Nonviolent Discipline
A Comparative Analysis of Tiananmen Square 1989 and Gwangju 1980

For Fulfillment of a MA in Peace and Conflict Studies
Supervisor: Dr Karen Brounéus
National Centre of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago

Liesel Mitchell
Abstract

Previous research on nonviolence movements in East Asia has explored factors which may have contributed to an increase in peace in the region. However, the conditions which influence maintaining nonviolent discipline within nonviolence movements are under-researched and invite further investigation. Evidence of a correlation between the way a conflict is resolved and the levels of freedom experienced indicates that groups or movements who do maintain nonviolent discipline have a good chance of creating greater freedom post-conflict (Ackerman and Rodal 2008, p.119).

This thesis identifies the conditions present in two nonviolence movements in East Asia: China, Tiananmen Square, 1989 where nonviolence was maintained and South Korea, Gwangju, 1980 where nonviolence was not maintained. An analytical framework is developed to compare the case studies in order to understand how the conditions of each setting may have influenced the dependent variable; nonviolent discipline. This is done by assessing the contextual, motivating, interaction and resulting factors, the independent variables, in each case.

The analysis of the case studies and independent variables suggest three influential factors for maintaining nonviolent discipline: the timeframe, ecology of social space, and external influence. First, time may influence whether a nonviolence movement chooses a strategic response or an emotive reaction. Nonviolent discipline appears to be more easily maintained when there is time to unify and commit to nonviolent tactics. Second, the physical location, control of space, and the symbolism attached to a place may influence whether nonviolent discipline is maintained or not. Third and finally, the external influence of third parties in particular the positive or negative perspective of media reports may impact on the ability of a group to maintain nonviolent discipline.

Tiananmen 1989, committed to nonviolence, yet the outcome for China was not greater freedom. Gwangju 1980 was not able to commit to nonviolence, and yet the long term results for Korea have enabled greater freedom overall. Further research is needed to understand more fully the conditions under which nonviolent discipline is maintained in
nonviolence movements and whether this may in turn, strengthen the potential for positive outcomes and greater freedom.
Acknowledgments

He aha te mea nui o te ao? What is the most important thing in the world?
He tangata! He tangata! He tangata! It is people! It is people! It is people!

Without people (and one seagull), this thesis would not have been written. It really has been the collaborative effort of so many who have continued to inspire me, kept me laughing and most importantly keen to keep going and finally, finish it! For this, I thank you, the people in my life.

To Dr Karen Brounéus, thank you for enabling me and for helping me believe I could do this. It has been your expert guidance, facilitation of learning, wisdom, advice, encouragement, knowledge, empathy, honesty, critique and care which has managed to coax a thesis out of me.

To my family - Sarah and Rod, Nicola, Daniel and Zac – who have been there for me the whole time, thank you. And especial gratitude for all those Saturday dinners which have kept me sane and fed, the wonderful coffees and conversation where you listened and encouraged, and to Nicola who sponsored me many a lunch and listening ear and for expert organisation in the final stages of putting this together! Thank you, thank you!

To my wonderful office buddies – Pedro, Ilkazelle and Ray-cho-cho – thank you for the support and all the positivity. I couldn’t have asked for a better team of cheerleaders! And to Kevin “Stumpy” Seagull – who inspired me to keep going, because if he could do it, I definitely could!

To Richard H, thank you for stretching my thinking in both our random and organised meetings at the cathedral of coffee. And a big thank you to Louise and Sarah for being so supportive!

To Ik-Young for his knowledge, advice and willingness to help on any information related to Gwangju.

Thank you to the University of Otago for providing an excellent learning environment and great library resources. In particular, thank you to The National Centre for Peace and
Conflict Studies, Aotearoa, NZ who have created an important research space, thank you for all your support. Karen and Isak deserve a particular mention for getting me so inspired after an excellent introduction to the discipline of peace and conflict studies.

Thank you Neill of SCM for giving me the opportunity to sharpen up my thoughts and be put in the firing line of a public lecture Q&A session! And to Knox Church thank you for giving me a space to speak my ideas aloud.

And to all the people who have coffee-ed with me and given me the chance to idea brainstorm – Todd, Audrey, Maria, Jo, Milton, Hamish, Eliot, Clare, Sam, Jack, Helen, RR, Jill, Josie, Jim, Jono, Noel and others I may have failed to mention who have challenged or inspired!

Finally, to the community who were my daily fix of people fun, thank you!! You know who you are Fluid coffee team, Campus Wonderful boys and the staff of our office building in Education Resources and Support with a special mention to the lovely Nola and Diane.
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Abbreviations

ASEAN – The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
MBC – Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation
KBS – Korean Broadcasting System
SMO – Social Movement Organisation
YMCA - Young Men’s Christian Association
Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Introduction and Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to explain nonviolent discipline in an East Asian context. Although there is current research on nonviolence movements in East Asia and the factors which may contribute to an increase in peace in the region, the reasons why nonviolence is maintained within these nonviolence movements invites further investigation. This will be done by assessing two nonviolence movements in East Asia as the case studies: China, Tiananmen Square 1989 and South Korea, Gwangju 1980. It will be a comparative analysis identifying factors which may influence the ability of a nonviolence movement to maintain nonviolent discipline. Thus, drawing conclusions regarding the conditions under which nonviolent discipline may or may not be maintained in movements which begin as nonviolent.

1.2 Research Question
The research question asks: *Under what conditions is nonviolent discipline maintained in nonviolence movements?*

This question will be explored within a context of nonviolence and East Asian peace theory. Research for this thesis has been conducted by drawing on secondary literary sources to form the research methodology of this thesis.

1.3 Structure
Chapter Two will provide the theoretical background. This will be done as a literature review of two research areas: nonviolence and East Asian peace theory. The aim of these two sections is to give a theoretical context in which the case studies fit.

Part One will provide a context in which nonviolence movements might be understood by defining nonviolence, nonviolent discipline, nonviolent methods and relevant nonviolence theory.

The purpose of Part Two is to further narrow the broader focus of nonviolence, to the specific phenomenon of East Asian peace. This is done in two ways. First, it
demonstrates there has been a clear increase in nonviolence movements in the region which the two case studies have been selected from. Second, reasons for why East Asia is being called more peaceful will be used to shed light on reasons why nonviolent discipline is sustained within nonviolence movements.

Chapter Three’s purpose is to create a method for analysing the case studies, using a framework for conducting comparative analysis of examples of nonviolent action.

Chapters Four and Five introduce each case study:

Case Study One is China, Tiananmen Square, 1989. This chapter will give a brief background to set the context, outline the stages of the nonviolence movement, followed by an analysis of motivating and interaction factors which may have influenced why nonviolent discipline was maintained.

Case Study Two is South Korea, Gwangju, 1980. This chapter also gives a brief background of events then outlines the stages of the nonviolence movement. This too is followed by an analysis of motivating and interacting factors and the possible influence they had on the ability to maintain nonviolent discipline.

Chapter Six discusses the two case studies, testing the research question against the theory, empirical data and analysis which have been laid out in the preceding chapters. It will identify the variation on the dependent variable – nonviolent discipline – and whether it was maintained and finally, draw conclusions.

1.4 Limitations
Although there is available theory and research in the area of nonviolence, it is still an under-researched area of academic study. This, therefore purely by the nature of the body of literature available at the present time, limits inquiry such as this thesis, which uses the existing literature as the source of its research methodology.

Nonviolent discipline, the dependent variable in both case studies and as in much of the nonviolence theory, can be examined from a principled or a pragmatic point of view. This thesis attempts to acknowledge both perspectives, however much of the
contemporary literature focuses on a pragmatic understanding of nonviolent discipline. This may be a limitation as research weight may inadvertently be given to the pragmatic side of the argument.

Both case studies are situated in East Asia hence there are some limitations in regards to accessing information. First, because some of the literature relevant to this thesis has been written in or translated from Chinese or Korean, it limits access to research which is not available in English. There may also be translation issues wherein interpretation confuses or unintentionally misleads the reader. Translation therefore may influence the way literature interprets concepts of violence and nonviolence as discussed in the case studies.

Second, on-going government control over politically sensitive information – either restricted or censored – may limit access to documents of relevance to the case studies.
Chapter Two: Literature Review
I. Nonviolence

Is it possible to do anything with a concept so overloaded with emotional connotations, so embedded in ideology, or is it . . . one of those concepts that should preferably be split into its components, which can then be subjected to separate scrutiny? (Galtung 1965, p.228).
Part I of this chapter introduces nonviolence theorists, identifies nonviolent tradition and then outlines the definitions and methods of nonviolence. It informs on nonviolent discipline, maintaining nonviolent action and critiques of nonviolence campaigns before concluding with current research status in the field of nonviolence.

Maintaining nonviolence in a nonviolence campaign depends on unity, leadership, strategy and nonviolent discipline (Ackerman and Rodal 2008; Stephan 2006; Stephan and Mundy 2006). It could be argued that with leadership there can be unity, with unity there can be consensus on strategy yet unless there is a commitment to nonviolent discipline, strategy, unity and leadership can be easily undermined. An understanding of nonviolence theory and practice may offer insight on ways nonviolence campaigns can support and sustain nonviolent discipline.

2.1 Nonviolence: Theorists
Mahatma Gandhi and Gene Sharp are two of the most significant names in nonviolence theory and practice.

Mahatma Gandhi is widely accepted in the literature as a leading nonviolence practitioner who also made an enormous contribution to the theory on principled nonviolence. Principled nonviolence seeks conflict resolution using an interpersonal conflict style, cooperation, trust building and inclusivity. It identifies an ethical commitment to living a nonviolent way of life, excluding violence as an option (Dudouet 2008; Bharadwaj 1998; Nakhre 1976). Gandhi’s assumption was that nonviolence was superior to violence both morally and practically. He explains this by saying that love embodies a force which has the capacity and strength to be more effective than any drive to hurt or hate another (Dalton 1993, p.37).

Despite Gandhi’s deep conviction of the power of nonviolence, the term ‘nonviolence’ appears to be something Gandhi grappled with over the course of his lifetime. He searched for language which could appropriately communicate his understanding of what nonviolence meant. Consequently, Gandhi developed the concept of satyagraha which means ‘holding firmly to the truth’ (Summy 2008; Dalton 1993, p.37). Its meaning
excludes violence but it is often used loosely and without this understanding (Dalton 1993, p.37). Gandhi struggled to ever fully translate his principled ideas even equipped with a definition which seemed to accurately reflect his philosophy. As a practitioner of nonviolence Gandhi continued to emphasise the differences between satyagraha (which was an active force) and passive resistance. He felt that the Indian Congress and the people of India had failed to understand this (Dalton 1993, p.42). So although Gandhi’s ideas and teachings have been extremely influential for activists throughout the world, his word for nonviolent action, satyagraha, has failed to gain popularity (Kurlansky 2006, p.7).

Gene Sharp dominates pragmatic nonviolence theory. Pragmatic nonviolence seeks victory over the opponent utilising tactical methods, large scale protest and persuasion and non-cooperation. It engages with nonviolence tactics when this is the most effective way of dealing with conflict (Dudouet 2008; Bharadwaj 1998; Nakhre 1976).

Sharp’s research in “. . . nonviolent analysis is most helpful; it is by far the most comprehensive and analytically useful work produced in the field” (Galtung 1965, p.243). Principled and pragmatic approaches to nonviolence are not new perspectives, however before the work of Gene Sharp, there was not such a clear conceptual distinction made. Sharp has become known in the literature on nonviolence as the leading theorist of pragmatic nonviolent struggle (Weber 2003, p.250). Sharp began his career as an “idealistic seeker after Gandhi” gradually moving away from Gandhi’s idea of satyagraha over the course of his career, developing the pragmatic tactics he writes at length about (Weber 2003, p.251).

Over the last three decades of Sharp’s research there has been an obvious reduction in references citing Gandhi (Weber 2003, p.255). It appears he has deliberately moved in a direction which no longer uses the philosophies of Gandhi as a cornerstone for his nonviolence theory. Although Sharp does acknowledge Gandhi’s significant contribution to bringing methods of nonviolence into public awareness, he argues that there is still a lot of confusion around definitions and understanding of what nonviolence actually is. The lack of clarity surrounding nonviolence resulted in Sharp categorising nonviolence into three different stages: protest and persuasion; non-cooperation and intervention
which will be discussed in more detail below (Weber 2008, p.1369; Weber 2003, p.252; Sharp 1973). These categorisations form the foundation to Sharp’s technique based nonviolent theory which is used for pragmatic rather than ethics or religious reasoning (Weber 2003, pp.251-252).

Depending on how one looks at it, Sharp either has gone beyond Gandhi, making nonviolence a more practically available method of struggle, or has ditched key elements of Gandhi’s philosophy in action in a way that diminishes nonviolence (Weber 2003, p.252).

Further research which expands the principled and pragmatic perspectives has been developed by people such as Robert Burrowes who uses a matrix which attempts to locate nonviolence on a continuum “from principled/ideological to pragmatic, and tactical to strategic” (Weber 2008, p.1364). Rather than isolating principled and pragmatic tactics, Burrowes combines the two ideas which allows the Gandhian method of persuasion to align itself with Sharp’s focus on the coercion of an opponent (Weber 2008, pp.1369-1370). This may challenge the understanding of principled and pragmatic nonviolence as two quite separate perspectives, by proposing they may be intertwined and quite compatible. A combined perspective may also expand the range of methods and techniques, utilising both the ethical and the pragmatic for developing strategy, unity, leadership and strengthening nonviolent discipline (Wehr 1995, p.86). For example, the principled focus on elements such as trust building and interpersonal relations could help to initially build unity between individuals and groups, giving a nonviolence movement a larger power base of people. Pragmatic strategy and tactics could then strengthen cooperation between groups by identifying and developing practical methods to help maintain unity and nonviolent discipline (Stephan and Mundy 2006, p. 22).

Ralph Summy adds to the Burrowes matrix, including, among other things, religious practices showing how these might influence the model (Weber 2008, p.1364). Kurt Schock stresses the idea, already mentioned, that nonviolence is active rather than passive, and doesn’t involve physical force against others (Schock 2003, p.707). This is supported by the differentiation Zunes makes between nonviolent action and pacifism, making it very clear that these are not the same, writing that pacifism is “…an ethical principle which does not necessarily involve political action” (Zunes 1994, p.403).
Furthermore, perceptions of nonviolence can be confused and weakened if inaccurate terminology is used. The example of ‘passive resistance’ demonstrates how a term can be associated with nonviolence (especially in research outside the Peace and Conflict Studies discipline) even though both Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. rejected it for being misleading as the word “passive” has connotations of inaction and weakness (Schock 2003, p.707). McCarthy and Kruegler also stress nonviolence is active, not passive (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.3). Gene Sharp writes on the subject: “As a technique . . . nonviolent action is not passive. It is not inaction. It is action that is nonviolent” (Sharp 1973, p.64). Kurlansky points out that nonviolence and pacifism are not the same things and that rather than being passive, as is pacifism, nonviolence is in fact active.

When Jesus Christ said that a victim should turn the other cheek, he was preaching pacifism. But when he said that an enemy should be won over through the power of love, he was preaching nonviolence (Kurlansky 2006, p.6).

2.2 Nonviolence: Terminology

Nonviolent Discipline
Nonviolent discipline is the commitment within a nonviolence campaign to remain nonviolent. Activists and protestors must be trained, taught and made aware that maintaining nonviolence is of great strategic importance to the movement (Stephan 2006, p.76). Both Sharp and Gandhi agree, the collective group is responsible for committing to nonviolent discipline however the concept of self-discipline is a critical element if discipline is to be maintained (Sharp 1973, p.616). Therefore, leadership and communication structures within a campaign carry the responsibility of educating people about not using violence against violence (Ackerman and Rodal 2008; Stephan 2006). Maintaining nonviolence is important for several reasons. First, if violence is used it weakens the group’s strategic position, creating critical problems and costs (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, p.223; Ackerman and Rodal 2008; Stephan 2006; Zunes 1994, p.406). Second, use of violence deters protestors from involvement, eroding their
commitment while also making it less likely to convince parties like business owners, the police and military to support or feel sympathy for the resistance movement (Ackerman and Rodal 2008, p.118; Zunes 1994, p.411). Third, nonviolent discipline wields force by distributing it across a group or a population, reducing risk overall and raising the probability of success while violence wields force at concentrated levels creating higher risk and lower success rates (Ackerman and Rodal 2008, p.119; Stephan and Mundy 2006, p.21).

Sustaining nonviolent discipline has also been argued to add to the level of freedom a post-conflict population may experience. A study investigating the correlation between the way a conflict is resolved and the levels of freedom experienced in a post-conflict society where there has been a change or transference of governing power, found that sustaining nonviolence was a critical factor in the degree of freedom attained (Ackerman and Rodal 2008, p.119).

In 50 of the 67 transitions, nonviolent civic force was pivotal; when less violence was used by the opposition more freedom followed; and the broader the popular participation in the resistance to oppression the greater the freedom after the change. In short, how one chooses to fight determines what one wins (Ackerman and Rodal 2008, p.119).

**Practicing Nonviolence**

The practice of nonviolence is most frequently called nonviolent action or nonviolent struggle/nonviolent resistance (Sharp 2008; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Weber 2008; Sharp 2006; McCarthy and Kruegler 1993; Sharp 1973). It is also referred to as *satyagraha* (Summy 2008; Dalton 1993) although, as already acknowledged, this is a term which has failed to gain popularity, yet is still included here for the contribution it makes to the definition of principled nonviolence. These terms appear somewhat interchangeable, but the following definitions have reasonable consensus in the literature.

**Nonviolent Action**

Gene Sharp identifies 198 ways to practice what he labels nonviolent action which can be engaged by either the principled or pragmatic perspective (Sharp 1973). These 198
methods can be condensed into three broad categories; nonviolent protest and persuasion, non-cooperation, and nonviolent intervention (Sharp 1973). Nonviolent action is described by Sharp as a “generic term” which encompasses these three broad ways of conducting nonviolent practice (Sharp 1973, p.64). However it is usually associated with principled nonviolence, although it is not exclusive to principled nonviolence. The variety of tactics available to actionists all approach conflict by engaging or conversely, *not* engaging specific actions without the use of direct physical violence (Sharp 1973, p.64). And even though conflict dynamics may be different, the actors involved are said to demonstrate quite similar behaviour in the form of “…symbolic expression (methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion), refusal to perform otherwise acceptable acts (methods of noncooperation), or direct and psychological disruption of normal activity (methods of nonviolent intervention)” (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.7).

**Nonviolent Struggle**

Nonviolent struggle is the term used for pragmatic nonviolence, distinguishing it from the principled Gandhian strand of nonviolence, which is more commonly called nonviolent action (Weber 2008, p.1369). Sharp calls nonviolent struggle an “alternative to violence” and a way of executing nonviolence which is expansive and able to incorporate many different methods, acknowledging too that it may also be called nonviolent action (Sharp 2006, p.6). Sharp’s use of the word ‘struggle’ may be an attempt to add strength, in its very connotation, to the argument affirming there is nothing passive about nonviolence. Struggle also fits the ‘war-like’ language which Sharp uses when describing pragmatic nonviolence.

> [Nonviolence] is a means of combat, as is war. It involves the matching of forces and the waging of ‘battles,’ requires wise strategy and tactics, and demands of its ‘soldiers’ courage, discipline, and sacrifice (Sharp 1973, p.67).

Sharp infers that nonviolent struggle is a stronger form of nonviolence used when the “milder types of action” for example persuasion or negotiation have proven ineffective or failed in some way (Sharp 2008, p.1373). It is also the means for conducting conflict
outside of traditional political practice, for example the use of election, political lobbying or use of legislation, which sets it apart from other forms of nonviolent techniques (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, p.10; Schock 2003, p.705).

**Nonviolent Resistance**

Nonviolent resistance is associated with movements where citizens engage in conflict without violence by way of economic, social, or the political forum. “It includes acts of omission, acts of commission, or a combination of both” (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, p.9; Schock 2003, p.705).

Nonviolent resistance may use disruptive pragmatic techniques such as defiance and noncooperation which can force an opponent to give in to its demands (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, p.10). Similar to nonviolent struggle, it is more commonly associated with pragmatic nonviolence methods however this does not exclude practitioners of principled nonviolence from engaging in nonviolent resistance. Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. are both examples of people who have used its techniques (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, p.10).

Nonviolent action, nonviolent struggle and nonviolent resistance are a way of framing the methods used in nonviolence campaigns. The way this terminology is used, may help a movement’s ability to maintain nonviolence, as the terms can indicate varying degrees of force used and whether principled or pragmatic nonviolence is engaged.

**Satyagraha**

The word ‘*satyagraha*’ was created by Gandhi to describe nonviolent action. *Satyagraha* embodies the idea of a power which is able to transform and liberate in some of the same ways love may be able to alter situations (Dalton 1993, p.37). *Satyagraha* also excludes the notion of passivity which Gandhi repeatedly rejected as weakness and holding onto selfishness (Dalton 1993, p.38). *Satyagraha* may include civil disobedience and non-cooperation but it does not promote passive resistance (Dalton 1993, pp.37-38). Gandhi sought to illuminate the idea that nonviolence was a ‘superior moral power’ in both the practical and the theoretical (Dalton 1993, p.40).
Such an approach demands imagination and courage, usually the rejection of expedient measures. It does not mean ignoring or running away from conflict; rather it looks on conflict as providing the creative opportunity for human progress (Summy 2008).

Although the terms *nonviolent action, nonviolent struggle, nonviolent resistance* and *satyagraha* can be defined, the literature appears to use the terminology with some flexibility, particularly when describing what may be principled or pragmatic nonviolence.

### 2.3 Nonviolence: Methods

Sharp’s *198 Methods of Nonviolent Action* (Sharp 1973) catalogues a variety of techniques all of which can be conducted from a principled or pragmatic perspective. These methods are grouped into three categories: protest and persuasion; noncooperation; and intervention.

**Protest and Persuasion**

Protest and persuasion form a collection of nonviolent methods used to indicate that a group is not satisfied, disagree with or are not in favour of something. It may also demonstrate a group is pro-something. This method is also a way of expressing an ethical or moral view on an issue. Protest and persuasion methods use symbolic acts which push beyond everyday verbal communication but do not exceed into the realm of noncooperation or intervention (Sharp 1973, p.117). Sharp has listed fifty-four protest and persuasion methods, for example: formal statements; symbolic public acts; pressure on individuals and drama and music (Sharp 1973, pp.117-173).

**Noncooperation**

Noncooperation is a very deliberate method of defiance, withdrawing, withholding, discontinuing or refusal of relationship within the political, social or economic context. Noncooperation may evolve spontaneously or be an organised event. People involved in
this kind of action reduce or completely halt normal cooperation and/or withhold any kind of new support, which causes usual processes to slow or come to a complete standstill (Sharp 1973, pp.183-184). Noncooperation is categorised under three headings: social noncooperation; economic noncooperation and political noncooperation (Sharp 1973, p.184). Examples are: ostracising others; withdrawing from social systems; industrial strikes; rejecting authority; citizens’ noncooperation with the government and international government taking action (Sharp 1973, pp.183-347).

**Intervention**

Sharp claims there are forty-one methods of nonviolent intervention. These are a very different class of action techniques from the previous methods of protest and persuasion and noncooperation, set apart by the fact that they “intervene” in a conflict (Sharp 1973, p.357). This may have a positive or a detrimental effect on a situation as intervention will either add, for example, new ways of relating or creating policy, or alternatively create destruction of relationship and policy which is not as desirable an outcome. Intervention is also a much more direct way of challenging the other party and can be very disruptive and difficult to ignore (Sharp 1973, p.358). This method of nonviolence, however, may produce change in a person’s point of view or at least “less certain of the rightness of his [her] previous views” (Sharp 1973, p.358). The five intervention categories are: psychological; physical; social; political and economic intervention (Sharp 1973, p.358).

**2.4 Nonviolence: Critiques**

Although nonviolence is not a new concept, and there is a growing body of research literature and empirical data to demonstrate its capacity for conflict resolution, nonviolence may still be viewed with suspicion when examined as an alternative to violence. Investigation into nonviolent campaigns and current nonviolence research may contribute to a greater understanding of nonviolence, explained in more detail below.
Nonviolence Campaigns

Thomas Weber writes of different standards being applied to nonviolence campaigns as opposed to military missions. He claims that when assessing nonviolent struggle the standards are comparatively much harsher. Weber argues, for example, that when nonviolent action is unsuccessful, it is nonviolence itself that is brought into question and viewed as not effective rather than the individual campaign (Weber 2008, p.1371). He reinforces this argument with the example of Vietnam as a military defeat, where violence was not challenged as being the reason for failure and “...certainly no conclusion was reached that military violence as a strategy was fundamentally flawed” (Weber 2008, p.1371). He continues,

[i]t seems only nonviolence is put to this higher test. If a nonviolent action fails to achieve change, often the entire strategy of nonviolent activism is questioned rather than some particular failing in that campaign being pinpointed as being the main contributor to failure (Weber 2008, p.1371).

The use of weapons and violent force in a conflict situation demonstrate power and an immediate response to threat. This tends to be reinforced by popular culture and the media’s portrayal of conflict (Weber 2008, p.1363). Likewise, when nonviolence doesn’t work, people are inclined to push the default button back to violence. However, when nonviolence campaigns abandon nonviolence for violence there are often “serious costs” (Ackerman and Rodal 2008, p.118). The social critic Theodore Roszak is quoted by Weber as saying: “People try nonviolence for a week, and when it ‘doesn’t work’ they go back to violence, which hasn’t worked for centuries” (Weber 2008, p.1371). However, the concept and practice of nonviolence has been present over much of the history of humankind and there is evidence indicating that our early hunter-gatherer ancestors lived a nonviolent way of life (Giorgi 2009, p.97). The twentieth century, has been witness to what appears to be an increase in nonviolence practice and this has been accompanied by recent academic investigation into this phenomenon (Zunes 1994).
**Current Nonviolence Research – East Asia**

At present, there is growing research interest in rising levels of nonviolence and decreasing levels of violence in East Asia. Research has found that since the early 1980’s there has been a marked downward trend in violent conflict, while at the same time a notable increase in nonviolent uprisings in this region (Svensson and Lindgren 2011; Svensson and Lindgren 2010; Kivimaki 2010a; Kivimaki 2010b; Tonnesson 2009). Zunes also identifies dramatic growth in nonviolence movements as good reason for exploring this trend (Zunes 1994, p.404). If nonviolence movements are becoming more prevalent in the East Asian region, there is scope for analysis of the broader factors motivating people to take part in nonviolent action. The current research which is emerging may also help to identify how a commitment to nonviolence is sustained for the duration of a nonviolent campaign.

A more detailed discussion of the East Asian peace phenomenon will now be given, providing a contextual base for the two case studies. Because this is a relatively new area of research interest, assumptions made in the literature on nonviolence are still under-researched. Further empirical work is needed in order to determine what factors are contributing not only to an increase in nonviolent campaigns and how they initiate but also ways nonviolence movements maintain nonviolent discipline. Despite recent research into an increase in nonviolence campaigns there is still a lack of clarity surrounding how nonviolence movements maintain nonviolence. The present thesis aims to shed some empirical light on this area of research.
II. East Asian Peace

[T]he dominant view in the debate is . . . that major armed conflicts are declining in frequency. The geographical area where this trend plays out most markedly is East Asia (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, p.220).
Since the early 1980s there has been a noticeable increase in peace and a decrease in armed conflict in the entire region of East Asia which has subsequently ignited interest for peace researchers (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, Kivimaki 2010a, Goldsmith 2007, Yan 2003). Various theories have been proposed as to why this phenomenon is occurring. The purpose of this section is to examine the literature on East Asian peace and provide a research base and context in which to situate the two case studies – nonviolence movements from China and South Korea – which will be discussed in more detail in chapters four and five. This section of the literature review also seeks to demonstrate ways in which nonviolent discipline may be influenced by the external and internal factors which promote East Asian peace.

To begin, East Asian peace will be defined followed by identifying factors which may contribute to East Asian peace. There are varied explanations suggested in the literature as to why East Asia appears to be more peaceful nowadays, however this thesis will address only those reasons which may add relevance to the case studies.

The factors which may influence East Asian peace such as international and national interests, South Korean peace processes and the role of ASEAN will be discussed (Yan 2003, Kivimaki 2010b). Following this, the chapter will describe empirical trends. These trends suggest that violent conflict has decreased in East Asia over the past thirty years while nonviolent insurrections and protest movements have increased, and possible reasons why this has occurred (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, Kivimaki 2010a; Stephan 2006).

### 2.5 East Asian Peace

East Asia is a geographic region comprised of seventeen countries (Table 1) (Tonnesson 2009). There has not only been a decrease in violent conflict in these countries but also a marked increase in nonviolent protests and uprisings in East Asia (Svensson and Lindgren 2011). This phenomenon is what peace researchers are calling East Asian peace and scholars are taking an interest, although it is worth noting it is still a very new
area of academic exploration (Svensson and Lindgren 2011; Kivimaki 2010a; Tonnesson 2009; Goldsmith 2007; Yan 2003).

Table 1: Countries of East Asia (Tonnesson 2009)

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>China</strong></td>
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<td>(Case Study 1)</td>
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<td><strong>South Korea</strong></td>
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<td><strong>North Korea</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Mongolia</strong></td>
<td><strong>Myanmar/Burma</strong></td>
<td><strong>Brunei</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Taiwan</strong></td>
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<td><strong>East Timor</strong></td>
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East Asia has shown itself to be not only peaceful when compared to other parts of the world, but peaceful in relation to itself (Kivimaki 2010a, p.523). In particular this has been evident since the 1980’s when there was a dramatic decrease in violence and marked increase in peace (Kivimaki 2010a, p.523). Because of the dramatic decline in battle-related deaths in the region since 1979, East Asian peace is a phenomenon worth exploring (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, pp.221-222). However, evidence of peace in East Asia does not automatically assume that this region has become more skilful in the art of being peaceful. Research is interested in the reduction of levels of violence in East Asia and what exactly may have enabled such a change (Tonnesson 2009). The reasons for why change has occurred in East Asia may also be of relevance to understanding the conditions which contribute to maintaining nonviolent discipline in each of the case studies.
2.6 Reasons for East Asian Peace
Why has East Asia in particular seen a rise in levels of peace and a decrease in violent conflict? The literature has a strong focus on reasons addressing why East Asian peace occurs and offers many possible explanations. This thesis acknowledges this contribution by exploring several examples. However this thesis is more specifically concerned with the conditions which maintain nonviolent discipline, so the following elements will be briefly outlined as a context for the case studies: international relationships; national interests; South Korean peace processes and the role of ASEAN.

International Relationships
International relationships and alliances between world powers have invested a presence in East Asia. Whether it has been for strategic, political or security reasons, alliances between countries in the region and international actors have been a part of the history of East Asian nations. However, though international power relations in the region may be a factor in helping develop peace, they have also participated in violent conflict in more than one country in East Asia (Yan 2003, p.31). Good relationships between international powers does not, therefore automatically guarantee security. “. . . [T]he goal of establishing partnerships is to avoid military conflicts, but it cannot ensure the absence of security dilemmas” (Yan 2003, p.32).

National Interests
National interests in East Asia may be a unifying factor which motivates peace. National interests within the region are closely intertwined acting as a deterrent for countries in East Asia taking up arms against each other. The close geographic proximity of these countries and their combined interest in development may encourage maintaining healthy relationships, therefore contributing to peace in the region. This may be another kind of relationship which may play a positive role in peace development in East Asia (Yan 2003, pp.32-33).
South Korea’s Policy on Reunification

Korea is a country which experienced one of the most violent wars with the greatest loss of life (per year) since the end of WWII (Kivimaki 2010b, p.356). From the early 1990’s the peaceful reunification of North and South was seriously discussed and this in turn had a valuable influence on South Korea’s policy on strategies in national defence (Yan 2003, p.44). Kim Dae Jung, the South Korean president who took up office in 1998, is well-known for his ‘Sunshine Policy’ towards North Korea, which was significant in improving the relationship between the two Koreas (Yan 2003, p.45). Unfortunately, many of these good intentions have been undone by subsequent South Korean government policy which more recently has taken a much tougher stance on relations with the North. Nevertheless, the efforts South Korea has made, and future possibilities of developing relationship with the North may also contribute to the ways of establishing peace in the region.

Jeju Peace Process

South Korea’s contribution to East Asian peace is also apparent in the initiation of the Jeju Peace Process which is a series of peace talks and forums held on the island of Jeju off the southern coast of Korea. The Jeju Peace Process hosts the bi-annual Peace Forum which focuses specifically on issues of security within both Korea and East Asia (Kivimaki 2010b, p.358). “...[T]he forum also represents a contribution to offering communication between former and current leaders, and thus, to introduce a longer learning curve for peace promotion” (Kivimaki 2010b, p.358). As there is yet to be an accepted peace agreement between North and South Korea, this state of limbo may provide an incentive for further Korean commitment to peace forums (Kivimaki 2010b, p.355). By actively creating ways to promote peace and maintain security Korea plays a function in the development of East Asian peace and addressing peace diplomacy in the region (Kivimaki 2010b, p.355).
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967 and is made up of ten member states, but includes other nations such as Japan, China and South Korea referred to as “ASEAN plus three,” or “East Asian Community” (Kivimaki 2010a, p.507). ASEAN is of interest to East Asian peace because the nations of ASEAN are made up of ten countries in East Asia, the region which may have become more peaceful since 1979 (Kivimaki 2010a, p.507). ASEAN security policy not only may create the potential for peace within the countries of East Asia, but also takes into account how international relationships, such as the US may affect the region (Yan 2003, p.43). ASEAN security policy plays a significant role in the region by offering solidarity to its member states protecting them from international interference. For example, ASEAN security policy was tested when the United States requested international sanctions against Myanmar/Burma in the early 1990s. ASEAN paid no attention to this request and went on to affiliate Myanmar/Burma in 1997 as a full member (Yan 2003, p.45). Affiliating Myanmar/Burma may have helped to solidify ASEAN’s position on international interference, while also setting a precedent for future interaction between the US and ASEAN member states.

The “ASEAN way”
The “ASEAN way” is based on four premises, which may be of interest to the development of nonviolent discipline as they address unity, leadership and strategy. This approach to issues is largely governed by a commitment to non-interference (Kivimaki 2010b, p.362). The “ASEAN way” of dealing with issues of security and controversy is not just about ASEAN but is in fact the way of East Asia (Kivimaki 2010b, p.361).

The four premises are as follows:
The first premise is concerned with issues of sovereignty. This is largely echoed by a strong commitment to non-interference in any domestic conflict that may arise within another country (Kivimaki 2010b, p.361).

The second premise addresses unifying elements that bring countries together rather than cause the conflicts. For example: “…common identity, common interests, confidence-building, and common norms” (Kivimaki 2010b, p.361).

The third premise and an interest which serves peace in the region is development. In almost all of the East Asian countries there is a strong drive for development, and because it is valued, it is unlikely that this would be abandoned for conflict (Kivimaki 2010b, p.361). Development is strategic and pragmatic, and may be a contributing factor when committing to nonviolence as a tactic. “Development became the prime declared objective and rationale for states, and the rationales of nationalism and revolution were put in the back seat” (Kivimaki 2010b, p.362).

The fourth and final premise is the recognized code of conduct of saving face, a cultural norm within East Asian diplomacy. This cultural practice encourages an environment which ensures that there will be non-confrontational tactics used when dealing with disputes. The idea of ‘saving face’ allows an extended time period for agreement to be reached, ensuring contentious issues are kept below the surface, and never brought into the public arena (Kivimaki 2010b, p.361). “…[S]aving face has also been part of the peace doctrine in East Asia. The effort to defeat one’s enemies no longer belongs to the code of conduct” (Kivimaki 2010b, p.363).

2.7 Empirical Trends in East Asian Peace
Peace and Conflict research has been exploring the data and empirical trends which indicate signs of East Asia becoming more peaceful since the 1980’s. These four trends will be discussed in more detail below.
Decrease in Violent Conflict
There has been a marked decrease in battle related deaths in the East Asian region. From 1950-1979 there were approximately 4.2 million deaths. Compare this with data from 1980-2005 which estimates 100,000 battle related deaths occurred in East Asia (Tonnesson 2009, p.112).

Increase in Nonviolent Action
Not only has there been a marked decrease in battle related deaths, but over the same time period empirical evidence demonstrates that nonviolent or unarmed uprisings are on the increase in East Asia (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, p.231; Stephan 2006, p.58). Since 1979 nonviolent uprisings have doubled in number (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, p.231). This is a notable increase, which is opposite to the trend in armed conflict with both a decline in battle-related deaths and in the number of active conflicts (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, p.225). Of interest to East Asian peace is the fact that “. . . almost a third of all non-violent uprisings since 1946 have occurred in Asia, and most of these in East Asia” (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, p.225).

Reasons for an Increase in Nonviolent Action
Reasons why there has been an increase in nonviolent action in East Asia may be explained by examining the relationship between armed and unarmed conflicts. Research attempts to understand this transformation from one to the other poses the question, “[w]hat would be the reason for such a transformation where unarmed ways of managing political conflicts have started to replace the relevance of armed force?” (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, p.222). There are several possible explanations:

First, there may now be greater costs in armed warfare and the benefits no longer outweigh these, making nonviolent action a more desirable alternative (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, p.223; Zunes 1994, p.406).
Secondly, is the growing awareness that unarmed or nonviolent movements can be very powerful and able to meet its goals with even more success than violent conflict (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, p.222; Ackerman and Rodal 2008, p.120; Zunes 1994, p.411).

The third and final reason suggested is the knowledge that military struggles have continued to have problems with developing democracy in these places once the conflict has ended (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, p.222; Ackerman and Rodal 2008, p.119).

**Differences between Armed and Unarmed Conflict**

Svensson and Lindgren further suggest that the objectives of armed and unarmed insurrections are different. Data analysis shows that there are two clearly differentiated purposes for unarmed and armed conflicts and from this data we can conclude that in East Asia, nonviolence movements are predominantly concerned with government issues, whereas violent uprisings are more likely to be about territorial disagreement (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, p.231). Prior to 1980, and the rising levels of nonviolent campaigns, East Asia experienced a large proportion of the world’s one-sided violence (Tonnesson 2009, p.116). Most frequently, one-sided violence is perpetrated by the government (Kivimaki 2010a, p.509). Therefore if nonviolent campaigns are usually concerned with issues of government and East Asia has been subjected to high levels of government-led one-sided violence, can this be another reason there has been an increase in citizen-led nonviolence movements in the East Asian region?

There also appears to be a clear differentiation between violent armed conflict and unarmed nonviolent methods of engagement. This is demonstrated not only by the evidence that the actors who participate in nonviolent struggle are not the same actors who take part in violent conflict, but also that once nonviolence has been determined as the method it is unlikely to escalate into violence (Svensson and Lindgren 2011, p.231).

The empirical evidence makes a robust argument for the claim that there has been a decline in violent conflict in East Asia since the early 1980’s. But not only has there been a decrease in overall violence but there has also been a significant increase in
nonviolent practice. This supports the premise that East Asia is a more peaceful region than it was prior to 1980, inviting investigation into nonviolence movements which have occurred in countries in East Asia, and how this context of increasing nonviolence may be able to influence nonviolent discipline in individual campaigns.

2.8 Challenges and Ways Forward for East Asian Peace

Although there has been evidence of a decline in battle related deaths this does not automatically equal peace. Kivimaki identifies there needs to be data drawn from a larger sample of violence sources for there to be a convincing argument for the decline of violent conflict and a rise in levels of peace. He proceeds to examine other kinds of less traditional conflict which may emerge in place of conflict determined by battle deaths (Kivimaki 2010a, p.504). His findings support the fact that violence has not only been reduced in conflict which is measured by battle deaths, but has also dramatically declined in other areas of conflict too (Kivimaki 2010a).

Although there has been a reduction in violence, East Asian peace is not as strong or successful in the area of resolving the disputes which the conflict originates from (Kivimaki 2010b, p.363). The weakness which is exposed here is that although there is peace, the underlying conflicts or problems, have not been dealt with at their origin. If conflict resolution is a key component in creating positive peace, then East Asian peace is still relatively weak in this area (Kivimaki 2010a, p.523). The importance of giving support to factors uniting the countries of East Asia, while still addressing the divisive issues which cause conflict, remains a challenge (Kivimaki 2010b, p.364).

Regional Level Processes

Utilising processes at a regional level is one way to approach concerns in the region for example, the issue of security (Kivimaki 2010b). Encouraging practice like the Jeju Peace Forum which acts at a national level, but still has the capacity to influence larger issues of security, may well be one way to resolve issues. This forum for East Asian nations is a powerful tool if given the necessary support from regional players. If the Jeju
Process could go deeper into the issues, and appreciate the relations and the variety of ways that war could be prevented by focusing on the problems that may cause violence, then it could play a vital role in developing answers to some of the challenges for East Asian peace (Kivimaki 2010b, p.364). It also appears to be important this should be an East Asian led process, rather than for example an American one, if it is to have a better chance at being successful (Kivimaki 2010b, p.360). This is indicated by processes such as ASEAN’s non-interference strategy seemingly making a positive contribution to peace in the East Asian region.

The Jeju Process is another mobilising structure from which nonviolence methods may be initiated from, supporting the ability to maintain nonviolent discipline. The Jeju Process may be a peaceful way to address political, cultural or economic issues which might otherwise be dealt with through more violent means (Kivimaki 2010b, p.365). Furthermore, if the public was committed to nonviolent action for political expression or as a collective cultural voice, it would aid the East Asian region in nonviolent strategies when dealing with conflict governments are unable to contain (Kivimaki 2010b, p.365). There is also the idea that the growing culmination of a history of nonviolence movements and protest in East Asia may be another unifying structural element which demonstrates and reinforces methods of remaining nonviolent.

The existing security umbrella of organisations such as ASEAN and the Jeju Process, alongside likeminded initiatives may provide a genuine platform in East Asia for the collective development of nonviolent discipline. These organisations, which provide leadership and support could become representative of the region’s capacity for unity, strategy planning and teaching nonviolent discipline (Akerman and Rodal 2008; Stephan 2006; Stephan and Mundy 2006).
2.9 Summary
This chapter has been written in two parts. The first part gives a theoretical background to nonviolence and its practice. The second part has identified East Asia as a specific region which has shown evidence of an increase in nonviolence. Research on East Asian peace may offer insight on the conditions which influence why nonviolent discipline is maintained in some nonviolence movements and not in others.
Chapter Three: Analytical Framework

If broader questions about how nonviolent action operates are to be answered adequately, they must be answered under as varied a set of circumstances as possible. This is implicitly comparative. Moreover, comparative research must itself be related to the theoretical basis of the field. It must inform theory and be informed by theory (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.25).
This chapter will provide an analytical framework for conducting comparative case studies of nonviolent action to illuminate the research question “Under what conditions is nonviolent discipline maintained in nonviolence movements?”

The aim of this framework is to create an overarching connection between the theory on nonviolence, the East Asian peace phenomenon and the contribution these make to understanding conditions which affect maintaining nonviolent discipline in the two case study chapters which will follow.

McCarthy and Kruegler’s research which forms the structure of the analytical framework, has addressed only how to utilise pragmatic tactics in the examination of nonviolence action (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.2). They argue that it is the pragmatic approach, rather than the principled method of nonviolent practice which offers more potential to the field of research (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.8).

In our view . . . the technique [pragmatic] approach is superior as the basis of a research strategy to any a priori understanding of nonviolence or nonviolent action (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, pp.8-9).

Their reasoning for this is supported by the claim that if nonviolent action is understood and interpreted properly it “. . . constitutes a readily identifiable, recurring, and significant human activity in the prosecution of conflicts” (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.2). This thesis, however, attempts to give equal analytical weight to the assessment of both principled and pragmatic nonviolence, arguing that both are credible ways of conducting nonviolent action. In fact, as already suggested in Chapter Two, combining the principled and pragmatic perspectives may positively impact on maintaining nonviolent discipline in nonviolence campaigns. Regardless of a contemporary emphasis which is placed on pragmatic nonviolence, both will be considered in this thesis. This extends the theory of McCarthy and Kruegler to examine not only pragmatic but also how principled tactics of nonviolence fit within this model.
3.1 Case Selection
The purpose of creating a framework of analysis is to provide a systematic way of examining under what conditions nonviolent discipline is maintained in the two case studies: China’s Tiananmen Square 1989 and Korea’s Gwangju Uprising 1980. These cases have been chosen because while both case studies used nonviolence, the movement in Tiananmen 1989 maintained nonviolent discipline whereas the uprising in Gwangju 1980 did not. Examining the conditions present in both cases may offer explanations for why nonviolent discipline can or cannot be maintained in nonviolence movements.

The two case studies are interesting to compare for several reasons. First, both countries are situated in the East Asian region. This offers two examples of nonviolent movements which took place in East Asia post-1979 when there was a recognised increase in nonviolence movements.

Second, there are many parallels between the two cases. Both were pro-democracy, both attempting to free themselves from oppressive regimes, both initiated and led by university students which then expanded to mass public support and similarly both ended with massive loss of life at the hands of their respective governments.

Third, despite many similarities, there were several differences. For example, the timeframe of both movements, the type of physical space the protests occupied, and the way external media played a part in each event. However, the most significant difference between the case studies was their ability to remain nonviolent.

3.2 Conducting Comparative Research
McCarthy and Kruegler identify four factors for nonviolent action case study research. The purpose of choosing these factors is to provide a line of inquiry into nonviolence movements identifying key elements which help to maintain nonviolent discipline. These four factors will be introduced here, applied in the following two chapters and then discussed in Chapter Six.
The dependent variable in the case studies comparison: maintaining nonviolent discipline. This variable is affected by groups of factors to be drawn out from the literature, the independent variables. In this diagram the independent variables are divided into four broad sets of factors: contextual, motivating, interaction and resulting factors (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993). These will be outlined in more detail in the following section.
**Contextual Factors**

Contextual factors form the structure or background to the action (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.25). These might be things such as economic, social, racial, and ethnic factors. It also may take into account the population size, place in international relations and what kind of governing system is in operation (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.25).

Other conditions can also be considered within the structural and contextual factors which are not as obvious as these already mentioned. Yet these factors may be just as important to explore for example, the conditions which create or disable community and commonality within groups which show the indications of being at a greater risk of conflict than others (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.25).

**Motivating Factors**

The second set of motivating factors focus on how and why nonviolent action is motivated and maintained (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.25). McCarthy and Kruegler include in this the basic idea of a “strategic consciousness” (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.26). This consciousness embodies things like the group’s knowledge of what the conflict is about, an understanding of how the opposing party may react or respond, an awareness of the potential for nonviolent action, the choice and execution of tactics or methods of action, and how outcomes might be realised through the use of nonviolence (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.26).

**Interaction Factors**

The interaction factors which are involved throughout a conflict are the third set of variables (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.26). Interaction factors involve the careful detailing of the actions of each party involved in the conflict and their subsequent effects. These are the internal and external factors which may play a part in a campaign, for example catastrophes that are beyond anyone’s control like a natural disaster or economic ruin. The fundamental relationship between actors may also prove to be a factor “. . . or collective action that goes seriously awry. For example, massacres are often crisis points in campaigns . . .” (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.26).
**Resulting Factors**

The fourth and final group of variables are resulting factors or ways of measuring the outcome (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.26). These variables can be divided into two categories which are first, an outline of the outcome or result of nonviolent action and second, analysis of reasons why this was the outcome (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.26).

Outcomes are very difficult to analyse because they are often looked at in terms of either being successful or failing, but within the comparative research framework according to McCarthy and Kruegler, this is not specific enough or has explored enough of the possibilities available (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.27).

As a practical matter, action groups regularly fail to achieve precisely what they set out to achieve (if indeed they know exactly what that is), but is this evidence of ‘failure?’ Likewise, in many cases, the relative effects of a given campaign cannot be fully assessed until some years have passed (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.27).

McCarthy and Kruegler are in favour of a method which looks at the assessment of outcomes as opposed to making a case for the success or inadequacy of a movement (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.27). Similarly, this thesis does not intend to assess the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of the nonviolence movements it will examine. As mentioned, it is difficult to know exactly at what moment in time analysis can determine that success or failure has occurred. The purpose is instead, to identify some of the factors or conditions which may influence the ability of a nonviolence campaign to maintain nonviolent discipline.
3.3 Application of Analytical Framework
This theoretical framework will be applied as follows:

**Contextual Factors: Case Studies Analysis**
Both case study chapters will begin with a brief explanation of the movements’ context, each describing the events and providing appropriate background to the respective case study.

**Motivating and Interaction Factors: Case Studies Analysis**
The two case study chapters will each discuss in more detail the motivating and interaction factors which may contribute to how and why nonviolent action takes place and what kinds of internal and external factors are present. These chapters will assess the structures which are relevant to unifying a nonviolence movement and where evidence of strategy and planning may have added to the structural elements. These chapters will identify evidence of nonviolent discipline and the ways it has been maintained.

**Resulting Factors: Discussion**
The outline of outcomes and an analysis of reasons for their occurrence will be presented in Chapter Six. This chapter will examine the two case studies, testing the research question against the theory, empirical data and analysis which have been laid out in the preceding chapters. It will identify the variation on the dependent variable – nonviolent discipline – and why it was or was not maintained and finally, draw conclusions.

3.4 Summary
This chapter proposes an analytical framework for the purpose of assessing the case studies. McCarthy and Kruegler’s model for comparative analysis of nonviolent action has been adopted to form the basis of the analytical framework of this thesis. The case studies have been introduced, outlining the strong points of similarity which contribute to reasons for case selection, while identifying the critical difference that nonviolent discipline was not maintained in both cases. Finally, the four factors which form the
independent variables of the analytical framework have been described. The following two chapters will use this analytical framework to assess each case study.
Chapter Four: Case Study 1: Tiananmen Square, China 1989

As morning came, students in the square began to gather into squared formations, as if taking up battle positions. Students spread the word, however, that they should all remain nonviolent in case of government attacks (Yang 2000, p.605).
4.1 Context
Tiananmen 1989 was a movement which maintained nonviolence and this chapter will explore some of the reasons why this may have been possible. It is known by various names with examples in the literature such as the “Student Movement” (Lui 2000), “prodemocracy demonstrations of 1989” (Mason and Clements 2002), “1989 Chinese student movement” (Yang 2000), “1989 Democracy Movement” (Tong 1998), and the “1989 Beijing Crisis” (Fei 1989). This thesis will refer to the movement as Tiananmen 1989.

A brief outline of the event will be given, followed by a section on the motivational and contextual factors which contributed to the nonviolent demonstrations during the spring of 1989. These factors will form the framework for addressing the research question, under what conditions is nonviolent discipline maintained in nonviolence movements?

Background on Tiananmen Square, 1989
Tiananmen 1989 was a nonviolent pro-democracy movement led by Chinese students, most significantly living in the Beijing area (Sharp and Jenkins 1989, p.1). Peaceful protests began in the spring of 1989, and ended with devastating violence approximately seven weeks later in Tiananmen Square (Lui 2000, p.139, Sharp and Jenkins 1989, p.1).

The student democracy movement was started by a few hundred students during a time of political change as China underwent economic reforms (Zuo and Benford 1995, p.131). This small group inspired other students and regular citizens too in an impressive movement which challenged the formidable power of the Chinese state (Zuo and Benford 1995, p.131).

Over the weeks of protest, huge numbers of the Beijing students led pro-democracy demonstrations. The focal gathering point was Tiananmen Square, which students occupied and used as their base to protest from over the seven week period (Hershkovitz 1993, p.400). Students used nonviolence tactics, including a hunger strike which helped to attract the attention of the media and the support of the people of China (Zhao 1997, p.159).
The Movement: April – June, 1989
Three stages have been identified in the 1989 student movement (Yang 2000, pp.599-606). The first stage started in mid-April and signalled the beginning of student mobilisation and first demands presented to government officials (Yang 2000, pp.599-600). The second stage began May 13 following the government’s public reaction to the recent demonstrations, which rather than shut down the protests, incited a re-commitment by the students to the movement (Yang 2000, pp.602-604). May 13-19, during the second stage, has been reported to be “[t]he high tide of the movement” (Yang 2000, p.602). The hunger strike and the implementation of martial law signalled the third and final stage of the movement (Yang 2000, pp.604-606). These three stages will now be addressed in more detail.

Stage One
The death of Hu Yaobang has been identified in the literature as the catalyst which initiated the protests of 1989 (Kim, S. 2000; Mason and Clements 2002; Ackerman and DuVall 2000; Tong 1998; Zhao 1998; Zhao 1997; Calhoun 1989). Hu Yaobang was a party leader with the Chinese Communist party who lost his role as general secretary after showing empathy with the 1986 student movement. His unexpected death April 15, 1989 and the feelings that this generated for the students opened a timely political window which began the nonviolent student movement 1989 (Yang 2000, p.599).

On April 18, 1989 a small group of students approached the government, with the intention to meet and give them a list of demands. The government refused to acknowledge the student’s petition, so the students responded with demonstrations and sit-ins which lasted from April 19-20 (Yang 2000, p.599).

The nonviolent student movement used sit-ins and class boycotts as methods of protest. The first record of a class boycott was on April 21 (Yang 2000, p.600). The same day was also memorable for the largest group of people yet to gather together in protest and support for the movement with approximately two hundred thousand people assembling in Tiananmen Square (Yang 2000, p.600).
April 22 was the next significant moment in the movement. Since the funeral for Hu Yaobang, crowds of students had begun gathering calling for specific dialogue with the government leaders in front of the Great Hall of the People, on the western side of Tiananmen Square. At this time, three students as representatives of the wider student group stepped forward, ignored the police presence and climbed the stairs to the Great Hall. They had with them a petition, which they presented “. . . in the style of a courtier presenting a memorial to the emperor in earlier times” (Yang 2000, p.600). However, none of the government representatives acknowledged their presence and the students were left kneeling on the steps, ignored by the officials for more than twenty minutes (Yang 2000, p.600).

This act of self-humiliation sent multiple symbolic messages. On the one hand, by assuming the posture of a traditional courtier, the three student representatives clearly drew an analogy between current state leaders and the feudal rulers of the past. It was thus a deeply critical and embarrassing gesture to the authorities (Yang 2000, p.600).

This act also sent the message that the government officials were unwilling to engage, demonstrated even more explicitly by the governments’ subsequent public statement for a newspaper editorial which was also broadcast on central radio (Yang 2000, p.601; Ackerman and DuVall 2000, p.423). It labelled the students and the movement a ‘turmoil’ and that demonstrations would be banned (Yang 2000, p.601; Tong 1998, p.316; Calhoun 1989, p.21). This threat of action against students who attended demonstrations and protest created a climate of fear amongst the student protestors (Yang 2000, p.601). However, this did not stop the students, who called for a rally on April 27, under the organization of the All Beijing College Student Unions (Yang 2000, p.602). Although the government’s threats had left some of the students wanting to cancel or downscale the size of the rally, the energy of the previous ten days was sufficient that many students were prepared and willing to continue with the movement (Yang 2000, p.602).

The students also knew that surrendering now, at the first show of significant government pressure would be a loss of face and very shameful, and so the students may
have felt they had to continue, to show their dedication to the movement was serious (Yang 2000, p.602). The students went ahead with the planned demonstration which was a huge success with over 200,000 students and more than a million citizens joining the march (Tong 1998, p.316). The government withdrew their threats allowing the movement to continue (Yang 2000, p.602). This began the second phase of Tiananmen 1989.

**Stage Two**

At this point in the movement it was apparent that the students had a very strong public backing. This was demonstrated by the crowds filling Tiananmen Square which numbered approximately one million on a daily basis between 16-18 May (Yang 2000, p.602). Dialogues which took place between the government officials and student delegates were televised along with news coverage time which was given to the student demonstrations (Tong 1998, p.316). This attention increased once the international media got involved which made it increasingly difficult for the Chinese government to disband the students through the use of violence (Lui 2000, p.140; Calhoun 1989, p.23).

The most significant reason for gaining such wide-reaching mobilisation was the students’ hunger strike, May 13-19 (Tong 1998, p.316). There are various explanations for why students chose to adopt the hunger strike as a tactic. First is that they believed this was a way to engage the government in dialogue; second, with Mikhail Gorbachev’s impending visit, the hunger strike would give students more power to bargain with the authorities (Yang 2000, p.602). The hunger strike evoked the empathy of the wider public and also demonstrated to the government the student’s commitment to the movement. “Most people in Beijing, including lesser government leaders, were concerned about the students’ health and greatly annoyed by a silent central government. They were also greatly moved by the heroism that the hunger strikers had expressed” (Zhao 1998, p.1499).

This continued to generate support from the citizens of Beijing and further afield (Lui 2000, p.140). The intellectual community was one group, significant in their support of the student’s protests. There were many who were willing to stand up publicly and
confirm this support. They also played a role in helping to draft the initial demands which were presented to the National People’s Congress (Lui 2000, p.140). “... From factories up to the State Council, almost all the government, public, and private institutions in Beijing had semiofficially organized demonstrations to support the students and to urge the central government to negotiate with them” (Zhao 1998, p.1499). The external support of these institutions may have been one reason negotiations did take place between the protest groups and the government throughout May 1989, however these talks started to break down towards the end of the month.

Tiananmen 1989 was growing and with Mikhail Gorbachev due to arrive on the 15 May, students were still occupying Tiananmen Square (Zhao 1998, p.1499). This attention was heightened as media captured the demonstrations that took place around President Gorbachev’s visit (Lui 2000, p.140). The student’s refusal to abandon the Square and to continue their demonstrations disrupted the original plans for Gorbachev’s stay in China and greatly embarrassed the Chinese government (Zhao 1998, p.1499; Calhoun 1989, p.23). In response, martial law was employed from May 20, 1989 (Zhao 1998, p.1499).

By May 18, 1989 numbers had grown to well over a million and students ended hunger striking in the evening of May 19, after they heard about martial law being put in place the following day. However, the square remained occupied (Zhao 1998, p.1499). May 18 was also the day that government and students attempted dialogue which ended with Li Peng, the Premier, taking offense to the remarks of the students and reacting by demanding they leave the Square and refusing to negotiate further (Lui 2000, p.142; Calhoun 1989, p.24). “May 18 represented the failure of the negotiation process on both sides” (Lui 2000, p.143). This presented the real possibility that the government might resort to violence to move the students out of Tiananmen Square (Lui 2000, p.140).

**Stage Three**

On May 19 the students heard rumours that martial law was being put in place generating fear amongst the student protest groups who occupied Tiananmen Square (Yang 2000, p.602). The night of May 19 troops numbering approximately 80,000 marched into Beijing, before martial law had been officially declared (Zhao 1998, p.1499).
Martial law officially came into effect on May 20 and yet there continued to be a show of support and participation in the movement (Yang 2000, p.605). It was over the next few days the troops attempted to move forward into Beijing. Barricades were erected by the public, creating a stalemate between the people supporting the nonviolent student movement and the military who were receiving their orders from the government (Calhoun 1989, p.27).

The government might have expected that the sheer size of the army itself would be enough to deter any attempt at resistance. On the contrary, under a popular belief that the soldiers were going to hurt the students in the square, people went out in the hundreds of thousands and successfully stopped the army (Zhao 1998, pp.1499-1500).

The troops were immobilised by local citizens and students in most areas of the city for about four days. People had climbed onto the military trucks, talking with the soldiers and preventing further movement (Calhoun 1989, pp.27-28). These troops were subsequently replaced as the government “. . . began to think these troops were both tired and insufficiently threatening” (Calhoun 1989, p.28).

As martial law was maintained, the movement steadily lost support and by May 29 numbers in Tiananmen Square had dropped to less than ten thousand people (Yang 2000, p.605). On the night of June 3 when the troops moved into Beijing, advancing on Tiananmen Square, there were no longer the large crowds which had been gathered earlier in the movement. It is estimated that between three and five thousand people remained who refused to leave the square (Yang 2000, p.605). At first, the troops were prevented from entering the square by the crowds of people who were supporting the remaining students.

By the early hours of June 4, reinforcements were called bringing with them tanks, live ammunition and boosting troop numbers (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, p.425). The army was ordered to advance but as they did the students stayed calm, maintaining nonviolent methods, using themselves as human barricades and placing obstacles in the streets in an attempt to halt movement of the 27th Army armed troops (Lui 2000, p.140).
The 38th Army who had been occupying Tiananmen Square while the students demonstrated was replaced now by the 27th Army which, it was understood, had been kept in isolation from any external information or influence and were informed that they were moving out to contain a situation of “counter-revolutionary uprising” (Lui 2000, p.143). It was also understood that these soldiers had been picked from the outlying rural areas, where standard Chinese was not fluently spoken, so as to be less sympathetic with the urban-living protestors (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, p. 425; Calhoun 1989, p.28).

The action of replacing the 38th Army who had built a relationship with the protesting students, with the 27th Army was another indication that the government was not interested in negotiations and they were priming themselves for armed engagement (Lui 2000, p.143). The students still appeared to have no reason to believe the soldiers might harm them as the “. . . mandate of the People’s Liberation Army was to serve and protect the people of China, and never before had the army used force to end civil strife” (Lui 2000, p.144). This may account for why the students were slow to react to the deployment of the 27th Army (Lui 2000, p.144). The students may have also expected to be able to win these troops over, the way they had with the 38th Army soldiers, but it quickly became clear by the military’s use of violent force that this was not an option. The belief that the army would not intentionally cause any harm probably contributed to the tragedy, adding to the confusion and increasing the death toll (Lui 2000, p.144).

When troops began firing, it created panic and dispersal of the crowd as they tried to find safety. Reports from bystanders called the soldiers methods ‘indiscriminate’ (Lui 2000, p.144). “Students attempting to return to their dormitories, innocent civilians, and those who simply tried to run or hide were killed” (Lui 2000, p.144). The soldiers reached Tiananmen Square and gave a command for the students to withdraw and leave the square. Most people followed orders and little was left but the students’ tents and other equipment they had used to shelter in for the tanks to demolish (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, p.425). This, however, gave the government grounds to assert that there was only one death in Tiananmen Square, due to the fact that most of the students had vacated of their own accord. What was overlooked is the fact that many died trying to prevent the
troops from getting into Tiananmen Square (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, p.426). The estimated death toll varies considerably ranging from the government’s claim that 300 died, and that most of these deaths were soldiers not civilians, and other figures that claim as many as 10,000 people lost their lives that day (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, p.426). The Chinese Red Cross puts the figure for June 4, 1989 at 2,600 deaths, and thousands of people taken away under arrest (Lui 2000, p.144).

4.2 Motivating and Interaction Factors
This section identifies factors such as collective action, protest history, ecology, political opportunity, university dormitory culture, leadership and external influence. These factors provide the conditions which may motivate or contribute to how nonviolent discipline is maintained within the case study context.

Collective Action
Collective action is a mobilising structure which may be a unifying factor in the events of Tiananmen 1989. Contemporary research in social movement theory focuses on the idea that collective action is about groups of people doing something together (Oliver 1993, p.272). Rather than being seen as mass irrationality or the foolish behaviour of a mob, as it once was, collective action is viewed by researchers as a legitimate group activity demonstrating purpose and quite deliberate tactics (McCarthey and Kruegler 1993, p.13). This suggests that the unifying, collective action of a group is both a natural, rational human activity and a vehicle for purposeful and strategic action, which may have a positive influence on how nonviolence movements are perceived and studied by academics. There may be sceptics who argue that nonviolent action is unlikely to mobilise groups to operate collectively and maintain nonviolent discipline (Sharp 1973, p.621). However, Sharp argues, as social scientists have come to similar conclusions, that people participate in nonviolent action, without necessarily needing individual reward, encouraged and supported by others who are similarly involved, thus helping develop nonviolent discipline on a mass basis (Sharp 1973, p.621). The assumption therefore, that people need to be guaranteed some kind of individual benefits in order to
collectively participate is not always true and even without reward people are willing to participate in “dissident collective action” (Mason and Clements 2002, p.160).

To dismiss the Student Movement [Tiananmen 1989] as solely motivated by self-interest, however, would do a grave injustice. The consciousness of students and intellectuals eventually expanded beyond particular interests to include national concerns and universal ideals (Lui 2000, p.141).

However, there is also the consideration that it seems unlikely that a revolutionary movement at the national level would emerge “spontaneously from community based social networks” (Mason and Clements 2002, p.161). In the case of Tiananmen 1989 the student networks, discussed in more detail in the following sections, partly emerged out of social (university based) networks, and partly by way of subsequent student organisations and leadership. According to some reports of events, the demonstrations by the students involved in Tiananmen 1989 did appear to be well organised and ordered in formation. This formed two functions, it demonstrated the solidarity of groups showing a united front but also had the practical function of being able to offer protection in the instance of a police confrontation (Lui 2000, p.140).

However Gene Sharp notes that there was also a lot of confusion around the organisation of the student movement as various groups were operating independently of each other (Sharp and Jenkins. 1989, p.3).

Those interviewed often stated that the lack of a ‘universally recognized organization’ was the weakest aspect of their movement. Nearly all students were organized into small, university based groups. By the time of the killings, the students had not produced a unified leadership structure” (Sharp and Jenkins 1989, p.3).

Negotiations were initiated with government officials, yet because of the lack of unification amongst the students they failed and this may be one of the key factors in the government eventually using violence and force to bring the protests to a close. The breakdown in dialogue and negotiation is recorded by Lui as being “[t]he greatest failure at Tiananmen Square . . .” (Lui 2000, p.144). Mason and Clements indicate that there
needs to be sufficient grievance shared by a section of the population to motivate joining a demonstration and there needs to be adequate dissident leadership and organization to help mobilise people to join the movement (Mason and Clements 2002, p.162). Tiananmen 1989 was motivated by a political grievance and there was adequate leadership, however it also lacked, as outlined in more general terms by Mason and Clements, sufficient organisation and leadership to maintain the movement and to coordinate the communication between various parties (Mason and Clements 2002, p.161).

Protest History
Tiananmen 1989 emerged out of a history of political protest. The political era in China following Mao, relaxed some of its control mechanisms and subsequently protest and mass demonstration became an important method for dissident Chinese citizens to exercise an opinion (Mason and Clements 2002, p.163). Some of the students involved in the 1989 movement had prior experience or knowledge of earlier demonstrations, in particular the protests of 1986-87 (Mason and Clements 2002, p.173). During 1988 there were over two hundred protest demonstrations or similar activities which took place at Beijing University campus (Mason and Clements 2002, p.173). The history of protest in China however, stretches much further back. There were a number of important campaigns which paved the way for the 1989 nonviolent student movement for democracy. These include the May Fourth Movement 1919; anti-government demonstrations from the 1920s-1940s (Hershkovitz 1993, p.406); the Democracy Wall Movement which ran from 1978-79; and a number of smaller protest movements from 1980-88 (Lui 2000, p.139). The May Fourth Movement 1919 took place in Tiananmen Square, which then became the popular space for public demonstrations and protests (Hershkovitz 1993, p.405). The May Fourth rally was led by about 3000 students marching in protest of the government’s response to the Treaty of Versailles, joined by citizens of Beijing, who all eventually collected in Tiananmen Square (Hershkovitz 1993, p.405). Subsequent demonstrations which took place in Tiananmen Square were increasingly met with violence as the state attempted to repress the protests (Hershkovitz 1993, p.406). It was then the symbolism of “... Tiananmen as the frontier between the
inner zone of the rulers and the outer zone of the ruled, that gave the Square its potency as the site for popular political action” (Hershkovitz 1993, p.406).

_Ecology (Social Organisation of Space)_

Tiananmen Square, therefore, can be examined also as a social structure which may have contributed to the students mobilising and maintaining a nonviolent movement. It is suggested, that the Square was more than just a space for the students to gather in. Historically, Tiananmen Square represented the “power of the state” (Hershkovitz 1993, p.399). However, since the early twentieth century, it has also become a space of protest and dissident action (Hershkovitz 1993, p.399). Tiananmen Square as a symbolic place of protest and its occupation by the students, may have helped to unify not only other students, but the wider community of Chinese citizens who were aware of the square’s significance (Kim, S. 2000, p.23).

The Square has been crucial to these struggles, not merely as a container or backdrop, but in a very real sense as the physical object of struggle and transformation. The Square which became the focus of the 1989 student movement is quite literally, the product of this historical process (Hershkovitz 1993, p.400).

Another theory which is explored by Zhao in his 1998 paper is the idea that Beijing university campus ecology, was also a factor in affecting student participation and mobilisation in the nonviolent student movement (Zhao 1998, p.1495).

Some social movement scholars may argue that it is the “. . . formal movement organizations and interpersonal networks [that] are the primary base for movement mobilization” (Zhao 1998, p.1523). Whereas Zhao would argue that the physical space of a particular environment could be interpreted as a ‘social structure’ itself and play a role in the mobilisation of people (Zhao 1998, p.1523).

**Political Opportunity**

Another structural component which arguably played a part in Tiananmen 1989 was political structures. One theory as to why collective action emerges at any given time is
linked to changes or division in political structures providing an opportunity for protest movements to emerge (Morris 2000, p.446). However, this suggests that political change is the only time movements will materialise, given political opportunity which can then be exploited (Morris 2000, p.446). Morris argues that this theory gives all the power to the political structure. “While there is insight here, I will argue that this formulation locates far too much social movement agency in the hands of external actors, and it truncates analysis of movement origins” (Morris 2000, p.446). Therefore it is not just political opportunity structures which provide the impetus for social movements. Cultural agency and dynamics are also significant to social movements and feature as an important contributor to how movements both begin and evolve (Morris 2000, p.446).

“...[I]n some instances, collective action can generate political opportunities where none existed previously; in other instance political opportunities can clear the way for collective action” (Morris 2000, p.447).

Zhao suggests the gradual weakening of the political system, evident in China’s universities through the 1980s could be a reason why students participated in the nonviolent student movement (Zhao 1997, p.161). The internal control system, which was a significant policing system in the universities during Mao’s era, quickly began to lose power once political reform began in the 1980s (Zhao 1997, p.164). The internal control system’s loss of strength, which had been very powerful in universities, meant students could now begin to interact with each other in a new way. This may have aided students’ ability to strategically mobilise (Zhao 1997, p.161).

“In the eighties, the campus environment, once facilitated political control, became conducive to movement mobilization, and the political control institution itself also acquired mobilization functions” (Zhao 1997, p.169). This control, which was no longer as powerful or influential, may have also provided the roots for the dormitory culture which nurtured networks of students capable of uniting for change.

**University Dormitory Culture**

The late eighties saw the university dormitory play a part in motivating students to mobilise the Tiananmen 1989 movement. The dormitory had shifted from being a space
where political control was exercised, but instead now was a place where the ideologies of the student movement could be discussed and gather power (Zhao 1997, p.169). The dormitory both prior to, and during the activities of 1989 was significant in facilitating and transmitting “dissident ideas” (Zhao 1997, p.170).

It is suggested that the tight unifying networks created by the dormitory culture of the universities, provided both the solidarity and the pressure of peers to initiate and participate in the student protests which led to the gathering at Tiananmen Square. There is much more likelihood of participation when there is the knowledge that many others will also be involved (Mason and Clements 2002, p.161). “As group size increases, the size of the contribution required from any one individual approaches zero while the probability of the good being provided approaches one” (Mason and Clements 2002, p.162).

**Leadership**

Out of the collective networks of the dormitory and university culture, it was the students who emerged, prepared to fulfil this leadership position, as had also happened in previous protests in 1976, 1978 and 1986. Although the government had attempted to shut down all previous protest, the dissident and capable group of students still had a legacy within the university culture (Mason and Clements 2002, p.163). “The student leaders at Tiananmen Square were the product of a succession of vociferous and politically involved youth leaders” (Lui 2000, p.139).

Despite the experienced leadership of some groups of students, the nonviolent student movement 1989 did not seem able to resolve the internal confusion surrounding leadership (Zhao 1998, p.1499). This also made negotiations with the government difficult as government officials were mostly unaware of what was happening within the movement, and efforts to negotiate with the students proved fruitless when there was no one leader which could speak for all (Zhao 1998, p.1499). This lack of unity may be one of the reasons the students were not able to be consistent with their demands, seemingly unable to present a unified front with unified goals (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, p.424).
The breakdown of negotiations with the government on May 18 had a significant impact on the nonviolent student movement 1989. A new Chair of the movement (Chai Ling) was appointed after much internal conflict between the organizers of the student group (Lui 2000, p.143). The internal conflict is referred to in an interview with Chai where she remarked that she found one of the other leaders consistently difficult and thought his use of power had done considerable damage to their campaign (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, pp.423-424). However it appears that Chai’s leadership may also have damaged the movement.

This change of leadership had a drastic impact on the movement, as Chai [new leader] . . . announced that the students would now embark on a more radical course. The unity of the student protestors with regard to both ideology and methodology began to crumble (Lui 2000, p.143).

As a result, the change in tactics which was initiated by Chai’ new leadership, indicated a more serious threat to the government. This in turn, may have pushed Li Peng into leading more aggressive action as it became apparent the legitimacy of his political career depended on the immediate evacuation of the students from the Square (Lui 2000, p.143).

**External Influence**

The international media played a significant role in alerting the international community to the events unfolding in Tiananmen Square over the approximately seven week period of student occupation and nonviolent protest. Dialogues between the government officials and student delegates were televised (Tong 1998, p.316) along with the demonstrations which increased in news coverage time once the international media got involved. The international interest made it increasingly difficult for the Chinese government to choose violence as the method to disband the students (Lui 2000, p.140; Calhoun 1989, p.23). The media appeared to be sympathetic to the students (Kim, S. 2000, p.32). The international media’s portrayal of events may also have put external pressure on the government’s decisions concerning their options for how they might respond to the students, for example whether violence would be engaged or not.
4.3 Evidence of Nonviolent Discipline
The students who initiated the protests which were sustained over a period of about seven weeks in Tiananmen Square maintained a nonviolent method of protest. Gene Sharp was in Beijing during the protests led by the students in Tiananmen Square and met with many of the student leaders for discussion, introducing them to the ideas and theory of both Sharpian and Gandhian nonviolence practice (Lui 2000, p.139; Sharp and Jenkins 1989, p.1). The reasons for maintaining nonviolent discipline that the students themselves offered were recorded by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins during the days leading up to the June 4 massacre.

The students produced two main reasons for why nonviolence tactics were more practical than violent methods. First, the students did not have the capacity to overcome the military and if the students used violence it would give the government a valid reason to respond forcefully (Sharp and Jenkins 1989, p.3). Second, nonviolent tactics such as boycotts, sit-ins, protests, demonstrations and a hunger strike were the most practical way for the students to protest (Lui 2000, p.140). This suggests that this movement was not driven by religious or moral reasoning (Sharp and Jenkins 1989, p.3).

One student voiced that the issues – both economic and social – needed constructive ways of resolution and were not the kind that could be settled effectively through violent methods (Sharp and Jenkins 1989, p.3). It was also pointed out that it was reform the students were seeking rather than the toppling of the current government, which nonviolence had a much better chance of achieving than violence (Sharp and Jenkins 1989, p.3). There are a number of references in the literature which make specific note of the students’ choice to remain nonviolent. Some examples of these are:

Lui writes of how the students committed to nonviolent methods from the outset. “Originally, the students who mobilized at Tiananmen were guided by principles of peace and nonviolence” (Lui 2000, p.139). This was reinforced by comments quoted from an interview with Chai Ling, the Chair of the Student Movement who reportedly said “. . . we insisted on peaceful struggle” and “[w]e were fighting a battle of love and hate, but not violence against violence” (Lui 2000, p.139). The commitment to nonviolence was maintained, even towards the end of the students’ occupation of the square, when it
became apparent that the military could use force against them. The citizens and students attempted to discourage entry into Beijing, using “. . . [h]uman barricades, coupled with the placement of obstacles in the streets, [as] the non-violent methods of choice . . .” (Lui 2000, p.140).

Some of the literature suggests that nonviolence was maintained overall by the students’ network which consistently reiterated the importance of staying nonviolent and sustaining a nonviolent discipline. For example, in the final days of the movement: “. . . [S]tudents in the square began to gather into squared formations, as if taking up battle positions. Students spread the word, however, that they should all remain nonviolent in case of government attacks” (Yang 2000, p.605).

Another example: “As troops of the 27th Army were deployed, student leaders instructed the demonstrators to remain composed and peaceful and not to provoke the police” (Lui 2000, p.140).

The literature suggests that nonviolent tactics were both acknowledged and engaged by the students, indicating that there was a deliberate commitment to maintaining nonviolent discipline.

4.4 Summary
Tiananmen 1989 was a student led movement which evolved out of a university culture of social networks. The movement emerged at a time of political opportunity, and managed to engage the support of both the student population and Chinese citizens. The motivating and interaction factors identified may have produced conditions which influenced the ability of students participating in Tiananmen 1989 to maintain nonviolent discipline. The independent variables discussed in this chapter have varying degrees of influence on maintaining nonviolent discipline, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.
Chapter Five: Case Study: Gwangju, South Korea

1980

What began as a peaceful demonstration against the reimposition of military rule turned into a bloody citizens’ uprising . . . (Lewis 2002, p.xv).
5.1 Context
Gwangju began as a nonviolence movement however nonviolent discipline was not able to be maintained. This chapter will explore some of the reasons why this may have occurred. The Gwangju uprising which occurred in May 1980 in the city of Gwangju in South Korea is known by several names in Korea, for example ‘The [G]wangju uprising’ (Cho 2003, p.67; Shin 2003, p.xi) the ‘Gwangju Democratisation Movement’ (Lewis and Byun 2003, p.53) and as ‘5월 18일’ or ‘5.18’ (Lewis 2002, p.xv).

“Some people prefer to call it ‘5-18,’ referring only to the date, to avoid ideological and political implications. Such struggles over how to recall the event are far from settled” (Shin 2003, p.xxvii). This thesis will refer to the movement as Gwangju 1980.

A brief outline will be given of the event, followed by a more detailed breakdown of the movement. Following this, the motivation and interaction factors which contributed to the initial nonviolent protests and subsequent violence will be discussed. These factors will form the framework for addressing the research question, under what conditions is nonviolent discipline maintained in nonviolence movements?

Background on Gwangju Uprising, 1980
In 1980 South Korea was in the grip of a national movement for democracy which was attempting to remove the military dictatorship. Issues of government had been present ever since North and South Korea were separated by war in 1950.

After the ceasefire was declared in 1953, South Korea remained in a state of military alert as the war between the two Koreas had not officially ever ended and so the North potentially still posed a viable threat. Therefore in 1980, twenty-seven years after the ceasefire, the uncertainty and mistrust still existed enabling any rumour of communist infiltrators to be taken seriously. This may be one reason why reports of North Korean spies being instrumental in the Gwangju uprising were used to legitimise the government’s harsh crackdown on the city (Shin 2003, p.xviii). However, these reports

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1 From 2002, the Romanisation system for the Korean language (Hangeul) was changed from the McCune-Reischauer (1939) system to a new National system of Romanisation (updated 2002). This thesis will use the updated Romanisation system. Therefore for purposes of consistency in the text ‘Kwangju’ will read, ‘[G]wangju’ (UNGEGN Working Group on Romanization Systems 2003).
were found to be lacking in evidence and were renounced as such in the 1990s (Shin 2003, p.xviii).

In South Korea 1979-80, there were democracy inspired nonviolent protests and demonstrations across the country. Gwangju was no exception. Demands for policy change, releasing of political prisoners like Kim Dae Jung and declaring the lack of support for the current military regime were some of the themes used in banners, slogans and the chants of the protesting students (Shin 2003, p.xviii). Seoul was at the centre of the student protests demanding General Chun Doo Hwan step down, but students from all the major cities in Korea were involved, protesting in solidarity with the Seoul students. Military martial law which closed universities and arrested key political figures was then implemented across the entire country (Shin 2003, p.xii). Under martial law, paratroopers and military police entered the city of Gwangju, in the southern part of Korea and sealed it off from the rest of the country. The presence of military special forces was not anticipated, and neither was the ensuing level of violence. Roads were closed and phone lines disconnected to the region while the national media reported almost nothing of what was happening in Gwangju (Lewis 2002, p.4). Although there may be different interpretations of what democracy might mean, to the citizens of Gwangju it was a fight for “recognition and human rights” exemplified in the strength of Gwangju’s ‘people power’ as crowds turned up in the thousands to support the nonviolent protests in the first few days of the movement (Shin 2003, p.xix). The movement quickly changed over the course of about three days from one of nonviolent protest, to violence, ending with heavy casualties at its conclusion ten days later.

**The Movement: May 18-27, 1980**

Although there is some discrepancy as to exact dates, Gwangju 1980 can be divided into three stages (Jung 2003, p.44; Kim and Han 2003, p.212; Lewis 2002, pp.80-81).

Stage One (approximately) May 18 – 21, began with nonviolent student protests and grew into larger street demonstrations (Kim and Han 2003, p.213; Lewis 2002, p.80). These relatively peaceful gatherings were subsequently disrupted by the violence of the army, leaving many innocent citizens dead. At this point a collective resistance movement was also formed (Jung 2003, p.44). Jung cites Stage Two’s dates as
(approximately) May 22 – 26 (Jung 2003, p.44; Kim and Han 2003, p.215), while Lewis suggests this stage occurs slightly earlier, beginning May 19 and finishing on the 21\textsuperscript{st} May (Lewis 2002, p.81). Stage Two signalled the phase when larger numbers of Gwangju citizens joined in the protests, expressing their support for the students and their outrage at the violence inflicted by the military (Lewis 2002, p.81). The civil resistance movement was getting stronger and the newly formed Citizens Army successfully forced the government troops out of the city in a short lived victory (Jung 2003, pp.44-45).

Lewis marks Stage Three, by the martial law troops leaving the city on May 23\textsuperscript{rd} (Lewis 2002, p.81) while Jung indicates it commenced on May 27, when the military troops re-entered the city, reclaiming it with violence (Jung 2003, p.45; Kim and Han 2003, p.219). These stages will now be reviewed in more detail.

**Stage One**

On the night of May 17, 1980, paratroopers and riot police were deployed to Gwangju and began to arrest student leaders and activists (Shin 2003, p.xv; Na 2003, p.179). Gwangju was being shut off from the rest of Korea. Jurgen Hinzpeter, a journalist who was an eyewitness to the events, writes of how the expressway from Seoul to Gwangju had been closed. “Every possible way into [G]wangju was being sealed off. That was the impression” (Hinzpeter 2000, p.87).

The next morning on May 18 students gathered outside Chonnam University unaware that the university had been closed. These students began a sit-in protest in response to the military that blocked entry to the university campus. It was not unusual for students to protest, however the response that ensued was completely unexpected (Shin 2003, p.xv; Choi 2003, p.3; Warnberg 1987, p.33). The paratroopers who had been deployed into the city the night before responded to the students with surprising violence. “... [A] squad of soldiers...charged the students and waded into the crowd swinging their batons. The students were beaten, clubbed, knifed and bayonetted” (Shin 2003, p.xv).

Out of the chaos and confusion at the university, students and some citizens regrouped and marched to the Provincial Building in the centre of the city. The demonstrations recommenced, much better organised than the somewhat random earlier groupings that had taken place (Shin 2003, p.xv). Again, the paratroopers launched an attack on the
crowd. The exact numbers of people who suffered injury is unclear as it is still difficult to be sure of the accuracy of reports, but martial law documents which exist, have recorded that about sixty-eight people were injured at this point in the uprising and there were arrests numbering over four hundred (Shin 2003, p.xv).

The next day was May 19 and news of the events of May 18 had reached more people. This time a few thousand people reportedly assembled on one of the main downtown streets and began demonstrating (Na 2003, p.179).

An eyewitness had this to say: “I was astounded. I’d never expected anything like this. It was unbelievable. The day before no one had joined in, no ordinary citizens. All of a sudden they were acting in unison with the students” (Lee 2000, p.32). Despite the growing numbers of people demonstrating, once again, the martial law enforcement responded with violence (Shin 2003, p.xv; Na 2003, p.179). It appeared to be very one-sided (Kim, C. 2000, p.8).

The [G]wangju citizens’ idea – to demonstrate peacefully against martial law and to protest violence – was blown away. The exorbitant violence of the troops was what did it . . . [r]ank incomprehension was overtaken by a sense of outrage (Kim, C. 2000, p.8).

The third day of the uprising was May 20. The city responded to the violence of the previous days by a show of increased support with between 30,000-40,000 people gathered in the downtown centre of Gwangju. The uprising attracted people from every corner of society – young and old, women and men. It didn’t appear to be led by the ideology of the students, or by another organisation, rather it seemed to encompass something broader which spoke to all people (Kim, C. 2000, p.10). The afternoon of May 20 the crowd further increased with almost a quarter of the city (between 100-200,000 people) joining in the resistance movement (Lewis 2002, p.15). The growing active involvement of the public was most evident on the night of May 20. The citizens anger was ignited by what they perceived was a lack of accurate representation by the national media of the events unfolding in Gwangju (Kim and Han 2003, p.211; Choi 2003, p.7; Warnberg 1987, p.41).
. . . [T]he whole central part of town was literally as well as figuratively inflamed. MBC, the [G]wangju Tax Office, the Provincial Office Building car depot, and sixteen police substations were burned down, and the Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) and the Labor Supervision Office had been set on fire; there were vehicles in flames all over town (Lewis 2002, p.14).

Although television broadcasting was no longer in operation, KBS radio continued to broadcast throughout the uprising (Kim and Han 2003, p.213). It was also at this point the underground newspaper *Fighters’ Bulletin* appeared in Gwangju as an alternative news source (Kim and Han 2003, p.212). This publication was also used as a flier to convey the sentiments of the movement (Kim and Han 2003, p.215). Another form of media was the reported “street broadcasts” made by a woman activist, who maintained these over the next ten days (Kim and Han 2003, p.213; Lewis 2002, p.53).

On May 21 a morning meeting between citizens’ representatives and the governor of the province occurred. The citizen delegate made their demands, asking for an apology to the Gwangju people for the violence, news as to the whereabouts or condition of those who had been injured, release of those people held or arrested and to withdraw the martial law troops from Gwangju by lunchtime of that day (Lewis 2002, p.20). However, this never happened. Instead, May 21, which was Buddha’s birthday was recorded as “the bloodiest day” of the uprising in Gwangju (Lewis 2002, p.20). Crowds of people had gathered to observe Buddha’s birthday, as the martial law troops opened fire on the Gwangju people in the middle of the day (Shin 2003, p.xvi; Lewis 2002, p.21). Most casualties were “unarmed citizens” who were gunned down outside the gates of Cheonnam University near the central city (Lewis 2002, p.20). Reportedly 54 people were killed and a further 500 injured in the shooting. This effectively was the moment that ended any hope for a peaceful resolution (Shin 2003, p.xvi). However, this did not deter the crowd’s support as they gathered in the central city district. Lewis, an eyewitness, writes that on May 21 “[t]he crowds on . . . [the main street] continued to grow, and leaflets (like the student activists’ plan of action I had seen posted up) asked people to gather downtown at 2 P.M.” (Lewis 2002, p.21).
**Stage Two**

Stage Two was distinguished by a time of relative peace as the citizens of Gwangju entered a period of self-government (Kim and Han 2003, p.215). This was achieved by the recently formed Citizens Army which was able to force the troops out of the city, resulting in five days of self-rule regaining temporary order and a sense of normalcy for people (Shin 2003, p.xvii). Over the following few days shops and local markets were opened once more for business. There was also cooperation between the leaders of the uprising and the local government leaders organising food, water and power distribution to those in need while the people of Gwangju helped tidy up the streets (Shin 2003, p.xvii; Lewis 2002, p.31). Lewis also mentions that there was hardly any looting or people intentionally destroying property over the next few days, the period in which “Free [G]wangju” became the popular slogan (Lewis 2002, p.31). During this short time of self-rule, with withdrawal of the martial law force, the citizens exercised nonviolent discipline as “. . . public order, not chaos, prevailed” (Lewis 2002, p.31).

In a kind of state of anarchy in which no security and administration authorities existed, however, there was no panic at all; it was rather a liberated space, a truly ‘our’ community, or the opening of the Gwangju Republic, which was sustained by the citizens’ consciousness (Kim and Han 2003, p.216).

It was during this time, on May 22 that the Settlement Committee was formed (Ahn 2003, p.15; Kim and Han 2003, p.215; Na 2003, p.182; Lewis 2002, p.27). This was comprised of fifteen members of the public, which included professors, lawyers, some students and leaders of the religious community. Ahn writes that there were two committees; the Citizen Settlement Committee and the Student Settlement Committee (Ahn 2001, p.15). Lewis, on the other hand only refers to one committee, the 5.18 [G]wangju Incident Settlement Committee (Lewis 2002, p.27). Although not clear, there seems to be more agreement in the literature that there were two committees (Ahn 2003; Kim and Han 2003). The committees were formed in partnership with the vice governor of the province. Their mandate was to negotiate with the martial law forces, in search of some kind of resolution (Ahn 2003, p.15; Lewis 2002, p.27). The Citizens’ Settlement Committee was predominantly concerned with negotiations and trying to manage the
people of the city. The Students’ Settlement Committee led by Yun Sang-won, was more hardline and did not support any ideas of surrendering (Kim and Han 2003, p.216).

May 21 negotiations took place with representatives of the martial law command. Of the seven points brought to the attention of the military, it was only the promise of Gwangju citizens’ disarming (conditional on the military meeting all six other demands) which was given attention. However, the other points were all but ignored (Lewis 2002, p.29).

By May 24, the Settlement Committees had been working at trying to convince people who were armed to surrender their weapons and prevent “further armed resistance” (Lewis 2002, p.39). They managed to gather around 50 percent of weapons, and also printed off information which was distributed regarding the meeting that had taken place with the martial law officials the day before (Lewis 2002, p.39). However, these negotiations were treated with suspicion by the general public who questioned the intention of the Settlement Committees.

On the same day at a public rally, the Gwangju citizens demanded the breaking up of the Settlement Committees. People were fearful that this group were going to be “. . . sold out in an unconditional surrender to the government . . . [and] dissatisfied demonstrators claimed that the negotiating stance of the committee did not represent the will of Gwangju citizens” (Lewis 2002, p.41). This may be explained further by surveys done in the late 1980’s, where the results indicated that most people had no idea what the actual activities of the Settlement Committees had been. “. . . [F]ewer than 10 percent felt well informed about the committee’s role” (Lewis 2002, p.41).

By the next day on May 25, the obvious split between the moderate Settlement Committees and the more extreme activists was becoming critical.
. . . [T]he Settlement Committee was on the verge of collapse. Although the moderates still kept persuading [the Citizens Army] to turn in their weapons, by May 25 the lines were more firmly drawn; no more guns were being given up, and the activists were planning to take over the leadership of the uprising (Lewis 2002, pp.44-45).

It was in this climate of leadership uncertainty that a group of young activists, university educated and respected for previous experience in protest activity, mostly working behind the scenes until this point, emerged as the leaders of the armed resistance (Ahn 2003, p.16; Lewis 2002, p.45).

Over the course of this day on-going negotiations took place between senior factions of the Citizens’ Army and the new leadership, in attempts to persuade the younger leaders to surrender their weapons. This was unsuccessful, and as a result the “senior dissidents decided that in the interests of presenting a united front in negotiating with the military, they should join with the Incident Settlement Committee at the Provincial Office Building” (Lewis 2002, p.45).

The internal conflict over leadership of the uprising and its ideology indicated the end of the relative peace and order which had prevailed during the time of ‘Free Gwangju’ and also signalled the final stage of the uprising.

**Stage Three**

On Monday, May 26, early in the morning, a series of tanks made their way into the city. It was prevented from going further by people from the Settlement Committees who had been on all-night alert at the Provincial Office Building (Lewis 2002, p.49). The Settlement Committee members were responsible for mobilising a demonstration, some reports saying that they even went as far as to form a human barricade in front of the tanks. The negotiations continued between the martial law troops and the Settlement Committees members, attempting to find a “peaceful resolution” (Lewis 2002, p.49). This action temporarily paused the military while over the course of the day internal (between leadership groups) and external (with the press and the martial law command) negotiations were taking place.
At 9 P.M., after a final effort to persuade the hard-liners to surrender their weapons, those young people and ordinary citizens who wanted to turn in the guns and settle the uprising left the Provincial Office Building and only those who decided to continue fighting remained (Lewis 2002, p.49).

On the morning of May 27, troops arrived in Gwangju with the intention of taking control of the city again. The Citizen’s Army was overpowered and the troops commanded Gwangju once more (Shin 2003, p.xvii).

Officially there were 170 killed and 380 who had been wounded, but these figures have been disputed (Shin 2003, p.xvii). “Even today, two decades after the uprising, it is not certain exactly how many were killed. The best estimates available today suggest about five hundred civilians dead and over three thousand injured” (Shin 2003, p.xvii).

### 5.2 Motivating and Interaction Factors

This section aims to identify factors, such as repression, collective action, regionalism, protest history, leadership and external influences which may motivate or contribute to understanding the conditions under which nonviolent discipline is maintained.

**Repression**

Repression of a group of people might be a reason which motivates citizens to act. However, this also raises the issue as to whether this was a contributing factor which motivated the people of Gwangju to act in a nonviolent or a violent way. The citizens of Gwangju had been targeted from the very beginning of the May 18 events by a sophisticated military, trained in “guerrilla warfare” (Shin 2003, p.xix). Approximately 3000 paratroopers had been deployed from Seoul to Gwangju. They were trained to kill and this is what they did. “These troops began indiscriminately killing people with their clubs and bayonets” (Shin 2003, p.xix).

No one was spared in the attacks with the elderly and children, women and men – all targets of this seemingly brutal violence. Shin proposes that it was “. . . these inhuman acts [which] undoubtedly roused the citizens to action” (Shin 2003, p.xix). The troops
dispatched to Gwangju had been trained for a particular kind of warfare and were loyal to General Chun. They had been prepared for “. . . behind-the-lines warfare in North Korea and antiguerrilla warfare in the South against North Korean infiltrators in the event of a North Korean attack” (Shin 2003, p.xx). This may explain why the paratroopers were so violent in their assault on the citizens of Gwangju. If they had been briefed with the information that North Korean spies had infiltrated the protests and were leading this rebellion then it may be one of the reasons for the way the people of Gwangju were treated (Shin 2003, p.xx). The brutality of the military was such that even Gwangju citizens who initially were not in support of the demonstrations, were so shocked that they too became cooperative with the movement as the whole city was inspired into action (Shin 2003, p.xx). Violent repression may be one factor which motivated the citizens of Gwangju to get involved in the students protests. However it may not have been a strong enough reason for a commitment to nonviolent action.

**Collective Action**

There were several factors which contributed to the collective action and ways Gwangju citizens unified during the events in May, 1980.

> [T]here was support from every stratum of society . . . [s]tudents were the ‘trigger’ that started the demonstrations in the first few days, and intellectuals and civic and religious leaders labored . . . to resolve the conflict through the work of the Incident Settlement Committee. Even for those less directly involved, the Uprising touched the lives of most of Gwangju’s citizens” (Lewis 2002, pp.144-145).

There were a number of groups who mobilised using available existing networks. The highest profile of these groups was the students, with their obvious connections to the university institution (Lewis 2002, p.80). Social Movement Organisations have been indicated as being very important to collective protests for mobilising both resources and people (Shin 2003, p.xxi). Shin however, states that Gwangju was in fact “. . . a spontaneous response to government repression . . .” (Shin 2003, p.xxi). One of the reasons for this is that many of the leaders who would have taken up leadership either managed to escape and were in hiding, or had already been arrested (Shin 2003, p.xxi).
“If there was any organizational base, it consisted of personal networks such as school and neighborhood connections that helped build trust and cooperation among the citizens in protest” (Shin 2003, p.xxi). Na also supports the claim that the uprising was an example of spontaneous collective action, but then goes on to qualify this, by saying this was the state of action demonstrated primarily in the early stages of the uprising (Na 2003, p.179).

Over the first three days, from May 18-20, there was an increasing sense of unity as the Gwangju citizens were quickly mobilised by the reaction they had to the excessive violence against the university students. This appeared to shock the people of Gwangju into a massive show of unity and support and as the demonstrations grew in size and intensity, so too the sense of unity increased (Na 2003, p.179). The reasons suggested for this increasing sense of unity and participation is twofold. First, is the emotional response of the public to an extreme situation that challenges perceptions of normal or acceptable human interaction, characterised in this case by the extreme violence of the military. This in turn often leads to anger, which “. . . led citizens to participate in the Uprising as an expression of basic, communal emotion related to the values of human dignity, justice and peace” (Na 2003, p.180).

Second, is the protest history of Gwangju and regional discrimination, which had instilled deep distrust and suspicion of the Korean government (Na 2003, p.180). These factors suggest that Gwangju citizens were not only experienced in protest demonstrations, therefore collective action of this nature could quickly mobilise, but the shared history seemed to also strengthen the city’s sense of unity (Na 2003, p.180).

**Regionalism**

Gwangju has historically and within more recent times been the subject of regional discrimination and isolation both politically and economically (Na 2003, p.180; Yea 2003, p.109). Regionalism may have manifested as resentment towards the government for two reasons. First, Gwangju is geographically isolated from the northern regions by mountain ranges. Without the modern ease of communication and travel, the Cheolla province of which Gwangju is a part, was cut off from greater Korea (Warnberg 1987, p.34). Second, Gwangju regionalism has a long political history which stems back as far
as the ancient feuding kingdoms of Baekche (of which Gwangju was a part) and Silla which the modern day southern provinces of Korea evolved from. This rivalry has carried into the present day and was apparent in the politics which played a part in the months leading up to the Gwangju uprising (Warnberg 1987, p.34). Regionalism, it may be argued has both played a part in isolating and uniting Gwangju people. Both may have been factors in motivating the nonviolent student protests, and reason too, for the ensuing violence. The people of the Cheolla region felt discrimination in many aspects of life and this may have contributed to the Gwangju students’ commitment to protest (Shin 2003, p.xx; Na 2003, p.180; Yea 2003, p.109). “Although it would be difficult to assess the precise extent of its influence, this regional resentment seems to have played a role in the uprising” (Shin 2003, p.xx).

Regionalism may also have been a contributing factor used to influence the soldiers to use extreme aggression against the citizens of Gwangju, which may be argued could have also provided the citizens of Gwangju with a reason for abandoning nonviolent discipline and instead responding with violent tactics.


It may be suggested that in order to commit such acts of violence against your own people, there needs to be a separating off from and creating of ‘other’ in order to justify the actions taken. The ‘regional racism’ may have been used as fuel for motivating the military to execute the swift and unprovoked violent action which commenced on May 18, 1980.
Protest History
In addition to regionalism playing a part in the Gwangju uprising, there is a long history of protest in the Cheolla province. This tradition of dissent was often referred to during the uprising, helping to boost the morale of Gwangju citizens and also inspiring the Citizens’ Army leaders who “. . . were seasoned veterans of social activism” (Shin 2003, p.xxi). This idea is also supported by Na, who writes of Gwangju’s history of social protest. There was a significant peasant uprising in the Gwangju region in the nineteenth century and then in the early twentieth century Gwangju was responsible for anti-imperialist movements which helped pave the way for independence campaigns demanding Japan’s withdrawal from Korea (Na 2003, p.180). Gwangju was also recognized as being one of the leading regions in the struggle for democracy from the early 1970s onward (Na 2003, p.180). There had been an impressive history throughout the twentieth century of student protest in Korea. Most famous was the March First uprising of 1919 which was inspired in part by Korean students studying abroad in Japan. A further example of student involvement was in 1929 which saw an impressive student uprising in Gwangju. Another incident where student leadership was to be seen was after Korea’s liberation from Japan in 1945 (Hwang 2003, p.135).

It was the students in particular who have had an impressive history of political protest in Korea. This appears to have established a kind of trust between Korean students and citizens in the recognition that the students were valid representatives to lead people in dissent and protest against the government (Lewis 2002, p.80). Alongside the students there were other groups, for example church leaders and other organisations such as the YMCA who had proven to be active in times of protest and were also seen as legitimate leadership during the uprising (Lewis 2002, p.80).

Leadership
Although there may be debate over the exact ideology and leadership of the movement, there were groups and organisations which played an important part in the Gwangju uprising, such as the YMCA, church groups and the committees formed by Gwangju citizens (Lewis 2002, p.80).
Student involvement in leadership of the movement was influential in the early national stages of the movement. However, students were targeted by the martial law force subsequently forcing many into hiding.

Although 5.18 has been characterized as a student uprising, college students in fact were just the catalysts, the first participants. It was only a relatively small group of them who were active, and armed, throughout the entire event. Students comprised just 19.5 percent of the official victims and were only a slight majority (fifteen of twenty-eight) of those killed on the last day (May 27), when the army retook the Provincial Office Building (Lewis 2002, p.12).

This meant that there was a shift in the leadership from students to ordinary citizens over the course of the uprising. This was evident after May 21 when the Settlement Committees were formed (Na 2003, p.180).

Both Sharp and Gandhi argue nonviolent discipline cannot be forced onto a group by its leaders, but instead must come primarily from the individual’s self-discipline (Sharp 1973, p.616). This provides a flow on effect if actionists can maintain nonviolent discipline, then it also commits them to the plans and strategies of the leadership.

If prospective nonviolent actionists do not have confidence in the judgment of those responsible for planning the nonviolent action, then they ought not to take part. If they do have the confidence, then the plans and instructions ought to be carried out precisely (Sharp 1973, p.617).

Gwangju citizens showed confidence in student leadership which may have been based on past involvement in dissident protest (Lewis 2002, p.80). However, with the closing of universities under martial law and students becoming a target, leadership shifted to the citizens. This may have resulted in a lack of confidence in the leadership, another possible reason for why attempts to maintain nonviolent discipline were not sustained.
**External Influence**

Although the citizens of Gwangju had destroyed the broadcasting stations early on in the movement there was still international and Korean media present in Gwangju attempting to get information broadcasted during the events of Gwangju 1980.

Henry Scott-Stokes comments on the information he relayed to the *New York Times*, from his source in Gwangju, and how “[r]eading this piece now, I am struck by how the grey prose of the New York Times diluted the drama” (Scott-Stokes 2000, p.109). This is reinforced by a study (Kim, S. 2000) which examined the ways U.S. press portrayed Gwangju 1980 compared with Tiananmen 1989 (which will be expanded on in the following discussion chapter). The reports in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* tended to describe Gwangju using “unfavorable symbolic terms such as ‘turmoil,’ ‘rebellion,’ [and] ‘riot’” (Kim, S. 2000, p.32).

During the [G]wangju movement, the Korean government exercised tight control and surveillance over the media through martial law and the far-reaching National Security Act. As a result, foreign journalists in [G]wangju could not access or report the event without the Korean government’s severe censorship (Kim, S. 2000, p.33).

### 5.3 Evidence of Nonviolent Discipline

Gwangju 1980 is reported for the most part as having started peacefully, with nonviolent student demonstrations and sit-ins. The literature describes it as a “relatively routine demonstration” (Warnberg 1987) and that students were “. . . demonstrating peacefully” (Kim and Han 2003, p.213). Jung too, writes of “peaceful demonstrators” who the military attacked with violence (Jung 2003, p.44). Lewis also refers to the downtown rallies as “nonviolent demonstrations” (Lewis 2002, p.41).

Lewis, who was present during the events of Gwangju 1980, comments on the fact that people in general, were not only supportive of the uprising but demonstrated this by taking part. The people’s actions were initially peaceful, but were not able to be sustained. “It was my observation at the time – since supported by other evidence – that participation in the event was citywide and involved a majority of the population” (Lewis
2002, p.40). She continues, saying that this participation was relatively peaceful amongst the citizens of Gwangju.

... I am not aware of any anti- or counterrebellion incidents (other than the activities of government agents, provocateurs, and infiltrators), and there was no violence among rival groups of citizens. Disagreements between the more radical activists and student leaders and the more moderate Incident Settlement Committee were over tactical matters in dealing with the military, rather than over the fundamental ‘rightness’ or the citizens’ armed resistance” (Lewis 2002, p.40).

However, Lewis’ observations, and this comment in particular, are in agreement with a general opinion represented in the literature, that Gwangju citizens were more supportive of the armed resistance than of the attempts to negotiate and maintain nonviolent discipline. What began as nonviolent demonstrations quickly became violent. Gwangju 1980 did however exercise a time of nonviolent discipline in the period of self-rule in the middle of the uprising. “During the five-day (May 22-26) period of self-rule, citizens maintained civil order, contrary to government reports of ‘acts of plunder’ and ‘complete lawlessness’” (Shin 2003, p.xvii). Lewis also mentions that there was hardly any looting or people intentionally destroying property over the next few days of the period which is known as the “Free [G]wangju” period (Lewis 2002, p.31). During this short time of self-rule, with the withdrawal of the martial law force, it is suggested that the citizens exercised nonviolent discipline as “... public order, not chaos, prevailed” (Lewis 2002, p.31).

5.4 Summary
Gwangju 1980 was a movement for democracy initially led by students. Although the movement initially engaged nonviolent and peaceful protest, this was not sustained. The factors identified in this chapter as motivating and interaction factors may have had an influence on the outcome of Gwangju 1980. The independent variables have varying degrees of influence on whether nonviolent discipline was able to be maintained. The degree of influence will be examined in more detail in the following discussion chapter.
Chapter Six: Discussion

. . . [T]wo prestigious U.S. newspapers – the New York Times and the Washington Post – reported the similar international events of China’s Tiananmen movement and South Korea’s [G]wangju movement in different and often diametrical ways. By using different patterns of news sources and symbolic terms, the papers portrayed the Tiananmen movement more positively than the [G]wangju movement (Kim, S. 2000, p.32).
This discussion will be a comparison of the two case studies, Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980. The two case studies share many similarities which may lead to the assumption that both may have had similar outcomes. However, it has become clear in the years since these incidents that China and Korea have followed very different political paths.

Some broad similarities are as follows: both began as nonviolent protest movements; both were pro-democracy; both were attempting to free themselves from oppressive regimes; both were initiated and led by university students then supported by the wider community; and both ended with massive loss of life at the hands of their respective governments. It is also of interest that they both occurred in a similar geographic location as increasing levels in nonviolence movements were emerging in East Asia during the 1980s (Svensson and Lindgren 2011; Svensson and Lindgren 2010; Kivimaki 2010a; Kivimaki 2010b; Tonnesson 2009; Kim, S. 2000, p.24).

Despite these many similarities, there were also several differences, for example, the different timeframe of each movement, the type of physical space the protests occupied and the differing external influence. However, the most significant difference between the case studies was their commitment to remain nonviolent. The students in Tiananmen 1989 maintained nonviolent discipline, while protesting students and citizens in Gwangju 1980 did not.

Chapter One, Part I cites evidence that there is a correlation between the way a conflict is resolved and the levels of freedom experienced in a post-conflict regime change or transference of power, revealing that sustaining nonviolence is a critical factor in the degree of freedom attained (Ackerman and Rodal 2008, p.119). This indicates that groups or movements who do maintain nonviolent discipline (as opposed to those who do not) have a good chance of creating greater freedom post-conflict.

However the two case studies do not support this hypothesis. In the case of Tiananmen 1989, there was a sustained commitment to nonviolence from the movement’s beginnings until the end. Yet the outcome for China was not greater freedom. Gwangju 1980 on the other hand, was not able to commit to nonviolence, and yet the long term results for
Korea have enabled greater freedom overall. Hence this suggests there may be many important factors contributing not only to maintaining nonviolent discipline but various conditions may also influence how nonviolent discipline contributes positively or negatively to the outcome. This chapter will now compare the two case studies, investigating the type of conditions and factors which may influence maintaining nonviolent discipline in a nonviolence movement.

6.1 Context
The context of each case study share a number of similarities with the other, however more detailed analysis indicates that there are also several important points of difference. Both Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 progressed through three stages, which will be outlined and compared below. This comparison will give a broad picture of similarities and will also indicate points of difference which will be the context for an analysis of the motivating and interaction factors.

Stage One
Stage One of Tiananmen 1989 began with protest followed by students presenting the government with a list of demands. The demands were ignored and the protests deemed a “turmoil” by the government (Yang 2000, p.601; Tong 1998, p.316; Calhoun 1989, p.21). The first stage ended with the students resolving to continue protests, regardless of the threats issued by the government that demonstrations would be banned.

Stage One of Gwangju 1980 began with student protests throughout Korea. Special forces were deployed to Gwangju under martial law, closing off contact from the larger national protest movement. The students protest was met with an extremely violent response from the military. Gwangju citizens joined the student protests and there were attempts to negotiate with the military. Stage One in Gwangju ended with “the bloodiest day” as troops opened fire on the crowd gathered in the city centre (Lewis 2002, p.20). This appeared to end any hope for peaceful resolution (Shin 2003, p.xvi).
**Stage One: Case Study Comparison**

Both movements began with nonviolent protest, however in the case of Gwangju 1980, the national network of the protest movement of which Gwangju students were a part, had been effectively disconnected by the swift implementation of martial law. This left the students unexpectedly without wider support and also without spaces to gather as military controlled the university campuses. Tiananmen 1989 on the other hand, had built up networks over time within the universities. Students had time to make a commitment to using nonviolent tactics, putting the theory into practice during the regular demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. These original networks enabled students to grow in unity, maintaining nonviolent protest. This unity was reinforced when the students resolved to continue protests even when threatened by the government. Gwangju 1980 also showed signs of unity as the Gwangju citizens offered overwhelming support for the students, but rather than being united by a commitment to remaining nonviolent, the citizens of Gwangju seem to have been unified by a growing outrage towards the martial law troops and government. The swift occupation of Gwangju by the military, the unexpected violence and the feeling of isolation from the rest of the country may have contributed to reducing the options available for maintaining nonviolent discipline from this very first stage.

**Stage Two**

Stage Two of Tiananmen 1989 showed increasing public support for the movement, media involvement and further attempts to negotiate between students and the government officials. Some of the students started a hunger strike in an attempt to alert the government to the serious nature of the protests (Lui 2000, p.140). It also signalled the shut-down of the negotiation process between government and student parties (Lui 2000, p.140).

Stage Two of Gwangju 1980 saw the formation of The Citizens’ Army who forced the military troops out of the city. This time was a period of relative peace. The city was under self-rule for approximately five days (Kim and Han 2003, p.215; Shin 2003, p.xvii). During this stage leadership underwent several dynamic changes and a large
number of citizens chose to publicly support the armed resistance rather than the negotiating committees.

**Stage Two: Case Study Comparison**

Stage Two of Tiananmen 1989 began very positively with growing support from the Chinese public and increased local and international media attention. By projecting the student movement out into the international community, students may have felt increased confidence in their nonviolent stance knowing that an international audience was watching. It also gave a greater guarantee that the government would be reluctant to use violence with the international media present. The commitment to nonviolent discipline was further evident when the students began a hunger-strike. Whether the hunger strike was in any way influenced by the potential impact it would have on Gorbachev’s visit or the media attention it generated, is difficult to confirm. These factors nevertheless, may have played a part in tactical reasons for choosing this particular time to commit to the hunger-strike.

Stage Two of Gwangju 1980 began with the citizens taking up arms and forcing the troops from the city, however somewhat ironically, this stage also signalled the beginning of almost a week of maintaining nonviolent discipline. At this stage it was also a city without access to a trusted news source, citizens having torched the national broadcasting stations in frustration over inaccurate reporting of events. Military was also monitoring any activity or information entering or leaving the city. Therefore, unlike the media coverage given to Tiananmen 1989, Gwangju 1980 was fairly isolated from local or international presence. This too may have added to Gwangju citizens feeling of anger as the outside world – including the U.S. who it was hoped may intervene – appeared to ignore the events taking place in Gwangju. It is interesting then that during this stage of self-rule, with no acknowledged government or police and no real accountability to the ‘outside world,’ Gwangju citizens conducted themselves in a nonviolent manner.
**Stage Three**

Stage Three of Tiananmen 1989 was defined by the implementation of martial law (Yang 2000, p.605). Troops were deployed but were disabled by citizens forming human barricades using nonviolent tactics to prevent the military entering the city. These troops were replaced, and protesters were warned to evacuate Tiananmen Square as the 27th Army used violence to disperse the crowds. The death toll was somewhere between government estimates of 300 and other claims of up to 10,000 people killed (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, p.426)

Stage Three of Gwangju 1980 began with troops re-entering the city. They were stopped by members of the Settlement Committees, forming human barricades in front of the tanks (Lewis 2002, p.49). Negotiations continued with the martial law command, but eventuated in the military taking control of the city again the next day. The death toll has never been agreed on, but approximately 500 killed and 3,000 people injured appear to be reasonable estimates (Shin 2003, p.xvii).

**Stage Three: Case Study Comparison**

Stage Three of Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 is where the most obvious parallels appear in the two case studies. Some examples of these similarities are: both movements were under martial law command; both had troops entering the city and both employed nonviolent tactics in attempts to disable and prevent the military’s progress. However, both cases were unsuccessful at resolving the conflict with nonviolence. In the case of both Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 violence was used by their respective governments as the method of regaining a sense of order and control.
6.2 Motivating and Interaction Factors
The following section will examine the independent variables in each case study which form the factors or conditions under which the dependent variable; nonviolent discipline, may or may not be maintained. Comparing the two case studies’ independent variables, may cast light on reasons why nonviolent discipline was maintained in Tiananmen 1989 and was not maintained in Gwangju 1980.

Figure 2: Analytical Framework (Points of Comparison in Case Studies)
**Collective Action**

Research has exposed the idea that even without reward people are willing to participate in “dissident collective action” (Mason and Clements 2002, p.160). Collective action was once seen as mass irrationality or the foolish behaviour of a mob; this emotional response has come to be viewed by researchers as a legitimate group activity demonstrating purpose and quite deliberate tactics (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.13). Collective action showing purpose and deliberate tactics is clear in the early stages of students’ mobilisation in Tiananmen 1989. Reasons for this could be that students were living in tight networks within the university campus, there was a strong nationalistic ideology and Tiananmen Square provided a space with powerful protest symbolism attached to it. However in the case of Gwangju 1980, although deliberate tactics and purpose emerged in Stage Two led by the Settlement Committees and the armed resistance, there did not appear to be the same strength of networks to sustain nonviolent discipline.

Literature on both Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 mention ‘emotions’ in connection with the movements. For example, Tiananmen 1989 shows several stages of mobilisation and these stages can be connected to the emotional dynamics of the movement. For example, the students first experienced outrage, anger and even shame in their attempts to interact with the leaders of state. From this intensely charged emotional period the largest and most successful demonstration was held. “The exuberance generated by this demonstration then set the stage emotionally for launching the hunger strike” (Yang 2000, p.594).

Emotion was also apparent in Gwangju 1980. The first stage of the protest movement in Gwangju also showed outrage, fear and anger which in turn, set the scene for people to mobilise. This is the stage where other citizens became involved, unified in support of the student cause. The emotional response of the public to a situation that challenged perceptions of normal interaction, characterised in this case by the extreme violence of the military, may lead to anger. Na suggests the reaction to violence “. . . led citizens to participate in the Uprising as an expression of basic, communal emotion related to the values of human dignity, justice and peace” (Na 2003, p.180).
However, the next phase which followed this emotional response was quite different in each case study.

Tiananmen 1989, as stated above, in an emotionally charged atmosphere of protest, experienced “success” which appeared to then give the movement a new and intensified commitment to their cause. By choosing to partake in a hunger strike, there was also a clear message to the government that nonviolent tactics were continuing to be used, which in turn may have strengthened the individual hunger-strikers and the larger student protest body, in their collective commitment to nonviolent discipline. “Developing tactical solutions in conjunction with the framing of a movement, plays a crucial role in the advancement of collective action (Morris 2000, p.449).

Gwangju 1980, on the other hand is described as “... a spontaneous response to government repression . . .” (Shin & Hwang 2003, p.xxi). This implies there was very little influence from organisations, and it was instead an example of collective action, without any particular purpose or strategy. Na supports the idea that it was a “spontaneous” uprising in its early stages, but then proposes that it evolved into a movement with fairly complex smaller organisations emerging, such as the Settlement Committees (Na 2003, pp.179-181). It seems that the emotionally charged atmosphere generated by unexpected military violence influenced and divided Gwangju people’s commitment to nonviolent discipline.

Tiananmen 1989 had strong social networks which facilitated the use of purposeful tactics from the first stage of the movement. The students were also mobilised by collective emotional responses which resulted in a positive commitment to the movement and maintaining nonviolent discipline. Gwangju 1980 did not appear to have strong networks in place in the first stage of the movement, although tactical response to martial law was developed in the second stage. The people of Gwangju were also mobilised by an emotional response to violence, however rather than strengthening a commitment to nonviolent discipline, it appears to have made nonviolence more difficult to maintain.
**Protest History**

Both of the case studies had a history of political protest and dissent. Tiananmen 1989 was an example of protest and mass demonstration which had become important for dissident Chinese citizens to exercise an opinion after many years of repression (Mason and Clements 2002, p.163). There were also students who participated in Tiananmen 1989 movement who had prior experience or knowledge of earlier demonstrations, in particular the protests of 1986-87 (Mason and Clements 2002, p.173).

Gwangju was also recognised as being one of the leading regions in the struggle for democracy from the early 1970s on (Na 2003, p.180). As in the case of Tiananmen 1989, there is also reference to students involved in previous protests bringing their experience to Gwangju 1980. This tradition of dissent was often referred to during the uprising, helping to boost the morale of Gwangju citizens and also inspiring the Citizens’ Army leaders who “... were seasoned veterans of social activism” (Shin and Hwang 2003, p.xxi).

Both Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 have a history of protest and both share the fact that experienced protesters were part of the case study movements.

**Political Opportunity**

Political opportunity structure may motivate collective action and in the case of Tiananmen 1989 there appeared to be a window of political opportunity which the students utilised. The gradual weakening of the political control in China’s universities through the 1980s has been a reason suggested as to why students participated in the nonviolence movement (Zhao 1997, p.161). University students were aware that the political control in the university and the dormitories had relaxed, therefore enabling students to voice opinions which previously had been censored. The weakening of political control in universities may have provided an opportunity for the students of Tiananmen 1989 to not only mobilise, but also develop structures to support nonviolent discipline. This could be interpreted in two ways. First, there was an opportunity for students to openly express shared political views at odds with the government without fear, allowing a collective ideology to emerge. Second, changes in political structures
also imply that there were divisions within government. This may have provided students with time to establish a commitment to nonviolent action, while government struggled to establish a united political point of view. However, whether students would have mobilised had there not been weakened political control is difficult to say. “. . . [I]n some instances, collective action can generate political opportunities where none existed previously; in other instance political opportunities can clear the way for collective action” (Morris 2000, p.447).

Gwangju 1980, comparatively, also arose out of an unstable political climate, but rather than providing the opportunity for students to unify, create strategy and maintain nonviolent discipline, it strangled students’ efforts to maintain nonviolent protest. This may have occurred because Korea’s military dictatorship had seized power by force, and continued to use force, demonstrating political control at the expense of the people of Gwangju. Rather than a weakening of political structure as in Tiananmen 1989, Gwangju 1980 occurred in the political stronghold of a military government.

Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 both initiated protest movements in a time of political change but in contrasting political conditions. China’s political system had relaxed certain areas of control, allowing students in particular, a space in which to question government systems. This situation was not reactive as much as responsive. Korea, on the other hand, was in the midst of political instability with a military dictator attempting to tighten control over things such as university education. Therefore, the protest which erupted in Korea may have been far more inflammatory and emotive as it was reacting to government policy with feelings of injustice. Do these elements of response and react have quite a different impact on the way people mobilise and were these factors contributing to the conditions under which nonviolent discipline may or not have been maintained?

Two reasons may support the nonviolent response of Tiananmen Square occupants who were able to maintain this nonviolent stance and sustain it for almost seven weeks. First, China had experienced a repressive political system which may have made the moment of opportunity clear. Second, as a result of experiencing a politically oppressive system, there was a realistic understanding of the risks involved in protest therefore students were
more calculated in their preparation. Gwangju 1980, on the other hand, had a reaction to events. People may not have been aware of the repercussions or the capability of the military government. Therefore when students and citizens who had followed usual protest protocol, were disrupted by the excessive violence used by the military, confusion and chaos ensued turning nonviolent action into violent reaction. Another important factor to consider is that Tiananmen 1989 had time to make strategic and tactical response to the government over the seven weeks of protest. Gwangju 1980 did not have this luxury. Had the excessive violence of the military in the last day of Tiananmen 1989 occurred any earlier in the movement could it too have drawn a violent reaction as in Gwangju 1980?

Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 emerged out of changes in political structures. This may have provided opportunity for both protest movements to emerge. However, Tiananmen 1989 responded to a weakened political structure, while Gwangju 1980 reacted to a military government’s show of strength. Tiananmen 1989 also had more time without serious threat to strengthen the commitment to nonviolent discipline. Gwangju 1980 had almost no time to prepare for the invasion of martial law troops and the ensuing violence.

**Regionalism**

Regionalism has been identified as a factor in the Gwangju 1980 case study. However, Tiananmen 1989 also has elements of regionalism present. Comparing the contribution of regionalism in both case studies may help to identify whether it is a significant factor in maintaining nonviolent discipline or hindering the ability to maintain nonviolent.

As already outlined, Gwangju has a long history of regional discrimination. By nature of its geography, Gwangju is physically isolated (Warnberg 1987, p.34). Gwangju has also been the subject of political discrimination and isolation (Na 2003, p.180; Yea 2003, p.109). Regionalism may add to an explanation of why Gwangju people have a history of protest and dissent. This history may also have been one reason for the government to intentionally target Gwangju students, as a history of protest may have contributed to the
perception that Gwangju students were a political threat. The physical and the political factors of regionalism may therefore have played a part in isolating and also uniting Gwangju people, motivating nonviolent student protests and uniting Gwangju people against the government. Yet this regionalism-related frustration and anger may also be a reason for the citizen violence which eventuated.

Tiananmen 1989 was initiated by the students living in Beijing and quickly the protesters took up occupation in Tiananmen Square. Tiananmen Square symbolising the seat of political power in the capital city meant that the ‘regional’ situation for Tiananmen 1989 was almost the complete opposite of Gwangju 1980. The demonstrations initiated by Tiananmen 1989 students in Tiananmen Square could not go unnoticed by the government, Chinese citizens, media and the international community. Beijing provided a central platform for students to bring their cause to the attention of the rest of the country. In comparison, Gwangju was an isolated region which enabled the military government to operate in relative secrecy.

By nature of location Tiananmen 1989 had an audience while Gwangju 1980 did not. This raises the question whether nonviolent discipline is easier to maintain in a very public setting, held accountable to a wider community and making violent repression more problematic for the oppressor to engage.

Gwangju 1989 had a history of regional discrimination, being both geographically and politically isolated from the rest of the country. This may have fuelled the emotions of Gwangju citizens and given reason to react to the military violence with violence. Gwangju’s relative isolation and history of protest may also have been a reason the government chose to target Gwangju. Tiananmen 1989 comparatively, took place in almost the opposite ‘regional’ context. The capital city of Beijing and Tiananmen Square were central locations which demanded the attention of both the government and wider community.

Ecology (Social Organisation of Space)

The way space is organised may be a factor why people become involved in collective action and may also be a reason why nonviolent discipline is maintained in some cases, and not in others. The point has already been raised in the Tiananmen 1989 chapter that
the physical space of a particular environment may be interpreted as a ‘social structure’ in itself and play a role in the mobilisation of people (Zhao 1998, p.1523). This will be further discussed leading on from the section on regionalism as the two ideas raise comparable themes.

In the case of Tiananmen 1989, the physical layout of space – individual campus layouts, Beijing universities’ proximity to each other, and Tiananmen Square itself – may be factors which enabled people to mobilise during the spring of 1989. The ecology of the university created a protected space within individual campus layout. There was also relatively easy access to other Beijing universities all in fairly close proximity to each other. Tiananmen Square also provided a particular space for protestors to gather in. This was a location from which students could claim and use as a base to coordinate protests. The ecology of Beijing contributed in a positive way to the mobilising of the Tiananmen 1989 and how nonviolent discipline could then be maintained.

Gwangju 1980, on the other hand, appeared to be disadvantaged by its ecology. Several factors may help explain this. First, and most importantly, the entire city was cut off from the rest of Korea by the military presence, which meant movement in or out of the city was almost completely restricted. In this way space was defined and controlled by the military not the protesting Gwangju students and citizens. Second, although some university campuses were in close proximity to the downtown area, they were closed by the military police therefore disabling the universities as a space to gather in. The third factor was that when the citizens attempted to meet collectively, particularly in central locations such as outside City Hall, the military used the opportunity to open fire, killing or injuring many of the people gathered.

This control of space appears to play some part in how nonviolent discipline may or may not be developed. The students in Tiananmen 1989 had a space in Tiananmen Square which was already layered with political and protest symbolism (Hershkovitz 1993). It was “... the frontier between the inner zone of the rulers and the outer zone of the ruled, that gave the Square its potency as the site for popular political action” (Hershkovitz 1993, p.406). The acknowledged symbolism of the square gave the students a space to step into – a structure which already had power – and by claiming this space, it helped
mobilise and support students in maintaining unity. Tiananmen 1989 was able to use the existing symbolic structure of Tiananmen Square to aid their cause, and may have been another factor in maintaining nonviolent discipline.

Gwangju 1980 was both repressed and controlled by space. The opportunity for using public spaces to help mobilise and gather was swiftly disabled. This may have contributed to feelings of anger and repression which did not assist in creating conditions conducive to maintaining nonviolent discipline.

Tiananmen 1989 had the advantage of location, with universities in close proximity to each other and a central gathering space already synonymous with protest and political dissent. Gwangju 1980 was disadvantaged by its location. The city was physically controlled by the military, disabling access to meeting places and disrupting gatherings with violence.

**Repression**

Repression of a group of people might be a reason which motivates citizens to act. Although, this also raises the issue as to whether this was the reason that motivated the people of Gwangju to act in a nonviolent or a violent way. It could equally be argued that China had been repressed for many years under the strict Mao government, and this could have been a reason why the students of China mobilised. However, can long term repression (as in the case of China) be compared with the incident of violent repression that the Gwangju people experienced in May 1980 and the subsequent outcomes? Does the timeframe which repression occurs within make a difference to the outcome – or the reasons for when and how people may react? This thesis would argue that yes, the timeframe does influence the way people feel they have choices or alternatively feel they lack choices. Again, this may be interpreted as ways to respond or react. The political situation in Korea and the consequent invasion of Gwangju took place on a relatively compact time scale when compared with years of political control and repression followed by gradual weakening of control in China during the 1980’s.
It might be suggested that Gwangju 1980 felt compelled to react under the sudden violent pressure of the situation. Tiananmen 1989 instead, responded to a noticeable weakening of a repressive system, engaging careful and considered protest as a result.

**University Dorm Culture**

Tiananmen 1989 emerged out of the university culture and in particular the dormitory culture. The tight networks created by the university dormitory, provided both solidarity and the pressure of peers, helping to mobilise the student protests which led to the gathering at Tiananmen Square. This raises the interesting point, that some students within the dormitory culture may not have wanted to take part in the protests but instead felt pressure to do so although this doesn’t appear to be explored in any depth in the literature. The literature however does indicate Chinese students were evolving out of an oppressive political system, into a way of thinking with a renewed sense of ideological freedom. This implies that dorm culture may have been a factor directly impacting on the development of student’s ideas and possibly their subsequent commitment to protest and nonviolent action.

Although there was no specific reference in the literature mentioning the dormitory culture in Korea during Gwangju 1980, there are many Korean students who live in dormitories during their time at university. It could be suggested that in 1980 there would also have been students living in dormitories in Gwangju which created important networks, as in the case of students in Beijing in 1989.

However, the Korean dormitory culture did not go through the same transition from a space exercising political control over ideas (as in China) to one where ideology could be discussed and empowered. This raises the question as to how significant this may have been in building strength to maintain a nonviolent movement. It is plausible to argue that the dorm culture also created networks for Korean students and provided a physical gathering space for students. Both of these things may well have played an early part in the mobilisation of the students in the Gwangju uprising. However, it is acknowledged that the lack of ‘dorm culture’ literature specifically related to Gwangju’s democratic
movement means it is difficult to construct an argument either for or against whether Korean students’ may have been mobilised by this.

The dormitory networks appear to have had an important role in mobilising Tiananmen 1989 protests. The networks gave students a place to develop dissident political ideology, to gather confidence and a united nonviolent stance, knowing others were also committed to maintaining nonviolent discipline.

**Leadership**

Tiananmen 1989 was led by students, as was Gwangju 1980 in its initial stages. But in the case of Tiananmen 1989 the students were able to mobilise through the university networks, which effectively were a structure enabling prominent spokespersons to gain exposure and promote the early stages of a movement (Morris 2000, p.446). The physical space of Tiananmen Square and its symbolic representation was also a structure which gave leadership a place in which to assemble large demonstrations and occupy on a permanent basis. The structures which support the ability of action groups to unify also simultaneously enable leaders to emerge, both which was evident in Tiananmen 1989.

However, although leaders of Tiananmen 1989 were supported by the university, and in particular the dormitory structures, this may have also added to the difficulty of establishing united leadership amongst these groups. Because there was more than one university, and consequently more than one leader emerging from each university, it was difficult to merge these separate groups into a cohesive whole. Although the Tiananmen 1989 movement still managed to maintain an overall cohesion in protests and demonstrations, the lack of united leadership created problems when attempting negotiations with the government. McCarthy and Kruegler examine the role of leadership in nonviolent struggle and argue that it may not be essential to determine the leader of a movement indispensable. This demonstrates that although leadership is an important part of the picture, it is but one part of a broader practice of nonviolent technique (McCarthy and Kruegler 1993, p.11). Tiananmen 1989 was let down to some extent by the internal conflict of its leadership however, it does appear that the participants had already made a commitment to maintain nonviolent self-discipline
regardless of the strength of leadership. This in itself appears to have been able to unify the students enough that they were committed to maintaining this tactic of engagement, even if there was not always overall agreement over their exact mandate and demands of the government.

However, in the Gwangju 1980 situation, stronger leadership from the very beginning may have helped students and citizens to have maintained nonviolent discipline – even under conditions of extreme violence. For although Gwangju 1980 began with student leadership, when the connection to the national network of student protest was essentially severed by the martial law troops, it may have isolated Gwangju students leaving them unprepared for the kind of leadership required by a situation which developed very quickly. The structures which were available to Tiananmen 1989 students such as the university campus, the political and social culture of the dormitory and Tiananmen Square itself, were not available to the citizens of Gwangju. The universities were taken control of by the military troops and students were forced into hiding as they were the immediate target of the violence, therefore rendering the dormitories or campus meeting spots as unsafe. Most of the student movement had to go underground or into hiding at this point, making student leadership very difficult.

The growing support of the citizens of Gwangju began to form networks as they gathered every day in the central city area. However, it was very unclear who was in leadership, as it was very difficult to know who could be trusted at an official level. “If there was any organizational base, it consisted of personal networks such as school and neighborhood connections that helped build trust and cooperation among the citizens in protest” (Shin 2003, p.xxl).

When the Citizens’ Army and the Settlement Committees were formed there was a semblance of acknowledged leaders, but the citizens of Gwangju appeared fearful and suspicious of leadership who were in negotiation with the martial law command. Support was given instead to the armed resistance, which had an emotive campaign and leaders who had experience in previous protests. However there seemed to be disagreement overall as to how the situation was to be handled.
Comparing Gwangju 1980 with Tiananmen 1989 demonstrates clear differences in leadership formation and on-going management of the movement. As already identified, the concepts of response and react may also be applicable in relation to leadership. Tiananmen 1989 was led in response to a political opportunity which initiated a dynamic social movement, using existing university structures and other support such as the space of Tiananmen Square. There was also a time frame of almost seven weeks without government intervention which gave leadership of the student movement time in which to respond and choose the most appropriate strategy for protest. This may be another reason why nonviolent discipline was maintained. Conversely, in the case of Gwangju 1980 student networks were severed and targeted by violence especially in the first few days, leaving Gwangju without clear leadership and without trust in the groups which attempted to take the students’ place. The lack of trusted leadership to unite people with a clear mandate was another factor which may have impacted on the ability of Gwangju 1980 to commit to maintaining nonviolent discipline.

**External Factors**

The role of the media in both Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 may have had an impact on maintaining nonviolent discipline. In the instance of Tiananmen 1989, the students were able to use their prominent position in Tiananmen Square to catch the attention of the media. The timely visit of Gorbachev meant that there was also heightened access to international media. The foreign press coverage of the students’ nonviolent protest appeared sympathetic to the student’s cause, especially when it could be identified as a movement which was pro-democracy (and therefore, anti-communism).

Gwangju 1980, on the other hand, was treated quite differently by the international media. Within Korea itself, there was very limited access to information coming out of Gwangju as events unfolded in May 1980. The burning of the broadcasting stations in Gwangju further disabled the ability of news to be relayed in to or out of the city. It also seems difficult to discern what news sources were to be believed, when government was not only censoring media activity but also issuing reports of North Korean spies being instrumental in the Gwangju uprising (Shin 2003, p.xviii). Freelance journalists who had
managed to get into Gwangju were unsure whether information leaving the city was being relayed accurately to Seoul and beyond.

Two examples from the U.S. press, illustrate the way that Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 were framed to an international public. Considering how many similarities existed there is remarkable difference in the way the two events were portrayed.

The Washington Post’s headline describing the events in Tiananmen Square read: ‘White House Condemns China Murder’ while the New York Times report on Gwangju headlined as: ‘As Tanks Rumble Off, a South Korean City Springs Back to Life’ (Kim, S. 2000, p.32). These two examples of influential U.S. newspaper reports were compared in a data collection and analysis study based on news articles in the month following each respective incidents’ violent conclusion (Kim, S. 2000, p.28). The conclusion of the analysis was that similar events from the two protest movements were reported in very different ways. Tiananmen 1989 was portrayed in a more positive way than Gwangju 1980. It seems that the U.S. newspapers were influenced by government foreign relations and policy, impacting on the way events from both movements were reported (Kim, S. 2000, p.32).

The international media’s positive coverage of events in Tiananmen 1989 may have assisted students in maintaining nonviolence. This may have happened in two ways:

1) The students had the knowledge that the events were being recorded by third party or international media, therefore building confidence in the ability to maintain nonviolence as they challenged the government, knowing that the outside world was looking on.

2) The international media took a positive “pro-student” perspective, portraying the students in a noble light as they maintained nonviolence against a powerful regime, therefore reinforcing the students’ resolve to sustain nonviolent discipline. The media in turn, praised the students’ nonviolent stance, the students’ therefore continued to maintain nonviolence which was supported by international media, which again reinforced the media’s positive view of the students.
The international media’s less positive coverage of events in Gwangju may have contributed to students and citizens’ difficulty in maintaining nonviolence. This may have happened in two ways:

1) Gwangju citizens and students felt isolated and misrepresented by the media, which may have increased the anger felt towards the government and the martial law troops which occupied the city.

2) By presenting a more negative view of the Gwangju situation, labelling the protesters with unfavourable terms in the international media, may have also contributed to the Gwangju citizens’ sense of despair. As a result Gwangju residents felt they had nothing to gain by maintaining nonviolent discipline and nothing to lose by using violence, which in turn reinforced the negative perspective taken by the media.

Tiananmen 1989 was given national and international media attention. The international community appeared sympathetic to the student’s cause, and the media reinforced this by the way Tiananmen 1989 was framed. Gwangju 1980 not only lacked accurate reporting, access to events as they occurred and was heavily censored, but the international community also reinforced a negative view of Gwangju as a rebellious uprising. The international media’s empathy for Tiananmen 1989 may have positively impacted on students’ commitment to nonviolent discipline as it received supportive international media attention. Equally so the negative portrayal of Gwangju 1980, may have reinforced Gwangju people’s feeling of isolation and given little encouragement to try any tactic other than violence.

### 6.3 Evidence of Nonviolent Discipline

Tiananmen 1989 demonstrates through eyewitness accounts such as Gene Sharp’s interviews with protesting students and further analysis in the literature, that there was a commitment to maintaining nonviolent discipline. Students were able to acknowledge reasons why nonviolence was chosen as the appropriate way to conduct the protests and throughout the seven weeks, it appears that leadership and the strategies used such as the
hunger strike, indicated an on-going commitment to nonviolent discipline. Tiananmen 1989 maintained nonviolent discipline until the end of the movement.

Gwangju 1980 on the other hand, was not as clear in a commitment to maintaining nonviolent discipline. The initial student protests were nonviolent and peaceful however this was not maintained after martial law troops were deployed. Of interest is that during the five days of self-rule, the city showed remarkable nonviolent discipline even in a situation which could have been a reason for riot and anarchy. These five days allowed negotiations to take place with the martial law command and continued attempts at disarming the Citizens’ Army, however these attempts were unsuccessful. Although Gwangju 1980 began as nonviolent, it did not maintain nonviolent discipline.

6.4 Conditions for Nonviolent Discipline
Having examined the two case studies, three influential factors stand out, contributing to the conditions under which nonviolent discipline can be maintained.

The first factor is the timeframe of events. Both Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 have been examined as moving through three stages, something they share in common. However, Tiananmen 1989’s three stages take place over almost seven weeks whereas Gwangju 1980 lasted just ten days. Tiananmen 1989 had more time to form a unified commitment to nonviolent discipline and strategies which might support this commitment. Although leadership was not cohesive, there seemed to be enough general agreement of a shared cause and enough self-discipline – possibly reinforced by networks such as the dormitory culture and the protest symbolism of Tiananmen Square – to maintain nonviolent discipline for the duration of the movement. It might also be important to consider that martial law was only enforced in Stage Three and this quickly put an end to the movement once it was engaged.

Gwangju 1980 had very little time to prepare for the extreme violence which caused chaos and confusion. There was very little time to form nonviolent strategy or leadership which might have supported maintaining nonviolent discipline, as many of the students who had been leading the protests up until this point were now a target and went into
hiding. Although citizens did unify, it appears to have been built on a strong emotional reaction – possibly fuelled by the history of regionalism and repression – and this was not able to support nonviolent discipline. Whereas in Tiananmen 1989 martial law was enforced in Stage Three, in Gwangju 1980 martial law was enforced from Stage One. The discrepancy in timeframe in regards to *when* the protesters had to engage with government violence in each case study may be significant.

The second factor to be suggested is the ecology of social space. Tiananmen 1989 was based in Tiananmen Square, historically the seat of political power and also a symbol of protest and dissent. The powerful symbolism of Tiananmen Square may have contributed to the confidence of students, and also provided a physical central gathering space for the protesters. Both the symbolism and the physical location were factors which enabled students to unify, an important strengthening factor in maintaining nonviolent discipline.

Gwangju 1980 did not have the advantage of controlling social space. The intervention of martial law troops controlled entry and exit to the city, while also policing gathering places with violence. As a result there were not many public locations which were safe and this may have contributed to the resentment of a city unable to gather, elect leadership and form strategies without fear of physical harm. Gwangju was also historically a place which was isolated physically, politically and economically from greater Korea. This in turn contributed to feelings of regional discrimination and it physically enabled the military to seal the city off from outside contact and support. These factors, it seems, played a significant part in contributing to Gwangju 1980’s inability to maintain nonviolent discipline.

The third factor discussed is external influence. Tiananmen 1989 was an event which had significant media attention, at a national and an international level. The students were portrayed in a favourable light as they maintained a nonviolent stance against the government. The students were able to use the opportunity of media events such as Gorbachev’s visit to China to further publicise their cause and gain international sympathy. The fact that there was considerable international media interest in Tiananmen 1989, thus making it more difficult for the government to justify violence
against the protesters, may have contributed to the students ability to maintain nonviolence in an environment which was accountable to a watching outside world.

Gwangju 1980 did not have favourable media attention. There was inaccurate reports of events and government censorship of information which contributed to a negative view of Gwangju citizens. The negative media helped to justify the need for containment of the city by martial law troops, as it was portrayed as a dangerous rebellion. International media did not give Gwangju 1980 the same sympathy which Tiananmen 1989 received regardless of their many similarities. Gwangju was framed as a rebellion, and although this was not how the situation initially begun, the retaliatory reaction of Gwangju citizens after three days of military violence, could have been framed in this way. The unfavourable media attention and isolation this created for Gwangju was not positive for maintaining nonviolent discipline.

Sharp notes that there are several tools that nonviolent campaigns need to utilise in order to help maintain nonviolent discipline: “Four of these are: 1) winning sympathy and support, 2) reducing casualties, 3) inducing mutiny of the opponent’s troops and similar disaffection, and 4) attracting maximum participation in the nonviolent struggle” (Sharp 1973, p.595). If Tiananmen 1989 and Gwangju 1980 are viewed with these four elements in mind, Tiananmen 1989 would meet almost all of these, whereas Gwangju 1980 managed to attract large participation, however the struggle was not able to be maintained with nonviolence.

Finally, the elements response and react are worthy of mention as they have been identified in various ways throughout the discussion. These factors are difficult to quantify and may arise from the culmination of other conditions rather than be independent factors themselves. Nevertheless, they make an interesting contribution to an understanding of the conditions under which nonviolent discipline may or may not be maintained.
6.5 Resulting Factors

Table 3: Variations in Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Short term Outcomes</strong></td>
<td>Military Intervention</td>
<td>Military Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brutal violence by special forces</td>
<td>Brutal violence by special forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian loss of life/massacre</td>
<td>Civilian loss of life/massacre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Repression of movement</td>
<td>Repression of movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Massive international media coverage</td>
<td>Difficulties with accurate local or international media coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Long term Outcomes</strong></td>
<td>On-going repression</td>
<td>Slow exposure of truth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political denial</td>
<td>Legal proceedings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very little change</td>
<td>A steady change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communism</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Short Term Outcomes**
Both case studies experienced very similar short term outcomes. By the Third Stage of each movement, they were both under martial law, military troops deployed, violence used and the movement repressed. Although Tiananmen 1989 was able to maintain nonviolent discipline and Gwangju 1980 was not able to maintain nonviolent discipline, the short term outcomes of both were very similar.
**Long Term Outcomes**

Contrary to what might be the expected long term outcomes, Tiananmen 1989 which maintained nonviolent discipline, was not as successful in making change as Gwangju 1980 which was unable to maintain nonviolent discipline.

South Korea has experienced a dramatic democratization over the last two decades, and the legacy of the [G]wangju uprising has been one of the main facilitating factors in the process (Cho 2003, p.79).

Although, there may be some discussion as to whether democracy is a ‘successful’ outcome, democracy still signals that Korea made significant political change, to which Gwangju has been attributed assisting in this process. Tiananmen 1989, made an impact which may still be evident in the memory of an international community, but failed to impact on its own political landscape. Hence the hypothesis that practicing nonviolence leads to greater freedom, is not supported by the findings of this comparative case study.

### 6.6 Conclusion

This thesis has provided an explanation of factors which may influence nonviolent discipline in an East Asian context.

Theory on nonviolence and East Asian peace formed a context in which the two case studies, China, Tiananmen Square 1989 and South Korea, Gwangju 1980, were compared. The analysis of the case studies identified several independent variables which may have influenced the two movements’ ability to maintain nonviolent discipline. By examination of the independent variables interaction with the individual case study, and a comparison of similarities and differences between the two case studies in the discussion, the following conclusions have been made:

Overall three factors were identified as making a significant contribution to the conditions under which nonviolent discipline was maintained or not maintained. The factors were: the timeframe; the ecology of social space; and the external influence.
Tiananmen 1989’s democracy movement emerged out of a political shift which influenced what students were free to discuss and a dormitory culture which provided a space for students to gather and share ideas over time. The dormitory culture seems to have had a significant role in the mobilising of students, creating an important physical and ideological space for gathering momentum towards the nonviolent movement that emerged. Zhao’s theory of ecology and its role as a social structure reinforces the idea that the dorm culture and universities physical proximity to each other along with the central gathering space of the square – in other words the actual spaces which student’s at this time were inhabiting – created another factor which aided nonviolent discipline.

Comparatively Gwangju 1980 was going through its own political upheavals in 1980 which were creating unrest and tension between the citizens of Korea and the military ruled government. This climate incited university students to protest the military regime demanding more democratic practice. However, the swift military intervention and subsequent physical disconnection from the rest of Korea resulted in violent interaction between martial law forces and Gwangju citizens. Regionalism and the protest history of Gwangju may have played a part in creating a negative view of the situation, reinforced in external media reports. Isolation, the extreme and unexpected violence of the military, and lack of leadership may have all contributed to Gwangju’s inability to maintain nonviolent discipline.

**Further Research**

More empirical research is needed to understand the conditions for maintaining nonviolent discipline.

First, it would be interesting to undertake a broader study of nonviolence movements which occurred in East Asia, comparing the conditions which have been identified in this study with other movements for more robust understanding of maintaining nonviolent discipline in nonviolence movements.

Second, the hypothesis rejected in this thesis; that maintaining nonviolent discipline in a nonviolence movement leads to greater freedom, would be worthy of further exploration.
by examining a broad cross section of nonviolence movements and assessing whether the outcome was similar or different.

Third and finally, the influence of media in nonviolence movements and how this may affect maintaining nonviolent discipline has emerged as a factor of interest in this thesis. Further research into how this may affect a commitment to nonviolent discipline would add to the literature on conditions which influence maintaining nonviolent discipline.
References


