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‘WELL-INTENTIONED BUT ILL-FATED’:
THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT’S
REPATRIATION SCHEME FOR WORLD WAR ONE
RETURNED SOLDIERS,
1915-1930.

BY
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A long essay presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in History, at the University of Otago, Dunedin, October 2001.
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INTRODUCTION

When War is on and danger nigh,
God and the soldier is the people's cry.
When war is over, and the wrong is righted,
God is forgotten and the solider slighted.¹

For New Zealand society in the immediate post war period the term 'repatriation' took on an additional meaning to its traditional definition of restoring one to their country of origin. Repatriation came to represent the efforts made by the government to fulfil its duty to returned soldiers, to ensure that they were placed in a position as near as possible to that which they had enjoyed prior to enlistment.²

The fact that the majority of the men who fought for their country were not professional soldiers per se, but civilians, intensified the New Zealand government's obligation to its soldiers. For the first two years of the war a volunteer system was in place, and any fit man who offered his services was enlisted, irrespective of marital status or involvement in essential industry. The wisdom of allowing married men with children to risk their lives, while single men remained at home was quickly questioned. Similarly, it soon became clear that permitting men with expertise in essential industries to enlist was also unwise. As a direct consequence of these drawbacks, the government introduced a compulsory system, under the Military Service Act of 1916, which obliged all eligible men between the ages of 20 and 45 to enlist. These men became known as the 'Reserve' and were separated into two divisions; the first consisting of unmarried men, men married after May 1st 1916 and widowers without children, while the second comprised all other men divided into six categories, on the basis of the number of children they had. Men were 'called up' by public ballot as required, but had the right to lodge an appeal to specially created appeal boards. Voluntary recruitment also continued for the duration of the war.³

³ H.T.B. Drew (ed.), The War Effort of New Zealand, Auckland, 1923, pp. xix-xx, J.L. Sleeman, 'The Supply of Reinforcements during the War', in H.T.B. Drew, (ed.), The War Effort of New Zealand, Auckland, 1923, pp.7-13. Sleeman argues that it was possible that New Zealand could have continued to supply enough men to meet her requirements under the voluntary recruitment system (p. 9). Other scholars have been less confident about this, suggesting that conscription was adopted because voluntarism was
The sheer numbers of New Zealand men involved in the First World War reinforced the opinion that generous State assistance should be provided at the conclusion of hostilities. In total, New Zealand’s contribution to the Allied Powers’ effort comprised 124,211 men (91,941 volunteered to serve, while 32,270 were conscripted under the Military Service Act), from an eligible male population of less than 250,000. This body of men represented approximately ten percent of the total population of New Zealand in 1918; to ignore the needs of such a significant group would be tantamount to political suicide. Moreover, public sentiment was firmly on the side of the returned soldier. Few who had stayed behind would have openly denied that New Zealand owed her combatants more than mere gratitude. Rather, the civilian attitude towards the returned soldier has been described as a combination of guilt, admiration and pity: guilt at having remained apart from the battlefield while men gave up their lives; admiration for the courage and fortitude the New Zealanders had shown in battle; and pity for those soldiers who had been maimed as a result of their service. Humanity and sentiment aside, the economic and social import of ensuring that returned soldiers were successfully reintegrated into society was undoubtedly paramount in the government’s mind.

It is expedient to look briefly at the nature and origins of the government on which the burden of solving this unprecedented problem of repatriation was placed. When war broke out in 1914 the Reform party, under the leadership of William Massey, was in power, with Joseph Ward’s Liberal party in opposition. The two parties had a bitter relationship, but decided to put their differences aside in order to meet the more pressing problem of war with Germany. In a gesture of patriotic good will, the Opposition declared it would support the Government in passing any economic measures necessary for the war effort and the provision of an expeditionary force. With a general election proposed for December, it was unrealistic to expect that this accord would have an extended life, and it was duly set aside as the two parties competed for office. Massey was victorious and his Reform Party was returned to office with a slim majority over the
other two parties, Liberal and Labour, combined. When parliament convened in June 1915 it became obvious that rivalry between the two parties was again surfacing, and that it could prove detrimental to the country’s war effort. The Opposition dismissed Massey’s suggestion that a ‘non-party government’ be established, primarily because they objected to their inferior representation in the proposed ministry. In August the Governor-General was forced to intervene, and the final outcome was the formation of a National Cabinet containing equal numbers of Reform and Liberal party members. Massey remained Prime Minister, while Ward, who was quick to play down the significance of the coalition, stressing that it was simply a wartime measure, became the Minister of Finance. Thus two opposing parties were forced to become unhappy bedfellows, and were subsequently entrusted with the demanding task of not only spearheading New Zealand’s war effort, but also of implementing a Repatriation policy for in excess of 100,000 soldiers.

For the new coalition government, the task of repatriation was made even more problematic by the fact that no precedent was available. New Zealand soldiers involved in the Boer War (1899-1902) were settled on farms and provided with some pension assistance from the state, but a system of medical rehabilitation or vocational training was never established. The majority of those veterans who required further aid had been forced to rely on public donations to patriotic funds. It must also be remembered that only 6,500 New Zealand soldiers were involved in the war in South Africa, with the normal length of service being one year, 228 died and 166 were wounded. Clearly World War One returned soldiers would place considerably higher demands on the State than their predecessors in the Boer War.

Internationally, the returned soldier had also historically received only limited state assistance. In Britain, the social and economic needs of veterans of the extensive wars of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were largely neglected by a series of governments which refused to compensate or rehabilitate them, forcing the men to rely on private charity. Payment of pensions to disabled and retired soldiers developed very

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slowly. With the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, a Royal Patriotic Fund Corporation was created to administer assistance to soldiers' dependants, although this was based on public contributions. The fund paid pensions to widows and children of dead soldiers and eventually began to administer annuities to discharged and disabled soldiers. The limitations of this system were obvious; the fund was reliant on patriotic contributions, which invariably subsided once a military campaign had ended. The system adopted in United States of America was a distinct improvement on the British version with the government introducing pensions after the War of Independence. In the early 1930s the total pension bill for veterans (and their dependants) of the 1812 war against the British, the Mexican War of 1846, the Civil War of 1861-5, a number of wars against the Amerindians and the Spanish-American War of 1898 had ballooned to an estimated £2 billion. The scheme was blighted by abuse and corruption however, with evidence as late as the 1920s that pensions were still being paid to the widows of soldiers who had died in the War of 1812.¹⁰

The New Zealand Government's challenge was to introduce a repatriation policy that amply rewarded the soldiers for their efforts, but at the same time did not place an insurmountable drain on the young country's resources. This task was made even more difficult by the high expectations the public held for a scheme which represented the depth of the gratitude they felt they owed their men, the lack of a workable precedent, the sheer numbers of men who were returning, and the nature of the coalition government.

This long essay examines the New Zealand Government's repatriation policy for World War One returned soldiers. While recognising the important role medical rehabilitation played in the overall repatriation process, the exigencies of time and space led to my decision to restrict analysis to policies which concentrated on economic and social assistance. The time period 1915 to 1930 was chosen because the former represents the date at which the government's plans for repatriation began, while the latter marks the date of the Ex-Soldiers Rehabilitation Commission, which investigated the plight of the returned soldier in the immediate postwar period.¹¹ The first chapter

¹¹ The repatriation process was by no means complete in 1930, as evidenced in the report generated by the aforementioned commission. Rather, it was decided to concentrate on the government's efforts in the
examines the general effect of warfare on the civilian soldier and attempts to elucidate how New Zealand soldiers viewed the home front, and what they expected on their return to civilian life. The second chapter outlines the various components of the state's repatriation policy, the nature of the legislation passed, the features of the specially created governmental departments, and the benefits available to returned soldiers. The final chapter reviews how the government's policies played out in practice, their reception by the public and the soldiers, as represented by the New Zealand Returned Soldiers Association (N.Z.R.S.A.), and the shortcomings of the schemes. The final chapter is pivotal to any understanding of the government's repatriation policy, thus it is considerably more capacious than the preceding chapters.

In embarking on this study I have endeavoured to in some way address what can only be described as a gap in New Zealand historiography. While considerable attention has been paid to the military aspects of World War One, less has been given to the social history of the conflict- in particular what the war meant to soldiers, how it impacted on their lives once they had returned home, and how they were treated on their return. In short there is a need for a definitive study of repatriation in New Zealand along the lines of the comprehensive volume- 'The Last Shilling-A History of Repatriation in Australia'- which was written by Clem Lloyd and Jacqui Rees. The need for more in-depth research of this nature to be undertaken is made all the more urgent by the fact that the number of living World War One returned servicemen has rapidly diminished. Of equal concern is the fact that the records of the Repatriation Department have vanished.12

This study has been hampered by a lack of evidence from returned soldiers themselves during the interwar years. An attempt to analyse diaries yielded little success, as collections invariably only held material which was written during the war or whilst in demobilisation camps in England. Some information was gleaned on the soldiers' impressions of what they expected to encounter on their return home, but unfortunately little information was found on what assistance they expected from the government. The immediate post war period, prior to the start of the world wide depression, which by its very nature resulted in further difficulties for returned soldiers.

12 A visit to National Archives, to look at the records of the aforementioned department, proved unfruitful, as the archivists could locate no such documents. A later visit by Dr. Stephen Clarke, Research Officer/Historian of the Royal New Zealand Returned Services' Association, on my behalf, was also unsuccessful.
World War One Oral History Archive housed at the Alexander Turnbull Library, proved invaluable to my research, although once again the majority of the interviews concentrated on the men’s war service. More than any other source however, these interviews provided some insight into individual men’s retrospective opinion of the government’s repatriation policy. A further method of attempting to elucidate the soldiers’ experience of repatriation was gleaned by consulting the N.Z.R.S.A.’s monthly papers *Quick March* and *Review*. While both publications provided essential commentary and criticism of government policy and procedure, they were limited by the fact that they can only be seen to represent the experiences of those soldiers who joined the association.
CHAPTER ONE
FROM SOLDIER TO ‘CIVVY’

Dear God, when the war is over,
And the horror and anguish cease,
I crave no glory or triumph —
Only just love and peace.¹

World War One was the first conflict of its type in the history of warfare. The nations involved sent almost a whole generation of men to participate in a war which dragged on without result and led to an unprecedented number of casualties. For the combatants the combined effect of trench warfare and suicidal assaults on the enemy was to create a feeling of isolation from reality.² In order to gain an appreciation of the difficulties confronting the returned soldier it is necessary to attempt to understand what he had experienced; in essence to ascertain what he was attempting to leave behind.

While it is beyond contention that all warfare has an indelible effect on its participants, trench warfare was renowned for being especially harrowing. One of the considerable problems in the trenches of the Western Front was mud. The level of mud in the trenches was always at least ankle deep and often rose considerably higher, making movement difficult, if not impossible. On a number of occasions men had to stand for days in water up to their waists, although usually the water would combine with earth in the trenches to form thick, impassable mud. The high levels of rain on the Western Front during 1916 and 1917 exacerbated the situation— in March 1916 the rainfall was the heaviest for thirty-five years. The most horrific consequence of these trying conditions was that soldiers sometimes drowned in the mire. Incidents were recalled where wounded men who had been ‘blown into the mud’, were unable to pull themselves out, and had subsequently drowned.³

A less disturbing, but nonetheless extremely debilitating, result of the wet conditions was the high incidence of trench foot, which arose from spending considerable periods in damp socks and boots. Trench foot was similar to frostbite and the two ailments were at

first frequently confused. The afflicted soldier’s feet would slowly become numb, turn red or blue, and in extreme cases gangrene would set in and individual toes or the entire foot would have to be amputated. While preventing trench foot involved the seemingly simple task of ensuring that the men dried their feet and changed their socks as often as possible, in reality it was almost impossible to ensure that this occurred. During the heat of battle, matters of hygiene were understandably forgotten as the need to preserve life and limb became paramount.

The considerable amount of rain which fell on the Western Front, while proving detrimental to the soldiers in a variety of ways, did not even have the advantage of sluicing away the large amounts of refuse-rubbish, excreta and urine- which amassed in the trenches. An even greater problem than disposal of waste was that of burying those who had fallen. Often men were buried where they died, which meant that when new trenches were dug bodies were uncovered. The immediate consequence of these unsanitary conditions was that vermin and disease became prevalent. The large number of rats in the trenches represented a significant dilemma as they ate anything they could find, including corpses, and would even attempt to eat a wounded man if he was unable to defend himself. Flies and fleas also became a continual irritation. One soldier spoke of flies ‘...getting into your eyes, ears, nose and mouth’ and of them being impossible to drive away. While at night fleas would become the new enemy: ‘You may feel beat to the world, but there is no rest for you; as soon as you lie down to enjoy a well earned rest the attack commences.’

It is perhaps unsurprising that after a significant period in such an appalling environment many soldiers began to feel estranged from the civilian world. They had experienced such unspeakable horrors that many were unable to envisage a life where death and destruction did not occur on a daily basis. They had endured conditions for which the term ‘squalor’ could be deemed a euphemism. Their previous existence with its social activities and concomitant frivolity undoubtedly became a vague memory; life in New Zealand seemed an insurmountable distance from the battlefields of Europe.

4 Ibid., pp.48-49.
5 Ibid., pp. 52-4.
7 Ibid.
The soldiers’ estrangement from the civilian population was further compounded by the realisation that friends and family who had remained at home could not possibly understand the nature of life at the front. One soldier recalled how his girlfriend sent him hair oil, cigars, a cigar holder and a ‘suit of pyjamas,’ accompanied by a letter which urged him to keep these items in his ‘tent’. She also wrote ‘[i]t must be a fag getting the [hair] oil you liked so much. I suppose you have to walk some distance from the firing line to the nearest shops.’ Other soldiers expressed an emotion akin to anger in their letters when referring to what they and their comrades had experienced and alluded to the division which had developed between the soldiers and the home front. Alec Hutton wrote in a letter home:

...you in New Zealand have not the slightest conception of what [the soldiers] have been through. They have been torn up by the roots, so to speak, from their old associations, and have been tossed backwards and forwards on the river of adversity. When they come back one can hardly expect them to take root again as if nothing had happened.?

Apprehension at returning home became commonplace amongst many New Zealand soldiers towards the end of the war and may have had some bearing on the lack of celebration witnessed when peace was finally secured. A number of the men interviewed for the World War One Oral History Archive described Armistice Day as a day of relief rather than rapture. Bert Stokes recollected:

Well now, you know there was no cheering, I mean the chaps didn’t get excited or anything like that. You know because I think it was just a matter of relief...we didn’t celebrate at all.10

Bert Lee recalled that there was very little celebration in comparison to what he later heard had occurred in the ‘civilian world.’11 James Hutchinson’s diary entry on November 11 1918 also reflected the nonchalance with which many soldiers greeted the

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ending of hostilities-"[t]he news of peace seems to be received most quietly. After all this time, nobody seems to realise what it means." Chen found that many of the soldiers she interviewed described being overwhelmed by the prospect of peace and the imminent end to the world they had occupied for such a considerable period. She stated that a number of the men feared that they were so irrevocably changed by their experience that it would be impossible for them to assimilate back into society.

Those who had remained at home were unable to understand what the soldiers had been through and often wanted to forget the war. There is little question that it was anticipated that now the 'boys' were back, things would return to 'normal'. Many men were reluctant to speak of their war experience, giving the impression that they too simply wanted to move on, however, it seems probable that other factors were behind their silence. William Jamieson did not talk about the war when he returned, even when asked questions, because he believed it was best to forget if you could. When asked whether he could forget, he replied 'No I don't think you'll ever forget it...lots of things you can't forget, well I can't.' Bert Stokes recalled that when he returned home relatives and visitors did not inquire about his war service. He was unsure whether this was because they did not want to know, or because they felt he did not want to talk about it. In any case, he admitted that he had very little desire to talk about the war. Bert Lee refrained from talking about his experience because he believed people had tired of the subject. If anyone asked him about the war he would stress that it was over. He believed that people could not understand the harsh reality of war unless they were there, adopting the stance that if men did speak about their service they were invariably 'skiting.' Russell Weir was another soldier who was reluctant to discuss the war: '[w]hen we got back the last thing we ever would discuss with anybody was the military or the war, we never discussed it.' He went on to state that he was certain his family knew very little about Gallipoli -where it was, what actually happened- because of his reticence, and was

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12 J.D. Hutchinson, Diary entry November 11 1918, MS. Papers 4172, Alexander Turnbull Library, p.40.


15 Bert Stokes, OHC-002768.

16 Bert Lee, OHC-002689.
adamant that this was the standard position adopted by returned men.\textsuperscript{17} Tom Lane was one soldier who remembered being less reluctant to share his experiences with others once he had returned home. He stated that while his family did not ask him many questions about the war, others did. Those who did question him were told ‘as realistically as possible’ what he had endured.\textsuperscript{18}

Other soldiers were reluctant to talk about the war simply because it was too painful and brought back bad memories. Alec Hutton warned his family even before he returned home that he was both unwilling and unable to explain what he had seen during his service:

No-one who has not been there with even the most vivid imagination can picture what it was like. Possibly I may tell you some things when I get back, possibly not, because I don’t like talking about it. One is apt to remember things too vividly and to have nightmares as a result.\textsuperscript{19}

A further reason why many men may have chosen not to discuss their wartime experiences with loved ones when they returned home may have related to a fear that they would be unable to recount events without breaking down. As soldiers, men were expected to suffer pain and injury without complaint, face the possibility of death without fear, and kill an enemy without considering the implications of the act. The ability to control one’s feelings was seen as an admirable quality and became synonymous with bravery. This much prized ability to endure trying circumstances without displaying emotion was a lesson that the soldier brought home with him at the conclusion of hostilities.\textsuperscript{20}

Phillips has argued that there was considerable pressure on New Zealand soldiers to show bravery in the face of adversity. One means of ensuring gallant behaviour was seen at Gallipoli where troops were organised according to their geographical origins, thus many men knew each other from civilian life. This organisation succeeded in acting as a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Thomas (Tom) Charles Lane interviewed by Jane Tolerton and Nicholas Boyack, 11 August 1988, World War I Oral History Archive, Alexander Turnbull Library Oral History Centre, OHC-002683.
\item Alexander Louis Hutton, 16 February 1919, Ms Papers 3906, Alexander Turnbull Library, pp.2-3.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
form of social control. Men were reluctant to show any sign of cowardice not only because it would lead to a loss of face in front of their comrades, but also because of the fear of bringing dishonour to their families back home.²¹

In order to survive the war men had to learn to subdue their emotions, in essence they had to become ‘killing machines.’ Even the death of friends was not believed to be an excuse for emotion. Randolph Gray recounted in a letter home his feelings on stumbling across his dying commanding officer, admitting that such horrific scenes had become so commonplace that he had become almost immune to atrocity. He conceded that ‘[t]here is not time for tears for the dying. Cheers for the living and on with the ghastly business.’²²

Having been compelled to present a stoic demeanour for a considerable period it was inevitable that on returning home many soldiers continued to ‘put on a brave face’ and were reluctant to ask for, or even admit they needed, help. Tom Lane found it hard to adapt to civilian life after the war but adopted the attitude that one had to ‘knuckle down’ and make the best of a bad situation.²³ William Jamieson recalled that he did not ask the N.Z.R.S.A. or any other institution for help, he simply ‘boxed on and [did] the best [he] could.’²⁴ Undoubtedly many men felt the same way. Bert Stokes was adamant that returned soldiers did not believe they were going ‘to be pampered and looked after’ by the government and felt certain that they did not want such treatment either.²⁵

Bert Lee was one soldier who found it very difficult to settle down after returning to New Zealand. He was unable to remain in one job for any significant period of time and found himself moving around the country; he attributed this transient behaviour directly to his war service during which he had ‘shifted around a lot.’²⁶ Russel Weir talked about not being able to stay ‘under four walls for too long,’ having spent the majority of his time in the Army outside, and recalled having to frequently leave his Wellington office to go for long walks.²⁷

²¹Ibid., p.171.
²³Tom Lane, OHC-002682.
²⁴William Jamieson, MSC-002673.
²⁵Bert Stokes, OHC-002769.
²⁶Bert Lee, OHC-002689.
Other returned soldiers turned to alcohol as a source of comfort and relief. Stan Stanfield insisted that all of the soldiers ‘drank terrifically’ on returning to New Zealand: ‘We did nothing else but drink, drink, drink. Drank ourselves into oblivion, I suppose.’ He also remembered feeling so confused when he came home that the only time he felt comfortable and in control of his life was when he was ‘in the pub... half full of beer.’

The impression that returned servicemen drank too much was prevalent in society. In Nor the Years Condemn, a novel by Robyn Hyde, the main character Doug Stark found there were:

...plenty [of people] in Invercargill who remembered him and wanted to help him. Sometimes it amused him to call on them, go into their houses, and stretch out his boots on their gaunt linoleum, staring as if they were queer fishes in an aquarium. They always began: “If you’ll only get off the beer, Doug,” and he replied gently: “Ah, what’s the use?”

An article in Quick March, the monthly paper of the New Zealand Returned Soldiers’ Association (N.Z.R.S.A), described the inherent difficulties many returned soldiers were experiencing and attributed these to the problems associated with attempting to adjust from being a soldier to being a civilian. It is important to consider the ‘violent break’ a man underwent when he joined the army, given that the life of a soldier differs substantially from that of an ordinary civilian. One of the most rudimentary adjustments a man had to make upon enlisting related to order and discipline. A new recruit had to recognise that he was subject to continuous instruction and had ceased to be a solitary unit. He was no longer in a position where he was able to choose who he wished to associate with, rather, his companions were now determined solely on the basis of alphabetical order or on the needs of the army. Perhaps most significantly the civilian had to learn ‘...how to kill, wound or otherwise put out of action as many as possible- but preferably to kill.’ This was indubitably the most difficult task which the new recruit faced, the realisation that he had to learn to kill or be killed.

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28 Ibid., pp.42-43.
On returning to New Zealand a soldier had to undergo a great many changes, in essence he had to learn to be a civilian again - a task which was more difficult than many at the time could possibly have imagined. One returned man was quoted in *Quick March* as having stated that: ‘It seems as hard to learn to be a ‘civvy’ again as it was to learn to be a soldier.’

Many men also returned home harbouring a sense of anger or frustration at having sacrificed what they saw as some of the best years of their lives. Their youth and its associated innocence had been lost forever. Perhaps more importantly, many had sacrificed a career and an education in order to serve their country. There was also a widespread belief amongst a number of the returned men that those who had stayed at home had benefited from their absence and had been able to ‘get ahead’ while they had been making a huge sacrifice for their country. This view was not misplaced. The war proved to be a potential goldmine for many farmers and businessmen, who took advantage of high prices that could be obtained for their goods, and subsequently enjoyed a period of unparalleled spending and prosperity.

Many soldiers also resented the fact that on their return they were forced to seek jobs from, and compete with those who had stayed comfortably at home.

It is pertinent that having addressed the soldiers’ view of postwar New Zealand, an attempt is made to try and assess how the general populus viewed the returned men. There is little question that while civilians could not understand the horrors that the soldiers had experienced, most were of the opinion that they owed them a considerable debt. During the war much was made of the need to ensure that disabled soldiers in particular received liberal treatment. An article in *The New Zealand Herald* outlined such sentiments:

Those who return broken from the war will never want for friends in New Zealand or in any part of the British world, for this is a national [problem] and few indeed are not affected by it in their innermost lives. Those who have lost

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32 James Morse lamented the fact that he had lost four of the best years of his life- 20-24, but appreciated the fact that he was lucky to have come out alive. James Morse interviewed by Jane Tolerton and Nicholas Boyack, 6 August 1988, World War I Oral History Archive, Alexander Turnbull Library Oral History Centre, OHC-002713.
34 Chen, 'Between Two Worlds,' p.138.
and those who may lose are the great majority of our people; to them the care of
the sick and the wounded is not merely a national duty but a personal obligation.\textsuperscript{35}
The plight of able soldiers was discussed in an article entitled ‘Our Duty to Returned
Soldiers’ which was published in the \textit{Masterton Daily Times} in 1917, but also appears in
pamphlet form at the Hocken Library:

The hardest time of a soldier’s life is in regaining his former position in civil life.
It is amazing how many people consider that a returned soldier should accept any
work offered to him, no matter how menial or uncongenial the nature of the work
may be, instead of offering him the best position he is capable of holding.\textsuperscript{36}

New Zealand society in general was therefore displaying a desire to ensure that
the returned soldiers were treated in a manner which befitted the sacrifices they had
made. Repatriation itself was such an emotive issue that it seems unlikely that anybody
would openly begrudge the soldiers a comprehensive policy of state assistance. What
remained to be seen was whether the government would match the sentiments of its
people and make provisions for such a scheme.

\textsuperscript{35} The \textit{New Zealand Herald} (hereafter NZH), 13 September 1915, p.6.
CHAPTER TWO
GOVERNMENT POLICY

Having witnessed a considerable number of men leave New Zealand’s shores to fight for King and country, the government soon realised that it had to make provisions for their eventual return. While there is little question that the government’s main focus was on the immediate question of winning the war, it was nonetheless forced to look ahead to a time when the men would return. The government had to address this potential problem sooner than expected when large numbers of injured men began returning to New Zealand following fighting in April 1915 at Gallipoli. These men, broken and battle weary, caught the country unawares, as no provisions had at this point been made to assist them in readjusting to civilian life. The government soon realised its lack of preparedness was unacceptable and began to piece together a comprehensive repatriation plan, the mainstays of which were the Discharged Soldiers’ Information Department, the War Pensions Act and the Discharged Soldiers' Settlement Act, all of which came into existence in 1915. It was not until after the conclusion of hostilities, with the return of the main body of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force looming, that the final element of the government’s efforts, the Repatriation Department, was instituted.¹

The establishment of the Discharged Soldiers’ Information Department in August 1915 represented the government’s first real effort to address the problem of absorbing returned soldiers into the community. The department’s sole function was to find suitable employment for men who had been discharged, a task which was undoubtedly made more difficult because soldiers returning at this early stage of the war were invariably suffering from either illness or injury.

In order to ensure that no soldier was overlooked, a complete register of all the men who had returned to the Dominion was compiled. Volunteers from the Government Insurance Department carried out this task, having patriotically offered to devote their spare time to any wartime duties which the government required. Information on each

¹ The Repatriation Department took over the duties of the Discharged Soldiers Information Department, as well as taking on new responsibilities (see below).
soldier was initially obtained from the files of the Base Records Office of the Defence Department, however this process was hindered by the fact that the files were also required by the Defence Department. To alleviate this difficulty arrangements were made enabling officers of the Discharged Soldiers’ Information Department to board transport ships as they arrived to acquire necessary information from the soldiers themselves. This procedure was further refined at a later date by arranging for military authorities on board the vessels to gather a large proportion of the information required whilst the men were still at sea.²

Once information on individual soldiers had been compiled it was recorded on cards and held until the Discharged Soldiers’ Information Department had been informed that the man had been discharged from military duty, as until such a point they were still under military rule. Arrangements were made however so that the department could receive prior notice of an impending discharge. Once such notification was gained, an officer of the department interviewed the soldier in order to assess his specific requirements, and filled out a detailed form summarising the soldier’s case. If the soldier did not require any assistance in finding employment his card was removed from the ‘Under action’ compartment, marked ‘Disposed of’ and set aside to be filed. If the soldier was not ready to return to employment, his card was set aside until a ‘reasonable period’ had passed, after which he was contacted again, with the process repeating until the soldier was either placed in suitable employment, informed the department that he required no further assistance, or proved unwilling to co-operate with the department in spite of their efforts to contact him.³

Committees designed to assist the department were established in a number of centres throughout the Dominion. The committees were advised of the names of the men returning in their district who had sought assistance from the department, whilst the men themselves were also requested by the Head Office of the department to get in touch with their local committee. The committee contacted the men and did their best to aid them in the procurement of employment.⁴

³ Ibid., pp.2-3.
⁴ Ibid., p.3.
The Discharged Soldiers' Information Department also made provisions for retraining soldiers who wished to pursue a different form of employment to that in which they were involved prior to enlisting, or who were unable to return to their former employment due to disability. Arrangements were made with the Department of Agriculture for a limited number of soldiers to receive training on State farms, though few soldiers embraced this option. In addition, free places were offered at technical schools, and the government gave preference to returned men who wished to join their staff. The New Zealand Society of Accountants also offered free training in book keeping and office work, with a considerable number of men enrolling for the classes, but few actually progressing very far; as a result the society considered withdrawing its financial support for the venture in 1917. The reasons behind the soldiers' lack of enthusiasm for the variety of training courses available are difficult to elucidate, with the department stressing that the men were well aware of the options open to them. However, it is possible that the training available was simply too difficult to undertake given that many of the men were faced with significant disabilities. It may also have been that having spent time in the army under constant instruction, men had tired of institution.

The realisation that disabled returned soldiers required special attention from the government was further illustrated in August 1915 when the War Pensions Act was passed. In introducing the bill to parliament for its second reading, James Allen stated:

I feel sure that the New Zealand Parliament desires to make provision on a fair and adequate scale for those who are rendering the great service our men are rendering, in order that they may go away from our shores with full confidence that the people of New Zealand will make provisions for themselves if they are disabled, or, in case they fall, for their widows and children and those who are dependent upon them.

Sir Joseph Ward, leader of the opposition, was similarly adamant that disabled soldiers should be afforded liberal treatment. He stressed that '...we want our brave soldiers who

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are fighting for our King and country treated generously.' Ward went on to say '[l]et the [War Pensions] Board err upon the side of generosity, and let them remember the sacrifice which the applicant made for his King and country.'

The War Pensions Act provided annuity for any disabled member of the New Zealand Forces and any ‘dependant’ of a soldier who was disabled, deceased or missing in action. A soldier was entitled to a pension if he was disabled by wounds or injury, or had contracted a disease during the course of his military service. In addition, soldiers who had been discharged from camps in New Zealand as a result of injury or disease were also eligible for financial assistance. Not all disabled soldiers were automatically accorded a pension- if a soldier’s disability arose from ‘wilful misconduct’ a pension could be refused.

The definition of a ‘dependant’ was quite considerable, and in addition to a wife and child (or children) included parents, grandparents, step parents, siblings and mothers in law. In order to receive a war pension, all dependants, except a wife and child, had to prove that they relied on assistance from a member of the New Zealand forces in the twelve months prior to the member enlisting in the forces. A dependant could also be a parent who lacked adequate support, but was not actually reliant on a soldier during the aforementioned twelve months. However, in such a case the mother had to be fifty years or over and the father fifty-five years. The definition of a ‘child’ was also suitably wide in order to encompass all eventualities. A ‘child’ was deemed to be a person under the age of sixteen years and could be a son, daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, illegitimate child, or a child legally adopted by a man before he joined the forces.

The War Pension scheme was administered by a board consisting of three members and was under the overall control of the existing Pensions Department. The act contained a provision by which the Minister of Defence could establish local advisory committees to assist in the investigation of pension claims and in the general management of the act, but this condition was never acted on. Greig suggested in his 1940 Treasury Department

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8 Mr Ward, Ibid., p.233.
11 NZOYB, 1915, p.653.
Review of the repatriation process that the need for local authorities was ameliorated by the fact that the board travelled around the country.\textsuperscript{12}

The process of applying for a pension involved the interaction of a number of different authorities. The Medical Board, which had recommended discharge, supplied the soldier with an application form, which once completed made its way to the Defence Department, and then on to the Pensions Department, with a copy of the soldier’s medical history. Once the application had been approved the soldier was supplied with a certificate outlining the amount awarded and the period for which it was to be received. Temporary pensions, payable for three to twelve months, were granted in the first instance, until the War Pensions Board was convinced that the soldier had recovered from the wound or injury. Soldiers in receipt of a temporary pension underwent a medical examination at the end of the payment period. If the soldier considered he was still suffering from a condition resulting from military service he could apply for his case to be further examined by the Pensions Board.\textsuperscript{13}

In situations where ongoing disability was evident, for instance a missing limb, paralysis, or the loss of sight or hearing, a permanent pension was made available. In such cases, disabilities were ranked according to severity and scales of pay enacted (See Appendix One). Once a permanent pension had been awarded it was payable for life and could only be detrimentally altered if the soldier ‘misbehaved’ (presumably by becoming involved in criminal activities, though details of inappropriate behaviour were not offered), or increased if the board could be convinced that the disability had worsened.\textsuperscript{14}

As well as being determined by the scale of injury suffered, the amount a disabled soldier was entitled to under the War Pension Act was also subject to rank. First and second-class Commodores and Rear Admirals received the highest amount of pension, while a Private received the lowest (the maximum amounts allowable according to rank can be seen in Appendix Two). Similarly, the wife and dependants of a high-ranking soldier were permitted more substantial assistance than those of an ordinary soldier. If a soldier considered that the pension allocated to him was not sufficient to enable him to enjoy the standard of living experienced prior to enlistment, he could apply for a

\textsuperscript{12} Greig, 'Rehabilitation of Returned Members of the Forces,' pp.1-2.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
supplementary pension of no more than £1 a week. The pension of a soldier and his dependants could not with the addition of the supplementary pension exceed £5 a week. A totally disabled soldier who required the services of an attendant could also be granted an additional pension of up to £1 a week.\textsuperscript{15}

The second significant piece of legislation enacted by the New Zealand Government to assist returned soldiers in 1915 was the Discharged Soldiers' Settlement Act. Prime Minister William Massey, who was also Minister of Lands, introduced the Discharged Soldiers' Settlement Bill to Parliament on the 24th of September 1915. The bill sought to make land available to two groups of returned soldiers: those who were afflicted by partial disabilities, and while in receipt of a pension sought to supplement their income with light farm work, and those who returned in good health.\textsuperscript{16}

The government’s desire to settle returned soldiers on land was popular with the majority of the members of the house and was seen as a fitting way in which to reward servicemen for the sacrifices they had made. Mr Webb was amongst those who were quick to remind their colleagues of the debt the government owed the returned soldier:

[These] men have sacrificed health, happiness, and practically everything that men could sacrifice, and in return it is for us to show that we want to place them in such a position that they will practically be independent of any particular master, and where they can work for themselves either as fruitgrowers, farmers, or pastoralist, or whatever occupation they may be called upon to follow. Let us provide them with the necessary land, equip them, and give them the necessary education to enable them to follow useful occupations.\textsuperscript{17}

It was proposed that the land required for this venture would consist of Crown land or land purchased under the Land Act or the Land for Settlements Act of 1908. The Crown land on offer was mainly unimproved, although some land which had been partially worked by previous tenants, but had since reverted to the Crown, was available.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16}Mr Massey, \textit{New Zealand Parliamentary Debates} (hereafter NZPD), Vol. 174 (September 24 1915), p.211.
\textsuperscript{17}Mr Webb, \textit{NZPD}, Vol 174 (September 24 1915), p.217. Similar sentiments were expressed by other members such as Mr Buddo who stated ‘...it would be a reproach to New Zealand, which prides itself on its humanitarian legislation and on its advanced legislation in regard to land and other problems, if we did not devise means of employing every one of our soldiers returning who require it.’ Ibid, p.221.
The government also purchased areas of both improved and unimproved land which it subdivided and made accessible to soldiers.\textsuperscript{18}

Even at this early stage in proceedings Massey had firm ideas not only regarding the location of suitable land but also concerning the manner in which the land was to be utilised. He proposed that sections available to soldiers would not be of a considerable size as it was intered that the land be used for fruit growing. Gum diggers employed by the Lands Department had already begun clearing land north of Auckland ready for fruit trees to be planted when the bill was still been read by parliament!\textsuperscript{19}

As well as providing land for the returned soldiers, the scheme offered financial assistance to enable farm cottages to be built and stock and necessary equipment to be purchased. Soldier settlers could also receive help in improving the land by means of drainage, clearance and fencing. The men could either obtain the land under standard leasehold, or under leasehold with the opportunity to purchase the land at a later date. All money advanced under the Act was subject to an interest rate of 5 percent per annum.\textsuperscript{20} Initially the amount which a soldier could borrow was limited to £500, but this was later raised to £2,500. However, the Minister of Lands had the authority to waive these limits and did so on a number of occasions.\textsuperscript{21}

The act was managed by the Department of Lands and Survey, whose main office was in Wellington. District offices were found in other centres and were run by Commissioners of Crown Lands. The commissioner was chairman of a Land Board, which met at least once a month, with the board being directly responsible for administering the act, and meeting with returned soldiers.\textsuperscript{22} Once a soldier had applied for an allotment of land he was examined by the Land Board in order to determine his suitability with regard to experience and available finance. When more than one application for a section was received a ballot was held.\textsuperscript{23}

Provisions were also made under the act for those soldiers who did not wish to take up residence on the land to purchase or build houses in urban areas. The soldier

\textsuperscript{19} Mr Massey, \textit{NZPD}, Vol. 174 (September 24 1915), pp.211-212.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p.212.
\textsuperscript{21} New Zealand Rehabilitation Board, \textit{War History of Rehabilitation}, p.2.
\textsuperscript{22} QM, Vol. I, No. 2, May 1918, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{23} New Zealand Rehabilitation Board, \textit{War History of Rehabilitation}, p.1.
could borrow up to £1,000 for this purpose to be repaid over a period of ten years with an interest rate of 5 percent, or over twenty five and a half years at a rate of 7.5 percent.24

Amendments to the Discharged Soldiers Settlement Act were passed in 1916 and 1917. The 1916 Amendment Act made available a further £500,000 for land purchases and extended the act to include land brought under the 1908 Public Works Act. In 1917 financial assistance was granted to soldiers who wished to acquire land privately, provided the Land Board deemed the price acceptable and the Minister's approval was secured.25

The need to supply soldier settlers with good land was also emphasised by parliamentary representatives, with some expressing a desire that large landowners part with areas of fertile land that was not being used to its potential, for instance land found alongside railways.26 In order to prevent speculation, soldiers were unable to sell land acquired under the Discharged Soldiers' Settlement Act until a period of 10 years had elapsed, unless in special cases where the Land Board approved of the sale.27

The final piece of repatriation legislation, the Repatriation Bill, was introduced to parliament on the 4th of December 1918, and became an Act of Parliament six days later, almost one month after the conclusion of hostilities. While there was undoubtedly relief in some quarters that the government finally appeared to be attempting to address the mammoth task of reintroducing a significant body of men to civilian life, there were many who were adamant that measures should have been put in place much earlier. The Otago Daily Times described the bill as belated, but conceded that criticism of this nature was not constructive.28 Similarly when the bill was being debated in the house the member for Dunedin West, Mr Downie Stewart, bemoaned the delay in establishing a broad system of repatriation, stating that the men who had already returned were afflicted by injury or disease and therefore had more of a need for government assistance than the main body of soldiers who would be returning soon in full health, and in a better position

28 Otago Daily Times (hereafter ODT), 7 December 1918, p.6.
to return to previous employment or acquire new positions.Quick March, the New Zealand Returned Soldiers’ Association (N.Z.R.S.A) monthly paper, while concerned with the delay in introducing the bill, also voiced its dissatisfaction with the manner in which the legislation was rushed through parliament in what it deemed ‘wild and insane helter-skelter’ and saw the passing of such an important bill in the early hours of the morning as an example of ‘legislation by exhaustion’. The N.Z.R.S.A was also disappointed that they and other interested bodies were not afforded an opportunity to study the bill before it was passed, and stressed that even members of parliament were not given sufficient time to inspect the proposed scheme in any depth. Members of Parliament were also critical of the speed with which the bill was put through Parliament—the member for Temuka, Mr Talbot, described the passage of the bill as occurring in a ‘rush session’, which he regretted as he believed that most members would undoubtedly have desired to speak at great lengths on the issue and to have played some role in drafting regulations.

It is difficult to fathom why such an important piece of legislation was rushed through parliament. Montgomery argued that the government’s failure to outline a comprehensive repatriation policy even after the Armistice, was due to a number of factors, not the least of which was the absence of the Prime Minister, who was attending a conference in England. In addition, Montgomery stressed that the public and press did not fully appreciate the amount of preliminary work required for such an important scheme, and that any policy could obviously not be made public until it had received Cabinet approval. Once introduced to Parliament however, it is difficult to ascertain why the bill received such a hasty passage. There does not appear to have been any other significant legislation before parliament at the time that was taking precedence, rather, it may simply have been that pressure from the public was taking its toll, especially as a similar bill had been introduced into the Australian Senate as early as July 1917.

29 Mr Downie Stewart, NZPD, vol 183 (4 December 1918), p. 776.
30 QM, Vol. I, No. 9, January 1919, p.3.
31 Ibid.
32 Mr Talbot, NZPD, volume 183 (4 December 1918), p.794.
34 Lloyd and Rees, The Last Shilling, p.79.
The Repatriation Act provided for the establishment of a Repatriation Department administered by a board of four ministers, who were responsible for selecting a Director of Repatriation. The decision to have a board of ministers instead of one minister in charge of the department was met with much criticism. It was widely held that the Repatriation Board was the unavoidable result of a war time coalition government, a move to ensure that neither the Reform party nor the Liberal party gained in stature from exclusive involvement in a potentially popular department. The N.Z.R.S.A saw the board as a 'political seesaw', where two 'Masseyites' were essential to balance two 'Wardites.' Further, it was feared that board control of the department would lead to delays in the decision making process as a result of divided authority. Ward defended the existence of a four-member board, stating that if only one Minister was in control of the department his activities would be delayed by the need to gain cabinet approval; however, a board comprising four members, half the size of a normal cabinet, would be free to simply carry out its proposals.

A further measure designed to alleviate delays in meeting the requirements of returned soldiers was evidenced in the policy of 'decentralisation' which the Repatriation Board adopted. The Dominion was divided into four districts - Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin, which were administered by District Repatriation Boards comprising individuals who were nominated by institutions such as labour organisations and the New Zealand Returned Soldiers Association. Departmental offices were opened and staffed with discharged soldiers under the control of District Repatriation Officers. In addition to the District Repatriation Boards, local committees were established in the major provincial towns throughout the Dominion.

The assistance available to returned soldiers under the Repatriation Act fell into three categories: Employment- whereby all discharged soldiers who applied to the department were found appropriate employment; Training- of both an occupational and

36 ODT, 11 December 1918, p.4.
educational nature; and Financial assistance- available to soldiers who wished to buy or establish a business, or obtain equipment or furniture.\textsuperscript{39}

Finding suitable employment for returned soldiers was considered the most important task to be addressed by the Repatriation Department. At the time of the first annual report of the Repatriation Department in 1919, no problems were being experienced in this area, with only twenty-five percent of all returned soldiers seeking the assistance of the Government. It was assumed that the remaining men either had no difficulty in obtaining the employment they desired, or had returned to jobs held prior to enlisting. These early successes were attributed to the fact that the men were continuing to show the 'spirit of self-reliance' they had exhibited throughout the war effort and that the employers of the Dominion were 'doing their bit' and reemploying their old workers.\textsuperscript{40} No consideration was given to the fact that the men may have been unaware of the assistance available, or that pride prevented them from asking for help.

The financial assistance offered under the Repatriation Act came in the form of business loans and sustenance allowances- both for soldiers who were unable to find work and those who were training. Business loans of up to £300 were available for both discharged soldiers and soldiers' widows at an interest rate of 5 percent over a ten-year period. Under the conditions of the loan no interest was charged on the first £50 lent. In addition, if payment was not completed within ten years, but the soldier could be seen to have used the loan 'properly', the term could be extended.\textsuperscript{41} The Department adhered to the principle that loans would not be extended to: applicants who were in a position where they could finance their own endeavours, who had already attained a position equal to that enjoyed prior to the war, or who were already involved in a business which was performing satisfactorily.\textsuperscript{42} The primary concern for the board was whether the credit was going to be of benefit to the soldier. However, it was believed that there was no use in assisting a soldier unless he showed some experience or business acumen which

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p.2.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} NZH, 20 February 1919, p.8
would make success more likely.\textsuperscript{43} Loans in excess of £50 required the approval of the Repatriation Department’s Ministerial Board.

Interest free loans of up to £50 for furniture, tools and equipment for either the home or business were also available. Loans of this nature were restricted to married men who were in employment or in business, and soldiers’ widows. Men with dependents who required a home were also considered eligible for this form of assistance.

Returned soldiers who had been incapacitated in some way and soldiers’ widows were also able to apply for a loan of up to £50 to use for travel beyond New Zealand; however, the District Board or Local Committee had to be satisfied that relocation was necessary and few requests were evidently made for this form of assistance.\textsuperscript{44}

Other forms of financial assistance provided for under the Repatriation Act were sustenance allowances for men who were unemployed or undergoing training. For unemployed soldiers the amount of financial assistance available was kept deliberately low to ensure that the soldier remained motivated to obtain a job and to ensure that he kept in touch with his Departmental officer and gained employment.\textsuperscript{45} The New Zealand Herald also reported other conditions which were placed on the receipt of an unemployment allowance; the applicant must have already applied for work through the Repatriation Board without success, and must have applied within 12 months of discharge. In addition, the soldier could only receive the allowance for ten weeks and could not be renewed if the soldier left a job which the Department had found for him, unless it could be proven that the employment was terminated for acceptable reasons.\textsuperscript{46}

Allowances available to soldiers undergoing training at technical schools were of a similar nature to those available to soldiers seeking work, with extra assistance being proffered to those who were married or had dependants.\textsuperscript{47} The Repatriation Department also subsidised the wages of apprentices who returned to their pre war indentures to bring them up to £3 a week, including any pension to which the soldier may be entitled.

\textsuperscript{43} NZH, 28 February 1919, p.6.
\textsuperscript{44} ‘Report of the Repatriation Department,’ AJHR, 1919, H-30, p.8.
\textsuperscript{45} QM, Vol. III, No. 34, 1921, p.41 A soldier was entitled to 42s a week, 10s extra for his wife and 3s 6d for each child (not exceeding four children). There were 20 shillings in a pound.
\textsuperscript{46} NZH, May 1 1919, p.7.
\textsuperscript{47} NZH, February 20 1919, p.8. A soldier was entitled to 50 shillings, his wife 10 shillings and each child 3s 6d.
Similarly, soldiers who were receiving training in private workshops and factories were entitled to have their wage supplemented to reach a total income of £3 per week.\(^{48}\)

A further service offered by the Repatriation Department was educational and vocational training. The department strove to provide training for: Soldiers’ widows, apprentices whose training had been interrupted by participation in the war, partly disabled soldiers whose condition prevented them from resuming their pre-war professions and soldiers who, having enlisted at an early age, had not decided on a trade or profession.\(^{49}\)

The Subsidised Wages scheme placed soldiers who wanted to learn a new trade or occupation in private workshops or factories, where the employer trained the discharged soldier and paid him a wage set by a committee which comprised a representative from the Repatriation Department, a trade union official for the particular industry, and the employer himself. The department then made up the difference between the wage agreed upon and £3, as previously outlined.\(^{50}\)

Vocational training in technical schools was also arranged throughout the country. Special soldier classes were formed in the main centres after it became clear that placing soldiers in the same classes as other students had considerable drawbacks—it was believed that the men needed an intense course during which they received individual instruction. The idea was for the soldiers to undertake a period of concentrated training of four to six months at the conclusion of which they were drafted into workshops and factories. The subjects taught were determined according to demand and consisted of commercial work, engineering, woodwork and wool classing.\(^{51}\) The courses were practically based, and the training received lasted from 6 to 7 hours per day. Classes were controlled by technical schools through the Education Department, with the Repatriation Department paying for additional instructors and equipment and for the trainees’ sustenance allowances.\(^{52}\)

The Repatriation Department also assisted soldiers who sought to further their education at tertiary institutions: men who worked at a trade during the day could receive

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\(^{48}\) Ibid.


\(^{50}\) Ibid. A variety of different trades were involved in this scheme including: tailoring, bootmaking, watchmaking, wire-mattress making, electrical engineering, carpentry, bag and trunk making, carpentry, wire weaving, electrical engineering, photography, wicker working, plumbing, French polishing, etc.

\(^{51}\) NZH, April 14, 1919, p.9.

\(^{52}\) ‘Report of the Repatriation Department’, AJHR, H-30, 1919, p.4
free training at technical schools during the evenings, while in approved cases the department would pay for a returned man’s university fees and up to £5.5 for his textbooks. Preference was given to those men whose university studies had been interrupted by war and to applicants who showed special ability, especially if disabled. Where the financial assistance required was likely to be a significant amount, for instance in the case of medical students, a portion of the aid granted was by way of loan, to be repaid when the student was in a position to do so.53

The Repatriation Department attempted to address the needs of the country by establishing training programmes in industries in which there were a shortage of workers, or industries which were deemed crucial to the country’s future success. The lack of sheet metal workers in Auckland led to the implementation of a class designed to train discharged soldiers in three main fields - general tin-smithing, motor bodies and utensils for the dairy industry. The department believed that the work was ideally suited to partly disabled men as it was of a light nature.54

The department also placed a considerable amount of emphasis on encouraging returned men to become involved in farming, in recognition of the important role primary products played in New Zealand’s economy. Farm training courses were instituted at established government farms in Ruakura and Weraroa, the former being exclusively for disabled soldiers who were trained in the ‘lighter’ aspects of farming, such as bee-keeping, poultry raising and horticulture, whereas the latter specialised in the instruction of fit men in sheep, dairy and pig farming. New soldiers’ training farms were set up in the Wairarapa on land gifted to the government by local people, and on Motuihi Island near Auckland. In the South Island a seed-raising farm was established in Central Otago, while in Avonhead the Repatriation Department purchased a 300 acre block, half of which was set aside for settlement by discharged soldiers and half used as a teaching institution. A training farm for men suffering from tuberculosis was set up in Tauherenikau, as such men obviously could not receive training with fit soldiers.55

The Repatriation Department also attempted to meet the special needs of returned men afflicted with significant disabilities such as, tuberculosis, the loss of a limb or

limbs, and blindness. A special section of the department was set up with travelling after care officers in the districts who acted as a liaison between the Defence, Pensions, Lands and Survey Departments and Medical and Hospital Services. Lists of men who had returned to the Dominion with major disabilities were compiled and notification from the Director General of Medical Services was received whenever such patients were discharged from sanatoria or hospitals having completed their convalescence. After-care officers were then required to travel the country locating the aforementioned soldiers to ensure that they were progressing satisfactorily and had access to appropriate employment and training where desired.

With a seemingly comprehensive repatriation policy in place the government could look forward in earnest to the return of the main body of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. There was little doubt that the measures which had been put in place would be put to the test as the numbers of men returning home magnified. Policies which had been enacted when an intermittent stream of men were returning would now be expected to meet the needs of a flood of thousands of soldiers, many of whom were anxious to leave the war behind them and settle into civilian society as soon as possible, while others would undoubtedly require more comprehensive assistance from the State. There was no time for reflection and fine-tuning, as within nine months of the creation of the Repatriation Department, 66,000 men had been demobilised.

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CHAPTER THREE
POLICY IN PRACTICE

With any governmental policy or scheme, indeed with any proposal in life, the actual can differ markedly from the theoretical. Ideas which appear perfectly legitimate and practicable on paper can often prove unworkable in reality. This was the case with certain elements of the New Zealand Government’s Repatriation Policy, where deficiencies only became obvious once the measures were put to the test. While there were undoubtedly aspects of the schemes which were successful, it is considerably easier to identify their shortcomings as they invariably received more attention in printed matter of the time, and can be traced by amendments to the legislation in question. Moreover, it is perhaps an unfortunate predilection of human nature that we are more inclined to condemn than to commend.

World War One, though predicted to be a short lived conflict, extended out to four long years of fighting; the process of repatriation, however, was to take even longer, as the problems of individual men began to manifest, and the difficulties of policy implementation in a changing economic environment became apparent. In the booming economic climate of the immediate post war period, few would have predicted that a financial slump and worldwide depression were just around the corner. The government assumed that the repatriation policies it had set in place would adequately meet the needs of returned men, and, had the boom period continued, this might well have been the case. Unfortunately, the ensuing economic decline would highlight the shortcomings of the various legislations, to the detriment of many of the returned soldiers who sought to make use of their provisions.

The general impression of the men interviewed for the World War One Oral History Archive was that the government did not do enough to assist returned soldiers in adapting to civilian society. Bert Stokes was especially critical of the government’s efforts, given the promises that Massey and Ward had made when they visited the troops in France- the underlying theme of their speeches had been ‘don’t worry boys, when you come back we’ll look after you.’\(^1\) Bert was adamant that these assurances were not borne out in post war New Zealand where, for instance, soldiers were placed on farms ‘that

\(^1\) Bert Stokes, OHC-002769.
were just hopeless.' He was unsure what other measures the government could have adopted to aid the soldiers' resettlement, but was adamant that there were certain men who needed assistance in establishing themselves in a business or trade. He mentioned in particular the large number of young men who, while supposed to be twenty years of age at enlistment, were often considerably younger, and had not embarked on a career before they left.² Vic Nicholson recalled the difficulties in adjusting to civilian life and remarked that

...you got no assistance whatsoever with rehabilitation. They [the government] made a big song and dance about that, but there was really nothing.³ Russell Weir, was decidedly more critical, describing the government's performance as a 'disgrace', and emphasising repeatedly how 'poorly' they had done.⁴ A more balanced appraisal was given by William Jamieson who, when questioned on the government's performance gave the rather cryptic reply- 'Well I don't know...at that time nobody had nothing. So nothing from nothing, you get nothing, isn't it?'⁵ Beethoven Algar summarised the general feeling of many returned soldiers, the government had failed to offer enough support:

They certainly didn't do much for us...There were no handouts or anything like that...I know for a long time you got no thanks for being a returned soldier. They took it for granted that you should have gone.⁶

Which raises the question, were the experiences of these returned soldiers atypical, or did the government's repatriation policy contain a number of inherent flaws which rendered it unable to adequately assist men who had sacrificed so much for their country? We begin by looking at the measures which were introduced prior to the conclusion of hostilities: the Discharged Soldiers' Information Department, and the War Pensions and land settlement schemes, and move on to look at the workings of the Repatriation Department.

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² Ibid.
³ Vic Nicholson, cited in Tolerton and Boyack, In the Shadow of War, p. 92.
⁵ William Jamieson, MSC 2674.
⁶ Beethoven Algar, cited in Tolerton and Boyack, In the Shadow of War, p.126.
The Discharged Soldiers' Information Department has received only very scant attention from scholars. The department itself appears to have been essentially a stopgap measure designed to meet the needs of the returned soldier in the short term. Little has been written about its activities and, as such, its success, or lack thereof, is open to conjecture.

The department was created in August 1915 and was faced with the difficult task of finding employment for soldiers who were discharged from further service as a result of either illness or disability. In a number of instances men had sustained permanent injuries and were unable to resume their previous occupations; such men required training in order to obtain employment in more suitable areas.

The minister in charge of the department, Mr Herdman, recognised the enormity of his task and was quick to utilise the assistance of other organisations to alleviate any possible difficulties. For instance, Herdman approached local authorities in Auckland, including the Mayor and committees in charge of patriotic funds, with a proposal for co-ordinating their work with that of the department, in order to best address the needs of the returned soldier. These efforts were commended by The New Zealand Herald, which believed that co-operation with other authorities was crucial to the success of the department.7

While little has been documented about the actual workings of the department, one can make some assumptions about the difficulties it may have experienced. It is possible, for instance, that the work of the department may have been hampered by its inability to assist a returned soldier until he had been discharged by the Defence Department. Similarly, soldiers who were injured or unwell remained under the auspices of the Public Health Department until restored to health, or unable to receive any further benefit from medical treatment. In either case, the Discharged Soldiers' Information Department could do little to assist men in finding work until other departments had finished with them, which must have invariably led to delays in the overall repatriation process.8

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7 *NZH*, 20 October 1915, p.4
8 Ibid., 22 October 1915, p.7.
The 1940 Treasury Report, ‘Rehabilitation of Returned Members of the Forces,’ which investigated the government’s repatriation policy with a view to establishing a similar scheme for World War Two returned soldiers, contained a brief critique of the Discharged Soldiers’ Information Department, describing it as being limited in function and powers, but conceding that it had carried out some commendable work. This admission was quickly qualified by the assertion that any credit in obtaining employment for returned soldiers should be given to the numerous local boards and committees, and the readiness of employers to welcome back their former employees. The favourable economic climate in New Zealand and the ongoing shortage of labour also undoubtedly assisted the department in its task, as a considerable number of men were able to find employment without engaging its services.\(^9\)

Once the number of soldiers returning began to increase substantially, it became obvious that the machinery of the Discharged Soldiers’ Information Department was insufficient. The press, public and N.Z.R.S.A. began to call for a more comprehensive policy to address the important issue of repatriation. The association was particularly fervent in its lobbying of the government and sent deputations to parliament to illustrate its dissatisfaction. The government’s response was to assert that the department was responsible for repatriating returned soldiers, however, this premise lacked substance, especially when Herdman himself declared that his organisation was solely concerned with the issue of employment.\(^10\) Eventually the government succumbed to this pressure and in December 1918 established the Repatriation Department.

The granting of pensions to disabled returned soldiers and their dependants under the War Pensions Act of 1915 highlighted the government’s desire to ensure that those who had been permanently scarred by their war effort were compensated for their losses. Mayhew has argued that the N.Z.R.S.A was initially relatively silent on the pension issue, which he attests arose from the fact that the association lacked the necessary personnel to thoroughly investigate the scheme.\(^11\) The association quickly compensated for this early

\(^9\) Greig, ‘Rehabilitation of Returned Members of the Forces,’ p.17.
\(^11\) Ibid., p.95.
reticence and became an open and persistent critic of the pensions legislation. It is through their remonstrations that we can gain some idea of the shortcomings of the legislation.\(^{12}\)

One of the initial preoccupations of the N.Z.R.S.A. involved appealing for the increases to pensions afforded under the 1917 amendment act to be paid retrospectively to those soldiers who had returned earlier. The government was reluctant to accede to this demand, as it would have involved the expenditure of around £615,000, once dependants were brought into consideration. After much deliberation it finally agreed to make £500,000 available for distribution, but refused to cover children, a move which enraged the N.Z.R.S.A., who continued to protest until September 1919 when retrospective allowances were finally awarded to children at a cost of £249,000.\(^{13}\)

In September 1920, the N.Z.R.S.A. began to agitate for further increases in the amount allocated by pensions. The association was adamant that it did not wish to ‘slate’ the government, as it had done a great deal for returned soldiers, but it believed that more could be done. It was argued that the present pension of £2 per week for a totally disabled soldier was inadequate and should be increased to £3 10s a week in accordance with the corresponding increase in cost of living. Similar increases were advocated for temporarily or partly disabled soldiers. The association stressed that the government had a duty to provide pensions for totally and partially disabled soldiers which at the very least allowed them to live ‘decently.’\(^{14}\)

In addition to increases in pension, the N.Z.R.S.A. also pressed for the establishment of a Pensions Appeal Board, to hear submissions from those men whose applications had been denied, comprising a Judge and two medical practitioners, one of whom they would nominate.\(^{15}\) These demands were only moderately successful. Parliament allocated a further £50,000 to increase pensions, the distribution of which was delegated to the

\(^{12}\) It is important to note that I have concentrated on the sections of the scheme which related to disabled soldiers and their dependants as opposed to those which pertain to the dependants of deceased soldiers. While there is little question that soldiers’ widows, for instance, endured considerable hardship as a result of insufficient annuities, they remain outside my area of concern due to the exigencies of time and space.

\(^{13}\) Mayhew, ‘The New Zealand Returned Services’ Association’, pp.95-96.

\(^{14}\) QM, Volume III, No.30, October 1920, p. 46. The association argued that the cost of living had risen by 75-80 percent since the war had begun.

Pensions Board,\textsuperscript{16} and decided to set up a War Pensions Appeal Board consisting of three medical practitioners. Neither of these measures met with the approval of the N.Z.R.S.A.; £50,000 was considered insufficient, while the proposed Pensions Appeal Board differed considerably from that envisaged by the association. The three medical practitioners were to be appointed by the Defence Minister and the function of the board was confined to medical appeals. The N.Z.R.S.A. considered this to be a grave mistake, as most of the dissatisfaction regarding pensions was economic in nature, and urged that the Appeal Board should also hear general appeals.\textsuperscript{17}

In 1921 the N.Z.R.S.A. embarked on a vigorous campaign to bring to the government’s attention the deficiencies of the pension legislation. As well as seeking a general increase in pensions the association had developed a series of more specific grievances. The N.Z.R.S.A had considerable difficulty accepting the logic of the schedule of injuries system adopted by the government in 1917. They cited as proof of the inadequacy of the system the fact it deemed the loss of a hand and a foot to be equivalent in disability to total paralysis, when clearly the latter complaint was more debilitating. The association also considered that the more serious amputations were assessed at too low a value – a man who had lost a finger on his right hand was entitled to 20 percent of the maximum pension, whilst a man whose right arm had been amputated at the shoulder joint only received 80 percent. They argued that a man who had lost his entire arm was more than four times as incapacitated as a man without a finger. A further contention held by the organisation was that men with multiple injuries did not receive adequate compensation - a soldier who had lost both an eye and his arm at shoulder level, received 50 percent for the first injury and 80 percent for the latter which it was argued should guarantee him a total of 130 percent, yet he received only 100 percent or £2 a week. The N.Z.R.S.A. recommended that the authorities consider the scheme adopted by

\textsuperscript{16}QM, vol III, No.33, Jan 1921, p.36. The Pensions Board subsequently decided to increase the pensions of the following: (a) totally blind soldiers, 10s a week (b) soldiers who have lost two limbs, 10s a week (c) soldiers in hospital receiving full pensions, 10s a week (d) all soldiers totally incapacitated in receipt of temporary full pensions, 10s a week (e) soldiers in receipt of permanent pensions of full amount, an amount according to the merits of each case (f) soldiers in receipt of full pensions with three or more children on a pension, 5s for each child, in lieu of 10s as above.

\textsuperscript{17}Article No.? The Pensions Board and the Pensions Appeal Board’, in New Zealand Returned Soldiers Association, War Pensions, Wellington, 1921.
the French government, whereby both the nature of the injury and the effect it had on the professional capabilities of the soldier were assessed.¹⁸

While the N.Z.R.S.A. had previously advocated an increase of 75 percent on all pensions, in 1921 they decided that in view of the country’s worsening economic climate this was unreasonable and resolved instead to urge the Government to apply the aforementioned increase only to those pensions awarded to men with disabilities greater than 50 percent. They argued that as the majority of pensioners’ injuries had been assessed at under 50 percent, the proposed increase would not be such a drain on the country’s finances and the benefit would be distributed to those who were most in need of assistance— the badly injured. In addition, they stressed that they aimed to be reasonable and that if the desired increase was approved, a reduction in pensions should occur if the cost of living decreased. This statement was qualified by the assertion that the maximum pension should never fall below its current rate of £2 a week.¹⁹

Further demands made by the N.Z.R.S.A. at this time were that the scale of pensions should be determined every three years, and be based on the Government Statistician’s cost of living figures, and that a fair minimum pension be determined. The article concluded with an appeal to all who appreciated fairness and justice to ensure that returned soldiers received more from the public than ‘bare sympathy.’²⁰

As a direct result of this agitation by the N.Z.R.S.A. the government decided to hold a Commission of Inquiry. The commission sat in Wellington from the 3rd to the 11th of October 1922 and heard evidence from a variety of parties, including members of the War Pensions Board, Patriotic societies, the N.Z.R.S.A., and medical practitioners.²¹ The commission considered the N.Z.R.S.A.’s claims and, in light of the evidence presented, reached a number of conclusions. Perhaps the most important outcome was the institution of an economic pension, set at a maximum rate of £1 10s a week, which could increase and decrease according to variations in the cost of living. The economic pension

was granted by the War Pensions Board to those men already in receipt of a disability pension, after due consideration of the applicant's ability to acquire suitable employment, his personal earnings, property and other sources of income.\textsuperscript{22} It was decided that the economic pension would be reviewed annually, rather than triennially, in light of the instability of the economic climate.\textsuperscript{23} The commission also decided to repeal the Medical Pensions Appeal Board, which had never gained the support of the N.Z.R.S.A., and to replace it with a new Pensions Appeal Board. The right of appeal was now afforded to any applicant who had been refused a pension on the grounds that their condition was not attributable to their war service and to those who wished to have their pension reassessed on medical grounds.\textsuperscript{24} The commission also called for a regrading of the schedule of injuries to be carried out by three orthopaedic specialists, however it was recommended that the percentages involved should not be reduced. The allowance paid to an attendant who assisted a totally disabled soldier was also increased from £1 a week to a maximum of £3 a week, to be distributed at the War Pension Board's discretion.\textsuperscript{25}

One of the best insights into the world of the returned soldier was provided by the Ex-Soldiers Rehabilitation Commission which was established by the government, at the behest of the N.Z.R.S.A., to investigate the economic and social position of returned soldiers within the Dominion, specifically those who suffered from either physical or financial hardship. The commission was charged with assessing the adequacy of the various forms of state assistance available to the aforementioned men. The first public sessions was held in Dunedin on the 26\textsuperscript{th} October 1929, followed by sittings in Wellington, Auckland, Rotorua and Christchurch. In each centre the local R.S.A.s were responsible for organising the forums, with the majority of the evidence being presented as prepared typewritten statements. Overall the commission received submissions from 166 witnesses.\textsuperscript{26}


\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., pp.10-12. The War Pensions Medical Appeal Board had lapsed at the time of the report but no mention is made of when, or for that matter why, it ceased operations. In its short existence it heard 600 appeals, of which only 31 were upheld, with 448 being dismissed, 43 reduced, 5 made permanent, 20 cancelled and in 53 cases the soldier did not appear.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p.15.

\textsuperscript{26} Report of the Ex-Soldiers Rehabilitation Commission, pp.1-3.
The general conclusion of the Ex-Soldiers Rehabilitation Commission was that the pension allocated to men classified as being 100 percent disabled was adequate, however, that which was granted to men who suffered from intermittent economic or physical disabilities was not received as favourably. The commission was especially critical of economic pensions, which, in view of the manner by which they were granted and withdrawn, succeeded in destroying a man's confidence and reducing his desire to find work. Cases were heard where men with families acquired jobs only to find that the wages they received amounted to five shillings more than what they received on the pension, resulting in the general impression, which was substantiated by a number of witnesses, that the economic pension led to idleness. It was also believed that economic pensions were arbitrarily awarded to any applicant with a disability of 50 percent or more, and that appropriate attention to the individual nature of each case was not being given. The overall weakness of the system, according to the commission, was the failure to link the granting of an economic pension with attempts to help the soldier to find adequate employment. It was firmly believed that since the closure of the Repatriation Department (see below) the State had surrendered its responsibility to rehabilitate men and help train them for employment. The overwhelming opinion of the witnesses who submitted evidence to the commission was that disabled men would benefit both physically and mentally from paid employment; thus if the government established an organisation which found work for disabled soldiers, many of those who would otherwise rely on the economic pension, would become self-sufficient.

The Treasury Report of 1940 commented on the late passage of the War Pensions Act, emphasising that in 1915 New Zealand had already been involved in a major battle (at Gallipoli) and seven hundred soldiers had returned home. The report also highlighted the experimental nature of the legislation, given that it was the government's first attempt to provide war pensions on a large scale, and asserted that this experimentation resulted in the need for a series of amendments to address the various problems that arose. The difficulty in proving that a disability was attributable to war service was also alluded to, with Greig concluding that this was often impossible, given that injuries could present in

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27 Ibid., p.8.  
28 Greig, 'Rehabilitation of Returned Members of the Forces,' pp.9-10.  
29 Ibid., p.10.
a variety of forms, which at first glance appeared unconnected to the man’s service.\textsuperscript{30} The overall conclusion of the Treasury Report of 1940 was that in the post war slump of the early 1920s the pensions provided by the government proved to be inadequate. Moreover, in the period of economic hardship the pension was insufficient to meet the general needs of the many disabled men who experienced difficulties in obtaining employment and for those who were unable to work. The report felt that the economic pension introduced as a result of the 1922 Commission of Inquiry had proved its worth and was meeting the requirements of those men who had begun to ‘crack up’ years after their return to New Zealand.\textsuperscript{31}

Another aspect of the government’s repatriation scheme which has been criticised for failing to meet the needs of returned soldiers is the land settlement scheme established under the Discharged Soldiers’ Settlement Act of 1915. The scheme, which was administered by the Lands and Survey Department, epitomised the widely held notion that the ‘vast’ amounts of ‘available’ land in New Zealand should be utilised for the production of primary produce. New Zealand’s farming industry had experienced an unprecedented boom during World War One, with increasing demand for agricultural products resulting in artificially high prices. This general optimism led to a widespread belief that returned soldiers, once placed on the land, would make considerable profits - a favourable outcome for both the soldier and the state.\textsuperscript{32} An article in The New Zealand Herald, written as the bill was being debated in parliament, claimed that if suitable men were placed ‘on reasonable areas of productive land, no better investment could be found for Government funds.’\textsuperscript{33} A later article in the same paper reiterated these sentiments, stressing that the country urgently required land that was ‘lying idle’ to be brought into productive use, and that there could be no more worthy recipients of Crown land than

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid. Tom Lane also mentioned the difficulties associated with getting a pension - ‘It was a hell of a job I don’t mind telling you to get a pension after the First World War’ - and recalled that many disabled men who were able to get a pension struggled to survive on it. Tom Lane, MSC-002683.

\textsuperscript{31} Greig, ‘Rehabilitation of Returned Members of the Forces’, p.2.

\textsuperscript{32} Powell, ‘Soldier Settlement in New Zealand’, p.145.

\textsuperscript{33} NZH, 25 September 1915, p.6. (My emphasis added).
returned soldiers who had already proved themselves willing to sacrifice everything for their country.\textsuperscript{34}

While the government’s land settlement scheme undoubtedly arose from noble intentions to reward soldiers for their considerable efforts, for a number of men it resulted in further heartache and despair. By 1935, twenty nine percent of the 9500 farms had failed, and after years of labour intensive struggle some soldiers were forced to abandon their holdings. For many men the burden of failure was too much to bear and suicides were not unheard of.\textsuperscript{35} The reasons behind the failure of the land settlement scheme invariably relate to unforeseen difficulties, such as the economic slump of the 1920s, administrative errors and deficiencies in the selection of land.

From its inception the scheme was a popular one with many returned men desiring to obtain a piece of the country they had fought for, however land in the amounts required was often not forthcoming, one reason for this delay was the considerable amount of preparation which was involved. A further problem for the government was that they wanted to keep some land in reserve for the soldiers who would return with the main body, but they were obviously unable to predict when the war would end. They could not purchase large quantities of land and then leave them untended for significant periods because they would deteriorate. While the government wanted to accommodate the soldiers’ needs as they arrived back in the country, it was considered undesirable that those who returned first should gain any advantage over their comrades.\textsuperscript{36} The government’s policy of holding back on the purchase of land lead to inevitable delays when the main body began to return and the demand for holdings increased, leaving the N.Z.R.S.A. to conclude that the amount of land available was insufficient.\textsuperscript{37} Similarly \textit{The New Zealand Herald} criticised the government for not making more land available and suggested that the Crown had already possessed idle land which could be opened up for settlement.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, 28 October 1915, p.6.
\textsuperscript{35} Tolerton and Boyack, \textit{In the Shadow of War}, p. 247. Tom Lane recalled 6 farms he knew about in Riccarton- four of the soldiers involved had committed suicide while two had walked off during the Depression, ‘Tom Lane’, MSC 2682.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{QMJ}, Vol II, No. 20, December 1919, p.50.
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{NZH}, Jan 20 1919, p.4.
The N.Z.R.S.A. also commented on the delays in the functioning of the Land Boards. An article in *Quick March* stated that the Land and Survey Department’s procedures were hampered by ‘red tape’, and that staff showed a discernible lack of initiative. The building of roads and other essential communications was also seen to be taking too long, especially as the soldier settlers were being charged for these improvements and were paying interest on work that had not been completed. A meeting of the N.Z.R.S.A. in 1919 outlined further administrative difficulties which the association believed were hampering the department’s efficiency and resulting in long delays for returned soldiers who were looking to acquire land. These included the fact that the applicant had to meet with the Land Board in person which for some soldiers necessitated a substantial amount of travel; the fact that the Land Board only met once a month, with applications that missed a given month’s meeting having to wait until the subsequent month; and that all applications had to receive the Minister of Lands’ approval. The association believed these conditions were unnecessary and strove for them to be revoked. It also asked for local boards to be established in the smaller centres to avoid the much-aggrieved delays in processing.

Aside from these administrative shortcomings, the fundamental problem which blighted the scheme from the outset was the fact that the government was forced to purchase sections at inflated prices. Land prices had risen appreciably during the economic boom of the war period, and showed no sign of abating following the Armistice. Soldiers who brought the holdings were forced to amass significant debts in order to purchase the land, and became committed to large repayments, detrimentally affecting any profits they might have made. This problem became even more marked with the slump of the early 1920s when prices gained for primary products began to fall—export prices for wool plummeted, as did those for dairy products. With the accompanying decline in profits many soldier settlers found it difficult to meet their financial commitments. In March 1921, *Quick March* reported that many soldiers were

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41 Powell, ‘Soldier Settlement in New Zealand,’ p.143.
42 Ibid., p.152.
beginning to ‘feel the pinch’ and expressed concern about the men’s ability to pay the large rentals due on some of the more highly priced properties. In the same article the government was chastised for having produced the ‘boom’ in land values by creating a situation whereby soldiers competed for insufficient amounts of improved land.\(^{43}\)

In November 1921 the situation became so dire that the Lands and Survey Department decided to restrict land applications to badly disabled men and men afflicted with tuberculosis, foregoing all other requests in order to assist existing settlers who were experiencing difficulties. The N.Z.R.S.A. approved of this decision, appreciating that even experienced farmers were struggling as a result of price decreases, and realising that men who attempted to settle on the land at this stage were destined to fail unless they were afforded considerable assistance. By July 1922 the association’s Dominion Executive was urging the government to establish commissions in each district to revalue the land to allow the soldiers an opportunity to keep their holdings.\(^{44}\)

By 1923 the distress amongst a large number of soldier settlers had become so marked that special Boards of Inquiry were established to investigate the situation and compile a report for the government. Detailed inspections of settlers' farms were only conducted at the request of the soldier owner. Powell has argued that as many of the soldiers misinterpreted the aims of the Board’s investigations, and saw an opportunity to secure a revaluation of their land which would result in lower rent, the resulting statistical report was unsatisfactory. He further asserts that the report probably covers most of the genuine cases of hardship, but may also have included a number of the aforementioned opportunists.\(^{45}\) Nonetheless, the Inquiry Boards’ findings provide us with an opportunity to deduce the reasons behind the scheme’s failure.

The overwhelming impression one gains from reading the reports of the individual Inquiry Boards is that on the whole they believed the Land Boards had been generous in their treatment of returned soldiers. On a number of occasions the Land Boards were

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\(^{43}\) QM, Vol III, No. 35, March 1921, p.41.
\(^{44}\) Ibid., Vol V, No. 3, July 1922, p.25. While it appears strange that the government would still be accepting applications from incapacitated soldiers when those from able men were being denied, it is probable that the former would receive substantial assistance from the state, or alternatively would be involved in ‘light farming.’
congratulated for their efforts. The reasons given for the significant numbers of soldiers who were failing to prosper under the settlement scheme varied from one locality to the next, yet a number of prominent factors can be identified. One of the primary reasons elucidated was the excessive price the government paid for land, which resulted in high rentals for the soldier settlers. In the Nelson district, for instance, it was argued that the original valuations exceeded the real value of the land and even without the economic slump the majority of men would have found it impossible to keep up with payments and enjoy a decent standard of living. The high costs associated with making necessary improvements to the land was also stated as a reason for the financial problems many men were experiencing. In the North Auckland district it was stressed that a large number of properties required significant work before the pastures were in a position where stock could be run on them. Similarly, in the Hawkes Bay, the Inquiry Board stated that it was the high prices paid for stock, fencing and buildings which was financially 'crippling' the settlers, not the rent they paid. The suitability of the soldiers was a further problem identified in a number of the districts. The Auckland Inquiry Board believed that the government had not subjected applicants to a strict enough examination regarding their qualifications for going on the land. In both Taranaki and Wellington the main problem hampering the success of the soldier settlers was believed to be the economic slump, however, the poor quality of the land selected was also criticised. Placing soldiers on unimproved (bush) land was considered to be a mistake as it was difficult to farm and the returns gained were small. An additional problem identified in Marlborough was that the settlers did not have enough of their own capital and in some cases had little or no farming experience. In Otago and Nelson the poor quality of the land was identified as the most significant problem. ‘Worn out,’ unproductive pasture was described, as were sections that were plagued by weeds.

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47 Ibid., p.5.
48 Ibid., p.7.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., pp.11-12.
51 Ibid., pp.13-14.
52 Ibid., pp. 15, 19.
must be duly noted that the Southland District Inquiry Board reported that soldiers in the area had little complaint and were making favourable progress.\textsuperscript{54}

The subsequent report revealed that of the 4,332 farms inspected, 50 percent were deemed to have been managed successfully, 30.5 percent were considered ‘temporarily unsuccessful’ and 18.5 percent failures. Jordain concluded that the success rate might have been even higher, given that 3,303 settlers did not respond to the invitation for inspection. As a direct result of the report’s findings an amendment act was passed in 1923 establishing a Dominion Revaluation Board which had the authority to revalue a settler’s land and also to decrease a soldier’s rent or mortgage. Farms that had been abandoned were allocated to other soldiers, or civilians where necessary.\textsuperscript{55} More than 5000 applications were received for revaluation and during the next two years £2.5 million in capital was written off.\textsuperscript{56}

The 1940 Treasury’s report contained a scathing appraisal of the government’s land settlement scheme. As with other repatriation measures the report concluded that inadequate planning was undertaken which had disastrous consequences. When the bulk of the New Zealand forces returned the government was forced to acquire large amounts of land from private owners at short notice, which resulted in land prices, already inflated by high export prices, sky rocking. The scheme was also condemned for the considerable waste which resulted: attempts were made to settle unprofitable land, money was spent improving land which was later abandoned and the state suffered considerable financial losses. The report concluded that a number of factors resulted in many soldiers failing to be successful farmers, these included an inability to settle down (which it deemed the major factor), compromised physical fitness, overwhelming financial commitments, and the unsuitability of the land. The summation was made that an inability to adjust to rural life, coupled with a lack of experience and suitable training, led many men to revert to their former occupations if the opportunity presented itself. The report also criticised the authorities’ selection of soldiers, stating that many men lacked the capital necessary for such a venture. The report did concede that some benefits were gained by the initiation of the scheme, though these were limited. A large amount of

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p.21.  
\textsuperscript{55} Jourdain, \textit{Land Legislation and Settlement in New Zealand}, pp.48-49.  
\textsuperscript{56} Burdon, \textit{A New Dominion}, p.42.
land, even if some of it was substandard, was brought into use and several thousand men managed to eke out a living for a short time. Those who gained the most from the scheme however, were undoubtedly the landowners who sold their holdings to the government. The inherent problems in the scheme were said to have arisen from three main areas: the deceptive economic conditions of the time, a general lack of caution on the part of the authorities, and legislative errors. In addition, it was stressed that the Land Boards selected land which was not suitable for settlement primarily because their judgement was obscured by the presence of high prices which made even marginal land initially profitable. The lack of sufficiently trained staff to supervise settlers was also alluded to.57

The lessons learnt from the failure of the soldier settlement scheme laid the foundations for a more successful scheme to be devised during World War Two. Thomson argues that these lessons became virtual ‘articles of faith’ and included the following: land values must be controlled; the State must be in charge of developing the land; men should only be settled on improved farms; each farm must be an economic unit; men must be carefully supervised; all applicants for land settlement assistance must be classified, and training provided for inexperienced men.58 Thus the World War One soldier settlement scheme cannot be deemed a complete failure, as it provided an invaluable blueprint which could be utilised and improved on, to benefit a later generation of returned soldiers from other conflicts.

The final aspect of the Government’s repatriation policy was the Repatriation Department which came into being one month following the conclusion of hostilities in December 1918. One of the earliest criticisms made of the Repatriation Department pertained to its reluctance to outline the nature of its policy. An analysis of several of the newspapers of the time reveals a widespread belief that the previously held fear that the establishment of a board of four members would lead to delays was proving well founded.59 The press reported that the delays were due to the fact that two of the four

57 Greig, ‘Rehabilitation of Returned Members of the Forces,’ pp.12-16.
59 The Repatriation Board consisted of two Liberal Party members and two Reform party members (see above).
board members, significantly both Reform Party ministers, were absent from Wellington. *The Otago Daily Times* argued that had one of the absentees been a member of the Reform party and the other Liberal, progress might have been possible, however, seeing as the reason behind the establishment of a board in the first instance was to prevent either party gaining from association with such an important department, delay was inevitable. A later article in the same paper went as far as suggesting that the entire scheme was ‘breaking down’.\(^{60}\) *The Otago Witness* also condemned the government for allowing ‘political pettiness and suspicion’ to jeopardise the welfare of returned soldiers, and implored the Repatriation Board to ‘wake up out of its present apathy and rise to the occasion’.\(^{61}\)

There was a general fear, which was wholly justifiable, that the Repatriation Department was unprepared for the impending influx of returned soldiers. By mid January 1919, the public had received no information regarding the workings of the department and was beginning to question whether any plans had actually been put in place.\(^{62}\) The *New Zealand Herald* argued that every New Zealander was prepared to do everything possible to aid the returned soldier and expressed a concern that:

...department inertia may prevent the expression of the real feeling of the country towards the soldier, and that the men who proved New Zealand’s readiness for war may return to find her unprepared for peace....

Minister of Parliament Downie Stewart, a staunch proponent of a single minister being in charge of the department, expressed similar fears about the lack of progress exhibited by the Repatriation Board. He resolved that unless an efficient repatriation scheme was established the government would be confronted with a considerable number of unhappy men.\(^{63}\)

The N.Z.R.S.A was also initially critical of Repatriation Department. An article in *The Otago Witness* reported a meeting of the Dominion Executive of the N.Z.R.S.A. in which the members voiced their disapproval of the department’s efforts in the first three months of its existence. The association also criticised the government for its delay in

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\(^{61}\) *OW*, 15 January 1919, p.36.


\(^{63}\) *OW*, 22 January 1919, p.7.
establishing the department, as it believed this had resulted in unnecessary suffering by disabled and partly disabled men. It was assumed that the Repatriation Board still did not have an adequate policy and was continuing to seek guidance. Members also stressed their opinion that the government was allowing its responsibilities to be assumed by patriotic societies and other civilian organisations. In an article in *Quick March* the author expressed his belief that the Government’s repatriation policy was essentially ‘to push the returned soldier back into any old job that is available.’ He believed that soldiers should be trained to enter agricultural pursuits as the land could and should absorb a large number of men. He was dubious about the need for men to be trained for other occupations such as typing and book keeping, as these were probably already suitably staffed, and implored the government to ensure that work was available before training commenced. An article in the same issue stressed the fact that repatriation was an issue affecting the whole community, unless a policy which successfully utilised the talents of the returned soldier was instituted, the whole country would suffer. It also argued that parliament had little conception of the enormity of the task at hand and expressed concern that if it failed to ensure it fully understood the matter New Zealand’s prosperity would be threatened.

Having initially been one of the Repatriation Department’s staunchest critics, the N.Z.R.S.A. soon became an advocate, and on occasion openly praised the department’s efforts— in 1921 the association congratulated the department for its ‘honest endeavours to repatriate our soldiers.’ One of the few criticisms the N.Z.R.S.A. did make of the Repatriation Department concerned the amount of money extended under the business loans. The association asked that the maximum amount available be increased from £300 to £500, as they believed that £300 was only sufficient for the establishment of a very basic business, and forced returned soldiers to commit to additional loans with exorbitant interest rates. A further complaint made by the N.Z.R.S.A. concerned decentralisation of the board, as it was believed that this led to variations in policy. The association

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64 *OW*, 23 April 1919, p.47.
66 Ibid., p.25.
67 Ibid., Vol. IV, No. 4, August 1921, p.34.
argued that furniture loans were considerably easier to attain in certain areas. While the association did not pinpoint smaller centres as being particularly at fault, it seems likely that in less populated areas there would be an increased chance that the repatriation officer would know the applicant personally, thereby the pressures of social contact may have made refusing assistance difficult.

Other shortcomings of the Repatriation Department were outlined in a 1940 report by the Treasury which investigated the government’s repatriation policy in preparation for the institution of a rehabilitation programme for soldiers returning from World War Two. The report questioned the wisdom of district boards and local committees having to submit every application for loans in excess of £50 to the central Repatriation Board for approval, stressing that this invariably led to unnecessary delays for men who were anxious to get back into civil life. It also concluded that the maximum loan entitlement should have been adjusted to suit the nature of the business the soldier wished to establish, rather than being fixed at £300. The report attempted to refute claims that the department was overly generous in its treatment of applicants, revealing that any perceived generosity was based on the number of loans approved, rather than the amount of money actually involved- the total of business loans amounted to just over £1,000,000.

The report also noted that while in some districts considerable caution was exercised, with stringent attention being paid to the man’s previous experience or training and whether the business was likely to be successful, there was evidence to suggest that in small towns procuring a loan was considerably easier. While checks were in place, with loans over £50 requiring approval by the Central Board of Ministers, in most cases the board had little choice but to accept the local recommendation. Initially monthly inspections were carried out following approval of the loan, but as the number of businesses involved increased, this procedure was abandoned.

As early as 1921 it became clear that the government was looking to downgrade the activities of the Repatriation Boards. In an article in *Quick March* in March 1921 it was reported that the government had decided to cut the number of members of the district boards due to the decreasing amount of work that both the boards and the local

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69 Ibid., Vol. IV, No.3 July, 1921, p.41.
70 Greig, ‘Rehabilitation of Returned Members of the Forces’, p.18.
71 Ibid., pp.19-20.
committees were faced with. Mr Guthrie, the Minister in charge of the Repatriation Department, deflected criticism from the department by stressing that the boards had suggested the downsizing.\footnote{QM, Vol.III, No. 35, March 1921, p.38.}

In February 1922 the N.Z.R.S.A. was informed that the government had decided the assistance offered to discharged soldiers under the Repatriation Act would cease to be available after June 30 1922.\footnote{Ibid., Vol. IV, No. 10 February 1922, p.28.} The N.Z.R.S.A was aghast at this decision, especially as it viewed the department as having been markedly successful, and resolved to pressure the government to allow the department to continue its work until at least June 30 1923. The Auckland R.S.A. in particular urged its fellow associations to lobby their respective Members of Parliament to endeavour to see advances under the act made available for a further eighteen months. They were adamant that many returned soldiers had yet to make use of assistance available because at the time of their return they were not of sufficient age to set out in business, or had simply not desired to do so at the time.\footnote{Ibid., Vol IV, No. 11, March 1922, p.27; Ibid., Vol V, No. 2, June 1922, p.37.} This pressure appeared to have some effect with cabinet deciding to give the Repatriation Department a six-month reprieve to continue its work until December 1922. The N.Z.R.S.A, while congratulating the decision, nonetheless asked for the department’s activities to be extended for a further twelve months, in order to ensure that all returned soldiers who wished to access the benefits of the scheme had ample opportunity to do so.\footnote{Ibid., Vol V, No.3, July 1922, p.21.} On this occasion however, they were unsuccessful, and on the December 31 1922 the Repatriation Department closed down. The association questioned why such a ‘young and healthy’ department had been forced to close, especially when they believed that it had given the ‘greatest satisfaction to all ex-soldiers.’\footnote{Ibid., Vol V, No.9, January 1923, pp.21-22.} The government gave as its official reason for the closure its belief that the work of re-establishing discharged soldiers into civilian life had neared completion.\footnote{"Report of the Repatriation Department', AJHR, H-30, 1922, p.1.}

At the same time as the department was winding up, the various boards and local committees throughout the country also closed down, and on April 1 1923 the collection of loan repayments was transferred to the State Advances Department. Two years later
all the powers of the Repatriation Department formally passed to the State Advances Department.\textsuperscript{78}

The aforementioned 1940 Treasury Report-‘Rehabilitation of Returned Members of the Forces’- considered that the government had made a serious mistake in shutting down the Repatriation Department in 1922, highlighting that the Australian equivalent was still operating.\textsuperscript{79} This assessment was echoed by several of the contributors who made submissions to the Ex-Soldiers rehabilitation commission in 1929. Mr White, Secretary of the Dunedin R.S.A, believed that the early closure of the Repatriation Department was in part responsible for the increased levels of unemployment seen amongst returned soldiers at the time of the commission, arguing that:

[o]n their return to New Zealand many men were in so unsettled a state that they did not know what to do in the future, and for a considerable period of time they just drifted into casual employment or undertook unprofitable ventures which later they were impelled to give up.\textsuperscript{80}

The Secretary of the Oamaru R.S.A., Mr Colquhon, mirrored Mr White’s assertion that benefits available under the repatriation scheme had been withdrawn too early, stating that the scheme had existed during a prosperous period during which employment had been easy to procure. Moreover, many soldiers still had been receiving treatment in hospitals at this time and as such had not been able to make use of the available benefits. He believed that if the repatriation scheme was reintroduced such men would welcome the assistance rendered.\textsuperscript{81} The Secretary to the North Otago Soldiers’ Aid Association, Mr Piper, also sought the reopening of the Repatriation Department, believing that the scheme would be an even more resounding success if it was attempted again and that, more importantly, the cost involved could be lessened if the benefits were restricted to those with impaired health.\textsuperscript{82}

The government’s decision to close down the Repatriation Department in 1922 provides further evidence of their failure to appreciate the complexities of the

\textsuperscript{78} New Zealand Rehabilitation Board, \textit{War History of Rehabilitation}, p.5.

\textsuperscript{79} Greig, ‘Rehabilitation of Returned Members of the Forces,’ p.18.

\textsuperscript{80} The N.Z.R.S.A. Review- The Official Organ of the New Zealand Returned Soldiers Association (INC), (hereafter Review), Volume VI, No.2 November 1929, p.12.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p.17.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., p.18.
rehabilitation process. There is little doubt that a number of men were still experiencing difficulties, whilst many more would have problems at a later date (as seen by the submissions to the Ex-Soldiers' Rehabilitation Commission). Thomson argues that the government's misunderstanding of the intricacies of repatriation was not confined to the early closure of the department, but can be seen from a much earlier date. The Repatriation Board was not established until after the war had ended, yet 24,000 men, out of a total of 82,000 had returned before 1918. In addition, within nine months of the department's creation 66,000 men had demobilised, thus the department's administration was quickly put to the test. There was little time for officials to be trained and policy to be perfected.83

It is pertinent to look at some of the general conclusions reached by the 1929-30 Ex-Soldiers Rehabilitation Commission. The commission was suggested by the N.Z.R.S.A., which was disturbed by the increasing number of disabled men in receipt of economic pensions, and the rising number of ex-soldiers who were finding it difficult to obtain permanent employment. The association argued that it was too easy to state that the war had been over for ten years and that returned soldiers should be thoroughly integrated into civilian life, as the full extent of the havoc brought upon the men by their war experience could never be completely appreciated.84 With these sentiments in mind, the N.Z.R.S.A. proposed that a commission be established to investigate the difficulties experienced by returned soldiers and identify possible means of helping them to gain a more satisfactory existence.

The commission found that the average age of returned soldiers was between 38 and 45 years of age, and that those soldiers who were substantially older or younger than this average age were experiencing considerable difficulty. The commission was convinced that many men had lied about their age when enlisting and that a considerable number had been under the age of twenty. As a consequence many of these boys had not been established either economically or vocationally before they went overseas. Such men presented a real problem when they returned as they had received no prior training and

had never developed a ‘work ethic.’ More often than not they became involved in casual work because it paid substantially more than they would have received if they took on an apprenticeship; moreover, many were reluctant to compete with 16 and 17 year olds. While initially these men experienced few difficulties as a result of the prosperity which the country enjoyed following the war, the economic downturn had resulted in considerable hardship. Many had gone from one casual job to the next and it was only now that they were beginning to fear for their long term future and, especially as many had now married and had children, how to provide for their dependants. This anxiety was said to be ‘breaking the nerves’ of these men. At the other end of the spectrum were older men who had also lied about their age, this time understating it, and ‘enlisted in a spirit of patriotic fervour.’ When these men returned their former jobs were often not available, and they found it extremely difficult to obtain employment, especially when forced to compete with much younger men.85

The commission’s overall impression was that the government’s presumption that any negative effects of the soldier’s war service had already presented themselves was incorrect and had been made too early. Virtually all the medical experts who had submitted evidence to the commission were of the opinion that for many returned soldiers the detrimental effects of war were only just becoming apparent. Many men who were judged fit at the time of demobilisation were now suffering from a variety of medical complaints. In addition to medical complaints, a number of returned soldiers were also suffering economically as a direct consequence of having missed out on training or work related opportunities whilst serving overseas, and many were described as living on or below the ‘bread-and-butter line.’ The commission also believed that society’s interest in, and sympathy for, the returned soldier was beginning to decline, and unless it was awakened again the men could no longer look to society to address their grievances.86

The New Zealand Government’s repatriations scheme for World War One returned soldiers has been criticised for its lack of co-ordination87, which is hardly surprising given the number of different departments involved. This leads one to question whether

86 Ibid., pp.5-6.
87 New Zealand Rehabilitation Board, War History of Rehabilitation in New Zealand, p.6.
one governmental department should have administered the whole process. While this would have undoubtedly made things easier for the individual soldier, the failings of the system, which have already been identified, would still have arisen. The fundamental problem with the government’s repatriation scheme was that its policies were all hampered by a lack of planning, and perhaps more importantly, a lack of foresight. The government’s intentions are beyond reproach, they did seek to provide a ‘land fit for heroes’; they were simply unable to execute it.
CONCLUSION
THE LEGACY OF THE REPATRIATION SCHEME.

The New Zealand Government’s Repatriation scheme represented a genuine effort to meet the needs of World War One returned soldiers, in response to considerable public pressure. Burdon has described the land settlement scheme as ‘well-intentioned but ill-fated’, an assessment which can be extended to encapsulate the government’s overall policy.\(^1\) The government attempted to make provisions which were generous and befitted the sacrifices the soldiers had made, however, its efforts were hampered by haste, and a failure to understand the complexity of the unique challenge it was met with. To be fair, there were no precedents to which the government could look for guidance. Previous wars had involved professional armies, not civilians, and the number of men involved paled in comparison to that which had taken part in the Great War.

In addition, the government failed to appreciate the potential long-term detrimental effects of war service, and assumed that once men had attained permanent employment they would no longer require the assistance of the state, a belief which was no doubt reinforced by the buoyant state of the New Zealand economy in the immediate post war period. This misconception was pertinently illustrated in the decision to close down the Repatriation Department after only four years of operation. Submissions to the 1929-30 Ex Soldiers Rehabilitation Commission would later highlight that the Repatriation Department’s closure had been premature and had led to the unnecessary suffering of a number of soldiers.

A further criticism which was levelled at the government by both the N.Z.R.S.A. and the public, concerned its delay in introducing measures to assist returned soldiers, in particular the fact that the Repatriation Department was not established until after the cessation of hostilities. The government’s failure to make early preparations to address the needs of returned soldiers, gives further credence to the argument that it underestimated the degree of assistance that would be required. There was no preliminary period in which staff could be trained, or procedures fine-tuned, as the benefits available under the legislations were already required by soldiers who had returned from the war incapacitated by illness or injury.

\(^1\) Burdon, *The New Dominion*, p.42.
While it is useful to pinpoint these failings, it is perhaps more constructive to address what was learnt from them. A 1965 publication by the New Zealand Rehabilitation Board, which looks at the history of rehabilitation of soldiers in New Zealand from 1939 to 1965, concluded that the World War One repatriation scheme offered many lessons which proved invaluable when authorities began devising policies to assist World War Two returned soldiers. These lessons included recognition of the need for one department to be solely in charge of procedure; that the normal functions of existing departments should be utilised as much as possible; that local and ex servicemen should be represented in all activities; that the competence of ex-soldiers who sought assistance should be assured, and that the organisations established should continue to exist beyond the initial assistance stage.²

Although mistakes were undoubtedly made, they were taken to heart, and the lessons learned formed the basis of the rehabilitation scheme set in place for soldiers returning from World War Two. The decision to change the name of the scheme from ‘repatriation’ to ‘rehabilitation’, in itself suggests an increased understanding on the part of the government of the exigencies of returned soldiers.

² New Zealand Rehabilitation Board, War History of Rehabilitation in New Zealand, pp.5-6.
APPENDIX ONE

DEGREES OF DISABILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disability</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loss of two limbs</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of limb and eye</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of both hands</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of all fingers and thumbs</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of both feet</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of hand and foot</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of sight</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Paralysis</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunacy</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanently bedridden</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounds or injuries to the head or other organ involving total permanent disabling effects</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced incurable disease</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very serious facial disfigurement</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amputation of right arm through shoulder joint</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amputation of leg through hip joint</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of speech</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe facial disfigurement</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amputation of left: arm through shoulder</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amputation of right arm at or above elbow</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amputation of leg through knee joint or thigh</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amputation of left arm at or above elbow</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amputation of right arm below elbow</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amputation of leg below knee</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total deafness</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amputation of left arm below elbow</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amputation of right hand</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amputation of left hand</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of one eye</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of four fingers of right hand</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of four fingers of left hand</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of three fingers of right hand</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of thumb of right hand</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of three fingers of left hand</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of thumb of left hand</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of two fingers of right or left hand</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of index finger of right or left hand</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes (a) In cases of left handed men, certified to as such to the satisfaction of the Board, pensions in respect of injury to the left arm or hand will be at the rate prescribed as for injury to the right arm or hand, and compensation in respect of injury to the right arm or hand will be at the rate prescribed as for injury to the left arm or hand.
(b) For the purposes of this Schedule, the expression 'loss of' includes 'permanent loss of the use of.'
(c) Where a member of the Forces suffers or has suffered more than one of the injuries mentioned in this Schedule he shall not in any case be entitled to receive more than the maximum pension payable as for total disablement.

### APPENDIX TWO

**Maximum Rates of Pension in Case of Disablement Payable per Week**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank or Rating</th>
<th>To the Member per week</th>
<th>To the Wife</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private, Bombardier, lance-corporal, trooper, gunner, driver, sapper, trumpeter, bugler</td>
<td>£ 2 0 0</td>
<td>£ 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able seamen and equivalent ratings</td>
<td>£ 2 0 0</td>
<td>£ 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>£ 2 0 0</td>
<td>£ 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farrier, Shoeing-smith, Saddler, or Fitter (if bombardier, lance-corporal, gunner or private)</td>
<td>£ 2 0 0</td>
<td>£ 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lance-Sergeant (not paid as such)</td>
<td>£ 2 0 0</td>
<td>£ 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading Seaman and equivalent ratings</td>
<td>£ 2 0 0</td>
<td>£ 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant, Farrier-Corporal, Saddler-Corporal, Corporal-Fitter, Farrier-Sergeant, Saddler-Sergeant, Armourer-Sergeant, Sergeant-Fitter</td>
<td>£ 2 0 0</td>
<td>£ 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lance-Sergeant (paid as such)</td>
<td>£ 2 0 0</td>
<td>£ 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty Officer and equivalent ratings</td>
<td>£ 2 0 0</td>
<td>£ 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squadron, Battery or Company Sergeant-Major, Quartermaster-Sergeant, Colour-Sergeant, Staff Sergeant, Pay-clerk</td>
<td>£ 2 0 0</td>
<td>£ 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Petty Officer and equivalent ratings</td>
<td>£ 2 0 0</td>
<td>£ 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimental Sergeant-Major, Regimental Quarter-Master-Sergeant</td>
<td>£ 2 0 0</td>
<td>£ 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer and equivalent ranks, Sub-lieutenant and equivalent ranks (Navy)</td>
<td>£ 2 0 0</td>
<td>£ 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain (Army)</td>
<td>£ 2 5 0</td>
<td>£ 1 2 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant under eight years seniority, And equivalent ranks (Navy)</td>
<td>£ 2 5 0</td>
<td>£ 1 2 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>£ 2 1 2</td>
<td>£ 1 6 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant of eight years seniority and Equivalent ranks; Commanders and Equivalent ranks (Navy)</td>
<td>£ 2 1 2</td>
<td>£ 1 6 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>£ 3 1 0</td>
<td>£ 1 1 0 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain under three years’ seniority and Equivalent ranks; Commanders and Equivalent ranks (Navy)</td>
<td>£ 3 1 0</td>
<td>£ 1 1 0 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>£ 3 3 0</td>
<td>£ 1 1 1 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Captain of three years' seniority and Equivalent ranks (Navy) .........................
Brigadier-General, Major-General 3 5 0 1 12 6
Commodores, first and second class; Rear 3 5 0 1 12 6
Admiral and other equivalent ranks ........

NB In each case the maximum payable to each child under sixteen years of age is 10 shillings per week.

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