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‘Our Bounden Duty’:
An Analysis of the Arguments Justifying
the Introduction of Peacetime Compulsory
Military Training in New Zealand, 1949

John R. Muir

A thesis submitted for the degree of

B.A. (Hons.) History

at the University of Otago, Dunedin,

New Zealand.

1995
This dissertation examines the arguments presented in favour of the introduction of compulsory military training (CMT) in New Zealand in 1949. It deals primarily with the perceptions of the advocates of CMT and the assumptions that underpinned their arguments. Central to this thesis is the pervasive impact of the dawning of the Cold War upon New Zealand’s collective psyche. As the international landscape became transformed by the emergence of bipolar superpower conflict, New Zealand’s domestic political arena became charged with the ideological black and white qualities of Cold War dogmatism. While the official stance of the New Zealand government owed much to the traditional Commonwealth loyalties and lingering memories of World War II, public pronouncements on CMT reveal equally strong Cold War and anti-communist sentiments. To the proponents of CMT, these two positions did not appear to be mutually exclusive.

The CMT referendum presented the New Zealand public with a rare opportunity to express its opinion on a facet of the Labour government’s Cold War defence policy. Although not necessarily providing a quantifiable expression of the common person’s view on foreign policy, it does suggest that many Cold War assumptions had become widely accepted among the population by 1949. The language used throughout the debate also contains important clues about the degree to which participants appeared to have internalised Cold War precepts.

The CMT debate lacks a detailed historiography, being commonly examined within the context of broader historical studies. Typically, such studies present the CMT referendum as a chronological signpost of the coming of the Cold War. This is to overlook exactly how New Zealand became transformed and how popular opinion came to embrace many of the tenets of Cold War thought so clearly demonstrable in other countries at the time. It is superficial to state that the introduction of CMT occurred after a clear majority vote in the August 1949 referendum. What is more significant is the justification provided by the various participants, both to themselves
and to the public at large, to explain such a radical departure from the Labour Party's time honoured traditions. Had New Zealand politicians been the only ones to consider the introduction of peacetime CMT as necessary, the referendum would probably have caused CMT to become dashed on the craggy rocks of public opinion and tradition. Instead, the views held by those at the top had sufficiently disseminated throughout the population - the pervasive ethos of the Cold War having become mixed with the persistent and lingering fears spawned during World War II - assuring that the majority of those who voted in the referendum did so in the affirmative.

Many historians note the emotive nature of the CMT campaign without examining why New Zealand politics had suddenly become a domain bristling with the excesses of scare mongering and slogans. Was the New Zealand public now more trusting of the platitudes of politicians? Should one portray them as the confused and gullible victims of a concerted manipulation campaign, as intimated by Sylvia Fraser when she wrote of the issue being placed at the feet of the 'bewildered elector'?¹ This study aims to delve into the hazy realm of assumption and perception lying dormant beneath the deceptive succinctness of the political polemics of the time.

This dissertation cannot cover in depth the decision to hold the referendum and the result of that referendum. Unfortunately, neither can it examine the wealth of material produced by those opposed to CMT. Constraints of time and space have dictated against it. There are also those questions that must remain unanswered for want of better evidence and remain caught in the give-and-take of historical conjecture, which is not usually the province of historians. One could, for example, postulate reasons why Peter Fraser considered it necessary to hold a referendum on such a controversial issue in August rather than wait until the general election held in the same year. Any definitive answer, however, appears to have gone with Fraser to the grave.

This is not to say that the answers to other key questions also lie beyond the historian’s grasp. Considering the political upheaval that peacetime CMT represented to the Labour Party, one must confront the following question. Was the introduction of CMT indicative of a political move to the right within the Labour Party in an attempt to deflect the pointed accusations of communist compliancy being levelled at its leaders by the National Party, or was it more symptomatic of Prime Minister Fraser’s own personal interpretation of the international Cold War situation and the threat that he perceived this represented to New Zealand in 1949? In other words, were Fraser and the Labour Party just ‘playing politics’, or were Labour’s leaders responding honestly to a threat they considered very real and dangerous?

It is part of the thesis presented in this work that, while politicians could not ignore the dictates of New Zealand’s domestic politics, the external pressures of the Cold War meant that those advocating CMT were expressing fears that they held to be true. While the central importance of the British Empire was not yet open to challenge by New Zealanders, the ripples caused by the geopolitical turbulence of the time tempered and distorted the long held conception of what the Empire stood for in the minds of many. The majority of New Zealanders accepted Fraser’s May 1949 statement that New Zealand’s commitment to the Commonwealth was as inexorable as ‘the law of gravity’, with New Zealand’s destiny being ‘... wholly and completely bound up in the British Commonwealth’. Fraser saw little or no incompatibility in fighting the Cold War through the framework of the Commonwealth. Those who campaigned for an affirmative vote skilfully used the trappings of Imperial loyalty to bolster their case and alienate their anti-CMT opposition. According to Fraser, it became ‘our bounden duty’ to introduce CMT.

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[3] Southland Times [Hereafter cited as ST], 19 July 1949; New Zealand Parliamentary Debates [Hereafter cited as NZPD], 1949, 285, p. 496. The MP for Napier, Arthur Armstrong, believed that ‘it is the bounden duty of leaders all over the world to devise some better way of settling differences than by fighting with the destructive weapons of war now in existence’. But until that time, men would have to be trained and would ‘have to know something about getting under the ground’ in case the next conflict was an atomic war.
A majority of the parliamentary Labour Party supported the introduction of peacetime CMT. The National Party under Sidney Holland also endorsed CMT and had made it part of their 1949 election platform. The other main proponents of CMT were the New Zealand Returned Services Association (NZRSA) and the Joint Defence Action Committee (JDAC), which was a more specific affiliation of pro-CMT groups.4

Ideologically, anyone who opposed CMT was open to the accusation of having been tarred with the insidious brush of communism. The Labour government experienced a shift to the right that coincided with it becoming highly sensitised to the politically pointed allegations of the Opposition. This shift was best symbolised by Peter Fraser himself, who became New Zealand’s first ‘cold war warrior.’5 Throughout the CMT campaign Peter Fraser exhibited the crusading vehemence of a man adamant that he knew what was best for the country. To Fraser, being a communist and being a New Zealander were mutually exclusive states of self-definition. The prevailing political climate enabled some to equate the term ‘socialism’ with communism. This was a form of political albatross that National Party politicians could hang around their opponents’ necks.

Fraser apparently had faith in the validity of the defence assessments provided by various experts as well as the need for New Zealand to make a defence contribution to the Commonwealth in the Middle East. It is interesting, therefore, that the nature of this military commitment did not feature prominently in the pro-CMT campaign. While Fraser may have been conscious of the need for secrecy about the plan to send a New Zealand expeditionary force to the Middle East at the outbreak of a major war, the traditional and historical nature of such a commitment meant that this deployment would have been a surprise to no-one, least of all the Russians. Instead, the government appeared to emphasise the need to protect New Zealand from invasion

4 The JDAC included the NZRSA; the New Zealand Air Force Association (NZAFA); the New Zealand Homeservicemen’s Association Inc. (NZHA) and the New Zealand Defence League (NZDL).
and of the fear of 'Asiatics' within the Pacific, a threat perception that owed more to the experience of the Second World War than it did to the contemporary Cold War climate. The reason for this more localised focus during the CMT campaign may well have been that regional defence arguments made CMT easier to justify, offering greater political mileage. Much of the discussion of the communist threat also related to the activities of supposed 'fifth columnists' within New Zealand, thereby making the external Cold War threat an internal one.

The arguments presented in favour of CMT drew both on traditional beliefs and experiences, and newer vitriolic denunciations of communist ideology that symbolised the arrival of the Cold War in New Zealand. Both of the major political parties in New Zealand, National and the majority of Labour, approved of CMT and both openly canvassed for the return of a 'yes' vote. Such bi-partisan consensus was not unusual in New Zealand politics, especially within the realm of foreign policy, but co-operation over CMT was not an entirely comfortable experience for either major Party. Perhaps the impending 1949 general election had something to do with this, heralding a time when competing parties would be emphasising the divergent nature of their policies rather than submerging their differences under a convenient shroud of unity. For those determined to find evidence of the Labour government's ideological drift to the right, Fraser's collaboration with National over CMT shone like a beacon.

This thesis thus seeks to examine the pro-CMT case presented during the 1949 referendum debate for what it reveals, both directly and indirectly, about New Zealand's Cold War consciousness at the time. The campaign to introduce CMT has a significance beyond New Zealand's immediate security concerns and this dissertation seeks to contribute to the historiography on the period by analysing the attitudes and assumptions of CMT proponents. What makes the CMT debate unique is that it represented an expression of public opinion on a Cold War defence question. While it may not have been a defining moment in the history of the nation, the CMT debate of 1949 was something of a historical watershed, one which signified the crystallisation of
the ideological concepts of the Cold War and encapsulated a mind-set which had become part of New Zealand’s post-war intellectual landscape.

There are very few historical studies that directly examine the introduction of peacetime CMT in New Zealand and no one has produced a complete synthesis on this topic. Those historians who have something to contribute to this topic generally discuss the issue of CMT within a much wider historical context and they do not examine the details that made this such a unique event in New Zealand history. Most historians do not analyse the significance of the arguments presented in favour of CMT and what they suggest about New Zealand’s defence thinking and threat perceptions of the time. For example, when Keith Sinclair described the Labour government’s introduction of CMT as a ‘self-inflicted wound’ it was because he considered the referendum campaign itself to be more important than CMT’s eventual implementation. Others, like Erik Olssen and Sylvia Fraser, also suggest that the introduction of CMT was significant only because of the effect that it had on New Zealand’s domestic politics, specifically the Labour Party’s defeat in the November 1949 general election.

This is not to say that historians have totally ignored the foreign policy aspect of the CMT issue. Erik Olssen has astutely observed that the CMT debate consisted of a set of interrelated issues, fusing the problems of a Cold War environment, the split within the Labour Movement and Fraser’s belief that a World War was near. R. J.

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7 E. Olssen, ‘Depression and War’ in K. Sinclair ed., The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1993, p. 233. Olssen does not even mention the result of the CMT referendum. S. E. Fraser, ‘The 1949 General Election’, p. 19. There are many reasons that can be given for Labour’s defeat in 1949 and CMT was only one factor among many. For example, Bert Roth believed that Fraser’s handling of the 1949 Auckland Carpenters’ Dispute played a more significant role in Labour’s eventual election defeat than CMT, arguing that, although the carpenters were defeated, ‘Fraser’s real victim was a divided and dispirited Labour Party . . . ’ H. ‘Bert’ Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand: Past and Present, Reed Education, Wellington, 1973, p. 70.
8 E. Olssen, ‘Depression and War’ in K. Sinclair ed., The Oxford Illustrated History of New
Cullen has argued that other historians have largely overlooked the ideological component of the CMT issue,⁹ one which Peter Fraser considered to be part of ‘an anti-communist crusade’.¹⁰ In *Independence and Foreign Policy*, Malcolm McKinnon agreed that ‘Labour’s internationalism has been explored more than its anti-communism’, something he sought to redress.¹¹ One of the dominant themes of McKinnon’s work was that New Zealand’s foreign policy during this period exhibited much consistency with the foreign policy of the past, despite outward vestiges of greater independence. McKinnon argued that part of the reason for the controversy surrounding CMT was that conscription touches peoples’ lives in a very direct way and that Labour stalwarts’ opposition to CMT had ‘far deeper roots [than communist agitation.]’¹² Political scientist Robert Chapman believed that at the time of the CMT referendum, Peter Fraser’s focus was as much on international politics as it was on domestic concerns.¹³ Ian McGibbon also commented on the uneven aspects of this intersection between foreign and domestic policy. McGibbon wrote that ‘The fact that Fraser regarded horse-trading in international dealings as “the height of political immorality” did not prevent him from practising it relentlessly at home’.¹⁴

When these general historical studies do endeavour to dip their toes into the particulars of the CMT case, their observations often appear to be conjecture. For example, James Thorn suggests that in 1949 there was ‘a strong movement throughout

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⁹ R. J. Cullen, ‘The Cold War In New Zealand 1949-1951’, BA Hons. thesis, University of Otago, 1977. While Cullen’s work is superior to Verran’s effort, he is similarly guilty of citing historical sources without adequate reference to the ideological viewpoint being expressed in such sources.


¹¹ M. McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World since 1935*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1993, pp. 1-13. McKinnon also believed that the CMT issue created a juncture where New Zealand’s foreign policy intersected with the country’s domestic politics.


New Zealand’ to have conscription introduced and that Peter Fraser recognised this consensus.\(^\text{15}\) This assessment, however, ignores the dynamics of the referendum campaign. It fails to explain Fraser’s vehement advocacy of CMT and the immense effort and money invested by the proponents of CMT to convince the public that CMT was necessary. Another work, David N. Verran’s disappointing MA research essay, attempted to analyse the CMT debate but contributed little to the historiography of CMT and contained many flaws. For example, Verran was incorrect when he asserted that Fraser believed that ‘The danger in May 1949 was . . . from invasion’, when Fraser real concerns lay with New Zealand’s Middle Eastern commitment and the threat represented by ‘fifth columnists’.\(^\text{16}\)

A notable recent addition to the sparse historiography of CMT is Frazer Andrewes’ MA thesis, which included an examination of the representations of gender utilised by those both for and against CMT during the referendum campaign.\(^\text{17}\) He observed that, while pro-CMT campaigners exhibited a largely hegemonic concept of masculinity, the notions of those opposed to CMT were much more pluralistic, perhaps reflecting their more heterogeneous composition.\(^\text{18}\)

This study seeks to contribute to the historiography of the CMT debate by focusing on the arguments presented by its proponents. It examines how those who supported CMT rationalised that support and ‘sold’ an important security proposal to the New Zealand public. In particular, it seeks to assess whether these arguments reveal the presence of a widespread Cold War consciousness in New Zealand in the late 1940s. It aims to deal with the CMT campaign in a more analytical way, avoiding


\(^{16}\) D. N. Verran, ‘1949 Conscription Referendum: Causes, Campaign and Effects’, MA research essay, University of Auckland, 1974, p. 36.


\(^{18}\) Ibid., pp. 14-15. He also argued that attempts to redefine gender, as a relational construct, by pro- and anti-CMT forces during the referendum campaign took place within a wider set of assumptions which defined ‘manliness’; assumptions that remained unchallenged.
the purely narrative accounts often presented in other works. By analysing such arguments, as well as the attitudes and assumptions that lay behind them, and presenting them in a coherent synthesis, this study also seeks to add to the historiography of New Zealand during the Cold War.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all those who assisted me with this study. Though too numerous for me to thank each one individually, I would like to single out the following people for special thanks. I am most indebted to my supervisor Dr. Roberto Rabel, firstly for his academic assistance and scholastic insight and secondly, for just plain putting up with me. He also managed to keep his sense of humour in the face of adversity and my bad jokes.

I would like to thank the entire History Department at the University of Otago for their support, without which this research would never have come to fruition. Thank you to all the librarians and staff and the Hocken Library, the Alexander Turnbull Library and the National Archives in Wellington. Also, thanks to Murdo Macmillan at the New Zealand Labour Party Headquarters in Wellington, Michael King for answering my correspondence and Frazer Andrewes for sending me a copy of 'Martial Men', a paper which he presented to at the 1994 NZHA Conference. A special thank you to Bob and Mary Stuart for giving me a place to stay in Wellington.

Thanks to all my friends who somehow managed to remember what I looked like, despite the fact that they did not get to see me all that often while I was writing this thesis. Thank you to Mark, Gary and Sian for sticking with me during the ups and downs. Last, but certainly not least, I want to thank my parents for their love and support.

John R. Muir
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<td>Australia, New Zealand Army Corps</td>
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<td>United Nations Organisation</td>
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An overwhelming vote for COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING
It is commonsense to guard the PEACE
STRIKE OUT THE BOTTOM LINE

1.) This government sponsored advertisement appeals to the public to vote in favour of CMT on the basis of ‘duty’.
CHAPTER ONE

New Zealand Feels the Cold War's Icy Chill

... the surest way to establish peace in the world, in the face of the cold blast that is already coming from the East, is to show the people behind the "iron curtain" that the West is prepared and that it cannot be bullied.1

The issue of compulsory military training in 1949, and the debate that surrounded it, evolved from the conceptual framework of the Cold War. A defining characteristic of this mode of thought was the acute fear of communism exhibited by Western leaders. Politicians' actions became assessed within the context of a new bipolar world and domestic events became integrated as part of a wider ideological conflict. The CMT debate is an example of how these Cold War pressures came to bear on a New Zealand issue, resulting in forces that Peter Fraser, astute politician and statesman that he was, could not entirely understand nor control.

New Zealand's defence planning had always exhibited a keen awareness that the country's heavy reliance on foreign markets, especially Britain, meant that during any world-wide conflict, the nation's lengthy and exposed lines of communication and trade would have to be protected. This necessitated an alliance with a Great Power. This sense of vulnerability fostered the belief that New Zealand's survival was inexorably linked with that of Britain. As Fraser told the 33rd Annual Conference of the New Zealand Labour Party in May 1949,

New Zealand's security problem consists not only in her local territorial defence but also, and even more significantly, in her effective contribution towards the protection of land and ocean areas vitally important to the Commonwealth's livelihood.2

It was this sense of shared destiny that moved the New Zealand government to make a gift of aid, in the form of foodstuffs, to Britain during 1947 and 1948.3

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1 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates [Hereafter cited as NZPD], 1949, 285, p. 492, Speech by Cyril Harker of Hawke's Bay.
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Another component of New Zealand's traditional defence planning was the country's isolation. New Zealand's geographical remoteness had strategic benefits because it made it physically difficult to invade and required an aggressor to possess considerable power projection capabilities. This faith in the protection offered by distance, however, became shattered when a militaristic aggressor state had emerged in New Zealand's backyard. New Zealand's experiences with Japan's forces in the Pacific during World War II had an impact on future defence assessments. There was the shock of the collapse of Britain's Singapore naval base in 1942 and a slow dawning realisation that American naval power could be the only guarantor of New Zealand's Pacific security. New Zealand's armed forces, however, remained modelled on the British standard and to have made its defence forces more compatible with American requirements would have entailed significant organisational and political adjustments.

New Zealand's armed forces were quickly demobilised after World War II and it was not until 1947, the year New Zealand reluctantly accepted sovereignty, that a post-war assessment of defence was begun in earnest. New Zealand's continued reliance on Britain's diplomatic network ensured that British influence on the country's foreign policy remained strong. Peter Fraser had once said that he considered membership of the Commonwealth to be 'independence with something added', and defence planning began in 1947 to ensure that adequate conventional forces would be available to contribute to the defence of the Commonwealth.

There were signs prior to 1949 that the proposed post-war defence preparations might necessitate the introduction of some form of large-scale peacetime military training in order to provide the desired number of troops. As early as 1946, Sir William Perry, a Legislative Councillor who had formerly been President of the New Zealand

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5 I. C. McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War*, p. 28. New Zealand's wartime commitment had peaked at 154,549 in 1942, which represented about 1/10th of the population of the country.
6 Ibid., pp. 19-28. A division sized unit was considered the most appropriate contribution that the New Zealand Army could make to an overseas conflict.
Returned Services Association (NZRSA) and President of the New Zealand Defence League (NZDL), had strongly advocated peacetime conscription as a means for New Zealand to meet its Commonwealth obligations. In 1948, Minister of Defence Fred Jones commented that 'in order to obtain this force it will be necessary to introduce a system of national service . . . .' In September 1948, before leaving for a Prime Minister’s Conference in London, Fraser told the National Council of the Federation of Labour (FOL) that the ‘pressure of events might make voluntary enlistment insufficient’. By this time, Deputy Prime Minister Walter Nash had also come to believe that some form of universal service would eventually be required.

The dawning of the nuclear age in 1945 had further complicated the attempts by politicians to come to terms with the dangers of the new international environment. As international events unfolded, they offered the opportunity for observers to construct an interpretation of reality that often only served to reinforce previously established ideological predispositions. While Soviet leader Joseph Stalin considered his actions justifiable on the basis of legitimate and historical security concerns, Western leaders saw nothing less than the manifestation of malevolent communist aspirations of world domination. The Truman Doctrine of March 1947 came to define United States foreign policy, while the Marshall Plan provided an associated economic strategy for combating communism in war ravaged Europe. The situation in Eastern Europe became increasingly tense. In 1947, Hungary came under communist control. Czechoslovakia fell under Soviet control in the February 1948 coup, and the June 1948 Berlin blockade seemed to present the very real possibility of a head-on superpower confrontation.

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7 Evening Post [Hereafter cited as EP], 19 July 1946, Folder 398, Papers of Archibald Charles Barrington, MS Papers 0439 [Hereafter cited as Barrington papers], Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington. [Hereafter cited as ATL]

8 NZPD, 1948, 280, p. 605.

9 Newspaper clipping, The Times, London, 4 August 1949, contained in a letter sent by Fred White in London which arrived 19 August 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, CMT, Papers of Sir Sidney George Holland, MS 1624 [Hereafter cited as Holland papers], ATL.

10 Newspaper clipping, EP, 1948, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, Compulsory Military Service (CMS), National Archives, Wellington. [Hereafter cited as NA]

11 For its part, New Zealand felt compelled to send three RNZAF Dakota aircrews to assist with
RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY THE EX-SERVICEMEN'S ASSOCIATIONS AT THEIR LAST ANNUAL CONFERENCES.

N.Z.R.S.A., 1948 CONFERENCE:

"That this Dominion Council re-affirms most emphatically its adherence to the principle of Compulsory Universal National Service. It further wishes to show appreciation of the efforts of the Joint Defence Action Committee of the N.Z.R.S.A., N.Z.H.A. and N.Z.A.F.A. in keeping the urgency of the matter before the Government and expresses its confidence in any further action that this Committee may feel called upon to take."

N.Z. AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION:

Resolution of the Dominion Council of the Air Force Association (Inc.) passed at Nelson on 22nd January, 1949: "That this Conference reaffirms its support for Universal National Service as the only fair and practical method for promoting National Security; and pledges its continued co-operation with the R.S.A. and the H.S.A. in the activities of the Joint Defence Action Committee in advocating this policy."

N.Z. HOMESERVICEMEN'S ASSOCIATION:

Resolution passed at the 1948 Annual Conference: "That this Conference affirms the broad policy of Universal Compulsory Service in a war emergency, and urges the introduction immediately of that portion of the scheme providing for Universal Compulsory Military Training."

Great Britain has resorted to conscription in Peace-time. In 1939 U.S.A. passed the Neutrality Act; in 1949 she adopted compulsory military training.

OF WHAT USE IS SOCIAL SECURITY WITHOUT NATIONAL SECURITY?

2.) Each of the ex-servicemen's associations that formed the JDAC had reaffirmed their support for CMT by January 1949. Much was made of the fact that both Britain and the United States had introduced peacetime conscription.
The various communist-nationalist insurrections in Asia were seen by most New Zealand politicians within the context of a broader communist world strategy and became nebulously linked to the upheavals in Europe. These conflicts included the Malayan ‘Emergency’ of 1948, the Indonesian War of Independence against the Dutch, and the conflict between the Viet Minh and the French in the First Indochina War. Each of these conflicts represented a potential threat to the economies of New Zealand’s European allies and there were fears that a dangerous power vacuum could result from the fall of these colonies. In March 1948, Peter Fraser, fearing the withdrawal of American forces, stated that Korea was almost ‘certainly lost’ to the communists. This pattern of communist aggression in Asia was sufficient to persuade New Zealand to reassert its defence commitment to Fiji.

New Zealand was placed in the anomalous position of not wanting to antagonise newly emerging Asian nations, yet at the same time wanting the West to retain a considerable colonial presence in the region. Conceptually, New Zealand still clung to the belief that it was a European ‘outpost’ in the Pacific and, therefore, her Asian neighbours were seen more as potential enemies than possible allies. This attitude was made clear in one of Fraser’s statements concerning a possible Pacific Pact. He said ‘There are countries in Asia with which our relations, though we hope they will always be friendly, cannot be expected to have the intimate character necessary for a genuine security grouping’. By 1949, Peter Fraser acknowledged that ‘Communist successes in the East’ had necessitated an adjustment in New Zealand’s position on defence.

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12 I. C. McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War, p. 35.
13 Ibid., p. 50.
16 I. C. McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War, p. 24; p. 45.
18 P. Fraser to Sir Patrick Duff, 23 February 1949, p. 2, EA 1, 156/1/1, Part 3, Imperial Defence
New Zealand's emerging concerns about the spread of communism, however, coincided with its fears of resurgent Japanese militarism. The emotional scars of the last war ran deep and Fraser favoured 'the most vigorous security control' in Japan. These concerns had provided the impetus for the Canberra Pact between New Zealand and Australia in January 1944, which had clearly signalled both countries' fears about Japan to the United States. When it became clear by 1947 that the Americans opposed a punitive peace settlement with Japan, the uneasy ambience of the Cold War began to feed into the past traumas of New Zealand's Second World War experiences. Carl Berendsen was an important man in New Zealand's foreign affairs, having been the Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department from 1935 to 1943 and then serving as the High Commissioner in Canberra in 1943. Before his appointment as New Zealand's ambassador in Washington in 1944, Berendsen had already voiced New Zealand's dissatisfaction with the Control Commission in Japan, and, during the course of 1948, the New Zealand contingent in Japan, 'J-Force,' was withdrawn. There was an underlying sentiment of anti-Americanism in some quarters of New Zealand but, as the Cold War gained momentum, this sentiment became submerged under New Zealand's increasingly strong feelings of antagonism towards the Soviet Union.

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 signalled the resolve of the Western Bloc to contain further Soviet expansion in Europe. The Treaty was welcomed in New Zealand, yet Peter Fraser also feared that the crystallisation of the situation in Europe might force communism to explore other global outlets and that the Russians would '... exploit these fields of mischief and aggression in the Far East'. Australia and New Zealand considered the Treaty 'both a model and a menace'.

1948-56, NA.

21 Ibid., p. 95.
22 Ibid., p. 78; I. C. McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War, p. 18; p. 24.
23 I. C. McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War, p. 17; p. 27; p. 35.
Within New Zealand's Parliament there were varying interpretations of the international situation. The National MP for Wallace, T. L. MacDonald, proclaimed in 1948 that 'The international ammunition dump might blow up at any moment', while A. C. Baxter, Labour's MP for Raglan, railed against what he considered a concerted '... attempt to stampede the public into some form of war panic and into the idea that war was imminent'. Fred Jones believed that any definitive assessment should be deferred until Prime Minister Fraser had returned from his discussions with the British Chiefs of Staff in London.

In the charged political climate of the time, the New Zealand Labour government found itself on the defensive from National Party accusations that it was 'soft' on communism and that the public should question the true motives of any one who championed the socialist cause. A National Party publication entitled 'Tarred with the Same Brush' portrayed Socialism as closely related to communism. Freedom warned that 'Socialism leads to Communism as surely as day follows night' [originally in bold]. By 1948, the encroachment of the Cold War meant that '... socialism tended to become even less possible than before. Anything that could be vaguely identified with communism was regarded with deep suspicion'. 'Socialism', wrote labour historian Bert Roth, eventually became 'a dirty word'.

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25 Newspaper clipping, EP, 1948, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
26 R. Chapman, 'From Labour to National' in W. H. Oliver ed., The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd ed., Auckland, 1992, p. 372. The National Party criticised the Labour government for their handling of the 1949 Auckland Carpenters' dispute, arguing that the government was too slow to react to the problem and that it was generally too 'soft' in its handling of industrial disputes. This perception was reinforced by the increasingly frequent occurrence of disruptions on the waterfront.
27 New Zealand National Party, pamphlet, 'Tarred with the Same Brush - Why We Fight Socialism', Wellington, 1947; S. E. Fraser, 'The 1949 General Election', p. 35.
28 See Freedom, 27 July 1949, p. 2; Freedom, 29 June 1949, p. 3; Freedom, 25 May, 1949, p. 2; Standard, 2 June 1949, p. 1. 'Little need be said of the Nationalists' ignorance of political history in trying to associate Labour's policy with Communism', bristled Fraser.
Both major political parties condemned the New Zealand Communist Party. Fraser appeared to personally resent the ‘incessant out pouring of hate and misrepresentation and falsehood’ from the ‘Communist Party and their tools’.  

31 Bob Semple, the Labour Party’s Minister of Works and Minister of Railways, said that the Communist Party, which he believed ‘should be called the Russian Party’, ‘... is out to destroy the Labour Party, its Enemy No. 1’.  

32 The Labour Party hoped that by distancing itself from the communists it would affirm its separate identity and diffuse the political gibes of its opponents. For example, the Labour Party National Executive told certain members of Parliament that they should resign their membership of the Society for Closer Relations with Russia.  

33 To some extent, the Labour government’s successful social reforms had fostered heightened expectations and created a domestic situation that was ultimately to demand a reassessment of Labour’s traditional beliefs. Indeed, it has been suggested that the Labour government found itself ‘... surrounded and trapped by the changes it had made’.  

34 There were political costs attached to some of Labour’s policies, such as the continuation of rationing so that aid could be given to Britain.  

35 Labour had become synonymous with the bureaucratic controls and rationing of the war years, and the promise of a continuation of wartime stabilisation policies offered little to enthuse the public.  

36 During the war, Fraser had been able to indulge his preference for international politics over the more mundane affairs of domestic policy. His trips to the United Kingdom in late 1948 and early 1949 enhanced his reputation as a statesman, but they also opened him up to accusations of being ‘out of touch’ with New Zealand’s
domestic affairs. As Robert Chapman has observed, ‘Instead of leading the politics of reconstruction, the attention of Labour’s ageing, thinning team of oligarchs and administrators was fixed on the coming of the Cold War overseas and the spectacle of militant strikers at home’. But nor could the Labour government isolate itself from world events for, as Legislative Councillor Thomas Bloodworth observed, external affairs had come to ‘dominate’ New Zealand’s politics. He commented that half of Governor-General Freyberg’s speech to Parliament had been devoted to external affairs, proving that ‘All that is going on in the world is concerned with matters happening outside each country’s borders, not necessarily within them’.

The Labour government, however, remained keenly aware that the 1946 general election had only furnished it with a slim four seat majority. New Zealand’s relative economic prosperity and the benefits of social security provided the basis for National Party claims that they could make ‘the pound go further’ by removing Labour’s restrictions. National MP Frederick Doidge stated that he considered the issue of peacetime CMT to be ‘political dynamite’ for the Labour government in what was an election year. In recognition of the delicacy of the situation, in September 1948 the Labour Party National Executive had passed a resolution ordering that the Labour regional councils (LRCs) and Party branches ‘refrain from passing or publishing any resolutions’ on compulsory national service until the issue could be put before the Labour Party Annual Conference.

In late 1948, Peter Fraser had discussions with British authorities to determine how New Zealand could best contribute to Commonwealth defence. The British Minister of Defence, A. V. Alexander, and the British Chiefs of Staff stressed the strategic importance of the Middle East, with its oil resources and the Suez Canal.

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39 Newspaper clipping, EP, 21 April 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
40 New Zealand Labour Party, Fifth Meeting of the 1948-49 Labour Party National Executive, June 1948 to May 1949, Tuesday, 21 September 1948, p. 4, LPHQ.
New Zealand had made a large contribution there during the last war and it was in keeping with the assessment of many in the New Zealand military, men like Howard Kippenberger, who insisted that ‘Our fate in a third world war will be decided overseas’. Fraser requested that Alexander’s appraisal of New Zealand’s contribution be both relevant to the prevailing world situation as well as integrated into the strategic defence planning of British Commonwealth group members.

The thinking of the British Chiefs of Staff is partly revealed in comments they made to Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley about military planning. It was stated that the Soviet Union aimed to spread communism throughout the world and that they were prepared to resort to war at the earliest possible moment to achieve this. While it was believed that this would not be until after the Soviet Union had completed its second post-war five-year plan in 1957, there was the ever-present risk of a premature conflict being inadvertently sparked by a ‘miscalculation’. It was suggested that Australia’s long term survival was, like New Zealand’s, contingent on the Western Allies’ ability to stand together and defeat the Russians. The Allies’ air bases were considered priority targets to be defended and, while it was believed that the Americans would match any threat in the Pacific, the Allies would be ‘hard put’ to protect their interests in the Middle East. Australia, and New Zealand, were asked to contribute forces ‘... over and above those forces which she requires for the defence of areas vital to her home defence’, to the Middle East.

The British made guarantees that the New Zealand expeditionary force would be transported to the Middle Eastern theatre by British shipping and supplied with modern equipment once they arrived. Fraser agreed that, in the event of a global war, New

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42 Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 10 March 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
43 Letter from A. W. McIntosh to F. Shanahan, 23 October 1948, p. 1, EA 1, 87/1/26, Part 3a, Imperial Defence 1948-56, NA.
44 Comments by the British Chiefs of Staff on the major military aspects of PM B. Chifley’s letter, p. 1, EA 1, 156/1/1, Part 3, NA.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 External, Wellington to Deputy, London, 14 April 1949, EA 1, 156/1/1, Part 3, NA.
Zealand would provide ‘... an infantry division (augmented with a significant armoured component), tactical air forces and surplus naval forces for service in the Middle East’. Unlike New Zealand, however, the Australians resisted British pressure and chose to take a leading role in the Commonwealth’s defence of the Pacific. ANZAM was an Australian defence initiative relating to the South-West Pacific that came to fruition in 1949.

The Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in October 1948 discussed the possibility of a Pacific Pact, like the Atlantic Treaty, but it was not until 1949 that such discussions developed any real momentum. Fraser thought that ‘any union designed to combat Communism or aggression generally can only end in disappointment and futility unless there can be an assurance of active support from the United States and the United Kingdom’. Yet he was under no delusion that inducing the United States into a peace-time defence relationship in the Pacific would be easy, although he hoped that events in China might provide a new impetus. While the National Party saw the benefits a Pacific Pact could bring, Frederick W. Doidge criticised such efforts as ‘wishful and fantastic thinking’. There was only a minimal awareness that New Zealand’s participation in the West’s global Cold War strategy, while still shrouded in the familiar wrap of the Commonwealth, could not always be reconciled with regional security interests.

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51 I. C. McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War, p. 32.
52 E. Olssen & B. Webb eds., New Zealand, Foreign Policy & Defence, p. vii. ANZAM stood for Australia, New Zealand and Malaya and it was concerned with ‘providing a framework for Commonwealth contingency planning for the south-west Pacific’. See also W. D. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, pp. 210-222.
53 T. R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, p. 112.
55 Newspaper clipping, New Zealand Herald [Hereafter cited as NZH], 15 June 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
The introduction of CMT was partly designed to be a signal to the United States that New Zealand was prepared to pull its weight on defence and, therefore, it would be more favourably disposed towards a Pacific Pact that would create 'a united front against Communist aggression'. As Fraser stated in Parliament on 20 July 1949, ‘An essential element of an adequate security arrangement is that each country will make the fullest provision to meet its own and the common interests, and this New Zealand is endeavouring to do’. In 1948, Frank Corner, then a young diplomat with New Zealand’s Department of External Affairs, argued that ‘It is not fanciful to suggest that the grand aim of New Zealand external policy and diplomacy might be to secure in some form an American guarantee of the security of New Zealand’.

The personality of Peter Fraser is central to the issue of CMT and the coming of the Cold War to New Zealand. Fraser was the epitome of a ‘Commonwealth man’. He had hoped that the co-operation between Commonwealth countries demonstrated during wartime would continue into the post-war era. He feared that the ties between Commonwealth countries would be weakened, with the advent of the newly independent states of Pakistan, India and Ceylon, and that their sense of loyalty to the Crown would become diluted.

Fraser became increasingly disenchanted with a United Nations (UN) organisation that could not escape the vicissitudes of the Cold War. It lacked effective collective security machinery and faced constant stalemate in the Security Council. By 1949, Fraser’s ‘idealism had become salted with disillusionment’. The British

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57 *Otago Daily Times* [Hereafter cited as ODT], 11 January 1949, p. 4.
60 I. C. McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War*, pp. 21-22. It was ironic that it was not these countries but Canada and South Africa who exhibited ‘active hostility’ to the concept of a co-ordinated Commonwealth defence plan. See Letter from A. W. McIntosh to F. Shanahan, 23 October 1948, p. 1, EA 1, 87/1/26, Part 3a, NA.
62 Ibid., p. 23.
High Commissioner to London reported that Fraser ‘... has come to accept the view that Russia is the real obstacle to world peace, and his attitude towards her is coloured by all the resentment which a man bears towards the destroyer of his illusions’.63

As a ‘statesman’, Fraser was the driving force behind New Zealand’s foreign policy during his time in office.64 He believed that principle had a role to play in international politics and considered ‘Realpolitik’ to be somehow politically immoral.65 The British Deputy High Commissioner in New Zealand, A. W. Snelling, said of Fraser that ‘On all international issues he takes the high moral line’, seeing problems in terms of ‘black and white’.66 It was a conceptual outlook well suited to the bipolar post-war world. A CIA report on New Zealand in mid-1949 observed that some ‘... Labour politicians, particularly Fraser and Semple, have become vigorous campaigners against Communism’.67 Fraser had come to accept much of the ‘exalted crusading spirit’ that had been personified by Carl Berendsen, portraying the Soviet Union as the villain of the piece.68 While in Canada, in January of 1949, Fraser lamented that ‘we in New Zealand are increasing our defence expenditures, because of Russia’s attitude, at a time when we would be much more glad to cut defence spending’.69 Therefore, anyone who opposed the introduction of CMT in New Zealand while Soviet countries remained ‘armed to the teeth’, should be considered obvious ‘enemies of any democracy, and would be treated as such’.70

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63 Ibid., pp. 26-7; Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 14 June 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. Fraser complained that the Russian media ‘... literally poured forth hate’.
64 K. Sinclair, Walter Nash, p. 264; D. W. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, p. 4. Fraser personally dominated New Zealand’s foreign policy.
65 I. C. McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War, p. 16.
66 Ibid.; W. D. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, pp. 4-5. Snelling also said that ‘... arguments of expediency carry very little weight with him ...’
68 I. C. McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War, p. 48; W. D. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, p. 1; R. Semple, pamphlet, ‘Why I Fight Communism’, p. 32. When Fraser described his ministerial colleague, Bob Semple, as ‘a crusader’ against communism, he could just as easily have been referring to himself.
70 Report of Peter Fraser’s address to Council 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
Peter Fraser’s political career was ironically intertwined with the issue of conscription. In 1916, Fraser had protested the introduction of conscription in a speech he delivered on 10 December. For this he was imprisoned, along with others including Bob Semple, on charges of sedition. Fraser himself had denounced conscription throughout the 1930s as an ‘anachronism’, arguing that it had been made obsolete by poison gas and the aeroplane. During World War II, Fraser had responded to the demands of the situation and had introduced conscription for both the armed forces and for civilian purposes in the face of remarkably little public outcry. Citing a desperate situation, he declared that compulsion was the ‘only fair method whereby a citizen could render the duty he owed to the country’. Asked at the time whether a referendum should have been taken in order to provide the mandate for conscription, Fraser had replied:

Our mandate is the necessity of the occasion. When a house is on fire no one needs a mandate to fight the fire. When a country’s very existence is at stake no other mandate than the necessity is required to conscript anything and everything.

In 1949, Fraser had to convince the New Zealand public that the introduction of peacetime CMT had become necessary to prevent the smouldering international situation from turning the ‘house’ into a fiery conflagration. Archibald Barrington, a pacifist and a prominent member of the peace movement of the time, had commented in 1947 that Fraser ‘was too wise to commit himself to peacetime conscription here’, only to be proved wrong within the space of two years. Prone to irritability during the 1949 referendum campaign, Fraser constantly resented having his past thrown back in his face by opponents.

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72 J. Thorn, *Peter Fraser*, p. 77.
76 Here Fraser appeared to be alluding to retired US air force Major General Claire Chennault’s statement that ‘The house is really on fire and the conflagration will extend throughout the world unless it is extinguished in China’. *ODT*, 17 January 1949, p. 5.
77 Newspaper clipping, Unknown, 28 July 1947, Folder 398, Barrington papers, ATL.
Australia’s Labour government had already dealt with the problem of CMT when, in 1945, the Labour Party’s triennial conference had rejected it by the narrow margin of three votes. The memories of the defeat of two referendums on conscription, held in 1916 and 1917, lingered. Australia’s leaders were not convinced of the necessity of peacetime conscription and were acutely aware of the political risk it entailed. Instead, Australia relied on voluntary enlistment to provide a permanent army of 19,000 men supported by a citizen force of 50,000. However, by 1949, only some 14,000, or 28% of the desired total, had come forward under the system of voluntary recruitment.

Returning from London on 8 May 1949, Fraser declared that the time had come to examine New Zealand’s defence capabilities. Discussing New Zealand’s defence contribution, Fraser compared its contribution of £7 per head with that of over £15 by every British person and said that New Zealand should share more of the burden in the name of self-respect. ‘It is not courageous to say we will produce the food and let the Mother Country do the fighting’, argued Fraser.

On 21 May 1949, the Labour Party Caucus Committee on national defence presented a report known as the ‘Defence of New Zealand’. Caucus approved a series of resolutions to be submitted to the Labour Party Annual Conference, one of which requested that the government use all of New Zealand’s available resources, including CMT, should it be considered necessary. The committee recommended

80 T. R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, p. 64. Australia did not introduce CMT until the outbreak of the Korean War when it was introduced by the Liberal and Country Party coalition.
81 Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 26 March 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
that ‘if the resources are not available without Compulsory Military Service, the Government [should] obtain the views of the electors on this question by referendum at the earliest possible date’.86 The committee emphasised that ‘The act will not establish any general system of industrial conscription’ [underlined in original].87 The Labour caucus’ acceptance of CMT was symbolic of an ideological shift to the Right within the Labour Party.88

Foss Shanahan, the Deputy Secretary of External Affairs, wrote to the Adjutant General, Brigadier William Gentry of Army Headquarters, asking him to comment on the legal status of existing defence legislation, especially the compulsory clauses of the 1909 Defence Act. Gentry replied that ‘Although the Defence Acts in existence could be made to give the necessary authority to introduce Compulsory Military Training, those acts are otherwise most unsuitable for modern conditions’.89 Gentry believed that these acts did not cater for the modern concept of ‘one army’ and recommended that a new and separate national service bill be introduced to cover CMT.90

Fraser was certainly aware that the issue of CMT might demand the use of a referendum even before the Caucus Committee on National Defence reported back, although he personally did not seem in favour of it.91 He realised that such a move could be politically costly. The Secretary of New Zealand’s Department of External Affairs, Alister McIntosh, supposedly passed on to Fraser an extract from the book From ANZAC to Amiens by the Australian official historian Dr. C. E. W. Bean, which included references to Australia’s referendum on conscription during the First World

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86 Report to the Parliamentary Labour Party, 20 May 1949, p. 2, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
87 Caucus Committee on Defence Report, 1 April 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
88 NZPD, 1949, 285, p. 40. Fraser was at great pains to emphasise that ‘There was absolutely no “leftist” influence’ in the decision to hold a referendum.
89 William Gentry to Foss Shanahan, 16 May 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
90 Ibid., Memorandum to Solicitor-General, 20 May 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA. A territorial army, composing troops provided by a compulsory service scheme, could apparently not be created under the auspices of the 1909 Act.
91 D. W. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, p. 195. Fraser saw the need for CMT, but as early as 1947 he had doubts about how much support the proposal would receive.
War. The extract suggested that although ‘Australia unquestionably stood in danger . . . this danger was too remote to have the driving force of a threat of immediate invasion. Most people did not believe their danger sufficient to make conscription necessary, and no argument as to its fairness would compel them’. For Dr. Bean, ‘there was no issue of principle between most of the protagonists of the two sides’. Because the Australian public remained unconvinced that Australia itself was threatened, they had proved unwilling to vote for conscription.

Recourse to a referendum on a difficult issue was not unusual for the Labour government, with two having already been held on 9 March 1949. The referendum to keep hotels open until 10 p.m. returned a negative result, with 75.5% of those who voted voting to maintain a 6 p.m. drinking curfew, while the proposal to institute government sponsored horse gambling through betting shops was approved, with a ‘yes’ vote of 68.0%. It should, however, be remembered that the turnout in these two referendums was only 56% of the total of those eligible to vote, well below New Zealand’s high turnout for general elections.

The Annual Conference of the FOL began in Wellington on 17 May 1949, only a week before the Labour Party’s own conference. Fraser had previously assured the Wellington Trades Council in February 1949 that conscription would only be introduced in New Zealand after all other options had been considered. Pickets opposing conscription made their presence known at Trades’ Hall, where the FOL Conference was held, with some of those protesting also being members of trade delegations. The issue of CMT did not cause major ruptures within the Labour government.

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92 Letter to A. D. McIntosh, 15 March 1949, ‘Extract from ANZAC to Amiens’, by C. E. W. Bean, p. 1, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA. (In the letter it is referred to as ‘From ANZAC to Amiens’ but the typed extract is headed ‘ANZAC to Amiens’)
93 Ibid. Of the 2,247,590 of the total votes cast on 28 October 1916, conscription was defeated by a margin of 72,476.
94 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Newspaper clipping, EP, 17 May 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA; EP, 24 May 1949, p. 10. Fraser later claimed that he would have ‘gladly’ addressed the issue of CMT at the FOL Conference but, because the Carpenters’ dispute had dominated proceedings, the opportunity had not
3.) This cartoon, used in a New Zealand Communist party pamphlet, shows how those involved in the debate over the introduction of peacetime CMT in New Zealand were keenly aware of the comparisons that would be made with Australia. Like New Zealand, Australia had a Labour government but Australia's politicians were unwilling to introduce peacetime conscription, especially in light of the two referendums in 1916 and 1917 which had failed to introduce conscription during the First World War. Yet both Labour government's were to share the same fate, losing general elections at the end of 1949.
Movement at this point but it did provide an issue over which clear battlelines were drawn between the militant and the moderate trade unionists and, in this regard, it encouraged more overt divisiveness.\textsuperscript{98}

The Thirty-third Annual Conference of the New Zealand Labour Party was held in the Wellington Town Hall from 21 to 26 May 1949. Even before the Conference opened, a request had been made of each of the affiliated bodies of the Labour Party to support compulsory military training and reduce the opposition to it within their ranks.\textsuperscript{99} On Tuesday 24 May, during the fifth session, Peter Fraser presented the Parliamentary report on defence that had been approved by the Labour Party Caucus.\textsuperscript{100} It included clause three which requested

\begin{quote}
the Government to use all the resources of the country, including compulsory national service, if the Government, after exploring all possibilities and alternatives, is convinced that such a measure is essential for the defence and preservation of our people, our country, our Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{101}
\end{quote}

Exactly what Fraser told the Conference concerning Remit eighteen on CMT is unclear because "Unfortunately there is no complete text of the Prime Minister's statement to the Conference".\textsuperscript{102} Fraser argued that Australia and Canada, both Commonwealth countries with larger population bases, had experienced shortcomings with the system of volunteer recruitment.\textsuperscript{103} It was significant, however, that both Britain and the United States, had considered it necessary to introduce their own peacetime compulsory military training schemes.\textsuperscript{104} Fraser spoke of the 'indisputable

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\textsuperscript{102} Memorandum dated 31 May 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA; ODT, 25 May 1949, p. 4. The Conference was not open to the press.
\textsuperscript{103} Newspaper clipping, NZH, 25 May 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; NZPD, 1949, 285, p. 39. Later, in Parliament, Fraser also noted that these countries were spending 'almost fabulous sums of money' on defence.
\textsuperscript{104} T. R. Reese, \textit{Australia, New Zealand and the Unites States}, p. 49. Historian Trevor Reese noted that, while both New Zealand and Australia were keen to allow for the 'rapid expansion' of their
fact that any war emergency ... would create a situation demanding instant preparedness and activity'.

After his speech, Fraser moved that the Defence Report be endorsed but A. B. Grant of the Christchurch Bricklayers’ Union moved that clause three be deleted and that the Labour Party ‘Reasserts its opposition to conscription in peace; and in war reasserts its support for equal conscription of wealth and manpower’. When Fraser had rhetorically asked the Conference whether CMT was considered necessary in peacetime, some ten to fifteen people were openly heard to mutter a dissenting ‘no’. What followed was an ‘acrimonious’ debate that spilled over into the sixth session the next day as a procession of speakers took the stage.

Among those supporting CMT at the Conference was W. N. Pharazyn, representing Wellington’s Biscuit and Confectionary Workers Union, who said that Labour Party ‘tradition’ was not a justifiable reason to reject CMT if New Zealand was threatened. Walter Nash maintained that his views on the issue had been shaped by Hitler’s actions in 1933 and that the international situation had changed dramatically from when ‘... Labour traditionally opposed militarism’. The Minister of Labour, A. McLagan, agreed that pacifism was no defence against aggression. C. F. Skinner, MP, believed that New Zealand should make itself strong enough to deter any attackers. C. Carr, the MP for Timaru, complained that ‘Mr Grant’s amendment was tantamount to a vote of no-confidence in the Government’.

defence forces, neither country was prepared to do so regardless of the impact that this may have on each government’s domestic policies.

106 Ibid., p. 19.
109 EP, 24 May 1949, p. 10
110 Ibid.
111 Newspaper clipping, NZH, 25 May 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
113 Newspaper clipping, NZH, 25 May 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
Others, however, were less convinced of the need for CMT. E. A. Napier of the New Zealand Waterside Workers' Union warned that CMT was the first step in an attempt to introduce 'complete military and industrial service', and he believed that Fraser had proposed everything but a declaration of war.Labour MP Frank Langstone spoke against CMT, saying he considered it 'politically unwise' to introduce a measure that would 'split the Labour movement'. Realising that he would face opposition from within the ranks of the Labour Movement while campaigning for a 'yes' vote, Fraser told the Conference that 'I recoil from being before the public and having to fight my friends of the Labour Movement'.

During the luncheon break of the sixth session of the Conference Fraser was supposedly approached by several Parliamentary members of the Labour Party who presented him with a possible amendment to his resolution, which included holding a referendum on CMT. Whatever the origins of the move, Fraser proposed that clause three be amended to include a line stating 'that if the resources are not available without Compulsory National Service, the Government be requested to obtain the views of the electors on the question by a referendum'. The amended report was adopted by a vote of 600 for and only eight against the proposal.

Fraser claimed that 'there were many advantages in the amendment resolution finally agreed to on my own motion' and denied that he was pressured into a referendum. This was not how many others saw it. The National Party claimed that this move proved that the Labour Party Conference was the 'real Parliament of New Zealand', having forced Fraser to suffer the 'inexpressible humiliation' of having to

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115 Freedom, 1 June 1949, p. 2; Standard, 2 June 1949, p. 4.
117 Auckland Star [Hereafter cited as AS], 25 May 1949; J. Thorn, Peter Fraser, p. 269. Thorn maintained that it was Fraser who had 'tactfully' proposed that a referendum on CMT be held.
119 AS, 25 May 1949; Dominion, 26 May 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA. It was not surprising that the Labour Party Conference also rejected a remit for the abolition of military training in schools.
120 Newspaper clipping, Southern Cross [Hereafter cited as SC], 27 May 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
"I thought he mightn't
look quite so fierce, this way"

"And I'm all yours in Buts and Thoughts."
agree to a referendum. The *Melbourne Herald* reported that Fraser had had the CMT referendum forced on him by the Labour Conference and the Prime Minister had conceded the ‘inevitable’ need for a referendum.

Commenting on the decision to hold a referendum on CMT, McLennan argued that ‘it is probable that from the start the government was tempted to abdicate making a decision on the most stormy and important political issue of the year’. Yet, while it was reported in January 1949 that a referendum on the issue had been mooted, McLennan has little supporting evidence to back his assertion that Fraser intended to hold a referendum ‘from the start’. There is sufficient evidence, however, to suggest that Fraser only consented to holding a referendum after he saw the extent of the opposition to CMT at the 33rd Labour Party Conference.

Fraser wanted the referendum on CMT to be put to the people prior to the general election. He previously claimed that a global conflict would begin within eighteen months but, after accepting the referendum, Fraser came to reassess the level of world tension. In June 1949 he told Parliament that, while it had appeared that war was imminent ‘eight or nine months ago’, the threat had now ‘receded’. Fraser, however, was unwilling to delay the decision until after the November election, a course of action that may have had less damaging consequences for the unity of the Labour Movement. As the National Party also wanted to introduce CMT, this would not have compromised New Zealand’s security unless one considered time an important factor, as Fraser appeared to do.

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121 Newspaper clipping, NZH, 26 May 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
122 Newspaper clipping, *Melbourne Herald* [Hereafter cited as MH], 31 May 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
124 ODT, 6 January 1949, p. 4.
125 Newspaper clipping, NZH, 26 May 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; NZPD, 1949, 285, pp. 39-40. In Parliament, Fraser made clear his preference that the CMT proposal should have been placed on the Labour Party’s general election platform. Yet his statements that circumstances now provided sufficient time to hold a referendum, and that one of the benefits of the referendum was that it would ‘facilitate the scheme by months’, seem contradictory.
127 NZPD, 1949, 285, p. 39; Newspaper clipping, *Dominion*, 14 June 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
"I believe the country has made up its mind..."

"The British people pay £15/- for defence..."

"The cost to New Zealand is £7 a head..."

"No more complete conscription than in Russia..."

5. An animated Peter Fraser asks the New Zealand Labour Party's Annual Conference to endorse a policy of CMT.
A Military Training Poll Bill was quickly passed on 30 June; with the date of the referendum being set for 3 August 1949.\textsuperscript{128} The Labour Party Executive then passed a resolution in July 1949 requesting all LRCs and Party branches to ‘loyally support’ the Labour government’s endorsement of CMT in the referendum.\textsuperscript{129} The Labour Cabinet also imposed collective ministerial responsibility to ensure that CMT was carried in the referendum, ‘... without conceivable latitude for any dissenting minister’.\textsuperscript{130}

If the introduction of peacetime CMT was nothing more than a vote-getting gambit by the Labour Party, it was certainly a risky one. It may have weakened the National Party’s attacks on Labour but the political costs for the Labour Movement must have appeared to outweigh these gains. Labour’s collaboration with the National Party over CMT was politically awkward; and yet, the National Party’s attacks on the ideology of the Labour Party masked the consensus between the two on foreign policy and security issues.

By 1949, the icy frost of the Cold War had truly begun to crystallise on the surface of New Zealand’s domestic political landscape. The ideological stance of politicians like Fraser and Semple became less flexible as their political doctrines hardened and congealed in the harsh international climate. In the realm of foreign policy, where old fears increasingly merged with new threat perceptions, New Zealand continued to seek reassurance in the time-honoured warmth of the Commonwealth fold. The Labour government’s military commitment to the Middle East and its endorsement of CMT were direct results of the pervasive Cold War atmosphere that existed in 1949. The next three chapters examine how those who called for the

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introduction of CMT justified this move to themselves and to the public of New Zealand.
CHAPTER TWO

Imperial Defence, the Alliance Tradition and the ‘Silken Bonds’ of Empire

This study raises a number of questions. Was the New Zealand public told the real reasons why CMT should be introduced? Did the politicians and others in favour of the move simply exploit existing fears by using the rhetoric of the Cold War and alluding to a vague ‘Bolshevik bogey’? Was it really secrecy that prevented Fraser from informing the public of the Middle Eastern commitment or did he believe that talk of defending New Zealand from invasion increased the chances of CMT being accepted? Did these leaders share the threat perceptions that they seemed so determined to agitate among the people or was the CMT campaign an example of calculating manipulation to achieve a political end? To answer these questions one must look not only at the arguments used, but also at the underlying assumptions made about New Zealand’s security and the dangers of communism.

The thinking of New Zealand policy-makers in 1949 was still largely encapsulated within a traditional alliance framework. New Zealand’s closeness to Britain and the Commonwealth stemmed not only from shared aspects of history, trade, race and culture but also from an unquestioned belief that New Zealand needed an alliance relationship with a great naval power for its security. As the power of the Royal Navy waned after World War II, the divergence between New Zealand’s security needs and the inability of Britain to fulfil those needs became evident. There was, however, still a reluctance on New Zealand’s part to question any such ties to the ‘mother country’ and the ‘silken bonds’ of Empire. This was clearly expressed when the leader of the Opposition, Sidney Holland, repeated Savage’s time-honoured doctrine of ‘Where Britain goes, we go. Where she stands, we stand’ in 1949. In

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1 Newspaper clipping, EP, 26 November 1948, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
3 Sidney Holland’s speech notes of a radio broadcast on CMT delivered on 1 August 1949, p. 9, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
many ways, those who supported CMT retained a firmer grip on the symbolism of Empire, in a way that made it easier for them to make appeals to the patriotism of the people. Correspondingly, it placed the opponents of CMT in the uncomfortable position of being classed as unpatriotic and adversaries of the British Commonwealth.

Major-General Sir Howard Kippenberger, who was Dominion President of the NZRSA, treated it as self-evident fact that New Zealand could not defend itself without the assistance of a Great Power, specifically Britain. He called for New Zealand to ‘act as a grown up Nation’ by doing what was necessary to preserve the British Commonwealth, rhetorically asking what would happen to this country should Britain fall. To this extent, Kippenberger argued that ‘Our fate in a Third World War will be decided overseas’. The Chief of the General Staff, Major-General K. L. Stewart, agreed that ‘the fate of New Zealand in any future conflict will be decided in an overseas theatre of war, and not in New Zealand’. In order to justify its protection by British and American forces, New Zealand would have to demonstrate ‘its willingness to send well trained troops to a decisive theatre of hostilities the moment war breaks out’. By adopting CMT, New Zealand was ‘leading the Dominions in supporting Britain’, while also serving as an acknowledgment that ‘the noblest feeling of our people has always been an intense loyalty to Britain’. A letter to the editor in the Evening Post also argued that New Zealand had the opportunity to set an example on defence that ‘... may have beneficial repercussions throughout the Empire, in Australia, Canada, and South Africa’. Even Frank Langstone, a Labour MP who opposed CMT, seemed to accept the assessment that if New Zealand accepted CMT then it would have a tangible influence on other Commonwealth nations, declaring that

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4 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 3, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
5 Ibid.
6 Statement on peacetime CMT presented to the Minister of Defence, F. Jones, by Major-General K. L. Stewart, p. 2, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash papers, NA.
7 JDAC brochure sent to the editors of New Zealand’s daily newspapers, 24 June 1949, p. 24, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
8 Ibid.
9 EP, 10 June 1949.
'probably we are to be used as the decoy ducks to draw those other self governing Dominions into the vortex of conscription'.

Fraser argued that ‘New Zealand must be capable of defending itself and contributing to the wider sphere of its own defence as a member of the British Commonwealth’. Again, should anything happen to the British Commonwealth, it was expected that New Zealand would ‘inevitably collapse’. This was not just political rhetoric. At a Prime Ministers’ Meeting in London in October 1948, Fraser stated his belief that ‘... if the United Kingdom were defeated in war, it would only be question of time before New Zealand fell too’. Fraser’s assertion, however, that the ‘majority of New Zealanders considered New Zealand worthy of defence to the utmost’ suggested a more direct threat to the country.

There was no ambiguity in the Labour government’s pro-CMT position. In a radio broadcast a month before the referendum Fraser demanded that the New Zealand public vote in favour of CMT’s introduction. To emphasise the need for an emphatic victory by CMT in the referendum, Fraser quoted the words of St Paul in 1 Corinthians, 14 Chapter, 8th Verse, ‘For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound who shall prepare himself for battle’. Clarence Skinner, Labour’s Minister of Lands, made an analogy between New Zealand’s defence and American heavy weight boxer Joe Louis arguing that ‘If New Zealand and the rest of the Commonwealth are just as ready, just as trained, no body will start a fight with us, either’. Such boxing analogies were common amongst the pro-CMT group.

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11 Householder pamphlet on CMT with statements by Fraser and Holland, p. 2, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
12 Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 14 June 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
13 PPM (48) 13th Meeting, Meeting of Prime Ministers, Confidential Annex, 21 October 1948, 12 noon, p. 3, EA 1, 153/26/4, Imperial Conferences, NA.
14 Peter Fraser’s speech notes of a 3 July 1949 broadcast address on CMT, p. 1, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
15 Ibid., p. 6.
16 Newspaper clipping, SC, 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
17 For other examples of this see William Goosman in NZPD, 1949, 285, p. 432; Cyril Harker and Arthur Armstrong in NZPD, 1949, 285, p. 493; p. 496, respectively.
At the end of his 1 August 1949 address, Holland broached his appeal for people to vote in favour of CMT in terms of assisting Britain to ‘defend the free world against totalitarianism’. By voting in the referendum ‘the people of New Zealand will give the people of Britain their answer. Britain is entitled to expect every New Zealander that day to do his duty. Britain has conscription’. Holland was every bit the ‘Commonwealth man’ Fraser was. He told a meeting in the Dunedin Town Hall that ‘To leave ourselves unprepared and defenceless would be a betrayal to our own people and of the British Empire’. Holland rationalised that ‘Historically, and in every other way, New Zealand’s defence problem has been a Commonwealth defence problem’. Hence, the failure to support CMT was to turn one’s back on the historic significance of the British Commonwealth.

Britain had passed a National Service Act in 1948, under which recruits served two years of full-time service, followed by three and a half years in the Reserves. Similarly, the United States Selective Service Act, also of 1948, had recruits serve twenty-one months in full-time service; with a further five years being spent in the Reserves. Necessity had forced these two countries to introduce peacetime national service and New Zealand felt the pressure to follow suit. As the Honourable Mary Dreaver, a Legislative councillor, informed the Legislative council that New Zealand must introduce peacetime CMT because ‘it is our duty to the Commonwealth and Empire. We are an Empire. We must co-operate with that Empire’. Major-General H. E. Barrowclough, who commanded the 3rd New Zealand Division before becoming President of the Auckland Branch of the Royal Empire Society, criticised the lack of assistance currently being given by New Zealand to the British armies that lay ‘on the front line of the battle for freedom’. He also made an appeal to duty, arguing that

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18 Sidney Holland’s speech notes of a radio broadcast on CMT delivered on 1 August 1949, p. 9, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
19 Ibid.
20 W. D. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, p. 6. Holland held an unshakeable belief in the ‘dear old Empire’.
21 Typed ‘Memo on CMT’, 12 July 1949, p. 3, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
because ‘We have not had the stamina to see the battle through by fighting to a lasting peace. We have not done our duty’.24 New Zealand was obligated to go ‘where Britain goes . . .’25

Fraser was sensitive to the emotionally charged nature of the CMT debate, even in his dealings with Commonwealth hierarchy. In a top secret note to Fraser from Sir Patrick Duff, the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Duff wrote that he had informed his government ‘of your views expressed to me orally that the planners should not come to New Zealand until after the referendum on conscription’.26 In July 1949, A. W. Snelling, the United Kingdom’s Deputy High Commissioner in New Zealand, also wrote to R. L. Hutchens of the Prime Minister’s Department saying that Fraser had orally conveyed to him his desire that the British authorities should not publicly announce the future visit to New Zealand by a British defence planning team, at least until after the referendum.27 The planners were to visit Australia prior to arriving in New Zealand but, if queried about their duties, New Zealand officials were to plead ignorance of the Staff’s arrangements.28

Both the positive and negative aspects of New Zealand’s geographic isolation were touched on in pro-CMT arguments. Major-General Sir Andrew Russell, who had commanded the 1st New Zealand Division, noted that New Zealand was ‘geographically part of Asia’ and could no longer rely on the British Navy, nor American forces preoccupied with Europe, to guarantee its security.29 The Joint Defence Action Committee (JDAC) warned that ‘New Zealand, which is geographically so far separated from the great land masses, could be conquered by Russian or Communised Orientals without creating any immediate danger to Britain or

24 Ibid.
25 Sidney Holland’s speech notes of a radio broadcast on CMT delivered on 1 August 1949, p. 9, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
26 Peter Fraser from Sir Patrick Duff, High Commissioner for the United Kingdom 6 June 1949, EA 1, 156/1/1, Part 3, NA.
27 Note from A. W. Snelling to R. L. Hutchens, Department of External Affairs, 21 July 1949, EA 1, 156/1/1, Part 3, NA.
28 Ibid.
29 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 9, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
America'. On the other hand, Fraser cited both the Atlantic Pact and New Zealand's geographical remoteness as reasons why it would be impossible for the country to be suddenly attacked. Yet even this statement was tempered by the observation that 'In modern conditions of war, no country could hope to stand apart in isolation'.

While the Second World War, and the fall of Singapore in particular, had shown the inability of the Royal Navy to protect the Pacific region, New Zealand's leaders were slow to place complete faith in the US. This was despite the Dominions' Secretary explaining as early as 13 June 1940 that Britain would 'have to rely on the United States of America to safeguard our interests . . .' in the Far East and the Pacific. Much of it had to do with the belief that the Americans would not give something for nothing on defence. Without the assurance of the Commonwealth's kinship and historical ties it is easy to understand why the stark reality of reliance on the US for its security was not welcomed with open arms by New Zealand's leaders.

Sir Godfrey Huggins told Fraser and the leaders of other Commonwealth countries at a Prime Ministers' Meeting in 1948 that 'it was no longer possible for the United Kingdom to protect them as in the past and [they] must be prepared to make adequate contributions in man-power and other resources' because, he warned, 'unless a united stand was made, the Commonwealth countries would disappear one by one'.

Howard Kippenberger's attitude typifies this stance. Kippenberger believed that New Zealand should seek to strengthen its ties with the United States, but he also warned against over reliance on the Americans in defence matters. He recalled the isolationist sentiment that was predominant in the US prior to World War II and, recognising the relative unimportance of New Zealand to America, said that 'we might

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30 JDAC brochure sent to the editors of New Zealand's daily newspapers, 24 June 1949, p. 24, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
32 PPM (48) 11th Meeting, Meeting of Prime Ministers, Confidential Annex, 20 October 1948, 11 a.m., p. 7, EA 1, 153/26/4, NA; W. D. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, p. 197.
34 PPM (48) 12th Meeting, Meeting of Prime Ministers, Confidential Annex, 20 October 1948, 3 p.m., p. 2, EA 1, 153/26/4, NA.
be one of the peoples overrun before the American people . . . could spare help for those who would not help themselves'. Holland made similar statements to the effect that ‘We dare not look for American help unless we are prepared to help ourselves’. Holland declared that New Zealand ‘must qualify for outside assistance’, from both Britain and America, hence the importance of CMT legislation.

This desire by New Zealand to be seen to be ‘pulling its weight’ in defence of the Commonwealth was a prime motivating factor behind plans to send New Zealand troops to the Middle East. It is perhaps surprising, considering the importance that Fraser’s commitment of New Zealand forces to the Middle East had in his decision to introduce peacetime CMT, that the Middle East connection did not feature prominently in the Labour government’s CMT campaign.

New Zealand troops had gained experience of the Middle Eastern theatre of war during the Second World War and much could have been made of the historical nature of this commitment, as well as the vital strategic importance of the region. While military secrecy may have been partly responsible, it is far more likely that pro-CMT forces found it politically expedient to talk in terms of CMT troops being used to defend the country from invasion. A lecturer in political science at Otago University, E. A. Olssen, observed that ‘In the absence of any other argument, the government’s strongest point was to request an affirmative vote for reasons which could not be disclosed’. Even the *Otago Daily Times* complained that

> the people are given no real facts to assist them in appreciating the urgency of the need [for conscription]. They will never be aroused to give the referendum an overwhelming affirmative vote if their leaders feed them on the pap of ambiguity instead of the hard meat of facts.

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35 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 3, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
36 Householder pamphlet on CMT with statements by Fraser and Holland, p. 3, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
37 Sidney Holland’s speech notes of a radio broadcast on CMT delivered on 1 August 1949, p. 6, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
The defence of the Commonwealth did feature in the debate, but only in a vague sense, where it was assumed that anything that was beneficial to Commonwealth defence would also strengthen the defence of New Zealand itself.

Fraser typically described New Zealand's defence problem as being twofold. Firstly, New Zealand, and those areas of the Pacific that provided access to the country, had to be secured. Secondly, the 'maximum contribution possible' was to be made to Commonwealth defence, with these two facets being self-reinforcing. However, having a New Zealand division in the Middle East, so far from the country's shores, could not always be seen to reinforce the compatibility of the two spheres of defence. In a speech in June 1949, Fraser hinted that the troops provided by CMT were not only to be used in the defence of New Zealand soil, stating that 'The land forces and some air forces would be needed for an overseas theatre'. There was, however, no specific mention of the Middle East or other likely theatres.

A CMT referendum campaign based on sending troops far overseas certainly would have provided government propagandists with less readily exploitable representations than that provided by the sparkling reservoir of images which pertained to the defence of the homeland. Another factor to consider was that Fraser did not intend to send recruits overseas until they were at least twenty-one years old and this meant that CMT needed four years before it could effectively come to fruition. To present the pro-CMT argument on the basis of having to wait four years would have undermined any corresponding arguments for the closeness of war, upon which seemed to rest much of the justification for introducing peacetime CMT.

Sir Howard Kippenberger believed that without the intervention of Imperial troops, including New Zealanders, the 'vital' Middle East region would probably have been lost in 1942. Kippenberger's assertion exhibits one of the characteristics common to arguments concerning the Middle East espoused during the CMT campaign. The

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40 Peter Fraser's speech notes of a 3 July 1949 broadcast address on CMT, p. 4, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
41 Peter Fraser's typed speech 1 June 1949, EA 1, 87/1/26, Part 3a, NA.
importance of the Middle Eastern region was discussed in terms of New Zealand's past war experiences but there was nothing to suggest that the Middle East had been made any less 'vital' to the survival of the Commonwealth in 1949. Kippenberger predicted that 'It is very possible that the approaches to Australia and New Zealand may have again to be held in that ancient battleground'.

One section of a JDAC brochure, provocatively titled 'Groping For The Middle East, Tentacles Of The Soviet Octopus,' echoed Kippenberger's concerns for the future of the region. It outlined attempts by the USSR to wrest control of the Dardanelles from Turkey and gain control of Iran's oil fields, and urged that 'New Zealanders will be well advised to keep their eyes on the Middle East upon the stabilising of which their security so largely depends'. At a Prime Ministers' Meeting, Fraser maintained that communism had made inroads into the Middle East and 'It was optimistic to think that any area was immune from the ravages of communism'.

Throughout the referendum campaign the National Party complained of the 'inability of the Prime Minister to tell the public what he knows' about Commonwealth defence planning. Holland warned that this lack of information could endanger the chances of the referendum returning a favourable result. National MP Ronald Algie also decried Fraser's tendency to talk in 'vague and ambiguous terms'. It was an issue picked up by various newspapers. The Press published an editorial in which they claimed that the New Zealand public '... must be given the evidence, drawn from

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42 JDAC pamphlet, "To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 4, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
43 See P. Law, "Too Much Yellow in the Melting Pot?": Perception of the New Zealand Chinese, 1930-1960", BA Hons thesis, University of Otago, 1994, p. 7, p. 74. One can observe how the image of an octopus, previously associated with 'The Yellow Peril', became transferred to the new threat of communism; for example, the 'Yellow Octopus' of communist China.
44 JDAC brochure sent to the editors of New Zealand's daily newspapers, 24 June 1949, pp. 12-13, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
46 Sidney Holland's handwritten notes on National Party Defence Policy, p. 3, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
47 Ibid.
48 Letter from R. M. Algie to S. Holland, Wednesday 15 June 1949, p. 3, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
expert reports and military and international intelligence, that has led the Government to its conclusion'. 49 A letter to the editor in the New Zealand Herald complained about Fraser’s failure to make the ‘... highly confidential information which came out of two Imperial Conferences’ known to the public when one could safely assume that the Kremlin had no difficulty in estimating the Dominion’s military capabilities. 50 An editorial in the Auckland Star labelled Fraser’s acceptance of a referendum on CMT as a ‘humiliating defeat’ caused, at least in part, by his ‘evasiveness’ and his failure to provide sufficient facts and details. 51

Such evasive language may have been indicative of the unfinished nature of the CMT proposal at this stage rather than of Fraser’s reluctance to share information with the public. Perhaps New Zealand’s politicians felt that it was undesirable to furnish the public with details that would allow them to comprehend what impact the CMT legislation would have on their everyday lives. Trying to keep the CMT issue on the lofty plateau of emotive patriotism and of doing one’s duty for one’s country was probably more the result of political expediency than any necessary imperative of defence planning. While certain elements of defence planning ought not to have been disclosed, Fraser’s reluctance to mention the Middle Eastern commitment seemed unnecessary considering the historic role of New Zealand forces in that area. 52

By 1949, it appeared that New Zealand’s political leaders had accepted and internalised a Cold War doctrine. Fraser’s statements at the Prime Ministers’ Meetings reveal that he acknowledged the threat presented by global communism. The proposal of peacetime CMT was more than a simple gambit designed to extricate the Labour government from a politically awkward situation and gain it much needed voter

49 Press, Christchurch, 24 June 1949, Folder 55, Papers of Lincoln Arthur Winstone Efford, MS Papers 0445 [Hereafter cited as Efford papers], ATL.

50 NZH, 26 May 1949.

51 AS, 25 May 1949, p. 2; Newspaper clipping, Press, 23 June 1949, Folder 55, Efford papers, ATL. In response to Fraser repeatedly resorting to vague references of advice supposedly received from the British General Staff, Lincoln Efford sarcastically noted that ‘Apparently Mr Fraser alone was admitted to the holy of holies while in England’.

52 W. D. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, p. 203. McIntyre describes the Middle East as ‘very familiar ground’; M. Templeton, Ties of Blood and Empire, p. 8. It was presumed that New Zealand would fight there in the next World War.
support. Those who advocated an affirmative vote in the referendum did not question New Zealand’s links to Britain and the defence of the Commonwealth. While there was an almost begrudging recognition of the increased importance of the United States in the Pacific, appeals to patriotism during the referendum campaign were still expressed in familiar Imperial form, within the confines of traditional alliance thinking. Loyalty to the ‘Empire’ and a need to fulfil its duty to Britain were the defining characteristics of New Zealand’s foreign policy of the time. By leading from the front on the CMT issue, its proponents believed that New Zealand could show up its Canadian and Australian relatives and earn extra Commonwealth kudos by exhibiting unshaken devotion to the Empire in the post-war world. The reality of New Zealand’s Pacific location was a double-edged sword. Its geographic remoteness meant that it was unlikely to ever be invaded, yet its reliance on trade with Britain and the vulnerable nature of its trade routes meant that it would not be isolated from any major European conflict. New Zealand’s commitment to the Middle East, a result of its alliance thinking, did not feature prominently in the government’s CMT campaign. The emphasis was instead placed on two separate, but ultimately mutually reinforcing, threat perceptions. One was based on the more traditional fear of Asians, and the other was based on the threat represented by communist ideology and its international sponsors.

53 G. Hensley, ‘The Relationship between Defence and Foreign Policy’ in A. Trotter ed., Fifty Years of New Zealand Foreign Policy Making, University of Otago Press, in Association with University Extension, Dunedin, 1993, p. 136. This conundrum persists today, with Hensley recognising the ‘gap between our security needs and our security interests’.
CHAPTER THREE

Old Fears of Asian Hordes and New Fears of a ‘loathsome thing in our midst’

This chapter analyses those arguments that drew upon New Zealand’s threat perceptions in order to justify the introduction of peacetime CMT in 1949. While the Labour government and the National Party Opposition both campaigned for CMT, there were subtle differences in the way they argued the case. The Labour government stressed the bipartisan nature of the CMT issue. The National Party seized on it as an opportunity to score some political points at the government’s expense, at one stage even introducing a no-confidence motion in Parliament over what it considered the imposition of the CMT referendum by the Labour Party Conference. The RSA, and the related JDAC, couched their approval of CMT in more forceful terms.

Despite the varying interests represented by the groups comprising the pro-CMT lobby in 1949 there was considerable internal consistency amongst the arguments put forward to justify CMT’s introduction. This is not to say that these arguments were presented as a cohesive whole and, in attempting to impose analytical order upon them, there is bound to be an overlap of ideas between categories. By analysing the common elements within each argument, however, two separate, but often reinforcing, streams of threat perception become discernible. One set of perceptions relate to New Zealand’s historical belief in the necessity of a defence alliance with a Great Power and how this notion influenced, and expanded, assessments of threats to the nation’s security. These interpretations owed much to the memory of Japanese aggression during World War II and to a deeper and more nebulous fear of the ‘yellow peril.’ The belief that New Zealand’s security was predicated upon the survival of Britain, as well as the emotional sinews of the Commonwealth, had been fostered not only by historic

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2 Newspaper clipping, Standard, 17 March 1949, Folder 55, Efford papers, ATL. The Standard refused to print the JDAC’s ‘propaganda campaign’ saying that it was ‘common knowledge’ that many returned servicemen did not agree with their ‘shallow arguments’ for conscription.
ties of kinship but also by a sense of dependence, a psychological offshoot of enduring alliance relationships.

The second set of ideas stressed the relatively new threat presented by global communism, and more specifically, the Soviet Union. This represented not only an external danger to New Zealand but also an internal one in the form of ‘fifth columnists’. New Zealand’s politicians watched as communism spread into Asia, with conflicts in China, Burma and Malaya. In the case of China, traditionally considered a weak nation and one that had been victimised by the Japanese during the Second World War, the move towards communism was responsible for a dramatic reassessment by Western leaders of its intentions and of its power in the region.\(^3\)

These two categories of threat perception became increasingly interconnected and less distinct. Kippenberger certainly did not consider the threat by New Zealand’s Asian neighbours as an isolated one. He warned that ‘This threat lies behind the grim immediate menace of Communism; the two may merge’.\(^4\) Indeed, it can be argued that the historical character of New Zealand’s threat perceptions facilitated this symbiotic transformation. The communist threat would eventually become the predominant expression of New Zealand’s Cold War anxiety and, in his early expression of these fears, Prime Minister Fraser was ahead of his time.

One of the most important components of the threat perception presented to the New Zealand public during the CMT debate was that of imminent war.\(^5\) This was almost exclusively related to fears of communist expansion, as made evident by events in Europe, and the belief that a global conflict could potentially occur with very little warning. If the public did not accept such a conflict as a real possibility, then the justification for CMT would have been seriously weakened.

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4 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 3; Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 10 March 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
Fraser faced a dilemma over the question of an impending conflict. Once he had agreed to hold a referendum on CMT, it was politically expedient for him to play down the threat of immediate war, otherwise he was open to accusations of further endangering New Zealand’s security by delaying a decision on CMT until the issue had been put to the people. On the other hand, Fraser did not want to understate the threat to the extent that CMT no longer appeared justified and thereby jeopardise the return of an affirmative vote in the referendum. This paradox prompted an editorialist in the Press of 24 June to make the following observation: ‘The case for conscription, therefore, becomes identical with the case for national defence; and the further the Government goes in establishing the case for both, the more nakedly must its own weakness be revealed’.6

In July 1949 Fraser told an audience at the Municipal Theatre in Hastings that war seemed less likely now than it did nine months ago when ‘...the anti-democratic nations would have swept to the North Sea’ if not for NATO and the West’s resilience over the Berlin crisis.7 He reflected that ‘Then it looked as though a cloudburst not only of antagonism but of active aggression was imminent’.8 That this assessment was not confined to New Zealand was demonstrated when the Australian Minister for External Affairs, H. V. Evatt, made a comparable statement on the receding threat of war in Darwin on 13 June 1949. Free of the political considerations of a referendum, he concluded that ‘The danger of physical conflict seems to have passed away’ over the last six months.9

Such statements, however, begged the question as to the extent Russian aggression could still be considered ‘imminent’ and how this would affect the government’s chances of introducing peacetime CMT legislation. An important component of such Cold War beliefs was the conviction of New Zealand’s political

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6 ‘Conscription’ editorial, Press, Christchurch, 24 June 1949, Folder 55, Efford papers, ATL. See also Freedom, 1 June 1949, p. 2.
7 Newspaper clipping, ST, July 19 1949, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
8 Ibid.
9 Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 15 June 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
leaders that the Kremlin exercised cast iron control over the tentacles of global communism. Frasers’ assertion that ‘The plain truth is that we are living in a state of semi-war or Cold War with millions of men under arms’ is consistent with the position he held throughout the CMT campaign. The existence of the Cold War was taken as a justification in itself that increased defence measures were required. The focus of such pronouncements was on the situation in Europe and concern over a potential global conflict brought about by Soviet expansion. Government arguments emphasising the closeness of war did not draw extensively upon perceived regional threats to New Zealand but instead owed much to the European imagery of two rival, armed ideological camps standing toe-to-toe across the remnants of war-torn Germany.

The divergence of opinion between the two major parties over this issue owed more to attempts at political point-scoring than it did to any significant breakdown in bipartisan consensus over the issue of CMT. The introduction of CMT was National Party policy and could always have been put into effect after an anticipated victory in the November 1949 general election. Holland spoke the same language of the Cold War as Fraser, and yet, in an ill-disguised gibe at Fraser, he declared that ‘We would only do the cause harm by exaggeration or by trying to scare the people’. To this end, he discouraged ‘too abrupt and unreasoned an advocacy of universal military training’. Holland, however, was to occupy a position almost identical to Fraser’s in one of his radio broadcasts, declaring that ‘I do not hold the view that war is either imminent or inevitable, but it is in my firm opinion that the danger that faces the world

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10 Broadcast address by Peter Fraser on CMT, 3 July 1949, p. 3, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; PPM (48) 9th Meeting, Meeting of Prime Ministers, Confidential Annex, 19 October 1948, 11 a.m., p. 7, EA 1, 153/26/4, NA.
11 Broadcast address by Peter Fraser on CMT, 3 July 1949, p. 1, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 23 June 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
12 Holland’s CMT radio broadcast 1 August 1949, p. 2, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. Holland felt compelled to boast that ‘In our parliamentary ranks there is not a single Member who is unwilling to assist or who is lukewarm’ on CMT.
13 Newspaper clipping, Unknown, 10 June 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
14 Holland’s notes on Major General H. E. Barrowclough’s Defence Policy, p. 1, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
and which threatens continued peace is a stark and grim reality'.\textsuperscript{15} This denial of the immediacy of war contrasts with the National Party’s previous agitation over what it considered the unnecessary delay caused by holding a referendum.

A deep mistrust of the intentions of New Zealand’s Asian neighbours featured extensively in its threat perceptions of the time. The fear of Asian expansion in the Pacific, whether initially by peaceful means or by military conquest, was a prominent component of many people’s support for CMT. Lingering concerns over the possibility of a resurgent Japan were openly voiced. Despite his opposition to CMT, university lecturer James Bertram declared that ‘I am more afraid of a rebuilt Japan than of anybody else’.\textsuperscript{16} Of the proponents of CMT, the RSA and the JDAC were the most virulent, warning of Asian hordes enviously eyeing New Zealand’s lush pastures. Having fought in the Second World War, these ex-soldiers still saw the face of the enemy whenever they looked towards Asia. China, New Zealand’s ally during the war, was discussed in reference to its immense population and its looming communist menace rather than in the friendly terms associated with an ally in distress.\textsuperscript{17} There was also a new ‘bogey’, that of ‘China gone Red!’\textsuperscript{18} In their crudest form such arguments pandered to little more than racial prejudice.

Asian nations’ large populations made many New Zealanders feel uneasy. It was assumed that incorporated in such enormous number of people were various internal dynamics and pressures which may eventually put New Zealand at risk. Major-General Sir Howard Kippenberger argued that with ‘... the tremendous pressures of increasing population all over the world, we [New Zealanders] cannot expect long to be left in exclusive occupation of these favoured lands’.\textsuperscript{19} It was not surprising that

\textsuperscript{15} Holland’s CMT radio broadcast 1 August 1949, p. 1, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
\textsuperscript{16} C. Brasch ed., ‘Conscription: a symposium’, \textit{Landfall}, III, 3, September 1949, p. 280. Bertram was opposed to peacetime CMT, saying that New Zealanders ‘... have no knack of peace-time soldiering ...’
\textsuperscript{17} P. Law, ‘“Too Much Yellow in the Melting Pot?”: Perception of the New Zealand Chinese, 1930-1960’, pp. 81-82. Even in 1945, when China was still an ally, concerns were being expressed in New Zealand over China being an ‘alien race 400,000,000 strong’.
\textsuperscript{19} JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training,
part of Kippenberger’s prescription for New Zealand’s defence was that ‘We must build up our population and our armed services’ [italics added]. 20 This was reflected in ‘populate or perish’, one of the RSA’s slogans concerning New Zealand’s immigration policy. 21 Kippenberger warned that, without CMT, New Zealand’s citizens would be ‘like fat lambs (to be protected or devoured), by the millions of the “asiatics” in the neighbourhood’. 22

Kippenberger’s attitude was not an isolated one, especially amongst some long standing veterans and Returned Servicemen. Major-General Sir Andrew Russell agreed that ‘Asia’s problems in over-population must find their solution in either ultimate aggression (forcible expansion overseas) or in the attainment of a higher standard of living’, with the latter of these two outcomes taking many years to achieve. 23 New Zealand was now left ‘ . . . face to face with the ever-increasing millions on the mainland of an awakened Asia, to whom we have confided the secrets of science and the technique of how to use them in the art of warfare’. 24 National MP Frederick Doidge quoted Sir Boyd Orr in Parliament to emphasise ‘that the immediate menace to life on this earth is not the atomic bomb but over-population and starvation’. 25 He believed that the desperation resulting from Asian ‘poverty and destitution’ would force them to turn their eyes to New Zealand’s shores. ‘Where do we find these half-empty lands? Where but in Australia and New Zealand? Where in all the world are there such alluring temptations for the land-hungry’. 26

Another JDAC brochure asked ‘Do we in New Zealand and Australia realise, quite apart from the hundreds of millions of Chinese in China itself, that all these South

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20 Ibid., p. 4.
21 Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 28 May 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
22 Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 22 June 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
23 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 9; Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 25 March 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
24 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 9, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
26 Ibid.
All we have is worth holding...

LET'S KEEP IT SECURE!

YOU ARE ASKED TO GIVE AN OVERWHELMING VOTE FOR COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING

It is necessary... It is the only fair way... It is the only effective way.

The scheme for Compulsory Military Training is necessary to ensure the Defence of our People, our Country and our Conservative Party.

One nation is not privileged to stand apart by being irresponsible among the nations, particularly when facing the dark form of the present world situation.

YOU must save our HOME Compulsory Military Training if you wish to keep New Zealand secure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

HERE ARE THE FACTS:

1. Twice in our history New Zealand has been faced with an invasion force so strong that defeat was inevitable. The only security was through the bravery of the New Zealanders.

2. The United Nations have now given the green light to the forces of aggression, who are already overrunning peaceful nations. The only security is to train for our own Defence.

Cast your vote this way — vote for Compulsory Military Training.

The Compulsory Military Training Scheme
The Compulsory Military Training scheme is this: Young men, on reaching the age of 18 years, will spend 16 weeks in camp in the first year. They will then be posted to a camp in the second year. They will then be posted to the camp for 6 years, but no training will be completed of them during those years.

6.) This pro-CMT advertisement suggested that New Zealand was facing a direct threat to its 'favoured' shores.
West Pacific Countries have immense populations?’ National MP F. W. Doidge similarly warned of ‘millions of people of a coloured race within a few hours sail of our shores - people who clamour for food and emotional expansion’. In an article entitled ‘Eastern Hordes a Menace to New Zealand’, it was reported that Mr Doidge had said that ‘These [Asian] people are only a hop, step and jump from our shores . . . and they would not die quietly of starvation. How were we justified, in the eyes of the world, in the retention of rich, sparsely populated countries like Australia and New Zealand?’ Such appeals to an Asian menace probably owed less to a fear of communism and more to racist attitudes prevalent at the time. Doidge, however, clearly incorporated the communist bogey into the spectre of Asian expansion in a speech he made in Parliament on 30 June 1949. He said

The greatest danger spot in the world today is . . . South-east Asia . . . . There are experts in the United States and Britain warning us that the tidal wave of triumphant Communism may well sweep from China right down through South-east Asia before the summer ends, unless a dyke is built.

One of the strangest arguments put forward by the RSA was that, should the Asians fail to dominate New Zealand by other means, they ‘. . . would ask the United Nations for the right to populate Australia and New Zealand’. This argument reveals as much about the RSA’s bizarre conception of the powers and purpose of the UN, as it betrays about the assumed desire by Asians to conquer New Zealand. This is not to say that the RSA believed that the UN had any real power, for it was felt that ‘the United Nations has speeded even more rapidly than its predecessor [the League of Nations] along the road to ineffectiveness’.

27 JDAC brochure sent to the editors of New Zealand’s daily newspapers, 24 June 1949, p. 22, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
28 Newspaper clipping, EP, 21 April 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
29 Freedom, 29 June 1949, p. 4.
30 M. Templeton, Ties of Blood and Empire, p. 3. Templeton notes how many of the returned soldiers who entered New Zealand politics continued to exhibit such racist attitudes.
32 Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 28 May 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
33 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 14, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
United Nations has speeded even more rapidly than its predecessor [the League of
Nations] along the road to ineffectiveness'.

Conrad Bollinger, an opponent of CMT, believed that such ‘hysterical’
pronouncements were effective in convincing many people ‘that they were about to be
massacred in their beds by “Asia’s hordes”’. Yet, while Bollinger was prepared to
discount such ‘hysterical’ threat perceptions, he was not prepared to disregard the
threat of Asian expansion entirely. He couched this threat in ideological terms, saying
‘The only force in Asia we need fear is a Fascist imperialism like Tojo’s Japan’.35
While John A. Lee also opposed CMT, and said that he could not see China posing a
threat to New Zealand in the next twenty-five years, he did suggest that there may be
long-term problems ‘if we refuse to use and occupy our land’.36

Although the Labour Member for Mt. Albert, Warren Freer, also discounted
the immediate threat of war from the Russian menace, he did see countries like India,
China, Japan and Burma as potential security risks. Freer believed that these countries
of ‘teeming millions’ may have to look elsewhere in the future to provide sufficient
foodstuffs for their expanding populations and, rather egocentrically, he considered
this to be a threat to a prosperous country like New Zealand.37

In the case of the Soviet Union, attempts were made to explain the aggressive
behaviour of the Russians in racial terms, quite separate from communist ideology. The
JDAC proclaimed that ‘Russian people are far more Asiatic than European in
temperament, outlook, historical experience and race,’ and that this ‘quite apart from
Marxist or Leninist ideology makes them think, act and respond generally to external
stimuli, differently from the way in which we do’.38 This comment seemed to suggest

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33 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training,
April 1949, p. 14, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
37 Newspaper clipping, SC, 10 June 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. See P. Law,
““Too Much Yellow in the Melting Pot?”: Perception of the New Zealand Chinese,
1930-1960”, pp. 81-82, for more on the ‘teeming millions’ motif.
38 JDAC brochure sent to the editors of New Zealand’s daily newspapers, 24 June 1949, p. 8,
Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
recourse but to prepare defensive measures because it was unlikely that a rational solution would be found in any future clash of wills with such an inscrutable enemy. The JDAC warned that the Russian withdrawal in Azerbaijan and the ending of the Berlin blockade were not to be interpreted as a sign of weakness because, for the 'Asiatic mind', such a '... withdrawal merely means that they await with increased potential the opportunity to strike again at a more opportune moment'.

Charles Petrie, the MP for Otahuhu, believed that Russia's foreign policy had changed little from the time of the Tsars and he told Parliament that 'I think the Slav nations understand force better than appeasement'. Others also doubted the efficacy of negotiating with the Soviet Union, who still exhibited the intrinsically untrustworthy vestiges of the 'Russian mind'.

Fraser also presented the other side of the racial coin during the CMT campaign. He elucidated on what he considered the exemplary racial qualities of New Zealanders. New Zealanders, he argued, would set an example to be followed by the democratic nations of the world by introducing CMT because they 'come from the race that has always been in the forefront of the fight against tyranny and dictatorship'.

Thomas Shand, the MP for Marlborough, was much more blunt in his appraisal of the Russian's state of mind; a mind that had become corrupted by the amoral doctrine of communism. He told Parliament, 'The Russian is not sane. The Russian is a religious fanatic. Communism is a religion ... with all the power of a religion to produce a fanatical attitude of mind'. Communism was a threat to Christianity and William Bodkin, National's MP for Central Otago, felt that it was 'clear that the

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39 Ibid.
42 Broadcast address by Peter Fraser on CMT, 3 July 1949, p. 6, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
problem confronting the world to-day was a struggle between Communism and Christianity.' As Nash, Jones and Skinner of the Labour government told a meeting of the Dominion Council of the NZRSA in Wellington, 'the Christian way of life might be at stake' unless adequate measures were taken to defend New Zealand. Correspondingly, Foss Shanahah, the Deputy-Head of the Prime Minister's Department and Deputy Secretary for External Affairs, strived to fight 'Godless Communism' with all the fervour of a devoted Catholic.

A New Zealand Communist Party householder pamphlet which featured a photograph of Hitler and was entitled 'In His Steps', was considered a blasphemous allusion to 'a well-known religious book' [the Bible]. Further evidence of the doctrinaire atheism of communism was observed.

the recent incident at Khandallah, Wellington, when Communist anti-conscription stickers were plastered over the pews of St. Barnabas Church, demonstrates that New Zealand Communists lack respect for anything religious or sacred, just as their opposite numbers in other countries do.

While Frank Langstone tried to call into question the 'moral cost' of conscription, those in favour of CMT continued to stress the supposed link between those who opposed CMT and the atheism of communism.

The JDAC noted an increase in the number of Chinese communities in South East Asia, arguing that 'wherever a Chinese Community exists, the Communists have endeavoured to make use of leftist portions of Nationalist organisations to spread the Gospel of Moscow'. This statement is evidence of a common assumption amongst

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45 Newspaper clipping, SC, 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
46 W. D. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, p. 13.
47 NZ Communist Party householder pamphlet, 'In His Steps', p. 1, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; NZPD, 1949, 285, pp. 534-35. This leaflet was even mentioned in Parliament by Fred Jones, the Minister of Defence.
48 CMT Background Bulletin No. 1, p. 2, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash papers, NA.
49 F. Langstone 'Why I Oppose Conscription', pamphlet, p. 17.
50 JDAC brochure sent to the editors of New Zealand's daily newspapers, 24 June 1949, p. 21; p. 22, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
democratic countries at the time that communism and nationalism could not be successfully combined in national liberation movements and that this merger could never occur independent of Moscow's control. The assumption was that a communist system would never be chosen by people with the power of self-determination, therefore it was something that must have been imposed from outside.

The JDAC believed that communism was the common factor in each of the upheavals experienced in Malaya, Burma and Indonesia and warned how the situation in China and Hong Kong had revealed 'the almost limitless potential of eventual Asiatic aggression'. New Zealand's historic fears of its Asian neighbours thereby became seamlessly integrated with the newly perceived dangers of communism in the region. Doidge quoted Lenin's directive of 'Let us turn towards Asia; we shall reach the West via the East' and blamed 'Moscow's fifth columnists' for the present political upheavals in the region. At a Prime Ministers' Conference in 1948, Fraser explained 'that the sale of rubber to the Soviet Union in present circumstances was comparable to the sale of scrap iron to Japan before the war and was difficult to justify to public opinion in New Zealand'. A letter to the editor in the New Zealand Herald maintained that the threat posed by a 'South East Asia seething with Communism' was considerably greater than that represented by Japan in 1938.

Fraser's hatred of communism was clearly expressed throughout the referendum campaign. He believed that '... the West fears the East, and the East loudly proclaims its fear of the West. Events over the past few years have served to more than justify

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51 Ibid., Stalin's regime was '... the sole motivating agency of Communist activity' throughout the world.
53 JDAC brochure sent to the editors of New Zealand's daily newspapers, 24 June 1949, p. 21, Folder 2, Box 51, Folland papers, ATL.
54 Newspaper clipping, NZH, 15 June 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
55 PPM (48) 6th Meeting, Meeting of Prime Ministers, Confidential Annex, 13 October 1948, 3 p.m., p. 5, EA 1, 153/26/4, NA.
56 NZH, May 26 1949.
the fears of the Western Democracies’. At the Prime Ministers’ Conference in London in October 1948, Fraser declared that ‘It was fantastic for Russia to maintain that she was threatened by the West. There was no such threat nor any question of the economic domination of Russia. The fact was that under Russian inspiration communism was becoming synonymous with aggression’. In contrast, W. B. Sutch argued that ‘It was convenient that the Cold War had become the policy of the Western powers and the requisite propaganda was so readily available’, to pro-CMT forces. But to accept such a statement is to deny the geo-political reality that had emerged in Europe and presents the Cold War as nothing more than a calculated conspiracy by the Western powers.

Pro-CMT exponents pointedly highlighted what they considered the hypocritical attitude of the communists over conscription. They remembered the communists’ opposition to wartime conscription in New Zealand prior to Russia’s entry into World War II in 1941, ‘when Britain was fighting a life-and-death struggle’. Fraser cynically noted that in the Soviet Union ‘only the male ballet dancers are excluded’ from military service. Vic Wilcox, the national organiser of the New Zealand Communist Party, still saw fit to argue that the Soviet Union was justified in having conscription ‘to safeguard and defend a Socialist country’ while New Zealand was not justified in using it ‘for the defence of a capitalist country’. Hubert Witheford of Wellington advised New Zealanders that ‘We should think of

57 Broadcast address by Peter Fraser on CMT, 3 July 1949, p. 2, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
58 R. Kay, Documents Document 94, p. 267; JDAC pamphlet, “To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 5, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA. Barrowclough declared ‘Our children need never die in battle unless a Communist Army wages war on us. We shall not be the aggressors’. See also E. N. Olssen, John A. Lee, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 1977, p. 201. Lee portrayed the Soviets ‘... as more sinned against than sinning’.
60 CMT Background Bulletin No. 1, p. 1, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash papers, NA.
61 EP, 24 May 1949, p. 10. See also JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 8, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
62 CMT Background Bulletin No. 1, p. 1, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash papers, NA.
NEW ZEALAND IS WORTH DEFENDING
but
New Zealand Communists 'lead the Fight' for a
DEFENCELESS NEW ZEALAND

Read these alarming extracts from the "People's Voice", the
organ of the N.Z. Communist Party, July 13th 1949:

VIC WILCOX SPEAKS:
"In a meeting in the Communist Party's campaign against peace-time conscription, at the Lewis Eddy Hall last Wednesday... Vic Wilcox pointed out the contradiction expressed by those who, while attacking the Soviet Union and all its works, suddenly found there was something to be learnt from it because it had conscription. They have conscription to safeguard and defend a 'socialist country,' he said, 'We would have conscription — what for? For the defence of a capitalist country.'"

In other words New Zealand COMMUNISTS say N.Z. isn't worth defending UNLESS IT BECOMES A COMMUNIST STATE.

And at the same time The N.Z. Communists are doing their best TO KEEP NEW ZEALAND WEAK AND VULNERABLE.

Why? HEED THE WARNING!

The Communists have come right out into the open. OUR FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ARE THREATENED and the New Zealand Communists are INSTRUMENTS OF AGGRESSIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM.

A strong New Zealand is necessary to frustrate their treacherous designs and to assure the security of OUR COUNTRY AND OUR COMMONWEALTH.

- BE DETERMINED TO PROTECT WHAT WE CHERISH
- BE STRONG ENOUGH TO DO SO

Vote for COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING

Strike out the bottom line

ISSUED BY THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT

7.) This government sponsored advertisement criticised Vic Wilcox and other New Zealand communists for their hypocritical attitude towards CMT.
conscription in New Zealand as part of the general armament of the Western powers against Communism.\textsuperscript{63}

In his speeches, Holland likewise proclaimed that the threat to peace was ‘no bogey’.\textsuperscript{64} He told a meeting in New Plymouth of his conviction ‘… that the totalitarian states are bent on world domination’ and that countries which did not defend their freedom would become ‘enslaved’.\textsuperscript{65} Doidge believed that without adequate defence, New Zealand risked ‘a lifetime in slavery’.\textsuperscript{66} Both stressed the danger which communism represented to New Zealanders’ fundamental freedoms and their way of life. Fraser was equally concerned about this and in June he warned that if the Soviets gained control of the country then New Zealanders would lose their economic and social freedom, while their standard of living and culture would be ‘hurled into the abyss’.\textsuperscript{67}

Richard Kay’s study of the rise of Cold War consciousness in New Zealand from 1944 to 1949 has made interesting comparisons between the Nazi menace of World War II and the Soviet Union’s emergence as the new totalitarian threat in the post-war period. He argued that during the CMT campaign, ‘The Nazi-Soviet analogy came to the forefront’.\textsuperscript{68} Images of Hitler and Stalin were indeed transposed and New Zealand’s Cold War consciousness had links to its past experiences in the same way that the ‘lessons’ of Munich had haunted American policy makers.\textsuperscript{69} Drawing on past images of red totalitarianism, a CMT ‘Background Bulletin’ tried to associate Hitler with the communist Party, saying that it is from him that the communists ‘have learnt


\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Dominion}, 26 July 1949; NZH, 28 July 1949.

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Taranaki Daily News}, 18 July 1949; Householder pamphlet on CMT with statements from Fraser and Holland. p. 3, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.

\textsuperscript{66} Newspaper clipping, \textit{Dominion}, 15 June 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.

\textsuperscript{67} Newspaper clipping, \textit{Dominion}, 14 June 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.


so much'. 70 When Mr G. H. A. Swan introduced Holland at a meeting in the Wellington Town Hall, he accused the Labour Party Conference of 'sheer Nazism', believing that it had usurped the sovereignty of Parliament and had overridden the desire of the Labour Party Caucus to have CMT introduced without a referendum. 71 A New Zealand Communist Party householder pamphlet entitled 'In His Steps' also used a Hitler motif because such imagery retained its emotive poignancy in the post-war world. It is interesting that both sides of the CMT issue tried to associate their opposition with images of Hitler and fascism. 72

During the referendum campaign Fraser concentrated on factors that made communism an internal danger to New Zealand. This had the associated benefit of highlighting the closeness of the communist threat without having to convince people of the likelihood of a Russian invasion. Fraser feared that communist 'fifth columnists' could potentially 'damage New Zealand as much internally as an external attack would do'. 73 New Zealand's leaders were not alone, moreover, in their recognition of the need 'to combat the internal menace of Communism' as these fears were shared by other Commonwealth leaders and officials. 74 In 1948, Evatt stated that it should be made clear to the Soviets 'that they must cease to intervene in the affairs of other countries through the means of Communist agents and parties'. 75

Furthermore, the threat of 'fifth columnists' provided justification for his opposition to the more militant unionists, whom he rationalised no longer represented the interests of the working man he had himself championed for so long. Instead, they

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70 CMT Background Bulletin No. 1, p. 2, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash papers, ATL.
73 Newspaper clipping, EP, 24 February 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
74 PPM (48) 12th Meeting, Meeting of Prime Ministers, Confidential Annex, 20 October 1948, 3 p.m., pp. 2-3., EA 1, 153/26/4, NA.
75 PPM (48) 11th Meeting, Meeting of Prime Ministers, Confidential Annex, 20 October 1948, 11 a.m., p. 6, EA 1, 153/26/4, NA.
8.) a) This New Zealand Communist party pamphlet drew heavily on the 'Nazi-Soviet analogy'. 
8.) b) The same pamphlet, entitled 'In His Steps', portrays Peter Fraser as using 'Red Peril' scare-tactics similar to those utilised by Hitler.
8.) c) This British pamphlet from 1946 illustrates how previous struggles to introduce conscription overseas had provided pro- and anti-conscription source material which was available for use by both sides of the CMT referendum campaign in New Zealand in 1949.
were to be considered compliant functionaries pandering to the will of Moscow and attempting to destabilise New Zealand society. Fraser seemed to have come to believe whole-heartedly what Attlee had told him at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, that ‘The Soviet Union had a vested interest in chaos’. New Zealand society was itself becoming increasingly sensitised to the internal threat that these communists represented. For example, when Lincoln Efford requested messages of support from Australian Trade Union leaders for the fight against CMT in New Zealand, Australian K. J. Kenafick replied that it ‘... may be difficult to achieve anything, for, as you have insinuated, a message from a communist would be worse than useless.’

Barry Gustafson has noted, it was ‘During this period [that] the New Zealand trade union movement acrimoniously split into two warring organisations, a conflict reflected within the Labour Party’s branch and constituency organisations’. Behind these conflicts, primarily grounded in domestic issues of economic stabilisation and arbitration, lay an increasing intransigence of attitudes fostered by the ideological polarisation of the Cold War. The bitterness such opposition engendered in Fraser suggests that he actually believed many of the allegations of communist duplicity on the part of some New Zealand citizens. His tendency to accuse anyone opposed to CMT of aiding and abetting the cause of communism did appear to have constituted

73 PPM (48) 11th Meeting, Meeting of Prime Ministers, Confidential Annex, 20 October 1948, 11 a.m., p. 2, EA 1, 153/26/4, NA.
74 Letter from Hon. Sect K. J. Kenafick to Lincoln Efford, 16 July 1949, p. 1, Folder 54, Efford papers, ATL. Mr K. J. Kenafick was the Secretary of the ‘League for Freedom,’ a group based in Melbourne, Australia and incorporating a ‘No Conscription Campaign’.
76 H. ‘Jock’ Barnes & John A. Lee, ‘Resist Peace Time Conscription’, p. 9. Barnes argued that the continuation of stabilisation policies had made ‘the relative position of the working class ... even worse’.
more than an attempt to manipulate the New Zealand public by means of politically motivated scare-tactics.\textsuperscript{82}

The Canterbury Trades Council (CTC), one of the more militant trade union groupings in the country, strongly opposed peacetime CMT and published their own anti-conscription material.\textsuperscript{83} Fraser reacted by telling a pro-CMT meeting in Hastings that, while some in the trade unions and trades councils had been ‘misled’, most were being wrongfully blamed for disseminating anti-CMT propaganda.\textsuperscript{84} He wanted to distinguish between the more moderate unions which were still under the sway of the FOL and supported the Labour government and those who openly opposed CMT. According to Fraser, these more moderate unionists should not be pronounced guilty just because of their past association with people who now wished to ‘destroy this country’.\textsuperscript{85} National’s Keith Holyoake similarly accused the militant trade unions of ‘torpedoing New Zealand’s defence in opposing military service’.\textsuperscript{86}

As far as Fraser was concerned, those who were the most ‘vociferous’ in their opposition to CMT were the same people ‘... who are always forward in creating disturbances in our industrial life’\textsuperscript{87} Such fears were only given credence by anti-CMT exponents like Jock Barnes who declared that ‘a Boston Tea Party staged in Wellington Harbour would be ... beneficial to the economic life of our country’.\textsuperscript{88} Fraser maintained that ‘In New Zealand the Communists are working overtime to keep us weak and vulnerable. Your vote for Compulsory Military Training is a vote against them and what they stand for’.\textsuperscript{89} The JDAC warned that New Zealand was ‘uneasy

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\textsuperscript{82} Outlook, Vol. 56, No. 31, 3 August 1949, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{83} Newspaper clipping, Unknown, 10 June 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. The CTC’s secretary, A. B. Grant, had called for the reaffirmation of Labour’s traditional policy of no conscription at the 33rd Annual Party Conference.
\textsuperscript{84} ST, 19 July 1949.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.; R. Semple, ‘Why I Fight Communism’, p. 3. Semple declared that ‘... wrecking is a sacred mission’ for communists.
\textsuperscript{86} Newspaper clipping, Unknown, 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
\textsuperscript{87} Newspaper clipping, Dominion, July 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
\textsuperscript{89} Householder pamphlet on CMT with statements from Fraser and Holland, p. 2, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
under Communist-inspired industrial troubles'. The Governor-General, His Excellency Sir Bernard Freyberg, told the Auckland Branch of the Royal Empire Society on Empire Day that 'We should do something to protect our great heritage, not only from attacks from outside, but from those within our shores'. He warned that 'subversive elements, most of them foreigners', desired 'to see the British Empire fall to pieces'. This statement reveals a degree of xenophobia present in many statements made by the pro-CMT lobby, particularly military or ex-military men, during the CMT debate. It also shows that anyone who was an avowed communist was allegedly not a true New Zealander.

Fraser believed that people would vote against CMT in the referendum only if '... the Communist campaign against national service in this country has appealed to you and you have been taken in by it'. Therefore, to avoid being labelled a 'fellow traveller' of the Communists, one had to be in favour of CMT. Speaking of those who opposed CMT, Fraser noted that 'Some of these, because they are religious and conscientious, are entitled to respect', which implied that, as far as Fraser was concerned, all other opposition was not. Some communists appeared in the guise of 'Trojan doves', cloaking their real intentions behind exhortations for peace. Fervent anti-communist Bob Semple believed that, even during World War II, various 'front' organisations hid the fact '... that militant pacifism owed much of its driving force to communism'. It was this perspective that enabled the Labour government to justify giving consideration to the opinions of only those organisations which they themselves

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90 JDAC brochure sent to the editors of New Zealand's daily newspapers, 24 June 1949, p. 21, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.  
91 NZH, 25 May 1949.  
92 Ibid.  
94 Broadcast address by Peter Fraser on CMT, 3 July 1949, p. 5, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. How much 'respect' they were entitled to is not entirely clear and after CMT triumphed in the referendum, Fraser urged that the '... greatest care must be taken not to allow people to escape their just obligations by conveniently held conscientious objections'. Typed draft of Fraser's speech, 3 August 1949, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.  
95 CMT Background Bulletin No. 1, p. 2, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash papers, NA.  
96 R. Semple, 'Why I Fight Communism', p. 16.
defined as 'responsible'. The Labour Party National Executive passed a resolution concerning the CMT issue which instructed the LRCs and Party branches that under no circumstances were they to use 'their funds to support any agitation against the policy of the Government'. John A. Lee believed that this action effectively 'muzzled thousands in . . . [the Labour Party's] own ranks', neutralising many of the opponents to CMT. Fraser alleged that 'The Communists are the very heart and core of the anti-defence movement in this country' and he urged the New Zealand public to 'Look around you! Watch your letter boxes for their propaganda! See who leads the attack against military training in New Zealand? See for yourselves!' Such talk moved A. R. D. Fairburn, an opponent of CMT, to comment cynically that 'Mr Fraser's "Communists" are a very large and heterogeneous group of people, of all shades of political belief. They include practically all those persons who don't like Mr. Fraser'.

The Labour government controlled the broadcasting service and refused to give the Communist Party radio air time during the CMT campaign. Meanwhile, Holland was praised in the press for his 'fairmindedness' in advocating that both sides be given access to broadcasting facilities. Yet in a note written on 9 June 1949, Holland expressed his objection to the CMT issue being discussed on the radio because he felt that the 'other side', including 'Jock' Barnes, A. G. Grant, Winston Rhodes Wrennen and John A. Lee, would claim to be entitled to air time. He felt that only selected speakers from both sides should be allowed to explain their views on the radio because 'That would get over the objection of letting the Commos on the air'. Fraser then

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97 Note entitled 'Suggested reply to Mr Sheat', 29 September 1948, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
98 Second meeting of the 1949-50 Labour Party National Executive, June 1949 to May 1950, Friday, 1 July 1949, p. 3, LPHQ.
99 Here and Now, No. 60, September 1957, p. 18.
100 Broadcast address by Peter Fraser on CMT, 3 July 1949, p. 4, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. Note how the term 'anti-defence' is used instead of anti-CMT.
101 A. R. D. Fairburn, 'Mr Fraser's Way of Doing Things' in Here and Now, No. 1, October 1949, p. 8.
102 Freedom, 3 August 1949, p. 2.
103 Holland's handwritten notes on National Party Defence Policy, p. 4, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
104 Ibid., p. 1.
sent Holland a list of organisations opposed to CMT that would be allowed to broadcast on the radio, stating that all of these broadcasts were to be recorded in advance.\footnote{Letter from Fraser to Holland on who would be allowed to broadcast in opposition to CMT, 14 July 1949, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. The four groups mentioned in the letter were the New Zealand Peace and Anti Conscription Federation, the 2nd NZEF Association, the New Zealand Christian Pacifist Society and the Peace Committee of the Society of Friends (Quakers) in New Zealand.} Paradoxically, while Holland publicly stated that it was wrong that ‘... broadcasting facilities should be used to present only one side of the case ...’,\footnote{Holland’s CMT radio broadcast 1 August 1949, p. 1, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.} he endorsed the government’s refusal to allow the communists to broadcast their opposition to CMT.\footnote{Note dated 7 July, 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.} As far as Holland was concerned, if you opposed CMT you were either a fool, a ‘conchie’, or a traitor. ‘There were those who could not see any danger, those who had deep-rooted conscientious and religious objections to war, and finally those who did not wish to see New Zealand defended. Those in the third category wanted to see the destruction of the British Empire’.\footnote{ST, 19 July 1949; Holland’s CMT radio broadcast 1 August 1949, p. 7, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; Freedom, 15 June 1949, p. 1.}

Holland considered public apathy as equally dangerous to attaining an affirmative vote in the referendum. In the draft of a radio broadcast he told the New Zealand public not to ‘... allow yourself to be a fellow traveller, either by voting with them [the communists] or by abstaining from voting, which is nearly the same thing’.\footnote{Draft of radio broadcast 1 August 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.} He reminded voters that ‘this issue will not be decided in electorates but in the total number of votes recorded’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 7.} ‘Most of the objectors’, he warned, ‘and ... those who wish to see our country undefended live in the towns and cities. It will be easy for them to vote’.\footnote{Three page typed section of Holland’s CMT radio broadcast headed ‘The Objectors’, p. 3, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.} By ‘objectors’ Holland clearly meant communists, who resided where workers were most concentrated. Holland’s assertion that the urban versus rural cleavage in New Zealand could influence the result in the referendum...
14th July, 1949.

Dear Mr. Holland,

It has been decided that the following organisations should broadcast in opposition to the compulsory military training scheme:

- The New Zealand Peace and Anti Conscription Federation
- 2nd N.Z.E.F. Association
- The New Zealand Christian Pacifist Society
- The Peace Committee of the Society of Friends (Quakers) in New Zealand.

All the broadcasts, both for and against the proposal, will be for a period of not exceeding twenty minutes and will be recorded in advance.

I think this should be satisfactory.

With kind regards,

Yours faithfully,

S.G. Holland, Esq., M.P.,
Leader of the Opposition,
Parliament House,
WELLINGTON.

9) Prime Minister Fraser’s letter to Sidney Holland outlining the few organisations that would be allowed to broadcast their opposition to CMT.
reflected an assumption there would be no opponents to CMT amongst National’s traditionally rural supporters.\textsuperscript{112}

Organisations opposing CMT, like the Peace and Anti-Conscription Federation, were considered guilty by association with known communists.\textsuperscript{113} When the Federation applied for a grant to be made available from public funds in order to present their viewpoint during the campaign, Fraser’s response was as predictable as it was undiplomatic.\textsuperscript{114} He claimed that the suggestion was ‘utterly ridiculous’.\textsuperscript{115} He went on say that ‘As, according to your letter, Communists and fellow-travellers figure conspicuously in the peace and anti-conscription improvised organisation, to make a grant to it would amount to subsidising the Country’s enemies to assist them to keep our defence forces inefficient’.\textsuperscript{116} In an earlier statement that alluded to Hitler’s totalitarian regime, Colonel K. W. R. Glasgow, a former commander in the 2nd NZEF and now chairman of the JDAC, had argued that ‘If in 1938 we had invited a Gestapo representative to address us he would have received very short shrift’.\textsuperscript{117} Fraser clearly did not consider these groups to be any more legitimate as opponents of CMT than the Communist Party and, indeed, in his mind there was probably no such thing as legitimate opposition to CMT. The desire of some of those who opposed CMT on religious and other grounds to distance themselves from the more extreme protests was not helped by the efforts of Fraser, Holland and many in the print media who portrayed all anti-CMT groups as subversive; a sentiment succinctly encapsulated in the slogan ‘a vote against conscription is a vote for Communism’.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{112} R. Chapman, “New Zealand Since the War 8: Politics and Society”, \textit{Landfall}, XVI, 3, September 1962, p. 252.
\textsuperscript{113} The national campaign organiser appointed in June 1949 was a ‘known’ member of the Communist Party.
\textsuperscript{114} A. I. Keesing, the National Secretary of the Peace and Anti-conscription Federation, wrote to Fraser in the belief that the Federation was entitled to such a grant as the official opposition to CMT.
\textsuperscript{115} ODT, 14 July 1949.
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Dominion}, 15 July 1949.
\textsuperscript{117} Newspaper clipping, EP, 22 June 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Outlook}, Vol. 56, No. 31, 3 August 1949, p. 3.
An article by Barrowclough, echoing Fraser’s sentiments, appeared in the *Dominion* newspaper under the title ‘Why Communists Object To Military Training In Dominion.’\(^{119}\) He indicated that the New Zealand Communist Party was the ‘loudest’ opponent to CMT, attempting to discredit other opposition groups by associating them with the communists.\(^{120}\) In March 1949, the JDAC launched a newspaper campaign with eight large, signed articles being supplied free to newspapers and published in the national press. Conrad Bollinger later complained that such coverage unfairly enabled the JDAC to reach ‘every household in New Zealand’ with their message.\(^{121}\) The JDAC explained that these articles were designed to redress an imbalance by refuting ‘the wholly misleading and often vicious pro-Russian propaganda being carried on by the anti-conscriptionists led by Communists and their fellow travellers’.\(^{122}\)

When Fraser encountered noisy interjectors during a speech at the Auckland Town Hall he disdainfully chastised the protesters saying ‘I just ask them to shoot less and think more. At the moment they are just opening their mouths, shutting their eyes and swallowing this Communist stuff’.\(^{123}\) Commenting that recourse to such ‘stupid tactics’ would only serve to lose the anti-CMT cause votes, the column ‘Current Comment by Shower,’ stated that many of this group were ‘undoubtedly Communists’.\(^{124}\) Regarding the Auckland fracas, Fraser had reportedly declared that ‘now the people have heard the voice of the enemy within, roaring and raucous, it will bring a more solid and bigger vote for compulsory military training’.\(^{125}\)

Fraser was not the only one encountering such protests and being quick to blame the communists. In a pencilled note concerning the Victoria University College Student’s Association Annual Meeting, it is recorded that, of the 110 present, 40 were

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\(^{119}\) Newspaper clipping, *Dominion*, 12 March 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.

\(^{120}\) JDAC pamphlet, *To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training*, April 1949, p. 5, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.

\(^{121}\) C. V. I. Bollinger, ‘The Referendum Exposed’, p. 17.

\(^{122}\) *Standard*, 17 March 1949.

\(^{123}\) *ODT*, 22 July 1949. See also J. Thorn, *Peter Fraser*, p. 269.

\(^{124}\) *Outlook*, Vol. 56, No. 31, 3 August 1949, p. 3.

\(^{125}\) Ibid.; *ODT*, 30 July 1949, p. 6. In the Dunedin Town Hall, Fraser faced so many interjectors that the *ODT* described the meeting as having the ‘pattern of an eccentric square dance’. 
considered socialists or communists, while another 30 came under the category of 'fellow travellers.' Holland was moved, presumably by disbelief, to query J. R. Marshall, the National MP for Mount Victoria, whether this student opposition to CMT was 'genuinely the opinion of the general body of Victorian students'? When also speaking at Victoria University, Sir Howard Kippenberger was reportedly subjected to what Freedom described as 'another sorry exhibition of boorishness' by the University Socialist Club. Such 'exhibitions' seemed to validate one letter to the editor printed in the Evening Post which claimed that the CMT referendum was a good thing because it would play a role in ' . . . exposing the Communists who support conscription in Russia and oppose compulsory training in New Zealand'.

A number of observations can be made about the arguments presented in favour of CMT. Firstly, the fear of communism had not yet come to totally dominate New Zealand's threat perceptions by 1949. Considerable apprehension over the designs of Asian and Western Pacific nations was still apparent. New Zealand's anxiety about the possible resurgence of a militaristic Japan, however, was not contingent on the threat represented by communism. Equally distinct were concerns related to Malthusian visions of rapid population growth which would necessitate Asian expansion, perhaps even as far as New Zealand's hallowed islands. As an organisation, the JDAC clung the most tenaciously to such ideas during the CMT campaign, with the validity of such ideas apparently still widely accepted. Yet the JDAC also spoke extensively of the threat, both external and internal, constituted by communism. As communism spread in South East Asia, this general Asian menace became increasingly merged and encapsulated in the language of Cold War anti-communism. This pattern of threat perception was further complemented by certain conceptual leaps, such as the attribution of the 'Asiatic mind' to the Russians. This process of concept development was to assume a much more complete form with the establishment of the Peoples'
Republic of China on 1 October 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.

Secondly, discussion of the ‘closeness’ of war proved problematical, especially for the Labour government. Fraser maintained that the tension of the Cold War meant that a superpower conflict could erupt at any time, the ramifications of which New Zealand would find impossible to avoid. However, during the CMT debate he continued to make statements to the effect that such a war was no longer imminent. In doing so, he hoped to alleviate the pressure on the Labour government created by allegations that, by holding a referendum on CMT, they were delaying the instigation of required defence preparations. The National Party attempted to make the most of Fraser’s awkward situation. As it would take four years for a system of CMT to reach its projected effectiveness, the Labour government was open to charges of further endangering the nation. Fraser remained personally convinced of the risk of imminent war but he found it politically expedient to temper his public pronouncements on the topic during the CMT campaign.

Thirdly, should a global conflict have occurred, Fraser had agreed to send the New Zealand forces that CMT was designed to provide to the Middle East to fight under the auspices of the British Commonwealth. Supposedly for security reasons, however, this Middle Eastern commitment was not discussed during the CMT campaign. Instead, emphasis was placed on the general threat communism constituted to the New Zealand way of life. The assumption appeared to be that referendum voters were more likely to respond to an emotive call to defend New Zealand’s shores. Associated with this issue, however, was recognition of New Zealand’s geographical isolation from any potential communist invasion, as opposed to a distinctly Asian aggressor. The result was an emphasis being placed on the danger personified by ‘fifth columnists’ within New Zealand. The country’s industrial problems were blamed on these internal agents of international communism who took their orders from

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130 W. D. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, pp. 192-3. Only a ‘first-class Asiatic power’ could be considered a potential threat to New Zealand’s islands.
Moscow. For Fraser, it justified the Labour government’s opposition to the more militant trade unionists. Fraser considered that the FOL was still the true voice of the working man and the government would not submit to those who sought to destabilise New Zealand in the name of a foreign power. The alliance between Peter Fraser and F. P. Walsh had resulted in what has been described as ‘Fraserian unity’ between the Labour government and the moderates within the trade union movement. The close operation between the Labour government and the FOL during the war had served to knit the interests of the two closely together.

Communism was seen as monolithic at this time and was closely associated with its most powerful exponent, the Soviet Union. At a Prime Ministers’ Meeting in 1948 Lord Tedder urged that ‘democratic countries everywhere should face the fact that a ruthless and unprincipled “cold” war was being directed from Moscow and was probing the weak spots of each country’. The fear of communism was voiced behind the closed doors of Prime Ministers’ Meetings in much the same terms as it was expressed in pro-CMT material during the referendum campaign. Such behaviour suggests that these threat perceptions of communism had been truly internalised by many of New Zealand’s politicians by 1949 and they were not just using empty rhetoric to calculatingly manipulate the voting public. To be a communist was to be more than just unpatriotic; it was an act tantamount to treason. Both Fraser and Holland considered the converse of this to be equally true. To oppose CMT was an act of treachery, consistent with the activities of communist subversives and their ‘fellow


132 There is no better expression of this than F. P. Walsh’s controversial 1946 report to the FOL which urged a continuation of the government’s stabilisation policy, which polarised the moderates and the militants within the labour movement. See H. ‘Bert’ Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand: Past and Present, p. 65.

133 PPM (48) 11th Meeting, Meeting of Prime Ministers, Confidential Annex, 20 October 1948, 11 a.m., p. 4, EA I, 153/26/4, NA.
travellers'. This alleged vanguard of communism bore the brunt of the virulent pro-CMT campaign.

In his discussion of the RSA’s attitude towards communism, historian R. W. McLennan typifies it as being ‘fantastically, grotesquely abusive’ and ‘... tinged with an irrationalism typical of a certain kind of conservatism’.134 This type of emotive language, however, was in widespread use, being found in both the National and Labour parties as well as RSA and JDAC circles. Correspondingly, one can assume that the ‘conservatism’ he speaks of had already permeated through much of New Zealand society by 1949. McLennan’s description tells us less about the attitude of the RSA as an organisation than it reveals about the ideologically charged atmosphere of the early Cold War years in New Zealand. While this chapter focused on negative arguments that drew upon the fears of New Zealanders’ and warnings of what would happen if the proper defensive preparations were not made, the next chapter examines more positive arguments expounding the benefits of introducing peacetime CMT in New Zealand.

CHAPTER FOUR

Fun, Fairness, and Fresh Air

Many of the arguments in favour of CMT focused on why it was considered the most appropriate defence system for New Zealand. These ranged from the continued relevance of large units of troops in the nuclear age, doubts over whether New Zealand could rely on Britain or the United States for protection in time of war, and the belief that trained soldiers had a better chance of survival on the battlefield. It was argued by the proponents of CMT that a voluntary system of recruitment was inadequate and that CMT was an intrinsically fairer and more democratic system. The many benefits of CMT camp were extolled, including everything from improving the health of trainees and making lasting friendships, to learning teamwork and being endowed with a sense of discipline. CMT camp would not only be ‘the grandest fun’, but it was envisaged that it would help cure some of society’s ills at the same time.1

Taken together, these arguments provide a fascinating example of a government trying to ‘sell’ its national security policy to the public.

During the course of the CMT referendum campaign, Fraser and Holland bore the brunt of the speaking engagements, with each delivering some 15 public speeches.2 The campaign saw both leaders visiting a total of 26 larger towns between them.3 Nevertheless, this co-operation was far from perfect and the National Party continuously chided the government for resorting to a referendum in order to introduce CMT. Often in the same breath as advocating an affirmative vote on CMT, Holland would vent his spleen, disapproving of the fact that a referendum was being held at all.4 He described Fraser’s decision to hold a referendum as ‘one of the blackest days in our history’, but National’s calls for Fraser’s resignation fell on deaf

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1 Transcript of radio broadcast by Holland dated 1 August 1949, p. 12, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
2 Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 12 July 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
3 ODT, 14; 15 July 1949. See ‘Appendix Two’, p. 98, for examples of the itinerary.
4 Holland’s handwritten notes on National Defence Policy, p. 1, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. See also AS, 25 May 1949, p. 2; ODT, 9 June 1949, p. 8.
You are asked to give an overwhelming vote for compulsory military training. It is the only effective way. The scheme for compulsory military training is necessary to ensure the defence of our People, our Country and our Commonwealth. Our nation is not justified in taking risks by being irresponsible about the future, particularly when facing the stark facts of the present world situation. You must cast your vote for compulsory military training if you wish to keep New Zealand secure...safe...strong.

Here are the facts:

1. Twice in 25 years we have defended ourselves successfully against aggressors, but at appalling cost. Prepared strength is our best insurance that it will not happen again.
2. The United Nations has not, up to the present, fulfilled the hopes of its founders. It has not given us international law and order, peace and security, as we hoped it would. We cannot afford to take risks in a dangerous world in which forms of dictatorship threaten.
3. Sound training in modern defence methods protects our men.
4. A compulsory system is the only fair way. It is also the only way that can effectively meet the needs. It is the fair way, the democratic way, the efficient way.
5. To be prepared is to guard the peace. Preparation is one deterrent which aggressors understand. To be capable of self-defence is not to be war-minded. A vote for compulsory military training is a vote against war.
6. The compulsory military training scheme is this: Young men, on reaching the age of 18 years, will spend 14 weeks in camp in the first year. Then they will have 14 days in camp and 6 days out-of-camp training during each of three succeeding years. They will then be posted to the reserve for 6 years, but no training will be required of them during those years.

You are asked to give an overwhelming vote for compulsory military training. Strike out the bottom line.
ears.\textsuperscript{5} When Parliament opened on 29 June 1949, Holland instigated an unsuccessful ‘want of confidence’ motion, saying that Fraser had bowed to ‘leftists’ at the Labour Party Conference.\textsuperscript{6} Frederick Doidge warned that because of the referendum the CMT issue would become clouded in ‘controversy and a maze of irrelevancies’ and that ‘... pacifists and communists would engage in an unholy alliance to defeat Compulsory Military Training’.\textsuperscript{7}

Most of National’s opposition to the CMT referendum, however, constituted a weak attempt at partisan point-scoring before the general election and it was not without its political difficulties. In June 1949, R. M. Algie, a National MP, noted that while in practice the referendum was ‘utterly undesirable’, he believed that National could not simply oppose a referendum when they had tacitly agreed to assist the Government in its CMT campaign.\textsuperscript{8} National had supported Labour’s proposals for referendums on licensing hours and off-course betting and there was also the consideration that National had its own proposed referendum on licensing amongst its policies. Such a rationalisation smacked heavily of political back-scratching.

More important was the realisation that, should the referendum return a negative vote, National could be placed in a politically damaging position. Even if it won the 1949 general election, they would be faced with the problem of implementing CMT legislation that went against the avowed will of the people. The RSA expressed concern over what it considered was unwarranted delay caused by the referendum and its belief that voters would not be fully informed on the issue.\textsuperscript{9} The RSA’s Annual Conference, however, eventually pledged its ‘fullest and complete support, with all the energy it can muster, of an affirmative vote in the referendum’.\textsuperscript{10} But Kippenberger

\textsuperscript{5} Newspaper clippings, \textit{Dominion}, 28 June 1949; SC, 27 May 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Dominion}, 28 May 1949; ODT, 26 May 1949, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{7} Newspaper clipping, \textit{Dominion}, 15 June 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. See also R. J. Cullen, ‘The Cold War in New Zealand 1949-1951’, p. 13; ODT, 18 May 1949.
\textsuperscript{8} Letter from R. M. Algie to S. Holland, 15 June 1949, p. 1, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
\textsuperscript{9} Newspaper clipping, \textit{Dominion}, 23 June 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA; \textit{RSA Review}, 1 July 1949; \textit{NZH}, 26 May 1949; Letter from H. Kippenberger to S. Holland, 9 June 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
\textsuperscript{10} Newspaper clipping, \textit{Dominion}, 23 June 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA; ODT, 23 June 1949,
The Prime Minister . . .

It is vital that the referendum on August 3rd should result in an overwhelming vote by the people for compulsory military training.

While forms of dictatorship threaten, New Zealand must be capable of defending itself and contributing to the wider sphere of its own defence as a member of the British Commonwealth. In the world of to-day, where peace is precarious, we cannot neglect to take elementary common-sense precautions.

Briefly—
The United Nations has not yet given an assurance of peace.
Aggressive Communism would destroy democratic freedom, and only prepared strength deters aggression.

In New Zealand the Communists are working overtime to keep us weak and vulnerable.

Your vote for Compulsory Military Training is a vote against them and what they stand for.

Why is a system of compulsory military training the answer to our defence needs? Here are the answers—

First, it is impossible to raise the necessary strength for our Defence Forces by voluntary means.

The Government is convinced, after a very close and searching examination, that a voluntary system could not possibly succeed.

Second, it is the fairest way. Common Service must be shared by all for the common good.

Unpreparedness in two previous wars has meant avoidable sacrifices.

If New Zealand's sons are ever called upon to bear arms in a future emergency—and we pray the need will never arise—the best insurance against needless sacrifice is sound training.

The scheme will efficiently equip our men with the basic skills in modern defence. It is so designed as to make a minimum interference with the natural development of their lives. For many it will give an opportunity for physical development which they otherwise might miss.

I must emphasize that compulsory military training does not mean mass-power direction. This is a falsehood being spread by the Communists in their efforts to defeat the scheme.

We are a small country, but our example has been, and can be, of priceless value to the democracies of the world facing desperate danger.

I know and feel that I can expect you, on August 3rd, to give a strong and clear answer to this appeal for the defence of our people, our country, our Commonwealth, and world-wide democracy and freedom.

The Leader of the Opposition . . .

320,000,000 people in subjugated countries have been enslaved, because they were unprepared to defend their freedom. Eleven ancient countries of Europe are to-day paying the dreadful cost of believing "It could not happen here."

No country has been enslaved by the honest vote of the people, and no enslaved people have ever been given the opportunity of recovering their accustomed way of life by an honest secret ballot of the people. People who lose their freedom seldom have the strength to recover it.

Unless we are prepared to meet the cost of maintaining the peace, we run a very big risk of having to meet the cost of war, and that cost will be measured in the incalculable casualties of war.

We cannot fully defend ourselves alone, and we must not leave everything to hard-pressed Britain. We dare not look for American help unless we are prepared to help ourselves. If war should come, our young men would be called to the colours in any case. It would be criminal to send servicemen to defend our shores without proper training and modern equipment.

Modern military training is interesting, valuable in after life, and of great physical advantage. Military training gives people life-long friendships. It is mainly to defend one's country. It is madness to be unprepared. Young men in two World Wars saved New Zealand and our Empire. Every young man of to-day should defend us again, should the necessity arise, but it is much more sensible to prevent trouble from coming than to fight it when it comes.

I urge every elector in New Zealand to vote in favour of the proposition that New Zealand should do her share in ensuring peace, by showing those who would interfere with our freedom that we are prepared and able and determined to defend ourselves.

STRIKE OUT THE BOTTOM LINE
maintained that ‘It is the opinion of the Council of the R.S.A. that if the referendum is lost it will be the duty of any Government nevertheless to introduce compulsory military training’. 11

Thomas Bloodworth, who personally opposed CMT, felt that ‘It is the essence of democracy to-day that the people should decide on foreign policy’. 12 Yet overseas opinion on the CMT referendum was divided. The Melbourne Herald believed that Fraser’s gamble was worthwhile, while the Glasgow Herald suggested that the Labour government was ‘too timid’ [originally in bold] in putting CMT to a referendum which, while suitable for questions on drinking and gambling, was not appropriate for a defence issue. 13

Those who had served directly in the armed forces pleaded that the hard learnt lessons of the Second World War should not be forgotten, such as the folly of sending inadequately trained men into battle. This military experience served as the basis of many pro-CMT arguments from men who claimed an insight into the harsh realities of combat. The RSA claimed that its members had first-hand knowledge of what such a lack of preparedness meant in wartime. 14 Colonel K. W. R. Glasgow’s article, ‘Cost of Inefficiency in Wartime’, recalled the problems encountered by the 2nd NZEF due to inadequate training during the early stages of the war in the desert. ‘Looking back’, he recalled, ‘those of us who had responsibilities of command almost feel sick at our unpreparedness’. 15

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13 Newspaper clipping, Melbourne Herald, 31 May 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA; Freedom, 23 November 1949, p. 11.

14 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 5, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA. Major-General Barrowclough asked rhetorically ‘Can all these men and women be utterly misguided and wrong?’

15 Ibid., p. 12; Newspaper clipping, Dominion, ‘Unprepared Troops Lead To Defeat In Warfare’, 31 March 1949.
Ex-Servicemen Appeal to You

WE know what war means.

By being strong, we have the best chance of avoiding war.

But should war come, victory can be assured without sacrificing precious lives only if our fighting services are thoroughly trained and equipped.

The possibility of an unprepared and untrained Army being called upon to defend New Zealand is unthinkable.

We confidently appeal, therefore, to all loyal New Zealand men and women to vote for COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING.

Mark your Voting Paper —

I vote for Compulsory Military Training.

I vote against Compulsory Military Training.

12.) Ex-Servicemen of the Joint Defence Action Committee assure New Zealand's public that they know what is required to defend the country.
Fraser assured the public that should war break out, a system of peacetime CMT would ensure ‘fewer casualties’ amongst New Zealand troops.\(^\text{16}\) He told Parliament of how, at a Labour Party meeting, a young wounded boy had pleaded ‘For God’s sake, if war is at all possible in the next few years, give the young boys of eighteen years and onwards a chance to learn something about defence . . . [because] it will mean less loss of life’.\(^\text{17}\) Major-General Stewart stated that it had been proven in ‘two World Wars that it is the untrained units and formations that incur the heaviest casualties in battle’.\(^\text{18}\) Holland also argued that any failure to introduce peacetime CMT would be to leave untrained New Zealanders ‘. . . without a decent chance of success in combat’.\(^\text{19}\)

The pro-CMT groups made much of the fact that ‘both Great Britain and the United States have resorted to conscription in peacetime which is unprecedented in their history’.\(^\text{20}\) This, they argued, was because the voluntary system of recruitment had proved inadequate during previous wars and CMT had become a necessity.\(^\text{21}\) A JDAC article, entitled ‘Voluntary System-Inefficient, Insufficient and Unfair’, presented four arguments in favour of CMT. These were that voluntary enlistment was wholly undemocratic, that it exploited the patriotism of the few while others avoided their obligations, that it had failed to produce adequate numbers of troops, and that peacetime CMT was the only way to ‘produce an organised nation capable of defending[ing] [sic] itself’.\(^\text{22}\)

\(^{16}\) Broadcast address on CMT by Peter Fraser, 3 July 1949, p. 5, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.

\(^{17}\) NZPD, 1949, 285, p. 38.

\(^{18}\) Statement on peacetime CMT presented to the Minister of Defence, F. Jones, by Major-General K. L. Stewart, p. 2, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash papers, NA.

\(^{19}\) Holland’s CMT radio broadcast, 1 August 1949, p. 4, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.

\(^{20}\) JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 6, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.

\(^{21}\) JDAC brochure sent to the editors of New Zealand’s daily newspapers, 24 June 1949, p. 24, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. CMT was presented as ‘the only means of preventing, or at any rate delaying, war’.

\(^{22}\) JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 10, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
Security Under Two Flags

A Message

From Ex-Servicemen's Organisations and New Zealand Defence League

Save needless sacrifice

Lack of training in Peace-Time means unnecessary sacrifice in War.

In two World Wars we had time to get ready.

We shall not be provided with a third opportunity.

Compulsory training means training young men so they can defend themselves and their country in the event of war.

Save your sons, your country, and your British Liberty by voting in the affirmative.

Vote for

Compulsory Military Training

Issued by the Joint Defence Action Committee, Ex-Servicemen's Associations and New Zealand Defence League

13.) This JDAC advertisement draws on New Zealand's close ties to Britain and the Empire, calling for 'Security Under Two Flags' to protect 'your British Liberty'.
This was certainly an image that Frasers had come to accept. He declared that ‘The Government is convinced after a very close and searching examination, that a voluntary system could not possibly succeed’.23 Holland also cited memories of the inadequacy of voluntary training during the 1930’s and he claimed that this, coupled with New Zealand’s small population, had convinced him that CMT was the only viable defence option.24

A great deal was made of the fairness of CMT as opposed to other methods of recruitment. It was also presented to the New Zealand people as something more ‘democratic’, as if this in itself made it a much more desirable scheme.25 Both terms took on the character of oft repeated truisms, without any serious attempt being made to clarify such assertions.

Fraser proclaimed that CMT was ‘the fairest way’ because ‘Common Service must be shared by all for the common good’.26 Sidney Holland was sent quotes from Eisenhower’s Crusade in Europe by H. Rowland, who felt that these would help justify peacetime CMT in a democratic country like New Zealand.27 The JDAC considered the voluntary system inadequate, undemocratic and ‘unfair’ to servicemen because it exploited ‘the patriotism of the few’.28 Supposedly, the benefit of CMT was that it would bring about the recruitment of ‘... not only all those who ordinarily would volunteer, but also all those who would willingly enlist if the other fellow were

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23 Householder pamphlet on CMT with statements from Fraser and Holland, p. 2, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. See also Memorandum on Defence - Compulsory Military Training, Prime Minister’s Department, 23 June 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA; Letter from Richard T. Allbon, Mt. Roskill, to Peter Fraser, 2 July 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
24 Holland’s notes on Major-General H. E. Barrowclough’s Defence Policy, p. 1, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
25 In the pamphlet ‘Why I Oppose Conscription’, Frank Langstone argued the opposite, that conscription is ‘totalitarian’, p. 14; and representative of ‘dictatorship’, p. 23.
26 Householder pamphlet on CMT with statements from Fraser and Holland, p. 2, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; Broadcast address on CMT by Peter Fraser, 3 July 1949, p. 5, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. Fraser declared that New Zealand’s ‘young men will be most content’ under CMT.
27 Letter from H. Rowland received 15 June 1949, sent after he read the NZHs report on Holland’s speech in Dunedin, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; ODT, 12 January 1949, p. 5. After talking with General Eisenhower in January 1949, Fraser also ‘was most impressed with the depth of his knowledge and understanding’ of world affairs.
28 Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 26 March 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
Sir Andrew Russell stressed the obligations of the male citizen by saying that ‘the voluntary system is undemocratic because it is unfair- leaving to the few what is the obligation of everyone’. In Major-General Stewart’s opinion, after the selfless service given to the country by the ‘old hands’ of the New Zealand Division during the last war, it did not seem ‘fair to expect them to make such a sacrifice again’.

Some tried to politicise the issue by comparing the Labour government’s policy of compulsory unionism with CMT. At the annual meeting of the Wairarapa RSA, A. R. Robbins of Featherstone, said that if the former was fair then the latter was just as fair and even more necessary. A correspondent writing to Freedom argued that compulsory unionism was like conscription because it prevented ‘... any man working at his trade or calling unless he becomes a member of a trade union’.

There was, of course, concern in New Zealand’s industrial movement over the potential for the government to use large numbers of CMT recruits for strike-breaking activities. Jock Barnes said that the workers saw conscription ‘... as an instrument of the employing class for regimenting and intimidating the workers and for breaking strikes’. Fraser tried to alleviate such fears by declaring that ‘The trainees will not be used in industrial disputes’.

Pro-CMT advocates broadly extolled the practical benefits that CMT camp would have on the young men of New Zealand. These ranged from the physical betterment of recruits to the breaking down of class barriers and them learning to appreciate internal dynamics of team work. Sir Andrew Russell believed that, with

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29 JDAC pamphlet, "To Preserve Our Security: The Case For CMT, April 1949, p. 7, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
30 Ibid., p. 9.
31 Statement on peacetime CMT presented to the Minister of Defence, F. Jones, by Major-General K. L. Stewart, p. 3, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash Papers, NA.
32 Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 28 May 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
33 Freedom, 29 June 1949, p. 2.
34 This concern was not unfounded given the events that transpired on the waterfront in February to July of 1951.
36 Broadcast address on CMT by Peter Fraser, 3 July 1949, p. 5, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
On Guard... for PEACE

- In a tense world and with the basis for lasting peace still eluding the United Nations we must be prepared. Strength discourages would-be aggressors.
- To be prepared is to guard the peace — it does not mean war-mindedness.
- Sound training in modern defence methods gives our men better protection if they ever have to bear arms.
- The compulsory system is the only fair way... The voluntary system has failed in the past.
- The compulsory system is the only efficient way. Efficient defence is essential in the interests of everybody — it is to protect all that they hold dear.
- This question must be given your most earnest consideration and then, by your striking out the bottom line, given the most overwhelming vote in the cause of security and, consequently, of peace.

COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING is the ONLY fair way!

14.) This New Zealand government advertisement transposes the image of a military sentry with the idea of ensuring peace, assuring the public that CMT did not entail ‘war-mindedness.’
peacetime CMT, 'the health of the trainees will be greatly improved, thereby raising the general physical standard of the race; and the trainee by mixing with all sorts and conditions of his fellows will form lasting friendships and get a better un­­understanding [sic] of their points of view'. Of course, more cynical observers could have argued that understanding others' points of view was hardly to be actively promoted by the army whose attitude was, more often than not, to nip divergent opinions in the bud.

Training was portrayed as a wholly positive experience. 'I deny that there is any hardship whatever involved in doing this training', proclaimed Kippenberger. Holland proclaimed that 'Modern military training is interesting, valuable in after life, and of great physical advantage. Military training gives people life-long friendships'. H. P. Kidson, the ex-rector of Otago Boys High School, described CMT in a way that conjured up images of Boy Scout camps rather than the serious business of military training.

You co-operate with all sorts and find talent, wit and good nature where perhaps you least expect it; you handle a lot of sleek mechanical stuff; field craft makes you take a new look at 'country'; good food and the out-of-doors give you physical well-being; there is satisfaction in growing, even as a lance-jack, the confidence and co-operation of your 'men'.

National’s Member for Clutha, James Roy, did not want recruits’ time to be wasted on ‘trivial duties’, thereby rejecting Labour MP Warren Freer’s suggestion that they

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37 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 10, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
40 Householder pamphlet on CMT with statements from Fraser and Holland, p. 3, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; Newspaper clipping, NZH, 28 July 1949, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. Holland said '...it does young men good to come together'.
should be engaged in work related to 'soil conservation, river control and afforestation'.

In terms of the health of the youth of New Zealand, Fraser believed that CMT offered the young men 'an opportunity for physical development which they might otherwise miss'. Holland quoted 'appalling' past figures, when '79% of those enlisted for the Air Force and 71% enlisted for the army were found to be suffering from some form of malnutrition or physical exhaustion'. He believed that CMT would lead to early diagnosis of such maladies. An editorial in *Freedom* claimed that CMT would make the young men of the Dominion 'huskier and healthier specimens'.

Amongst the material Holland had been provided on CMT was a note stating that the reason that Switzerland had avoided conflict in the two World Wars was that over 70 years of CMT had ensured its reputation as 'a tough nut to crack'. Included with the note was an article entitled 'Compulsory Military Training in Switzerland' which quoted the Consul for Switzerland, E. Theiler, as saying that CMT was one of the reasons why Switzerland had experienced little industrial unrest. Theiler went on to argue that the discipline learnt during military training was necessary for industrial harmony. In a similar comparison, the Honourable Mary Anderson, who was 'a descendent of that grand nation of Sweden', believed that 'the physical training that goes with military service has made Sweden a nation of wonderful people. They have fought no wars for many years'. These comparisons are interesting because both

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42 Newspaper clipping, *Dominion*, 2 July 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA; SC, 10 June 1949.
43 Householder pamphlet on CMT with statements from Fraser and Holland, p. 2, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. See also Thomas Brindle in NZPD, 1949, 285, p. 482.
44 Holland's CMT radio broadcast, 1 August 1949, p. 5, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
46 *Freedom*, 20 July 1949, p. 2; CMT Background Bulletin No. 1, p. 1, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash papers, NA. Fraser made a point of assuring parents that there would be no 'wet canteens' at camps.
47 Typed note, 15 July 1949, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. It is an argument comparable with Skinner's 'Joe Louis' analogy.
48 Ibid.; NZPD, 1949, 285, p. 160. Legislative Councillor, the Hon. Mary Dreaver, described Switzerland's system of training as 'wonderful'.
THE MOST VITAL ISSUE THAT EVER FACED NEW ZEALANDERS

Have no doubt about this. The future safety and security of our people, our country and the Commonwealth may well depend upon your vote in this referendum. Here are the facts. Weigh them carefully...

This is the situation

In a tense world United Nations has not yet been successful in finding a basis for lasting peace. We are not justified in taking risks. We must not be taken unawares. We must be prepared.

There are nations with military strength far in excess of their purely defensive needs. Forms of dictatorships threaten.

If the welfare, freedom and progress of the great mass of the people is to be preserved...preparedness for defence is essential.

The right to life, liberty and security means that we must be prepared to defend them.

Why a compulsory system?

Because the compulsory system is the only way in which we can effectively meet the needs.

Because the compulsory system is the fairest way.

Because the voluntary system has always failed.

Because sound training in modern defence gives protection to our men. Un-preparedness in the face of efficient aggressors causes needless sacrifice.

Twice we paid dearly for unpreparedness.

We must not take the risk of it happening to our sons.

Why this scheme is a vote for peace

To be prepared is to guard the peace. Obligations under the United Nations Charter demand readiness.

Enthusiasm discourages would-be aggressors — to vote for the scheme is to vote against war.

The compulsory military training scheme provides an effective means of training our young men. They will emerge from it as trained, fit men well able to look after themselves and their country.

This is how you must vote

Strike out the bottom line.

To vote FOR this scheme is to completely confound those whose propaganda aims to keep us weak and vulnerable.

Vote for

COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING

Strike out the bottom line

15.) This advertisement purports to give New Zealanders the facts about why they should vote for CMT, in contrast to 'those whose propaganda aims to keep us weak and vulnerable'.
Switzerland and Sweden were neutral countries and did not fit the pattern of New Zealand’s commitment to alliance thinking.

Opposed to CMT, John A. Lee stated that the real reason the Labour government wanted to introduce CMT was ‘because they believe conscription is good for citizenship’. It was an argument that received a receptive hearing in the post-war years and had special appeal to those in the National Party who desired to take a harder line with striking trade unionists upon ascending to power. Members of the older generation looked at the youth of the time and saw their lack of discipline as the cause of many problems. Holland, and many others, certainly believed that CMT ‘is a good thing for personal discipline’. Hurunui MP William Gillespie even told Parliament that if CMT ‘does nothing else than bring to some a sense of responsibility with a knowledge of discipline, it will have been worth while’.

Russell felt that an important benefit of CMT would be that ‘there will be a better discipline of the nation, which is necessary if we are to progress along democratic lines’. Holland agreed that CMT would teach recruits the value of cooperation and ‘... impress upon them the importance of discipline and that every right they enjoy has an accompanying obligation to their fellow men’. Legislative Councillor Rangi Mawhete hoped that the benefits of CMT camp would help the Maori people as a whole. ‘The Maori boys, and perhaps girls, would go into camp and be taught discipline, obedience, and respect for the law. Then, when they went back to their tribes, they would teach others what they had learned in camp’. The Member of

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51 MacDonald, Article ‘Compulsory Military Training in Switzerland’, 13 July 1949, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
52 Freedom, 15 June 1949, p. 1; Holland’s CMT radio broadcast, 1 August 1949, p. 5, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. Holland argued ‘There is a great need in the world for discipline today . . .’.
54 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 10, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
55 Holland’s CMT radio broadcast, 1 August 1949, p. 5, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
the Executive Council representing the Maori Race, Eruera Tirikatene, also felt that the ‘general discipline’ learned during CMT could be passed on to recruits’ families.\footnote{Ibid., p. 407.}

In a related argument, Major-General Stewart believed that CMT could be used to find the country’s ‘natural leaders’. Because such leaders would be spread throughout all sections of the community, and may not come forward under a voluntary system, ‘... they can only be found if the whole of the fine youth of this country passes through the selective processes of the Army’, by means of peacetime CMT.\footnote{Statement on peacetime CMT presented to the Minister of Defence, F. Jones, by Major-General K. L. Stewart, p. 3, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash paper, NA.} As Gordon Troup, the Liaison officer at Canterbury University College, put it ‘the privates’ knapsacks may secrete marshal’s batons’.\footnote{Gordon Troup in C. Brasch ed. ‘Conscription: a symposium’, Landfall, III, 3, September 1949, p. 289.}

In a recent MA thesis, Frazer Andrewes examined the CMT issue in reference to how a dominant and largely hegemonic notion of masculinity came to be expressed by pro-CMT forces.\footnote{F. Andrewes, ‘Marial Men’, p. 1. He contrasted this with the ‘plurality’ of those opposed to CMT, as is borne out by the more varied nature of their arguments. See also F. Andrewes, ‘Representations of Masculinity in Post-War New Zealand, 1945-1960’, MA thesis, University of Otago, 1995.} While identifying the consistency of this concept, he also noted that what constituted ‘masculine nature’ represented a contested site between those for and against CMT and that this contestation took place within an assumed paradigm of ‘manliness’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 15.} Those in favour of CMT were keen to portray camp as a male ‘rite de passage’ that would make men out of those who participated.\footnote{Ibid., p. 6.}

Separate from the advantages of discipline and physical fitness which CMT was supposed to bestow on young men, there was still much debate about its military appropriateness in the post-war world. With the advent of the nuclear age there was much discussion about how the nature of warfare had been transformed. For those in favour of CMT, this took the form of acknowledging that large units of men still had a place on the battlefield and that they would play a significant role in the next conflict.
"Well, if they bring it in, I wonder if they'll still have that 'Bludgers' Hill' Dad talks about."

16.) This cartoon suggests that CMT will teach discipline to the young men of New Zealand and transform the 'bludgers' among them.
The validity of assertions about the supposed supremacy of air-power were called into question by Fraser. He declared that he had received ‘authentic information’ while in Britain that disproved such claims. When Fraser asked if New Zealand would be better served building up its air-force or its navy, Field-marshal Sir William Slim replied that ‘... it would be wrong entirely to reduce the land forces. We do not see the next war being simply in the air or with atom bombs’.

There was still a need for a highly trained infantry force, argued Holland, despite the dawn of the atomic age, and he was convinced that a Division constituted the ideal sized military force for New Zealand’s purposes. This would enable the troops to retain a sense of ‘national identity’. The RSA’s Howard Kippenberger also believed that the ‘strong Division’ required by New Zealand’s defence forces could only be provided by CMT.

Major-General H. E. Barrowclough maintained that the New Zealand armed forces’ organisation and training needs had not yet been radically altered by the nature of modern warfare. He believed that peacetime CMT would enable New Zealand to fulfil its obligations to the UN, the Pacific area and on its own soil. Replying to the argument put forward by some in the 2nd NZEF, that conscription should only be

63 Labour MPs Frank Langstone and Warren Freer both opposed CMT because they considered that small and efficient air and sea forces had a far more significant role to play in modern warfare than large units of infantry. In ‘Why I Oppose Conscription’, Langstone agrees with Seversky’s view that modern air-power has made other types of weapons ‘largely irrelevant’, p. 9. At one point, Langstone talks of America’s atom bombs being ‘combated with deadly germs released from the air’, p. 26. NZPD, 1949, 285, p. 82. Langstone urged all members to read Major de Seversky’s book Victory Though Air Power. See also James Bertram in C. Brasch ed. ‘Conscription: a symposium’, Landfall, III, 3, September 1949, p. 280.

64 Newspaper clipping, Unknown, 26 July 1949, Folder 395, Archibald Charles Barrington, MS Papers 0439 [Hereafter cited as Barrington papers], ATL.

65 Holland’s notes on Major-General H. E. Barrowclough’s Defence Policy, p. 1, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; Transcript of Holland’s radio broadcast, 1 August 1949, p. 8, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.

66 Holland’s CMT radio broadcast, 1 August 1949, p. 8, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.

67 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 4; p.12, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA. It needed to be ‘quickly ready for overseas service’. 

68 Major-General H. E. Barrowclough’s notes on Defence Policy, p. 1, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.

69 Ibid., p. 3, Barrowclough, however, neglected to mention New Zealand’s Commonwealth commitment to the Middle East in his list of obligations.
employed in time of war and that it should encompass the entire resources of the Dominion, Barrowclough made an analogy with someone who receives ‘no instruction in swimming until one falls in deep water’. Kippenberger described as ‘disgraceful’ the 2nd NZEF’s assertion that CMT was not needed because soldiers from the Second World War would serve as the nucleus of New Zealand’s small, professional, volunteer defence force in the next war. The 2nd NZEF Association changed its stance on CMT in July 1949, after it had ‘received assurances that the scheme has the approval of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and it is an integral part of the Commonwealth defence plan’.

Upon his retirement as the Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Sir Norman Weir spoke in favour of CMT because, he argued, the volunteer soldier could no longer devote the necessary hours needed to master all the complexities of modern warfare. He reasoned that any CMT scheme would only have to be in effect for a shorter duration in New Zealand than was the case in other countries, ostensibly because he believed that our males were more adaptable and had a faster capacity to learn than other nationalities. This essentially represented a military manifestation of the old ‘Kiwi ingenuity’ myth.

Incorporated in the concept of modern warfare was a heightened understanding of the need for rapid mobilisation. Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery expressed a common sentiment when he stated that ‘Modern weapons and inventions mean that we

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70 Newspaper clipping, letter to the editor, Major-General H. E. Barrowclough’s reply to Nigel Wilson, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; W. R. McLennan, ‘The Last Years of the First Labour Government: 1945-1949’, p. 266; Standard, 15 April 1948, p. 5. Some in the 2nd NZEF considered CMT to be a ‘Rip Van Winkle’ defence policy in the atomic age.

71 Newspaper clipping, EP, 15 October 1948, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA. There were, however, divisions within the 2nd NZEF Association, with branches in Wanganui, Whangarei and Invercargill supporting the introduction of CMT. See also NZH, 28 July 1949.

72 C. V. I. Bollinger, ‘The Referendum Exposed’, p. 22, Hocken. Bollinger argues that this volte-face by the Association was the result of the direct political pressure Fraser bought to bear on it.

73 Newspaper clipping, EP, 1 April 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.

74 Statement on peacetime CMT presented to the Minister of Defence, F. Jones, by Major-General K. L. Stewart, p. 2, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash Papers, NA. No longer was it acceptable for a delay of around eighteen months until a New Zealand Division was considered ‘fit for active operations’. 
can no longer count on a breathing space at the beginning of another war to build up and train’. The JDAC argued that ‘To become efficient, the armed services require to be built up in peacetime’. Major-General Stewart stipulated that peacetime CMT was the only way to protect the Commonwealth effectively against aggression because in future wars ‘there will not be time to call-up, organise and train forces after hostilities commence’. Sir William Perry agreed that people must ‘pay the necessary insurance premiums’ in peacetime.

Fraser was dismissive of anti-CMT arguments. He felt that such opposition reflected the prejudices of an irrelevant ‘past age’ and lacked the data necessary to form intelligent opinions. Fraser preferred to accept the ‘well-considered’ evaluations of the British Labour government on the defence question over those who quoted expelled British Labour Party members, who were out of touch with the public majority. When Warren Freer, the Labour Member for Mt. Albert, publicly espoused his opposition to CMT, Fraser announced that Freer was not in a position to make a ‘conclusive, fully-informed opinion’. He openly belittled Freer, saying that he was ‘entitled to the respect due to any person who has not had the opportunity of considering the full facts in a realistic way’.

In response to anti-CMT groups like the 2nd NZEF Association, who quoted overseas experts to support their opposition to CMT, those in favour of CMT

75 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 4, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA; W. D. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, p. 195. In July 1947, Montgomery preached the need for peacetime CMT while visiting New Zealand.
76 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 6, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA. The article was entitled ‘Too late to prepare when war starts’.
77 Statement on peacetime CMT presented to the Minister of Defence, F. Jones, by Major-General K. L. Stewart, p. 2, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash papers, NA.
78 JDAC pamphlet, ‘To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training, April 1949, p. 8, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
79 Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 14 June 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
80 This seems to be a reference to people like K. Zilliacus, who was expelled from the British Labour Party and who had complained that the ‘blithering idiots on the National Executive have gone cuckoo about Communism’.
81 Press, 10 June 1949; SC, 10 June 1949.
82 SC, 10 June 1949.
attempted to discredit such ‘expert’ opinion, which they rationalised was never intended for application in a New Zealand context. Fraser told the annual conference of the 2nd NZEF Association that ‘The country was very well served by men like General Stewart and Brigadier Gentry’, men ‘who were not tied up in the knots of conservatism’. Pro-CMT exponents argued that ‘experts’ like Hanson Baldwin, Liddell Hart, C. E. M. Joad, Major-General William Fuller, Group Captain Bader and Major Alexander de Seversky did not hold positions of authority in the post-war military and that they wrote ‘. . . with assumptions doing the duty of facts and sensation as their objective rather than balanced criticism’. Selected extracts were presented in an attempt to prove that their opinion was not to be heeded because ‘Some of their prophesies have been proved utterly wrong in the past’.

Those experts quoted by opponents to CMT often had more to say about the nature of modern warfare than they did about conscription per se. While those in favour of CMT conceded that Bader was a ‘very gallant pilot’ and de Seversky was a ‘leading authority on aeronautical technique’, they did not see how this qualified them to discuss the relevance of CMT as a method of recruitment in New Zealand. For example, when Liddell Hart was quoted advocating the benefits of a standing army, Doidge countered that New Zealand had neither the manpower nor the money to achieve a permanent army. In his letter, Doidge quoted from Major Harry

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83 CMT Background Bulletin No. 1, p. 3, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, NA; Newspaper clipping, Unknown, 26 July 1949, Folder 395, Barrington papers, ATL. Fraser was unimpressed by those who quoted such experts, on the basis that ‘a Government could not go to newspaper writers for their advice’.

84 Newspaper clipping, Unknown, 26 July 1949, Folder 395, Barrington papers, ATL.


86 CMT Background Bulletin No. 1, p. 3, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash papers, NA. Why a one hundred percent success rate in estimating the future should be a prerequisite to accepting the utterances of these experts was not adequately explained.

87 CMT Background Bulletin No. 1, p. 3, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash papers, NA; NZPD, 1949, 285, pp. 400-403. These points were presented in parliament by the Hon. Clarence F. Skinner, who he’d the portfolios of the Minister of Lands and of Rehabilitation, among others.

88 Typed note, F. W. Doidge to S. Holland, p. 2, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
Capamagian, who declared that ‘Courage is no match for skill,’ after some of the men that he commanded on Crete during the last war ‘admitted to me that they had never fired a .303 rifle in their lives’.89

The Labour government made a concerted effort to reassure people that CMT did not incorporate any system of manpower direction outside of the military, as had been utilised during the war.90 Opponents, like Frank Langstone, made statements suggesting ‘That the carrying of the referendum would be followed by Compulsory National Service and manpower direction, and that such measures were in fact drafted [originally in bold]’.91 Fraser claimed this was ‘... a falsehood being spread by the Communists in their efforts to defeat the scheme’.92 Yet some National Party politicians suspected the government’s motives. R. M. Algie wrote a private letter to Holland expressing concern that CMT could be used as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for a ‘complete implementation of Socialist Policy’ by the Labour Government.93

The Labour government was also keen to emphasise that the CMT scheme would not have an ‘unduly serious’ impact on industry as a whole.94 While the Army actually preferred older recruits for training, eighteen year olds were recommended ‘in order to minimise inconvenience and loss to industry’.95 It was expected that the

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89 Ibid., p. 4.
90 Householder pamphlet on CMT with statements from Fraser and Holland, p. 2, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; Broadcast address on CMT by Peter Fraser, 3 July 1949, p. 5, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; Newspaper clipping, Auckland paper, 20 July 1949, Folder 395, Barrington papers, ATL; ST, 19 July 1949.
92 Householder pamphlet on CMT with statements from Fraser and Holland, p. 2, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; NZPD, 1949, 285, p. 575; ‘Compulsory Military Training Background Bulletin No. 5’, ‘No Manpower Legislation’, 27 July 1949, p. 1, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
93 Letter from R. M. Algie to S. Holland, 15 June 1949, p. 2, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
94 Confidential Draft on ‘National Service’, 28 June 1949, p. 5, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA; Major-General H. E. Barrowclough’s notes on Defence Policy, p. 2, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL; Newspaper clipping, EP, 2 April 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA. Kippenberger felt that a reduction of less than 3% in New Zealand’s labour force under CMT was quite acceptable.
95 Confidential Draft on ‘National Service’, 28 June 1949, p. 2, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA. The projected percentage of the labour force affected in terms of man weeks was calculated to be 0.44% during the first year, 0.55% for the 2nd year, 0.56% for the 3rd year and 0.63% for the 4th year.
MEMBER FOR ROSKILL

Frank Langstone, M.P.

Member of the Labour Party for over 30 years, Minister of Lands, Forestry, Cook Islands (in the First Labour Cabinet 1935; represented Waimarino for 18 years; represented Roskill since 1946; N.Z. Minister to Washington and later Canada.

17.) Frank Langstone was the most outspoken of the few Labour party MPs who came out publicly against CMT.
overall effect on industries by the end of the first four years would be 1.07% of the
labour force. By comparison, it was speciously rationalised that the 'Annual camps
of a fortnight's [sic] duration would account (on a basis of 15,000 men under training)
for 150,000 working days, i.e., less than double what is already lost in disputes . . . '97
Manufacturing groups, once they overcame their initial fears that CMT might
incorporate manpower direction schemes, endorsed an affirmative vote in the
referendum.98

It is useful to examine the operational advantages available to the pro-CMT
movement through their access to an established nation-wide institution like the
RSA.99 The opponents of CMT could not match the organisational advantages that
this network provided, especially considering that they did not have the support of
either of the two major political parties.100 For example, the Publicity Committee of
the JDAC sent out a series of recommendations that were to be submitted to all of the
associations of each constituent organisation directing 'That local associations and
Branches of all servicemen's organisations in each district combine and co-operate in
the prosecution of the affirmative for the Referendum'.101 Local Committees were
organised to assist the referendum campaign and the Association specifically sought
the co-operation of farmers, churches and women's groups.102 For example, the local
branches of the RSA attempted to mobilise the support of local women's organisations

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96 Ibid., p. 5. This was 'the equivalent of the permanent withdrawal of 5,700 men from industries'.
97 JDAC pamphlet, 'To Preserve Our Security: The Case For Compulsory Military Training,
April 1949, p. 15, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
clinking, EP, 11 October 1948, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA; Newspaper clipping, Dominion,
12 July 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
99 Newspaper clipping, EP, 15 October 1948, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA. The President of New
Zealand's RSA, Sir Howard Kippenberger, stated that '90 per cent' of the RSA's membership
were in favour of CMT.
100 K. P. Clements, 'The Influence of Individuals and Non-Governmental Organisations on
New Zealand Foreign Policy Making, 1943-1993' in A. Trotter, Fifty Years of New
Zealand Foreign Policy Making, p. 118. All RSA members were expected to vote in favour
of CMT in the referendum. See also R. J. Cullen, 'The Cold War in New Zealand 1949-
1951', p. 21; Articles in the RSA Review declared that CMT was essential to maintain the
Country's defences.
101 JDAC Publicity Committee recommendations on the CMT Referendum, 30 June 1949, p. 1,
Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
behind CMT. They were to ‘Convince them that a vote for the proposal is the only fair way for their menfolk - husbands, sweethearts or sons - that the object is to train young men so that they are fit for their duty when 21, just as children are educated to take their place in the community’. The JDAC also published advertisements that targeted women voters. In a radio broadcast, Holland made an appeal to the women of New Zealand. He acknowledged that everyone was opposed to war but he argued that ‘No mother would like to think she has a son who would not defend her, should she be attacked’. It was an argument drawing on the prevalent imagery of defending one’s women folk from an invading army.

Organisational duties included making sure that everyone was on the election roll and providing a fleet of cars to take people from the various branches to the polling booth to ensure that they actually voted on the day. In Dunedin, for example, transport to the polling booths on 3 August was organised in association with the Dunedin branches of the National and Labour parties. All RSA members were expected to vote in favour of CMT. Posters were provided to the various branches, while the government sponsored ‘an intensive advertising campaign’ advocating an affirmative vote. The RSA also helped organise the meetings at which Fraser and Holland spoke during the CMT campaign, sometimes having RSA members parade outside beforehand. When Holland spoke to around 350 people at a pro-CMT meeting in Masterton, about half the audience consisted of members of the RSA, who also paraded. The ex-servicemen’s parade before a meeting of 600 people in Hastings on 25

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103 JDAC Publicity Committee recommendations on the CMT Referendum, 30 June 1949, p. 1, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
104 Ibid.
106 Holland’s CMT radio broadcast, 1 August 1949, p. 3, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
108 JDAC Publicity Committee recommendations on the CMT Referendum, 30 June 1949, p. 2, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
109 Ibid., p. 3.
Women have **EVERY** reason to vote for **COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING**

*Ex-Servicemen Make This Earnest Appeal.*

RETURNED men from two wars gratefully remember the wonderful support they received from the women of New Zealand. Now they ask it again—to *prevent* war. Safety lies in a strong nation. Preparedness can ensure security.

If war should come, we, who know so well what it means, are appalled at the possibility of an untrained and ill-equipped Army taking the field... for this would again lead to the unnecessary sacrifice of young lives.

*Therefore we urge you to VOTE FOR COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING!*

Mark your Voting Paper—

1. vote for Compulsory Military Training
2. vote against Compulsory Military Training

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18. a) This is an example of the JDAC making a direct appeal to the women of New Zealand to vote in favour of CMT.
Your son's future is at stake... and so is yours

A FINAL APPEAL TO THE WOMEN OF NEW ZEALAND

by Ex-Servicemen's Associations and N.Z. Defence League

Give your son a chance to defend himself and his country if attacked.

He cannot do this without needless risk unless he is trained. Ex-Servicemen who defended you and whom you trust, strongly advise you to see that he is trained.

Returned men know from bitter experience that lack of training means useless sacrifice in war. They know that Compulsory Military Training is the only practical solution.

Be guided by them, not by the inexperienced and those who for their own purposes, would have this country weak.

Mark your Voting Paper —

I vote for Compulsory Military Training

I vote against Compulsory Military Training

Issued by
THE JOINT DEFENCE ACTION COMMITTEE Ex-Servicemen's Associations and NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE LEAGUE

18.) b) This is another JDAC advertisement targeting women, this time emphasising motherhood.
18.) c) These are some of the diverse RSA and JDAC advertisements related to the CMT referendum which appeared in the ODT of 2 August 1949.
July must have presented a somewhat intimidating sight for any CMT opponents in attendance.\textsuperscript{110}

Finally, there was the role of the media in the referendum. JDAC Chairman Glasgow supplied a brochure to the editors of 'All New Zealand Daily Newspapers and all Weekly Publications' thanking them for the '... help we have received from you in the past'.\textsuperscript{111} Such material was designed to 'educate the hitherto uninstructed public' on why they should vote for CMT in the coming referendum.\textsuperscript{112} The Melbourne Herald noted that the New Zealand press 'normally supports the National Party', and as National and the Labour Party were in consensus over the introduction of CMT, this left little room for the organised expression of anti-CMT sentiment in the national papers.\textsuperscript{113} As Richard Kay has pointed out in his study of newspaper reporting of the early Cold War, New Zealand editors were heavily reliant on information from Western European sources for their news coverage and they were largely reflecting the bias already present in such material.\textsuperscript{114} It is also a mistake to ignore how the reality of events in the rest of the world transpired to reinforce these ideas. The politicians and the newspapers may have served as 'missionaries' of the Cold War gospel, but their evangelical crusade was assisted by the communist takeover in Eastern Europe, the Berlin Blockade and other acts of the 'devil'.\textsuperscript{115} Kay also argued that 'Newspapers had an inherent structural bias in the political economy of capitalism' and that 'their sole objective in life was to make a profit'.\textsuperscript{116} This was true to the extent that it would have been financially imprudent for

\textsuperscript{110} *Dominion*, 26 July 1949.
\textsuperscript{111} Letter from JDAC Chairman, K. W. R. Glasgow, 24 June 1949, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
\textsuperscript{112} Letter from K. W. R. Glasgow to editors of the morning papers, 13 July 1949, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
\textsuperscript{113} Newspaper clipping, *Melbourne Herald*, 31 May 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA; H. 'Jock' Barnes & John A. Lee, 'Resist Peace Time Conscription', p. 2, Hocken. Barnes bemoaned the fact that 'no daily newspaper sponsors the cause against conscription', the main dissenters being small publications like *The Peoples' Voice* and *J. A. Lee's Fortnightly*.
\textsuperscript{114} R. G. H. Kay, 'Take That, You Dirty Comrnie!', p. 18; pp. 27-8; p. 115. The New Zealand media lacked the capacity to investigate or substantiate the claims levelled at the Soviet Union, even if they had possessed the inclination to do so in order 'to perform their critical duty'.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., pp. 113-4.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
newspapers to refuse to run the government's pro-CMT adverts. The real burden of impropriety would seem to rest instead with the Labour government's use of public funds to push for an affirmative result in the referendum, and not with the dailies for carrying such advertisements. This is not to say that the government had it all their own way. In what amounted to blackmail, the Newspaper Proprietors Association (NPA) argued that unless more newsprint was made available, the government would be taking up advertising space which had already been allocated and 'this would cause a great deal of dislocation which may even be reflected in the advertising space available for the Election period'.

In presenting the case for peacetime CMT, its proponents argued that modern technology, atomic weapons and strategic air power had not made conventional forces redundant, despite what various 'experts' quoted by their opponents claimed. The system of voluntary recruitment had not proven successful during past conflicts and it was rationalised that it would once again prove inadequate to satisfy New Zealand's defence requirements. CMT was also portrayed as more democratic than voluntary recruitment and a fairer way of ensuring that all of the eligible young men did their patriotic duty. At the same time, great care had to be taken by the Labour government to distance peacetime CMT from the schemes of manpower direction that had been enacted during the last war and would no longer be tolerated by the public.

CMT camp was presented as a panacea to the ills of New Zealand society. It would supposedly improve the health of the nation's youth, uncover the leaders of tomorrow, enhance feelings of citizenship and, most importantly, instil much needed discipline in young men. In this sense, CMT was not just a security issue and the justification for its instigation did not always directly relate to the Cold War, for it was assumed that CMT would have an equally beneficial impact on the national community.

117 Memorandum for P. Fraser on 'Publicity Campaign For Compulsory Military Service', 2 June 1949, p. 1, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA. The NPA told the Government that it would have to approve its application for its newsprint import license to be increased by 3,000 tons in 1950, in order for the press to carry out the referendum publicity campaign.
The arguments presented in favour of CMT exhibited a considerable degree of internal consistency and consensus between the two major parties, who shared the same assumptions about New Zealand’s defence needs. The main divergence was over whether the CMT issue was an appropriate one to be put to a referendum, but even this was blunted by National’s commitment to support the government over this important foreign policy issue. It has been observed that military leaders often fall victim to the trap of preparing for the last war they fought and a similar statement could be made about those who presented arguments endorsing peacetime CMT. While it appeared clear that the Cold War world would be dramatically different from what had gone before, pro-CMT advocates tended to argue their case on the basis of past experience, especially during the Second World War, and the assumption that these experiences were still relevant in the post-war environment. The result of the referendum on 3 August 1949 suggests that a majority of the New Zealand public, or at least of those who felt motivated enough to vote on the issue, accepted these arguments and believed that the introduction of peacetime CMT was now justified.
CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusion

The referendum on the conscription of young manpower has produced the rare political phenomenon of international affairs becoming a public concern.1

What matters in this is less the actual results of elections and the adoption of one policy or another than the attitude of the mind that leads to them.2

The introduction of peacetime CMT in New Zealand cannot be understood outside the context of the Cold War in 1949 and its impact on the threat perceptions of those in power, especially Prime Minister Peter Fraser. The CMT debate was primarily conducted using the rhetoric of the Cold War but this represented more than just calculated political manoeuvring, for these ideas appear to have been largely accepted and internalised by the participants.3

The referendum may have represented a political compromise on Fraser’s part and he appeared to alter his public pronouncements to suggest that war was now less imminent than before.4 Yet, the political risk associated with CMT suggested that Fraser’s conviction that he was doing the right thing by his country was not weakened by him having to resort to a referendum, and his resolve to see the measure passed never waiver in the face of the opposition he encountered. If one does not accept the level of Fraser’s commitment to Commonwealth security and his fear of communism then it is hard to justify his desire to introduce CMT without delay only months before the November 1949 general election. This becomes even harder to understand when one also considers that the 1946 election had left the Labour government with only a

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4 R. W. McLennan, ‘The Last Years of the First Labour Government 1945-1949’, p. 257. McLennan saw the CMT referendum as ‘...the New Zealand electorate...being asked to solve a party difference, to adjudicate in a party quarrel’ (Perhaps it would be more correct to describe it as a Labour Movement quarrel); NZPD, 1949, 285, p. 39.
slim four seat majority and that the National Party also openly supported the introduction of peacetime CMT.

The perception of a monolithic communist threat to world security was more important than any, more divergent, reality. A conspicuous factor during the CMT campaign was the sensitivity of New Zealand’s political leadership to the communist ‘bogey’. In a New Zealand ‘... peppered with great expectations’, the National Party offered to ‘make the pound go further’, while Labour had little to offer but more of the same.⁵ Some argue that Labour had become a victim of their own success, increasingly making them appear as reactionary defenders of the status quo.⁶ But one must acknowledge that Fraser’s advocacy of peacetime CMT was not an endorsement of the status quo; it was a politically risky move which went against Labour’s political traditions. The CMT referendum was part of a set of interrelated events from which the Labour government could not be isolated and which were largely beyond their control.⁷

It is fatuous to try to explain the introduction of CMT in New Zealand in terms of Peter Fraser’s alleged senility. For example, R. W. McLennan made the remarkable claim that ‘... Fraser was suffering from a psychological deterioration, a decline in his mental powers, which led him to think in terms of the traditional New Zealand concept of training a large expeditionary force which could be shipped to the war zone’.⁸ In fact, Fraser was convinced of the need for New Zealand’s Middle East Commonwealth commitment by the British Chiefs of Staff and it seems highly unlikely that they were


⁶ R. W. McLennan, “The Last Years of the First Labour Government 1945-1949”, p. xiii; R. Chapman, ‘New Zealand Since the War 8: Politics and Society’, Landfall, XVI, 3, September 1962, p. 258; p. 263. The Labour Party was reduced to being ‘the alternative conservative party with the reputation for radicalism’, and became stigmatised with being ‘well and truly identified with scarcities’.


also suffering from some form of 'psychological deterioration' - unless one is willing to attribute paranoia and hysteria as defining characteristics of the Cold War mind-set.\footnote{9}

James Roy, the MP for Clutha, suggested that the Soviet Union's paranoia was entirely the product of the psychological make-up of Russians. 'Russia', he declared, 'is so completely obsessed, as the Prime Minister stated, with the idea that the whole world is against her'.\footnote{10} Such attitudes, however irrational they seem from a contemporary perspective, were a product of the ideologically charged atmosphere of the time and Fraser was certainly not alone in his outlook. What many today see as a paranoid over-reaction to the communist threat represented by the Soviet Union was, at the time, viewed as a deliberate and rational response by Western leaders to what was considered a very real threat. Richard Kay argued that the press played an important role in presenting the Soviet Union as 'un trustworthy' and intransigent, but the analysis of Soviet documents by the leading American diplomatic historian, John L. Gaddis, suggested that the West's mistrust of Stalin was more than just a creation of the media and was in many ways justified.\footnote{11} When examining the past, one must look into the 'mirror' of history to see how things appeared at the time, without the distortions created by the benefits of hindsight.\footnote{12}

Fraser strongly resented the dissent he encountered during the CMT campaign, treating these opponents with disdain, probably because he was clear in his own mind that the referendum must return a positive result. Indeed, it seemed as if Fraser had 'made the conscription issue his personal responsibility'.\footnote{13} A. R. D. Fairburn,
however, overstated the case when he talks of Fraser’s calculating manipulation of the referendum process in order to see CMT implemented. He believed that Fraser’s . . . stuttering with rage, his foaming at the month when speaking of the Communists, were exactly calculated to gain the support of that large section of the public which knows nothing about politics but is always ready to be scared out of its wits by any well-furbished bogey-man. Because of the perceived ‘authoritarian’ nature of the government’s pro-CMT campaign, the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand’s magazine, The Outlook, stated that the CMT referendum was the first of its kind in New Zealand and disapprovingly hoped that ‘All who value democracy will strive to make it the last’. The opponents of CMT believed that the problem was that the people could not have been expected to make a useful judgement on conscription because ‘. . . conscription is only one aspect of defence, and defence policy nowadays is so complex and has so many ramifications that the average citizen is not qualified to grasp it in sufficient detail’. In Landfall, Janet S. Bogle declared that the decision on CMT should have been ‘. . . made by the Government, not by the uninformed and largely irresponsible mass of the people’. Writing on referendums as a political phenomena, F. M. Brookfield seems to reinforce these ideas:

The evidence . . . indicates that the outcome of referendums is liable to be influenced by popular indignation and prejudice, which

'heavy-handed', 'dictatorial' and autocratic; Newspaper clipping, letter to the editor by 'Democritus', Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL. Democritus complained of Fraser’s 'intolerant jingoism' and questioned how he could seriously suggest that members of the Labour Party and the 2nd NZEF were traitors or communists on the grounds that they did not support the introduction of CMT.

is readily able to be fanned by advertising and other publicity emanating from monied interests, leading to simplistic and ill-informed judgements on issues which are in fact of real complexity.\textsuperscript{19}

Reporting on the referendum campaign, \textit{Landfall} recalled that ‘There was a fog of catch cries and platitudes about danger, democracy, freedom and communism, and an alarming absence of soberness and reason’.\textsuperscript{20}

E. A. Olssen questioned why the government would introduce CMT when this ‘must cause it to lose votes at the forthcoming election, and which involved the risk of a party split’.\textsuperscript{21} Critical of many of the aspects of referendum campaign,\textsuperscript{22} Charles Brasch wrote to Dr. J. A. W. Bennett saying that ‘Fraser apparently hoped to save his party in the country thus, but I doubt whether it has done so, and the split within the Labour Party may go deep’.\textsuperscript{23} A. R. D. Fairburn also saw Labour’s emphatic condemnation of communism during the referendum campaign as an attempt ‘… to take the wind out of the sails of the National Party’,\textsuperscript{24} and McLennan believed that the CMT issue had successfully ‘removed the thunder from the more militaristically-inclined and tub-thumping right wing opposition’.\textsuperscript{25} Whatever scraps of political capital could be gleaned from the introduction of CMT, once he had acquiesced to hold the referendum, Fraser knew that the costs of failure would be far more catastrophic. Mark Gobbi presents the situation faced by the Labour government in a generic way. ‘Logically, an unpopular government with a vested-interest in a particular policy will avoid subjecting the policy to a referendum. If it must, the government would be expected to do its utmost to ensure that the result is interpreted

\begin{footnotesize}


\textsuperscript{24} A. R. D. Fairburn, Mr Fraser’s Way of Doing Things’, \textit{Here and Now}, No. 1, October 1949, p. 10.

\end{footnotesize}
favourably’. As it turned out, victory in the CMT referendum apparently did little to bolster Labour’s chances in the 1949 general election, but it probably would have been much more damaging to Fraser’s political credibility if he had lost his own referendum.

The Referendum took place on 3 August 1949 and the CMT proposal was accepted by the New Zealand public. The result had some 49.1% in favour of CMT, 13.9% against, with a substantial non-vote of 37.0%. The official count was 568,427 votes for CMT and 160,998 against, resulting in an affirmative majority of 407,429, although the New Zealand Gazette does not include the total on the electoral roll for the referendum. Some of the strongest opposition came from the four Maori electorates and other Labour strongholds, yet a majority in favour of CMT was returned in all 80 seats. The majority for CMT in rural areas averaged six votes to one, while in urban areas the majority was still an emphatic three to one.

Political scientist Robert Chapman has suggested that these results ‘suggested that apathy and disbelief were the Prime Minister’s most widespread opponents’. Historian R. J. Cullen also believed that these figures conceal the high degree of non-voting because, taking the 1949 electoral roll as a base, only 64.78% of those eligible...

26 M. W. Gobbi ‘We, the Sovereign: Clarifying the Call for Direct Democracy in New Zealand’, in A. Simpson ed. Referendums: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, p. 160.
27 In the general election of 30 November 1949 the National Party won 46 seats, while the Labour Party won only 34 seats.
28 R. Chapman, ‘From Labour to National’ in W. H. Oliver ed., The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd ed, p. 372; W. D. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, pp. 204-5. McIntyre has the same voting figures but records that 51% of the electorate voted in favour of CMT, with 14% voting against it.
29 R. J. Cullen, ‘The Cold War in New Zealand 1949-1951’, p. 30; See New Zealand Gazette [Hereafter cited as NZG], 25 August 1949, Vol. 2, p. 1784, for complete referendum results by electorate; Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives [Hereafter cited as AJHR], 1950, H-22, p. 32. For the CMT referendum, general and supplementary rolls for the 1946 General Election were used together with a supplementary roll prepared for the Gaming Poll in 1948 and a further supplementary roll of recent registrations; Letter from Fred White to S. Holland, arrived 19 August 1949, contained newspaper clipping from The Times, 4 August 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
30 W. D. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, p. 205.
31 Letter from Fred White to S. Holland, arrived 19 August 1949, contained newspaper clipping from The Times, 4 August 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
Tremendous Majority In Favour Of Compulsory Military Training Plan

Aggregate Vote More Than 3 To 1 In Support

The proposal for compulsory military training was carried by an overwhelming majority in the national referendum yesterday. The voting was 3.5 to one in favour of the proposal. The final Dominion figures last night, were:

For compulsory military training .......... 533,016
Against compulsory military training ...... 152,443

Majority for the proposal ............... 380,573

Just over 60 per cent. of the electorate went to the poll. The number of electors voting in the liquor and gaming referendum on March 9 last was 54 per cent.

Majorities in favour of the proposal were recorded in all electorates. Extremes in voting were Piako and Waikato (nearly 10 to one), Sydenham and Petone (about two to one).

Voting was most heavily in favour of the proposal in the rural areas, where the vote averaged about six to one in favour. Voting in the city electorates averaged about three to one in favour.

Strong National Party seats contained a larger vote in favour and some of the Labour Party strongholds the heaviest vote against.

Opposition to the proposal was stronger among the Maoris, whose total vote in the four Maori electorates was 11,872 in favour and 6688 against.

In the Western Maori electorate the voting was 2941 in favour and 2240 against—a majority of only 701.

19.) An article that appeared in the Dominion of 4 August 1949. It records some interesting facts, such as the greater degree of support for CMT in rural areas and the more substantial opposition to the proposal amongst the four Maori electorates.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Electorate</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Maj. For</th>
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Totals           | 533,016 | 132,443 | 380,573 | —                                   |

No Maori roll has been compiled in the past for general elections.
to do so voted in the referendum. At the time, Conrad Bollinger argued that the 40% or so non-votes (about 500,000) would have been votes against CMT and that this would have given the anti-conscriptionist vote a majority of 100,000, representing ‘a magnificent vote for peace’. Bollinger, in this instance, is perpetuating the myth of the non-voter, saying that an ‘abnormally large number of people’ did not vote. This is because he has made the mistake of comparing the turnout in the November 1949 general election with that during the CMT referendum, when general elections have historically yielded larger voter turnout than referendums. Malcolm McKinnon believes that the large number of people who abstained from voting in the referendum were probably disillusioned Labour voters who could not bring themselves to oppose a Labour Party sponsored measure but nor could they be persuaded to vote for CMT. Such assertions, however, are very difficult to either prove or disprove. Low voter turnout was a common feature of all of the referendums held in 1949 and not just the CMT referendum. The total voting percentage in the CMT referendum, which was comparable with the 1949 referendums concerning off-track betting and six o’clock drinking, was merely indicative of the turnout to be expected during a referendum.

33 R. J. Cullen, ‘The Cold War in New Zealand 1949-1951’, pp. 30-1. Calculations made by comparing the results in the NZG, 1949, Vol. 2, 25 August, p. 1784 with the electoral roll for the 1949 general election. AJHR, 1950, H-33. Cullen went further and claimed that the referendum result for the Otago-Southland region reflected the national trend, with 66.8% of those on the region’s electoral rolls for the 1949 general election having voted in the referendum. In this region, about 75.42% of those who voted supported CMT, which was comparable to the national average of 77.93%.


36 M. McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World since 1935, p. 77. Also see K. Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, p. 286; D. N. Verran, ‘1949 Conscription Referendum: Causes, Campaign and Effects’, p. 52; S. E. Fraser, ‘The 1949 General Election’, p. 154. Sinclair and others believed that the CMT issue had caused much damage to the Labour Party’s branch organisations because many Labour traditionalists saw it as a betrayal of cherished ideals.

37 R. J. Cullen, ‘The Cold War in New Zealand 1949-1951’, p. 31. Cullen also felt that the Labour Party leadership had moved too far to the right and, in the referendum, the confusion this created manifested itself in the large non-vote, a proportion that would have previously supported a Labour Party instigated proposal.

38 D. Butler & A. Ranney eds., Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory, footnote 2, pp. 4-5. They suggest the use of the plural form ‘referendums’ which has the more precise meaning of ‘ballots on one issue’, while ‘referenda’, ‘necessarily connotes a plurality of issues’. 
Comparison Of Voting In Metropolitan, Provincial And Rural Electorates

Maori Districts Show Smallest Percentage In List Of Majorities

An interesting analysis is made possible by grouping electorates of similar character, providing total figures within groups for comparison with other groups. In the figures shown below it will be seen how the metropolitan centres voted; also the provincial centres, the substantially rural areas, and the Maori electorates.

The figures are:

Wellington Urban Area
(Comprising the electorates (9) of Brooklyn, Hutt, Island Bay, Miramar, Karori, Onslow, Petone, Wellington Central, Mount Victoria.)

FOR COMPULSORY TRAINING
AGAIST
MAJORITY FOR PROPOSAL

Auckland Urban Area
(Comprising the electorates (14) of Arch Hill, Auckland Central, Eden, Grey Lynn, Mount Albert, North Shore, Onehunga, Onewa, Parnell, Penrose, Remuera, Rosedale, Tauranga, Waitakere.)

FOR COMPULSORY TRAINING
AGAIST
MAJORITY FOR PROPOSAL

Christchurch Urban Area
(Comprising the electorates (7) of Avon, Christchurch Central, Fendalton, Lyttelton, Riccarton, St. Albans, Sydenham.)

FOR COMPULSORY TRAINING
AGAIST
MAJORITY FOR PROPOSAL

Dunedin Urban Area
(Comprising the electorates (4) of Dunedin Central, Mornington, North Dunedin, St. Kilda.)

FOR COMPULSORY TRAINING
AGAIST
MAJORITY FOR PROPOSAL

Larger Provincial Centres
(Comprising the electorates (12) of Ashburton, Glenduan, Hamilton, Hastings, Invercargill, Napier, Nelson, New Plymouth, Oamaru, Palmerston North, Timaru, Wanganui.)

FOR COMPULSORY TRAINING
AGAIST
MAJORITY FOR PROPOSAL

Maori Electorates
(Consisting of votes cast in the Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western Maori electorates.)

FOR COMPULSORY TRAINING
AGAIST
MAJORITY FOR PROPOSAL

Rural And Semi-Rural Electorates
(Embracing the remainder of the electorates (80) which are chiefly composed of rural areas and the smaller towns.)

FOR COMPULSORY TRAINING
AGAIST
MAJORITY FOR PROPOSAL

Voting Percentages

An understanding of the attitude of voters for and against compulsion military training in the respective groupings is more readily obtained by reducing the figures in the foregoing tables to percentages of the valid votes cast—:

Wellington Urban Area: 74 per cent. voted in favour of compulsory military training; 26 per cent. against.

Auckland Urban Area: 74 per cent. for; 26 per cent. against.

Christchurch Urban Area: 72 per cent. for; 28 per cent. against.

Dunedin Urban Area: 72 per cent. for; 28 per cent. against.

Larger Provincial Centres: 78 per cent. for; 22 per cent. against.

Maori Electorates: 64 per cent. for; 36 per cent. against.

Rural Areas and Smaller Towns: 82 per cent. for; 18 per cent. against.

Voting Percentages:

Final figures may be affected to a very small extent by the addition of postal and absentee votes.

20.) This Dominion article compares voting figures, again drawing attention to the comparatively small majority for CMT in the Maori electorates.
Therefore, such ambivalence may not be issue-related but demonstrative of an apathetic attitude towards referendums in general.\footnote{Ibid., p. 236. Butler & Ranney list the following figures for New Zealand’s 1949 referendums:}

\begin{tabular}{c|c|c|c|c}
  & Total % turnout & Yes vote % \\
  \hline
  9 March 1949 Off-course betting & 56.3\% & 68.0\% \\
  9 March 1949 Maintain 6 p.m. drink curfew & 56.3\% & 75.5\% \\
  3 August 1949 CMT & 61.5\% & 77.9\% \\
\end{tabular}

The first citizen-initiated referendum in New Zealand, held on 2 December 1995 on the issue of reducing the number of firefighters, is a prime example of how apathy and an inability to educate the public can result in an embarrassingly low voter turnout of under 30\%.\footnote{ODT, 4 December 1995, p. 1. Only about 27.7\% of those eligible to vote did so. This situation is more likely when a referendum is not held at the same time as a general election. When a referendum and an election coincide, it results in a higher voter turnout because people are more motivated to go to the polls. See C. A. Hughes, ‘Australia and New Zealand’ in D. Butler & A. Ranney eds., \textit{Referendums Around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy}, AEI Press, Washington, D.C., 1994, pp. 157. Note that two separate issues were voted for on 9 March 1949 and having made the effort to go to the voting booth to vote, one would expect the voting turnout figures to be almost identical. This makes it difficult to form an accurate hypothesis on voting in New Zealand referendums in 1949. This is further complicated by the huge gaps between the holding of referendums. From 1908 to 1919 four national referendums were held with an average total turnout of around 80\% and from then no further referendums were held until the three in 1949. The next national referendums did not take place until 23 September 1967 when two issues were voted on at the same time and returned exactly the same turnout percentage of 71.2\%. The long breaks between referendums renders comparative analysis of total turnout during referendums largely problematical.}

Bollinger used faulty analysis to claim that ‘Almost as many as voted for the proposal were so little affected by the high-powered scaremongering that they could not be enticed to the polls’.\footnote{C. V. I. Bollinger, ‘The Referendum Exposed’, p. 24.} Alternatively, one could presumably argue that those who did not vote were not sufficiently motivated to vote in the CMT referendum because they believed that, with both the Labour government and the Opposition supporting CMT, an affirmative result was ‘a foregone conclusion’.\footnote{Letter from Fred White to S. Holland, arrived 19 August 1949, contained newspaper clipping from \textit{The Times}, 4 August 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.} Lieutenant Colonel-Thomas W. McDonald provided yet another explanation for the large non-vote, maintaining that, because of the way the CMT referendum voting form was...
worded, the voting public was confused as to 'whether the question was to be decided, was the creation of C.M.T., or the continuance of C.M.T. already in existence'. Therefore, when historians like Cullen assert that the large numbers of non-voters represented an important minority that did not accept the Soviet menace, this is something that is very difficult either to prove or disprove.

In his post-referendum speech, Fraser said that the public’s endorsement of CMT would ‘hearten Britain’ and ‘encourage’ democratic countries to make a greater commitment to resist aggression. With the victory, Fraser informed British Prime Minister Clement Attlee that he was now able to fulfil New Zealand’s Commonwealth commitment to the Middle East, provided that no ‘major change affecting New Zealand in the strategic situation now forecast’, occurred. The ‘loss’ of China on 1 October 1949 was interpreted in New Zealand as a victory for the Soviets and the strengthening of the communist monolith in the region. It bought the Cold War even closer to home. New Zealand’s imperial bonds remained strong and when the result of the referendum was made known at the Kindergarten Ball the ‘... crowded throng magnificently sang land of hope and glory demonstrating inspiring loyalty to empire’. A cherished doctrine had been sacrificed in the face of the realities of a dangerous global environment and New Zealand had thereby made a greater effort to share in the ‘world responsibilities of the British Commonwealth’. The Melbourne Herald also spoke approvingly of the referendum victory, saying that 'The New Zealand

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44 Letter from Fred White to S. Holland, arrived 19 August 1949, contained newspaper clipping from The Times, 4 August 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
46 T. R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, p. 151; EP, 24 May 1949, p. 10; The defeat of the Chinese Nationalists was not a complete surprise, Fraser was conscious of '... the huge forces under Russian direction in China', and a communist victory had been described as 'inevitable' as early as May 1949. See also ODT, 8 January 1949, p. 7.
47 New Zealand Post Office Telegram from Paul Griffiths to S. Holland, 4 August 1949, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
48 Letter from Fred White to S. Holland, arrived 19 August 1949, contained newspaper clipping from The Times, 4 August 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
21.) The introduction of CMT enabled New Zealand to demonstrate its commitment to the ideals of Imperial Defence and was perceived to set an embarrassing example to Australia, who had failed in its own efforts to introduce conscription.
spokesmen have behind them a Government which has faced the facts . . . and obtained a mandate from its people for the introduction of compulsory military training'.

Victory in the CMT referendum came at the price of increased tension within the Labour movement. These tensions had already been compounded by prevailing domestic pressures and had now become expressions of the onset of a dominant Cold War mentality in New Zealand. Fraser found the CMT issue all the more difficult because he had to oppose publicly many of Labour’s traditional supporters and this ‘. . . created all the mental discomfort that such appeals usually cause’. Labour MP Frank Langstone resigned from the Labour Party over the introduction of CMT yet the National Executive felt that the damage caused had been minimal, with ‘less than a dozen members’ resigning as a result of the CMT referendum. Furthermore, it was resolved ‘that any person who resigns from the Party be not permitted to rejoin without the prior endorsement of the National Executive’.

With the public endorsement of CMT, Holland could not resist pointing out that ‘practically all the opposition came from those who were normally the Government’s staunchest supporters, while its political opponents gave wholehearted support’. Holland argued that ‘The result confirms what the Opposition has said all along - that there was no justification at all for the referendum’. He declared that ‘. . . the Government should have passed the necessary legislation and saved tens of thousands of pounds of the taxpayers’ hard-earned money and also it would have avoided the bitter recriminations that have been engendered. The electoral account

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49 Extract from ‘Weekly Newsletter’ for week ending 29 August 1949, quote from the Melbourne Herald, p. 1, EA 1, 156/1/1, Part 3, NA. See also Statutes of New Zealand, Third session of the Twenty-Eight Parliament of New Zealand, 28 June 1949 to 26 October 1949, Wellington, 1950, Military Training Act 1949, No. 23, pp. 382-422.


51 Letter from Fred White to S. Holland, arrived 19 August 1949, contained newspaper clipping from The Times, 4 August 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.


53 Ibid.

54 Letter from Fred White to S. Holland, arrived 19 August 1949, contained newspaper clipping from The Times, 4 August 1949, Folder 1, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.

55 Typed draft of S. Holland’s speech, 3 August 1949, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.

56 Ibid.
estimated that for the year ended 31 March 1950, a total of £121,736 was spent by the government on ‘Special Polls’, which included the CMT referendum. Thomas McDonald estimated that £32,282 of state funds had been spent by the government during the referendum campaign to return an affirmative result.

Thomas W. McDonald stated that the Labour government’s defeat in the November 1949 general election was ‘the direct result’ of its introduction of CMT. John A. Lee believed that, as a result of the CMT campaign, Labour had ‘estranged enough supporters to lose the [1949] election’. Roy McLennan argued that the government’s efforts to introduce CMT represented ‘... the virtual abdication of Labour’s right to govern’. Robert Chapman assessed the Labour Party’s political position differently, saying that ‘Probably it was bound to sink below its unencumbered rival. The additional weight of the 1949 setback can hardly have helped’. What is even more interesting is that Chapman does not mention the CMT referendum at all in his article and the ‘setback’ he refers to is the 1949 carpenters’ dispute. Of course, one can only speculate on the impact that the CMT debate had on the general election result.

The 1949 CMT referendum was an historically significant event because it provided a rare occasion when the New Zealand public was given a say in the country’s defence policy. It represented an intersection between New Zealand’s foreign affairs, where political consensus reigned, and the cut-and-thrust of domestic Party politics, driven as it was by a need for votes. The CMT issue revealed the high

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57 R. J. Cullen, ‘The Cold War in New Zealand 1949-1951’, p. 17; AJHR, 1950, B-7, Part I, p. 122; Freedom, 2 November 1949, p. 1; ODT, 4 August 1949, p. 6. Freedom unrealistically estimated that between £120 000 to £150 000 had been spent on the referendum campaign by the government. An ODT editorial estimated that an astronomical £200,000 of the taxpayer’s money had been spent on the campaign.
59 Ibid., p. 7.
63 Ibid., p. 257.
64 Despite the political quarrelling between Fraser and Holland, primarily over whether the CMT issue should have been put to a referendum, their pro-CMT arguments exhibited a conspicuous
degree of interdependence that these two supposedly separate political arenas had during the vicissitudes of the Cold War. As politicians and military men were forced to justify the need for CMT, they encapsulated contemporary concerns and assumptions in their arguments.65 This dissertation has shown that these fears and beliefs were, on the whole, genuinely held by the participants. They were often expressed in extreme and hyperbolical terms but this should not be dismissed merely as calculated efforts at vote-catching.66 These arguments were expressed in the linguistic currency of the time, the language of the Cold War, which by definition was embellished with talk of ‘iron curtains’ and ‘fifth columnists’ threatening the world. It was not simply a case of scaring the public with the communist ‘bogey’, for the same terms were being used by Commonwealth leaders behind closed doors.

The pro-CMT arguments show that New Zealand still clung to the apron-strings of Empire and the continued importance of maintaining links to Britain was assumed without question. The commitment to send troops to the Middle East in the event of a major war was a product of the continued resonance of traditional alliance thinking, and it remained equally unchallenged. The enduring fears of ‘Asian hordes’ merged with, and eventually became subsumed within, the communist inspired menace of the Cold War. The lessons of the past - the failure of the policy of appeasement, the demise of the League of Nations and the inadequacy of voluntary systems of recruitment - all fed into current defence reasoning, as did the belief that force was the only deterrent which totalitarian regimes really understood. In this post-war environment, it became easy to perceive the introduction of peacetime CMT in New Zealand as ‘our bounden duty’. This devotion to duty also became superimposed on to the domestic situation in the form of arguments that CMT would benefit New Zealand

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65 For example, it was widely accepted that, despite the dawning of the atomic age, future battles would still require armies to field large units of trained soldiers.
66 While one could say that Fraser was being politically shrewd by emphasising the threat of communist invasion and ‘fifth columnists’ over the need to send New Zealand troops overseas to the Middle East, this assessment fails to take into account Fraser’s belief in the communist threat. Because communism was perceived as a monolith, each event was considered part of an all encompassing whole.
society by instilling in its young men a sense of discipline, citizenship and increased feelings of patriotism, while making them healthier by providing a fair and ‘democratic’ system under which each would have to ‘do his bit’ for his country. The result of the referendum suggested that a majority of the New Zealand public accepted and endorsed the imperatives to ‘duty’ highlighted by the proponents of CMT as well as the Cold War rationale which underpinned their arguments.
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APPENDIX ONE

A note concerning language

Concern over the correct labelling of the proposed training scheme was demonstrative of both the delicate nature of the compulsory military training debate and the control over most of the media enjoyed by pro-CMT forces. The biggest fear for the advocates of CMT was that the word ‘conscription’, considered a more emotive term than CMT, would be associated with the compulsion of wealth and forced employment in ‘vital’ industries, as was experienced during the war. Such precision may seem out of place in the Cold War context of hyperbole and rhetoric but the Labour government was acutely aware of the difficulties of introducing peacetime CMT without also having to overcome the negative connotations associated with certain words during the referendum campaign.¹

The distinction between the terms ‘CMT’ and ‘conscription’ is primarily one of semantics. Historians have commonly used such terms as if they were interchangeable.² What is significant, however, is not that there was any tangible difference between these words but that those in favour of CMT perceived that there was a real difference.³ For example, a letter sent to all major newspapers made the following request: ‘The Prime Minister . . . further asks that you consider the possibility of avoiding the use of the word “conscription” . . . [It] has wider meanings

¹ G. A. Wood, ‘Commentary on “Democracy and Referendums”’, in A. Simpson ed., Referendums: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, p. 72; M. W. Gobbi, ‘We, The Sovereign: Clarifying the Call for Direct Democracy in New Zealand’, in Ibid., p. 160. Even the use of the word referendum could be considered significant because the term ‘plebiscite’ had developed ‘an unsavoury reputation’ prior to the War.
² For example, see W. D. McIntyre, Background to the Anzus Pact, p. 165; pp. 203-4. He uses the terms ‘Conscription’, ‘National Service’ and ‘compulsory military training’ to refer to the same thing.
³ Confidential Draft on ‘National Service’, 28 June 1949, p. 1, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA. The choice of terms was by no means clear cut. The Caucus Committee on Defence initially decided on the term ‘National Service’. Another typed draft suggested the term ‘Compulsory Military Service’ be used, only to have the word ‘Service’ crossed out and replaced with the word ‘training’. NZPD, 1949, 285, p. 341. The Honourable Frederick Hackett, Postmaster-general and MP for Grey Lynn, even proposed that the scheme be given the rather long-winded title of ‘national military and physical training’.
which, if associated with the scheme, would be unhelpful. Likewise, the JDAC recommended to all its constituent associations ‘THAT use of the term “conscription” be discouraged and discontinued - the objective is “Compulsory Military Training.” That expression only is to be used and encouraged’. William Goosman, the National MP for Piako, felt the distinction was clear and told Parliament ‘that this is not conscription for war; it is compulsory military training’.

Labour government MPs also used the terms ‘National Military Service’ and ‘National Service’ in preference to conscription. Peter Fraser would himself not be drawn into a definition of National Service, other than to state that it did not involve the control of manpower in industry. Mr K. W. G. Glasgow of the RSA, who was also Chairman of the JDAC, complained that

No fewer than three ministers of the crown had used the term “national service” in addresses to the [RSA Annual] Conference the previous day. That term brought up the bogey of compulsory direction of manpower in peacetime which was opposed to the RSA policy.

There were complaints that the opponents of CMT were misnaming the issue as ‘compulsory national service’. The editor of Freedom stated that it was incorrect to use to term ‘conscription’ to describe the CMT scheme because ‘Strictly, conscription means calling up, training or forcing to serve in the forces all eligible males over a wide range of ages and more or less irrespective of status, marital, occupational or otherwise’.

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4 C. V. I. Bollinger, ‘The Referendum Exposed’, p. 15, Hocken. The letter was sent from the Prime Minister’s Office in Wellington by Fraser’s Information Officer, R. S. Odell, 19 July 1949.
5 JDAC publicity committee recommendations on the CMT Referendum, 30 June 1949, p. 1, Folder 2, Box 51, Holland papers, ATL.
6 NZPD, 1949, 285, p. 432. Goosman was repeating what the Hon. Erura Tirikatene had already said on 13 July, p.407; Also see p. 479, where the Hon. Thomas Brindle, MP of Wellington, says that CMT ‘only means that training will be carried out’ and ‘would not be used for industrial purposes’.
7 Speech entitled ‘New Zealand’s Defence Policy’, 1 June 1949, p. 9; p. 12, EA 1, 87/1/26, Part 3a, NA.
8 Newspaper clipping, SC, 13 May 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
9 Newspaper clipping, Dominion, 23 June 1949, EA 1, 87/1/37, Part 1, NA.
10 ‘Compulsory Military Training Background Bulletin No.1’, p. 2, Nash Folio 0452, CMT, Nash papers, NA.
11 Freedom, 31 August 1949, p. 2.
For this dissertation, and for the sake of convenience, the term compulsory military training (CMT) has been used to describe the training scheme. This study focuses on the ‘pro’ side of the debate and this was the name by which the scheme was eventually enacted.

The term ‘introduction’ of peacetime CMT has also been used in this study, though technically 1949 saw its ‘reintroduction’. The 1909 Defence Act, which was introduced by the Liberal government of Sir Joseph Ward, was the only other time that peacetime CMT had been enforced in New Zealand. It was a response to New Zealand fears over German militarism and was of added significance because it was the first instance of peacetime CMT being introduced anywhere in the Empire, although Australia introduced it later that December.12 Those in favour of CMT called for its ‘introduction’, partly because it was a less clumsy term, and partly because they did not want a confused public to think that conscription, as experienced during the last war, was now being reintroduced.

APPENDIX TWO

Sidney Holland and Peter Fraser’s 1949 CMT Referendum
Campaign Itineraries:

Itinerary of the Leader of the Opposition, Sidney Holland

National Campaign for Compulsory Military Training:

Monday 18 July Civic Theatre, Invercargill
Tuesday 19 July Majestic Theatre, Oamaru
Wednesday 20 July Regent Theatre, Christchurch
Thursday 21 July His Majesty’s Theatre, Blenheim
Friday 22 July Theatre Royal, Nelson
Saturday 23 July State Theatre, Masterton
Monday 25 July Assembly Hall, Hastings
Tuesday 26 July Opera House, New Plymouth
Wednesday 27 July State Theatre, Devonport, Auckland
Thursday 28 July Regent Theatre, Whangarei
Friday 29 July State Theatre, Hamilton
Saturday 30 July State Theatre, Palmerston North
Monday 1 August Wellington.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DAY</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>HALL OR THEATRE</th>
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<td>Hastings</td>
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<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>Hamilton</td>
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<td>Theatre Royal</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Thursday</td>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Town Hall</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 22</td>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>Wanganui</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Opera House</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 23</td>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>Free</td>
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<td>Monday</td>
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<td>Invercargill</td>
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<td>Greymouth</td>
<td>8.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Opera House</td>
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* At the request of the South Canterbury Branch of the Returned Services Association arrangements are being made to obtain a larger hall at Timaru, but no decision in this matter can be obtained until Monday 18th July.

Internal Affairs.
16.7.49

22.) Prime Minister Peter Fraser’s itinerary of public appearances made during the CMT referendum campaign.