original or sovereign peoples also confers specific legal rights relating to ownership of land and natural resources, cultural preservation, and political representation” (2004: 87). Kukutai locates the issue in wider context and points out that comparable countries with indigenous populations all share similar characteristics: “high rates of intermix with the European-descent majority, integration into a capitalist economy, rapid urbanization, differentiation in legal and policy context, pronounced population growth in recent decades, and over-representation in the lower socio-economic strata” (2004: 104).
bicultural discourse and have a lasting impact on articulations of national identity. This legislation, as Marilyn Lashley states, not only “reasserted the importance of the Treaty of Waitangi as the founding document of New Zealand” but also placed the Treaty “at the centre of New Zealand governance and policymaking” (2000: 7). The Treaty of Waitangi Act marks the emergence of a bicultural discourse and the new prominence of the Crown/Māori contract in two important ways. First, it establishes the Waitangi Tribunal to hear claims of breached treaty rights and to investigate all new legislation for possible treaty breaches (2000: 7-8). Second, it invokes the rule of contra preferentum which, as Lashley explains, “holds that where a divergence or ambiguity in a treaty document between two parties results, a provision should be construed against that party which drafted the document” (2000: 7). In the 1970s turn to biculturalism then, Māori identity acquires new status and priority both in the totalizing processes of legislative and juridical rulings and in the promotion of Māori subjectivity as an increasingly powerful strategic resource.

According to Sissons, biculturalism enacts “an uneasy juxtaposition of two imagined communities: a Treaty nation, in which tribes have a quasi-legal relationship with the Crown as the representative of settler interests; and a bicultural nation in which individuals share – albeit unequally – two cultures” (2004: 29). Sissons draws an important distinction between these two imagined communities, pointing out first, that a Treaty nation is most fundamentally a territory owned by iwi and the Crown and that “Pākehā belonging within a Treaty nation absolutely require the perpetuation of official, territorial tribalism” (2004: 29). The Treaty claims settlement process exposes and addresses the dispossession at the heart of settler nationhood without threatening State sovereignty or the legitimate belonging of Pākehā settlers. In the imagined community of bicultural nationhood, it is not territory but culture that signifies belonging and legitimacy. However, as Sissons points out, Pākehā cultural belonging acquires automatic legitimacy while “in continuities with assimilationism that are most insidious, it is Māori belonging that is at issue” (2004: 29, emphasis in original). Rather than requiring Māori to become like Pākehā as in assimilationist policies, a bicultural discourse requires Māori to become Māori and “to

77 The Treaty of Waitangi Act requires the Tribunal to investigate all new legislation from 1976 by determining “the meaning and effect of the Treaty of Waitangi as embodied in the two texts [English and Māori], and to decide issues raised by the differences between them (Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 §5[2])” (Lashley, 2000, 7-8).
visibly inhabit a distinctive culture with traditional roots, with tribal roots” (2004: 29). The only difference between assimilationist and bicultural narratives is the version of cultural identity required in articulations of unified nationhood. The important point here is that Māori identity continues to be the object at issue for biopolitical modes of governmentality and that the Pākehā/Māori dichotomy is a reiterative effect of the fundamental power-knowledge regime at play in the particular history of this country.

The drive to rejuvenate and enhance Māori cultural identity and to promote a bicultural narrative prompted widespread debate and often worked to disturb prevailing understandings of the national narrative and colonial history. This is apparent, for example, in retrospective articles about the production and screening of the 1970s television drama, The Governor. Keith Aberdein, who co-wrote the series, explains that at the time he had “somehow come to believe there was a deep injustice at the heart of all imperial systems” and was beginning to realise that as “white, male and nominally Protestant” he was “part of the problem” (2010: 2). He also explains that he arrived as an immigrant to New Zealand in the early 1960s and after being “constantly told it enjoyed the best race relations in the world” eventually had to ask “compared to what?” and “what does that mean?” He recalls that Pukemanu was among the first programmes to challenge racial simplicities and take the “TV drama walk in the minefield of racial and cultural conflict” (2010: 2). He also makes the point that “a significant majority of white New Zealanders had still nodded comfortable assent to Keith Holyoake’s assertion that ‘our’ Māoris [sic] made terrific bulldozer drivers, his implication being: wasn’t that enough?” (This comment fits with the claim made earlier by Sissons that the proletarianization of Māori was one reason for political protest). Aberdein hoped his rendition of The Governor would challenge such complacency and, in retrospect, suggests “possibly the nodding became less comfortable” (2010: 2). Paul Ward puts the series in social context by reminding that

78 The Governor was filmed at Avalon studios in 1976 and screened by TVNZ in 1977. Keith Aberdein and Paul Ward produced this retrospective analysis when The Governor was re-screened on TV One in July 2010. Ward notes that at its peak, The Governor claimed nearly 50% of the viewing population. The Governor won the 1978 Feltex Award for Best Drama and Episode 4, “He Iwi Tahi Tātou (Now We Are One People)” won the 1978 Feltex Award for Best Script (2010: 4-5) (Aberdein, 2010 and Ward, 2010).

79 Pukemanu was set in a fictional North Island mill town and depicted a bicultural community of hardy forestry workers. Trisha Dunleavy states: “Richly evocative of the ‘small town New Zealand’ with which New Zealanders have retained a nostalgic identification, Pukemanu posited an image of the kind of shared culture and values that viewers recognized and enthusiastically embraced” (2004: 207). Dunleavy also makes the point that despite its “popularity and enduring constructions of ‘localness’, its achievements were vastly underestimated at the time, and the series was prematurely axed” (2004: 207-208).
when the series went to air in 1977, “the government had only recently admitted liability for land crimes (in 1975, when the Waitangi Tribunal was set up) and land marches (hīkoi) were stirring public emotions” (2010: 4). He also explains that in the early 1970s, when co-writer Michael Noonan came up with the idea of revisiting the Grey story, “Māori activism was challenging assumptions about the colonial period, and there was a nationalist push for local drama on TV One” (2010: 3).

While The Governor broke new ground in both respects, dramatizing local history and prioritizing a Māori perspective, its reception and impact also demonstrates how broadcast television was already serving to inform, educate and stir the emotions of a national audience. This comes through in various reviews cited in Ward. For example, Barry Shaw, from the Auckland Star claimed, “It has made Māori matter. If Pākehā now have a better understanding of the Māori point of view, if the Māori, particularly the younger generation, now have a pride in their race, it stems from The Governor. Now how do you measure that in dollars?” (cited in Ward, 2010: 4). In a 1977 Auckland Star article, Professor Ranginui Walker wrote it was exciting for Māori children to see, for the first time, Māori depicted as “goodies” and claimed “people now understand why the Bastion Point protesters are camped on Crown land and why groups like Ngā Tamatoa exist” (cited in Ward, 2010: 5). In summary, Ward declares, “Given the audience size and the ‘campfire’ that television represented in the 1970s (there had only been a second channel for two years) The Governor must have enlarged public consciousness of New Zealand history” (2010: 5). Aberdein offers a more circumspect opinion noting, “Quite deliberately, and with the arrogance of relative youth we’d set out to bring down a few flagpoles of our own … but as Heke understood, flagpole lowering has to be repeated … it’s never enough to destroy the symbols if you cannot change some hearts and minds” (2010: 2). In Aberdein’s view, “nothing as risky, ambitious or subversive has appeared since” and although it did cause controversy he remains wary of “Pākehā who make claims for their contribution to the Māori cause” (2010: 2). Aberdein’s insightful comments are

80 Ward points out how previous accounts of the Grey story had been from a “Pākehā perspective, with Victorian gent Grey as the ‘Good Governor’ steering ‘God’s Own Country’ towards its egalitarian destiny” (2010: 3). However, he says, extensive primary research uncovered a Grey “as shady as his name, who, as well as being a figurehead of the new colony, was duplicitous towards Māori, a drug addict, and lecher” (2010: 3). This drama broke new ground by offering an alternative view to dominant historical accounts but it still presents only a partial, retrospective perspective. At Grey’s funeral in 1898, for example, there was: “A poignant message from the Māori people – Horei Kerei, Auē! Ka nui mātou aroha ki a koe George Grey, alas! Great was our love for thee” (Sir George Grey – 1812-1898).
affirmed by Ghassan Hage, who warns “we are far from reaching a stage where ‘we’, Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, can remember the acts of dispossession and murder within that history without partisan affective intensity” (2003: 93). To paraphrase Hage, it is not politically innocent to speak of a New Zealand memory. And it is not enough to either call for justice and hold oneself responsible by identifying with the history of the coloniser, or call for justice and put oneself in an accusatory position by identifying with the history of the colonized (2003: 94). For Hage, the very idea of “recognizing” injustice and assuming responsibility for it, admirable as it is, is still a coloniser’s take on history, even when it is a repentant coloniser’s take (2003: 94). Hage, like Aberdein, is not denying the need for such recognition, but pointing out the limitations of such retrospective critique (2003: 94). It becomes clear in this discussion of a television drama’s production and impact that “partisan affective intensity” plays a crucial role in constructions of subjectivity and in the turn to a bicultural national narrative (2003: 93).

The Te Māori Exhibition, New York

The role of ‘affective intensity’ in the (re)construction of Māori subjectivity and official biculturalism is well exemplified in the production and reception of Te Māori, a major international Māori art exhibition which opened at New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art in September 1984 (1993: 103).

81 ‘Indigeneity’ in Aotearoa New Zealand connotes Māori identity and Māori culture and so Hage’s indigenous/non-indigenous binary can equate with a Māori/Pākehā binary. Having said that, however, the term ‘indigeneity’ produces the effect that it names through the power of reiterative discourse and demonstrates how political economy and social context formulate seemingly incontestable referents that are in fact discursively constructed expressions of power.

82 It is significant that the early 1980s were a time of confrontation and disruption between Māori and the Crown; activists called for greater awareness and acceptance of Māoritanga, seen as guaranteed by the Treaty, and for acknowledgement of Māori as the tangata whenua [people of the land]. Such concerns culminated in protest action on Waitangi Day (February 6) 1984 when approximately 3000 people joined a hikoi [march] from Turangawaewae Marae in Ngāruawāhia to Waitangi (Waitangi Day 1980s, 2007).
Allan Hanson claims “through a stroke of genius in the presentation of the exhibition, Mead and the other Māoris [sic] involved in it managed to clothe the objects with more than simply artistic value” (1989: 896). He explains, first, how the exhibition opened with “a dramatic dawn ceremony” in which Māori elders “ritually lifted the *tapu* (‘taboo’) from the objects and entrusted them to the care of the host museum” (1989: 896). After noting that this ceremony “received extensive media coverage in each city” he goes on to point out that “it conveyed the Māori idea that the objects were infused with a spiritual power that derived from the ancestors and linked them in a mystical union with the Māoris of today” (1989: 896). As a consequence, according to Hanson, the objects were viewed as more than examples of fine and exotic artwork; they were also seen to convey, “in the minds of many Americans who saw or were involved with the exhibition,” that the Māori people had “access to primal sources of power long since lost by more rational cultures” (1989: 896). In other words, *Te Māori* projected a spirituality and affective intensity implicitly lost or lacking in Western or Pākehā culture and, by doing so, invested ‘Māori culture’ with a unique point of difference albeit from “primal sources” and in contrast with “more rational cultures” (1989: 896). Hanson claims “the exhibition did have some effect in both strengthening Māori identity and increasing Pākehā respect for the Māori people and Māori culture” (1989: 896). Furthermore, in his view, *Te Māori* “advanced the

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84 Hanson uses plural forms “Māoris” and “Pākehās” but ‘Māori’ and ‘Pākehā’ are now widely understood to convey both singular and plural cases.
agenda of Māoritanga and the notion of a bicultural New Zealand” which, as he sees it, “was one of the prime purposes and major benefits of the entire project” (1989: 896).

In order to situate the staging of the Te Māori exhibition in wider sociocultural context, I again invoke the work of David Harvey and, more specifically, his account of the neoliberalization of culture in New York City (2005: 46-47). Harvey explains how in the aftermath of the 1970s fiscal crisis, when the city’s infrastructure deteriorated markedly from lack of investment and maintenance, New York investment bankers seized the opportunity to restructure it in ways that would suit their agenda and create a “good business climate” (2005: 47). Harvey explains how public resources were appropriated; subsidies and tax incentives were put in place for capitalist enterprises and “corporate welfare substituted for people welfare” (2005: 47). He claims that “city government was more and more construed as an entrepreneurial rather than a social democratic or even managerial entity” and that this 1970s re-structuring and business takeover of New York presaged and pioneered the model of neoliberal practices that would inform 1980s politics (2005: 47-48). Financial activities, legal services, media development and “diversified consumerism” took priority and “the city’s elite institutions were mobilized to sell the image of the city as a cultural centre and tourist destination” (2005: 47). Harvey points out how “identity became the leitmotif of bourgeois urban culture” and how “the city’s elites acceded … to the demand for lifestyle diversification … and increasing consumer niche choices (in areas such as cultural production)” (2005: 47). It was from this context that the Te Māori exhibition emerged, as Hirini Mead explains in an interview: “The head of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York wanted to hold an exhibition of Māori treasures to showcase to the world. That was his idea, to take taonga over there to display to the world.”

The Te Māori exhibition must be understood, therefore, not so much as the

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85 The Tangata Whenua website states, “Te Māori: Māori Art from New Zealand Collections” borrowed from twelve New Zealand museums, exhibiting 174 taonga [treasures] and, after opening in New York, travelled to the Saint Louis Art Museum, the de Young Memorial Museum in San Francisco and finally to the Field Museum in Chicago in 1986. … In New York over 202,000 people visited the exhibition … many more were exposed to Te Māori through cable and national television coverage … the exhibition made the front page of the New York Times.” Between 1986 and 1987, Te Māori: Te Hokinga Mai travelled to the National Museum, Wellington, the Otago Museum, Dunedin, the Robert McDougall Art Gallery, Christchurch and finally to the Auckland Art Gallery. The website echoes Hanson when it claims “As an historical moment, the exhibition raised the mana [prestige] of Māori art, revitalized Māori culture, drew the people of New Zealand closer together … and was a profoundly moving experience for international audiences as much as it was for all New Zealanders” (Kōrero about Te Māori, 2007).

86 Takuta Hirini Moko Mead makes this statement as part of a Wakahuia TVNZ production recording the events leading up to and characterizing the Te Māori exhibition in 1984 (Mead, 2010).
epitome of cultural recognition and renaissance but more as part of a neoliberal movement that situates ‘culture’ as a commodity to be marketed by capitalist enterprises.

In his discussion of the *Te Māori* exhibition, Sissons speaks of a “mood of optimism” taking hold in official circles with regard to Māori subjectivity and cultural status (1993: 103). He suggests that *Te Māori* successfully communicated this mood to a wider audience and that “the implied equivalence between Māori tribal art and the works of great European artists symbolically prefigured the future bi-cultural society” (1993: 103). The impact of *Te Māori* equates with what Arlene Davila calls the “marketing and making” of an identity (cited in Comaroff, 2009: 16). Commercial, especially prestigious, representations of identity can shape people’s cultural identities as well as affect notions of belonging and cultural citizenship in public life. The term ‘affect’ is appropriate, or apt, pointing simultaneously to cause, sentiment and effect. A prestigious New York establishment highlights Māori artifacts and spiritual beliefs, creating a new context for Māori identity, one that connotes affective connection and a shared feeling of ‘Māoriness’. The stress quite blatantly is on conjuring affect, itself ever more a commodity, by aesthetic means. Links with New York increase the cultural capital associated with Māori identity and cultural heritage. It can be argued therefore, that Māori tribal art was seconded by bourgeois urban culture and that *Te Māori* did not so much symbolically prefigure future bicultural society as demonstrate bicultural nationhood’s symbolic function as a marketable brand. These accounts and recollections of the production of both *The Governor* and *Te Māori* demonstrate that articulations of cultural and/or national identity are complex mixes of social (re)construction, the generation of partisan affective intensity and the proprietorial commodification of cultural expression.

Bourgeois urban culture is associated with affluent, middle-class people and with access to what Pierre Bourdieu refers to as economic and cultural capital. Bourdieu claims that culture and class are inextricably linked and that attitudes to culture and understandings of taste are wholly dependent on one’s social class and upbringing. For Bourdieu, class and taste intertwine to produce “class habitus,” “the internalized form of class condition and of

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87 A special feature of the *Te Māori* exhibition was the use of “kaiarahi or Māori gallery guides” who were selected by Elders and trained to “increase the mana of taonga and by extension their ancestors, by providing a unique world-view” (*Kōrero about Te Māori*, 2007). In Chapter Four, I discuss the role and influence of Māori guides at the tourist resort of Whakarewarewa in the late 19th and early 20th century; there is a reiterative cultural theme playing out here and it may be because the early guides gained a worldwide reputation that this practice was (re)produced at the New York exhibition.
the conditionings it entails,” and attitudes to taste work as a device, therefore, for structuring distinctive life-styles and for reinforcing class stratifications and hierarchies of social power (1984: 101).

Bourdieu coins the term “cultural capital” to describe non-economic sources of social power or, as he puts it, “nonmonetary investments (inter alia, the affective ones) and the material and symbolic profits that education provides in a deferred, indirect way” (1986: 56). According to Bourdieu, “Most of the properties of cultural capital can be reduced to the fact that, in its fundamental state, it is linked to the body and presupposes embodiment” (1986: 48). Embodied cultural capital cannot be acquired or transmitted instantaneously (like property) but is accumulated through “work on oneself” or “self-improvement” (1986: 47-48).

For Bourdieu, cultural capital refers not only to the connection between power and education but also to nonmonetary, affective investment and to the social power inherent in embodied affect. While Foucault’s term ‘biopower’ refers to the way bodies are incorporated and normalized through knowledge/power regimes, Bourdieu emphasises the crucial role of “nonmonetary, affective investment” in this process. It is my contention, therefore, that affective force and biopower are inextricably linked and I coin the term ‘affective biopower’ to encapsulate that point. Affective biopower cannot be contained by any individual, group or state apparatus and is both irreducible and irrepressible. It informs creative sociality and is an illimitable source of potential resistance. However, because affective biopower functions primarily to form social bonds and to build a common world, it also works to shape and normalize. Affective biopower, as a normalizing force, is the focal point of this thesis and subsequent Chapters will focus on the manipulation of affective biopower in an era of media governmentality and brand marketing. Here, I have sought to argue that neoliberalism is the (re)implementation of a market-led capitalist economy and that biculturalism develops the complementary forms of affective investment and identity (re)construction that facilitate the marketing of a brand-state.

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88 The relationship between class, taste and lifestyles is examined in more detail in Chapters Two and Three.

89 Cultural capital can be objectified in material objects and institutionalized in the media, for example, and can be transmitted both symbolically (which presupposes cultural capital) and materially (which presupposes economic capital). However, as Bourdieu explains, “the owner of the means of production must find a way of appropriating either the embodied capital which is the precondition of specific appropriation or the services of the holders of this capital (1986: 50). In short, “to possess the machines he only needs economic capital; to appropriate them and use them in accordance with their specific purpose … he must have access to embodied cultural capital, either in person or by proxy” (1986: 50). The idea that “embodied cultural capital” accumulates through “self-improvement” and “work on oneself” comes through in contemporary media culture, especially reality television, and is discussed in detail in Chapters Two and Three.
**Bicultural National Identity**

Biculturalism and neoliberalism emerged in parallel forms during the 1980s but this does not mean they emerged in uniform, predictable trajectories following a unified political agenda. On the contrary, Lashley claims that the macroeconomic policies enacted to restructure an ailing economy “collided” with the targeted social policy and reparative treaty settlements enacted to settle Māori grievances (2000: 45). This “collision” serves to illustrate both the contingent and unpredictable nature of relations of power and also the liberal anxiety underpinning all liberal government. On the one hand, Prime Minister David Lange’s Labour government (1984-1989) sought to prioritize social issues (like the anti-nuclear movement) and address Māori grievances but, on the other hand, it was constrained and directed by the overarching imperatives of a capitalist political economy. A Māori politics of resistance challenged the legitimacy of the state and called for revision of notions of justice, for redress and for the right to self-determination. However, as Dean makes clear, these grievances intersected with neoliberal critiques of the welfare state and the rights of self-actualized subjects and so came to be aligned with the neoliberal critique of excessive government (1999: 155). For example, in 1980 a new Māori political party, *Mana Motuhake* (Self-determination), called for greater Māori political and economic autonomy and in 1982 and 1983 a series of articles called *Māori Sovereignty* provoked growing protest and widespread debate (Sissons, 1993: 105). However, in the context of the 1970s and 1980s these calls for greater Māori political and economic autonomy were reconfigured and implemented as calls for deregulated economic policy and entrepreneurial freedom in market enterprise. The upshot of this collision between neoliberal economics and social justice for Māori is that Māori are granted autonomy and freedom to participate as business operators in free market enterprises on neoliberal terms. As Sissons sees it, the state responded to Māori political activism by directing “the systematization of Māori tradition increasingly towards Māori self-administration and the enhancement of its own bicultural corporate image” (1993: 106). However, the Labour

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*Sissons cites Andrew Sharp who notes that “governing circles in New Zealand found themselves in the 1980s operating in conditions of extreme uncertainty in Māori-Pākehā and Māori-Crown relations … violence was often mentioned as a possible consequence of continued injustice. Of more immediate concern, it was obvious to all that the state as it was constituted and as it operated was hardly the object of devotion of many Māori and that it stood to lose the adherence of still more (Sharp, 1990: 266)” (1993: 106).*
government did attempt to address Māori grievances, for example, by retrospectively recognising the right to claim against Treaty breaches as far back as 1840. Such Treaty and race-based politics contain a double movement. While seeking to address the racially inflected unjust outcomes encapsulated in the Treaty’s history, a racial binary is (re)deployed in terms of “positive discrimination” and an absolute right to signify. The problem is that ‘race’ is a contingent category and can never function as a guarantee of behaviour, conditions of existence or politics. Although reparative Treaty settlements imply that social inequality and injustice is being addressed, as Lashley stresses, Treaty settlement assets represent private property and “are not expected to pay for costs of State programs or for the duties of the State towards its citizens under welfare legislation or the like” (2000: 40). In the context of 1980s neoliberal reform then, rather than working to improve Māori economic and social well-being, reparative treaty settlements are (re)allocated as corporate structures which work to enrich and empower only an elite few. The government also implemented “positive discrimination” policies which aimed to improve ‘Māori’ well-being by contracting directly with Māori organizations and enterprises to deliver programs and services to Māori people and increasing the budget for Māori affairs from $67 million to $250 million (Lashley, 2000: 14). However, as Lashley also points out, before these targeted social policies could take hold and be evaluated, new fiscal policies “devolved targeted programs, cut social welfare, and mainstreamed Māori into universal programs irrespective of lingering effects of dispossession and marginalization” (2000: 45). Reparative treaty settlements and targeted social policies both contained neoliberal prerogatives with regard to business enterprise and devolved notions of responsibility and accountability but, as Sissons claims, they also went some way to reduce “the state-legitimation deficit for Māori” (1993: 101). It was because they utilized “positive discrimination” and were seen to benefit only Māori that they increased the state-legitimation deficit for “a significant proportion” of the Pākehā electorate and fuelled a “Pākehā backlash” (1993: 101). In order to restore state legitimacy, government then reneged on its targeted social policies and turned to a symbolic form of biculturalism that could affectively elevate Māori cultural identity without compromising neoliberal policy.

Elizabeth Rata (2000) coins the term “neotribal capitalism” to describe the forms of post-1985 re-tribalization that automatically conflate Tribunal settlement assets with capitalist corporate institutions and the paradoxical requirement that re-tribalized iwi members function as corporate directors and shareholders (see Chapter Five).
Sissons points out how the State orchestrated “bicural partnership” by redefining the meaning of the Treaty of Waitangi (in terms of “principles”) and by elevating Māori language, ceremony, art and identity (as in Te Māori) in narrations of national identity (1993: 107, emphasis in original). He explains how government departments adopted alternative Māori names, began publishing official pamphlets, booklets and policy statements in Māori and English and incorporated Māori ceremonial traditions and rituals into formalities at official occasions (1993: 107). These initiatives not only helped to develop the concept of a bicultural national brand but also reconfigured and transformed individual conceptualizations of Māori identity. By increasing the number of Māori ‘experts’ within Government departments who could advise on matters of Māori protocol, knowledge and expertise, the State “created the appearance of a significantly expanded Māori middle class” (1993: 107). Nikolas Rose describes this as “the accreditation of experts, who are accorded powers to prescribe ways of acting in the light of truth, not political interest” (1996: 73). That is to say, expert knowledge is utilized as a biopolitical strategy in processes of cultural enunciation and consumption that gloss lived reality and function indirectly to generate cultural capital and normalize middle-class subjectivity.

The drive for Māori cultural rejuvenation did benefit a growing Māori middle class (often those involved in framing and implementing the process), but cultural revitalization policies did not reduce or alter overall socio-economic inequalities. As Bourdieu makes clear, and as will be discussed again in Chapters Two and Three, the accumulation of cultural capital is dependent on past and present material conditions of existence and “can only be acquired by means of a sort of withdrawal from economic necessity” (1984: 53-54). Cultural capital refers to the value of image and reputation in social discourse and is, therefore, inextricably linked with conceptualizations of ‘self’, ‘community’ and ‘nation’ as marketable brand identities. These conceptualizations inform the thrust of this thesis and will be considered in depth in the following Chapters. As neoliberal thinking transformed state policy and worked to shape individualist subjectivity, Māori cultural identity also underwent transformation, shifting in the social imaginary from that of collective political resistance to marketable marker of bicultural nationalism. Maaka and Fleras describe biculturalism as “essentially a society-building exercise that seeks to de-politicize differences through institutional accommodation, thus making New Zealand safe from

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92 Sissons describes how most government departments took on Māori advisory or Māori liaison officers and how, for example, the Departments of Justice, Health, Social Welfare, Conservation, Inland Revenue and Labour established “‘Cultural Advisory’, ‘Māori Perspective’ or ‘Partnership Response’ units, as did the Ministries of Education, Women’s Affairs and the Environment” (1993: 107).
diversity, safe for diversity” (2005: 142). Biculturalism can also be characterized as a brand-building exercise through which a marketing narrative constructs an image of inclusiveness and diversity and so secures a capitalist economy against any social dissidence or activism. These issues will be examined again in Chapter Five.

Conclusion

This Chapter has used the historical significance of All Black rugby and its uptake by Adidas as a premium brand, to trace the production and marketing of Aotearoa New Zealand as a brand state to its colonial beginnings. It has linked colonial, liberal and neoliberal modes of government with media (press, radio and television) to argue that the production of a social bond, a national or brand identity is as important to global capitalism as is the facilitation of individualized subjectivity, free market trade and transnational corporatism. It has claimed that affect, affective connection and the management of affective biopower are intimately connected with the production of national identity, a nation brand and the operation of a brand state. It has discussed the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of Māori society in colonial and contemporary eras and examined the processes of individualization and cultural commodification that mark the articulation of bicultural nationhood. It has also demonstrated (for example, in the uptake of the All Blacks haka) how Māori cultural expression is being and has always been appropriated to enhance the value of Brand New Zealand.

In the colonial and Fordist eras, the material form of the brand, its image, logo, or trademark, added value as a marker or guarantee of quality. In the emergence of the post-Fordist, neoliberal era, it is the immaterial form of the brand, its ability to stand alone, to serve as a context for life and as a prestigious sign of social identity, that is most valuable. The difference between branding understood as a marker of guarantee or quality and branding understood as a context for life marks the seminal difference between a liberal state and Fordist society and a neoliberal state and post-Fordist society. In Fordist society branding mechanisms forged a vital link between production and consumption and brand value was embodied in particular commodities or products. In post-Fordist, neoliberal society, brand value exists at the level of the social imaginary and emerges in the sets of social relationships that inform consumer identity and cultural citizenship. Brand value
now equates with the level of affective investment or with the extent to which consumers identify with and ‘live’ through the brand. As Alison Hearn claims, it is not ‘meaning’ per se (or ‘truth’ or ‘reason’) that matters most in this new promotional discourse, it is the ‘winning’ of “attention, emotional allegiance, and market share” (2008: 497). Goods, corporations, places and people are all implicated in brand-based promotional culture and function not only as “commodity signs” or “object(s)-to-be-sold” but also as “bearer(s) of a promotional message” (2008: 497).

The process of branding, of creating and engendering affective attachment to a named product, to both its object-form and to the idea of an association with it, provides clues to the understanding of how allegiances to culture are made. Cultural identity, like brand identity, is “at once essentialized and made the subject of choice, construction, consumption – as the taken-for-granted domain of collective action” in an era of image entrepreneurialism and market control (Comaroff, 2009: 150). In other words, once identity politics begins to play out in the commodified and branded forms of consumerism and lifestyle choice there follows a general tendency to valorize cultural identities at the expense of any other kinds of collective consciousness. John and Jean Comaroff claim that “it is only by understanding how and why identity congeals into property – into a species of capital vested in the entrepreneurial subject, singular and collective – that we may fully grasp emerging patterns of selfhood and sociality at the dawn of the twenty-first century” (2009: 144). In closing, I turn again to the promotion and marketing of All Black rugby and make the point that individual players are now contracted and marketed in forms of self-branding that reinvent them as marketable commodities.
As Lewis and Gordon put it, “The new All Black is a commodity draped in Adidas sportswear, exposed to promote Jockey underwear or chocolate biscuits, and grouped to sell Ford pick-up trucks and government-funded health and fitness projects” (2007: 213). This Chapter has linked the turn to neoliberal government in Aotearoa New Zealand with the production of individualized subjectivity, bicultural nationhood and with new formulations of media-driven, brand-based identity politics. The following Chapters examine the forms of identity emerging in Aotearoa New Zealand, both singular and collective, and emphasize the role of media culture and media governmentality in orchestrating those identities. My argument is that market imperatives underpin all understandings of selfhood and sociality and that the production of value concerns the full-scale cultivation of affective attachment to consumerist identity, lifestyle culture and branded commodities.

93 This image is taken from a New Zealand Listener article which reports, “Dan Carter is the million-dollar man of rugby – and a big part of that is getting his gear off for Jockey. Rangi Kipa is the ta moko tattoo artist who designed the stylized image on Jockey’s new range of men’s and women’s underwear” (Milne, 2011).
CHAPTER TWO

*Media Governmentality, Reality Television and Self-Branding*

“Economics are the method,” she said, “but the object is to change the soul”  
(Thatcher, cited in Harvey, *Spaces of Global Capitalism*, 2006: 17)

Liberalism: “free foxes in free chicken coops”  

Chapter One argued that economic imperatives always underpin liberal government and have always informed the production of cultural and national identities in Aotearoa New Zealand. It linked national identity and biculturalism with brand identity and with modes of media governmentality that facilitate the marketing of a brand state. This Chapter links market capitalism with the transformation of subjectivity and situates individualized subjectivity within the collective consciousness of a neoliberal nation state. The transformation of subjectivity goes hand in hand with the transformation of populations and should be recognized as the continuation of liberal modes of governance under changing socio-economic conditions. I examine the transformation of subjectivity as the effect of changing modes of liberal governmentality and claim that subjectivity is shaped and controlled through an ethos of individual freedom and an exercise of personal choice that is both contrived and delimiting. Practices of ‘self’ are conditioned and transformed by broader political objectives, most especially the optimal operation of a capitalist political economy. After discussing first, technologies of power that underpin and inform neoliberal governance, this Chapter examines the production and orchestration of individualized subjectivity. It claims that norms of identity and constructions of ‘self’ are prescribed and channelled through modes of media governmentality and examplifies this claim by focusing especially on the burgeoning phenomenon of reality television. Reality TV offers individuals multifarious models and techniques for shaping and guiding themselves and their association with others and, in an age of proliferating and interactive media technologies, has become a key technology of social management and control. This Chapter links productions of ‘self’ with the notion of self-branding and argues that media culture and branding mechanisms converge to construct and normalise the notions of image-entrepreneurialism and brand identity that inform and characterize neoliberal subjectivity.
Biopolitical Government and Technologies of Power

When Foucault describes the modern state in terms of a new form of pastoral power or “as a modern matrix of individualization” he stresses the co-dependent nature of state and subjects and posits “a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated” so long as individuals are shaped in a particular form and submitted to a set of very specific patterns (1982: 783). Power of a pastoral type targets the whole social body by executing “two roles: one, globalizing and quantitative, concerning the population; the other, analytical, concerning the individual” (1982: 784). Pastoral power requires individuals to internalize various ideals and norms so that they both regard an external body as concerned with their well-being and strive to regulate themselves in accord with the dictates of that external body. This struggle between ‘self’ and an external body can be conceptualized in terms of the “encounter between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self” (Rabinow and Rose, 2003: 147). ‘Technologies of domination’ use disciplinary and regulatory forms of power to normalize systems and manage populations while ‘technologies of the self’ engage individuals themselves in a process of self-government whereby their values and moral beliefs are constituted and manipulated to fit a normalizing agenda. It is the interdependent and interlocking nature of these technologies that characterize pastoral power.

Foucault refers to ‘technologies’ as “truth games” – “the different ways in our culture that humans develop knowledge about themselves: economics, biology, psychiatry, medicine, and penology” (Rabinow and Rose, 2003: 146). As Foucault explains, “The main point is not to accept this knowledge at face value but to analyze these so-called sciences as very

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94 Foucault links the rise of the modern state with the emergence of ‘reason of state’ and accompanying ‘science of police’. It is with the rise of the modern state that individualizing pastoral power is coupled with the totalizing power of the state. As Daniel M Bell explains, “Reason of state entails a new, pastoral kind of relationship between the state and the individual … Reason of state is concerned first and foremost with strengthening and perpetuating the state, but it realizes that its strength and prosperity lie in the strength and prosperity of its population. The state, therefore, takes an abiding interest in the individual details of its subjects’ lives. Each individual is now addressed (measured by the new political statistics) in terms of how that individual’s life may contribute to or detract from the state’s strength” (2001: 24). ‘Science of police’ was about the task of forming the social body, shaping the population into an efficient and productive body. “In sum, police science underwrites political governance by the extension of an individualizing, pastoral power. It is government as the exercise of a specific, permanent and positive intervention in the behaviour of individuals” (2001: 25).
specific ‘truth games’ related to specific techniques that human beings use to understand themselves” (cited in Rabinow and Rose, 2003: 146). He identifies

(1) technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform, or manipulate things, (2) technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification; (3) technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject; [and] (4) technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality (cited in Rabinow and Rose, 2003: 146).

Foucault distinguishes between two aspects of pastoral power, “between the ecclesiastical institutionalization, which has ceased or at least lost its vitality since the eighteenth century, and its function, which has spread and multiplied outside the ecclesiastical institution” (1982: 783). Technologies of the self continue long-held pastoral understandings of a relationship between self and salvation and, for Foucault, the modern state deploys a secular but omnipresent system of pastoral power (1982: 782-784). As he explains, “a series of ‘worldly’ aims took the place of the religious aim of the traditional pastorate” and “the officials of pastoral power increased,” spreading out to encompass “the whole social body” (1982: 784). Mitchell Dean extends Foucault’s argument to contend that liberalism combines the “shepherd-flock game” and the “city-citizen” game (1999: 132). Liberalism articulates “a pastoral power that takes the form of a biopolitics of the administration of life and a form of sovereignty that deploys the law and rights to limit, to offer guarantees, to make safe and, above all, to legitimate and justify the operations of biopolitical programmes and disciplinary practices” (1999: 132). 95 Nikolas Rose refers to the articulation of the ‘shepherd-flock game’ in terms of “the techne of the confessional” and cites Foucault to link the symbolic power of ancient regimes of confession with

95 The bio-political state can only guarantee bio-security by exercising sovereign power, or, as Pierangelo Di Vittorio explains, “the power of sovereignty constitutes an outer limit for the powers of normalization that these powers can neither cross nor eliminate” (2006: 79). However, they interact and the powers of normalization can functionalize this limit, re-absorbing it as a sort of antinomic condition of the exercise of power. In the words of Di Vittorio, “this functional recovery of sovereignty allows the power of normalization to function, while, at the same time, allowing sovereignty to outline its own demise” (2006: 79). Mitchell Dean explains it this way, “the liberal attempt to shape freedom, choice and aspiration … does not dissolve the sovereign decision on matters of life and death … the force of the sovereign power of decision is embedded in particular regimes of power and practices … the call to decision arises at multiple and unpredictable sites, as too does the exception” (2007:157).
modern “psychological sciences” (Foucault, 1978b cited in Rose, 1996: 96). Rose claims “the truthful rendering into speech of who one is and what one does – to one’s parents, one’s teachers, one’s doctor, one’s lover” is both identifying, in that it constructs ‘self’ in terms of a certain norm of identity, and subjectifying, in that “one becomes a subject at the price of entering into a certain game of authority” (1996: 96). According to Rose, the confessional process characterizes proliferating systems of psychotherapy and counselling and, by replacing the claims of gods and religion with those of nature and the psyche, it continues to subjugate individuals through words and invent rituals prescribed by an authority.

Biopolitical strategies do not replace already existing technologies of power but, rather, re-inscribe that power in modes of governmentality that are dispersed, indirect and increasingly intensified and ubiquitous. Within contemporary enunciations of biopolitical control, decentralized sovereign power serves as the outer limit of the powers of normalization, disciplinary power pervades the whole social space to serve as the bioregulatory force that controls and normalizes populations, and pastoral power links with both to make everyone, without exception, both governed and self-governing:

The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the “social-worker”-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behaviour, his aptitudes, his achievements (Foucault, 1977b: 304).

It is the de-institutionalization of technologies of power that led Foucault to cynically depict the disciplinary apparatus as being “democratically controlled” (1977b: 207). Alain Beaulieu points out, “It is now the deinstitutionalized practices of control, which Foucault associates with a regime of governmentality, that have become the most determinant”

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96 Of course, it was Foucault who used the term ‘bio-politics’ to describe the generalization of psychiatric power and recognized that in their dispersion outside the apparatus of the asylum these new power apparatuses no longer concerned individual people but whole populations (2006: 74). After acknowledging Foucault’s “discovery” of bio-politics, Pierangelo Di Vittorio refers to Basaglia’s analysis of CMHCs (Community Mental Health Centres) and to Basaglia’s conclusion that, “by adopting an apparatus of prevention, new ‘bio-political psychiatric services were succeeding in creating a subtle techno-social network in which the boundary between the norm and deviance was becoming increasingly blurred’” (2006: 73).

97 For Rose the ‘psychologization’ of technologies of the self in advanced liberal democracies needs to be understood in terms of the connections between ethics and politics (1996: 98). These connections will be taken up in Chapter Four.
What must be recognized here is that sovereign power remains embedded in biopolitical strategies of liberal government and, rather than being the sole prerogative of the territorial state, is delegated to various agents across multiple domains. That is to say, the power to decide on life and death is becoming more and more an individualized issue and, recalling Foucault’s reference to a new form of pastoral power, tends to be enunciated in terms of subtle persuasion rather than through overt coercion. For Foucault, liberal government is synonymous with the introduction of very specific apparatuses of rationality for governing the “problem of population” and for constituting and normalizing an image of coherent, enduring and individualized subjectivity (2007: 382). Population is a ‘problem’ because biopower emerges from the living beings contained therein; the exercise of biopower always begins with a freedom to act and therefore also retains a capacity for creativity, resistance and transformation. Maurizio Lazzarato, citing Foucault, describes biopower in these terms:

The biopolitical functions of ‘co-ordination and determination’ concede that biopower, from the moment it begins to operate in this particular manner, is not the true source of power. Biopower co-ordinates and targets a power that does not properly belong to it, that comes from the ‘outside.’ Biopower is always born of something other than itself (2002: 2, emphasis in original).

Lazzarato conceptualizes biopower as the targeting and co-ordination of power that does not properly belong to it. Michael Hardt understands Foucault’s concept of biopower as being exercised from above and cast in terms of patria potestas, “the right of the father over the life and death of his children and servants” (1999: 98). According to Hardt, Foucault situates biopower as “the power of the emerging forces of governmentality to create, manage and control populations – the power to manage life” (1999: 98). Hardt extends and modifies Foucault’s concept by defining biopower as “the power of the creation of life” and by situating “the creation of life precisely in the production and reproduction of affects” (1999: 98). Hardt claims that “politics has become a matter of life

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98 Foucault believes the history of the pastorate involves the history of the subject and, indeed, the entire history of procedures of human individualization in the West (2007: 184). He gives two reasons for describing the pastorate as a “prelude” to what he called “governmentality”: “First, it is the prelude through the procedures peculiar to the pastorate, through the way in which, fundamentally, it does not purely and simply put the principles of salvation, law and truth into play, but rather, through all these kinds of diagonals, establishes other types of relationships under the law, salvation and truth. And it is also a prelude to governmentality through the constitution of a specific subject, of a subject whose merits are analytically identified, who is subjected in continuous networks of obedience, and who is subjectified (subjectivité) through the compulsory extraction of truth. Well, I think this typical constitution of the modern Western subject makes the pastorate one of the decisive moments in the history of power in Western societies” (Foucault, 2007: 185).
itself, and the struggle has taken the form of a biopower from above against a biopower from below” (1999: 99). On one hand, as Hardt sees it, affective labour “has become firmly embedded as a necessary foundation for capitalist accumulation and patriarchal order” but, on the other hand, “the production of affects, subjectivities and forms of life present an enormous potential for autonomous circuits of valorization, and perhaps for liberation” (1999: 100). Foucault makes the point that in order to “cut off the head of the king” we must understand power, not as transcendent or external, but as a relational force channelled and controlled through the exercise of sovereign, disciplinary or governmental strategies (1978: 89). On these terms then, biopower is an immanent force produced in society through productive sociality and it is this power that is governmentalized and controlled through techniques of domination and knowledge/power regimes. Biopower emanates from communicative, cooperation and productive sociality and is targeted and co-ordinated through strategies and techniques of governmentality. As Foucault explains, to conceive of power on the basis of right and violence, law and legality, freedom and will, and especially the state and sovereignty “is to conceive of it in terms of a historical form that is characteristic of our societies: the juridical monarchy” (1978: 89). Foucault describes juridical monarchy as “characteristic yet transitory” and as “utterly incongruous” with new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus (1978: 89).

Foucault emphasizes the transitory, contingent nature of state authority and, in doing so, extends concepts of politics and political capacity to everyday communication, to the human ability to cooperate and build community and to the ethical surplus inherent in all social interaction. My reading of Foucault situates biopower, not qua Hardt, as imposed authority, but as the relational force at stake in the biopolitical production and management of society in general and subjectivity in particular. Biopolitics concerns the production and management of subjectivity; biopower is the communicative, cooperative force informing and underpinning social (re)production and, as such, is always in excess of, or external to, biopolitical control. Biopolitical techniques emerge as tactics of resistance and multiplicity as well as strategies of integration and control. I conceptualize biopower as the power of life, the production of multiplicity, the productive and ethical surplus inherent in social cooperation and in the building of a common. My conceptualization of biopower does not
situate a struggle taking the form “of a biopower from above against a biopower from below” as Hardt suggests (1999: 99). For me, biopower is the productive potential produced in everyday sociality, and biopolitics concerns the shaping, management and control of its implicit political potential. Sovereign, disciplinary, and pastoral strategies of power may seek to manipulate and manage that social force, but biopower can never be fully contained. Against the forces of normalization, there is always the unassimilable creativity and relational productivity of affective and resistive biopower. It is affective labour and the immaterial production of ideas, knowledge, and co-operative forms of communication that produce social life, that underpin informational capitalism and that now situate media governmentality as capital’s prime mode of production. While the potential for resistance and capacity for transformation is inherent in biopower, this thesis focuses on the biopolitical strategies and modes of media governmentality that serve to determine, co-ordinate and normalize consumerist subjectivity.

Biopolitical strategies are always subject to change and, as discussed in Chapter One, during the twentieth century liberal modes of governmentality shifted from practices of collective policing and external regulation to technologies of individual autonomy and self-regulation. Until the 1960s, a Keynesian welfare state complemented Fordist capitalism by disciplining and regulating a working class for industry and by constituting all subjects as subjects of exchange and consumption. According to Alliez and Feher, “the Fordist conditions of existence generated a working class endowed with ‘class’ interests objectively opposed to those of capitalists” (1986: 343-344). The state was the central organizer of society, individuals identified with a particular social ‘class’ and freedom was associated with social security and the possibility of upward mobility. David Harvey describes the Keynesian compromise as a time when “redistributive politics, controls over the free mobility of capital, public expenditures and welfare state building went hand in hand with relatively high rates of capital accumulation and adequate profitability in most of the advanced capitalist countries” (2006: 14). In this context, governmental practices enabled and encouraged the subject of exchange and consumption.99 It was not until the

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99 Alliez and Feher explain how Fordism consists in developing mass consumption, “concentrating on the production of consumer goods (and on the capital goods that produce them) that are both plentiful and inexpensive enough for the workers themselves to acquire. Here is born the maxim attributed to Henry Ford: our workers should also be our customers” (1986: 323). That is, as Alliez and Feher point out, “Fordism constitutes a relatively self-reliant model of economic growth: domestic workers are to a large extent the consumers of the merchandise they produce; hence the national territory defines a relatively autonomous space of valorization” (1986: 323).
economic stagnation of the 1970s that a crisis of capitalism was interpreted as a crisis of
governance and all forms of social solidarity and welfare state commitments were re-
defined as hindrances to competitive flexibility and as the antithesis of individualism,
freedom and liberty (2006: 16). Foucault points out that “in the thirties and after the war,
the problem of security was so acute and so immediate that the question of dependency
was practically ignored” (Rabinow and Rose, 2003: 67). As he also points out, “From the
fifties on, in contrast, and even more from the sixties on, the notion of security began to be
associated with the question of independence” (cited in Rabinow and Rose, 2003: 67). In
consequence, individual aspirations and notions of freedom slowly transformed from
security-seeking through state welfare provision to security in individual autonomy and
ownership. Underlying any transformation of liberal subjectivity is the imperative that the
state guarantee and maintain economic freedom, and this idea not only continually grounds
the state’s legitimacy but also produces social consensus among all those who accept this
economic game of freedom whether they participate as Keynesian subjects or neoliberal
subjects.

**Fordism, Post-Fordism and Consumerism**

Foucault links the emergence of biopolitics with urbanization and with changing strategies
for managing urban populations. These strategies include data gathering on birth rates,
mortality rates etc as well as the statistical elaboration of social categories like class, race
and ethnicity and, in Fordist society, data analysis was used to manage and regulate these
various components as part of a mass society, a national population. In post-Fordist
society, however, the development of television and of “a highly differentiated and
complex media environment” coincided with a counter-cultural rejection of mass
conformity (discussed in Chapter One) and a new emphasis on the “cultural” and
“experiential” dimensions of consumption caused a shift in focus from the use factor of
particular products to the “image” and “feeling” or “experience” they could stimulate in
consumers (Arvidsson, 2006: 54-55). Adam Arvidsson notes the emergence of a new form
of data gathering or market research called “Motivation Research,” which not only
emphasized the “cultural function of goods” but which also signalled a major
transformation in the strategic approach to measuring and managing urban populations.
One market researcher of that era, cited by Arvidsson, described “a greater transformation
in our system of values since 1940 than in the last 2000 years of existence” and that for Americans in general “class mattered less and less, and as middle class, they were no longer so much interested in status achievements as in individual self-expression” (2006: 57). The subsequent publication in 1959 of the first ‘life-style’ study marks a major transition from studying the everyday life of housewives in terms of traditional class positions to studying their attitudes, opinions and interests (2006: 60). Although this study, entitled *The Workingman’s Wife: Her Personality, World and Life Style*, was still obviously coupled to a particular class position, its investigation and analysis of “the cultural universe of their main advertising object: the Middle Majority Housewife,” encapsulates the aims and objectives of a post-Fordist focus on the specific, if mercurial, relations between particular products and particular groups of consumers (2006: 60-63).

The development of middle-class subjectivity and the re-classification of class identities in terms of life-style choices correlate with the impact of television, advertising and televisual promotion of lifestyle choice and brand identity. The central issue here is the marketing turn to social productivity or, in other words, growing economic interest in the private sphere and in the untapped potential and productivity of women in particular and of civil society generally. Middle-class-ness is, of course, not confined to women and there is no doubt that the ‘middle majority housewife’ continues to be the target of marketing gurus and to play a major role in the production and promulgation of mediatized, middle-class lifestyles. However, middle class sensibilities are inextricably linked with expanding consumerism and with myriad lifestyle choices that promise upward social mobility.

The mass media work with other social forces (like education systems, churches and ubiquitous shopping malls) to produce a common social world round what Teresa Ebert and Mas’ud Zavarzadeh call “an ideological illusion” (2002: 1). For them, class is a relation of owning and people are divided into only two classes: those who own the labour of others and make profits from it, and the others who own only their own labour and sell it for wages (Ebert & Zavarzadeh, 2002: 4). They claim that the whole concept of ‘middle’ class is constituted to obscure the economic reality that one’s class is determined not by how much one makes but where one stands in the social division of labour, and that capitalism is a brutal social regime in which the relatively few who own capital exploit the labour of the many (2002: 5). According to Ebert and Zavarzadeh, the ‘middle-class’ narrative relies for its legitimacy on a return to old theories of ‘embourgeoisement’ whereby some are allowed to access a little more share of the wealth produced by labour
and so align themselves politically and culturally with the ruling class (2002: 4). They believe that the media “obscures the economics of class by translating class into cultural status, pride, prestige and lifestyle,” and works to convince Americans that, in a new “post-capitalist” society, economic and technological changes have transformed the source of wealth from “labour” to “knowledge” thereby enabling “one-class classlessness” (2002: 1-2). In Fordist society, consumption was almost always purely functional, aimed at meeting needs. In post-Fordist mediascapes, consumption loses its pure functionality and becomes a matter of affect, feeling, desire and longing. According to Ebert and Zavarzadeh, consumption becomes a matter of wants, not needs, and acts as a symbolic communication of identity for the consumer who “by choosing a commodity chooses a lifestyle that provides an identity” (2008: 170).

Zygmunt Bauman characterizes post-Fordist embourgeoisement in terms of a transition from a society of producers to a society of consumers, and as the supplanting of Fordism’s disciplinary “work ethic” with post-Fordism’s “aesthetics of consumption” (2005: 32). He explains how work lost its privileged position and ceased to be either the “axis around which all other effort at self-constitution and identity-building rotate” or the focus of intense ethical attention as a “chosen road to moral improvement, repentance and redemption” (2005: 32). Instead, like other life activities in the emergent mediatized, consumerist society, work was to be valued for its aesthetic appeal and judged for its capacity to entertain and to generate pleasurable experience. As Bauman explains, the Fordist ‘work ethic’ conveyed a message of equality, playing down the obvious differences between jobs, their potentials for satisfaction, their status-bestowing capacities or the material benefits they offered (2005: 33). It served as the underlying principle of a moral and proper society, one in which full employment marked the aims and objectives of “normal society” and to be employed was seen as both a right and a duty (2005: 37). In this way, the ‘work ethic’ enacted a form of biopolitical governmentality, constituting all work as essentially a matter of morality and, regardless of underlying equalities and systemic exploitation, enabling the misery of the poor to be blamed on their unworthiness or “unwillingness to work” thus negating their duty to themselves and the social world.

100 Ebert and Zavarzadeh explain, “The material inequality – produced at the point of production – is covered up by cultural equality: the power of purchasing in the shopping malls of consumption. The structural inequalities of wage-labour are diffused in consumption because shopping disguises the fact that the person who pays for a silk shirt with one hour of work is not equal to the one who purchases the same shirt with five hours of labour” (2008: 179).
Although the ‘work ethic’ has lost out in most respects to aesthetic consumerism and materialist objectives, Bauman makes the point that poverty is still cast as the penalty for sin and a sign of “moral depravity” (2005: 37). The aesthetics of consumption shifts the value of work into “a potent stratifying factor”, separating the few for whom work is a lifestyle and an entertaining vocation from all those for whom work is nothing more than the means of survival. Bauman explains that in a society of consumers, a “normal life” is preoccupied with making choices and accepting as many opportunities for pleasurable experiences as possible. Those who are too poor to participate in this “normal life” are “socially defined, and self-defined, first and foremost as blemished, defective, faulty and deficient – in other words, inadequate – consumers” and they are inadequate because they don’t contribute to the GDP (2005: 38). In a society of consumers, it is the inadequacy of the person as a consumer that leads to social degradation and “internal exile” (2005: 38). This issue is discussed again in Chapters Four, Five and Six.

The turn to “voluntary flexibility” in the work place, which initially served the interests of workers in the 1980s and 1990s, actually became another form of biopolitical control affecting whole populations, “including those to whom ‘flexibility’ means not so much freedom of choice, autonomy and the right to self-assert, as lack of security, forced uprooting and an uncertain future” (2005: 36). In many cases people are forced into accepting jobs that offer no aesthetic satisfaction and, as Bauman claims, “rough coercion once hidden under the veneer of the work ethic now appears bare-faced and unconcealed” (2005: 34). In effect, the opportunity to experience “work as vocation” is available to only a privileged few while the majority must “watch in awe, admire and contemplate at a distance” or experience such lifestyles “only vicariously” through the “virtual reality of televised docu-dramas” (Bauman, 2005: 35, emphasis in original). Bauman is here identifying the emergence of media governmentality as a system of social education and control, and the promulgation of identities and lifestyles that are always ephemeral, sensation-gathering and image-based. As Bauman puts it, “The saints of the stardom cult are, like all saints, to be admired and held as an example, but not emulated. They embody, at the same time, the ideal of life and its inachievability” (2005: 36). What is valued above

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101 Jonathan Bignell, in his analysis of Reality TV, makes the point, “Contemporary television not only mixes dramatic and documentary codes, but extends this into the blurring of the boundary between private and public experience, and between being ordinary and not-on-television versus being celebrated and on-television” (2005: 106).
all in lifestyle consumption is the capacity “to arouse desire, the most pleasurable phase of the consumer’s life pursuits, more satisfying than the satisfaction itself” (2005: 32). Bauman follows Jean-Joseph Goux to argue, first, that “to create value, all that is necessary is, by whatever means possible, to create a sufficient intensity of desire” and, second, that “what ultimately creates surplus value is the manipulation of surplus desire” (2001: 130). The important point here is that in today’s neoliberal society the manipulation of surplus desire is the core function of brands and brand marketers and the primary mode of production for the media industry and global capital.

Maurizio Lazzarato sums up the social transformation discussed above by pointing out that in post-industrial society the contractual relationship between capitalist and worker has changed from that of waged labour and direct subjugation within organizations, to that of self-employed “intellectual worker” and self-managed negotiation of a constantly shifting market and informational network (2001: 140). Lazzarato uses the term “immaterial labour” to describe the central role of knowledge, information, communication, and affect in a new mode of production that “is defined precisely by putting subjectivity to work both in the activation of productive co-operation and in the production of the ‘cultural’ contents of commodities” (2001: 142.3). A central characteristic of ‘immaterial labour’ is that it cannot be structured or measured according to Fordist or industrial concepts of labour and, because it is defined more by cultural, informational, or knowledge components or by qualities of service and care, “much of the value produced today thus arises from activities outside the production process proper, in the sphere of non-work” (2001: 261). Hardt and Negri point out that post-Fordism and the immaterial paradigm of production adopt performativity, communication, and collaboration as central characteristics (2004: 200). Performance has been “put to work” and “every form of labour that produces an immaterial good, such as a relationship or an affect,” (solving problems, providing information, sales work, for example), is fundamentally a performance and “the product is the act itself” (2004: 200). For Lazzarato also, the process of social communication is directly productive, not only because its principal content is the production of subjectivity but also because, in constructing the consumer/communicator, “in a certain way it ‘produces’ production” (2001: 142.3). Lazzarato concludes, “The fact that immaterial labour produces subjectivity and economic value at the same time demonstrates how capitalist production has invaded our lives and has broken down all the oppositions among economy, power and knowledge” (2001: 142.3).
Hardt locates “immaterial labour” in service occupations (like health care, education, finance, transportation, entertainment and advertising, for example) and notes that while they may not produce any material or durable good, they do produce the immaterial value that drives a post-industrial “informational economy” (1999: 91). However, Hardt also invokes the term “affective labour” to link the production and value inherent in immaterial labour with the production and value of biopower:

By biopower, I understand the potential of affective labour. Biopower is the power of the creation of life; it is the production of collective subjectivities, sociality and society itself … what is created in the networks of affective labour is a form-of-life (1999: 98).

Biopower flows from the co-operative, communicational and affective networks of everyday life and its potential or force is being harnessed as human capital or, as Hardt argues, “humanity and its soul are produced in the very processes of economic production” (1999: 91). “Affective labour” has always been part of capitalist production, but since informational and communication services have become the privileged sector of the economy, capital has incorporated and exalted “affective labour” positioning it in a role “that is not only directly productive of capital but at the very pinnacle of the hierarchy of labouring forms” (Hardt, 1999: 90). In the new economic paradigm, labour can no longer be confined to a particular role or place of work and “capital is not something that one confronts in a particular place (the factory) as much as it is something ‘within which’ one lives one’s everyday life” (Arvidsson, 2006: 126-127). Arvidsson cites Arjun Appadurai to explain that a further critical difference between modern capitalist societies and those based on simpler forms of technology and labour is the difference in turn-over time of marketable or fashionable commodities against more regulated, customary systems, for, as Arvidsson stresses, it is “modern mass mediated communication” or “media culture” that facilitates constant revision and reinvention of lifestyle choice and informs middle-class subjectivity (Appadurai, 1986: 32 in Arvidsson, 2006: 36). Hardt and Negri use the term ‘affective labour’ to explain how “our economic and social reality is

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102 Hardt and Negri (2000) argue: “The co-operative aspect of immaterial labour is not imposed or organized from the outside, as it was in previous forms of labour but rather, co-operation is completely immanent to the labouring activity itself. This fact calls into question the old notion (common to classical and Marxist political economics) by which labour power is conceived as ‘variable capital,’ that is, a force that is activated and made coherent only by capital, because the co-operative powers of labour power (particularly immaterial labour power) afford labour the possibility of valorizing itself. Brains and bodies still need others to produce value, but the others they need are not necessarily provided by capital and its capacities to orchestrate production. Today productivity, wealth, and the creation of social surpluses take the form of co-operative interactivity through linguistic, communicational, and affective networks” (2000: 294, emphasis in original).
defined less by the material objects that are made and consumed than by co-produced services and relationships” (2000: 301, emphasis in original). That is to say, in a networked mediascape where “producing increasingly means constructing co-operation and communicative commonalities,” it is the functionality of affective biopower, the capacity to build relationships and produce a common, that becomes the primary source of surplus value and capital growth (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 301).

**Media Governmentality and Social Transformation in Aotearoa New Zealand**

I now turn to take up these issues in the context of Aotearoa New Zealand, looking specifically at current affairs, media and then reality television. Mass media in Aotearoa New Zealand once correlated with Fordist/Keynesian modes of governmentality to project a public service ethos and to advance what were assumed to be the generally shared values of an already existing national community. Until the turn to neoliberalism in the 1980s, state-owned broadcasting systems reflected the values of a social state promising steady and incremental progress for all citizens. In 1946, for example, the state-owned National Film Unit produced a documentary called *Housing in New Zealand*. This documentary presents a history of housing, outlines the problem of post-war shortages in labour and material, and ends by releasing plans for the building of state houses in future towns. It records how the Department of Housing was set up in 1936 to provide “houses of a modern standard for reasonable rental to people in medium and lower income groups” and how, although 20,000 houses had been built and rented out since then, there were still 26,000 families on the waiting list. The documentary reflects prevailing Keynesian social welfare principles by calling for “simplicity” and “practicality” in design, for safe communities on the outskirts of cities and for “a better standard of living for every New Zealander”. It ends by emphasizing that the solution to the housing problem lies in large-scale planning and “a community effort by the people”.

In 1946 this film would have

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103 David Hill explains that at this time in Aotearoa New Zealand everything was scarce and people still queued for their meat ration. He also explains that renting was common and that when his parents moved into their first house in Napier in the mid-1940s, it was a rented place with a wood range, no fridge and no washing machine – “a house of their own” was his parents’ “Holy Grail” and seemed “about as distant” (Hill, 2008).

104 In his analysis of the Reality TV genre, Jonathan Bignell compares the style and approach of early television documentaries with late twentieth and early twenty-first century reality TV and claims: “Whereas
been shown in local community halls and theatres because television was not introduced into Aotearoa New Zealand until 1960. The commitment to social welfare comes through very strongly in this documentary with, for example, the narrator’s use of inclusive language (“we know now that we can build communities that we are pleased to live in”) and a commitment to raise the standard of living for every New Zealander. However, so does the unchallenged acceptance of conformity, regulation and dependency as evidenced by housing designed for nuclear families (‘a man likes a place of his own’) and the idea that 50% of state houses would be reserved for returned servicemen who would be re-trained to work in trade and industry. The assumption that husbands would work to provide for wives and families reinforces gender roles and guarantees a renewable labour force for capital accumulation. As Wendy Larner points out, equality was understood primarily in class and income terms and welfare-state policies were designed round the assumption that the national population comprised two-parent households with a male breadwinner and an expectation of life-time employment (1998: 603). Such a policy reflects the social engineering promoted by Henry Ford. Michael Mahoney points out, for example, that, in 1914, Ford created a ‘Department of Sociology’ (or Personnel Department) in order to encourage workers toward the ideal of a single nuclear family living in a single family dwelling tended by a non-working mother whose children attended school. That is to say, in an era of mass production and growing urbanization, men were encouraged to be responsible for the social and economic welfare of their ‘dependents’ and, as this documentary so aptly exemplifies, the notion of the ‘family man’ documentary has a history of representing and arguing for those in society who are the least privileged, the most vulnerable to exploitation, and the most marginalized, the use of documentary footage from closed-circuit television in Reality TV programmes has the opposite force” (2005: 135). He claims CCTV cameras function “to police the boundaries between normal and deviant or criminal behavior” and that when sequences shot by CCTV appear in reality television programmes “the television audience are placed in the position of the norm from which deviance departs” (2005: 135). There is no doubt that, in the documentary discussed here, the least privileged in society are the focus of attention and viewers are assumed to empathise as part of a nation-building collective community. In contrast, reality TV programmes using CCTV footage do tend to focus on deviant behavior and to draw social divisions between those identified and the viewing ‘community’. However, while productions and representations of normal/deviant behaviour may differ, both forms of television function indirectly to shape the social and so enact effective modes of media governmentality.

105 Larner notes that gender and racial inequalities remained fundamental in Aotearoa New Zealand society and that “Māori, and later migrants from the Pacific, were incorporated into the capitalist economy as a reserve army of labour, and largely remained concentrated in positions at the bottom of the labour market (Larner, 1991; Ongley, 1991)” (1998: 603).

106 In addition, according to Mahoney, “Ford workers were expected to maintain bank accounts, to purchase the domestic products of technology, to learn to speak English if they did not already, and to pursue an American way of life based on the industrial virtues of sobriety, punctuality, and reliability” (Mahoney, n.d.).
was keenly promoted. In Fordist society the majority of workers were employed in the manufacturing sector or in ‘blue collar’ jobs, completing repetitive and standardized tasks that required little formal education or on-the-job training and, in Aotearoa New Zealand, class-based political affiliations were split between blue collar workers loyal to trade union solidarity (Labour Party followers) and a small number of managerial and professional elite who owned the means of production (National Party followers). Under liberal modes of governmentality, Keynesian welfarism complemented Fordist capitalism by disciplining and regulating a working class for industry and by constituting all subjects as consumers. As Alliez and Feher explain, in a Fordist society, individuals were identified “as free workers, as responsible citizens and finally as consumers” and control was maintained within institutions like factories, prisons and schools (1986: 345). Keynesian welfarism, in other words, deployed biopolitical strategies for the administration of a Fordist society. Nikolas Rose and Paul Rabinow describe the totalizing/individualizing relations of biopolitical government in terms of a “macro” approach which concerns ways of thinking and acting at the level of population groups and collectivities and a “micro” approach which focuses on individualized strategies (2006: 204). They explain that in the era of the social state it was the “macro” approach that was privileged: “States not only developed or supported insurantial mechanisms of security, but gathered together, organized and rationalized the loose threads of medical provision, specified and regulated standards of housing, engaged in campaigns of health education and the like” (2006: 204).

In the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, modes of governmentality shifted from a focus on state-controlled ‘macro’ approaches to individualized ‘micro’ approaches which, as communication technologies improved, centred round increasingly ubiquitous modes of media governmentality and the image-based approach of brand marketing. In that highly regulated society, media was “abstract, didactic, unadorned, and dominated by academics, journalists and other bona fide intellectual authorities” who set out to address and educate what Laurie Ouellette and James Hay describe as “a gullible mass that needed guidance in

107 Phillip Brown and Hugh Lauder compare Fordism and post-Fordism in a succinct, one-page review under the headings, “Economy, Competition and Production Process,” “Labour,” and “Politics and Ideology,” (1992: 4). In post-Fordist society, as they appraise it, the protected national markets of a Fordist economy are opened to global competition; people move from “blue collar” to service sector “white collar” jobs and, as trade union membership and class-based politics declines, workers face an unpredictable labour market due to technological change and increased economic uncertainty. In addition, post-Fordist social fragmentation and mediatized “global villages” replace Fordist notions of locality, class and gender-based lifestyles and mass consumption of consumer durables gives way to individualized consumption, niche markets and branded lifestyles (1992: 4).
the liberal arts to participate in the rituals of public democracy” (2008: 3). The state housing policy outlined in this documentary and the paternalistic approach of the National Film Unit documentary itself combine to imprint a sense of egalitarian nationhood and family-oriented subjectivity in the social imaginary.

State House provision was a priority in 1945 but by the 1960s, as home-ownership became increasingly viable and socio-economic prosperity enabled burgeoning levels of production and consumption, people’s aspirations shifted from collective security through social welfare to security through independence and material wealth. By the 1980s, post-Fordist capitalism replaced the labourer/capitalist dichotomy with a new regime of capital accumulation that eschews private/public barriers and state regulation in order to extend the biopolitical control of human potential. Alliez and Feher describe a “neo-Fordist” scenario in which “the productive decentralization of industry involves its transnationalization as well as the overflowing of the work day and the diffusion of the work place (that is, the diffusion of the factory throughout the city)” (1986: 346). In other words, capital no longer constitutes work within a limited space and time but sets out to delineate and control all use of time. This appropriation of time and “blurring of the boundaries between production and reproduction sectors” does not so much obstruct the subjection of individuals as transform and intensify subjection (1986: 346). According to Alliez and Feher:

*Whereas the regime of capitalist subjection – upholding labour as the highest value – allows free time (while nevertheless controlling it) in order to permit labour to reconstitute itself, the neocapitalist regime of enslavement tends to permeate the totality of time in the name of an overall increase in commodities (1986: 353).*

Under this regime, the distinction between work time and free time gives way to a division between those who are “integrated into the new valorization circuits” and those whose conditions of existence are seriously compromised because they are excluded (1986: 317). Liberal subjectivation, whether it is enacted in forms of Fordist consumption or post-Fordist entrepreneurialism, binds an individual to certain practices of self and subjectivity

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108 Arianna Bove and Erik Empson, following Negri, link post-Fordism with biopolitical production: “Biopower takes life as its object and is fully operative within the workings of the modern state as political economy becomes the essence of governmentality. For Negri total subsumption operates at the level of biopolitical production because production has subsumed life itself, but as society becomes a diffuse factory, it also becomes a school, a hospital, a prison and an army” (2006: 17).
that are always linked to biopolitical control and the broader objectives of a capitalist political economy.

The strongly individualized subject of post-Fordist society contrasts sharply with the compliant, collectivized subject of Fordist society and is well exemplified in a news story that featured in 2008 on national television in Aotearoa New Zealand and was also published as a magazine article.\(^{109}\) This story of a man called Laurence Pope is relevant not only because it highlights the emergence of entrepreneurial subjectivity but also because it demonstrates how governmental strategies and media coverage are also deeply implicated in the production and representation of individualized subjectivity. Pope is described in the magazine article as a “Remuera-raised entrepreneur” who has bought and renovated 16 ex-railway and ex-state houses in Porritt Street, Paeroa (Fox, 2008: 23).

![Figure 7 John Campbell, Property Buy-up in Paeroa, TV3, 2008](http://www.3news.co.nz/How-one-man-turned-one-Paeroa-street-round/tabid/367/articleID/59266/Default.aspx)[Accessed 08.08.11].

The article explains how Porritt Street had been known in the town as “Harlem” (after the ghettoized neighbourhood in New York’s Manhattan) because it was run-down, conveyed “a vague sense of menace” and police “had reason to visit the street at least every two days pre-Pope” (Fox, 2008: 26). Pope began by buying “a good ex-state house with the worst...

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\(^{109}\) This story featured on *Campbell Live*, TV3, Thursday, 12 June 2008, 7-7.30 pm. *Campbell Live* is a prime-time current affairs programme with a substantial following. The magazine article on which this exemplar is based is entitled “Angel of Harlem” by Andrea Fox and features in *New Zealand Property Investor*, June 2008: 22-27.

\(^{110}\) This image from video-on-demand at TV3’s website, shows John Campbell presenting a news feature on Laurence Pope called “How one man turned one Paeroa street around” Thursday, 12 June 2008, [online] Available at: [http://www.3news.co.nz/How-one-man-turned-one-Paeroa-street-round/tabid/367/articleID/59266/Default.aspx][Accessed 08.08.11].
tenants imaginable” and then “struck a deal” to buy the one next door, his plan being to “do them up and make a capital gain” (Fox, 2008: 25). Pope acknowledges the collaborative support of the police and the district council in this venture especially when neighbouring tenants resisted Pope’s “makeover moves” as, for example, on his second visit to the street when he “was chased out of the street and his car was rammed” (Fox, 2008: 24). As he explains, because other Paeroa properties were valued at around $200,000 and these were just over $100,000, he knew “by removing those tenants the area would shoot up in value” (Fox, 2008: 25). After renovation, the valuations did increase by 50% and his long term plan is not only to achieve sales of $200,000 “when the residential market corrects”, but because his “investment babies” are ex-state houses and have big sections, his next plan is to subdivide and build 13 new houses. He intends selling all 29 houses in about three years when he expects a $5.3 million sale bonanza in the Paeroa market will provide him with $1 million capital gain before tax (Fox, 2008: 27). In the meantime, new tenants pay rents from $180 to $240 a week, “most tenants are employed” and “Porritt Street is no longer beneficiary alley” (Fox, 2008: 27).

Issues arising from this story include the privatization of state-owned houses, the respect and praise afforded to Pope because he is an entrepreneurial speculator, and the general attitude of police, council and Pope to beneficiaries and unemployed. Pope, at age 24, is the epitome of a self-actualized, self-enterprising entrepreneur and is acclaimed for his ability to effect what Harvey describes as “accumulation by dispossession” (2006: 43). Harvey explains how in the neoliberal state the preferred form of governance is that of ‘public-private partnership’ in which state and key business interests collaborate and coordinate their activities around the aim of enhancing capital accumulation (2006: 27). In this case, the state turns public assets over to private interests and, in doing so, not only opens up public utilities to market imperatives, but also reneges on its commitment to provide those welfare services that underpin the ethos of the social democratic state. This

111 Harvey explains the concept “accumulation by dispossession” as “the continuation and proliferation of accumulation practices that Marx had treated as ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ during the rise of capitalism” (2006: 43). He includes “the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations…, conversion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, state etc) into exclusive private property rights; suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources); monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; the slave trade (which continues particularly in the sex industry); and usury, the national debt, and, most devastating of all, the use of the credit system as radical means of primitive accumulation” (2006: 43).
process of re-development, of buying into a poor suburb, getting the people expelled, re-building and then claiming to have re-vitalized the area, is a typical form of accumulation by dispossession and, as Harvey argues, rather than solve any problem, it simply “moves the problem elsewhere” (2006: 111). Furthermore, the victims of such re-development “are viewed and treated as if they are disposable and redundant populations” (Harvey, 2006: 82). As the story of Porritt Street reveals, in the quest for profit through property development, no provision is made for the people who are expelled or driven out of their homes, and furthermore, entrepreneurial subjects like Laurence Pope believe they are acting in ‘good conscience’ because they are ‘improving’ the area for ‘deserving’ tenants who are employed and can afford high rents. However, Pope’s ‘good conscience’ is the product of neoliberal rationale, and of modes of governmentality that measure ‘good conscience’ in market terms and attribute social success or failure to personal entrepreneurial virtues or failings, rather than to any systemic conditions, such as the exploitation and exclusions typical of capitalism (Harvey, 2006: 27). In the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, social conceptions of justice and of rights had to be transformed from notions of political democracy and collective action to notions of individual freedom and rights to accumulate capital through market enterprise.

Capitalism operates by producing surplus value and re-investing that surplus value in new development and, as Harvey explains, the use of the credit system provided a radical means of primitive accumulation (2006: 43). Where outlets for growth were once found in new production, since 1970 money has been increasingly invested in assets, stock shares, property rights, intellectual property rights and, of course, property. Financial institutions lend money to property developers and so property prices inflate but in the post-1970s neoliberal economy, real wages have not kept pace with property prices and so, in order to keep the housing market growing, financial institutions have enabled or encouraged wage-earners into what Harvey calls “the debt environment” (Harvey, 2009). Harvey, speaking at the World Social Forum in Belem, 29 January 2009, claims the economic crisis is “basically a crisis of urbanization” and points out that “household debt in the United States has gone from about $40,000 per household to over $120,000 per household in the last 20 years” (Harvey, 2009). An article in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, 2005, reports that while the debt-to-income ratio in New Zealand was fairly stable throughout most of the 1980s, averaging around 50 per cent of disposable income, “following financial de-regulation from the mid-1980s, the debt-to-income ratio accelerated to reach
around 140 per cent of disposable income” (Khoon, 2005). The article further informs that “a characteristic of New Zealand household indebtedness is the concentration of debt to large financial institutions, secured against housing” and that “almost 90 per cent of total household debt is owed to large financial institutions, and of that over 90 per cent is for mortgages” (Khoon, 2005).

Furthermore, as evidenced by the Porritt Street development, competition tends to benefit those already in the housing market, for as Stuart et al explain, the “type of loan finance extended to low/modest income households is more in the nature of credit card/personal loan finance including hire purchase finance” and, because this type of finance incurs higher interest charges, it “can act as a barrier to accessing mortgage finance” (2004: 3). That is to say, the loan finance offered by private financial institutions is more expensive and harder to obtain for first-time home buyers and/or low income households and, as Harvey claims, in the neoliberal State it is the well-being of financial institutions that is protected at all costs, not the well-being of the people (2009). Financial de-regulation brought profound change to State housing policy in Aotearoa New Zealand. The State moved away from any direct home-ownership support through the provision of loans etc and in 1991 housing reforms included the sale of the substantial loan portfolio HCNZ [Housing Corporation of New Zealand] had built up over thirty years.112 Brian Roper explains that throughout the Keynesian era, state-funded house construction ensured a steady supply of affordable and reasonable quality housing and that by 1991, the Housing Corporation managed almost 70,000 rental properties, had annual revenue in excess of $700 million, and owned assets valued at $8,581 million (2005: 214-215). He then points out that from 1993 onwards, “in order to encourage fairness, self-reliance, efficiency and personal choice,” the government re-structured Housing New Zealand as a state-owned enterprise, demanding that it be “as profitable and efficient as comparable businesses not owned by the Crown” and that it preside over the introduction of market rents for state tenants and the privatization of the state housing stock (2005: 215). Private rental housing grew throughout the 1990s, accounting for more than 80 per cent of the total increase in private occupied dwellings but, as Stuart et al point out, the private rental market is

112 Stuart et al explain, “Over eight years NZS$2.4 billion worth of mortgages were sold (Murphy 2000) …The selling off of the loan portfolio represented the second biggest revenue generator of the Government’s privatization programme but did not receive the level of attention and debate that smaller sales like Air New Zealand ($660m) and the Post Office Bank ($678m) did (Murphy 2000)” (2004: 4).
dominated by small investors who may own only one or two properties but whose investment accounts for a significant proportion of the additional capital flowing into the local mortgage market (2004: 4). In other words, investors and developers like Laurence Pope have ready access to mortgage funds and only a small percentage of mortgages are loaned to first home buyers and so, as property values keep rising, those on low or fixed incomes face increasing hardship.  

Financial de-regulation may produce consumers/investors and encourage an enterprise society but it does not alter the underlying inequalities embedded by a capitalist political economy. Rather, it provides an illusion of increased wealth and ‘middle-class’ affluence by privatizing public assets and by condoning exorbitant levels of household and personal debt.

While it is probably not surprising that this article, published in a real estate magazine, emphasizes the rewards of individual entrepreneurialism and property speculation, it is telling that this story also featured on prime time national television and that the television coverage served to promote Pope’s exemplary prowess as both developer and speculator. The story went to air on Campbell Live, TV3, in June 2008 and a ten-minute clip presented interviews not only with Laurence Pope but also with a town councillor, a local policeman and Pope’s builder. John Campbell, the television presenter, began the presentation by posing the question, “which would you prefer – rough locals or developers from out of town?” Campbell’s mode of positioning immediately invites the audience to judge Pope according to a polemic binary that Goldie Osuri describes as “a generic media strategy emerging from the influence of tabloid TV (especially reality TV) on news and current affairs programs” (2006: 5). To paraphrase Osuri’s discussion of ‘media necropower’ and ‘media governmentality,’ since no other alternatives are put forward and since the terms ‘rough locals’ and ‘developers’ are not accompanied by any analysis or discussion, the television interviews specifically position Pope as the epitome of the ideal citizen under

Robert Reich describes the new world of middle-class subjectivity as “supercapitalism” and claims not only that our capacity as “citizens” has been eclipsed by our increasing power as “consumers and investors” but also that the resulting internal or subjective conflict marks a new “crisis of democracy” (2007: 89). Although Reich tends to idealise earlier forms of liberal government by recalling a “Not Quite Golden Age” when issues of economic security, social equity and common decency were once central to “democratic capitalism,” he also pinpoints the shifting subjectivities and relations of power that are crucial to the diminution of such democratic processes (2007: 89). For Reich, it is the power of individualized citizens in their capacity as consumers and investors that is intensifying competition and demanding the entire economy be more productive and, although we may be in two minds about the consequences, as he claims, it is our desires as consumers and investors that usually win out against our capacity and values as citizens (2007: 89).
neoliberalism, and situate the subjectification of the viewer as one who participates in an enterprise society and identifies with ‘developers’ rather than ‘rough locals’ (2006: 5). While Osuri is “not suggesting that the positioning of viewers elicits the desired responses structured by the genre itself,” she does discuss ways a “particular model of viewership is invited and desired” by the generic strategies of reality TV and the “discursive shifts it enables within television programming in general” (2006: 5).

For example, rather than challenge the idea that state housing is available to private speculators, or even seek the perspectives of the people who resisted such re-development, Campbell answers his rhetorical question by focusing on Pope’s ‘risk’ and ends with the comment that “the first houses Pope bought at $100,000 each are now valued at $160,000 and that with property prices holding steady in Paeroa his punt is looking pretty good at the moment.” Campbell’s comments and the overall ethos of the news clip not only reflect the transformation of societal attitudes in the transition from a Keynesian economy to a speculative economy but also exemplify the role of media in representing an image of society to itself. In this exemplar, the narration of identity choice is that of self-actualization through speculation and property development, and ‘good conscience’ is measured according to market imperatives and the opportunistic prowess of an entrepreneur. It is not only the behaviour of Laurence Pope and the attitudes and reactions of the television journalist, the city councillor and local policeman who all express their admiration of Pope that sells a positive image of entrepreneurial speculation. It is also the fact that this programme featured on national television, prime time, and that Laurence Pope represents an image of lifestyle choice that is judged by the media to be newsworthy and laudable. The nation-building strategies of a Keynesian welfare state are supplanted by individualized, self-actualizing notions of identity, which are defined in terms of lifestyle experiments and consumer choice and are narrated and promoted by brand marketers through advertising images and new communication technologies, especially television.

Ebert and Zavarzadeh compare Fordist and post-Fordist subjectivity by pointing out that in Fordist or Keynesian society, consumption was “almost always purely functional, aimed at

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114 Osuri argues: “Contemporary western governmentalities (through state and other forms of governmentalities such as media governmentality and the exercise of consumer citizenship) demand new forms of racialized assimilable bodies and subjectivities which will comply with, consent to, and even demand overt practices of necropower while maintaining the identity of the ‘west’ as ‘civilized,’ democratic, and free” (2006: 2). These concepts are discussed again in Chapter Five.
meeting needs,” whereas in post-Fordist or post-industrial society, consumption “loses its pure functionality and becomes a matter of affect, feeling, desire and longing” (2008: 170). When consumption becomes a matter of wants and not needs, “it acts as a symbolic communication of the identity of the consumer” and, it is on these terms that media culture takes a prime role in normalizing middle-class-ness and orchestrating government of the ‘self’ through patterns of consumption. Of course, as Jennifer Cotter explains, the transition from an economy based in material production to an immaterial economy has not “moved us beyond class relations – and beyond the theft of surplus-labour in production – into an increasingly flat world of ‘equal opportunity’” (2008: 2). Rather, as Cotter argues, “capitalism remains a system based in the exploitation of labour” and “the developments outlined in bourgeois theories of a ‘digital’ economy cannot be understood except as expanding the logic of capitalism over every aspect of social life” (2008: 2). That is to say, market imperatives and the logic of capitalism infiltrate and inform all those ‘immaterial’ or ‘affective’ systems of communication that produce social co-operation and constitute understandings of ‘self’. When Arvidsson states that “capital feeds directly off life itself” he is referring to those biopolitical strategies of immaterial capitalism that produce individuals as human capital and that rely on media culture to effect that outcome (2005: 252). Arvidsson invokes the term “informational capitalism” to describe the logic of a new immaterial, informational production that blurs any distinction between “production” and “consumption” or “circulation” and involves “the putting to work of communication” and “the mediatization of consumption in general” (2006: 9-11). Media culture works to construct a common social world and operates through modes of media governmentality to constitute and facilitate informational capitalism. For example, users of social media like YouTube and Facebook are the producers of content; they are given free access to services and platforms but their time online is put to work, their productive sociality accumulates a proliferating community of producers who are then sold as a commodity to advertisers.

115 Michael Hardt (1999) identifies the succession of three dominant economic paradigms in capitalist production, the first being agriculture and the extraction of raw materials, the second, industry and the manufacture of durable goods and the third, qua Arvidsson’s ‘informational capitalism’, he describes as “providing services and manipulating information” (1999: 90).
Alliez and Feher claim the implementation of this capitalist strategy depends ultimately on the need for workers to conceptualize themselves in terms of “human capital” so that “even people at work stations or on assembly lines … begin to perceive themselves as entrepreneurs and treat their colleagues at the previous station like suppliers and the ones at the following stations like clients!” (1986: 349). However, as they point out, the relations of communication inherent to cybernetic machines are structurally reversible and if computer technology makes the worker a controller of machines, it also gives the machine unprecedented means for the surveillance of individuals (1986: 348). According to Alliez and Feher, this reversibility tends to make human beings and technical machines equivalent and assimilates both as cogwheels or relays “in a vast machinic network for the productive circulation of information” (1986: 348). Such “machinic enslavement” extends itself to new household technologies as well as affecting older objects such as televisions (1986: 348). In effect, as Alliez and Feher claim, “the role of television is now less one of captivating a viewer considered as a target to be subjected (bringing him/her to identify with what he/she is watching) than one of assimilating the viewer in the permanent spectacle it produces” (1986: 348).

Deleuze and Guattari use television to illustrate the point that modern power is not reducible to the classical alternative “repression or ideology” but instead “implies
processes of normalization, modulation, modelling and information that bear on language, perception, desire, movement etc., and proceed by way of micro-assemblages” (1988: 458). They argue that television viewers are “no longer consumers or users, nor even subjects who supposedly ‘make’ it, but intrinsic component pieces” and that “in machinic enslavement, there is nothing but transformations and exchanges of information, some of which are mechanical, others human” (1988: 458). Jonathan Beller conceptualizes informational capitalism as a cinematic mode of production and claims, “One cannot overestimate the necessity (for capital) of the amalgamation of the imagination and therefore of concrete bodies by media” (2006a: 67). Beller points out, first of all, that an image is a “dematerialized form of the commodity, the commodity without its material content” (2006: 76). He then states that although “an image has no use-value in the practical, material sense … its use-value is its exchange-value” (2006a: 76). Beller explains:

[An image] circulates commodities through our sensoriums and exchanges itself for us. When we incorporate the image, we ourselves become exchangeable; we have/are social currency. In this respect, the commodity that the image most closely resembles is indeed money, the vanishing mediator, which, from the standpoint of the consumer, is the most general form of pleasure, the general form of social wealth, the means to life; and yet it is not money. One does not spend image; one performs it. As with money, the circulation of the image and its related phenomenological effects, along with the subroutines these imply, are essential for the valorization of capital (2006a: 76).

With the advent of computers, television, cinema, cell phones and the internet, technological mediation renders individual bodies affectively “global” and “bodies give time for image in a new totalitarianism of the sensual” (Beller, 2006a: 74). Here, Beller is referring to the concept of affect value and to those forms of immaterial labour that underpin productive sociality. Advanced systems of electronic media now work interactively to attract, incorporate and capitalize on the social wealth generated through affect-rich circuits of communication. An informational economy situates media culture and media governmentality at the apex of life experience and it is self-actualization through brand-image that informs social currency and underpins social wealth. Current affairs programmes like Campbell Live and presenters like John Campbell (discussed earlier) become pivotal in the construction of a national social imaginary and, as will be discussed in the next section, reality TV programmes become the stage on which brand-image is constructed and self-actualization is modelled and practised.
Reality Television, Lifestyle Interventions and the Makeover Industry

Reality TV plays a key role in commodifying immaterial labour, in assimilating the viewer into the media spectacle and in linking notions of self with brands and the affective, capricious demands of branded identity. Reality TV performs as a microcosm of media governmentality by utilizing systems of self-surveillance to guide the conduct of conduct. As Ouellette and Hay explain, “at a time when privatization, personal responsibility, and consumer choice are promoted as the best way to govern liberal capitalist democracies, reality TV shows us how to conduct and ‘empower’ ourselves as enterprising citizens” (2008: 2). Reality TV re-invents television’s educative agenda, firstly, by embedding the enterprising citizen as a point of reference for the practice of everyday life and, secondly, by appropriating the conduct of private citizens in program production thereby diminishing any perceived boundary between media culture and lived reality.

In her examination of reality television in Aotearoa New Zealand, Misha Kavka explains that “reality television is the only genre which deliberately seeks out ‘ordinary’ or ‘normal’ people, and emphasises this ordinariness by placing people in at-home or on-the-job settings” (2004: 224). Although the effect on the viewer is that we feel as though we “potentially know the people we see on screen,” this itself does not reflect reality “but rather produces an effect of authenticity” (2004: 224, emphasis in original). In fact, reality television removes individuals from reality and re-presents them devoid of any historical subjectivity in contrived situations that always only concern the present moment (2004: 225). According to Kavka, “Reality television is thus not so much a slice of life as a slice of the present, lived out by a group of individuals brought together in a constructed situation” (2004: 225). For Kavka, reality television performs as the sine qua non of the television medium because it delivers to audiences “a ‘window’ through which we may peer, in particular into the domestic lives of people behind closed doors – even though these doors have, until recently, been fictional” (2004: 226). Kavka suggests that reality

117 Lair et al claim “a professional work world where personal branding predominates would also be one with few enduring bonds and little trust but a great deal of political maneuvering, competition and cynicism. Social values have little depth beyond their packaging and promotion, and inhabitants of this marketed world would not be expected to hold or demonstrate lasting social commitments. Players would be looking at themselves in the mirror as well as over the shoulders of others while they strive to fashion and refashion themselves without concern for values, deep satisfactions, or contributions to society” (2005: 335-336).
television provides a ‘window’ through which to view everyday lives but, as Arvidsson claims, the mediatization of the social is so pervasive that “it is no longer meaningful to maintain a distinction between media and reality” and “information is no longer something that represents reality, but something that provides an ambience in which reality can unfold” (2006: 126). The mediatization of the social underpins informational capitalism and, as Beller argues, media technologies are “deterritorialized factories in which spectators work” and “the image, which pervades all appearing, is the mise-en-scène of the new work” (2006a: 1). Reality television epitomizes informational capitalism’s mode of production through which attention serves as commodity and the act of viewing becomes a value-productive activity within the media industry.

The conflation of mediated image culture and capitalist enterprise is well exemplified by reality TV programmes that deal with the buying, renovating and selling of property. As Kavka claims, real estate in Aotearoa New Zealand “is heightened reality … it is a dramatic enactment of identity and place” and “it is in and around their homes that New Zealand reality television goes looking for ordinary people who will facilitate cultural (self-) recognition” (2004: 232, emphasis in original). The programmes *Mitre 10 Dream Home*, *Mitre 10 DIY Rescue* and *Mucking In* are local spin-offs of a reality TV format that combines commercial sponsorship and renovation projects with competition and a race against the clock. As well as situating viewers within a familiar culture and enacting a detailed, visualized sense of place, the real estate reality programme also emphasises ‘home’ as ‘capital’ and as a source and opportunity for reinventing an entrepreneurial ‘self’. This emphasis contrasts markedly with the 1946 documentary in which good quality housing for all is seen as a state responsibility and as a guiding principle of the welfare state. The news-clip feature on Laurence Pope and his property re-development is itself a form of reality television through which the ‘real’ is projected to fit a much broader market-oriented and profit-driven nation-building agenda. Reality television is a prime example of those modes of governmentality that have a subtle yet intense impact on understandings of ‘self’ because they infiltrate domestic or private settings to project notions of ‘ordinary’ behaviour and normalized citizenship under the seemingly innocent auspices of free-time entertainment. While Rose links the ‘shepherd-flock game’ with the subjectifying role of psychological sciences, I argue that modes of media governmentality specialise in the ‘shepherd-flock game’ not only through the ‘techne of the confessional’ but also through a rendering of ‘expert’ authority that continually constitutes and conveys
‘who one is’ and ‘what one does’ in the minds of viewers (Foucault cited in Rose, 1996: 96). Reality television demonstrates how mediatized flows of power constitute the subject as an object for him/herself and, following Foucault, exhibits “the formation of procedures by which the subject is led to observe himself, analyze himself, interpret himself, recognize himself as a domain of possible knowledge” (cited in Rabinow and Rose, 2003: 2).

Reality television constructs ‘ordinary’ people as both subject and object by, first of all, utilizing subjects as inexpensive ‘human capital’ in programme production and then, secondly, by objectifying all aspects of everyday existence in terms of individual lives and lifestyles that should be constantly scrutinized, upgraded and transformed for the joy of consumption and for maximum return on capital. Alison Hearn explains how reality television production models usually by-pass unionized people, especially writers and performers in order to produce cheap, flexible programming that can be on-sold to multiple networks, and that can include high levels of promotional content (2008: 502). Hearn also makes the important point that reality television utilizes “affective labour” by capitalizing on the emotions and private feelings of participants who receive minimal remuneration (2008: 502). In effect, their work is not recognized as labour at all and instead, as Hearn claims, “producers and networks position themselves as benign corporate benefactors and the participants as their grateful beneficiaries” (2008: 502-503).

Broadcast television has always positioned itself as a form of benign authority and as a nation-building forum in Aotearoa New Zealand, and recent programme scheduling on TVNZ’s Channel One demonstrates how ‘reality’ programmes now dominate this forum and how the demand for individualized, enterprising subjectivity permeates all representations of life and lifestyle.118

It is appropriate to begin this analysis with the real estate programme called Location, Location, Location, first of all because it focuses on private property exchange and ties in with the previous account of Laurence Pope’s speculation and, secondly, because it projects the normalized ‘self’ as investor/entrepreneur and encourages viewers to incorporate their homes in the life-defining accumulation of capital. This programme epitomizes the forms of media governmentality that shape conduct and are instrumental in

118 All programmes included in this analysis screened between 12 noon and 8.30 pm on TVNZ, Channel One, Saturday, 15 November 2008 (NZ Listener, Nov 15-21 2008: 73).
fuelling the relentless demand for self-improvement and image-based identity that is the central focus of this Chapter. The first couple lives on Waiheke Island and intends selling one of two properties which they have built themselves over many years while raising a family. They explain they have an option of living in two “wonderful” properties and have decided on “rationalizing some of the assets to a point where we can change our lifestyle.” The programme focused on the many desirable features of the property, including a separate building that realized $17,000 rent per year, and demonstrated how a ‘soiree evening’ and ‘viewing by appointment only’ approach would be necessary to attract the ‘right’ buyers for this $4 million property. Although “no punters turned up” and there was no sale in the time and space of programme production, the owners were more than happy with the interest shown. In this context, the ‘interest shown’ refers as much to their national television exposure as it does to any actual buyer interest, and confirms Kavka’s claim that real estate in Aotearoa New Zealand performs a “heightened reality” and is a dramatic enactment of identity and place (2004: 232).

The second couple bought a “modest south Auckland property” with the specific intention of realizing “a tidy profit through makeover” in a six week period. By buying second-hand “bargain” items using Trade Me online auctions, for example, and doing all the renovations themselves, they planned to make $20,000 profit on a short-term investment. The programme focused on the painting, wallpapering and garden improvements they made (all the time featuring the names of suppliers) and, although the property failed to sell on Trade Me auctions as planned, the property was eventually sold (to cover costs and labour only) to a local chemist who bought it unseen for his own rent-to-buy investment scheme. Although the chemist’s purchase was just a footnote to this ‘reality’ programme, this investment plan does resemble Laurence Pope’s system of accumulation, discussed earlier.

The final couple had six children and were looking to move from a five bedroom house to a six bedroom house. They did not find the house they wanted but the programme did convey the “normalcy” of having your home “on the market” indefinitely and of spending month after month searching for that opportunity to improve on an investment and transform your life. In summary, this one hour programme projected

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119 Trade Me is the largest internet-auction website operating in Aotearoa New Zealand.
consumer/investor/entrepreneurial subjectivity, but it also normalized a middle-class aesthetic while catering for and simultaneously masking the class differences at play in people’s actual conditions of existence. That is to say, the couple who dabbled with “rationalizing assets” and owned two valuable properties on Waiheke Island have vastly different lifestyles and expectations from those who live in South Auckland and seek to rent “modest” properties from the local chemist. In addition, the couples who feature in this programme all conform to white, middle-class, family ideals; those who are marginalized and disadvantaged by the market imperatives of neoliberal society remain invisible. For Ouellette and Hay, programmes like this are premised on the unavailability of welfare as an entitlement and situate the idea of home ownership as “a symbol of the so-called Ownership Society” and as a foundation for executing personal responsibility and therefore good citizenship (2008: 44).

Another real-estate programme screened later in the evening during prime-time viewing and, although it is a British programme, this version of ‘reality’ television continues to link the makeover and exchange of ‘home’ with a sense of identity and endless choice for lifestyle transformation. The programme is called Relocation, Relocation and its content is similar to Location, Location, Location, but it intensifies the property exchange concept by featuring greater risk, greater speculation and the potential for greater capital accumulation. In the opening remarks the narrator tells viewers:

Two homes in two different countries sounds like a wonderful dream for most of us but you don’t have to rob the bank to get that dual life. With a small budget we’ve got big plans to help a young family buy a brand new life on each side of the English Channel.

The programme then goes on to explain how Jenny and Morgan Williams are re-training as a plumber (Jenny) and electrician (Morgan) and, with the help of the Relocation, Relocation programme, plan to let their home in Brighton so that they can buy and renovate two more houses, one in Crawley and one in France. As the narrator proclaims, “Jenny and Morgan are leaving their seaside home in Brighton, giving up their desk jobs and putting on overalls for their dual-life dream on both sides of the channel and totally transforming their lives.”

120 The fact that Jenny and Morgan choose to re-train as plumber and electrician, respectively, raises some interesting questions. Firstly, it demonstrates how such manual labour, once regarded as the domain of male, working-class subjects allied to trade union struggles and anti-capitalist politics, becomes a vehicle for upward mobility and a means to capital accumulation (see Walkerdine, 2003). Secondly, as Lair et al claim,
using their leisure time to renovate investment properties they are ensuring that eventually they will have more time together and more time with their baby son Rhys. This young couple epitomize post-Fordist reality because they are blurring the boundaries between work and leisure and, in an effort to save time and create more space for family life they are working longer, losing time and extending their financial indebtedness thereby producing the opposite result. In effect, they are enacting what Alliez and Feher describe as a form of subjectivity in which individuals “invest their lives in capital accumulation as a stock of ‘saved’ time of enjoyment” and are incorporated in “the neo-capitalist regime of enslavement” that tends to “permeate the totality of time in the name of an overall increase in commodities” (1986: 353). It is through the affirmative uptake of capitalist concepts and practices that neoliberalism inflects the production of subjectivity to embed the economic profit-motive and to ensure that it becomes the norm and the dominant logic of everyday life. Foucault’s analysis of biopower emphasises the need to focus on the costs of emerging subjectivity and to identify the positive mechanisms that result in misery (Nealon, 2008: 21, emphasis in original). The subject of neoliberalism must make a life project of self-realization, and must keep the illusion of a unitary subject intact while also handling the uncertainty inherent in constant change and transformation. In other words, as Valerie Walkerdine explains, “the goal of happiness is invested in ‘endless becoming’” and in “turning oneself into a commodity and thereby owning the means to consume” (2003: 247). The costs associated with reality television programmes and promises of self-improvement may well be a sense of failure and misery when leisure time is permanently postponed and when the drive to accumulate does not curtail insecurity.

such an obsession with work and upward mobility can either “lead people to ignore their relationships or to commodify such relationships within the frame of a market discourse” (2005: 327).
The concept of the ‘makeover’ has been a staple of women’s magazines for years but, nowadays, television ‘makeover’ programmes dominate the airwaves, as attested by the fact that there are three hours of makeover programmes in the eight hours of TVNZ scheduling under analysis. Ouellette and Hay invoke the term “life intervention” to describe those programmes which “mobilize professional motivators and lifestyle experts, from financial advisors to life coaches, to help people overcome hurdles in their personal, professional and domestic lives” (2008: 63). The marketing of self-improvement in ‘makeover’ programs “draws from, and intensifies, a history of the promotion of make-up and costume as potential ‘class levellers’ among women” but upward mobility is not only implied, it is fundamental to the ‘makeover’ genre (2008: 123). As Ouellette and Hay argue, women who do not have access to the “professional middle class on their own ‘merit’ are offered another route to personal and professional empowerment by makeover TV” (2008: 123).

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121 This image is from TVNZ’s website promotion of a show called “Trinny and Susannah’s Downunder Makeover Mission” screening on TV One, Fridays at 7.30 pm, beginning 15 July 2011, [online] Available at: http://tvnz.co.nz/trinny-and-sussannahs-downunder-makeover-mission/susannah-s-4260822 [Accessed 08.08.11].

122 Incitements to viewers to re-invent ‘self’ and ‘place’ are relentless and ubiquitous and are not confined to scheduled programmes but are continued and consolidated in myriad forms of commercial sponsorship, product placement and especially in strategically timed advertising. During the screening of Relocation, Relocation, for example, there were advertisements for Bedpost bedroom furniture, State Insurance (offering opportunity to win $100,000 Fly Buy points), Harvey World Travel, ASB Bank, Jennian Homes and Mason leather furniture. Between the screening of Location, Location, Location, and Relocation, Relocation, advertisements for Briscoes, Bunnings Warehouse, Mitre 10 Megastore, Powerbuilt tools, and Russell Hobbs kitchen products kept the viewers focused on house and garden improvement/transformation.
The stories of personal and material transformation proliferating in ‘reality’ television serve to offer hope while masking a profound sense of insecurity or what Hearn refers to as a “generalized cultural condition of precariousness” that pervades neoliberal society (2008: 502). The makeover genre, as depicted in programmes like Trinny and Susannah and Ten Years Younger, deploys pastoral relations of power to offer instruction and aid to “downtrodden, unfashionable, insecure people” who must admit (or confess) that they need help before subjecting themselves to the restorative guidance of experts (Hearn, 2008: 495). Class differences are elided here but, as mentioned earlier, transformation television depends on “cultural conditions of precariousness” to provide a steady supply of makeover subjects and it is the working class domestic workers, identified as marginal in some way, who epitomize precariousness and who serve as fodder to be made-over as “confident,” “a go-getter” and “modern”, or, in other words, “a bankable, standardized female brand” (Hearn, 2008: 502). In her paper on makeover television, Brenda Weber claims, “This reliance on all-powerful experts is consistent throughout the makeover canon: doctors are glorified, powerful, and full discursive agents; patients (a disproportionate number of them women) are passive and yielding, even grateful for their transformations, creating a culture of docile bodies eager for discipline” (2007: 91).

According to Weber, makeover programmes reiterate traditional modes of femininity and “one likely explanation for the veritable explosion of makeover themed programming in the early 21st century is the ‘corrective’ function that these shows aim to write on women’s bodies” (2007: 89). Weber coins the term “affective domination” to describe the format that insists a woman must be shamed before she can be instructed and transformed, arguing “it is only after her shaming and capitulation that she can be praised” (2007: 89).

A British version of Ten Years Younger screened on TVNZ between Location, Location, Location and Relocation, Relocation on the day designated for analysis and, in this episode, the subject was a young woman who provided ideal ‘fodder’ for makeover because she had already followed ‘a punishing diet’ and shown ‘dogged determination’ to transform herself by reducing her weight from 17½ stone to 10 stone. The format of this programme is to have members of the public guess the subject’s age before the makeover and then have other members of the public guess her age after the makeover; if the makeover is successful, the average age guessed after the makeover will be at least ten years less than the average age guessed beforehand. Jayne, the subject of this episode, was taken to the seaside and a hundred locals were asked to guess her age while she stood on
the beach in a bikini. While Jayne admitted to the camera that she had felt humiliated while strangers made comments regarding her ‘saggy’ skin and cellulite etc, Jayne’s partner also appeared on camera saying she ‘had lost her bust, had always been heavy on the hips and hadn’t lost any weight there at all really’. These humiliating strategies set the platform for what was to be a series of invasive and painful medical procedures that would supposedly transform Jayne’s physical appearance thereby restoring the confidence and self-esteem the programme itself had been instrumental in shattering. After reporting that “the British public mistook Jayne’s age to be 46 when she is only 41” and pointing out how she had some “seriously enviable peers”, namely, Elle MacPherson, Courtney Cox and Elizabeth Hurley, who were the same age but “still sizzle in swimwear”, Jayne’s case was discussed with a series of professionals and experts. Once again she was subjected to the humiliation of being scrutinized while she stood in a bikini but this time the professionals sat and watched as they each took turns to point out what body part had to be removed, replaced or altered. These ‘judges of normality’ did not mention risk or side-effects when they described a series of invasive, cosmetic procedures that could be of only dubious benefit to Jayne, but would most certainly be both lucrative and career-enhancing for each of them. After being submitted to medical procedures like liposuction, breast augmentation, laser eye-surgery and cosmetic dental work, Jayne was also ‘made over’ by fashion experts, a hairdresser, a chiropodist and a make-up artist. The narrator then reviewed the total makeover:

Twelve weeks of makeover magic and she is a new woman: extensive liposuction has taken her from lumpy to lithe, tummy tuck means she is not flaccid but firm, the boob job means her empty chest is now ample, and eye surgery, new hair and make-up means she is now no longer haggard but hot. What a difference three months makes!

The makeover process, as a microcosm of governmentality, puts “democratically controlled” judgements and disciplinary apparatus to work demonstrating how each individual, whatever the context, participates in the universal reign of the normative by subjecting to it his body, his gestures, his behaviour, his aptitudes, his achievements (Foucault, 1977b: 207). Jayne is taken back to the beach for re-assessment by one hundred members of the British public and their guesses set her new average age at 35. So, before makeover Jayne was judged to be 46, after makeover she was judged to be 35 and her actual age is 41. Programme narrators made no attempt to justify such subjective and far-from-compelling results but, instead, had Jayne comment that “there is no way I will ever
go back to the old Jayne” and that the years off her age had “done wonders to her self-esteem”, made her “more outgoing”, “happier”, a “different” and “new” woman. Programme producers have seemingly convinced Jayne that the cure for flagging self-esteem resides in the bodily image and in conforming to a perceived norm. Expert opinion holds, according to Ten Years Younger, that the ‘sexiest shape’ is one in which waist size is seven-tenths of hip size and, though ‘beautiful’ women like Twiggy, Marilyn Monroe and Audrey Hepburn are all different in size, they have a similar waist-to-hip ratio. The normalization and objectification of the female body calls to mind Foucault’s claims that “a normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centred on life” and that “one would have to speak of biopower to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life” (1978: 142 and 145). Makeover television works to normalize and objectify the female body by deploying experts, authorities and professionals (dentists, cosmetic surgeons) as agents of transformation in a knowledge-power regime centred on image and the manipulation of affective biopower. Weber uses the term “affective domination” to describe the strategic management of self-worth, the generation of affect (shame and love) and the appropriation of affect value for entertainment, high audience ratings and profit (2007: 89).

Self-Branding and Identity as Image

Hearn claims that transformation programmes address larger societal issues of precarious life and individual insecurity by “staging, over and over again, fantasies of incorporation into a stable, dominant cultural imaginary in the form of self-branding” (2008: 502). For Hearn, the forms of self-branding reiterated on makeover shows restrict notions of ‘self’ to the specific “templates of the corporate culture” and “the instrumental logic of the market” (2008: 502). Walkerdine also sees the makeover television as a call for self-branding but she believes a middle-class gloss builds especially upon the long-established incitement to women to become producers of themselves as objects of the gaze. Furthermore, as she sees it, the “erosion of a discourse of classed identity can also be seen as a feminization” (2003: 242). According to Walkerdine, “we are certainly not witnessing any lessening of inequality or exploitation – far from it – but I would claim that inequality is differently lived because low-paid manual and service workers are constantly enjoined to improve and
remake themselves as the freed consumer, the ‘entrepreneur of themselves’” (2003: 242-243). Media culture, and reality television more particularly, enacts a pastoral approach to both individualize and collectivize women according to a middle-class mantra that normalizes both the upwardly mobile project and understandings of self as entrepreneurial enterprise.

Makeover television programmes appeal to an image of ‘self’ as self-governing, self-actualizing and transformative, but this image of autonomous subjectivity disguises the fact that personal insecurity is a necessary precondition of the ‘makeover’ mentality and that subjectivity is reduced to a superficial ‘image’ that is both ephemeral and delimiting. In other words, subjective existence is reduced to the “gauzy, insubstantial, legitimating discourses of post-Fordist flexible accumulation, which assert that image savvy and flexibility, consumer prowess, and attention-getting confidence is the means to self-fulfilment and success” (Hearn, 2008: 502). It is not the subject’s conditions of existence that are transformed, at best it is the ‘image’ they have of themselves or perceive others to have of them. The ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’ offered in transformative programmes is contrived and conformist and, more to the point, although the individual is encouraged to be self-reflexive, that reflexivity concerns self-as-commodity and the broader ethical and political implications of fragmented, individualized subjectivity remain undisturbed and unchallenged.

Figure 10 Donald Trump (U.S.A.), The Apprentice, 2004-2012

123 The Apprentice is a reality TV based show in which contestants compete for a job as an apprentice to billionaire American Donald Trump. Image from The Apprentice (TV Series 2004) – IMDb website [online] Available at: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0364782/ [Accessed 22.08.12].
The Reality TV show, *The Apprentice*, showcases and valorizes self-branded, image-entrepreneurialism and follows a format in which, as Alison Hearn puts it, “while labouring at performing themselves as corporate moguls-in-training, contestants produce their own branded image-tokens” (2006: 141). As Hearn claims, *The Apprentice* functions to “dramatize and embody the collapse of any meaningful distinction between notions of the self and capitalist processes of production” (2006: 133). The concept of ‘self-branding’ links the ‘image-making’ agenda of transformative television with the ethos of the neoliberal workplace and the government of ‘self’. Personal branding, for Lair et al, is not so much a process of transformation or self-improvement as it is a matter of “self-packaging” and “a startlingly overt invitation for self-commodification” (2005: 309). For me, self-branding is nothing less than the culmination of a neoliberal discourse that narrates image as identity and that interprets all government of ‘self’ as government of ‘human capital’. Personal branding is a pervasive and sophisticated mode of governmentality that “wraps itself in an upbeat celebration of democratic choice and opportunity” thereby shielding itself and its neoliberal marketing context from ethical scrutiny and systemic critique (2005: 333). Where once ‘branding’ referred to labelling tactics for product placement in the world of business, self-branding refers to marketing strategies for self-management and reveals the extent to which corporate ideology now over-determines all understanding of ‘self’ and extends its influence into the everyday practice of life itself. Because ‘success’ has less to do with an individual’s internal set of skills, motivations and interests and more to do with how well their ‘image’ has been arranged, crystallized and labelled, self-branding promotes a superficial vision of the self and a form of ‘hyper-individuality’ that lacks any nuanced sense of identity and self-awareness (2005: 314).

Branding emerged as a communication strategy and flexible response to an increasingly crowded and fragmented post-Fordist world and, as Lair et al contend, the expansion from company branding to branding of a person and a career well exemplifies “the ultimate marriage of marketing culture with the mythos of the American individual” (2005: 314). However, as I argue throughout this thesis, the neoliberal autonomous subject (*homo economicus*) is the product of very specific socio-economic relations of power. As Foucault explains, “what is sought is not a society subject to the commodity-effect, but a
society subject to the dynamic of competition. Not a supermarket society, but an enterprise society. The *homo economicus* sought after is not the man of exchange or man the consumer; he is the man of enterprise and production” (2008: 147). The neoliberal subject is concerned not with relations of production dominated by factory-organized manufacturing but by information, services and brands and the production of ‘self’ as human capital. In the context of a capitalist political economy, matters of class, gender and race are elided while the white, male, professional stands as default image for any self-branding autonomous individual. In the post-Fordist or neoliberal political economy, in the wake of de-regulation and privatization and in the emergence of a knowledge economy, workers are encouraged to ‘brand’ themselves as individual entrepreneurs and to negotiate their own terms of employment from among the many corporate employment options made available by free market imperatives. Although a market-oriented, individualized approach supposedly ensures the privileging of worker agency, no allowance is made for the issues of class, race and gender that are largely ignored in personal branding literature and that effectively work to disavow personal agency. As Lair et al claim, a seemingly classless perspective re-casts the “self-reliance-equals-success mythology,” blames the poor for poverty, leaving those who are economically marginalized as responsible for their circumstances and “their economic failures become simply a result of their inability or unwillingness to package themselves correctly” (2005: 333). Lair et al note also that “the literature of personal branding is overwhelmingly silent on the issue of race” (2005: 331). In their view, this silence reflects the “racial blindness” apparent in all organizational studies within the United States where the image of many professionals is coded for “‘Whiteness,” even if such intention is “below the surface of awareness” and where personal branding not only helps “to fix the idea of the White professional but also leaves little room for alternative identities” (2005: 333). That is to say, in the corporate business world, matters of race and class are glossed and ignored, until or unless they surface as labels for the marginalized, excluded ‘other’ who do not

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124 Lair et al qualify this statement: “To the extent that other groups are addressed by personal branders, they are either assumed to fit this dominant mold … or they are implicitly instructed to resolve individually any tensions that might be present between their cultural norms for work and career and those of the packaged professional” (2005: 334). They add, “We would say that the personal branding movement makes a nod toward diversity in the category of gender but that it in fact perpetuates stereotypes of women and does not adequately deal with either the second shift or the glass ceiling. Age is rarely mentioned; when it is, it is treated as a problem that one must overcome by developing the perfect brand” (2005: 334).
qualify to participate in the accumulation of capital but whose conditions of existence may be appropriated and exploited for capital gain.

Women, too, in negotiating the ‘white, male, professional’ self-branding norm, must contend with a double-edged contradiction, one that promotes both a “feminine surface identity and a masculine internal identity, all the while perpetuating the work/home dualism” (Lair et al., 2005: 328). In other words, women are expected to “get ahead” at work but also “to look womanly” and “be there for their children and husbands” while also recognizing that by doing so they may not qualify as a 100% company woman (Lair et al., 2005: 328). Older workers also fall outside the optimal “white, male, professional” parameter, so they are encouraged to “re-invent themselves” for the “second act” in tactics of self-branding that re-produce their experience and expertise as marketable commodities (Lair et al., 2005: 331). While Lair et al. focus on self-branding as a work-related phenomenon and the understanding and uptake of self-branding may be different in social domains (as for example in the makeover programme, Ten Years Younger, discussed earlier), there is little doubt that these technologies of ‘self’ blur work/home boundaries and increasingly align with the idea of the ‘self’ as a marketable image. Hearn cites Lair et al. (2005), and their analysis of a burgeoning literature on self-branding, to argue that what is being sold is “expertise in crafting a potent synthetic image of autonomous subjectivity,” and that self-branding “reduces the ‘self’ to a set of purely instrumental behaviours and circumscribes its meanings within market discourse” (2008: 498). Hearn’s conclusion is an accurate appraisal of self-branding but autonomous subjectivity is always a crafted ‘image,’ just as superficial and contingent as self-branding, but constituted and promoted as the cornerstone of freedom and liberal democracy. Similarly, Bauman makes the point that whatever forms of identity one may contemplate and desire, just like jobs in the labour market, they must retain the quality of flexibility and be “amenable to change with short notice, or without notice” (2005: 28). As he explains, “Identities, just like consumer goods, are to be appropriated and possessed, but only in order to be consumed” and, furthermore, “consumption of an identity should not – must not – extinguish the desire for other, new and improved identities, nor preclude the ability to absorb them” (2005: 29). Neoliberal subjectivity may be posited on an ethos of free choice and individual autonomy, but when identity is formulated in the image of cultural consumption and in the branding of ‘self’ as human capital, there can be little possibility for resistive reflexivity and little concern for social commitments or personal integrity.
Douglas Holt (2002) situates the branding phenomenon in a wider socio-economic context by linking its evolution to the transformation of consumer culture and to shifting corporate strategies over the course of the twentieth century (also discussed in Chapter One). Holt links the Fordist or Keynesian post-war years of high state regulation with “modern” consumer culture and a form of cultural engineering through which marketers linked product attributes with a package of “desirable personal characteristics” and with particular credentials that would “constitute the modern good life” (2002: 80). The state-directed housing-for-families documentary serves to demonstrate this era’s moulding of consumer culture. By the 1960s, however, consumer culture rejected prescribed tastes and opted instead to seek personal sovereignty through brands. Where ‘modern’ consumer culture worked to select and authorize the meanings that consumers valued, ‘post-modern’ consumer culture provided space for individual choice in the meanings consumers valued, while ensuring the values chosen were channelled through brands (2002: 82). For Holt, “modern” consumer culture linked product with ‘self’ in forms of power and expert discourse that could claim cultural authority through institutionalized systems, whereas “post-modern” consumer culture embeds market imperatives by utilizing biopower, or “a widely dispersed, rhizome-like technology of ‘self-control’ to narrate ‘freedom’ as the right to construct oneself according to any imaginable design through commodities” (2002: 83). What comes through here is the continuing dominance of market imperatives in construction of ‘self’ while “widely-dispersed, rhizome-like” technologies of self-control move the responsibility and labour for government of ‘self’ from central authority and a welfare state to individualized subjects (Holt, 2002: 83). The transformation from modern to post-modern culture parallels the economic transition from Fordism to post-Fordism and reflects the processes through which capital moves from controlling the worker at work to controlling the world of the worker, using ‘rhizome-like’ and indirect options for self-government to do so. While people may believe they have autonomous ‘agency’ and are ‘free’ to make their own life ‘choices,’ as the above discussion of reality television and makeover programmes demonstrates, when people are subjected to what Holt calls the cultural ‘infomediaries’ at work throughout society, subjectivity is moulded and commodified (Holt, 2002: 87). A commodified mode of subjectivity provides an “extraordinary alliance between potentially antagonistic positions,” facilitating market interests and expanding profit while simultaneously providing people with identities that satisfy, or deflect, their demands for greater participation in the economy and polity (2002:
In summary, the transformation of subjectivity, as it is played out in modes of media
governmentality and in processes of cultural consumption, serves only to re-invent and re-
subjectify individuals within a matrix of market-driven individualization.

Media culture intersects with everyday life to such an extent that it is difficult to maintain
a clear distinction between the two so that, as Arvidsson claims, everyday life is now
unfolding within a “well-nigh completely artificial environment” as evidenced by reality
television programmes (described earlier) that perform a double movement by realistically
depicting “everyday life in its real artificiality” (2006: 13). In this way, media culture is
more accurately perceived as providing an environment or a series of contexts within
which “life naturally occurs” and through which we can have experiences (Arvidsson,
2006: 13). Arvidsson emphasizes the point that media culture is commercial culture; that
its contents are commodified and that life within the media is also life within capital (2006:
13). Mediatized calls to makeover, self-branding and subjective transformation, therefore,
participate in a more general movement toward what “Marx theorized as the ‘real
subsumption’ of life” under capital and the “process in which capital enters the social
fabric ‘vertically’ to penetrate its every fibre” and to construct subjects within a common

Conclusion

This Chapter has focused on the formation and transformation of subjectivity and argued
that neoliberal modes of governmentality, as exemplified by the media messages of
‘reality’ television, construct lifestyle ‘values’ and “real artificiality” round notions of self-
conscious consumerism and individualized entrepreneurialism (Arvidsson, 2006: 13).
However, as Arvidsson et al point out, in contrast to the protestant ethic guiding early
capitalism which was oriented towards transcendent values, the contemporary ethical
economy produces value “by continuously producing values: to fit the particular social
situation” (2008a: 11, emphasis in original). The value of any brand, for example,

...
depends on the affective loyalty it can evoke, or in other words, a brand’s success depends on its ability to become an aspect of the relations, identities, fantasies, desires and hopes that social life engenders (Arvidsson, 2006: 90). Branding is a core activity of capitalism and plays a key role in productions of neoliberal subjectivity because it generates profits by targeting and manipulating the affective dimensions of social interaction. As Holt explains, people value iconic brands because “commodities materialize myths … allowing people to interact around these otherwise ephemeral and experientially distant myths in everyday life” (2006: 374). The crucial point here is that values are affiliated with myth and with ephemeral mediatized images that work to obscure and distort economic realities. Neoliberal subjectivity links value with consumption and identity with individualized, lifestyle culture, thereby prompting competitive, cynical attitudes and increasing social insecurity.

In this Chapter, I have focused on individualized and normalized aspects of liberal subjectivity, but it is also necessary to align liberal modes of governmentality with the construction of the state and with notions of democratic nationhood that belie the lived realities of pervasive state surveillance and control and growing social inequality (this issue is dealt with in Chapter Five). In the post-Fordist or neoliberal state, ethical subjectivity is linked with ethical consumerism and with the management of life itself through affective capture and through a mediatized environment in which centralized power and control is more intense than ever. The next Chapter will examine the biopolitical interventions that shape and manage social values, and that generate notions of collective identity, place and nation. It will invoke Nikolas Rose’s concept of etho-politics to link ethics with affective management and will argue, following Rose and others, that the productivity of ethics resides in its biopolitical function and “its ability to fine-tune the formation of subjectivity and sociality” (Arvidsson, 2008b: 1-2). As Arvidsson explains,

affinity: chosen commitments to productive networks or other forms of community” (2008a: 12). Their choice of the term ‘ethical economy’ (as distinct from ‘capitalist economy’) is motivated by a wish to underline a fundamental incompatibility: “The capitalist economy is founded on private property, organized by markets and motivated by the private accumulation of wealth. The ethical economy, on the other hand is primarily structured by networks and motivated by the accumulation of social recognition. But recognition is an effect of sharing and generosity: you have to give back more than you take out to acquire peer respect. This means that private property has no key function in the ethical economy. The ethical economy and the capitalist economy thus represent two structurally distinct economic forms. This article suggests that the split between these two economies will grow clearer and more articulated in the future” (2008a: 11 and 12). In contrast to forms of neoliberal subjectivity in which ethics and values are subsumed and controlled by capitalist logic, Arvidsson et al are positing further subjective transformation and the possible emergence of an ‘ethical economy’ (2008a: 11 and 12).
“the object of management is not so much the particular individual with his or her particular social determination, as much as the pattern of actions or affective investments, of which he or she might be part” (2008b: 6). In other words, the next Chapter will discuss how, in post-Fordist or neoliberal states, the affective dimensions informing all social interaction and communal co-operation (conceptualized by Marx as ‘general intellect’) are being managed and mined to extract surplus value and further capital accumulation. It is my contention that neoliberal concepts of ethical ‘self’ or ‘community’ are nothing more than superficial, middle-class justification for consumerism and capitalism, and that emerging enunciations of ‘etho-politics’ demonstrate how middle-class values permeate society.

One of the most important revelations in Foucault’s thesis on power is the idea that power is relational, that “a strategic manoeuvre must be countered by an opposing manoeuvre; a set of tactics must be consciously invented in opposition to the setting in place of another,” and that “subjectivity is formed and transformed as a different ‘art’ of the human body opposes a historically given one, and so on” (McHoul and Grace, 1998: 84). Neoliberal ‘ethics’ or ‘values’ oppose the historically given forms that kept understandings of a private, ethical ‘self’ separate from ‘self’ as homo economicus and transform liberal subjectivity by consciously inventing an ‘ethical’ self that counters religious connotations and links ethics with secular values and freedom of choice. Shifting identificatory spaces may form national, non-national and trans-national communities and shifting uses of time may mean locating ‘self’ outside the parameters of a national public sphere or local neighbourhood (as, for example, online chat groups or online shopping sites, as opposed to broadcast television or shopping malls) but the lifestyle aesthetic remains intact. The Les Mills World of Fitness organization serves to exemplify lifestyle culture, shifting identificatory space and new understandings of community and features in the next Chapter. Chapter Three argues that neoliberal modes of governmentality narrate community and ethical subjectivity by linking affective potential and sociality with aesthetic values and free market imperatives thereby re-inventing and rejuvenating the aspirational myth that underpins and legitimizes the liberal democratic state.
CHAPTER THREE

Brand Identity and the Mediated Production of Community

‘We have sophisticated metrics which capture Love and Respect’
(Kevin Roberts, CEO of the Saatchi & Saatchi Ideas Company)\textsuperscript{126}

The previous Chapter examined neoliberal modes of governmentality that, in a new paradigm of informational capitalism, utilize immaterial labour and media culture to re-invent the liberal subject in terms of human capital and narrate every aspect of life as the object of entrepreneurial enterprise. While modes of media governmentality, especially those exemplified by the interactive processes of reality television, situate the individualized, autonomous subject as free, self-governing and self-actualized, the production of that subject is based on tenuous notions of ‘self’ that link identity and value with self-conscious consumerism. This Chapter links neoliberal, consumerist subjectivity with neoliberal society and with articulations of community that constitute social bonds through consumerism and utilize the affective, relational aspects of everyday communication to infuse aspects of social organization with market imperatives and capitalist logic. It examines modes of governmentality that rely on affective management to structure the freedom of the subject and to generate notions of collective subjectivity and ethical community. I argue that in neoliberal society, community becomes a vehicle for nurturing and advancing entrepreneurial subjectivity and for normalizing an image-based brand culture that promotes acquisitive materialism and glosses class divisions and growing economic disparities. Market research undertaken in Aotearoa New Zealand in 2005 reveals that while a majority agree there is a class system and see income as the key determinant of social stratification they also tend to avoid identifying as either working class or upper class:

Most think themselves as middle class, or a shade thereof. Only two per cent see themselves as upper class, and five percent as lower. The rest put themselves into the upper-middle (13%), middle (59%), and lower-middle (18%) classes (\textit{NZ Listener}, 2005: 21).\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{126}“Loyal beyond reason,” A Presentation to Various US Defence Agencies, New York City, 9 March 2005, (on how to better “brand” and “sell” the war in Iraq), (cited in Arvidsson \textit{et al}, 2008a: 9 and 19).

\textsuperscript{127}In 2005, the \textit{NZ Listener} employed TNS, global market research specialists, to poll 1000 people nationwide on the subject of class. Results reveal that 70 per cent of New Zealanders think a social class system exists here. Furthermore, “of those who believe it exists, 74 per cent say class is mostly based on
This variation on a theme of middle-class-ness signals an attitudinal change that turns away from political affiliations and working-class solidarity, for example, and reflects instead a conceptualization of ‘class’ in terms of consumption patterns and the financial, educational and social aspirations of individuals.\(^{128}\) Clive Hamilton and Richard Denniss invoke the term ‘affluenza’ to describe this societal obsession with acquisition and consumption and argue not only that a prevailing middle-class sensibility seeks to emulate the consumption and spending habits of the wealthy but also that “neoliberal economic policies set out to promote higher consumption as the road to a better society” (2005: 7 and 9). They refer to market research in Australia and to attitudinal patterns that parallel the findings of the Aotearoa New Zealand survey:

Surveys in which respondents were asked to define their social positions have shown fewer and fewer people willing to identify themselves as working class. Indeed, 93 per cent of Australians believe they are in the middle-income bracket (that is the middle 60 per cent) and only 6.4 per cent see themselves in the bottom 20 per cent and 0.7 per cent in the top 20 per cent (2005: 8).

Hamilton and Denniss believe attitudes to social positions can be linked directly to an “across-the-board escalation of lifestyle expectations” and argue that it is the marked difference between the actual standard of living afforded by average incomes and the opulence promoted in media culture as both normal and attainable that leaves people feeling deprived of the “good life” and leads to stress, overwork and financial indebtedness (2005: 3 and 8). Hamilton and Denniss claim that while neoliberal society may appear to offer individual freedom and unlimited choice, it actually robs people of both their individuality and their autonomy, not only because they must commit more of their lives to money, but that education, where you live, your ethnicity, occupation and family background also play important roles” (Black, 2005: 16). Joanne Black, in the ensuing NZ Listener article used survey findings and additional interviews (with John Key, the Prime Minister, for example) to point out why egalitarianism is a myth in Aotearoa New Zealand, and why what you earn is the main determinant of where you fit into the class structure (Black, 2005: 16-21).

\(^{128}\) Žižek links class divisions in today’s “post-modern” capitalism with the privatization of the social, with the exploitation of labour-power into rent appropriated by the privatization of the “general intellect” and with the establishment of “new enclosures” (2009: 145-146). He identifies three main classes in today’s developed societies “which are precisely not classes but three fractions of the working class: intellectual labourers, the old manual working class, and the outcasts (the unemployed, those living in slums and other interstices of public space)” (2009: 147). For Žižek, the outcome of this process is the “gradual disintegration of social life proper, of a public space in which all three fractions could meet, and 'identity' politics in all its forms is a supplement for this loss” (2009: 147). As he points out, identity politics acquire a specific form within each fraction, “multicultural identity politics among the intellectual class; regressive populist fundamentalism among the working class; semi-illegal groupings (criminal gangs, religious sects etc) among the outcasts” (2009: 147).
working to pay for material desires, but also because the more acquisitive people become, the more the means of satisfying desires are determined by others (2005: 15-18). As they claim, “the more materialistic we are the less free we are” (2005: 15). Against any ideas of individual autonomy and free choice, individuals become subject to external forces and the mercurial whims of markets, taste and fashion. That is to say, while egalitarianism is deterritorialized as a social myth, its connotations of democratic equality and good conscience are reterritorialized in consumerist notions of middle-class-ness. In other words, neoliberal society is collectivized and managed through notions of community that evolve in the pursuit of individual happiness and coalesce in the commodified identities of a brand society.

Žižek points out that “at the level of consumption, this new spirit is that of so-called ‘cultural capitalism’: we primarily buy commodities neither on account of their utility nor as status symbols; we buy them to get the experience provided by them, we consume them in order to render our lives pleasurable and meaningful” (2009: 52). To exemplify his point, Žižek uses the “Starbucks Shared Planet” campaign, which claims “when you buy Starbucks, whether you realize it or not, you’re buying into something bigger than a cup of coffee” (2009: 53). According to their advertising campaign “through our Starbucks Shared Planet program, we purchase more Fair Trade coffee than any company in the world, ensuring that the farmers who grow the beans receive a fair price for their hard work. And we invest in and improve coffee-growing practices and communities around the globe. It’s good coffee karma” (2009: 53). As Žižek claims, “the ‘cultural’ surplus is here spelled out: the price is higher than elsewhere since what you are really buying is the ‘coffee ethic’ which includes care for the environment, social responsibility towards the producers, plus a place where you yourself can participate in communal life” (2009: 53).

Bourdieu refers to “middle classes” and to new fractions of these classes, in terms of “grey areas, ambiguously located in the social structure, inhabited by individuals whose trajectories are extremely scattered” (1986: 112). He explains, “Whereas the old system tended to produce clearly demarcated social identities which left little room for social fantasy but were comfortable and reassuring even in the unconditional renunciation which they demanded, the new system of structural instability in the representation of social identity and its legitimate aspirations tends to shift agents from the terrain of social crisis and critique to the terrain of personal critique and crisis” (1986: 156). As has already been discussed (see Chapter Two), “the primary differences, those which distinguish the major classes of conditions of existence, derive from the overall volume of capital, understood as the set of actually usable resources and powers – economic capital, cultural capital and also social capital” (1986: 114). For Bourdieu, “class struggle … is at the very heart of culture” and, as is argued throughout this thesis, the middle class myth, played out in domains of aesthetic consumption and media and lifestyle culture, only serves to mask and repress real conditions of existence, which foster class divisions and social exclusions (1986: 251).
Starbucks is using the ‘coffee ethic’ to link individual consumerism with ethical surplus and the production of a common or, as Žižek puts it, by buying their coffee, “we are not merely buying and consuming, we are simultaneously doing something meaningful, showing our capacity for care and our global awareness, participating in a collective project” (2009: 54). To paraphrase Žižek, in this very consumerist act, you buy your redemption from being only a consumerist and, in a logic that is almost universal today, by buying Starbucks coffee seemingly fulfil a whole series of ethical duties (Žižek, 2010). However, as Žižek argues, these admirable though misdirected intentions are not a solution; the proper aim is to try and reconstruct society on such a basis that poverty will be impossible and misdirected altruism only hinders the carrying out of this aim.

Zygmunt Bauman believes the pursuit of happiness and hope for its success are now the “fundamental motivation of the individual’s participation in society” (2001: 83). He cites Harvie Ferguson to claim that the worldview of the bourgeois, “that simultaneously principal character, pace-setter and unwitting scriptwriter of the modern drama of unstoppable and infinite improvement, ‘can be understood as … the pursuit of pleasure’, guided by ‘regulated insatiability’” (2001: 82). Bauman argues that, having been assigned such a role, “the pursuit of happiness could not but turn sooner or later from a mere opportunity into a duty and supreme ethical principle” (2001: 83). According to Bauman, this “ethical principle” is the antithesis of communal responsibility and long-term commitment, and fosters instead “superficial,” perfunctory” and “transient” social bonds which are both “frangible and short-lived” (2001: 71). As Bauman explains, bourgeois social bonds do not bind but tend to evaporate at the very moment “when they are needed to compensate for the individual’s lack of resourcefulness or impotence” (2001: 71). Alongside the modes of governmentality that construct and mediate individualized subjectivity, are the community-building or totalizing strategies that co-construct subject and sociality within the parameters of media culture and informational capitalism.

**Affective Investment and Corporate Brand Identities**

In today’s networked society, it is the affect value inherent in co-operative interactivity that is targeted by capital. Antonio Negri follows Marx to connect affect, labour and value and to explain that subjectivity is formed and continually validated in forms of social
communication and co-operation that constitute “a surplus of value that is prior, or at least irreducible, to the capitalist organization of labour, even if it is recuperated by it” (1999: 80). Negri points out “since value is outside of every measure (outside of both the ‘natural’ measure of use-value and monetary measure), the political economy of postmodernity looks for it in other terrains” (1999: 86). He claims “conventions of the market and communicative exchanges would thus be the places where the productive nexuses (and thus the affective flows) are established – outside of measure, certainly, but susceptible to biopolitical control” (1999: 86). As Negri explains, capital now recognizes that affect is fundamentally productive, that “value is formed in the relation of affect” and that “value is now an investment of desire” (1999: 87, emphasis in original). Marx used the term ‘variable capital’ to describe both the labour power that is activated and articulated by capital and the co-operative, affective labour power of everyday social interaction which is not imposed or directed from the outside but which is also productive. In what Negri describes as “a real and proper conceptual revolution,” political economy includes domination of the affective value of social relations and of the terrain marked out by the production of subjectivity or by “productive subjectivity” (1999: 87). Although affective value is contained within what Negri describes as “immeasurable productive reality,” neoliberal modes of governmentality aim to bring affect-value under control by superimposing market imperatives over all expressions of productive subjectivity thus creating “new figures of valorization” and “new figures of exploitation” (1999: 86).

It is those acts of communication that work to create a social bond, a shared experience and a common world that are channelled and managed in a post-industrial, informational society as a source of surplus value. Arvidsson sees the appropriation of affective value as a capitalist response to the conditions of post-modernity whereby understandings of identity and community are splintered, mobile and transitory and where media culture plays an increasing role in the production of the social (2005: 252). Arvidsson points out

130 Marx spoke of labour-power and “variable capital” in terms of a mixture of independence and subjectivity whereby independence was enunciated in “small-scale circulation” (family economy, tradition of gifts etc), in systems of “workers co-operation” and in the set of “historical and moral values” that was continually renewed as needs and desires by the collective movement of the proletariat and produced by its struggles (cited in Negri, 1999: 80). The idea that independence is enunciated in social interaction and that the collective is produced by its struggles echoes Ferguson’s notion of effective civil society as “the agitations of a free people” (1966: 61) and Foucault’s concept of freedom as “permanent provocation” (1982: 790).

131 James Hay cites Raymond Williams to point out that “any theory of communication is a theory of community” and that Williams’ emphasis on “the development of technologies for overcoming and
that since the 1980s the development of electronic media and the emergence of a “highly diversified media environment” has enabled market research techniques to programme deeper and tighter relations between consumers and goods or brands and that, rather than just connote style or image, brands can now elicit consumer attention and loyalty by anticipating things like “emotion,” “community” or “reassurance” (2006: 62-63). The previous Chapter highlighted those processes of self-branding that can seemingly satisfy desire for a sense of identity, stability and connectedness, but it also pointed out how self-branding transforms the whole process of identity production to a commercial venture and how the affective dimensions of identity production are distorted and subsumed as a source of surplus value. Branding is a core activity of capitalism, not only because brands have become “an omnipresent tool” for constructing identity, social relations and a common social world, but also because brand management involves manipulating “a productive process which is external to the brand-owning organization, and which cannot be controlled in its entirety” (2006: 3 and 7). That is to say, the brand follows neoliberal capitalist logic by infiltrating every context of existence to appropriate and subsume the most fundamental desire and capacity in social interaction, the ability to produce a common.

Brand value is now inextricably linked with socially-productive labour and with the extent to which the brand can become a marker of identity and a symbol of the desires, hopes and aspirations of individuals in their everyday life. Brand value is built on a productive process that is external to the brand-owning organization and, as Negri points out, socially-productive labour is in effect “in a non-place in respect to capital” and beyond its direct command (cited in Arvidsson, 2006: 130). However, brand management overcomes this problem by making sure that brands evolve with the activity of the social so that the qualities they represent are always compatible, and it is this compatibility that comprises the source of a brand’s use-value, for consumers and corporations alike (2006: 130-131). In the context of post-industrial, informational capitalism, brand value is built on affective investment and through immaterial forms of interactive communication. Brand value emerges when people construct and transform their own subjectivity to match the logic of

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managing the extensiveness of Modern forms of community makes his work consonant with Foucault’s writing about governmentality” (2003: 201). Hay also notes, “Williams’ inclination to describe television as communication and to emphasize the relation between communication and community implies that television is a ‘cultural technology’ – a technology that came to matter in defining, shaping, and managing community/culture” (2003: 201).
the brand or, in other words, when interactive communicative processes co-determine (that is, qualify, limit and link) subject values and brand values.

Media culture provides a platform for the cultivation and proliferation of brand values. By linking brand values with specifically targeted audience clusters, media culture constructs imagined communities that work to increase brand awareness and that imply a shared social world which is, of course, media-generated but which nonetheless produces the affect-value that brands appropriate for profit. Where Fordist-style consumerism utilized advertising and branding to promote and market the meanings that consumers valued, post-Fordist consumerism insists that the meanings consumers value are actually identified through and invested in brands. This is well exemplified in television advertisements that link a product with a notion of national identity and use images of rural traditions and genial, down-to-earth characters to conjure a sense of affective connection and shared values. Stephen Turner identifies a 1999 award-winning Toyota Hilux advertisement as a case in point. He explains how the meaning of the advert “turns on the word ‘bugger’, uttered by a string of local characters, including the farm-sheepdog, in response to accidents caused by the surprising power of the new Toyota Hilux” (2004: 94). As Turner notes, such an advert “depends on settler history, or more specifically, the good keen man, his travails, endurance, honesty, humour, homeliness” and it is these values and meanings that resonate with viewers and that become affectively associated with the vehicle itself (2004: 94). The most successful advertisements “superimpose or supplant existing popular memory with a memory of adverts, so that the world of advertising itself becomes the stuff of folk memory, a common language (‘bugger’) and cultural literacy that defines what is actually common” (2004: 95). Turner points out that the relation of the Toyota Hilux advert to other advertisements “is crucial to its success, its resonance” and names Mainland Cheese, Vogels Bread and Speights beer as notable examples (2004: 94). I would add that such advertisements also interact with television programmes like Hyundai Country Calendar, Annabel Langbein the Free Range Cook and Hunting Aotearoa to entrench a particular representation of national identity.132

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132 Hyundai Country Calendar screens on TV1, Saturday, 7.00 pm, Annabel Langbein the Free Range Cook screens on TV1, Saturday, 7.00 pm and Hunting Aotearoa screens on Māori Television, Thursday, 9.30 pm.
Mainland Cheese: Linking Corporate Brand with National Identity

The development of the Mainland Cheese brand in Aotearoa New Zealand exemplifies the transition from the marketing of commodities for their utility or as status symbols to the marketing of commodities as meaningful and as a life-enhancing experience (Žižek, 2009: 52). During the 1980s, Mainland extended its product range and increased sales and profitability by launching an intensive marketing campaign that played on its locally-owned-and-operated tradition to link cheese production with New Zealand identity and especially with affective ideas of belonging, links with the land, continuity and community.

![Mainland Cheese, Cheesemakers, 2005](image)

Figure 11 Mainland Cheese, Cheesemakers, 2005

Its enduring television marketing campaign continues to conjure the notion that Mainland cheese symbolizes a bygone era when quality mattered and life was slower. Its brand value is built around the slogan ‘good things take time’. The advertisements orchestrate affective ties to country, to the majestic scenery of the south island of Aotearoa New Zealand (which is known colloquially as the ‘mainland’), and enact a lifetime friendship between

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133 Mainland Products Ltd was founded in 1955 by Peter McConnon and acquired by Fonterra in 2002. According to the Fonterra website, Mainland is a premium brand, symbolizing “craftsmanship and quality”. Its products include speciality cheeses, butter and spreads, and more recently, a range of snack options which are now available in Australia and parts of Asia as well as Aotearoa New Zealand (Mainland, 2012).

134 This image is retrieved from “Mainland Cheese Cheesemakers on TV, The Inspiration Room” website, 2005, Mainland Cheese Cheesemakers on TV, [online] Available at: [http://theinspirationroom.com/daily/2005/mainland-cheese/](http://theinspirationroom.com/daily/2005/mainland-cheese/) [Accessed 04.03.09].
two old men to link place and product with congeniality, loyalty and tradition. As an article on the World Advertising Research Centre website explains, “with clear goals in mind, the ‘good things take time’ campaign sought to create a sense of attachment with its customers and overtake its main competitor, Anchor”. The article goes on to report that Mainland not only became market leader and “increased awareness by 71%” but was also awarded the Communication Agencies Association of New Zealand, Grand Prix, Advertising Effectiveness Award, 2004.

Mainland were among the first corporations in Aotearoa New Zealand to link their product brand with the concept of ecology and environmental awareness, and in 1989 they enhanced the nature-loving, pastoral connotations of their television marketing campaign by endorsing efforts to save the endangered yellow-eyed penguin, and by becoming the major sponsor of the Yellow-eyed Penguin Trust. A ‘barcode redemption scheme’ was set in place whereby package barcodes bearing Yellow-eyed Penguin Trust logo could be returned to Mainland to be redeemed as donations to the Trust. In other words, Mainland customers must not only buy Mainland cheese to participate in this fund-raising

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135 Mainland Cheese television advertisements (NZads, 2007).

136 This information was accessed online (Warc.com, 2011 and The Inspiration Room, 2005).

137 This image is retrieved from the Yellow-eyed Penguin Trust’s website [online] Available at: http://yellow-eyedpenguin.org.nz/get-involved/trust-supporters [Accessed 28.07.10].

138 The Yellow-eyed Penguin Trust website announces that “through the barcode redemption scheme, Mainland has donated more than $1 million to the Trust” and that “thanks to Mainland, the Yellow-eyed penguin has found its way into the homes, hearts and minds of all New Zealanders” (Yellow-Eyed Penguin Trust, 2003-2011).

139 A cheese wrapper dated ‘Best before 12.07.09E’ carries the following instructions: ‘Save the Yellow-Eyed Penguin: Help Mainland raise $50,000 to save the Yellow-eyed Penguin. Clip the barcode from this pack and attach it to your yellow-eyed Penguin chart. Please call 0800 CHEESE for your wall chart. When the chart is full send it to Mainland Products Ltd, PO Box 397, Dunedin. For every full chart, Mainland donates $10 to the Yellow-eyed Penguin Trust up to a maximum of $50,000 per year.’
venture but they must also demonstrate special commitment to the Trust’s work by applying for a wall chart, before completing the chart and then posting the barcode/label collection to Mainland. In light of the fact that every wall chart redemption represents not only an affective commitment to help save the yellow-eyed Penguin but also multiple Mainland cheese sales, it may be more pertinent to invert the Trust’s claim that, “thanks to Mainland, the yellow-eyed penguin has found its way into the homes, hearts and minds of all New Zealanders,” and claim instead that, thanks to the Yellow-eyed penguin, the Mainland brand has found its way into the homes, hearts and minds of all New Zealanders!

The Mainland Cheese brand targets the affect-value immanent in environmental matters, and more specifically, affective connection to the plight of the yellow-eyed Penguin, and enhances its brand value by linking its objectives with those of the Yellow-eyed Penguin Trust. By sponsoring this Trust, the Mainland brand can access and capture the very important affective aspects of immaterial labour (aesthetic, emotional and social) which create shared meaning, sociality and “ethical surplus” (Arvidsson et al, 2008a: 11).

Arvidsson et al cite Lazzarato (1997) to define “ethical surplus” as “a social relation, a value, an affective intensity that was not there before” (2008a: 11). They explain that rather than being co-ordinated by bureaucratic hierarchies or driven by monetary obligations, ethical surplus is the product of affective affinity and is primarily motivated by the desire to accumulate respect and recognition within a chosen community (2008a: 11). However, they also explain that this use of ‘ethical’ is not primarily about choosing between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ according to some pre-established moral framework but is more about finding ways in which free human beings, without any a priori obligations to each other, can find ways to construct a viable community (2008a: 11).

In today’s informational economy, therefore, the source of value is not primarily information, knowledge or talent but the social relations and forms of organization that make it possible to act coherently and flexibly on such knowledge for, as William Halal puts it, “information is meaningless if it is not guided by relationships, values and vision” (Halal, 1996: xxvi cited in Arvidsson et al, 2008a: 11). In other words, the source of value is often an “ethical thing,” “a community, a shared value,” and value is now based less on direct command over a productive process, and founded more on the ability to organize,

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140 As discussed earlier in this chapter, such a notion of viable community could be problematic in a consumerist society in which as Žižek (2009) claims, corporations like Starbucks construct ‘viable’ and ‘ethical’ communities but, in such cases, the desire of free human beings to accumulate respect and recognition only serves to mask and aggravate the inherent problems of a capitalist economy.
tap into and subsume this affective and independent production process, this “ethical economy” (Arvidsson et al., 2008a: 11 and 12). Furthermore, because “the ethical economy is emerging as a potentially hegemonic mode of production,” “ethical surplus” is now being recognized as “the primary source of value” (2008a: 11). Arvidsson et al point out, for example, that the people who participate in creating the enormous wealth of content that gives MySpace or YouTube their market values are not in it for the money but are there “to build networks, make friends, show off, be cool” (Arvidsson et al., 2008a: 10). As Arvidsson et al claim, companies have long recognized that the prime source of productivity is not what people get paid for but is, rather, people’s intangible ability to network, share knowledge and support each other; managers know that the best way to foster a good business environment is not through monetary incentives but through building a “corporate community” and a “corporate culture” with strong values and a strong sense of solidarity or commitment (2008a: 10). It is the recognition and respect gained through shared commitment that builds an ethical economy and produces ‘ethical surplus’ and it is this surplus value that is utilized and harnessed in Mainland’s symbiotic relationship with the Yellow-eyed Penguin Trust. Surplus value emerges here from two sources; first, from the increased circulation and consumption of goods (cheese), and second, from the immaterial production of an ‘ethical economy’ through social commitment to the Trust. The processes of identification and affective capture at play here demonstrate how the ‘ethical’ economy is now appropriated as a primary source of brand value.

However, this social turn to environmental concerns needs also to be considered in terms of governmentality and as an example of incremental shifts in technologies of truth, power and ethics that work continually to form and transform subjectivity. Rabinow and Rose call to mind the crucial links between “the play of truth, power and ethics in relation to the subject, and to the possibilities of a good, or as the Greeks would have it, a flourishing, life” (2006: 200). They claim that by paying attention “to peculiarities, to small differences, to the moments when shifts in truth, authority, spatiality or ethics make a difference for today as compared to yesterday we can observe how configurations or narrations of race, health, genealogy, reproduction and knowledge are intertwined, recombining and transforming one another” (2006: 205). The endeavour to preserve native flora and fauna marks incremental change in social values and contrasts markedly with British settler attitudes which once considered it ‘ethical’ and progressive to clear all
accessible land for agricultural (economic) purposes. It could be argued that this ‘ethical’
turn to environmental protection and sponsorship of the Yellow-eyed Penguin Trust is
inextricably linked with the emergence of eco-tourism, with a lucrative new economic
market, and with the narration of national identity as ‘clean,’ ‘green’ and ‘100% pure’ (see
Chapter Four). Furthermore, in what would seem to be ethical hypocrisy, the Mainland
Cheese brand (now part of the Fonterra Co-operative Group) is profiting from its
sponsorship of the Yellow-eyed Penguin Trust while hundreds of its dairy-farm suppliers
are polluting the country’s waterways on a daily basis.141 Ethics and values may be seen as external and detached from any economic considerations, but this example strengthens the
main claim of this Chapter that, under neoliberal modes of governmentality, the objectives
of a capitalist political economy and the ethics and values of civil society are more-or-less co-determined. When, as Bauman argues, the pursuit of individual happiness serves as a
consumerist society’s supreme ethical principle, social bonds and notions of community
tend to be non-binding and self-serving. In such circumstances, according to Bauman,
people still need to know that “one is not alone and that one’s own personal cravings are
shared by others,” and two sources of communalism emerge to fulfil this need for
belonging and craving for social approval (2001: 63). Both manifest in forms of authority,
the first as “the authority of experts, people ‘who know better,’” and the second as “the
authority of numbers” through which it is assumed the larger the numbers the less likely
they are to be wrong (2001: 63). Bauman (2001) characterizes the first authority as the
natural market for the counselling boom or what Nikolas Rose (1999b) refers to as forms
of etho-political, affect-laden communities that connect ethics with economic value (see later in this Chapter). The second form of authority “gives shape to the community of their dreams,” and is “a community of sameness – which, when projected on a wide screen of widely replicated/copied conduct, seems to endow the chosen individual identity with the solid foundations the choosers would not otherwise trust it to possess” (2001: 64).
Bauman’s descriptions of contemporary communalism encapsulate perfectly both the

141 In May 2003, a ‘Dairying and Clean Streams Accord’ between Fonterra Co-operative Group and
Government ministries aimed “to achieve clean healthy water, including streams, rivers, lakes, ground water
and wetlands, in dairying areas” and performance targets were set so that dairy cattle “be excluded from 50%
of streams, rivers and lakes by 2007, 90% by 2012” (Dairying and Clean Streams Accord, 2003). However,
in 2008, a Forest & Bird and Fish & Game Report found waterways in many areas to be more polluted than
they were five years ago when the voluntary Clean Streams Accord was set up and that “the Dairying and
Clean Streams Accord has not only failed to improve water quality but in some areas has allowed rivers and
streams to deteriorate further from continued dairy efflueence and nutrient run-off”. The Report concluded
that “the dairy industry is still not meeting its environmental responsibilities, which undermines the integrity
of its products” (Forest and Bird, 2008).
fundamental attractions of brand logic and the modes of media governmentality that promote and disseminate that logic for global capital. As Bauman puts it, “the need for aesthetic community generated by identity concerns is the favourite grazing ground of the entertainment industry: the vastness of the need goes a long way towards explaining that industry’s astonishing and continuing success” (2001: 66).

Aesthetic communities and brand identities may offer ethical purpose and social reassurance, but their production is always underpinned by the profit motive and a determination to create surplus value by mobilizing desire and manipulating affective affiliations. As Ebert and Zavarzadeh argue, alliances based on ethics are “a reification of individualism and individual desire(ing),” and “the spiritual – in short the values of freedom of the individual, freedom of enterprise, freedom of choice – is seen as exceeding all materialist explanations,” but turns out to be “just cover for the economic” (2008: 119 and 139). In effect, technologies of liberal subjectivity are motivated as much by the desire to belong as by the desire for wealth, and liberal social norms function to serve the totalizing and individualizing matrix of a capitalist political economy.

**Etho-Political Governmentality and ‘Ethical’ Community**

Affect offers potential for thinking in new ways about the deep interdependence of norms and motives, and the contingent processes of ethical subjectivity. In reviewing the ‘Third Way’ or the revival of social democracy in British politics in the 1990s, Nikolas Rose emphasizes the reiterative nature of liberal democracy and claims that the governmental techniques informing ‘Third Way’ policies are nothing more than minor modifications of the social liberalism that developed across the 20th century (1999a: 474). He heralds the recent turn to ecology and environmental issues when he describes ‘Third Way’ discourse as entirely familiar, except for the addition of a certain “therapeutic individualism” which plays into the trope of self-realization, and which expands “the ethic of collective responsibility to include nature as well as humankind” (1999a: 474). Rose explains that the nature of the social bond has moved beyond either “social” (Keynesian) or “rational” (neoliberal) forms of governance and, in a re-territorialization of subjectivity, human beings are now considered to be, first and foremost, “ethical creatures” whose behaviour can be made governable by acting upon this “ethical force-field” (1999a: 474). Rose’s
definition of the social bond in terms of an ‘ethical force-field’ reiterates Hardt’s contention that affective labour is the binding element in human interaction, and that affective labour “produces social networks, forms of community, biopower” (1999: 96). While Hardt and Rose both define ‘biopower’ in terms of the production of collective subjectivities, sociality and society itself, Rose invokes the term ‘etho-politics’ to describe those governmental technologies that seek to shape the social values, ethics, and affective connections produced by biopower (Hardt, 1999: 98 and Rose, 1999a: 477). What is at stake here is the intertwined connection between affective labour, ethical surplus, etho-politics, biopower and the modes of governmentality that align the language of community (totalizing strategies) with practices of the self (individualizing techniques) in the constitution and control of life itself. As Rose claims, it is the “language of community” that identifies “a territory between the authority of the state, the free and amoral exchange of the market and the liberty of the autonomous, ‘rights-bearing’ individual subject” (1999a: 475). And as Rose also contends, it is the language of etho-politics that inculcates individual subjects “in the self-techniques necessary for responsible self-government and the relations between one’s obligation to oneself and one’s obligations to others” (1999a: 478). Rose’s description of individualized etho-politics and of a totalizing language of community correlates with Bauman’s notion of ‘aesthetic community,’ and with his argument that such a community cannot and does not “weave between its adherents a web of ethical responsibilities, and so of long-term commitments” (2001: 71, emphasis in original). Aesthetic communities work to intercept and appropriate ethical surplus and so to divert and foreclose the forms of affective affiliation that would seek collective solutions to individual troubles.

Responses to the massive destruction caused by the series of earthquakes that hit Christchurch in 2010 and 2011 provide a case in point. James Dann (2012) writes that in the wake of this destructive and complex event thousands of students joined the Student Volunteer Army (SVA) and combined with volunteers from the Federated Farmers and Christchurch City Council’s Farmy Army to coordinate silt removal from private properties and schools. The volunteers worked clearing streets, yards and garages of the mud and silt which inundated eastern suburbs during the earthquakes). Approximately ten thousand students joined the SVA via the social networking site Facebook and included students from Canterbury University, Lincoln University and the University of Otago. This mass student response demonstrates how, in the face of such adversity, forces of
affective biopower can generate ethical surplus, construct a common and provide a collective solution to individual troubles. It also demonstrates how people can be mobilized to work and cooperate for collective gain outside and beyond the business or capitalist structures that dominate neoliberal society. Dann contrasts the work of these students with the priorities of Prime Minister John Key’s government. He describes the renovation of Rugby League Park in Addington as one main priority, and explains it will become the new home for the Crusaders rugby team, Christchurch Stadium. Dann (2012) writes, “The government has put up some of the money for the stadium, and despite the budget blowing out by $5 million dollars, they are doing all they can to have the park open for Todd Blackadder and his boys”. Another priority for Key’s government, according to Dann (2012), is the Re:Start container mall, clustered around the Ballantynes store in Cashel Mall, “the department store which defines Christchurch – or at least, part of Christchurch. It is a store for people who aspire to own Le Creuset kitchenware and Polo shirts by Ralph Lauren”. Dann (2012) also notes, “The other stores in Re-Start also pander to the high-end of the market; Apple computers, designer women’s fashion, faux-kitsch nicknacks from stores such as Toi Toi; it’s our very slice of Newmarket in the middle of our desolate CBD”. Dann makes the point that Prime Minister Key is quick to enhance his media image and be photographed inspecting the work at the stadium and opening the Re-Start Mall. In contrast, “he was nowhere to be seen when the bulldozers began their death-march into Bexley and the eastern suburbs last month. 6,500 houses to go – the population of a small town like Oamaru or Feilding, just rubbed off the map. Surely one of the most significant events in the history of not just the city, but the whole country, and yet the Prime Minister is more concerned with retail and rucks, a modern-day bread and circuses” (Dann, 2012). Key’s priorities revolve around the (re)production of aesthetic communities in forms of entertainment, symbolic spectacle and consumerism and relate primarily to restoring a brand image. This neoliberal discourse of community effectively diverts and forecloses the forces of affective biopower that forged the student volunteer army and that could reaffirm what Bauman describes as, “the right of every member to communal insurance against the errors and misadventures which are the risks inseparable from individual life” (2001: 73).

A neoliberal discourse narrates community and ethical subjectivity by linking affective potential and sociality with economic values, thereby re-inventing and intensifying the matrix of individualization that underpins and legitimizes the liberal democratic state. It is
ironic that while current neoliberal governments promote individualism and claim to uphold the rights and freedom of autonomous citizens, strategies of governance encroach more and more into citizens’ private lives. In Chapter Two, I examined reality TV programmes that utilize a confessional discourse to make the scrutiny and evaluation of the private life of individuals, especially women, an effective instrument of social control as well as a highly lucrative aspect of the media industry. Reality TV functions by making private lives available for public consumption and epitomizes, therefore, new modes of governmentality that underpin and normalize a society in which every aspect of private life is increasingly under surveillance. Programmes like *Police Ten 7*, for example, function not only to accustom viewers to continuous social surveillance but also to monitor behaviour by including the viewer in a discourse of community that separates viewers from potential ‘criminals’ who may disrupt it. Like many similar factually-based programmes, *Police Ten 7* has to reduce complex relationships between state, criminality and the viewing public to what Jonathan Bignell describes as “smaller-scale personalized relationships” (2005: 141). He makes the point that although “television is a mass medium, broadcast to a collective audience, the viewer is addressed as an individual,” and “it is individual action which is requested from the viewer” (2005: 141). During *Police Ten 7*, individual viewers are asked to remember the faces and names of those highlighted and to contact the police if and when they see them. They are also prompted to watch for stolen vehicles and asked to take a note of the licence plate number, for example. In other words, individual viewers are encouraged to participate in the surveillance and policing process. Bignell also makes the point that programmes like *Police Ten 7* focus on apprehending individual offenders because that form of confrontation has “emotional and dramatizable effects on their individual victims” and so fits well with the reality television genre (2005: 141). According to Bignell, Reality TV’s focus on a narrative of individual experience “militates against representing ‘white collar’ crimes (like fraud or embezzlement)” and leaves institutional crime relatively invisible (2005: 141). As a result, the ‘reality’ of crime for programmes like *Police Ten 7* is that it is committed by “a small group of deviant outsiders against certain unfortunate individuals,” while determinant social factors (like social class, economic position, and ideologies of gender or race) remain beyond purview (2005: 141). For example, in one episode of *Police Ten 7*, a woman is driven home after being found drunk in a public place; she tells the police she is unemployed (when the policeman asks her, “What do you do for a job?” she replies, “Nothing; drink”). In the same episode, another woman is interviewed for allegedly stealing from a supermarket and
for driving an unregistered, unwarranted car (she had recently been released from prison). No further action was taken in the first case and, in the second, although the woman claimed she had receipts for all the goods in her car, the Countdown supermarket issued a trespass notice against her. They had no proof of theft but, as the policeman explained, they exercised their discretionary right to refuse right-of-entry to a customer. The vehicle was not stolen and the woman was free to go after being fined for the car’s out-of-date registration and warrant of fitness. In both these cases, “the image of the idle poor” is overlaid with the threat of criminality and, as Bauman argues, to link poverty with criminality not only situates the poor as outright enemies of society but also “helps to banish the poor from the universe of moral obligations” (2005: 82).

Reality TV programmes like Police Ten 7 give the impression of providing an ‘ethical’ public service but, as Bignell argues, they serve to “reinforce marginalization, to deprive those perceived as deviant people of the opportunity to explain and provide context for their actions and to remove their actions from larger social and political contexts” (2005: 135). Police Ten 7 is in its tenth year on-air (screens Thursday, 7.30 pm, TV2) and is described on TVNZ’s website as a “home-grown crime-fighting series,” and as the first of its kind to feature a “behind-the-scenes glimpse into the real working lives of New Zealand police, while also giving viewers the opportunity to take an active role in solving serious crime”. The website also states that 2010 saw “a record number of arrests,” thanks to help from viewers’ calls to the 0800 number and there is a direct link from Police Ten 7 home page to the NZ Police website, a link which not only facilitates “help from viewers” but also serves to demonstrate how self-surveillance is encouraged and normalized. The NZ Police website features the caption “Safer Communities Together” thereby implying that those who participate in the Police Ten 7 programme and take an “active role in solving crime,” are building the bonds of an ‘ethical’ community, while those who are under police surveillance or refuse to participate are automatically excluded. The reference to “safer communities” plays on the feelings of insecurity and anxiety that are endemic in a neoliberal world of deregulation, flexibility, competitiveness and uncertainty. The ‘community’ as played out through the NZ Police website does not bind people together but instead aggravates existing social divisions and, as Bauman claims, tends to evaporate just when community bonds should “compensate for the individual’s lack of resourcefulness or impotence” (2001: 71). In summary, what was private becomes public and what could be a matter for social concern and collective responsibility becomes a
source of individualized entertainment; Reality TV, in that sense, operates effectively to augment hegemonic systems of surveillance and social containment.

In contemporary forms of communalism, as Bauman sees it, individuals are being called upon “to seek biographical solutions to systemic contradictions” and to interpret insecurity as “a private problem” and “an outcome of personal failings” (2001: 144). He argues that it is precisely “this falling back on our individual wits and resources that injects the world with the insecurity we wish to escape” (2001: 144). Nikolas Rose concurs, arguing not only that the language of community and etho-politics reduces social problems to personal problems but also that “ethical practices increasingly take the body as a key site for work on the self” (2001: 18). As Rose explains:

> From official discourses of health promotion through narratives of the experience of disease and suffering in the mass media, to popular discourses on dieting and exercise, we see an increasing stress on personal reconstruction through acting on the body in the name of a fitness that is simultaneously corporeal and psychological (2001: 18).

For Rose, official and popular discourses converge to render all aspects of human vitality visible and to articulate values about who we are, what we must do and what we can hope for through the trope of “biological citizenship,” and according to “the politics of life itself” (2001: 18-21). The prerogatives of ‘good government’ espouse and promote community values, while simultaneously upholding individualism as social norm and disavowing any governmental responsibility or accountability for socio-economic outcomes. The neoliberal turn to discourses of ‘community’ implies a desire to overcome individualism and difference and to produce social wholeness and mutual identification but, as J. K. Gibson-Graham point out, “at the centre of these community economies is a commonality of being, an ideal of sameness” where economic difference is not only suppressed but “any ethic of being-in-common, of co-existence with the other, is relegated to a remnant” (2006: 85-86, emphasis in original). Gibson-Graham invoke Marx and Jean Luc Nancy to argue that there are different ways of “being-with” and to point to what, for them, is “a truly salient distinction between whether interdependence is recognized and acted upon or whether it is obscured or perhaps denied” (2006: 84). Gibson-Graham

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142 Gibson-Graham is the pen name of Katherine Gibson and Julie Graham. They note in the preface to their book, “Our own interdependence as the collective author J. K. Gibson-Graham gives us the fortitude (foolhardiness?) to address such monumental issues and the embodied insights into processes of self-cultivation that might equip us to become ethical subjects of a postcapitalist order” (2006: x).
explain that the hallmark of capitalism “is the denial of its basis in an exploitative form of interdependence in which non-producers appropriate surplus from direct producers” and compare economic being-in-common with current discourses of community which may practice forms of social connection but which also hide or attenuate aspects of economic interdependence (2006: 84). They cite Tom Morton, from the Sydney Morning Herald, who claims “community has become a cult, an object of warm-and-fuzzy ritual worship … a panacea for reducing crime, stopping youth suicide, getting the unemployed back to work and improving your health” (2000: 1, cited in Gibson-Graham, 2006: 84-85). Morton reiterates points made earlier when he argues that the “C-word is the camouflage behind which government has conducted a massive withdrawal from society … while at the same time promoting conservative, moralistic ‘community values’ that endorse greater public involvement in citizens’ private lives” (cited in Gibson-Graham, 2006: 85). These communities form across neighbourhoods, networks, subcultures, age groups, ethnicities and life-style sectors and, as Rose points out, seek to foreclose any problematic economic or ethical issues by proffering values and moral codes that “purport to be timeless, natural, obvious and uncontestable” (2000: 1398 and 1409). For Rose ‘community’ is a moral field binding persons into durable relations:

[Community] is a space of emotional relationships through which individual identities are constructed through their bonds to micro-cultures of values and meanings (1999b: 172, emphasis in original).

Rose cites Etzioni to define community by two characteristics; first, “a web of affect-laden relationships among a group of individuals, relationships that often crisscross and reinforce one another … and second, a measure of commitment to a set of shared values, norms, and meanings, and a shared history and identity – in short, to a particular culture” (1999b: 172). Rose uses the term “ethopolitics” to describe a new “politics of behaviour” or set of governmental strategies that seek to intensify and redirect the feelings of “shame, guilt, responsibility, obligation, trust, honour and duty” that bind individuals into such groupings and relations (2000: 1399). Etho-political modes of governmentality work through a language of ‘community’ to constitute and constrain an ethical subject whose political awareness is reduced to notions of personal and cultural identity, lifestyle choice and environmental sustainability.

Etho-political governmentality engages individuals in a process of self-government whereby their values and moral beliefs are moulded to fit a normalizing agenda, and
technologies of pastoral power revitalize a matrix of individualization. As discussed in Chapter Two, pastoral power requires individuals to internalize various ideals and norms so that they both regard an external body as concerned with their good and strive to regulate themselves in accord with the dictates of that external body. Rose, however, identifies different ‘logics of control’ at play in contemporary bio-medical contexts because in this context there is no priest-like authority endeavouring to encapsulate and protect a flock (2001: 9). Rather, this new form of pastoral power is “relational” and “works through the relation between the affects and ethics of the guider” and “the affects and ethics of the guided” (2001: 9, emphasis in original). Rose is referring here to new relations of power that involve neither subordination nor coercion but utilize techniques of governmentality that regulate by means of, rather than in spite of, notions of individual autonomy and personal responsibility. This relationship involves a kind of “discipleship” which connects expert and client through a “hierarchy of wisdom,” held in place by the “wish for truth and certainty,” and offers the disciple “the promise of self-understanding and self-improvement” (1996: 93). Both the experts who claim authority and those who consult them see an ethical-therapeutic understanding of the vitality of ‘self’ as their personal responsibility and their life’s work.

As Rose explains, these encounters entail “intense bi-directional affective entanglements between all the parties to the encounter,” and that in these entanglements “the ethical relations of all the subjects to themselves and to one another are at stake – including the experts themselves” (2001: 10). Rose’s work highlights those inter-relational forms of power whereby affective potential and sociality are utilized to foster ‘community’ and build ethical subjectivity but, as he also explains, while “new pastors of the soma” espouse the ethical principles of informed consent, autonomy, voluntary action and choice, and non-directiveness, they also always imply a bio-economic search for “bio-value” and a desire to extract “the production of a surplus out of vitality itself” (2001: 9 and15). Rose links the notion of human capital with the intertwining of economic and ethical concerns and invokes the term “somatic ethic” to refer to ways people understand, fashion, and manage themselves in the everyday conduct of their lives (2008: 48). He believes people now measure their quality of life and monitor their self-esteem in terms of their health and vitality, and that they judge and act upon their “soma” not only to make themselves physically better but also to make themselves better human beings (2008: 46). The conduct of individualized subjects is co-ordinated through concepts of ethical community which
utilize indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals while at the same time avoiding being responsible for them. Diverse formulations of ‘community’ such as the Mainland Cheese, Yellow-eyed Penguin Trust community and the Police Ten 7 surveillance community, intersect and operate under economic imperatives on a global scale to govern the relations of subjects to themselves, to one another and to the neoliberal state.

**Health, Fitness and the Les Mills Community**

The Les Mills World of Fitness is a New Zealand enterprise which franchises ten clubs nationwide and which is also a major provider of choreographed exercise-to-music group fitness classes internationally. The Les Mills Dunedin website declares as its mission: “to make a major difference in the lives of New Zealanders by dramatically improving their fitness, health and happiness” (Les Mills, 2007). The ethos of the Les Mills World Gym enterprise is also well-expressed in the book called *Fighting Globesity* which is written by the owners, Phillip and Jackie Mills, and which claims to be “a practical guide to personal health and global sustainability”.

![Fighting Globesity](image)

*Figure 13 Fighting Globesity, P. and J. Mills, Book cover, 2007*

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143 There are currently ten Les Mills World of Fitness gyms in Aotearoa New Zealand with over 40,000 members in total. A survey conducted by SPARC (Sport and Recreation New Zealand) in 2007/08 reported that nearly 12% of adults were members of a gym or fitness centre, that nearly 30% of adults used equipment-based exercise (at home or at the gym) and that, for women, aerobics is now in the top ten choices for sport or recreation activities scoring higher participation rates than netball (SPARC (Sport and Recreation New Zealand), 2011).

144 This image is retrieved from the cover of *Fighting Globesity* by Philip and Jackie Mills, 2007, design by Nic Hall and gettyimages (2007: 4).
Phillip and Jackie Mills say they coined the word ‘globesity’ to “describe the relationship that currently operates between personal fitness, national health systems and global sustainability” (2007: 9). This description of an already-existing relationship between individuals, state institutions and global issues exemplify Foucault’s description of individualized governmentality and especially of the forms of pastoral power that invite individuals to internalize particular ideals and strive to regulate themselves and to regard an external body, Les Mills World of Fitness, as concerned with their good. The authors claim that if readers can learn to appreciate the important inter-relationships encapsulated in the term ‘globesity’ they will be “empowered and motivated to take some simple actions, essential actions, that will dramatically improve your life and make a powerful contribution to the health of our planet” (2007: 9, emphasis in original). This call to action is not only guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome but also linking ‘salvation’ with secular objectives like health, well-being and quality of life and, most importantly, forming ‘community’ through a call to ethical conduct or, as Rose puts it, a “somatic ethic” (2008: 46). For example, on a full-page illustration of people exercising together, the caption reads, “People whose deep emotional needs are fulfilled through exercising together experience a lesser need to replace that fulfilment with overconsumption and material acquisition” (2007: 96-97).

There are parallels to be drawn here between the marketing of the Mainland Cheese brand through an ethical call to support ecological conservation and the marketing of the Les Mills brand through an ethical call to address ‘globesity.’ Both exemplars adopt ethopolitical modes of governmentality, and both seek to appropriate the ethical surplus generated as changing values and beliefs impact everyday choices and alter the practice of everyday life. Earlier in this Chapter, I referred to Žižek (2009) and discussed his take on the Starbucks “coffee ethic” which, like Mainland’s ‘Save the Penguin’ campaign and the Les Mills ‘globesity’ movement, offers the opportunity for fulfilling a whole range of ethical duties and experiencing a sense of community in the process of making consumerist lifestyle choices. For Žižek, consumption is no longer “the time of alienation” but is, instead, “the time of the authentic fulfilment of my true Self, of the sensuous play of experience, and of caring for others, through becoming involved in charity or ecology etc” (2009: 53). It is through this transformation of consumption that, as Žižek claims, “capitalism is transformed and legitimized as an egalitarian project: accentuating auto-
poetic interaction and spontaneous self-organization” (2009: 52). Capitalism aims to present an image of egalitarian enterprise but there is a contradiction at work here as is well exemplified by the Mainland campaign which raises funds from consumers of dairy products to save coastal environment of the yellow-eyed penguin while the producers of dairy products (Mainland’s parent company, Fonterra) are simultaneously causing pollution and widespread environmental degradation (see note 136). Starbucks, Mainland and Les Mills all represent emerging forms of capitalist enterprise which link individual consumers with global issues and environmental and ecological discourses in order to generate and exploit potential affective investment and benefit from brand associations.

The language of ‘global’ community promises a new form of ethical conduct based upon etho-political ideas that link ‘value-affect’ with ‘ethical surplus’ and with a notion of community or social bond. In the case of Les Mills, the language of community also works to link leisure and recreation with economic resource and profit, and blurs any conceptual boundary between private and public, or social and commercial enterprise. The evolution and expansion of Les Mills’ gyms over the last thirty or forty years in both local and global capacities needs, therefore, to be situated in a wider socio-political context.145 Until the 1970s, gyms reflected a patriarchal society in which male sports dominated and gyms trained a small number of men for competitive body-building or sports like rugby, cricket and boxing. Sports teams were generally organized through clubs and managed and coached by volunteers on a social basis with minimal government intervention. In his review of politics, government and sport in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Chris Collins points out that government involvement in sport has been motivated by many different factors, “such as ensuring public order, and promoting matters such as fitness, health, values consistent with ‘good’ citizenship, national identity and economic productivity”(2007: 226). He also points to a marked change in attitudes since the early 1980s explaining that where once any government interference in sport was hotly debated and was a highly contentious issue, nowadays government involvement is both expected and desired and, furthermore, in line with neoliberal policy, business values such as strategic planning, profitability, investment, return on investment and accountability now dominate and determine sports policy (2007: 227). Michael Sam cites the 1985 creation of the market-

145 See international website for more information on the history and scope of Les Mills’ global gyms and especially on the Les Mills global ‘community’ where “you can create your own space and enjoy the online company of other Les Mills™ followers worldwide” (Les Mills International Ltd, 2011).
oriented organization, Sportscorp, and its transformation in 1992 to a Crown Agency named the Hillary Commission for Sport, Fitness and Physical Leisure as evidence that sport has not been immune from a neoliberal environment and now reflects a societal trend where all organizations are re-invented to follow a corporate model and where efficiency, competitiveness and leadership are fostered as ultimate ideals (2003: 194-195). While Sam agrees that sport policy is shaped by the dominant ideas of a neoliberal political economy, he also points out that other interest groups like athletes, educators, sports administrators and physical fitness experts play an important interactive role in everyday decisions and practice, and though none could be said “to ascribe to any single determinable ideology” they do tend to “adhere to particular dominant ideas about sport, within wider ideological undercurrents” (2003: 192). In other words, as Sam puts it, sports policy ideas in Aotearoa/New Zealand “display a complex array of considerations” and, as such, “are social constructions, strategically portrayed for the purposes of persuasion” (2003: 193).

Sports governance in Aotearoa/New Zealand provides a fine exemplar of those power relations that, as Foucault points out, are “elaborated, transformed, organized” within a society and cannot be reduced to the study of a series of institutions, “not even to the study of all those institutions which would merit the name ‘political’” but are “rooted in the system of social networks” (1982: 792-793).

The complex considerations and multifarious relations of power at work in the government of sport include the emergence and development of Les Mills’ gyms. As with all aspects of contemporary society, the local and the global are intertwined and the evolution and success of this business venture began in the United States of America with the invention of aerobics. Dr Kenneth H Cooper coined the term ‘aerobics’ to describe a revolutionary fitness programme using running, walking, swimming and bicycling which he promoted through his 1968 bestseller, *Aerobics*. During the next two decades, aerobic dance and exercise spread throughout the world and the numbers of participants in the United States grew from an estimated 6 million in 1978 to 22 million in 1987. Cooper is said to have helped change the social norm around exercise and to make preventive health measures accessible not only to athletes but to everyone. While Cooper was surprised by the phenomenal success of his book, it was published at a time when Americans were starting to face the ill effects of a sedentary middle-class lifestyle made possible by growing
affluence and the many comforts that technology provided. Phillip Mills recognized the commercial potential of the aerobic movement while he was on a track scholarship to UCLA in California in the late 1970s, describing it as “the beginning of a global revolution in the way that people, especially women, exercised,” and proceeded to travel “throughout New Zealand and Australia, publicizing aerobics, training instructors and opening fitness clubs” (2007: 21). It could be said, therefore, that the aerobics phenomenon, especially as an exercise routine for women, emerged as an unexpected outcome of scientific or medical research and that the Les Mills franchise is built on the entrepreneurial appropriation of American innovation. Les Mills’ gyms grew exponentially throughout the 1970s and 1980s in line with a world-wide growth in aerobic fitness training, and Phillip Mills also elaborated and transformed the aerobics concept by inventing BodyPump® (weight-lifting fitness training) and BodyBalance® (yoga and pilates in stretch-class format). The uptake of aerobic fitness training and the subsequent patenting of BodyPump® and BodyBalance® brands by Les Mills’ Gyms not only demonstrate how research and technology influence social outcomes but also how concepts are re-articulated within local contexts before being (re)turned to global contexts and global markets. It also demonstrates, more importantly, how brands capitalize on socially-derived affect-value and ethical surplus to increase market-share and profitability.

Sport and leisure activities are expressions of previously untapped immaterial and productive subjectivity and neoliberal modes of governmentality work through public-private partnerships to re-position sport and leisure activities as sources of surplus-value. As Negri claims, affective value concerns an “immeasurable productive reality,” and neoliberal government seeks to align everyday activities like leisure, sport and travel (tourism) with market imperatives thereby gaining access to society’s “immeasurable productive reality” (1999: 86). Such a biopolitical discourse links ethical subjectivity with personal responsibility and connects the health and well-being of one’s body with a wider

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146 Dr Kenneth H Cooper, a physician at the San Antonio Air Force Hospital in Texas, originally devised ‘aerobics’ as a form of exercise for astronauts who were being carefully monitored for pulse rate and oxygen consumption – all information sourced from his official website (Cooper Aerobics, 2009).

147 Since the mid-90s Les Mills World of Fitness gyms have “become known throughout the industry as the home of BodyPump® and other branded Les Mills classes that are licensed by more than 11,000 gyms around the world” and “70,000 instructors now teach BodyPump® and other branded Les Mills programmes, and every week more than five million people do a Les Mills class in 73 countries around the world” (2007: 20-21). In 2004, Phillip Mills was named Aotearoa New Zealand’s Ernst & Young Entrepreneur of the Year (2007: 21).
neoliberal political economy. Bourdieu believes a particular sport is more likely to be adopted by a social class if it does not contradict that class’s relation to the body at its deepest and most unconscious level, that is, in terms of “the body schema, which is the depository of a whole world view and a whole philosophy of the person and the body” (1984: 218). He claims a history of the sporting practices of the fractions of the dominant class can shed light on the evolution of its ethical dispositions and bring to light “the deep-rooted, unconscious conception of the relationship between the sexual division of labour and the division of the work of domination” (1984: 218). Bourdieu adds that this is perhaps truer than ever “now that the gentle, invisible education by exercise and diet which is appropriate to the new morality of health is tending to take the place of the explicitly ethical pedagogy of the past in shaping bodies and minds” (1984: 219). Bourdieu calls to mind Foucault’s notion of new forms of pastoral power and Rose’s reference to ‘pastors of the soma’ when he claims that current cults of personal health and psychological therapy are “perfectly consistent with the more or less secularized forms of the search for religious salvation” (1984: 367). As Bourdieu explains, this cult is at the opposite pole from the “ politicization” which depersonalized personal experiences by “presenting them as particular cases of generic experiences common to a class” (1984: 367). He argues that the new psychological relation to the body is inseparable from an exaltation of the self, “but a self which truly fulfils itself (‘growth,’ ‘awareness,’ ‘responsiveness’) only when ‘relating’ to others (‘sharing experiences’) through the intermediary of the body treated as a sign and not as an instrument (which opens the door to a whole politics of the ‘alienated body’)” (1984: 368). When Bourdieu claims “such are the intentions which lie behind exercise of ‘bodily expression’, a sort of painless delivery of one’s own body,” he captures exactly the processes of self-branding and the utilization of the body as human capital that characterize the ‘alienated body’ in a neoliberal society (1984: 368).

Bio-medical knowledge is one of the most powerful discourses in contemporary society and Rose’s term “somatic ethics” locates the body as the central object of study in

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148 Bourdieu makes an explicit example of rugby, pointing out that it combines the popular features of a ball-game with a battle, involving the body itself, and has affinities with “popular dispositions” like the cult of manliness, the taste for a fight and sense of solidarity (1986: 213). However, as he also points out, this does not prevent members of the dominant fractions of the dominant class “from making an aesthetic-ethical investment in the game and even sometimes playing it” (1986: 213). The role of rugby as marker of social structures and site of both economic and aesthetic-ethical investment in Brand New Zealand is discussed again in Chapter Four.
prevailing modes of bio-political governmentality and etho-political management (2008: 48). Bio-medical discourses have always been used to discipline, regulate and classify populations but, in contemporary society, individuals are expected to take responsibility for their own health and are encouraged to follow the healthy lifestyles promulgated by medical experts and promoted by government agencies. Bio-medical discourses are powerful because, as Rose claims, they play into the idea that “all choices that individuals make about matters like education or medical care are seen as investments in their own human capital,” and that individuals should live their lives as a kind of ethical enterprise “to maximize lifestyle or potential” (2008: 40). Samantha King describes the 1980s “fitness boom” as “the turn to physical activity on the part of millions of previously sedentary middle- and upper-class Americans,” and situates this phenomenon as co-terminous with the ascendance of Reaganism, and with “the rise of lifestyle politics” (2003: 209). In other words, the fitness boom correlates with the arrival of those strategies of neoliberal governmentality through which “the body became at once a status symbol and an emblem of one’s purchasing power, moral worth, and personal discipline” (2003: 309). Rose argues that “human beings identify and interpret much of their unease in terms of the health, vitality, and morbidity of their bodies,” and “judge and act upon their soma in their attempts to make themselves not just physically better, but also to make themselves better persons” (2008: 46). What comes through here is the idea that ethical subjectivity is inextricably linked with image, with brand logic and with an understanding of “self” as self-actualizing human capital. In an era of aesthetic consumption, as Bauman argues, individuals seek reassurance and legitimacy through two forms of communalism, the first through the authority of experts (who know better), and the second through the authority of numbers, or the “community of sameness” (2001: 64, emphasis in original).

It is, therefore, no coincidence that Dr Cooper’s fitness regime became a globalized yet individualized enterprise, or that a corporate like Les Mills reaps the benefits of indirect

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149 While King explains how “the ethos of self-betterment and quality-of-life through consumption became the normative code of conduct – and therefore that by which bodies were judged, celebrated or condemned – for everyday life in America” in the 1980s, she also notes “the production of a constant flow of techniques, tools, and strategies designed to elicit self-responsibility and responsibility to others mediated not through the state, or through political agitation, but through the ‘freedom’ of personal philanthropy and volunteerism” (2003: 311). A media culture which devotes considerable attention to philanthropy and volunteerism (while eschewing questions of corporate tax breaks, deep-seated inequalities of income, or other tropes of global capitalism) will be discussed in Chapter Four.
governmental surveillance and bio-political management. However, although Phillip and Jackie Mills admit that there is money to be made in global sustainability, and that their call to others to fight ‘globesity’ is economically beneficial for them, they also claim that they are using their knowledge and global reach to link current lifestyle choices with climate change and impending ecological calamity to call for lifestyle changes. They believe they are providing knowledge that can build motivation and empowerment as well as providing strategies for improving personal health and fitness. For example, they also provide a list of books they consider to be essential reading on global sustainability (2007: 263-264). However, their own book exposes a certain ambivalence. For instance, while calling for readers to make little changes in their everyday lives in order to “make a difference,” and while emphasizing that “climate stability can be restored by millions of sensible choices,” they also make the point that “these actions have the double benefit of not only contributing to planetary health but also improving your personal life or that of your family or business” (2007: 262). This not only serves to demonstrate the ineluctable intertwining of economical and ethical imperatives but also highlights the ambivalent and ambiguous entanglements that inform etho-political relations of power. For example, although Phillip and Jackie Mills operate a business franchise that capitalizes on the individualized, self-centred ethos of lifestyle culture, their “fight against globesity” also offers alternative perspectives:

Worry less about issues of left and right (e.g. public versus private ownership) because both tend to avoid the issues on the main environmental agenda (designing waste and pollution out of the system and developing equitable resource allocation) (2007: 273).

Identities are always partial, never fixed, and Phillip and Jackie Mills may represent expert ‘authority’ in the fields of fitness and health, and successful entrepreneurs in their business venture, but by publishing this book on the need for urgent socio-political transformation, they may also be seen as political activists. The Les Mills’ ‘globesity’ campaign

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150 A feature article in Time magazine dated 2 November 1981 and called “America Shapes Up” discusses the genesis of the fitness industry, its phenomenal success and its untapped potential, explaining that “the country runs and runs, from fear of death and pollution and old age as well as from longing for health, beauty and well-being” (Reed, 1981).

151 Phillip and Jackie Mills admit that they are as culpable as anyone living in a Western liberal economy and that according to the international footprint calculator, Global Footprint Network (www.footprintnetwork.org), they are each responsible for approximately 14 hectares of land use, against a global availability of 1.8 hectares per person, and that if everyone lived like them, we’d need approximately eight planets to sustain the present world population. They also admit that even if they cut out the huge amount of air travel they do in their jobs it would only get them down to the national average for Aotearoa New Zealand of 8.7 hectares and five planets (2007: 262).
exemplifies what Rose calls a “new pastor of the soma” by including informed consent, autonomy, voluntary action, choice and non-directiveness in an “ethical” approach, while also always aiming to extract economic surplus or bio-value from the vitality and practice of life itself (2001: 9 and 15).

In summary, both the Les Mills global enterprise and the call to fight ‘globesity’ serve to demonstrate how new pastors of the soma narrate ethical community in terms of “an alliance between the powers of expertise and the wishes, hopes and fears” of responsible, autonomous citizens committed to maximizing their quality of life (Rose, 1996: 163). Health issues stand as fine exemplars of governmental transformation because, “we no longer need state bureaucracies to enjoin healthy habits of eating, of personal hygiene … with compulsory inspection, subsidized incentives to eat or drink correctly and so forth” (1996: 162). As Rose explains, in the new domain of consumption, “individuals will want to be healthy, experts will instruct them on how to be so, and entrepreneurs will exploit and enhance this market for health” (1996: 162, emphasis in original). The Les Mills World of Fitness gyms comprise one element in a network of partnerships between government, corporations, specialists, experts and non-profit agencies that speak to the State’s indirect role in the privatization of welfare through private-public educational initiatives and to the relegation of care to the corporate sector. The Les Mills ‘globesity’ campaign is only one manifestation of a new language of ‘community’ whereby individuals are encouraged to learn to be self-actualizing and self-governing by seeking expert advice from those with authority and communities form around and through specialized interactive networks. The institution of ‘community’ enables “government through community” or the mobilization and deployment of programmes and techniques “which encourage and harness active practices of self-management and identity construction, of personal ethics and collective allegiances” (Rose, 1999b: 176, emphasis in original). In neoliberal society, the affectively-produced language of ‘community’ enables business enterprises to, firstly, mask the economic imperative underpinning the voice of authority and, secondly, to identify with and to profit from the ethical surplus or the bio-value inherent in co-operative sociality.
Weight-Watchers, Body Image and the Stylization of Life

The link between individual enterprise, productive community and business acumen is well-exemplified by Weight Watchers International®. This organization was founded in the 1960s when an American woman, Jean Nidetch, asked some friends if they would join her in following a medical diet recommended to her by her hospital dietician. Nidetch’s decision to seek advice from the hospital dietician is not in itself unusual, nor is the fact that she recognized the value inherent in co-operative sociality and called on her friends for reciprocal motivation. What is significant is that this productive form of community, this ethic of ‘being-in-common’ or co-existence with the other, was appropriated and capitalized to form the business enterprise, Weight Watchers International. While Weight Watchers’ business format builds on the productive sociality of community through group meetings, the idea of being-in-common is re-invented in the form of what Gibson-Graham call “community economies” whereby a “commonality of being, or ideal of sameness” works to suppress difference and to advance individualized subjectivity and profit-making imperatives (2006: 85-86). The Weight Watchers and Les Mills World of Fitness enterprises both emerged and flourished during the 1970s and 1980s and provide micro-pictures of a macro social transformation that saw the rejection of the Keynesian welfare state and the incremental co-emergence of the individualized citizen and the neoliberal state (see Chapter One).

Weight Watchers is now well-established in both Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand as a weight-loss franchise and its group meeting format is also well-marketed and successful. In 2007, Weight Watchers produced a thirty-second television advertisement not only to promote its weight-loss brand but also to link its corporate community with the affective affinities of a national community, implying to viewers that they could or should belong to both communities and that both were concerned with their good. It is worth describing this advertisement in detail because it encapsulates the intertwining of economic and ethical concerns in the everyday conduct of lives, and demonstrates how politics is being returned to citizens, no longer in a social form but in the form of “individual morality,

152 A Health Information New Zealand website advises: “Weight Watchers® is an international organization that promotes weight management for life through healthy lifestyle changes and a support system that works”. It also advises that “every week over one million people attend nearly 30,000 Weight Watchers meetings in 24 countries around the world and that nearly 400 meetings are held weekly throughout Aotearoa New Zealand” (Everybody, 2011). Other information regarding Weight Watchers® in Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand was sourced from the official website (WeightWatchers, 2011).
organizational responsibility and ethical community” (Rose, 2000: 1400). The advertisement opens with a picture of an obese person sunbathing on the beach alone and the attached caption reads, “What happened New Zealand?” The second scene features more obese people walking along a city street and more captions make the point, “We’re now one of the fattest developed nations on earth.” The third scene depicts a group of mostly young people smiling and socializing and none of them is overweight or unhealthy. The captions read, “Weight Watchers is working to turn things around … by removing our $33 registration fee.” As a green salad is passed among the same group of healthy people, the final caption announces, “We’ve made it easier for all New Zealanders to get healthier.” While the visual images and accompanying captions work to connect viewers first with a “national” problem and then imply that Weight Watchers can provide a “national” solution, the small print at the bottom of the advertisement reads, “Weight Watcher programmes take time and personal commitment to be effective and need professional advice on diet, exercise and lifestyle changes. Individual results may vary.”

What is going on here is that this Weight Watchers’ advertisement adopts the language of community to situate viewers within a national imaginary and to inscribe a business enterprise as ‘personally’ involved and/or interested in the health of the nation’s citizens. For example, in only four short statements the advertisement draws the viewer’s attention to a major health issue and the captions use personal pronouns, “We’re,” “We’ve” and “Our” to imply a personal relationship and to invoke affective connection between the business, the nation and the viewer. However, while the advertisement claims to be addressing the obesity problem in Aotearoa/New Zealand, it is actually a micro-picture of the ethical/economic interface that informs economic ‘community’ and, while appealing to a common good and offering to make it “easier for all New Zealanders to get healthier,” the small print in the advertisement makes it clear that individuals must not only pay for access to this apparent benevolence but must also be self-motivated and find their own professional advice on diet, exercise and lifestyle changes. In other words, this advertisement epitomizes those neoliberal modes of governmentality through which a seemingly benign and benevolent authority invokes a discourse of ‘community’ in order to

153 There is no audio relay of these messages, they must be read; the only sound is from a musical soundtrack which plays later in the advertisement with the lyrics, “Come on and wake up, come on and face up”. The small print also advises that the “Weekly meeting fee of $17.99 still applies,” that “Offer is not available to Current, Lifetime, At Work, One-on-one or At-home members,” that “No further discounts apply to concession member” and that “Offer is open till 29 September 2007”.
extract surplus value and economic gain from the human desire for mutual identification and for a sense of belonging with a common good.

The notion of 'common good' links ethics with the dominant ideology or with what Pierre Bourdieu calls an aesthetic world view which rejects the “ascetic ethic of production and accumulation, based on abstinence, sobriety, saving and calculation, in favour of a hedonistic morality of consumption, based on credit, spending and enjoyment” (1984: 310). According to Bourdieu, a “new ethical avant-garde urges a morality of pleasure as a duty” and posits a doctrine through which “pleasure is not only permitted but demanded, on ethical as much as on scientific grounds” (1984: 367). He claims this “new ethical avant-garde” judges people “by their capacity for consumption, their ‘standard of living,’ their life-style,” and finds “ardent spokesmen in the new bourgeoisie of the vendors of symbolic goods and services” (1984: 310). Bourdieu lists “the directors and executives of firms in tourism and journalism, publishing and the cinema, fashion and advertising, decoration and property development” as the “new tastemakers” who through “slyly imperative advice and the example of their consciously ‘model’ life-style,” proffer a morality which serves only to valorise consumption and enjoyment (1984: 310-311).

Taste, Bourdieu informs, “continuously transforms necessities into strategies, constraints into preferences, and, without any mechanical determination, it generates the set of ‘choices’ constituting life-styles, which derive their meaning, i.e., their value, from their position in a system of oppositions and correlations” (1984: 175). The idea of “taste” implies or presupposes absolute freedom of choice but, as Bourdieu explains, “the true basis of the differences found in the area of consumption, and far beyond it, is the opposition between the tastes of luxury (or freedom) and the tastes of necessity” (1984:177). Put another way, “taste is amor fati, the choice of destiny, but a forced choice, produced by conditions of existence which rule out all alternatives as mere daydreams and leave no choice but the taste for the necessary” (Bourdieu, 1984: 178).

It is brand marketers who are the “new tastemakers” and the vendors of “symbolic goods” and it is their injunctions “masquerading as advice or warnings” that instil the fear of not living up to the standards of “liberated” lifestyles and that underpin “a new form of the sense of moral unworthiness” (Bourdieu, 1984: 311). Bourdieu warns against ignoring the specifically political effect of moralization which, he states, is exerted through “the vehicles of the new therapeutic morality (women’s magazines, the glossy weeklies, radio
programmes)” (1984: 384) and, I would add, television, cinema and the interactive systems of social media. As he argues, it is the relentless imposition of “the dominant life-style and the legitimate image of the body” that delimits the capacity to produce alternative representations of cultural accomplishment and the social world (1984: 384). According to Bourdieu, body image is directly commensurate with social position so the chances of experiencing one’s own body as “a vessel of grace, a continuous miracle,” are very much greater “when bodily capacity is commensurate with recognition” (1984: 207). Conversely, as Bourdieu also points out, the chances of experiencing the body with unease and embarrassment grows “with the disparity between the ideal body and the real body, the dream body and the ‘looking-glass self’ reflected in the reactions of others” (1984: 207).

Organizations like Les Mills and Weight Watchers flourish because the dominant lifestyle culture links ethical self with self-actualization and with the production of one’s body and vitality as a symbol of social success or as a brand image. As discussed in the previous Chapter, a normalized, mediatized ‘lifestyle’ narrative blames the health crisis on the uninformed habits and unguided desires of autonomous individuals and “promotes the idea that our social, economic and physical fate in life is determined only by the little choices we make, not the social structures we inhabit” (Ouellette and Hay, 2008: 92). This Chapter argues that contemporary expressions of ‘community’ may be prolific and globalized but, rather than emerging as the expression of being-in-common or of co-existing actual lived realities, the neoliberal ‘community’ epitomizes a calculated ethic of self-enterprise and enacts a means of manipulating the feelings of others for self-actualization or personal advantage. That is to say, a Les Mills or Weight Watchers ‘community’ mobilizes a sense of personal responsibility for one’s bodily well-being while simultaneously underplaying the socio-economic differences that not only affect and inform varying levels of health and fitness but also restrict ‘community’ membership to those with the requisite economic and cultural capital.

Bourdieu correlates the accumulation of economic and cultural capital with a bourgeois experience of the world, and with conditions of existence “characterized by the suspension and removal of economic necessity and by objective and subjective distance from practical urgencies” (1984: 54). Bourdieu explains that economic power is first and foremost a power to keep economic necessity at arm’s length and that, as the objective distance from necessity grows, lifestyle increasingly becomes the product of a “stylization of life” (1984:
Cultural capital symbolizes distance from necessity and from those trapped within it, and implies a claim to a legitimate superiority over those who remain dominated by ordinary interests and urgencies (1984: 54-55). According to Bourdieu, the basis of the bourgeois experience of the world is an “aesthetic disposition … a durable inclination and aptitude for practice without a practical function, [that] can only be constituted within an experience of the world freed from urgency and through the practice of activities which are an end in themselves” (1984: 54). Neoliberal forms of ‘community’ obscure socio-economic difference and serve to legitimate class by fashioning a relation to the world and to others, a life-style, in which as Bourdieu claims, “the effects of particular conditions of existence are expressed in a ‘misrecognizable’ form,” and emerge in forms of pseudo-community as varying levels of individual enterprise and worthiness (1984: 54). Bourdieu could be referring to Les Mills or any of the above-mentioned examples of aesthetic community when he describes the stylization of life as “a systematic commitment which orients and organizes the most diverse practices – the choice of a vintage or a cheese or the decoration of a family home in the country … or walking and tourism, movements without any other aim than physical exercise and the symbolic appropriation of a world reduced to the status of a landscape” (1984: 55-56). For Bourdieu, the stylization of life is managed by “a corps of experts” or a “new petite bourgeoisie, which employs new means of manipulation to perform its role as an intermediary between the classes” and which by its very existence brings about social transformation that can only be understood in terms of “changes in the mode of domination” (1984: 153-154). Bourdieu explains how new forms of authority interconnect to construct and control body, image and lifestyle:

From marriage counsellors to the vendors of slimming aids, all those who now make a profession of supplying the means of bridging the gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in the realm of the body and its uses would be nothing without the unconscious collusion of all those who contribute to producing an inexhaustible market for the products they offer, who by imposing new uses of the body and a new bodily hexit – the hexit which the new bourgeoisie of the sauna bath, the gymnasium and the ski slope has discovered for itself – produce the corresponding needs, expectations and dissatisfactions (1984: 153)

Bourdieu lists all those who combine, and compete amongst themselves, to “advance a cause which they can serve so well only because they are not always aware of serving it or even of serving themselves in the process” (1984: 153). As Bourdieu sees it, these

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154 Bourdieu’s list includes: “Doctors and diet experts armed with the authority of science … couturiers who confer the sanction of good taste on the unattainable measurements of fashion models; advertisers for whom the new obligatory uses of the body provide scope for countless warnings and reminders” and “journalists
agents all satisfy their group interests by deploying the cultural capital they have acquired through the education system to “win the acquiescence of the classes excluded from legitimate culture” and so produce the need for and the rarity of their class culture (1984: 153). Bourdieu identifies change in modes of domination which, “substituting seduction for repression, public relations for policing, advertising for authority, the velvet glove for the iron fist, pursues the symbolic integration of the dominated classes by imposing needs rather than inculcating norms” (1984: 153-154). His insights correlate with Bauman’s conceptualizations of authority and also with Rose’s concept of somatic ethics to demonstrate how brand identity offers symbolic recognition through aesthetic communalism and also how brands and brand marketing systems utilize existing class divisions to create and exploit investments of desire. In short, enterprises like Les Mills and Weight Watchers legitimate capitalist class relations by obscuring lived reality behind symbolic activities and pseudo-community.

Because liberal political rationality must always reconcile the rights of autonomous, self-governing citizens with the need for a governable, normalized population, liberal government must combine the everyday management of technologies of ‘self’ with management through legislative policy and other technologies of ‘domination’. Cultural capital and economic power are interdependent and underpin what Zygmunt Bauman refers to as the prevailing “ideology of privatization,” an ideology in which that interdependence is obscured or disavowed and notions of solidarity, of joining forces and subordinating individual actions to a “common cause” are proclaimed futile and counter-productive (2008a: 20, emphasis in original). Bauman argues that individuals are judged to be solely responsible for their plight, for adversities as well as successes, and that what is at stake “is social recognition – exclusion or inclusion – based on the choices we have made” (2008a: 22). In other words, neoliberal notions of ‘community’ or ‘common good’ normalize aesthetic etho-politics and gloss systemic social inequalities and unethical exploitation. As Rose sees it, “the management of health and vitality, once derided as narcissistic self-absorption, has now achieved unparalleled ethical salience” and the inequities and injustices underpinning this infrastructure constitute a biopolitical reality in which “the differential value of life is very much at stake” (2008: 48). Such biopolitical

who exhibit and glorify their own lifestyle in women’s weeklies and magazines for well-heeled executives” (1984: 153). To this list we can include television presenters/celebrities and brand experts among those who mediate and disseminate the “bodily hexis” and “legitimate” culture (1984: 153).
reality is exemplified in the following case studies which adopt similar strategies for managing health and vitality, but which are taken up at different ends of the social spectrum for very different reasons. In the first case, a challenging exercise regime serves as an exciting, optional lifestyle choice but, in the second, a similar regime is imposed by the state as compulsory chastisement. These examples serve to demonstrate not only how systemic inequality is accepted and naturalized, but also how poverty and social deprivation are equated with criminality and dealt with accordingly.

Social Disparity and Unequal Productions of Pseudo-Community

In 2009, Les Mills offered its members the opportunity to participate in a unique training programme called Bootcamp. As the Les Mills website explains, “Inspired by the military, Les Mills BOOTCAMP® is a programme that will challenge you and commit you to making a change … you will be part of a team of like-minded recruits who will give you that support and motivation to get you through and achieve physical results you never thought possible … the concept can be summed up in one word – teamwork”.

In February 2009, Prime Minister John Key announced plans for new legislation as a result of which, “serious young offenders will face army ‘boot camp’ [and] be required to take part in military-style activity programmes run by the army, consisting of up to three months residential training using army-type facilities or training methods” (Key, 2009).

Although the aims and objectives of Les Mills fitness Bootcamps and Government reformist Boot Camps have little in common and address very different sectors of society, they both seek to improve self-esteem and to encourage positive habits and behaviour through intensive military-style physical training. The (re)turn to a disciplinary mode of

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157 A 2012 online article, “Shock Incarceration and Boot-camp Prisons,” describes boot-camps as “short-term prison programs run like military basic training for young offenders and youthful felons”. It states that “boot-camp prisons were first established in Georgia and Oklahoma in 1983 and since then all states and many counties have adopted this type of program”. It also states that “boot-camp prisons have proved controversial over time, as critics argue that this type of regimen does not reduce recidivism” (e-Notes.com, Inc). [online] Available at: [http://www.enotes.com/shock-incarceration-boot-camp-prisons-reference/shock-incarceration-boot-camp-prisons][2] [Accessed 17.03.12]. Another American website called “Boot Camps for Troubled Teens” offers parents options for getting “boot-camp” help for their teenage children, and provides the

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governmentality in both public and private, voluntary and involuntary training regimes demonstrates, *qua* Foucault, how disciplinary, regulatory and pastoral forms of biopower co-exist and interact in micro and macro formulations to inform what Rose calls ethopolitics, or the politics of life itself. Disciplinary and regulatory forms of power use normalizing systems to manage populations and, to re-quote Rose, “official discourses of health promotion” increasingly stress personal reconstruction through “acting on the body in the name of a fitness that is simultaneously corporeal and psychological” (2001: 18). Parallels can be drawn between the Les Mills’ ‘boot camp’ promotion and the proposed Government initiative in several ways. First of all, as the Les Mills’ Boot Camp website declares, “Inspired by the military, it’s a programme that will challenge you and commit you to making a change” and “it doesn’t just shape your body, it shapes your mind too” (Les Mills BOOTCAMP®, 2011). As with the government scheme, recruits will be exposed to “intense workouts, disciplined regularity and professional expertise” over a set period of time and their levels of fitness and motivation will be monitored and assessed for improvement. However, unlike the government initiative, this programme is voluntary and structured to fit within the course of everyday lives, it is not state-sanctioned incarceration, and the financial ‘investment’ in the (re)training of minds and bodies is made by individuals themselves. Another major point of difference concerns the Les Mills claim that their ‘boot camp’ is the “gym equivalent of team sports because it’s all about camaraderie, support and inspiration,” and that “you become part of a close-knit team, with each person collectively supporting and motivating the others to work harder”. The Les Mills ‘boot camp’ concept augments the individualized ideal-of-sameness form of ‘community’ constituted within the wider gym ‘community’ and, by offering a variation on the same consumer product, serves to satisfy the corporate demand for product expansion and increased profit.

following overview: “Started as an alternative to jail for juvenile adolescents, there are several types of teen boot camps from state run to privately run … these facilities can be a starting place for getting your teen help. In both the state and private environment the camps’ goal is to scare kids straight, generally only giving a short-term solution”. The same website also describes “Brat Camps” as a series of reality television shows in both the UK and USA which closely resemble the juvenile boot camps but which use the “adventures, battles and emotional breakdowns” of “unruly, disrespectful brats” as a source of entertainment (Bootcamps.com, March 2012). [online] Available at: http://boot-camp-boot-camps.com/ accessed 17.03.12. While John Key’s boot camp programme resembles the state-run programmes initiated in the USA for young offenders, the television programme, “Real Life: The Outsiders,” discussed later in this chapter, plays out as a local version of the “Brat Camps” reality TV shows.
The whole notion of joining or belonging to such a ‘community’ is bound up with consumerist society and the need for publicly recognizable self-definition and marketable identity. Bauman coins the term “cloakroom communities” to describe those “ghost communities, phantom communities, ad hoc communities, carnival communities” which “one joins simply by being where others are present or by sporting badges or other tokens of shared intentions, style or taste,” and from which one “falls out” as soon as the crowd disperses or from which one is free to leave at any time should one lose interest (2007: 111). As Bauman points out, the modality of such “community membership” is fully subjective and it is the “momentary experience of community” that counts:

In a consumer existence smarting under the tyranny of the moment and measured by pointillist time the facility to join in and to leave at will gives that experience of the phantom, ad hoc community a clear advantage over the uncomfortably solid, constraining and demanding ‘real thing’ (2007: 112, emphasis in original).

The difference between superficial ‘experience’ of community and the uncomfortably solid, constraining and demanding ‘real thing’ may also be demonstrated in the boot camp policy being posited by Prime Minister Key. Key followed up on a 2008 campaign promise “to deal more effectively with the growing group of young Kiwis who are seriously and repeatedly breaking the law” by introducing “boot camp legislation” to Parliament in February 2009. The legislation is aimed at “the worst 1,000 young offenders” and will give the Youth Court the power to issue a new range of compulsory orders including boot camp training. Key explains, “Initially up to 40 of the most serious young offenders will be required to take part in military-style activity programmes run by the army, consisting of up to three month residential training using army-type facilities or training methods”. Key adds that other programmes would also draw on the military-style training and that, at an estimated cost of $35 million, he thought the investment was worthwhile (NZPA, 2009). Although political critics argue that schemes like military-style training camps do nothing to address the underlying causes of youth offending and that their use has been widely discredited overseas, Key expects the legislation to be passed and implemented by 2010. Annette King, social development

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158 This information was sourced from Newstalk ZB/ONE News, available TVNZ website (TVNZ, 2009).

159 On 25 February 2010, Paula Bennett, Social Development Minister, announces that “Fresh Start legislation targeting the country’s most persistent, serious young offenders with a range of tough new measures has now become law”. Fresh Start is the revised name for Key’s Boot Camps. Bennett explains, “The bill, aimed at the worst 1,000 young offenders provides greater Youth Court powers, including
spokeswoman for the Labour Party, claims that “the proposed military-style activity camps … simply produced faster, fitter criminals who could outrun the cops and [who] learnt new tricks from their cellmates,” and that a similar 1971 programme “had a re-offending rate of 92 per cent”. Children’s Commissioner, Cindy Kiro, claims that the “most effective ways of reforming child and youth offenders focus on addressing the issues in their lives, rather than just dishing out punishment,” and that the “hype” concerning serious youth offending and “alleged public concerns about unsafe communities” was not supported by statistical data and that, in fact, “the figures have stayed quite steady for the past 10 years”. What comes through here is evidence of a problem being measured by ‘pointillist time’ and being addressed with short-term, short-sighted policy that enables Key to be seen to be fulfilling election promises despite statistical evidence proving that the Boot Camp idea is ineffective.

Boot camp legislation will not address any real issue of rising criminality but, rather, aims to deal with errant individuals and so assuage the demands of a consumer society divided between those who have the wherewithal to satisfy their consumerist desires and those who pose a threat because they do not. Bauman links perceived criminality with poverty and describes the poor of today as “flawed consumers” who, after failing to perform as active buyers of goods and services, are able to be removed from the recognizably “human community” by effectively rewriting their stories away from the language of deprivation to that of depravity (2007: 126-127). In a consumerist and neoliberal discourse, the poor are portrayed as amoral and lax, and their plight is narrated as individualized irresponsibility. When the poor are excluded from the human community and are treated with moral indifference and as the equivalent of “criminal elements,” the “question of poverty” becomes a “question of law and order” and is then responded to on the same terms as any other form of law-breaking (Bauman, 2007: 127, emphasis in original). The growing incidence of conduct classified as “criminal” must be recognized, not as “an obstacle on the road to a fully fledged and all-embracing consumerist society,” but as a “natural and perhaps indispensable accompaniment and prerequisite” of that consumerist society (2007: 132). For Bauman, the “ghettoization or criminalization” of juvenile delinquents, school extending jurisdiction to 12 and 13 year olds and tougher, more effective sentences”. She further explains, “Military activity camps for the most serious repeat young offenders will teach self-disciplines, respect and responsibility, with mentoring, parenting and drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes to address the cause of offending”. Bennett also advises, “Fresh Start will cost $84 million over the next three years” (Bennett, 2010). [online] “Fresh Start for Serious Youth Offenders,” beehive.govt.nz, Available at: http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/fresh-start-serious-youth-offenders [Accessed 17.03.12].
dropouts, drug addicts, and others is nothing less than an exorcizing of the inner demons, overt fears and hidden burdens of the consciences of a “well-off, comfortable, pleasure and happiness-seeking society” (2007: 132 and 134). Furthermore, as Bauman also argues, sharing poverty, stigma and public humiliation does not necessarily sediment community and “make the sufferers into brothers,” but tends to feed “mutual derision, contempt and hatred” (2001: 122). According to Bauman, “stigmatized individuals may live in peace or be at war with each other,” but they are unlikely to develop mutual respect because ghettoization does not serve as a “collective buffer” against social exclusion but as “a deadly machinery for naked social relegation” (2001: 121-122). Bauman claims “once they have become the sole alternatives to the uncertainties of a deregulated labour market, prison and the ghetto transform a meek acceptance of the ‘casino economy’ with its no-rules game of survival into a bearable, perhaps even a desirable, option” (2001: 120-121). In short, “ghetto means the impossibility of community” and the normalization of social fragmentation and atomization (Bauman, 2001: 122, emphasis in original).

Although a discourse of ‘community’ informs all modes of neoliberal governmentality and especially media governmentality, its modus operandi actually serves to suppress collective solidarity and nurtures instead an isolated, insecure notion of ‘self’ that is both depoliticized and vulnerable to exploitation. As discussed in Chapter Three, reality television plays an integral role in the dissemination of techniques of self-actualization and self-management as promulgated by neoliberal post-welfare ideology and it does so by linking needy subjects with entrepreneurial enterprise and welfare provision with privatized social networks.

Figure 14 Real Life: The Outsiders, Greenstone Pictures, 2012

This image is retrieved from Greenstone Pictures website, “Programme listing for Greenstone Pictures New Zealand” which states that The Outsiders documentary series gives a dozen “at risk Māori youths” the
In the reality television series, *Real Life: The Outsiders*, a group of Māori youths are cast as ‘needy subjects’ and a group of youth workers including a youth psychologist provide the privatized social network that aims to help them by changing the way they think about themselves and their prospects. The television programme follows the ‘real life’ progress of the boys as they participate in a remedial programme that has some of the characteristics of a boot camp but also follows a Kaupapa Māori philosophy crossed with the outdoor activity format of Outward Bound. A narrator explains how every year more than 1600 New Zealand school kids are expelled permanently from mainstream education, that Māori teenage boys are over-represented in this statistic and that because many join gangs, commit crimes and ultimately end up in prison, this three-week programme is aimed at changing the thinking of these twelve boys, “away from crime, off drugs and on to the right track”. The fact that this programme is set up as a television documentary prompts the question of who benefits from instigating such a programme, and could this be just another form of ‘makeover’ in which the socially marginalized serve as fodder for the self-improvement premise of reality television? There is no record of how these twelve boys are chosen, whether they are paid or what incentives, if any, they are given to participate. However, the TVNZ website promotional material asserts that “this is not boot camp,” but rather that “showcasing the potential these young men have, the series shows these boys how different their lives can be when they have opportunity and support,” and that the purpose of the programme is “to improve the life chances for youth and to educate the public about youth needs and issues”. After going ‘cold turkey’ on alcohol, cigarettes and drugs during the first week, the boys are encouraged to take part in various tasks and exercises designed to help them learn about themselves and each other and to set goals for opportunity to turn their lives around. The programme “showcases the potential these young men have and reveals how different their lives can be when they have opportunity and support,” [online] Available at: http://www.greenstonetv.com/programmes/documentaries/society/the-outsiders/ [Accessed 31.08.12].

Kaupapa Māori concerns Māori philosophy and principles and as well as presupposing the validity and legitimacy of Māori language and culture, it also posits that “the struggle for autonomy over our own cultural wellbeing, and over our own lives is vital to Māori survival” (He Whakamarama). According to its website, “Outward Bound is Aotearoa New Zealand’s leading organization for showing people their full potential” through outdoor challenge and adventure. In other words, like the Les Mills enterprise, its operation accesses the surplus-value generated by sport and leisure activities and by a neoliberal ethos that requires individuals to invest in and maximise their own human capital (Outward Bound).

The boys are accompanied by three mentors experienced in youth development, education and psychology, and by four youth workers as well as a staff of cooks and carers (including kaumātua and kuia) (*Real Life: The Outsiders*, 2009).
the future. In one role-playing exercise, the boys help each other to play out the family dynamics of their upbringing and all are encouraged to comment on the effects of such experiences. The intention is that feelings of humiliation and loss of self-esteem will be understood as the outcome of a personal trauma or particular upbringing rather than as personal failure, and that if they can change how they think, their actions will follow.

What is not addressed is the social context for familial dysfunction and deeply embedded inter-generational notions of humiliation and inadequacy. As Bauman explains, “in the individualized society of consumers, the most common and ‘most telling’ definitions and explanations of pain and grievance are moving away from group- or category-related features, and towards personal referents” (2008a: 23, emphasis in original). The problem is, therefore, that young ‘offenders’ are expected to take personal responsibility for social outcomes that are universally symptomatic of poverty and systemic injustice. Emphasis is placed on learning to empathise, and on understanding that what they do has consequences. The youth psychologist points out, for example, that “with a lot of these kids … they’re quite narcissistic, quite fixed on themselves,” and another youth worker asks them, “why have you got this attitude that you don’t want to help each other?” This question highlights an apparent paradox between an agenda that seeks empathetic co-operation among disparate, troubled individuals and a dominant ideal that calls for competitive, self-serving entrepreneurialism. The general ethos of reality TV continues a concept of ‘community’ that offers the taste but not the substance of requisite cultural capital and, in this case, serves to imply that school dropouts and juvenile delinquents can be ‘made-over’ to fit mainstream society just as older women can be ‘made-over’ to look ten years younger. Neoliberal ‘communities,’ fostered through these domains, constrain affective connection in two ways; first, by focusing on middle-class sensibility, thus glossing and exacerbating the social divisions of individualized/privatized society and, second, by mobilizing feelings of shame, responsibility and trust on an individualized basis, and so committing individuals to finding individual solutions to socially-produced problems.

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163 One youth explains that he smokes dope every day and that having fun means escaping from the reality of his life. He describes how his uncle, a former gang chapter president, gave him hidings and how he ran away when he was 12/13 years old and lived on the streets for two years during which time he robbed houses and carried a machete. He reacts to the idea of setting goals with the comment, “No use setting goals, [I] live life as it comes ‘cos I’ll be in jail tomorrow – no use setting goals in jail” (Real Life: The Outsiders, screened TVNZ, TV One, Wednesday, 04.02.09, 9.30 pm).
Conclusion

This Chapter has linked individualized subjectivity with etho-political modes of governmentality and argued that a new form of informational capitalism superimposes market imperatives over all expressions of productive subjectivity and promotes ‘community’ membership as an easily disposable source of affect value and ethical surplus. After discussing the role of affect value and subjective investment in product branding and brand value, this Chapter used Mainland cheese and its yellow-eyed penguin sponsorship to demonstrate how affective investment produces an ethical economy and underpins the ethical surplus that is now recognized as a primary source of value in an informational economy. It demonstrated how community becomes a vehicle for nurturing and advancing entrepreneurial subjectivity and for normalizing an image-based brand culture. Brand value emerges when people construct and transform their own subjectivity to match the logic of the brand and when people’s values and meanings are correlated with, and invested in, brand identities and brand communities.

The Chapter invoked Rose’s concept of etho-politics to link affect value, ethical surplus and biopower and to claim that the neoliberal language of community serves to enable and intensify a neoliberal subjectivity that intertwines ethics and economics and undercuts any notion of self-transformation through social solidarity or being-in-common. Because Rose also argues for a ‘somatic ethic’ in which individuals gauge their self-esteem in terms of their health and vitality, and act upon themselves not only to make themselves physically better but also to make themselves better persons, the Chapter then focused on the uptake of such an ethic by Phillip Mills and the Les Mills world-of-fitness enterprise. The Les Mills’ language of ‘community’ instantiates what Bourdieu refers to as a bourgeois experience of the world, one in which the accumulation of economic and cultural capital keeps necessity at arm’s length, and through which middle-class values permeate society to obscure lived reality. Furthermore, the language of ‘community’ is inextricably bound with consumerist society and the insatiable need for publicly recognizable self-definition and marketable identity. Bauman describes the language of ‘community’ as a validation of the individual, as a source of social recognition, and of acceptance that an individual, in practising a particular form of life, is leading a worthy and decent life and, therefore, “deserves the respect that is owed and offered to other worthy and decent people” (2008a: 22). In this regard, despite the fact that they display all the characteristics of an
individualized, commodified, disposable experience, ‘communities’ like Les Mills and Weight Watchers may also function in a secular, neoliberal narrative of ‘salvation’ by offering members pastoral guidance and a shared commitment that attracts respect and social recognition.

The neoliberal, narrative of “ethical” community focuses primarily on “responsibility to oneself” and “responsibility for oneself,” and delimits concepts of ‘other’ to those who, as failed consumers, are necessarily excluded from consumerist society (Bauman, 2007: 92, emphasis in original). Bauman believes that the concepts of responsibility and responsible choice “which resided before in the semantic field of ethical duty and moral concern for the Other, have shifted or been moved to the realm of self-fulfilment and the calculation of risks,” and have been “overshadowed by the actor’s own self” (2007: 92). While Bauman is right to highlight the self-centred premise or ‘somatic ethic’ underlying today’s ‘ethical’ communities, I would argue that ethical responsibility for others has not been replaced or overshadowed so much as it has been depoliticized and reinscribed to naturalize poverty and to constitute marginalized others as appropriate targets for charity, remedial projects and correction facilities. For this reason, the Chapter then discussed the resurgence of the ‘boot camp’ both as a marketing tool and as a disciplinary strategy, before returning to media culture to examine the portrayal of those ‘outsiders’ who have become the object of moral concern both for political grandstanding and as grist to the mill for ‘makeover’ reality television programmes. While the inequalities and injustices inherent in a neoliberal political economy remain naturalized and uncontested, the marginalized other can now be any individual who, as a needy or failed consumer, does not own the cultural capital for access to neoliberal society. This Chapter has demonstrated how ‘community’ reinvents the ‘social’ in the art of neoliberal government, and has become in Rose’s words, “the plane or surface upon which micro-moral relations amongst persons are conceptualized and administered” (1999b: 136). It has discussed ‘community’ as a space of emotional or affective relationships in which individual subjectivity is constructed and managed, especially through media culture, to produce and sustain consumerist values, a ‘somatic ethic’ and a sense of middle-class entitlement. In other words, in neoliberal society the

164 Robert Winnett, writing in *The Sunday Times*, March 27, 2005, refers to a special category of citizen or underclass “known in Whitehall as Neet: not in education, employment or training.” He goes on to explain how they comprise a group of 1.1 million in Britain and as “a class of über-chavs, they encompass a wide range of people, from the law-abiding who have fallen on hard times … to the truly antisocial neighbours from hell. What they all have in common is that they are not doing anything productive and are costing taxpayers a fortune” (Winnett, 2005).
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omic and the ethical are always intertwined and the affective dimensions informing all social interaction and communal co-operation are being managed and mined to access affect value and extract ethical surplus for profit. Subjectivity is always simultaneously individualizing and collectivizing, which is to say, we understand ‘self’ through the collective, relational and affective bonds made with other individuals.

Conspicuous consumption regimes and a politics of lifestyle now link individuals with a plurality of cultural communities that are both ephemeral and depoliticizing, and work to advance capital accumulation as both personally pleasurable and socially acceptable. The next Chapter will examine those concepts of ‘community’ that depoliticize the social bond by representing political affiliation in terms of those who promote the neoliberal capitalist enterprise and those who don’t. It will begin by examining market-based strategies that articulate middle-class citizenship as the ‘free’ exercise of choice and responsibility, and it will situate social norms within modes of governmentality that not only embrace free-market imperatives but also entrust matters of social welfare to informational capitalism and the machinations of commerce, consumption and competition. By returning to the context of media culture and especially reality television, it will demonstrate how social services are brought into the market, how ‘charity TV’ works to privatize care and mobilize compassion, and how media culture normalizes a continuum of governing strategies “from detainment in a private facility to self-help strategies that liken running one’s life to managing a business” (Ouellette and Hay, 2007: 66). In short it will discuss and analyse those versions of the politics of ‘ethical community’ that manipulate and capitalize affective sociality on a national scale.
CHAPTER FOUR

Nationhood, National Identity and Brand New Zealand

It is within the framework of the nation-State, or of national subjectivities, that processes of subjectification and the corresponding subjections are manifested (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988: 457-458).

We believe that feelings are immutable, but every sentiment, particularly the noblest and most disinterested, has a history (Foucault, 1977a: 153).

This Chapter explores the production of community at the national level, and argues that the processes of subjectification behind the manifestation of a national identity are analogous to the processes of affective investment that underpin loyalty to a brand. Nation states have always used flags, anthems, myths and other symbolic forms to instil a sense of nationhood and mark a sovereign territory and, as Chapter One discussed, Aotearoa New Zealand has always been conceptualized and promoted as a prime tourist destination and ideal site for economic development and capital investment. What distinguishes contemporary nation-branding from earlier efforts is that any perceived split between civil society and economic enterprise has dissipated, and the ethical surplus generated in the building of a national community is now manipulated and appropriated primarily for commercial gain. Deleuze and Guattari (see above) argue that nation-states are models of realization of an axiomatic in which we are no longer “under the transcendence of a formal Unity” but controlled in “an entire system of machinic enslavement” (1988: 458). They explain that new forms of automation and information technologies enable “a progressive increase in the proportion of constant capital” and, as they claim, “at the same time the work regime changes, surplus value becomes machinic, and the framework expands to all of society” (1988: 458). Branding is the socialization of affect, and Brand New Zealand operates affectively at a national level to mould subjectivity, to access and harness “constant capital,” and to structure a brand-state for global capital (1987: 458). In an era of informational capitalism and media governmentality, brand marketers are the new experts in nation-building and, as Sue Curry Jansen claims, “Branding not only explains nations to the world but also reinterprets national identity in market terms and provides new narratives for domestic consumption” (2008: 122). This Chapter interrogates strategies of media governmentality that target the hearts and minds of the population and underpin
notions of an imagined national community whether that community is conceptualized and construed as liberal democratic state or as brand-state. As discussed in Chapter Two, media governmentality is a strategy that links the world of mediated communication with the narration and organization of everyday life, and situates the media not as a check on governmental action and as an objective and independent domain, but rather as a ubiquitous technology of control. Media governmentality follows the logic of informational capitalism and works on and through the affective dimensions of social interaction and communal co-operation to extract ethical surplus and to enunciate governance through the fostering of the idea of community.

Nation-brand marketers extract key elements of the idea of nation to mobilise the affective biopower that informs a national consciousness and, by doing so, effectively facilitate the implementation of a neoliberal model of social control. Deleuze identifies a move from disciplinary societies toward control societies and to forms of power that “no longer operate by confining people but through continuous control and instant communication” (1995: 171 and 174). For Deleuze, capitalism in its present form is no longer directed toward production but toward products, that is, toward sales or markets and, as he argues, “marketing now features as the new instrument of control” (1995: 181). Or, as Aihwa Ong puts it, “the elements that we think of as coming together to create citizenship – rights, entitlements, territoriality, a nation – are becoming disarticulated and rearticulated with forces set into motion by market forces” (2006: 6). The communicative acts and forms of affective association that inform political ideals and underpin social solidarity are being appropriated to function primarily according to market imperatives and to serve as the pivotal elements of informational capitalism.

As public-private interests merge to construe and convey national identity through specific marketing strategies and branding practices, the brand-state performs as the fulcrum of informational capitalism and situates the nation-as-commodity within a global community of market logic. In this Chapter, I argue that the brand-state emerges under prevailing social conditions to situate government itself as a marketing enterprise whose task it is to compete on a world stage and to circulate market-shaped images of culture, place and

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165 While I refer to nation-brand and brand-state interchangeably, I do not mean to imply that the hyphen that links the nation to the state is unproblematic and can be taken for granted or naturalized. However, in this examination of national branding processes, ‘nation’ refers to an affectively-mobilized image community constructed and shaped to fit ‘state’ structures and both terms refer to that symbolic and marketable image.
productivity for capital gain and global consumption. And business-based strategies maintain and perpetuate notions of national identity. That is to say, the practice of nation-branding intersects with the production of a national imaginary and, rather than rendering the notion of nation redundant, serves instead to qualify and reinforce the need for the national form. However, while nation-branding may signal a change in the way we construe social bonds and formulate notions of national identity, it also serves to remind that nationhood is the product of myth and narrative, and that nationalism is always emotionally charged and affectively mobilized. In addition, the nation-state has always utilized communication technologies to construct a collective social imaginary and to project social and cultural cohesion and homogeneity, as theorized in Benedict Anderson’s seminal work Imagined Communities (1991). Hardt and Negri point out that the common conception that media (and television in particular) have destroyed politics is false only to the extent that it seems based on an idealized notion of how earlier forms of democratic political discourse, exchange and participation played out (2000: 322). As they claim, “the difference of the contemporary manipulation of politics by the media is not really a difference of nature but a difference of degree” (2000: 322). Where once a state-controlled public sphere dictated the terms and conditions of citizenship, a variety of private, corporate and public-private media systems now narrate democratic citizenship in terms of personal participation in a globalized, market-oriented media culture. In other words, the liberal democratic state is a product of media governmentality and while numerous mechanisms (like newspapers, trade fairs, national and international exhibitions, radio) were deployed in earlier times to shape public opinion and public perception, more powerful, interactive and diffuse contemporary media technologies now impact every aspect of biopolitical life. And one of the most significant media technologies and social developments of our time is the brand. The strategies and tactics of branding now stretch far beyond corporate and business sectors to encompass politics, the arts, charities, sport and education, and have become a global social and cultural phenomenon with increasing influence, strength and power. When we negotiate identity and construct social bonds within the parameters of brand marketing, perception supersedes practicality, image and reputation are fabricated rather than earned and social bonds are based on style more than substance.

This Chapter examines nation-branding in Aotearoa New Zealand, focusing especially on the development of Brand New Zealand first as a marketing tool for the tourist industry
and then as a symbol of corporatized national identity competing in a global hierarchy of brand states. It begins by presenting the views of international marketing experts who celebrate and promote nation-branding as a benign and beneficial system of national identity. It then invokes the works of Deleuze, Bourdieu, Appadurai, Arvidsson and others to claim that nation-branding represents, first, the (re)inscription and dominance of market logic on a global scale and, second, the growing influence of media governmentality as a governing strategy or system of social control. The Chapter then links nation-branding with tourism, tracing the development and promotion of Aotearoa New Zealand as a holiday destination, and claims that contemporary enunciations of Brand New Zealand demonstrate nothing more than the reiteration of long-held myths and innovative adaptation to marketing paradigms in the narration of national identity. After invoking Morgan et al to explain and evaluate Brand New Zealand’s success in vacation marketing, I turn to Ateljevic and Doorne and others to situate that success in a wider socio-political context. I argue that nation-branding (and tourism) are directly related to the promotion and growth of lifestyle culture and consumerist values and, against any notion of egalitarianism, continue and consolidate a neo-colonial pattern of unequal development and exploitation. Because the task of legitimizing national identity begins at home, and because the role of image-making and differentiating between places is increasingly important in globalized markets, the Chapter ends by demonstrating how media, and television more specifically, work to situate Brand New Zealand as the epitome of national identity in the social imaginary.

**Nation-branding from a marketing perspective**

When Wally Olins (2004) explains why brands are such a clear and unique manifestation of our time, he highlights three contributing and related factors.\(^{166}\) First of all, he implicates the ubiquity and power of new interactive media technologies, noting that “it is the feelings and emotions of individuals as opposed to groups that are targeted” (2004: 66). Olins describes a “sea change in the popular mood” and claims that “individuality, self-

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\(^{166}\) Wally Olins is Chairman of Saffron Brand Consultants of London, Madrid, Mumbai and New York. He has worked for a number of cities and countries on national brand image including London, Mauritius, Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal and Vietnam. He has also advised many of the world’s leading organizations on identity, branding and communication, including McKinsey, Renault, Volkswagen and Akzo-Nobel. He is currently Visiting Fellow at Said Business School and Visiting Professor at Copenhagen Business School. Information sourced online (Olins, 2011).
fulfilment and self-expression” have emerged “as the major tenets of our epoch” (2004: 66). Secondly, Olins links the rise of individualized subjectivity with concomitant changes in the form and management of corporate structures and state-owned enterprises (2004: 66). He points out that businesses are now “going global,” that they are “outsourcing so much that they become a shell,” that they are “employing people on contract, using more part-timers” and moving into business activities which may be unrelated to their traditional ventures (2004: 129). Where boundaries are fuzzy, where companies amalgamate or dissolve on a regular basis, and where employees cannot expect a long-term contract or any real job security, employees begin to reflect transformations in corporate culture and learn to prioritize their individual careers against any notion of loyalty or long-term commitment to a corporate or national organization. Finally, Olins points out that in this climate of competitive clamour and shifting alliances, a brand not only serves to represent “clarity, reassurance, consistency, status, membership and everything that helps human beings define themselves,” but also emerges as “the most significant spiritual and emotional glue holding organizations together and representing their reputation to all the worlds with which they deal” (2004: 27 and 115). In summary, as Olins sees it, a brand represents identity, image and reputation, and nation-states are increasingly adopting corporate-style branding techniques to promote an idealized but immediately recognizable identity to a globalized world.

While nations have always utilized various modes of media governmentality to inform a social imaginary and orchestrate a sense of unity and nationhood, nations must now compete on a global stage, for what Olins terms as more “quantifiable” economic purposes, namely, “inward investment, exports and tourism” (2004: 158). Olins believes that these issues were not major factors before “because tourism was small, inward investment was confined to a relatively few countries and brand export mainly embraced traditional products going to traditional markets” (2004: 158). In the case of Aotearoa New Zealand, for example, until the 1970s Great Britain provided a guaranteed market for both exports and inward investment and tourism remained peripheral to farming and related primary industries. In today’s political economy, as Olins sees it, marketing inward investment is “a serious, expensive and sophisticated business,” corporate brands and national identities feed off each other and overlap in the export of products and services, and tourism has grown to become the world’s fourth largest industry (2004: 160). Olins explains that tourism is “growing at about 9% per year,” and after commenting that “many
of the most unlikely countries are highly reliant on it,” notes, as exemplar, that “New Zealand’s largest foreign exchange earner is tourism” (2004: 161). The reference to “most unlikely countries” becoming highly reliant on tourism reflects the impact of neoliberal policies worldwide and marks not only transition from production to consumption and from production to financialization, but also burgeoning reliance on immaterial capital and media governmentality. The tourist industry in Aotearoa New Zealand serves as a fine exemplar of this global transformation and is discussed more fully below.

Peter van Ham, echoing Olins, claims that the art of politics is changing from old-style diplomacy to the art of brand-building and that “image and reputation are thus becoming essential parts of the state’s strategic equity” (2001: 3). For van Ham, the art of politics increasingly concerns “social power” or “the ability to set standards, and create norms and values that are deemed legitimate and desirable, without resorting to coercion or payment” (2010: 8). He acknowledges that it is difficult to say to what extent social power can be considered truly effective or how much the use of social power still depends on military force or hard power. However, he claims that in an international climate where “the playing field for social power is broader and more diverse than that of hard power … the role of media, public relations (PR), public diplomacy, and branding is particularly important” (2010: 9). Brand-building involves the construction of an emotional bond between product or state and customer; a state brand works at diplomatic level to access global markets and to project positive perceptions of that country to the outside world. In van Ham’s view, the turn to brand-states “implies a shift in political paradigms, a move from the modern world of geopolitics and power to the postmodern world of images and influence” (2001: 4). Old-style nationalism linked national identity with particular geographical and political settings but new national narratives increasingly play out as a series of concepts and images that seek to strike emotional resonance with an external audience of global consumers. What is being transferred, as van Ham sees it, is not old-style us-versus-them politics but us-versus-them feelings and, as with perceptions of the brand product, consumers now talk about a state’s “personality” and discuss its appeal in terms of expectation and satisfaction (2001: 3). According to van Ham, globalization and the media have made each nation-state “more aware of itself, its image, its reputation and

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167 Peter van Ham is Senior Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael” in The Hague and the author of European Integration and the Postmodern Condition (Van Ham, 2001).
its attitude – in short, its brand” (2001: 3). He argues that in the evolving branded world of identity politics, politicians will have to find a “brand niche” for their state, “engaging in competitive marketing, assuring customer satisfaction, and most of all, creating brand loyalty” (2001: 6).

What comes through strongly in the work of both Olins and van Ham is their unproblematic approach to the concept of a branded nation-state and their shared belief that branding has a benign, even positive effect on nation-states and on society generally. They both point out, for example, that the modern state has always been based on a mythical sense of community, that the state adapts itself continuously, invoking nationalism to charge the emotional batteries of its citizens, and that the brand-state is nothing more than a continuation of this process. For Van Ham “the brand-state’s use of its history, geography, and ethnic motifs to construct its own distinct image is a benign campaign, a positive move, because it lacks the deep-rooted and often antagonistic sense of national identity that can accompany nationalism” (2001: 3). Olins, too, believes that a successful brand should be seen as a key national asset and that politicians are realizing that “every nation has an identity” and “they can either seek to manage it or it will manage them” (2004: 169). Simon Anholt makes the additional point that the state brand may not be the primary brand but merely the manager of “a group of related sub-brands,” and that national brand building will always involve “the cautious and slow-moving husbandry of existing perceptions” (2002: 232). In accordance with van Ham and Olins, Anholt argues that “the competitiveness of nations and the branding of countries is the only way forward; it has become an immutable law of global capitalism” (2002: 239). 168 Olins, van Ham and Anholt are correct to situate branding as only the latest of many nation-building strategies utilized by modern nation-states, but I take issue with their claim that nation-branding should be conceptualized as both a benign and a beneficial strategy. What their arguments leave unaddressed and unchallenged is the increasing depoliticization of citizenship in all nation-states, and the delimiting of all modes of quotidian life to a branded image of community and to an illusion of choice and freedom.

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168 Simon Anholt directs Earthspeak, a strategy consultancy which advises governments and corporations on branding, cultural and ethical issues (Anholt, 2002: 229).
Nation-branding is one manifestation of what Pierre Bourdieu refers to as an unprecedented neo-conservative revolution which re-inscribes the law of the market and the law of the strongest into defining standards for all practices:

[This conservative revolution] ratifies and glorifies the rule of what we call the financial markets, a return to a sort of radical capitalism, but one that has been rationalized, tuned to the limit of its economic efficiency through the introduction of modern forms of domination (‘management’) and manipulative techniques like market research, marketing and commercial advertising (1998: 125).

Bourdieu’s observation refutes any conceptualization of nation-branding as innocuous and/or socially beneficial and, instead, affirms my critique of such a standpoint by situating branding’s management and marketing strategies as new instruments of social domination and control. Susan Curry Jansen contributes to this critique by challenging what she calls van Ham’s “false Manichean dichotomy” and a choice of “either market fundamentalism or bloody nationalism” that leaves no room for alternatives as, for example, “a form of solidarity that is secured by principles of justice, not in blood or money” (2008: 132). Curry Jansen cites Aronzcyk to argue that nation-branding and nationalism are not mutually exclusive and that, on the contrary, “nation-branding is really an updated form of nationalism” (2008: 132). She also challenges Anholt’s claim that nation-branding is “a great leveller” and source of “soft power” for small nations, arguing that “Anholt seeks to extract and purify positive elements from national stereotypes and capitalize on them by targeting Western consumers who are searching for ‘exoticism’” (2008: 133). Such an approach exacerbates existing social disparities by excluding or marginalizing those who do not or cannot participate as consumers. Olins, van Ham and Anholt all advocate “radical capitalism” and, as sought-after experts in brand management for corporates and countries alike, valorize the marketing and management strategies Bourdieu describes as “modern forms of domination” (1998: 125). While Deleuze concurs with Bourdieu to argue that “marketing is now the instrument of social control and produces the arrogant breed who are our masters,” he also highlights the role of affect and affective capture in neoliberal marketing techniques and warns, “We’re told businesses have souls, which is surely the most terrifying news in the world” (1995: 181).

Anholt affirms Deleuze’s claims when he makes the following statement regarding the marketing of Brand New Zealand: “If a country wants to improve its reputation, build personality, increase its brand, increase its footprint on the global mentality it has to create a culture of innovation in every area of national life: in civil society, in companies, in the public and private sector, in NGOs and in schools, most importantly” (Anholt, 2009).
marketers deliberately produce the impression that the feelings of affiliation and loyalty generated through brands are reciprocal and that a corporation or state operates in the best interests of its members or citizens. But this is not the case. A brand-state aims to control the population by capturing the hearts and minds of the people in the name of a pseudo-community while simultaneously securing its neoliberal agenda for global capital.

**Nation-branding as a strategy of neoliberal government**

Nation-branding epitomizes those modes of neoliberal governmentality in which, as Beller claims, “the dominant mode of production becomes the dominant mode of representation” and this representation itself exceeds representation as such, “passing into a technology for the rational production of affect and becoming part of the general cycle of production” (2006a: 137). All brands and branding mechanisms are technologies for “the rational production of affect” and, more to the point, it is the rational production of affect that underpins informational capitalism and informs the government of the social (2006a: 137). Foucault points out that it is the tactics of government that allow the continual definition of what should or should not fall within the state’s domain, “what is public and what private, what is and is not within the state’s competence” (2007: 109). Technologies of nation-branding widen the state’s domain to conflate public with private and to situate the production of every sentiment, “particularly the noblest and most disinterested” within the state’s competence and as central to neoliberal modes of representation and production (Foucault, 1977a: 153). To paraphrase Arvidsson, nation-branding performs as a biopolitical management device by means of which everyday life is managed, or programmed, so that it evolves in ways that can potentially generate the right kind of attention and hence serve as a source of surplus value and profit (2006: 7). Nation-branding makes consumers of citizens, normalizes symbolic representation as dominant modes of production and capitalizes on an already-existing image-community. That is to say, nation-branding accesses immaterial capital and extends the power of a globalized capitalist order by articulating nationhood and national identity through the fetishistic image-signs of production and consumerism. Arjun Appadurai coins the term “landscapes of images” to describe various dimensions of what he calls “imagined worlds,” or “the multiple worlds that are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe” (1996: 33). While his landscapes of images explore
certain fundamental disjunctures between economy, culture and politics in the current global economy and include “ethnoscapes,” “mediascapes,” “technoscapes,” “financescapes,” and “ideoscapes,” it is the closely related “mediascapes” and “ideoscapes” that are of particular interest here (1996: 33).\(^{170}\) The first term, ‘mediascapes’ refers to the electronic production and dissemination of information, as well as to the images of the world created by media. The second term, ‘ideoscapes,’ involves the ideas, terms and images, including “freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, representation, and the master term democracy,” that emerge from the Enlightenment worldview and that inform Western mediascapes (1996: 35-36). Mediascapes, whether produced by private or state interests, tend to be image-centred, narrative-based accounts of segments of reality, and what they offer those who experience and transform them is a series of elements “out of which scripts can be formed of imagined lives, their own as well as those of others living in other places” (1996: 35). Appadurai’s mediascapes are, in many ways, analogous to Arvidsson’s concept of media governmentality in the assemblage and maintenance of the nation-brand or brand-state.

The brand-state emerges as neoliberal government’s response to the “forces of media, technology and travel that have fuelled consumerism throughout the world and have increased the craving, even in the non-Western world, for new commodities and spectacles” (Appadurai, 1996: 40). And the brand-state must build on already-existing nation-building myths or ‘ideoscapes’ in order to produce locality and mobilize brand loyalty. Before elaborating on how brands appropriate prevailing ‘ideoscapes’ to reinforce notions of national identity and image community, I wish to connect Appadurai’s discussion of production and consumerist fetishism with the process of nation-branding.

Nation-branding facilitates the glossing of actual relations of production whereby local control, national productivity and territorial sovereignty are severely compromised by translocal capital, transnational earnings flows, global management and the use of transient or non-local workers. Appadurai divides Marx’s view of the fetishism of the commodity into two mutually supportive parts, the first he calls “production fetishism,” and the second, “the fetishism of the consumer” (1996: 42). Appadurai explains “production fetishism” as “an illusion created by contemporary transnational production loci that masks

\(^{170}\) Although this study focuses on mediascapes and ideoscapes, it is impossible to keep the various ‘scapes’ identified by Appadurai separate; they are interrelated and interconnected.
translocal capital, transnational earning flows, global management, and often faraway workers … in the idiom and spectacle of local (sometimes even worker) control, national productivity, and territorial sovereignty” (1996: 42). In other words, “production has itself become a fetish, obscuring not social relations as such, but the relations of production, which are increasingly transnational” (1996: 42). Secondly, by referring to “the fetishism of the consumer,” Appadurai means to show how the consumer has been transformed through commodity flows (and the mediascapes that accompany them) into a sign, “both in Baudrillard’s sense of a simulacrum that only asymptotically approaches the form of a real social agent, and in the sense of a mask for the real seat of agency, which is not the consumer but the producer and the many forces that constitute production” (1996: 42). For Appadurai, “these images of agency are increasingly distortions of a world of merchandizing so subtle that the consumer is consistently helped to believe that he or she is an actor, where in fact he or she is at best a chooser” (1996: 42). Aotearoa New Zealand participates in the globalized networks of a neo-colonial hierarchy, and Brand New Zealand co-ordinates the marketing of all product brands, situating the nation-state as a visible stakeholder in the global economy, especially in terms of leisure and tourism.

Brand New Zealand is nothing more than a state-managed marketing strategy and, as such, it glosses any ambivalence inherent in the very notion of ‘national identity,’ and forecloses any recognition of ‘nation’ as a site of ongoing political contestation and social struggle. Rather, nation-branding serves to reflect the prevailing socio-political reality, one in which economic power prevails to dictate all terms of identity and citizenship. In Chapter Three, I invoked Bourdieu (1984) to point out that economic power is first and foremost a power to keep economic necessity at arm’s length and that, as the objective distance from necessity grows, consumerist notions of choice, entitlement and ‘lifestyle’ legitimate capitalized identity and the market imperatives of the brand-state. This is what Melissa Aronczyk alludes to when she claims that nation-branding not only alters the cultural context in which national identity is articulated and understood, but also “affects the moral basis of national citizenship” (2008: 43). Aronczyk describes the move “to form allegiances with regard not to shared traditions and rituals, kinship and ethnicity, language or geographic proximity, but to the profit-based marketing strategies of private enterprise” as a “shift from political to ‘postpolitical’ representations of national identity” (2007:
Aronczyk encapsulates her point with the comment, “if flags set up nations as equivalents in war and diplomacy, brands and logos set up nations as equivalents in commerce and leisure” (2007: 124). However, as Aronzcyk makes clear, the ultimate responsibility for the brand’s success or failure lies neither with the marketing consultants nor with the state, but with its citizens. Citizens are expected to identify with and represent the “brand,” and are “castigated for being poor cultural ambassadors if they do not” (2009: 292). As Aronzcyk suggests, “this is where the phenomenon becomes most problematic,” because in enjoining citizens to “live the brand” and embody its values, nation-branding serves not merely as a vehicle for marketing goods or services but also as a hegemonic benchmark of ideal citizenship (2009: 293). On the one hand, nation-branding claims to offer new understandings of citizenship by breaking with the past and operating from a ‘postpolitical’ standpoint. On the other, nation-branding is an intensely political strategy because it transposes authority from elected government officials to market professionals, reducing government to a marketing, managerial function, thereby subsuming the antagonistic or political dimension of citizenship.

Nation-branding also reiterates politically embedded understandings of national identity and performs, in Aronzcyk’s words, as “a logical extension of earlier (late 19th and early 20th century) forms of social thought, cultural communication and community formation”. After claiming that debate should centre not so much on what the nation-brand reveals but more on what it obscures, Aronzcyk poses the question, “what are the consequences when ‘real’ differences – historical practices, cultural memories, conflict and disparity among

171 Of course, notions of shared traditions, kinship and ethnicity etc., articulate their own hegemonies, exclusions, obligations and repressions. Aronzcyk is paraphrasing Wally Olins who uses the term ‘postpolitical’ with reference to a new flag designed to promote Poland, describing the use of a toy kite as a symbol for its national persona as a “postpolitical” … “joyful, modern” … “break from the past” when flags had “nationalist, military or political connotations” (2007: 105). Olins’ positive uptake of the term is in stark contrast to its uptake as a pejorative description of apolitical, neoliberal society (see Jacques Ranciere, 1999, Chantal Mouffe, 2005 and Slavoj Žižek, 2009). Žižek, for example, refutes the idea that “one accepts in advance the (global capitalist) constellation” and critiques “the post-political suspension of the political, the reduction of the State to a mere police-agent servicing the (consensually established) needs of market forces and multicultural tolerant humanitarianism” (2009: 237). For Žižek, “the political act (intervention) proper” is not simply something that works well within the framework of existing relations but is something that “changes the very framework that determines how things work” (2009: 237, emphasis in original). There can be no “postpolitical suspension of the political” because all social productivity is inherently political or, as Foucault puts it, “the analysis, elaboration and bringing into question of power relations and the ‘agonism’ between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is a permanent political task inherent in all social existence” (1982: 792). Relations of power have been “progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions” but this does not and cannot totally suppress political potential and “means of escape” (1982: 793).
classes, ethnicities and forms of belief – are subsumed by the conscious differentiation of the place brand?” (2007: 124). Aronczyk’s question highlights the fact that place branding obscures socio-political reality, but I contend that narrations of national identity always conceal more than they reveal and always mobilize affective affiliation to cultivate consensus and to legitimate state sovereignty. This is well exemplified in the evolution of the tourism industry in Aotearoa New Zealand.

**Early Expressions of Destination Marketing in Aotearoa New Zealand**

Here I turn to two official accounts of tourism’s evolution, the first a book by Margaret McClure, and the second an online publication specially produced by Tourism New Zealand in recognition of the industry’s centenary 1901-2001. These works are useful not only because they celebrate the fact that the Government was a prime mover in the development of tourism but, more importantly, because by highlighting the profit-motivated, public-private co-operation that informed early liberal governmental intervention, they display the reiterative nature of the contemporary (re)turn to neoliberalism. This review of particular modes of governmentality within the tourism industry also ties in with my account of early expressions of branding and promotion in Aotearoa New Zealand and with the deterritorialization and re-territorialization of Māori territories and people (see Chapter One). In Chapter One I argued that early liberal governance, premised on a platform of British colonization, postulated humanitarian ideals but turned out to be fundamentally paternalistic and autocratic. The story of the development of tourism presents a micro-picture of that liberal governance and of the paternalistic and autocratic policies that culminated in the setting up of the world’s first national tourism organization, the Department of Tourist and Health Resorts, in 1901. McClure begins by describing how William Fox was one of the first businessmen/politicians to foresee the lucrative potential of tourism, and claims his 1874 Report to Parliament, urging the government “to take on the roles of developer and protector of this landscape” can be seen as “the founding document for the place of the government in the New Zealand tourist industry” (2004: 2). Fox’s request that the

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172 McClure’s book was commissioned by Tourism New Zealand and managed by the History Group of the Ministry for Culture and Heritage. Tourism New Zealand’s centenary publication called “One Hundred Year’s Pure Progress” is available online (Tourism New Zealand, 2001).
government act simultaneously as benefactor/protector of natural thermal wonders, and as entrepreneur, guaranteeing the investment of private capital, demonstrates the irreconcilable contradiction underlying liberal government in a capitalist political economy. Furthermore, Fox exposed the janus-faced nature of attitudes to the Treaty of Waitangi and to Māori sovereignty when he further urged the Premier, Julius Vogel, to intercede in the thermal lakes district “as soon as Native title may be extinguished” (cited in McClure, 2004: 13). Thermal resorts were the main focus of government policy because they had most potential to draw overseas visitors and at the end of the 19th century and early years of the 20th century it was those areas that were targeted by government. The story of the ‘development’ of the thermal resorts is also an account of the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of Māori communities in those regions, firstly, in terms of the appropriation of their land and, secondly, in terms of their objectification as native and exotic ‘others’ for the satisfaction of a tourist gaze.

McClure explains that “the first tourists to visit New Zealand were well-to-do members of a privileged class” who began arriving after the wars of the 1860s when “Māori resistance had been subdued and tourists followed in the wake of British imperialism to gaze on the Empire’s wonders” (2004: 8 and 9). As McClure notes, “for these visitors, their experiences of a different, more exotic people reinforced their own sense of refinement; they had come to another world to affirm their own” (2004: 13). McClure also points out that the most popular destination for these affluent visitors was the “Hot Lakes district around the Terraces and Rotorua” (2004: 10). The earliest hosts and guides in these areas were the Te Arawa people of the Rotorua district, particularly the women, who became legendary guides to the pink and white terraces (before they were destroyed in 1886), and afterwards at Whakarewarewa Reserve. Guides such as Sophia Hinerangi, Maggie Papakura and Rangatiara Dennan (Guide Rangi) were well renowned and popular with visitors for providing the warmest of welcomes to Rotorua’s thermal attractions. However, while Māori guides welcomed visitors to the thermal regions, tourists came with idealized preconceptions of an indigenous people bound to nature and were, according to McClure, “disconcerted to find that Te Arawa were entrepreneurial providers of tourist experiences, charging entry to sights and expecting payment for guiding and entertainment” (2004: 12). What comes through here is the fact that tourism is premised

173 This information is from Tourism New Zealand’s centenary publication “One Hundred Years Pure Progress” (Tourism New Zealand, 2001: 6).
upon idealized preconceptions of the exotic ‘other’ and on the problematic assumption that ‘culture’ can be preserved, packaged, marketed and consumed. Tourism emerges from a colonial mentality and an exploitative sense of entitlement that seeks to capitalize place and people. It may be debatable whether Te Arawa were subsequently fooled into having their enterprise wrested from them, or whether they became willing partners in a co-operative business enterprise, but as McClure remarks, the State showed both a determination to please tourists and “a determination to control Māori entrepreneurial practices rather than encourage them” (2004: 16). The tourism industry relies on the biopower inherent in affective or immaterial labour to add value and generate profits, but immaterial labour cannot be measured or controlled in any quantitative or rational way and must be accessed from the forces of creativity and sociality that are external to or beyond state control (see Lazzarato (2002) and Hardt (1999), Chapter Two). Although Māori guides participate in the entrepreneurial practices of the tourism industry, they are valuable to the State precisely because they retain a capacity for innovation and originality, which can also transpire as resistance to cultural constraints and normalization.

The story of Rotorua, Whakarewarewa and of the Te Arawa people epitomizes what Foucault describes as the “centralization, normalization and disciplinarization of dominant knowledges” as well as the “biopolitical regularization of behaviour” (2004: 288). It also reflects the impact of colonization (see Chapter One) and forms of biopolitical governmentality that promised freedom and equality before the law, but which worked to facilitate tourism and discipline Māori subjectivity. Parliament passed the first Thermal-springs Districts Act in 1881, legislating on the principle of reserving thermal districts for the use of the nation. However, according to McClure, the speed with which the government acted “suggests that development, rather than protection of this special area, was the chief goal of the Act” (2004: 15). In 1890, the government also obtained four to five thousand acres around Lake Rotorua (including all the best thermal springs), and Rotorua was proclaimed “a township, with a majority of government officials on its Board” (2004: 15). As McClure points out, the legislation not only pre-empted possible speculation, it also “stalled Māori participation in the future bonanza of tourism” (2004: 15). By 1891 the government owned and controlled much of the Rotorua area, but it did not gain title to Whakarewarewa, a region of Rotorua which contained several of the most popular geysers and hot springs. However, in 1893, in another example of the symbiotic and insidious relationship between the State and the Law, the Native Land Court facilitated
government control by awarding five-sixths of Whakarewarewa to those villagers who belonged to Ngāti Whakaue, thereby deterrioralizing and disempowering the villagers from other tribes (2004: 19). (I discussed earlier instances of this deterrioralization or enactment of ‘official tribalism’ in Chapter One). This was, to say the least, “a controversial judgment” because the Government knew that Ngāti Whakaue was the tribe most likely to allow this land to be purchased and, as McClure reports, “sure enough, two years later Ngāti Whakaue sold 157 acres of Whakarewarewa to the Crown” (2004: 19). Although 58 acres of Whakarewarewa remained in hapū ownership, the State exerted biopolitical control there, too, by introducing a toll-gate and charging fees from tourists who “seem never tired of watching the peculiar customs and manners of the ‘MĀORI AT HOME’” (2004: 20-21, emphasis in original). In other words, the colonial tourism industry was already targeting exoticism and profiting from the objectification and commodification of the racialized indigenous ‘other’ in the practice of everyday life. During the following years funds were poured into baths, gardens, a ‘model Māori village,’ and into making the thermal areas accessible to visitors. However, the independent Māori villages received little or no government funding or support and eventually they, too, were brought under the control of the Rotorua Town Act. By 1900 the government had wrested control from Te Arawa at Rotorua and, according to McClure, “had been able to nationalize a prime tourist asset and pioneer its development as a spa” (2004: 24). When the Department of Tourist and Health Resorts was set up in 1901 it was lauded as a world leader, the first government department ever established specifically to promote and organize the business of tourism. Its establishment reflects not only a governmental focus on health resorts, reserves and tourism, but also the first Liberal government’s overt pattern of intervention (see Chapter One).

Thomas Donne, the first Superintendent of the Department of Tourist and Health Resorts, understood tourism to be “our richest and most lasting gold-mine,” and also considered “the Māori presence at Rotorua as one of its chief tourist drawcards” (2004: 27 and 41). He tried to satisfy tourists’ desire for “a perfect picture of the primitive” by organizing, for example, regattas with war canoes and by (re)constructing an ‘authentic’ village, but

174 As the centenary publication reports, “Reflecting its original name, and the interventionist policies of the first Liberal Government, the early years focused on overseas promotion and management and development of health resorts and reserves. Many of these ‘resorts,’ such as Rotorua, Hanmer Springs and Te Aroha were transferred immediately under the Department’s control following 1901, while others were added over the ensuing years. Some 17 reserves were under its control by 1906” (Tourism New Zealand, 2001: 9).
Māori would not readily conform and many resented having their customs reinvented as a tourist commodity (2004: 41-42). As McClure explains, Donne would discover that while tourists were searching for a timeless romantic past, Māori leaders were “heading into the future” and were fundamentally opposed to providing “a daily spectacle on their home ground for European travellers” (2004: 42).175 The Tourist Department had no control over the Whakarewarewa village because it did not own the land, but it continued to intervene in the following decades, aiming to satisfy tourists by making “the Māori presence in Rotorua more attractive” (2004: 217). This meant, according to McClure, “no visible poverty or forthright comments and the provision of regular guiding and cultural performances when required” (2004: 217). Guide Rangi serves to exemplify the struggle between Tourist Department expectations and the lived reality of everyday life. For example, when tourists complained about the “assertiveness” of the older guides, especially their appearance “in ordinary dress,” guide Rangi reacted by saying she would wear traditional Māori costume only “if critics were prepared to wear the traditional dress of Old England” (2004: 215-216).

Guide Rangi also caused controversy with her forthright political comments. According to McClure, “Americans and South Africans felt they were being deliberately insulted by the outspoken commentary of guides who compared New Zealand’s political culture with the colour bar in the tourists’ home countries” (2004: 216). In spite of departmental orders that guides refrain from controversial discussions on politics, race or religion, guide Rangi “remained irrepressible” (2004: 217). As McClure notes, it was no coincidence that in 1965, when guide Rangi retired, the department introduced a set of regulations to systematise the work of these independently minded women, requiring them to wear uniforms and to work regular fulltime hours (2004: 221). Here, the State exerts biopolitical control by regulating conduct or, in Foucault’s words, by orchestrating “an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future” (1982: 790). Guide Rangi’s resistance exemplifies biopower’s inherent capacity for subversion as well as the complexity and reactionary nature of all power relations, for as Foucault reminds, “it would not be possible for power relations to exist without points of insubordination which, by definition, are means of escape” (1982: 794).

175 Although “Donne invested in measures to highlight the picturesque qualities of Māori life,” his influence and impetus was soon lost and, as McClure points out, “by 1960 both the model pa and the living village at Whakarewarewa were decrepit” (2004: 214).
Guide Rangi’s reputation and dynamic personality were sources of surplus value to the tourism industry, but they also enabled her to subvert biopolitical regularization and to challenge prevailing political attitudes. Foucault distinguishes between power relations understood as strategic games between liberties, in which some try to control the conduct of others, who in turn try to avoid allowing their conduct to be controlled, and the states of domination that people ordinarily call “power” (1997: 299). He makes the point, however, that “between the two, between games of power and states of domination, you have technologies of government … [and] the analysis of these techniques is necessary because it is often through such techniques that states of domination are established and maintained” (1997: 299). As technologies of government played out in Rotorua, Māori hapū are, on the one hand, manipulated collectively to be dispossessed of their land and so denied proprietary access to the lucrative potential of the tourist economy while, on the other, their communities, private lives and social productivity are appropriated and exploited for tourism and capital gain. McClure concludes, “While Māori were an essential feature of Rotorua’s tourist identity and history, the government had constructed this

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176 Rangitiaria Dennan, Guide Rangi, (1896-1971) was from Ngāti Tarāwhai and was a guide at Whakarewarewa, Rotorua, for over 40 years. She married William Francis Te Aonui Dennan, the only son of another famous guide, Maggie Papakura (Diamond, 2011). Image retrieved from Jacket Photo: Jack Lang, Dennan, Rangitiaria and Annabell, Ross, (1968), Guide Rangi of Rotorua, Christchurch, Whitcombe & Tombs Limited, [online] Available at: http://akhiliterature.com/authors-d/115-dennan-rangitiaria-guide-rangi-of-rotorua [Accessed 22.08.12].
identity and determined where the profits should go” (2004: 48). Official accounts celebrate the development of tourism in Aotearoa New Zealand and describe the first Liberal Government’s determination to invest in tourist-attracting landscapes, spas and exotic culture as ‘visionary,’ but the strategies deployed also bear testimony to intense state intervention and demonstrate how nation-branding and destination branding are as old as the nation-state itself.

The crucial difference between nation-branding at the turn of the 20th century and nation-branding at the turn of the 21st century is the degree to which it is utilized to articulate citizenship and to legitimate national identity. The first Department of Tourist and Health Resorts targeted wealthy overseas visitors (a total of 5,233 in 1903) and highlighted Rotorua, Hanmer, and the Hermitage as sites of interest. Subsequent Tourist Departments followed a similar trajectory using overseas expos/exhibitions, and advertising slogans like ‘NZ is Yours, Go there Now’ to attract tourists. While many Māori communities became embroiled in the cultural politics linked with tourism and tourist expectations of an exotic ‘other,’ national identity was linked more with British and Commonwealth patriotism than with tourism and a marketable reputation. In fact, McClure describes tourism in the post-war years (1946-59) as “the Cinderella of Industries” (2004: 169). She explains that there was a strong feeling that a tourist policy should serve New Zealanders first and that tourism as an industry “intruded on ordinary New Zealand life, demeaned New Zealanders with expectations of servility, and led to the loosening of legislation on liquor, gambling and entertainment” (2004: 188). Such attitudes reflect both collective conformity and egalitarian ideals, and are co-determined by the social structures and policies of a welfare state. They also reflect post-war economic hardship and a standard of living far removed from the neoliberal ‘middle-class’ sensibility that aligns ‘class’ with individual lifestyle choices and glosses actual economic disparities (see

177 In a final section of her book called “In search of authenticity,” McClure notes, “Whakarewarewa remains open to visitors but is resolutely less commercial than other Māori enterprises. The most evocative sight in the village is the ponga fence and gate built in 1997 to separate Whaka from the neighbouring Māori Arts and Crafts Institute reserve. The locked gate stands as a symbol of rivalry between local hapū and conflict with government attempts at control, and as a stark reminder that Māori life is not to be confined to picturesque concepts of the past” (2004: 277).

178 This information is from Tourism New Zealand’s centenary publication“One Hundred Years Pure Progress” (Tourism New Zealand, 2001: 10).

179 This slogan comes from an online 1973 video-recording made for Tourist & Publicity, starring Craig Scott, (The New Zealand Film Archive, 2009).
Chapter Three). While tourism may have been marketed in terms of a nation-brand, the objectives of the tourism industry were not understood to be synonymous with the ethics and values of society at large or constitutive of national identity. The conflation of national identity with nation-as-brand is directly attributable to the neoliberal conflation of social and commercial enterprise and the blurring of any conceptual boundary between ethical community and market imperatives. Since the 1980s, national identity has been re-conceptualized as a marketable commodity and, just as Māori communities were appropriated, depoliticized, and reconstructed to suit tourist expectations at the turn of the 20th century, so Brand New Zealand works now to appropriate, depoliticize and capitalize the social affiliations that underpin notions of nationhood and that attract trade, tourism and overseas investment.

“Lifting our Game – My Vision for Tourism”180

Nation-branding and tourism are inextricably linked and it is no coincidence that Prime Minister John Key is also the Minister of Tourism.181 It is also no coincidence that Key uses the sporting cliché, ‘lifting our game,’ to encapsulate his vision for tourism.

180 This is the title of the speech delivered by Prime Minister John Key to the Hotel Industry Conference 2009 (Key, 2009).

181 Premier Richard Seddon and Minister of Railways, Joseph Ward, were also closely involved in the creation and operation of Aotearoa New Zealand’s first Department of Tourist and Health Resorts in 1901, ensuring it was “linked with the Department of Industries and Commerce and shared its international focus: the pursuit of trade, tourism and overseas funds” (McClure, 2004: 22-27).
In November 2008, within two weeks of becoming Prime Minister, Key flew to London to officiate at the opening of Tourism New Zealand’s latest promotional tool, a giant inflatable Rugby Ball, which was installed in the British capital for a week to promote the 2011 Rugby World Cup and to herald the beginning of a new tourism campaign. The giant rugby ball represents far more than the promotion of the 2011 Rugby World Cup event. It performs nation-branding par excellence by aligning the intangible assets of a country, its distinctive cultural, sporting and creative characteristics, with its attraction as a tourist destination, and its trade and investment opportunities. As Simon Anholt claims, rather than focusing purely on economic issues and developing a two-dimensional brand image, of interest only to investors, tax exiles and currency speculators, “culture, heritage and sport provide the third dimension, giving places richness, dignity, trust and respect abroad,

182 The giant inflatable rugby ball measures 12 metres high, 25 metres long and 17 metres wide and while images from around Aotearoa New Zealand are projected onto its exterior both night and day, its main attraction is the “groundbreaking” and “spectacular audio visual display inside the ball” (New Zealand 100% Pure, 2008). Information and image retrieved from “Key Facts About the Rugby Ball – London,” Tourism New Zealand, November 2008, [online] Available at: http://www.tourismnewzealand.com/news-and-features/latest-tourism-news/2009/10/key-facts-about-the-rugby-ball-london/ [Accessed 22.08.12].

183 Over seven and a half thousand people visited Tourism New Zealand’s Rugby Ball venue in London, including the Queen (pictured) and the Mayor of London and many more saw Aotearoa New Zealand’s message through media coverage of the event. Image retrieved from “Photo Gallery: New Zealand’s Giant Inflatable Rugby Ball in London,” New Zealand 100% Pure, Facebook, November 27, 2008 [online] Available at: http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=48753376257 [Accessed 22.08.12].
and quality of life at home” (2005: 5). In other words, the creation of a successful nation-brand is all about building an image or reputation that produces empathetic and affective reactions in both potential visitors and New Zealand citizens. The marketing of New Zealand in terms of rugby prowess and a shared rugby tradition works to do just that because, as I argued in Chapter One, nationhood and national identity are inextricably intertwined with rugby culture and All Black mythology. In his account of the history of professional rugby in New Zealand, Gerard John Martin claims that until the 1980s “rugby (in the form of club, provincial and international matches) dominated society in New Zealand in a way that was all encompassing, suffocating and certainly disturbing” (2005: 24). Martin refers to Greg McGee’s play *Foreskin’s Lament* (1981) to make the point that many New Zealanders recall history in terms of famous matches, itineraries and key characters in the game at the time and to understand these factors to be at least as important, if not more so, than other more far-reaching issues of the day (2005: 24).

McGee’s play enables Martin to highlight and illustrate the ongoing influence of masculinist rugby culture on the national psyche. However, Martin’s primary focus is the socio-political impact of the post-1980s professional era and, in particular, the power of global media in the governance and marketing of rugby and rugby players. Martin explains how Aotearoa New Zealand’s hosting (and winning) of the inaugural Rugby World Cup coincided with the development of global media networks and with a determination by media conglomerates to attract subscribers to growing pay-TV networks (2005: 8).

Martin’s study provides a micro-picture of the neoliberal turn in Aotearoa New Zealand, and demonstrates how globalized media networks effectively usurped national and international institutions like the New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) and the International Rugby Board (IRB) by shaping the game and the administration of the game to fit global TV schedules and market imperatives. As Martin claims, “in the professional era, generating revenue drives the game itself” and the NZRFU sells opportunities for sponsors and broadcasters that make the professional game viable (2005: 102). This is what the giant Rugby Ball promotion represents. The All Blacks may be national representatives, but they are first and foremost corporate employees, marketed and on-sold

184 Michael Neill, in the Foreword to the 1995 edition of McGee’s play, writes: “So *Foreskin’s Lament* is not just a play about rugby, but (as its workshop producer, Mervyn Thompson, put it), a play about the ‘state of the nation’ AD 1980 … What Greg McGee’s play has to show us is that it was never possible to keep politics out of rugby, because in New Zealand (as in South Africa) rugby has been an expression of the *polis*” (1995: 10).
as a valuable brand. Martin explores the consequences of professional-era rugby, noting not only that sponsors and global media are capitalizing on voluntary effort, commitment and social co-operation generated in quotidian New Zealand life, but also that grassroots followers are increasingly disillusioned, and that professionalized, commercialized rugby may be killing its golden goose. Grassroots followers are becoming disillusioned because they are expected to fund the lucrative global, professional game while being denied ready access to any benefits. This is most obvious in the move of rugby away from free-to-air coverage to pay-TV because, as Martin explains, pay-per-view broadcasters now control All Black matches, and access is limited to “subscribers willing to pay for exclusive viewership, and to advertisers wanting to reach a sizeable affluent audience” (2005: 55). The reference to an ‘affluent audience’ is significant here because it speaks to a very real characteristic of consumerist society, one that classifies citizens and measures their subjective value in terms of their purchasing power and lifestyle practices (see Bauman (2005) and Bourdieu (1984), Chapters Two and Three).

McGee’s play represents the rugby culture of a particular era and, although fictional, works well in the context of Martin’s analysis of professional rugby to illustrate a transition in technologies of subjectivity, or in “the field of concerns” Foucault came to call “ethics” (Rose and Miller, 2008: 7). Foucault’s concept of governmentality links the

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185 The professional era began in 1995, marked by the creation of the SANZAR group (a combination of South Africa, Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia) which was formed with the purpose of selling TV rights for two new competitions, the domestic Super 12 and the Tri-Nations. Martin elaborates: “Negotiation of the SANZAR relationship with News Corp in 1995 was the catalyst for the advent of professionalism. This generated further commercial influences on how rugby is managed, administered, watched and played. Consequently, the significance of the NZRFU’s relationship with News Corp is almost impossible to overestimate. It was the main source of revenue for the first five years of the SANZAR and News Corp contract. By 2003 it still accounted for 50% of the NZRFU income (that was complemented by sponsorship revenue streams)” (2005: 179). Adidas sponsorship, for example, is worth an estimated $20 million a year and is valued by Adidas as a long-term relationship with the most iconic brand in world rugby; however, as Martin claims, this “relationship” with Adidas would have been impossible for the NZRFU to negotiate “if the All Blacks were not seen on television in markets desired by Adidas” (2005: 180).

186 Once the NZRFU lost control of how its major matches would be scheduled and screened, it was subsequently forced to “heighten the commercial value of matches” (2005: 218). This has included rugby law changes designed to speed up play and increase the number of tries and a transition to night rugby that maximises television audiences, despite the fact that wintry evening conditions have a negative impact on the quality of games, both for players and spectators (2005: 218). In addition, commercial imperatives dictate that Pacific Island nations like Tonga, Samoa and Fiji must be left out of the SANZAR competition, and that provincial and club level rugby in Aotearoa New Zealand is impoverished by a feeder network that encourages top players to bypass club rugby for professional franchises. Perhaps the most contentious issue concerns rugby stadia and the pressures placed on local government to not only install floodlighting and “to build exclusive seating areas to entice high-revenue corporate patrons” but to also commit ratepayers’ funds to the prerogatives of rugby, global media and corporate sponsors (2005: 218).
affective or binding elements in social interaction with ethics, with understandings of self and with discourses of freedom. Foucault explains, “I believe that the concept of governmentality makes it possible to bring out the freedom of the subject and its relationship to others – which constitutes the very stuff [matière] of ethics” (2004: 41). For Rose and Miller, technologies of subjectivity or “ethics” refer to the aims, methods, targets, techniques and criteria in play when individuals judge and evaluate themselves and their lives, and to the strategies they seek to employ to master, steer, control, save or improve themselves (2008: 7). McGee’s play confronts the “state of the nation” circa 1976, a time when long-held conventions were being challenged and politically contested (1995: 9). He explores technologies of subjectivity by pitting the “catechism of rugby” against the “rival creed” of education as, for example in the following outburst from a rugby stalwart character, “Haven’t you heard up at the univarsity [sic]? Keep politics out of sport” (1995: 16 and 40). Of course, the misspelling is deliberate and the phrasing, ‘up’ at the ‘univarsity’ signals social demarcation between those with a university education and others. McGee alludes here to understandings of ethical subjectivity built on notions of social solidarity, the Fordist work ethic and egalitarian values (see Chapter Two). However, in the turn to post-Fordist neoliberalism, ethical subjectivity is re-narrated and re-inscribed in terms of ethical consumerism, individual freedom of choice and entrepreneurial, market values.

Martin’s work, therefore, reflects technologies of subjectivity that naturalize the market imperative and evaluate ethics from an economic perspective, as exemplified by his remark that “the NZRFU should invest in the grassroots game in a way that increases its income potential for the long-term future” (2005: 222). Rugby was once the domain of amateurs and volunteers where, as Bauman states, leadership was located in local opinion and “community” was understood as collective, long-term commitment, and “as a site of equal shares in jointly attained welfare” (2001: 62). In contrast, professional rugby epitomizes an individualized ethos and marks a societal transformation in which sport and all expressions of creative and productive sociality are targeted and harnessed for surplus value and profit. Underlying this transformation are technologies of ‘self’ which reinvent social prestige and status in terms of individual wealth and media celebrity, thereby disavowing any ideal of social responsibility or public good. I am not suggesting here that the era of amateur rugby is preferable to the professional era; rather, I am pointing out, firstly, how modes of governmentality re-inscribe relations of power to transform societal
norms and, secondly, how global media networks and media conglomerates play a defining role in contemporary conceptualizations of subjectivity. The previous Chapter discussed affective value in acts of communication and surplus value emerging from the production of a social bond, a shared experience and a common world. It also examined how informational society and a diversified media environment enables marketers to not only elicit tighter and deeper relations between consumers and brands, but also to anticipate, boost and exploit socially-produced bonds of loyalty, community and connectedness. As the above discussion reveals, Tourism New Zealand’s giant Rugby Ball promotion utilizes audio-visual technologies and plays on perceived ideals of sporting tradition, pride in nationhood and enduring loyalties between Aotearoa New Zealand and Britain to add an extra dimension (culture, heritage and sport) to its nation-brand image.

Contemporary Tourism and the Politics of ‘Destination Branding’\textsuperscript{187}

The 2009 giant Rugby Ball promotion participates in a much larger nation-branding exercise, one that was launched by Tourism New Zealand in 1999 and which is pitched around the all-encompassing logo, ‘100% Pure New Zealand’.\textsuperscript{188} The politics of destination marketing involves both the production of affective affiliation and astute product positioning and, while 100% Pure New Zealand advertisements usually feature eye-catching and pristine landscapes, they also allude to the many and varied unique

\textsuperscript{187}The term ‘destination branding’ is from Morgan et al, 2003: 285.

\textsuperscript{188}A logo may work to encapsulate the brand image, but as Morgan et al explain: “It is crucial to note that the New Zealand brand (like any) is not its logo but an embodiment of values, intellect and culture. These are the unseen components, and yet they are the most important. The brand essence represents the destination’s identity, and one of its key functions is to communicate and energise those inside the organization. In sharp contrast, the tagline represents the brand position (or communication goals), and its function is to communicate with the external audience” (2002: 348). In other words, a nation-brand targets affective affiliation and aims to win the hearts and mind of the population as well as attract overseas consumers. Tourism New Zealand’s website for international media and broadcast professionals states: “When the ‘100% Pure New Zealand’ campaign was launched 10 years ago, it was seen as a revolution in tourism marketing. One year into the ‘100% Pure’ campaign, New Zealand visitor numbers were up 10% and visitor spending had risen 20%. From 1999 to 2008, arrivals went from 1.6 million to 2.4 million, and foreign exchange earnings from tourism increased from NZ$3.5 billion to NZ$5.9 billion. Today the ‘100% Pure New Zealand’ brand is one of the most highly acclaimed in the world, and is used in all New Zealand’s key markets for trade and consumer events, advertising and marketing. In 2007/8 Tourism New Zealand’s international media programme saw one billion people exposed to stories about New Zealand in print, broadcast and online. Major events like the America’s Cup, the Rugby World Cup, World of Wearable Arts (WOW) Awards, The Lord of the Rings film trilogy and the Chelsea Flower show created valuable leverage” (Tourism New Zealand, 2009).
experiences available to visitors. For example, in the sample image below, a pristine landscape is portrayed as background to the opportunity of a cycling adventure/holiday:

Figure 18 Cyclists, 100% Pure New Zealand, Tourism New Zealand 189

Aside from incorporating participation and adventure in its vacation marketing, this advertisement also speaks to contemporary social issues like ethical consumerism, environmental protection and ecological sustainability. The ‘100% Pure’ logo is particularly successful because, as an empty signifier, it is readily adaptable and can be positioned with any image of place, person or experience that marketers may want to promote under the New-Zealand-as-destination umbrella. Jodi Dean cites Žižek and Claude Levi-Strauss to describe an empty signifier as “a zero institution,” meaning “it has no determinate meaning but instead signifies the presence of meaning” (2005: 67). While Levi-Strauss originally developed the idea to explain how people with radically different descriptions of their collectivity nevertheless understand themselves as members of the same tribe, Žižek adds insight into how the nation designates the unity of society in the face of radical antagonism and the irreconcilable divisions and struggles between classes (cited in Dean, 2005: 67). An ideal logo or image attracts viewer attention but its power

189 Tourism New Zealand, cyclists, 2009, 100% Pure New Zealand Campaign, image retrieved from Google, “100% Pure New Zealand” images page 5, [online] Available at: http://www.google.co.nz/search?q=100%25+pure+new+zealand+images&hl=en&sa=G&biw=756&bih=554&prmd=imvns&tbnid=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&ei=zyKSTrOjLpCkiAfD053mDQ&ved=0CCEQsAQ [Accessed 04.10.09].
lies in its lack of precision and its open-endedness, its ability to resonate meaningfully without closing off interpretative possibilities. For example, as Morgan et al explain, while “100% Pure New Zealand” is the main tag-line of the campaign and is primarily associated with “awesome sights, breathtaking vistas, indelible experiences,” it has also been extended and adapted to include such lines as “100% Pure Romance,” “100% Pure Spirit,” and “In Five Days You’ll Feel 100 per cent” (2002: 348). The whole marketing campaign situates Aotearoa New Zealand as a young or ‘new’ country and the theme of “100 per cent” and “pure” is echoed in all promotional material, “with the scenery, its wines and foods, its people and its experiences being seen as being untainted, unadulterated, unaffected and undiluted” (2002: 348). The “100% Pure New Zealand” campaign serves to incorporate and extend earlier promotions of a clean, green, exotic and new destination (see Chapter One). Morgan et al also point out how promotions situate the pristine beauty of the landscape as something “diametrically opposite” to that experienced on a daily basis by many of the country’s visitors who, they say, live in some of the world’s most “overpopulated and polluted countries” (2002: 348). The landscape may be ‘diametrically opposite’ to that usually experienced by many visitors, but it is also ‘diametrically opposite’ to that experienced on a daily basis by the majority of New Zealanders, most of whom live in cities, smaller in scale but not dissimilar to those of the ‘overpopulated and polluted countries’.  

In addition, the image of a pristine unspoiled landscape masks severe pollution problems and continuing ecological degradation (see, for example, the previous Chapter on the pollution of waterways from dairy farming effluent). Tourism New Zealand competes in a burgeoning global tourist industry in which it is becoming increasingly necessary for destinations to promote an image that is both unique

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190 The NZ Department of Internal Affairs website informs: “By world standards, New Zealand is a highly urbanised nation, with 72 percent of the population living in the 16 main urban areas — around 33 percent of the population live in the Auckland urban region alone. We are overwhelmingly ‘townies’ — nearly 87 percent of us live in urban areas with populations ranging from around 1000 to more than one million” (The New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, 2008).

191 On 14 November 2009, the Otago Daily Times reprinted an article by Fred Pearce of The Guardian, in which he accused Aotearoa New Zealand of unjustifiably trading on a “clean, green 100% pure” image when its emissions record is abysmal. Pearce is quoted as saying that 12 years ago, when the Kyoto Protocol was signed, “New Zealand secured a generous Kyoto target, which simply required it not to increase its emissions between 1990 and 2010. But the latest UN statistics show its emissions of greenhouse gases up by 22%, or a whopping 39% if you look at emissions from fuel burning alone”. Pearce claimed that a “commercial greenwash” is being used to promote both tourism and dairy exports and that the national marketing strategy was underpinned by a survey showing that tourism would be reduced by 68% if the country lost its prized “clean, green image,” and that international purchases of its dairy products could halve (Pearce, F., 2009).
and affectively appealing. According to Morgan et al, Tourism New Zealand meets this requirement by highlighting, firstly, a “unique Māori heritage” and, secondly, “eco/adventure-based” experiences aimed at “energising the traveller,” thus appealing to what is described as the “real travel and special interests segment” of the tourist market (2002: 345). A nation-state cannot be branded and marketed as a new commodity, but must work with existing perceptions and build on positive images while masking or eliding negative ones. As discussed in Chapter One, and as Peter van Ham explains, states have always used the best and newest technologies in their pursuit of legitimacy and power and “place branding therefore stands in a long tradition of innovations in statecraft and advances in the application of social power” (2010: 137). Therefore, as van Ham states, “against this historical backdrop it becomes clear that the emerging brand state is not a brand new state, but a political player promoting itself more assertively than before … now even more efficient/clean/democratic/liberal” (2010: 137). In their study of “tourism imagery and ideology” in Aotearoa New Zealand, Irena Ateljevic and Stephen Doorne compare tourism at the turn of the 20th century with tourism today, and claim that contemporary tourism reiterates colonial ideology to serve as both a political agent for colonization and as an arena for displaying social identity and marking social differentiation (2002: 662). They note, for example, that while representations of Māori and Māori culture continue to “lend an exotic flavour to the overall place experience” of contemporary tourists, “the reality of Māori as largely urbanized people suffering high levels of intergenerational unemployment, poverty, and incarceration rates are carefully avoided by the contemporary tourism discourse” (2002: 660 and 662). Of particular significance to Ateljevic and Doorne is the fact that class differentiation based on the political and economic capital of production has given way to consumption and to the rise of a “new bourgeoisie within the contemporary cultural economy” (2002: 650). The

192 For example, The Rough Guide to Māori New Zealand states “In Nelson you can visit the marae of the local Whakatu Iwi ($100), devote a few hours to learning the haka ($90), spend the day learning Māori ways of gathering seafood ($100) or combine one of these with a hangi and overnight stay on the Marae ($650). Alternatively head out to the hills nearby to experience harakeke weaving ($70), where, under the experienced eye of Arohanui Rōpata, you should end the session with some flax flowers and small baskets” (Whitfield et al., 2004: 83).

193 Ateljevic and Doorne explain that although travel in the 19th century was a privilege of the affluent elite, the Colonial government recognized the economic potential of tourism development, perceiving it as “an effective agent for the stimulation of the ‘perfect’ immigration of investment and capital” (2002: 653).

194 The contemporary cultural economy reinvents Māori culture both as a marketable commodity in the narration of bicultural nationhood and as a symbol of social conflict and potential threat to national security. This matter is discussed in depth in Chapter Five.
cite Featherston, Bourdieu, and others to point out that in advanced capitalist economies the “culture of consumption” is characterized in terms of “what we buy” and “where we go away” and, in this context, leisure and tourism have become important arenas for the construction and articulation of identity, for signaling taste and position in society, and for acquiring cultural capital (2002: 662).

While leisure and tourism offer an emerging middle class or ‘new bourgeoisie’ the opportunity for acquiring social status and cultural capital, they also reiterate and perpetuate a social hierarchy and a specific set of values and expectations associated with the colonial era. After reviewing a wide body of literature and perspectives on the issue of tourism, Malcolm Crick concludes that “the world of tourism is rife with the class distinctions of our everyday world,” and that “international tourism is doubly imperialistic,” not only because “it makes a spectacle of the Other, making cultures into consumer items,” but also because tourism is “an opiate for the masses in the affluent countries themselves” (1989: 334). That is to say, Brand New Zealand presents a particular mediascape, an idealized worldview from which people conjure imagined lives and an imagined national identity and according to which affluent citizens justify consumerist values and cultivate a sense of entitlement with regard to leisure and tourism. As discussed in Chapter Three, cultural capital symbolizes distance from necessity and from those trapped within it, and a sense of entitlement implies a claim to a legitimate superiority over those who remain dominated by ordinary interests and urgencies (Bourdieu, 1984: 54-55).

Mowforth and Munt echo Crick by explaining the phenomenon of tourism in terms of “a new class of tourist,” and of a turn to ‘lifestyle’ culture in which the consumption of holidays assumes an increasingly significant role in both “stocking up on cultural capital” and in “building a reputation that can be converted into economic capital” (2009: 125-126). Mowforth and Munt also argue that tourism reiterates global class distinctions, noting that “the majority of the world’s tourists are from the industrialized countries: 57 per cent from Europe, 16 per cent from North America,” and that “80 per cent of all international travellers are nationals of just 20 countries” (2009: 54).195

195 They also point out that most of the money generated by tourism is sent abroad (for example, 60 per cent of Thailand’s $4 billion a year tourism revenue leaves the country), and that although tourism usually promises to provide employment to the local community, “the jobs are most often unskilled, menial and poorly paid” and “more often than not, the needs and rights of indigenous peoples are ignored” (2009: 54).
In other words, the tourism industry participates in a global structure in which affluent Western countries dictate the terms and conditions under which individual nation-states can be involved. Nation-branding works to secure and advance neoliberal ideology in the global imaginary, and not only reinforces existing exploitation and inequality but also symbolically reinforces the notion of a “natural hierarchy of nations” within the world order (Roy, 2007: 572). At stake here is burgeoning middle-class subjectivity, the reinvention of parameters of state citizenship according to an international culture of consumption and the normalization of social inequality both within and across nation-states. With a total population of less than five million and a GNP (Gross National Product) far below that of Australia, Canada, Ireland and, of course, the United Kingdom, Japan or the USA, Brand New Zealand represents a niche tourist market and exploitable economic potential to more affluent and powerful operators in the global neoliberal project. I argue, therefore, that Aotearoa New Zealand participates as a bit-player or junior partner in a global hierarchy of nation-states and that the enthusiastic uptake of nation-branding and the capitalization of leisure and tourism indicate complicity with, and subservience to, a wider neoliberal agenda.

196 This claim is well borne out by ‘The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index’ which provides an analytical ranking of the world’s nation-brands. The Index confirms “a natural hierarchy of nations” by including only 50 countries of the more than 190 countries belonging to the United Nations and, as Anholt reports, “within the top 10 most positively perceived countries, the ranking reveals a strong correlation between a nation’s overall brand and its economic status” (Nation Branding, 2008). New Zealand is No 17 in the Nation Brands Index as of 2008 and Anholt, commenting on Brand New Zealand’s performance, notes that it performs “spectacularly well in tourism – no 4 on the planet”. Anholt further explains: “The Nation Brands Index points to market potential, to goodwill, there’s a reservoir of interest, fascination and goodwill out there.” As he explains, “wanting to visit the country is a proxy for a lot of other things, it means I love the look of it, I love the feel of it, I love the sense of the sort of place it is, it is kind of my ideal country. Now, vicariously, you can sell that fascination in the products. If NZ products were felt to carry some of the magic of that brand they would, all other things being equal, be more saleable than the same product coming from Guatemala. Because a good brand is like a magnet – it both attracts and confers magnetism. Magnets create order out of chaos. Magnets create consistency and coherence among the stakeholders of the nation” (Anholt, S., 2009).

197 As of 2011, as stated on the Immigration New Zealand website, the population of Aotearoa New Zealand is “over 4.4 million” [Online] New Zealand govt.nz, Available at: http://www.dol.govt.nz/immigration/knowledgebase/item/4026 [Accessed 18.03.12].

As at 2005, a distribution graph of the GNP (Gross National Product) of more than two hundred countries situates Aotearoa New Zealand 44th in a list of 224 countries. The USA is 1st, Japan 2nd, Great Britain 5th, Canada 9th, Australia 13th and Ireland 35th (GNP, 2005). [Online] GNP – Gross National Product @ Countries of the World, 2005. Available at: http://www.studentsoftheworld.info/infopays/rank/PNB2.html [Accessed 18.03.12].
Reality Television, Lifestyle Culture and National Identity

So far, I have discussed the concept of nation-branding as a key aspect of neoliberal government and examined the reiterative processes involved in inventing and re-inventing national identity, using as exemplar the development of tourism and Brand New Zealand. I have argued that nation-branding and tourism not only reflect burgeoning middle-class lifestyle culture, but also continue a neocolonial discourse of capitalist exploitation and Western hegemony. In her analysis of nation-branding and neocolonial relations of power, Ishita Sinha Roy claims that although “the nation-brand is constituted as a symbolic substitute for a ‘real’ community that is, in turn, an ideological construct, this semiotic construction has material effects in how a nation is perceived within the global order” (2007: 570). Roy invokes the American Reality TV series Worlds Apart to demonstrate how third-world countries are represented as production and service centres for affluent Western countries and how these embedded perceptions underpin the materialist lifestyle culture celebrated and promoted as brand-America (2007: 582). She explains that, in Worlds Apart, an American family performs “as a microcosm of the nation” in a tourist capacity, while ‘other’ cultures provide a point of difference and comparison by being fixed within the rubric of backwardness and underdevelopment (2007: 578). According to Roy, this interaction with, and experience of, “native authenticity” or “primitiveness” represents cultural capital in Western media, where survival and hardship are not part of daily life but are “consumed as the dramatic components of reality television shows” (2007: 578). Roy claims that “compare-and-contrast” strategies symbolically reduce difference to neo-colonizing binaries (First World/Third World, self/other, white/black, culture/nature) and that the show’s scripting works to uphold America’s role in taking “worlds apart” and, following Appadurai, in encapsulating the ‘other’ to form one ‘image

198 Roy explains: “Worlds Apart (NGC, 2003) follows American families, on a 10-day survival camp, among indigenous groups in remote Third World villages. The three episodes informing the main analysis in this article are ‘Katonah, NY meets India,’ ‘East Brunswick, NJ meets Kenya’ and ‘Travers City, MI meets Guyana’. The show follows a structural formula: disjuncture, culture shock, assimilation and introspection, during which the participants reveal what’s been learned from the experience. Subsequently, the return home is accompanied by self-discovery and a renewed appreciation for family and nation” (2007: 572).

199 Roy points out that it is difficult to insist on ‘nativeness’ when the ‘natives’ speak English and know the logos and brands of Western corporate culture, even though in many cases they cannot afford the products. As Roy contends, “what this forces us to confront is the poverty-as-difference that the neocolonial discourse hides behind the fetishized surface of culture-as-difference” (2007: 587-588).
community’ (2007: 570 and 586). In other words, according to the format of this show, brand-America earns special kudos because “the American people are willing to venture out of their comfort zone and establish an extended family-community or ‘global village’ with the rest of the world” (2007: 589). While participant American families may benefit from interaction with ‘other’ cultures, Worlds Apart uses “visual fetishism” (images of tribal rituals, taboo food, extreme poverty) to mark ‘difference’ rather than commonality, and to communicate that what is of ultimate value is the “privileged economic lifestyle that allows such cultural consumption” (2007: 581).

 Worlds Apart re-inscribes cultural imperialism through contrived media images and, as Roy points out, viewers participate vicariously in this knowledge-making process, “while the ideological basis of such ‘edu-tainment’ supports nation-building, making the American viewer feel ‘at home’ in the world” (2007: 579).

An equivalent Aotearoa New Zealand reality TV series called Intrepid Journeys (2003-2009), catalogues the journeys of well-known New Zealanders as they travel in remote destinations, and demonstrates not only how television naturalizes lifestyle culture but also how local ‘celebrities’ serve as role-models in the narration of ‘kiwi’ identity. TVNZ website informs: “Intrepid Journeys has encouraged well-known New Zealanders to step aboard planes bound for exotic locales, but they must leave the comforts of the first world behind and embrace the adventures that await in the developing world. This award-winning TV One series celebrates how that small step can be a giant leap … Intrepid Journeys is about being open to sharing the simple realities of life in the developing world with ordinary people. That can mean no running water or hot showers, a bed that looks suspiciously like a floor and food of indeterminable origin” (Intrepid Journeys, 2009).

 Worlds Apart and Intrepid Journeys are equivalent to the extent that they both use an edu-tainment format to constitute travel and tourism as a valuable source of cultural capital and

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200 For Roy, Worlds Apart works to construct an “image community” by implying that “a family-of-nations is possible if America goes to other places and makes ‘personal’ contact (albeit through its cultural products and mass media, or even military occupation). It suggests that, if other nations see and ‘know’ the American people through such an exchange, unequal as it may be, they will realize that Americans are well meaning” (2007: 588).

201 Roy explains that “in Marxist terms, the commodity fetish heralds the triumph of appearance over the material conditions of production” and that within global capitalism, the fact that the commodity culture that defines First World brand-states is supported by Third World labour remains invisible to the Western gaze (2007: 575). A culture-as-difference fetish masks and normalizes poverty-as-difference.

202 TVNZ website also informs that Intrepid Journeys was the the winner of Best NZ Popular/Factual/Unscripted Programme – Qantas Television Awards 2005.
both deploy neo-colonizing binaries of First World/Third World, self/other, to narrate fetishized forms of cultural difference. While *Worlds Apart* attempts to represent ‘American’ as a family unit in these contrived cultural exchanges, *Intrepid Journeys* focuses on the exploits of nationally-recognizable celebrities, thereby representing ‘New Zealander’ in terms of an independent, pioneering spirit and of an intrepid individual. In episode 7 of the 2009 series, for example, Judy Bailey travels overland through Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay.  

Bailey’s comments during her first day in Rio de Janeiro provide ample evidence of Western attitudes that inform lifestyle culture, legitimize middle-class good conscience and, as Roy argues, naturalize a “neo-colonial hierarchy of nations arranged according to their economic and political clout” (2007: 570). Bailey begins, “Although I’ve travelled quite a lot, I’ve never been to South America,” thereby immediately naturalizing travel, tourism and lifestyle culture, while simultaneously offering ‘viewers’ vicarious experience of the other. Bailey then captures the ethos and aims of this reality TV programme by announcing that although her journey is challenging and “covers three huge countries in 17 days” she knows “being an intrepid kiwi” that she will manage it. The term ‘intrepid kiwi’

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203 The episode of *Intrepid Journeys* in which Judy Bailey travelled to South America screened on TV One, Tuesday, 11 September 2009, at 8.30 pm. Judy Bailey is a former newsreader for TVNZ. She hosted the 6 pm Network News, the highest rated evening television news programme in Aotearoa New Zealand, for 18 years and attracted such a following she has been called the “Mother of the Nation” (NZ On Screen, 2011). Bailey’s contract with TVNZ ended in 2005 after there was a public outcry when it became known that she was being paid an $800,000 salary (ONE News, 2005). This was at a time when, according to the World Socialist website, the average wage-earner’s salary was $30,000 (Gordon, M. and Braddock, J., 2006). While Bailey’s exorbitant salary and ‘celebrity’ status may be exceptional, many of the hosts on *Intrepid Journeys* are or were broadcast journalists, highlighting the crucial role of media exposure in the construction of ‘celebrity’.

conjures long-held notions of independence, individualism, tenacity and boldness (as embodied in national heroes like Sir Edmund Hillary) and so works to (re)invent the settler mentality which is, in turn, linked with the colonial project. However, *Intrepid Journeys* enunciates ‘intrepid kiwi’ through tourist paradigms and (re)presents a world discovered (or even created) and marketed by entrepreneurs for self-interested consumers. Tourism is, as Crick argues, “a form of experience packaged to prevent real contact with others” and is about “our culture”, lifestyle culture, “not about their culture or our desire to learn about it” (1989: 314). *Intrepid Journeys* constructs a mediascape, a space in which narrators (like Judy Bailey) produce scripts of imagined lives, for themselves as well as for audiences watching from elsewhere. During her first day in Rio de Janeiro, for example, Bailey notes the stark demarcation between rich and poor, explaining “You’ve got these amazing five-star hotels right next door to a favela, the local slums”. She also explains that “you can actually do tours of the favelas,” and the cameras then show her visiting a favela-dweller called Maria and being shown through her home. While Bailey claims that she “wants to see a bit deeper, behind the façade of the favelas,” her comments reveal more about her own values and priorities than they do about either the causes and conditions of slum life or the implications associated with re-inventing favelas as a tourist attraction. For example, for Bailey, “the really interesting thing about the favelas is that they have the best views in town” because “the wealthy people have chosen to live on the lower slopes”. Secondly, after noting that “despite being squatters here, favela dwellers like Maria have sorted out electricity, phone and internet supply,” she concludes that “behind the infamy for drugs, guns and crime, the favelas are just places where poor people are getting on with their lives”. So, in getting behind the “façade of the favelas,” Bailey highlights good views and access to electricity, phone and internet as pointers towards normalcy. By buying into the façade of tourist images of favelas, Bailey allows actual socio-economic deprivation and disparity to be subsumed while its simulacrum is consumed as both a dramatic component of reality television and as intercultural exchange invested with cultural capital for Bailey herself.

In the marketing of favela as tourist attraction, poverty-as-difference becomes culture-as-difference and, in an excellent example of the capitalization of life itself, lived realities are obscured behind symbolic activities, ‘deprivation’ and ‘struggle’ are reinscribed as ‘native’ and ‘authenticity,’ and the ethical surplus of everyday life is appropriated for profit. Bauman explains how, in an ethical shift “from equality to multiculturalism,”
contemporary indifference to difference is theorized as recognition of “cultural pluralism” and is justified as liberal tolerance and “care for the communities’ right to self-assertion and public recognition of their chosen (or inherited) identities” (2001: 107). This multicultural approach works effectively as “a recasting of inequalities” (which are unlikely to command public approval) to “cultural differences,” which are posited as something to cherish and obey (2001: 107). In Bauman’s words, “the moral ugliness of deprivation is miraculously reincarnated as the aesthetic beauty of cultural variety” (2001: 107). The important point here is that all bids for cultural recognition are “toothless unless sustained by the practice of redistribution,” and any communal assertion of cultural distinctiveness brings little consolation for those who, “courtesy of the increasingly unequal division of resources, have their ‘choices’ made for them” (2001: 107). (This issue is particularly relevant to articulations of bicultural nationhood and Māori identity in Aotearoa New Zealand and is taken up again in Chapter Five.) When favelas serve as a tourist attraction, and media technology is utilized to glean value from affective labour and social productivity, any affinity between tourist and slum-dweller is contrived and disingenuous. As Crick argues: “If tourism commoditizes cultures, natives categorise strangers as a resource or a nuisance rather than as people” (1989: 329). Crick concludes that, in short, in this sort of representation, tourists enact “leisure imperialism” and the “hedonistic face of neo-colonialism” (1989: 323). Although these reality television shows operate on a premise of cultural interaction, the focus is not on the places and people being visited and how this experience may affect them, but more on the celebrity guests who are (re)constructing their own identity by assimilating (and being seen to assimilate) otherness. As Roy explains, the traveller distances himself/herself from the “tediously familiar” experiences of home and seeks novelty in the location of the ‘Other’ but, at the same time, transforms the foreign space into the familiar territory of ‘home’ (2007: 585). The whole premise of a programme like *Intrepid Journeys*, that is, the notion of overseas travel as a taken-for-granted opportunity for adventure and leisure, underscores the privileged position of the viewer, especially for example, with respect to Bailey’s visit to slums or favelas. And Judy Bailey, as TV’s ‘mother of the nation,’ contributes to the process of nation-building by negotiating ‘foreign spaces’ for and on behalf of broadcast television audiences.

Television is integral to the production of nation as imagined community, interacting with public-private entities, corporate and volunteer, to disseminate acceptable ways of
belonging, of managing differences and of participating as citizens in the practice of everyday life (see Deleuze and Guattari (1988) and Beller (2006a), Chapter Two). In a neoliberal context, television serves as cheerleader for the nation-brand, narrating a politics of community in which ethics and economy are inextricably linked, and through which the image-based world of lifestyle culture and consumerist values takes priority. Here I turn again to Ouellette and Hay and their study of reality TV in order to demonstrate how an individualized, post-welfare society re-articulates responsible citizenship and national identity through strategies of media governmentality. And, as promised in Chapter Three, this discussion will highlight the media strategies that link notions of self-responsibility and ethical community with the ‘freedom’ of personal philanthropy and volunteerism. Ouellette and Hay uphold the thrust of this thesis by situating welfare reform within changing stages of liberalism and by noting not only that “welfare states have historically been deeply contradictory,” but also that government (re)inventions never make a complete break with the past, “for residual and emerging techniques of governing converge and sometimes collide in TV’s charity productions” (2008: 39). Charity TV reinvents the roles of charity workers, social workers, and welfare case managers, and is the latest manifestation of various strategies of liberal governmentality that seek to manage and control poverty while leaving underlying social inequalities unaddressed and unchallenged. In summary, as they argue, “Do-good TV does not hide the ‘truth’ about the changing state of welfare as much as it literally reconstitutes it as a new and improved product of private initiative” (2008: 40). Reality TV modifies residual notions of social welfare by situating social service within the logic of the commercial market and by organizing social action through the neoliberal filter of consumer choice and individual responsibility, whether that be in terms of what products to consume or what charity to support.

Charity TV and Telethon

Charity TV addresses social service as a community-building exercise, aligning with corporate sponsors and non-profit organizations to mobilize fund-raising and attract

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205 Beller claims that “the development of a media-environment that functions as the mise-en-scène for capitalist production via social cooperation – engineered both culturally and by the deployment of military hardware – short circuits, as it were, traditional forms of subjectivity (experience) and of objectivity (events, collective knowledge, reality)” (2006a: 265). He argues that “Capitalism turns empathy into television and humans into images” (2006a: 274).
volunteer participation in the name of a worthy cause. The coverage and promotion of a worthy cause on television, especially if it addresses an international humanitarian crisis, often takes the form of what Keith Tester refers to as “a scripted morality play” (2001: 92). According to this script, a crisis arrives “with the suddenness and power of an earthquake,” even though causes are often social and historical events; international aid agencies and Western relief operations arrive as heroes to deliver aid where it is most needed; and United Nations bureaucrats are cast as villains for not mobilizing in time or failing to resist the demands of local war lords or dictators (2001: 92-93). Tester cites Hammock and Charny (1996) to claim that in the continual replaying of these “morality story conventions” the script transforms the social and historical into the natural in three ways. First, the script tends to view all emergencies as if they were disasters, the disaster is transformed into a logistical exercise in humanitarian relief, and the news becomes the speed and efficiency of the relief effort. Second, the script casts “a halo over every relief agency” and, third, the script naturalizes the asymmetrical power relationships in First World/Third World binaries (as outlined earlier with regard to tourism) (2001: 92-94).

Telethons perform this ‘morality play’ at a micro-level as, for example, in the case of the Big Night In Telethon, where the play scripts a crisis within the ‘national community,’ focuses on the relief effort, casts a halo over TV3 and KidsCan Charity Trust, and naturalizes poverty in the social imaginary. The telethon media-event functions as a strategy of media governmentality, operating outside the State but doing the work the State no longer has to do. That is to say, social service is deterritorialized as a state priority or public service, and reterritorialized in a private capacity. In the case of the Big Night In Telethon, it is not the State, but a media network and a charitable trust that decides who participates and who benefits from the telethon fundraiser. To paraphrase Ouellette and Hay, the aim of the Big Night In Telethon media-event was to provide relief that would benefit children marked as poor, deprived. This did not mean channelling resources into

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206 Keith Tester defines Telethon as: “a television and/or radio appeal on behalf of a charity or a range of charities. Telethons involve lengthy broadcasts (often of 24 hours) and are invariably aimed at raising funds for specific concerns, e.g. child poverty, famine, flood relief and so forth. Telethon broadcasts are invariably fronted by celebrities and involve the audience, engaging in allegedly ‘fun’ pursuits. Telethons are usually justified on the grounds that, ‘it is all in a good cause’” (2001: 139). Earlier telethons were more ‘amateur’ and community-based, without corporate sponsorship or conspicuous corporate involvement and reflect an era, before neoliberalism, when broadcast television was state-owned and imbued with a public service mandate. The declining popularity of the telethon concept reflects the impact of global television networks on national audiences. Telethons have not featured regularly on TVNZ schedules since the 1970s and 1980s but the format re-appeared in August 2009 when the KidsCan StandTall Charitable Trust collaborated with CanWest’s TV3 to produce the Big Night In Telethon in aid of “Kiwi Kids living in poverty” (ODT Big Night In, 2009).
state and local government bodies; any role of the public sector in both preventing and resolving poverty was absent in the telethon format. Instead, the TV3 promoters channelled energy and resources into assisting a local non-governmental private charity organization. Other storylines stressed the role of both corporate goodwill and individual volunteerism in the relief of poverty, and contained an underlying message that the private sector is doing good work, rather than waiting around for the government to do it (2008: 54).

Brett Nicholls links the Big Night In Telethon with Aotearoa New Zealand media’s “preoccupation with national identity,” and with systems of representation through which the “cultural multiplicity of New Zealand” is packaged and circulated “in the form of a diverse but united People (a singular subject)” (2009: 6). Nicholls explains that, as an example of a ‘conventional’ media event, The Big Night In Telethon functions on three levels. He notes, first of all, that the event is sanctioned on the premise of a “noble cause,” thereby activating both the ethical surplus immanent in productive sociality, and the capacity for imagining community and building a common that underpins notions of nationhood and informs a national mediascape (2009: 8). As Nicholls claims, “the sentimental register makes this a zero degree position (who would not want to alleviate poverty!)” (2009: 8). Secondly, the ‘event’ disseminates pure ideology, promoting corporate branding and commercial enterprise under the auspices of a national concern (as epitomized in the enthusiastic participation of Prime Minister, John Key, and prominent sponsorship from ASB, for example) (2009: 8). However, as Nicholls points out, while corporate enterprise enacts responsible citizenship and ethical nationhood (“we want poverty to end too!”), no mention is made either of the systemic causes of poverty or of how this social ‘crisis’ might be resolved (2009: 8). As he observes, “In this confrontation with poverty it is striking how the hegemony of the capitalist corporation is maintained” (2009: 8). I would argue that it is capitalist corporate enterprises that can profit most from

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207 This information comes from an unpublished paper called “Beyond Empire” presented to the Media, Film and Communication Department, University of Otago, 18 August 2009. For related reading see Nicholls, B., 2011.

208 According to its website, “the ASB Group of Companies is one of the largest providers of financial and insurance services in New Zealand.” It includes ASB Bank Ltd, ASB Securities Ltd, ASB Group Investments Ltd, Bank Direct, Sovereign and Commonwealth Bank (ASB, 2009).
a burgeoning charity industry and present the following account and investigation of the operations of the Charitable Trust driving *The Big Night In Telethon* as a case in point.

The KidsCan StandTall Charitable Trust was founded in 2005 and states as its mission: “To meet the physical and nutritional needs of disadvantaged New Zealand children to assist them in reaching their full potential in life”. It also states: “Our vision is of a New Zealand where less fortunate children have an opportunity to make a positive contribution to society”. The Trust’s vision of “a New Zealand” in which the less fortunate can “make a positive contribution to society” reveals neoliberal attitudes which situate poverty not as a systemic indictment on state policy but as the result of personal choice and as a sign of flawed consumers and potential criminality (see Chapter Three). In its 2009 Annual Report, the Trust states its initiatives “currently support the education of more than 39,000 children in 183 low decile schools across New Zealand ensuring they get through the school gate in a better position to learn”. It also states, “We now have more than 15,000 children in 110 low decile schools across New Zealand waiting for our support” (2009: 5). On the face of it, it would seem that the Trust is filling a social need and using the funding it receives to improve lives and make a social difference. On closer inspection, however, the Trust provides marketing opportunities for its various “Platinum Partners” (Number 1 Shoes, the New Zealand Rugby Union, The Warehouse Limited, TV3, for example) and secures prestigious careers for its professional staff, but falls far short of meeting the needs of disadvantaged children.

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209 These statements are quoted directly from the KidsCan StandTall Charitable Trust Annual Report 2009, page 3, and all other information, statistics and financial statements used above are taken from this Report (KidsCan Annual Report, 2009).

210 The New Zealand Ministry of Education website explains that “a school’s Decile indicates the extent to which it draws its students from low socio-economic communities. Decile 1 schools are the 10% of schools with the highest proportion of students from low socio-economic communities. Decile 10 schools are the 10% of schools with the lowest proportion of these students” (Ministry of Education, 2009).
For example, the Report states that KidsCan StandTall provides thousands of free Adidas All Blacks raincoats to children from low income families each year, ensuring thereby that “they arrive at school warm, dry and in a better position to learn”. The Report also claims that these raincoats have “boosted their self-esteem, pride in their school and attendance in the process”. As it is likely to be the All Blacks logo on the raincoats that “boosts self-esteem” (and only on a superficial basis), and as these children attend Decile 1 schools, such claims disavow the raincoat as branded commodity and the fetish it produces. The branded raincoats represent, as Appadurai puts it, both “production fetishism” (masking transnational production and third world labour) and “the fetishism of the consumer” (masking lack of agency and contrived choice) (1996: 42). In other words, the raincoat-giving exercise works effectively to situate altruism as antidote to commodification and consumerism.  

Because the objectives of *The Big Night In Telethon* are to maximize audiences and boost ratings for the television network, the issue of ‘kiwi kids living in poverty’ is sidelined while the programme focuses on the participation and input from presenters, sponsors and volunteers. In a TVNZ newsclip of sponsors dispensing goods in a school classroom, the narrator informs, “KidsCan has a high profile in New Zealand; it’s even the charity of choice for the All Blacks. The ambassador is lock, Ali Williams.” Furthermore, to paraphrase Žižek, by showing a capacity for care and participating in a collective project for charity, both participating All Blacks and contributing firms are seen to fulfil their ethical duty (2009: 54). According to Žižek, “This is how capitalism, at the level of consumption, integrated the legacy of ’68, the critique of alienated consumption: *authentic* experience matters” (2009: 54).
group of school children sitting watching as Ali Williams pulls clothing from a carton and, at the same time, announcing, “And for everybody in the school, a new, brand new raincoat.” This moment is significant for several reasons. First, the All Black’s ‘celebrity’ image equates here with social responsibility and dutiful citizenship. Ouellette and Hay explain that celebrities (well-known figures) are called upon to enunciate volunteerism as civic obligation and TV viewers, in turn, are encouraged to seek to fulfil their own civic obligation by supporting the organizations and charities featured (2008: 55). Dutiful citizenship and brand marketing are thus intertwined. The fact that KidsCan is ‘the charity of choice’ for the All Blacks reiterates the linking of affect-value and affective capture with brand image, as discussed in Chapters Two and Three. The All Blacks ‘brand’ gains ethical surplus through its association with a ‘noble cause’ and, in turn, the appearance of the All Blacks enhances telethon’s image as a ‘national’ fund-raiser. Another issue arising from this clip is the fact that “everybody in the school” is being given a raincoat (marked with the All Black logo). This suggests that every student qualifies as a ‘kiwi kid living in poverty,’ and not only marks students, a school and locality as other (flawed consumers), but also makes use of the State’s decile grading system to legitimate and advance the Trust’s agenda. In a fine example of neoliberal governmentality, the Ministry of Education reduces its accountability to a managerial function, transferring authority for redress from elected government officials to market professionals who then target ‘poverty’ as a marketable commodity and generator of ethical surplus and affect-value. It could be that this ‘gesture’ was not typical and was performed on a one-off basis for Telethon, but it begs the question nonetheless, to whom is charity administered through the KidsCan Trust and according to what criteria? Against the claim that All Black sponsorship helps “to level the playing field for thousands more financially disadvantaged Kiwi kids,” I argue that it is the Trust’s Platinum sponsors who benefit most, both from the publicity garnered through parties involved, it is noteworthy that the whole matter of legitimacy is reduced to a costing exercise and the ‘ethical’ balance of an accountant’s ledger. The economic and ethical are inextricably intertwined. The object of the telethon, ‘kiwi kids living in poverty,’ is not interrogated, the notion that charity and almsgiving is the best and only way to deal with poverty is naturalized, responsible citizenship is aligned with brands, media image and conspicuous giving and the role of television as chief mediator and disseminator of nation as ethical community is taken for granted (Close Up, 2009).
Telethon’s nation-wide media spectacle and from the in-school forms of brand promotion thinly disguised as aid to ‘disadvantaged’ children (Annual Report, 2009: 12).214

The Trust’s 2009 Report lists dozens of organizations who support the Trust’s charitable work and categorizes them as Platinum Partners, Gold Partners or Silver Partners (2009: 13). The Report also explains how the Government gets behind its Food for Kids programme and how, in 2009, the Ministry of Social Development and Ministry of Health provided $320,000 to enable KidsCan StandTall to “immediately assist 7500 hungry children in low decile schools who were on our waiting list” (2009: 11). This networked partnership between government and the Charitable Trust epitomizes the neoliberal State’s indirect mode of governmentality and demonstrates how it facilitates the privatization of welfare through such public-private initiatives. And media events like Telethon play an important role in normalizing this process in the social imaginary. As Ouellette and Hay claim, television is important to capital flows, to localizing and naturalizing a hierarchy of values and the Telethon format speaks to the “affinity between de-regulated public interest activity and contemporary welfare reform” (2008: 35). Ouellette and Hay also explain that the private sector enlisted by do-good reality TV to manage poverty in a post-welfare society is not limited to corporations and businesses, but also includes “armies” of individuals who are called upon to voluntarily donate their time and personal resources to the care of the less fortunate (2008: 55). While Telethon mobilizes viewers to donate time and money to fund-raising for the KidsCan Trust, the Trust uses the funds raised to access food and clothing – most of what it distributes is also donated and, furthermore, most of the distribution is done by volunteers (Rick Shearer, Chair of KidsCan Trust, see

214 The work of KidsCan StandTall Charitable Trust is not helping “to level the playing field” nor is it addressing the growing levels of poverty and income inequalities in Aotearoa New Zealand. In an article called “Facts About Poverty in 2009” the New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services states that around 583,800 people exist in poverty in this country (one in seven households) and that around 163,000 of them are children. The article points out that the benefit rates are at levels that leave people in poverty, that getting a job doesn’t solve the poverty problem because wages are often inadequate and there is little union support or job security. It also points out that the overwhelming majority of people on lower incomes must rent their housing on the private market and the Accommodation Supplement is not sufficient to cover the gap between current rent levels and incomes (see chapter three). It refutes all claims that poverty is the result of bad lifestyle choices, poor budgeting skills or welfare dependency and claims instead that “inadequate income levels is the real issue” made worse by persistent income disparities and a growing gap between rich and poor. The article cites a 2007 study which reports “the top 10 per cent of wealthy New Zealand individuals own over half of New Zealand’s total net worth, and nearly one fifth of total net worth is owned by the top one per cent of wealthy individuals. At the half way mark, the bottom half of the population collectively owns a mere 5 per cent of total net worth” (NZCCSS, 2009). Poverty, persistent income disparities and a growing gap between rich and poor are the inevitable effects of privatization, de-regulation and globalized neoliberal capitalism.
interview, *Close Up*, 2009). As exemplar of neoliberal charity, the Trust operates mostly by utilizing volunteer labour to redistribute donated food and clothing to ‘disadvantaged’ children and, in the process, serves as a marketing tool for its corporate sponsors. In short, the Trust capitalizes ethical surplus.

A nation-building spectacle like Telethon works in parallel with organizations like KidsCan Stand Tall Charitable Trust to access and capitalize ethical surplus and, as Jodi Dean claims, “with the commodification of communication, more and more domains of life seems to have been reformatted in terms of market and spectacle” (2005: 55). Dean argues that communicative exchanges are the basic elements of capitalist production and that, with the proliferation of interactive media, “the standards of a finance- and consumption-driven entertainment culture set the very terms of democratic governance today” (2005: 55-56). In domains of what Dean refers to as “communicative capitalism”, “ideals of access, inclusion, discussion and participation are realized in and through expansions, intensifications and interconnections of global telecommunications” (2005: 55). However, as Dean points out, this “deluge of screens and spectacles” does not lead to more equitable distributions of wealth and influence or to the emergence of richer varieties in modes of living and practices of freedom but, instead, “undermines political opportunity and efficacy for most of the world’s peoples” (2005: 55). The exchange value of messages overtakes their use value or, in other words, “messages become contributions to circulating content – not actions to elicit response” (2005: 58). As Dean explains, “A contribution need not be understood; it need only be repeated, reproduced, forwarded,” and in the circulation of branded media identities, it is the popularity, the penetration and duration of the contribution that marks acceptance or success (2005: 58 and 59). The very purpose of nation-branding is to inspire a sense of collective belonging to the nation-state and the Telethon spectacle works to communicate, disseminate and cement the nation’s brand identity in the social imaginary. As Aronczyk and Powers claim, “the brand identity must not only be representative of particular ways of being but actually lived – embraced and embodied – by the country’s citizens if it is to be effective as a modern version of nationality” (2010: 10, emphasis in original). In other words, when audiences are

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215 The 2009 Report’s income and expenditure “snapshot” shows income from In Kind Gifts and Donated Goods (26%), Campaigns/Events (24%), Telethon (19%), Philanthropic Trusts and Gaming (14%), Government support (9%) and Sponsorships and Invitation Only Events Donations (8%). Expenditure is divided between Head Office (14%), Campaign Expenditure (7%) and Investment in Children’s Programmes (including in kind gifts and donated goods) (79%) (KidsCan Annual Report, 2009: 10).
connected to various points or regions throughout Aotearoa New Zealand and witness a range of events designed to raise money, cultural and regional differences emerge as expressions of unified nation, “the content of culture becomes sheer circulation and television becomes event” (Nicholls, 2009: 8). In effect, the “noble cause” is “pressed by the TV network axiomatically into the myth of nation” and “television, in this instance, is New Zealand” (Nicholls, 2009: 8). The communicative network is the significant thing, the connection-making and the being-part-of far outweighs any underlying issue or message. The legitimacy or ‘success’ of the event is measured in terms of the numbers of people involved and the amount of cash raised. As Nicholls argues, communicative networks circulate and celebrate affective response to poverty as “noble cause,” but actual poverty remains framed in neoliberal terms as “deficiency and lack rather than as systemic predicament” (2009: 8).

In Bauman’s terms the Telethon media event enacts a “carnival” community, a transitory form of ‘community’ which circulates according to the mercurial and materialist values of market forces and which actually works against the possibility of making ethical connections to others (2007: 111-112). When viewers choose to volunteer their time or money to Telethon, they do not participate as social agents whose action will make a political difference but rather as actors who choose the practice of charity as one of a variety of consumer-related activities (which, as Žižek claims, means we gain redemption from being only consumers by “doing something meaningful”) (2009: 54). The Big Night In Telethon serves to illustrate how, in an age of informational capitalism, fund-raising becomes another form of consumption, accruing cultural capital for conspicuous contributors and advancing an ethos of good conscience in the representation and articulation of a national community. What it does not do is interrogate the motivation and ethics of a consumerist society in which inequality is naturalized and poverty and misery are judged to be largely self-inflicted. Telethon excels as a mode of media governmentality not only because it mobilizes immaterial labour and affective biopower in the production of image-community, but also because it enunciates as a nation-building exercise and as a practice of state. That is to say, the state is not a spontaneous, automatic mechanism imposing itself on individuals but rather, as Foucault points out, “the state is a practice”
and telethons co-ordinate and centralize community-building practice at the level of the state (2007: 277). 216

Although telethons have not featured regularly on TVNZ schedules since the 1970s and 1980s the format also reappeared on 22 May 2011 when Māori Television produced *Christchurch Rise Up*, an international, 12 hour Telethon in aid of those affected by the Christchurch earthquake. Bevan Hurley, writing for the *New Zealand Herald*, reports that the telethon raised $2.7 million, “about 62 cents for every New Zealander,” whereas “TV3’s 2009 *Big Night In* telethon raised 45 cents a person” (Hurley, 2011). Hurley draws attention to the conspicuous levels of corporate support, noting “Fonterra’s last-minute $1 million donation helped. They also contributed $500,000 to production costs and Māori TV paid $100,000 towards hosting the show”. He also makes the points that “telethons of the mid-1980s raised about four time more when adjusted for inflation,” and that although this telethon did not attract huge audiences it achieved Māori Television’s highest-ever ratings. In her coverage of the event, Diana Wichtel states, “the money came in at a satisfactory clip,” and comments “this sometimes lurching, casually bilingual, defiantly uncool event demonstrated once again the extent to which Māori Television has become the default setting for genuinely New Zealand television. Odd, really, that it should be this channel, a product of our bicultural heritage, that on our big occasions really makes it feel as if we are one people” (Wichtel, D., 2011). These commentaries combine to demonstrate, first, how media work to normalize private-public corporate modes of governmentality and to align brand promotion with ethical sociality and, second, to show how crucial television, and events like telethon, are in the production of the state as a practice, and in the maintenance of a national identity. The fact that Māori TV’s *Christchurch Rise Up* telethon raised more money than TV3’s *Big Night In* suggests either that the cause was more affectively appealing or as Wichtel claims, that Māori Television is performing as the default setting for genuinely New Zealand television. The emergence, development and ethos of Māori Television (MTS) will be examined in detail in Chapter Five.

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216 Foucault explains, “The state is inseparable from the set of practices by which the state actually became a way of governing, a way of doing things, and a way too of relating to government” (2007: 277).
Conclusion

This Chapter has linked the practice of nation-state with neoliberal modes of media governmentality and claimed that ethical nationhood is narrated in terms of brand value, market imperatives and conspicuous consumption. It has examined nation-branding and nation-building from historical as well as international and national perspectives, and used the promotion of tourism and examples from Reality TV to demonstrate how managed mediascapes produce an idealized, marketable image of nationhood and national community for local and global consumption. I have argued that symbolic representations of people and place mobilize affective registers to inform consumerist subjectivity and to screen or mask lived realities. I have also argued that neoliberal modes of media governmentality narrate lifestyle culture and consumerism as the markers of ideal citizenship and situate Brand New Zealand as the epitome of ethical nationhood. Bauman characterizes the neoliberal nation-state as a “liquid-modern society” of consumers in which the “totality” to which the individual should stay loyal “is no longer a reluctantly embraced, discomforting, cumbersome, and often onerous duty but an avidly sought and eminently enjoyable entertainment” (2008b: 119 and 156). For Bauman, national identity is no longer correlative with obligation and the surrendering of one’s individual interests to the survival and welfare of a “whole” country or “national cause” but, rather, takes the form of “highly entertaining, invariably pleasurable and relished festivals of communal togetherness and belonging” (2008b: 156). Bauman’s reference to “festivals of communal togetherness” calls to mind media-events like the Rugby World Cup (see Chapters One and Four) and the Americas Cup sailing regatta, in which teams promoted and funded by state-corporate joint ventures perform as the post-political, joyful nation-building exercises of a brand-state (2008b: 156). Brand New Zealand capitalizes affect-value on a national scale and constructs a social bond by representing political affiliation in terms of those who celebrate the neoliberal capitalist enterprise and those who don’t. The next Chapter will address what Slavoj Žižek describes as “the post-political suspension of the political” and the “reduction of the State to a mere police-agent servicing the needs of market forces and multiculturalist tolerant humanitarianism” (2008a: 237). In other words, it will examine the manipulation of affect-value, first, in the (re)invention of biculturalism as a (re)branding exercise, and, as neoliberal diversification and, second, in the exclusionary tactics that situate ‘flawed’ consumers and political activists as security risks and a threat to society.
CHAPTER FIVE

Affective Biopower, the Brand State and Global Capital

What is at issue is whether a market economy can in fact serve as the principle, form and model for a state, which, because of its defects, is mistrusted by everyone on both the right and the left, for one reason or another. … Can the market really have the power of formalization for both the state and society? This is the important, crucial problem of present-day liberalism (Foucault, 2008: 117).

The previous Chapter argued that ubiquitous modes of media governmentality mobilize affective registers and narrate ethical community in terms of brand loyalty and consumer citizenship thereby normalizing neoliberal subjectivity. It demonstrated how Brand New Zealand epitomizes neoliberal government by (re)articulating the social bond in market terms and situating the nation-state as a marketable commodity in a globalized market economy. This Chapter addresses Foucault’s question, “Can the market really have the power of formalization for both the state and society?” (2008: 117). It focuses on the brand-based articulation of biculturalism to claim that a market economy is in fact serving “as the principle, form and model” for neoliberal states, and that under present-day neoliberalism the market does have “the power of formalization for both the state and society” (2008: 117).

This Chapter links Brand New Zealand with multicultural globalization, bicultural nationalism and neoliberal media governmentality. After situating multicultural globalization as a master myth and as a way of branding the world, it examines articulations of bicultural national identity that play out in this country’s national mediasphere and echo globalization’s neoliberal discourse. The Chapter then interrogates modes of media governmentality through which dissent and protest are co-opted, incorporated or neutralized to comply with neoliberalism’s established social order. The emphasis here is on the biopolitical management of Māori communities because as Sissons points out, and as was discussed in the Introduction, all strategies of government and narrations of nationhood have been grounded in “the simultaneous individualization and tribalization of Māori society since the late 19th century” (2004: 19). The Chapter explores the reiterative practices and recurring themes of this thesis to show how corporatized media systems, with capitalist agendas, channel and guide affective biopower and operate the bicultural nation brand as a “matrix of individualization” and thus as a key strategy of social control (Foucault, 1982: 783). It compares the advent and ethos of the Māori
Television Service (MTS) with the situation and treatment of the Tūhoe people and so characterizes the nation-state’s deeply-embedded Māori/Pākehā binary first, as symbolic marker of a bicultural brand and, second, as a racialized mode of governmentality. These exemplars demonstrate how the brand state secures legitimacy by idealizing individual and collective investment in the brand image while simultaneously excluding and/or criminalizing the victims and critics of the neoliberal project. In other words, this Chapter examines the ways by which, as Foucault puts it, “we have been led to recognize ourselves as a society, as a part of a social entity, as a part of a nation or a state” (cited in Lemke, 2007: 12). At stake here is the articulation of social reality and the production of a climate of opinion which supports and valorizes neoliberal nation-states as exclusive guarantors of freedom. I claim that affectively-mobilized modes of media governmentality benefit business enterprise and work to secure affiliation and loyalty to a mythical bicultural nation-brand but eschew any social obligation or commitment to a common good. Because corporate power decides what is emphasized and what is sidelined in media culture, a nation’s social imaginary is constituted and controlled by the neoliberal project. And television produces the images and spectacles that underpin myth-making and nation-building in the nation-state. However, affective biopower is an irreducible, immanent life force that cannot be completely trained, constrained or subsumed and, as the necessary precondition of productive sociality, it is always potentially political. It is resistive struggle round concepts of indigeneity, environmental ecology and anti-corporate globalization, for example, which contest neoliberal ‘reality’ and which belie any claim to the harmonious unity depicted in media culture and the brand identity of the Aotearoa New Zealand nation-state.

We are directed to recognize ourselves in contemporary society through the reiteration of a neoliberal discourse, one that valorizes individualist entrepreneurialism and market imperatives, and materializes through the nation-brand. However, as discussed in Chapter Four, nation-brands are only effective because they enable nation-states to (re)define and (re)position their marketable value within the much wider agenda of globalized neoliberalism. Ghassan Hage coins the term “transcendental capitalism” to describe the process whereby large corporations can now access resources and extract capital without needing to be associated with, or accountable to, the regulations and controls of any nation-state (2003: 19). As he explains, partly because of the accumulation of capital outside the traditional industrial sector, and partly because of the dominance and expansion
of the finance, information and services sectors, “the global firm is now characterized by an almost complete loss of a specific national anchoring” (2003: 19). The corporate enterprise “simply hovers over the Earth looking for a suitable place to land and invest” and, for this reason, “governments all over the world are transformed from being primarily the managers of a national society to being the managers of the aesthetics of investment space” (2003: 19). According to Jansen, globalization functions as a universal culture or macro-myth into which individual nation-brands like Brand Estonia, Cool Britannia, Magical Croatia, Incredible India and 100% Pure New Zealand can “project their respective micro-myths and articulate their aspirations for wealth, power and enhanced visibility” (2008: 122). Jansen cites Vincent Mosco (2002) to suggest that, although globalization is a multi-dimensional and contested concept, it may be best understood as a strategy for creating “a brand for the world” (2008: 122). For Mosco, globalization functions as a way of branding the world by promulgating the myth that free markets equate with democratic freedom and enable all people to “transcend their messy differences to create a universal culture” (2002: 10). Mosco explains that a myth is alive and potent so long as it continues to give meaning to human life: “if it continues to represent some important part of the collective mentality of a given age, and if it continues to render socially and intellectually tolerable what would otherwise be experienced as incoherence” (2002: 4). Globalization performs as a brand for the world by offering meaning to human life through consumerism and capital accumulation, while situating socioeconomic inequalities, exploitation and injustice as evidence of either under-developed societies or poor self-management skills and lack of self-motivation. In this respect, Mosco states, “globalization is one of the master myths of our time” (2002: 4).

In Chapter One, I discussed the way colonial literature and brand marketing were used to portray and promote Aotearoa New Zealand as ideal for settlement and for achieving upward social mobility. Although colonial entrepreneurs and speculators advertised emigration to fulfil a need for farm labourers and industrial workers, they also sought to win hearts and minds, or appeal affectively, by promoting an idyllic fantasy. Television New Zealand reiterates a similar theme, not only to prospective immigrants and tourists but also to the national audience. A television series called Annabel Langbein, The Free Range Cook incorporates images of the traditional, rural fantasy with a cooking show, thereby combining notions of national identity with reality television’s penchant for
themes of self-improvement and lifestyle enhancement.\textsuperscript{217} The TVNZ website explains how Annabel Langbein shares the secrets of her “free range cooking style” by gathering the “freshest fruit and vegetables from her own garden” and by “travelling to the source of the best seasonal ingredients”. Her “expeditions” take her “into secluded fiords to harvest giant crayfish, see her brave a local beekeeper’s hives for the purest honey, and cast a line for the freshest salmon”. As the text on the following image informs, the show is presented from “her simple cabin kitchen in her family’s lakeside retreat” and is “set against the breathtaking backdrop of the Southern Alps of New Zealand”:

This image (among others available on the website) sets the scene for the television series, conjuring an idyllic, rural lifestyle reminiscent in many ways of the Rita Angus painting (see Introduction) and of the Mainland Products marketing images (see Chapter Three) which link New Zealand identity with affective ideas of continuity, tranquility and rural community. The Annabel Langbein television series incorporates these ideals while also informing and engendering the consumerist subjectivity that feeds into the Brand New Zealand narrative. It is, therefore, instrumental in projecting a very particular form of

\textsuperscript{217} Information retrieved from TVNZ, “About the Show” [online] Available at: \url{http://tvnz.co.nz/free-range-cook/show-3691643} [Accessed 29.09.10].

\textsuperscript{218} Image retrieved from “Annabel Langbein The Free Range Cook” website [online] Available at: \url{http://www.thefreerangecook.com} [Accessed 29.09.10].
subjectivity, one that aligns well with an underlying regime of upwardly mobile consumerism and neoliberal ideology.

Reality television, media culture and consumerist neoliberal ideology are inextricably linked. As Arundhati Roy claims, “It’s important to understand that the corporate media doesn’t just support the neoliberal project. It *is* the neoliberal project. This is not a moral position it has chosen to take, it’s structural. It’s intrinsic to the economics of how the mass media works” (2004: 85). Jansen, too, sees mass communication as corporate communication but she also asserts that “mass culture is a class culture” created “for the people, not by the people” (1991: 160). Jansen describes this class culture as:

A counterfeit but technically superb rendering of social reality which celebrates and legitimates the hierarchical power-knowledge of the ‘tinsel’ aristocracy of industrial capitalism: officials, investors, managers, experts, and the princes and princesses of consumerism – stars, celebrities and other big spenders (1991: 160-161).

According to Jansen, media culture is a class culture compiled by elites who “go elsewhere for their own pleasures,” but set the agenda for public opinion, define the permissible alternatives and confine “expression of the people’s political vision to the parameters of a multiple-choice question” (1991: 161). Within a capitalist political economy, economic elites control global media and project images of lifestyle options and notions of freedom that serve market imperatives and underpin conformist citizenship.

Roland Barthes describes our society as “the privileged field of mythical significations,” and argues, “whatever the accidents, the compromises, the concessions and the political adventures, whatever the technical, economic, or even social changes which history brings us, *our society is still a bourgeois society*” (1973: 137, emphasis added). Barthes is referring specifically to France in mid-twentieth century context but his argument remains relevant today and is correlative with what Jansen describes as the ‘tinsel’ aristocracy.

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219 Jansen cites Max Horkheimer to describe how “the patterns of thought and action that people accept ready-made from the agencies of mass culture act in their turn to influence mass culture as though they were the ideas of the people themselves” (1991: 161). After pointing out that Jeremy Bentham’s *Panopticon* (1843) “exemplified the new technology of Enlightened censorship” she notes that, for Foucault, “Panopticism is the paradigm of Liberal authority” (1991: 22). Jansen claims, “Metaphorically, the Panopticon describes the architecture of the modern bureaucracy, corporation, spy network, system of mass marketing and mass education” (1991: 22). For Jansen, an “Electronic Panopticon” of television, computers, and global satellite systems replaces Bentham’s louvered blinds “so that today nearly every citizen of an enlightened society is wired to the tower and yet remains only marginally aware of the attachment” (1991: 22-23).
informing and orchestrating media culture. Barthes points out that although Western society readily acknowledges capitalism as an economic system, we are much more reluctant to acknowledge that capitalism is also our political system and ruling ideology. As he explains, when promulgated on a national scale, “bourgeois norms are experienced as the evident laws of a natural order … the fact of the bourgeoisie becomes absorbed into an amorphous universe, whose sole inhabitant is Eternal Man, who is neither proletarian nor bourgeois” (1973: 140). The same natural varnish covers up all “national” representations and although, as Barthes contends, the social rituals of the bourgeoisie can bear no relations to the economic status of the lower middle-class, “through the press, the news, and literature, it slowly becomes the very norm as dreamed, though not actually lived” (1973: 141). Hence the appeal of reality television programmes like Annabel Langbein, The Free Range Cook which tap into a traditional narrative of landed gentry and mythical country lifestyle in order to attract affective investment and build profitable audience ratings. Barthes also identifies bourgeois culture in terms of consumption alone: “our press, our films, our theatre, our pulp literature, our rituals … our conversations … the cooking we dream of, the garments we wear, everything, in everyday life, is dependent on the representations which the bourgeoisie has and makes us have of the relations between man and the world” (1973: 140). Barthes’ consumerist “bourgeois culture” and Jansen’s mass media “class culture” converge to link nationhood and national identity with a consumerist lifestyle and image-focused society.\(^\text{220}\)

**Multiculturalism and/or Biculturalism**

The aim of liberal government is to naturalize Western capitalist culture (or bourgeois consumerist culture) in the public sphere, and to (re)frame cultural politics by situating culture as a marketable commodity and as an interface between citizen consumers and the world system. In liberalism, according to Žižek, culture is privatized as a “way of life, a set of beliefs and practices,” and a matter of personal choice bearing no relation to “the public network of norms and rules” (2008b: 661). Neoliberal multiculturalism, as Žižek rightly points out, is the culturalization of politics and the reduction of political inequality, social

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\(^{220}\) Bourdieu also links economic and cultural capital (social power) with a bourgeois experience of the world (see Chapter Three) and Bauman uses the term “liquid-modern society” to describe a conceptualization of national identity as a form of avidly sought and enjoyable entertainment (see Chapter Four).
injustice and economic exploitation to the neutral, disempowered status of “cultural”
difference; difference that need not be addressed, cannot be overcome, and need only be
“tolerated” (2008b: 660). For Žižek, multiculturalism, as the hybrid coexistence of diverse
cultural life-worlds, is possible only against the background of capitalist globalization.
Multiculturalism and biculturalism are inextricably linked in Aotearoa New Zealand and
although these concepts represent different perspectives in the articulation of cultural
politics, they both function to project the image-based brand values of capitalist
globalization.

In their study of television and multiculturalism in Aotearoa New Zealand, Kothari *et al*
begin by noting that although increased movement of refugees, asylum seekers and
economic migrants foreground the irreducibility of culture to national origin and territory,
“the nation state and its institutions remain powerful and influential arbiters in the
cultivation of a public sphere” (2004: 138). According to Kothari *et al*, because “official
bicultural rhetoric” takes top priority in the nation’s public sphere, “New Zealand is a
place in which multiculturalism as policy has been explicitly deferred,” but in which
“nevertheless it lurks in the quotidian shadows as a de facto reality” (2004: 139). They
point out that while the Charter for Television New Zealand (TVNZ) ensures “the presence
of a significant Māori voice” in its programming, “the media rights of other non-
Pākehā/European ethnic groups are relatively low on the list of priorities and barely hinted
at in this document” (2004: 141). Kothari *et al* also identify a “current racial hierarchy”
within “the national culture” whereby, apart from Māori, “the claim to national belonging
has been easier for white Europeans (Pākehā) than Pacific Islanders and Asians, however
long they or their families have lived in this territory” (2004: 140). They explain that, in
practice, “the racism of skin colour” determines that recent migrants of European descent,
regardless of where they come from, “often acquire many of the same authorized
privileges of national belonging as Pākehā descended from early settlers” (2004: 140).
They claim that, although this racialized order of national belonging does not neatly
correspond to the relative socio-economic power of particular ethnic communities, it most
certainly “impacts upon the relative cultural representation of particular groups on
television” (2004: 140). *Tagata Pasifika* and *Asia Downunder* are two magazine
programmes broadcast on a national platform through TVNZ which have been created
specifically to address what Kothari *et al* call “two minority groups, defined in New
Island people have been immigrating to Aotearoa New Zealand (often as indentured labour) since the 1950s but they were rarely seen on television screens before the arrival of *Tagata Pasifika* in 1987. According to Kothari et al, *Tagata Pasifika* is perceived “by the Pacific community as a program produced by Pacific peoples for Pacific peoples”, whereas *Asia Down Under* is designed for the Asian community and has “a more explicit mandate to make local Asian cultures accessible and assimilable to the European mainstream” (2004: 141-142). As they see it, *Asia Downunder* tends to present Asians “as nestling into the New Zealand narrative of an immigrant nation where everyone finds their place, but this place is assigned according to a social hierarchy of ethnic groups” (2004: 148). They conclude that the desire to orchestrate cultural translation for a “national community” can reproduce assimilationist imperatives and produce a concept of “cultural safety” that is “not so much about cultural protection or keeping New Zealand safe for difference, but keeping it safe from difference” (2004: 148). I refer again to Barthes’ claim that a “natural varnish covers up all ‘national’ representations” and, through the media, a bourgeois consumerist culture “becomes the very norm as dreamed, though not actually lived” (1973: 141).

Sneja Gunew characterizes multiculturalism in terms of “a kind of liberal pluralism” through which an implied norm permits minority groups limited cultural divergence and where “cultural differences are paraded as apolitical ethnic accessories celebrated in multicultural festivals of costumes, cooking and concerts” (2004: 17). Gunew also makes the point that “in New Zealand ‘biculturalism’ is the preferred official term because multiculturalism is seen as a diversion from the Māori sovereignty movement” (2004: 16). Struggles for Māori sovereignty and the status of the Treaty of Waitangi play a significant role in upholding official biculturalism over multicultural discourse, but note that in 1985, as Lashley reports, the Law Commission Act “proclaimed a new national ethos for New Zealand – as a bicultural nation and multicultural society” (2000: 15). This statement reiterates the ambivalence and ambiguity of the Treaty itself, and while both concepts (‘bicultural nation’ and ‘multicultural society’) pay lip service to the notion of cultural pluralism, the point is that a global, hierarchical, corporate monoculture informs both. The crucial point here is that multiculturalism, biculturalism, globalization and neoliberalism are all inextricably linked and all work together through modes of media governmentality to shape subjectivity and produce and control a consumerist society.
In Chapter One, I examined the parallel emergence of neoliberalism and biculturalism in the 1980s and claimed that, as neoliberal thinking transformed the social imaginary, Māori calls for cultural revitalization also underwent transformation, shifting from marginalized political dissidence to become mainstream; a marketable marker of a unique bicultural nation-brand. I utilized the work of Jeffrey Sissons to background the 1980s emergence of official biculturalism, and to point out how the politicization of Māori identity within the state “entails an ethnicization of tradition, and in a derived, and highly contested sense, a transformation of national identity” (1993: 108). For Sissons, the ethnicization and rationalization of Māori tradition has entailed a “fragmentation, objectification and standardization of form and meaning” (1993: 113). He argues that “language has been broke into ‘bits’ in order to signify ‘Māoriness’, concepts have been extracted from a wider traditional discourse to connote ethnic difference and hui ceremony has been lifted from its original kinship, community and cosmological contexts to express corporate identity” (1993: 113). He concludes, “reflected and fractured in the systemic mirror, Māori tradition appears, therefore, as an awkward, distorted simulation of ‘the real,’” and that “only with our backs turned to the mirror can we again appreciate its unreflective vitality” (1993: 113). Sissons is making the point that Māori cultural identity is not reducible to the systemic simulations of a bicultural discourse and, as with all mediated identification processes, ‘Māoriness’ should be interrogated as a means of subjectifying and of stipulating what is required or allowed in the name of the nation-brand. It is with these issues in mind that I now examine the advent of the Māori Television Service (hereafter MTS) and claim that inasmuch as it seeks to represent Māori perspectives in a bicultural mediascape, it also represents neoliberal logic and articulates national identity in terms of ‘aesthetic consumerism’ and brand image (see Bauman (2005) and (2007), Chapters Two and Three).

Calls to revitalise language and rejuvenate cultural traditions play into the hands of marketing gurus who, rather than demanding you erase your difference, as was the case with colonial assimilation policies, now mediate and regulate the elaboration of difference. In an online brand marketing case study, a marketing firm called 4i’s explains how it developed Māori Television’s “brand identity,” and how “in a little over two years, the Māori Television brand – with its distinctive word mark and inclusive tagline – has
become a beloved symbol not just to Māori, but to New Zealanders of widely mixed backgrounds”. This firm’s online reviews and case studies deserve special attention, not only because they offer an instructive insight into the world of brand marketing but also because they highlight the construction of brand identities for both Māori Television and its subsidiary channel, Te Reo. 4i’s overview of Māori Television recounts how “the creative process began with a promise that became the station’s tagline: ‘Mā rātou, mā mātou, mā koutou, mā tātou’ (For them [those who have gone before], for us, for you, for everyone)”. After noting how “this was a notion of profound meaning for Māori, but was also patently risky given the channel’s single-minded cultural mandate,” the overview continues, “4i’s set about developing a brand that would embody that meaning for all New Zealanders”. The overview then claims, “With recognition and acceptance now high in most communities, 4i’s continues to refine the brand identity as Māori Television seeks to develop language systems – both verbal and visual – through which it can communicate with relevance to its many and varied audiences”. What comes through here is a conceptualization of Māori Television as a product, a commodity, to be packaged, marketed and controlled by the marketing fraternity or, as Deleuze (1995) describes them, “the arrogant breed who are our masters” (see Chapter Four). For example, the marketers do not attempt to explain why they chose to override the channel’s “single-minded cultural mandate” in order to construct a brand “for everyone”. They acknowledge this decision is “patently risky” but, in my view, it demonstrates how market logic dictates that what sells matters and that the ‘product’ should, therefore, be positioned to appeal to as wide an audience as possible.

Marketing language and logic is also pronounced in the review of Te Reo channel’s launch and development. The website describes the firm’s strategy as “Brand architecture and brand identity development applied to a cultural broadcasting brand,” and this strategy is made evident in Te Reo’s case study title: “When language is literally at the heart of a brand” (4i’s, Case Studies, 2009). Such an approach begs the question, “whose language?” especially when brand-speak describes “Māori Television” as the “Client,” and “strategies” for promoting a “cultural broadcasting brand” are listed under the headings, “brand engagement, brand architecture, brand awareness and advertising”. It is on these

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221 4i’s is “a leading Auckland branding and communications agency with award-winning packaging design and web development services” (4i’s, 2009). Quotations are taken from its webpages (Design Directory: Better by Design New Zealand, 2006) and (4i’s, Case Studies, 2009).
terms that culture is positioned as a commodity and language revitalization becomes a business venture. *4i’s* promotional overview advertises te reo Māori (the Māori language) as “the very lifeblood of being Māori,” and declares that “the first-ever 100 percent Māori language television channel asserted its brand with pride”. The brand marketers apparently see no irony or contradiction in describing te reo Māori as “the very lifeblood of being Māori” before stating that only 4% of those who identify as Māori are fluent in the language. Instead, *4i’s* see te reo Māori as the basis of a cultural brand so, in marketing language, “the audience for Te Reo is decidedly niche” and “launching the brand, therefore was a necessarily low budget affair that aimed to enrol reo speakers in the significance of the channel’s existence and forge strong cultural and emotional ties”. In the world of brand management and communicative capitalism it is the ability to connect at an emotional level and appropriate affect that counts and, for the brand marketers, it does not matter if people do not use or learn te reo Māori so long as Te Reo and MTS can deliver a feeling with which people can identify. Te reo Māori may be the language at stake, but the object of the exercise is to utilize marketing logic and compile a business brand round the affect-laden rhetoric informing language revitalization policies.\(^\text{222}\)

A branding approach to MTS elides both the social and political struggles informing its emergence and the concomitant conditions and expectations attached to its performance. The history of Māori representation in media generally and on national television more particularly is one in which Māori are depicted as a racially specified, culturally exotic minority, integral to the symbolic domain of national identity but of marginal interest to an Anglo-Celtic mainstream audience. Māori activists have been struggling against such representational tokenism for more than thirty years. In a statement to the Waitangi Tribunal in 1985, for example, Richard Benton argued not only that television had a vital role to play in the survival of te reo Māori but also that as “the invisible invader,”

\(^{222}\) Language revitalization success is rare and promoting revitalization through televisual representation can perform a double movement in that while it seeks to define and connect disparate communities it can also act as a cultural barrier by potentially marginalizing those who are not language literate. Joshua Fishman, in his review of te reo Māori revitalization, expresses concern that the Māori community is depending on the small number of graduates from te reo Māori learning programmes to restore their language (1991: 230-252). He points out that it is unwise to do so when most Māori are still immersed in English culture and English education systems and he does not believe in relying on Government resources to make a difference either. It could be, as Ronald Wardhaugh argues, that language revitalization will only be successful if it leads to socio-economic advancement (1986: 346). There is the likelihood therefore, that language revitalization becomes an end in itself rather than a means to an end. By this I mean that language revitalization loses its purpose and impetus if it becomes institutionalized and serves only to provide socio-economic opportunity for those who work in education and in media.
broadcast television’s monoculture was having a devastating impact on Māori culture (1985: 1). Benton’s claim did represent a growing groundswell of public opinion, and did result in official recognition of the language in 1987 (as mentioned earlier). Such a claim may, however, problematically empower elite cultural translators, a matter I will return to later in this Chapter. Nonetheless, it was the 1989 legal decision requiring TVNZ to promote Māori language and culture that had a greater political impact and presaged the advent of MTS. Underlying both the 1989 Privy Council ruling and the Waitangi Tribunal claim for ‘more Māori on air’ is the fundamental assumption or implication that television plays a central role in articulating cultural identity. Tainui Stephens, for example, identifies a direct correlation between television, cultural identity and political power when he argues, “we need to see ourselves on screen because (like it or not) to many people the television speaks the truth … and the control must be with Māori” (2004: 112 and 114). While Stephens is correct to identify and emphasize a crucial link between media power and political power, I would argue that increased media representation is not equivalent to, or indicative of, increased political power and that, according to the terms of the Māori Television Service Act 2003, the control of MTS remains with the State. As state-funded, broadcast television channels, both MTS and Te Reo work first and foremost to cultivate and enhance a bicultural, nation-brand in the social imaginary. Furthermore, in the context of neoliberal media governmentality, an image-based cultural collective is as much the product of media norms and brand marketers as it is of any existential cultural reality.

By being incorporated and institutionalized within State modes of media governmentality, Māori cultural rejuvenation and activism has been (re)branded as unique and eminently marketable cultural difference. According to Jansen, postmodern branding experts (“performing a surreal semiotic dance on Marx’s grave”) see branding as providing a solution, however illusionary, to the alienation produced by advanced capitalism (2008: 126). Jansen describes ‘alienation’ as “the fragmentation of communities, loss of meaning

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223 Members of the Māori community objected to a 1986 government plan to re-structure TVNZ as a State Owned Enterprise and took out an injunction against such policy until Treaty of Waitangi obligations were met and adequate provision had been made for the protection and promotion of Māori language and culture. They also lodged a claim with the Waitangi Tribunal for more Māori on air. A subsequent ruling by the Privy Council recognized the representational bias against Māori in the media. As a result, when the Broadcasting Act of 1989 established New Zealand on Air (NZOA), it was charged with the responsibility of promoting Māori language and culture (Beatson, 1996: 92).
and intrinsic satisfaction in work, and widespread spiritual ennui” (2008: 126). She claims branders turn this fundamental Marxian diagnosis on its head by changing the sign of commodity fetishism from a minus to a plus: “instead of a condition to be critiqued and redressed, alienation becomes a commercial opportunity to be celebrated and capitalized” (2008: 126). She explains, although advertising and marketing have long exploited alienation, “postmodern approaches tend to be playfully provocative in flaunting their capacity to create faux communities of brand loyalists as compensation for the lonely individualism consumerism promotes” (2008: 138). Jansen’s reference to “faux communities” echoes the work of Rose (1999a) and (1999b), Bourdieu (1984) and Bauman (2001) (see Chapter Three) who define the language of ‘community’ in terms of affect-laden relationships among individuals which are both transitory and superficial. Branding experts specialize in constructing brand communities as phantom or carnival communities and in exploiting socially alienated individuals by promising access to a set of shared values or, in Etzioni’s words, “to shared history and identity – in short, to a particular culture” (cited in Rose, 1999a: 476). It is my contention that MTS functions as just such a community and works in correlation with TVNZ to augment the image of a bicultural nation-brand and to construct a corporate identity through the symbolic representation of what Sissons calls ‘Māoriness’ (1993: 113).

According to its brand and corporate mission statement, MTS seeks to “make a significant contribution to the revitalization of tikanga Māori and reo Māori by being an independent, secure and successful Māori Television broadcaster” (Māori Television Fact Sheet, 2009).²²⁴ However, as a state-funded Māori language broadcaster, MTS is not an independent broadcaster and, furthermore, according to a 2010 Waitangi Tribunal Report, it has made no significant contribution to the revitalization of tikanga Māori and reo Māori. The Waitangi Tribunal Report states, for example, that in 2006 State funding towards the growth and development of the Māori language was $226.8 million and that $49.8 million of that had been allocated to Māori language broadcasting. The Report also states that the number of young speakers has declined both proportionally and in absolute numbers and that repeated policy failures had pushed the Māori language to the brink of

²²⁴ Tikanga refers to protocol, custom or practice; reo means language (Māori Dictionary, 2003-2010).
This is in spite of the fact that MTS positions itself, first and foremost, as an educative force by constructing a ‘virtual’ Māori community round a platform of language-learning programmes. For example, *Toku Reo* screens twice a day and is described on the MTS website as a “Māori language programme for the new millennium,” which “teaches te reo to absolute beginners – in the comfort of their own homes.”\(^{226}\) Dr Pita Sharples, Māori Affairs Minister, responded to the Report by pointing out that the Māori language has been in crisis for a long time and that many people would be surprised to hear the number of te reo speakers was falling because the language was “more in your face now”. He is referring here to the impact of MTS and comments further, “They’re probably thinking they’re doing rugby games and so on, it’s pretty strong, but it’s who is speaking it and where they’re speaking it. It’s got to be in the homes. Really, it is about getting the language into the homes and families talking it and that’s how it will survive”.\(^{227}\) This is a telling observation, one that locates language vitality in the practice of everyday life and that situates media culture as a class culture, constructed for the people, not by the people, empowering only elite cultural translators within corporate media (Jansen, 1991: 160). As Spivak warns, it is in the moment when history is said to be remade that an often innocent informant, “the new culturalist alibi, working within a basically elitist culture industry, insisting on the continuity of a native tradition untouched by Westernization whose failures it can help to cover, legitimizes the very thing it claims to combat” (1989: 281). That is to say, te reo Māori cannot be revitalized if the social conditions that gave rise to it, and the cultural milieu in which it thrived, are no longer present. This underlying problem is also raised by Māori broadcasters themselves; Willie Jackson, for example, argues, “In our strategy in terms of reclaiming the language, we’ve

\(^{225}\) A corresponding article in the *Otago Daily Times* reports, “The proportion of Māori children in Māori-medium education had dropped from a high point of 18.6% in 1999 to 15.2% in 2009 and the number in Māori-medium education had fallen every year since 2004. The proportion of Māori able to speak te reo conversationally had also declined, with 8000 fewer speakers in 2006 compared with 2001 levels (NZPA, 2010).

\(^{226}\) The website also informs, “Designed by Professor John Moorfield, *Toku Reo* works with an interactive website to reinforce and encourage further learning. The half hour episodes run Mondays to Fridays at 3.00 pm and 7.00 pm and viewers can use their tools on the *Toku Reo* website to reinforce and encourage further learning” (*Toku Reo*, 2008-2011).

\(^{227}\) When Sharples states, “They’re probably thinking they’re doing rugby games and so on, it’s pretty strong” he is referring to the fact that, on MTS, many rugby match commentaries are given in te reo Māori, or at least in a form of code-switching between English and te reo Māori. And MTS attracts high ratings for sport, and especially rugby and rugby league matches (see Rugby World Cup discussion, for example, in Chapters One, Four and later in this Chapter). Sharples means, therefore, that when viewers hear te reo Māori being used in this context the perception grows that its use is widespread or, at least, becoming more common.
almost forgotten about the people and most of our people don’t speak the language and we can’t afford to have elitist views in terms of te reo Māori”. This comment affirms Sissons’ claim that “language has been broke into ‘bits’ in order to signify ‘Māoriness’” and holds little relevance in the everyday world of kinship and community (1993:113). Whai Ngata, another Māori broadcaster, also contends, “The language used by kaumatua that I interviewed wasn’t only on the lips, it was pierced into the heart, and that’s something that I can see now, that while competency brings language to the lips, it hasn’t quite reached the heart”. Ngata is making the point here that language is a living form of communication intimately and affectively connected with a shared existence, with the building of a common and is constantly changing with social context, especially inter-generationally.

And as Jackson asserts, when its use is confined to educational and media institutions, and speaker affiliation is limited to symbolic membership of an aesthetic community, a language serves only as an elitist source of cultural capital. Like other national television channels, MTS selects, cultivates and disseminates the symbolic markers that link a mythic past with notions of shared destiny, but this is not a mirror of society; it is a reflection of the distribution of political and economic power and, therefore, of neoliberal modes of media governmentality.

The MTS schedule adapts existing television genres and formats, or as Tainui Stephens puts it, “MTS has enormous flexibility; it can take any form of television and inject new life into it”. Reality TV themes re-emerge albeit with a ‘Māori’ makeover as, for example, Ka Life, which focuses on self-improvement through individual health and fitness (see Chapter Three). As the MTS website explains, the Ka Life crew will show you “how to improve your health and lifestyle with small, easy changes,” and how to “learn the Geek dance craze, recipes from a celebrity chef, traditional Māori exercise and more to help you maintain physical health today” (Ka Life, 2010-2011). Another series, Kia Ora Hola, follows six teenagers from Māori language schools in Rotorua who travel to Chile to spend three weeks in Santiago (Kia Ora Hola, 2010). The students are hosted by families from a local school and each student uses their own camera to record their experiences which they then recount in te reo Māori in a series of six documentaries. This concept calls

228 Here I am following Hardt and referring to “a common” as “the results of human labour and creativity, such as ideas, language, affects, and so forth” (2010: 4), see Introduction.

229 Comments made by Whai Ngata, Willie Jackson, Tainui Stephens and Jim Mather are all quoted verbatim from episode 7 of “TaongaTV” (Prime Presents: Fifty Years of New Zealand Television, 2010).
to mind TVNZ’s *Intrepid Journeys* series which follows well-known New Zealanders (like media personality, Judy Bailey) on overseas expeditions (see Chapter Four). As with *Intrepid Journeys*, this series demonstrates how television naturalizes tourism and lifestyle culture and, although operating on a premise of cultural interaction, focuses on the perspective of teenagers who are (re)constructing their own identity while assimilating (and being seen to assimilate) otherness.

MTS injects new life into the cooking show genre with the series *Kai Time on the Road*, (*Kai* means food, meal); first, (as the name suggests) by travelling to a variety of locations and preparing food in situ and, second, by focusing on fish and game recipes that highlight rural living and local produce. Parallels can be drawn between the idyllic setting and lifestyle images portrayed in *Annabel Langbein, the Free Range Cook* and the equally idyllic, scenic backdrops portrayed on *Kai Time on the Road*. Both succeed in building notions of a mythic lifestyle and easy access to the pristine and bountiful landscape that underpins Brand New Zealand’s ‘100% pure’ image. They are different, however, in that Annabel Langbein’s show evokes an upwardly mobile, lifestyle-seeking ethos, whereas *Kai Time on the Road* offers “inventive, curious and delicious recipes presented with lashings of Māori flair and humour” from a laid-back, down-to-earth “kiwi” perspective. This is not to say that media and television producers are solely responsible for the production of different perspectives. As Nick Perry points out, “the word ‘television’, which literally means ‘seeing from a distance’, is not just a condensed description of the medium’s main characteristic as a medium; it is also symptomatic of its necessary, but necessarily partisan, mode of engagement with this wider social order” (2004: 79-80). Or, as Foucault’s concept of governmentality makes clear, power cannot be reduced to a structure of domination, “power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not reconstituted ‘above’ society as a supplementary structure” (1982: 791). Both TVNZ and MTS reflect the impact of a neoliberal market economy and the articulation of bicultural nationhood, and demonstrate how the national mediascape adjusts to engage with its social context.
The following website preamble (for episode 17, series four) demonstrates how Kai Time on the Road links attachment to place and issues of sustainability or kaitiaki (guardianship) with the production and preparation of ‘modern Māori food’:

The Kai time boys travel to a famous place known throughout the world, the little settlement of Whangara, as the filming place for Whale Rider. But whale is not the kai that’s needed for the menu; the kaupapa is all about conserving our marine resources. There is lots of marine life to see, and in this reserve crayfish are thriving in only a metre of water, so you don’t have to be Jacques Cousteau to find kōura in this rohe, but remember you can’t take it home.

The language style is personal and inclusive as, for example, in reference to the Kai Time ‘boys’ and ‘our’ marine resources, but it is the use of Māori terminology that signifies cultural difference and serves to align this cooking show with the MTS brand. In his paper, “Covert Attitudes to Māori,” Ray Harlow contends that such uses of te reo Māori reveal underlying and prevailing attitudes situating Māori, “not as potentially one language of two in a bilingual society, but only as a flag, a marker of distinctness” (2005: 145). After reasserting the point that Aotearoa New Zealand “is doggedly monolingual, both in practice and in attitude,” he argues that language rejuvenation policies “serve to increase the visibility and distinctiveness of Māori as an element within an English-speaking

230 Kai Time on the Road is produced by Maui Productions, Rotorua; notes and image retrieved through website [online] Available at: http://www.kaitime.co.nz/index [Accessed 30.10.10]. A series of Kai Time on the Road began screening on MTS, Sunday, 7 November 2010 at 7 pm.

231 An online Māori dictionary provides the following definitions: kai [food, meal], kōura [sea water and fresh water crayfish], rohe [district, region or territory], kaupapa [topic, policy, plan, scheme, proposal, agenda or subject] and kaitiaki [trustee, minder, guard, custodian, guardian or keeper] (Māori Dictionary, 2003-2010).
environment, not as a language in its own right” (2005: 145). In other words, as the findings of the Waitangi Tribunal Report also indicate, investment in language revitalization has had little impact on everyday lived existence or on the monolingual status of the population. However, investment in language revitalization is proving lucrative as te reo Māori becomes a unique and marketable marker of distinctness for bicultural nationhood and Brand New Zealand.

**Blending Public Service Initiatives with Indigenous Broadcasting Policy**

MTS distinguishes itself both as indigenous broadcaster for a bicultural nation and as a prime source of public service television as outlined in the TVNZ Charter. Jim Mather, CEO of MTS explains, when interviewed in the programme “Taonga TV,” that “what has garnered affection for us from New Zealand is the fact that we are distinctly New Zealand, we are distinctly Māori and we are providing a form of public service television broadcasting that has not been seen for a long time in our country”. One of the best examples of this form of public service television is the decision by MTS to provide all-day coverage of Anzac Day commemorations. When it first screened in 2006, this coverage “garnered affection … from New Zealand” not only by evoking a mythic past and shared sense of destiny as in the title *Na Ratou, Mo Tatou: They Did It For Us*, but

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232 The concept of independent, public service broadcasting is an ideal that underpins TVNZ’s Broadcasting Charter but it remains an elusive ideal, especially in today’s privatized, profit-motivated national mediasphere. The TVNZ Charter was formally implemented on 1 March 2003. It begins by stating that its demands shall be predominantly fulfilled through free-to-air broadcasting. It stipulates, among other things, that TVNZ shall “feature programming across all genres that informs, entertains and educates New Zealand audiences … provide shared experiences that contribute to a sense of citizenship and national identity … ensure in its programmes and programme planning the participation of Māori and the presence of a significant Māori voice” (TVNZ Charter, 2003). However, in March 2010, Broadcasting Minister Jonathan Coleman, introduced legislation to Parliament that would change the TVNZ Charter. According to TVNZ’s website, he says, “the old charter has TVNZ stuck with an unworkable dual mandate to meet detailed content and commercial objectives” and “the changes leave the broadcaster with a less prescriptive list of functions and leave it free to function as a competitive multimedia company” (Newstalk ZB, 2010). In other words, neoliberal policies aim to remove any public service stipulations from the Charter enabling the state broadcaster to operate as any other profit-motivated corporation.

233 The Māori Television Service Act 2003 states: “The principal function of the Service is to promote te reo Māori me ngā tikanga Māori through the provision of a high quality, cost-effective Māori television service, in both Māori and English, that informs, educates, and entertains a broad viewing audience, and, in doing so, enriches New Zealand’s society, culture and heritage” (Māori Television Service (Te Aratuku Whakaata Irirangi Māori) Act 2003). The call to “inform, educate and entertain a broad viewing audience” and so “enrich New Zealand’s society, culture and heritage” reiterates public service ideals, ideals which also underpin New Zealand Television’s Charter.
also by employing “mother of the nation” Judy Bailey as presenter and co-host. As an indigenous broadcaster, MTS has the potential to endow Anzac Day coverage with alternative perspectives, and open concepts of nationhood to scrutiny and debate. When Mather, CEO, declares that the channel has a role “as a publicly funded broadcaster to fill the gaps that may be neglected by the state or the other commercial broadcasters,” he is providing space for tactical intervention (NZL 2008: 28). By even attracting a record number of viewers to its Anzac Day coverage, MTS is making a significant impact on viewers’ perceptions and expectations and thus portending historical emergence. However, although public service broadcasting may present differently from commercial broadcasting and make space for local voices and locally-produced content, it does not signal ideological difference or independence from Government intervention and State control. Rather, public service broadcasting is first and foremost a technology of government, guiding and conducting the construction of subjectivity, and managing the investment of affective biopower in circumscribed concepts of nation and nationhood. In a neoliberal context, any public service ethos is also inextricably intertwined with a commercial mandate and MTS is, therefore, predisposed to adhere to the profit-motivated, ratings-based criteria of media’s wider agenda.

MTS offers promising, celebratory statistics for audience share and viewing ratings but a 2009 statistical report by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage produces a rather different picture. This report states that “the ratings for Māori TV provide one measure of the level of interest in Māori culture,” and cites AGB Nielsen Media Research Quarterly ratings data to reveal “that in both Quarter Four of 2008 and Quarter One of 2009, the average all-day audience share for Māori TV was 0.6 percent” (2009: 51).

In a 2008 Listener article, Fiona Rae says, “Employing the ‘mother of the nation’ who had been let go from TVNZ, was a turning point for Māori Television (MTS)” (Rae, F., 2008). Rae points out how early problems at managerial and board level “had not exactly endeared it [MTS] to taxpayers” but “giving our national day of remembrance 18 hours of coverage, fronted by Bailey and Wena Harawira, made people reassess their views” (NZL 2008: 28). The 2006 Anzac Day coverage scored unprecedented audience ratings and was also awarded Best NZ Sports or Event Coverage at the 2006 Qantas Television Awards, Best Documentary for the TV Guide and Best on the Box People’s Choice Awards. As the Māori Television Fact Sheet 2009 also informs, “All-day ANZAC Day broadcasts continue to attract widespread critical and public acclaim for emotional, insightful and respectful coverage” (Māori Television Fact Sheet, 2009).

In comparison, TV One and TV2 have 25 and 20 percent audience share respectively and TV3 has just over 15 percent share. PrimeTV has 5-6 percent audience share and C4 and other TV channels all have less than a 5 percent share. SKY Network, on nearly 30 percent, maintains the largest all-day audience share of all main television channels. The report also points out that “on average around 13 percent of the population

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235 Cultural Indicators for New Zealand, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2009).

236 In comparison, TV One and TV2 have 25 and 20 percent audience share respectively and TV3 has just over 15 percent share. PrimeTV has 5-6 percent audience share and C4 and other TV channels all have less than a 5 percent share. SKY Network, on nearly 30 percent, maintains the largest all-day audience share of all main television channels. The report also points out that “on average around 13 percent of the population
compared with the audience shares of other broadcast channels it becomes obvious that, although MTS may be integral to the symbolic media presentation of a bicultural national brand, its ethos and content remains of marginal interest to mainstream television audiences. MTS addresses this issue by extending its coverage of sport and especially of major sporting events as, for example, the 2011 Rugby World Cup. An MTS press release announces, in this regard, “Rugby is at the heart of the New Zealand nation and Māori Television is proud to be lead free-to-air broadcaster for Rugby World Cup 2011”.

In Chapters One and Four, I discussed the importance of rugby to tourism and nation-branding, and argued that notions of national identity are crucially linked with rugby culture and All Black mythology. I also claimed that global media networks dominate sports administration in the post-1980s professional era, and that pay-per-view broadcasting epitomizes a consumer society in which amateurism and grassroots organizations are effectively disenfranchized. Because global media networks dominate sports administration and control satellite telecasts, MTS had to bid against other broadcasters (including TVNZ) to “win” the right to be lead free-to-air broadcaster. In short, all free-to-air broadcasting of the 2011 Rugby World Cup took place in subservience to Sky’s pay-per-view supremacy and under Sky TV’s jurisdiction.

Mather acknowledges “Sky Television as host broadcaster, and our partners in the consortium” but, according to the arrangements of this partnership, Sky TV broadcast all 48 matches live on satellite television (pay-per-view), while MTS broadcast all 48 games but 32 were delayed and only 16 were live (Horan, V., 2010). In a fine example of over five years old was watching television at any time of the day, and 33 percent of the population over five was watching television during peak time” (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2009).

See an overview of the world’s six leading media conglomerates and their ‘family’ brands online (New Internationalist, 2011).

The Rugby World Cup 2011 Free to Air broadcast deal was confirmed on 3 March 2010 and according to Vanessa Horan, in an online news release: “The deal, which confirms that in addition to Sky TV’s live satellite coverage of all 48 matches, Māori Television will be the lead free-to-air broadcaster working in partnership with TVNZ and TV3. It will see Māori Television broadcast all 48 games of the tournament and TV One and TV3 each simulcast seven key live games. Coverage on MTS will include 5-10% Māori language” (Horan, V., 2010).

MTS Rugby World Cup promotion online (Māori Television, Rugby World Cup, 2011).

Sky TV is the dominant pay television broadcasting service in Aotearoa New Zealand. Its website reports, “SKY’s principal business activity is the distribution of both local and foreign programme content to its subscriber base, predominantly through a digital satellite network ... As of 30 June 2010, SKY had a total of 802,397 subscribers, representing a residential household penetration of approximately 47.9%” (Sky Network Television Limited, 2010). MTS, TVNZ and TV3 eventually put forward a joint bid for the 48 free-to-air games, but only after what Mather describes as “political interference” (NZPA, 3news, 2009).
neoliberal media governmentality, Sky Television exerts ultimate control, and State broadcasters must not only compete to screen free-to-air coverage but also limit that coverage to accommodate the profit-generating agenda of a global corporate enterprise. In short, host broadcasters dictate the terms of an international event to the host countries whose citizens provide the venues, affect value and return on investment for both Sky TV and Rugby World Cup Limited. In this scenario, MTS performs with other state-funded broadcast television channels to provide a public service ethos and build a sense of nationhood that strengthens the affective affiliations crucial to any brand value, whether that brand is Sky TV, Rugby World Cup Limited or Brand New Zealand. As Jansen argues, nation-branding works to transfer public funds and authority into private hands while cultivating the “feel-good illusions of community participation and solidarity” (2008: 132). Notions of nationhood, patriotism and team loyalty serve as affective mechanisms for generating audiences and ensuring profit for media moguls and corporate conglomerates.²⁴¹

MTS seeks to distinguish itself as “New Zealand’s national indigenous broadcaster” and as a “world-class indigenous broadcaster” and, as is made clear in its declared vision, mission statement and strategic plan, it aims to underpin cultural objectives with proactive

²⁴¹ John Pilger discusses the corporatization of sport in an article called “C’mon, time to rebrand your life” (World Focus Supplement, ODT, September 27-October 3, 2010: 9). He begins by comparing the life and times of 1966 World Cup soccer star, Bobby Moore, with the life and times of Australian tennis player, Lleyton Hewitt, or Brand Hewitt, owned by Lleyton Hewitt Marketing. Pilger highlights what he calls “the ubiquitous nature of extreme corporatism” in which “it seems that no idea, no event, no talent, no personality, no resource of nature has value unless it is owned and branded”. He observes that “the pursuit of profit in sport seems unrelenting” and uses first the World Cup in South Africa and then the Commonwealth Games in India to make his point. He states that the South African treasury invested $US5 billion ($NZ6.9 billion) into the World Cup and corporate sponsors took home more than $US4 billion in tax-free profits. The corporate parties, free tickets, kickbacks and other gifts “merely indulged a post-apartheid elite which presides over the most inequitable society on Earth”. Pilger notes that since 2008, more than a million people have lost their jobs and that, in the wake of the World Cup, 1.3 million public sector workers have struck for a living wage. He notes that “the South African police now have paramilitary powers comparable with the apartheid era” and that “a new Protection of Information Bill before Parliament will conceal the corruption of the ruling African National Congress”. He then turns to India’s hosting of the 2010 Commonwealth Games and points out that “in the country that has most of the world’s malnourished children, the capital Delhi has been rebranded a world-class city at a cost of $US2.5 billion”. Pilger reports: “more than 100,000 families have been evicted to make way for security zones around the Games and facilities that will mostly benefit India’s small but powerful managerial and technocratic class who, besotted with all things corporate, prefer not to be reminded that 77% of their compatriots are dirt poor”. He concludes: “Corporate sport has enriched Rupert Murdoch, corrupted cricket and much of football, subverted numerous other play and appropriated the Olympics and similar spectacles. Its language is that of business schools, PR companies, consultancies and banks. Its philosophy is that everything is for sale and monopoly rules”. Pilger’s article situates events like the 2011 Rugby World Cup in international context and emphasizes the growing divide between the consumer class that buys into neoliberal brand logic and all those who are silenced, disenfranchized and (re)colonized for the sake of global capital.
marketing and commercial success. When Jim Mather spoke to a Thrive Business Breakfast meeting in July 2009 he began by saying he is honoured that MTS “is today considered an example of a successful Māori business organisation,” and that he looks forward to sharing “global ambitions based on local traditions”. MTS implemented its global ambitions by convening the inaugural indigenous broadcasters’ international conference (in 2008) and by being proactive in establishing the World Indigenous Television Broadcasters’ Network (WITBN). According to Mather, WITBN aimed to deliver a weekly current affairs programme called “Indigenous Insight” which addressed key issues occurring throughout the indigenous world, “through the eyes and lives of the tangata whenua of each of these countries”. WITBN also aimed to deliver and exchange up to 32 one-hour documentaries comprising four hours of programming from each of the nine member organizations. As Mather explains, such a project can save partner organizations costs, and “deliver a major source of high quality indigenous programming that showcases the tremendous talents of our respective independent producers”. Such initiatives do offer potential as emergent spaces for indigenous expression and for an “oftentimes unanticipated outcome” or “effect” (Nealon, 2008: 43). For example, in August 2009, officials from the Chinese Embassy in Auckland formally requested that MTS rescind its decision to screen a documentary called The Ten Conditions of Love. This documentary is the story of exiled Uyghur leader, Rebiya Kadeer, an activist and human rights advocate but, according to the MTS website, “China has denounced Ms Kadeer as a terrorist and has accused her of helping to orchestrate recent violence in the Xinjiang region between Muslim Uyghurs and members of the Chinese Han community”. The Chinese Embassy officials, in a meeting with Mather, alleged that “Ms Kadeer was linked

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242 This information comes from the MTS website homepage (Māori Television, 2011).

243 All quotes in this paragraph are from a speech by MTS chief executive Jim Mather to the Thrive Business Breakfast, July 3 2009, called “Global Ambitions Based on Local Traditions” (Mather, 2009).

244 WITBN website mission statement declares “The main aim of WITBN is to develop collaborative relationships between indigenous television broadcasters in order to create opportunities for increased audiences, better access to resources, enhanced knowledge transfer, strategic international leadership, enhancements of schedules through programme exchange and reaching out to all other indigenous television broadcasters” (WITBN, 2008).

245 All information and quotations come from the MTS media statement, “Controversial Documentary to Screen on Māori Television” 12 August 2009, (Haggie, S., 2009). MTS subsequently agreed to screen, Xinjiang Urumqi July 5 Riot: Truth, a documentary representing China’s official view on ethnic civil unrest between the Uyghur people and the Han Chinese immediately after its screening of The Ten Conditions of Love. Both these documentaries screened on 1 September 2009.
to terrorist groups and that the content of the film distorted the facts about China’s policies regarding treatment of ethnic minorities”. However, Mather decided the documentary would screen, stating “We will at all times protect Māori Television’s right, free from political and/or editorial interference, to broadcast the stories of indigenous people both from New Zealand and throughout the world”. As the MTS media statement explains, international indigenous documentaries and films are broadcast regularly, and “many of these programmes document the experience of indigenous peoples as a consequence of colonialism (and in some cases) oppression”. In this example, MTS provides a platform for moving beyond images of national ‘biculturalism’ or Māori ‘identity,’ and for conceptualizing indigeneity as a multi-faceted and highly contested aspect of global politics.246

That said, both MTS and WITBN function within the auspices of a global media industry that equates freedom of expression with freedom to produce and consume a plurality of images. As Susan Sontag explains, a capitalist society uses images both “as a spectacle (for masses) and as an object of surveillance (for rulers)” and that, within this system, “freedom to consume a plurality of images and goods is equated with freedom itself” (cited in Mitchell, 1992: 56). State-sanctioned indigenous broadcasters add to the plurality of images available for consumption in a global mediasphere and, in the process, become an object for State regulation and surveillance. In this regard, Mather notes the irony of a situation in which several of the key members of WITBN are from Europe, “the bastion of colonialism” as, for example, television channels S4C of Wales, TG4 of Ireland, BBC Alba of Scotland and Sami TV of Norway. I have argued that MTS (and all these channels) represent the institutionalization and corporatization of indigeneity within modes of media governmentality that celebrate, co-opt and effectively mainstream expressions of difference for the benefit of global capitalism. However, this does not mean that MTS and other indigenous television networks can be classified as simply the tools and expressions of a neoliberal project. Here, I turn to the work of Jo Smith and Chris Prentice who situate indigenous expression in televisual context and discuss both the limitations and opportunities that access to such representational media offers. In her analysis of the politics and potential of MTS, Smith addresses the issue of “self-exploitation in a context where the embeddedness of indigenous ways of knowing can be picked up, processed, and

246 See, for example, Sissons, J, 2005, chapter one: 7-35.
then circulated for the sake of the bi- or multi-cultural nation” (2010: 724). She acknowledges that the “institutional norms of the television industry and the geopolitical make-up of the nation regulate, constrain, and domesticate Māori entry into the cultural lines of social mobility offered by television broadcasting” (2010: 726). However, she also argues that “the polysemic powers of Māori Television play a political role in shaping and disseminating emerging notions of Indigeneity and that the political implications of such polysemic powers are uncertain (2010: 719). Smith elaborates on this point, first, by reminding that the agenda-setting function of the media is not to tell us what to think, but “what to think about” (2010: 727, emphasis in original). She then makes the claim, “the agenda-setting function of Māori Television gives the New Zealand nation new words, images, and ideas to think about, and thus generates an excess of meaningfulness that holds the potential to spark arguments, debates, readings, mis-readings, and re-readings” (2010: 727). For Smith, it is television’s capacity for generating “an excess of meaningfulness” that “inaugurates the productive gap between representations and ‘the real’ as such” (2010: 726-727).

Chris Prentice locates both MTS and questions of culture in all televisual representation within the context of “the global cultural economy” and claims:

“culture – in the senses of both collective identity and the creative expressions of that identity – may be mobilized in the political demands of marginalized groups, but these demands will inevitably cast culture as a ‘value’ – literally or metaphorically a commodity – in the circulation of capital, perhaps all the more ‘valuable’ for being identified as ‘marginal’ (exotic) in an economy perpetually seeking sustenance through ‘difference’ (2012: 5-6).

Prentice makes the important point that such cultural commodification is “not only the fate of colonized, Indigenous, minority or otherwise oppressed ‘cultures’” but rather, as she claims, “one could clearly make the same argument regarding ‘national cultures’, or ‘cultural identities’ such as New Zealand’s” (2012: 6). For Prentice, “the difference of Māori culture/s, like any culture/s, is reducible to the semiotic code or system itself, and in that sense offers diversity within the significatory system, rather than an intervention into it” (2012: 10). Prentice refers to Smith (2010) and to her ambivalence with respect to MTS’s potential role in “staging cultural identity,” resulting in “empty televisual representation” and claims that this lack of external referent is not exceptional but is always “the condition of televisual codes of production and circulation (including consumption) themselves” (2012: 16). Prentice follows Baudrillard (1981) to state that
“the condition of simulation – the copy or image with no original, or referent in the real world” is “already inscribed in the decoding and orchestration rituals of the media, anticipated in their presentation and possible consequences … where they function as a group of signs dedicated exclusively to their recurrence as signs” (2012: 14). In more specific terms, as Prentice explains, by invoking the situation “where ‘what’s on’ television comes to determine what ‘is’, we see the televisual production of reality, rather than its representation of it” (2012: 17, emphasis in original). Such reality is a televisual simulation but, as Prentice also makes clear, this “does not make it any less real or authentic in the sense of being lived; rather it is a different ‘order’ or ontology of the real” (2012: 17). For this reason, Prentice suggests “it might be more strategically canny to acknowledge and celebrate television as a ‘simulation machine’ and, indeed, to celebrate MTS’s advent as a significant step in Māori participation in this very order of simulation” (2012: 19, emphasis in original). Prentice concludes, “Rather than pursuing truth, adequacy and wholeness of cultural (self)representation, it might be better to play the game of appearances, images, a game that would collapse the very opposition of truth/appearance, and allow each to allude to and reverse the other in a continual and unarrestable cycle” (2012: 19). According to Prentice, it is precisely in the field of “audiovisual politics” that Māori have achieved the opportunity to engage and that what is at stake now is “the politics of simulation – the politics of dis/appearances” (2012: 19, emphasis in original). As Prentice argues, “by engaging television – or audiovisual culture more generally – as simulation, it may even re-open the space between audiovisual culture and the symbolic quality of singularity – unrepresentability – that would sustain te ao Māori beyond its equivalence to, difference from, or general comparability with, the national and global political economy of culture” (2012: 19). Both Smith and Prentice see the pitfalls inherent in attempting to represent Māori culture and revitalize Māori language through MTS, but they also argue for the potentiality of a ‘productive gap’ or ‘space’ that audiovisual cultural expression provokes and generates. There are important connections to be made here to what Massumi refers to as the autonomy of affect, to the potential for

247 Prentice explains further: “In simulation, signs circulate freely and independently of attachment to any referent, their value/meaning ‘floating’ on the market in differences (from one another). In other words, the notion of representational adequacy is not tied to the sign’s identity with, or equivalence to its referent, but to its identity with itself, and its difference from other signs that confers that identity” (2012: 17).

248 Prentice is alluding here to Marcia Langton’s essay, “Well, I heard it on the radio and saw it on the television…,” An Essay for the Australian Film Commission on the Politics and Aesthetics of Filmmaking by and About Aboriginal People and Things, (Sydney, Australian Film Commission, 1993).
manoeuvrability in affect as well as for its constraining capacity. Massumi points out, “there is no such thing as autonomy and decisive control over one’s life in any total sense … autonomy is always connective … wherever you are, there is still potential, there are openings, and the openings are in the grey areas, in the blur where you’re susceptible to affective contagion, or capable of spreading it, it’s never totally within your personal power to decide” (2003: 19). For Massumi, the individual is “a checkpoint trigger and a co-producer of surplus-values of flow” (2003: 15). It is my contention that, “surplus-values of flow” congeal through affective contagion to emerge and circulate as forces of affective biopower. It is the transmissible aspect of affective biopower that seamlessly interweaves media-generated social interactions with face-to-face sociality to inform subjectivity, to form and transform social collectives and, in a neoliberal economy of culture, to inculcate brand value as social value.

Although MTS contains potential for manoeuvrability in cultural expression, it also performs cultural difference within the parameters of a neoliberal economy of culture, and so makes an important contribution to the construction of an aesthetically pleasing bicultural nation-brand. Hage conceptualizes global capitalism and consumerist ideology in terms of the “articulation of a middle-class multicultural aesthetic” (2003: 110). He asserts that “one of the most important changes accompanying globalization has been the increased diversity of the professional and managerial class of capitalist corporations” (2003: 110). He points out how this class, though now diverse in ethnic origins, “is unified by similar tastes and aspirations,” and while these emerging managers and professionals do not need workers’ rights they do need “cultural recognition of the equal worthiness of their cultural roots” (2003: 110). Contemporary articulations of national or cultural identity reanimate some of the “neat, middle-class aesthetic fantasies” that, as Hage sees it, “were, and still are, part and parcel of traditional colonial racism” (2003: 111). According to Hage, the main feature of colonial or developmental racism is the presumption that “your cultural or racial identity is your essence,” and that “European Whiteness” is always imbued with “superior values and superior capacities” (2003: 111-112). Hage explains that class is intrinsically connected to developmental racism because racists construct an aesthetics of “self” which is itself achieved “through a middle-class image-based

249 As Hage argues, and as I discuss in chapter one, colonial racism’s implicit message is that if you have not created societies that are advanced (in a capitalist sense) this has more to do with your “essential character” as non-White people than with the socio-historical and ecological conditions of social development (2003: 112).
aestheticization of the ‘group’ one claims to belong to” (2003: 112). This aestheticization of ‘self’ and production of an image-based, consumerist group or ‘community’ is what a national mediasphere (and reality television in contemporary media) works to cultivate and disseminate. It is in this context that the nation-state becomes a brand-state, designed and promoted for global investment and, as Hage claims, it is also this version of the nation-state, more than any of its predecessors, that “has no room for marginals” (2003: 20). Hage contends that in dominant modes of representation “the ideological and ethical space for perceiving the poor as a social/human problem has shrunk,” and that “the poor become primarily like pimples, an ‘aesthetic nuisance’ … standing between ‘us’ and the yet-to-land transcendental capital” (2003: 20). A brand-state (re)constitutes a Pākehā/Māori binary as a marketable expression of social freedom and cultural tolerance, while simultaneously exercising the surveillance and policing tactics necessary to secure corporate culture as the nation’s unifying voice and sovereign authority. In his study of Aotearoa New Zealand’s “political economy of identity,” Stephen Turner claims that biculturalism and multiculturalism both represent strategies of “inclusive exclusion” in the government of national identity, and that both serve as “a manufactured, media-driven identity of culture for the nation’s sake” (2007: 87). Turner contrasts the construction of “Kiwi” identity and its manufactured, mythical ‘100% pure’ habitat with “the concurrent marking of aliens in our midst – new migrants, refugees, non-patriots, or those otherwise uninvested in the enterprise of New Zealand Inc” (2007: 87).

According to the political economy of a brand-state, then, it is the settler society’s short history as a viable market, a marketable entity, or brand, that signifies national identity, and that simultaneously detaches and disavows any long history or alternative worldview. In the context of a neoliberal brand state, Māori cultural politics play out in terms of those who are invested in the enterprise of New Zealand Inc and those who are excluded because they are not. For example, as Jo Smith and Sue Abel point out, in the same year that MTS was launched and celebrated as long-awaited recognition of the Treaty partnership, “the Government passed the Foreshore and Seabed Act, which ensures state ownership of land positioned below the high tide mark” (2007: 12). Smith and Abel explain, by declaring this land Crown-owned, the Government prevents Māori from exercising their rights as guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi and, as they say, “these larger issues of sovereignty and governance cannot be separated from the phenomenon that is Māori Television” (2007: 12). The Foreshore and Seabed Act prevents Māori collectives from exercising a
different worldview, one that rejects ideas of private ownership and seeks continuance of the concept of long-term, local guardianship of the contested shorelines. It is not so much a matter of Māori versus Pākehā, but more a case of activists for a different worldview versus promoters of neoliberal enterprise. For example, in 2004, the same year that the Foreshore and Seabed Act crushed Māori claims to customary guardianship of land positioned below the high tide mark, the Government passed the Māori Fisheries Act. This legislation facilitated Māori entry into the fisheries industry and, in what became known as the Sealord deal, granted Māori (principally Ngāi Tahu, South Island iwi) 50% share in Sealord Products, Aotearoa New Zealand’s largest fishing company (Begg, 2006: 140). As expressions of ‘acceptable’ Māori collectives, both MTS and Ngāi Tahu Holdings Ltd signify investment in New Zealand Inc and articulate indigenous or Māori identities in terms of corporate structures and brand imperatives (Ngāi Tahu’s brand profile is discussed again later in this Chapter).

The Tūhoe People’s Long History of Exclusion and Marginalization

Against the celebratory narrative of brand identity, this Chapter now highlights the deployment of exclusionary tactics that mark Māori tribal history and alternative worldviews as socially undesirable and threatening and, as Hage argues, “encourage the general public to make a causal link between criminality, poverty and racial or ethnic identity” (2003: 20). The history of the Tūhoe people, the tangata whenua (people of the land) of the Urewera, is a case in point, and Judith Binney’s account of their struggle enables us to situate the terror raids of October 2007 in ‘long history’ and to compare that perspective with ‘short history’ as it is portrayed in mainstream media. Binney’s

250 Ngāi Tahu Holdings Ltd is an economic powerhouse managing interests in fishing, tourism and property in the name of ‘beneficiaries’ who, in order to belong, must be able to trace their ancestry back to the official census list of all Ngāi Tahu living in 1848 as listed in the ‘Blue Book’. This form of retribalization, grounded in revivalist ideology, merges historical tribal identity with new capital-owning corporate identity to garner political authority and to gain socio-economic advantage. By binding the construction of culture to the fulcrum of capital it obscures widening social class differences among Māori (see Lashley later in this Chapter). Trappings of ethnic tradionalism serve as cultural alibis for economic restructuring and development, and underpin the operation of Ngāi Tahu Holdings Ltd as a corporate brand (Begg, 2006: 142).

251 I refer here to Judith Binney’s book, Encircled Lands: Te Urewera, 1820-1921, which was awarded Supreme Award, 2010 New Zealand Post Book of the Year. New Zealand Post Book Awards judge, Paul Diamond, described the work as one that will profoundly change our understanding of our shared history: “Encircled Lands is an exhaustive, comprehensive history of Te Rohe Pōtāe o Te Urewera, the only autonomous tribal district that was recognized in law. Not only does it fulfill the author’s hopes of revealing an almost unknown history to a new audience, it also deftly illustrates why the history of the Urewera and its
analysis is useful for two reasons; first, her findings corroborate my claim that such exclusionary tactics are fundamental to the art of liberal government, whether that be in forms of classic liberalism, Keynesian liberalism or neoliberalism (see Chapter One). Second, the story of the Tūhoe nation demonstrates how exclusionary tactics exemplify governmental racism and are inextricably linked to individualized consumerism and to a totalizing matrix that secures populations by marginalizing or eliminating all threats to the logic of the market. Foucault argues that when you have such a “normalizing society” you also have “a power which is, at least superficially, in the first instance, or in the first line a biopower, and racism is the indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed” (2004: 256). For Foucault, “once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State” (2004: 256).

Two points need to be clarified here. First, when Foucault refers to ‘killing,’ he does not mean only actual murder, but also every indirect form of murder, including increasing the risk of death for some people, and “political death, expulsion, rejection and so on” (2004: 256). Second, while contemporary bicultural or multicultural discourse serves to obfuscate the very definite historically determined link between race and exploitation, I would argue, following Foucault, that concepts of ‘race’ perform as slippery signifiers in continuing socio-political struggle and involve “an infinitely dense and multiple domination that never comes to an end” (2004: 111).

Binney begins by citing Benedict Anderson to describe “the Rohe Pōtāe, the encircled lands of the Urewera,” as an “imagined community” that is “real” (2009: 7). She states, “It existed on the ground in the nineteenth century; it exists in the minds and hearts of the Māori people who live there today” (2009: 7). Binney’s study of 19th and 20th century Tūhoe history focuses on shifting power relations and seeks to demonstrate how, “in the ‘middle ground’ that often forms between cultures in a colonial situation, Tūhoe tried to

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252 The term “Te Rohe Pōtāe” refers to “the notion of the chiefly ‘cap’ (pōtāe)” and “asserts the autonomy of the area within the encircling boundaries” (2009: 5, emphasis in original). Binney explains further, “For Māori, the strongest power and the tapu nature of authority are associated with the head; the metaphor, therefore, has powerful resonances. The Rohe Pōtāe of Maniapoto and the Rohe Pōtāe of Tūhoe were both circumscribed lands. Both areas were known by this term by the later 1860s; and both were severed from access to the sea by the confiscation line that defined their respective northern borders. Both rejected the authority of the Native Land Court, whose procedures brought Māori-owned land under the Queen’s law” (2009: 5).
sustain their way of life and their autonomy – their mana motuhake” (self-rule, self-determination) (2009: 7). According to Binney, “Te Rohe Pōtæ o Te Urewera has coexisted with the nation-state of Aotearoa New Zealand since the nineteenth century” but, as she points out, this has always been an uneasy co-existence because “new settler societies do not much like sustaining those who possessed independence in a persistently sovereign manner” (2009: 8). In other words, this uneasy co-existence epitomizes ongoing struggle between the sovereignty of indigenous people with a ‘long history’ and that of a settler society with a ‘short’ history. It also highlights the liberal state’s fundamental contradiction that, on one hand, claims to uphold liberal principles and political freedom but, on the other, represses any challenge to crown sovereignty and state legitimacy.

This contradiction is well exemplified in Binney’s account of the first Liberal government’s dealings with Tūhoe. When Richard Seddon visited the Urewera in 1894 he was the first Premier to do so and his visit coincided with what had been tense and protracted efforts by government to lay claim to the Urewera area. However, as Binney points out, Seddon’s visit was prompted not so much by survey disputes and increasing protest action, but more by “the widespread belief that mineral wealth lay hidden” in the Urewera mountains (2009: 328). As an ex-goldminer, Seddon’s prime purpose was to assess the region’s potential wealth in land and minerals and, in echoes of the appropriation of Rotorua and Te Arawa land (see Chapter Four), he also wanted to “examine the region’s accessibility for tourism” (2009: 328). In subsequent negotiations, Seddon reiterated the colonizing mantra, claiming “that the land could only be protected by establishing title to it” (2009: 357). According to Binney, “Tūhoe knew the law only purported to protect when in practice it alienated, as every historical account of the Liberals’ ‘streamlined’ legislation in the 1890s has also noted” (2009: 346). In one meeting with Seddon, Tūhoe reasserted their position stating, “we have defined our territorial boundary … we simply want a committee for our own district to settle matters amongst ourselves, not between ourselves and other people – a committee to protect and control our own affairs” (2009: 357). Seddon responded that “only an ‘advisory’

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253 Binney points out that when the Liberal party came to power in 1891, “the new government began an aggressive policy of Māori land acquisition and, after reinstating the Crown’s monopoly right of purchasing Māori land, between 1892 and 1899, bought over two million acres of Māori land, most of it in the north island, “and much at artificially low prices” (2010: 328). After 1899, the Native Minister, James Carroll, “introduced different coercive policies, the purpose of which was to vest ‘idle’ Māori land in productive hands” (2009: 328).
committee was feasible” but, as Binney claims, this was a mistaken legal assumption that “simply demonstrated his imperialist views” (2009: 358). It was only after “the ‘small war’ of 1895” that it became clear to Seddon that Tūhoe’s ‘country’ existed, within explicit boundaries, that it “coexisted in an undefined relationship with government” and that “its leaders held de facto power” (2009: 394). Furthermore, as Binney makes clear, the ‘small war’ served to reinforce the fact that this land, “with its great forests and rich birdlife, remained intact, and was protected, because these things were valued by its inhabitants” (2009: 394-395). There is much in this statement that evokes Hardt and Negri’s notion of “the common” comprising both “the common wealth of the material world” and “those results of social production that are necessary for social interaction and further production, such as knowledges, languages, codes, information, affects and so forth” (2009: viii). This does not mean that Tūhoe life was unified and harmonious.

Indeed, as Binney points out, it was apparent to all that there “was a tension emerging between families who wanted education and wider opportunities for their children and those who chose, rather, to focus on keeping their heartlands intact and to live off the land’s resources” (2009: 358). In the shifting relations that characterize colonial situations, notions of racial and cultural superiority inform the ‘normalization’ of behaviour, and while individualizing technologies of power promise freedom and equality before the law, they simultaneously shape subjectivity in ways that undermine “common” belonging and facilitate a capitalist political economy. Binney also emphasizes the crucial role of media in reinforcing cultural stereotypes, in presenting only the “dominant” interpretation, and in structuring “the meaning of these events for the European public” (2009: 343). For example, Binney describes how the media presented the successful completion of the 1893 Ruātoki survey as “a victory for strong government” and called the police and artillery escort a “brave army,” but referred to Te Kooti as the “manslaughterer” (2009: 343). She then points out that it was actually Te Kooti’s “spiritual authority” and decision to “accept

254 In Chapter Ten, “The Rohe Pōtae and ‘The Small War’, 1891-1896,” Binney provides a detailed account of the struggle by Tūhoe to protect their territory from the Liberal Government’s “virulent version of late nineteenth-century capitalism” and the “unpopular pre-emptive right of purchase” policy that aimed “to make ‘unused’ lands available, by one means or another” (2010: 328). The Liberal government eventually adopted “a strategy of military pressure” to achieve its ends in the Urewera in 1895 (2009: 331).

255 For example, Binney points out how Apirana Ngata had been instrumental in protecting Ngāti Porou’s tribal lands from alienation but had also “formulated with Carroll the legislation that enabled the government to achieve its broader goals – including land acquisition – in the Urewera between 1905 and 1910” (2009: 319). Binney claims that “the strategies and methods for making Māori land available and productive were developed by Māori leaders within the Liberal government” and that “the legal measures they adopted in pursuit of this goal enmeshed the Urewera and its chiefs” (2009: 328-329).
the notion of working through the law, while seeking to change its unjust expression” that was central to Tūhoe’s collective acceptance of the survey (2009: 343). As Binney claims, “these were crucial aspects of the Ruātoki dispute that few European New Zealanders had any means of grasping,” and it is “in such manner, stereotypes are publicly sustained and the past distorted” (2009: 343).

Te Rohe Pōtae o Tūhoe appeared to have been granted independent authority through the landmark Urewera District Native Reserve Act of 1896: “there was – and is – no other legally recognized, self-governing tribal enclave in the country” (2009: 396). However, as Binney concludes, the Act can reasonably be described as “Janus-faced” because it looks in two directions simultaneously: it created the possibility of local self-government for the Urewera but actually extended the authority of the state (2009: 404). On the one hand, Seddon stated the purpose of the Act was to prevent the Urewera being open to “the ever-expanding process of colonisation” and to “have a reserve such as this is made now, with the sanction and approval of our Parliament” (2009: 404). On the other hand, when Tūhoe agreed to “acknowledge that the Queen’s mana is over all, and that you will honour and obey her laws”, the Act, “promising internal self-government, brought the Urewera under the Crown’s overarching authority” (2009: 404). Binney notes the first manifestation of this authority was “the permanent establishment of a police post at Te Whaiti in late 1896, evolving from the military base set up there the year before” (2009: 404). A later issue was the “mounting pressure on the Urewera hapū to open their land for gold prospecting” (2009: 404). In effect, the principles of the 1896 Act were systematically undercut, and “the people of the Urewera were separated from the economic – and even the spiritual – bases of their lives” (2009: 610). After the 1866 land confiscations, Tūhoe were severed from their established pathways to the sea at Ohiwa and, as the government continued to buy land around shrinking “enclosing” borders, “what had been a way of living reliant on access to a wide range of resources, including kaimoana, was diminished” (2009: 609).256 There is no “causal link” between poverty, despair and racial or ethnic deprivation and poverty facing Tūhoe, explaining how recurrent crop failures caused by flooding, unseasonal frost and blight were an indication of the marginality of the land and how by the late 19th century they were reliant almost entirely on potatoes and, to a lesser extent, maize as staple source of food (2009: 609). As she sees it, “even today, to drive across the confiscation line, one see relatively rich soil on one side, while the other sustains only limited fare. For those who have travelled overland from the United States into Mexico, the visual and historical parallels are astonishingly similar” (2009: 609).
identity; rather, as Foucault claims, when the State operates in biopower mode and systematically increases the risk of socio-political death, expulsion and rejection for those who will not be normalized, “racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State” (2004: 256).

There are differences between 19th century colonization and 21st century neoliberalism, especially in terms of communication technology and today’s globalized military/corporate/media nexus, but one constant theme is the use of war, or the threat of war, to justify racism and totalitarian rule.257 Georgio Agamben claims that in contemporary politics, “the state of exception tends increasingly to appear as the dominant paradigm of government” (2005: 2).258 Agamben also claims that this technique of government threatens to radically alter the structure and meaning of the traditional distinction between constitutional forms of democracy and absolutism (2005: 2). Agamben cites Schmitt to argue that liberal government always aims to balance the appearance of constitutional democracy (and freedom) against the absolutist rule that underpins modern state sovereignty (2005: 1-3). I substantiate this argument by pointing to the continuing alienation of Māori communities from their land and to a juridico/political system which works symbiotically to enable and facilitate this process (see Chapter One). Agamben is right to highlight the increasing role of the “state of exception” in contemporary politics, and “to bring to light the fiction that governs this arcana imperii [secret of power] par excellence of our time” (2005: 86). As he argues, the “state of exception has today reached its maximum worldwide deployment,” and the normative aspect of law is being obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that produces a permanent

257 For Foucault, racism has two functions. The first function of racism is “to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower” (2004: 255). The second function is to legitimate the relationship of war: “In order to live, you must destroy your enemies” (2004: 255). Foucault explains that racism makes the relationship of war function in a way that is completely new and that is quite compatible with the exercise of biopolitical control: “The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer” (2004: 255).

258 For Georgio Agamben “The state of exception is not a dictatorship (whether constitutional or unconstitutional, commissarial or sovereign) but a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all legal determinations – and above all the very distinction between public and private – are deactivated” (2005: 50). Agamben makes the point that “modern totalitarianism can be defined as the establishment, by means of the state of exception, of a legal civil war that allows for the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system” (2005: 2).
state of exception but “nevertheless still claims to be applying the law” (2005: 87). Law is invoked and construed to enable and justify the violent imposition of sovereign authority, as is well demonstrated both in the history of the treatment of Tūhoe people and in the current techniques and strategies being deployed to contain and control them.

Binney links Tūhoe history with contemporary politics by describing the symbolic use of flags at Maungapohatu on 21 February 2005, when Waitangi Tribunal members arrived for the last of the Urewera claimants’ hearings. She explains that “flags are the tohu, the construct and marker of the people present on the marae,” and that four flags were chosen (2009: 2). One of these, Te Mana Motuhake o Tūhoe (The Separate Authority of Tūhoe), was (re)created by Tame Iti, “its words adapted from an earlier flag given by the government to the Urewera Commission in 1899” (2009: 2). Binney also points out how, at the Waitangi Tribunal hearing in Ruātoki a month earlier, Tame Iti, “dressed in the bushfighter’s plaid kilt and military cap of the nineteenth century, fired a shotgun into a [NZ] flag thrown on the ground” (2009: 2). For Binney, “This was theatre of protest” (2009: 2). However, there were major repercussions and after a member of the right-wing ACT Party sent a letter of complaint on 3 February 2005 to the Commissioner of Police, Iti was committed for trial, “found guilty of two charges of unlawfully possessing a firearm, and fined” (2009: 2). As Binney argues, the law was invoked by prejudice: “the instigator of the complaint had not been present at the events for which Iti was charged, and the prosecution was based on television footage” (2009: 2). Although Iti’s sentence was overturned by the Court of Appeal two years later, this incident highlights an insidious form of media governmentality and presages or foreshadows the tactical surveillance that

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259 The opening paragraph of a 1995 feature article in Mana: the Māori news magazine for all New Zealanders describes Tame Iti as “the manifestation of every Pākehā’s worst nightmare.” It explains how, on Waitangi Day 1995, Tame Iti spat in front of the Governor General, Cath Tizard, “before delivering his pièce de résistance, a whakapohane, a baring of the buttocks – an action hard to top on the list of Māori insults.” The paragraph concludes, “His face is flashed on news bulletins around the world; beware the dangerous face of Māori radicalism.” The article then explains that Tame Iti has been a political activist for most of his life, “Growing up in the heart of Tūhoe country where the spectres of Te Kooti and Rua Kenana maintain an almost tangible presence, the seeds for Māori nationalism were firmly planted in the mind of young Tame Iti.” The article states, “He joined in the ‘No Māori, no tour’ protest, read about communism and went to China in the early 1970s, followed the American Black Panther movement, and helped set up the Māori Liberation Front, before moving north to Auckland where he met up with Syd and Hana Jackson and others who would eventually become key members of Ngā Tamatoa.” The article also states, “Many who don’t know him assume, and his moko probably has something to do with it, that Tame is a violent man. Nothing could be further from the truth.” Tame Iti makes his point, “I came back here to Ruātoki because this is where I belong; for me it’s where everything begins and finishes. This is Tūhoe land and it should be run according to our tikanga” (Anon, 1995: 18-19).
preceded and motivated Tame Iti’s equally dubious arrest in the police raids at Ruātoki in October 2007.

Tame Iti, Media Governmentality and the Anti-Terror Raids of October 2007

Media coverage of the anti-terror police raids of 2007 worked to locate affectively positive notions of national identity against negative projections of threat, illegitimacy and difference. This event provides a case in point for examining both the media frameworks that inform affective responses and the racial tropes that serve to mine and undermine affective biopower. The events of October 2007 relate directly to a global ‘war on terror,’ contrived and orchestrated by an American-led military-industrial-media matrix, which calls on allied nation-states not only to comply with stringent surveillance and security measures, but also to devise anti-terrorist policing strategies. The ‘war on terror’ is constituted and disseminated through modes of media governmentality that underpin neoliberal enterprise society; that is to say, the ‘war on terror’ is actually a war on any political opposition to market imperatives and is contrived to maintain the monopoly of an unregulated, global capitalist economy.

In Aotearoa New Zealand, this narrative of fear, insecurity and call to act prompted pre-emptive ‘Suppression of Terrorism’ legislation (2002) and unprecedented levels of covert civilian surveillance which, in turn, resulted in a nation-wide policing operation, code-named Operation 8. On 15 October 2007, 300 police conducted a series of anti-terror raids at 60 different locations, targeting Māori sovereignty activists and political and environmental activists, in their homes and communities.

Michel Chossudovsky claims the “war on terrorism” is “a lie” and argues that “this war is not a ‘campaign against international terrorism’” but “a war of conquest with devastating consequences for the future of humanity” (2005: 125 and 61). I will be elaborating on Chossudovsky’s standpoint later in this chapter.

Valerie Morse situates the October 2007 police raids in global context by explaining that Aotearoa New Zealand’s security systems and police strategies are linked closely with the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia in an “exclusive five-nation UKUSA intelligence network” (2008: 3). She points out how the government “signed up for all of Bush’s post 9/11 terrorism requirements” providing massive funding injections and personnel increases to the state’s security and surveillance services and introducing new legislation (to mirror changes to US law) (2008: 3). Morse lists, in addition to the Terrorism Suppression Bill, “the Border Security Act, the Maritime Security Act, the Telecommunications (Interception Capability ) Act, the Identity (Citizenship and Passports) Act, the Security Intelligence Act and amendments to both the Immigration Act and the Crimes Act” (2008: 3). The anti-terror raids occurred because the Government needed to demonstrate its commitment to the five-nation ‘system of states’ and because, as Morse claims, “with all their new toys, eventually, the police and spooks had to find a terrorist” (2008: 3).
Ruātoki, the single road entry into the township was blocked and the community placed under siege in ways suggestive of previous State incursions. As Binney notes, “the police provocatively mounted their cordon along the 1866 confiscation line, immediately north of Ruātoki” (2009: 10). In addition, homes were turned over, people were strip-searched by members of an armed police squad and, although police at other locations displayed search warrants, those at Ruātoki did not. These racialized policing techniques not only replay patterns of state violence and colonization, but also deliberately contrive to link indigenous communities seeking sovereignty with America’s war on terror. The 2007 anti-terror police raids were a deliberate ploy by the State to (re)assert sovereign power and justify state racism in the name of public safety and national security. Valerie Morse was one of seventeen arrested in the raids and she begins her review of the event with the telling comment, “What is actually happening in Aotearoa beneath the government’s clever ‘clean, green, 100 per cent pure’ marketing campaign is not at all what they would lead you to believe” (2008: 1).

A brand-state utilizes affective reactions to a perceived ‘war on terror’ to exclude and criminalize all those who, as Turner puts it, are marked as “aliens in our midst” because they are perceived to be “uninvested in the enterprise of New Zealand Inc” (2007: 87). When the police carried out the anti-terror raids, code-name

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262 Morse sees the anti-terror raids as a “wake-up call” about the growing power of the state against political dissidents, and claims that “the culture of these agencies is such that they view ex-parliamentary political activity as dangerous” and “they view Māori political activity as particularly dangerous” (2008: 3). After seeing nearly 10,000 pages of evidence, Morse believes she was arrested “to provide a cloak for the racist nature of the operation” and declares “it is the political force of unified indigeneity that scares the ruling class of New Zealand” (2008: 2).

263 Concern over the implications of indigenous politics is evident in the decision by Prime Minister, Helen Clark, not to ratify the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was adopted almost unanimously only a month before the raids. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on 13 September 2007 (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2007). Aotearoa New Zealand was one of only four countries who voted against adopting the Declaration, the others were Canada, Australia and the United States. This has changed; Australia endorsed the Declaration in 2009 and Canada did also in March 2010. On 20 April 2010, Māori Affairs Minister Pita Sharples declared Aotearoa New Zealand’s support for the Declaration at the United Nations in New York. However, Prime Minister, John Key, later told reporters “The practicalities are when we read out our affirmation statement we made it quite clear that nothing in the statement supersedes our laws or our constitution … it’s a non-binding aspirational goal … but in a practical step our existing legal frameworks and constitution remains” (Young, A., and NZPA, 2010). The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples reiterates technologies of power whereby calls for Indigenous sovereignty are managed and co-opted by nation-states that pay lip-service to indigenous rights but which abjure any real intention of relinquishing or compromising their hold on absolute sovereignty.

263 When Jansen speaks of an “electronic panopticon” and the domination of a “culture industry” by “corporate elites”, she points out that although there is cohesion and solidarity across this dominant class, that cohesion is tenuous and in constant jeopardy (1991: 165). She claims “spectres of ‘unknown enemies’ must continually be raised by these elites to re-create and reinforce their own class solidarity as well as to justify their control of the consciousness industry” (1991: 165-166). Jansen notes that the spectre of
Operation 8, Māori in the Tūhoe area were singled out and treated like terrorist suspects; in an unprecedented move, police not only locked down the whole township of Ruātoki but also closed down Māori media sites (see footnote 259). That the police were able to invade a township and intimidate the people en masse without protests and challenges from media and the wider community indicates that racialized attitudes continue to mark Māori in the Tūhoe area as an economic underclass and also, therefore, as outsiders and potentially threatening.

Front page headlines in the *Otago Daily Times* on 16 October 2007 announce, “Police swoop on activists – Hunters reported training camps” (*ODT* 16.10.07: 1). The opening paragraph states that “The activities of a group of extremists conducting military-style training in the Bay of Plenty wilderness had been under investigation by police when two young hunters reported stumbling on a group of about 15 mostly Māori people” (*ODT* 16.10.07: 1). The article goes on to say that “Police investigations indicate some disenchanted members of the Tūhoe tribe, who point out their ancestors never signed the Treaty of Waitangi, have been involved,” and that “Tūhoe activist Tame Iti and four Wellington peace activists are among those who appeared in court on firearms charges yesterday” (*ODT*, 16.10.07: 1). A subsequent paragraph explains that 17 people were arrested in an operation involving 300 police officers in Whakatane, Ruātoki, Hamilton, Rotorua, Wellington and Auckland. However, the Tūhoe region is obviously demarcated for exceptional measures because, as the *ODT* notes, “air space in the Bay of Plenty was shut down” (*ODT*, 16.10.07: 1). It also reports that police inquiries, “including some by the specialist police antiterrorist unit, revolved around a core group of about 20 but with 40 more potentially involved. Conversations were bugged, phones tapped, text messages intercepted and suspects secretly videoed” (*ODT*, 16.10.07: 1). Police Commissioner Howard Broad is quoted saying police had moved “in the interests of public safety,” and

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264 On 18 October 2007 an anonymous online blogger asked “Anyone know Why a Number of Māori Websites are Down?” and after listing the sites that were unavailable commented, “In fact, the only Māori media site I can seem to get to at the moment is Māori Television which doesn’t seem to have any coverage of the raids on Tūhoe”. Hours later the blogger adds, “I’ve just heard that the server which hosts the Manamotuhake and AoCafe websites has been confiscated as part of the raids. Yet another example of the attacks on freedom of expression” (Aotearoa Independent Media Centre, 2007).
that “People numbering in the 10s, had been conducting and participating in training camps involving firearms and other weapons” (*ODT* 16.10.07: 1). Other sources suggested “the training camps were to prepare a terrorist group which planned to carry out assassinations for causes such as declaring the Tūhoe region in the Bay of Plenty an autonomous state” (*ODT*, 16.10.07: 1). The front-page article is accompanied by a large photo of armed police stopping vehicles at a checkpoint outside Ruātoki (significantly located on the 1866 confiscation line) as well as a smaller photo of accused in a police car and this photo of Tame Iti:

It is only on page 3 in follow-up articles that counterclaims are recorded. For example, Kohineoha MacDougall, “a Ruātoki kaumātua” (senior), claims “the police presence in her town was a complete overreaction … there was ‘no way’ there could be a terrorist cell in the Ureweras without the people of Ruātoki knowing” and “Tame Iti, her relation, would be acquitted of any charges” (*ODT*, 16.10.07: 3). Although this article does include alternative viewpoints from a variety of sources, it also leaves the issues of covert police surveillance systems and militaristic police tactics unaddressed and unchallenged. That is to say, the media report fails to draw any parallels between the commando-style, military tactics utilized in the police operation and the forms of terrorist activity that are allegedly and potentially posing a threat to public safety. Furthermore, there is no critical analysis of the simplistic link being made between long histories of indigenous activism and wider issues of contemporary international terror(ism). In his analysis of a range of online press articles, Vijay Devadas claims that such media coverage of the police raids of October 2007 “can be grasped as an attempt to produce a racialized moral panic around terrorism”

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265 This image of Tame Iti is retrieved from the front page of the *Otago Daily Times*, Tuesday, October 16, 2007.
Devadas explains, for example, how Tame Iti’s persona and image features in many reports and how “the image of Iti was circulated as the face of terror; in other words, Iti as a campaigner for indigenous rights and sovereignty stands in for the figure of the terrorist” (2008: 7). This conflation of the image of a local political campaigner with that of international political terrorism demonstrates how information is specifically construed in order to elicit particular moral responses to people, events and notions of nationhood.

Goldie Osuri makes the claim that, post 9/11, western modes of governmentality demand new forms of racialized assimilable bodies and subjectivities which will comply with, consent to, and even demand overt practices of ‘necropower’ while maintaining the good conscience of the ‘west’ as ‘civilized,’ ‘democratic’ and ‘free’ (2006: 4).

Osuri further claims that these new forms of racialized assimilable bodies and subjectivities “are always-already situated within the shifting historical hierarchies of racial formations in different locations” (2006: 4).

In Aotearoa New Zealand, post 9/11, historical hierarchies of a Pākehā/Māori racial binary are reconfigured in terms of those who comply with the normalizing machinations of a

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266 Tame Iti did feature in media coverage as the face of terror but he was also cast, for example, as “the accidental terrorist” and described as a “complex character who moves with ease between different worlds, one day playing the fearsome Tūhoe warrior fighting colonial oppression, the next hanging out with Remuera millionaires. There’s Tame Iti the activist, Tame Iti the artist and actor, Tame Iti the social worker and Tame Iti the family man” (Wall, T. and Knight, K., 2007). Tame Iti also features in local documentaries, for example, Children of the Revolution, (screened on MTS, 2008) and Tame Iti, the man behind the Moko, (screened on TV2, 2005). Devadas notes that “Coverage of the event in the media did attempt to inflect other images of Iti that differ radically from the staging of Iti in highly racialized and reductive terms as the face of terror” but, as he also points out, “the non-racialized coverage that circulated could be seen as efforts to mask the racialized processes themselves” (2008: 20). I would add that alternative views of Tame Iti also work to affirm (and reaffirm) the notion of good conscience that underpins media culture and informs the national narrative.

267 Morse discusses the difficulties involved in defining an act of terror and/or attempting to legislate against terrorism stating, for example, ‘The criticisms of the legislation questioned the necessity for the law – full stop – and the process being used to enact it. Particularly contentious areas of the proposed bill included the definition of terrorism, the process of designating people or organizations as terrorists, the judicial processes and the use of classified information that could not be made public’ (2007: 24, emphasis in original).

268 Achille Mbembe believes “late modern colonial occupation is a concatenation of multiple power: disciplinary, biopolitical and necropolitical” and argues that “the notion of biopower is insufficient to account for contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death” (2003: 29 and 39–40). Mbembe, therefore, “puts forward the notion of necropolitics and necropower to account for the various ways in which, in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the interest of maximum destruction of persons and the creation of death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead” (2003: 40, emphasis in original). Mbembe also cites David Theo Goldberg to note that “necropower can take multiple forms: the terror of actual death; or a more ‘benevolent’ form – the result of which is the destruction of a culture in order to ‘save the people’ from themselves” (2003: 22).
neoliberal, brand-state, and those who represent continuing resistance. Morse’s first-hand account of the 2007 police raids underscores the marked difference between police treatment of non-indigenous arrestees (like herself), and the treatment of Māori arrestees and their communities. As she points out:

Of the 17 arrested … 12 were Māori, many from the Tūhoe iwi (tribe) … In a spectacular display of force, armed, balaclava-clad police known as the ‘armed offenders squad’ quite literally invaded the small Tūhoe town of Ruātoki and blockaded the entire community. On an elaborate quest for terrorists and evidence, they stopped all vehicles coming in or out of the community and photographed the driver and occupants … In my case I was not even handcuffed as I was walked to the car. No white neighbourhoods were blockaded, nor were white bystanders stopped and photographed as they went about their daily business that cool Monday morning in October. *It was only Māori*’ (2008: 1-2, my emphasis).

These starkly contrasting police strategies demonstrate deeply embedded institutional racism and reiterate the processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization that (re)construct Māori as tribal collectives and as a problematic population that must be controlled and administered by the State. Pākehā, on the other hand, are automatically granted full legal agency as rights-bearing individuals and citizens. As Devadas claims, these “differential policing techniques” produce Ruātoki and South Auckland as ‘states of exception’ and, in this way, racism operates as “a way of separating out the group that exists within a population (Foucault 1997: 255)” (2008: 17). For Devadas, the media practices and differential policing techniques enacted on 15 October follow a logic in which “the racialization of terror functions to fragment the biopolitical field to situate Māori, the demand for indigenous sovereignty, Ruātoki, Tūhoe, and indigenous resistance, in the zone of exclusion” (2008: 18). What comes through here is the State’s underlying fear of the affective biopower inherent in the collective. The State can capture and mine mainstream affective biopower by generating affective investment in and loyalty to a state brand. However, when affective biopower produces collective solidarity outside State control (as it does in the Tūhoe community, for example), that collective is regarded as potentially threatening and politically contentious. There are also other collectives targeted here, of course, political activists and environmentalists, for example, groups that often operate transnationally as well as locally. That is to say, neoliberal government seeks to manipulate and control affective biopower through an imagined national community but, at the same time, it must vilify and undermine the social solidarity and affective biopower that emerges from shared struggle to create political resistance.
Slavoj Žižek identifies this fear or “hatred of the Other” as “the symptom of multiculturalist late capitalism,” and claims it serves to highlight “the inherent contradiction of the liberal-democratic-ideological project” (1997: 37). Žižek refers to liberal “tolerance” as that which, on one hand, “condones the folklorist Other deprived of its substance – like the multitude of ‘ethnic cuisines’ in a contemporary megalopolis” (and as portrayed on television and discussed earlier in this Chapter) (1997: 37). However, on the other hand:

Any ‘real’ Other is instantly denounced for its ‘fundamentalism’, since the kernel of Otherness resides in the regulation of its jouissance: the ‘real Other’ is by definition ‘patriarchal’, ‘violent’, never the Other of ethereal wisdom and charming customs (1997: 37).

This image retrieved from the documentary, *October 15*, depicts a scene outside the Auckland High Court in November 2007 when Tame Iti and several others arrested during the anti-terrorism raids were finally released on bail. The yellow banner reads: “Freedom to dissent is the difference between DEMOCRACY and FASCISM – NZ not N?” (*October 15*, P. Brettkelly, K. Webby and M. Clarke, 2010, Auckland, NZ).

Žižek explains: “Modern society is defined by the lack of ultimate transcendent guarantee, or, in libidinal terms, of total jouissance. There are three main ways to cope with this negativity: utopian, democratic, and post-democratic. The first one (totalitarianisms, fundamentalisms) tries to reoccupy the ground of absolute jouissance by attaining a utopian society of harmonious society which eliminates negativity. The second, democratic, one enacts a political equivalent of ‘traversing the fantasy’: it institutionalizes the lack itself by creating the space for political antagonisms. The third one, consumerist post-democracy, tries to neutralize negativity by transforming politics into apolitical administration: individuals pursue their consumerist fantasies in the space regulated by expert social administration” (Žižek, S., n.d.). In a review of Žižek’s work, Matthew Sharpe states: “Žižek argues that subjects’ experiences of the events and practices wherein their political culture organises its specific relations to jouissance (in first world nations, for example, specific sports, types of alcohol or drugs, music, festivals, films) are as close as they will get to knowing the deeper Truth intimated for them by their regime’s master signifiers – ‘nation’, ‘God’, ‘our way of life’, etc. Žižek argues that it is such ostensibly nonpolitical and culturally specific practices as these that irreparably single out any political community from its others and enemies. Or, as one of Žižek’s chapter titles in *Tarrying With the Negative* puts it, where and although subjects do not know their Nation, they ‘enjoy (jouis) their nation as themselves’” (Sharpe, M., 2005).
When Žižek explains that the kernel of Otherness resides in the regulation of “jouissance,” he is speaking of the role of jouissance in the process of ideological identification and, in this respect, the regulation of jouissance correlates with biopolitical governmentality and with the regulation of what I call affective biopower. As Devadas argues, the media are instrumental in shoring up racialized moral panic and in condoning the forms of biopolitical government that exclude, banish and ‘kill’ those who are “deemed a threat to the population” (2008: 1 and 18). It is the function of a national mediascape to regulate affective biopower or, in other words, to set up zones of inclusion/exclusion in the social imaginary by producing particular interpretive frameworks that conjure notions of democratic citizenship and nationalist belonging. The term “manufacturing consent” describes a propaganda model used by the corporate media to sway public opinion and “inculcate individuals with values and beliefs” that establish conformity and generate allegiance to the prevailing social hierarchy. Liberal democratic nation-states maintain and consolidate legitimacy by being seen (through the media) to accept and tolerate public expressions of difference, protest and political dissent. In the matter of the 2007 anti-terror raids, for example, media coverage includes critique of the raids, reports on the hīkoi to Parliament by Tūhoe and other protest marches, as well as criticism of the Terrorism Act and its shortcomings. However, liberal tolerance is also a “repressive tolerance,” and the State condones only limited and controlled forms of opposition (Žižek, 1997: 37). As Michel Chossudovsky points out, “under contemporary capitalism, the illusion of democracy must prevail,” and “it is in the interest of the corporate elites to accept dissent and protest as a feature of the system,” but only “inasmuch as they do not threaten the established social order”. Chossudovsky coins the term “manufacturing dissent” to draw attention to the subtle ways in which corporate elites utilize their economic power not to repress, but to shape and mould and set the outer limits of political dissent. As Chossudovsky sees it, the process of “manufacturing dissent” acts as a “safety valve” to protect and sustain “the New World Order” and, to be effective, it must also be “carefully

271 Michel Chossudovsky cites Noam Chomsky and Edward S Herman when using the term “manufacturing consent” (Chossudovsky, M., 2010).

regulated and monitored by those who are the object of the protest movement”. The process of “manufacturing dissent” is fundamental to the exercise of power in a neoliberal state and it is my contention that dissent is not only shaped and controlled but also managed and marketed as signifier of freedom and democracy for the State brand. I am suggesting here, for example, that the image of Tame Iti provides spectacle and entertainment value for the media and that, as the face of indigenous activism, his image also signifies confrontation, political antagonism and functioning democracy. Although the image of Tame Iti as indigenous activist would appear to contradict and disturb the brand value of Māori as “the Other of ethereal wisdom and charming customs” (Žižek, 1997: 37), it also connotes an individual’s right to political freedom and liberal ‘tolerance,’ thus enhancing the socio-political profile of Brand New Zealand.

**The Management and Manipulation of Dissent in a Brand-state**

In order to demonstrate how subtle governmental processes work to set the limits of dissent, I refer, first, to some of the legal ramifications of the anti-terror raids and, second, to the State’s response to concomitant claims by Tūhoe for separate sovereignty. In its symbiotic relationship with the State, the law works to individualize, obfuscate and protract Court proceedings on potentially volatile political issues, thereby delimiting the impact of public response and the power of collective action. For example, it was not until October 2008, one year after the anti-terror raids, that seventeen defendants were committed for trial for firearms offences (2009: 13). Furthermore, as Binney reports, the judge ordered the depositions hearings to be “conducted under secrecy: thus, the police evidence could not be reported” (2009: 13). Then, on 28 October 2008, “the prosecution indicated that new charges would be laid under the 1961 Crimes Act against five defendants – among them Tame Iti – of participating in a ‘criminal gang’” (2009: 13). Not only did these new charges emerge over a year after the first arrests but, as Binney argues, “their purpose is to use the law to have the five defendants declared criminals” (2009: 13). The procedure deployed in laying these new criminal charges was described at the time as

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274 Chossudovsky defines “New World Order” this way: “We are fast moving towards a totalitarian system in which the institutions of war, police repression and economic policy (i.e. ‘strong economic medicine’) interface with one another” (2005: 126). He claims “the powers behind this system are those of the global banks and financial institutions, the military-industrial complex, the oil and energy giants, the biotech-pharmaceutical conglomerates and the powerful media and communications giants, which fabricate the news and overtly distort the course of world events” (2005: 127).
“a desperate attempt by the Government to save face” and is, according to Binney, at the very least legally “exceptional,” if not an outright abuse of legal process (2009: 13). In the process of manufacturing dissent, legal action (some under secrecy) takes a year to be processed, and five of the people arrested are redefined as ‘criminals’ to fit with the anti-terrorist theme of the original police action.275

Although my second example of manufacturing dissent specifically concerns the State’s response to Tūhoe claims for sovereign rights, it also encapsulates the much wider issues in that it demonstrates how neoliberal market policies transform subjectivity, undermine social bonds and facilitate a brand-state for global capital. Chossudovsky claims the process of “manufacturing dissent” is achieved not only by “fabricating dissent,” but also by “funding dissent” and by channeling resources from those who are the object of protest movements to those who are involved in organizing the protest movements. He refers to the production of a “counter-discourse” through which civil society leaders are handpicked and integrated into a “dialogue” that makes them feel they are “global citizens” acting on behalf of their fellow citizens, but through which they serve the interests of the corporate establishment (2005: 128). Chossudovsky is here referring to the infiltration and subversion of the anti-globalization movement, but market imperatives are brought to bear on all modes of subjectivity and work also, for example, to disarm and transform indigenous movements. In Aotearoa New Zealand, indigenous dissent is both manufactured and delimited through the legal processes of the Waitangi Tribunal and the compulsory re-channeling of grievance payments and Treaty settlements into neo-tribal corporations or investment portfolios.276

Elizabeth Rata uses the term ‘neotribal capitalism’ to identify a political strategy that combines communal ownership with exploitative class relations and to argue that “indigenization and retribalization are political vehicles for the inclusion of the traditional means of production, including knowledge, into the global sphere of circulation” (2000: 51). This process is exemplified, for example, in the establishment of Te Ohu Kai Moana (the Seafood Group) and the Ngāi Tahu Corporation whose Internet websites transmit to a transnational, global ‘public’ and enact the amalgamation of neotribal affiliation with corporate enterprise thereby encapsulating the way culture is being constructed through the fulcrum of capital. For further reading see Rata, E., 2000, A Political Economy of Neotribal Capitalism. Also, for further reading on the

275 A trial date has since been set for 18th August 2011 in the Auckland High Court, nearly four years after the anti-terror raids of October 2007. As contributor notes on the Indymedia website: “‘Operation 8’ was a grotesque attack on legitimate political opposition. The police targeted Tūhoe and tino runga ritratanga activists, environmentalists, union organizers and peace campaigners in a thinly veiled attack on dissent” (October 15th Solidarity, 2009). Another online article reports that this “high profile and potentially sensational criminal trial” coincides with the staging of the Rugby World Cup and that the “World Cup final on October 23 could well occur as the criminal trial is reaching its climax” (Field, M., 2009). This clash of dates could be pure coincidence or it could also be another example of the subtle processes involved in managing dissent.

276 For further reading see Rata, E., 2000, A Political Economy of Neotribal Capitalism. Also, for further reading on the
Waitangi Tribunal and as institutionalized in modes of bicultural governmentality, constitutes Māori as purportedly equal while continuing to classify Māori citizenship within tribal or communal forms. Indeed, Roger Maaka and Augie Fleras, in their analysis of the politics of indigeneity in Canada and Aotearoa New Zealand, contend that “the concept of a structural hierarchy of whānau, hapū and iwi is largely a colonial construct that bears little relationship to what actually happened,” and that “paradoxically, a static and hierarchical structure has become imbedded in the government policy paradigm, with the focus on īwi as a resource delivery mechanism” (2005: 79). Indigenous subjectivity and solidarity is deterritorialized and reterritorialized in hierarchical structures that ostensibly accommodate and redress Māori disadvantage and disenfranchisement but (re)direct resources to the elite beneficiaries of corporate enterprises. This is not simply the exercise of State authority and the subjugation of Māori subjectivity, however. Rather it serves as a fine example of power relations in action and demonstrates Foucault’s point that power is “less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government” (1982: 789). In short, “to govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others” (1982: 790).

In the modern state’s very sophisticated structures, as Foucault argues, “individuals can be integrated under one condition, that this individuality would be shaped in a new form and submitted to a set of very specific patterns” (1982: 783). In contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand, individuals are integrated and shaped to fit the specific patterns of image-based brand values and neoliberal economics. Tame Iti provides a case in point here because, since the anti-terror raids, he has indicated that his attitudes to dissent and protest are changing. He claims, for example, that the tino rangatiratanga (sovereignty, chieftainship) movement has to evolve and that while the first phase of the movement was protest, “and opening people’s eyes to forms of racism,” the next phase has to have some practical meaning (NZH, 09.08.08: A5). Iti’s change of heart reflects the influence of capitalist logic or, in other words, “now, as the tribe becomes a major multimillion-dollar force in the forestry industry courtesy of the Central North Island collective deal, things have changed” (NZH, 09.08.08: A5).277

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277 In February 2008, a Central North Island īwi Collective signed Terms of Agreement with the Crown “to develop proposals for the allocation of Crown-owned forest lands between īwi with unsettled historic claims.

establishment of Te Ohu Kai Moana (the Seafood Group) and the Ngāi Tahu Corporation see Begg, A., 2006, pp. 120-146.
Iti explains that the constitutional relationship between the Crown and Tūhoe is “on the table” and under negotiation, and claims this economic base will “give substance to Tūhoe’s self-determination aspirations” (*NZH*, 09.08.08: A5). He believes that “separatism is already a way of life for many Tūhoe people,” and envisages “constitutional change which would see his iwi have a relationship towards the Crown akin to Northern Ireland, Scottish and Welsh arrangements with Britain” (*NZH*, 09.08.08: A5). However, to paraphrase Chossudovsky, this “funding of dissent” essentially circumscribes the boundaries of dissent because it is not possible to meaningfully question the legitimacy of government while working in partnership with that government in a corporate venture (2005: 132). As the prospect of acquiring substantial Trust funds becomes the focus for Iti, he sees the subjectivities of Tūhoe changing or, as he puts it, “we have to start acting differently … we have to act like rangatira [chiefs] more than victims” (*NZH*, 09.08.08: A5). In a neoliberal context, “to act like rangatira” is to perform as a corporate executive, and success is measured by the financial worth of the ‘brand’. Tame Iti believes newly acquired financial resources give Tūhoe more freedom and power in their quest for self-determination, but that freedom is produced and organized according to neoliberal terms of consumption and choice. Technologies of power operate as modes of action upon the action of others and, as Foucault argues, that “power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” (1982: 790). Although in extreme cases it constrains or forbids absolutely, the exercise of power “is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action” (1982: 789). For Tame Iti and Ngāi Tūhoe, the possible field of action is being structured and governed not only by the extreme, racist and intimidating tactics of anti-

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278 In May 2010, settlement negotiations between Tūhoe and the Crown broke down when Prime Minister John Key refused to countenance giving Tūhoe exclusive ownership of the Urewera National Park. In October 2010, as negotiations on this issue resumed, Prime Minister John Key announced, “There is a simple bottom line from the Crown – we won’t be transferring sole ownership of Te Urewera National Park to Tūhoe” and although a future agreement could entail some form of customary title “negotiations could take years and may even extend beyond National’s 2014 target of getting all Treaty claims resolved” (*Voxy News Engine*, 2010).
terror police action, but also by the corporatized and financialized market imperatives of a neoliberal brand-state.\\(^{279}\)

It remains to be seen to what extent Tame Iti and Ngāi Tūhoe are co-opted and transformed by neoliberal policies in future negotiations, but the South Island iwi, Ngāi Tahu, were awarded their Waitangi Tribunal settlement in 1996, and since then that iwi has grown to become a major transnational corporation. Furthermore, according to an *Otago Daily Times* article, Ngāi Tahu is “preparing to brand itself in an effort to raise its profile” (*ODT*, 23.11.10: 23). In this article, “Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu kaiwhakahaere Mark Solomon” claims that “although the iwi had grown its asset base and cash reserves, more work was needed to market its successes and raise its profile” (*ODT* 23.11.10: 23). Solomon acknowledges that this iwi is recognized as a corporate “success story,” but also claims it needs “a more consistent branding message for its diverse portfolios” (*ODT* 23.11.10: 23). Solomon states that “one of the main challenges facing Ngāi Tahu included the state of the world economy and the high dollar, which was affecting the tourism and fishing industries” (*ODT*, 23.11.10: 23). He explains that “the iwi was also focused on growing the wealth of its shareholders through savings and educating and employing the future leaders of tomorrow” (*ODT*, 23.11.10: 23). These plans to build Ngāi Tahu’s brand, raise a business profile, and grow the wealth of shareholders, all point to the corporatization of indigenous assets and the overwhelming impact of the logic of the market on what were once dissident movements for local representation and social justice. This means the inequalities and social deprivations that produced dissidence and demanded redress, remain unaddressed.

The Waitangi Tribunal is instrumental in awarding enormous settlements to various *iwi* as reparation for historic grievances and land confiscations, but then these settlements are (re)invested in forms of corporate ventures or investment portfolios. In other words,

279 On Thursday, 24 May 2012, Justice Rodney Hansen jailed Tame Iti and Te Rangikaiwhiria Kemara to for two and a half years on firearms charges connected with alleged military-style camps in the Ureweras. A jury was previously unable to reach a verdict on charges of participating in an organised criminal group.

280 The term ‘kaiwhakahaere’ means ‘chair’ and Solomon is chair of ‘Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu’ which, according to its official website, is the organization “that services the tribe's statutory rights and ensures that the benefits of the Settlement grow for the future generations. It was established by the Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu Act 1996” (Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, 1996). Solomon’s official title is included in the press article without explanation or translation, implying perhaps that such titles are now part of everyday parlance.
reparation serves only to advance a capitalist agenda. In her analysis of the limits of Treaty Settlement, Lashley produces official census data as evidence that Māori continue to constitute a disproportionate share of Aotearoa New Zealand’s urban poor. She points out how assets or income from Treaty settlements constitute private property, albeit communally held, and are not construed in any way as State or public funds. That is to say, assets and income from Treaty settlements “are not expected to pay for costs of State programs or for the duties of the State towards its citizens under welfare legislation or the like” (2000: 40). Treaty settlement assets “are distributed to Māori tribal collectives – iwi and hapū – and managed by tribal trust boards, generally, as commercial ventures and investment portfolios” (2000: 46). Within the terms of neoliberal government, claims for social equity and legal redress become opportunities for further embedding the privatized, corporate imperatives of capital accumulation, only exacerbating existing social deprivation and inequalities. As Lashley argues, the corporatization of state reconciliation settlements is a crucial, definitive aspect of neoliberal governance that “many people fail to notice,” and one that “needs constant assertion” (2000: 40). Treaty settlements are being seen to address past injustices, and reparative justice is equated with distributive justice but, in fact, “very few deeds of settlement have reached the asset disbursement stage,” and the channeling of Treaty settlement financial resources into corporate enterprises or investment portfolios increases rather than lessens social inequalities (2000: 46). In other words, Waitangi Tribunal settlements are re-inscribed and re-circulated to accumulate capital while the socioeconomic disparity and systemic injustice prompting or underlying indigenous dissent is glossed over and effectively exacerbated.

The corporatization of Māori tribal collectives epitomizes neoliberal logic and demonstrates how racial categories are utilized in the generation of affective communities and branded identities. Maurizio Lazzarato describes racism as a governmental technique arising from the “inability of capitalist economy to delimit and ground a territory, an identity or a sociality” and, following Foucault, adds “now it is a matter of economic policies relating to the production and reproduction of a population (biopower) rather than

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281 The UN Development Program recently published a report looking, among other things, at income inequality worldwide. The world’s most advanced economies were listed, Scandinavian countries, Japan and the Czech Republic have the least amount of inequality. The US is among the most unequal, in 3rd place, and Aotearoa New Zealand is 6th with the following statistics: GDP 2007 (US$billions):135.7; Share of income or expenditure (%): Poorest 10% - 2.2; Richest 10% - 27.8. The report states, “According to the OECD, New Zealand had the biggest rise in inequality among member nations in the two decades starting in the mid-1980s” (Einhorn, B., 2009). These dates correspond with the state’s turn to neoliberal market policies.
to the ‘organization of labour’ strictly speaking” (2009: 131). As discussed in Chapter
One, liberal government invents ‘civil society’ in order to situate or territorialize biopower
and enable the governmentalization of the social, the population. As Lazzarato explains,
“Foucault conceptualizes the recourse to the ‘social’, the ‘nation’, ‘civil society’ in terms
of techniques that, in ensuring territorialization, allow the integration of the economic and
the juridical:

The power of ‘capital’ rests upon the de-territorialization of social and political
relations, and its weakness arises from the processes of re-territorialization
which, to be effective, must appeal to dispositifs that are not at all economic.
Only the social, civil society, the nation, the state, etc, can provide the
territorial limits, the boundaries of ‘community’ and the social bonds that the

Underpinning the biopolitical control of ‘society’ is a necessity to mobilize the affective
co-operation and social bonds that a capitalist economy works against but also seeks to
exploit. Lazzarato argues that neoliberal society is founded on differentiation and
insecurity, and that “it is racism that will secure the exercise of a sovereign power (the
restoration of the power of life or death through the selection of who belong and who is
excluded from the national community) and that will, additionally, enable biopower to be
circumscribed within certain limits” (2009: 131). Racism endorses and explains “the
political force of the appeal to ‘national preference’ as part of the neoliberal socialization
of the economy” (2009: 131). This entails a form of state racism that condones systemic
economic inequalities (local and global) and demonstrates massive contradictions, if not
blatant hypocrisy, in ethical attitudes to human life.

**Conclusion**

This Chapter has claimed that a neoliberal political economy demands the corporatization
of the state, the nullification of any vestige of liberalism as governmental critique, and the
imposition of administrative, managerial modes of governmentality that reconfigure nation
as nation-brand. It has argued that corporate states not only disavow any responsibility for
social inequities and the destruction of social bonds, but also utilize totalitarian
surveillance and security measures to control the population and protect the brand. The
Chapter began by linking identity politics with nation-branding and argued that
globalization functions as a universal culture or macro-myth through which individual
nation-brands (like 100% Pure New Zealand) promote and uphold the market imperatives of a globalized, capitalist political economy. The Chapter then explored neoliberal strategies of media governmentality through the prism of broadcast television and, more specifically, through the establishment and administration of the Māori Television Service (MTS). It used the advent of MTS to connect biculturalism with the neoliberal project and to examine the ways in which modes of media governmentality work to narrate a folklorist image of indigenous subjectivity and so enhance the neoliberal nation-branding project. The Chapter focused on the narration of a deeply embedded Pākehā/Māori binary and argued that this binary serves a dual purpose, first as symbolic marker of a bicultural State brand and, second, as a biopolitical strategy in the management and control of cultural diversity. It traced the governmentalization of the Tūhoe people in order to study the systems of surveillance and coercion that manipulate dissent and secure market fundamentalism for a neoliberal political economy. The bicultural brand is designed to attract affective commitment and global investment while systems of tribal identification enable collective forms of Māori identity to be deterritorialized and reterritorialized as investment trusts or corporate ventures. The Chapter has argued that reiterative racialized strategies contrast axioms of ideal consumerist citizenship with activists or ‘terrorists’ who threaten to besmirch Brand New Zealand’s ‘100% pure’ image. In other words, the Chapter explored split and doubled contradictory narrations of bicultural nationhood, in which the brand-state celebrates bicultural diversity (as through MTS for example) and in which state racism works to mark and suppress any opposition to the neoliberal project.

My aim in this Chapter, and indeed throughout this thesis, has been to centralize the crucial role of media (or what Jansen calls the “electronic panopticon”) in the production of subjectivity and the management of a globalized, neoliberal culture industry. All notions of national identity and bicultural nationhood relate directly to the biopolitical management of a population and to the manipulation and regulation of affective biopower. In the words of Jonathan Beller:

It is largely through the rational calculus of affect that capital organizes and reorganizes populations. The print nationalism of the Benedict Anderson variety was just the crude beginnings. Today, rational and irrational behaviour is rationalized for production through the mass dissemination and careful tweaking of structures of feeling (2006b: 169, emphasis in original).

Beller encapsulates the crucial connection between affective biopower, media governmentality and neoliberal capitalism when he posits the question, “What are
corporations and politicians buying when they buy “airtime” if not, in the words of Antonio Negri, “productive social cooperation” (2006a: 108). Affective biopower generates social cooperation and underpins productive sociality, and it is this capacity for the production of a common that is constantly mined and undermined by the image-based, brand values of a neoliberal market economy. This Chapter has addressed the issues raised by Foucault in the heading of this Chapter by arguing that the market imperatives of globalized neoliberalism are elitist, racist, hierarchical and politically blinkered. As Beller claims, in consumer society “we renounce our own agency for the myth of agency” (2006a: 272). Beller points out that the “mediated flattening out” of human agency is necessary precisely because “democratic capitalism” is an oxymoron and “capitalism’s structural inequality is the direct contradiction of egalitarianism” (2006a: 272). Brand-states emerge when the market has the power of formalization for both the state and society, and a globalized, capitalist oligarchy subsumes principles of liberal democracy reducing the State, as Žižek claims, “to a mere police-agent servicing the needs of market forces and multiculturalist tolerant humanitarianism” (2009: 237). In the face of increasing inequality, deprivation and social injustice, the neoliberal state garners legitimacy by utilizing media governmentality to portray the myth of a democratic, bicultural nation-brand on one hand while deploying totalitarian surveillance and policing tactics to secure the brand-state for global capital on the other.

Beller explains, “Today, only those who command the most attention are genuine personalities. Those who have nothing (the indigent, the homeless, the planet’s impoverished majority) cannot speak, and those who have little speak through their consumer practices. One of the things we (those of us who have little) buy are images (enabling) of personality. The consumption of these personalities helps us to imagine what it would be like to actually have one. That action, which in its own meager way realizes a desire for individuality, is necessary because if we did not believe in the possibility of eventually having a personality we might not believe in individuality, which means we might not believe in ‘representative’ democracy, or in America, or in that Truth among truths: humanity’s social nature itself – capitalism. If we doubted more rigorously the moral rectitude of capitalism, its truth as an expression of human nature, its incontestable force of destining the world, we might become more imaginative. In valorizing the closed circuit that constructs personality at our own expense, we consume and internalize the very relation that negates us. We pay, we give our all, to retain our faith in the system that denies us precisely what we desire: agency” (2006a: 271-271).
CONCLUSION

This thesis has identified affective biopower as the productive social force that constitutes brand value and brand identity, and which underpins notions of nationhood and that now comprises capitalism’s prime mode of production. Branding involves the socialization of affect, and Brand New Zealand operates affectively at a national level to mould subjectivity, to access and harness surplus value, and to structure a brand-state for global capital. This thesis has claimed that nation-branding represents, first, the (re)inscription and dominance of market logic in the organization and government of neoliberal nation-states and, second, the growing influence of the spectacle, the image and media culture as political tool and system of social control. It has argued that liberal notions of individual freedom and democracy are affectively mobilized and are increasingly linked with a market morality in which profit and expediency perform as sole criteria for government policy.

Globalised, corporatized mediascapes play a crucial role here because, as Jansen claims, today’s media technologies render “two-step” models of opinion formation obsolete and enable a corporate controlled “consciousness industry” direct access to the individual (1991: 138). For Jansen, the “consciousness industry” bears “the imprimatur of cultural imperialism” and prescribes global realignments in relations of power and knowledge which translate “the imperatives of the hierarchical relations of U.S. capitalistic production into global imperatives” (1991: 139). Within this context, nation-branding serves to imprint and protect capitalism’s “cultural imperialism”:

Nation-branding is a monologic, hierarchical, reductive form of communication that is intended to privilege one message, require all voices of authority to speak in unison, and marginalize and silence dissenting voices (Jansen, 2008: 134).

Nation-states have always used symbolic forms and mythical narratives to affirm national allegiance and secure sovereignty and, as the previous chapters demonstrate, they have also utilized media technologies to mobilize and influence a unified social imaginary.

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283 Jansen explains that mass media, especially electronic media, paved the way for the current removal of “institutionalized resistance” to the imperatives of a deregulated marketplace. Globalized media systems enable corporate conglomerates to bypass and usurp the power of “patriarch, priest and party boss” and, by gaining direct access to the individual, set the public agenda as well as stipulate the parameters for action (1991: 138).
Nation-branding is different, however, because it reconfigures the social bond and conflates the production of a common, a shared world, with economic development and the production of a profitable image. The point here is that nation-brands do not benefit the people whose affective affiliations add value to the national brand. On the contrary, as Jansen makes clear, nation-branding serves as a successful mechanism for advancing “market fundamentalism” and “transferring public funds and authority into private hands” while cultivating the “feel-good illusions of community participation and solidarity” (2008: 132). Nation-branding performs as the ultimate example of neoliberal governmentality, situating economic development as the nation’s prime focus and responsibility and reconfiguring all social production as intellectual property to be capitalized and secured for the benefit of a global economy.

The aim of this thesis has been twofold, first, to interrogate the problematic link between liberal democratic government and a capitalist political economy and, second, to demonstrate how control of affective biopower is central to the strategies of all liberal government and, more especially, to the operation of neoliberal informational capitalism. In this age of informational capitalism and media governmentality, social productivity and productive cooperation provide the immaterial labour that now underpins capital accumulation. Political potency, understood in a broad sense as socially produced ethical surplus, is harnessed and captured in forms of brand identity for the valorization of a capitalist political economy. Social productivity has been, and is being, channeled into mediatized, corporatized and branded events (as, for example, the 2011 Rugby World Cup) in exchange for a fantasy of national empowerment and/or security. As Beller claims, “along with life and labour, the very consciousness of our bodies has been and is being expropriated. For this we have become not just spectators, but specters” (2006a: 295). In summary, this thesis has argued that the art of liberal government is to equate notions of freedom and democracy with the agenda of a capitalist political economy, and that neoliberal capitalism finds its very conditions of possibility in brand identities and in the facilitative capabilities of interactive media systems and modes of media governmentality.

Jansen notes the term ‘market fundamentalism’ was coined by George Soros who, she says, “first used it in interviews and newspaper articles in which he warned of the inherent instability of global markets, from whence he had made his own fortune” (2008: 138). She points out that he developed the concept in The Crisis of Capitalism (1998) and that she uses the term to describe “a constituent of the ideology (or post-ideology) of globalization, which positions the ‘free-market’ as the arbiter of all things” (2008: 138).
Chapter One began by situating Aotearoa New Zealand as a product of British imperialism and used the history of All Blacks rugby and the development of the All Blacks brand to demonstrate how affective investment both underpins notions of national identity and informs the production of a brand state. It examined various implementations of liberal government in Aotearoa New Zealand noting especially those instances of state policy that signalled neoliberal reform in the 1980s and that led to de-regulation, privatization and the (re)invention and (re)articulation of Aotearoa New Zealand as New Zealand Inc. It tracked the parallel emergence of neoliberal and bicultural narratives and the transformation of anti-capitalist, environmental campaigns and Māori rights movements to anti-state sentiment and cultural or identity politics, paying special regard to the role of media governmentality in these processes. The Chapter argued that in a neoliberal brand state culture and capitalism converge in the production of a new cultural economy, and that market imperatives and brand logic now dominate new forms of identity politics and underpin the affective production of a bicultural social imaginary. Chapter Two shifted the focus of analysis from political history and the biopolitical management of a population to the production of individualized subjectivity and image-based identity in the context of media governmentality. This Chapter focused on individualized transformation of subjectivity in the face of neoliberal modes of governmentality and argued that, within the ethos of neoliberal, consumerist society, individuals must continually appraise notions of ‘self’ in terms of marketability and return on human capital. It elaborated on the concept of media culture and modes of media governmentality as key strategies in the construction and normalization of subjectivity, and claimed that branding (self-branding) and brand marketing are the core activities of a neoliberal capitalist economy.

Chapter Three linked media culture with branding mechanisms and explored the ways in which media networks rely on affect and affective affiliation to structure virtual communities around consumerist subjectivity and brand loyalty. It discussed affect value as immeasurable productive reality and argued that post-Fordist, neoliberal regimes seek to superimpose market imperatives over all expressions of productive subjectivity, thus creating “new figures of valoration” and “new figures of exploitation” (Negri, 1999: 86). It argued that contemporary expressions of ‘community’ may be prolific but, rather than emerging as the expression of being-in-common or of co-existing actual, lived realities, the neoliberal ‘community’ epitomizes a calculated ethic of self-enterprise and enacts a means of manipulating the feelings of others for self-actualization or corporate advantage.
Chapter Four analyzed the production of community at a national level, noting strong parallels between the affective affiliations that underpin nationhood and inform a social imaginary and the affective affiliations that underpin loyalty to a product brand. It claimed that the brand is one of the most significant media technologies and social developments of our time and that the tactics of branding now stretch far beyond advertising and business merchandise to encompass politics, the arts, charities and sport to become a global social and cultural phenomenon with increasing influence, strength and power. It used examples from contemporary tourism, destination marketing and Reality TV to argue that nation-branding and tourism are directly related to the growth of middle-class lifestyle and to a culture of consumption that continues and consolidates a neo-colonial pattern of unequal development and exploitation. Chapter Five examined the manipulation of affective biopower in the national mediasphere, first, in the (re)articulation of bicultural nationhood and, second, through the exclusionary tactics that mark ‘flawed’ consumers and political activists as security risks and a threat to society. It used the emergence of the Māori Television Service and recurrent intimidation of the Tūhoe community to demonstrate the contradictory interplay which, as Foucault claims, characterizes the art of liberal government and which entails both the production of freedom and the establishment of limitations, controls, obligations and forms of coercion (2008: 64).

Although this thesis has focused on the production of consumerist society and the nurturing of a single mind-set in the state mediascape, affective biopower does always offer potential for disrupting the neoliberal matrix and for reconceptualizing political citizenship and ethical community. In Chapter Three, I noted how Arvidsson et al highlight a fundamental incompatibility between a “capitalist economy” founded on private property, organized by markets and motivated by capital accumulation, and an “ethical economy” structured primarily by networks and motivated by the accumulation of social recognition (2008a: 11-12). They argue that the ethical economy and the capitalist economy represent two structurally distinct economic forms and posit the possible emergence of an ethical economy co-ordinated by “affective affinity: chosen commitments to productive networks or other forms of community” (2008a: 12). The problem is that brand marketers already access this affective affinity through media networks and acquire peer respect and social recognition for their corporate customers in the process. In a neoliberal society, as this thesis has argued, the ethical and the economic are intertwined, and brands work to link ethical issues and national values with corporate ventures and
global capital. However, as this thesis has also argued, affective biopower is an irreducible, uncontainable and inherently political force producing constant social struggle.

Political conflict emerges and escalates when standards of living are threatened or, to return to Bourdieu (1984), when the buffer between economic necessity and image-based, debt-driven consumerist lifestyle disintegrates. Such scenarios are currently playing out in Greece, Spain, Italy and Israel, for example, where mass protests are refuting the reiterative neoliberal mantra that claims there is no alternative to deregulation and privatization, and that finance capital must be protected at all costs. As the 2007-8 global financial melt-down continues to decimate social infrastructures, and as the Rupert Murdoch tabloid scandal exposes the symbiotic and insidious relationships between media, police and politicians, global neoliberalism is losing credibility and facing increasing resistance.  

In this image, the main sign reads “Smash Corporate Greed, Support the Occupation” and immediately to the left of this is the flag symbolizing Tino Rangatiratanga [Māori Sovereignty]. This flag flew alongside the New Zealand flag in Wellington for the first time on Waitangi Day 2012. Mayor Celia Wade-Brown stated it should be the “start of a long-running tradition” and urged “the Government to give the Tino Rangatiratanga flag the official status it deserves” (Dominion Post, February 2012), (Photo courtesy of Professor Lee F. Schweninger, University of North Carolina, Wilmington, U.S.A.).

I refer here to two articles that encapsulate a growing groundswell of grassroots resistance to neoliberalism. The first provides links to reports on the phone-hacking scandal involving Rupert Murdoch’s News of the World, on police attacks on the G20 protests in 2009 and on undercover police work within the environmental and anti-capitalist movements. It highlights the Eurozone financial crisis and claims that under neoliberalism “mechanisms of debt have maintained most people’s living standards” and “politics has been reduced to technocratic rule”. It argues “the only way out of the present impasse is to spark mass political action such as that glimpsed in Greece, Spain and the Maghreb, as well as the student movement in the UK” (Harvie and Milburn, 2011).
imperialism and the principles of liberal democracy become starkly apparent and when the market logic of brand states is exposed as socially destructive and economically exploitative. And it is at times like these that the transformative force of affective biopower is most potent.\(^{287}\) In Foucault’s words, “It is the connection of desire to reality (and not its retreat into the forms of representation) that possesses revolutionary force” (1983: xiii-xiv). However, it is also at times like these that dominant hegemonies utilize affective domains to access and (re)articulate resistive potentiality as manageable difference and/or as systemic anomalies easily addressed. In Chapter Five, for example, I described the production of a bicultural discourse in Aotearoa New Zealand, and the advent of MTS, as the reining in and re-articulation of the potentially transformative force that informed and inspired the 1970s Māori renaissance. What had been a social movement grounded in the connection of desire to reality became a form of representation in which “massively potentializing” affective biopower was neutralized and “massively delivered to proliferating spaces of containment” (Massumi, 2002: 83). I also pointed out how the Tūhoe people have been systematically deterritorialized and reterritorialized in modes of governmentality that seek to close down and usurp the social bonds and sense of belonging that remains resistive to the state’s sovereign authority and capitalist agenda.

The second article reports on mass direct action in Spain: “Last night Madrid’s city centre offered a glimpse of what Western democracies have become, as thousands of unarmed nonviolent civilians with their hands up in the air shouting ‘these are our weapons’ and ‘this is a dictatorship’ were beaten by police commandos in full riot gear. This event was the culmination of a month of intense mobilizations across the country by the popular movement known as the ‘Indignados’. People, whom despite being ignored by the government have made their voices heard, as banking cartels, European bureaucrats, rating agencies and the country’s elites continue in their frantic push to sell-off Spain’s remaining public wealth, and persist in the implementation of drastic cuts to the welfare state. The ‘Indignados’ are fully aware of the fact that their government does not represent them, whenever they congregate they shout that loud and clear. They know that only popular unity will salvage them from the train wreck which complicit speculators and politicians have created, and as they read the financial news, they know things can only get worse” (Ouziel, 2011).

\(^{287}\) Another online article concerns the Israeli Tent Protests which began 14 July 2011 (dubbed the J14) and which comprised, “first, scattered hundreds – then, on Saturday, July 30, over 300,000 people in Tel Aviv alone, with tents mushrooming across the country, in self-conscious defiance of state-peddled neoliberalism”. The article makes the point that this tent protest, “did not begin among the destitute and immigrant-rich south Tel Aviv, but in the city’s affluent north, by those who had gone to Hebrew University and Ben-Gurion University, the seminaries of the country’s elite, those who had done the requisite military service, the children of the bourgeoisie or the declining bourgeoisie, who had expected a smooth ride into an affluent future and are now colliding with the debris of the shattered Israeli social compact.” The article also states: “Revolutions are inherently unpredictable, as people move out of the gentle ebbs and flows, the quotidian cycles, of their lives, and move to messianic time. At such movements, belief in their own power, a kind of ‘collective effervescence,’ can create opportunities that no one would have predicted or believed possible just weeks before, and radical change becomes a kind of a mirage that one suddenly wills into being real. Such sparks of human creativity and the instinct for freedom kindle flames within structures designed to douse them” (Ajil, 2011). This description of ‘collective effervescence’ correlates with my conceptualization of ‘affective biopower’ as socially-produced resistant force.
This thesis has argued that “capitalism is the global usurpation of belonging” and although affective biopower is potentially transformative, it is precisely this dynamic potentiality that is pre-empted and expropriated in proliferating formations of brand identity and brand communities (Massumi, 2002: 83, emphasis in original). And brand identity is constructed and negotiated in symbiotic relationship with the production and articulation of cultural identity. While both are at once essentialized and constructed in terms of aesthetic consumerism and lifestyle choice, they are also regularized and normalized as the natural, taken-for-granted domains of affective investment and collective action. As Massumi claims, “we are in-formed by capitalist powers of production. Our whole life becomes a ‘capitalist tool’ – our vitality, our affective capacities – it’s to the point that our life potentials are indistinguishable from capitalist forces of production” (2003: 13). My claim is that a nation brand links brand identity with the articulation of a unified national cultural identity and thereby sets the bounds of social affiliations and collective belonging to the commodified parameters of neoliberal market imperatives. In other words, capitalist productivity is more about capturing and multiplying potentials for doing and being than it is about selling things. Massumi follows Deleuze and Guattari to call this capitalizing on movement “surplus-value of flow” and to point out that what characterizes the “society of control” is that “the economy and the way power functions come together around the generation of this surplus-value of flow” (2003: 14). The important point here is that capitalizing on affective vitality involves hitching a ride on movements afoot in the social field, acting on social stirrings, and channelling them via brand and cultural collectives, into profit-making directions.

My argument is that a brand economy functions to control the social through the affective underpinnings of the surplus-value of flow, through the marshalling and management of socially-produced affective biopower. Brands are the catalysts through which power operates, but brands do not possess power; as Foucault stresses, power is exercised by guiding the conduct of conduct, by structuring the field of possible actions, by framing the parameters of what is socially acceptable and expected (1982: 789). Brands are the instruments of choice in societies of control where power relations are expressed through the action at a distance of one mind on another or, as Lazzarato puts it, “through the brain’s power to affect and become affected, which is mediatized and enriched by technology” (2006: 180). Brands exert power and structure the actions of others by
dominating and assimilating media technologies, by disseminating market values as social values, and by limiting representations of identity and citizenship to the capital-serving tenets of aesthetic consumerism and lifestyle culture. I believe that affective biopower operates to construct points of commonality and that its force for forging an ethical politics is constantly undermined by a neoliberal matrix of individualization. In closing, therefore, I turn once again to Foucault, who claims “what is needed is to ‘de-individualize’ by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations” (1983: xiv). For Foucault, “the group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals, but a constant generator of de-individualization” (1983: xiv). If the art of neoliberal government resides in manipulating affective biopower through processes of individualization then the art of resistive politics resides in changing our relation to ourselves and in rejecting the individualized subjectivity that binds and secures us and makes us subject.
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