The Effect of Gender and Familiarity on the Use of *like* in New Zealand English

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

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Abstract

Research on the pragmatic device *like* has primarily focused on *like* as a quotative. The overall distribution of *like* has received comparatively little attention. Particularly lacking are accounts which show how *like* may vary for a speaker in different situations or contexts.

This study addresses this gap by testing the effects of speaker gender, addressee gender and familiarity on the frequency of *like*. This study is based on 24 20-minute dyadic conversations, 12 of which occurred between friends, and 12 between strangers. The dyads were split evenly between female-female, female-male and male-male pairings. The recordings were transcribed and coded according to a system based on Terraschke (2008). The data was then analysed using mixed effects logistic regression.

The results for discourse marker *like* showed a significant interaction between familiarity and gender relation. When participants were friends with their addressee, they were more likely to use "quotative", "subjective stance" and "hesitation" *like* if their addressee was of the same gender. In the unfamiliar data, both males and females were more likely to use quotative *like* and subjective stance *like* when speaking to a female addressee. "Discourse link" *like* was more likely to occur in the male-male dyads. "Cut-off" *like* was more likely to occur between friends, and females were more likely to use it when speaking to males.

Audience design (Bell, 1984), social identity theory (see Meyerhoff, 1996) and observations on the communicative preferences of men and women (Coates, 2004) are used to account for these results. It is argued that because quotative *like* and discourse link *like* are used to structure discourse, or have a textual function, they are better explained by the communicative preferences of men and women. Subjective stance *like* and hesitation *like* are better accounted for using audience design and social identity theory because of their interactional function.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Like is a pragmatic device found throughout the English-speaking world. It is used in the USA (Blyth, Recktenwald, & Wang, 1990), Canada (D'Arcy, 2004), England (Levey, 2006), Scotland (Miller & Weinert, 1995), Australia (Winter, 2002) and New Zealand (Baird, 2001). It is used by speakers from many ethnicities (Cukor-Avila, 2002; Kohn & Franz, 2009; Sharifian & Malcolm, 2003), the old (D'Arcy, 2007), the young (Helt & Foster-Cohen, 1995), and second language speakers (Müller, 2005). There are equivalent forms in other languages (Levey, 2006).

Like has generated interest from many areas of linguistics. Its meaning is unclear (e.g. Andersen, 2001), and its grammatical function (D'Arcy, 2006) and origin are debated (Buchstaller & D'Arcy, 2009). Its geographic distribution can tell us about the globalisation of English and about how language change spreads (Buchstaller & D'Arcy, 2009). *Like* can give us insight into the process of grammaticalisation (Meehan, 1991).

Studying the distribution of *like* contributes much to sociolinguistics. Asking whether *like* is age-graded or represents generational change (Barbieri, 2009) tells us about change mechanisms for English in general. It can tell us about how men and women might differ in how they use language (Barbieri, 2007; Dailey-O'Cain, 2000; Romaine & Lange, 1991).

According to Holmes (2008), the aim of sociolinguistics is to explain why people speak differently in different social contexts, to identify the social functions of language and to examine how language is used to convey social meaning. One aspect of this that has received a great deal of interest over the past forty years or so is gender. Men and women express gender in different ways in interaction. This varies again according to social context. In certain contexts, men and women convey social meaning differently. Women and men have been shown to establish rapport differently when speaking to members of the same gender (Coates, 2004). Women bond by sharing personal experiences, while

men are more likely to discuss more public things, such as sport. These two strategies for establishing rapport come with different conversational styles. Women have been shown to communicate collaboratively. Many speakers may share the floor. Men are more likely to take turns to hold the floor, but this is worked out competitively rather than cooperatively.

One way people convey social meaning is to use pragmatic devices. Pragmatic devices are syntactically optional elements that have no propositional meaning but can be used to structure discourse (Schiffrin, 1987), direct a hearer on how they should interpret an utterance (Andersen, 2001) or convey affective meaning (Holmes, 1990a). Pragmatic devices can attenuate the force of an utterance or can strengthen it (Holmes, 1986). Because they can convey interpersonal meaning, the use of a pragmatic device can tell us about the context in which it is found. This can tell us about how men and women communicate.

One of the focuses of this study is how the pragmatic device *like* operates in relation to gender. The core function of *like* is to convey a mismatch between a person's thought and how this thought is realised in speech (Andersen, 2001). *Like* can also convey interpersonal meaning (Müller, 2005). When a person uses *like* to convey to their addressee that their speech does not perfectly represent their thought, they are attributing understanding to their addressee. This can be a form of politeness. Women have been shown to use more positive politeness (Brown & Levinson, 1987) strategies than men (Holmes, 1993). Perhaps because of this, women have been shown to use *like* more than men (Andersen, 2001; Fuller, 2003; Tagliamonte, 2005).

Gender and other sociolinguistic variables have also been shown to affect the frequency of *like*. *Like* is used predominantly by younger speakers (Andersen, 2001; Blyth et al., 1990; Buchstaller & D'Arcy, 2009). Some studies find that a person's socioeconomic status affects how often they use *like* (Baird, 2001; Buchstaller & D'Arcy, 2009; Macaulay, 2001) and that ethnicity may also have an effect (Kohn & Franz, 2009; D'Arcy, 2010). Additionally, intralingual factors such as grammatical person (Romaine & Lange, 1991), tense (Singler, 2001) and whether the quotation is of real or inner speech (Tagliamonte & Hudson, 1999) have been found to influence how likely a person is to choose quotative *like* over another quotative.

At the same time, there are things that are still not known about *like*. One gap concerns how the function and rate of *like* may vary for an individual in different contexts. Studies of other pragmatic devices have shown they vary according to context. Pragmatic devices which occur more in casual conversation are used more between people of the same gender in casual conversations, and in more formal interactions they are used more towards women (Holmes, 1990a).

To address the context gap in the literature on *like*, this study tests whether familiarity affects the use of *like*. There is some evidence that friends use *like* more than strangers (Jucker & Smith, 1998), but this has not been investigated thoroughly. Additionally, this study focuses on gender, because of its documented influence on the use of *like*. As well as the gender of the speaker, this study also examines addressee gender as a potentially relevant factor, because of its effect on other pragmatic devices such as *sort of* (Holmes, 1988b).

This study is based on a corpus of approximately 80,000 words produced by 24 dyadic 20 minute conversations. These conversations were analysed using mixed effects logistic regression.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

In this chapter I will review the literature on *like.* In Section 2.1 I will describe *like* in more detail and talk about its functions. I will then outline Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), the coherence view (Schiffrin, 1987) and Politeness Theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987) and discuss how these theories of communication relate to *like* and can account for *like* and other pragmatic devices (Section 2.2). Following this, I will discuss whether *like* is in fact a pragmatic device (Section 2.3). Section 2.4 surveys the literature on the sociolinguistic distribution of *like.* Finally I will show that previous accounts of *like* do not adequately explore how its distribution might be influenced by contextual factors such as a speaker's addressee's gender, or their relationship with the addressee. I will show how such contextual factors might be accounted for by outlining some accounts of style (Section 2.5). I will finish the chapter by giving an overview of the present study.

2.1 What is *like*?

In this section I will describe how *like* functions and compare accounts of its function in the literature, beginning with probably the most recognised form of *like*: *like* as a quotative marker. I additionally will survey the literature on *like* as a focus marker and show why this theory cannot account for all instances of *like* as a pragmatic device. I will then describe alternative explanations for non-quotative *like.* Unless otherwise stated, all examples are from the present study. All names are pseudonyms.

2.1.1 Quotative

A quotative is a word or phrase which is used to introduce a quotation. These are also called quotative complementisers (Ferrara & B. Bell, 1995; Romaine & Lange, 1991)

and constructed dialogue introducers (Tannen, 1986). Tannen makes a good argument for the term "constructed dialogue". Quoted or reported speech is reported by to be a "misnomer" , since most 'reported' lines have not actually been spoken (Tannen, 1986, p. 311). In saying that the lines have not been spoken, Tannen refers to two observations about the nature of constructed dialogue. The first is that people are often not able to recall and accurately relate the precise utterance of another person. The second is that so-called 'quotations', which represent internal reactions, may not have been actually spoken prior to being quoted.

Quotative *be+like* lets speakers quote what they themselves have said or thought, or what another person has said or may have thought. *Like* is used as a quotative in utterances such as (2.1 a). The use of *be+like* in (2.1 a) means that the utterance can be roughly interpreted as speech, as in (2.1 b), or an internal reaction, as in (2.1 c).

(2.1) (a) Adelaide: ... she's like ah I'm ready to go up there and I *was like* no you're not...

(b) Adelaide: ... she's like ah I'm ready to go up there and I *said* no you're not...

(c) Adelaide: ... she's like ah I'm ready to go up there and I *thought* no you're not...

This distinction can be further explained by looking at some utterances in which it is clear whether the speaker is referring to real or imagined speech. *Like* reports an utterance that occurred in previous dialogue in (2.2), a previous internal utterance in (2.3), and an imagined utterance used to portray a person's potential reaction in (2.4).

(2.2) Jen: and I sort of had a feeling that it might have been then but my sister *was like* "no why would you think that?" and I just believed her so

(2.3) Nick: and then *I'm like* "ok I need to go eat"

(2.4) Mel: ... I find that you know guys will *be like* "oo single girls" and they'll kind of cluster around like vultures

In (2.2), Jen is telling Harry why she didn't think her sister was coming to visit. We can tell that (2.2) represents an utterance that actually occurred, because the fact that Jen's sister said "no why would you think that" is important to the story. In (2.3) we can guess that "ok I need to go eat" occurred internally, because in the story that he is telling, Nick is alone in his room. In (2.4), Mel is describing how guys treat single girls in clubs. She uses quotative *like* to avoid the clumsier version in (2.5).

(2.5) Mel: ... I find that you know guys will *look as if they might be thinking* "oo single girls"...

Although they all introduce constructed dialogue, different quotative markers may have different meanings. Thus, although they are somewhat interchangeable, the use of each can affect the meaning of an utterance.

Fox Tree and Tomlinson (2008) discuss the differing meanings of *like* and *say.* They investigate the idea that *like* could be overtaking *say* in frequency because speakers want to express quotations that are less source faithful more now than in the past. While they find no evidence to suggest this is true, their study does highlight the differences between these quotatives.

Fox Tree and Tomlinson (2008) interpret source faithfulness as a continuum. Quotations prefaced with *say* are thought to be more source faithful than quotations prefaced with *like.* This distinction works only when *say* is used with a direct quotation. *Say* with an indirect quotation implies a lower level of source faithfulness (Fox Tree & Tomlinson, 2008). Consider (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8). Example (2.6) does not necessarily imply that the words "I'm hungry" were uttered aloud. Utterance (2.7) does, however, carry this implication. Sentence (2.8) could have been paraphrased, for example, from "I'm starving", because the quotation is indirect.

(2.6) (constructed) She was like "I'm hungry"

(2.7) (constructed) She said "I'm hungry"

(2.8) (constructed) She said that she was hungry

Quotative *like* differs from other quotatives in that speakers can use it to present a more approximate rendering of an actual quotation than they might felicitously be able to with other quotatives, such as *say.* Quotative *like* also allows speakers to quote without specifying whether the quotation was said out loud, or internally, or was imagined.

2.1.2 Focus

One of the first meanings put forward for non-standard *like* was that of focus (Underhill, 1988). By this approach, *like* is said to mark the element in the sentence upon which the speaker wishes to put focus. Underhill first proposed this theory in 1988 and it has since been a source of argument in research on *like.* Underhill defines focus as "the most significant new information in a sentence" (p.238). Underhill points out that

questions always have a focus and that *like* is frequently used in questions to mark this focus. Likewise, answers necessarily have focus, and *like* is frequently found here too.

Underhill provides many excerpts in support of these ideas. However, it is clear that these examples could be interpreted differently to how he has interpreted them.

(2.9) But then the first day of our skiing, you know we're gettin all excited to go skiing the first day it's *like* snowing... blizzard snowing...

(Underhill, 1988, p. 235)

Underhill interprets (2.9) as a clear example of focus marking. He explains that "snowing" and "blizzard snowing" are new, focused information in the sentence, and this is marked with *like*. This utterance can be interpreted differently, however. It might be argued that the speaker has reformulated their asserting that it was "snowing" to "blizzard snowing". By this interpretation the speaker may want to indicate that "snowing" is not an ideal description of what they had in mind. They then reformulate this to a more descriptive, and perhaps accurate, phrase "blizzard snowing".

The main problem with Underhill's description of *like* as a marker of focus is that focus is not fully defined in his article. Miller and Weinert (1995) define focus more fully. They assert that focused elements are made salient by their pitch, their position in the linear order of constituents in a clause, a special syntactic structure, or the use of a particle. The purpose of focus is "to introduce or reintroduce entities into the discourse, to secure the listener's attention, to direct the listener's attention to particular entities, particular properties of entities, particular events or states, particular propositions, anticipating or countering misunderstanding or misconstrual by other participants in the dialogue, and to explicitly contrast one entity with another" (p. 375). They assert that *like* is a marker of non-introducing, non-contrastive focus and that it can focus on new or given entities. They prove this by showing that the majority of *like* sentences can be paraphrased either with WH-clefts or IT-clefts, both of which have been shown previously to mark focus. Miller and Weinert (1995) note that *like* is not identical in meaning to these clefts however. Clefts are deictic, which means that IT-clefts and WH-clefts "point to one item or set of items as being relevant, thereby implicitly excluding other items and they are available for speakers who wish to draw explicit contrasts" while *like* cannot (Miller & Weinert, 1995, p. 379). *Like* is thus not as powerful a focuser as these constructions but is more flexible. Levey (2006) notes that, in his data, 72% of *like*s that occur before noun phrases also occur with some marker of indefiniteness, which is often the case with new information in a sentence.

Fuller (2003) explains that Underhill's focus marker theory is useful, but in some cases not confirmed by the data. She shows this with example (2.10).

(2.10) A: You've travelled all around over, like, within the United States?

B: Yeah. I've been to Oregon... four or five times. I lived in Florida, when I was, *like*, three. We lived up here and then my Dad moved down there to work and then we moved back up here. That's about it more or less.

(Fuller, 2003, p. 368)

Fuller explains that in the excerpt, *like* cannot be marking focus since the important part of the sentence is talking about where the speaker has travelled, not how old he was at any particular point. This information is a side note and therefore not the focused element of the sentence. Fuller (2003) maintains, however, that focus need not be seen as incompatible with the idea that *like* marks approximation. She explains that *like* could serve both these purposes at the same time. If an item is the focus of a sentence, it might be important to stress that it is an approximation. Likewise, if an entity needs to be approximated, it may well also be the focused element.

Siegel (2002) also disagrees with the idea that *like* is a focus marker. Like Fuller (2003), she provides examples from her data where *like* occurs but its scope does not fall over the most focused idea in a sentence. Siegel (2002) remarks that focus generally falls on a new item or idea in an utterance. *Like* is most likely used because the speaker is unsure how to phrase this new idea, and thus it co-occurs with new ideas, rather than directly marking focus (Siegel, 2002). She also points out that *like* can occur many times in a sentence, as in (2.11), and it is improbable that all of the items after these *like*s are focused.

(2.11) She isn't, *like*, really crazy or anything, but her and her, *like*, five buddies did, *like*, paint their hair a really fake-looking, *like*, purple color. (Siegel, 2002, p. 36)

Siegel (2002) and Fuller (2003) show that the idea that *like* is a focus marker cannot entirely account for its use. This does not mean that *like* doesn't mark focus, just that this explanation is insufficient.

2.1.3 Approximation of a quantity

Like has long been known to express approximation of a quantity, as in (2.12a) (Schourup, 1985). In example (2.12a), the speaker prefaces their assertion with *like* to indicate to their addressee that when they say that they are "six feet" tall, they are approximating this quantification. This kind of *like* can for the most part be glossed with 'about'.

(2.12) How tall are you?

a) I'm *like* six feet tall

b) five feet eleven inches

(based on Schourup, 1985, p. 39)

This meaning in particular is readily explained by relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), in that the speaker is only giving as accurate a measure of their height as the circumstances call for. If they were applying for a driver's license, for example, they might chose a more precise measure as in (2.12b).

2.1.4 Non-equivalence

Similar to the notion of approximation is that of non-equivalence. A speaker is thought to use *like* when they want to indicate that their verbal expression of a thought is not completely equivalent with that thought. This idea originates in Schourup (1985), and is explored by Fuller (2003), Siegel (2002) and Andersen (1998). Andersen (1998) defines *like* as a marker of "loose use of language" (p. 148).

2.1.5 Lexical imprecision

Siegel (2002) equates non-equivalence with lexical imprecision. Her data suggests that people use *like* more when they plan their utterance for less time time before beginning to speak. Because of this correlation, she asserts that *like* is used to signal lexical imprecision. She finds nothing to explain, though, why some speakers plan their utterances more fully than others, except that speakers who feel more comfortable may begin without planning.

2.1.6 Structuring utterances

2.1.6.1 Syntactic change

Sharifian and Malcolm (2003) report that in Australian Aboriginal English,"*like* appears to provide a 'bridge', so to speak, to make a transition from one aspect of the conceptualized event to another without sounding chaotic or irrelevant" (p. 339). In their data, *like* is used to mark a change in narrative perspective and to mark a change to the topic. In example (2.13), the speaker is thought to use *like* to signal a temporary change from descriptive to explanatory language.

(2.13) an 'e got one... an' 'e bring one home it was about- hoh about a ruler *like* you know a teacher's ruler a meter one

(Sharifian and Malcolm, 2003p. 340)

Similarly, Sharifian and Malcolm (2003) also find that *like* can be used to signal a lexical or syntactic change. In (2.14), the speaker uses *like* to mark their change from one grammatical subject to another.

(2.14) an' one of my Nannas she um feel these little fing like fingers an' that choking 'er, and she 'as to *like*, they left the windows open so the spirit goes out

(Sharifian and Malcolm, 2003p. 340)

2.1.6.2 Linking *like*

Example (2.13) from Sharifian and Malcolm (2003) might also be interpreted as a discourse link (Andersen, 2001; Müller, 2005; Terraschke, 2008). It appears that the speaker might be using *like* to link an elaboration of what they mean by "a ruler", to their statement about the ruler. *Like* can be used to specify, explain, elaborate, or describe a previous portion of an utterance in order to clarify the speaker's meaning (Terraschke, 2008). Example (2.14), on the other hand, cannot be interpreted in the same way. Prosody would need to be taken into account in this example. It might be that the speaker is cutting themself off after *like*. The speaker may have intended to use *like* in one of the other functions before they cut themself off.

2.1.7 Stylistic marker

Erman (1992) describes a distinction in the function of pragmatic devices. Pragmatic devices may have either "textual" or "interactional" uses (p. 220). Erman lists three subcategories for each. The textual function of pragmatic devices contains the following: decoding of information, orientation in the discourse and regulation of turns. The interactional function contains the functions of hesitation marker, repair marker and marker of appeal.

Fox Tree and Schrock (2002) discuss a distinction in the literature on pragmatic devices where they are either described as being "randomly sprinkled" or used at a particular time when their meaning is needed (p. 728). The random sprinkling approach posits that pragmatic devices may occur anywhere in a sentence, but that their meaning relates to the utterance as a whole. Because of this large scope, the random sprinkling approach accounts for the interactional, rather than textual, meanings of pragmatic

devices. The "moment-of-use" (Fox Tree & Schrock, 2002, p. 728) approach, on the other hand, means that when a pragmatic device is used, it is used where it is useful and because its function is useful. The moment-of-use approach can describe the interactional meanings of pragmatic devices, as well as the textual functions (Fox Tree & Schrock, 2002).

The functions of *like* so far have carried the assumption that *like* is used at particular points in an utterance for a particular purpose. Fuller (2003), however, notes that *like* might be used as stylistic marker to create a casual conversational style.

Fuller's study is based on the speech of two females conducting interviews as part of a larger study on register. The interviews were meant to represent relatively formal speech. One interviewer interviewed two males and two females, and the second interviewer three males and two females. The rate of *like* varied considerably for each interviewer (*like* as a quotative was excluded). Fuller rules out both addressee gender and accommodation to the rate of *like* of the interviewee as the cause of the variation in the interviewers' frequency of *like*.

Fuller (2003) founds that both interviewers used *like* significantly more when interviewing difficult interviewees, or interviewees who were more reserved and harder to get to talk. Interestingly, *like* was also used more by the interviewers in interviews where they had formed a good rapport with the interviewee. Thus, *like* was used more when the interviewer was trying to create a casual conversational style to encourage their interviewee to talk more and when a casual conversational style had already been created because of the good rapport between interviewer and interviewee.

Although Fuller concludes that *like* is "more of a functional particle than a stylistic marker" (p. 375), *like* occurs when speakers are in an interaction where they are comfortable or have a good rapport with their addressee. They also use *like* in conversations where they are working to establish such rapport, such as in the conversations where the interviewers had to work harder to get their interviewees to speak. Thus although it performs certain functions, *like* nonetheless marks casual or comfortable conversation in some way.

Similarly, Fox Tree (2006) asks whether *like* operates textually or interactionally. To test this, she carried out an experiment wherein participants are to recount a memory to another participant, and then straight after recount it to a different participant again. The first listener then told the speaker's story in another room. If *like* operated at an interactional level, we would expect that it would not be repeated in later retellings (Fox Tree, 2006). If *like* operates textually however, then it will be repeated in the later retellings. Fox Tree (2006) did in fact find that *like* was often repeated in subsequent retellings, and thus concludes that *like* functions textually. As further evidence for this

claim, Fox Tree (2006) describes another study, where participants all described the same Monty Python sketch. She finds that *like* often occurs in the same places across the different participants.

The findings of Fuller (2003) and Fox Tree (2006) suggest that *like* operates textually. However, this does not preclude them also operating interactionally. It might be the case that *like* serves both of these functions. Erman (1992) shows that *you know*, *you see* and *I mean* function both textually and interactionally.

2.1.8 Are these meanings joint or separate?

There is no agreement as to whether the meanings of *like* outlined above constitute different meanings of the same lexeme, or if they all share a basic meaning. A basic meaning would cover all the functions of *like* discussed above. On one end of the scale is Andersen (2001), who includes even quotative *like* as accounted for with his basic meaning of non-equivalence (Section 2.1.4). On the other end of the scale is D'Arcy, who focuses on these meanings separately. She asserts that the approximative function (D'Arcy, 2006) and quotative function (D'Arcy, 2004; D'Arcy, 2010) are separate from a discourse marker (linking) function (D'Arcy, 2006). Others simply distinguish between so-called focus and quotative *like* (Dailey-O'Cain, 2000; Tistadt, 1999), while others (Blyth et al., 1990; Ferrara & B. Bell, 1995) implicitly make this distinction addressing quotative *like* but not its other functions. This issue will be taken up further when coding is discussed (Section 3.4.2).

2.1.9 Summary

Quotative *like* is probably the most recognised and studied meaning of *like*. The other functions of *like* have been accounted for using three main approaches. One theory, which is pervasive particularly outside of linguistics, is that *like* is a filler word used by inarticulate people (Levey, 2003). This idea cannot adequately account for quotative *like* or linking *like*. Another approach is that *like* marks focus. This is supposed to account for all non-standard *like*, but it has been demonstrated that it cannot (Fuller, 2003; Siegel, 2002). Another function is Andersen's non-equivalence. This is also said to account for all non-standard *like*. Andersen (2001) lays out how all of the functions outlined in the previous section fit into this theory. Thus, although Andersen asserts that *like* has one basic meaning, he still leaves room for quantitatively analysing *like* according to function.

2.2 What does *like* do?

In this section some theoretical perspectives regarding communication will be reviewed, and the place of *like* in these will be explored. The purpose of this discussion is to give a greater explanation of what motivates people to use *like* and what communicative function *like* fulfills. These theories may also help explain the social distribution of *like*.

2.2.1 Relevance Theory

Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) concerns listener processing. According to Sperber and Wilson (1986), listeners assume that anything said to them is relevant. Utterances are then interpreted based on both the utterance itself and contextual cues. We saw this with example (2.12), where the speaker could give two different answers to the same question in different situations. One answer would be more relevant in one situation, and the other in another.

Andersen (1998) and Helt and Foster-Cohen (1995) use Relevance Theory to explain the function of *like*. According to Andersen (1998), pragmatic devices "contribute to relevance by operating as signals which tell the hearer how an utterance is to be understood, thus reducing the processing effort that the hearer must employ in utterance comprehension" (p. 151). *Like* contributes to relevance by signaling to the hearer that an utterance should be interpreted as "loose talk" (p. 151). Andersen asserts that all of the meanings explored above can be accounted for, using this basic meaning. As an approximative, *like* is said to signal that the speaker is not aiming at literal truth. Andersen explores the effect of *like* being in different syntactic positions and accounts for examples of these using his looseness idea. He also accounts for quotative *like*, saying that "*like* indicates the looseness of an attributed thought" (p. 157). Andersen asserts that *like* qualifies form rather than content. He therefore categorises *like* as procedural rather than conceptual. This contrasts with D'Arcy (2006), where approximative *like* is classified an adverb, and therefore qualifies content (see Section 2.3.2.1).

Helt and Foster-Cohen (1995) place the idea of distancing within their relevance-theoretical account of *like*. They assert that the relevant interpretation of any utterance containing *like* is that the speaker wants to distance themself from a potentially face threatening utterance. Their account thus also describes *like* as a negative politeness tool (discussed in Section 2.2.3 below). They believe that both the quotative and focus functions of *like* can be explained by this. With regards to the quotative function, a speaker is said to use *like* to explicitly indicate that they are removed from the utterance at "the current time of speaking" (p.139). 'Focus' *like* is said to generally distance

the speaker from their utterance. This assertion rests on the fact that new information is generally focused information, and that new information needs qualifying whereas old information should already have been qualified, when it was new. For Helt and Foster-Cohen, Andersen's loose *like*, and focus *like* are compatible, when examined in terms of processing, with which Relevance Theory is concerned.

2.2.2 Coherence

The relevance-theoretic explanation of *like* is not incompatible with theories of coherence. A procedural cue is a cue which makes an utterance more coherent. Schiffrin (1987) famously analyses pragmatic devices in terms of coherence. Whereas Andersen's (1998) relevance-theoretical account of *like* focuses on specific items, or specific clauses and how they are to be interpreted, coherence theory shows how components of a sentence might relate to each other. Pragmatic devices highlight a particular segment's relationship with previous segments (Fraser, 1999). This explanation is particularly useful when we examine the syntactic change and linking meanings of *like* outlined above (Section 2.1.6). *Like* might help a speaker indicate to an addressee that they are changing the direction of their utterance, and thus make their utterance more coherent for the addressee. Linking *like* tells an addressee that two sentences or ideas are related.

2.2.3 Politeness

Although politeness theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987) may not be as universal as they claim (see Kasper, 1990), it has nevertheless proven a useful tool in investigating the meaning and function of pragmatic devices in English (Holmes, 1986, 1990b). According to Brown and Levinson, people have two types of face wants. Politeness is used in accordance with these. Positive politeness occurs to preserve positive face, or "the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others" (p. 13). People can employ positive politeness to preserve either their own positive face or the positive face of their addressee. Negative politeness is employed to minimise the effect of a face-threatening act on the speaker's or addressee's negative face, which is "the want of every 'competent adult member' that his actions be unimpeded by others" (p. 13).

Andersen shows that *like* indicates looseness of language. A speaker's utterance when prefaced by *like* may not be a perfect representation of the thought. Speakers use this effect to advantage. By prefacing an utterance with *like* the speaker essentially removes their responsibility from that utterance. Thus, when they make a face threatening

utterance, they can preface it with *like* to mitigate the effect of the face threat. In (2.15), Carl wants to distance himself from the face threatening act of potentially insulting Caroline's school.

(2.15) Carl: wow its just the thing about Otago is that like I dunno they let I'm not sure how it is for you but *like* you they let anyone in here *like* you just

Caroline: you mean admission-wise

(Yates, 2010)

Müller (2005) maintains that the relevance and coherence views are compatible. Both theories see pragmatic devices as helping the listener to understand an utterance. Politeness theory is compatible with these, since it accounts for instances where pragmatic devices have interpersonal rather than textual meaning.

2.3 Is *like* a pragmatic device?

In order to facilitate comparisons of research concerning the meaning and social distribution of other pragmatic devices, it is necessary to determine whether *like* fits into this category. In this section I will outline the criteria in the literature of pragmatic devices and discuss whether *like* can be considered part of this category

2.3.1 Characteristics

Pragmatic devices have been given many names. Although these terms typically pertain to the same kinds of words, each researcher tends to have their own definitions and list of items they include. They have been called pragmatic particles (Holmes, 1988a), pragmatic expressions (Erman, 1992), pragmatic markers (Brinton, 1996), discourse markers (Fox Tree & Schrock, 2002; Fraser, 1999; Schiffrin, 1987), hedges (Lakoff, 1975) and compromisers (James, 1983). Although they both use the term discourse marker, for example, Schiffrin (1987) includes *oh*, *I mean* and *you know* as discourse markers but Fraser (1999) excludes them.

Three basic characteristics of pragmatic devices have been established in the literature (Jucker & Ziv, 1998).

1. They have no propositional meaning
2. They are syntactically optional

3. They are typically multifunctional

These criteria work well for pragmatic devices such as *well* and *you know*. Looking at examples (2.16 a) and (2.16 b) below, the truth conditions of the utterance do not change when *well* is subtracted. This means that *well* has no propositional meaning. The speaker "didn't like it" in both sentences. The same goes for the second characteristic. The sentence remains grammatical when *well* is removed.

(2.16) (a) (constructed) *Well*, I didn't really like it

(b) (constructed) I didn't really like it

In example (2.16 a), the speaker is using *well* to hedge their statement to protect the face of their addressee, since saying that you do not like something might cause offense. In this way *well* softens the blow.

The multifunctionality of pragmatic devices can be exemplified with *you know*.

(2.17) (constructed) *You know*, blue milk is much better for you than green

(2.18) (constructed) It can be hard to tell your parents that you're failing, *you know*?

In example (2.17), the speaker uses *you know* to add force to their statement. They are sure that their statement is factual and they want to convince their addressee of this. In example (2.18), on the other hand, the speaker is offering how they feel, and they use *you know* as a direct appeal to their addressee to understand how they feel. In (2.17) the speaker is distancing themself from their addressee and trying to appear an expert. In (2.18) the speaker is appealing for understanding, and thus avoiding such a gap (see Holmes, 1986).

How then does *like* fit with these characteristics? Let us begin with characteristic 1: that it should have no propositional meaning.

2.3.2 Does *like* have propositional meaning?

(2.19) Elizabeth: and their kitchen is fricken massive and [...] that little *like* scullery bit

(2.20) Lewis: cos I went to bed at *like* half past 12 on Saturday night

In (2.19), removing *like* doesn't really affect the meaning of the sentence. This does not mean, though, that *like* is serving no useful purpose. One possible interpretation is

that Elizabeth is unsure whether "scullery" is the best word for what she is describing. In (2.20), *like* serves to show that "half past 12" is approximately the time that Lewis went to bed on Saturday. Removing *like* would remove the approximation.

Does the *like* in these examples have propositional meaning then? In (2.19), *like* does not affect the truth conditions of the sentence, just how committed Elizabeth is to her choice of the word "scullery". It could also be argued that *like* could be removed in (2.20) without changing the meaning of the utterance, depending on how it is interpreted. If the speaker is using *like* to avoid committing to the exact truth of the utterance as in (2.19), because they are not entirely sure of the truthfulness of the statement, then we might be inclined to say that *like* here has no propositional meaning. On the other hand if we take the approximation reading, as in "I went to bed at about half past 12" then we would have to conclude that yes, *like* does have propositional meaning.

D'Arcy (2006) asserts that this approximative *like* functions adverbially and that it is replacing adverbials such as *about*. She thus prefers the idea that *like* has two forms: it can be an adverb or a discourse marker. Andersen (1998), on the other hand, asserts that *like* signals to the hearer how they should interpret an utterance. In (2.19), the speaker might be signaling that the word "scullery" should be interpreted loosely; it is perhaps not the ideal phrasing of her idea. In (2.20), Lewis may want to make it clear that he is not aiming for absolute truth when he says "half past 12". In this way, Andersen's interpretation operates procedurally, and thus *like* has no propositional meaning.

From these explanations alone it can be seen that the differentiation of *like* into meanings or senses is by no means clear cut. The two meanings exemplified above in (2.19) and (2.20) are classified as related by some linguists, and one in the same for others. The propositional meaning of *like* is investigated further in Sections 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2.

2.3.2.1 Does approximative *like* change the meaning of an utterance?

Andersen (1998) argues for a unified account of *like* so, unsurprisingly, he classifies approximative *like*, along with its other uses, as a pragmatic device. Anderson gets around the problem of *like*'s equivalence to approximative adverbs by saying that *like* operates on a pragmatic rather than a semantic level. *Like* is said to give the addressee information on how they should interpret the utterance, rather than being a part of the semantic meaning of the utterance.

D'Arcy (2006) questions the place of this form of *like* as a pragmatic device. She argues that it is functionally equivalent to adverbs such as *about* or *approximately* and therefore belongs to the same class as these words. She supports her claim with data

collected from speakers across a range of ages. Her data shows evidence of a change over time in speakers' preferred methods of approximation. The younger speakers use *like* mostly, while older speakers prefer other adverbs. D'Arcy interprets this as lexical replacement, which is evidence for her claim that *like* functions as an adverb.

Siegel (2002), on the other hand, asserts that approximative *like* functions differently from approximative adverbs. She shows this with example (2.21) below (? means marginally acceptable, * means unacceptable).

(2.21) 1 He has about six sisters

1a. ?Yes he has exactly six.

1b. Yes, he has about six.

1c. No, he has exactly six

1d. *No, he has about six.

He has, like, six sisters.

2a. Yes, he has exactly six.

2b. Yes, he has about six.

2c. ?/*No, he has exactly six. (Good only as a sort of prescriptive correction; the speaker shouldn't have used the work *like*.)

2d. *No, he has about six.

(Siegel, 2002, p. 40)

Siegel (2002) asserts that (1c) is an acceptable response, but (2c) is not. Siegel explains that (2c) is not an appropriate response, since the *like* version of the sentence only refers to a possible non-equivalence, and therefore cannot be disagreed with as in (1c). (1c), however, is acceptable, since the approximation is overt. D'Arcy (2006) reviews Siegel's above example, but disagrees with her assertion that (2c) is an unacceptable response to the *like* version of the sentence, and finds (1a) and (2a) "marginal" (p. 352). Whether approximative *like* can truly be classified as a pragmatic device remains contentious.

2.3.2.2 Does quotative *like* change the meaning of an utterance?

Quotative *like* introduces quotations that can be real, imagined or approximate. In this way, substituting another quotative for quotative *like* can change the meaning of an utterance.

(2.22) Hayley: I'm like oh I've seen that it was his birthday on Facebook and I was *like* I'm not saying happy birthday because I'm not invited

In example (2.22), Hayley is describing an internal reaction that occurred when she decided not to say happy birthday to a friend on Facebook because she wasn't invited to his party. We can tell that this is most likely an internal reaction because of the context; Hayley is alone at her computer. *Say* thus could not be substituted into this utterance as that would imply that "I'm not saying happy birthday because I'm not invited" had occurred out loud. It is also possible that Hayley fabricated this quotation entirely to add drama to her narrative. *Say* would also not be appropriate in this situation. Because of this, quotative *like* does have some propositional meaning.

2.3.3 Is *like* syntactically optional?

To see if *like* is syntactically optional, it must be able to be removed from an utterance without rendering it ungrammatical.

(2.23) (a) Sophie: She's *like* make sure you put the timer on before you have a shower

(b) ? Sophie: She's make sure you put the timer on before you have a shower

(c) * Sophie: She make sure you put the timer on before you have a shower

Starting with quotative *like*, example (2.23 b) is borderline in terms of grammaticality. The zero dialogue introducer has been attested in English (Mathis & Yule, 1994). This utterance might well be understood if a quotative frame had already been established in the conversation. If the speaker simply uttered this utterance at the beginning of a conversation, however, we could not be sure that the addressee would have enough information to interpret "make sure you put the timer on before you have a shower" as constructed dialogue, meaning that the utterance would not make sense, and that *like* would not be syntactically optional. Likewise, if the whole quotative frame, as in (2.23 c), were removed, the sentence would no longer be grammatical.

However, looking at the example from (2.19) again in (2.24 a), *like* can be removed without making the sentence ungrammatical.

(2.24) (a) Elizabeth: and their kitchen is fricken massive and [...] that little *like* scullery bit

(b) Elizabeth: and their kitchen is fricken massive and [...] that little scullery bit

In (2.24 a) *like* is clearly syntactically optional. The sentence still makes sense when *like* is removed (2.24 b).

(2.25) (a) Lewis: cos I went to bed at *like* half past 12 on Saturday night

(b) Lewis: cos I went to bed at half past 12 on Saturday night

The same goes for (2.25 a). Some forms of *like* are syntactically optional. Quotative *like* is not optional though. It can only be removed when context or prosody functionally replaces it.

2.3.4 Is *like* multifunctional?

Section 2.1 on the functions of *like* would indicate that, yes, *like* can perform a variety of functions. The discussion on the propositional meaning of *like* and whether it is syntactically optional also points to *like* having multiple functions, since these different functions conform to the characteristics set out in Section 2.3.1 to different extents. It was argued that quotative *like* must have some propositional meaning, since it can't be substituted for other quotatives. It was argued, however, that the *like* in example (2.19) did not have any propositional meaning. The fact that some meanings of *like* have propositional meaning and some do not suggests that *like* has different functions, and therefore is multifunctional.

2.3.5 So, is *like* a pragmatic device?

Jucker and Ziv (1998) argue that a pragmatic device may be less or more prototypical of this group, while still remaining a member. In this way, we can still place *like* under this umbrella, without needing it to conform completely with the three characteristics discussed. It is clear that *like* does to some extent belong in the pragmatic device category.

2.4 How is *like* distributed?

2.4.1 Quotative *like*

This section reviews the extralingual and intralingual factors which influence the distribution of quotative *like*. Extralingual factors refer to social variables like age and gender. Intralingual factors refer to factors related to language itself, such as tense and aspect. Studies on the distribution of quotative *like* are often done within the variationist paradigm. They investigate how various intralingual and extralingual factors condition a speaker's choice of quotative.

2.4.1.1 Language external factors

Gender In the literature, gender is reported as important in determining which quotative a person will choose. With regards to quotative *like*, not all studies agree as to whether males or females use it more. Some studies assert that men use quotative *like* more than women (Blyth et al., 1990), while some find the opposite (Macaulay, 2001; Romaine & Lange, 1991; Tagliamonte & Hudson, 1999). Ferrara and Bell (1995) find that females favour *like* in their 1990 corpus, but that this effect no longer exists in their 1994 corpus. Several studies show gender to have no significant influence (Andersen, 2001; Dailey-O'Cain, 2000).

Gender often interacts with other sociolinguistic variables in determining what quotative a person will use. Barbieri (2007) finds that men aged between 27 and 40 use quotative *like* more frequently than women of the same age, while women 16 to 26 use this variant more than their male peers. Likewise, Tagliamonte and D'Arcy (2004) find that gender is more significant for their speakers between 17 and 19, where females use *like* more. Gender has only marginal significance in the older groups. Singler (2001) ascertains that female dyads favour *like* while mixed ones do not. Terraschke (2010), on the other hand, finds that mixed gender dyads produce quotative *like* more than same gender dyads.

Age Age is perhaps the most widely agreed upon sociolinguistic variable to influence an individual's quotative use. Teenagers and people in their 20s are found almost unanimously to be the most frequent users of *like*, right from 1990 (Blyth et al., 1990) through to 2009 (Buchstaller, 2011). This pattern exists in the US (Barbieri, 2009; Blyth et al., 1990; Buchstaller, 2006; Singler, 2001), Canada (D'Arcy, 2007; Tagliamonte & D'Arcy, 2007), Britain (Buchstaller, 2006) and New Zealand (Buchstaller & D'Arcy, 2009).

Barbieri (2007) finds that while age does influence quotative use, it needs to be combined with gender. She shows that, for females, the 16 to 26 age group use *like* most frequently, while, in the male group, those aged between 27 and 40 use *like* the most.

Register Barbieri (2005) compares quotative use in four contexts which represent different levels of formality: casual conversation, university service encounters and workplace conversation, study groups, and academic office hour consultations. The casual conversation data was collected by having participants carry tape recorders and record their conversations over a week. The university service encounters and workplace data also contains a large amount of casual conversation, as this corpus caught a lot of casual conversation between co-workers. The study group data consists of conversations

between students meeting to do university related tasks. The office hours data consists of lecturers talking to students during their office hours.

These corpora represent three levels of formality with the conversation data designed to be the least formal, followed by the service encounter and workplace, and study group data. The office hour data is the most formal. In the conversation data, Barbieri finds that *say* is approximately twice as frequent as *like*. In the present tense data, however, *like* and *say* occur at roughly the same frequency. In the service and workplace data, *like* occurs twice as frequently as *say*. The study group data exhibits a different pattern again, with *like* and *say* occurring with approximately equal frequency. In the office hours data *say* clearly dominates. In the simple past data, *say* is the most frequent quotative across all registers. Comparisons just with *say* don't provide the whole picture either. Overall, *like* is used most frequently in the casual conversation data, but *say* is used a lot too. *Say* appears to be predicted by the past tense. The high frequency of *say* in the casual conversation data could reflect a high frequency of the past tense. Nonetheless, *like* appears to be the quotative of choice for casual conversation for quotations in the present tense.

Socio-economic status Buchstaller and D'Arcy (2009) show that socio-economic status alone is not significant in their study but that it is in interactions with other variables. In American and British English, *like* tends toward being used more frequently by non-professionals but in New Zealand English the opposite in true (Buchstaller & D'Arcy, 2009). Baird (2001), however, finds that there is no difference in the frequency of quotative *like* between professionals and non-professionals in New Zealand English. The American data in Buchstaller and D'Arcy in particular show that socio-economic status interacts strongly with speaker gender. Professional and non-professional females use *like* with differing frequencies, as do professional and non-professional males. Likewise, the different gender groupings within the professional and non-professional groups behave differently also. Buchstaller and D'Arcy state that this pattern affects American women more than British or New Zealand women; American non-professional women push *like* forward while professional women resist it (Buchstaller & D'Arcy, 2009). Buchstaller (2006, cited in Buchstaller & D'Arcy, 2009) shows that *like* is used more by those less educated in America, but that this was not true in Britain. Macaulay (2001) finds that *like* is a middle class form in Scottish English, but that working class girls quote more overall than their male and middle class peers.

Ethnicity The effect of a person's ethnicity on their choice of quotatives has been most thoroughly examined in America. In their 1992 corpus, Ferrara and Bell (1995)

find that African American and Latinos use *like* but they do not elaborate this quantitatively. Kohn and Franz (2009) study the quotative use of African Americans and Latinos in two towns in North Carolina and find different patterns in each. In Hickory, Latinos use *like* more than African Americans, while in Durham, the opposite is true. To summarise their results, the quotative system is not consistent within each town, within each gender, or within each ethnicity. Kohn and Franz thus conclude that the "new quotatives" can be adopted differently in different social groups.

D'Arcy (2010) studies the effect of ethnicity in New Zealand with regards to Māori and Pākehā use of quotatives. She shows that both groups use the same quotatives most frequently, and that *like* is the most frequently used by both groups. *Like* accounts for 58.5 percent of total quotative use for Pākehā and 41.9 for Māori. Pākehā also use *say* more than Māori and Māori use a zero quotative considerably more than do Pākehā. D'Arcy (2010) finds that *like* operates the same within the two varieties; the effects of grammatical person and content of the quote are similar (see Section 2.4.1.2).

2.4.1.2 Intralingual factors

Grammatical person The grammatical person of a quotation has been shown to affect the speaker's choice of quotative. This effect has been found to exist throughout the US (Barbieri, 2005; Blyth et al., 1990; Buchstaller & D'Arcy, 2009; Cukor-Avila, 2002; Ferrara & B. Bell, 1995; Romaine & Lange, 1991; Singler, 2001) and New Zealand (Baird, 2001; Buchstaller & D'Arcy, 2009), where the first person is preferred with quotative *like*. Canadian English appears generally to favour the first person also (Tagliamonte & D'Arcy, 2004; Tagliamonte & D'Arcy, 2007; Tagliamonte & Hudson, 1999), though D'Arcy (2004) finds that the third person may be slightly favoured in St Johns, the capital of Newfoundland province in Canada. British English also favours the first person (Buchstaller & D'Arcy, 2009; Tagliamonte & Hudson, 1999) with the exception of Scotland (Macaulay, 2001). Conversely Winter (2002) asserts that the third person singular is favoured in Australia.

Tense D'Arcy (2004) reports tense as the strongest factor in her multivariate analysis with *like* correlating with the present tense and being the only quotative to occur with the historical present. Tagliamonte and D'Arcy (2007) also find the historical present to be the strongest factor across their age groups. Blyth et al. (1990) also report tense to be the most significant factor in the analysis with *like* again correlating with the present, though this is not separated from the historical present. Again with regards to American English, Singler (2001) reports that tense is the most significant factor in his analysis and that *like* favours the present. Buchstaller and D'Arcy (2009) show that

tense conditions the choice of quotative differently in different locations. In American English, *like* is favoured with the historical present and present, and disfavoured with the past. In British English on the other hand, they find that the present and past are favoured, with the historical present disfavoured. Finally, they find that *like* is favoured with the historical present in New Zealand English and that it is disfavoured in the past and present. Similarly, Winter (2002) finds that *like* is used most frequently with the historical present in Australian English.

Singler (2001) maintains that the relationship between present tense and quotative *like* is not causal, but that they co-occur because of a reduced formality associated with each. Barbieri (2005) compares the normed frequencies of each of the quotatives and compares their patternings. She finds that *say* is the most common quotative used in the past tense, with *like* the second. *Like* is favoured in casual and semi-formal conversations with the present tense (Barbieri, 2005).

Aspect Blyth et al. (1990) find that aspect is a significant factor governing the use of *like*. They assert that *like* favours the continuous and *say* the punctual aspect.

Content The content of a quote is usually analysed as to whether it represents direct dialogue or inner speech. Direct dialogue here refers to Tannen's "constructed dialogue" (1986), in that it does not necessarily constitute a verbatim report (see Section 2.1.1). There is some variation in reports concerning the effects of this on a person's choice of quotative. In general though, *like* is used with inner speech (Buchstaller, 2001a; Buchstaller & D'Arcy, 2009; Cukor-Avila, 2002; Dailey-O'Cain, 2000; Romaine & Lange, 1991; Tagliamonte & D'Arcy, 2004; Tagliamonte & D'Arcy, 2007; Tagliamonte & Hudson, 1999). Tagliamonte and D'Arcy (2007) report that this effect is stronger with those aged nine to sixteen and over 30. A correlation with direct speech on the other hand is found in D'Arcy (2004). Barbieri (2005) finds that when the subject of a quote is the first person singular, what follows is likely to be inner speech, and, if it is the third person singular, direct dialogue is likely to follow. Tagliamonte and D'Arcy (2004) note that the effect of content appears to be leveling in their data from their youngest speakers.

Mimesis Mimesis is when a person portrays another. This may be accompanied by a change in prosody, pitch or accent (Buchstaller & D'Arcy, 2009). Buchstaller (2001a), explains that mimesis portrays the "how" of the quotation, rather than the "what" (p. 13). Buchstaller and D'Arcy (2009) find that mimesis is favoured with *like* quotations and that this is significant across their three regional varieties. Buchstaller (2001a) finds

that *go* is used slightly more than *like* with mimetic performances, but this difference is not significant. D'Arcy (2010) finds also that *like* is the most frequently used quotative with mimesis, although this effect is slightly more pronounced in Pākehā English than in Māori English.

Most recent quotative Singler (2001) finds that strings of the same quotative tend to occur within a turn. Buchstaller (2001a) discusses this idea in terms of priming effects and finds that clusters of *like* occur frequently.

Sequence of quotatives in narrative Blyth et al. (1990) find that *like* is disfavoured at the beginning of a narrative sequence. They attribute this to the fact that *like* does not let the listener know whether they are hearing about the speaker's internal reactions or actual speech.

2.4.2 Non-quotative *like*

Generally, the non-quotative functions of *like* have received less attention in the literature than quotative *like*. This also holds true for studies on its social distribution. In this section *like* refers to non-quotative *like* unless otherwise stated.

2.4.2.1 Gender

Siegel (2002) asserts that *like* is much more frequent in the speech of young girls than young boys. D'Arcy (2006) finds no gender influence on the approximative function of *like*. Dailey-O'Cain (2000) finds that focuser *like* is used slightly more by males than females but that this difference is not significant. Fuller (2003) shows that females use *like* more frequently than males. Levey (2006) finds a strong relationship between age and gender, though he excludes approximative *like*. Girls aged 10 to 11 use *like* the most, followed by boys 7 to 8, girls 7 to 8, and finally boys 10 to 11. Levey also adds that boys use *like* before noun phrases more than girls and that this has a focus marking function. Girls, on the other hand, are more likely to use *like* clause-initially. This effect increases with age. Tagliamonte (2005) shows that females use *like* more than males across every age group in her study. Müller (2005) finds that males are more likely than females to use *like* to mean "something like that" and to introduce an example. Andersen (2001) finds that females are significantly more likely than males to use *like* overall.

Overall, females appear more likely than males to use *like*. As we saw in the quotative *like* section though (2.4.1.1), gender often interacts with other factors.

2.4.2.2 Age

Dailey-O'Cain (2000) shows that younger speakers use *like* much more than older speakers. The 14 to 29-year-old speakers in her study used *like* far more than the next oldest group, the 30 to 49 year-olds. Levey (2006) reports that his older cohort (10 to 11-year-olds) use *like* in a clause initial position more than the younger cohort (7 to 8-year-olds). Tagliamonte (2005) finds that of her participants ranging in age from 10 to 19 years, the 15 to 16-year-olds use *like* most frequently. The next most frequent users are the 13 to 14-year-olds, followed by the 10 to 12-year-olds, and finally the 17 to 19-year-olds. Tagliamonte (2005) interprets this pattern as age grading. Miller and Weinert (1995) assert that *like* is all but absent in the 8-year-olds in their data, and very infrequent with 10-year-olds. *Like* becomes much more frequent when participants reach 13 years. Andersen (2001) compares his Corpus of London Teenage English (COLT) with the British National Corpus (BNC) and finds that *like* occurs much less frequently in the BNC and that 83 percent of the tokens founds in the BNC were produced by speakers under 41.

2.4.2.3 Familiarity

Jucker and Smith (1998) find that friends are more likely to use *like* than strangers. Müller (2005) reports that in her American data, friends were more likely than strangers to use *like* to introduce an example. Her data consists of people relating an excerpt of a movie they had just seen to another participant and then the two discussing it. Familiarity information was collected through a demographic survey completed at the time of recording. Participants could rate their relationship as that of acquaintances, friends or strangers. Acquaintances were grouped with strangers for the purposes of the study. It is possible that the narrow task might have resulted in the relationship between the participants not having as strong an effect as it might have, given that "personal matters did not play a dominant role" (Müller, 2005, p. 44). A different task might have resulted in familiarity having a significant effect in other functions.

2.4.3 Summary of factors

There is some uncertainty as to whether all the differences outlined above reflect actual differences, or merely differences in methodology. Blyth et al. (1990), for example, use data collected from one-on-one conversation, people in groups, couples, and families. Data from all these sources is combined and analysed for gender and age differences in quotative use. They find that men use quotative *like* more than women. There is evidence to suggest that people speak differently to their spouse than they might a

friend (Holmes, 1991). Their results might reflect this, since their result goes against the general consensus that either there is no difference, or women use quotative *like* more.

2.5 Style

2.5.1 What's missing?

"Sociolinguistics argues that language exists in context, dependent on the speaker who is using it, and dependent on where it is being used and why" (Tagliamonte, 2006, p. 3). The final part of Tagliamonte's comment represents style. In studies of *like* in particular, style has not received as much attention as the other factors surveyed in Section 2.4. As we saw in Section 2.4, much is known about how the use of *like* varies between speakers. The use of *like* has been shown to vary with age, gender, ethnicity and socio-economic status. However, not many studies have focused on how *like* may vary for an individual. Exceptions are Barbieri (2005), and to some extent Jucker and Smith (1998) and Müller (2005), where this is not a focus. There is evidence that pragmatic devices other than *like* differ in function and frequency in different contexts and with different addressees (e.g. Holmes, 1990a; Stubbe & Holmes, 1995). This may also be the case for *like*.

In this section I will outline some frameworks that have been proposed to understand style.

2.5.2 Attention to speech

Labov's seminal work on the social stratification of New York city represents one of the first works on style. To collect his data, Labov (1966) asked shop assistants where a particular item was to get them to say "fourth floor". He pretended to mishear and asked the shop assistants to repeat themselves. Upon repeating, the shop assistants changed their pronunciation. Labov (1966) attributed this difference to the extent to which the speaker was paying attention to their speech. Labov argued that his participants changed their style according to how considered their speech was. The theoretical implication of this study carries further than just people speaking differently in order to be heard. It extends to the idea that people change their language in more formal situations, because their speech is more considered. Likewise, a speaker may pay more attention to their language when speaking to an interlocutor of a higher status than themself. Labov's attention-to-speech hypothesis has strong methodological implications. It is thought that a skilled interviewer will, in a sociolinguistic interview, be able

to ask certain questions and generally behave in ways which will result in the speaker paying less attention to their speech. In other words, the interviewer will be able to get the interviewee to forget about their speech and this will result in increased use of the vernacular (Labov, 2001).

Siegel (2002) asserts that *like* is more frequent when speakers take less time to plan their utterance. This ties well into Labov's attention-to-speech account of style. Labov's theory would predict that speakers would use *like* less when they are paying attention to their speech. Siegel finds that this is true; speakers who stop and think before speaking use *like* less.

2.5.3 Accommodation

On the other hand, the shop assistants might not have been paying more attention to their own speech, but to that of Labov (Meyerhoff, 2006). Communication Accommodation Theory is based on the idea that a speaker's language is influenced by their addressee (Giles, Coupland, & Coupland, 1991). Speakers are said to converge with their addressee by making their language in some way closer to that of their addressee. A similar idea is termed alignment (Pickering & Garrod, 2004). Alignment "[reflects] a speaker's or group's need (often unconscious) for social integration or identification with another" (Giles et al., 1991, p. 18). Convergence usually occurs when the speakers have a positive relationship, or a speaker might converge to help establish a positive relationship (Holmes, 2008). Speakers may also diverge or move away from the speech of their interlocutor (Giles et al., 1991). Speakers diverge to establish their difference from their interlocutor. This might happen when people don't agree with the views of their interlocutor and can also be done deliberately to tell the addressee this (Holmes, 2008). With regards to *like*, it is possible that a speaker's rate of *like* might be influenced by the rate at which their addressee uses it.

2.5.4 Audience design

Bell proposed that speaker style relates to audience (Bell, 1984, 2001). A change in audience can thus explain a speaker's change in style. Bell explains that an audience may consist of up to the following: a speaker, an addressee, an auditor, an over-hearer and an eavesdropper. All of these, apart from the eavesdropper, influence a speaker's style; this effect decreases along the list. The eavesdropper does not affect the speaker because the speaker does not know the eavesdropper is there. Audience design thus has some merit over accommodation theory in that it accounts for the effect that a high-status auditor, for example, will have on a speaker's style (Bell, 1984). Bell asserts that

inter-speaker variation is greater than intra-speaker variation. In other words, there is more variation across speakers in a community than within each individual.

The audience design covered so far is what Bell terms 'responsive'; it occurs in response to the speaker's knowledge of their addressee. Bell (1984) also explains that audience design can be initiative. A speaker can use a particular style with an addressee they know nothing about to have a particular effect. A speaker might use the style they use with friends, for example, to create intimacy with a stranger. Bell (1984) explains that this initiative audience design cannot be predicted: a speaker may choose to use it, or not. It can be interpreted though when examining conversational data.

2.6 Gender and style

2.6.1 Defining gender

How we see gender has changed in the past 50 years. Fundamentally, we have moved from a binary and determined view to a more fluid view, where gender is performed. Sex is a mostly fixed state dictated by biology, while gender is a social performance. "...Gender is the collection of social, symbolic meanings that a society constructs and confers on biological sex." (Wood, 2011). Gender differs from sex in that a person does nothing to acquire their sex, while they do to become gendered. We can therefore describe sex as a state, more or less, while gender is process. Gender norms are defined by society and expressed by individuals through their interactions with others. Gender is learned and not necessarily stable. Gender is cultural. Different cultures have different gender norms. Gender is therefore not necessarily innate (Wood, 2011). Male and female are thus social categories, based on biological differences, but defined within the culture. Gender can therefore not be seen as an individual quality as it depends so much on the society in which it is constructed.

2.6.1.1 How has gender been studied in sociolinguistics?

Although the way gender is treated in other fields has changed a lot due this understanding, how gender is typically treated in variationist sociolinguistics often does not express this change. Frequently, gender is still treated as a variable. Instead of saying that a person behaves a certain way because of their gender, we need to investigate how people use language to construct their gender.

A problem with treating gender as a variable is that it can be essentialist. Essentialism, in this context, is when sex is conflated with gender and seen as a fixed and given state

(Speer, 2005). Current perspectives on gender make quite clear that gender is not a constant, rather it is created socially and performed individually and socially. Speer describes essentialism as "reify[ing]" gender, in other words turning it into a thing rather than recognising it as a construct. When we treat gender as a variable in sociolinguistics then, according to Speer, this is essentialist. This is a criticism of much sociolinguistic methodology. Treating gender as a variable also means assuming that men and women form two relatively homogeneous groups meaning that we assume all members of each group behave the same, and all members of each group behave differently to all members of the other group. This kind of research ignores the differences within these groups (Speer, 2005). Another of Speer's criticisms is that treating gender as a variable which affects language presumes that it exists prior to and outside of language, when really it is performed and constructed by language. Essentialist views of language and gender rob people of their agency, since as a variable, gender affects people as passive objects.

2.6.1.2 Difference, dominance or deficit?

There is much language and gender research that shows that men and women speak differently. How these differences are interpreted though depends on whether the dominance, deficit, or difference hypothesis is used.

The deficit hypothesis concerns the idea that women's language is deficient compared with the male norm (Speer, 2005). The way women speak is thought to be symptomatic of their powerlessness and subordinate position to men. Lakoff (1975) asserted that women must 'remedy' their language in order to be treated more equally and that they are contributing to their own powerlessness by using powerless language.

The dominance hypothesis postulates that women speak differently from men because they are dominated by men. The dominance framework was pioneered by Dale Spender (1985) as somewhat of a reaction to the deficit framework, on the basis that a framework which starts with men as the standard or norm will continue the view that women are deficient.

The difference hypothesis on the other hand asserts that women and men speak differently because they constitute different cultures, and therefore have different norms of conversation. Female language is in this view different, rather than deficient (Speer, 2005).

Tannen (1994) makes it clear that the dominance and difference approaches can coexist; she says that there is "an unfortunate dichotomy that has emerged in the literature" (p. 9). Just because she describes differences does not mean that she denies that other forces are at work. When two groups with different styles communicate, the

group with less power will always be disadvantaged. This approach does not necessarily point to specific differences in style being the result of dominance, however, and here the difference between her approach and dominance approaches seems to lay. Tannen takes a cultural approach as a starting point, but also talks about what her studies imply about dominance in society, while other scholars take dominance as a starting point. What is important to note here is that the cultural perspective does not deny the existence of dominance. Tannen finds the dominance view insufficient, believing that men do not set out to dominate women.

Cameron (1992) argues that the best way to move forward is work within the differences paradigm, but stress that these differences are the result rather than the cause of sexism. She thus rejects the deficit framework but retains the dominance framework as a way of accounting for differences. She agrees with theorists such as Holmes (1993), who emphasise the positive ways which specific features of women's style may be interpreted.

2.6.2 Do women and men speak differently?

These arguments aside, there is a considerable body of research that finds differences in how men and women talk. Women and men have been shown to favour different interactional styles. Women have been described as more polite and cooperative than men (e.g. Coates, 2004; Holmes, 1990a, 2008). What this suggests is that women are more likely to attend to the feelings of their addressee. This is achieved through their use of minimal responses, hedges and tag questions (Coates, 2004). Minimal responses show an addressee that they are being listened to. Hedges can be used to express uncertainty, and therefore to soften assertions. A speaker can use a hedge to soften a potentially offensive statement in order to protect the addressee's face. They can also protect their own face by hedging potentially boastful utterances (Coates, 2004). Tag questions may express uncertainty, but they also have an affective function (Holmes, 1982). A tag question may be used to soften a potentially face threatening utterance. Tag questions can also be facilitative. This relates to the idea that women tend to communicate cooperatively. A facilitative tag can invite the addressee to contribute to the conversation (Holmes, 1982). Conversation between women tends to relate to personal experience. As such, they typically contain more instances of self-disclosure than might be present in an all male or mixed gender conversation. Conversations where only women are present also tend to have a shared floor. Utterances are co-constructed and more than one person can talk at once (Coates, 2004).

Men have been shown to use a more competitive style of interaction. They are less likely to self-disclose than women and are more likely to talk about more impersonal or public things (Coates, 2004). In contrast to the collaborative floor used in women's con-

versation, men's conversation often employs monologues, where speakers take turns at playing the expert, or short turns when the speakers engage in verbal sparing (Coates, 2004). In both of the monologues and sparring matches men tend to take turns rather than co-construct utterances (Coates, 2004). From the description above it may seem that women are more interested than men in creating solidarity. Men's talk has been asserted to also pursue this goal however.

These observations about men's and women's communicative styles are not necessarily true for every man and every woman in every context. As discussed above, a person's language varies according to context, and men and women do not form homogenous groups. A women may speak in a more typically feminine way in some situations and less so in others. In other words, in some circumstances a women might perform femininity more than in others. Meyerhoff (1996) reviews findings from social psychology which show that people's gender identity is more salient in some situations than in others. This is elaborated further in Section 5.2.1.3, where its predictions are used in interpreting the results of the present study.

2.6.3 Do women and men use pragmatic devices differently?

Section 2.6.2 showed that men and women generally tend toward different conversation styles. Women have been found to communicate more cooperatively and men more competitively. Do women and men also use pragmatic devices differently?

There are mixed findings for the pragmatic device *you know*. Holmes (1986) finds that women use *you know* more than men to express certainty, while men use it more to express uncertainty. Both women and men used *you know* more when speaking to someone of the same gender. Erman (1992) also finds that people use *you know* more to people of the same gender, but also that men use it more overall. Erman finds that women use *you know* more in discourse marking and hesitation, while it is used more by men in decoding, turn regulation, repair and appeal. Östman (1981) and Macaulay (2000), on the other hand, find that *you know* is used more by women than by men.

Looking at other pragmatic devices, Holmes (1988a) finds that men and women use *of course* with roughly the same frequency. Erman (1992) and Stubbe and Holmes (1995) find that *I mean* is used more by men than by women. Holmes (1995) finds that women use *I think* more in its deliberative function and men use it more in its tentative function. Müller (2005) finds that gender has no influence on the frequency of *well*. Holmes (1988b) finds that *sort of* is used more to women, regardless of the gender of the speaker. Gender interacts with age and ethnicity in the frequency of the New Zealand English pragmatic device *eh* (Holmes, Bell, & Boyce, 1991; Meyerhoff,

1994). Young Māori males are the most frequent users of *eh*, followed by young Pākehā females (Meyerhoff, 1994).

The mixed results of studies of *you know*, and *like*, indicate that gender is not a clear predictor of the use of pragmatic devices. The fact that many studies have conflicting results rather than no results indicates that something else must be occurring. A change in context or methodology might perhaps explain the conflicting results. This brief summary also highlights the importance of a more fine-grained approach to quantifying the use of pragmatic devices. The work of Holmes (1986; 1988) in particular shows that females and males make use of the different meanings that pragmatic devices can express with different frequencies. Meyerhoff's study on the use of *eh* and gender shows that it is important to take social variables other than gender into account when studying the social distribution of pragmatic devices.

Social variables other than gender have been shown to affect the frequency of pragmatic devices. Stubbe (1999) finds that Māori New Zealanders use more addressee-oriented pragmatic devices (e.g. *you know*, *eh*) than Pākehā New Zealanders. Stubbe and Holmes (1995) find that addressee-oriented pragmatic devices are more frequent when interlocutors are semi-intimate. The fact that these differences in terms of context exist warns us that they must either be controlled for or included when studying pragmatic devices and gender.

2.7 The present study

In this chapter I have highlighted some gaps in the sociolinguistic literature on *like*. There is not much data focusing specifically on *like*'s distribution in different contexts. Research generally focuses on sociolinguistic variables or intralingual factors for quotative *like*. Meanwhile, there are some conflicting results on its gender distribution. While this could reflect variation in the distribution of *like* in time and space, it could also reflect methodological differences, since these certainly exist. Methodological differences often are differences of context: interview versus conversation, whether the interviewer is of the same gender as the interviewee, the relationship between interlocutors.

This study will test the effect of familiarity on the use of *like*. This study will therefore contribute to the knowledge of how the use of *like* may vary for an individual speaker in different situations or contexts. In this case it focuses on the relationship between the speaker and addressee. While Müller (2005) and Jucker and Smith (1998) report that familiarity has an effect on the frequency of *like*, there are no studies which explicitly study familiarity and *like*. The findings of Jucker and Smith (1998) are suggestive, but their data is not adequately structured in terms of gender and familiarity, as this is not

their primary concern. Also, both studies group acquaintances with strangers, which might have an effect. Jucker and Smith (1998) do not examine the frequencies of the different functions of *like* when reporting their familiarity results. Holmes (1986, 1990a) highlights that not taking the various functions of pragmatic devices into account can hide important patterns. Additionally, Holmes (1990a) suggests that formality and addressee gender may interact in accounting for the distribution of *you know*, *sort of* and tag questions.

Because of the documented effects of gender on *like* (e.g. Barbieri, 2007; Romaine & Lange, 1991), it makes sense to examine gender along with familiarity. Studying familiarity along with gender may also help to shed light on the different results for the gender distribution of *like* reported in the literature. Also, because gender has been documented as having an influence on the use of *like* and other pragmatic devices, it needs to be controlled for. Additionally, there is not much data on the gender distribution of non-quotative *like*, particularly in New Zealand English. Apart from these methodological concerns, *like* is also a good means for theorising gender and communication. *Like* can convey uncertainty, hesitation, and politeness, all of which, it has been claimed, women express more often than men. The study of *like* therefore relates strongly to the study of gender and language.

This study will investigate whether people perform their gender differently with regards to their use of *like* when they have differing relationships with addressees.

2.7.1 Research questions

- *(How) does familiarity affect the use of* like*?*
- *(How) does gender affect the use of* like*?*
- *How can any results on the effect of familiarity and gender be accounted for?*

2.7.2 Summary

Context has been shown to influence how people use language, and pragmatic devices in particular. The present study aims to investigate context in two ways. The first relates to familiarity. This study will investigate how a person's relationship with their addressee affects their use of *like*. Additionally, this study investigates gender. Although many previous studies on *like* investigate the use of *like* by men and women, it remains to be seen how differing levels of familiarity influence a person's performance of gender with regards to *like*. The four conditions tested in this study are friends/not

friends, female/male, addressee female/addressee male and same/mixed gender. As well as investigating the effect of familiarity then, this study will investigate if any effect is the same for males and females. Likewise, we will be able to see whether males and females, friends and not friends, react to mixed and same gender dyads, and the gender of their addressee in the same way.

Chapter 3

Methodology

To obtain data for this study, 24 dyadic 20-minute conversations were recorded. These recordings were then transcribed and tokens of *like* were categorised according to their most salient function. I will begin by describing how the data for this study was elicited (Section 3.1). I will then describe the participants and the criteria I used to find and select participants (Section 3.2). I will then give an overview of the data collection process (Section 3.3) and describe how the data was analysed (Section 3.4).

3.1 Data elicitation techniques

The aim of this study is to study the influence of addressee on the speaker. Therefore, traditional sociolinguistic interviews were not suitable. I decided that the participants should talk to each other. The next question of course was what, if anything, I should ask them to talk about. Conversational tasks or topics were appealing in that they would result in comparable data. This must be balanced, though, with the ideal of natural conversation. In the end I decided to compromise these two ideals, natural data and comparable data, and provided conversation topics for each group.

I considered encouraging all participants to use conversation topics in order to obtain data that could be more easily compared. However, I felt that that would result in unnatural conversation from those in the familiar category. A participant might have already talked to their co-participant about a topic and therefore might not talk in as much detail the second time. While it is certainly true that the it was still unnatural for the unfamiliar participants to talk using prescribed conversation ideas, the language was still authentic in that each participant was genuinely trying to communicate something to another and establish a good rapport. Participants had genuine cause to try to establish a good rapport with their partner, since they might run across them again at

university (Terraschke, 2008). Not forcing the participants all to talk about the same topics also eliminated the risk that I would give participants topics that they were not interested in or did not feel comfortable with.

The topics were: flatmate or hall problems, your first day at Otago, a holiday that was really good or really bad, the rugby world cup– awesome or overrated?, and the most adventurous thing you've ever done. While some studies of *like* use descriptive tasks to elicit data (Miller & Weinert, 1995; Müller, 2005), topics involving opinion and narrative are advantageous in that they might encourage more personal conversation. Since *like* can be used to express interpersonal meaning, and there are differences in how men and women express interpersonal meaning, such topics were deemed more appropriate for the present study.

Many of the unfamiliar groups used all the topics. This meant that they had to come up with some ideas themselves when they had exhausted those provided. I hoped that, since they had already gotten to know each other a bit by using the topics, they would not feel uncomfortable because of this and would instead produce more spontaneous conversation. Some of the familiar dyads also chose to use the topics. All of the topics were successful in that at least some of the dyads used them.

3.2 Participants

3.2.1 Description

A total of 48 people participated in this study.

Table 3.1: Participants by Gender and Relationship with Co-Participant

	Known	Unknown	Total
Male	12	12	24
Female	12	12	24
Total	24	24	48

Table 3.2: Dyads by Gender and Relationship with Co-Participant

	Known	Unknown	Total
Female-female	4	4	8
Female-male	4	4	8
Male-male	4	4	8
Total	12	12	24

3.2.1.1 Gender

Participants were divided evenly between male and female. They were divided evenly into female-female, female-male, and male-male dyads (Table 3.2). This implies that twice as many participants were speaking to addressees of the same gender, compared with participants who were speaking to someone of another gender.

3.2.1.2 Familiarity

The variable of familiarity has two dimensions: known and unknown. 'Familiar' was defined as 'friend' while 'unfamiliar' meant 'stranger'. If a participant wanted to be in the familiar category, I asked them to bring a friend and allowed them to define this for themselves. An obvious disadvantage to this is that the participants may have known each other for different lengths of time, or have differing levels of friendship. On the other hand, it would be very difficult to counter both of these issues. People take varying amounts of time to form friendships. Similarly, a "good friend" means different things to different people. Most people leave their childhood friends to come to university, therefore some first year students might not feel that they had any really good friends, while others might equate the fast friendships they have acquired as really good ones. People's perceptions of friendship are different and so the participants were able to define 'friendship' on their own terms. Participants indicated on the participant questionnaire (Appendix B) how long they had known their friend. The shortest time any of the participants had known each other was four months and the longest was 15 years.

The unfamiliar dyads were matched up by the researcher. I generally paired participants who had been recruited by different means (see Section 3.3.1) to ensure that they did not know each other. In all cases, participants in the unfamiliar category indicated that they did not know each other on the participant questionnaire.

3.2.1.3 Age

Age was a variable I wanted to keep relatively consistent because of its well documented effect on *like* (Barbieri, 2007; Buchstaller, 2006; Tagliamonte & D'Arcy, 2007) and pragmatic devices in general (Andersen, 2001; Holmes et al., 1991). I decided to limit the ages of participants to between 18 and 28. Since participants were recruited at Otago University, 18 was chosen since it is the age of most first year university students. Limiting the age to 28 was somewhat arbitrary, although other studies also limit their sample to people born within 10 years of each other (Terraschke, 2008), or study *like* in participants up to 30 years of age (Blyth et al., 1990; Singler, 2001).

3.2.1.4 Ethnicity

Ethnicity information was gathered using the 2006 New Zealand census form ethnicity question (see Appendix B). However, the ethnicity information was not used to select participants, nor was it used for analysis.

3.2.1.5 Social class

I did not collect any data on social class. Although social class has been shown to affect language in other countries (e.g. Huspek, 1989), generally, this effect is not as strong in New Zealand (Holmes et al., 1991).

3.2.1.6 Native speakers of New Zealand English

When recruiting participants for this study, I specified that participants needed to be native speakers of New Zealand English. They needed to have lived in New Zealand their whole lives, with the exception of travel. This requirement is somewhat vague. One participant had lived in France for three years, but still considered herself to be a native speaker of New Zealand English. All other participants had come to live in New Zealand before seven years of age. I also made clear that being a native speaker of New Zealand English does not necessarily mean that it is the only language that a participant speaks. If a participant had lived in New Zealand for their whole life, even if they only speak their parents' language at home, they were still considered to be native speakers. While these criteria could be considered too broad, I think that they more accurately reflect the New Zealand population, and particularly the University of Otago student population, where the study was conducted.

3.3 Data collection

3.3.1 Recruitment

I recruited participants through three methods. First, I hung posters around the university advertising the project. A copy of this can be found in Appendix C. Secondly, I attended a couple of Linguistics and English lectures and talked to the students there. Thirdly, I invited my friends on Facebook to participate. This variety of sources for participants was advantageous as it allowed me to be fairly confident that the participants I matched up for the unfamiliar category would not have met previously. When matching up participants for the unfamiliar category I would not, for example, put together two participants who were taking the same paper.

3.3.2 Reward

The original design for the study included a $5 voucher to a café on campus. The first 42 participants received this voucher. To recruit further participants I advertised the study as a job on Student Job Search, a recruitment agency for students (www.sjs.co.nz). A condition for listing on this website is that jobs must pay at least minimum wage. I therefore had to put the reward up to $10.

3.3.3 The recording process

I recorded participants either in a seminar room in the English department or in a group room in the library. I chose these locations because they are convenient, but also pleasant. I rejected a few rooms with no windows, as I thought that sitting in a dark room with an unknown person could be stressful.

I set up the equipment before the participants arrived. I used a laptop and external microphone to record the participants. When the participants arrived, I introduced myself and offered them something to drink. I then asked them to read the information sheet and sign the consent form (Appendix A). They then filled out the participation survey (Appendix B). I explained to the participants that I would start the recording and leave the room. I told them they would then talk for 20 minutes and I would then return and stop the recording when the time was up. The participants were informed that they were free to talk about any thing they wanted and they did not need to censure themselves since the data would be anonymised. I left them with five conversation topics face down on the table. They were told that they were welcome to use these, but they did not have to. They were also told they could discard some topics if they wanted.

I made sure the participants were aware of their right to stop the recording at any time. Finally, I asked if they had any additional questions and left the room. When 20 minutes had passed I returned to the room and stopped the recording. I asked how the conversation had gone. Mostly, the participants said that they had enjoyed it. I then informed them that I would be analysing their data for the word *like*. If they seemed interested, I explained further. Many of the participants remarked that they had used that word a lot. I asked if they were happy for me to analyse their language in terms of *like* use. No one declined. I then gave them a $5 voucher or $10 and thanked them for participating.

The observer's paradox To mitigate Labov's Observer's Paradox (1972; 1984), I left the room while the recordings were made. Although the participants were aware

they were being recorded, I hoped that leaving would still help them to feel more relaxed. It appears that this was relatively successful, in that several participants talked about how they would rather have been at home rather than participating in the study and several participants made fun of the conversation topics.

3.4 Data analysis

3.4.1 Transcription

I transcribed all the data collected for this study. Due to time constraints, I was not able to complete narrow transcriptions of all the data. I recorded pauses when I used them in interpreting the function of *like* (for transcription conventions see Appendix D).

3.4.2 Coding

After I had transcribed the data, I went through and found all the tokens of *like*. I first did this by hand and then when I had finished categorising I checked this with the word count function of a word processor. After identifying all tokens of *like* in the data, I began to categorise these according to their most salient function.

I decided to categorise tokens of *like* according to Terraschke's (2008) framework. I also considered using Andersen's system (Andersen, 1997, 1998, 2001). Andersen asserts that all uses of *like* are variations on the core meaning of "non-literal resemblance between an utterance and the underlying thought" (Andersen, 2001, p. 210) . While I would not disagree with this statement, I decided to use Terraschke's framework as it better handles the interpersonal and textual meanings *like* can express on top of this. Research has shown that females and males differ in how and how often they express interpersonal meanings (e.g. Holmes, 1990a). Terraschke's framework therefore allows for a better description of these differences. When working out her framework, Terraschke found that classifying tokens of *like* was harder the more categories she used, because often the categories ended up overlapping. She therefore uses four broad categories: quotative, hesitation, subjective stance and discourse link. I will describe each of these categories below, based on Terraschke's original analysis. I also include another category, cut-off *like*. I will elaborate each category with examples from the present study. These categories are collectively referred to as discourse marker (DM) *like*.

3.4.2.1 Standard

The standard *like* category was comprised of all instances of *like* which do not fall under one of the discourse marker functions. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, *like* can be used as a verb, an adjective, a noun, an adverb, a preposition, a conjunction and a suffix.

I also used the general pragmatic device characteristics outlined in the literature review: 1) a pragmatic device can be removed from a sentence without making it ungrammatical, and 2) a pragmatic device does not affect the truth conditions of an utterance. Characteristic 3) that pragmatic devices are multifunctional was not used. A token of *like* that did not fit these characteristics was generally coded as standard *like*. Approximative *like* and quotative *like* were exceptions to this rule. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, quotative *like* often does not fit under these, and approximative *like* does not fit under 2). I have included these in this study, however, in order to provide a more comprehensive view of *like*. Standard *like*s are not directly analysed further in this study.

3.4.2.2 Quotative

The quotative category is relatively straight forward. *Like* when used as a quotative introduces a segment which the speaker presents as a quotation, real or imagined. A typical instance will include a grammatical subject, the quotative form *be + like*, and the quote, during which the speaker often changes their pitch.

(3.1) Beth: yea accused us of um stealing his sugar he he like came out to us and was *like* um do you mind not like um can you stop using my sugar and I was just *like* it's our sugar he was *like* well blah blah blah blah and I was just *like* no we bought it

In example (3.1), Beth is describing an interaction between her and her flatmate that had occurred the previous evening. Beth uses quotative *like* to introduce segments as quotations. This excerpt also illustrates that *like* also allows the speaker to present quotations that do not represent literally what was said. It seems unlikely that the flatmate answered "well blah blah blah blah". We are unable to tell whether the other quotations are verbatim or represent the message of what was said. Nevertheless, it is plausible that something was actually said in the place of each of the *like*s.

In example (3.2), it seems that the quoted portion represents thought or internal reaction rather than speech.

(3.2) Adelaide: sorry she lay there in the snow crying and I was *like* oh fuck are you serious and I just had to stand there...

While it is certainly possible that Adelaide actually said "oh fuck are you serious" to her friend, it seems more likely that she instead thought this or is using the quotation to portray to her conversation partner how she felt at the time.

The quoted portion is sometimes just a sound effect, and at times it appeared that speakers used a facial expression or mime in this slot, which was apparent because of a pause followed by laughter. In example (3.3), Elizabeth expresses her reaction to what Sophie has told her with "aw" and prefaces this with *like*.

(3.3) Sophie: I thought that was so nice and also um Allan Rickman put his wand on like an auction and he's donating the money to Christchurch

Elizabeth: that's so cute it's *like* aw

There are a few instances in the data where a grammatical subject is missing as it has been established in a previous portion of the utterance, or even a previous turn. In example (3.4), Rose introduces the subject, "that one person", and Kendall quotes that subject.

(3.4) Rose: there's always like that one person

Kendall: yea that just kind of waltzes up on the day *like* this is fun...

In example (3.5) no subject is explicitly stated, but because of the preceding clause the subject can be taken to be "people on Facebook"

(3.5) Kendall: like you see on Facebook all the time *like* oh and if you All Blacks if you want to keep domestic violence rated down you need another win tonight and stuff like that and it's just like

This case as well demonstrates that what is quoted need not have been spoken (Terraschke, 2010; Tagliamonte & D'Arcy, 2004).

3.4.2.3 Hesitation

The hesitation category covers instances of *like* which occur in "false starts, self-repairs, repetitions, or before pauses" (Terraschke, 2008, p. 157). As a hesitation marker, *like*'s main function is to allow the speaker to hold the floor while formulating an utterance.

According to Andersen (2001), a false start is when a speaker restarts their utterance in a way in which the preceding material is syntactically unrelated to what follows it. *Like* occurs between these segments. In example (3.6), Eva changes the grammatical subject of her utterance and uses *like* to mark this.

(3.6) Eva: and it *like* I was in [name of bar] like just looking over the railing...

A self repair, on the other hand, occurs "within an otherwise syntactically coherent discourse unit" (Andersen, 2001, p. 255). The highlighted *like* in the example (3.7) doesn't mark a syntactic change in the utterance, but it seems to buy Tom time while he thinks of how to continue it.

(3.7) Tom: ...he gets like served 7 years or something like that in . *like* the um like terrorist facility

This analysis is further supported by the fact that even when Tom does have a way to continue his utterance, he still uses lexical approximation *like*, which shows that he is not all together confident is his word choice.

When two *like*s occur in a sequence, Terraschke codes the first *like* as part of the hesitation category. In the example (3.8), Amy is explaining why she is uncomfortable with her flatmates having let someone sleep in her room while she was away for the weekend.

(3.8) Amy: next time I just want someone to tell me kinda stuff cos I just know a mate that's got *like* like it's real easy when you've got people over for people to just walk in and steal shit and

The highlighted *like* was coded as hesitation because it occurs before another *like*. This *like* might also be considered to be marking a false start, since the utterance then goes on in a syntactically unrelated way. We might say that the first *like* indicates a false start, making room for the next *like* to perform as a discourse link or elaboration (Section 3.4.2.5). This crossover highlights the benefit of broad categories for coding. It might also be interpreted as subjective stance *like* (Section 3.4.2.4), however, since it seems as if the sentence is leading to an approximation of what was stolen in a friend's flat. We can't know this for sure though. Nonetheless, all *like* repetitions were coded as hesitation.

Like can also be used to fill pauses, while the speaker finds an appropriate expression. In the following example, Lewis explicitly states that he is looking for an appropriate word.

(3.9) Lewis: what *like* er what's the word I'm looking for begrudgingly he was still a flatmate

Related to this, hesitation *like* is also often found in utterances where a speaker repeats part of their utterance after *like*. In this situation both the repetition and use of *like* appear to buy the speaker more time to formulate their utterance (example 3.10).

(3.10) Lewis: had *like* had a shower and everything got ready for work...

At times it was difficult to differentiate between subjective stance *like* (Section 3.4.2.4) and hesitation *like*. A person using *like* to mark that they are unsure of their word choice (subjective stance *like*) is similar to a person using *like* as a hesitation while they think of a word. To solve this problem, a token was only coded as hesitation *like* if there was other evidence of hesitation present, like pauses, repetitions, *um*s, or other pragmatic devices. Other instances were coded as subjective stance *like* as instances of lexical approximation.

3.4.2.4 Subjective stance

According to Terraschke, when *like* is used in the subjective stance category, it functions as "an expression of the speaker's evaluation of the accuracy of the utterance" (p. 143). Subjective stance *like* is thus an expression of epistemic modality; it expresses how certain or uncertain the speaker is towards their utterance. This certainty can be lexical, numerical or propositional. Although she groups them together when quantifying her data, Terraschke explains that subjective stance *like* may be divided into 'intensifiers' and 'hedges'.

Hedges Hedges show that a speaker is not sure about the accuracy of their utterance, be it lexical, numerical or propositional. A side effect of hedge *like* is that it may mitigate a potentially face threatening utterance, as it serves to soften the statement. A speaker can use this effect to their advantage. They can either soften a proposition that their addressee may find face threatening, or protect their own face by telling their addressee that they do not take responsibility for the potential that their proposition is untrue.

Lexical approximation occurs when a speaker wants to show that how they are expressing an idea is imperfect. In example (3.11) Sophie is telling Elizabeth about the flat she will be renting next year. She wants to express something like "there are three bathrooms in my new flat, but one of those just has a toilet and not a shower".

(3.11) Sophie: and there's two bathrooms well three bathrooms

Elizabeth: seriously

Sophie: yup one *like* toilet or one's a toilet downstairs and upstairs there's two bathrooms there's two showers which is good cos

It seems that Sophie is having trouble finding a word that expresses the idea "a bathroom without a shower". She settles for "toilet" but prefaces this with *like* to signal to Elizabeth that her phrasing is perhaps not ideal.

Numerical approximation is one of the more well-known uses of *like*. Here, *like* means something akin to 'approximately' or 'about'. As discussed in the literature review though (Section 2.3.2.1), these cannot be substituted perfectly. Excerpt (3.12) is a quite straight forward example of this. It seems that Rob wants to express that you get "roughly a third off".

(3.12) Rob: um it's there's like there's certain like requirements but you can get *like* a third off

Propositional approximation is a little harder to pin down. In example (3.13), Ben is explaining some of the different bungee jumps that he perceives to be more "hard out" than the one he has done.

(3.13) Ben: so not the really hard out one

Diana: yea no

Ben: you know that's there's *like* off a cliff or something

The "or something" here is a definite clue that Ben is unsure of his proposition "there's a bungee jump off a cliff". It could equally be argued that this excerpt in fact conveys lexical approximation. This would imply that Ben is sure the bungee jump he is talking about exists, but he doesn't know how to best describe it. The "or something" here though seems to point to the approximation being propositional.

Intensifiers Intensifiers emphasise a proposition or highlight a particular aspect of it. This notion is similar to 'focus' (Underhill, 1988). Approximations can at times also be intensifiers. Andersen (2001) discusses *like* when it occurs with metaphors and hyperboles. These uses seem to fit under Terraschke's intensifier subcategory. In example (3.14), Rose's use of *like* conveys hyperbole.

(3.14) Rose: yea no me too I was just like chilling out this morning and then I had *like* a three quarters of an hour long shower and then I was just like (sound effect) and I just completely forgot

It seems unlikely that Rose's shower actually lasted three quarters of an hour. It seems more likely that the phrase "*like* a three quarters of an hour long" instead serves to emphasise that "she had a really long shower". It might therefore be argued that *like* here serves to highlight this exaggeration rather than just soften the assertion. It could reasonably also be argued though, that she did in fact have a shower that lasted three quarters of an hour. Such classifications always rely on interpretation. In example (3.15), Bridget uses a metaphor to describe how a friend lost his teeth and marks this with *like*.

(3.15) Bridget: oh it was so gross he *like* bit the curb

Andersen describes this kind of *like* as different from a hedge *like* by testing it with the glosses "approximately" and "for example".

(3.16) Rose: yea no me too I was just like chilling out this morning and then I had (approximately/*for example) a three quarters of an hour long shower and then I was just like (sound effect) and I just completely forgot

(3.17) Bridget: oh it was so gross he (*approximately/*for example) bit the curb

While the "approximately" gloss does work in (3.16), it doesn't convey the exaggeration or hyperbole that Rose is trying to express. Andersen suggests using "virtually" instead.

(3.18) Rose: yea no me too I was just like chilling out this morning and then I had (virtually) a three quarters of an hour long shower and then I was just like (sound effect) and I just completely forgot

(3.19) Bridget: oh it was so gross he (virtually) bit the curb

This gloss encodes the participants' intended meaning better. Although the hedge and intensifier categories are quantified together in this study, it is useful to note the breadth of the subjective stance category.

Subjective stance *like* generally occurs clause medially. There is sometimes a quick pause after subjective stance *like* but not always. If *like* is pointing to a single word, it occurs just before the word and the word may be pronounced slowly and carefully.

3.4.2.5 Discourse link

The final category Terraschke uses in her analysis is discourse link *like*. Discourse link *like* basically serves to show links between elements in an utterance. As such, it often occurs between clauses or sentences. It shows that an additional comment links back to a previous statement; discourse link *like* clarifies a previous statement. Terraschke lists specifications, explanations, elaborations and descriptions as subcategories of this. It is difficult to see in her work a clear difference between specification and explanation, as she uses the same example to illustrate them. I will therefore just elaborate on the final three subcategories. Discourse link *like* typically occurs between clauses, which makes sense since its purpose is to show relations between these. As with the sections above, I will show a few excerpts which show the subcategories of this category. The subcategories for discourse link *like* overlap greatly, however.

Excerpt (3.20) contains an example of explanation.

(3.20) Tony: nah definitely go Macs eh they're so much easier to use and like I've got Windows on the Mac now as well so

Mike: yea oh yea

Tony: *like* for gaming and stuff

Here, the phrase "for gaming and stuff" is an explanation of why Tony has deemed it relevant to say that he has Windows on his Mac computer.

As Terraschke notes, the difference between elaboration and the other subcategories is not very pronounced. Nevertheless she classifies tokens as elaboration when they "serve to introduce segments that add more detailed information to a topic." She continues that "unlike with clarification *like*, this additional information does not necessarily disambiguate or illustrate a previously made point" (p. 150).

(3.21) Kendall: it kind of freaked me out that the essay was worth 25 percent of the marks I was just like wow

Rose: wow

Kendall: *like* if you don't get all the points [...] or you've completely answered it wrong [...] it's just 25 percent gone

Example (3.21) was classified as elaboration rather than explanation, because Kendall is explaining further why it freaked her out that the essay was worth 25 percent. It doesn't seem to clarify the point THAT she was "freaked out" but rather gives more information. This information isn't needed for Rose to understand what she meant.

Discourse link *like* and conjunctions It was decided that discourse link *like* can occur before conjunctions, but not after. This may diverge from Terraschke, as she does not discuss this issue.

(3.22) Ben: and then this like random man had found it who she'd asked and he'd like walked back from the like the platform to tell her so *like* it was only by complete chance that I actually found...

In example (3.22), *like* was coded as subjective stance rather than as a discourse link, because it is preceded by *so*.

3.4.2.6 Exemplification

An interesting aspect of Terraschke's analysis is how she treats exemplification. She divides instances into either the subjective stance or discourse link category. According to Terraschke, exemplification *like* "operate[s] as an epistemic indicator when it functions as an interpersonal device by marking the following example as random. However, it can also be classified as a discourse link when the main function of the example is to clarify a previous point." (p. 146).

The highlighted *like* in example (3.23) was coded as discourse link *like*. Here, Jen uses *like* to show that the fact that "two of the girls don't clean" is an example of the "issues" she introduced earlier.

(3.23) Jen: um yea I flat um with four other girls at the moment and there's some issues

Harry: oo

Jen: *like* oh two of the girls just don't clean...

The exemplification *like* in example (3.24) was classified as subjective stance *like*.

(3.24) Joe: ... like a huge number of us came down here to Otago [...] most of them went off and did *like* PE or BComs and [...] things like that anyway [...] the degrees that you do to get a degree

Joe marks "PE" and "BComs" as examples of the kind of degree he is talking about – "degrees that you do to get a degree". The argument could be made that these examples are random. It is difficult to say for sure however, whether an example is random or not.

I have modified this distinction by classifying exemplification as a discourse link if it occurred clause initially and subjective stance *like* if it occurred clause medially. Examples (3.23) and (3.24) remain in these same categories when this change is applied. This change mostly served to make the classification process easier.

3.4.2.7 Cut-off *like*

Unlike Terraschke (2008), instances where the speaker cut themself off or was cut-off just after using *like* were quantified in this study. To be classified as cut-off *like*, the token in question had to be prosodically integrated into the preceding clause.

In example (3.25), Sally cuts Alicia off to clarify why she is taking a classics paper.

(3.25) Alicia: I dunno I cos I like I'm taking a classics paper at the moment and I think that's it's my hardest by far I just find it a lot harder than the other stuff *like*

Sally: does classics even do you it's just an interest

Alicia: it's just an interest yea

A speaker may also cut themself off, as in example (3.26). In this example, it seems like Erin is about to introduce a quotation with quotative *like*, but then changes the direction of her utterance. Because *like* is integrated into the preceding clause, this token was classified as cut-off *like.* If it was instead integrated into the speech following it, it would be classified as hesitation *like*, as in (3.7).

(3.26) Erin: I just ran to the bedroom and burst into tears I was *like.* that oh but to an eight year old it was horrible anyway then her and Mum didn't talk for the rest of the holiday

Cut-off *like* was coded and quantified in this study because it is relatively frequent, occurring at 0.20 times per 100 words.

3.4.2.8 *It's like*

The phrase *it's like* warrants separate attention. Instances of *it's like* occurred across the first four discourse marker *like* categories.

As a quotative *it's like* appears to mean something like "what a person in this situation (might) say or think..."

In example (3.27), Bridget is explaining why she is excited about the Rugby World Cup, even though she is not that into rugby.

(3.27) Bridget: I actually don't know anything about Rugby either but everyone in my flat is like Rugby maniacs so I kind of am like super excited anyway cos *it's like* aah

This *like* was classified as a quotative because it introduces the exclamation "aah", which has to be something someone says or thinks, as it is a reaction. The *it* that precedes *like* does not seem to have an anaphoric referent; it instead seems to function as an expletive, allowing Bridget to express a general reaction. Basically she is saying that she is "super excited anyway" because of all the "aah" or general excitement of others.

When the *it* of *it's like* referred to something in the utterance, it was usually classified as subjective stance *like*. Example (3.28) contains three instances of *it's like*. It should be noted that this chunk makes *it's like* seem a lot more common in the data than it actually is. In this excerpt, Fred is telling Steph about the UMAT test.

(3.28) Fred: it's basically a intel- intelligence test almost like an IQ thing that they do for the health professions here or to get into health professions and *it's like*(1). there's three sections and like first is like reading comprehension then *it's like*(2) interpreting situations is like the second so *it's just like*(3) lots of like dialogue and you have to write what you know A feels at this point and what B should say or what is B actually meaning and C is section last section is just kind of like shapes and puzzles and like how to reorientate it's just like puzzle solving the last one and

The second *it's like* in this passage is the easiest to classify. The *it* refers to the test and the *like* expresses lexical approximation. The third *it's like* appears to do the same thing. The first *it's like* was harder to classify. At first it seemed like a discourse link, like Fred was using it to link his elaboration on the test. On the other hand, the *it* could also refer to UMAT, which would point to subjective stance *like*. We must also consider the pause, and the fact that what follows *like* is not syntactically linked to what came before. These considerations point to hesitation *like*. In the end, this example was classified as hesitation *like* and it falls into the false start category.

In example (3.29), Brent is explaining why it isn't a big deal that his flatmates complain about each other at times.

(3.29) Brent: and so you get the wee bits of bitching as well which I think is healthy you know what I'm saying as long as it's not someone's as long as it's not out of control *it's like* in the workplace it's good to have a bit of bitching cos it means they're bitching about small things it's better than bitching about big things

The *it's like* in example (3.29) was classified as discourse link *like*. While is it feasible that the "it" could refer to "bitching", it seems that *it's like* is in fact introducing an elaboration on the idea that "bitching isn't always necessarily a problem".

Chapter 4

Results

In this chapter I will analyse the data statistically in order to answer the research questions. In the literature review I asked if gender and familiarity affect the frequency of *like*. As outlined in the Methodology, the data was divided into five functional categories: quotative, hesitation, subjective stance, discourse link and cut-off *like*. Thus, in this chapter I will survey how gender and familiarity affect each of these categories.

I will begin by describing procedures for preparing the data for statistical analysis. I will then move onto describing the comparison of means techniques used for analysis and the results these gave. I will show that these results are insufficient and move onto the main analysis used: mixed effects logistic regression. I will then provide the results of this analysis for each functional category of *like*.

4.1 The data

4.1.1 Preparing the data

Before the data was analysed statistically, outliers were removed. Outliers were found by first calculating means for each category of *like* for all of the participants together. Any data that lay more than two standard deviations from the mean was considered a potential outlier. Outliers were dealt with by giving the speaker the mean rate of the other speakers in their gender/familiarity grouping. This meant that the speaker could still contribute to the discourse marker (DM) category in a meaningful way, while no longer contributing to the mean of their gender/familiarity grouping for the particular category of *like*. This method was employed for a participant in the female-male familiar category for her use of quotative *like*, and a participant in the female-female unfamiliar category for her use of discourse link *like*. A male-male familiar pair was removed from

the data entirely because both participants were outliers across many of the categories and adjusting their data as described above would have left very little true data. This means that the male-male familiar category was left with six participants rather than eight. Another speaker in the male-male familiar group was an outlier in the hesitation category. It was decided not to remove his data however, since the male-male dyad just discussed were also part of this same gender/familiarity group, and the group would be left with little data. Additionally, because his rate was high, like the two who were removed, leaving his rate leaves a more accurate picture of group behaviour. In total, two participants were removed from the data, leaving 46 participants in this study. Two female participants had their rates normalised, one in the quotative function and one in the discourse link function.

4.1.2 A description of the data

Table 4.1 shows the number of words in each section of the data. Most sections of the data contain similar amounts of words with the exception of the male-male familiar category, which, as described above, has two less participants than the other categories. Nevertheless, the averaged words per participant shows that participants in the group produced about the same amount of words as speakers in other categories.

Table 4.1: Number of Words by Gender and Familiarity (Mean Per Person in Brackets)

	Familiar	Unfamiliar	Total
Female-Female	15414 (1926.75)	15421 (1927.63)	30835 (1927.19)
Female-Male	14251 (1781.38)	14425 (1803.13)	28676 (1792.25)
Male-Male	10651 (1775.17)	14712 (1839.00)	25363 (1811.64)
Total	40316 (1832.55)	44558 (1856.58)	84874 (1845.09)

Table 4.2: *Like* as a Percentage of the Total Corpus

	Familiar	Unfamiliar	Total
Female-Female	587 (3.81%)	544 (3.52%)	1131 (3.67%)
Female-Male	252 (1.77%)	415 (2.88%)	667 (2.33%)
Male-Male	452 (4.24%)	358 (2.43%)	810 (3.19%)
Total	1291 (3.20%)	1317 (2.96%)	2608 (3.07%)

Table 4.2 shows that *like* makes up 3.07% of the corpus, or occurs 3.7 times per 100 words.

Table 4.3: Mean *like* Rates Across Gender and Familiarity

	Quotative	Hesitation	Subjective stance	Discourse link	Cut-off	DM
Female	0.5953	0.3533	1.4878	0.4749	0.2026	3.1140
Male	0.3553	0.3807	1.2051	0.6307	0.1943	2.7660
Familiar	0.4980	0.4078	1.3877	0.5545	0.2334	3.0813
Unfamiliar	0.4645	0.3285	1.3204	0.5448	0.1668	2.8250
Everyone	0.4805	0.3664	1.3526	0.5494	0.1986	2.9476

4.2 Analysis

As described in the Methodology, tokens of *like* were categorised according to their most salient function. Table 4.3 shows the frequency per 100 words of each category of *like*. It also shows the frequency of discourse marker (DM) *like*. DM *like* is made up of the other function categories. Table 4.3 compares males and females, and familiar and unfamiliar participants (see also Figure 4.1).

4.2.0.1 Basic analysis

Data was analysed using the free statistical environment, R (R Development Core Team 2011). Two basic tests were used to compare the means of males and females, and familiar and unfamiliar pairings for each category of *like*. These tests were ANOVA and the Wilcoxon rank sum test. First, a variance test and Shapiro test were applied to each to see if the data was suitable to be tested using ANOVA. Those that did not fulfill the requirements were analysed using the Wilcoxon rank sum test. The rest were analysed using ANOVA. The only significant result was found using the Wilcoxon rank sum test. It showed that females use quotative *like* more than males (W=358, p=0.03894). Gender and familiarity were not significant for all the other categories of DM *like*.

If we examine Table 4.4 though, we can see patterns that this analysis fails to capture. For example, women (0.60 times per 100 words) use quotative *like* more than men (0.36 times per 100 words; Table 4.3). But on examining Table 4.4 we can tell that this is only half the story. Table 4.4 contains the mean for each gender/familiarity group. The mixed gender groups have been broken down into males and females, and the mean of the group is also given (see also Figure 4.2).

In some categories males use *like* more than females; men in the male-male familiar dyads (0.54) use quotative *like* far more than women in the familiar mixed gender dyads (0.27). If we look just at the familiar groupings, for example, we see that the



Figure 4.1: Mean *like* rates across gender and familiarity

difference is more about whether the dyad is same or mixed gendered, since the same gender dyads (0.68 for females and 0.54 for males) are using quotative *like* much more than the mixed gender dyad (0.28). The picture looks a bit different in the unfamiliar data though, where males (0.38 mixed gender, 0.23 same gender) appear to be using quotative *like* much less than females (0.70 same gender, 0.55 mixed gender). The idea that females use quotative *like* more than males now doesn't seem as clear cut, given the differences between the more fine categories. Mixed effects logistic regression can be used to give us a clearer picture of what is going on.

4.3 Mixed effects logistic regression

Logistic regression predicts the probability of a categorical outcome occurring (Baayen, 2008). Mixed effects logistic regression allows for the simultaneous inclusion of categorical and continuous predictors in a model. A benefit of this kind of analysis is that it includes random effects. Random effects are effects that are not repeatable (Baayen, 2008). In this study, the particular participant and their dyad are treated as random effects, because specific behaviour of individuals and dyads is not repeatable with a

Table 4.4: *Like* Classified by Function

	Quotative	Hesitation	Subjective stance	Discourse link	Cut-off	DM
F-F familiar	0.6793	0.4897	1.9817	0.5931	0.1953	3.9390
F-M familiar	0.2819	0.1836	0.5507	0.3470	0.1957	1.5590
female	0.2707	0.2403	0.6814	0.3293	0.2278	1.7496
male	0.2931	0.1269	0.4201	0.3647	0.1636	1.3684
M-M familiar	0.5443	0.5975	1.7115	0.7797	0.3343	3.9673
F-F unfamiliar	0.6950	0.3074	1.6773	0.4984	0.2186	3.3967
F-M unfamiliar	0.4690	0.3571	1.3042	0.4335	0.1900	2.7508
female	0.5526	0.2854	0.9275	0.3371	0.1600	2.2626
male	0.3793	0.4289	1.6809	0.5299	0.2200	3.2389
M-M unfamiliar	0.2326	0.3210	0.9798	0.7024	0.0917	2.3275

second sample. Contrast this with something like gender. We can make sure that we include the same number of people of each gender and this could be repeated if the experiment were performed again with different people. Gender, therefore, is treated as a fixed effect.

The advantage of including random effects is that it lessens the possibility that any significant results we find are due to the influence of a single individual or dyad. A separate regression line is created for each individual and dyad and outlying cases are adjusted toward the group. Including random effects also makes the model more conservative (Quené & van den Bergh, 2008), meaning that any significant results are less likely to be due to chance.

Logistic regression has been used for many years in sociolinguistics to do variable rules analysis, through programs such as GoldVarb and its predecessors (Tagliamonte, 2006). Johnson (2009) argues for using mixed effects logistic regression over GoldVarb. He argues that GoldVarb overestimates the significance of fixed effects, because it doesn't include random effects. Studies such as Drager, Hay, and Walker (2010) represent the move toward mixed effects logistic regression, away from GoldVarb.

4.3.1 Summary of factors

The aim of the mixed effects logistic regression model in this study is to determine what factors are significant in determining the frequency of each functional category of *like*. Mixed effects logistic regression is done by assembling models. Models should contain as many significant predictors as possible. To achieve this, the following factors were tested together in a model for each functional category of *like*.

Gender This was self identified.



Figure 4.2: *Like* classified by function

Familiarity As described in Section 3.2, participants in this study were either friends or strangers. Each dyad was coded as being 'familiar' or 'unfamiliar'.

Addressee gender This was self identified

Gender relation A dyad with two participants of the same gender was coded as 'same'. A dyad with a male and a female was coded as 'different'.

Speaker's frequency The speaker's frequency of quotative *like*, hesitation *like*, subjective stance *like*, discourse link *like* and cut-off *like* were factors. The functional category for which the effects were being calculated was always excluded. For example, when the model for quotative *like* were being assembled, the speaker's rate of quotative *like* was not included as a predictor.

Addressee's frequency Same as above, but for the speaker's conversation partner.

Speaker's words per turn This was calculated by dividing the total number of words a person produced during the 20 minute conversation by how may turns they had. A person's turn was coded as having ended when their addressee started speaking, whether or not this resulted in the first person stopping talking. This is illustrated in the sample transcript in Appendix E.

Addressee's words per turn Same as above, but for the speaker's conversation partner.

DM *like* For DM *like*, the speaker's frequency of the functional categories was not tested, nor was the addressee's rate of use of these categories. This is because DM *like* overlaps with the categories and therefore would be redundant. For this reason, DM *like* was also not included as a predictor in the models for the functional categories.

Models reported in this study are those with the largest number of significant predictors and that provided a better fit over simpler models. Factors were tested for significance by creating one model with all the other factors. Factors which were not significant were removed. Forming the model therefore involved experimenting with the different factors and trying to place as many in each model as possible, while keeping all factors significant. Interactions were also tested between gender, addressee gender, gender relation and familiarity.

4.4 Models

DM *like* will first be examined. Following this, each of the functional categories will be examined separately. For each functional category, a table will be presented which shows the best model for the category of *like*. Graphs of interactions will also be presented, as these aid in interpreting interactions.

4.4.1 DM *like*

Table 4.3 suggests that females use discourse marker *like* more than males (3.11 times per 100 words, vs. 2.77), and that friends use it more than strangers (3.08 vs. 2.82). Table 4.4 suggests that this pattern is more complicated. At 3.24 times per 100 words for the mixed gender dyads, and 2.33 for the same gender dyads, males at times used DM *like* more to females in the unfamiliar data than in the familiar data. Mixed effects logistic regression was used to determine the best model to explain the patterns in the data.

Table 4.5: Model 1: Mixed Effects Logistic Regression for DM *like*

	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	$Pr(>\|z\|)$
(Intercept)	-3.95265	0.36473	-10.837	<0.001*
Familiarity (unfamiliar)	1.16891	0.50936	2.295	0.2174
Gender relation (same)	1.86042	0.45414	4.097	<0.001*
Addressee's rate of DM *like*	-0.29220	0.02505	-11.665	<0.001*
Interaction: F (unfamiliar) & GR (same)	-1.79768	0.62949	-2.856	0.00429*

Table 4.5 shows the best model for predicting whether or not DM *like* will occur, Model 1. As explained in Section 4.3.1, this model was created by testing each of the factors listed in Section 4.3.1 together in a model. Interactions between the first four factors (gender, familiarity, addressee gender and gender relation) were also tested. Factors that were not significant were removed from the model. Model 1 represents the model with the most significant factors. The first column of Table 4.5 displays the factors which are tested in the final model, Model 1. These are familiarity, gender relation and addressee's frequency of DM *like*. The final row shows the interaction between familiarity and gender relation. The factors which have two realisations (gender, familiarity, addressee gender and gender relation) are represented by the realisation which comes second alphabetically. In Model 1, familiarity is thus reported in terms of how the 'unfamiliar' must be adjusted from the 'familiar' baseline. The estimate column shows the direction of the effect of each factor. The estimates for familiarity and gender relation don't really tell us anything, since these are in an interaction. However, to further explain what was said before about the factors with categorical realisations, the estimate for familiarity would show that DM *like* correlated positively with the unfamiliar condition, if familiarity was not in an interaction. The fact that the estimate for addressee's frequency of DM *like* is negative tells us that this factor correlates negatively with the speakers rate of DM *like*. The estimate of the interaction is also negative but is better understood by looking at the graph in Figure 4.3. The final column is also important. It tells us the probability that the effect we have found (*Wald's Z* or the *Z-value*) is due to chance. A p-value of less than 0.05 is counted as significant in this study. The last column tells us, then, that gender relation, addressee's rate of DM *like*, and the interaction between familiarity and gender relation are all significant.

Moving onto the results, Table 4.5 shows that there is an interaction between a person's relationship and gender relationship with the person they are talking to. Figure 4.3 shows how this interaction works. On the y-axis of the graph is the probability that a person will use DM *like* over another word. The four points on the graph show the four combinations of the realisations of familiarity and gender relation. The graph shows that familiar participants of different genders are the least likely to use DM *like.* Unfamiliar participants seem to be about as likely to use DM *like* whether they are speaking to someone of the same gender or someone of a different gender. Familiar participants of the same gender are the most likely to use DM *like*.

The two points on the graph in Figure 4.3 which represent the unfamiliar participants are quite close together. To see if there were any factors influencing the use of DM *like* by unfamiliar participants, some models were tested just on the unfamiliar data. Subset models were used throughout to dissect the main models. Model 2 is made up of an interaction between gender and gender relation. Unlike Model 1, it does not



Figure 4.3: Model 1: The interaction between familiarity and gender relation and its effect on DM *like*. U is unfamiliar. S is "same" gender relation, which means the participants are of the same gender. D is "different" gender relation.

include the addressee's rate of DM *like*. A model was made with the interaction and addressee's rate of DM *like*, but addressee's rate of DM *like* was not significant. When Model 2 was tested on the unfamiliar data only, the interaction approached significance (*Wald's* Z=-1.811, p=0.0702). Figure 4.4 shows this interaction.

According to Figure 4.4, when speaking to someone they don't know, males use DM *like* more if speaking to someone of the other gender, and less to someone of the same gender. For females the reverse is true. Females are more likely to use DM *like* when speaking to someone of the same gender, and less likely when speaking to someone of the other gender.

To see if there is this same effect on familiar participants, Model 2 was tested on just the familiar data and the interaction was not significant. Figure 4.3 made it seem like gender relation might have an effect on its own in the familiar data. This was tested using Model 3. Model 3 contained gender relation and addressee rate of DM *like*. Gender relation was significant (*Wald's* Z=3.880, p<0.001), as was addressee rate of DM *like* (*Wald's* Z=-7.364, p<0.001). The probability that familiar participants will use DM *like* based on whether or not they are of the same gender as their addressee is shown on the graph on the right in Figure 4.4. So far then, female unfamiliar participants have been shown to use DM *like* more to people of the same gender. Male unfamiliar participants use DM *like* more to people of the other gender. Familiar participants were all more likely to use DM *like* to addressees of the same gender. It



Figure 4.4: Model 2 (left): The interaction between gender and gender relation on unfamiliar participants for DM *like*; and Model 3 (right): The effect of gender relation on familiar participants on DM *like*

seems that female participants are not changing their frequency of DM *like* according to familiarity, since they are using it more to other females in both the familiar and unfamiliar data. The males on the other hand are more likely to use DM *like* to a male friend, and a female stranger.

These observations are further corroborated by examining the male and female data sets individually. First, the male data was examined alone using Model 4. Model 4 contains an interaction between gender relation and familiarity, and partner's rate of DM *like*. The interaction between gender relation and familiarity is significant (*Wald's* Z=-2.625, p=0.00865) and the addressee's rate of DM *like* approached significance (*Wald's* Z=1.886, p=0.05932). Model 4 thus indicates, as above, that males change their behaviour between familiar and unfamiliar situations. Figure 4.5 shows that in familiar situations they use DM *like* more when speaking to someone of the same gender, and in unfamiliar situations they use it more to females. Looking at the female data, the interaction between familiarity and gender relation is not significant. Removing familiarity from Model 4 creates Model 5. Gender relation is significant in Model 5 (*Wald's* Z=2.714, p=0.00665), and addressee's rate of DM *like* approached significance (*Wald's* Z=1.703, p=0.0886). This shows that females always use DM *like* more when speaking to another female, regardless of whether they know that person or not. Both females and males are affected by gender relation, but only males were affected by familiarity.



Figure 4.5: Model 4: The interaction between familiarity and gender relation on male participants for DM *like*

In sum, gender relation and familiarity interact to affect a person's use of DM *like*. When speaking to friends, people are more likely to use *like* to someone of the same gender (Model 3). If the speakers don't know each other, females are more likely to use *like* to another female (Model 5), and males also to females (Model 4). Looking back to Table 4.4, this can be observed in the means of each gender/familiarity group. The bar height in Figure 4.2 also shows these means. In the familiar data, the female-female mean (3.94) and male-male mean (3.98) are higher than the mixed gender group (1.56). This pattern is also present for the unfamiliar females (3.40 for the female-female dyads and 2.26 for the females in the mixed gender dyads), but is reversed for the unfamiliar males where those in the mixed gender group use DM *like* more (3.24) than those in the male-male group (2.33). The speaker's partner's rate of DM *like* correlates negatively with the speaker's use.

4.4.2 Quotative *like*

Model 6 contains a three-way interaction between gender, gender relation and familiarity, the speaker's rate of discourse link *like*, and their addressee's rate of hesitation *like* (Table 4.6). Table 4.6 shows that a speaker's use of quotative *like* correlates positively with their use of discourse link *like*, and correlates negatively with their partner's use of hesitation *like*. It also shows that the interaction between gender, gender relation and familiarity is significant.

Table 4.6: Model 6: Mixed Effect Logistic Regression for Quotative *like*

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	$Pr(>\|z\|)$
(Intercept)	-6.84860	0.37335	-18.344	<0.001*
Gender (male)	-0.16082	0.44711	-0.360	0.719082
Gender relation (same)	0.07561	0.43526	0.174	0.862086
Familiarity (unfamiliar)	-0.21217	0.47979	-0.442	0.658329
Addressee's rate of hesitation *like*	1.38320	0.37748	3.664	<0.001*
Speaker's rate of discourse link *like*	1.59263	0.30103	5.291	<0.001*
Interaction: G (male) & GR (same)	-0.46630	0.55119	-0.846	0.397562
Interaction: G (male) & F (unfamiliar)	0.69461	0.59055	1.176	0.239514
Interaction: GR (same) & F (unfamiliar)	0.70509	0.58752	1.200	0.230096
Interaction: G & GR & F	-1.76956	0.75607	-2.340	0.019259*

The effects of the interaction cannot be interpreted directly from Table 4.6. Therefore, Model 6 will be interpreted using subsets of the data. The logic behind this is that a subset model may still contain each of the three factors in some way. Testing the interaction between familiarity and gender relation on the female data and then the male data contains all three factors, albeit in a different form.

Let's begin with gender subsets. Model 7 is made up of the predictors of Model 6, minus gender. Model 7 was tested on the female and the male data. In the female data, this model had no significance for the familiarity/gender relation interaction. Model 7 contained a significant interaction between familiarity and gender relation when tested just on the male data however (*Wald's* Z=-2.209, p=0.027152). The speaker's rate of discourse link *like* was also significant (*Wald's* Z=3.728, p<0.001), as was addressee's rate of hesitation *like* (*Wald's* Z=4.207, p<0.001). The interaction between gender relation and familiarity is shown in Figure 4.6. Men are more likely to use quotative *like* to someone of the other gender. This difference is particularly pronounced when the participants don't know each other. Looking back to Model 6, we have discovered that gender affects the familiarity/gender relation interaction, since it is present in the male data but not the female data.

So what is happening in the female data then? Model 8 tests gender relation in the female data. It is significant (*Wald's* Z=1.933, p=0.0532). Females are more likely to use quotative *like* when speaking to other females. Because gender relation does not need be in an interaction with familiarity to reach significance, there is no evidence that familiarity has an effect on the frequency of quotative *like* by females. This is different to what we saw in Model 7 in the male data, where familiarity did interact with gender relation.

We can test the assumption that familiarity only has an effect on males by splitting



Figure 4.6: Model 7: The interaction between familiarity and gender relation on the male data for quotative *like*

the data into familiarity subsets. Model 9 tests gender relation in the familiar data. Gender relation is significant (*Wald's* Z=2.122, p=0.0339). This means that when speakers know each other, they are more likely to use quotative *like* when speaking to someone of the same gender.

Gender relation is not significant in the unfamiliar data. However, it was also tested in an interaction with gender. Model 10 contains an interaction between gender and gender relation, and the speaker's rate of discourse link *like*. It was tested just on the unfamiliar data. The interaction between gender and gender relation was significant (*Wald's* Z=-3.944, p<0.001), as was the speaker's rate of discourse link *like* (*Wald's* Z=5.303, p<0.001). The interaction between gender and gender relation is shown in Figure 4.7. In the unfamiliar data, males are more likely to use quotative *like* to people of the other gender and less likely to use it to other males. Females are more likely to use quotative *like* to other females and less likely to use it to males.

Another way to represent this pattern is with Model 11, which contains the factors partner's gender (*Wald's* Z=-3.976, p<0.001) and the speaker's rate of discourse link *like* (*Wald's* Z=4.057, p<0.001). Model 11 shows that when people don't know each other, both males and females are more likely to use quotative *like* if speaking to a female. This is essentially the same result as Model 10.

So far, we have found that gender is not significant in the familiar data, but that gender relation is. This means that females and males are both more likely to use quotative *like* when speaking to someone of the same gender. In the unfamiliar data, partner's



Figure 4.7: Model 10: The interaction between gender and gender relation on the unfamiliar data for quotative *like*

gender was significant, which means that both males and females are more likely to use quotative *like* when speaking to females. This fits with the findings of Model 8 on the female subset, that gender relation is significant on its own without familiarity, since in both the familiar and unfamiliar data females are more likely to use quotative *like* to females. In the male data, gender relation was significant when in an interaction with familiarity. This indicates that males are affected by familiarity: that they behave differently in the familiar and unfamiliar data. This makes sense, since the familiarity subsets show that when speaking to someone they know, males are more likely to use quotative *like* if their addressee is male. When they are speaking to someone they don't know, though, they are more likely to use quotative *like* to females.

This summary contrasts with what Model 7 predicts for the male data, shown in Figure 4.6. Figure 4.6 indicates that males are always more likely to use quotative *like* to females, though this is less pronounced in the familiar data. However, since the interaction between gender and gender relation is not significant in the familiar data, we can assume that males and females are both using *like* more to people of the same gender. If males were more likely to use quotative *like* more to women in the familiar data, we would expect there to be an interaction between gender and gender relation. The two unfamiliar points in Figure 4.6 may therefore not in fact be different. Also, the fact that familiarity interacts with gender relation in the male data means that the males must be influenced differently by gender relation in the familiar and unfamiliar data. Because of this, it seems reasonable to say that males use quotative *like* more

to males in the familiar data, and females in the unfamiliar data. The raw data also supports this analysis. In the familiar data, males use quotative *like* to other males at a rate of 0.54 times per 100 words, and to females at a rate of 0.29 times per 100 words. In the unfamiliar data, they use quotative *like* more to women at 0.38 times per 100 words, compared with 0.23 times to males.

To summarise, when people are friends, they use quotative *like* more to people of their gender. When they don't know each other, they are more likely to use it to females.

4.4.3 Hesitation *like*

Table 4.7: Model 12: Mixed Effects Logistic Regression for Hesitation *like*

	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	$Pr(>\|z\|)$
(Intercept)	-6.5919	0.2814	-23.422	<0.001*
Familiarity (unfamiliar)	0.6417	0.3452	1.859	0.06303
Gender relation (same)	0.9274	0.3327	2.787	0.00532*
Addressee's rate of hesitation *like*	-0.6339	0.3047	-2.080	0.03750*
Speaker's rate of subjective stance *like*	0.2312	0.1041	2.222	0.02631*
Speaker's rate of cut-off *like*	1.0468	0.4230	2.475	0.01333*
Interaction: F (unfamiliar) & GR (same)	-1.0712	0.4208	-2.546	0.01090*

Model 12 contains an interaction between familiarity and gender relation, partner's rate of hesitation *like*, and the speaker's rate of subjective stance and cut-off *like*. This model is shown in Table 4.7. Subjective stance *like* and cut-off *like* correlate positively with hesitation *like*. Partner's use of hesitation *like* correlates negatively with the speaker's use of hesitation *like*. The interaction between familiarity and gender relation is significant.

Overall the pattern appears quite similar to what we saw for DM *like*. Table 4.4 shows us that people used hesitation *like* more when speaking to someone of the same gender except in the case of male-male unfamiliar group (0.32) and the males in the female-male unfamiliar group (0.43). Figure 4.8 shows the interaction between familiarity and gender relation. The graph shows that participants who were friends were more likely to use hesitation *like* if they were speaking to someone of the same gender. If the participants were not friends, they were possibly more likely to use hesitation *like* if they were speaking to someone of the other gender.

Again, the data was split into groups to test the significance of these observations. Model 13 contains gender relation and the speaker's rate of cut-off *like*. As the graph suggests, gender relation is significant for familiar participants (*Wald's* Z=3.661, p<0.001). The speaker's rate of cut-off *like* was also significant (*Wald's* Z=5.044,



Figure 4.8: Model 12: The interaction between familiarity and gender relation on hesitation *like*

$p<0.001$). Gender relation was not significant when Model 13 was tested on the unfamiliar data.

Figure 4.9 shows the interaction between gender relation and familiarity in the female (left) and male (right) subsets. Model 14 (female data) contains the interaction between gender relation and familiarity, and the speaker's rate of cut-off *like*. The interaction between gender relation and familiarity approached significance in the female data (*Wald's* Z=-1.938, p=0.0526). Speaker's rate of cut-off *like* was also significant (*Wald's* Z=3.989, $p<0.001$). Model 15 (male data) also contains the interaction between familiarity and gender relation, and also partner's rate of hesitation *like*, and the speaker's rate of cut-off *like*. The interaction between familiarity and gender relation was significant (*Wald's* Z=-2.173, p=0.029751), as was the speaker's rate of cut-off *like* (*Wald's* Z=3.178, p=0.001483). Partner's rate of hesitation *like* approached significance (*Wald's* Z=-1.862, p=0.062608).

The graphs for the female and male data subsets (Figure 4.9) further corroborate the idea that gender relation has no effect in the unfamiliar data. The female graph quite well matches the graph for the overall data. The male data however shows a fair difference between males speaking to females in familiar and unfamiliar situations. Interesting to note here, while the gender/familiarity group means presented in Table 4.4 show unfamiliar males using subjective stance *like* more when speaking to females (0.43) than to other males (0.32); this is not reflected on the probabilities as created by Models 14 and 15 (Figure 4.9). The regression presents a graph that appears closer



Figure 4.9: Model 14: The interaction between gender relation and familiarity in the female data for hesitation *like* and Model 15: The interaction between gender relation and familiarity in the male data for hesitation *like*

to the overall pattern for the rest of the data than the raw data does. This highlights the benefits of this kind of statistical analysis.

In sum, we can say that when a speaker is friends with the person they are talking to, they are more likely to use hesitation *like* if they are speaking to someone of the same gender. There is no evidence that such a pattern exists in the unfamiliar data.

4.4.4 Subjective stance *like*

Table 4.8: Model 16: Mixed Effects Logistic Regression for Subjective Stance *like*

	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	$Pr(>\|z\|)$
(Intercept)	-5.20708	0.37343	-13.944	<0.001*
Familiarity (unfamiliar)	1.39537	0.50939	2.739	0.00616*
Gender relation (same)	2.01785	0.46727	4.318	<0.001*
Speaker's rate of hesitation *like*	0.34855	0.20865	1.670	0.09482
Addressee's rate of subjective stance *like*	-0.57781	0.05936	-9.735	<0.001*
Interaction: F (unfamiliar) & GR (same)	-1.99440	0.63282	-3.152	0.00162*

Looking back to table 4.4, we again have a pattern similar to DM *like* for subjective stance *like*. Familiar participants tended to use *like* more when speaking to someone of the same gender (F-F 1.98 times per 100 words, F-M 0.55, M-M 1.71) but this pattern didn't exist in the unfamiliar data (F-F 1.68, F-M 1.30, M-M 0.98). These observations

were tested using Model 16 (Table 4.8). Model 16 contains an interaction between familiarity and gender relation, the speaker's rate of hesitation *like* and addressee's rate of subjective stance *like*. Table 4.8 shows that the interaction between familiarity and gender relation is significant. It also shows that partner's use of subjective stance *like* correlates negatively with speaker's subjective stance *like*. The speaker's rate of hesitation *like* correlates positively with their use of subjective stance *like*. The interaction between gender relation and familiarity is shown in Figure 4.10. This graph of the interaction between gender relation and familiarity is quite similar to the one for DM *like* (Figure 4.3) since subjective stance *like* is the most common category overall within DM *like*.



Figure 4.10: Model 16: The interaction between familiarity and gender relation on subjective stance *like*

Figure 4.10 appears to show that people use subjective stance *like* more to addressees that they are the same gender as across both the familiar and unfamiliar data. However, the difference is greatly reduced in the unfamiliar data. Again, splitting the data into familiarity subsets and examining the unfamiliar data can give us more of an idea of what is happening at the unfamiliar end of this graph.

To start with, to confirm the above observation that in the familiar data people use subjective stance more to people of the same gender, Model 17 was created. In Model 17, gender relation was tested on the familiar data, along with partner's rate of subjective stance *like*. Gender relation was significant (*Wald's* Z=4.885, p<0.001), as was the addressee's rate of subjective stance *like* (*Wald's* Z=-7.676, p<0.001). Gender relation was also tested for significance in the unfamiliar data and was not significant. Therefore, there is no evidence that people use subjective stance *like* more to addressees of the same gender when they do not know each other.

The unfamiliar data is examined further using Model 18. Model 18 contains an interaction between gender and gender relation, and the speaker's rate of hesitation *like.* The interaction between gender and gender relation approached significance (*Wald's* Z=-1.785, p=0.0743) and the speaker's rate of hesitation *like* was significant (*Wald's* Z=5.461, p<0.001). Looking at Figure 4.11, it appears that females in the unfamiliar data follow the same pattern as as in the familiar data; they use subjective stance *like* more when speaking to someone of the same gender. The males exhibit a different pattern, using subjective stance *like* more when speaking to females. This reflects the raw data in Table 4.4, where the mean rate for males talking to unfamiliar females (1.68) is higher than the mean rate of unfamiliar male-male dyads (0.98). An easier way to represent this pattern is to test partner's gender on the unfamiliar data. Model 19 contains as factors partner's gender and the speaker's rate of hesitation *like.* Partner's gender is significant (*Wald's* Z=-2.374, p=0.0176), which shows, when people don't know each other, they are more likely to use subjective stance *like* if talking to a woman, whether they are male or female. The speaker's rate of hesitation *like* was also significant (*Wald's* Z=5.180, p<0.001).



Figure 4.11: Model 18: The interaction between gender and gender relation on subjective stance *like* for unfamiliar participants

To further examine the differences between males and females, the data was divided into male and female subsets and the interaction between familiarity and gender relation was tested, along with partner's rate of subjective stance *like.* As we would expect given the observation above that in both the familiar and unfamiliar data females use subjective stance *like* more to other females, the interaction between familiarity and gender relation is not significant in the female data. Model 20 tests gender relation on its own with the speaker's rate of hesitation *like.* Gender relation is significant (*Wald's* Z=2.653,

p=0.00799), as is the speaker's rate of hesitation *like* (*Wald's* Z=4.172, p<0.001). Model 21 contains an interaction between familiarity and gender relation, and partner's subjective stance *like*. It was tested on the male data. The interaction between familiarity and gender relation was significant (*Wald's* Z=-2.661, p=0.00778), as was addressee's rate of subjective stance *like* (*Wald's* Z=-6.012, p<0.001). The interaction between familiarity and gender relation in the male data is shown in Figure 4.12.



Figure 4.12: Model 21: The interaction in the male data of familiarity and gender relation

To summarise, when people know each other they are more likely to use subjective stance *like* if they are speaking to someone of the same gender. If they don't know each other, they are more likely to use *like* if they are speaking to a woman. Females are unaffected by familiarity, since in both the familiar and unfamiliar data they are significantly more likely to use subjective stance *like* if they are speaking to another female. Males, on the other hand, are affected by familiarity. When they are friends with the person they are speaking to, they are more likely to use subjective stance *like* when talking to another male. If they do not know the person they are talking to, they are more likely to use subjective stance *like* if that person is female.

4.4.5 Discourse link *like*

Model 22 contains an interaction between gender and gender relation, partner's frequency of discourse link *like*, and the speaker's rate of quotative *like*. This model is shown in Table 4.9. There is a significant interaction between gender and gender relation on discourse link *like*, which is shown in Figure 4.13. Also, a speaker's use of discourse link *like* correlates negatively with their partner's use of discourse link *like*.

Table 4.9: Model 22: Mixed Effects Logistic Regression for Discourse Link *like*

	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	$Pr(>\|z\|)$
(Intercept)	-5.49579	0.27600	-19.912	<0.001*
Gender (male)	0.05454	0.19341	0.282	0.77796
Gender relation (same)	0.32151	0.31214	1.029	0.30331
Addressee's rate of discourse link *like*	-0.97654	0.22572	-4.326	<0.001*
Speaker's rate of quotative *like*	0.57323	0.17885	3.205	0.00135*
Interaction: G (male) & GR (same)	0.71955	0.35431	2.031	0.04227*



Figure 4.13: Model 22: The interaction between gender and gender relation on discourse link *like*

The speaker's rate of quotative *like* correlates positively with the rate of discourse link *like*.

As we observed for the other categories of *like*, people generally use discourse link *like* more when speaking to someone of the same gender. The graph of the interaction (Figure 4.13) shows that this effect appears much stronger for males than females.

The graph indicates that both males and females use discourse link *like* more speaking to someone of the same gender. To test whether there really is a difference between the two female data points, which look quite close together, gender relation was tested on just the female data. No significant effect was found. The effect of gender relation on males was confirmed in the same way, in a model with the speaker's rate of quotative *like* (Model 23: *Wald's* Z=2.812, p=0.00493). The speaker's rate of quotative *like* was also significant (*Wald's* Z=2.295, p=0.02171).

To see if there is a real difference between the probabilities for males and females in the

"same" data, Model 24 was used. Model 24 contains gender, along with the speaker's rate of quotative *like* and their partner's discourse link *like*. It was tested on the "same" gender relation data. Males were found to be significantly more likely to use discourse link *like* than females (*Wald's* Z=3.107, p=0.00189). Speaker's rate of quotative *like* was also significant (*Wald's* Z=2.314, p=0.02064), as was addressee's rate of discourse link *like* (*Wald's* Z=-4.103, p<0.001). As we would expect, there is no significant difference between males and females in the different data.

To summarise, males use discourse link *like* more when speaking to someone of the same gender, and within the "same" category, males use discourse link *like* more than females. We have no evidence to suggest women's use of discourse link *like* is affected by the gender of their addressee.

4.4.6 Cut-off like

Table 4.10: Model 25: Mixed Effects Logistic Regression for Cut-off *like*

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	$Pr(>\|z\|)$
(Intercept)	-7.9864	0.4209	-18.973	<0.001*
Familiarity (unfamiliar)	-0.4367	0.2348	-1.860	0.0629
Gender (male)	0.7306	0.3621	2.017	0.0436*
Addressee's gender (male)	1.0487	0.4072	2.575	0.0100*
Speaker's rate of subjective stance *like*	0.8716	0.1643	5.305	<0.001*
Interaction: G (male) & AG (male)	-1.2520	0.5489	-2.281	0.0225*

Model 25 contains an interaction between gender and addressee gender, along with familiarity and the speaker's rate of subjective stance *like*. Model 25 shows that the speaker's use of subjective stance *like* correlates positively with their use of cut-off *like*. It also shows that people are more likely to use cut-off *like* when speaking to someone they know. The interaction between gender and addressee gender is shown in Figure 4.14. Figure 4.14 shows that females use cut-off *like* more to males. It suggests also that males use cut-off *like* more to females. To see whether it is true that males use cut-off *like* more to females, addressee gender was tested on the male gender. It was not significant. Model 26 tests the effects of familiarity and the speaker's rate of subjective stance *like* on just the male data. The model shows that males are more likely to use cut-off *like* to people they know (*Wald's* Z=-2.819, p=0.004814). The speaker's rate of subjective stance *like* was also significant (*Wald's* Z=3.817, p=0.000135). Males, then, are affected by familiarity but not the gender of the person they are talking to.

Familiarity is not significant in the female data. Model 27 contains the factors of partner's gender and speaker's rate of subjective stance *like*. It shows that females are



Figure 4.14: Model 25: The interaction between gender and addressee gender for cut-off *like* (P_Gender is addressee gender)

more likely to use cut-off *like* to males (*Wald's* Z=*2*.469, p=0.013538). The speaker's rate of subjective stance *like* was also significant (*Wald's* Z=3.857, p=0.000115).

Males and females are influenced by different factors in their use of cut-off *like*. Men are more likely to use it to a friend, and women are more likely to use it to men.

4.5 Summary

This chapter has laid out the results of the mixed effects logistic regression analysis and shown how these results were obtained. What follows is a summary of the gender and familiarity results for each functional category of *like*.

Quotative *like* The results for quotative *like* showed a three-way interaction between gender, gender relation and familiarity. Dissecting this model further showed that when participants were friends, they were more likely to use quotative *like* if their addressee was of the same gender. When the participants were strangers, however, they were more likely to use quotative *like* when speaking to a woman. This means that women are unaffected by familiarity in their use of quotative *like*, but men are. Men are more likely to use quotative *like* to a male friend and to a female stranger.

Subjective stance *like* Subjective stance *like* was accounted for with an interaction between gender relation and familiarity. The subset models revealed, however, that, as

for quotative *like*, males and females are affected differently by familiarity and gender relation. The final result for subjective stance *like* is the same as that for quotative *like*. Females were more likely to use subjective stance *like* to other females whether they were friends or not. Males, on the other hand, were more likely to use subjective stance *like* to male friends and to female strangers.

Hesitation *like* Like quotative and subjective stance *like*, both males and females were more likely to use hesitation *like* to a friend of the same gender than to a friend of the other gender. Unlike quotative and subjective stance *like* however, there were no significant factors in the frequency of hesitation *like* for the unfamiliar participants.

Discourse link *like* Discourse link *like* exhibited a different pattern to quotative, subjective stance and hesitation *like*. The distribution of discourse link *like* was best explained with an interaction between gender and gender relation. The interaction showed that males were more likely to use discourse link *like* when speaking to another male.

Cut-off *like* Cut-off *like* was distributed differently again. Males were more likely to use it with friends of both genders, and females were more likely to use it with males regardless of familiarity.

DM *like* The distribution of DM *like* is the same as for subjective stance and quotative *like*. Together these two categories make up 62 percent of DM *like*. In the familiar data, people were more likely to use DM *like* to someone of the same gender. In the unfamiliar data, both males and females were more likely to use DM *like* to women.

In relation to the research questions set out in the literature review, the data shows that gender influences the use of *like* across all the categories. Familiarity had an effect on all of the functional categories, except for discourse link *like*.

In this chapter I have presented the best model for each category of *like* and explained how various factors interact to influence the frequency of *like*. I have also analysed subsets of the data to gain greater understanding of the interaction.

Chapter 5

Discussion

In this chapter I will answer the research questions as set out in Section 2.7.1. I will then theorise the results of this study using audience design (Bell, 1984, 2001), social identity theory (e.g. Meyerhoff, 1996) and theories of female and male communication (e.g. Coates, 2004; Holmes, 1990a). Finally, I will compare the results of this study with similar studies. These comparisons will relate to the frequency, the functional distribution, and the gender and familiarity distribution of DM *like*. I will also analyse differences in the results of these studies.

5.1 Answering the research questions

5.1.1 *(How) does gender affect the use of discourse marker* like*?*

As we saw in the results chapter, the patterns concerning gender are complex. The functional categories of *like* do not behave the same regarding gender. The only category of *like* to be affected by gender without an interaction was quotative *like*, where females were significantly more likely to use it than males. Additionally, females were more likely to use quotative *like* when speaking to another female. In the familiar data, males where more likely to use quotative *like* to another male, but in the unfamiliar data they were more likely to use it to a female.

Gender interacted with gender relation for discourse link *like*. In the discourse link data, males were more likely to use discourse link *like* when speaking to someone of the same gender. Males and females were more likely to use hesitation *like* and subjective stance *like* when talking to a friend of the same gender than to a friend of the other gender. In the unfamiliar data, both males and females were more likely to use subjective stance

like to female addressees. Addressee gender had no effect for unfamiliar participants, however, with regards to their rate of hesitation *like*. Males and females were affected by different factors with regards to their rate of cut-off *like*. Males were more likely to use cut-off *like* to a friend. Females were affected by the gender of their addressee. They were more likely to use cut-off *like* to males.

5.1.2 *(How) does familiarity affect the use of discourse marker* like*?*

Familiarity was only significant as a main effect for cut-off *like*; people were significantly more likely to use cut-off *like* with friends than with strangers. However, familiarity interacted with gender relation or partner's gender for quotative, hesitation, and subjective stance *like*. In the familiar data, people were more likely to use quotative, hesitation and subjective stance *like* when speaking to someone of the same gender. For subjective stance *like* and quotative *like*, partner's gender was significant in the unfamiliar data. People were more likely to use subjective stance and quotative *like* when speaking to someone female.

Females then, are not affected by familiarity for the quotative and subjective stance categories, since they are more likely to use *like* to other females across both the familiar and unfamiliar data. Males are affected by familiarity though, since they are more likely to use *like* to other males in the familiar data, and to females in the unfamiliar data. Familiarity also affects hesitation *like*, since everyone used hesitation *like* more to people of the same gender in the familiar data but there were no significant effects in the unfamiliar data. Familiarity does not appear to have any significant effect on the use of discourse link *like*.

5.2 Theoretical accounts for results

This section explores how the results of this study can be accounted for theoretically. In the DM *like* section I will discuss the patterns apparent in the data for subjective stance *like*, hesitation *like*, and quotative *like*, since these pattern similarly in the data and constitute the bulk of DM *like*. Quotative *like* will also be discussed in a separate section to account for its function. Discourse link *like* and cut-off *like* are also discussed separately.

5.2.0.1 A note about the analysis

The data in this study was analysed using mixed effects logistic regression. The results are presented in terms of correlations. Correlation does not necessarily imply causation. In the results chapter, correlation was discussed. However, accounting for data theoretically involves inferring causation. If there is a theory which can explain a correlation, it is discussed as a possible cause.

This presents a problem when accounting for the unfamiliar data, in particular. For quotative *like*, hesitation *like*, and subjective stance *like*, in the familiar data, males and females were more likely to use *like* when speaking to someone of the same gender. In the unfamiliar data, both males and females were more likely to use quotative *like* and subjective stance *like* when speaking to a woman. In order to account for males in the unfamiliar data then, it is necessary to consider at least two possibilities. The first is that males are using *like* less when speaking to other males, and the second is that males are using *like* more when speaking to females. However, we are unable to tell from the results of the regression what the baseline for male unfamiliar *like* is. So, the males could be diverging form this baseline when speaking to males, or to females, or to both. It is unclear therefore whether divergence needs to be accounted for in both directions or just one. In this section I will attempt to account for both. It should be kept in mind however, that it is impossible to tell which, if either, of the male groups in the unfamiliar data is diverging from the other.

5.2.1 DM *like*

For quotative, subjective stance and hesitation *like*, there was an interaction between gender relation and familiarity. In the familiar data, both males and females were significantly more likely to use *like* when speaking to someone of the same gender than to someone of the other gender. A different pattern for the males occurred in the unfamiliar data. For subjective stance and quotative *like*, both genders were more likely to use *like* when addressing females. For hesitation *like*, there were no significant factors in the unfamiliar data.

A starting point for understanding this result might look to Siegel's (2002) and Fuller's (2003) findings on *like*. Siegel (2002) asserts that *like* is characteristic of speakers who feel comfortable beginning an utterance without planning it first, and Fuller (2003) finds that *like* may be a marker of casual conversation style, and, importantly, that it can be used to create a casual conversation style. The assumption underlying this analysis is that people use these kinds of *like* when they are comfortable with the person they are speaking to. If people are most comfortable speaking with people of

the same gender, this might be why people are using *like* more to people of the same gender. So why are males more likely to use *like* to females in the unfamiliar data?

It seems safe to assume that people are most comfortable speaking to people they are friends with, rather than strangers. This could account for why men who are talking to men use *like* less in the unfamiliar category than in the familiar category. It doesn't explain why this isn't the case for women though. Below, theoretical accounts for why women and men are behaving differently in their use of DM *like* are explored.

5.2.1.1 Audience design

One way to account for the females' high same gender use of DM *like* in the unfamiliar data is with audience design. The basic claim of audience design is that speech is influenced by audience (Bell, 1984, 2001). A person's language thus reflects the context they are in. Additionally, people may change their language to create the context they want (Bell, 1984). The context here is the relationship between the two members of each dyad, familiar or unfamiliar. The higher frequency of *like* in the same gender familiar dyads might reflect the comfortable conversation they are experiencing.

The unfamiliar female-female dyads also were more likely to use *like*. It is possible that the female-female unfamiliar dyads are using *like* in order to create a casual, comfortable conversation and relationship with their interlocutors. This is Bell's initiative audience design. The females are behaving as they would with a friend, in order to create a friendly interaction with the person they are speaking to. The idea that people create social relationships with language relates also to how people perform or create gender through language. Viewing language as something people use has become pervasive in recent years. Rather than language passively reflecting sociolinguistic variables such as gender, people use language to construct social relationships and their identities (Sunderland, 2004).

So why aren't men also using *like* in unfamiliar male-male dyads as much as they do in the familiar dyads? Why aren't they using initiative audience design to create a good rapport with their addressee? A possible explanation is that they are unable to get over their discomfort enough to create a friendly, relaxed atmosphere. Men are less likely to do the interactional "shitwork" (Coates, 2004; Fishman, 1978, p. 405), because of their tendency to use a competitive, rather than cooperative, conversation style (Coates, 2004). Because of this, the conversation doesn't flow as easily and congenially as it could, and therefore *like*, a marker of a relaxed, comfortable conversation, doesn't occur as much. This difference in conversational style is explored further in Section 5.2.1.4 below.

It is worth noting that Fuller's study contained both female and male interviewees but only female interviewers. In an interview situation it would be expected that the interviewer makes any effort to shape the conversation. Therefore in that study there is only evidence that females use *like* to create a casual conversation style. It could be that males don't do this, and the data from the present study is reflecting this.

Thus, when men are using *like* frequently in the familiar male-male data, their language reflects the fact that they are participating in a friendly relaxed conversation. The same is true for the familiar female-female dyads. Again, the lack of *like* in the unfamiliar male-male dyads might reflect that the conversation is awkward or uncomfortable. The unfamiliar female-female dyads tell a different story. Here, the use of *like* creates, rather than reflects, reality. The unfamiliar female-female dyads are using *like*, amongst other things, to create a friendly relaxed conversational atmosphere.

To summarise, it has been argued so far that people use *like* more in same gender familiar dyads because they are more comfortable. There is some evidence that *like* is used more in conversation where the speakers are more comfortable (Fuller, 2003; Siegel, 2002). We would therefore expect *like* to be used less when the interlocutors don't know each other. This is true of the male-male unfamiliar dyads, but not the female-female ones. This can be explained by initiative audience design, where the females are using *like* to create a casual, comfortable conversation.

So far the higher likelihood of the female-female and familiar male-male dyads to use *like* has been accounted for, along with the unfamiliar male-male dyads. We might also ask why the mixed gender dyads, apart from the unfamiliar males, are less likely to use *like*. Also, why are unfamiliar males more likely to use *like* to females? The fact that the mixed gender familiar dyads and and the females in the unfamiliar mixed dyads use *like* less might be accounted for with the same assumption as was used to explain why the same gender familiar dyads are more likely to use *like*. The mixed gender familiar dyads would by this theory be using *like* because they are less comfortable. This assumption would also extend to the females in the mixed gender unfamiliar dyad.

It is more difficult to account for the high rate of *like* of the unfamiliar males in the mixed gender dyads. Initiative audience design can't really account for it the same way as it can for the unfamiliar female-female dyads, since the unfamiliar males in mixed gender dyads are using *like* more frequently than the males in the familiar mixed gender dyads (3.24 vs 1.37). We cannot therefore say that the males are using initiative audience design to create a speech situation that they would have with a female friend, since this rate is so much higher than what the male in the familiar mixed gender dyads used. Audience design can thus account for the rate of *like* for all dyads, apart from the males in the mixed gender dyads in the unfamiliar data.

5.2.1.2 Women are good to talk to

Holmes (1990a) surveys literature which suggests that the gender of a speaker's addressee affects their use of pragmatic devices. She reports that pragmatic devices are sometimes more frequent in same gender interaction, and sometimes used more to women. Holmes suggests that these seemingly conflicting results might be explained by examining the context in which they occur. She shows that pragmatic devices typical of casual conversation are more likely to occur between interlocutors of the same gender in casual conversations, but are more often addressed to women in more formal contexts (Holmes, 1990a). The data in this study could be taken as instances of more and less casual conversation, based on familiarity. And, as was shown in the results section, participants were found to use *like* more to interlocutors of the same gender in the familiar data for quotative, hesitation and subjective stance *like.* In the unfamiliar data on the other hand, people were more likely to use subjective stance and quotative *like* to females, regardless of their own gender. This resembles the data Holmes presents for other pragmatic devices.

Holmes (1990a) accounts for the gender relation formality pattern by equating pragmatic device use with how relaxed the speaker is. This is similar to what Siegel (2002) and Fuller (2003) find for *like*. In an interview situation for example, Holmes asserts that better interviewers, those who make their interviewees feel more at ease, will create a situation where the interviewee uses more pragmatic devices. The fact that more pragmatic devices are addressed to women than men in her study reflects women being good interviewers. Women are widely described as supportive and responsive listeners (e.g. Coates, 2004; Holmes, 1990a, 1993) and therefore, again, create a more relaxed context for their addressee (Holmes, 1993). Thus, the pattern in the unfamiliar data, where *like* is used more to female addressees, might be the result of people feeling more comfortable in such contexts.

5.2.1.3 Social identity theory and accommodation

Another theory that could account for the patterns we have seen for *like* is social identity theory as described in Hogg (2006). In a discussion of how gender needs to be dealt with in sociolinguistics, Meyerhoff (1996) introduces the idea that people have multiple identities. These different identities will be triggered in situations; they will become more salient. Meyerhoff summarises some findings of social identity theory for gender. She cites a study by Doise and Weinberger (1973) which shows that men are more likely to use more feminine speech when speaking to one other man, rather than to a group of men. Men were also likely to use more feminine speech if they were engaged in a cooperative rather than a competitive task.

Hogg (1985) reports an experiment in which the speech of same sex dyads was compared with the speech of mixed sex groups in order to test the levels of gender salience associated with each. He found that gender was less salient in the same sex dyads, which is in keeping with the Doise and Weinberger study, and more salient in the groups. Hogg reports that in mixed gender conversation, women accommodated to the speech of men, and men's masculinity became more salient.

First let's look at the results for the familiar data. There is some evidence in the literature that *like* is used more by females than males (see Section 2.4). In this study, however, there was no evidence that females use DM *like* more than males. The identity observations above may help to explain why men used *like* as much as females, and why people tended to use *like* more with people of the same gender. For starters, the participants are always speaking in dyads, which would reduce the salience of masculine identity for the males. For the familiar participants it is conceivable that the task of chatting for 20 minutes is cooperative rather than competitive, which would further reduce the salience of their masculine identities. Hogg's (1985) study could account for the dip in *like* use for the different gender familiar dyads, if we take *like* as characteristic of female speech, and therefore a lower rate of *like* as characteristic of male speech. People would be using *like* less in the mixed gender dyads because masculine identity becomes more salient in mixed gender groups.

It may be the case that gender is more salient in the unfamiliar data. Hogg (2006) explains that people categorise each other in terms of prototypes. Prototyping means prescribing behaviour (Hogg, 2006). People might find more of a need to categorise their addressee when they do not know them. The males in the mixed gender unfamiliar group used *like* more to females they did not know than to males they did not know. The opposite occurred in the familiar data. It might be that upon meeting their unknown female addressee, males categorise them as frequent *like* users (and Dailey-O'Cain [2000] shows that people do associate *like* with females), and then accommodate to their perception of female speech. The same could be happening in the unfamiliar male-male dyads; males associate other male speech with less *like*, and therefore use *like* less with a man they do not know. On the other hand, it may be that for the unfamiliar males their masculinity is more salient. When faced with a male they do not know, male identity salience would rise, resulting in less use of *like*.

Social identity theory can account for the tendency in the familiar data for people to use *like* more when speaking to someone of the same gender than the other gender. If *like* is characteristic of female speech, then it makes sense that it would be used more in the same gender dyads, where masculine identity is less salient. In the unfamiliar data however, we need to account for the fact that both males and females use quotative and subjective stance *like* more to females. We can't account for this using Hogg's

(1985) observations, since males are using *like* more, or experiencing greater feminine gender salience, when speaking to women. This is the reverse of Hogg's prediction. Here, people may be categorising their addressee and then accommodating to that prototype. This would account for people using *like* more to females, but it then misses the gender salience crucial to social identity theory, since in the familiar data the use of *like* is being attributed to the speaker's identity, and in the unfamiliar data it is being attributed to their prototyping of their addressee.

Both the familiar and unfamiliar data have been accounted for, but the explanation is not unified. Social identity theory does a good job of accounting for the familiar data for hesitation, subjective stance and quotative *like*, but accommodation theory (Giles et al., 1991) is required to account for the unfamiliar data for quotative and subjective stance *like*.

5.2.1.4 *Like* and topic

The accounts so far have accounted for *like* as a kind of routinised marker of informality or comfort without really considering its specific function. In other words, the analyses have focused on the effect of *like* on a conversation or interaction as a whole, rather than its specific function at a specific time. This section looks more closely at the effect of subjective stance *like*. As explained in Section 3.4.2.4, subjective stance *like* can either function as a hedge or as an intensifier. The explanation in this section focuses on the hedge meaning of subjective stance *like*.

Coates (2004) asserts that females use *like* more than men because of the different conversational styles of men and women. While they both seek solidarity with their interlocutor, men tend to use language competitively and women cooperatively (Coates, 2004). What does this predict for the use of subjective stance *like*? One aspect of this cooperative style, according to Coates, is self-disclosure. Coates explains that women use *like* to distance themselves from self-disclosure, while men self-disclose less, and therefore use *like* less.

The idea that subjective stance *like* occurs with instances of self-disclosure and otherwise more personal talk may help to explain the gender relation pattern. It is well documented that women self-disclose frequently in all female conversation (e.g. Coates, 1996). Less research with regard to topic has been carried out on mixed gender conversation however. If women are less likely to self-disclose in mixed gender conversation though, and this seems likely, it would make sense that they would use *like* less in mixed gender interaction. The theory predicts that men would use *like* less overall, since they self-disclose less. This was true of the men in mixed gender interactions in the present study.

But how can the high rate of the familiar male-male group be accounted for? The answer may lie in social identity theory again. It is possible that since the males' masculinity is less salient in male-male dyads, the typically masculine style may not apply as much, leading to discussion of more personal topics and self-disclosure. This contrasts with the male-male unfamiliar dyads, where males might want to express their masculinity more. Since a cooperative style of conversation is not the default for males, it makes sense that they would revert to the more competitive style, which doesn't involve as much self-disclosure, when faced with a male they don't know.

In the unfamiliar data overall, both males and females used *like* more to females than males. Males might be more likely to self-disclose here thanks to the skill of their female interlocutors in making them feel comfortable (Section 5.2.1.2).

5.2.1.5 Summary

The general pattern accounted for in this section is that when people know each other, they tend to use hesitation, subjective stance and quotative *like* more if the person they are speaking to is of the same gender. The explanations for this pattern relied on the assumption that people are more comfortable speaking to someone of the same gender. In the case of social identity theory, this meant gender salience was reduced. The fact that women and men are documented to prefer different conversational styles would suggest that women and men might be more comfortable when their preferred interactional style is most used. This would be more likely to occur in same gender conversation.

In the unfamiliar data, people were more likely to use quotative and subjective stance *like* to females. For women, this meant no change in the frequency of *like*, as compared with the familiar data. This can be explained by saying either that women are unaffected by their relationship with their addressee, or that they use *like* to create a comfortable and pleasant interaction with their addressee through initiative audience design.

The males, on the other hand, went from being more likely to use *like* to other males in the familiar data, to using it more frequently to females in the unfamiliar. Again, the speaker's comfort was asserted to result in the more frequent use of *like*. The mixed gender conversations were thought to be more comfortable for males in the unfamiliar data because of women's greater skill at putting their addressee at ease. Another explanation is that they were accommodating to their perception of female language. These explanations can also be used to explain the low rate of *like* in the unfamiliar male-male dyads. These may have been less comfortable, or the males could have been accommodating to their perception that males don't use *like* as much as females.

5.2.2 Quotative *like*

Although quotative *like* was accounted for to some extent in the section on DM *like*, it will be discussed here separately in relation to its function in that data. Because quotative *like* has a different function to hesitation and subjective stance *like*, it makes sense to examine it on its own.

A limitation of the present study is that quotative *like* is not compared quantitatively with other quotatives. Because of this, we cannot tell if the rate of *like* reflects people choosing *like* over other quotatives or the rate at which people are quoting. Nevertheless, the data does show that females use quotative *like* more frequently than males. Like the subjective stance data, quotative *like* was used more in same gender conversations in the familiar data. In the unfamiliar data, both genders were more likely to use quotative *like* to females.

To explain why women would use quotative *like* more than men, it is useful to look at some general observations about how males and females tend to communicate. While it has been established that both men and women gossip, women's talk relates more to personal experience, while men are more likely to talk about more public things (Coates, 2004). Talk about personal experience could perhaps result in the more frequent use of quotatives. There is evidence that women quote more than men (Ferrara & B. Bell, 1995; Terraschke, 2010). This would account for the fact that women use quotative *like* more in general. What about the fact that women use quotative *like* more to women? Talk about personal experience might be more present in all female conversation, meaning that quotative *like* would occur more. Females use quotative *like* more to other females in both the familiar and unfamiliar data. Is it reasonable to say that this style of conversation, talk about personal experience, is present both between friends and strangers? Two answers are possible. The first is of course that yes, even when females do not know each other, they use a feminine conversational style. The second is that females adopt features typical of this style, such as self-disclosure, in order to create a friendly rapport with their addressee. In each case, the action and outcome are the same. The male data tells a different story.

Men were more likely to use quotative *like* to other men in the familiar data, but to women in the unfamiliar data. This could reflect two things. The first is that the males are quoting more, and the second is that they are choosing quotative *like* over another quotative form. First let's look at the assumption that men are quoting more to males in the familiar data. Since the men are engaged in a cooperative task and have been instructed to talk to each other, it is possible that their masculine identity is less salient. Again, the fact that they are in a pair and there are no women present could reduce the salience of their masculine identities. This could mean that they are

self-disclosing more and therefore quoting more. The other explanation, where men are choosing quotative *like* over another quotative, might again be accounted for by drawing on the findings of social identity theory, if *like* is perceived to be a feminine form. Both these explanations also lend themselves to accounting for the lower rate of quotative *like* in the mixed gender dyads by both men and women. The increased salience of masculinity might result in less quoting altogether, or the disfavouring of quotative *like* to introduce quotations.

The use of *like* by females in the unfamiliar data is the same as in the familiar data, and thus can be explained in the same way. Social identity theory cannot entirely account for the unfamiliar males, however. In the unfamiliar data, the low rate in the male-male category could be attributed to masculinity becoming more salient. Men would be unwilling to talk about personal matters when talking to another man who they don't know. The fact that men were more likely to use quotative *like* when speaking to women cannot be explained by social identity theory. Masculinity should be at its most salient. This would either result in less quoting or less frequently choosing *like* over another quotative. The high rate of the males in the unfamiliar female-male dyads might be accounted for as a form of accommodation, however. As discussed in Section 5.2.1.3, the males might be accommodating to the high rate of quotative *like* that they have prescribed their prototypical female.

These explanations for the gender distribution of quotative *like* are not very unified. The explanations for female frequency of quotative *like* are based on the idea that because of how females talk, they are more likely to quote, and therefore use quotative *like*. The explanations for the use of quotative *like* by the males speaking to females in the unfamiliar data, on the other hand, are based on quotative *like* functioning as a marker of femininity. The females then, are using *like* because of its use in terms of content or textual function, while the males are using it for interactional reasons. As well as not being unified, this explanation paints males are more involved in interpersonal meaning than females. This is the opposite of what the literature on pragmatic devices shows (e.g. Coates, 2004; Holmes, 1993).

Overall then, the idea that *like* is used more when it is needed more, in more cooperative or feminine discourse, explains the fact that women use quotative *like* more than men and are more likely to use it when speaking to other women. It also explains why familiar males might use it more than unfamiliar males. The low rate in the familiar mixed gender dyads might also be accounted for if we use the findings of social identity theory to predict that masculinity might be more salient in this context, and therefore both genders would be less likely to talk about personal experiences and would need to quote less. The males in the male-female unfamiliar dyads present a problem for this content-based analysis. However, because of the nature of the statistical tests used,

we can't actually tell what the baseline for the unfamiliar males is. Basically, the rate for the males in this category might represent the baseline, with the male-male dyads moving away from this baseline.

The content-based explanation – that dyads which are more likely to discuss personal experiences use quotative *like* more because of its function – overall seems best. Of course, the best way to truly resolve this issue would be a variationist or variable rule study of quotatives (see, for example, Barbieri, 2007; Buchstaller, 2006; D'Arcy, 2004), which was beyond the scope of this study.

5.2.3 Discourse link *like*

For discourse link *like* the interaction between gender and gender relation was significant. Males were significantly more likely to use discourse link *like* when speaking to another male. Females were not affected by gender relation with regards to their use of discourse link *like*.

Again, looking at male and female interaction patterns tells us why this may be. Males are known to interact competitively, while females are more cooperative. It could be argued that discourse link *like* is a helpful tool in this kind of interaction.

One aspect of the male interactional style is the monologue (Coates, 2004). Men are more likely than women to 'play the expert', which involves one speaker holding the floor and talking about something that they are 'an expert' in. Discourse link *like* is used to link arguments and to elaborate. It might therefore be a useful tool in allowing men to keep the floor. This would explain why it shows up most in the speech of the male-male dyads.

This contrasts with the more typically female collaborative style. In this style of talk, people co-create or build on the utterances of others. It may then be that females do not need discourse link *like* as much, since they typically don't hold the floor individually and don't need to hold it.

This theory conflicts with the social identity theory account used for quotative, hesitation and subjective stance *like*. How can we explain why males talking to females are about as likely to use discourse link *like* as females are overall? According to social identity theory, males should be behaving more typically masculine in the mixed gender interactions, as should the females. Perhaps this theory doesn't apply on higher levels such as how discourse is structured, and topics.

Research on the structure of discourse between men and women often shows that men tend to dominate women in mixed gender interactions by hogging the floor (Coates,

2004). Discourse link *like* again seems like it would be useful in this. Did the males dominate the females in mixed gender interaction? Taking the number of words a person produced as an admittedly crude measure of this, in the eight mixed gender conversations, men produced more words in five of the dyads, and women in three. In three of the four unfamiliar dyads, the males produced more words, while in the familiar dyads the split is even with half having females speak more and half males speaking more. This doesn't really seem to indicate any domination by men.

To summarise, the data for discourse link *like* show that it is more likely to be used between males than in mixed gender, or female-female conversation. The fact that *like* is most frequent in male-male dyads reflects the competitive nature of male conversation. Discourse link *like* is useful in this kind of interaction as it allows the speaker to elaborate and keep the floor. In this way, the use of discourse link *like* is interactional rather than textual. Men use it more than women in same gender conversation because it suits their purpose, rather than to convey any interpersonal meaning. This contrasts with subjective stance *like*, for example, which allows the speaker to distance themself from their utterance. While discourse link could also be a useful tool for males to dominate females in conversation, it seems that it is not being used for this purpose in the present study.

5.2.4 Cut-off *like*

The results for cut-off *like* showed that males were more likely to use it to friends, and females are more likely to use it to males. This category contains tokens of *like* where speakers were cut-off by their addressee as well as when the speaker cuts themself off. These two subcategories of cut-off *like* have quite different implications. One person cutting off another suggests either competition for the floor, or that one speaker is dominating the other speaker in the conversation. A speaker cutting themself off, on the other hand, might mean that they have started an utterance without planning it fully, and therefore need to stop and rethink the direction of that utterance. It is also possible that cut-off *like* functions as a turn-yielding signal (see Erman, 1992).

Women used cut-off *like* more when speaking to men. If cut-off *like* contained only instances of people being cut-off by others, it might indicate that women were being dominated in the conversation by men. There is evidence that in mixed gender conversation, men tend to interrupt more often than women (Coates, 2004). The fact that women used cut-off *like* more when speaking with men might reflect them being interrupted more often than they would be when speaking to another female. However, this would only explain women being cut-off, rather than cutting themselves off.

Males were more likely to use cut-off *like* to friends. To begin with, let's focus on the speaker cutting themself off. This might suggest that cut-off *like* is occurring because people are comfortable with each other, and therefore are starting to speak without planning their utterance. For the other form of cut-off *like*, that people cut each other off, this may be the result of the fact that people feel they can be less polite with friends (Holmes, 2008). People might therefore feel more comfortable cutting a friend off, resulting in cut-off *like* being more frequent among friends.

To fully account for cut-off *like*, all tokens in this category would need to be coded for whether the speaker was cutting themself off or being cut-off by their addressee. This category was created during coding because of its high frequency and thus such analysis was beyond the scope of this study.

5.2.5 A note on the familiar dyads

An interesting pattern appeared in the familiar data, where participants who brought a friend along tended to use *like* more than their friend. Seven of the eleven familiar dyads were created by asking a person interested in the study if they had a friend that they could bring along (originally there were twelve dyads but one was removed as an outlier). As such, the original participant was probably more interested in participating in the study than their friend. They might also have felt more comfortable. In many cases the first participant knew me either socially or because I had come to speak to their class, and was thus endorsed by their lecturer. Also, the original participant might have felt more responsible for the conversation, in terms of making their friend feel comfortable and keeping the conversation going. Both the original participant's comfort, and their feeling of responsibility could have resulted in their greater frequency of *like*. In all cases where one participant was brought along by a friend, rather than having applied for the study together, the original participant produced more words than their friend. This might suggest that these participants took more responsibility for the conversation. Of the seven dyads that this situation affects, in six the original participant used *like* more than their friend.

This might be considered a limitation of this study, since there is another factor other than familiarity here which is influencing the familiar data. However, the dyads in question are well spread in terms of gender. Two of the dyads are female-female and two are male-male. Three are female-male. Of the mixed gender dyads two contain females who brought males and one contains a male who brought along a female friend. The original participant used *like* more in all cases except one of the female-female dyads.

In any case, this trend is interesting theoretically. The case may be that the original participants were more comfortable with the situation and therefore used *like* more frequently. On the other hand, it was noted in Section 5.2.1 that the female-female unfamiliar dyads may have been using *like* to create a comfortable relaxed conversation with their addressee. It appears that the same thing may be happening in the familiar data. People who have brought their friend to a potentially threatening situation are using *like* to make their addressee feel more relaxed. This trend has not been fully explored in terms of the different *like* categories because of time constraints, but certainly reinforces the effect of context on the frequency of *like*.

5.2.6 Summary

5.2.6.1 Summary of findings

In this chapter, I have answered the research questions. Hesitation *like* is affected by familiarity in that familiar speakers use it more to addressees of the same gender, while there are no significant effects in the unfamiliar data. For quotative and subjective stance *like* males are affected by their familiarity with their addressee while females are not. Females are always more likely to use *like* to other females, while males are more likely to address *like* to a male friend or a female stranger. This is in keeping with previous studies (Erman, 1992; Holmes, 1990a). A number of theoretical perspectives could account for this. Most of these are based on the idea that females and males are different in how they communicate. Nonetheless, the data in combination with findings of social identity theory and audience design suggests that these patterns of communication are not static.

I have demonstrated with social identity theory that males and females communicate in more typically masculine or feminine ways depending on context. In the familiar data, male identity appears, based on previous research and the findings of this study, to be less salient in male-male familiar dyads, where *like* is frequent. Likewise, it was more salient in mixed gender dyads, where *like* was less frequent. Relating to the unfamiliar data, I have used audience design to show that people may use language to create a more comfortable, friendly context, as was the case for the female-female unfamiliar dyads. I have demonstrated that females are more likely to make their interlocutor feel comfortable, as was evidenced in the unfamiliar data, where males were more likely to use *like* when addressing females.

Discourse link *like* was more frequent in male-male unfamiliar dyads because of its function as a way to hold the floor. I have shown that this function is most useful in the male-male unfamiliar dyads, where masculinity may have high salience, meaning

that a more competitive conversational style is used. I have examined the data for cut-off *like* and determined that the data would need to be re-coded to be meaningfully accounted for.

The most important finding in the section is that although they have differing communicative norms or tendencies, the communicative behaviour of men and women is not static. It changes according to context. This section has demonstrated that the frequency of *like* for both men and women may change with a change in addressee gender, or the speaker's relationship with their addressee. This study shows how important context is when studying the language of men and women.

5.2.6.2 Accommodation

Accommodation (Giles et al., 1991) has been used to account for the use of quotative, hesitation and subjective stance *like*. It has been argued that in the unfamiliar data, males may be accommodating to their perception of females as frequent *like* users. Firstly let's look back to Section 5.2.0.1. In this section it was pointed out that the rate of the unfamiliar males in mixed gender dyads may not need explaining, it may represent the baseline.

That aside, if we do want to explain the behaviour of these males, the accommodation explanation is somewhat problematic. If males associate *like* with female speech, and therefore use it to females they don't know to appeal to them, why aren't they also doing this with discourse link *like*? There are two possibilities here. The first is that subjective stance, hesitation and quotative *like* are associated with female speech, but discourse link *like* is not. The second is that accommodation does not account for the use of *like* by the unfamiliar males speaking to females. Both explanations have some merit. Because it has a more recognised function, quotative *like* appears to have more salience than the other functions of *like*. Likewise the "*like* as a symptom of unclear thought" attitude toward *like* is pervasive (Levey, 2003). These kinds of *like* might thus be more recognised. The fact that these kinds of *like* are more recognised might result in them being more easily associated with a particular group, in this case young women.

The second explanation was that accommodation does not explain the use of *like* by males to unfamiliar females. This could also be true. For subjective stance *like* and hesitation *like*, social identity theory and women's communicative skill were also presented as viable alternate explanations. There was not really any alternative explanation for quotative *like*. The problems with social identity theory and accommodation in accounting for quotative *like* were pointed out in section 5.2.2. The main problem is that we have no way of knowing whether the use of *like* reflects the speaker choosing it over

another quotative or choosing to quote. Thus we cannot say which the males would be accommodating to. No satisfying explanation for the distribution of quotative *like* can get around this. A study of other quotatives would be needed.

If we put quotative *like* aside, the interactional-textual distinction may help to account for why people would accommodate to hesitation *like* and subjective stance *like* and not to discourse link *like*. If hesitation and subjective stance *like* are interactional, it would make sense that accommodation, which is about people rather than text, would account for these functions, but not for discourse link *like*, which is textual. This distinction is explored further in Section 5.2.6.3 below.

5.2.6.3 A unified theory?

The above summary (Section 5.2.6.1) presents the best way that the gender and familiarity distribution of each *like* category was accounted for in the discussion so far. But is there any way to unify these explanations? The textual–interactional distinction is useful here (see Section 2.1.7). Erman (1992) lists three subcategories for the textual function of pragmatic devices: decoding of information, orientation in discourse and regulation of turns. There are also three subcategories of the interactional function: hesitation marker, repair marker and marker of appeal. These functions are on a continuum, with the decoding information function being the most textual, and the marker of appeal the least textual, or most interactional. The rest appear along the continuum in the order they have been listed here.

So how do these general functions of pragmatic devices fit with the functional categories of *like* being used in this study? Let's start with discourse link *like*. Discourse link *like* appears to fits under Erman's decoding of information and orientation in the discourse functions. It fits under the decoding of information function because it serves to introduce elaborations or clarifications. It can also fall under the orientation in the discourse function, as it aids in organising the structural components of an utterance by introducing examples. As discussed in Section 2.3, quotative *like* is border-line in terms of being classified as a pragmatic device, because it has some propositional meaning. Because of this, its function is more textual than interactional.

Hesitation *like* is interactional rather than textual. It fits under Erman's hesitation marker and repair marker categories. Cut-off *like* cannot really be classified as textual or interactional, because of the composite nature of the category. It could perhaps be used in the regulation of turns and therefore be textual. Further research would be needed to determine this.

Subjective stance *like* is more difficult to classify as textual or interactional. Because

of the broad nature of this category, it seems to function in both ways. Erman outlines four other dichotomies which seem also to correlate with the textual–interactional distinction. These are decoding–encoding, certainty–uncertainty, addressee-oriented–speaker-oriented, and politeness–face saving. Decoding, certainty, addressee-oriented and politeness thus all relate to the textual function, while encoding, uncertainty, speaker-oriented and face saving all relate to interactional functions.

Looking at each of these dichotomies individually may help to classify subjective stance *like*. Beginning with the certainty-uncertainty dichotomy, subjective stance *like* can express either of these. In its hedging function, it expresses uncertainty. Its intensifying function expresses certainty to some extent, but could also be considered neutral. The decoding–encoding dichotomy relates to how an idea is phrased. At the decoding end the speaker is more certain of the idea's linguistic form, while at the encoding end, they are unsure of its linguistic form. The lexical imprecision meaning of *like* thus fits at the encoding end. The approximation reading of *like* though, might fit better at the decoding end, since the speaker is not necessarily uncertain. The addressee-oriented–speaker-oriented dichotomy is harder to relate to any particular function of subjective stance *like*. Likewise, though subjective stance *like* can express politeness and face-saving, it can be difficult to tell which is occurring at any one time. Using lexical imprecision *like* may save a speaker's face as it warns the addressee that their phrasing is not ideal. However, it might also appeal to a speaker's positive face by implying that the addressee knows what the speaker means. Vagueness, in this way, may indicate politeness.

Subjective stance *like* thus appears to function both textually and interactionally. However, looseness appears also to be its most basic meaning. Although coding the distinction proved unreliable (see Section 6.2), the hedge function of subjective stance *like* was more frequent than the intensifier meaning. Examining the four dichotomies suggested that hedge *like* may be more interactional than textual. Subjective stance *like* might then be classified here as interactional.

The point of the discussion about the distinction between the interactional and textual functions of *like* has been to show which functional categories are more similar. Discourse link *like* and quotative *like* have been argued to function textually, while hesitation *like* and subjective stance *like* have been argued to function interactionally. If subjective stance and hesitation *like* operate on an interactional level, while quotative and discourse link *like* operate on a textual level, this distinction may explain why these functions are distributed differently in the data.

As discussed above, quotative *like* and discourse link *like* are used for their discourse functions. They are used to structure discourse. Females find quotative *like* useful in

describing personal experiences, so they use it more than males who have less use for this function. Male-male dyads use discourse link *like* because it is useful to them in their competitive, monologue style of interaction.

Subjective stance *like* and hesitation *like*, however, function interactionally. Hesitation *like* shows that a speaker is having trouble forming their utterance. In this way, it functions interactionally; it informs the listener of this problem. It doesn't relate to the content or structure of the utterance. Subjective stance *like*, while it may also operate textually, appears to be primarily interactional. Because they operate on an interactional level, subjective stance and hesitation *like* can be better explained than quotative and discourse link *like* by theories which relate to identity, politeness and personal relationships. Social identity theory worked well to account for subjective stance and hesitation *like*, but as we saw in Section 5.2.3, its predictions were not true for discourse link *like*. Likewise, accommodation was not entirely satisfying in accounting for the males in the unfamiliar mixed gender dyads for quotative *like* (Section 5.2.2) because of the content based explanation that accounted for the rest of the data. Because cut-off *like* probably includes tokens of each of the categories of *like*, the content-interactional distinction can't really be made.

Overall then, the interactional-textual distinction provides the best means for unifying the accounts found throughout this chapter for the functional categories of *like*. Interactional explanations best account for the *like* categories which show the speaker's relation to their speech. These two categories are subjective stance *like* and hesitation *like*. Discourse link *like* and quotative *like* are used textually. They are content-based. They are therefore best accounted for by examining the type of content that male and females typically produce.

5.3 How does the data compare to similar studies?

5.3.1 The rate of *like*

Table 5.1: Data Compared with Similar Studies (modified from Terraschke 2008)

	Andersen (2001)	Müller (2005)	Terraschke (2008)	Present study
Words	approx. 500,000	53,028	58,869	84,874
Total *like*	0.7%	ca. 1.76% (excl. verb *like*)	2.2%	3.45%
DM *like*	0.27% (38.6%)	ca. 1.47% (83.5%)	1.78% (80.9%)	3.07% (89.0%)

The total *like* row shows what percentage tokens of *like* make up in each corpus. The DM *like* row shows what percentage tokens of DM *like* make up in each corpus. In brackets is the percent DM *like* makes up of total *like*.

In this Section the frequency of discourse marker *like* and ratio of discourse marker *like* to non-discourse marker *like* will be compared to Andersen (2001), Müller (2005)

and Terraschke (2008). These studies were selected because they are similar to the present one in that they examine the functional categories of DM *like* and analyse these quantitatively. Terraschke (2008) will be examined in more detail since the categories of *like* in her study were replicated in this study.

Table 5.1 shows the percent that *like* makes up of the total data and the proportion of *like*s which were coded as discourse marker *like*, for the present study, Andersen (2001), Müller (2005) and Terraschke (2008). The calculated proportion of *like* is equivalent to the normalised rate per 100 words that was used in the results chapter. *Like* make up a much greater portion of the data in this study than in any of the other studies presented here.

Terraschke discusses why *like* is more frequent in her data than in Andersen (2001) and Müller (2005). She looks particularly at the ratio between total and DM *like*. She points out that Andersen only codes 38.7% of the total number of the *like*s that occurred as DM *like*, as to exclude tokens that might not fit into this category. Andersen (1997) suggests that the real ratio may be around 50%. The rate of DM *like* in Andersen (2001) is thus probably a lot higher than 0.27%. Even if 100% of the *like* tokens in Andersen were DM *like* though, the 0.7% rate would still be much lower than in the other studies. Terraschke (2008) suggests that the low frequency of *like* in Andersen compared with her data and that of Müller might be the result of *like* increasing in frequency over time, or the fact that each of these studies is based on data from a different location, with Andersen's data coming from England, Müller's from the US, and her own from New Zealand. She also suggests that Andersen's data might contain less tokens of *like* because his data is based on people who know each other. The present study does not support this analysis, since familiarity was found to have no significant main effect on the frequency of *like*. On the other hand, if the speakers were in relationships or were family members rather than friends, this could be the case. There is data to suggest that discourse markers are used less between intimates (Östman, 1981).

At 83.5%, 80.9% and 89%, the other three studies include similar proportions of *like* as DM *like*. So why is *like* so much more frequent in the present study? There is no simple explanation. One possible reason is that the present study includes cut-off *like*, where Terraschke does not. Cut-off *like* makes up only 0.2% of the data, however, which isn't high enough to explain the difference. The difference between the rate of DM *like* in Terraschke (1.78 times per 100 words) and the present study (3.07) seems too large to put down to language change, since both studies were done in New Zealand only four or five years apart, though it is possible. The data was collected in much the same way, which rules out methodological differences. The only real difference in the data collection of Terraschke is that her data is all from unfamiliar participants. The

fact that the overall familiar and unfamiliar means were so similar (see Figure 4.1), however, argues against this as an explanation.

5.3.2 Functional comparison

Table 5.2: Functional Distribution of DM *like* Compared with Terraschke (2008)

	(Terraschke, 2008) rate	%	Present study rate	%
Quotative	0.31	17.0	0.4805	16.3
Hesitation	0.16	9.1	0.3664	12.8
Subjective stance	0.65	36.3	1.3526	45.7
Discourse link	0.67	37.6	0.5494	18.6
Cut-off	0.03 (calculated)	NA	0.1986	6.6
DM	1.78	100	3.0728	100

The data from Terraschke (2008) warrants comparison with the present study because the same categorisation system was used. Table 5.2 shows that all categories of *like*, apart from discourse link, were used at higher rates in the present study. The rate of cut-off *like* for Terraschke was calculated from the number of times she reports it occurred. It is not presented as a percentage of DM *like* because Terraschke doesn't include it as such. The difference in frequency of cut-off *like* can in part be explained by the fact that the Terraschke data is all unfamiliar, and in this study familiar dyads were found to use it significantly more than unfamiliar dyads. In the unfamiliar data cut-off *like* occurred at a rate of 0.17 times per 100 words however, which is still higher. Also Terraschke appears only to have counted tokens of cut-off *like* where the speaker was cut-off, rather than cut themself off and then continued with a new thought. Quotative and hesitation *like* make up a comparable amount of the corpus to Terraschke (2008).

5.3.2.1 Discrepancies and explanations

Subjective stance *like* makes up a greater part of the current data, while discourse link *like* makes up a smaller part. Two explanations for these differences are possible. The first is that I have coded the data differently to Terraschke. The second is that the participants in my study are behaving differently. Both explanations are plausible. Reproducing another person's coding is difficult. Additionally, it was decided to diverge from Terraschke (2008) in terms of the coding of exemplification. As explained in the Methodology (Section 3.4.2.6), exemplification was divided between subjective stance *like* and discourse link *like* in this study, according to whether it occurred clause initially (discourse link *like*) or clause medially (subjective stance *like*). Also, Terraschke does not describe how *like* was treated when it appeared with a conjunction. As outlined

in Section 3.4.2.5, in this if *like* appeared before a conjunction it could be coded as discourse link *like*, but if it appeared after, it couldn't. This might also have lowered the discourse link *like* rate in this study, if Terraschke coded *like* as a discourse link in both contexts.

However, based on Terraschke's description, a second rater was trained and an 80% agreement rate was reached. Also, the discourse link *like* rates are not that dissimilar, and even if subjective stance *like* and discourse link *like* were conflated, the fact remains that combined, the two categories contain 0.6 tokens per 100 words more than in Terraschke's study. Participants in this study are using subjective stance *like* more frequently than in Terraschke (2008), even if some of these tokens could have been classified as discourse link *like*.

Terraschke (2008) compares the functional distribution of *like* in her corpus with that of Müller (2005). Interestingly, she finds that the categories which are the equivalent of discourse link *like* in Müller (2005) is much less frequent in Müller, at 21%, at the very most. This is close to the portion discourse link *like* makes in the present study. Other studies, while they don't examine *like* in terms of its functional distribution, provide data on where *like* occurs in sentences. Since discourse link *like* typically occurs clause initially, these figures are worth looking at. Tagliamonte (2005) finds that *like* occurs clause initially 23% of the time, and Levey (2006) reports that for speakers aged 10-11 it occurs clause initially 26% of the time. The discourse link function of Andersen (2001) as extracted from his hesitation/discourse link category appears to make up about 25% of the total DM *like* figure. Andersen's exemplification category makes up about about 19% of his data. Thus, some of Andersen's exemplification category also would need to be added to his discourse link figure. If we assume that half of Andersen's exemplification is equivalent to discourse link *like* in this study, the total for his study is around 35%. It needs to be kept in mind though that Andersen only includes around half of all the DM *like* tokens that occurred, to make certain that all tokens were definitely discourse markers. If one functional category were more salient then, it may have ended up over represented in Andersen's sample. Overall, these studies appear to have discourse link *like* occurring as a proportion of the total DM *like* somewhere between Terraschke (2008) at 37.6% and the present study at 18.6%.

How much importance we should put on the ratios also needs to be considered. While useful to compare data for coding discrepancies, there is nothing to prevent a certain category becoming more frequent over time. It might indicate a form is undergoing grammaticalisation (see, for example, Buchstaller, 2001b; Meehan, 1991).

5.3.3 Comparison of results

This section so far has focused on comparing the data from this study to the data from other studies. The results in terms of gender and familiarity are now examined.

As discussed in the literature review (Section 2.4), there is limited research on the effect of familiarity on the use of *like*. Jucker and Smith (1998) found that *like* is used more between friends and Müller (2005) found that people were more likely to use *like* to introduce an example when speaking to a friend. In the present study, the only functional category in which familiarity acted as a main effect was cut-off *like*. A subset model revealed, however that only males were more likely to use cut-off *like* to a friend. For quotative, hesitation and subjective stance *like*, familiarity was significant in an interaction with gender relation. The Jucker and Smith data is not adequately structured in terms of speaker and addressee gender to make any conclusive claims about familiarity, however, in that there is no familiar male-male data or mixed gender stranger data. Müller's result conflicts slightly with this study in that her introducing an example category falls under discourse link *like*, which was not affected by familiarity in the present study.

Barbieri (2005) finds that quotative *like* is more frequent in less formal contexts. The formal context in her study was office hours, which is presumably more formal than the unfamiliar data here. It contained the lowest frequency of *like*. The two contexts between the most and least formal ones contained the greatest frequency of *like*. How this compares with the present study is unclear. Perhaps of greater interest is the fact that the less formal the situation, the more quotatives were used altogether. In Section 5.2.2, it was noted that the results of this study can't tell us whether the differences in the rate of *like* reflect the choice of *like* over another quotative or changes in the rate of quotatives altogether. It was argued that the low rate in the unfamiliar male-male data was reflected a low rate of quotatives. The data from Barbieri (2005) supports this analysis.

The effect of gender has been investigated more thoroughly in the literature. Beginning with quotative *like*, most studies find that females use it more (Macaulay, 2001; Romaine & Lange, 1991; Tagliamonte & Hudson, 1999), or that gender has no effect (Andersen, 1997; Dailey-O'Cain, 2000). This study finds that quotative *like* is used more by females.

Next, let's look at the effect of addressee gender in the literature. Singler (2001) finds that quotative *like* is most likely to occur in females' speech when they are being interviewed by another female. Next most likely is males interviewed by females, females interviewed by males, and finally males interviewed by males. Singler's data was collected through sociolinguistic interviews collected by students. Although he doesn't

state this explicitly, it seems as if the students interviewed people they knew. However, Singler's data probably represents more formal language than the familiar data in this study, since interviews are usually more formal. This might be equivalent to the unfamiliar data here. Singler's results resemble the pattern present in the unfamiliar data in this study. Singler's results may also reflect the pattern outlined by Holmes (1990a). Holmes reports that pragmatic devices which are more typical of casual conversation are used more to women in semi-formal contexts. This observation might corroborate the idea that quotative *like* indexes comfortable conversation.

Terraschke (2010) finds that quotative *like* is used more in mixed gender dyads. In the present study, the opposite was found to be true in the familiar data. In the unfamiliar data, which is similar to Terraschke's data, people were more likely to use *like* to females, regardless of their own gender. If we look at the group means for the unfamiliar data, the female-female dyads used quotative *like* the most at 0.70 times per 100 words, followed by the female-male dyads (0.47) and finally the male-male dyads (0.23). Terraschke (2010) observes, however, that her results may not be entirely accurate because a lot of the mixed gender quotative *like* came from one speaker. Terraschke's findings then might be different from the findings of the present study because one speaker may have heavily influenced her results. A single speaker cannot have had such an impact on the results of the present study, because outliers were removed prior to statistical analysis, and the effects of single speakers were lessened with the inclusion of speakers as random variables in the mixed effects logistic regression. Nonetheless this result does conflict with the results of the present study.

With regards to the other functions of *like*, the consensus also seems to be that they are used more by females (Andersen, 2001; Fuller, 2003; Siegel, 2002; Tagliamonte, 2005). This was not the case in this study. However, it was also clear that gender is insufficient in accounting for these functions of *like*.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

6.1 Summary of findings and contributions

The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of familiarity and gender on the frequency of *like*. This was investigated using recordings and transcripts of 24 dyadic conversations. Discourse marker *like* was divided into five functional categories. The effects of familiarity and gender on these categories was investigated using mixed effects logistic regression. As well as the gender of the speaker, the gender makeup of the dyad, and the gender of the addressee were found to have significant effects on the frequency of at least some of the functional categories of *like*.

Quotative *like* was affected by a three-way interaction between gender, gender relation and familiarity. This interaction showed that when speakers are friends, they are more likely to use quotative *like* when speaking to someone of the same gender. When speaking to a stranger, both males and females were more likely to use quotative *like* if their addressee was female. This tells us that males changed their behaviour due to their relationship with their addressee, but females did not. The higher frequency of quotative *like* between the same gender dyads in the familiar data and the female-female dyads in the unfamiliar data was attributed to the type of interaction likely in these dyads. Because people were more likely to be comfortable in same gender dyads, and when speaking to friends, it was predicted that these interactions would be more cooperative and would contain more talk about personal experience. Talking about personal experience lends itself to using quotatives. The high frequency of quotative *like* in the female-female unfamiliar dyads was attributed to Bell's initiative audience design. The females talked to their female addressee as if they were a friend, resulting in frequent quotative use. The fact that this did not occur in the male-male unfamiliar dyads was attributed to masculine identity becoming more salient in these interactions, and therefore resulting in more public talk, which requires less quotatives.

Discourse link *like* was more likely to occur in male-male dyads. This can be explained by the competitive style males prefer in male-male interactions. Discourse link *like*, like quotative *like*, was used because its textual function was useful. A key aspect of male-male competitive style is the use of monologues. Discourse link *like* might be useful in this style because it allows speakers to add on to their utterance.

Hesitation *like* and subjective stance *like* were accounted for using the interactional-textual distinction. Hesitation *like* and subjective stance *like* function interactionally. They were therefore more readily accounted for using theories of interpersonal relations, rather than in relation to the structure of discourse, as was the case for quotative *like* and discourse link *like*. *Like* has been found in the literature to be characteristic of comfortable conversation. In the familiar data, both hesitation *like* and subjective stance *like* were used more in the same gender dyads. This reflects the speakers' comfort in these two contexts. Although *like* is found in the literature generally to be more frequent in the speech of females, it was argued that it was frequent in the male-male familiar dyads because of reduced salience of masculinity, as predicted by social identity theory. While there were no significant correlations in the unfamiliar data for hesitation *like*, both males and females were more likely to use subjective stance *like* to female addressees. Females in the unfamiliar data were more likely to use hesitation *like* to other females. This pattern was attributed to the interpersonal skills of females and their ability to put addressees at ease. It is also possible that males were accommodating to their perception of female speech to appeal to their female addressees.

Overall, this study has shown that a person's performance of their gender varies according to context. In this study, two variables showed this: addressee's gender, both on its own and in relation to the gender of the speaker, and familiarity.

In terms of what this study can tell us about gender, the gender of a person's addressee appeared to affect that person's performance of gender differently in the different familiarity contexts. Men appeared to interact quite differently to a man they did not know as opposed to a man they did know, with regards to their use of subjective stance *like*. Because subjective stance *like* operates interactionally, it might tell us something about these interactions. Based on the literature on men's interactional styles, and the fact that *like* is considered more feminine than masculine, it seems as if men attributed more salience to their masculinity in interaction with a male they didn't know. This result in particular shows the value of studying *like* in different contexts.

6.1.1 Implications

An important finding of this study is that gender on its own is insufficient to account for the use of *like*. In only one subcategory, quotative *like*, was the speaker's gender by itself significant. Research on the distribution of *like* needs to take context into account. The findings of this study show that gender relation has more of an impact on the frequency of *like* than gender itself. The relationship between participants also needs to be taken into account when comparing studies on *like*. There is no clear consensus in the literature on the gender distribution of *like*. It is possible that some of this confusion stems from different study designs. As the results of this study shows, the relationship between the participants, in terms of familiarity and gender relation are important in determining the gender distribution of *like*. The findings of social identity theory also predict that masculinity and femininity will have differing levels of salience depending on whether participants are in groups or pairs. This also needs to be taken into account when comparing studies.

6.2 Limitations

One of the main goals of this study was to see if a person would differ in their use of *like* when talking to a friend or a stranger. To investigate this, two corpora were assembled, one that contained dyads where the participants were friends, and one that contained dyads where the participants were strangers. It might also have been interesting to put each of the participants in each of these contexts. The participants would have a conversation with a friend and then have been paired with a stranger from another of the dyads to see if participants changed their use of *like*. The results of the present study can only tell us about how people generally use *like* in each context.

The data in this study is structured so that for each familiarity condition there were an equal number of dyads that were female-female, female-male, and male-male. The data was structured in this way so there would be an equal number of participants in each of these conditions. However, upon analysing the data it became clear that the gender relation of participants in a dyad has a strong effect on the use of *like*. The structure of the data, however, means that there are twice as many participants in the "same" category than in the "different" category. Any results concerning females in mixed gender dyads then, are based on half as much data as results concerning females in same gender dyads.

A different categorisation system could also have been used. The subjective stance category makes up 45.7% of the data. This category covers a broad range of functions.

Subjective stance *like* can function interactionally or textually. Although I draw on its interactional effects in the discussion, there are some functions of it that are more textual. The approximation meaning, when modifying a quantity particularly, appears to function textually. The subjective stance category also contains both hedge *like* and intensifier *like*. While both these meanings convey the speaker's orientation in relation to their proposition, they do different things. Intensifier *like* highlights, and hedge *like* attenuates force. Studies of other pragmatic devices have shown that females and males often use these kinds of functions with differing frequencies (e.g. Erman, 1992; Holmes, 1986, 1990a). In light of these studies, I did attempt to code focuser and hedge subjective stance *like*. However, this coding proved highly unreliable. The second coder and I frequently had conflicting interpretations even after training. Developing more reliable criteria for distinguishing between the two was an option, but was deemed beyond the scope of this study. Some research also denies the existence of focuser *like* (e.g. Andersen, 2001), and some argues that hedge and focuser *like* might be one in the same (Fuller, 2003). Since subjective stance *like* covers such a large portion of the data, it might have been interesting to see if there were any gender or familiarity effects on the subfunctions this broad category contains.

As outlined in the Discussion, the distribution of quotative *like* was not fully accounted for. This was because in this study its frequency was not compared to those of other quotatives. Because of this, a difference in the rate of quotative *like* between two gender/familiarity groups could have reflected either a difference in the rate at which quotative *like* was chosen over another quotative, or how frequently quotations were occurring. Also, as outlined in the Literature Review (Section 2.4.1.2), intralingual factors such as grammatical person and tense have been showed to greatly influence a person's choice of quotative. This study does not examine these. Overall, while this study does not provide a full description of quotative *like*, looking at intralingual factors and comparisons with other quotatives were beyond the scope of this study.

As alluded to in Section 5.2.4, the discussion of cut-off *like*, it might be illuminating to split this category into instances where the speaker cut themself off and instances where the speaker is cut-off by their addressee. It is also interesting that *like* seems to be such a popular spot for cutting off a sentence. Are speakers cutting themselves off after *like* or are they using it to signal an impending direction change? The frequency of cut-off *like* might suggest the latter. This warrants further research.

The results in this study were accounted for in some part by making assumptions about when a speaker would be more comfortable and when their gender identity might have higher salience. A more qualitative examination of the data might be helpful. To add weight to assumptions about gender salience and comfort, a future study might look for other signals that these assumptions were true. Discourse link

like, for example, was accounted for by saying that the male-male dyads might have been using monologues. Looking for evidence that this kind of communicative style was occurring would strengthen the account of discourse link *like*.

6.3 Directions for future research

The fact that gender relation is significant suggests that people change their use of *like* when speaking to different people. It would be interesting to explore this further. Age might be an interesting variable to explore. While it is generally agreed that teenagers and young adults are more likely to use *like*, it remains to be seen whether they are affected by the age of the person they are speaking to. The effect of register might also be worth looking into. While Barbieri (2005) has looked at quotative *like* in terms of register, discourse marker *like* has not been explored in the same way. While the familiar/unfamiliar dimension in this study may have resulted in more and less formal language, this dimension could be explored more fully.

In Fuller (2003), interviewers used *like* more speaking to reticent interviewees. Because both the interviewers in her data were female, Fuller (2003) cannot tell us anything about the use of *like* by males who are responsible for a conversation. In the unfamiliar data of the present study, I argued that the female-females dyads used *like* initiatively to create a comfortable conversation with their addressee, but that the males did not. On the other hand, the males who had brought a friend along to participate in the study also may have been using *like* to makes their friend comfortable. The initiative use of *like*, where people use *like* to create a comfortable or pleasant conversation or put their addressee at ease might warrant research.

It might also be interesting to look at the relationship between *like* and other pragmatic devices. This study showed that subjective stance *like* patterns similarly to *you know* in that people use it more to friends of the same gender and to females in more formal contexts. If a person is more likely to use *like*, are they more likely to use discourse markers in general? Or, would they be less likely to use other discourse markers if they can achieve their intended meaning with *like*? Comparing a person's use of *like* and *sort of* might be worthwhile, since they both can be used epistemically and to show the speaker's orientation in discourse. This kind of study might allow us to see whether frequent *like* users need to express their orientation in the discourse more, or if other people also express this meaning with equal frequency, but by different means.

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Appendix A

Information sheet and participant consent form

Reference Number 11/182
10/09/11



New Zealand English
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS

Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate we thank you. If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for considering our request.

What is the Aim of the Project?

This project studies New Zealand English in natural conversation. The specific features of this can be elaborated further after you have participated, so as to capture your most natural speaking style.

What Type of Participants are being sought?

Native speakers of New Zealand English aged 18 to 28 are being sought for participation in this project. The study concerns New Zealand English, therefore, to qualify for this study, participants must have English as their first language, and must have spent their whole lives here, with the exclusion of travel.

What will Participants be Asked to Do?

Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to have a conversation with another participant. This participant may or may not be known to you. The conversation will be recorded. You will be given a list of conversation topics to discuss with your partner. If you do not wish to use a certain topic, that's fine. After 20 minutes I will return and end the conversation. You are free to stop at any time for any reason. You will be asked to fill in a brief form asking for your age, ethnicity and gender.

After the data has been collected I will tell you in more detail what I am studying.

Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind.

What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it?

After your conversation, I will listen to it and transcribe it. I will then analyse it. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity. Any future research publications will only include group details or small transcribed excerpts. A pseudonym will be used for your speech, but the gender information you provided, along with your relationship to the person

you had the conversation with, will be attributed to any samples quoted. However, in the interest of disseminating research to the broader scientific community, the transcriptions will be made available through hosting on a web server.

This project involves an open-conversation technique. The general line of conversation includes a general discussion of events in your life. You will be able to discuss a range of topics freely. Consequently, although the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee is aware of the general areas to be explored, a free conversation could flow in many directions.

In the event that the line of conversation does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant or uncomfortable you are reminded of your right to participate further and also that you may withdraw from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind.

Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project?

You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind.

What if Participants have any Questions?

If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact either:-

Rebecca Yates and/or Hunter Hatfield
Department of Linguistics Department of Linguistics
rebecca.anna.yates@gmail.com hunter.hatfield@otago.ac.nz

This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you will be informed of the outcome.

Reference Number 11/182
10/09/11

New Zealand English
CONSENT FORM FOR
PARTICIPANTS

I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about. All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request further information at any stage.
I know that:-

1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary;

2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage;

3. Personal identifying information (surveys) will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project but transcripts will be made available to the research community;

4. This project involves an open-conversation technique. The general line of conversation includes a general discussion of events in my life. In the event that the line of conversation does develop in such a way that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable I may withdraw from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to myself of any kind.

5. I will receive a small gift as thanks for participating in this study;

6. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity.

I agree to take part in this project.

....
(Signature of participant) (Date)

This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you will be informed of the outcome.

Appendix B

Participant questionnaire

Questionnaire for participants

Name:

Date of birth:

Gender:

Ethnicity (New Zealand 2006 Census)
http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/about-2006-census/2006-census-questionnaires.aspx

Which ethnic group do you belong to?
Mark the option or options which apply to you.

New Zealand European
Mäori
Samoan
Cook Island Maori
Tongan
Niuean
Chinese
Indian
other such as *DUTCH, JAPANESE, TOKELAUAN*. Please state:

Have you ever lived outside New Zealand? If so, when and for how long?

Please list the languages you spoke as a child.

Have you met the person you are speaking with before? If yes, how long have you known them?

Thank you for participating in this project.

Appendix C

Poster

New Zealand English

I'm looking for people aged 18 to 28 to participate in a Linguistics study. Participants must be native speakers of English (this means you spoke it as a child, but it's fine to have another native language too) and have lived in New Zealand their whole lives, with the exception of travel.

You will receive a $5 Union Grill voucher as thanks for participating in the project.

Should you choose to participate in this project, it will take 30 minutes. You will be asked to have a conversation with another participant about a range of topics relating to your personal experiences. One of the variables in the project is the level of familiarity between participants. Therefore, I'm looking for participants both individually, and in pairs.

The data I collect in this study will form the basis for my Masters in Linguistics.

If you are interested in taking part in this study, or have any questions, please contact me at rebecca.anna.yates@gmail.com

This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee

Appendix D

Transcription conventions

(laughs)	Paralinguistic features in brackets
.	Pause of less than a second
. .	Pause of more than a second
Publicat-	Incomplete or cut-off word
(xx)	Unclear

Appendix E

Sample transcript

Diana What was your name again

Ben Ben

Diana Ben Diana I'm useless at remembering people's names I'm sorry

Ben that's ok

Diana how's your day been

Ben it's been ok

Diana yea

Ben yea

Diana that's good I'm so tired (laughs) I'm like why do I have to do this I just want to go home to bed

Ben aw

Diana most adventurous thing you've ever done . . um I dunno have you ever done anything adventurous

Ben um I've been bungee jumping

Diana oh have you

Ben but that's kind of boring

Diana no that's not boring (laughs) that's cool

Ben yea

Diana where'd you do that

Ben just Qu- just on the bridge in Queenstown

Diana ok

Ben so not like the really hard out one

Diana yea no

Ben you know that's there's like off a cliff or something

Diana oh yea (xx)

Ben there's like one that's like 2 or 3 times higher that you jump

Diana yea yea

Ben than the bridge

Diana wow

Ben yea

Diana how was it

Ben it was ok um they're like do you want to um touch the water and I was like no

Diana yea (laughs)

Ben they're like so push off really hard when you jump and you won't touch the water so I did and I got like dunked in the water until like my underarms

Diana (laughs) oh my god

Ben so I was real angry

Diana yea

Ben and um yea afterwards like I'd really hurt my stomach I must of whipped back

Diana yea yea

Ben and I like couldn't really sit properly all my stomach muscles were really sore

Diana oh yea

Ben for like 2 days afterwards but it was fun I guess

Diana yea

Ben I shut my eyes cos I like when I jumped I just saw like this wall of water rushing

Diana yea (laughs)

Ben up so fast

Diana yea

Ben yea it was scary

Diana yea

Ben so I just closed my eyes

Diana scary but so fun yea I've always wanted to that but yea th- how much does it cost is it

Ben um I'm not sure my Godparents paid for it for my birthday

Diana oh ok

Ben I think it was like 130 dollars or something

Diana oh ok

Ben 120 or 130 or 40 dollars

Diana yea it's expensive to like

Ben yea

Diana jump of a cliff (laughs)

Ben yea

Diana with some rope attatched (laughs) yea I can't remember anything I've done that's adventurous um yea lead a fairly boring blameless life (laughs)

Ben yea

Diana so a holiday that was really good or really bad um my family always used to go on like . yearly . holiday . camp . things and it was always like to Tekapo or somewhere like that and um we'd always stay in like these really tiny cabins where it was like a bunk that you know two me and my brother had two bunk beds and then a double bed and everyone's in the same room and everyone's in eachother's space and I hated it so much and one night I remember I was about 8 and I woke up and my dad was snoring and he wouldn't stop and I was just so like desperate for him for sleep and I could- I just started sobbing I went down I'm like Mum Dad won't stop snoring

Ben (laughs)

Diana and he felt real bad but I'm like yea just one of those moments where

you're not at

Ben yea

Diana yea (laughs) no one's in good form when they're deprived of sleep

Ben um the like worst holiday I've ever had was it was the second last time I was in the US my mum's American

Diana oh cool

Ben um and I was 15 and me and Mum went into the city to Philadelphia cos my par- my grandparents live like in a little town sort of like an hour away

Diana mm

Ben so we went into the city and um me and my mum got in like an argument and she got on the bus and I didn't get on the bus and then she drove away

Diana oh go (laughs)

Ben and I waited for like 45 minutes and she didn't come back

Diana (laughs)

Ben and I got really scared

Diana (laughs)

Ben and um I didn't really know what to do

Diana yea

Ben so I I had a train ticket to go home but I didn't know where the train station was

Diana (laughs) yes

Ben or how to get there so I like tried to find out how to get there and I was only like 15

Diana mm

Ben but I managed to find a bus and like I don't I was re- (laughs) really shy and I had to like get the coach to ask someone on the bus to tell me when to get off

Diana yea

Ben cos I had no idea

Diana yea

Ben and um

Diana oh my god

Ben they did and then I got off and I'm like oh this isn't the same train station that I came in on

Diana (laughs)

Ben so I didn't really know where to go

Diana yea

Ben and then I was trying to look for this platform for the last train that I could get back to where I was meant to be going

Diana mm

Ben and I couldn't find it and then this woman asked me where it was

Diana yea

Ben and I was like I'm looking for it too

Diana (laughs) yay buddies

Ben and then this like random man had found it who she'd asked and he'd like walked back from the like the platform to tell her so like it was only by complete chance that I actually found like because this man could be bothered doing that that like I got on the train with like 5 minutes to spare

Diana mm

Ben and managed to get home

Diana oh my god

Ben yea otherwise I would have been stuck in this random city

Diana yea

Ben like without hardly any money and

Diana yea

Ben yea

Diana I can't imagine that though like your Mum just being like just having a fight and just see you later

Ben yea

Diana how old were you at the time

Ben 15

Diana oh yea so mm kind of kind of old enough to be able to find your own way

Ben yea

Diana oh my gosh

Ben it wasn't very good

Diana no but thank god that that guy I was there

Ben I was really angry

Diana mm and when you like was your mum gunna try and come back to find you or

Ben no no

Diana had she just like had enough

Ben I can't remember

Diana (laughs)

Ben yea

Diana ok

Ben I didn't talk to her for a while

Diana yea fair enough I woudn't either (laughs)

Ben yea

Diana let's see the rugby world cup awesome or overrated I can't even be bothered having this discussion about the

Ben I don't care about rugby at all and I don't care about the world cup

Diana yea me neither I'm like my only attitude the only opinion I have on it is that I hate all the people coming over from overseas cos I've got to serve them in my job

Ben (laughs)

Diana like I work at a hairdressers and it's um like a no appointment type place

Ben mmhm

Diana so people come in and they go oh so can I have a haircut right now and I'm like um no and there's a waiting time and all that kind of stuff

Ben oh yea

Diana and it it's set up so that people can have an idea of how long they'll have to wait and they can go and come back and they don't have to sit there

Ben oh yea

Diana and just wait um but people especially like the Americans are really bad for it and um yea French people or

Ben (laughs)

Diana they they cannot understand like why they would have to wait like when so- they're like well take me in front of them I need a haircut more badly than they do

Ben yea

Diana and I'm like wh-

Ben no

Diana (laughs)

Ben go away

Diana exactly

Ben that's so rude

Diana and people who yea you get the rude ones you get the people who swear at you because of the waiting time and it hasn't happened to me but one of the other girls that was working there who like we're both receptionists um she got sworn at and told that she was a bitch and da da da and she the person (xx) her

Ben woah seems like kind of a bad idea

Diana (laughs)

Ben (laughs)

Diana well it's like it's one of those ideas that's really really good in theory but

Ben yea

Diana yea and um when somebody can't understand English it's like and there's lots of rules and that that we've got to enforce like if someone hasn't washed their hair in the last 24 hours then we have to do it for them and we have to charge them it's only like 6 bucks but you'll get people who go you fuckin bitch why are you trying to ruin my day I'm like cos I hate you that's why

Ben yea

Diana and so yea rugby world cup that's the first thing I think of it's like all that in a day just coming at me and I'm like no

Ben aw

Diana I don't want any of that

Ben yea

Diana I should get a new job

Ben (laughs)

Diana when I explain it to somebody I'm like this job sucks (laughs)

Ben (laughs) yea (laughs)

Diana but the team is good at the money's good so (laughs)

Ben that's good

Diana yea

Ben yea

Diana so yea just completely don't care about it

Ben don't care at all waste of money

Diana mm yea

Ben I hate the stadium

Diana yea

Ben it's so stupid such a waste of money and like the council just like (groan)

Diana what's up with

Ben you could just talk about that for so long about how like the council's decieved everyone and oh like

Diana yea it's painful and like what's up with um like they spent heaps of money on the stadium and then they spend have you been in the octagon you've seen that big massive thing that looks like a penis

Ben yea

Diana I'm like what the f- and I thought it was just me like I thought I had a dirty mind but then I was reading Critic and it was like they had this big thing on the front page

Ben yea

Diana about how everyone said it looked like a penis and like

Ben I've seen atleast 2 facebook groups one's like the hu- one's just called the dunedin penis and

Diana (laughs)

Ben the other one's called like the big thing in the octagon that looks like a penis

Diana yea (laughs) and like

Ben that's what my mum said too

Diana yea

Ben I could tell that it was a Rexona can straight away

Diana yea

Ben like from the shape of it but

Diana yea well like

Ben no one else seemed to

Diana oh I was passing on the bus and so I sort of saw it out the corner of my eye and I was like what is that and I was like what is that and I got the Rexona can shape as well but my first instinct was yea

Ben yea

Diana looks like a penis and then I saw this man looking into the side of it and I'm like ok

Ben yea it's just pretty bizare

Diana yea 50 grand apparantly

Ben really

Diana it cost yea to put it there and it's like yea well if you've got 50 grand to spare do you not think you'd put it into rates or whatever

Ben yea

Diana yea it's dumb / flatmate or hall problems um I live with my boyfriend so yea um I don't know if he counts as a flatmate sometimes he does and sometimes it depends how I feel about him (laughs)

Ben (laughs)

Diana we just kind of um we moved in together um basically cos I needed a flatmate and so did he and we're like oh yea we get on ok clearly we do cos we're going out with each other

Ben yea

Diana and yea but it and all my friends give me shit they're like so how's married life and I'm like (sound effect) (laughs)

Ben yea

Diana yea so you in a hall or are you in a flat

Ben ah no I live at home

Diana oh yea

Ben but I'm wanting to go flatting next year

Diana yea

Ben but it's just been like drama

Diana mm

Ben trying to uh it's just been really messy like um we me and one of my friends we had like 5 flatmates but we don't like 2 of them so we're trying

Diana ok

Ben to find 2 other people so we can get rid of those people

Diana yea

Ben cos we all want like a really quiet nerdy flat

Diana yea

Ben like no fun

Diana (laughs)

Ben whatsoever

Diana yea

Ben is the name of the game

Diana mm

Ben then um yea so we had like 3 flatmates looking for 2 other ones then a third flatmate um isn't flatting with us anymore because their ex boyfriend is friends with us and is gunna be at the flat and we're like no well I'm like I'd rather have you than them

Diana mm

Ben like I don't care about them I'd rather have you living with me

Diana yea

Ben and um yea so I but and even though it's gunna be like you know 6 months plus after they've broken up anyway but like

Diana yea

Ben I think they're not flatting with us anymore

Diana yea

Ben then we've just been trying to find a flat in at the very start I was like ok I

want to live in this flat or this flat like this is

Diana mm

Ben (xx) I told them exactly where I wanted to live whereabouts relative to uni I wanted to live

Diana mm

Ben like not not near the food places not near the students

Diana yea

Ben like far away on the other side

Diana mmhm

Ben and the I got like this facebook message the other day about how I'm indecisive and

Diana oh

Ben actually help me and I was just like blew up and wrote this huge reply

Diana mm

Ben like I am not indecisive I told you where I wanted at the start I sent you the links

Diana mm

Ben to the flats that I wanted at the very start of this conversation and then you sent me this other one and I said how it wouldn't work and

Diana mm

Ben yea (groan)

Diana (laughs)

Ben it's just been really annoying like my friend is really annoying

Diana mm

Ben like I was talking to my other friend Caroline about it and she was like how could live with him

Diana mm

Ben cos he just is so annoying

Diana yea (laughs)

Ben so that's my flat problems

Diana (laughs)

Ben just trying to find one then find flatmates

Diana yea trying to find a flat and some people to flat with

Ben yea

Diana yea nup yea I'm living by [park name] if you know where that is

Ben yea

Diana thank god everyone I says to they're like where's the [park name]

Ben I live in [suburb] at the moment yea so I do know where that is

Diana ok yea so you do know it yea um I'm in [street] so it's kind of just

Ben oh yea one of my friends lived there next year

Diana yea

Ben last year I mean

Diana oh ok yea um and I mean it's a bit of a walk and it's like half an hour to uni but I really love you know that you're kind of separate from the uni stuff

Ben mmhm

Diana and you're not right in studentville and if you want to kind of have a quiet night then it you know you're

Ben yea

Diana not gunna be bothered by everyone having raging parties outside your window (laughs)

Ben yea

Diana though sometimes we've got some neighbours who like have a once a month bash but yea they're annoying

Ben yea

Diana but yea so 5 people that's a lot (laughs) yea

Ben yea

Diana mm that'll be less now

Ben yea

Diana yea

Ben (groans) just

Diana grrr

Ben messy

Diana yea

Ben and like yea and the end of the year's coming up and everyone's stressed from like exams and assignments

Diana mmhm

Ben and just want it to be sorted but it's like not sorted at all

Diana yea

Ben it's not coming together

Diana yea you could give them like an ultimatum just say like this is the house we're going for and you can be the either in or out make your choice

Ben yea

Diana yea

Ben yea

Diana so is there like a couple and they've like broken up but they still want to be flatting together

Ben no it was we're friends with both of them

Diana oh ok

Ben and one of them was going to be flatting with us but the other one will probably hang out

Diana mm

Ben at the flat

Diana yea

Ben but now that they've broken up

Diana which could be awkward

Ben they don't want to be together

Diana yea

Ben like one doesn't want to yea and there's this other flat and I was like it's not gunna last email the agent when we can like view it I'm free that this time this day and all this day

Diana mm

Ben and then they didn't and then it's like how am I indecisive I like st- told you all the information

Diana mm

Ben damn near everything

Diana yea

Ben but it's fine

Diana yea it's fine it's fine (laughs) your first day at Otago my first day sucked

Ben (laughs)

Diana so did my first semester (laughs) just the whole thing was just shit

Ben (xx)

Diana I um yea I wasn't really prepared for uni I still don't know if I'm prepared for uni I'm just trying to finish off my first year and um yea the first day I didn't kind of know where any- you know the typical stuff like you don't know where anything was and I kind I like I went to [Highschool] and so you know from Duendin and but by and large they're sort of the rumours are true they are farmers' kids and so um you know there was a really I think there might be 10 at the most of us just people that I knew around here but it it who were going to uni

Ben mm

Diana but it was all sort of people that I never really got on with that well at

school

Ben yea

Diana and so just sort of wandering around and everyone was else was sort of making bonds cos they were in their halls or whatever

Ben yea

Diana and I was out flatting and I sort of I got what from wanted from it but yea just wandering round by myself and didn't really have anyone to ask about things and it's like aw

Ben yea

Diana (sigh) how was your first day

Ben um I can't remember my first day of like study or the first day of semester but I remember like course approval

Diana mm

Ben and um I'm from Dunedin as well and wasn't in a hall so I had like the same issues

Diana yea

Ben about not like feeling excluded I guess

Diana yea

Ben and not like knowing very many people

Diana yea

Ben um here especially people in my year because I had a gap year and so most of the people from my highschool didn't go to uni anyway

Diana mm

Ben so um and people that I know here are like third year now

Diana yea

Ben or fourth year

Diana yea

Ben like so we're not like in the same class or anything

Diana yea

Ben and but course approval was fun I just remember like there were so many people

Diana mm

Ben and I was dressed up for work so I was like in a shirt and a tie and dress pants

Diana (laughs) people would be walking past you like (laughs)

Ben so I looked like some loser who dressed up for uni

Diana (laughs)

Ben and I was just like yea I just I wanna get this form signed and yea I had no idea where anything was but I had like someone showing me where everything was

Diana oh ok

Ben which was really lucky for me

Diana yea

Ben cos I would have just been really traumatised

Diana yea

Ben um

Diana you're so screwed eh I couldn't read maps either like you give me the biggest map in the world and I'm like yea that's cool I still

Ben yea

Diana I've got no sense of direction

Ben I find it annoying because like you can find a map of the whole university but when you go to find a room in one of the buildings like that's way harder than finding a building

Diana yea yea you find the building and then it's like

Ben yea

Diana yea

Ben then you have to walk around lots

Diana you get confused and hope

Ben yea

Diana that someone will take pity on you yea I remember I had to find this room GW5B I had no idea at and it said it was in the information services building and I was able to work out that meant the library

Ben yea

Diana and so that was all good um and I went in there and I asked like 5 different people who were all official looking and nobody could find it for me

Ben oh

Diana and then I didn't yea I was all young and naive I didn't understand G ground W west

Ben oh I didn't know that

Diana yea (laughs) well I yea I do now I worked it out in the end but just wandering round and of course because I hadn't met anyone from my class yet I couldn't sort of see oh yea I know

Ben yea

Diana I recognise your face sort of follow them

Ben where was it

Diana it was like in the library on the you know when you walk in from that side

Ben yup

Diana um and there's like that little there's like a photo of all the disabled people that work for the university

Ben oh yea

Diana it's like in there

Ben oh

Diana and then you have to go down there and turn right

Ben oh god that's really weird

Diana and push all yea it was one of those things where you have to push a button for the door to open

Ben yea

Diana and yea

Ben yea my uncle works in there I didn't know they had like classrooms in there

Diana yea

Ben that's really bizare

Diana yea and then I got in there and it was like cos it was a paper on how to speak Spanish and I didn't realise that we were gunna be like live doing a but we had the teacher but they were teaching through Skype or whatever

Ben oh

Diana a class in Auckland and so I got in there and there's all these cameras in my face so that they could see us and you know but they had you know screens as big as the wall and then half of it was we could see ouselves and then the other half we could see Auckland and I'm looking there and looking at myself and going this is awful and I have to be here for 2 hours

Ben oh

Diana just staring at (laughs) cos nobody likes just yea

Ben yea

Diana yea

Ben mm that's really weird

Diana (laughs) yea I was so glad when it was over like the paper was interesting but I'm like just go away

Ben yea

Diana go away yea but I reckon like I always get so jealous of people who were in halls because they do have a lot of support there and

Ben yea

Diana you know