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Take *That, You Dirty Commie!: The Rise of a Cold War Consciousness in New Zealand, 1944-1949.*

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A thesis submitted for the degree of B. A. (Hons.) History
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Abstract

Between 1944 and 1949 a Cold War consciousness emerged in New Zealand in response to the ideological struggle which gripped the international world. During this period the New Zealand press came to visualise the world in stark terms, recognising that a collision between the West, led by the United States of America, and the Soviet Union and its allies, was likely. By the end of 1949 a Cold War consensus had developed in New Zealand based on the rhetoric of liberal anti-communism, the fear of the Soviet Union and domestic concern at the activities of the New Zealand Communist Party. This consensus became the dominant domestic motif of New Zealand foreign policy up until the Vietnam War.

This long essay argues that a dominant Cold War consciousness developed in the public domain as a result of New Zealand's confrontation with totalitarianism during the Second World War, the aggressive behaviour of the Soviet Union after the defeat of Hitler, Winston Churchill's 'iron curtain' speech, and the perceived disruptive activities and influences of the New Zealand Communist Party. Combined with these factors, the negative portrayal of the Soviet Union and communism in the major newspapers, helped to create a dominant 'take 
that, you dirty commiel' attitude in New Zealand by the end of 1949.
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Preface and Acknowledgments

The rise of a Cold War consciousness in New Zealand has been neglected in virtually all studies concerning the historical setting of foreign policy-making in New Zealand. There has been a failure by authors to offer a serious, detailed analysis of the changing public perceptions of the Soviet Union and the role of domestic influences in shaping New Zealand's attitudes to the post-war bipolar world. Except for M. McKinnon, most authors make little or no reference to the importance of public perceptions, newspaper attitudes and elections.¹

The challenge of this long essay is to give more attention to the changing domestic context of New Zealand's perceptions of the Soviet Union, the Cold War and communism. The emphasis is on the changing stereotype of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a Cold War consciousness in New Zealand. The discussion will trace public representations of the emerging Cold War through newspaper editorials and politicians from 1944 to 1949. Over this period the dominant public discourse of the Soviet Union transformed radically from ally to enemy. During this time there was considerable anger both at Soviet post-war actions in Eastern Europe and at what many saw as a more immediate threat, the New Zealand Communist Party. By the end of 1949, the New Zealand public was fighting a Cold War on two fronts, at home and abroad.

¹ See: M. McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935, Auckland, 1993, pp. 69-77. McKinnon has an illuminating section in his book entitled 'Labour, the left and the Cold War in the 1940s'. This is the first serious attempt to analyse the role of domestic influences on the foreign policy framework of the first Labour Government.
A number of experiences have undoubtedly shaped my approach to this subject. The first was my reading of the M. Barson's book, *Better Dead Than Red*, a brilliant look at Russophobia in American popular culture. This book provided the inspiration to study New Zealand's Red-baiting with reference to a cross-cultural approach as well as a number of useful pictures. I would like to thank Radar, my flatmate's boyfriend, for bringing Barson to my attention.

If this experience made me aware of the extent to which Russophobia pervaded America during the Cold War, I must also pay my respects to the work done by G. Barratt, who has successfully studied the early genesis of anti-Russian sentiment in New Zealand. His book entitled *Russophobia in New Zealand 1838-1908* and article 'The Enemy that never was', challenged me to view the New Zealand public's fear of Russia in the early Cold War period as a phenomena that was not new. Barratt brought to my attention New Zealand's traditional fear and distrust of an expansionist Russia. Anti-Russian feeling has been an early feature of New Zealand's history and the guns built around the country to stop the invading Russians are testament to this fact.

In the course of researching this long essay I have made new friends and have accumulated many debts. The most I can do is thank them here on the pages of this study and ask for their continued support. Firstly, I would like to thank Dr. Roberto Rabel for his unswerving loyalty and encouragement as my supervisor. He applied the right amount pressure to

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get me to finish this monograph, but not enough to drive me crazy. The balance was delicate and this is to his credit. Besides kindly lending me a number of valuable articles and photocopied documents, his insights were extremely thoughtful and piercing.

My next biggest debt should be paid to the staff of the Hocken Library, who suffered the pain of bringing up volumes of newspapers to the reading room. I thank them for their fitness and exercise, especially David McDonald who went to the extra trouble of photocopying numerous cartoons and article pictures for me. Without them this study would be substantially smaller and the reader would not get to see New Zealand’s Cold War mentality in the flesh and blood, as the saying goes. Thanks should also go to the Reference Staff of the Central Library for processing my interloan requests at such short notice and assisting me in the search for relevant material. I am very grateful to them all.

Final hugs and kisses should go to my friends and family. Without them my sanity through this fourth year honours programme would have been severely tested. Special thanks must go to my flatmates for their tolerance around times of writing and cooking when it was my turn. Thanks also to my classmates and friends Jaime Meikle, Travis Benson, Chuck Little and Mark Waghorn for playing table soccer in the downstairs cafe. This activity provided the perfect alibi for not working as well as much needed therapy lessons. I would also like to thank Louisa Dempster and special thanks must go to my parents for having me.

Richard G. H. Kay

Chapter 1: Introduction

Between 1944 and 1949 a Cold War consciousness emerged in New Zealand in response to the ideological struggle which gripped the international world. During this period the New Zealand press came to visualise the world in stark terms, recognising that a collision was likely between the West, led by the United States of America, and the Soviet Union. By the end of 1949 a Cold War consensus had developed in New Zealand based on the rhetoric of liberal anti-communism, the fear of the Soviet Union and domestic concern at the activities of the New Zealand Communist Party. This consensus became the dominant domestic motif of New Zealand foreign policy up until the Vietnam War.¹

Using a selected number of newspapers, this long essay will argue that the emergence of a Cold War consciousness in New Zealand was a logical response to an interplay of several powerful factors. A dominant Cold War consciousness developed in the public domain as a result of New Zealand's confrontation with totalitarianism during the Second World War, the aggressive behaviour of the Soviet Union after the defeat of Hitler, Winston Churchill's 'iron curtain' speech, and the perceived disruptive activities and influences of the New Zealand Communist Party. Combined with these factors, the negative portrayal of the Soviet Union and communism in the newspapers of the period, helped to create a dominant Cold War mentality in New Zealand.

Interpreting the factors which contributed to the rise of a Cold War consciousness in New Zealand is difficult, considering the sparse historiography on the subject. The best single source which deals with the changing public perception of the Soviet Union during the Second World War is a thesis by D. B. Atwool. Basing his observations on the images depicted in the local press, Atwool has forcefully argued that the stereotypes portrayed of allies and enemies 'were not exclusively the products of popular or traditional ideas, but that they were shaped by the political needs of the day and altered as political and military alignments changed'. While this study accepts Atwool's final conclusion that particular nations went from being an ally to an enemy because of political expediency, one cannot dismiss out of hand the historic fear held by many New Zealanders and reactivated by the politicians and the newspapers. Even before the Cold War many New Zealanders saw Russia as a potential threat.

Historian G. Barratt has argued that at the turn of the nineteenth century a public view in New Zealand existed that saw Russia as being synonymous with cynicism and aggressiveness. According to Barratt, 'from its earliest days New Zealand viewed Russia's presence in the Pacific as the main external threat'. Gun emplacements were built on Mount Victoria in Auckland to cover Rangitoto Channel where the Russians were expected to attack the Waitemata from the late 1860s onwards. Other studies have shown that the public fear of Russia was not only confined to the Auckland region. A. J. Culling has argued that the Russian scare of

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3 Ibid., p. ii.
4 W. H. Oliver claims that 'Russia was the nineteenth-century nightmare, Germany more realistically, that of the twentieth'. See: W. H. Oliver, The Story of New Zealand, London, 1960, pp. 169-70.
1885 was a turning point in the New Zealand public's attitude to the Empire. The perceived Russian military threat pushed New Zealand closer to the defensive umbrella the British Navy could provide.6

Anti-Russian feeling in New Zealand was not, therefore, an exclusive Cold War phenomenon. It could be argued that it had historical roots in the Anglo-Russian conflicts of the late nineteenth century but proving this link is difficult.7 Barratt found that Russophobia in the early twentieth-century 'formed a patriotic reflex in New Zealand to be activated by the merest touch of Anglo-Russian discord by any echo or suspicion of imperial collision'.8 Anti-Russian attitudes were natural emotions for New Zealanders to have and this theme occasionally surfaces in this study. The first signs of Anglo-Soviet conflict and disagreement over Poland were immediately seized upon by the newspapers as a catastrophe for world peace.

In his recent doctoral dissertation, B. Barrington, argues along much the same lines as Barratt. In his view, New Zealand's fear of Russia sprang from renewed tensions in Anglo-Russian relations between 1914 and 1941 and when attacks from the North Pacific grew imminent.9 Such irrational fears, in Barrington's mind, stemmed from New Zealand's close ties with Great Britain and the strong sense of alienation and isolation we felt in the security vacuum after the Second World War. Great Britain was a long

7 This long essay will show that newspapers used historical discourse from the nineteenth-century period to reinforce their reappraisal of the Soviet Union in the post-war period. As the Soviet Union's occupation of Eastern Europe seemed permanent, editors began to talk about renewed 'Tsarist imperialism'.
8 Barratt, Russophobia in New Zealand 1838-1908, p. 7.
way away and it was no longer 'Great', graphically symbolised by the fall of Singapore and the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*.

Thus, in Barrington's view, the political realities of the post-war world dictated that an anti-Russian consensus was to be the dominant theme of New Zealand's domestic foreign policy setting. In September 1948, after discussions with the British government, Prime Minister Peter Fraser agreed that New Zealand would, in a future conflict with the Soviet Union, make an immediate contribution to protect Commonwealth interests in the Middle East. The New Zealand Government, at least, shared the Western held fear of the Soviet Union.\(^\text{10}\)

In Barrington's view, the Russian threat to Commonwealth interests was not the only reason for New Zealand's renewed fear of Russia. There was a real fear in some public circles that the Soviet Union would turn its expansionist tendencies to the East. Combined with the loss of China and the threat of Russian inspired communist aggression in Asia, this fear moved New Zealand closer to the United States. Both the major political parties were anti-communist and held similar bi-partisan views towards the Soviet Union. By November 1950, it became possible for Prime Minister Sid Holland to echo sentiments like: 'In a country like this with its small population and differences there should as far as possible, be unanimity of opinion in international affairs'.\(^\text{11}\)

J. H. Beaglehole, however, takes a slightly different approach to the reasons behind anti-Soviet feelings in post-war New Zealand. Beaglehole


argues that New Zealand's anti-Soviet attitudes were inevitable in light of
the political and social differences between the two countries. We were a
democratic capitalist state while the Soviet Union remained committed to
a communist planned social and political system. In his view, New
Zealand's perceptions of the Soviet Union after the Second World War
were also coloured by the 'suspicious' motives of Soviet policy and a
traditional suspicion of Russian policy in the Pacific which long preceded
1917.12

There was also no doubt in F. L. W. Wood's mind that New
Zealand shared a virulent anti-communist Cold War consciousness which
dominated American thinking.13 Prime Minister in 1948, Peter Fraser,
spoke bitterly of Communists in Eastern Europe which, as a 'dark, turgid,
dangerous flood', was threatening to swamp South-East Asia.14 The
leaders of the National Party, Sid Holland and Keith Holyoake, who won
the 1949 election, were even more reactionary and fervently anti-
communist. They were responding, in part, to the feeling that 'New
Zealanders were repelled by Stalin's activities, his excesses within the
Soviet Union, his conquest of the Baltic states and his attack on Finland,
and by the aggressive brand of world revolution that was beginning to

12 J. H. Beaglehole, The Economics and Politics of New Zealand's Trade Relationship
13 See: F. L. W. Wood, 'New Zealand Foreign Policy 1945-1951', in A. McIntosh, et al,
(eds.), New Zealand in World Affairs, Volume I, 1977, p. 103. For the American experience
see: M. B. Smith, 'The Personal Setting of Public Opinions: A Study of Attitudes Toward
14 Peter Fraser as quoted by Wood, 'New Zealand Foreign Policy 1945-1951', in McIntosh, et
emanate from Moscow'. Indeed many came to see the Soviet Union as equally as dangerous as the defeated Nazis were.

A consistent theme that runs through this essay is that the dominant Cold War consciousness that emerged in public domain was in part drawn from New Zealand's confrontation with Nazi Germany. M. Templeton, in his book on the history of the New Zealand Legation in Moscow, has argued along similar lines. During this period, through newspaper reports and editorials, most New Zealanders came to see the Soviet system of government as equally repugnant as fascism and Nazism. The presentation of the Nazi enemy in the newspapers was transferred to the Soviet Union in the post-war years. The public were told that the Soviet government were concerned with secrecy and the Russian people were cut off from the outside world. Local newspapers made the public aware of the similarities between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

This analogous view of the Soviet Union received authoritative confirmation in the public domain by Winston Churchill's 'iron curtain' speech at Fulton, Missouri on 5 March 1946. Churchill warned of the aggressive tendencies of the Soviet Union and the danger posed by communist fifth columns - the domestic communists. In his view, Stalin's quest for security seemed akin to Hitler's aggressive march

17 M. Templeton, Top Hats Are Not Being Taken: A Short History of the New Zealand Legation in Moscow, 1944 - 1950, Wellington, 1989, p. 2. In Templeton's view, most New Zealanders came to see the Soviet communism as more dangerous than Nazism because it preached world revolution.
18 Ibid.
towards world war.¹⁹ Disillusionment about the prospects of co-operation with the Soviet Union set in rapidly in the New Zealand press and public attention was alerted to the dangers posed by the New Zealand Communist Party. Such was the disenchanted with the direction of Soviet foreign policy and the fear of communism that the National Party promised in the 1949 election campaign to close the Moscow Legation and to weed out communists from government service. In 1950, with little opposition from Labour, they closed the Legation and in 1951 passed the Police Offences Amendment Bill to curb communist inspired union activity.²⁰

There can be no doubt that a virile Cold War consciousness developed over the five year period from 1944 to 1949. By 1949, in the words of B. Gustafson, 'most New Zealanders accepted uncritically the West's distorted cold war stereotype of the Soviet Union as a devious and dangerous communist state with increasing global military capacity and reach to match its threatening global aspirations'.²¹ The question this long essay seeks to answer is how, why and to what extent this feeling emerged in New Zealand. How, why, and to what extent did Cold War terms, concepts and frames of reference appear in New Zealand society? This


²⁰ See: Wilde, 'Opening Address: New Zealand and the USSR', in Hayburn, (ed.), New Zealand, the Soviet Union, and Change, p. 2; Templeton, Top Hats Are Not Being Taken, p. 2. Apparently Labour would have also closed the Legation due to the high running costs and the fact that it had no rationale for existence since the conclusion of the agricultural bulk purchase contracts with Great Britain. Trade development was its primary function. See also: R. Chapman, 'From Labour to National', in W. H. Oliver with B. R. Williams, (eds.), The Oxford History of New Zealand, Wellington, 1981, p. 359.

study will examine how certain New Zealand newspapers perceived the domestic and international communist threat and what determined that perception. This involves a study of the relationship between the rise of Cold War feeling in New Zealand and the role of the newspaper media. Essentially this will be a cursory glance at New Zealand's Cold War mentalité, relying on a limited range of primary sources that time permitted. It will explore editorial opinion towards the Soviet Union and communism from the last years of the anti-fascist alliance to the breakdown of the wartime coalition. This study ends in 1949 with the introduction of Compulsory Military Training, the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb, the loss of China and the election of Sid Holland's vigorously anti-communist National Party.

The focus of this essay on the editorial perceptions of the Soviet Union and communism has been deliberate, if not out of necessity. It is a response to a recent call by several diplomatic historians for the need to expand the horizons of the discipline and examine the domestic context of foreign policy.22 While this study does not pretend to analyse the complex relationship between foreign policy and the domestic sphere, it will examine the public response, expressed mainly through newspaper editorials, to the emerging Cold War world. While the collapse of the public Cold War consensus has been explored extensively, there has been a serious historiographical neglect on the early formation of that consensus. This examination hopes to fill some of that void. Such a study may provide useful insights about the domestic influences that shaped New

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Zealand's national security interests in the post-war era. As a 'thick description' of the domestic context, the discussion here will recreate the dominant patterns of meaning and perceptions towards the dangerous outside world presented in certain newspapers. It will be an examination of the newspaper perceptions of the Cold War rather than an analysis of the events themselves.

An analysis like this does not necessarily transcend the conventional limits of historical writing but is does challenge the fundamental dichotomy that has structured the field of diplomatic history: the opposition between foreign relations and the domestic setting. In most histories of foreign relations the domestic context has been displaced or ignored.24 Historians should never forget that foreign policy makers, like historians, are not independent of their domestic environment. Foreign-policy decisions in liberal democratic societies are not made in socio-economic vacuum and can be swayed by the elusive entity called public opinion. If this was not the case why did the National Government adopt the anti-nuclear policy when they clearly did not wish to do so? As a result, this essay hopes to explore the complex and mystifying discourse of the Cold War and the rhetorical and institutional basis of the liberal anti-communism which came to dominate the domestic setting of New Zealand foreign policy by 1949.25

24 See: Kaplan, 'Commentary: Domesticating Foreign Policy', Diplomatic History, v. 18, 1 (Winter 1994), p. 97. The worst example of this neglect is in R. Kennaway and J. Henderson, (ed.), Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s, Auckland, 1991. In the index there is no mention of New Zealand culture and only nine references to 'public opinion'.
25 Explicit in a cultural studies approach is that all historical evidence ('reality') is socially and culturally constructed and that this process of construction is of prime importance. See: G S. Smith, 'Security, Gender, and the Historical Process', Diplomatic History, v. 18, 1 (Winter 1994), p. 81.
A theoretical problem which underpins this essay involves how historians reconstruct past attitudes. R. Rabel, in his study of Vietnam and the collapse of the Cold War consensus, makes this point when he laments that in the absence of political opinion polls, it is difficult to know what the public is precisely thinking. This is why many historians have given up on historical consciousness. It is virtually impossible to know accurately what the public was thinking about a certain issue in the absence of opinion polls. But we do know that a Cold War consciousness emerged in New Zealand. Proving what it meant to the public is the main difficulty of this essay.

In the absence of hard empirical data like opinion polls, this essay will attempt to gauge dominant public feeling through newspaper editorials and articles, selected documents and Parliamentary debates. In using these sources, the discussion will explore whether or not these dominant sources of public discourse rose above partisan narrowness or if they were caught up in the myopia of the Cold War. In order to achieve this, the study has drawn upon a number of newspapers, articles and letters to the editors found in the Otago Daily Times, the New Zealand Herald, the Southern Cross, the New Zealand Truth and the New Zealand Listener. The business press in the form of the New Zealand National Review and the New Zealand Commerce, has also been explored as they contain extensive comment about foreign relations and Labour's anti-communism. Their interpretation of events in editorials helps the historian shed light on what the Cold War meant to the public at the time.

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Newspapers and politicians were important in the construction process of a Cold War consciousness in New Zealand. Both helped to articulate the existence of anti-Soviet and anti-communist feeling in New Zealand. Relying on information from overseas' sources, local newspapers in New Zealand portrayed Western images of the Cold War to the public. The newspaper media was vital in presentation process of Cold War stereotypes to the public. Politicians played their part too. They were important as a legitimation and reinforcing role. They helped to forge a consensus and project a Cold War feeling across different political constituencies in New Zealand society. Their efforts met with varying success within their own constituencies, as Peter Fraser found out in the 1949 conscription debate. Overall, the cumulative effect of the newspapers and politicians anti-Soviet and anti-communist discourse must have been very persuasive in helping to produce and foster a strong Cold War consciousness in New Zealand.

Newspapers were very important for disseminating knowledge and they gave the New Zealand population a high rate of exposure to international news and Western images of the emerging Cold War. Of those people surveyed in the Mount Victoria by N. M. Donald in 1949, 84% read one or more newspapers a day.\(^{28}\) Newspaper information, in this way, could have been a major catalyst in the formation of a Cold War consciousness in New Zealand.\(^{29}\) They were widely used by the public as a source of information and an arena for debate. Even though their rhetoric was highly biased there was little hostile response from the public to their


presentation of the Cold War. In practice, the Cold War mindedness of the newspapers observed served 'to short circuit rational, intellectual discussion of issues, policies, philosophical differences'.\textsuperscript{30} This immediately raises the crucial question of how newspapers contributed to the shaping of public references and assumptions towards the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the New Zealand Communist Party. This theoretical problem will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter.

Chapter 2: Newspapers

Where there is much desire to learn there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making.\(^1\)

Milton, *Areopagitica*.

The public buys its opinions as it buys its meat.\(^2\)

Samuel Butler, *Notebooks*.

In order to adequately describe the dominant picture concerning the Soviet Union, the communist threat and the Cold War in New Zealand, several conceptual questions need to be addressed. The first concerns the treatment of public opinion by historians. This part of the chapter will discuss how historians have constructed past attitudes and the domestic framework of foreign policy decision-making. This section will also include a theoretical analysis of the role of newspapers in the formation of public discussion and frames of reference.

According to A. Porter, it is possible to discern at least two approaches to the study of public opinion among historians.\(^3\) The first treats public opinion as an objective entity, the sum of total attitudes and ideas held by the public as understood by reading the newspapers and other recorded expressions of opinions. Usually public opinion is subdivided into a hierarchy, historians detecting liberal and conservative trends.\(^4\)

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4 M. Leigh, *Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy 1937-1947*, Westport, Connecticut, 1976, p. 4. According to Leigh, public opinion concerning foreign policy has generally been treated as a hierarchy. Members of the public are allocated to different strata according to their awareness of foreign policy issues. For example, J. Rosenau has divided opinion into three categories: the opinion makers, the attentive public and the mass public.
Other historians have preferred to see public opinion as a term captured by others, those who have appeared to try and capture public attention, attempting to assess its meaning and practical implications. One of the major problems here is that politicians frequently misused the idea in order to claim ultimate authority for their position. For this reason, this study, in so far as it refers to 'public opinion', belongs loosely to the first camp.

Lacking any independent analytical constructs to guide them on their search for past political reality, historians have heavily relied on the available documentary record of public opinion. Historians have chiefly sought to find explanations for past foreign policy decisions of liberal democratic governments in newspapers and other sources of public opinion. In the words of B. C. Cohen, 'it is standard for historians to turn to public prints as the voice of public opinion during the period under examination, since the press is often the only extant remnant of non-governmental expressions of opinion'.

Cohen believes that historians make a grave mistake relying on newspapers as kaleidoscopes of past opinion. Newspapers are unreliable, not only because they may be quite wrong, but because they are always fragmentary and partial conceptions of news. Because they contain 'news' rather than truth, newspapers merely get revised, supplemented or corrected at a later date. But most historians still fall into the trap as

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6 Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy, p. 108.
described by Cohen: 'Once caught in print, like an etching on a rock, it is history; and the historians transfers it with few questions to his pages, where it is subtly transformed into truth'. Cohen's criticism of historians methodology goes further by saying that portraying opinion manifestly in the form of polls and newspaper editorials become blinders, they delimit artificially the areas in which historians look for the content of public opinion.8

Cohen's criticism of historians for using newspaper editorials as reflectors of public opinion has some valid points but he ignores some crucial facts. Clearly, in the absence of opinion polls, newspaper editorials and letters to the editor are the most visible forms of public discourse. In distribution and circulation they encompass the most number of people in their reach.9 As a country that was geographically isolated from the main Cold War events, New Zealand society was highly dependent on newspaper information. The New Zealand newspaper industry were well placed to help shape public perceptions of overseas events.10 As we have seen already in 1949 over 84% of New Zealanders read one or more newspapers.11 Newspapers are very revealing for the historian because they provide rich glimpses into the cultural forms of the era and reflect changes of the dominant thinking at that time.

While there are several methodological problems associated with the use of newspapers, they do have some research advantages. There is

7 Ibid., p. 26.
8 Ibid., p. 125.
9 See: P. Clarke and E. Fredin, 'Newspapers, Television and Political Reasoning', The Public Opinion Quarterly, v. 42, 2 (Summer 1978), p. 145. Clarke and Fredin argued that the public in the late 1970s relied 'on newspapers somewhat more than on television'.
greater access to newspaper material than radio broadcasts. The products of
newspapers are not as ephemeral compared to other sources as it is
possible to collect, to study and compare them. Newspaper coverage was
more lasting, extensive and thorough than any other source of
information back in the 1940s. Newspaper editorials also have the added
advantage of illustrating the direct articulation of the dominant Cold War
ideology. Editorials, in this way, can be supplemented by using
Parliamentary debates.

Using newspaper editorials is a very legitimate way to explore the
moods of the public. They help reveal the nature of events in context and
the changing foci of public concerns. Through newspaper editorials
dominant trends in public discourse can be gauged in a very real sense.
One has to work on the crude theory that editorials, as product of a
particular time, reflect that time. The rationale behind this is that
editorials are cultural artefacts, outcomes of the structure of the society in
which they were stated. If the public disagreed with the picture presented
by the editorials they could always write a letter to the editor. Newspaper
editorials and Parliamentary debates, therefore, provide the main sources
of public discourse concerning the Cold War in the 1940's. Besides there is
no other way to interpret mass psychology in the past. In the words of

12 Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy, p. 8.
191. Every serious historian who utilises newspaper data should read this as it provides a
useful appraisal of the making of news.
14 Interestingly enough, John Moffett, editor of the Otago Daily Times believed editorials
had two functions: the first was to inform and the second to instruct. In his view, 'if you
disagree with the conclusions, then of course, you can write a letter to the editor'. See: New
Zealand Magazine (hereafter NZM), v. 28, 2 (Winter 1949), p. 11.
52, 3 (Fall 1988), pp. 279-80. Back argues that 'any public opinion can be seen as a metaphor
for an experience that cannot be expressed easily in words'.
one U. S. State Department official, 'what blankets the country via the press is an important source of public opinion'.

The argument so far that newspapers can both in shape and mirror public perceptions may seem contradictory. This contention, however, is theoretically possible and in line with current thought on the role of newspapers in the formation of public opinion. According to T. Burns, 'the press has an ambiguous role in broadcasting politics: it acts either as the voice, reflector, or organ of 'public opinion' or it is the controller, regulator or ever creator of public opinion'. Newspapers do not simply report fact objectively and unconsciously, they disseminate knowledge through a process of filtering and distortion. In this manner they have the ability to shape the opinions of the readers by defining what 'news' is. For unless a story gets printed, then it is not regarded as news. At the same time they were part of society, thus providing a rich record into the thoughts of the era in which they were inextricably part of.

The power of the media to shape opinion and preferences is very real. As the definers of 'news', they hold great persuasive power and the ability to structure the environment around us. This power is magnified in the arena of national and international politics, where the majority of the public are isolated from the events that happen outside them. The

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16 Cohen, *The Public Impact on Foreign Policy*, pp. 111-2. For policy making officials, the press serves the function of a 'mechanism for the transmission of the opinion of others and even for the creation and stimulation of that opinion'.
20 W. Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, London, 1922, passim. Lippmann argues that the media are important in shaping our notion of the world beyond what we can experience directly.
newspaper media can form and communicate a political setting to the public. Information about this environment is almost impossible to escape as it filters through and affects everyone, even those who are not directly exposed to the news.21

The power of the media to frame the references of public discussion is very important part of this thesis. The newspaper media impinged on the daily life of New Zealanders back in the 1940s.22 Along with radio, they were able to communicate and influence public feeling towards the Soviet Union and communism.23 They did this through a series of persuasive techniques including stereotyping, relying on Western news agencies, overgeneralising and drawing upon past representations familiar to the public. The media had the power to define the Cold War world for the New Zealand public.

Newspapers have the power to define the world and our perceptions in a number of ways. They have the ability of agenda-setting, 'the capacity to shape public opinion by leading the public view to certain
issues'. The press and editorials can point to problems in society which have become salient as political issues, meriting the attention of society and the polity. The usual strategy of the Otago Daily Times and the New Zealand Herald was not to capture some passive element of sympathy for the Russians, but to actually expose the Russian villain and confront it in a rigorous manner. In this way they were able to artificially limit the frames within which public issues about communism were debated and so narrowed the alternatives. They presented the Soviet Union and communists as the baddies and this was beyond question.

The newspaper media, therefore, had the power to foster a climate of conformity by containing consent. As we shall see, any views that fell outside their definition or stereotype of the Soviet Union and communism were considered heresies and abhorrent to the New Zealand way of life. They treated the dissenting views of the New Zealand Communist Party as dangerous, but irrelevant eccentricities which right-minded people would dismiss as of no consequence. As a result, there was little diversity in newspaper opinion in New Zealand between 1944 and 1949 over the main issues of the emerging Cold War. The Otago Daily Times, the New Zealand Herald and the Southern Cross were relatively homogeneous in their views towards the Soviet Union, communism and the Cold War. This is not, however, to rule out the subtle differences between them.

The relative lack of diversity among newspapers could be attributed, in part, to the role played by the editors. By providing the constructed

images of the world, of social life and the definitions of social reality, the editor can work directly on the consciousness of the public.\textsuperscript{25} The editor, as a gatekeeper of information and news, the person who assigns the attribute of newsworthiness to everyday occurrences, can bring public attention to what he or she considers are salient issues, like communists in the trade union movement. Moreover, the editorial can have a transforming twist in actively claiming to speak for the public.\textsuperscript{26} This type of editorial goes beyond expressing the publication's views and actually claims to be expressing the public opinion. This is where the media is at its most active, campaigning to the point where it hopes to shape and structure public opinion for the support of a particular kind of policy, such as the American post-war strategy of containment.\textsuperscript{27}

In both kinds of editorials, the editor is trying to interconnect with personal lives and public activities and shape public consciousness. The editor can legitimate and reinforce stereotypes and portraits and can bring public opinion to bear. They are challenged to present an opinion in terms that are correct, concise and above all, clear. In both cases, 'the editorial seems to provide an objective and external point of reference which can be used either to justify official action or to mobilise public opinion'.\textsuperscript{28} Editors are in the position to exercise the agenda and set the tone of the messages and for its part, public opinion may just reflect the messages.

\textsuperscript{26} See: Atwool, Enemies and Allies: Changing Stereotypes Portrayed in New Zealand During the Second World War, University of Waikato, M. A. History, 1986, p. 4. According to Atwool, even if many people did not read editorials back in the forties, most would have looked at newspapers and have been influenced by them as editors determined the layout and headlines of the day.
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.}
sent, whatever they may be. As one prominent U. S. judge said, 'for better or worse, editing is what editors are for and editing is the choice and selection of material'.

This essay is not trying to argue that the gatekeeper role of the editor is omnipotent. Their message has to be consistent and continually emphasised if it is to shift public opinion and perceptions. If the media is to provide materials for the public to change its views, their messages have to accumulate overtime in a long term process of socialisation. Their cumulative impact is important to remember on public feeling, especially in light of this essay. The newspapers used in this essay provided their readers with the arguments and evidence to develop or change their views towards the Soviet Union and communism. Newspapers provided dominant terms of reference and discourse for the New Zealand public to draw upon.

The complexities and hidden pitfalls of the editorial process make life difficult, however, for the historian. We should always keep in mind Mark Twain's observation of the process:

The editor of a newspaper cannot be independent, but must work with one hand tied behind him by party and patrons and be content to utter only half or two-thirds of his mind... writers of all kinds are manacled servants of the public. We right frankly and fearlessly, but then we "modify" before we print.

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32 See: A. D. Trlin, 'Dear Reader, Dear Editor: An Analysis of Editorial and Letters to the Editor', in P. Spoonley and W. Hirsh, (eds.), *Between the Lines: Racism and the New Zealand Media*, Auckland, 1990, p. 90. Trlin sees that the editor exercises considerable discretionary power in the selection and presentation of facts. In doing so, the final product that reaches the stands reflects the values of its staff and their perceived mission.
Indeed, it is impossible for the historian to verify or confirm such modification in the editorials of New Zealand's main newspapers. All the historian can do is take a behaviourist approach to study of the most visible source of public discourse in the Cold War. An approach like this reveals how systematic editors were in their use of anti-communist and anti-Soviet rhetoric. Perhaps, in the words of W. Lippmann, 'without standardisation, without stereotyping, without routine judgments, without a fairly ruthless disregard of the subtlety, the editor would soon die of excitement'.

A factor crucial for newspapers to be influential is their credibility in the eyes of the reader. Tuchman has put this nicely: 'Credibility in the minds of the audience is the *sine qua non* of news'. The public is more likely to be swayed by a credible news source, for instance the *New Zealand Herald*, rather than the New Zealand Communist Party journal, *The People's Voice*. If you were a member of the New Zealand Communist Party you were more likely to view *The People's Voice* as a more trustworthy information source than, for instance, the *Otago Daily Times*. If you were not a member, you would have most likely rejected it as an inherently ideologically biased source. As A. J. Liebling ruefully said: 'Freedom of the press is guaranteed only to those who own one'.

Distrust of an information source was, therefore, likely to be in the 1940s a situational response stemming from involvement in particular groups and issues. New Zealand Communists were very sceptical about

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the editorials of the major dailies, the *Otago Daily Times* and the *New Zealand Herald*, and as a result tended to write large numbers of letters to the editor. For a big lie to work, the medium transmitting the propaganda must have a good reputation because the populace will assign validity to it in relation to the reputation of the medium. Group membership does play a role in public perceptions of the fairness and credibility of the mass media.\(^{37}\) Trustworthy news sources are effective in producing attitude change.\(^{38}\)

 Newspapers by themselves were not enough to shape public discussion during the period under investigation. People could defend themselves resourcefully against information and opinion which they strongly disagreed with. For the majority of New Zealanders between 1944 and 1949 this meant not buying the Communist Party journal. People have a tendency only to expose themselves to information they can agree with or like. The public looks for communication that reinforce their predispositions, and newspapers, in effect, serve to nourish and strengthen attitudes that already exist.\(^{39}\) In our case, the New Zealand public was already favourably predisposed to accept a negative image and portrayal of the Soviet Union and communism and the newspapers helped to breathe life into this feeling. It was easy to transfer totalitarian attributes of Nazi Germany onto Russia, a similar country to all outward appearances in the newspaper's view. Thus, media coverage interacted with the audiences' preconceptions to reaffirm and existing attitudes and feelings.


Implicit in the approach of this long essay is that the cumulative impact of newspaper information did help shape the public's image of communism, the Soviet Union and the emerging Cold War. Newspapers were the major force that contributed to the rise of a dominant Cold War consensus in New Zealand. They played a pivotal role in articulating the rhetoric and dimensions of New Zealand's Cold War consciousness. The press were crucial in deliberately articulating the similarities between Nazi and Communist ideologies, German and Soviet foreign policies, authoritarian controls and Hitler and Stalin. They constructed the enemy image of the Soviet Union for ordinary New Zealanders to draw upon. They provided the potent Cold War stereotypes which gained popular currency in New Zealand.

As a result, this essay firmly rejects the 'minimal' school of the effects of newspapers on public opinion. Clearly the press is able to set the agenda for the public and is able to mould opinion within agenda items. While 'individual news items are themselves still likely to have small impact... over the long term, all the effects accumulate and the totality of press messages is capable of being the major influence on opinion'. It is the totality of relevant anti-Soviet information which provided the public with a rhetorical Cold War discourse. The old model of the media as a hypodermic needle that injects ideas into the public and political body

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42 Fan, *Predictions of Public Opinion From the Mass Media*, p. 3.
should be rejected by historians in favour of a paradigm that takes account of the cumulative effect of news stories and editorials.\textsuperscript{43}

Editorials and news reports are, therefore, vital in the formation of public. They trigger cognitive, perceptual and behavioural processes in three ways. Firstly, they lead recipients to think about the issue; secondly, they polarise and exaggerate perceptions; thirdly, they lead to personal opinion consistent with these exaggerated perceptions.\textsuperscript{44} Newspapers in New Zealand were at a particular advantage to accomplish this as they were able to reach large numbers of people simultaneously. The New Zealand public was constantly bombarded with anti-Soviet images, a fact that this essay highlights.

The theoretical argument so far has shown that newspapers are simultaneously recorders of events and products of social reality that reflect and shape public opinion.\textsuperscript{45} Newsworkers invoke and apply norms defined by society in their gathering of news and at the same time apply social norms and define them. In other words, newsworthiness receive their definitions from moment to moment as editors decide which are to be the main items. This was clearly the case during the period under discussion where editors saw the Cold War and communism as the main

\textsuperscript{43} J. R. Zaller, \textit{The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion}, New York, 1992, pp. 310-1. Zaller argues that the 'minimal' effects school has come under severe attack from recent studies. Several research groups have found evidence of substantial media effects on public perceptions.


Chapter 3: Our Soviet Comrade

In America, one of the most visible after effects of Operation Barbarossa... was how quickly and wholeheartedly Hollywood supported the cause of the U. S. S. R. And why not? They hated Hitler and so did we. For less compelling reasons are alliances often forged.1

M. Barson.

New Zealand foreign policy was developed at a time when the Soviet Union was still a major western ally, although never a particularly trusted one.2

W. M. Falconer.

In the opening address of the Twenty-Fourth Foreign Policy School in Dunedin in 1989, the Minister of External Relations, Fran Wilde, stated that during the Second World War 'common cause against Nazi Germany overcame ideological differences'3 between Russia and the West. As soon as Hitler invaded Russia, the New Zealand stereotype of the Soviet Union changed from being the bully of Finland to being the glorious liberators of Nazi occupied territory. Almost overnight the public perception of the Soviet Union transformed from enemy to a comrade in arms. Antifascism became the solvent for this unlikely alliance.

According to D. B. Atwool, the stereotypes portrayed in the newspapers attempted to shape public opinion towards enemies and allies.4 Newspapers could create enemies and allies through the images and ideas they disseminated through their product. Editors could create national stereotypes by beginning with an 'idea' of the appropriate image

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4 D. B. Atwool, Enemies and Allies: Changing Stereotypes Portrayed in New Zealand During the Second World War, University of Waikato, M. A. History, 1986, p. 134. Please note this chapter draws heavily from the observations made by Atwool and only two primary sources, the New Zealand Truth and the Otago Daily Times.
of the Soviet Union. This idea was strongly influenced by the Great Britain, the United States and the New Zealand Government. Then in their editorial columns and through the selection and lay-out of news items, they could 'prove' the idea by emphasising events and facts which fitted the stereotype. This is the process by which stereotypes of enemies and allies were created in the minds of the New Zealand public. It often began with a traditional or popular concept of the nation under scrutiny. The Soviet Union in this way could be either portrayed as an enemy or as an ally.5

Before Operation Barbarossa the Soviet Union was seen as a natural enemy for the West and New Zealand in the media's view. It was a Bolshevik state, it was undemocratic and it threatened British interests. The Russian bear was portrayed in newspapers as ruthless, oppressive and bullying. The public image of the Soviet Union before Hitler's attack was definitely negative, especially after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on 23 August 1939 and the attack on Finland in November 1939.6

The Russo-Finnish war proved to be a major news item in New Zealand as the war in Europe had reached the 'phoney' stage. New Zealand newspapers sympathised with the small democratic Finnish nation as it was being attacked by the Soviet Union. There was natural affinity and support for the small democratic nation. The Russians were portrayed as the ultimate aggressors, picking on a small defenceless state. The Soviet Union was seen as a potential foe and a danger to democracy.

5 Ibid. Atwool applies an ethnomethodologist model to the creation of stereotypes of enemies and allies. This is based on the paradigm formulated by D. Smith, 'Theorizing as Ideology', in R. Turrer, (ed.), Ethnomethodology, Middlesex, England, 1974.
The *New Zealand Herald* 'attributed to the Russians such traits as inhumanity and barbarism in order to classify them beyond doubt as an enemy'. The New Zealand Federation of Labour also condemned the Soviet attack on Finland as ‘unwarrantable and unjustifiable’. The negative image of the Soviet Union was not just confined to the political right in New Zealand.

At the Government level in New Zealand the feeling against Russia was equally strong. The Labour Government did not want any other view of the Soviet Union to be presented to the public. In 1940 the New Zealand Communist Party journal, *The Peoples Voice*, which had a mere circulation of 6 700 in 1938, was suppressed under the Censorship and Publicity Regulations Act. (See Appendix 2) Only after the German invasion of Russia occupied Poland was it allowed to re-distribute, reflecting the fickle nature of political expediency in international relations at the time. The left-wing journal of the Labour Party, *Tomorrow*, was also suppressed in 1940, proving how conservative the Parliamentary wing of the Labour Party must have been. Atwool believes these journals were suppressed because they portrayed in the Labour Government's eyes an inappropriate image of the Soviet Union and they refused to legitimise New Zealand's role in the war. More to the point, they were a political embarrassment for the Labour Government who were aligned to the democratic West during the war.

Atwool believes that New Zealand press took delight in painting the meanest possible picture of the Soviet Union. They produced a

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7 Ibid., p. 25.
8 Ibid., p. 27.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 28.
UNDER THE HAMMER AND SICKLE
dehumanising stereotype of the Soviet Union, emphasising the power and menace they posed. The New Zealand press designated the Soviet Union as the enemy. The *New Zealand Truth*, that stalwart paper of unflinching professionalism and impartiality, magnified the heroics of the Finnish army to David and Goliath proportions. In early 1940 they headlined, 'THE PRICKED BUBBLE OF RED ARMY MIGHT' and saluted 'the gallant Finnish fighters . . . for picking the bloated Red bubble with inferior numbers and less equipment'. The Finnish nation deserved praised as 'the Reds in their conceit undertook a tougher proposition than they knew when they invaded little Finland'. They pictured a photo of a grotesquely shaped frozen Russian soldier and the caption read:

Monument to the baseness of the ruling clique in Moscow: Red invader frozen as he fell in death on the Suomussalmi Front in Finland, one hand still clasping a wire. No defender of "democracy" in this, but just another of the ignorant human cattle used in another corrupt adventure by the Communist conspirators of the Kremlin. Like his comrades, he didn't wake up in time and he won't now.

The *New Zealand Truth* were glad to see the gallant Finnish fighters putting up a brave fight against the antithesis of democracy, the Red Army. The image created by the *New Zealand Truth* made a credible, tangible Soviet enemy for the public to see. It was easily understood and reconcilable with their past fears of Russian aggression, demonstrated in Poland. They did not want the Soviet Union to achieve it's aims through 'invincible' armed strength, which political and economic turmoil and propaganda had failed to accomplish.

The signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, which had a secret clause by which spheres of influence in Eastern Europe were defined, was also a concern to the New Zealand press. The

12 *New Zealand Truth* (hereafter NZT), 17 January 1940, p. 8.
13 NZT, 17 January 1940, p. 8; NZT, 28 February 1940, p. 10.
14 NZT, 28 February 1940, p. 8.
15 NZT, 17 January 1940, p. 8.
New Zealand Truth became worried about the implications for New Zealand and the fact that the agreement aimed at dividing the greater part of their world between the Soviet and Nazi Empires after the joint Soviet-Nazi invasion of Poland. At the same time, the Dunedin Branch of the Returned Servicemen's Association was calling for a stop to 'Red Rot'. Their members were increasingly worried about the widespread influence of communism in New Zealand, in particular the 'extensive spread of Communistic propaganda throughout the universities, schools and libraries of the Dominion'. One reader, signed anti-Red, argued that New Zealand's 'social fabric has been riddled by [communist] vermin'.

Even the Labour Party denounced Stalin as 'the Red Czar . . . the executor of traditional imperialism of Czarist Russia'. New Zealand's traditional fear of Russia was being relived in the confusion of the Second World War. Stalin was characterised as a powerful despot, whose Red Army manipulated the freedom they enjoyed to 'defend war and tyranny'.

The predominant picture of the Soviet Union presented to the New Zealand public was very clearcut before the German invasion of Russia. The Soviet Union were the unsurpassed embodiment of the natural enemy, treacherous and undemocratic and willing to use force to achieve their foreign policy goals. According to J. R. Zaller, a prominent media theorist, 'every opinion is a marriage of information and values'. Editorial opinion of the Soviet Union was precisely this type of marriage. The Soviet Union provided the treacherous deeds and the editors were anti-communist. As a result, the Soviet Union were labelled as the enemy.

17 NZT, 28 February 1940, p. 12.
18 NZT, 20 March 1940, p. 12.
19 NZT, 3 April, 1940, p. 8. In the 'Readers Have Their Say' column.
20 NZT, 10 April 1943, p. 10.
21 Ibid.
The stereotype of the Soviet Union was created to meet public expectations of a huge nation invading a small democratic nation, and a nation that could make a deal with Hitler. The image created by the New Zealand press, therefore, met reader expectations. The Soviet Union were given the suitable traits of an enemy: aggressive, barbaric, cold, manipulative and insatiable in their quest for power. This picture of the Soviet Union was deemed appropriate by the Labour Government of the time as they were not suppressed.

After Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 there was an immediate turn around in the media’s portrayal of the Soviet Union. Political realities dictated that a reorientation of the Soviet enemy was expedient. Atwool has made this point succinctly: ‘The State which even in mid-1941 had been described as being ruled by ‘thieves’, ‘double-dealers’ and ‘tyrannical gangsters’, had by 1942 been officially raised to the status of an illustrious ally’. 23 The Russians became perceived allies, at least in the military sense and the press bestowed upon them the attributes appropriate for an ally. The Red Army became recognised as a tough, well-respected, well-equipped, brave fighting force. 24 The problem of Soviet communism was usually dealt with by ignoring it. There was less stress on the differences between the West and Russia. They were now fighting the same enemy and that was the main priority.

Enthusiasm for our new Russian ally became encouraged in New Zealand after Hitler attacked. The New Zealand Communist Party journal was allowed to be published and redistributed again. In February 1943, the

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24 Ibid., p. 29.
Prime Minister made a broadcast on radio and paid tribute to the Red Army. The Red Flag even flew over Parliament House in honour of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Red Army. New Zealand was happy to see such a powerful army on 'our' side, so long as they kept fighting the common enemy, Adolf Hitler.

In July 1944, the *Otago Daily Times* heralded the powerful Soviet armies closing in on Minsk as a 'rain of steel'. The editorial congratulated the spectacular achievements of the Soviet armies in swiftly contriving the collapse of German resistance on the eastern front. At the same time, they were increasingly apprehensive about the strength of the Red Army which stretched from the Black Sea to the Baltic. The editor became worried about the massive size of the Red Army, comprising of nearly four million men. The Otago public learned that the Red Army was 'surging West' and 'increasing their threat of the Baltic states' as they swept forward from Polotsk towards Drinsk. They were also told of the capture of Minsk which opened a broad road westward for the Red Army. Even the former gallant Finns who were on the side of the Germans could not long withstand the weight of the Russian attack. There was not a picture of a frozen Russian soldier in sight!

While the Russian move westward was a source of worry for the *Otago Daily Times*, praise of the Soviet war effort continued while Hitler

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26 *Otago Daily Times* (hereafter *ODT*), 3 July 1944, p. 3
27 *ODT*, 3 July 1944, p. 3; *ODT*, 4 July 1944, p. 4.
28 *ODT*, 5 July 1944, p. 5; *ODT*, 6 July 1944, p. 5. News about the Eastern Front was even coloured by quotes from the *Red Star*.
29 *ODT*, 6 July 1944, p. 5.
30 *ODT*, 7 July 1944, p. 4. The editor later blamed the Finns alignment with Germany against the Soviet Union on the 'tragic intransigence of the [Finnish] politicians'. The editor also expressed hope that the Finns would realise Russian power and that the Russians would show 'moderation' in the peace negotiations.
remained alive. In an editorial entitled 'Moving West', the editor of the
_Otago Daily Times_ felt that the Soviet contribution was 'shortening the
war beyond the most sanguine expectations of a few months ago'. The
Soviet Union were good allies so as long as they shortened the war and
saved British lives. Besides, they had to do the dirty work because they
signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

The future of Poland came up in editorials as the Red Army swept
towards Berlin in the middle of 1944. Over the future of Poland, many
expressed the desire to see a free and independent Poland. Many hoped
that the London based Polish Government and Moscow would remove
the major causes of distrust and tension between them. The editor of the
_Otago Daily Times_ did not think this was possible, given that Stalin was
pursuing his own security aims 'by the application of political pressure
and by the use of newspaper, radio propaganda directed against so-called
"imperialist" elements in the Polish Government in London. Within a
year, the New Zealand public were being told that the liberators of Eastern
Europe were now the imperialists, just like Hitler.

Up until the end of 1944 the New Zealand public continued to see
the Soviet Union portrayed in their local newspapers as an ally. The
Russian Bear was expected to be more benign in its peace negotiations
with the 'tragic' Finns - the terms would not be that 'unduly harsh' - and
the United States was now living up to its proper place in international
affairs by calling for military bases in the Pacific. But it was hoped that
Mr Fraser would not 'rush to Mr Roosevelt with assurances that might in

31 _ODT_, 18 July 1944, p. 4.
32 _ODT_, 28 July 1944, p. 4. By the end of July, the editor was worried that 'the Red
invaders' were only 350 miles from Berlin. See: _ODT_, 29 July 1944, p. 4.
33 See: _ODT_, 9 August 1944, p. 4; _ODT_, 15 August 1944, p. 4.
advance of a general settlement commit this country to a Pacific policy under which she would become purely an American satellite'. While New Zealand press were not completely sure about the Soviet Union, the same could be said for the United States of America. Nevertheless, both were still seen as benevolent in light of their march forward on Nazi Germany, 'the most tyrannous military and political power system in history'.

References to Poland continued to crop up in the editorials of the Otago Daily Times. Poland was seen as a litmus test of Soviet intentions in the post-war world and relations with the West. Poland, in the words of the Otago Daily Times, 'is the first real test of the statecraft of the Soviet Union since its emergence as one of the greatest world Powers'. The editor made it clear that he felt most New Zealanders wanted the new post-war order to be based on the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter and that a Great Power unity was essential for peace. This included a democratic basis for the governments of Eastern Europe.

By the end of October it was appearing to the New Zealand public 'that Russia [was] resolved not merely to dictate the frontier settlement but also to influence the course of Polish politics with the object of ensuring that only a government susceptible to Russian influences' was installed after it was liberated. Many questioned the so-called logistical problems the Red Army in its failure to help the uprising in Warsaw and Stalin's refusal to allow American planes to supply the Warsaw resistance. Even though the defeat of Hitler appeared imminent, the newspapers gave their

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34 ODT, 15 August 1944, p. 4.
35 ODT, 25 August 1944, p. 4.
36 ODT, 1 September 1944, p. 4.
37 Ibid.
38 ODT, 3 October 1944, p. 4.
Programmes for December 18—24

JOSEPH STALIN: At 7.30 p.m. on Thursday, December 21, in the Pacific Service the BBC will salute him on the occasion of his 65th birthday.

Q-TOL soothes 'sunburn'

takes the itch

out of insect bites

Get your bottle today

Q-TOL is not sticky or greasy. It does not show on the skin, does not soil clothes or pick up sand.

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W. H. STEVENS, Managing Director.

ADVANCE PROGRAMMES FROM ALL STATIONS
Russian ally the benefit of the doubt. The *Otago Daily Times* felt that 'a final question that must await explanation is why the Russian advance was halted' on the outskirts of Warsaw.\(^{39}\)

By the end of 1944 the editor of the *Otago Daily Times* was hoping that the anti-fascist alliance would last in peacetime and form the basis of a lasting post-war settlement. The meeting between Churchill and Stalin in 1944 was seen as an encouraging sign, a step in the right direction for the continuation of Great Power co-operation.\(^{40}\) As the Russians encountered fierce German resistance in East Prussia, the editor of the *Otago Daily Times* wrote that this would be overcome by typical Russian 'vigour and toughness'.\(^{41}\) On the December cover of the *New Zealand Listener* there was even a photo of a majestic looking Stalin, in celebration of the B.B.C. Pacific Service salute for him on the occasion of his birthday.\(^{42}\)

As New Zealand approached the New Year, the editor of the *Otago Daily Times* reflected cautiously on 'Russian and the New Europe':

> The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 struck deep and suddenly into the historic heart of Russia, and produced the same result. Everywhere throughout the nation there was again a welling-up of a rigorous national spirit. ... In itself the present growth of Russia nationalism may well be fraught with dangerous and explosive qualities, particularly if Russia is allowed to retire in the post-war world era into an atmosphere of suspicion and resentment. If, however, British leadership can draw Russia into a close understanding with Marshal Stalin it is the British Prime Minister. The world is already heavily in Mr Churchill's debt. If, however, he wins the unqualified co-operation of Russia, with Britain and the United States in assuming joint responsibilities for shaping the post-war world it will be perhaps his finest achievement since the Battle of Britain.\(^{43}\)

The editor, one suspects like many New Zealanders, was hoping that Allied unity would last into the post-war world, especially Russian cooperation. The *Otago Daily Times* optimistically announced that the

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\(^{39}\) *ODT*, 5 October 1944, p. 4. The editorial was entitled 'Tragedy in Warsaw'.

\(^{40}\) *ODT*, 11 October 1944, p. 4.

\(^{41}\) *ODT*, 12 October 1944, p. 4; *ODT*, 26 October 1944, p. 4.

\(^{42}\) *New Zealand Listener* (hereafter *NZL*), v. 11, 286 (15 December 1944), p. 1.

\(^{43}\) *ODT*, 14 October 1944, p. 6.
'Russian State will not hold itself aloof from the new world that is to emerge'.\textsuperscript{44} Stalin must have heard.
Chapter 4: One World into Two 1945-1946

Surely the United States has never had a more persistent courtier than Churchill.¹

F. J. Harbutt.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of central Europe . . . and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow . . . The Communist parties, which were very small in all these eastern states of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy.²

W. Churchill.

This chapter will explore the changing perceptions of the Soviet Union and editorial reactions to overseas diplomatic events. It will argue that there was a substantial shift in editorial opinion towards the Soviet Union after the defeat of Germany in response to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.³ The media coverage of the Soviet Union became increasingly negative during 1945 and 1946 and the Soviet stereotype was altered to be more menacing and aggressive. New Zealand editors expressed dissatisfaction with what they saw as the implementation of totalitarian methods by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. This dislike of the Soviet Union received authoritative confirmation in the eyes of the editors by W. Churchill's famous speech at Fulton, Missouri. By the end of 1946, the New Zealand public were told that Stalin and the Soviet Union were the

² Churchill as quoted by Harbutt, The Iron Curtain, p. 186.
³ This chapter argues against the notion held by B. Barrington and D. Bolitho that there was relatively little anti-Russian sentiment in New Zealand in the years immediately following the Second World War. See: B. Barrington, New Zealand and the Search for Security 1944-54: A Modest and Moderate Collaboration, University of Auckland, Ph. D. History, 1993, p. 123; and D. Bolitho, 'The Development of Anti-Communism in New Zealand Politics, 1945-1951', Victoria University of Wellington research essay, History, 1976, passim.
enemy, a fact that made sense in light of their dislike of expanding totalitarian powers.

In the early part of 1945 the Soviet Union was still seen as an ally who was making enormous sacrifices to rid the world of Hitler and Nazism. The press was in total admiration for the conduct of the Red Army in pursuing its destruction of the German armies on the Eastern Front. The New Zealand Truth headlined with 'RUSSIA OUT TO SMASH GERMANY', commenting that the Russians were going to pull down the Nazi edifice and smash Germany. The Russians were the 'realists of this war' and that the British Commonwealth and America would either have to agree with the Russian attitude or watch it without agreement because the Russians would go their own way. The Soviet denunciation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was also welcome news to the democracies of the Pacific.

In fighting the common enemy, New Zealand editors saw the Soviet Union as a helpful military friend. The Red Army was characterised as being thorough, well co-ordinated and bringing the war to an end with phenomenal speed and vigour. The New Zealand Truth felt that the Russian offensive on Germany 'should be heartening for New Zealand. For every mile into Germany means time gained for New

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4 See: R. B. Levering, 'Is Domestic Politics Being Slighted as an Interpretive Framework?', The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter (hereafter SHAFR Newsletter), v. 25, 1 (March 1994), p. 29. Levering argues that the American public, having just fought a long and bloody war against two expanding totalitarian powers, were fully capable of concluding that it made sense to take a strong stand against the third major totalitarian power, the Soviet Union. While this author agrees with Levering, he ignores the role played by newspapers in creating the public image of the Soviet Union as the enemy. G. S. Smith argues along the same lines as Levering. See: G. S. Smith, 'Security, Gender, and the Historical Process', Diplomatic History, v. 18, 1 (Winter 1994), p. 85.

5 New Zealand Truth (hereafter NZT), 7 February 1945, p. 4.

6 New Zealand Herald (hereafter NZH), 7 April 1945, p. 6.

7 See: NZH, 9 March 1945, p. 4; Otago Daily Times (hereafter ODT), 6 February 1945, p. 4.
Zealand in her contribution towards beating the Japanese. The Russians were fighting with dignity and clearly deserved the honour of being first to Berlin, a purchase bought dearly with the expenditure in Russian lives greater than the cost of other nations. Headlining V-Day celebrations in May 1945, the Otago Daily Times had a picture of a smiling Stalin, 'whose nation bore the brunt of the land fighting during the war'. The editorial of the same day showered the Soviet war effort and contribution with praise, labelling Stalingrad the 'Red Verdun'. The editor felt the 'debt of the world of the United Nations to Russian arms is beyond assessment' and that it was 'inconceivable' that the bonds forged in war would not stand the anxious strains of varying national concepts for peace. Traditional Russophobia in New Zealand had all but disappeared in the march to victory.

Throughout 1945 the New Zealand press expressed hope for Great Power unity as the defeat of Germany and Japan appeared imminent. In February, the New Zealand Herald argued that a 'secure and peaceful future must depend on the willingness and ability of the nations to cooperate'. Many New Zealanders felt that future world peace required the three major powers, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union to be united to save the world from 'war' and 'anarchy'. As opposition leader, Sid Holland expressed the view that 'we should strive

8 NZT, 24 January 1945, p. 1. The New Zealand Truth felt that the two million men of the Red Army should persuade the few crusty old gentlemen in exclusive clubs that the Russians are not some mythical monster bent on preventing the said crusty old gentlemen from enjoying their gooseberry pie in "exclusive establishments".
9 ODT, 16 April 1945, p. 4; ODT, 23 April 1945, p. 4.
10 ODT, 8 May 1945, p. 1.
11 ODT, 11 May 1945, p. 4.
12 NZH, 9 February 1945, p. 4. This contradicts D. B. Atwool's argument that while the war against Hitler continued, the Russians were still an ally but an ally that was increasingly regarded as one of convenience rather than one based on long-term mutual interests. See: D. B. Atwool, Enemies and Allies: Changing Stereotypes Portrayed in New Zealand During the Second World War, University of Waikato, M. A. History, 1986, p. 102.
13 ODT, 5 April 1945, p. 4.
and strive to ensure that a satisfactory and happy relationship is created and exists and continues between the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom'.

The *Otago Daily Times* echoed the same sentiments in an editorial entitled 'The Trials of Victory':

> If unity of post-war aims among the nations of the Allied coalition is to be preserved, there must be an immediate clarification of the misunderstandings and confused situations which have already given use to regrettable recrimination and, if permitted to continue unchecked, may threaten to weaken the whole structure of peace.

By the end of 1945, calls for Great Power unity had evaporated as Soviet-West tension increased over Poland and the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. The New Zealand press began to advocate an Anglo-American basis for world unity and post-war peace, since the world was a in a 'terrible mess'. Many believed that no amount of goodwill shown by Great Britain or the United States would move Russian intransigence in international affairs.

Change in the media’s attitudes towards the Soviet Union slowly developed over the course of 1945. As the Red Army advanced towards Berlin in the early part of 1945, subtle changes were already perceptible in newspaper editorials. The occupation of non-Soviet territory by the Red Army became to be perceived as increasingly ominous and potentially dangerous for the post-war world. The Polish question, in particular,

14 *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates* (hereafter *NZPD*), v. 268, June 27 - August 3, 1945, p. 140. Holland was convinced that the Western Allies should understand Russia and that Stalin had no territorial aspirations that might give the West cause for concern. This was not the last time Holland was wrong about the future of the international environment.

15 *ODT*, 17 May 1945, p. 4; *NZT*, 3 October 1945, p. 2. This editorial argued that the 'spirit of Dunkirk' would fashion the post-war peace.

16 See: *NZT*, 12 December 1945, p. 1; *NZH*, 17 December 1945, p. 4. The editor of the *New Zealand Herald* believed that 'too often the democracies have found themselves going far more than half-way to meet Russia'.

provoked harsh criticism of the Soviet Union and its conduct in international affairs. The press were beginning to draw similarities between the Soviet liberators and the Nazi oppressors.

Through the course of 1945 the New Zealand press became concerned that the Red Army was being used as a battering ram of Soviet might.18 The newspapers continuously described the Red Army in powerful, threatening terms, such as the 'Soviet Avalanche' and the 'Russian colossus'.19 Ten days after the opening of the Soviet offensive on Germany, the New Zealand press felt that no limit could be set on the Red Army sweep and compass.20 Editors became increasingly worried that the Red Army was being used an instrument of Soviet policy and began questioning Soviet motives in Eastern Europe. As the Red Army marched into Eastern Europe, the press saw it as immediate aggression rather than liberation. Stalin's sphere-of-influence in the Baltics, the Balkans and Central Europe looked to the West like communist imperialism.21 The New Zealand public learned that the Red Army was sweeping over Eastern Europe like a 'tidal wave' and that the word 'liberation' was not being used by the B. B. C. regarding any Russian operations in Poland.22

The Polish question continued to be a topic of discussion and focus in editorials. The rift over Poland was initially blamed on the 'unreal,

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18 ODT, 15 January 1945, p. 2.
19 See: ODT, 16 January 1945, p. 5; NZH, 15 January 1945, p. 4; ODT, 19 January 1945, p. 4.
21 See: NZH, 4 April 1945, p. 6. The editor felt that 'since armies are instruments of policy, the motives of the Russia . . . demand prime consideration in an examination of the campaigns of Hungary and Austria'. The editor also made the comment that 'the achievements of the Red armies in fulfilling the demands of Soviet foreign policy make an impressive record . . . They have brought Rumania, Bulgaria [etc] . . . within the orbit of the Kremlin'. See also: F. L. W. Wood, 'New Zealand Foreign Policy 1945-1951', in A. McIntosh, et al, (eds.), New Zealand in World Affairs, Volume 1, Wellington, 1977, p. 95.
reactionary, intolerant groups of Polish politicians safely housed in London'. New Zealand editors did not want Poland to cause a split in the Grand Alliance while the war against Germany and Japan still raged. Many believed that Allied unity was the key to post-war peace and the settlement of European affairs. The maintenance of the anti-fascist alliance was more important to New Zealand editors than the future of Poland.

The even-handed approach to the Polish issue soon fell away to recriminations levelled against the Soviet Union. The New Zealand public were informed that at Yalta, Stalin wanted unreasonable demands. Seven weeks after Yalta, the public were told that the Soviet Union was pouring 'sand into the machinery of co-operation between herself and the Anglo-Saxon powers'. The editor of the New Zealand Herald also felt it was 'most disappointing to find the Soviet ready to jeopardise the full success of the San Francisco Conference, a gathering of supreme importance to all mankind, in order to gain a small political advantage in regard to a single liberated country on her own border'. The Polish issue was seen as a serious impediment to the more important issue of post-war peace.

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23 NZT, 3 January 1945, p. 1. The war correspondent for the New Zealand Truth in London, F. E. Baume, reported that the Poles in London were first linked to the British right-wing. He also stated that they were deliberately infesting England with anti-Soviet propaganda. See also: ODT, 8 January 1945, p. 2. In an editorial entitled 'The Polish Tangle', the editor argued that 'The problem of political and territorial adjustment in Poland...has been complicated perhaps disastrously, by the action of the Lublin Committee in assuming the status of a provisional government'. See: NZH, 15 February 1945, p. 4. The editor blames the 'intransigent Poles' in London.

24 NZH, 1 March 1945, p. 3. The New Zealand Herald felt that 'it is of supreme importance that no unreasonable claims by the Poles should take shake the mutual trust now happily existing between Mr Churchill and Marshal Stalin'. Also see: ODT, 1 March 1945, p. 4; ODT, 8 March 1945, p. 4. Both editors did not want the Polish issue to imperil Allied cooperation and solidarity in the war and the peace negotiations upon which European reconstruction would depend.

25 NZH, 2 April 1945, p. 6.

26 Ibid.

27 ODT, 27 April 1945, p. 4.
Slowly the Soviet Union became recognised as an enemy in the post-war world, one that should not be appeased over anything, including Poland.\textsuperscript{28} Russia was beginning to replace Nazi Germany as the disruptor of peace. The \textit{New Zealand Truth} headlined with 'SPARKS FLY BETWEEN CHURCHILL AND STALIN - Poland a Headache to Everybody' and the public learned that Stalin had given Poland a raw deal.\textsuperscript{29} The newspapers abhorred power politics and Soviet moves to establish a puppet regime in Poland. The term 'satellite' became applied to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{30} Once Germany was defeated, editors no longer felt compelled to paint a positive picture of the Soviet Union. Their methods were opened to more hostile criticism. Many felt Soviet actions were laying 'the foundations for a repetition of the pre-war scramble for alliances, creat[ing] discord among the major nations and encourag[ing] the rise of a host of little Hitlers.'\textsuperscript{31} The New Zealand press believed the proper place for negotiating spheres-of-influence was around the peace conference table.\textsuperscript{32}

The New Zealand media's dissatisfaction and disappointment over Soviet diplomatic style was seen to be directly related to the Soviet totalitarian system. As the stereotype of the Soviet Union altered over the year, the public were fed the appropriate information as the press

\textsuperscript{28} ODT, 7 May 1945, p. 4; Also see: \textit{New Zealand National Review} (hereafter NZNR), v. 28, 9 (15 September 1945), p. 19. The NZNR were convinced that the sole chance to avoid war with Russia was not to appease as it did not work with Nazi Germany.

\textsuperscript{29} NZT, 10 May 1945, p. 1.


\textsuperscript{31} ODT, 17 May 1945, p. 4. See also: NZH, 26 June 1945, p. 4. According to the \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 'the reconstruction of Poland cannot be accomplished unless the Soviet abandons its policy of exclusivenes and facilitates the flow of capital and consumer goods into famishing Poland'.

\textsuperscript{32} ODT, 17 May 1945, p. 4.
presented a portrayal of potential enemy attributes.\textsuperscript{33} The newspapers routinely and ironically complained about the lack of impartial sources concerning the activities of the Red Army. The New Zealand public learned that Soviet censorship was 'the strictest in the world'.\textsuperscript{34} The press made New Zealanders aware that the Soviet leaders had absolute control over the means of communication, just like Hitler and Goebbels.

The media began to play on New Zealand’s historical fear of Russia, equating Soviet policy in Eastern Europe with that of the Tsars. The catchphrase for Soviet post-war aggression was 'Tsarist imperialism'.\textsuperscript{35} The Russian bear became more dangerous and threatening, classically illustrated by the \textit{New Zealand Truth} headline, ‘RUSSIAN BEAR GROWLING - Firm Policy Gains Britain Ground’. After the defeat of Hitler the Russians became perceived as secretive, arrogant, obstructive and unco-operative.\textsuperscript{36}

Attitudes to the Soviet Union solidified after the defeat of Hitler in response to Russian aggrandisement in Europe. New Zealand newspapers spelt out to the public that Russia, like Nazi Germany, was engaged in a systematic effort to settle frontier questions. In doing so, the New Zealand press portrayed Soviet foreign policy as 'brusque and heavy-handed' and blamed it for the hardening of opinion.\textsuperscript{37} The \textit{New Zealand Truth} called for 'the Russian problem to be dealt with',\textsuperscript{38} echoing fears of Munich. They presented to the New Zealand public the stark choice the world

\textsuperscript{33} The business press were particularly savage in their comments about the Soviet Union. See, for example: NZNR, v. 28, 7 (15 July 1945), p. 17. In the 'World Commentary' section, they describe the Soviet Union as a 'dictatorship addicted to ruthless courses'.
\textsuperscript{34} NZT, 7 February 1945, p. 1; NZT, 6 June 1945, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{35} NZH, 4 April 1945, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{36} NZT, 13 June 1945, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{37} See: NZH, 2 July 1945, p. 4; NZT, 13 June 1945, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{38} NZT, 13 June 1945, p. 1.
faced: 'DEMOCRACY OR TOTALITARIANISM'? The public was told about Stalin's extremely hard-headed and uncompromising security demands which threatened the cause of democracy in Germany. The Otago Daily Times commented that: 'Democracy, the cause that is never lost, must be made the cause of the German people if the victory for democracy which was claimed early in May is to be confirmed'. Soviet 'imperialism' endangered this cause in Eastern Europe as well as in Asia.

By late 1945 the press foreshadowed W. Churchill's 'iron curtain' rhetoric and were complaining that Russia had built an impenetrable 'Chinese Wall' from Stettin to Trieste. New Zealanders were told that no diplomats or journalists could move freely through Soviet controlled territory. The Soviet system was fast becoming equated with the Nazi police state. The stress on the enormous Soviet war effort was only a temporary façade. The media were becoming concerned that the Soviet Union were withdrawing into a fortress mentality, with a habit of seeing sinister intentions in innocent Western movements. V. M. Molotov's interests in Tripolitania compelled the New Zealand Herald to say:

Not all our admiration for Russian bravery and success in the past four years should hide our apprehensions over Soviet brusqueness, over the spread of Soviet power in Eastern Europe and over this latest evidence of intrusion into the Mediterranean. The Russian colossus has much to contribute to the benefit of mankind; it would be a disaster if the colossus planted his feet too wide across the narrow world.

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39 NZT, 18 July 1945, p. 18.
40 ODT, 4 August 1945, p. 6.
41 See: NZT, 8 August 1945, p. 1; ODT, 10 August 1945, p. 4. When the Soviet Union declared war upon Japan, the editor noted that 'the world has been served definite notice that in Asia, where already three-fourths of Russia's vast domain is situated, the Soviet is bent upon playing a political part commensurate with her strength and authority'. The papers gave due recognition and status to the Soviet Union as one of the major powers in the world.
42 See: NZH, 17 September 1945, p. 4. According to the editor, it was Russian suspicion that led to the creation of a Western bloc.
43 NZH, 20 September 1945, p. 4. See also: ODT, 22 September 1945, p. 6. The editor argued that Soviet suspicions were understandable in light of Russia's 20 year long isolation from the world but that it was essential for the foundations of world peace that there should be mutual understanding and confidence between Russia and the other Great Powers.
V. M. Molotov, Stalin's Foreign Minister, embodied all the attributes of the emerging Russian enemy. His attitude had a passion for anticipating troubles and creating difficulties and he was a 'tardy diplomatic demurrer'.

The New Zealand media presented Soviet-West tensions as symptoms of Russian intransigence. Constant references were made of the Soviet 'misuse' of the veto in the United Nations and aggressive Soviet tactics in Europe. The Soviet Union was fast becoming in the public view the new Nazi Germany. In November, the New Zealand Truth ran the headline 'NO APPEASEMENT POLICY TOWARDS SOVIET RUSSIA'. A Nazi-Soviet analogy was being drawn between the pre-war actions of Germany and those of Russia in the post-war period. The New Zealand public began to be re-educated that the Soviet Union were 'distrustful, suspicious, medieval, serf-ridden and land animals to boot!'. Disquiet and trouble in Persia, Germany, Hungary and Austria reinforced this belief. The stereotype of the Soviet Union had come full circle since the start of the war.

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44 NZH, 4 October 1945, p. 4.
45 NZH, 9 October 1945, p. 4; NZT, 31 October 1945, p. 8.
46 NZT, 7 November 1945, p. 1.
47 NZH, 9 November 1945, p. 6; NZH, 23 November 1945, p. 6; NZT, 28 November 1945, p. 2. According to the New Zealand Truth, Russians were inscrutable as nobody knew what they were doing or thinking. See also: ODT, 17 May 1945, p. 4. As far back as May, the editor of the ODT found that the Soviet attitude was not easily reconciled with the sentiments they expressed at Yalta. Of interest is the ODT, 5 October 1945, p. 4. The editorial is entitled 'Russia and Austria'. The editor talks about the 'implacable façade' of the Soviet Government.
48 See: ODT, 23 October 1945, p. 4. This editorial discusses Russia in Hungary; ODT, 24 November 1945, p. 6. An editorial on the trouble in Persia talks about the uncommunicative Soviet Government; NZH, 27 November 1945, p. 4. This editorial discusses the ominous trends in Persia; ODT, 5 December 1945, p. 4. Editorial addresses Russia and Persia with a classic line which says 'unless the Russian bear emerges from its lair sufficiently far [enough, it will not be able] to make at least a few preliminary sniffs at the friendly hands extended to it'; ODT, 29 December 1945, p. 4. Editorial on the Moscow Conference.
Throughout 1945 there were calls in the press for New Zealand to realign itself with the United States as the public perception of the Soviet Union was transformed. In a plea for New Zealand to embrace realism, the New Zealand Truth argued that New Zealand's future as a member of the British Commonwealth was bound up with the United States. As the Soviet menace became more threatening, New Zealand press attitudes softened towards the United States. Support for U.S. bases in the Pacific were met in favourable light. In Parliament, Mr Doidge, stated that: 'We fully realise that the Battle of the Coral Sea saved us, and we are deeply mindful of what we owe to the United States of America'.

Common ideals also placed us naturally on the American side in the emerging bipolar world. According to the New Zealand Truth, we had a 'duty to civilisation and freedom and liberty to destroy military nations'. This statement fully applied to Russia as much as it did to Germany. Current American policy towards New Zealand at the time was 'concerned with obtaining New Zealand support for an enduring post-war settlement, particularly in the Pacific, and in laying the basis for close economic and cultural relations after the war'. President Truman's recommendation for universal military training to Congress was seen as

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49 NZT, 24 January 1945, p. 10. According to the New Zealand Truth, 'the maintenance of peace in the Pacific will fall on the shoulders of the United States in co-operation with Britain and Australia and New Zealand'.
50 NZT, 2 May 1945, p. 11. 'We looked to the United States in 1942 and the United States did not fail us', unlike Great Britain!
51 NZPD, v. 269, August 7 - September 14, 1945, p. 319.
52 See: NZT, 16 May 1945, p. 11.
the 'best guarantee of peace'.

The New Zealand public were made acutely aware of any discord between the United States and the Soviet Union. Differences between the two were a constant theme of editorials. In February 1945 the *Otago Daily Times* contrasted the socio-economic systems of both countries. It argued that Soviet interests centred around the Communist ideology (although much changed, according to the editor, from the oecumenical ideology that led to Trotsky's exile) and the United States, with its rugged, individualistic life. The editor also noted, besides the social problem, a political gulf separated the two countries. The world was slowly being divided in two, with the western democracies on one side, Russia and her satellite states on the other.

Through the course of 1945 New Zealand newspapers began to emphasise that totalitarian systems exhibited undeniable similarities. The public were told that control through fear and terror was a significant component of totalitarian regimes. The public learned that despite the

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55 B. Barrington, *New Zealand and the Search for Security 1944-54: A Modest and Moderate Collaboration*, University of Auckland, Ph. D. History, 1993, pp. 79 - 81. According to Barrington, New Zealand officials 'hoped that the Commonwealth might be able to deal on equal terms with the U. S. and the Soviet Union in the post-war world'. From an editorial perspective, a contrast must be noted with M. McKinnon's assertion that 'New Zealand's Cold War alignment was in the first instance an alignment with Britain, secondarily one with the U. S.' See: M. McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935*, Auckland, 1993, p. 81. See also: W. M. Falconer, *Aid to Asia: The Origin's of New Zealand's Post-War Foreign Policy 1943-50*, University of Canterbury, M. A. History, 1984, p. iii.
56 *ODT*, 26 February 1945, p. 4.
57 Coverage of the Soviet Union before Churchill's speech was marked for its almost complete absence of anti-communist rhetoric. The only major news source which dealt with it exclusively was the *New Zealand Listener* (hereafter NZL), which, according to J. C. Beaglehole, is invaluable for the 'New Zealand mind'. See: *New Zealand Listener*, v. 12, 291 (19 January 1945), p. 10. The article is entitled 'Principles or Tactical Tricks? Portrait of Communism: 1944' and is fervently anti-communist. Also see: J. C. Beaglehole, 'The Development of New Zealand Nationality', *Journal of World History*, v. 2, 1 (1954), p. 123.
demise of the Gestapo, concentration camps still existed in Siberia. Stalin was portrayed as the 'Lonely Sphinx of the Kremlin', who had no real friends but a lust for construction and revenge. At Potsdam, the public were told that Stalin consumed three gallons of Vodka and six pounds of caviar. In Poland, women and children lived in fear of Red Army soldiers who raped and pillaged. Russian interpretations of war-time agreements were perceived to diverge widely from the Anglo-American view. There was growing trouble in Berlin due to a Russian fear of a western coalition against them. The New Zealand Herald noted that the British and the Americans would get better results in negotiations with the same severity as their great, but difficult, Soviet ally. The lesson of Munich showed that it was necessary to adopt a 'get-tough' policy towards the Soviet Union. The parallel between the behaviour of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia was seen as undeniable.

By the end of 1945 the world was beginning to split into two distinct parts. New Zealand newspapers presented this emerging division in clear, dichotomous terms. The editor of the Otago Daily Times told his readers: 'Between the democracies of the West and the Stalin system of governance there is a great difference; it may prove . . . a difference that is irreconcilable'. New Zealand editors and politicians saw the world dividing along democratic - communist lines. At the Annual Conference in 12-16 November 1945 the Labour Party denounced communism and

58 NZT, 16 May 1945, p. 1.
60 See: NZNR, v. 28, 11 (15 November 1945), p. 27. This information came from an account by Private P. R. Earle, a New Zealander who 'JUST GOT OUT'.
61 NZH, 20 June 1945, p. 6.
62 NZH, 10 July 1945, p. 4.
63 NZH, 10 July 1945, p. 4.
64 ODT, 25 September 1945, p. 4.
any links with the Communist Party. The Soviet Union was considered an expansionist and imperialist power, lacking the right approach to international cooperation. Just as well in the Otago Daily Times view that Truman had 'one eye on Russia'. Maybe he would have been better with two.

The start of 1946 saw the continuation of anti-Soviet rhetoric. In the New Year, the New Zealand public read about the 'poisonous Russian vapour over Eurasia' and the Russians 'playing with fire over the Middle East'. Themes about Russian expansionism and aggressiveness pervaded press coverage of international affairs, finding historical explanations for Stalin's behaviour in Russia's Tsarist past. The propaganda campaign against the leadership of the Soviet Union entered a new gear as the public learned about the drinking habits of Marshal Zhukov and Stalin. New Zealanders were even told that Molotov had made the Second World War inevitable because he signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. The Soviets were thus revealed as a deadly and traditional enemy. The achievements of the Red Army were forgotten and the media's emphasis was on Soviet 'imperialism' and the analogy with Nazi Germany.

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65 847H.00/11-2745 #1065 P. Childs to U.S. State Department, 27 November 1945, p. 1. Childs observed that 'Communism has apparently little influence in the Labour Party'.
66 NZH, 14 November 1945, p. 6. The editor warned of the dangers of appeasing Russia and giving them the atomic secret. In his words, 'giving the secret of the A-bomb ... to Russia without getting guarantees of better international behaviour is akin to the appeasement policy which permitted Hitler to ride rough shod over Europe'.
67 See: ODT, 29 October 1945, p. 4.
68 NZT, 2 January 1946, p. 1; ODT, 7 January 1946, p. 4.
69 ODT, 12 January 1946, p. 4. According to the editor, 'Russian policy in Bulgaria, Finland, the three Baltic republics, Austria, Rumania and Persia, all point in the same way. Russian diplomacy has returned to the lines laid down in Czarist days, and is seeking the aggrandisement of Little Mother Russia'.
70 NZT, 6 February 1946, p. 1. The story goes that Zhukov got drunk at a party while Bevin and Stalin were present. Apparently Stalin, with his winning smile, turned to Bevin and quipped: 'My Dear Bevin, I suppose you have the same trouble with Montgomery?'
71 NZH, 8 February 1946, p. 6.
If some newspapers were becoming vehemently anti-Soviet and pro-Anglo-American, the same could not be said about the *Southern Cross*. Throughout 1946 this paper remained conciliatory in tone, and presented probably the most balanced view of the deteriorating international scene. The *Southern Cross* was balanced in the sense that it was capable of being equally critical of both the United States and the Soviet Union, something which the other major newspapers did not do. The *Southern Cross* editor was opposed to American bases in the Pacific as it 'would be uncommonly dangerous to allow the militarists of any single Power, whatever its strength and economic authority, a disproportionate voice even in defence matters'.

One *Southern Cross* reader even complained about the rest of the newspapers in New Zealand for their 'pro-war with Russia' attitude. The *Southern Cross* supported Henry Wallace's speeches calling for American understanding of Russian views, saying they were not pro-Russian but anti-war. They were particularly hostile in their attitude towards an article by Mr S. Greenbie, the former head of the U. S. Office of War Information in Wellington, published in the *Saturday Evening Post*. Greenbie criticised New Zealand as an 'uneasy socialist' utopia. The editor called Greenbie a 'capitalist apologist' who was 'too amateurish to be taken seriously'. Mr R. Semple, a Cabinet Minister of the Labour

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72 *Southern Cross* (hereafter SC), 30 April 1946, p. 4. See also: SC, 17 May 1946, p. 4. Letters to the Editor. Alan Hill of Auckland felt American bases were not a good idea because they were at the expense of Britain.
73 SC, 18 September 1946, p. 4.
74 SC, 20 September 1946, p. 4.
75 See, for interest: S. Greenbie, 'Are Americans Imperialistic?', *NZL*, v. 11, 282 (17 November 1944), pp. 8-9.
76 SC, 4 October 1946, p. 4. Even Prescott Childs, the first secretary of the American Legation in New Zealand, did not like Greenbie. See: 711.47H/3-1246 P. Childs to U. S. State Department, 12 March 1946, p. 1.
Government, described Greenbie's article as 'poisonous balderdash ... written for monetary gain'.

In 1946 the New Zealand press began to give more extensive coverage of the Russian communist system. They portrayed the Soviet system of government in terms used to describe their former enemy, Nazi Germany. In Russia, communism was backed up by military force and a highly distinguishable class of decorated soldiers and 'by all those appurtenances known so well to those who studied the rise and fall of the Hitler regime in Germany and Austria'. Russian democracy became synonymous with a communist dictatorship and the breeding of ignorance, especially after the farcical elections of March 1946 where Stalin received 100% of the vote. Communism began to wreck havoc in other parts of the Commonwealth and this was accompanied by calls for American bases in the Pacific. New Zealand's emerging anti-Soviet feeling, however, needed a weld at the join. It came from a traditional source of wisdom, in the form of Winston Churchill.

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77 Semple as quoted in 847H.00/10-846 #447 E. Seibert to U. S. State Department, 8 October 1946, p. 1.
79 NZH, 11 February 1946, p. 4; NZH, 13 February 1946, p. 6; ODT, 16 February 1946, p. 6. According to the editor of the ODT: 'To us, democracy means political liberty; Soviet citizens on the other hand, are content to do without this conception of democracy in favour of economic freedom'; NZT, 6 March 1946, p. 1. 'The Russian people ... are docile slaves of their system'.
80 NZT, 20 February 1946, p. 1; NZH, 5 February 1946, p. 4; NZT, 9 February 1946, p. 1. F. E. Baume interviews Peter Fraser where he is reported to have said: 'I believe there were influences, such as Communism, which as in other countries are making rehabilitation much more difficult'.
81 The New Zealand public admired Winston Churchill, even though he was the man responsible for the Gallipoli disaster and New Zealand nationalism. He was the only voice who warned the world of the dangers of Hitler and he was even 'brilliant' in opposition. See: NZT, 4 April 1946, p. 10; NZT, 22 August 1946, p. 2. See also: T. L. Janis, A. A. Lumsdaine, and A. I. Gladstone, 'Effects of Preparatory Communications Research to a Subsequent News Event', *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, v. 15, 3 (Fall 1951), pp. 487-93. Janis et al argue that a single news event, like the Fulton speech, can produce gross changes in public opinion. In this writer's opinion, the Fulton address is comparable to the Tet Offensive of 1968, which thanks to television, dramatically shifted public opinion.
Winston Churchill's 'iron curtain' speech on 5 March 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, 'gave the first authoritative public utterance to many of the leading political and ideological themes of the coming Cold War'.

Churchill laid down in legitimate terms the Cold War mind set of the world and indeed New Zealand. He presented a precise catalogue of aggressive Soviet post-war actions. Churchill portrayed the Soviet Union as a brutal, totalitarian polity, whose expansionist tendencies could only be checked by Anglo-American power. More importantly, he envisaged a new Manichaean world order based on the confrontation of the two superpowers. His provocative thesis was that Soviet expansionism threatened world peace and that a fully militarised Anglo-American 'fraternal association' was needed to resist it.

Churchill's Fulton address was a brilliant exercise in political prophecy. He enunciated many of the themes which newspapers incorporated into their editorials. He laid out the future shape of the Cold War to the world. Churchill formulated a crusading Anglo-American ideology of liberalism based on the virtues of democracy and freedom and embellished it with appealing images of Christianity opposing totalitarianism and communism.

He popularised the 'iron curtain', the rhetorical label for the division between East and West, communist and capitalist. He portrayed communists as untrustworthy and ruthless and

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82 Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain*, p. 183. This book has made the strongest case for Churchill's importance in the articulation and coming of the Cold War. See also: H. B. Ryan, 'A New Look at Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' Speech', *The Historical Journal*, v. 22, 4 (December 1979), p. 920. According to Ryan, Churchill's speech at Fulton is perhaps a good example of an idea whose time has come, at least in regard to one of its propositions, ie confronting the Soviet Union. Churchill altered the terms of discussion of international affairs, precisely what President Truman wanted, just as Churchill did.


84 Ibid., p. 184.

warned that Soviet Russia and its communist international organisation had no limits. Domestic communist parties were also a danger to democracy. Churchill warned that 'in a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist centre'.

It is, of course, extremely difficult to measure the impact of Churchill's 'iron curtain' speech on public opinion in New Zealand. There was, however, almost certain recognition of the Fulton speech as a portent of change in the New Zealand media. In the immediate months after the speech, like in America, New Zealand newspapers and magazines changed their editorial thrusts. The Otago Daily Times, New Zealand Herald, New Zealand Truth and the New Zealand Listener, with the possible exception being the Southern Cross, became more carefully focused on Soviet moves in Asia, Europe and the Middle East and expressed more self-assurance in their damnation of Soviet actions and communism.

The Otago Daily Times headlined the Fulton speech and heralded it as 'challenging, frank and direct'. The editor commented that 'it is beyond ordinary doubt . . . that the Soviet leaders are, as Mr Churchill declares, seeking the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines'.

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89 ODT, 7 March 1946, pp. 6-7.
90 Ibid., p. 6.
There was general acceptance of the Fulton thesis that the Soviet Union and communism threatened peace and that they should be contained through Anglo-American cooperation and strength.\textsuperscript{91} The \textit{New Zealand Herald} commented that Stalin had not abandoned Lenin's and Trotsky's policy of world Communististic revolution. In the editor's view: 'Unquestionably the greatest single factor making for the disturbance of the peace is the diplomacy of the Soviet!'\textsuperscript{92} Communism had become a greater menace than fascism.

Churchill, in his zeal, pointed out that communism, like fascism, attempted to extend its ideological appeal by subversive tactic. He exposed the dangers of domestic communist subversion and infiltration in the trade union movements. Churchill encouraged New Zealand newspapers to think about the activities of the New Zealand Communist Party, the so-called communist fifth columns who received their orders from Russia. For the first time since the war, the papers did not ignore communist ideology which marked the late war years. Almost overnight, the activities of communists became a major preoccupation for editorials and a fix for the New Zealand public. Even the American Legation in Wellington recognised that public opinion was much stirred by the current events.\textsuperscript{93}

Three days after the Fulton address, the \textit{Otago Daily Times} ran an editorial, following Churchill's warning of communist infiltration, entitled 'Communist Fifth Columns'. The editor warned that it was dangerous to dismiss the presence of small communist parties as insignificant because they held influence disproportionate to their size. The editor gave an example of 'ill-informed Communist Party...'

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{92} NZH, 9 March 1946, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{93} 847H.00/5-2946 Warren to U. S. State Department, 29 May 1946, p. 1.
interference with foreign policy' in a message 'sent to the Acting Prime Minister, Mr Nash, urging the Government to use influence in favour of immediate and complete independence for India'. The editor hoped that New Zealand would learn the lessons of other countries such as Canada and Australia - that the activities of the New Zealand Communist Party should be carefully watched.

The business press were predominantly coloured by articles and editorials calling for communist influences to be rooted out of the New Zealand labour movement. The New Zealand National Review stated that in 'the Labour Party structure the Communists are liable to become termites, while still protesting friendship. They place allegiance to Moscow above all other loyalties . . . Trade unions and the world Labour movement must be purged of the Communist menace'. Communists were being fast denied political legitimacy as they threatened economic and political stability in New Zealand.

In the fallout from Churchill's speech, editorials became more concerned about the domestic activities of the communists rather than the international setting. Readers began to take a keen interest in the domestic implications of the Cold War, discussing issues in Cold War rhetoric laid down by Churchill. One New Zealand Truth reader stated that 'Communists are to be found in ranks of our industrial workers and . . . unions. Opposed to the British constitution they seek . . . to institute a system that would throw aside religion and bring all men to the same

94 ODT, 8 March 1946, p. 4; NZH, 22 March 1946, p. 6. Editorial entitled 'Invective From the Left'. It states that there is a 'close similarity in style between recent polemics from the fount of Communism in Moscow and the centre of New Zealand social democracy in Wellington . . . the Federation of Labour'. See: NZT, 3 April 1946, p. 1. It also ran articles on the 'sinister' activities of communist fifth columns.

95 NZNR, v. 29, 6 (15 June 1946), pp. 11-2.
level of slaves'. In public meetings, New Zealanders were told from men like T. L. MacDonald, National M. P. for Wallace, that it could happen here. The newspapers were telling the public that freedom of the press was one of the fundamental safeguards to their liberty.

Even conciliatory Soviet gestures after the Fulton speech were seen as negative in the New Zealand press. It was not good enough that the Soviet Union was prepared to talk about the problems of Germany and Austria at the United Nations negotiation table. According to the New Zealand Herald, the history of the Soviet Union and its principal characters made it impossible to believe in the sincerity of the disarmament proposals put before the General Assembly of the United Nations by M. Molotov. The Munich analogy was very much embedded in the New Zealand’s Cold War consensus. It was useless to negotiate or compromise with totalitarian states like Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union because they were inherently aggressive.

Even when Stalin talked about democracy, he was meant communist democracy. The Soviet use of the veto was even blamed for

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96 NZT, 12 June 1946, p. 18.
97 See: ODT, 6 November 1946, p. 4. Mr T. L. MacDonald’s speech to a meeting in Gore was an exact rip-off of Churchill’s Fulton address. The New Zealand Communist Party were portrayed as ‘disciples of disorder’, who worked by methods of infiltration to create conditions of anarchy which offer the greatest scope for the ‘peculiar philosophies of Communism’. He gave communist support for the Labour Party as an example by which they work. See: ODT, 6 November 1946, p. 4; ODT, 15 November 1946, p. 6.
98 ODT, 2 December 1946, p. 4. The editor stated that the ‘Soviet press is controlled to a degree which Nazism could never achieve’. See: Real, Super Media, p. 177. Real believes the motive of the Western press to create and support the aggressive anti-communism of the Cold War liberal ideology was because they were an intrinsic part of the capitalist political economy. They had to support anti-communism as firm believers of print-capitalism in order to make a profit.
99 NZH, 6 August 1946, p. 4.
100 NZH, 1 November 1946, p. 6.
101 ODT, 27 September 1946, p. 6. The atomic world seemed a more dangerous place to live. According to the editor: ‘It well be believed that Russia does not want war. Until the eleventh hour Hitler did not believe that war would be necessary’. 
torpedoing the U. N. organisation of collective security and hopes for world peace. 102 Behind every Kremlin action and opposition to British and American plans were suspicion and fear, distrust of the West was the guiding motive. Soviet behaviour was explained in various ways, the most original being that Russians wore their brains tilted to the side of their heads. 103

New Zealand editors saw the current hostile nature of international affairs as Russia's fault. They told the public that in Germany, Russia 'maintained and intensified a situation which must be regarded as Europe's greatest post-war problem'. 104 The widening gulf between East and West was attributed thanks to Russian intransigence and obstruction. 105 The Russian mind harboured contempt, distrust, and tolerance, barriers which were considered insurmountable in order to gain peace. 106 When Mr Nash suggested that the West should be prepared to go more than halfway to win the confidence of Russia, he was immediately jumped on by the New Zealand media, in much the same way Henry Wallace was. 107 Such a reaction shows how deep Churchill's speech influenced the New Zealand media.

After Churchill's Fulton address, the newspaper media portrayed the world as divided between the free world and the Soviet bloc. This dualism pervaded media thinking. Occasionally it emerged in stark and vivid terms. According to the New Zealand Herald , during the war it was

103 NZT, 27 March 1946, p. 4.
104 ODT, 23 August 1946, p. 4.
105 NZH, 29 August 1946, p. 6.
106 NZH, 14 September 1946, p. 8.
107 For editorial reactions see: NZH, 6 November 1946, p. 6; ODT, 7 November 1946, p. 6.
only 'Anglo-Saxon fair play' that saw us 'forget the undemocratic nature of Russia's mode of government, her shackled press, her secret police, her propaganda, her pact with Germany and the seizure of the Baltic States'.\textsuperscript{108} W. Churchill, embodied with the necessary authority and status in the New Zealand media's view, confirmed the legitimacy of the stark emerging stark Cold War consciousness in New Zealand. His speech can be seen as the licence to view our war-time ally, the Soviet Union, as the unquestionable enemy and the start of the domestic Cold War in New Zealand. Thanks to Churchill's speech, the Cold War was now a domestic struggle as well. As a result, the New Zealand media quickly turned their attention to the communists in their midst.

\textsuperscript{108} NZH, 8 April 1946, p. 6.
Chapter 5: The Communist in Our Midst 1947-1949

The Communist in our midst is a potential traitor and should be treated as such.¹
Editor, New Zealand Herald.

This chapter will discuss the domestic Cold War in New Zealand between 1947 and 1949. It will highlight the dominant media perception of the domestic communist threat and show how the Cold War was played out in New Zealand. It will also look at the ideological implications of the international Cold War and the domestic social convulsions it produced. Such a discussion will describe the boundaries of New Zealand’s political culture that branded belief in communism as disloyal and treason.² It is argued that following Churchill’s warning, the newspapers and politicians in New Zealand became more interested in the Cold War at home. In this way, the Cold War became an ideological struggle that was played out in every New Zealand home. It was over this period that anti-communist liberalism triumphed in New Zealand in the wake of anti-fascism.

In the aftermath of the Fulton address, the editors of New Zealand’s newspapers began to take a keen interest in the 'spurious' ideology of communism and the domestic activities of the small Communist Party. Editors around the country paraded their liberal anti-communist identity and alerted the New Zealand public to the dangers of communist activity. Marking the centenary of the Communist Manifesto, the editor of the New Zealand Herald in January 1947 described Marx and Engels as suspicious 'collaborators' whose political creed was based on 'fallacy' and a

¹ New Zealand Herald (hereafter NZH), 7 October 1948, p. 6.
'discredited materialism'.³ The New Zealand media were now telling the public that communism was a defunct ideology. There were no letters to the editors questioning this view.

The rampant anti-communist rhetoric of the papers manifested itself in a number of ways. Their reporting of events concerning communism was always based on the premise that communism was disruptive and inherently evil. There was a general presumption of guilt where communism was concerned. The New Zealand public learned that the communists were squatters of unoccupied state houses in Dunedin, but no proof was presented.⁴ Communists were portrayed as undignified, immoral and corrupt. When the Soviet Legation representative, Mr Ivan Ziabkin, left New Zealand, the editor of the Otago Daily Times noted that he did not follow conventional diplomatic manners and thank his hosts or call for cooperation or amity.⁵

New Zealanders also learned about the hysterical American witch hunt for communists in the Hollywood film industry. They were told that Reds ran certain film studios, such as Warner Bros, which made pro-Soviet films such as Mission to Moscow, North Star and The Battle for Russia. By 1947 the House of Un-American Activities Committee was asking Jack Warner to explain how such shamefully pro-Soviet propaganda could have been produced at his studio.⁶ The Southern Cross believed that such a notion that the U. S. were in danger of communist

³ NZH, 9 January 1947, p. 6.
⁴ Otago Daily Times (hereafter ODT), 14 April 1946, p. 4.
⁵ ODT, 16 August 1946, p. 6.
enslavement was hysterical and pure scare-mongering. Nevertheless, many of its readers felt that the communist threat should not be underestimated as it endangered freedom.

Communism was not only evil, it was disloyal as well. Editors alerted New Zealanders to the 'position inside the legitimate citizenry, exhorting others to join the crusade against the enemy fifth column'. If you were a member of the New Zealand Communist Party you were not a loyal New Zealand citizen because you owed superior allegiance to Moscow. 'Communists do not make loyal citizens in democratic countries because either loyalties are divided between their country and an alien state, or they give their whole allegiance to the alien state'. The subversive influence was seen to be Russia and the editor of the *New Zealand Herald* questioned, in light of the precautions taken by Truman and Great Britain, what moves the New Zealand Government was taking to prevent the infiltration of the Red menace. The amorphous guilt of the Communist was best summed up by that shadowy term 'subversion'.

The rhetoric of anti-communism contained numerous ideas relating to questions of loyalty and security. Editors became the judges of loyalty, emphasising the similarities with the people of the United States, the main crusader in the fight against communism. It could almost be argued that condemning local Communists was part of New Zealand's quest for a new ally. There was a congruence of fear of disloyalty with

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7 *Southern Cross* (hereafter SC), 26 April 1947, p. 4.
10 *NZH*, 24 March 1946, p. 6; *NZH*, 29 March 1946, p. 8. In an editorial entitled 'The Communist Canker', the editor states the 'Communist, by the very nature of his political creed is incapable of... loyalty and is self-condemned as a traitor, potential or actual'.
12 *ODT*, 11 September 1946, p. 4.
being communist. Heterogeneity was feared by the public as it made security more difficult to obtain from communists.13

Being a 'communist' was defined by having greater loyalty to Russia. It was a surreal dichotomy that did not allow for subtle differences, such as being a socialist. One was either wholly loyal and anti-communist, or wholly disloyal and communist. Allegiance to New Zealand was defined by the willingness to conform, and the editors put real pressure upon New Zealand society to obey. Those who did not, most notably the New Zealand Communist Party members and those trade unions who went on regular strike action, were labelled treacherous. They were failing to live up to the Cold War image of the ideal citizen, the anti-communist liberal14

The danger of communism to New Zealand society was, therefore, seen in its very foreignness and its refusal to play by the established rules. In applauding Truman's move to purge the American civil service of communists, the editor of the Otago Daily Times stated that 'Communism, which today is nothing more or less than Sovietism, cannot be allowed to flourish within a democratic State, because it is of essence anti-democratic'.15 Further he added, 'the Communist is pledged to impose upon society a system that is dictatorial, holding the ballot box in contempt; he is ready and anxious to secure the dictatorship by revolution and to perpetuate it by force'.16

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15 ODT, 25 March 1947, p. 4. Also see: ODT, 18 October 1947, p. 6. Both editorials argue that communist activity in New Zealand is executed solely on behalf of the Soviet Union.
Communists who sought to capture government through the democratic process were also out of luck in New Zealand's Cold War mindset. 'No sane interpretation of the freedoms which democracy confers upon the citizen can allow that he is free to conspire against and to overthrow the State'. Communists were doubly disqualified from legitimate political representation in New Zealand. It insisted that: 'Communism should not be allowed in the free-market place of ideas because it sought the destruction of that very economy'. Communism, according to the editors of the time, was a destructive, abhorrent political ideology. Truth in this way became ideologically defined. The Otago Daily Times editor believed that democratic states 'should defend themselves with vigour against the cynically disruptive influence of the power-crazed [communist] malcontents who are seeking to undermine them from within'.

Throughout 1947 the newspaper media continued to paint a grim picture of communism. Many representations in the early Cold War period fed on particularly acute fears of instability. Communist fifth columns were everywhere, threatening the liberty and freedom which the New Zealand public held so dear. The communists in our midst were portrayed as people who were 'discontented, unstable, unhappy, have thwarted ambitions, ill-balanced personalities, seeking relief in the pursuit

17 Ibid.
19 ODT, 25 March 1947, p. 4; NZH, 29 March 1947, p. 8. The editor of the New Zealand Herald argued that the 'Communist deny rule of law, yet seek its protection. They aim at the overthrow of civil liberties and political freedom, yet seek to shelter behind democratic safeguards. They are prepared to betray the country of their birth, yet expect the same protection which law and custom afford the loyal citizen'.
of power'.\textsuperscript{22} Newspapers advocated a strict medicine to stop the fifth column. The 'only course is to prevent its development by the vigorous and active pursuit of the democratic way of life'.\textsuperscript{23} The New Zealand press discouraged apathy and complacency. Our Anglo-Saxon task was 'to keep the torch of liberty brilliantly aflame, not only for our own sake, but as a token of hope and inspiration to those now kept in darkness'.\textsuperscript{24} In a letter to the editor, S. C. Cockburn-Thorpe of Papatoetoe, argued that the only answer to communism was to wipe it out at the source and free the millions of enslaved Russians.\textsuperscript{25}

Another potent source of anti-communism were the two major political parties in New Zealand, National and Labour. The political exigencies of the international Cold War made both parties take a hostile stance towards communism. The National Party was exceptionally anti-communist and tried to connect the Labour Party with the New Zealand Communist Party via the trade union movement.\textsuperscript{26} In early July, the National Party President, Mr W. J. Sim, made an address in Dunedin. He talked about a potent menace that was not overt and declared, but hidden and insidious. Sim argued that the 'menace is the creeds of Communism and Socialism, which are actively supported by many who are attracted by their surface humanism on a materialistic level but who are ignorant of their inner barrenness of what must be called the spiritual values'.\textsuperscript{27}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{22} NZH, 8 October 1947, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{24} NZH, 5 November 1947, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{25} NZH, 27 November 1947, p. 6. Letter to the Editor.
\item \textsuperscript{26} R. S. Milne, \textit{Political Parties in New Zealand}, Oxford, 1966, p. 284. According to Milne, the National Party, 'by contriving to identify itself more closely than the Labour Party with the Commonwealth, national defence, and opposition to strikes and Communism, it has managed to represent itself successfully as the 'patriotic' party'.
\item \textsuperscript{27} ODT, 1 July 1947, p. 4.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
In 1947 Keith Holyoake became the deputy leader of the National Opposition. He was particularly concerned about the communist influence in the Watersiders' Union. He blamed strikes and anarchy on communism, arguing that it threatened our way of life. On 1 April 1947, the leader of the National Party, Sid Holland, issued a statement condemning the menacing tactics of communism in the industrial field, calling them 'irresponsible law breakers'. He added that crime pays under the Labour Government, implying that they were 'soft' on communism. Many felt that communists were making headway in the New Zealand labour movement by pressing the Labour Government for 'radical reforms'. Holland iterated that the National Party would not suffer such threats as government.

Calling Labour 'soft' on communism was not a very fair call. From 1946 the Labour Party hierarchy had become increasingly worried about the split the Cold War was causing in the labour movement between the militants, who favoured direct action to settle industrial disputes, and the moderates, who believed in arbitration and conciliation. The Parliamentary wing of the party, led by Peter Fraser and Bob Semple, were concerned about the damage that the National Party communist smear was having on the image of the party. Peter Fraser, at the 1947 Party

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29 847.00B/10-1447 Green Interviews Marshall, 14 October 1947, p. 2. Also see: Mr. J. D. Edgecombe, 'Hamilton Chamber President on Alarming Trends', New Zealand Commerce (hereafter NZC), v. 3, 2 (15 August 1947), p. 45. Mr. J. D. Edgecombe, the Hamilton Chamber of Commerce President, felt that communists were 'now coming forward with eager hands to grasp the reins of power'.
Conference, hit out at the communist ‘wreckers’ who threatened unofficial strikes.32

In response to the National Party campaign, Bob Semple issued a pamphlet in 1947 entitled *Why I Fight Communism*, which was widely publicised throughout New Zealand.33 With a foreword by Peter Fraser, Semple launched a personal attack on communism. He condemned the lack of individual liberty allowed under the Communist system and warned of the dangers of communist infiltration into trade unions.34 Semple believed that New Zealanders must be ready to fight communism because it posed a real threat to the New Zealand way of life. He drew distinction between communism and socialism and reaffirmed that the Labour Party stood for socialism and hated communism. No wonder he was described by a representative of the American Legation in Wellington as the ‘most voluble and spectacular opponent of Communism’.35

It was not, however, in the National Party’s political interests to recognise the distinction between communism and socialism. In a pamphlet entitled *Russianising New Zealand*, National attacked the Labour Government’s socialist aims. It warned ‘New Zealand has started

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33 See: 847H.00B/6-248 R. M. Scotten to U. S. State Department, 2 June 1948, p. 1. Apparently the New Zealand Communist Party publicly offered to donate two hundred and fifty pounds if Mr Semple could prove his allegations that they received their instructions from Moscow. Of course the challenge was declined by Semple and the Communists made do with a pamphlet by H. E. Childs, *Semple-ism or Communism?*, Wellington, 1948.
34 R. W. Semple, *Why I Fight Communism*, Wellington, 1947, pp. 7-30. Semple was not the only one to warn of the communist danger to the trade union movement. See: Edgecombe, ‘Hamilton Chamber President on Alarming Trends’, NZC, v. 3, 2 (15 August 1947), p. 45. ‘Slowly but surely and working from within with devilish cunning, the Communist has white anted and gained control of the great portion of the trade union movement’. The American Legation also saw the possibility of the communists infiltrating the Labour Party through the trade union movement. See also: 847.00B/10-1447 Mr. Green Interviews Marshall, 14 October 1947, p. 2.
35 847.00/5-1748#145 R. M. Scotten to U. S. State Department, 17 May 1948, p. 2.
Why I Fight Communism

by

BOB SEMPLE

With a foreword by the Rt. Hon. Peter Fraser
FOREWORD

DOMINION OF NEW ZEALAND

PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE,
WELLINGTON.

In this booklet Robert Semple gives forcible, convincing, and unanswerable reasons for his spirited public attack on Communism and what it means, and Communists and all that they stand for.

He writes, as he speaks on the subject, with deep conviction based upon unchallengeable facts. The case against Communism as stated by Mr. Semple is the most convincing and conclusive brought before the people of New Zealand. It is overwhelming because it is supported and proved beyond doubt by the authenticated and authoritative statements of the leading Communist writers, spokesmen, and theoreticians. While scathing and devastating in his attacks on Communism and its advocates, devotees, and dupes, Mr. Semple does not attack any nation or people. He attacks the Communist doctrines and disciples. He does that faithfully, fearlessly, meticulously, resolutely, and mercilessly. He is forcible in his exposition of the facts and in his able exposure of the malignant danger that threatens mankind. He does not denounce or even adversely criticise Russia or its Soviet system. He says that their form of Government and social system is a matter for the Russian people. He wishes them well. But he does point out very definitely the dangers of Russian based, dominated, and directed Communism which has become a menace to democratic civilisation.

Mr. Semple, returned from a recent visit to Australia where the Queensland Labour Government, supported by the people of that State as a whole, were fighting against a Communist inspired and directed industrial strike which threatened its economic existence, determined that, as far as he could, he would endeavour to prevent the same evil thing taking shape in New Zealand. He entered on his mission with the spirit of a Crusader. He is determined that, as far as he can influence persons and public opinion, the Labour Party and Labour Government shall be defended from their Communist enemies; that the trade-union movement will be entirely, freed from the danger of domination by Communists who would use it for their own evilly-designed purpose and wreck it in the process: above all, that New Zealand and its people shall be saved even a semblance of the fate that has overtaken so many European countries and peoples.

I hope the pamphlet will have the wide circulation it so thoroughly deserves.

PETER FRASER.

PREFACE

Many of my friends ask me why I fight Communism; why at my time of life I should undertake a strenuous lecture tour and the writing of this booklet in an anti-Communism campaign.

My short answer is that I love my country and I fear for the freedom and liberty of the peoples privileged to enjoy the British way of life.

In Communism I see a dangerous enemy sworn to destroy the very things which we cherish, willing to wreck our country and the British Commonwealth of Nations in the pursuit of its avowed aim of establishing a world dictatorship of the proletariat.

I see it as a sacred duty to fight this thing. To stand by while it pursues its evil, insidious way would be a betrayal not only of my own principles but of the trust which the people of New Zealand have reposed in me over a long period.

R. SEMPLE
Russianising New Zealand

Published by N.Z. NATIONAL PARTY
August 1st 1948

TARRED WITH THE SAME BRUSH
-Why we fight Socialism

Published by N.Z. NATIONAL PARTY
on the road to State socialism, communism, revolutionary socialism'.36 National played up fears concerning the Supply Regulations Bill which Labour introduced in late 1947. They felt it limited the freedom of the individual to the point where the Labour Government was Russianising New Zealand. Another pamphlet, *Tarred with the Same Brush: Why We Fight Socialism*, hammered home the same anti-Labour, anti-socialist rhetoric, stating that 'socialism and communism, in the long run, are one and the same thing'.37 The Labour Government were accused of 'smoothing the path to communism'.38

In 1948 the Cold War feeling intensified in New Zealand.39 In the mind of the American Legation there was 'no question that New Zealand public opinion is becoming extremely agitated over the general question of Communism'.40 The American Legation had views about what brought this charged atmosphere:

> It has been brought about partly by news from abroad: the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia, the disastrous transport strike in Queensland, and the moves taken by the British Labour Government to restrict Communist activity. But a domestic labor [sic] crisis, coinciding with these events overseas has been even more important. Communists have been charged with responsibility for the carpenters' go-slow strike, the overtime strike on the Auckland waterfront, and, most recently, a stoppage of work at the important Waikato River hydro-electric project.41

Events in Czechoslovakia, Holland felt, 'brought home to us with dramatic suddenness, the increasing threats there is to the peace of the world and to our very way of life, by the recent tide of totalitarian Communism'.42

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38 Ibid., p. 18.
39 847H.00B/3-3/48 #98 Mr. Lee to U. S. State Department, 31 March 1948, p. 5.
40 847H.00/3-1748 #83 J. S. Service to U. S. State Department, 17 March 1948, p. 2.
41 Ibid.
42 *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates* (hereafter NZPD), v. 280, June 22 - July 20, 1948, p. 325.
The first emotional years of the Cold War had made New Zealand intolerant and conservative. 'In this atmosphere', according to R. McLennan, 'any deviation from the accepted line of policy could be labelled with the dreaded tag 'communism' and the chances are that the charge would stick . . . in the public mind'.43 The editor of the *Otago Daily Times* criticised a Mr. John Platts-Mills for defending 'the Communist rape of Czechoslovakia'.44 He called Mr Platts-Mills' views 'pathetic, as they are ignorant, they are also dangerous'. If his name wasn't a bad enough character assassination, the editor finished him off by calling him 'an enemy of freedom'.45 Peter Fraser also caused an uproar when he stated that: 'I do not think there is any great danger from Communists in this country'.46

The newspapers continued their unrelenting assault on the New Zealand Communist Party. The public learned that the New Zealand Communist Party wanted to place their own country under a tyrannical foreign system. The *Otago Daily Times* had become a very anti-communist paper in by this time. Here is a classic piece of editorial dialogue:

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44 *ODT*, 4 March 1948, p. 4. It is interesting to note that the rhetoric of anti-communism drew from discourses related to both race and gender. See: Rosenberg, "Foreign Affairs After World War II Connecting Sexual and International Politics", *Diplomatic History*, v. 18, 1 (Winter 1994), p. 68.
45 *ODT*, 4 March 1948, p. 4; *ODT*, 18 March 1948, p. 6. The editor also chastised Labour's M. P. for Palmerston North, Ormond Wilson, for a speech where he stated that 'American capitalism is preparing to go to war with Russia in defence of the dollar'. The editor argued 'this type of monocular logic . . . is infinitely dangerous'. In this way, widespread antipathy toward domestic communist solidified anti-Soviet feelings. It was thus harder for moderates like Wilson to receive a fair hearing. See: R. B. Levering, 'Is Domestic Politics Being Slighted as an Interpretive Framework?', *The SHAFR Newsletter*, v. 25, 1 (March 1994), p. 31.
46 *NZPD*, v. 280, June 22 - July 20, 1948, p. 335. Fraser later repeated this sentiment by saying that Communists are 'a great danger in the world [but] . . . a minor danger in our own country'. See: *NZPD*, v. 280, June 22 - July 20, 1948, p. 343.
Communists... fasten on to-day's discontents to spread their cruel, pernicious doctrine, who gaze with glazed idolatrous eyes at the flag of the hammer and sickle, who would wade through treachery to their country and the blood of their fellow countrymen to establish their own - or Stalin's - form of tyranny in the democracies.47

The New Zealand Communist Party were the 'disciples of revolution, partners in a world conspiracy to destroy democracies to the bloody prescription of Marx'.48 If New Zealanders did not keep an eye on them they would 'usher in the blessings of dictatorship and secret police and the glories of the concentration camps and the firing squad'.49 Communists had overtaken fascists and become the most vile and despicable creatures in the world.

The newspapers played constantly on the public's fear of instability by emphasising the disruptive nature of communism. The New Zealand public were particularly vulnerable to this type of rhetorical strategy in light of international events and the wave of strikes that hit New Zealand. In 1947 there were over 130 industrial disputes in New Zealand involving 27 000 workers. By 1949 there was over 100 000 workers involved in industrial action with 218 000 working days lost. (See Appendix III) Newspapers in this environment were not likely to meet any adverse criticism in their calls for communists to be excluded from positions of trust such as government employment or trade union offices.50 The feedback from the public actually encouraged their crusade against communism. One letter to the editor felt that 'no Communist [should] be allowed in this country' because they were murderers in Europe.51

47 Ibid.
48 ODT, 24 April 1948, p. 6.
49 Ibid.
50 ODT, 18 March 1948, p. 6.
51 ODT, 3 July 1948, p. 8.
The New Zealand public were vulnerable to the newspapers’ strategy of scare mongering. Just as the First World War and the Great Depression bred Hitler and Nazism, so too could war breed a new virulent strain of totalitarianism. The business press were the best proponents of this type of strategy. A. H. Tocker of the New Zealand Commerce argued that war and inflation ‘provide the very seed beds in which communism grows best’.\(^{52}\) Any victory against communism in this atmosphere was, therefore, duly invited. The Otago Daily Times was relieved to see the Secretary of the Auckland Electrical Workers’ Union, Mr. G. Albright, warn of the chaos communism could produce and the Executive of the Victoria University Students Association kick out the ‘stupid’ resolution congratulating the Czech Prime Minister for the triumph of democracy.\(^{53}\) The downfall of the railway workers’ strike in Auckland was also heralded as a ‘victory against communists’.\(^{54}\)

The anti-communist Cold War consciousness was not only confined to the business sections of New Zealand society. Even the Labour Party were fervently anti-communist. At the April 1948 Annual Conference of the Federation of Labour in Dunedin, the atmosphere was strongly against communism and the militants. Labour had just passed the controversial Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Bill in September 1947 which required a secret ballot before strikes in order to nullify communist influence.\(^{55}\) The conference was tense. Peter Fraser and Bob Semple campaigned passionately against communism. Semple promised that: ‘I am going to fight [the Communists] while I have got

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\(^{53}\) ODT, 13 March 1948, p. 8; ODT, 27 March 1948, p. 6.  
\(^{54}\) NZH, 17 March 1948, p. 8.  
\(^{55}\) Apparently the Carpenters’ Union referred to it as ‘the Truman-like slave bill’. Mr. F. Doidge proposed an amendment to make it illegal for communists to be trade unions officers. See: 847.00/9-547 #861 Bi-weekly Summary, 5 September 1947, p. 15.
breath of life in this old frame of mine'. Fraser contended that the tactics of the New Zealand Communist Party:

... followed a pattern displayed in Central Europe. Infiltration was accompanied by appeals for a united front in elections. Once members of Government, Communists would manage, as in Czechoslovakia, to gain control of the courts, the police and the army, after which they would drop the mask of collaboration and seize absolute power.57

The American Legation was very pleased to report back to the U. S. State Department that Fraser had devoted a major portion of his speech at the conference to a denunciation of communism.58

At the conference the militants, (probably the nearest things to communists supporters in the Labour Party), met with defeat as F. P Walsh was reinstated to the executive. In 1949 Labour passed the Industrial Relations Act to promote socio-political harmony. According to McLennan, this 'Act implicitly revealed that the Labour Government did not recognise the existence of anything approaching a class struggle'.59 Fraser and Semple had successfully used the fear of communism as a political tool to achieve the acquiescence of the labour movement. The use of the communist fear was, however, less successful in uniting the labour movement over the peacetime conscription referendum.

Holland in the mean time continued to attack the Labour Government's encroaching socialism. Early in 1948 National formed an Opposition Committee on Communism. Its task was to observe the occurrence and control of subversive communist activity in New Zealand. It was chaired by C. Harker and the committee included K. Holyoake and F. Doidge. On 5 July 1948 Holland held his leader's rally and stressed that

56 847.00/5-1748 #145 R. M. Scotten to U. S. State Department, 17 May 1948, p. 2.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., p. 1.
National would fight the 'curse of Communism with all weapons'. In August, the Government put forward the Coal Bill to nationalise selected coal mines. This gave Holland more ammunition to launch an anti-socialist, anti-communist tirade against the Labour Party.

The newspapers were very critical of the Labour Government's handling of industrial unrest. Many felt that Labour had tongue-in-cheek when blaming communists for industrial strife while permitting the same Communists to function as a legal party. The newspapers always assumed that the communists were behind strike action. There were numerous calls for the Government to follow the U. S. example in denouncing and finding 'pinks'. These calls increased after the Mangakino affair in March, where 900 workers at the Waikato hydro-electric plant went on strike in protest at the transfer of the local secretary of the General Workers' Union, who was a communist. Holland on this occasion called for the removal of communists from the public service. The newspapers did not like anything approaching the class struggle in the form of strike action. Many editors just wanted a return to normalcy and stability in the post-war period and communism did not offer this.

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60 ODT, 6 July 1948, p. 4. The editor believed Holland's attacks on communism would succeed but not Fraser's or Semple's. See: ODT, 16 March 1948, p. 4. Perhaps the attitude of the ODT can be best summed up with by one quote: 'The surrender of liberty is part of the price that Socialism exacts from the individual'. Holland successfully managed to equate socialism with communism. See: ODT, 23 September 1948, p. 4. See also: 847.00/3-1748 #83 J. S. Service to U. S. State Department, 17 March 1948, p. 1. In March 1948, Holland was 'agitating for the adoption of legislation restricting the activities of the Communist Party'.
61 NZH, 15 March 1948, p. 6; G. D. Stewart, 'Stand Against Fifth Column', NZC, v. 3, 11 (15 May 1948), pp. 25-7. Some people advocated that Western liberalism should be taught in schools following the exposure of Miss Elizabeth Bentley, a communist spy in the U. S., who missed out on liberal illumination at school. See: NZH, 13 November 1948, p. 8.
63 847H.00/3-1748 #83 J. S. Service to U. S. State Department, 17 March 1948, p. 2.
64 NZH, 1 May 1948, p. 8.
How Reds seize power

IT CAN HAPPEN IN NEW ZEALAND UNLESS WE TAKE STEPS TO PREVENT IT

- By the method shown above, the Communists, since the war, have taken control of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.

In Finland the preliminary steps are over. Moscow's demand for a treaty linking the Finns and Russians completes the pattern.

In Italy the groundwork has been laid. The Communists are in the labour unions, the schools, the farming groups and all elements of the population.

In France, too, the programme is well advanced.

But in Britain the Communists are weak; the pattern hasn't even begun to take shape.

In the United States also they are weak, and they face a different system of government that makes their European pattern useless.
STALIN IS DOWN UNDER
Even the more left-wing oriented paper, the *Southern Cross*, shared many of the same anti-communist sentiments. Following a warning by the Federated Seamen's Union about the activities of communists, the paper stated that communists 'display a hypocritical concern for the welfare of the workers'. The *Southern Cross* even ran an article on 'WHY I FIGHT COMMUNISM' by and applauded Mr. Nash's warning of the communist menace. The left became infected by same the persuasive liberal anti-communist rhetoric of the right. One Labour Party supporter from Green Island felt that their was a conspiracy organised by the National and Communists Parties to embarrass the Government, crush the worker and bring about a dictatorship. The Cold War consciousness cut across all divisions of society, class, sectarian and regional. These differences were overcome by a commonly held set of beliefs in democracy.

In 1949 the Cold War fully reverberated itself in New Zealand. The bitter ideological divisions within the labour movement and the two major political parties climaxed in the Compulsory Military Training Referendum and the General Election. The conscription issue divided the labour movement and polarised public opinion. In the end, liberal anti-communism triumphed with the reintroduction of peacetime conscription and the election victory of Holland led National Party over Fraser's Labour Party.

In early 1949 the anti-communist fervour which had gripped the country in 1948 reached its zenith with the exposure of the Holmes Case.

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65 SC, 1 June 1948, p. 2.
66 SC, 5 June 1948, p. 7; SC, 22 December 1948, p. 2. There were a number of letters to the editor supporting Mr Nash.
The origins of this scandal can be traced back to the public service wage disputes near the end of 1948. Public service wages were deteriorating as were their relations with the Labour Government. The Government attempted to shelve the problems by passing the Government Tribunal Bill on 18 November 1948. This led civil servants to take unprecedented measures including a protest at Parliament and a petition.

Within this context the Holmes Case occurred. In December 1948 efforts were being made at the Miramar Film Studios of the New Zealand Film Unit to hold a stop-work meeting to discuss pay claims. A senior member of the Prime Minister's office stole a satchel belonging to Cecil Holmes, a member of the Film Unit, out of his car. The satchel contained resolution notes concerning direct strike action. The notes ended up in Walter Nash's possession and he publicly released them. It was no coincidence that Holmes was a member of the New Zealand Communist Party.68

Nash alleged that the Communist Party was using the public service dispute to further its own ends. As a result, Holmes was dismissed from the Film Unit. Instead of being a fundamental case of civil liberties and wages, the Labour Government went on the anti-communist offensive. Nash 'saw the possibility of demonstrating that public service agitation was Communist-inspired'.69 The Government's tactic worked publicly in the first, early and emotional phase of the Cold War. Despite P. S. A. condemnation, Labour did not have to worry about public opinion in

69 K. Sinclair, Walter Nash, Auckland, 1976, p. 277. According to Sinclair, this is one the few occasions Nash was involved in such an 'illiberal act'.
dealing with the public sector's wage claims. Even the *Southern Cross* said Nash 'was doing no more than his duty in helping to preserve our mode of life against sinister activities, that would, if they could, destroy it entirely'.

The Holmes Case backfired and became a political embarrassment for the Labour Government. National had a field day in Parliament as Holland moved a motion of no confidence and talked about a police state. In mid-September the Court of Appeal found that the Government did not have the rights of summary dismissal in the Holmes Case. The editor of the *New Zealand Herald* lamented: 'If the government had the courage to declare the Communist Party a subversive and unlawful organisation, then conceivably it might free its hand in its dealings with individual Communists'. Nash admitted later in life that he was deeply ashamed of his involvement in the Holmes scandal.

If the Cold War made respectable politicians do things they would not normally do it also divided the labour movement over the conscription referendum. The prime mover behind the issue was Peter Fraser, who came out in favour of peacetime conscription after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conferences of 1948-49, where Ernest Bevin talked about the Russian threat to the Suez. The tension of the international climate in the aftermath of the Berlin blockade, the North Atlantic Pact in April 1949 and the communist insurgencies in China and Malaya were other initiating factors. Fraser presented the conscription

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70 SC, 7 June 1949, p. 2.  
71 NZH, 13 September 1949, p. 6.  
73 Ibid., p. 274.
proposal to the Annual Labour Party Conference in May 1949, where he spoke of the threat of the totalitarian police state, the Soviet Union.74

Although the Cold War consciousness was powerful, it could not hope to banish conflict altogether. Fraser's conscription proposal opened up labour movement sectionalism. Sixteen Trade Councils, the Watersiders, Carpenters', Tramwaymen, Drivers and Freezing Workers' Unions as well as the Communist Party were against it. Failing to get Labour Party conference approval, Fraser took the issue to a national referendum. Public resources campaigned in favour of a 'yes' vote. Advertisements placed in newspapers emphasised that post-war peace had eluded the United Nations and that New Zealand must be prepared to discourage would-be aggressors. Fears of a 1930s replay were part of the conscription push in 1949. The Nazi-Soviet analogy came to the forefront. 'We cannot afford to take risks in a dangerous world in which forms of dictatorship threaten', read one advertisement.75 The inferences of the campaign were clear. The West must be prepared for an attack from another totalitarian power. This time the danger was posed by the Soviet Union, not Nazi Germany.

In early May, the Peace and Anti-Conscription Federation, led by John A. Lee and Ormond Burton, held a meeting in Wellington.76 Commenting on the gathering under the heading 'Unholy Alliance', the

75 See: ODT, 18 July 1949, p. 3; ODT, 27 July 1949, p. 5.
editor of the Otago Daily Times emphasised the communist influence in the organisation and associated anti-conscriptionists with communist fifth columns. The major newspapers were unashamedly pro-conscription leading up to the referendum. The Southern Cross became fervently anti-communist around this time. Communists were portrayed as the 'wreckers of the conciliation and arbitration system . . . the enemy of Labour . . . the enemy of the worker . . . the enemy of democracy'. All the newspapers kept up their polarised stance on communism.

Those supporting peacetime conscription declared themselves anti-communist, claiming that New Zealand's security was threatened by the Soviet Union and communist advances. The R. S. A., a firm advocate of conscription, were constantly calling for communists to be barred from New Zealand, expelling a 'Red Sympathiser' in May from the northern Wairoa branch. Many became worried about communist influences in universities and schools. At Otago University the Democratic Anti-Communist Society was founded to offset the anachronistic attitude of the Student Executive. The conscription issue brought all these polarised fears to the surface. Just before the referendum newspapers ran ominous headlines and articles such as 'COMMUNISM IS A DESTROYER OF LIBERTY'. The referendum was set up as a showdown between those forces in New Zealand society who wished to preserve democracy versus those who did not. It was essentially a test of strength for the Cold War mind set in New Zealand.

77 ODT, 18 May 1949, p. 4; ODT, 25 May 1949, p. 4.
78 SC, 7 April 1949, p. 2; SC, 30 June 1949, p. 2. One reader even blamed communists for the miners strike in New South Wales.
80 ODT, 30 May 1949, p. 4.
81 NZH, 28 July 1949, p. 5.
On 3 August 1949 the referendum was held and 568,427 voted in favour of conscription, with 160,998 against. Based on the 1949 Electoral Roll there was a high-degree of non-voting, as much as 35%. Some scholars have suggested this indicates an important minority that did not consider the Soviet threat as a real menace. But this ignores that salience of the issue for the half-million who did vote for conscription. Close to half the country were sensitive of the 'Red bogey' to get out of bed and vote 'yes' for the Cold War warrior, Mr Fraser. The lessons of the 1930's were painfully clear for these voters: arm now and prevent another world war. Even the traditional opponents of conscription, the North Island Maori, voted in favour of conscription. Clearly many people in New Zealand accepted that there was a communist threat, a fact highlighted by thousands of New Zealanders joining the Civil Emergency Corps.

The threat of communism was an important issue in the referendum, revealing how national the Cold War consciousness was in New Zealand society. At the Government level the fear was very real. The Prime Minister hailed the vote as 'fine victory for democracy and for the defence of democratic freedom'. The Otago Daily Times labelled it a 'sharp defeat for the Communist party' as the 'people of New Zealand... recorded their conviction that democracy must arm against Communism'. But ironically the editor deplored the democratic methods:

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84 Ibid.
85 We must remember that this was a country that was happy to see an Australian Communist, Laurence Sharkey, go to prison for three years for sedition. See: ODT, 19 October 1949, p. 4.
88 ODT, 4 August 1949, p. 6.
The decision could have been made in confidence that the official Opposition in Parliament would have given its support to the principle of military preparedness in New Zealand, at a time when the world is divided into ideological camps and the forces of Communism are engaged in a conspiracy to weaken, if possible, to destroy Western democracy.89

The editor of the *New Zealand Herald* shared the same sentiments, praising the vote as 'a vote against Communism, a vote against industrial wreckers . . . [which] commands the Government - or its successor - to defend New Zealand against the enemy within'.90

The General Election of 1949 provided another rich site for the Cold War ideological struggle to be played out at home. The National Party made it clear at their Annual Conference in June that their tactic was to 'hit hard on the line that Labor [sic] socialism is akin to Communism in objective'.91 The conservative papers portrayed the election contest in sharp focus. The 'real issue' of the election was whether or not New Zealand wanted to go further to the left, down the path to totalitarian Statism or down the road forged by Englishmen, that of democracy and individual freedom.92 When Sid Holland declared he was going to repair the damage done by fourteen years of socialism, this had appeal in a society primed by the Cold War and bombarded with messages about the virtues of democracy and the dangers of socialism and communism.93 Five days before the election, the editor of the *Otago Daily Times* stated that Labour Party socialism 'will destroy with contempt our democracy and substitute a complete State discipline'.94

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89 Ibid.
90 847H.2222/8-1249 R. M. Scotten to U. S. State Department, 8 August 1949, p. 2.
91 847H. 90/7-849 #167 R. M. Scotten to U. S. State Department, 8 July 1949, p. 1.
92 ODT, 28 June 1949, p. 4.
93 ODT, 28 October 1949, p. 6.
In the Cold War atmosphere, the National Party was always going to win the election on 30 November 1949. National received 556,805 votes or 51.9% of the total votes cast and won 46 seats to Labour's 34. The Cold War and the conscription issue had effectively destroyed the political unity of the labour movement. National had used the 'Red scare' tactic in their campaign with effect. New Zealand, with its wartime fear of totalitarianism, naturally saw communism as abhorrent. The communist smear was always going to be useful in a country with a democratic heritage. The public needed little convincing that communism was disruptive. Industrial unrest was rampant in 1949. Their experience of the Mangakino Affair and the Holmes Case had shown the pernicious nature of communism. They found the communist inspired subversion explanation much more credible than inflation in light of international events such as Czechoslovakia. The Social Laboratory built by the first Labour Government, with its high standard of living, was never going to be a fertile ground for communism. It was, however, a perfect recipient of anti-communist liberalism, which preached the virtues of democracy, stability, and down-played class differences.

A survey carried out in the Mount Victoria electorate concerning the 1949 General Election indicates the extent to which the fear of communism was held by the community. (See Appendix I) The majority of Labour supporters voted Labour because they supported principles of social equality. Labour voters were then asked if they supported Labour

because of its socialism or communism. Not one voter said 'yes'. National supporters were a different story. Of those who voted National, 34% said they did so because of their opposition to socialism, or in the interests of personal or individual freedom. This suggests that the Cold War had a very significant political impact on New Zealand. M. McKinnon is correct when he asserts that anti-communism had been a dominant theme in the election, albeit a domestic one.\(^98\) In the Mount Victoria electorate, at least, the Cold War consciousness cut deep into the community.

The poor performance of the Communist Party at the elections also indicates how pervasive the Cold War mind set was in New Zealand. They received only 3,499 votes in total or 0.3% of the total votes cast, a percentage that reflects, in part, their negative press coverage.\(^99\) Subsequently their membership collapsed as did their journal circulation numbers as the domestic Cold War intensified.\(^100\) (See Appendix II) Cullen believes the evidence suggests that the Party 'was a minority which became an important national scapegoat'.\(^101\) The Cold War mind set had sent the New Zealand Communist Party to the margins of society. Their only hope of recovery lay in the impossible: the reorientation of the image of the Soviet Union as in the halcyon days of the Second World War.

By the end of 1949 a powerful Cold War consciousness existed in New Zealand. The Neville Chamberlains of this new bipolar world were sent to the political wilderness, a fact Henry Wallace and like minded

98 McKinnon, *Independence and Foreign Policy*, p. 118. McKinnon argues that Labour's electoral defeat seems to have deepened the shadow cast by the Cold War and increased the fear of being labelled 'soft' on Communism.
people found out. Those who were not fervently anti-communist or preached moderation with the Soviet Union met with defeat, like O. Wilson, the Labour M. P. for Palmerston North. Those who got in its way were condemned by newspaper editors as weak links in the chain to defend democracy from the new totalitarian scourge, the Soviet Union. Cold War liberalism, with its emphasis on anti-communism, had definitely triumphed in New Zealand by the end of 1949. It would take a war in South-east Asia to bring it down.
Chapter 6: The Undeclared War 1947-1949

The dual [sic] for influence between the United States and Russia is one which is being fought on many fronts . . . widely beyond the centres of the conflict.\(^1\)

John Moffett.

No observer of international affairs can fail to see in this undeclared war the explanation of Russian obstinacy.\(^2\)

Editor, New Zealand Herald.

This chapter will focus on how the New Zealand public perceived the international Cold War between 1947-1949. A number of issues need to be addressed, including how the public saw the rivalry - in terms of an ideological struggle or as a contest of political power between the United States and the Soviet Union. Over this period the prevalent stereotype of Russia was one of a totalitarian dictatorship engaged in spreading world Communism for the purposes of self-aggrandisement. There was a resurgence of peacetime hostility towards the Soviet Union in New Zealand due to their aggressive behaviour.\(^3\) The public were constantly told that the Soviet Union were essentially the same threat as Hitler’s Germany. The analogy provided New Zealanders with the assurance that they knew what to expect from the Soviet Union as it taught them and convinced them that the 1940’s was simply a replay of the 1930’s.\(^4\) The public were relieved to see the United States stand up to its responsibility

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\(^1\) Otago Daily Times (hereafter \textit{ODT}), 3 November 1947, p. 4. John Moffett was the editor of the \textit{ODT} around this time.


\(^3\) W. P. Davison, 'The Public Opinion Process', \textit{The Public Opinion Quarterly}, v. 22, 2 (Summer 1958), p. 29. In 1948 Congress passed the Smith-Mundt Act which called for an information programme to promote a better understanding of the U. S. in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the U. S. and the people in other countries. In this view, the press had immense power to govern the sentiments of the public.

the world coming to some stage of peace and progress'. But communism did have an Achilles heel and it was democratic liberalism. The public were told that Russian diplomats were not encouraged to go overseas 'to avoid the danger of contamination by liberal ideas'.

Just like Hitler's Nazi Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union was not to be trusted. Stalin was a ruthless opportunist who 'rose to power through the unresisting mass of ancient Russian apathy'. Throughout 1947 the newspapers emphasised that Russia's behaviour was too unpredictable to be trusted. Even conciliatory acts by the Soviet Union were seen with surprise and mistrust. For this reason Britain's Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was to watch his back in dealing with the Russians.

If the Soviet Union were perceived as untrustworthy, they were also seen as unco-operative. This characteristic was most commonly embodied in the term 'intransigence'. In an interview with Stalin over the deadlock reached in the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations, he stated: 'I want to bear testimony to the fact that Russia wants to co-operate'. But according to the editor, 'if the Soviet record is evidence of desire to co-operate, the word has lost all meaning'. The press felt that Russia was most unwilling to co-operate on the most important issues such as the reconstruction of Germany by zonal co-ordination.

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10 ODT, 9 January 1947, p. 4.
13 NZH, 5 May 1947, p. 6.
14 Ibid. This view was not shared by Mr B. Martin of the Legislative Council. In his view, Russian suspicion was not 'altogether unnatural'. See: NZPD, v. 276, June 24 - July 29, 1947, pp. 313-4.
Explanations for this unwillingness were ascribed to the traditional Russian trait of suspicion and paranoia. Stalin was full of 'balderdash' and Molotov became the most visible dirty Commie. He was the symbol of Russian non-cooperation, 'the hammer on the flag, abrupt, heavy, destructive . . . enigmatical and unresponding and formidably righteous'. The public were told that Molotov in diplomatic dialogue sabotaged debate, trifled with the West, whom he held in contempt. Moreover, 'he delays the world's healing because he sees hope in its wounds'.

By this stage most editors believed that the world was divided in two. Stalin had included within his 'iron curtain' system most of the states of Eastern Europe by this time. Churchill's Cold War 'iron curtain' rhetoric pervaded editorials on the subject of international affairs as New Zealand tried to come to grips with the new bipolar world. Editors were pessimistic about the democratic cause in light of Soviet advances on Eastern Europe. Even though Great Britain was declining in stature, many hoped that Britain would provide the moral leadership in the Cold War. According to B. Barrington, the New Zealand public was conservative because it refused to see 'the days of the Commonwealth monopoly on New Zealand foreign policy had passed'. The possibility of a Western Union was also bounced about as a possible bulwark against further Soviet expansionism.

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15 ODT, 12 May 1947, p. 4.
17 NZH, 12 July 1947, p. 8.
18 ODT, 9 June 1947, p. 4.
20 Ibid; ODT, 17 June 1947, p. 4.
The world seemed in a dangerous state of flux as the problem of maintaining peace remained unresolved. Many wanted the United States to realise that 'the boundary of the United States lies even beyond the Rhine'\textsuperscript{21} and not to fall back into pre-war isolationism. The indications of the East-West split were becoming all too apparent. According to Mr M. Moohan, Labour M. P. for Petone: 'We are faced to-day with an international situation in which the destiny and peace of the world rests with the three Great Powers'.\textsuperscript{22} New Zealanders were worried about the possibility of another world war, a reason that pushed them towards supporting a firm line against the Soviet Union.

There was some sympathy for the Soviet Union in the crumbling left-wing quarter in New Zealand. Many saw the United States, with its 'rip-roaring capitalism', as equally culpable as the Soviet Union with its political economy based on the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'.\textsuperscript{23} The Southern Cross at was equally critical of the United States and the Soviet Union. In an editorial on the Russian use of the veto in the Security Council, the editor said:

In many respects we are critical of the Soviet Union; but we recognise damaging and mischievous anti-Soviet propaganda when we see it. The basis of much of this propaganda has been Russia's recourse to the veto, and the source of much of it has been the United States'.\textsuperscript{24}

Clearly there was a small left-wing view in New Zealand that associated the coming of the Cold War with the aggressive American economic tendencies. With the announcement of the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, however, this view was to lose credibility.

\textsuperscript{21} ODT, 17 June 1947, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{22} NZPD, v. 276, June 24 - July 29, 1947, p. 290.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid}. Many Labour politicians saw the Cold War as conflict between sharp extremes. In the words of Reverend Mr. Carr, 'There are diametrically opposed philosophies in the world to-day - extreme capitalism and extreme socialism'. See: NZPD, v. 276, June 24 - July 29, 1947, p. 407.
\textsuperscript{24} Southern Cross (hereafter SC), 8 July 1947, p. 4.
President Truman's speech to Congress on aid to Greece and Turkey dramatically announced the Truman Doctrine. Extracts from his 12 March 1947 speech were splashed all over the main news columns and editorials of the papers. 'At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life', declared Truman. The world faced a choice of two ways of life:

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.25

The New Zealand Herald editor called the speech 'a fair description of life in the Soviet Union and in the puppet States dominated by Moscow'.26 The editor called the United States and Great Britain the 'champions of liberty ... [who] ... stand four-square against the domination of majorities by armed minorities ... By this test alone Communism is condemned'.27 The same editor described the passage of Truman's Greece-Turkey Aid Bill as a development of the 'greatest sign', a realisation by the United States of its position and responsibility in world affairs.28 The New Zealand press

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26 NZH, 17 March 1947, p. 6; and NZH, 9 April 1947, p. 6. The editor felt later President Truman's call was a message 'to his country to stamp out the smouldering beginnings of another world conflict'. The editor argued that the U. S. must challenge the Kremlin in the affairs of Italy, Greece, Turkey, Persia, the Levant etc. because Russia interest in these areas is selfish and aggressive.
27 Ibid.
28 NZH, 12 May 1947, p. 6. Also see: O. Wilson, 'Russian Intransigence', World Affairs, v. 3, 2 (June 1947), pp. 15-6. Wilson saw the Truman Doctrine as a sign of 'America's get tough attitude' and the Russian reaction to it as 'surprisingly moderate'. Wilson's position over the Cold War was clearly moderate, a bit like Henry Wallace. On many occasions he expressed the view that the press in New Zealand was badly informed about the Soviet Union and the Cold War. He accused them of 'scare mongering' and building 'up quite false impressions'. See: NZPD, v. 278, September 3 - October 16, 1947, p. 457.
were glad to see the United States reject isolationism and take a firm stance towards the Soviet Union.

The *Otago Daily Times* was more enthusiastic over the announcement of the Truman Doctrine. 'It becomes clearer everyday that the United States of America by reason of its power, resources and successful war effort is at last beginning to realise its world position'. The editor was relieved to see the United States lift some of the burden of policing the world from Great Britain. It was important in the editor's mind to see the United States lead the West in the Cold War, 'a clear conflict of ideologies between Western democracy and Sovietism'. This cleavage between East and West was seen as potentially explosive because of 'the modern apple of discord, the atomic bomb'.

The *Southern Cross* was also supportive of Truman's policy as it made 'clear that American's plan for the assistance of Greece is one which is aimed at democratic freedom for Greek people'. Many, however, did not want the Truman's prescription to be worse than the communist disease. The left-wing was always sceptical of American moves and should have realised that the Truman Doctrine came close to shutting the door against any revolution. Since the terms 'free peoples' and 'anti-Communist' were thought to be synonymous, all a government had to do

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29 *ODT*, 17 March 1947, p. 4; *ODT*, 29 August 1947, p. 4. According to the editor, 'the United States has become the greatest power in the world to-day'. New Zealanders were disappointed at early war American isolationism This attitude is expressed by the American Legation in Wellington. See: 847H.00/9-547 #861 Bi-Weekly Summary, 5 September 1947, p. 9.

30 For editorials emphasising the weakness of Great Britain see: *ODT*, 23 January 1947, p. 4. 'Great Britain's foreign commitments are too heavy for a nation strained and impoverished by six years of war'. Also see: *NZH*, 16 September 1947, p. 6. This editorial is on 'British Sea Power in Jeopardy'.

31 *ODT*, 17 March 1947, p. 4.

32 *Ibid*.

33 *SC*, 18 March 1947, p. 4.
to get U. S. aid was to claim that its opponents were Communist. But the *Southern Cross* was satisfied that aid to Greece and Turkey was not unilateral interference or American imperialism.

The Truman Doctrine was an important step in the reorientation of editorial opinion towards the United States and the Soviet Union. It scared the hell out them, pushing them firmly behind the international right in the Cold War. The Truman Doctrine saw a sharp increase in newspaper hostility towards the Soviet Union. The editors saw the pronouncement as the U. S. shifting from support for the anti-fascist alliance to leadership of the international anti-communist alliance. Greece was seen as a 'frightened country, struggling to withstand the onset of Communism in its most violent and bloody aspect'. Greece and Turkey were seen as nations under menace from a totalitarian system. Truman's stance was positive as it allowed 'the nations under threat to preserve their dignity, their nationhood, and their democratic way of life'. It was now possible and desirable to become moral supporters of the United States in the Cold War.

The Truman Doctrine crystallised editorial opinion. There was now an undeniable realisation that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were the greatest problem in the world. The United States were seen as the defenders of democracy, the very antithesis of the

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36 A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency*, Boston, 1989, p. 128. In order to enlist Congress support for his aid package to Greece and Turkey Truman had to scare the hell out of America. At the same time he successfully managed to scare the hell out of the rest of the world, including New Zealand.
38 ODT, 26 March 1947, p. 4.
39 ODT, 11 April 1947, p. 4.
principles of Soviet totalitarianism. The Cold War was, therefore, a conflict of philosophies. The Truman Aid Bill to Congress was the salvation of democracy under the severe strain of aggressive Soviet foreign policy. The Marshall Aid Plan was see in the same light. Communism was seen as most vulnerable in the economic sphere. By September, the Americans had 'reached the stage of brandishing the big stick towards Russia'.

In the wake of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the left-wing in New Zealand by the end of 1947 had become slightly ambivalent and apprehensive in their attitude towards the United States' beefed up role in international affairs. The United States mission in life was to make the world safe for democracy. The mission was honourable but the means and consequences were questioned. The editor of the *Southern Cross* wrote: 'Where democracy begins and free enterprise ends in the American outlook is often hard to determine'. The *Southern Cross* was very sceptical of American motives and attacked the 'unregulated capitalism' of the United States. The *Southern Cross* was extremely anxious over the new aggressive stance of the United States:

Communism is a dogma the spread of which American foreign policy is designed to arrest; yet it would be an extreme irony if this policy were to fail and end perhaps in general disaster through adherence to the opposite dogma that the system of free enterprise is sacrosanct. America must put itself in order before it can use its vast resources to do the same, with lasting benefit for Europe.

The left in New Zealand saw the Cold War as a battle between two evils: unregulated capitalism and communism. The Cold War was perceived as

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40 ODT, 31 December 1947, p. 4. 'The champion of the democratic nations in this flagrant Communist bid for world dominion has been the United States of America, a physical giant brought to full political maturity by the experience of the greatest war in its history'.
41 ODT, 17 May 1947, p. 6.
43 ODT, 16 September 1947, p. 4.
44 SC, 31 October 1947, p. 4.
45 Ibid.
a battle of philosophical economic hegemony. Both sides or extremes of the belligerents did not appeal to many in the left-wing, but the undemocratic position of the Soviet Union, made it almost impossible for the vast majority of New Zealanders not to support the United States.

Perceived communist inspired problems throughout 1947 reinforced editorial support for the United States in the Cold War. There were endless editorials on China, Korea, Poland, Hungary, Austria, the rigged Russian elections, Persia, divided Europe, the agony of Eastern Europe and the future of Germany. Invariably all editorials were vehemently anti-Soviet and anti-communist as press coverage of the Cold War became highly ideological. Where there was communism, it was bad and the West had to fight back. By the end of 1947 a Cold War consciousness had emerged in New Zealand that saw the East-West divide in permanent geopolitical terms.

Throughout 1948 themes of Russian intransigence, communist expansionism, anti-Soviet sentiments and the bad state of international affairs pervaded the editorials of the New Zealand press. For the first

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47 SC, 8 December 1947, p. 4.

48 See for example: ODT, 5 February 1948, p. 4. According to the editor, 'while the Soviet Union maintains its present attitude of intransigence and even hostility to the democracies, no good can be served by sending representatives of small countries to batter their heads against the walls of the Kremlin'. See also: ODT, 12 February 1948, p. 7. The public were told that in 1940 Hitler and Stalin almost agreed to carve up the world into Axis and Russian spheres-of-influence; ODT, 31 March 1948, p. 4. The public even learned that Russia had banned 'Lady Macbeth of Minsk' as 'bourgeois formalism'. See: ODT, 23 August 1948, p. 4. Editorial talks about the 'iron curtain' and how it hides the true evil nature of communism in practice. On Russia's use of the U. N. for 'propaganda purposes' see: ODT, 23 November 1948, p. 4.
time the phrase 'Cold War' entered the public's lexicon. Obviously this term was imported from the British and American media. In early February the New Zealand Herald ran a headline which read 'The “Cold War” Must Be Checked', a call from Anthony Eden.\textsuperscript{49} The term gained widespread use in public discourse. The Cold War was seen as something unique. It was a showdown in which the two major belligerents were not prepared to carry it to its fateful conclusion - another world war.\textsuperscript{50}

One of the two themes that dominated New Zealand editorials during 1948 was the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia. This event solidified and polarised attitudes towards the activities of the domestic Communists. Both Eduard Benes and Jan Masaryk were admired in the New Zealand press. Many felt Klement Gottwald's Communist's were trying to change the role of Czechoslovakia from a democratic bridge into a 'dagger pointed at the throat of Europe'.\textsuperscript{51} The fall of Benes on 25 February 1948 was seen as a tragedy.\textsuperscript{52} Two weeks later Masaryk's assassination met with the same sorrow.\textsuperscript{53}

The Czechoslovakian coup produced two repercussions. Firstly, as Truman noted, it 'sent a shock throughout the civilised world'.\textsuperscript{54} The New Zealand press had regarded Czechoslovakia as a model democracy

\textsuperscript{49} NZH, 13 February 1948, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{50} ODT, 31 August 1948, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{51} NZH, 23 February 1948, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{52} ODT, 27 February 1948, p. 4. The editor felt that with the division of Europe between the Marshall Plan and the Molotov Plan, Czechoslovakia was in a dilemma. He also felt that the tragedy was the result of Russian fears and ambitions which created the belief that it was necessary to force a willing ally into the position of an occupied country.
\textsuperscript{53} See: ODT, 12 March 1948, p. 4. Editorial is entitled 'Death of a Patriot'. The Communist takeover is 'a tyranny that will bring to Czechoslovakia more anguish than it knew under the cruel but careless Austro-Hungarian Empire or even the militarily efficient Germans'.
\textsuperscript{54} Truman as quoted by Ambrose, \textit{Rise to Globalism}, p. 94.
and were deeply distressed at its overthrow. Nearly everyone began to discuss Hitler and Munich. According to the editor of the *Otago Daily Times*, under an editorial entitled 'The Way to War!', 'there is strong similarity between the Nazi seizure of this country and the Communist coup which is most disturbing'. The press were very worried that war was about to happen the same way ten years later.

Secondly, the coup dramatically highlighted the limitations of Western policy. Nothing could be done, except short of war, to prevent the Communist takeover. The *New Zealand Herald* reflected that 'Czechoslovakia again typifies the fate which must befall the free peoples of Western Europe unless they take steps to halt the advance of totalitarian expansionism'. There were calls for the West to stop 'Russian absolutism' and expansionism, many feeling that the coup may have done the cause of world freedom an unintentional service by waking the West to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The coup was seen as warning light and the ultimate test for the Western Allies came in Berlin.

In June 1948 the Western Powers indicated that they were going ahead with plans to formalise a West German government. Tension over the future of Berlin and Germany was closely followed in New Zealand from the end of March when the Soviet delegation walked out of the

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55 *NZH*, 6 March 1948, p. 8; *SC*, 12 June 1948, p. 2. Even as late as June 1949 New Zealand was mourning the loss of Czechoslovakia. See: *ODT*, 23 June 1949, p. 7. The headline read: 'Czechs and Communism - Hope Died With Dr. Benes'.

56 *ODT*, 10 March 1948, p. 4. The New Zealand press were full of comments equating Stalin with Hitler. See: *NZH*, 12 March 1948, p. 5. The Communists in Czechoslovakia were 'Hitlerite in technique and utterly damnable in every way'. See also: *New Zealand National Review* (hereafter *NZNR*), v. 31, 12 (15 December 1948), p. 11. 'A new villain has appeared among the nations. Hitler is forgotten and Stalin has taken up his role'.

57 *NZH*, 1 March 1948, p. 6.

58 Ibid.
Allied Control Council. The New Zealand press was positive about the American moves to set up a unified zone government with Britain and France. 

The crisis over Berlin was seen as a classic showdown of East facing West. Russia was blamed for the latest trouble. 'Moscow has reacted characteristically by making as much trouble as possible for Britain and United States in the easiest place - Berlin'. Since Stalin had broken the Potsdam agreement, it was felt that there should be no appeasement of Russia. 'It is well, therefore, that Munich and its consequences should be recalled at this moment', stated the editor of the New Zealand Herald. Russia had worries if the democracies decided to stand firm.

The Berlin Blockade preoccupied the New Zealand press for the months over its duration. All the editorials emphasised the dangerous nature of the stalemate and the heroic deeds of the personnel involved in the massive airlift. There were constant calls for New Zealanders to give moral support to the Allies in the Berlin Crisis. The referral of the dispute to the U. N. Security Council was not welcomed by some, an indication of New Zealand's growing disillusionment with the organisation. The best statement of New Zealand's feeling at the time

59 NZH, 25 March 1948, p. 6; ODT, 5 April 1948, p. 4. The editor stated that Russia was playing a dangerous game in Berlin and over the question of a divided Germany.
60 ODT, 4 June 1948, p. 4.
61 NZH, 21 June 1948, p. 6.
63 NZH, 3 August 1948, p. 6.
65 NZH, 17 July 1948, p. 8. New Zealand did in fact provide an aircrew for the Berlin airlift. Fraser also made three frigates available for Hong Kong and agreed to commit troops to the Middle East in case of a Russian invasion.
66 ODT, 29 September 1948, p. 4. The editor stated 'the return to secret diplomacy was expected to appeal to the masters of the Kremlin'.


came from the editor of the *New Zealand Herald*: 'Not by M. Stalin's occasional smile or M. Molotov's infrequent geniality should Russian intentions be judged. A surer guide are the happenings in Berlin. There Russian duplicity, craft and cunning have been starkly revealed'.

The situation in Berlin was seen as a direct reflection of the evil totalitarian nature of communism. The Communist takeover in the Russian sector of Berlin in December was aggressive, revealing 'nothing more than the oft-proved truth that the Communists dare not commit their fate to a free election'.

One letter to the editor stated that: 'Communism teaches fear, hatred, resentment [and] envy'. The crisis in Berlin underlined the aggressive intentions of Stalin and the abhorrence of communism. Communism was seen in the same light of fascism. Communism was seen as undemocratic in nature and many concluded that the 'Nazi threat was as sinister'. Editors were exasperated and angered by the Soviet attitude and came to accept the view that Soviet aims were aggressive and expansionist. The results of the West Berlin elections in December were met with relief as they emphatically rejected communism.

The New Zealand public were made aware of other important developments in the international Cold War. There were editorials on

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67 *NZH*, 10 September 1948, p. 6.
68 *NZH*, 2 December 1948, p. 6; *NZL*, v. 18 464 (14 May 1948), p. 5. 'Every democracy in the world today is in trouble with communists and every communists knows why'. The *New Zealand Listener* saw the Cold War as 'one of those unequal contests morally in which one side has scruples and other only aims'.
70 *NZH*, 2 October 1948, p. 8; *NZH*, 9 August 1948, p. 6. According to the editor, 'the world suffered through not reading Hitler's Mein Kampf. It seems in danger of ignoring Stalin's *Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*'.
72 See: *ODT*, 8 December 1948, p. 6; *NZH*, 18 December 1948, p. 8.
communist insurgencies in Asia, with particular focus on China, Korea, Malaya and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{73} The Cold War was gaining more significance in New Zealand as the front line move closer to home. Public attention was drawn to Marshal Tito and his strike for an independent course from Moscow.\textsuperscript{74} For the first time it was acknowledged that the communist monolith was not impregnable. Under the editorial entitled 'A Rent in the Curtain', the editor of the\textit{Otago Daily Times} said the Yugoslavian expulsion from the Comintern 'reveals [the Soviet Union's] development towards a strict imperialism [which] cannot permit nationalism to raise its head among satellite states'.\textsuperscript{75} The Tito-Stalin split was seen as a lesson to all would-be communists that there existed only one Communist god and that was Stalin.\textsuperscript{76}

The moderate view of the Cold War persisted throughout the turbulent events of 1948. The\textit{Southern Cross} continued its assault on 'backward America' for its unregulated capitalism and its lack of a workers' party.\textsuperscript{77} The\textit{Southern Cross} could understand the Western dislike of the Russian Communist system, but also the Russian dislike of the Western social system.\textsuperscript{78} Their appraisal of international affairs was definitely ideological, but it was the closest thing many New Zealanders got to read of a balanced account. On many occasions it supported the U. S. line in the Cold War, praising, for instance, the Truman Foreign Aid Bill. 'Certainly its purpose is to counteract the encroachment of communism,

\textsuperscript{73} NZH, 5 February 1948, p. 6; NZH, 17 June 1948, p. 6; NZH, 19 July 1948, p. 6; SC, 3 August 1948, p. 2; NZH, 27 November 1948, p. 8; NZH, 6 December 1948, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{74} ODT, 1 July 1948, p. 4; SC, 2 July 1948, p. 2. 'Titoism', as it was described, was considered a new communist heresy.
\textsuperscript{75} ODT, 19 August 1948, p. 4. There was delight at seeing the Tito-Stalin split as late as 1949. Many wanted to see war between the two. For example: NZH, 22 August 1949, p. 6.; NZH, 30 August 1949, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{76} ODT, 1 November 1948, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{77} SC, 12 January 1948, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{78} SC, 31 January 1948, p. 4.
and for that part: we welcome that unreservedly. But most of the time it remained on the sidelines of the Cold War as it editorials were more concerned with domestic problems.

Other similar minded people pervaded the back-benches of the Labour Government. In late March, the Labour Member for Mount Albert, Warren Freer, stated that: 'I honestly believe that in the long run, the people of Russia do not want war. But I also honestly believe that the powers that be in the United States of America do want war'. Freer argued, like many of his left-wing colleagues, that America wanted war to solve the employment problems created by the massive demobilisation programme.

This was too much for the rigid Cold War consciousness to handle. Anything 'left' or remotely moderate or anti-American was suspect. In response, Peter Fraser rebuked Freer's dissension. Fraser stated that 'far from trying to foster war the United States was giving hundreds and thousands of millions of dollars from its resources to allay conditions that might cause war'. Freer was stated to be 'close to a group of younger Labor [sic] MPs (Ormond Wilson, Palmerston North; P. G. Connolly, Dunedin Central; Dr. M. Finlay, North Shore) whose views [were] generally similar to those of the left-wing back-benchers in the House of

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79 SC, 6 April 1948, p. 4.
80 W. Freer as quoted in 847.00/4-248 #101 J. S. Service to U. S. State Department, 2 April 1948, p. 1. In Parliament Fraser fended off pro-Commie accusations by saying that he would 'certainly refuse to be placed alongside Communists, whose colleagues in other parts of the world are endangering the freedom of the world by trampling freedom into the mud of dictatorship'. See: NZPD, v. 280, June 22 - July 20, 1948, p. 343.
81 The National Opposition made political mileage out of the comments made by Freer and other left-wing Labour moderates, especially O. Wilson. Mr Doidge of National felt that 'Stalin would have been pleased' with one of Wilson's speeches. See: NZPD, v. 287, August 26 - September 29, 1949, p. 1927.
82 Fraser as quoted in 847.00/7-748 #205 Scotten to U. S. State Department, 7 July 1948, p. 1.
HOSTILE FIELD
Commons who have accused the U. S. of imperialistic policies.83 This was paradox of the Cold War mind set. It was constantly emphasised that the West enjoyed the privileges of democracy, which presumably included the right to free speech, but Freer was still chastised. The potent anti-communism of the state was never in danger.

By the end of 1948 New Zealanders saw the Cold War as synonymous with communism and the Soviet Union. Even the left-wing moderates of the Labour Party were cornered into this view. O. Wilson stated that 'the enemy is Russia and the menace is Russia' while trying to convince New Zealanders that most people in Europe did not think that.84 Wilson spent a month in the Soviet Union immediately before the Second World War. In a classic piece of Parliamentary banter, Mr. T. L. MacDonald, the National MP for Wallace, queried: 'The police are very efficient there, are they not?'. Wilson replied: 'I did not find them so. They only arrested me a couple of times'.85 At least there was a sense a humour during the early Cold War years of stifling conformity. But those politicians who spoke in conciliatory terms towards the Soviet Union found themselves in difficulty, often marginalised and usually defeated like Wilson in the 1949 General Election.

The promise of a North Atlantic security alliance ushered in the Cold War year of 1949 with high expectations and optimism.86 The pact

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84 NZPD, v. 280, June 22 - July 20, 1948, pp. 530-1. Wilson believed it was an oversimplification to view the Cold War as an issue between communism and capitalistic democracy. According to Wilson, if you believed in this simple dichotomy you were accepting 'a dangerous line of American propaganda'.
85 Ibid., p. 532.
86 NZL, v. 20, 497 (31 December 1948), p. 5. The end of 1948 was seen with pessimism and failure considering the Cold War and the deterioration of peace in Palestine and China.
was seen as a 'logical and progressive extension of Western Union'.

The prospect of a West European collective security alliance was welcomed in New Zealand as it would mean the final demise of American isolationism. It would also serve notice on Russia. In late March, Western European nations signed the treaty and it was heralded as a triumph for the defence of liberty. The *New Zealand Herald* headline read: 'ATLANTIC PACT AGAINST AGGRESSION - Western Powers Unite For Liberty'.

The Southern Cross also saw NATO as a pact for peace because it sought to provide unity and defend liberty.

The American signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 in Washington was warmly endorsed, with the country blaming Russia for its necessity. 'If Russia had prosecuted the cold war less relentlessly', according to the editor of the *Otago Daily Times*, and if she had used the international goodwill of 1945 for constructive purposes, the future menace of Communism would have been less intensified. Instead, it was made all too obvious that Europe could work with Russia on Russian terms only. NATO was seen in New Zealand as a good way to contain and challenge the Soviet Communist threat to the Western democratic way of life.

By now Cold War terminology was an intrinsic part of New Zealand society. The Cold War, in the words of Keith Holyoake, 'was being

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87 ODT, 6 January 1949, p. 4; ODT, 11 January 1949, p. 4. The editor was disappointed not to see on the horizon a Pacific Pact. 'Mention of a Pacific Pact comes ill from any representative of New Zealand while this country's Government continues its unconvincing shadow-sparing with the Communists within its own ranks'.

88 NZH, 21 March 1949, p. 6.

89 SC, 23 March 1949, p. 2.

90 ODT, 5 April 1949, p. 4.

91 SC, 13 April 1949, p. 2; ODT, 10 October 1949, p. 4. The editor of the ODT stated that, 'whatever Russia may choose to say in public about the "aggressive" tendencies of the treaty, privately the men of the Kremlin should know that the aggression is limited to a determination to resist the bullying and kidnapping methods of Communism'.
fought for the possession of men’s minds, a more ruthless war than ever previously waged'. He saw the Cold War as a challenge from the left. 'To-day . . . a new challenge has arisen, from the left this time. We find it in extreme form in Russia - the dictatorship of the proletariat'. It was an East-West conflict of ideologies in which Russia were 'devious' and 'aggressive'. With Russia being committed to an uncompromising ideology of Marxism-Leninism, many feared that the Cold War would be 'perpetual'. The Cold War was an ideological struggle, where communism, like fascism, was evil. New Zealanders learned that communists brutally murdered a young New Zealand geologist in Malaya. The New Zealand public were told of the horrors of the Soviet technique of interrogation and torture.

Symptomatic of the Cold War mentality in New Zealand was the polarisation of attitudes towards national leaders. Western leaders who espoused the virtues of democracy and preached liberal anti-communism were idolised, for example Keith Holyoake and Joe McCarthy. Reflecting on the deeds of George Marshall after his resignation as Secretary of State in January, the editor of the *Otago Daily Times* called him the 'architect of peace'. The Marshall Plan assisted 'the countries outside the "iron curtain" to reconcile their many differences'. Truman was hailed as the

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92 Keith Holyoake as quoted in *NZH*, 5 April 1949, p. 8.
95 See: *NZH*, 20 August 1949, p. 8; *ODT*, 1 August 1949, p. 4; *SC*, 23 September 1949, p. 2. Even the *Southern Cross* was more assertive in its anti-communist remarks. 'In communist countries for the major part the rulers govern by virtues of the power of the police State and a comparative reign of terror'.
96 *ODT*, 27 September 1949, p. 4. The prisoner of a Russia gaol would beg for death, according to the editor. 'Death, to him, is preferable to further torment in a prison where men's souls are tortured to serve a political purpose'.
97 *ODT*, 10 January 1949, p. 4.
personal leader of world peace and faith in Winston Churchill remained strong. 98

In contrast, communist leaders were condemned as no better than Nazis. The portrayal of Stalin in the media was probably the funniest of the Cold War, next to the Zhukov drinking story. In an editorial on 'Stalin the Man', the editor of the New Zealand Herald argued that the Stalin legend had won too much thoughtless acceptance. He argued that the New Zealand public should cast off their fondness of 'Uncle Joe' as he was a 'new Tsar', with a 'sly humour', 'cool wisdom', being 'ruthless and wise'. 99 They even ran a headline which read: 'STALIN'S CAREER: TERRORIST TO STATESMAN'. 100

The New Zealand press blended their images of Hitler with Stalin in the early Cold War phase. 'Stalin the strategist and the omniscient seems strangely akin to the Fuehrer', stated the editor of the New Zealand Herald. 101 Stalin and Molotov were also said to fear the truth, like Hitler and Goebbels. 102 The Tsars of the Kremlin were ruthless rulers, 'men who never in their lives have been subject to the law of their own country'. 103 Stalin was perceived to have carried on the Tsarist tradition of concentration camps. He was truly the 'iron Georgian', even after the lifting of the Berlin blockade. 104

98 NZH, 15 January 1949, p. 6; and ODT, 4 April 1949, p. 4.
99 NZH, 5 February 1949, p. 8.
100 NZH, 24 June 1949, p. 5; SC, 8 February 1949, p. 2. Even the Southern Cross got in on the act of Stalin-bashing, calling Stalin's accusations of a West led paper war as a 'fantastic assumption'. Further, the Southern Cross took another swipe, 'Russians always assume perfection in judgement'.
101 NZH, 23 December 1949, p. 6.
103 NZH, 1 October 1949, p. 8.
104 NZH, 8 October 1949, p. 8.
The lifting of the Berlin blockade in 1949 was hailed as the West's finest victory yet in the Cold War against Russia. The public were told that the lessons of Munich were heeded and that Allied firmness had won the day.\(^{105}\) The end of the blockade saw the New Zealand press adopt a more tougher stand towards the Soviet Union. They felt the victory in Berlin 'should be received by the Western Allies as a challenge and an inspiration to renewed determination and caution'.\(^{106}\) The newspapers and the public were glad that the get-tough approach had worked in Berlin. In their view, the lessons of Munich were vindicated.

New Cold War problems were emerging in Austria and geographically closer to home in China and Vietnam.\(^{107}\) 'For the first time the subjugation of [China] has become a distinct and menacing possibility', the editor of the *New Zealand Herald* confessed.\(^{108}\) There was a real fear in New Zealand that the fall of China 'would mean that organised Communism would spill beyond the borders of China into the countries of South-east Asia'.\(^{109}\) This fear of communist revolution in Asia, a fear that became articulated in the Domino Theory, frightened the New Zealand press. The stability of China and other Asian countries was seen as vital to the maintenance of world peace. The loss of China, however, did not generate that much excitement in the New Zealand media. They were already prepared for a Communist victory as early as January.\(^{110}\)

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\(^{105}\) *ODT*, 2 May 1949, p. 4; *NZH*, 6 May 1949, p. 6; *ODT*, 7 November 1949, p. 4.

\(^{106}\) *ODT*, 7 May 1949, p. 6.

\(^{107}\) *ODT*, 19 September 1949, p. 4.

\(^{108}\) *NZH*, 3 January 1949, p. 6.

\(^{109}\) *ODT*, 20 January 1949, p. 4.

\(^{110}\) See: *NZH*, 3 October 1949, p. 6; This observation varies slightly from R. G. Shuker's view, who argues that as it became increasingly clear that the Communists in China were going to win, anxiety came to the surface in New Zealand. See: R. G. Shuker, *New Zealand Policy and Attitudes Toward Communist China: A Study in the Evolution and Influence of the American Alliance*, Victoria University of Wellington, M. A. History, 1971, p. 22. As early as July 1948 it was obvious to New Zealanders that the Chinese Communists were going to win. See: *NZPD*, v. 280, June 22 - July 20, 1948, p. 325. Holland talks about 'the
What was more distressing to the New Zealand press was the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in September 1949. The editor of the New Zealand Herald commented: 'It is a disturbing moment hardly less ominous than that of four years ago when the dread name of Hiroshima passed for ever into history'. The world was now a different place. 'War in 1949 is a prospect infinitely more terrible than it was ten years ago', the editor of the New Zealand Herald said pessimistically. 'Should the alternatives again be war or slavery, the same choice would be made'. The possibility of the Cold War turning into a hot one had become a frightening reality in New Zealand by the end of 1949. No wonder the New Zealand Herald editorial on 31 December read: 'Glad Good-bye To the Forties'.

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111 NZH, 26 September 1949, p. 6.
112 NZH, 3 September 1949, p. 8.
113 Ibid.
114 NZH, 31 December 1949, p. 6.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

By the end of 1949 the ideology of anti-communist liberalism had become the dominant political discourse in New Zealand. The New Zealand public were exposed to a powerful Cold War consciousness based on the Nazi-Soviet analogy, anti-communism and the belief in the virtues of democracy. New Zealanders had become convinced that the Soviet Union was engaged in an aggressive campaign to extend the ideological appeal of Communism by overt and subversive means. This had two repercussions. First, in the immediate post-war years the media’s presentation of the Soviet Union as an ally faded as dramatically as it had a risen. Second, the New Zealand press turned their hostility towards the most visible signs of Soviet aggression, the New Zealand Communist Party. Indeed, by the start of 1950 New Zealand was fighting a Cold War on two fronts, at home and abroad.

The emergence of the Cold War consciousness in New Zealand was the result of an interplay of several powerful factors. The first and most potent source of New Zealand’s Cold War consciousness was rooted in the experience of the Second World War and Nazi Germany. The country’s confrontation with Hitler’s brand of totalitarianism moved easily into the clash with the Soviet Union and Stalin.  

After the collapse of fascism, New Zealand newspaper editorials casually and deliberately distorted similarities between the Nazi and Communist ideologies, German and Soviet foreign policy, the authoritarian controls in both countries and Hitler and Stalin.

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sinister activities of the New Zealand Communist Party. This led to calls for communists to be banned from employment in the government service and trade union offices. The logic behind these calls were based on the premise that committed communists owed a superior loyalty to a foreign power. Both the major political parties held this view. Red-baiting became a significant feature of early post-war politics in New Zealand.

As New Zealanders perceived an increasing post-war threat from the Soviet Union, many came to see communism as a greater threat than fascism. This belief blinded their judgement of events in the post-war era. Instead of recognising Stalin's security interests, New Zealanders immediately perceived the Red Army's march into Eastern Europe as communist aggression to extend its appeal. They did not question British or American occupation of Germany. In the civil war in Greece New Zealanders could only see it as 'Hitler-like fifth column intrusion by the Russians and not, as it was in reality, a struggle of Greeks against a British supported monarchy with little interference by the Soviet Union'.\(^3\) This view received authorisation in the public domain from President Truman's speech to Congress in 1947.

According to Adler and Paterson, perhaps the most significant and misleading part of the Nazi-Soviet comparison was drawn between the pre-war actions of Germany and the post-war actions of the Soviet Union.\(^4\) As soon as the Red Army entered Eastern Europe the alarm bells rang in New Zealand. It was perceived as immediate aggression rather than wartime liberation. New Zealanders immediately began to perceive Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe as communist domination. In this way, the

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 1055.
\(^4\) Ibid., p. 1056.
Soviet Union replaced Germany as the disruptor of peace. It was their fault that the wartime anti-fascist coalition disintegrated. They stopped the world from coming to a meaningful peace, a notion polarised by Winston Churchill’s 'iron curtain' rhetoric.

The leading view that emerged in New Zealand in the early Cold War years predicted that Russia was going to sweep all before it like Hitler had done five years earlier. New Zealand editors argued that Russian aggression had to be halted at the Brandenburg Gates to prevent another world war. Memories of Munich and appeasement were invoked by the press during the Polish crisis, the Czechoslovakian communist coup, and the Berlin blockade. Many felt it was useless to negotiate with the intransigent Russians and the treacherous Molotov, the man they were convinced made the Second World War inevitable by signing the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. The press advocated a firm line towards the Soviet Union to prevent another Munich. In an atmosphere like this, Truman's Doctrine was welcomed along with any diplomatic victory over the Soviet Union.

Such a hostile public attitude obstructed any thoughtful debate on the Cold War. It was inflexible, negating rational thought and discussion on the sophisticated understanding of power relationships. Many New Zealanders just assumed the United States and Britain led a united western front. The same erroneous view was applied to the Soviet Union, many believing that they led an indivisible monolith. Many did not question the unhistorical and illogical view that Russia in the 1940s would behave as Germany had in the previous ten years.\textsuperscript{5} The press were determined that the painful lessons of the Second World War had to be

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., p. 1060.
learnt. The analogy contained the ultimate paradox: history made unpredictable Soviet behaviour predictable. Those who pointed out the futility of the comparison were condemned, marginalised or defeated.

The most obvious source of New Zealand's Cold War consciousness was the Cold War itself. The rise of New Zealand's Cold War mentality came in on the tide of increasing Soviet-West tension. In New Zealand eyes a number of important events brought about the collapse of the anti-fascist coalition. The dispute over Poland was the first sign of a split in the Grand Alliance. Poland was seen as the litmus test of the permeance of the anti-fascist coalition, in particular Russia's post-war intentions. The Soviet Union, by all accounts, failed to meet New Zealand media expectations. It was no longer seen as a co-operative, trustworthy international partner.

The second event that solidified negative feeling towards the Soviet Union was Winston Churchill's speech at Fulton, Missouri. Faith in Churchill's wisdom remained strong in post-war New Zealand, a sentiment laid down by his forecast of the Nazi threat. His 'iron curtain' speech was, therefore, given authoritative legitimation and status in New Zealand as a warning of things to come. As a result, New Zealand paid homage to Churchill's words and more public focus was placed on the domestic activities of the infant Communist Party. Churchill's address, in effect, gave the New Zealand press the official green light to despise the Soviet Union and communists. Churchill's speech was like a bomb of

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realisation and was the single most important event that encouraged New Zealand to see the Soviet Union and communists in general as the enemy.

The third important event in that reinforced New Zealand's Cold War consciousness was the Truman Doctrine. Like Churchill's speech, it laid down the battle lines of the Cold War in sharp focus. The confrontation with the Soviet Union was portrayed as an ideological struggle, a zero-sum contest between the virtues of democracy and totalitarian communism. The public's anti-Russian predispositions were reaffirmed by the rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine and reinforced by press reports of Russian and communist aggression in Europe and Asia.

The fourth important factor in the rise of New Zealand's Cold War consciousness was the print media. Charged with cultural production, New Zealand's newspaper industry played a powerful role in the rise of the public's Cold War mentality. In the early post-war years, editorial opinion of the Soviet Union underwent a radical change. As the Second World War neared its conclusion, newspaper hostility and anti-Soviet rhetoric increased in response to the aggressive behaviour of the Soviet Union and the totalitarian nature of the Soviet system. A strong anti-Soviet, anti-communist ideology pervaded their reports, headlines and editorials. They became the major evangelists in the reversal of the allied image of the Soviet Union. In this way, they were probably the most important factor in the formation of New Zealand's Cold War mind.

The cumulative effect of the newspapers as a persuasive form of communication depended on the ideas already present in the public's

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mind. The New Zealand public already had a fear of Russian expansionism and totalitarianism. There were numerous press references to Stalin as the new 'Tsar' of the Kremlin embarking on a new course of Tsarist imperialism. Moreover, the Soviet Union in international affairs seemed akin to Nazi Germany: aggressive, obstructive and expansionist. Editorial comment made sense in the light of history considering that Molotov had signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Resistance to the change of attitude towards the Soviet Union only came from two sources, the back benches of the Labour Government and the New Zealand Communist Party.9

Newspapers were instrumental in the ideological struggle, a key terrain where consent for the Cold War consciousness was won or lost. They help to reactivate the public's anti-Russian sentiments and reinforced this consensual viewpoint by condemning local communists and using public idioms to claim voice for public opinion. Anti-Russian feeling was already amnestic in New Zealand.10 Clearly newspapers and politicians in this way had the opportunity to shape and lead public opinion.11 The views articulated by newspapers and politicians were contagions of social influence, missionaries who converted the

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9 Ibid., p. 267. Resistance to attitude change depends on a person’s political predispositions and values.
11 A. D. Trlin, 'Dear Reader, Dear Editor: An Analysis of Editorials and Letters to the Editor', in P. Spoonley and W. Hirsh, (eds.), Between the Lines: Racism and the New Zealand Media, Auckland, 1990, p. 90. Editorials have the ability to enlighten on the one hand and to perpetuate prejudice on the other. Also see: M. D. H. Freeth, Politician-Reporter Interactions in the New Zealand Parliament: A Study in Political Communication, University of Canterbury, M. A. Political Science, 1985, p. 66. According to Freeth, the news media are the means by which politicians seek to communicate to the public for political purposes.
unconverted. Fraser and Holyoake were the politicians of the anti-
Communist sermon.

The New Zealand media and politicians used six standard
persuasive techniques to project the anti-Soviet message and foster the
Cold War consciousness. These can be listed succinctly: they over­
simplified diplomatic issues; they aimed their anti-Soviet commentary at
the lowest common denominator, those people in society without a
critical capacity in the area of international affairs; they overgeneralised;
they created bandwagon peer pressure; and used historical illustrations to
prove that the Soviet Union was the logical enemy after the defeat of
Hitler.

These techniques explain well how the media helped to create and
foster a Cold War mind set in New Zealand. Diplomatic issues were
presented as simple two-way process between the Soviet Union and the
United States in collaboration with Great Britain. The Soviet Union were
given the suitable attributes of an enemy stereotype. They were portrayed
as aggressive, intransigent, obtrusive and uncooperative. The New
Zealand Truth's Russophobia catered for the lowest common
denominator in New Zealand society, the rugby, racing and beer crowd.
The newspapers appealed to traditional anti-Russian sentiment in New
Zealand by manipulating historical examples of Soviet treachery, such as
the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and 'Tsarist imperialism'. Ironically,
the major newspapers at the same time had the gall to claim that they

\[\text{12 M. MacKuen and C. Brown, 'Political Context and Attitude Change', American Political}
\text{Science Review, v. 81. 2 (June 1987), p. 485. The contagion model of social influence states}
\text{that missionaries convert the unconverted. The citizens social circle plays a discernable and}
\text{important role in the development of political evaluations.}
\]
\[\text{13 Real, Super Media, p. 168.}\]
were objective reporters of the truth while criticising Soviet newspapers as mere propaganda puppets.

The central reason behind the media’s dislike of the Soviet Union was ideological. The Soviet Union advocated a system that robbed the individual of democratic freedom and the incentive to make a profit. Newspapers had an inherent structural bias in the political economy of capitalism. Of course their sole objective in life was to make a profit. It was, therefore, in their economic interests not only to oppose communism but to ensure that the public opposed its very source: the Soviet Union. Newspapers had structural incentives to ensure conditions for the stabilisation of capitalism in the circumstances of the ideological competition posed by communism. This is why no theory of freedom of the press could extend to communism because it sought the destruction of that very economy.

The New Zealand media in the early years of the Cold War, therefore, acted as cheerleaders of the democratic cause. There was little effort to see from the opposite perspective with the possible exception being the Southern Cross which was equally suspicious of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Newspapers were too caught up in the myopia of the Cold War to perform their critical duty. They encouraged and fostered public antagonism and mistrust of the Soviet Union. They exaggerated the threat posed by the New Zealand Communist Party, whose membership numbers never rose above 2,000 persons. (See Appendix II). They were the best weapons yet against the dissolute fringes of New Zealand society.

The newspaper media and the consciousness of the public were inseparable in the years between 1944 and 1949. The New Zealand press were the consciousness-making industry during this turbulent period, creating a set of popular myths about the virtues of democracy, capitalism, the United States, Soviet aggression, communist villainy and the need to stand firm. The press presented the Cold War in stark terms to the New Zealand public. The media, in this way, helped to build and foster a Cold War consensus in New Zealand that provided reassurances to the public that the Soviet enigma could be fathomed by the application of past historical lessons.

The first fundamental part of the consensus consisted in the belief of the notion that the West was good and that Russia was bad. The reprehensible nature of the Soviet Union and its leaders defined the sides and justified opposition to them. Coverage of Churchill's speech and the Berlin blockade carried this theme. Stalin and Molotov were constantly equated with Hitler and Goebbels. They were considered dirty commies by the New Zealand press and abhorrent dictators.

The second tenor to the Cold War consensus was the belief in the Soviet enemy leading an international communist monolithic conspiracy against the West. Even though this notion should have been discarded after Tito's split from Moscow it still persisted in the public arena. Late in 1949, the Otago Daily Times still talked about the fall of China and the fact that 'more than 400 million people would become subservient to Moscow'.15 This second part of this assumption entailed the view that the Soviet Union's communist ideology made the West the target of

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15 Otago Daily Times (hereafter ODT), 20 January 1949, p. 4.
destruction, whether by direct conquest as in Poland or by subtle subversion as Czechoslovakia. Soviet imperialism was portrayed as consistently aggressive and voracious.

A third concept that ran through New Zealand’s early Cold War consensus was the idea all international trouble was caused by Russia. The Soviet Union were seen as uncooperative and intransigent. This obtrusive behaviour was blamed on the traditional Russian traits of fear and suspicion. This view included the judgment that the Soviet Union was to blame for the breakdown of Great Power unity and the demise of the United Nations as a collective security organisation. The Soviet Union were selfish in their aims and ruined any chance of post-war peace.

The Cold War consensus also included assumptions drawn from the past. Many felt that the only appropriate solution to foreign problems was a tough stand, backed up by the possible use of military force. The Munich analogy came to the fore in the Cold War consensus. It was felt that Nazi aggression in the 1930s and democracy's failure to respond forcefully to that threat provided the appropriate model for dealing with post-war security problems. The New Zealand public had learned the follies of appeasing a totalitarian power and they were determined not to make the same mistake twice. Thus, peacetime conscription was endorsed in New Zealand to meet head on the perceived Soviet threat.

The next theme of the Cold War consensus was closely interrelated. This entailed the view that the United States and Great Britain were the defenders of the free world and New Zealand should do everything in its powers to help them preserve and if need be, extend, the liberal

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democratic system. There were increasing calls from New Zealand newspapers to allow American bases in the Pacific. In 1950 Sid Holland stated that New Zealanders 'are proud to claim the friendship of our great ally, the United States of America'. The corollary of this idea was the gradual realisation that Great Britain could no longer defend us. By the end of 1949 the New Zealand society saw the United States as a desirable powerful new ally to have in the emerging bipolar world.

The final and most important belief embodied in New Zealand's Cold War consensus was that communism was bad and that liberal democracy was good. The New Zealand press felt that communism was evil because it threatened the democratic way of life and individual freedom. This view gained rapid support in a country blighted by industrial unrest. Communism was perceived to be disruptive as it caused strikes and threatened the destruction of the free marketplace of ideas. It provoked two fundamental fears of the New Zealand public: instability and class conflict. Communists were infiltrators and their natural tactic was subversion and hijacking the trade union movement to capture the state. Communism, in this way, was seen as foreign to the New Zealand way of life. It became synonymous with the Soviet Union in the public discourse.

If communism was seen as domestically disruptive it was also equally seen as internationally disruptive. International communism became hated in New Zealand because it was violently aggressive and expansionist and seemed to jump borders. It seemed to threaten the unity

17 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (hereafter NZPD), v. 292, October 5 - November 2, 1950, p. 3956.
18 See: K. Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, London, 1969, p. 285. 'New Zealand is not a classless society. It must be nearly classless, however, than any advanced society in the world'. CHECK.
of the British Commonwealth. Any country falling to communism was seen as a net loss to the West. The Cold War was definitely perceived as a zero-sum game in New Zealand between the West, led by the United States and the East, spearheaded by the Soviet Union.

Whether consciously conceived or not, these were the popular myths of the Cold War espoused by the newspapers studied between 1944 and 1949. Instead of providing a reality check on official foreign policy, the media suspended their critical function and served to reinforce the official government position. They closed the information loop and did not investigate or substantiate the claims levelled at the Soviet Union. The information policy-makers received about public opinion confirmed the policy choices they had already made. This was one of the most important consequences of the press not maintaining an autonomous role or perspective in the early post-war period. They were too much involved in the business of cultivating a 'take that, you dirty commie' attitude in New Zealand.

## Appendix I

### Voting Intention in 1949 Election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National No.</th>
<th>National %</th>
<th>Labour No.</th>
<th>Labour %</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Material interest of class or group.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Judgement on administration.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Material interest of all in New Zealand.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Oppose/Support socialism or communism in New Zealand.</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Personal and industrial freedom for all.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Material interest of majority in New Zealand.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Oppose/support equal rewards.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Material self-interest.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Moderation.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Unspecified and other.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix II

New Zealand Communist Party Membership and Journal Circulation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Communist Party Membership</th>
<th>Circulation of Party's Journal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>6700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>14000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>5100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix III

Industrial Disputes in New Zealand 1947-49.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Disputes</th>
<th>Workers Involved</th>
<th>Working Days Lost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>27 000</td>
<td>102 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>28 500</td>
<td>93 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>101 500</td>
<td>218 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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