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In Pursuit of Victory:
British-New Zealand Relations During the First World War

By Richard G. H. Kay

A thesis submitted for the degree of Ph. D. History at the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand October 2001.
IN MEMORY
OF THOSE
NEW ZEALANDERS
WHO FOUGHT AND DIED
IN THE
FIRST WORLD WAR.
Abstract

The First World War of 1914-19 was the bloodiest in New Zealand's history. The official statistics reveal the human cost for New Zealand society. Out of a population of just over 1 million people, 59,483 New Zealanders were killed, wounded or captured. An estimated 18,166 New Zealanders were killed and 41,317 were wounded. Overall, New Zealand casualties in the First World War exceeded the combined total number of casualties suffered by New Zealand in all the other wars of the twentieth century.

It has been widely assumed that with this heavy sacrifice New Zealand had demonstrated its loyalty to Great Britain. This thesis reconsiders this interpretation in light of New Zealand's actual war experience and argues that New Zealand did not always live up to this reputation. Rather than proving New Zealand's loyalty, as is popularly believed, the First World War made Wellington and London acutely aware of their differences. This thesis will also illustrate that the so-called 'independent' foreign policy pursued by New Zealand's First Labour Government actually emerged much earlier. It will show that during the First World War, New Zealand's policymakers had a keen appreciation of their country's own interests. The intensity and ferocity of the war made New Zealand and Great Britain extremely conscious of the reciprocal nature of their relationship. By the end of the First World War, both countries came to recognise that eternal imperial unity was a dream and that they enjoyed different interests within the imperial partnership.
Preface

This thesis examines the diplomatic relationship between Great Britain and New Zealand during the First World War. It focuses on the impact of the war on New Zealand's 'special' relationship with Great Britain. In light of New Zealand's actual war experience, it reconsiders the popular assumption that New Zealand subordinated its own interests and followed Great Britain with blind subservience during the First World War. This thesis also discusses the New Zealand attitude to the British Empire and explores New Zealand's participation at the Paris Peace Conference.

Initially, this dissertation started life as a Master of Arts thesis under the supervision of Dr. Roberto Rabel, a senior history lecturer at the University of Otago. It was originally planned to combine my own interest in the First World War and diplomatic history to produce an assessment of the origins of New Zealand nationalism. Within the space of a few months, I quickly realised that the scale of the project would have to be substantially widened to accomplish this goal. As a consequence, along with the existential need to live the life of a student, the study became converted into a doctoral thesis to examine the broad diplomatic relationship between Great Britain and New Zealand during the First World War. Inevitably, this expansion led to an exponential growth of my student loan along with my debts of gratitude to those who made this thesis possible.

My first task is to thank all the staff of the various libraries and archives used for the purposes of research. In New Zealand, David McDonald and his staff at the Hocken Library in Dunedin were always kind and helpful. In Wellington, the help of staff of the National Archives was exemplary. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of David Retter of the Manuscripts and Archives Collection at the Alexander Turnbull Library (National Library of New Zealand) for pointing me in the direction of the Massey Papers. In Australia, I would like to thank the staff at the National Archives of Australia and the National Library. In Great Britain, I would also like to thank all the staff and the individuals at the following institutions: the House of Lords Records Office; the British Library in the British Museum and at St Pancras; the National Register of Archives in London; the Public Record Office in Kew, Richmond; Helen Langley of the Modern Political Papers Reading Room at the Bodleian Library in Oxford; the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College, London; the Wiltshire and Swindon Record Office in Trowbridge; and Stephen Plant at the Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge.
As well as libraries and archival institutions, numerous friends, colleagues and scholarships contributed to the making of this thesis. The most important sources of information, constructive criticism, golfing tips, and cans of Coke have been my supervisors, Associate Professor Tom Brooking and Dr. Roberto Rabel. Both have been very professional and encouraging. I would also like to thank Dr. William Harris, Dr. Ralph Hayburn, Dr. John Stenhouse, Aaron Fox, and the vast network of Otago history postgraduates who offered me valuable assistance and advice, particularly Shaun Broadley, Paerau Warbrick (alias Andrew Anderson), and D. John Milne. I would also like to thank the only 'full Colonel and Professor of the entire Commonwealth', Emeritus Professor Angus Ross, for his time, wisdom, and amusing anecdotes on British-New Zealand relations. He will be sadly missed.

This thesis would also not have been completed without the generous financial support from the University of Otago who awarded me a Postgraduate Award and Scholarship. Assistance from the Post-Graduate Studies Committee of the Department of History, the Special Education Service and the Maori Education Trust enabled me to undertake overseas research. I would also like to thank School House and my new work colleagues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade for their support.

Last but certainly not least, I would to thank my close friends and family. They kept my accommodation bills to a minimum and checked creeping insanity. In this category I would like to thank Dr. Jonathan Alsop, Travis Benson, Paul Dennison, Paul Hunt, Troy Landrebe, Dr. "Chuck" Little, Iain Lockey, Kelvin McCrone, Jaime Meikle, Andrew Smith, Mark Waghorn, and the Dempster family. I would also like to pay a special tribute to my parents, Patricia and George, and my little brother Hamish. Finally, I would like to thank my long-suffering partner Louisa Dempster. Without her help and encouragement this thesis would not have been written or corrected!

Richard G. H. Kay.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>Adm</td>
<td>Admiralty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adj-Gen</td>
<td>Adjutant-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIF</td>
<td>Australian Imperial Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJHR</td>
<td>Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJLC</td>
<td>Appendix to the Journals of the Legislative Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWN</td>
<td>Auckland Weekly News</td>
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<tr>
<td>BED</td>
<td>British Empire Delegation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEF</td>
<td>British Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCab</td>
<td>British Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPD</td>
<td>The [British] Parliamentary Debates (Official Report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHBE</td>
<td>The Cambridge History of the British Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Colonial Defence Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGS</td>
<td>Chief of the General Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIGS</td>
<td>Chief of the Imperial General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-in-C</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Committee of Imperial Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>The Colonial Office List</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNZEF</td>
<td>Chronicles of the N. Z. E. F.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DBR</td>
<td>Director of Base Records</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dom</td>
<td>The Dominion</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>The Evening Post</td>
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<td>Gen</td>
<td>General</td>
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<td>GOC</td>
<td>General Officer Commanding</td>
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<td>GGAust</td>
<td>Governor-General of Australia</td>
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<td>GGCan</td>
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<td>GGNZ</td>
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<td>GovNZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>High Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHR</td>
<td>Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand</td>
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<td>JICH</td>
<td>The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCPS</td>
<td>Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICon</td>
<td>Imperial Conference</td>
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<td>IWCab</td>
<td>Imperial War Cabinet</td>
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<tr>
<td>IWCab</td>
<td>Imperial War Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>MW</td>
<td>The Maoriland Worker</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Mediterranean Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Min of Def</td>
<td>Minister of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIO</td>
<td>Naval Intelligence Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZEF</td>
<td>New Zealand Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>The New Zealand Gazette</td>
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<td>The New Zealand Herald</td>
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<td>NZIR</td>
<td>New Zealand International Review</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZIH</td>
<td>The New Zealand Journal of History</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZLP</td>
<td>New Zealand Labour Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZPD</td>
<td>New Zealand Parliamentary Debates</td>
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<td>NZOY</td>
<td>The New Zealand Official Yearbook</td>
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<td>NZ Tab</td>
<td>The New Zealand Tablet</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZ Times</td>
<td>The New Zealand Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZT</td>
<td>New Zealand Truth</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHBE</td>
<td>The Oxford History of the British Empire</td>
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<td>ODT</td>
<td>The Otago Daily Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>OW</td>
<td>The Otago Witness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>The Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sec</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNO</td>
<td>Senior Naval Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSCols</td>
<td>Secretary of State for the Colonies</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSFor</td>
<td>Secretary State for Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSWar</td>
<td>Secretary of State for War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>The Southland Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMH</td>
<td>The Sydney Morning Herald</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>The Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCab</td>
<td>War Cabinet</td>
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<td>WCP</td>
<td>War Cabinet Paper</td>
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<td>WP</td>
<td>The Weekly Press</td>
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Notes

FOOTNOTES

In the footnotes, I have refrained from using Ibid. Given the large number of official documents, books, and articles listed in some references, I wanted to avoid confusion and keep things simple for the reader's benefit.

"BRITISH" and "ANGLO"

The word "British" in this thesis had been used in its modern context to refer to those four nations that make-up the United Kingdom. As Australian historian Eric Andrews has pointed out, this usage is an anachronism, because New Zealanders were British in the early part of the twentieth century. The passage of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act in 1914 conferred the status of a natural born British subject on individuals naturalised under Dominion legislation.

The phrase "Anglo" has been retained in some instances where it had been historically appropriate, i.e. Anglo-Japanese Alliance, or where it has been used in direct quotations or by other historians.
Introduction

Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation.

ERNEST RENAN
Qu'est ce que c'est une nation?

The First World War\(^1\) of 1914-19 marks an important evolutionary phase in the diplomatic relationship between New Zealand and Great Britain. For both countries, the unprecedented scale of the conflict represented the ultimate test of their 'special relationship'.\(^2\) For New Zealand, the war presented the perfect opportunity to demonstrate its loyalty and commitment to the British Empire. Ironically, this very commitment led to a greater awareness by Wellington policy-makers of New Zealand's own distinct national interests. Far from being the British Empire's most loyal Dominion, the New Zealand Government vigorously articulated, promoted and defended its interests even when they conflicted with British Government policies. By the end of the First World War a new era had dawned in British-New Zealand relations, one that accommodated both their individual and common interests in an imperial partnership.

The present state of our knowledge on the wartime relationship is somewhat limited and diffuse. On the one hand, there exists a firmly entrenched and widely disseminated version that has been left unquestioned. It was repeated at length by the official histories of the war which were based on secondary material and aimed at a wide audience; more briefly by scholarly analyses on the constitutional development of the Commonwealth to which the diplomacy of the war was important but not central; and more briefly still by general histories of New Zealand and surveys treating aspects of the war, imperialism and the development of New Zealand's foreign policy.\(^3\)

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1 R. J. Q. Adams, 'Introduction', in R. J. Q. Adams, (ed.), The Great War, 1914-18: Essays on the Military, Political and Social History of the First World War, College Station, Texas, 1990, p. 1. Also see C. C. Repington, The First World War, 1914-1918, London, 1920. The Time's war correspondent, Charles à Court Repington, was the first person to refer to the conflict of 1914-18 as the First World War. As early as September 1918, he knew that the war would not live up to H. G. Well's optimistic assertion that it would be 'The War that Will End War'. As R. J. Q. Adams has pointed out, it is highly unlikely that Repington 'expected the gigantic blood letting to be the first in a series; what he meant was that there had never been another conflict - a world war - quite like it. How frightening correct he was.' Also see N. Ferguson, The Pity of War, London, 1999, p. 463.


3 The historiography has tended to lump the four Dominions together in seeking to explain the impact of the First World War. For example see G. St. J. Barclay, The Empire is Marching: A Study of the Military Effort of the British Empire 1800-1945, London, 1976; M. Beloff, Imperial Sunset Volume I: Britain’s Liberal Empire 1897-1921, London, 1969; C. E. Carrington, The Empire at War, 1914-1918, in E. A. Benians, Sir J. Butler, and C. E. Carrington, (eds.), CHBE: Volume III: The Empire-
On the other hand, there has been no comprehensive or substantial examination of the wartime relationship. Despite phenomenal academic interest in the First World War, a full account of the diplomatic relationship is strangely absent from the historiography. This is a considerable oversight given that the 'war to end all war' was the bloodiest in New Zealand's history. Participation in the four year struggle indebted the country to the tune of £60 million and cost 18,166 lives. However, in light of New Zealand's incomplete historiography of the First World War and the prominence given to the First Labour Government in foreign affairs by our diplomatic historians, it is hardly surprising that British-New Zealand relations in this period has received scant attention. More concerned with the evolution of an independent New


4 I. McGibbon, 'New Zealand Historiography of the First World War', Historical Branch, Wellington, 1984, pp. 1-2. McGibbon argues that the lack of New Zealand interest in the First World War stemmed first from a sense of disillusionment and revulsion against [sic] war which developed in

References


6 See I. McGibbon, 'New Zealand Historiography of the First World War', Historical Branch, Wellington, 1984, pp. 1-2. McGibbon argues that the lack of New Zealand interest in the First World War stemmed first from a sense of disillusionment and revulsion against [sic] war which developed in
Zealand foreign policy since 1935, the transformation of 'the most intimate long-distance relationship in the world' during the First World War has not been fully explored. Political scientists, by their very contemporary nature, have been no better equipped than their professional historian counterparts to address the subject. They have focused their energies on New Zealand's external relations in the post-Second World War period. While good work continues to be produced at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels on social and military aspects of New Zealand's First World War experience, the political and diplomatic components of the war have been neglected in the age of 'new imperial history'. As a result, our understanding of British-New Zealand relations during the First World War has not substantially changed since the very first historians approached the subject over seventy years ago.

the late 1920s'. Academic interest in the First World War also dwindled in New Zealand as a result of the Great Depression and the Second World War. Also see G. Hucker, 'When the Empire Calls: Patriotic Organisations In New Zealand During The Great War', M. A. History, Massey University, 1979, p. iv. In 1979 Hucker noted the same lack of interest in the First World War by budding young New Zealand historians: 'One noticeable feature of theses completed in New Zealand in recent years has been the absence of studies dealing with aspects of the Great War. Some thesis writers have used the War years as convenient departure and initiation points for their particular topics of study. Others have spanned the War years using a wider chronological context with the result that a limited number of studies have been presented on the watershed years 1914 to 1918.'


8 See R. Kennaway and J. Henderson, (eds.), Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s, Auckland, 1991. In this 'useful text for undergraduate and graduate courses in New Zealand foreign policy', the First World War only warrants a passing mention and it is not listed in the index. Also see J. Henderson, 'Changes in New Zealand Defence Policy', in R. Kennaway and J. Henderson, (eds.), Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s, Auckland, 1991, p. 83.

9 See M. Adas, "High" Imperialism and the "New" History, Washington, D. C., 1993, p. 2. Adas has noted that in recent times there has been a 'shift away from the elitist, political and military emphasis of much of the earlier literature on imperialism to focus on social history and questions of political economy'. Also see C. Midgley, 'New Imperial Histories', Journal of British Studies, v. 35, 4 (October 1996), p. 548. Midgley believes that 'new imperial history' 'is characterised by its diversity rather than by a single approach'. University of Otago history students have been on the cutting edge of the radical transformation in the historiography of imperialism and the First World War. They have embraced fresh new perspectives in their search for New Zealand's First World War experience. See M. Anderson, 'The Female Front: The Attitudes of Otago Women Towards the Great War 1914-1918', B. A. (Hons.) History, University of Otago, 1990; A. P. Fox, 'Silent Sentinels: The War Trophies of the First New Zealand Expeditionary Force in War and Peace', B. A. (Hons.) History, University of Otago, 1987; N. J. Wright, 'Beyond the Pale of Human Recognition. The Image of the Enemy as Portrayed in the Otago-Southland Press During WWI: Attitudes Towards British Propaganda and Censorship', M. A. History, University of Otago, 1996. Also see J. Belich, 'War', in C. Davis and P. Lineham, (eds.), The Future of the Past: Themes in New Zealand History, Palmerston North, 1991, p. 123. Belich argues that 'war has not been properly incorporated into our history'. He makes no mention of the diplomacy of war.
The first writers to tackle the question of New Zealand's First World War experience were the official historians of the early 1920s. Working under the auspices of the New Zealand Army Department, a collection of army officers began writing a series of popular histories in their spare time. In the words of Sir James Allen, the Minister of Defence responsible for the series publication, their specific aim was 'to present to the people of New Zealand the inspiring record of the work of our sons and daughters overseas'. Allen wanted quickly produced histories 'that would be concise and interesting', avoiding the necessary complications of 'considerable research'. Like good soldiers, the authors of the first three volumes followed Allen's instructions to the letter and churned out heavily laden accounts of the New Zealand combat soldier in Gallipoli, France and Palestine. In the fourth volume, a collection

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11 J. Allen, 'The New Zealand Popular History Series', in Major F. Waite, The New Zealanders at Gallipoli, 2nd edn., Auckland, 1921, p. v. As early as January 1917, Allen was planning to appoint official historians to record New Zealand's war effort. See Allen to Gibbon, 15 Jan 1917, AD1/1287/51/669. In an undated memo, Allen outlined the main objectives of the popular series. He wanted them 'to present to the world, in general, and to young New Zealanders, in particular, a sympathetic story of the New Zealand soldiers overseas'. See 'Memorandum', by James Allen, undated, AD78/28/FW/5/19. See also Adj-Gen to DBR, 14 Jul 1917, AD78/16/27/101A. 'We owe it to those brave men who have made the name "Anzac" a household word that their deeds should be recorded so that their descendants may know how their fathers left their homes and fought for freedom'. Also see Montgomery to Allen, 25 Mar 1919, AD78/16/27/101A. W. H. Montgomery was Assistant Director of Base Records and he told Allen that the object of the popular histories 'is to present to the world in general, and to young New Zealanders in particular, a sympathetic story of the New Zealand soldiers overseas'. Also see Min of Def to Miss McLean, Matron in Chief of New Zealand Army Nursing Service, 26 Mar 1919, AD78/16/101A.

12 The first three volumes in the official popular series were Major F. Waite, The New Zealanders at Gallipoli, 2nd edn., Auckland, 1921; Colonel H. Stewart, The New Zealand Division 1916-1919: A Popular History Based on Official Records, Wellington, 1921; Lieutenant-Colonel C. G. Powles, The New Zealanders in Sinai and Palestine, Wellington, 1922. Colonel H. Stewart, a Professor of Classics from the University of Canterbury, even admitted to Allen that: 'It is easy to write balderdash and so extraordinary difficult to get truth'. See Stewart to Allen, 1 Sep 1919, AD1/51/669. For an interesting discussion on the discourse of heroism see R. Gerster, Big-noting: The Heroic Theme in Australian War Writing, Melbourne, 1987. Of interest is K. Sinclair, 'Reviews: Robin Gerster, Big-noting: The Heroic Theme in Australian War Writing', NZJH, v. 22, 2 (October 1988), pp. 187-8. The merits of writing Official History has been questioned by at least one historian. See R. Rabel, 'The Future of War History in New Zealand', Comments at a Seminar Marking the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of the War History Branch: Government History: Past, Present, Future, Wellington, 1995, pp. 1-2. Rabel has argued: 'Official History is an exhausted mode of scholarship if that phrase refers to the writing of state-commissioned histories which are either explicitly or implicitly intended to justify past government policies or to celebrate uncritically past national war efforts'. Rabel believes that 'this is
of essays edited by Lieutenant H. T. B. Drew, the diplomatic relationship was briefly discussed by one of the contributors:

In all essentials New Zealand emerged from the greatest trial in the history of the world with a record which stands high in the mighty Empire to which she belongs. The farthest removed from many theatres of war, she subordinated all interests to one great cause, and maintained her generous response to the end of the great war. The ties of kinship to the Mother Country were proved to be of the finest and strongest material by the searching test of war.

Despite the questionable scholarly status of Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Sleeman, his views on the wartime relationship received popular acceptance and academic respectability. Writing during the era of the Great Depression, one of the first professional historians to analyse British-New Zealand relations following the First World War, J. B. Condliffe, paid Sleeman the ultimate compliment by endorsing his views. In his critique of New Zealand's economic dependence on Great Britain, *New Zealand in the Making*, Condliffe accepted the general thrust of Sleeman's interpretation that New Zealand rigidly and uncritically accepted British leadership during the war. Condliffe, in a plea for greater independence, chastised New Zealand for its total reliance and subservience to Great Britain in foreign affairs. In doing so, Condliffe managed to stigmatise the very idea of loyalty, by famously describing this so-called affliction of over-dependence as the 'mother complex'.

Zealand as a faithful adherent to British war policy and the British Empire's most loyal Dominion. Sixty years later in the second edition of The Oxford History of New Zealand, described as by one illustrious reviewer, Keith Sinclair, as 'the only full-scale modern treatment of New Zealand history', historians have still echoed the sentiments of Sleeman. New Zealand is portrayed as the 'loyal outpost of empire', a country which 'interfered not at all with British and allied strategic decisions .. [and] .. was placed at the disposal of the British authorities almost as if it were part of the British Isles'. Tenaciously, Sleeman's legacy has even followed New Zealand into the millennium. According to a recent national television documentary, chronicling the country's passage from the twentieth century to the start of the new millennium, New Zealand was the 'most loyal' of the four Dominions participating in the First World War.

After five years of research this historian has come to the conclusion that it is time to modify our received version of British-New Zealand relations during the First World War: the idea of a loyal New Zealand having its interests defended by Great Britain. There are strong grounds to question the validity of the dominant interpretation's claim that New Zealand's policy-makers subordinated all interests to one great cause because of a sentimental dependency. This is not the full story. In


18 P. Smith and L. Callan, Our People, Our Century, Auckland, 1999, p. 45.
reality, the wartime relationship was characterised by repeated tensions in pursuit of victory. Behind the public façade of loyalty there were deep-seated problems and policy differences over the most efficient way to prosecute the war. Public rhetoric and propaganda cleverly masked these differences of opinion as well as the high level of congruency in New Zealand and British interests. As the war dragged on the debates concerning important issues of war policy confirmed the simple fact that Great Britain could not pursue a direction entirely separate from New Zealand's national interests without complaint from Wellington. The diplomatic dialogue emanating from Wellington made it crystal clear to the British Government that it could not assume or automatically expect New Zealand consent to its policy objectives.

Since this is the first full-time study of British-New Zealand relations during the First World War, the usual methodological problems have become more acute. Considerable time and effort has been invested into ensuring the historical accuracy and sequencing of events. To facilitate this process the narrative quotes extensively from the primary record, especially from the dominant historical figures of the story. This should help impart a sense of history to the modern reader and breathe life into the analysis. As one recent New Zealand diplomat, Brook Barrington, has observed much of New Zealand's diplomatic history is dull and routine because 'differences with allies over matters of foreign policy have tended either to occur privately or be expressed in polite terms'. Where possible, events have been cross-referenced with other primary and secondary sources to bolster the credibility of the author's interpretation and the authenticity of the history. Occasionally the footnotes and general text will bring to the modern reader's attention omissions or errors of fact that have crept into the historical record, proving the dictum that history is never definitive.

This thesis also centres the New Zealand perspective at the heart of the relationship, risking British historian Niall Ferguson's criticism that too much of what is written on the First World War is taken 'from the vantage point of a single nation-state'. Besides, a study of this kind can always prove useful in a wider context. As Canadian historian J. M. Drummond has pointed out, 'before anyone can reach finality, we must know more about the policy-making process in each of the colonies

20 Ferguson, The Pity of War, p. xxv.
and protectorates. Historian Roger MacGinty takes a similar view that although 'often weak, geographically peripheral and strategically unimportant, small states are still numerous and can make significant contributions to the international system.' He believes they are 'worthy of study' for this very reason.

This thesis has taken on a revisionist role though it would hesitate to claim 'myth exploding' potency. Recently, one of the great imperial scholars, Canterbury's W. David McIntyre, has argued that as New Zealand 'history is rewritten and the general concept of "independence" becomes outdated, we can surely look at fresh eyes at relationships once stigmatised as dependency. This study is part of this process. With unhindered access to the relevant archival sources in New Zealand, Australia and Great Britain, we can now overcome the most debilitating criticism of Sleeman and Condliffe's work: the lack of primary research. Clearly with this advantage it is now possible to measure the historical validity of their interpretations. We can test the idea of New Zealand loyalty to Great Britain during the First World War against the realities of the primary historical record.

To accomplish this task, a much broader, more comprehensive approach to the subject has been taken. This has demanded a multi-archival research and a comparative analysis of national diplomatic strategies looking at the impact of New Zealand's diplomatic relationship with Great Britain from both a national and international perspective. This has meant an extensive survey of the Canadian and South African literature. In particular, the works of prominent Australian historians have been widely consulted. Eric Andrews' fine interpretative history of Anglo-Australian relations during the First World War, *The ANZAC Illusion*, has been an invaluable comparative tool. Andrews has convincingly argued that the much touted

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23 Unintentionally or not, the back cover of Ferguson's seminal book states that 'Niall Ferguson explodes many of the myths about the First World War. See Ferguson, *The Pity of War*.


special relationship that Australia was said to enjoy with Great Britain during the war was in fact a mere illusion. This thesis will reveal the extent to which his arguments apply to New Zealand's wartime experience with Great Britain.

At this stage it should be noted that this doctoral thesis is not a military study. There is no detailed narrative of New Zealand's military role in the war. The military side of the war will only be dealt with in so far as it sheds light on British-New Zealand relations. For this reason, the discussion centres on Gallipoli and the Western Front. The Middle East is mentioned briefly because the other two theatres were both more important to the war and to British-New Zealand relations. The main focus of this thesis is New Zealand's diplomatic relationship with Great Britain taken from June 1914 to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919. It will be a case study concerned with the early formation of New Zealand national interests, freely selecting topics that shed light on British-New Zealand relations. This makes it possible to move beyond metaphors of family and loyalty and speak with precision about the limits and possibilities of the relationship during the First World War.

A study of this nature cannot avoid the personalities of the main diplomatic actors. This is especially true for New Zealand where a handful of men dominated policy formulation. In doing so, this thesis is keeping in step with the latest historiographical trend: the reclamation of First World War statesmen. The role of New Zealand's Minister of Defence, Sir James Allen, is reconsidered. While he may have been 'cruel' and 'unfeeling', for the entire war period Allen remained the organising linchpin for New Zealand's substantial war effort. With the absence of Massey and Ward, Allen assumed full control as the Acting Prime Minister on three separate occasions aggregating almost two years. Despite this extraordinary burden, Allen showed

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27 In choosing to neglect of the military history of the war, this thesis is prepared to run the risk of incurring the criticism from at least one prominent New Zealand historian. See Belich, 'War', in Davis and Lineham, (eds.), *The Future of the Past*, p. 123.


29 The unfavourable portrayal of Allen is directly related to the Defence Department's policy of inflicting cruel and unusual treatment on New Zealand's conscientious objectors. They were sent forcibly to the Western Front to endure ritualistic humiliation and Field Punishment #1, popularly known as 'crucifixion'. This critical perception of New Zealand's wartime administration persists even today. For example, see R. Palenski, 'Time to right the wrongs of Chunuk Bair', *The Sunday Star Times*, 23 April 2000, C-6. On the treatment of New Zealand's conscientious objectors see the harrowing first-hand account by A. Baxter, *We Will Not Cease*, Whatamongo Bay, Queen Charlotte Sound, 1980.
considerable administrative skill and patience. As his private secretary remarked years later, Allen's 'capacity for work was simply prodigious'.

The personal relationship between New Zealand's two fiercest political rivals, William Massey and Sir Joseph Ward, also features prominently. One historian has commented that the 'differences in the degree of imperial loyalty between Ward and Massey were perhaps measurable only in micromillimeters'. This thesis takes a slightly different approach. From the inception of the National Government in August 1915, the 'Siamese Twins', Sir Maurice Hankey's apt description for the Massey-Ward partnership, successfully defended and promoted New Zealand's interests. The 'deep-seated personal animosity' between Massey and Ward created a partnership of formidable strength. As competitive rivals vying for the attention and adulation of the New Zealand public, each leader tried to drive home the advantage of fighting a war under the imperial banner. Far from being stereotypical imperialists, Massey and Ward exhibited behaviour of two policy-makers imbued with a strong sense of their own country's views and interests.

Of the two political leaders, the central figure who dominates this story is the New Zealand Prime Minister, William Massey. The system of inter-imperial relations concentrated responsibility in the Dominions' Prime Ministers. For too long his reputation has been characterised by The Daily Telegraph's description of him as a 'robust Imperialist'. Massey's contribution to imperial politics and diplomacy have also been overshadowed by his contemporary Australian counterpart, William Morris Hughes, who has no less than four volumes dictated to his tumultuous work as an imperial statesman. As a result, Massey's profile has suffered from comparative history, especially juxtaposed between arguably two of New Zealand's greatest Prime Ministers, Richard Seddon and Michael Joseph Savage. Massey may have lacked the

30 G. F. Dixon to L. Voller, 3 May 1943, AG458, Voller Papers.
charisma and outward aggressiveness of Hughes or Seddon and the messianic qualities of Savage, nevertheless, he was one of New Zealand's most accomplished international leaders. Indeed, his skill as a politician should not be underestimated. He was one of three Prime Ministers in the British Empire to have survived in office over the entire duration of the First World War.\textsuperscript{37}

Yet despite Massey's obvious credentials, no serious historian has attempted to chronicle his life in a full-blooded biography. While New Zealand historian Michael Bassett has recently published a political biography of Sir Joseph Ward, as far as the Reform Party leader is concerned the cupboard is bare.\textsuperscript{38} We are dependent on a few articles and a smattering of private papers to understand New Zealand's second longest serving Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{39} The brief portraits that do exist are generally prone to exaggeration, political bias, and slogan history. Massey is usually portrayed unfavourably as the xenophobic Anglophile, the arch conservative who ruthlessly oppressed the working classes in the 1913 Waterfront Strike. Such interpretations leave little room for subtleties. He is consistently misrepresented as the man resistant to change and stubbornly loyal to Great Britain. Sir Keith Sinclair considered Massey to be 'earnest', 'inflexible and of narrow outlook'.\textsuperscript{40} Miles Fairburn's attempt to paint Massey in 'original light' has tended to reinforce this view. In his eyes, Massey epitomised the stereotypical farmer politician whose austere Reform Party contributed to the cultural malaise of the inter-war years. As a result, Massey's image has


\textsuperscript{39} In 1990, Massey's great grand daughter made a half-hearted attempt to write a biography. See D. C. Massey, The Path He Chooses: The Life of Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey P. C., L. L. D. Prime Minister of New Zealand 1912-1925, 1990, MS4289. Apparently, New Zealand historian W. J. Gardner came the closest to writing Massey's biography, publishing two articles and a pamphlet book. However, legend has it, that he found Massey so abhorrent that he could not bear to write a full account of Massey's life. I would like to thank Associate Professor Tom W. H. Brooking and the Honourable Dr. Michael Bassett for bringing this point to my attention. Also see W. J. Gardner, William Massey, Wellington, 1969; W. J. Gardner, The Rise of W. F. Massey, 1891-1912, Political Science, v. 13, 1 (March 1961), pp. 3-30; W. J. Gardner, 'W. F. Massey in Power, 1912-1925', Political Science, v. 13, 2 (June 1961), pp. 3-30; According to Gardner, Massey 'left no personal papers, [and] the men who knew him have recorded very little of his personality, and later investigators (in the words of Keith Sinclair) 'have found Massey, though in some ways a more admirable person than Seddon, a more difficult subject for a verbal portrait'. Some private papers, however, can be located in the Alexander Turnbull Library (National Library of New Zealand) in MS1398, Massey Papers. Also see K. Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, 1959, p. 234; W. J. Gardner, 'Reviews Sir Joseph Ward: A Political Biography' by M. Bassett', NZIH, v. 28, 1 (April 1994), p. 95. On Ward see M. Bassett, 'In Search of Sir Joseph Ward', NZIH, v. 21, 1 (April 1987), p. 112. According to Bassett, Ward's personal and private papers were destroyed.

\textsuperscript{40} Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, 1988, pp. 240-1. Also see G. McLauchlan, (ed.), Bateman New Zealand Encyclopedia, 3rd edn., Auckland, 1992, p. 332. According to this popular encyclopaedia, 'Massey was a stolid shrewd man, with great organising ability and a domineering personality. In many ways he was a divisive influence, extraordinarily conservative, even reactionary'.
remained that of a small farmer from Mangere, 'stunted in outlook' and one who 'never had an original idea in his life' and 'regarded foreign policy as something not to be engaged in.'

There is a clear need to present a more balanced assessment of Massey's imperialism. This thesis will reconsider Massey's views on the British Empire and will provide an interpretation that takes into account his active pursuit of New Zealand's interests, particularly in the country's trade relations with Great Britain during the First World War. He felt that New Zealand's interests were best served by maintaining close ties with the British Empire. Despite Massey's relative lack of sophistication and formal education, his intuitive grasp of New Zealand's interests made him an effective imperial statesman. During the First World War, he never lost sight of New Zealand's most fundamental interests. Massey quickly realised that New Zealand support for the British cause was not simply the duty of an imperialist but the recognition that what mattered most to New Zealand could be achieved as a member of the British Empire and depended on the war's outcome. He worked tirelessly for New Zealand's interests within the framework of the British Empire. New Zealand's reputation within the British Empire as the loyal Dominion owed much to Massey's clever politicking and statesmanship. With considerable skill and guile, Massey's political instincts worked effectively for New Zealand. During the war he managed to promote the Dominion's favourable loyal image while pursuing New Zealand's narrow self-interests.

It is perhaps not surprising that only a small number of New Zealand historians have argued in this way. It requires acceptance of the fact that New Zealand, as a member of the British Empire lacking the necessary formal constitutional and administrative attributes to conduct a foreign policy, could still have interests of its own. This is a major departure from the assumption that has influenced much of New Zealand's diplomatic history: the idea that independence arrived with the advent of the First Labour Government. According to retired diplomat Malcolm Templeton, this congratulatory form of history is a gross 'over-simplification'. When New Zealand historians such as Malcolm McKinnon argue that 'it is impossible to separate out the notion of independence from the country's status as part of the British Empire', it is

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little wonder that historians have failed to advance our understanding of the interaction between nationalism and imperialism. McKinnon has overstated his case. In this period, New Zealand's policy-makers believed that national definition could be achieved within the imperial partnership.

New Zealand's most prolific diplomatic historian, Ian McGibbon, has been quick to recognise this point. As he has argued, if 'it is accepted that the primary, indeed overriding objective of a nation's foreign policy is security, New Zealand had the substance if not the form of such a policy long before 1935'. Early forms of New Zealand national interest under the aegis of the British Empire have also been detected by Raewyn Dalziel's research on Julius Vogel and the office of New Zealand Agent-General in London. In 1904 it was even clear to one French observer, André Siegfried, that despite devotion to the British Empire New Zealand 'would not tolerate the encroachment of the central power on territory which they consider to be their own'. In fact, we can even go as far to say that Massey's approach to the imperial relationship represented a nationally-oriented policy. His commitment to the imperial alliance made perfect national sense given the relative congruency of interests just as much as his open disagreement with various aspects of British policy. Massey's decision to remain close to the British Empire was in New Zealand's best interests 'although loyalty did not mean that disagreement was absent'. In other words, Massey's commitment to the British Empire and the pursuit of New Zealand's interests were not incompatible. New Zealand support for Great Britain during the war did not mean that there was an absence of national thought. Such an approach by Massey did not imply necessarily that he was any less independent or heedless of national interests than the other Dominions. As we shall soon discover, from the beginning of the conflict in August 1914, Massey consistently followed a course aimed at protecting New Zealand's interests within the imperial context.

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48 See A. Ross, 'Reluctant Dominion or Dutiful Daughter? New Zealand and the Commonwealth in the Inter-War Years', JCPS, v. 10, 1 (March 1972), p. 36. Professor Angus Ross was the first historian to make this observation: 'In a sense, in pursuing such a strongly imperialist policy . . . the New Zealand leaders were following a positive independent line of their own'. Also see Barrington, 'New Zealand and Search for Security 1944-54', p. 11; Templeton, 'Beginnings', in Templeton, (ed.), An Eye An Ear And A Voice, p. 6.
Rather than viewing nationalism and imperialism in dialectic opposition, interpreting issues of war policy in terms of national interest allows this thesis to simultaneously explain why 'exercises in loyalty and troublemaking' occurred within the wartime relationship.\(^{49}\) It can help us explain why 'even a publicly committed Empire loyalist like Massey' kept New Zealand's needs uppermost in responding to British war policy.\(^{50}\) Loyalty certainly did not prevent the New Zealand Government from criticising the British Government when its interests were felt to be at stake. At the 1917 and 1918 Imperial War Conferences and Cabinets, Massey was just as nationalistic as any other Dominion leader. No trace of loyal subservience could be detected in New Zealand's behaviour at these imperial gatherings. Throughout the war, the general attitude of Massey and Ward demonstrated that attachment to the idea of imperial unity did not preclude frank statement of national interests.

Bringing this perspective to New Zealand's diplomatic role in the First World War offers a reappraisal of Massey's imperialism, suggesting a more complex story behind the man's policies and beliefs when it came to dealing with Great Britain. This will help shift the historiography from its article of faith that the arrival of a nationally motivated New Zealand foreign policy coincided with the election of the First Labour Government. This thesis will reveal that Massey led a country that was far from subservient. He was every a bit as concerned with his country's own interests as his fiery Tasman counterpart William Morris Hughes. Throughout the war he was prepared to speak his mind openly and forcefully on matters vital to New Zealand. Under Massey's leadership, a sense of national self-interest guided New Zealand's relations and actions with Great Britain. He successfully blended these selfish qualities with distinguishable emotional and economic elements to produce firm adherence to the concept of a united British Empire.

For reasons of simplicity and convenience, the chapters of this thesis are arranged in chorological order. The first chapter considers the historical forces behind New Zealand's participation in the First World War. Drawing on the secondary works of other historians this chapter will explore the constitutional, economic, cultural and military links between New Zealand and Great Britain prior to the outbreak of the First World War. This should reveal the answer to the perplexing question that has


haunted every New Zealander on 25 April: why were 91,941 New Zealand volunteers prepared 'to make any sacrifice'? With the benefit of hindsight, some historians have claimed that New Zealand's active military involvement in the First World War was unnecessary. They have argued that New Zealand did not appear to have any interests directly threatened by German aggression and its invasion of Belgium. The First World War was ostensibly a conflict started by Europeans and fought predominantly in Europe. This chapter will argue, however, that it was quite natural for New Zealand to become involved in the First World War as a combatant nation. The discussion in this chapter will point out that New Zealand's decision to enter the First World War demonstrated that its policy-makers had a keen appreciation of where their country's best interests resided.

The next four chapters form the bulk of the thesis and take the reader back to a time that seriously tested British-New Zealand relations. The second chapter explores the 'neglected paradox' - the tension that existed between imperial defence and foreign policy in the first few months of the war. Right from the beginning of the war, New Zealand's policy-makers demonstrated a critical capacity to evaluate the strength and weaknesses of British policy and how it affected the country's interests. They did not axiomatically believe that British leaders always knew best. As a result, New Zealand's policy-makers quite often implemented seemingly contradictory and inconsistent policies when it came to dealing with Great Britain. On the one hand, New Zealand quickly acquiesced and performed a British request to capture German Samoa. On the other hand, less than three weeks later, the same policy-makers refused to comply with an innocuous British request to despatch the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) Main Body to Australia.

Chapter three deals with the political impact of the war on the relationship. In the first eighteen months of the war, British-New Zealand relations were conducted at great personal distance. With the postponement of the Imperial Conference, Wellington had to rely upon the wisdom of London to provide sound policy advice.

51 Sleeman, 'The Supply of Reinforcements During the War', in Drew, (ed.) The War Effort of New Zealand, p. 13. Between August 1914 and November 1918, 91,941 New Zealanders volunteered for active military service and a further 32,270 men were conscripted under the provisions of the Military Service Act. In total, 124,211 New Zealand males out of an eligible population of 250,000 were called for active duty. See 'Graph Showing the Strength of N.Z.E.F.', in Studholme, Record of Personal Services During the War of Officers, Nurses, and First Class Warrant Officers, appendix. By the end of 1921, the total number of embarkations from New Zealand for overseas service came to 101,651.


53 D. C. Watt, 'Imperial Defence Policy and Imperial Foreign Policy, 1911-1939: A Neglected Paradox?', JCPS, v. 1, 3 (1962).
When the expected 'knock-out' blow did not eventuate, New Zealand's political leaders were forced to reassess traditional political boundaries as the nation struggled to maintain its military commitment. Gradually, as the war deteriorated into a bloody stalemate, New Zealand began to question Great Britain's military and political judgment. As the country struggled to adjust and mobilise its resources for the prolonged conflict, calls for greater levels of communication and consultation between Great Britain and New Zealand emanated from Wellington.

Eventually New Zealand concerns with British war management propelled Massey and Ward to sail to Great Britain. Chapters four and five examine their attendance at the Imperial War Conference of 1917 and the part they played in the inaugural Imperial War Cabinet. These two chapters focus on the limits of the relationship in terms of New Zealand's military contribution, the country's economic sacrifice and how Wellington and London worked their way through their differences. Chapter six looks at the second wartime trip of Massey and Ward to Great Britain in the middle of 1918 against the backdrop of German spring offensive campaign. This chapter deals with the impact of the Imperial War Cabinet and Conference of 1918 on British-New Zealand relations.

The final chapter examines New Zealand's participation at the Paris Peace Conference. Even though the presence of Massey and Ward symbolised 'a striking confirmation of the progress already achieved in the remodelling of imperial relations since the outbreak of war', relatively little attention has been paid to the 'Siamese Twins' in Paris. Their 'important, though subsidiary contribution' has only been covered by two secondary source based Masters theses and a solitary journal article written over twenty-five years ago. This chapter plans to fulfil a substantial gap in the literature. It will outline the role played by Massey and Ward at the Paris Peace Conference in the shaping of the post-war world, and ask what results their actions had for New Zealand and intra-imperial relations.

This study therefore should throw considerable light on the pattern of British-New Zealand relations during the First World War. It hopes to untangle the web of national and imperial interests, which has until very recently blinded our understanding of the relationship. On the eve of the First World War, New Zealand enjoyed the reputation as being the British Empire's most loyal Dominion. André Siegfried, a shrewd French

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observer who visited New Zealand in 1904, held that 'New Zealand may with justice be regarded as the English colony which is most faithful to the mother country . . . A thousand bonds unite her to old England, and these bonds neither hurt nor annoy her she never thinks even of relaxing them'.\textsuperscript{55} Notwithstanding this, the following pages will suggest that New Zealand did not always live up to its reputation as the most loyal Dominion of the British Empire. Massey was every bit as nationalistic as his successors when it came to dealing with his British counterparts. This thesis will illustrate that the so-called 'independent' foreign policy pursued by New Zealand's First Labour Government actually emerged much earlier. Far from being the 'dutiful daughter'\textsuperscript{56}, New Zealand viewed the 'special relationship' as a partnership that could be exploited and considered that benefits could arise for both countries during the war. The intensity and ferocity of the First World War made New Zealand and Great Britain extremely conscious of the reciprocal nature of their relationship.

\textsuperscript{55} Siegfried, \textit{Democracy in New Zealand}, pp. 359-60.
CHAPTER ONE

To Make Any Sacrifice

New Zealand . . . happens to find her interests in the friendship which unites her to England.

ANDRÉ SIEGFRIED

Democracy in New Zealand, 1904

On 28 June 1914 Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife were shot in Sarajevo. The assassin was a young Bosnian student revolutionary named Gavrilo Princip. He supported the separation of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Habsburg Empire and its union with Serbia.¹

News of the assassinations made headlines around the world. Over the next two days Press Association cablegrams detailing the grisly intricacies of Ferdinand’s death filled New Zealand’s major daily newspapers. Generally, these newspapers were quick to condemn the murders. They were appalled by the actions of Princip and the ‘Black Hand’ conspirators. The editor of The New Zealand Herald deplored the ‘ruthless’ methods employed in the ‘Sarajevo murders’ but it was ‘part of the price paid by the Hapsburgs for their leadership of the dominant Teutonic element in the ancient empire’.² In Wellington, The Dominion described the assassinations as an ‘outrage’. Perceptibly, the editor feared, given that all ‘the nations of Europe are armed to the teeth’, that the ‘ultimat consequenc of the assassinations might be ‘far-reaching’.³ The editors of The Press and The Otago Daily Times considered the crime a ‘dreadful tragedy’ and a ‘repulsive deed’. They predicted that it would have an ‘unsettling’ effect on Europe.⁴

For the time being, reaction from Wellington remained muted and restrained as officials adopted a wait-and-see approach. The New Zealand Government, through its British-appointed Governor, Lord Liverpool, telegraphed the Dominion’s condolences to the Emperor of Austria, expressing sympathy at the terrible crime which has been

² NZH, 30 Jun 1914, p. 6.
³ Dom, 30 Jun 1914, p. 6.
⁴ Press, 30 Jun 1914, p. 6; ODT, 30 Jun 1914, p. 4.
perpetrated and which we in common with the whole world view with abhorrence'.\(^5\) This was a significant gesture from a country that had little direct contact with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. While a Consul-General of the Austro-Hungarian Government was based in Auckland, there were fewer than 2,000 Austro-Hungarians living in New Zealand.\(^6\) For the past decade trade between the two countries had been relatively static and unimportant. The value of New Zealand exports to the Austro-Hungarian Empire amounted to £2,809, consisting mainly of kauri gum.\(^7\) New Zealand imported £17,863 worth of Austro-Hungarian products, mostly furniture and tinware.\(^8\)

Over the next month, the New Zealand Government carefully followed the Balkans crisis through Colonial Office telegrams and newspaper reports.\(^9\) Initially, it appeared that the removal of a Habsburg heir was of little consequence for Great Britain or New Zealand.\(^10\) The New Zealand Government had to rely upon the counsel of the British Government. Geographically isolated from the centre of events and receiving second-hand information, New Zealand's principal policy-makers did not consider Ferdinand's murder to be a matter of grave concern, let alone an event that would thrust the world into a general war. According to one reflective Liberal member of Parliament: 'We little thought that on account of the murder at Serajevo [sic] this country would be compelled to take part in a war, or that we should be concerned

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\(^5\) GovNZ to Emperor of Austria via SSCols, 30 Jun 1914, G5/14; SSCols to GovNZ, 30 Jul 1914, G1/185.

\(^6\) NZOY, 1913, p. 65, p. 108.

\(^7\) NZOY, 1914, p. 341, p. 345.

\(^8\) NZOY, 1914, p. 383, p. 395.

\(^9\) Important sources of information for the New Zealand Government on events in Europe were newspaper reports. Press Association cablegrams were published verbatim in New Zealand newspapers, chronicling the escalation of the crisis. In contrast, the information provided by the British Government on the crisis in Europe tended to be late, piecemeal and incomplete. In some instances, Colonial Office reporting gave a misleading picture of British-German relations and the general dynamics of the crisis. For example, see SSCols to GovNZ, 4 Jul 1914, G1/185; SSCols to GovNZ, 23 Jul 1914, G1/185. Also see K. Robbins, 'Sir Edward Grey and the British Empire', *JICH*, v. 1, 2 (January 1973), p. 220. Grey 'was prepared to give information to the dominions so long as this did not lead them to suppose that they had the right to exercise any kind of veto. By consultation, Grey usually meant retrospective explanation'. Also see Constantine, 'Britain and the Empire', in Constantine, Kirby and Rose, (eds.), *The First World War in British History*, p. 257. It must be conceded that British governments before the First World War were not prepared to allow dominion governments a share in imperial policy-making. The Colonial Office might pass on information on international matters from the Foreign Office, dominion representatives might be briefed at Imperial Conferences, but the crucial decisions affecting the security of the Empire and of the United Kingdom were taken by the British government alone. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 7 Aug 1914, G1/186; SSCols to GovNZ, 28 Aug 1914, G1/186. New Zealand received copies of the Parliamentary debates and the official report relating to the war in Europe.

with the murder of an archduke in that locality, or even the murder of a whole Royal family'.

The assassination plot raised larger issues for European statesmen to consider as the Austro-Hungary moved to exact revenge on Serbia for the murders. On 5 July Austro-Hungary received a German guarantee of support if Russia moved to assist Serbia. On 23 July Austro-Hungary presented an ultimatum to Serbia. This alarming sequence of events finally elicited a response from the New Zealand Government. A full month after the death of Archduke Franz Ferdinand the New Zealand Prime Minister William Massey read the latest telegram from the Colonial Office to Parliament: "His Majesty's Government has not received any intimation of the outbreak of war". It was to be hoped, even now, that war would be averted. Massey had spoken too soon. Two days later Liverpool broke the news that Austro-Hungary had declared war on Serbia, prompting the Russians to order a general mobilisation of its military forces. By the start of August, debate in Wellington now focused on whether Asquith's Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, could maintain British neutrality.

While the New Zealand press were cautiously optimistic that Grey's diplomatic skill would hold the British Empire 'aloof from the threatened carnage', the New Zealand Government prepared for the worst. When Massey learned that Canada (erroneously as it turned out) had offered Great Britain an army 20,000 men strong, he primed the country for war. Keen to prove that New Zealand was as every bit as loyal to the British Empire as Canada, Massey made his first significant decision on war policy. On 31 July Massey indicated that 'the Government of New Zealand will ask
Parliament and the people of New Zealand to do their duty by offering the services of an Expeditionary Force to the Imperial Government. By adopting such a belligerent stance, Massey tried simultaneously to appease popular opinion and safeguard New Zealand's long-term security interests by preserving harmonious relations with Great Britain. It was not simply a show of imperial solidarity. He admitted that an 'understanding' had been arrived at in Cabinet 'with regard to the number and constitution of a Force which will fit in with Imperial requirements'.

Massey then

17 NZPD, v. 169, 31 Jul 1914, p. 369. The composition of the NZEF Main Body was not transmitted to the British Government until two days after the declaration of war. Clearly, it was a Reform Cabinet 'understanding' rather than a British-New Zealand agreement with regard to the nature and size of New Zealand's military contingent. Also see GovNZ to SSCols, 7 Aug 1914, G4/l/1: A. Mitchell, 'Caucus: The New Zealand Parliamentary Parties', JCPS, v. 6, 1 (March 1968), p. 5; NZPD, v. 186, 8 Jul 1920, pp. 268-9. Most of the Reform Cabinet probably continued to think in terms of a limited military role for New Zealand and therefore quickly agreed to sanction the offer of an expeditionary force to the British Government. They might not have acquiesced so readily had they appreciated how dramatically the commitment would escalate. According to Massey: 'It is only right and proper that the man at the head of affairs should keep himself in touch with his friends and supporters . . . . One should mix with one's friends when the opportunity offers and get to know their ideas and so be able to give them lead'.
simply praised the reported Canadian offer - 'Well done, Canada'. There appeared no reason to 'manufacture spontaneity' in New Zealand. In Liverpool's words, 'Massey's remarks received great cheering'. The whole House and crowded galleries rose and 'fervently' sang the National Anthem.

Sir Joseph Ward, the Leader of the Liberal Opposition, listened to the Prime Minister's words with the 'utmost satisfaction'. Ward, New Zealand's most experienced imperial statesman, delivered a rousing speech in support of Massey's offer to the British Government. He was of the expert opinion that the 'wise counsels of men' in Europe would be able to prevent a widespread military conflict. He 'sincerely hoped that there will be no occasion' to send New Zealand soldiers but that if it became necessary the Liberal Party would 'heartily co-operate with the Government of the day in assisting in this way, or otherwise, to defend the interests of this portion of the Empire, and of the Empire as a whole'. The Evening Post wrote the following night that New Zealand's loyalty went without saying.

Behind the political rhetoric and imperial drum beating lay some serious policy implications. Inadvertently, New Zealand had become the first Dominion to offer military support to the British Empire. In promoting such a commitment, New Zealand's most powerful and influential policy-makers had given a clear and unequivocal statement of support for Great Britain in the event of war, disavowing neutrality and a strictly moral stance. A formidable bipartisan consensus now existed in the Dominion for direct military involvement. At the last General Election in December 1911 Reform won thirty-six seats and the Liberals won thirty seats in the eighty-seat House of Representatives. Combined, Reform and Liberal represented over 75 per cent of the voting New Zealand public. As a result, New Zealand's two main political parties dominated Parliament and the decision-making process. They both agreed in principle to send an expeditionary force composed of volunteers to participate in an overseas military role. Massey probably hoped that his offer would ably demonstrate New Zealand support for the British Empire without undue strain on the country's resources. One member of Massey's Cabinet, William Fraser,

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18 GovNZ to SSCols, 7 Aug 1914, G41/1.
21 GovNZ to SSCols, 31 Jul 1914, AD1/732/9/9. Extracts of the speeches are contained in SSCols to GovNZ, 18 Sep 1914, G1187.
22 EP, 1 Aug 1914, p. 8.
23 D. Thorns and C. Sedgwick, Understanding Aotearoa/New Zealand: Historical Statistics, Palmerston North, 1997, p. 166. At the 1911 General Election, Reform won 35 per cent of the vote and Liberal won 41 per cent.
commented that: 'They could not send men to the front from here. That was nonsense. The great thing was to show the Old Land that we were heartily with her up on every occasion to the fullest extent of our power.' Massey confidently predicted that 'within a very few months the Imperial authorities will be able to announce that peace with honour has come for the British Empire'.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lewis Harcourt, heard through his loyal servant and close friend, Lord Liverpool, that New Zealand's major political figures were 'prepared to send her utmost quota of help in support of the Empire'. Even the 'extreme Labour section' was reported to be 'just as patriotic as anyone else'. Encouraged by New Zealand's show of solidarity, the British Government graciously sent a message from His Majesty King George V, calling the offer a 'further manifestation of the staunch loyalty' of the Dominion. However, the New Zealand Government's offer had arrived at an awkward time for the British Government. While the British Government appreciated Massey's gesture, it did not want to be seen encouraging 'premature local demonstrations', fearing that such a position would undercut whatever chances remained of the Foreign Office averting general war. At this stage, the British wisely refrained from formally accepting New Zealand's offer of military support.

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24 ODT, 3 Aug 1914, p. 6. The very next day, Fraser was explaining to the press by what he meant by the term 'nonsense'. He stated that: 'It was quite possible, however, that an expeditionary force from New Zealand might be used somewhere in the Pacific or in this hemisphere for Imperial purposes. He added that the New Zealand Government would be prepared to do whatever the Home Government might ask them to do for the advantage of the Empire'. See ODT, 4 Aug 1914, p. 6.

25 NZPD, v. 169, 5 Aug 1914, p. 399. Also see ODT, 3 Aug 1914, p. 4. The Otago Daily Times argued that a New Zealand military force would not be needed in Europe because of the overwhelming superiority of the French Army.

26 GovNZ to SSCols, 31 Jul 1914, G41/1; GovNZ to SSCols 31 Jul 1914, AD1/732/9/9; Liverpool to Harcourt, 20 Sep 1914, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/264. Liverpool wrote privately to Harcourt: 'I am glad to say that there have been no Party wrangles over the numbers or equipment of the Force from any quarter'. Labour opinion over the First World War was divided. The Maoriland Worker, under the guidance of Harry Holland's editorship, maintained a hostile attitude to the war and New Zealand's military involvement. For example, see MW, 5 Aug 1914, p. 4; MW, 12 Aug 1914, p. 4; MW, 19 Aug 1914, p. 4.

27 SSCols to Gov NZ, 2 Aug 1914, G41/1.

28 See 'Defence Scheme - First Draft Copy', March 1916, p. 1, AD1/7/11. According to the Defence Scheme: 'The system of sending "warning" and "war" telegrams is not intended to fetter the discretion of local authorities, in adopting such measures as may appear necessary, having regard, on the one hand to immediate local exigencies and on the other hand, to the prejudice likely to be caused to the general interests of the Empire by premature local demonstrations. The other telegrams do not affect local defence and the measures referred to in them should only be adopted on receipt of definite communications from His Majesty's Government'.

29 See G. H. Cassar, Asquith as War Leader, London, 1994, pp. 15-6. Cassar relays a story that on 28 July Asquith was even reluctant to act upon the suggestion of Captain Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, to put into effect the precautionary stage of the War Book. Also see Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918, Volume One, p. 154.
Over the next five days, the New Zealand Government pursued the Colonial Office for a definitive answer. Massey and Allen knew that they would have to call for volunteers, potentially delaying any proposed New Zealand military response. In order to obtain Parliament's consent to avoid such problems, Liverpool telegraphed Harcourt 'to ascertain if circumstances warrant my Government calling immediately for the names of volunteers to compose an expeditionary force'. The British response was equivocal. While the British Government received the New Zealand Government's state of readiness 'with deep gratitude', they advised Liverpool that 'no condition has yet arisen which would make this step necessary at present'.

Despite British reticence, New Zealand's naval preparations gathered momentum. The Senior Naval Officer stationed in New Zealand, Captain H. J. T. Marshall, received a telegram from the Admiralty on 27 July advising him that war was 'by no means impossible'. Marshall initiated plans to shadow hostile German ships in the South Pacific region. He wired the Captain-in-Charge in Sydney and the Naval Intelligence Officer in Hong Kong for information on the whereabouts of German naval forces in the area. Two of the three ships under Marshall's command, HMS *Psyche* and HMS *Pyramus*, also completed their coaling at Lyttelton. On 30 July an Admiralty message indicated 'that war appeared imminent'. Marshall immediately informed Liverpool who quickly convened a meeting of the War Council in Wellington consisting of Massey, Marshall, and General Officer Commanding, Major-General Alexander Godley. On 1 August Marshall informed the War Council that in line with standing war orders, the three New Zealand ships under his command, *Psyche*, *Pyramus* and HMS *Philomel*, were to proceed to Fiji 'with the view of doing intelligence work'. Such a step was consistent with British-New Zealand naval policy.

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30 See McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 248; Allen, 'New Zealand in the World War', in Rose, Newton, and Benians, (eds.), *CHBE*, p. 224; *The Public Acts of New Zealand (Reprint) 1908-1931: Classified and Annotated: Volume II*, Wellington, 1932, p. 583-4. Massey knew that it was illegal for the New Zealand Territorial Force to serve overseas. Under sections 22 and 26 of the 1909 Defence Act, the Territorial Force was only liable to serve in New Zealand, though its members could voluntarily undertake service overseas.

31 GovNZ to SSCols, 2 Aug 1914, G41/1.

32 SSCols to GovNZ, 3 Aug 1914, G41/1.

33 Adm to SNO, 27 Jul 1914, N20/9; 'Journal of War', 10 Sep 1914, N20/4/034. Also see McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 245.


35 SNO to GovNZ, 30 Jul 1914, G41/1; GovNZ to SNO, 30 Jul 1914, G41/1; SNO to GovNZ, 31 Jul 1914, G41/1.

In times of war, New Zealand naval forces were governed by statutory regulations embodied in the Naval Defence Act 1913. Under section nineteen, subsection two of this Act:

> Whenever war between Great Britain and any other country or countries is imminent, or when in the opinion of the Governor-General it is expedient in the interests of Great Britain so to do, or upon the request of the Government of Great Britain, the Governor-General may by Proclamation declare that the ships, vessels, or boats acquired under this Act for naval defence or for services auxiliary thereto and the New Zealand Naval Forces shall pass and remain under the control and be at the disposition of the Government of Great Britain.

In reality, the New Zealand authorities found that the legal requirements were practically useless. As Allen later recalled, the New Zealand Government had the 'curious experience' of asking the Admiralty on 31 July when the transfer should take place. The Admiralty ordered Liverpool to issue the proclamation to say that the transfer of control was 'in the interests of Great Britain'. Following this instruction, Liverpool issued the proclamation on 3 August.

Three days later, *Psyche* and *Pyramus* left Auckland for Fiji on the understanding that *Philomel* would join them as soon it was ready to leave. On the afternoon of 8 August the small New Zealand naval force aborted its mission and returned to base. Marshall was informed, erroneously as it turned out, that a dangerous proportion of the German China Fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Count von Spee, *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, were using their wireless at a distance of little more than six hundred miles from his ships. Marshall later recalled in his *Journal of War* that it

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37 See GovNZ to SSCols, 15 Jan 1914, CO209/280. Liverpool informed the Admiralty via the Colonial Office about the implications of the Act in times of war.
39 Alien to Creswell, 27 Jan 1915, Alien Papers, M1/14; GovNZ to SSCols, 31 Jul 1914, G41/1. Allen informed Creswell that he looked forward to the day when the controlling authority would not be the British Government, the Admiralty or the War Office. See Allen to Creswell, 19 Feb 1915, Alien Papers, M1/14. Also see I. McGibbon, 'Australia-New Zealand Defence Relations to 1939', in K. Sinclair, (ed.), *Tasman Relations: New Zealand and Australia, 1788-1988*, Auckland, 1987, p. 172.
40 SSCols to GovNZ, 3 Aug 1914, G41/1. See also McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 246. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 21 Aug 1914, G2/21. According to Harcourt, with the transfer of the ships to the Admiralty, 'New Zealand has no Naval Forces'.
41 NZG, no 71, 3 Aug 1914, pp. 3035-6.
42 McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 246. McGibbon lists the *Pyramus's* date of departure for Fiji as the 5 August but according to Marshall's *Journal of War* the *Pyramus* left on the morning of 6 August, meeting the *Psyche* the following day. See *Journal of War*, 10 Sep 1914, N20/4/034.
would have been 'inviting disaster to proceed to Fiji, and it was decided to return to New Zealand to await further developments'.

In comparison, the preparations of New Zealand's armed forces went relatively smoothly. Precautionary measures and procedures had been planned well in advance. As early as January 1914, the British Army Council had advised the New Zealand Government that it would be responsible 'in the event of mobilisation, for the collecting of all Army Reservists residing in the Dominion and for their despatch to whatever place may at the time be ordered'. Acting on orders from the British War Office, the Admiralty and the Colonial Office, Godley organised the New Zealand Territorial Force for overseas duty. On 30 July the four military districts were issued with orders instructing them to prepare for mobilisation. Strict laws of secrecy surrounded the military build-up. Liverpool had introduced a system of censorship, appointing eight censors 'for the effective regulation, control, or prohibition of telegraphic messages in time of war'. On 2 August the British Government warned the New Zealand Government to 'enforce [an] Examination Service at all Defended Ports and to call out the Royal Naval Reserves. Mindful of the disruption to New Zealand trade, Massey promised Parliament that the inspection of the vessels trading into the four principal ports of the Auckland, Wellington, Lyttelton and Port Chalmers would 'not be in any way detrimental to the interests of the country'. He pledged that 'in all probability any such vessel would only be delayed for a few moments'. To minimise the impact of the new stringent regulations, Massey relaxed the inspection requirements at nighttime.

By the start of August, Europe was heading inexorably towards war. The Austro-Hungarian Army shelled Belgrade and Germany declared war on Russia because Tsar Nicholas II refused to demobilise his armies. Two days later, in keeping with the strategical priorities of the Schlieffen Plan, Germany presented an ultimatum to Belgium demanding free passage for its armies across Belgian territory in order to

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43 'Journal of War', 10 Sep 1914, N20/4/034; McGibbon, The Path to Gallipoli, p. 246.
44 SSCols to GovNZ, 15 Jan 1914, G1/181.
45 GovNZ to SNO, 30 Jul 1914, G41/1; NZPD, v. 169, 4 Aug 1914, p. 380. In a ministerial statement to Parliament, Massey stated that 'these measures have been taken either under Imperial instructions, under the recommendation of the Imperial authorities, or in accordance with Imperial regulations'.
46 Def Min to SNO, 30 Jul 1914, N20/9.
47 NZG, no 71, 3 Aug 1914, pp. 3036-7. The Governor could exercise wide powers during wartime. He could even prohibit the exportation of goods, which he considered would aid and abet the enemy. On 4 August New Zealand coal came under such legislative export control. See NZG, no 73, 4 Aug 1914, p. 3041.
48 SSCols to GovNZ, 2 Aug 1914, G41/1; NZG, no 71, 3 Aug 1914, p. 3035. Also see McGibbon, The Path to Gallipoli, p. 245.
attack France. The British Cabinet had already decided that a 'substantial violation' of Belgium's neutrality would constitute a casus belli.\(^{50}\) The Belgians rejected the German ultimatum and King Albert of Belgium pleaded to King George V for 'diplomatic intervention' to safeguard the neutrality of his country.\(^{51}\)

In the meantime, the Colonial Office decided to warn the Dominions. On the morning of 4 August Liverpool received a telegram from Harcourt, alerting him to the 'strained relations with Germany'. Harcourt advised him to be on 'guard against the possibility of attack in advance of any formal declaration of war'. Harcourt, still holding out for British-German rapprochement, made it perfectly clear to Liverpool that it was not a 'war telegram'.\(^{52}\) According to his private secretary, John Davidson, 'Lulu', as Harcourt was affectionately known to his friends, 'was to the last possible moment a pacifist'.\(^{53}\)

On the eve of war, the New Zealand Garrison Artillery was called to active service.\(^{54}\) Massey assured Parliament that 'the forts will be fully manned day and night'.\(^{55}\) Liverpool informed the Colonial Office that Massey, 'in view of the seriousness and urgency of the situation . . . desires to call up at once for names of volunteers from the Citizen Army for an expeditionary force so that in view of your possible request for us to mobilise no delay will ensue'.\(^{56}\) The Prime Minister stated in Parliament that volunteers for the expeditionary force would only be called for after 'a cablegram has been received from Imperial authorities, and until Parliament has been advised and has signified its approval'. For the sake of the British Empire, Massey pleaded for political harmony and the end to political division and sectarianism. In his opinion, it was not the time for 'jingoism'. He was 'confident that the people of this

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\(^{51}\) Cassar, *Asquith as War Leader*, p. 27.

\(^{52}\) SS Cols to GovNZ, 4 Aug 1914, G41/1.


\(^{54}\) NZG, no 72, 4 Aug 1914, p. 3039.

\(^{55}\) NZPD, v. 169, 4 Aug 1914, p. 380.

\(^{56}\) GovNZ to SSCols, 4 Aug 1914, G41/1.
country, and the Parliament, and the Government will do their duty calmly and quietly, but firmly and determinedly.\footnote{NZPD, v. 169, 4 Aug 1914, pp. 380-1. The existence of Massey's statement would tend to contradict the view expressed in J. Anderson, 'Military Censorship in World War One: Its Uses and Abuses in New Zealand', M. A. History, Victoria University of Wellington, 1952, p. 290. Anderson has argued that Massey did not really appreciate the virtues of a united New Zealand society to facilitate the country's war effort.}

The Leader of the Liberal Opposition, Sir Joseph Ward, shared Massey's pessimistic assessment of the situation. He felt that it was 'next to impossible' for Great Britain 'to remain a silent onlooker'. Ward did not hold his Liberal counterparts in Great Britain responsible for the crisis. He had absolute trust and faith in the wisdom of British statesmen and he praised the Dominions for 'offering to take up arms in unison for the protection of Empire interests common to them all'. He repeated his earlier promise to 'co-operate in every way with the Government of the day in any action it may be necessary to take to preserve the integrity of the Empire'.\footnote{NZPD, v. 169, 4 Aug 1914, p. 381.}

Sagacious political reasons motivated Ward to strike an affable accord with his fierce conservative rival. With a general election in the offing Ward's political instincts ensured that the Liberal Party resisted the temptation of criticising the Reform Government. Besides, Ward knew that such a strategy would be extremely unpopular. Besides, there was no rational explanation to disagree with Massey's approach to the crisis. As a result, Ward did his best to demonstrate that his party's loyalty to the imperial cause was beyond reproach. This had unintended results. In publicly announcing Liberal support for any Reform measure designed to promote victory, Ward had effectively abrogated the right to debate the extent to which New Zealand cooperated with Great Britain. Ward had cast aside the Liberal Opposition's critical Parliamentary function: the duty of taking government policy to task. (Not until 1916 would the newly established New Zealand Labour Party fill this political vacuum). No matter which political party was in power, victory at all costs had been adopted as the cornerstone of government policy. Eventually, this bipartisan consensus became formally recognised in August 1915 with the temporary alliance of the Reform and Liberal parties in the National Government.\footnote{The events that led to creation of the National Government between the two major political parties in New Zealand, Reform and Liberal, are discussed in some detail in Chapter Three.}

On the morning of 4 August the British Cabinet met at Prime Minister's residence at 10 Downing Street. The Liberal Cabinet members listened attentively as news of the German invasion of Belgium was relayed to them. This made matters simple. Asquith and his Cabinet colleagues finally agreed that if Germany did not respect the
terrestrial integrity of Belgium there would be war 'by tonight'. Cabinet instructed Grey to seek assurances from Germany would withdraw its armies and observe Belgian neutrality in accordance with the Treaty of London of 1839. Grey sent an ultimatum to Berlin that was due to expire at eleven o'clock. The clock was now ticking.

New Zealand's policy-makers remained completely oblivious to the diplomatic timetable set by the British Government. In no shape or form were they consulted or informed of the British Cabinet decision to deliver an ultimatum to Germany. Even at this very late stage the British Government was reluctantly backing in to the war. On 4 August the Colonial Office approached the New Zealand Government on behalf of the Army Council to ask if New Zealand officers on duty in Great Britain could be utilised for military purposes if the occasions arose. The Colonial Office worded the telegram in conciliatory terms. According to British historian Ronald Hyam, Colonial Office always 'saw the necessity for caution in handling colonial susceptibilities, especially dominion resentment of allegedly meddlesome practices and dictatorial attitudes'.

On 4 August the New Zealand Parliament adjourned at five o'clock in the afternoon and Massey retired to his office to wait for the declaration of war. Later that evening, a boisterous crowd of 400 young men lured him out of his commodious surroundings. Massey thanked them for their support and reminded them that it was not a time for talking but a time for action. Encouraged by the crowd's enthusiasm he added: 'So far as New Zealand is concerned it may be my duty, as head of my Government, within the next few days, to ask New Zealanders to do their duty, not only in protecting our own dominion, but also in protecting the Empire as a whole'. Massey was certain that: 'When it all over . . . the Union Jack will still be on top'.

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60 Ekstein and Steiner, 'The Sarajevo Crisis', in Hinsley, (ed.), *British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey*, p. 408.
61 Cassar, *Asquith as War Leader*, p. 28. The corresponding time in New Zealand was eleven o'clock in the morning.
62 See P. Hayes, 'British Foreign Policy and the Influence of Empire, 1870-1920', *JICH*, v. 12, 2 (January 1984), p. 112. According to Hayes: 'The speed at which events moved prevented the British government [sic] from consulting with the dominions as had been promised'.
63 SSCols to GovNZ, 4 Aug 1914, G5/14.
65 NZPD, v. 169, 4 Aug 1914, p. 394. When Massey asked the House to adjourn, he stated: 'I do not propose to take any contentious measures to-day, as I am afraid the thoughts of honourable members are, like my own, on events occurring in Europe, and not on the business of the House. I move adjournment'.
66 ODT, 5 Aug 1914, p. 6; NZPD, v. 169, 8 Aug 1914, p. 480. Massey described the encounter in Parliament: 'When a crowd of young fellows came up to interview me the night previous [before war with Germany had been announced] at the front of this building they were under the impression that war had been declared, and they could scarcely credit me when I told them that it was not so'.

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The crowd then moved on to disturb Sir Joseph Ward. They shouted, cheered and sang until he appeared on the balcony of his hotel room. Awoken from his slumber, Ward rallied and spoke of the need for all parties to follow the lead of the Irish Nationalists and Ulsterites; to cast aside their differences and unite behind the British cause. Ward bade the crowd farewell and they left singing 'God Save the King' and other patriotic tunes.

The following morning the British Government finally accepted the logic of New Zealand's argument that it would be 'wise' to make arrangements for mobilisation. Harcourt instructed Liverpool to take the necessary steps so that an expeditionary force could be 'enabled without delay' if Great Britain requested such a force. Before the necessary action could be taken another secret cypher telegram arrived at Government House at a quarter past twelve in the afternoon. With deadly economy, the telegram simply read in capitals: 'SEE PREFACE DEFENCE SCHEME WAR HAS BROKEN OUT WITH GERMANY. (Signed) HARCOURT.' Liverpool received the message just a few minutes before one o'clock. As an act of courtesy to

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68 ODT, 5 Aug 1914, p. 6.

69 SSCols to GovNZ, 5 Aug 1914, G41/1. Also see NZPD, v. 169, 5 Aug 1914, p. 399. Massey told the House that while the NZEF 'is not required at present ... our men might be required at some not-far distant date ... we have to be prepared'.

70 SSCols to Gov NZ, 5 Aug 1914, G41/1; NZPD, v. 169, 5 Aug 1914, p. 398. 8 Aug 1914, p. 480; McGibbon, The Path to Gallipoli, p. 244; McGibbon, (ed.), The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History, p. 173; McGibbon, 'Books: G. Harper, Massacre at Passchendaele: The New Zealand Story', NZIR, v. 25, 4 (July/August 2000), p. 27. McGibbon has claimed that: 'News of the outbreak of war was received in Wellington at 1 p.m. on 5 August 1914'. This is simply not true. The official war telegram, in the possession of the National Archives, clearly stated that it was received in Wellington at a quarter past twelve in the afternoon. Either way, New Zealand had been at war with Germany for over an hour without knowing it. Also see James, Memoirs of a Conservative, p. 20. The memoirs of Harcourt's private secretary provide the best contemporary account of the atmosphere in the Colonial Office. According to Davidson, on the night of 4 August, Harcourt was 'absolutely worn out and looked like death. He was so tired that he could hardly walk or stand. He called for me and said wearily: 'Well, Colin, I'll leave it with you. If no reply has been received from Germany by 11 o'clock this evening, that's the end. But don't send off the telegrams to the colonies announcing the outbreak of war without the full authority of the Foreign Office". He went back to his house in Berkeley Square and I remained on until 11 o'clock. I went into the Foreign Office through the connecting door from the Colonial Office, and found the Resident Clerk ... we waited a few minutes to make certain that no reply had come and then we set off, with me carrying the sheaf of cipher telegrams to the Colonies informing them of the expiration of the ultimatum and the declaration of war. I was accompanied by the Colonial Office Resident Clerk and a Major Brough, who acted as, in a sense, as my bodyguard. We went out into Downing Street, which had been kept fairly free from the crowds, as Whitehall was simply packed with a seething mass of people. We fought our way up Whitehall and, unable to get through Trafalgar Square, took route through some side streets by way of the Strand - which was still open - and went in with the telegrams. We walked up to the counter, and handed the telegrams over. The woman behind the counter did no more than just look at them. We didn't even get a receipt for them ...'.

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the citizens of Wellington', Liverpool's staff quickly arranged for a public announcement at Parliament.\textsuperscript{71}

By three o'clock in the afternoon a large enthusiastic crowd of 15,000 had gathered around the steps of Parliament.\textsuperscript{72} Both chambers of the House were adjourned for the occasion and throngs of people surrounded to hear their diminutive Governor, Lord Liverpool, read out the King's message to the British Dominions:

\begin{quote}
I desire to express to my people of the oversea dominions with that appreciation and pride I have received the messages from their respective Governments during the last few days. These spontaneous assurances of their fullest support recall to me the generous self-sacrificing help given by them in the past to the Mother-country. I shall be strengthened in the discharge of the great responsibilities which rest upon me by the confident belief that in this time of trial my Empire will stand united, calm, resolute, trusting in God.\textsuperscript{73}
\end{quote}

Liverpool then read out New Zealand's emphatic reply to the King, 'that come good or ill she in company with the other Dominions and Dependencies of the Crown is prepared to make any sacrifice to maintain her heritage and her birthright'.\textsuperscript{74} The crowd cheered. Liverpool, after regaining his composure, announced: 'War has broken out with Germany'.\textsuperscript{75}

According to \textit{The Otago Daily Times}, the crowd erupted and 'a wild burst of cheering broke out'. They sang a verse of the National Anthem and the euphoria took several minutes to fade. With order restored, Massey called for national unity in 'the most serious crisis ever experienced in the history of the Empire'. He argued that New Zealand 'must do everything possible to protect our country, and at the same time to assist the Empire'. After quoting a proverb from the Bible, Massey offered the large crowd of Wellingtonians his final thoughts: 'My advice at the most trying moment is

\textsuperscript{71}NZPD, v. 169, 8 Aug 1914, p. 480. Liverpool personally informed Massey of the 'war telegram'. The Cabinet and Sir Joseph Ward did not find out until Liverpool made the official announcement on the steps of Parliament. Three days later, Ward told the House he had 'nothing in the shape of what might be termed peevishness about' not being informed of the outbreak of war prior to Liverpool's public announcement.

\textsuperscript{72}ODT, 6 Aug 1914, p. 8; EP, 6 Aug 1914, p. 4; Baker, \textit{King and Country Call}, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{73}NZPD, v. 169, 5 Aug 1914, pp. 395-8.

\textsuperscript{74}NZPD, v. 169, 5 Aug 1914, pp. 395-8; GovNZ to SSCols, 5 Aug 1914, G41/1. This telegram was cabled to London at three o'clock in the afternoon, almost three hours after the 'war telegram' was received in Wellington.

\textsuperscript{75}ODT, 6 Aug 1914, p. 8; NZPD, v. 169, 8 Aug 1914, p. 480. Massey confessed to the House that Liverpool did not have 'the slightest idea that when it was made public that it would be necessary for him to announce the outbreak of war'. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 13 Aug 1914, G41/1. Within a week, New Zealand learnt that Great Britain had declared war on the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
to keep cool, stand fast, and do your duty to New Zealand and the Empire'. Ward let it be known that his motto was "For King and Country" and New Zealand would support the British Empire to 'its last man and its last shilling'. Two hours later the Legislative Council tabled a resolution authorising the New Zealand Government to take 'the necessary steps . . . to have in readiness and Expeditionary Force'. Without discussion the motion was passed. Two days later the British Government formally accepted the New Zealand Government's 'gracious' military offer.

It would be easy to dismiss Massey's words as those of self-serving politician eager to exploit nationalistic and imperialistic sentiment for political advantage. Yet his words have proved to be a more feasible starting point than a survey of the current historical literature. While writing extensively on the prowess of the New Zealand soldier in battle and the "Home Front" experience, the vast majority of New Zealand historians have ignored detailing why the Dominion actually entered the First World War as a combatant nation. There has been a marked degree of historical complacency surrounding this basic question. New Zealand scholars have glossed over the rationale behind Reform's decision to participate in the conflict alongside Great Britain. A number of New Zealand historians have presented a critical explanation that stresses the inevitability of New Zealand's involvement in the war given the close constitutional ties with the British Empire. Left-wing idealism has permeated their approach to the country's entry in the First World. From this perspective, some historians have argued that New Zealand was involved needlessly in the war; it was a tragic consequence of dependence. Put simply, New Zealand's interests (and presumably the lives of thousands of New Zealanders) were sacrificed in the pursuit of imperial interests.

78 SSCols to GovNZ, 7 Aug 1914, G41/1; SSCols to GovNZ, 18 Sep 1914, G1/187. Harcourt suggested that the composition of New Zealand military's contribution should consist of three units: a mounted rifle brigade, a field artillery brigade plus an infantry brigade; War Council Meeting 1#, 5 Aug 1914, CAB42/1/2. The War Council directed the War Office to 'accept the offers of the Dominions to provide contingents, which should be concentrated in England'. The Colonial Office undertook this task on the behalf of the War Office.
79 Wood, The New Zealand People at War, p. 25.
80 For example, see Coad, New Zealand from Tasman to Massey, p. 283; Shrimpton, and Mulgan, Maori and Pakeha, p. 380; Gordon, New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power, p. 44; N. Boyack and J. Toleron, In the Shadow of War: New Zealand Soldiers Talk About World War One and Their Lives, Auckland, 1990, p. 77. One New Zealand veteran argued that New Zealand should not have been involved in the First World War because 'we weren't threatened'. At least one Australian historian has argued along these lines. See M. C. Parsons, 'Was Australia's Contribution To World War I In Her National Interests?', R. M. C. Historical Journal, v. 2, (1973), pp. 37-41. Parsons has stated that 'objectively speaking, it was not in Australia's national interests to go to war in 1914'.
Keith Sinclair's treatment of New Zealand's entry into the First World War is emblematic of this kind of interpretation. He has argued that New Zealand was 'fighting for the Empire and becoming a nation' and we 'have sent troops to most available wars . . . with little thought about how our interests were involved'.

W. H. Oliver is equally brief in his explanation for historical motive. In his Story of New Zealand, Oliver states that: 'The Great War brought New Zealand with all possible speed to the side of the United Kingdom. It was fought with some intensity, but at a distance'.

W. P. Morrell also declared in vague terms that: 'As the clouds gathered in Europe, New Zealand's intention to take her stand beside Britain became steadily clearer'.

Recent discussion by New Zealand historians has a similar dismissive quality. While the first edition of The Oxford History of New Zealand glossed over the issue, W. David McIntyre's contribution to the revised second edition left the historical record largely intact. In McIntyre's words: 'New Zealand went to war, with great eagerness, upon a British declaration, without consultation.'

In his personal account of the New Zealand Division, Ormond E. Burton, soldier turned pacifist, argued that New Zealand's policy-makers were 'ignorant of its causes and innocent of its meaning'. The research of Jock Phillips has reinforced this impression. Writing on the construction of Pakeha masculinity, Phillips has argued that New Zealanders went to war to 'prove ourselves the finest of the Empire's sons'. He portrays a jingoistic New Zealand, indoctrinated in the military values of the English public school, going to war at the behest of the British Government without any thought for the consequences of the action.

New Zealand's Gallipoli specialist, Chris Pugsley, has argued that 'we did not even consciously go to war as New Zealanders'.

One dominant factor has clouded the judgment of New Zealand historians on this issue: the nature of the British constitutional system. This explains why historians have overlooked the role played by New Zealand's policy-makers and treated our involvement in the war as a fait accompli. The irrepressible A. J. P. Taylor wrote that

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84 McIntyre, 'Imperialism and Nationalism', in Rice, (ed.), The Oxford History of New Zealand, p. 344.
87 Pugsley, Gallipoli, pp. 12-22 and p. 32.
'the war came as though King George V still possessed undiminished the prerogatives of Henry VIII'. Even the unpretentious newspaper, *The Otago Daily Times*, warned its readers on the 1 August 1914: 'The position is that once England is at war, New Zealand, as part of the British Empire, is at war. If England, therefore, joins Russia and France in war against the Triple Alliance - Austria, Germany, and Italy - New Zealand will also be at war with the same Powers'. The Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 could still be enforced by the British Government to pass legislation for the Dominions and Great Britain retained the right of appeal from New Zealand to the Privy Council. British Prime Minister Herbert Asquith bluntly made this point at the 1911 Imperial Conference. He felt that Sir Joseph Ward's imperial federation proposal would impair, if not altogether destroy, the authority of the Government of the United Kingdom in such grave matters as the conduct of Foreign Policy, the conclusion of Treaties, the maintenance of Peace, or the declaration of War. The responsibility of Imperial Government subject to the Imperial Parliament in these matters could not be shared.

It was only after Labour Prime Minister Peter Fraser signed the Statute of Westminster in 1947 that New Zealand became a legally independent sovereign state capable of choosing to remain at peace or go to war.

Yet despite the seemingly deterministic nature of the British constitutional system, the question of New Zealand's involvement in the war was a far more complicated process than the historiography suggests. As historian Joan Beaumont has pointed out in the Australian context, 'being legally at war was not the same as supporting it enthusiastically'. While New Zealand's policy-makers did not appear calculating, nevertheless, they played a decisive role not only in determining the level of support

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89 OTD, 1 Aug 1914, p. 10.
but also the extent of it. While neutrality was not an option, there was no formal obligation for New Zealand to support Great Britain. New Zealand's policy-makers were free to keep both its army and navy out of the war. The most important questions therefore hinge around why did the New Zealand Government embrace the war so uncritically? Why did the New Zealand Government consider it necessary to support Great Britain? Was it simply a case of the New Zealand Government sending thousands of young men to fight and die in "other people's wars"?

There seems to be plenty of prima facie evidence to suggest that New Zealand's decision to become a combatant country in the First World War was simply a desire to support Great Britain. Publicly at least, the war was fought in defence of Belgium and British liberal principles. Harcourt informed Liverpool that:

Great Britain is fighting in the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation . . . and secondly to vindicate the principle that small nationalities were not to be crushed in defiance of international good faith by the arbitrary will of a strong and over mastering power . . . No nation ever entered into a great controversy with a clearer and stronger conviction that it was fighting not for aggression but in defence of principles, the maintenance of which, were vital to the civilisation of the world . . . It was essential that all the resources of the Empire should be thrown into the scale.

Pro-British rhetoric litters the historical record lending credence to the "other people's war" view that New Zealand's participation in the First World War demonstrated the existence of a "mother complex". On 7 August 1914 Harcourt made a point of telling Liverpool that: 'His Majesty's Government cordially thank your Government for the support to the Empire they propose and accept generous offer made.' Massey offered Great Britain the effusive backing that: 'All we are and all we have are at the disposal

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95 War Council Meeting 1#, 5 Aug 1914, CAB421/1/2. Asquith stated that it was up 'to each Dominion to decide the strength of the contingent which it is prepared to provide'. Also see Parsons, 'Was Australia's Contribution To World War I In Her National Interests?', R. M. C. Historical Journal, v. 2, (1973), p. 39.
96 See J. B. Hirst, "Other People's Wars"? Anzac and Empire', Quadrant, v. 34, 10, (October 1990), p. 15.
98 SSCols to GovNZ, 7 Aug 1914, G5/14.
99 SSCols to GovNZ, 7 Aug 1914, G41/1.
of the Imperial Government for the purposes of carrying on the war to a successful issue'.

It is only recently that more realistic currents have emerged from the literature. As always official historian Ian McGibbon has led the charge, arguing that New Zealand's decision was based on 'patriotic enthusiasm for the Imperial cause and sober recognition that defeat for the British Empire would open the way to many dangers' for New Zealand. Otago historian Erik Olssen has also argued that it was a sensible decision, one which hardly 'a person doubted - in public anyway - that the security of New Zealand, and the country's future as Britain of the south seas, required the victory of the British empire'. Australian diplomatic historian Rolf Pfeiffer has been a supporter of this line of argument. In his view:

A decisive victory of the Central Powers ... would have had disastrous consequences. The loss of, or limited access to, the British market or even the inability of a defeated Great Britain to continue to still New Zealand's insatiable hunger for credit would have led to the inevitable economic collapse of the Dominion. Thus the decision to contribute all available resources to the common effort - Governor Lord Liverpool spoke of the willingness 'to make any sacrifice' - was one arising out of political commonsense, and certainly not a result of devoted allegiance. Even a less loyal Dominion, on considering it own long term interests, would not have been able to come to any other conclusion.

Indeed if New Zealand was only genuinely moved by a kind of instinctive 'colonial reflex', as one recent New Zealand historian has described it, then 'we would be the most noble or most stupid people on earth'.

New Zealand did not enter the First World War 'blindly' or with 'incredible naivety'. The decision of the New Zealand Government to fight alongside Great

104 Rabel, "Where She (Britain) Goes, We Go" But With Eyes Wide Open', Defence New Zealand Quarterly, no. 27, Summer 1999, p. 27; Hirst, "Other People's Wars"? Anzac and Empire', Quadrant, v. 34, 10, (October 1990), p. 15.
Britain reflected a keen appreciation of the country's own interests. It was a pragmatic policy based on a realistic appraisal of the country's long-term security interests. New Zealand's policy-makers recognised that the failure to support Great Britain would have seriously undermined British-New Zealand relations, thus weakening the British security guarantee. According to political scientist John Henderson, an 'insurance policy reasoning lay behind this willingness to fight in distant lands. As New Zealand security depended upon the power and influence of its major ally, it was in New Zealand's interests to pay its premium and provide assistance when required. One former New Zealand Secretary of Defence has described imperial defence arrangements as 'security at a price'. With this mind, New Zealand's policy-makers felt that they could not desert Great Britain in its hour of need without serious repercussions for the relationship. Machiavellian virtues dictated a loyal New Zealand response. As McGibbon has correctly asserted, 'New Zealand sent its men to support the Empire in 1914 not so much to create a debt of gratitude or to prove itself as a nation, but rather to sustain a security system within which it believed all the country's defence needs could be met at an acceptable cost'.

Besides meeting the alliance demands of the British Empire, there were also more powerful considerations that encouraged New Zealand to become an active participant in the First World War. As Massey alluded to in his speech on the steps of Parliament, virtually every aspect of New Zealand life owed its existence to the political, economic and social institutions of Great Britain. New Zealanders believed the political and economic destiny of the two countries were inseparable. This illusion was shattered in 1961 when Great Britain signalled its intention to join the European Community. As historian Paul Baker argued in his doctoral thesis, the First World War

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108 McGibbon, The Path to Gallipoli, p. 259.

109 Procok, 'History and Sovereignty', Journal of British Studies, v. 31, 4 (October 1992), p. 361. In this fascinating article, Procok has argued most persuasively that: 'Politically and economically, the Europeanization of Great Britain has been a disaster for New Zealanders. It deprived them of the markets their society had been shaped to supply'. Also see M. Josephson, 'Gallipoli and the New Zealand Press', P. G. D. History, University of Otago, 1978, p. 61; A. L. Burt, The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth from the American Revolution, Boston, 1956, p. 716. According to Burt, New Zealand's 'small size and exposed position made it most conscious of all the dominions that its fate was bound up with the empire'.
War represented a conflict of 'self-defence'. Wellington policy-makers, sensibly and rationally, judged a British victory vital to New Zealand's prosperity. New Zealand and British interests were congruent on this important point. By August 1914 New Zealand's policy-makers considered it 'inconceivable' for to stand aside and allow the fate of the country to be decided without contributing militarily.

New Zealand's vulnerable and narrowly based economy had become highly dependent on Great Britain for immigrants, capital and technology. As W. J. Gardner pointed out: 'Among British settlement colonies none had closer trading ties with the United Kingdom though New Zealand provided only a minor element in British trade'. On the eve of war, New Zealand had become little more than Great Britain's 'outlying farm', relying almost exclusively on its agricultural products and access to the British market for its wealth and income. For Great Britain the economic relationship served as a reminder that it 'was the only nation whose economic interests were global and the only one whose status as a great power rested upon world-wide commitments'.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, Great Britain gradually became the chief destination for New Zealand primary products. The Australian monopoly weakened under the strain of technological innovations and the establishment of direct-shipping links. In 1865 70 per cent of the total value of New Zealand exports went to Australia. By the mid 1870's Great Britain had overtaken Australia to become the

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112 P. D. Kennedy, 'Europe and New Zealand: The New Millennium Beckons', Presentation to Waikato University Seminar on New Zealand and its Relations with Europe, 1999, p. 2. Also see Burton, The Silent Division, p. 121. Burton felt that: 'No alternative was suggested by the politicians or the press, or the parsons'.
largest recipient of New Zealand exports. For the next forty years the exports to Great Britain fluctuated between 70 to 80 per cent of the total value, reaching 84 per cent in 1877, 86 per cent in 1894 and 84 per cent again in 1910. By the end of 1913, close to 80 per cent of the total value of New Zealand exports went to Great Britain, in comparison to the 10 per cent that went to Australia.¹¹⁷ In total, the British market was worth over £18 million to New Zealand exporters.¹¹⁸

The exporters most dependent on the British market were New Zealand’s primary producers.¹¹⁹ After the successes of the first frozen meat exports from Buenos Aires to Le Havre in 1878 and from Australia to Great Britain in 1880, on 15 February 1882 the first shipment of frozen New Zealand meat left Port Chalmers on board the Dunedin. Its cargo of 4,460 mutton and 449 lamb carcasses arrived in London on 24 May and fetched 6d. to 7½ d. a pound, well above normal colonial prices.¹²⁰ This development heralded the arrival of the frozen meat industry that radically transformed New Zealand’s economy. Large pastoral estates began to give way to smaller owner-occupied farms where sheep were bred for their meat as much as their wool. A dramatic shift in the balance of political power accompanied this rural transformation. Small farmers, comprising the backbone of rural society, became the dominant interest group in New Zealand’s political economy. With the fall of the Sir Thomas Mackenzie’s fragile Liberal Government in 1912, the rise of William Massey’s Reform Party to the treasury benches symbolised the transfer of power. The research of New Zealand historian Tom Brooking has confirmed that in the pre-war years the Farmers’ Union enjoyed a ‘closeness’ with the Reform Party in the formulation of government policy. The wealth of its members depended in large part on access to the lucrative British market.¹²¹ Conscious of the needs of his farming


¹²¹ See T. Brooking, ‘New Zealand Farmers’ Organisations and Rural Politics in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century’, Historical News, no. 42, (May 1981), p. 11; Brooking, ‘Economic Transformation’, in Rice, (ed.), The Oxford History of New Zealand, p. 230. Brooking has argued that ‘These men were only ‘small’ farmers in comparison with the big pastoralists of the mid-nineteenth century; they dominated the export sector and wielded a disproportionate political influence. The power of these small farmers in politics was greater in the first two decades of the twentieth century than it ever had been or ever would be again’; T. W. H. Brooking, ‘Agrarian
constituency, Massey reassured his supporters at the opening of the Agricultural Conference in late July 1914 that: 'When a war started there was no telling where it would stop. If the great Empire to which we belonged happened to become involved, he was quite sure the different parts of the Empire would stand together as they had done in the past years'.

By the end of the nineteenth century refrigeration had facilitated the export of three staple New Zealand products to the British market - wool, meat and dairy produce. By 1891 trade in frozen meat had surpassed gold as New Zealand's second export and its earnings passed the £1 million mark. In 1895 New Zealand officials reported to Parliament that 'the results of our own enterprise are, in many forms, making a deep impression on the imagination of the British population. New Zealand frozen mutton, cheese and butter are invading the markets of every town and hamlet in Great Britain'. By 1914 the value of meat exports to Great Britain had reached over £4 million and the frozen meat trade won 20 per cent of the value all New Zealand

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Businessmen Organise: A Comparative Study of the Origins and Early Phases of Development of the National Farmers' Union of England and Wales and the New Zealand Farmers' Union, ca 1880-1929', Ph. D. History, University of Otago, 1977, pp. 83-97. Also see M. Roche, 'Frozen Meat: The Sheep-Meat Industry, 1880s to 1930s', in M. McKinnon, (ed.) with B. Bradley and R. Kirkpatrick, New Zealand Historical Atlas Ko Papatuanuku e Takoto Nei, Auckland, 1997, plate 60; E. Olssen, 'Towards a New Society', in G. W. Rice, (ed.), The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd edn., Auckland, 1992, p. 261; W. J. Gardner, The Farmer Politician in New Zealand History, Palmerston North, 1970, pp. 1-5; Gardner, 'The Rise of W. F. Massey, 1891-1912', Political Science, v. 13, 1 (March 1961), pp. 3-30; Gardner, 'W. F. Massey in Power, 1912-1925', Political Science, v. 13, 2 (1961), pp. 3-30; Lloyd-Prichard, An Economic History of New Zealand to 1939, p. 203. Wool, as a percentage of New Zealand's total exports, began to decline in the mid 1890s but it still remained New Zealand's most important exported commodity. In 1913 wool accounted for 35 per cent of New Zealand's exports, meat 19 per cent, butter 9 per cent and cheese 8 per cent. Gold was ranked fifth on the list at 7 per cent of New Zealand's total exports. Also see Fairburn, 'The Farmers Take Over (1912-1930)', in Sinclair, (ed.), The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, p. 185. Also see R. Robinson and J. Gallagher with A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism, 2nd edn., London, 1983, p. 488. According to Robinson, Gallagher and Denny, the Dominions' 'bread was buttered in the mother country. Exporter and importer, banker and docker, farmer and drover in the colony voted for politicians who would respect the arrangements required to keep export markets open and capital flowing in. Unemployment and defeat at the next election were penalties for breaking them'. In their belief, direct imperial control was unnecessary because 'co-operation was achieved mainly by economic attraction through the normal internal political processes of the colony itself, so long as there were sufficient economic inputs to maintain political alliance'.

ODT, 29 Jul 1914, p. 5.

Brooking, 'Economic Transformation', in Rice, (ed.), The Oxford History of New Zealand, pp. 230-6; M. McKinnon, 'Butter and Cheese: The Dairy Industry, 1880s to 1930s', in M. McKinnon, (ed.) with B. Bradley and R. Kirkpatrick, New Zealand Historical Atlas Ko Papatuanuku e Takoto Nei, Auckland, 1997, plate 61. See also Condliffe, 'The External Trade of New Zealand', in NZOY 1915, p. 913. By 1910 these three staple primary products accounted for 89 per cent of the total value of New Zealand's exports. Also see L. Barber, New Zealand: A Short History, Auckland, 1989, p. 73. By 1900 New Zealand was exporting over 1,000,000 carcasses to Great Britain, 9000 tonnes of butter and 5000 tonnes of cheese.


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exports.\(^{126}\) New Zealand's economic prosperity of the last thirty years was due directly 'to the extraordinary rise in the price of exported farm-products'.\(^{127}\) By 1914 New Zealand's economic wealth had become totally reliant on the London market's appetite for wool, meat, butter and cheese.\(^{128}\)

Great Britain also derived significant economic benefits from the relationship. The steady supply of Australian and British goods and material sustained the colonisation of New Zealand.\(^{129}\) In 1862 Australia supplied 60 per cent of goods exported to New Zealand.\(^{130}\) By the end of the nineteenth century, the pattern of imports had dramatically shifted as New Zealand received most of its imported goods from Great Britain, followed not very closely by Australia, and the United States of America. While the proportion of imports to New Zealand from Great Britain declined in the first decades of the twentieth century, in 1913 60 per cent of the total value of New Zealand imports still came from the Mother Country.\(^{131}\) By the 1914 New Zealand had become a valuable market for British manufacturers worth over £13 million.\(^{132}\)

British investment played a key role in the development of the colony's economy. The infrastructure of New Zealand's fledgling economy was based on finances and loans secured in London and Glasgow. According to J. B. Condliffe: 'Borrowing began in New Zealand with colonisation, and it is plain from the early trade figures of trade, which give so large a surplus of imports, that a small community was living mainly on imported capital'.\(^{133}\) The first Provincial Governments in New Zealand began to borrow heavily on the public account and in 1870 Sir Julius Vogel introduced a comprehensive scheme of borrowing for national public works, entrenching the economic dependency pattern of British-New Zealand relations. Between 1871 and 1890 New Zealand Government debt rose by £32 million and an interest bill of £27 million had been paid on central government loans.\(^{134}\) As New

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\(^{127}\) Condliffe, 'The External Trade of New Zealand', in NZOY 1915, p. 869.


\(^{129}\) J. Graham, 'The Pioneers (1840-1870)', in K. Sinclair, (ed.), The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, Auckland, 1990, p. 56. Graham provides an excellent account of the harsh economic conditions that early settlers of New Zealand had to endure in order to scratch out a living.

\(^{130}\) Condliffe, 'The External Trade of New Zealand', in NZOY 1915, p. 936.

\(^{131}\) NZOY 1915, p. 429.


\(^{133}\) Condliffe, 'The External Trade of New Zealand', in NZOY 1915, p. 919.

\(^{134}\) Gardner, 'A Colonial Economy', in Rice, (ed.), The Oxford History of New Zealand, p. 76.
Zealand Governor Sir William Jervois told one of his correspondents in the mid 1880s:

> British statesmen may perhaps look forward to the day when the Australasian Colonies will form independent States, and hope that it may not be far distant. Separation would be a simple method of settling all difficulties, were England merely a suzerain and not a mortgagee - but when we consider the enormous sums owed . . . to British capitalists, I apprehend that Great Britain cannot relax her hold on these Colonies . . .

Vogel, described by his biographer as the 'business politician', had set a dangerous precedent. After his proposal, it became the settled central government policy to float big loans for land-settlement, public works and State enterprises. While this massive injection of British capital encouraged between 1895 and 1907 'twelve years of strong and uninterrupted economic growth accompanied by full employment, rising real wages and diminishing inequality', New Zealand's fragile economy had become saddled by huge sums of debt.

As a consequence, economic growth began to slow, culminating in a two year recession between 1908 and 1910. Liberal Government policies of state welfare and closer settlement merely added to the problem. Successive Liberal and Reform administrations tried to combat the recession by increasing government expenditure. Between 1910 and 1914, the amount raised (and remaining outstanding) in London increased from £58 million to £78 million. At the end of the financial year 1914-15, New Zealand's gross public debt amounted to over £100 million, the equivalent of £90 per capita. Of the total net debt in 1914, about £17 million were held in New Zealand while the balance was held mainly in London. The level of private debt in New Zealand mirrored this pattern. In the decade before the war, opportunities of

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136 Dalziel, Julius Vogel, p. 1.
137 Fairburn, 'The Farmers Take Over (1912-1930)', in Sinclair, (ed.), The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, p. 187; Condliffe, 'The External Trade of New Zealand', in NZOY 1915, p. 871 and p. 920. Condliffe argued that: 'It cannot be emphasized too often that the high price of living in New Zealand is simply a corollary of the high export values, and that on these export values depends the prosperity of New Zealand'.
139 NZOY 1919, Wellington, 1919, p. 764.
140 Condliffe, 'The External Trade of New Zealand', in NZOY 1915, p. 920.
141 NZOY 1919, p. 764.
profits in the colonies attracted private British investment.\textsuperscript{142} It was estimated in 1910 that the amount of British capital invested in New Zealand was close to £80 million. In 1913 the percentage of total New Zealand debt raised in London was 76 per cent.\textsuperscript{143}

Alongside these very real material considerations, the decision to support Great Britain also reflected less tangible ties of blood and sentiment. Following hard on the heels of Wakefield's immigrants, New Zealand quickly developed a British flavour and character. The settlers

were loath to regard themselves as exiles. They were still British, and in their only fear was lest they should lose touch and perhaps be forgotten in the politics of Britain. No one can read their letters, their first poems, their public speeches, without realising how large a place their continued British citizenship claimed in their thought.\textsuperscript{144}

By 1858 the ethnic balance of New Zealand's population had irreversibly changed. For the first time in the country's history, Europeans outnumbered Maori (approximately 56,000 Maori to 59,000 Europeans). By the turn of the century, less than sixty years after the arrival of the first Wakefield settlers, Maori constituted a mere 7 per cent of the population.\textsuperscript{145}

The colony's thirst for expansion encouraged greater numbers of British settlers to make the arduous journey to New Zealand. The New Zealand Government tried to attract greater numbers of British migrants to develop the economy through railway construction, road building and agriculture. The Agent-General in London, in charge of the recruitment drive, offered assisted passages 'to healthy farmers, farm labourers, and domestic servants'.\textsuperscript{146} Between 1871 and 1880 close to 100,000 immigrants whose fare was partially or wholly paid by the government arrived in New Zealand. The new arrivals were predominantly British in origin. Over half came from England, about a quarter from Ireland with fewer from Scotland and less than 10 per cent from the rest of Europe.\textsuperscript{147} By 1886 British settlers totalled 40 per cent of the European

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\textsuperscript{143} \textit{NZOY 1919}, p. 764; Lloyd-Prichard, \textit{An Economic History of New Zealand to 1939}, p. 217.
\textsuperscript{144} Condliffe, 'The Attitude of New Zealand in Imperial and Foreign Affairs', in Hurst, et al, \textit{Great Britain and the Dominions}, p. 363.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{NZOY 1914}, Wellington, 1914, p. 97.
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population living in New Zealand, bringing with them 'a striking degree of intolerance towards non-European minorities and a strong sense of Anglo-Saxon superiority over coloured people'.

The Immigration Restriction Acts passed in 1899 and 1908 were very effective in 'keeping the Dominion British' by excluding Asian immigration. The Acts prohibited 'the landing of lunatics or idiots, persons suffering from a dangerous or loathsome contagious disease, certain convicted criminals, and any person other than of British birth who fails to write out and sign, in European language, a prescribed form of application. Shipwrecked persons are excepted'. Between 1910 and 1913 only 4,752 immigrants from foreign countries arrived in New Zealand. Over the same period 48,365 immigrants from Great Britain entered the country. In 1910 over 9,000 arrived and the influx peaked in 1913 with 14,707 British migrants settling in New Zealand.

By the start of the First World War the vast majority of New Zealanders saw themselves as living in the 'Britain of the South'. Most of them were of British descent and nearly one in four was born in Great Britain. By counting all the people

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150 *NZOY 1913*, Wellington, 1913, p. 120. Out of a total population of 1,008,468 persons living in New Zealand at the time of the 1911 Census, 228,684 were born in Great Britain (England, Wales, and
from countries within the British Empire and all those born in New Zealand. The *New Zealand Official Yearbook* of 1913 declared that out of a population of 1,147,10497 persons 92 per cent were "British". The "Britishness" of New Zealand even became embedded in the legal framework of the British Empire. After consulting with the Dominions at the 1911 Imperial Conference, the British Government ended the confusion surrounding the applicability of Dominion citizenship laws with the passage of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act in 1914. This established inter-imperial definitions of citizenship and conferred the status of a natural born British subject on individuals naturalised under Dominion legislation.

In the early years of the twentieth century most New Zealanders considered Great Britain as "Home". The New Zealand Natives' Association faded into obscurity and a rapid advance in technology had at least ensured that nascent New Zealand nationalism would emerge within a British framework. Improvements in transport and communication networks enabled New Zealanders to maintain close links with their relatives still living in Great Britain. In 1902 the Pacific Cable opened for international business and by 1913 the time for mail to reach England by steamer via Vancouver was down to thirty-three days. New Zealanders immediately took advantage of the improvements and sent over 15,000 parcels and millions of letters and postcards to family and friends in Great Britain.

British culture dominated the lives of ordinary New Zealanders. Sixty-three daily newspapers fed New Zealanders a rich diet of British news and stories. British journals and periodicals had a high circulation and the universities of the Dominion were largely staffed from British universities. Even literature, music and art were

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154 NZOY 1913, p. 121.
156 Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart*, pp. 31-35 and p. 94. According to Sinclair, the New Zealand Natives Association formed in Auckland in May 1894 had little chance of success and it began to fade away in the first decade of the twentieth century.
157 NZOY 1914, pp. 499-505. Residents of Great Britain also enjoyed sending parcels. In 1913 they sent over 100,000 parcels to their friends and relatives living in New Zealand.
158 On the relationship between the origins of national consciousness and the rise of literacy see Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 37-46.
influenced by the fashion and tastes of Great Britain. Little wonder that for many New Zealanders, the idea of going "Home" to the ancestral land of Great Britain remained a passion. E. H. McCormick made this point in his survey of New Zealand literature: "Education, reading, prevailing sentiment, economic interest - all turned the New Zealand writer's thoughts and ambitions towards England; and, given the opportunity, it was to England she or he migrated." In 1913 over 2,000 New Zealanders did make the pilgrimage to Great Britain. Alan Mulgan, a notable New Zealand-born journalist, even wrote an account of his visit to England entitled *Home: A Colonial's Adventure*. In verse, Mulgan expressed his happiness at discovering 'on England's very ground, in bay and lane and field the joy my fathers found'.

At turn of the nineteenth century the South African War provided an opportunity for New Zealanders to demonstrate their emotional loyalty to the British Empire. The war generated immense jingoism and by the middle of 1899 over 7,000 New Zealand men had volunteered to fight Kruger's Boers. The departure of the First Contingent from Wellington on 21 October 1899 saw a reported crowd of 50,000 cheering cries of 'Bravo, New Zealand'. The public turned its attention towards the Veldt, wondering how 'our boys' would perform. The newspapers were packed with stories from the war that amplified the heroics of the New Zealand troopers. *The Lyttelton Times* saw the performance of the New Zealand Contingent as 'one of the chief foundations of national inspiration'. The war confirmed that New Zealand's nationalist imagining was to be along patriarchal and imperial lines. According to

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160 Sinclair, *A Destiny Apart*, p. 94.
162 NZOY 1914, p. 96.
165 According to
W. David McIntyre, 'even an imperial war - became a major crucible of nationalism'. In the very act of demonstrating solidarity with Great Britain, New Zealand could be found asserting its individual identity. At the time, the New Zealand Herald commented: 'We are, if it is possible, more loyal, and certainly, to all appearances, more determinedly warlike than the people of the United Kingdom themselves'. Loyalty to the British Empire remained a key discursive element in the public articulation of New Zealand nationalism.

The South African War represented an important step in the development of national feeling in New Zealand. It established the relationship between war and nationalism, which remained largely unchanged for the next fifty years. The war 'allowed the New Zealanders to form and confirm a self-image and validate attitudes towards other national groups'. A group of nationally organised men had gone overseas and made contact with the "other". From this process of interaction, distinctions were drawn which made 'our' soldiers different. In essence, war had become an arena for national self-identification and praise from Great Britain became a source of civic pride. General Sir Ian Hamilton, after encountering some New Zealand troopers in the South Africa, offered affirmation of the high quality of British stock residing in New Zealand: 'I have never in my life met men I would sooner soldier with than the New Zealanders'. A legend was secured around the image of the colonial trooper's physical and mental superiority in battle. Our pioneering heritage was said to have toughened the soldiers into adaptive and practical 'natural


169 McIntyre, 'Imperialism and Nationalism', in Rice, (ed.), The Oxford History of New Zealand, p. 343.


172 Sinclair, A Destiny Apart, p. 135.

173 As quoted by McIntyre, 'Imperialism and Nationalism', in Rice, (ed.), The Oxford History of New Zealand, p. 343.
fighters', an image that New Zealand society would later draw upon as its sons tackled the rugged slopes of Gallipoli.\textsuperscript{174}

The South African War coincided with a fear that urban decadence was causing the British Empire to go soft.\textsuperscript{175} Instilling the population with the necessary mental and physical attributes for war became a major preoccupation for New Zealand society. The challenge of preserving imperial virility initiated an indoctrination of military values and skills for the youth of New Zealand.\textsuperscript{176} We were to be more 'British' than the British themselves. The present flag, with its Union Jack and Southern Cross, was adopted along with jingoistic flag raising ceremonies at schools. In 1902 the school cadet system became centralised under the Department of Education and two years later the military drill was made compulsory in schools. In 1907 the publication of the \textit{School Journal} began, containing stories emphasising the virtues of imperial loyalty and war.\textsuperscript{177} In 1908 the Boy Scouts were established and in 1909 the government introduced compulsory military training for schoolboys. Even rugby, after the success of the 1905 All Black Tour of Great Britain, had been transformed into a 'soldier-making game'.\textsuperscript{178} By the time of the First World War an imperial transmitted culture had taught New Zealand school children that war was the ultimate test of their nationhood.\textsuperscript{179} The mythology of war promulgated by the school system and the


\textsuperscript{175} Phillips, \textit{A Man's Country}?, pp. 152-3.


\textsuperscript{179} See E. Gellner, \textit{Nations and Nationalism}, Oxford, 1983, pp. 36-7. Gellner's school-transmitted theory is a fundamental part of the conditioning process of preparing men and women to die for their country. The teacher in New Zealand was very important for instilling the imperial work ethic of war
newspapers had drummed home the importance of fighting for King and country. No wonder thousands of New Zealanders flocked to military recruiting centres to volunteer to fight in the First World War.\textsuperscript{180}

The South African War established the reciprocal pattern of British-New Zealand defence relations.\textsuperscript{181} In return for the protection of the British Royal Navy, New Zealand had been prepared to contribute military resources to a conflict, which had little direct interest for the country. The decision could only have been taken in the context of imperial collective security obligations. McGibbon has shown that in the decade prior to the First World War, New Zealand's political leaders had developed clearly defined attitudes to security *in which British naval and military power was the central element*.\textsuperscript{182} As would later be the case in the First World War, New Zealand did not wish to put this safety guarantee in jeopardy by refusing to support the British war effort. Indeed at every opportunity New Zealand's leaders jumped at the chance to enhance the scope of the defence relationship. At the 1902 Colonial Conference, only New Zealand supported the idea of an Imperial Reserve Force.\textsuperscript{183} In the same year, the Dominions were convinced that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was 'inimical to their interests'. Under the terms of the Alliance 'each power agreed to come to the other's assistance in the event of it finding itself confronting two enemies'.\textsuperscript{184} In 1903 New Zealand agreed to a new naval agreement that stipulated that a subsidy paid to the Admiralty should be spent on the provision of two vessels to be stationed in New Zealand and loyalty to the British Empire. Also see P. J. Rich, *Chains of Empire: English Public Schools, Masonic Cabalism, Historical Casualty, and Imperial Clubdom*, London, 1991; P. J. Rich, *Elixir of Empire: English Public Schools, Ritualism, Freemasonry and Imperialism*, 2nd edn., London, 1993; R. McLennan, 'Constructing an Ideology: A Study of Progress, Equality and the Nation-State in the School Journal 1907-22', B. A. (Hons.) History, University of Otago, 1989, pp. 1-15; R. Openshaw, The Patriot Band - The School Cadets From Their Evolution to the Great War, M. A. History, Massey University, 1973, pp. 5-22.

\textsuperscript{180} Phillips, *A Man's Country?*, p. 159.

\textsuperscript{181} Crawford with Ellis, *To Fight For the Empire*, pp. 92-4.


Zealand waters as part of the Australian Squadron. New Zealand also agreed to pay one-twelfth of the annual running costs of the normal Australian Squadron.\textsuperscript{185} In 1904 New Zealand also had no objections to the reconstitution of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) as a body of advisers to the British Cabinet.\textsuperscript{186}

At the beginning of 1907, in the wake of growing tension between the imperial powers in Europe, New Zealand looked to strengthen its defence arrangements with Great Britain. The chief cause of New Zealand's anxiety was the naval competition between Great Britain and Germany in building of the Dreadnought class. New Zealand's policy-makers were extremely conscious of the German threat to Great Britain's worldwide interests. The regional threat posed by the industrial emergence of Japan also made New Zealand's political leaders increasingly apprehensive about their country's future security prospects. At the 1907 Colonial Conference, Prime Minister Sir Joseph Ward expressed his country's concern, stating that New Zealand was 'very anxious and willing to assist the Old Land in the event of trouble arising, to do so voluntarily by men or money, and . . . always would be ready to do its share in fighting for the defence of the Motherland in any portion of the world'.\textsuperscript{187} Two years later Ward underlined his commitment to the defence of the British Empire offering to finance the building of one Dreadnought class battleship for the Admiralty. Ward arranged a London loan of nearly £2 million to pay for the construction of HMS \textit{New Zealand}. Ward's generosity appeared limitless. Under the Naval Subsidy Act of 1908 Parliament authorised an unconditional annual payment of £100,000 to the Admiralty over the next decade.\textsuperscript{188}

The Reform Opposition strongly criticised the Liberal Government's naval policy. Colonel James Allen, the shadow defence spokesman, believed that Ward had unnecessarily sacrificed New Zealand's local security interests in the favour of faint imperial praise.\textsuperscript{189} Following the collapse of Sir Thomas Mackenzie's Liberal Government in the early part of 1912, Allen became the new Minister of Defence. He was determined to implement a policy whereby New Zealand would follow


\textsuperscript{186} J. P. Mackintosh, 'The Role of the Committee of Imperial Defence Before 1914', \textit{The English Historical Review}, v. 72, 304 (July 1962), pp. 490-503.

\textsuperscript{187} McGibbon, \textit{The Path to Gallipoli}, pp. 167-8.


\textsuperscript{189} For Allen's earlier views on the development of a local New Zealand naval unit see J. H. Allen, \textit{A Naval Policy for New Zealand}, Dunedin, 1912.
Australia's lead and form a navy of its own. Such a fundamental change in naval policy, however, required Allen to convince his counterparts in Great Britain. In the last months of 1912 Allen visited London to outline his proposals to British Government. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, remained hostile to any policy that diverted British resources away from defending British interests in Europe.\textsuperscript{190} He remained adamant that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance protected New Zealand from attack.\textsuperscript{191} Despite Churchill's resistance, Allen received British assent to establish a local New Zealand unit of the Imperial Navy. Allen reassured a sceptical Admiralty that in the event of war, New Zealand naval forces would automatically revert to British control.\textsuperscript{192}

According to Ian McGibbon, by 1914 'the British authorities could be reasonably certain that within a short time after the outbreak of war New Zealand, like Australia, would make available trained forces for services overseas'.\textsuperscript{193} Compatibility with British requirements had been a key driving force in the development of New Zealand's defence policy. In 1909 Ward attended the Imperial Defence Conference, which sought to improve the military co-operation within the British Empire in the event of a large scale war. The Conference attempted to organise and coordinate the forces of the British Empire 'into one homogeneous Imperial Army'.\textsuperscript{194} To meet this end, Ward's Liberal Government passed a new Defence Act in December 1909, which introduced a system of compulsory military training for all males between twelve and thirty years of age for service at home and 'beyond the limits of New Zealand'.\textsuperscript{195}

In 1910 Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief in India, arrived in New Zealand to examine the compulsory military training scheme in action. Over the duration of a fortnight Kitchener reviewed New Zealand's defences while taking in the sights. Adding to the tourist theme, Kitchener found it unnecessary to submit a

\textsuperscript{191} BPD, v. 59, 17 Mar 1914, pp. 1931-4; \textit{Round Table}, no. 4 (June 1914), p. 408-9; \textit{National Review}, v. 63, (June 1914), pp. 704-5; Lowe, \textit{Great Britain and Japan 1911-15}, pp. 283-5. Churchill defended the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the House of Commons, arguing it is the only 'true and effective protection for the safety of Australia and New Zealand'. Massey bluntly repudiated Churchill's pronouncement. He publicly stated: 'I do not want to do Mr. Churchill an injustice, but if he means that the people of Australia and New Zealand are to be satisfied with the protection afforded by Japanese ships and Japanese sailors, then Mr. Winston Churchill is very much mistaken'.
\textsuperscript{192} McGibbon, \textit{The Path to Gallipoli}, pp. 175-8 and pp. 218-32.
\textsuperscript{193} McGibbon, \textit{The Path to Gallipoli}, p. 243.
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separate report. Instead, he recommended that New Zealand should follow the recommendations that he had given Australia - which amounted to the extension of the age for compulsory military training.\textsuperscript{196} Kitchener also endorsed the idea that a professional British commander should take charge of imperialising New Zealand's Territorial Force. On 6 September 1910 Sir Joseph Ward appointed Colonel Alexander J. Godley, a nephew of Canterbury's founder John Robert Godley, New Zealand Commandant with the temporary rank of major-general. Over the next three years, Godley encouraged eleven imperial officers to take up military appointments in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{197}

During the early part of 1914, the Inspector-General of Overseas Forces, Sir Ian Hamilton, visited the Dominion to examine Godley's efforts at improving the efficiency of New Zealand's armed forces. Despite Hamilton's well-known respect for the ability of the New Zealand soldier, the intensely ambitious Godley remained apprehensive about the inspection. Hamilton preferred voluntary military training schemes such as one firmly established in Canada.\textsuperscript{198} Hamilton's staff officer, however, reassured anxious New Zealand defence officials that: 'As Sir Ian puts it, the smiling face of the Jap and Chinaman over the Pacific is quite sufficient cause for sterner measures in N. Z. than in Canada'.\textsuperscript{199} Sir Ian Hamilton's report publicly endorsed the progress Godley had made on New Zealand's defence arrangements. Hamilton concluded that the New Zealand 'army ... puts it best into work; it is well equipped; well-armed; the human material is second to none in the world; and it suffers as a fighting-machine only from want of field-work and want of ingrained habit of discipline.'\textsuperscript{200} In less than year, the New Zealand Army would receive this field-work experience and discipline under his command on the Dardanelles Peninsula.

In retrospect it is not hard to find reasons why the New Zealand Government committed itself 'to make any sacrifice'. By August 1914, a widespread consciousness

\textsuperscript{196} Kitchener to PM [Ward], 2 Mar 1910, AD10/16/1. Kitchener told Ward: 'I do not think that it is necessary to write you a special memorandum on the Defence of New Zealand as from what I have seen during my inspection the necessity for improved training is just as equally marked in this country as it is in Australia. It appears to me that for your land forces New Zealand and Australia should adopt homogeneous military systems in order to be able to efficiently support one another in the event of national danger'.

\textsuperscript{197} McGibbon, The Path to Gallipoli, pp. 192-5.


\textsuperscript{199} McGibbon, The Path to Gallipoli, p. 203.

General Alexander John Godley, Earle Andrew Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library.
of the German threat meant that there was strong domestic support for Massey's decision to lend military support to the British war effort.\textsuperscript{201} As American policymakers later developed, New Zealand's political leaders held firm to the concept of Imperial Germany which saw Prussian militarism as a danger to both the material and ideological interests of the British Empire and New Zealand itself.\textsuperscript{202} Ward considered the conflict a 'just war' and Massey believed that the Kaiser's national aim was "Germany over all".\textsuperscript{203} According to one recent history graduate, 'New Zealand wholeheartedly believed that Germany was unrepentantly evil'.\textsuperscript{204} German aggression threatened New Zealand's free and intimate existence. Recent evidence confirms the validity of New Zealand's fear that Germany posed a direct and hostile military threat to the Dominion.\textsuperscript{205} Given this set of circumstances, New Zealand had no alternative but to enter the war alongside Great Britain.

New Zealand involvement therefore seemed necessary not only to safeguard imperial interests but also the rights and interests of New Zealand. New Zealand's policy-makers knew that if Germany won the war in Europe the Dominion would not be immune from the effects of that victory. At best, Great Britain would have been financially ruined and Germany would have acquired all the colonies in the Pacific. At worst, New Zealand might have expected German domination. As Ian McGibbon has noted, 'colonies had a nasty habit of changing hands as part of peace settlements. Racial disaffinity was no barrier to incorporation in another empire, as the French-speaking parts of Canada attested'.\textsuperscript{206} Massey clearly believed this. In November 1918, he stated feared that 'if Germany became victorious . . . she intended to annex

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\item \textsuperscript{201} R. Cuming, 'New Zealand's Role in the First World War', M. A. History Paper, University of Auckland, 1971, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{203} For Ward's description of the war see \textit{NZ Tab}, v. 41, no. 33, 20 Aug 1914, p. 33; W. F. Massey, 'The Imperial Conference', \textit{The N. Z. School Journal}, Part iii., v. xvi. 1 (February 1922), p. 19
\item \textsuperscript{204} Wright, 'Beyond the Pale of Human Recognition', p. 2. Also see R. M. Anderson, 'New Zealand Methodism and World War I: Crisis in a Liberal Church', M. A. History, University of Canterbury, 1983, pp. 57-8.
\item \textsuperscript{206} McGibbon, \textit{The Path to Gallipoli}, p. 3; Hayes, 'British Foreign Policy and the Influence of Empire, 1870-1920', \textit{JICH}, v. 12, 2 (January 1984), p. 113. Hayes has made a similar point, arguing that: 'In Canada any collapse of the Empire, or the conclusion of a British agreement with Germany on unfavourable terms risked the effective incorporation of Canada into the sphere of influence, political and economic, of the United States. A decline in British strength threatened the security of Australia and New Zealand; both countries feared Japan and neither had much faith in or liking for the United States'.
\end{itemize}
some of the British colonies. Massey argued that 'for some time Germany has been looking with an envious and covetous eye on both Australian and New Zealand'.\textsuperscript{207} Belgium's fate clearly illustrated that the concept of neutrality itself offered little immunity. Massey and the Reform Cabinet were not remiss in thinking that the interests of New Zealand were closely bound with the actions of British policymakers. Only the elimination of Germany could provide New Zealand with some peace of mind.\textsuperscript{208}

In the end, New Zealand's decision to enter the First World War was based on a logical assessment of the country's long-term interests. From the outset Massey sought direct New Zealand military involvement in the war founded on a set of key principles, which would guide New Zealand's relationship with Great Britain over the war period. There was a pragmatic recognition that defeat for Great Britain would spell disaster for New Zealand. Germany was perceived as a threat to small nations and only a British victory would protect New Zealand's way of life. There was also an over-riding concern about the British security guarantee. New Zealand's policymakers understood that failure to support the British war effort might have weakened that guarantee.\textsuperscript{209} In offering the services of an expeditionary force to Great Britain, Massey spoke of New Zealand's 'duty' and the need for the British Empire 'to stand together as one man'.\textsuperscript{210} Massey was clearly thinking in terms of collective security and the reciprocal defence arrangements the Dominions had made with the British Empire.\textsuperscript{211}

Four years later at the Paris Peace Conference Massey gave some insight on the New Zealand Government's thinking to the First World War. In his emotional denunciation of Wilson's League of Nations mandatory principle, Massey encapsulated the very essence of New Zealand's response to the crisis of August 1914:

\begin{quote}
It has been said by some of the previous speakers that the Dominions entered into this war because they knew it was right to do so - because it was a good cause. That was only one reason. They went into this war because the Empire, of which they were a part, was fighting for a great cause - fighting for its honour - for
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{207} NZPD, v. 183, 7 Nov 1918, p. 282.
\textsuperscript{209} John Robertson has come to a similar conclusion for Australia. See J. Robertson, \textit{Anzac and Empire: The Tragedy and Glory of Gallipoli}, Port Melbourne, 1990, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{210} NZPD, v. 169, 31 Jul 1914, p. 369.
\end{footnotes}
humanity - for civilisation, and in order to keep faith with its Allies, and fighting for the defence of smaller nations. There was also another reason why the Dominions entered this war - because they had confidence in the leaders of the Empire and their judgment - in their discretion - and, in saying that, he hoped that if it ever became necessary for Great Britain again to go to war, the Dominions would be officially represented as never before in the Council of the Empire.²¹²

The following chapters will illustrate just how dramatically the First World War tested New Zealand's confidence in Great Britain's ability to lead the British Empire.

CHAPTER TWO

Troubled Waters

The Government of New Zealand has no desire to embarrass Admiralty but it did not consider it right to take any unnecessary risk either in respect to lives, war material, or transports which are the chief ships available for frozen meat trade.

LIVERPOOL TO HARCOURT, 6 OCTOBER 1914.

On 6 August the British Government sent a message to the New Zealand Government containing the following request: 'If your Ministers . . . desire and feel themselves able to seize German Wireless Station at Samoa we should feel that this was a great and urgent Imperial Service'.\(^1\) The New Zealand Government wasted no time in accepting the invitation. Five hours later Liverpool telegraphed his Cabinet's affirmative reply to the Colonial Office.\(^2\)

The British request was not totally unexpected. As early as 1913, leading imperial military strategists agreed that 'if action were taken in the South Pacific New Zealand would concentrate on Samoa - an orientation which accorded well with New Zealand's long-standing but stifled aspirations'.\(^3\) Prior to the war, the New Zealand General Officer Commanding, Major-General Alexander J. Godley, had written to the British Director of Military Operations, General Henry Wilson, suggesting that 'in the

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\(^{1}\) Correspondence Relating to the Occupation of German Samoa by an Expeditionary Force from New Zealand', *AJHR*, 1915, v. 3, H.-19C, p. 3; SSCols to GovNZ, 6 Aug 1914, G41/1; SSCols to GovNZ, 7 Aug 1914, G41/1; I. McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli: Defending New Zealand 1840-1915*, p. 248. McGibbon is mistaken when he claims that the New Zealand Government received the invitation to seize Samoa on the 6 August. The original telegram was despatched from the Colonial Office on 6 August 1914 at a quarter past seven o'clock at night. The message did not reach New Zealand until the afternoon of 7 August at twenty minutes to three o'clock.

\(^{2}\) GovNZ to SSCols, 7 Aug 1914, G41/1. New Zealand sent its affirmative cable at half past seven at night. The quick response of the New Zealand Government undercuts W. R. Louis's view that New Zealand was less interested in the Pacific than Australia. See W. R. Louis, *Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919*, Oxford, 1967, p. 41. Louis argues that: 'Throughout the war the Australians showed a far more intense interest in the Pacific Islands than did the New Zealanders'.

\(^{3}\) McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 242; A. Ross, *New Zealand Aspirations in the Pacific in the Nineteenth Century*, London, 1964; M. Boyd, *The Military Administration of Western Samoa, 1914-1919*, *NZIH*, v. 2, 2 (October 1968), p. 148. Boyd argues that New Zealand's occupation of German Samoa 'had little to do with her nineteenth-century imperialist aspirations in the South Pacific'. Also see P. M. Kennedy, *Bismarck's Imperialism: The Case of Samoa, 1880-1890*, *The Historical Journal*, v. 15, 2 (1972), p. 267-83. Also see Hankey, *The Supreme Command, Volume One*, chapter 8. In November 1909 Hankey wrote a document on the 'War Organization of the British Empire'. Hankey outlined contingency plans and for the wartime co-ordination between government departments at home and in the Dominions overseas. 'It is an axiom', he wrote, 'that in order to terminate a war effective pressure can be asserted by ourselves are by the attack of trade and the attack of colonies'. The Dominions would seize German ships in their ports, or capture German colonies.
event of War with Germany, we should seize Samoa'. Wilson's reply indicated that this 'would probably be the first step New Zealand would be asked to undertake' in a war with Germany.

On 5 August a group of military and colonial experts - who collectively became known as the Offensive Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence - assembled in London to consider the international dimensions of British war strategy. Under the chairmanship of Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, the Sub-Committee recommended that Great Britain should carry the struggle to Germany's colonies in Africa and the Pacific. According to the official naval history, 'all operations were to be regarded as primarily designed for the defence of our maritime communications and not for territorial conquest'. More importantly, the seizure of the German colonies would prevent the Germans from employing them as bases for attacks against British territories and as signal stations for their commerce raiders. The capture of the German colonies in the Pacific and South-West Africa would 'deprive the enemy of his distant coaling and telegraphic stations'. The German colonies were

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4 Godley to Col W. L. H. Burgess, 18 Jan 1926, AD12/21, Unnumbered Files, NF/1. Before the war in 1914, Godley wrote to Wilson suggesting 'in the event of War with Germany, we should seize Samoa, and his reply to that was I remember not only interesting but most amusing'.

5 General Sir A. Godley, Life of an Irish Soldier: Reminiscences of General Sir Alexander Godley, G. C. B., K. C. M. G., London, 1939, p. 154. Also see 'E1.5. Questions Requiring Joint Naval and Military Consideration. Notes Handed by the Director of Military Operations [Brig.-General Henry Wilson] to Secretary CID 13 Dec 1909', WO106/45. This may have been in response to Hankey's memo, which had been sent to the War Office and the Prime Minister's Office the previous month. The minutes of the Sub-Committee are contained in CAB21/3.

6 Hankey to Asquith 5 Aug 1914, CAB21/3. Hankey asked for Asquith's permission 'to set up a Joint Naval and Military Committee for the consideration of Joint Naval and Military offensive expeditions against German Colonies'. Hankey noted that such 'a Committee was actually decided on by the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1905 and suitable rules were drawn up . . . . The lines on which the Committee would work would be, first to indicate those expeditions which might have a definite effect on the result of the War; then to submit their proposals to the Cabinet; and finally, if the Cabinet approve, to work out all the details'. Asquith approved the formation of a Joint Naval and Military Committee for the consideration of combined naval and military operations in foreign territory on 5 August 1914. Its membership comprised Admiral Sir Henry Jackson (in the chair), Colonel Sir G. G. Aston of the Admiralty, Sir John Anderson and Sir George Fiddes of the Colonial Office, General Sir Ian Hamilton, Inspector-General of the Oversea Forces, Brigadier-General C. Callwell representing the War Office, Major Ward, Colonel Dallas, Brigadier-General Dobell, Colonel Hoskins, General Sir E. Barrow, and Secretary of the Cabinet Sir Maurice Hankey.

7 Sir J. Corbett and Sir H. Newbolt, Naval Operations: Volume I, London, 1920, p. 129. Also see P. G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I, Annapolis, 1994, p. 82. Also see 'Naval Notes on "New Zealand's" Expedition to Samoa', 7 Aug 1914, CAB21/3. On 14 August the British Government instructed the New Zealand Government that 'no formal proclamation annexing any such territory should be issued without specific instructions from His Majesty's Government, and further, that an agreement should be come to with our Allies to act on similar lines'.

regarded as an intolerable menace to the security of the British Empire and an easy target for propaganda purposes.

The following morning Asquith held a Council of War meeting to determine how the war with Germany should be fought. The Cabinet Ministers discussed the Sub-Committee’s proposals with some gusto, prompting Asquith to remark that they ‘looked more like a gang of Elizabethan buccaneers than a meek collection of black-coated Liberal Ministers’. Along with the other operations, the British Cabinet approved of the New Zealand Government ‘being invited to send an expeditionary force to occupy Samoa’. At the last minute, Harcourt decided that the tiny phosphate rich island of Nauru would be designated an Australian objective. The British Government’s interest in German overseas possession did not really stem from a desire to add more territory to the British Empire. Rather, the German colonies were seen as a bargaining chip at the peace conference. This was clearly spelt out by Harcourt in his telegram to Liverpool: ‘You will however realise that any territory now occupied must be at the disposal of the Imperial Government for purposes of an

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10 ‘Operations in His Majesty’s Oversea Dominions and the Neighbouring Germany Territories, 1914, Part IV. Operations Against Samoa’, MS. Harcourt dep. 508/176, Harcourt Papers. Also see ‘Proceedings of a Joint Naval Committee and Military Sub-Committee for the Consideration of Combined Operations in Foreign Territory’, CID 113-C, 6 Oct 1914, CAB5/3; ‘Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, assembled on the 5th of August, 1914, to consider the question of offensive operations against German Colonies’, CAB21/3; James, Memoirs of a Conservative, p. 21. On the morning of 5 August 1914 Harcourt arrived at the Colonial Office and asked his private secretary, J. C. C. Davidson, ‘to pull down the map of the world from amongst the maps in the walnut map case on the wall’. According to Davidson’s memory, they both ‘stood in front of it and discussed the apportionment of the German Empire between the various parts of the British Empire in relation to their propinquity and character . . . . There and then Harcourt drafted in red ink with his stylographic pen telegrams to the various governments, setting them their various tasks’. Originally, the Offensive Sub-Committee recommended that New Zealand ‘should be invited to send an expedition to attack SAMOA and NAURU’. However, the task of capturing Nauru was entrusted to Australia. We can only assume that this did not square with Harcourt’s plan but it is safe to say that Massey’s Cabinet would have jumped at the chance to occupy the phosphate-rich Nauru Island. Also see Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918, Volume One. According to Hankey, ‘Harcourt as Colonial Secretary had of his own initiative, and as far as I know without consulting anyone, communicated with the various Dominions and Colonies with a view to their taking action’. It is, however, important to remember that Harcourt was authorised by Cabinet to put into effect the Sub-Committee’s proposals for the operations against German colonies in the Pacific and Africa.

11 See J. S. Galbraith, ‘British War Aims in World War I: A Commentary on “Statesmanship”, JICH, v. 13, 1 (October 1984), p. 26. Galbraith believes that: “In eschewing any aggressive purpose, the Asquith Government may have been influenced by the attitude of the Wilson government that Britain already had far too many colonial possessions”. Also see ‘Untitled Memo’, MS. Asquith 27/93, Asquith Papers. This memorandum illustrates the deep divisions of opinion which existed amongst elements of Asquith’s Government over the morality of conquering new territory. It also responds to the issues raised in Harcourt’s Cabinet memorandum entitled ‘The Spoils’, arguing that any new territories would require more men and money. The memorandum concluded that Harcourt had been seduced by the ‘departmental spirit’ of the Colonial Office. Also see ‘The Spoils’, 25 Mar 1915, MS. Harcourt dep. 468/266, Harcourt Papers. In this Cabinet paper, Harcourt argued that: ‘It is out of the question to part with any of the territories now in the occupation of Australia and New Zealand’. Also see Louis, Great Britain and Germany’s Lost Colonies 1914-1919, p. 62.
ultimate settlement at the conclusion of the war'. He reassured Liverpool that Australia and South Africa were 'acting in a similar way'.

The New Zealand Minister of Defence, James Allen, and the General Officer Commanding, Major-General Alexander J. Godley, were responsible for the logistics of the Samoan Expedition. On 8 August the defence authorities called for volunteers for the mission. Within three days a 1,374 strong force consisting of one battalion of infantry, one company of Engineers, a field artillery battery complete with a Signal, Medical and Army Service Corps had been assembled, ready to embark on the two transport ships, *Moeraki* and *Monowai*. The troops of the Advance Party, as the New Zealand contingent to Samoa became popularly known, were kept in the dark over their ultimate objective until the very last minute. This did not prevent the local newspapers from the odd piece of speculative reporting. Two Otago newspapers predicted that German Samoa would be the logical target for the Advance Party. According to *The Otago Witness*, 'Germany is never a pleasant neighbour'.

Wellington defence analysts did not share the high level of public enthusiasm for a New Zealand military operation against German Samoa. Despite years of military training and reform, New Zealand did not possess a regional intelligence capability. As a result, New Zealand's policy-makers were unable to make sound judgements on the anticipated level of German defences an attacking amphibious force would be likely encounter in German Samoa. Not for the last time in the war, New Zealand turned to Australia for help. Allen prompted Liverpool to seek information on the defences of German Samoa from his Australian counterpart, Governor-General Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson. The Australian authorities advised New Zealand that

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12 SSCols to GovNZ, 7 Aug 1914, G41/1.
13 NZG, no. 82, 8 Aug 1914, p. 3113; 'Correspondence Relating to the Occupation of German Samoa by an Expeditionary Force from New Zealand', *AJHR*, 1915, v. 3, H.-19C, p. 3, GovNZ to SSCols, 9 Aug 1914; GovNZ to SSCols, 8 Aug 1914, N20/4/034A; Smith with foreword Massey, *The Samoa (N.Z.) Expeditionary Force 1914-1915*, pp. 14-22. Smith gives the strength of the force as 1363; Sergeant S. J. Smith, 'The Seizure and Occupation of Samoa', in Lieutenant H. T. B. Drew, (ed.), *The War Effort of New Zealand*, Auckland, 1923, p. 23. According to Smith, by 11 August 'a composite force, consisting of headquarters, one battery of field artillery, one section field company N.Z. engineers, three companies infantry (Wellington 5th and Auckland 3rd Regiments) and machine guns, one company N.Z. Railway Engineers, details from the Royal Naval Reserve, a signalling company, motor boat mechanics, Post and Telegraph Corps, Army Service Corps, one section N.Z. Ambulance, nurses and chaplains - a total of 1,413 rank and file, was fully equipped and ready to embark on the waiting transports'; McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 249. McGibbon, by analysing the embarkation rolls of the two transport ships, gives the strength of the force as 1374; Lieutenant-Colonel J. Studholme, *Record of Personal Services During the War of Officers, Nurses, and First-Class Warrant Officers*, p. 483. Studholme lists the strength of the force as 1,385 in all ranks. Also see AD1/9/5; Baker, *King and Country*, p. 17; Pugsley, *Gallipoli*, p. 52.
14 *ODT*, 6 Aug 1914, p. 8; *OW*, 12 Aug 1914, p. 51.
15 Allen to Liverpool, 7 Aug 1914, G41/1; GovNZ to GGAust, 7 Aug 1914, N20/4/034A; GovNZ to GGAust, 7 Aug 1914, G5/89.
German Samoa was poorly defended. The Germans could only muster about eighty armed native constabulary led by German officers and the solitary gunboat.\textsuperscript{16}

By 11 August the Advance Party was fully equipped and ready for action. Security issues, however, delayed its departure. Concerns were raised in Wellington over the weak escort assigned to protect the two transports. The direct source of this anxiety was the unknown whereabouts of the Tsingtao-based German East Asian Squadron commanded by Vice-Admiral Count von Spee.\textsuperscript{17} According to Captain Percival H. Hall-Thompson, naval adviser and commander of Philomel, if von Spee's two armoured cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, were to 'become aware of the expeditionary force leaving New Zealand the strength of the convoying ships would not have been sufficient to resist the Germans for five minutes'.\textsuperscript{18} The Admiralty considered 'it is improbable that a strong German force will be in the vicinity'.\textsuperscript{19}

The Admiralty delegated the authority of determining the safety of the Samoan operation to Marshall. He did not share the Admiralty's optimistic view of the naval position in the South Pacific. On 10 August Marshall urged Liverpool to be cautious. He suggested a 'deferment of expedition until movements of German Fleet is definitely known or until Australian Squadron can escort'.\textsuperscript{20} Godley strongly protested

\textsuperscript{16} GGAust to GovNZ, 8 Aug 1914, G41/1; GGAust to Gov NZ, 8 Aug 1914, N20/4/034A. Also see W. D. Stewart, The Right Honourable Sir Francis Bell, P. C., G. C. M. G., K. C: His Life and Times, Wellington, 1937, p. 115. According to Stewart, Mr. F.M.B. Fisher, the Minister of Marine, recorded 'a curious incident' that 'when a cable was sent to the Colonial Office to ascertain what German forces and defences existed in Samoa, Sir Lewis Harcourt (later Lord Harcourt) replied to the amazement of the New Zealand Cabinet that the War Office advised "for information regarding the defences of Samoa see Whitaker's Almanac"! A search afforded no information and Cabinet was alarmed at the idea of sending a force to Samoa under the convoy of Philomel, Psyche, and Pyramus.' Like McGibbon, this author has found no evidence at the Public Record Office or the National Archives that such an exchange took place. The story is definitely 'apocryphal'. See McGibbon, The Path to Gallipoli, p. 249.

\textsuperscript{17} GovNZ to SSCols, 7 Aug 1914, G41/1. Liverpool informed Harcourt: 'My Government have agreed to seize Samoa telegraph at once stating what escort can be provided and when, in view of the possibility of presence of German cruisers'; GovNZ to SSCols, 8 Aug 1914, G41/1. Harcourt was told that arrangements had been made in New Zealand to despatch the Advance Party on Tuesday 11 August but only if the Admiralty organised the appropriate escort.

\textsuperscript{18} Hall-Thompson, 'The Work of the "Philomel"', in Drew. (ed.), The War Effort of New Zealand, p. 65. Also see Smith with foreword by Massey, The Samoa (N. Z.) Expeditionary Force 1914-1915, p. 8. According to Massey: 'For it was known when the force set sail that a powerful German Squadron was moving in readiness in the Pacific and as the troopships were convoyed by the small crushers "Physche" [sic], "Philomel" and "Pyramus", disaster could easily have overtaken them'.

\textsuperscript{19} 'Naval Notes on "New Zealand's" Expedition to Samoa', 7 Aug 1914, CAB21/3. These notes were actually signed by Jackson himself. Initially, the Admiralty felt that an escort of one cruiser would be sufficient for the task. However, on 8 August the Admiralty decided that 'the escort to be provided and the time at which the Expedition should start are questions which depend on the Naval Situation in the Pacific and must be decided by the Admiralty'. On 14 August the Sub-Committee decided to turn down an offer by the Governor of Fiji to assist the Samoan Expedition.

\textsuperscript{20} SNO to Adm, 10 Aug 1914, N20/4/034A; SSCols to GovNZ, 9 Aug 1914, G41/1; Adm to SNO, 11 Aug 1914, N20/4/034A; SNO to GovNZ, 10 Aug 1914, N20/4/034A; SNO to NIO, 10 Aug 1914, G46/1.
to Liverpool, asking him to overrule Marshall in his official capacity as the Commander-in-Chief so 'that there should be no delay in starting the Expedition to SAMOA'.

Liverpool bluntly rejected Godley's advice, informing him 'that no expedition will leave New Zealand until we have satisfied ourselves regarding the position of all the German cruisers'. While the Admiralty believed that the 'departure of this expedition must be governed by the naval situation in the Pacific', it did not consider that von Spee constituted a direct threat to the Samoan Expedition.

Even though von Spee's two battle-cruisers were 'probably coaling near New Guinea', the Admiralty recommended that the Advance Party could leave New Zealand without fear because the Australian Squadron was providing sufficient cover.

On 12 August Marshall decided to explain the difficulties of the situation to Liverpool and Massey in person. In Wellington, Liverpool and Massey were both anxious. They argued 'that if no news of large German ships is received' the Advance Party should leave on 15 August and assemble with the escort in the Bay of Islands. Marshall disagreed with their suggestion. He informed Liverpool that the Australian naval commander-in-chief, Rear-Admiral Sir G. E. Patey, 'does not consider it safe at present for expedition to start without strong escort'. Marshall advised that the two transports 'should remain at Wellington for the present'.

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21 GOC to GovNZ, 10 Aug 1914, G46/1. Godley was handed Marshall's telegram which advised Liverpool to postpone the departure of the Samoan Expedition and he was asked for a reply.

22 GovNZ to GOC, 11 Aug 1914, G46/1.

23 'Naval Notes on “New Zealand’s” Expedition to Samoa', 7 Aug 1914, CAB21/3.

24 Adm to SNO, 11 Aug 1914, G46/1.


26 GovNZ to GOC, 11 Aug 1914, G46/1; 'Journal of War', N20/4/034A; NIO to SNO, 11 Aug 1914, N20/4/034A; GovNZ to SNO, 13 Aug 1914, G41/1; SNO to GovNZ, 10 Aug 1914, N20/4034A; Adm to SNO, 11 Aug 1914, G46/1. The New-Zealand Government was quite prepared to run the risk of the two transports leaving Wellington for the Bay of Islands without an escort. It seems that Marshall was more concerned than Massey's Cabinet over the fate of the Samoan Expedition. On 10 August, while he was at sea, Marshall was informed by the Admiralty that New Zealand would be sending the expedition to Samoa on 11 August, three days after he had received information pointing 'to the fact that a large proportion of the German China Fleet were in the South Pacific'. At sea, he quickly arranged the postponement of the departure with Liverpool and the Admiralty, who thought von Spee's Squadron was probably coaling near New Guinea. But Marshall was in direct contact with Patey who possessed more accurate information. Marshall arrived back in Auckland on 11 August and travelled to Wellington by train the following day to confer with Liverpool and Massey's Cabinet. He returned to Auckland the same night. The reasons behind the New Zealand Government's decision to proceed with the Samoan Expedition without an adequate escort is open to debate. McGibbon has argued that the New Zealand Government may have been influenced by the Australian plan to take New Guinea, thereby delaying New Zealand's ambitions in the Pacific. Alternatively, Halpern has argued that the New Zealand decision was influenced by war fever and the desire to eliminate the German threat as quickly as possible. See Halpern, A Naval History of World War I, p. 83; McGibbon, Blue-Water Rational, p. 20.

27 SNO to GovNZ, 13 Aug 1914, G41/1; SNO to GovNZ, 13 Aug 1914, N20/4034A. Marshall told Liverpool that Patey had searched New Guinea and New Britain without any trace of the von Spee's cruisers.
Naval Intelligence Officer, confirmed the accuracy of Marshall’s security assessment.  

On 14 August the Admiralty informed Marshall that it had arranged with Patey for HMAS Australia and the French cruiser Montcalm to rendezvous with the expedition at Fiji on 20 August. Marshall quickly advised Liverpool that the expedition should leave Wellington immediately to meet the escort of Psyche, Pyramus and Philomel en route in the Bay of Islands. On 15 August, just before seven o’clock in the morning, the two transport ships sailed out of Wellington harbour and headed for the pre-arranged coordinates. The expedition’s destination was no longer a state secret. On the very same day that Massey reassured Parliament ‘all possible precautions have been taken for the safety of the men and the ships by the Imperial Government and the New Zealand Government’, all the major newspapers ran the story of the Advance Party’s departure for German SmIToa. This was not the last time that the safety of Colonel Robert Logan’s men was jeopardised by press reporting and an inefficient censorship regime.

Marshall and the three ships under his command, described by one Admiralty memorandum as ‘submarine bait’, left Auckland later that afternoon at five o’clock. Marshall’s escort met the two transports out of Wellington at four o’clock on the afternoon of 16 August. Marshall, still in New Zealand waters, received fresh orders instructing the flotilla to link up with Australia in Noumea. From here the Advance Party was to proceed to Suva to meet the aging French cruiser Montcalm. This sudden change in plans was indicative of the Admiralty’s poor coordination and communication systems. The Admiralty had failed to consult properly with Patey. As a result, Marshall would only follow the new orders on the condition that Patey would guarantee the Advance Party’s safe passage to Noumea. The following day Patey cabled back his assurances and the Advance Party reached Noumea on 20 August. The rest of the voyage to German Samoa proved uneventful and on 29 August the

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28 NIO to GovNZ, 13 Aug 1914, G46/1.
29 Adm to SNO, 14 Aug 1914, N20/4/034A.
30 SNO to GovNZ, 14 Aug 1914, G41/1.
31 NIO to SNO, 15 Aug 1914, N20/4/034A; SNO to Adm, 14 Aug 1914, N20/4/034A; ODT, 1 Sep 1914, p. 5. There is some confusion as to what date the two transports left Wellington - it was either the morning of 14 or 15 August.
34 Adm to SNO, 16 Aug 1914, N20/4/034A; GovNZ to SSCols, 18 Aug 1914, G41/1. The New Zealand Government was not informed of the change in destination of the Samoan Expedition by either the Admiralty or the Senior Naval Officer.
35 SNO to Rear-Adm, 18 Aug 1914, N20/4/034A.
Advance Party landed in whaleboats and occupied the capital of German Samoa, Apia. The small German presence offered no resistance. At eight o'clock the following morning the British flag was hoisted above the courthouse. As instructed, no formal proclamation of annexation took place. During the flag-raising ceremony, Logan stated that: 'The New Zealand Government of His Britannic Majesty King George Fifth now occupy for His Majesty all the German territories situated in the islands of the Samoan Group.' With this act, New Zealand had secured the honour and the glory of capturing the first piece of German territory in the Pacific. According to historian Erik Olssen, 'New Zealand's imperial ambitions took a significant step forward.'

'We have simply done our duty as part of the Empire in carrying out the task allotted to us and now our duty is to hold Samoa for the Imperial Government', Allen told the large gathering of journalists at the Wellington press conference the next day. On the difficult issue of German Samoa's future, Allen evasively declared that

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36 SNO to GovNZ, 31 Aug 1914, G41/2; GovNZ to GG Aus, 22 Aug 1914, G41/2; GG Aus to GovNZ, 29 Aug 1914, G41/2; GG Aus to GovNZ, 30 Aug 1914, G41/2 Liverpool to Massey, 19 Nov 1914, G15/11: Massey to Liverpool, 19 Nov 1914, G15/11. Liverpool asked Munro-Ferguson to inform the Australian Press not to publish any details concerning the movements of the Advance Party. Munro-Ferguson replied that it was too late but he promised Liverpool that: 'Precautions are being taken against further information appearing in the Australian Press regarding Expeditions'. Munro-Ferguson made sure that when it came to the departure of the Main Body only pictures with minimum information would appear in Australian newspapers. See ODT, 1 Sep 1914, p. 4. News of the occupation of Apia by New Zealand troops was not a surprise to the Dunedin editor because a week earlier Senator Millen of Australia announced the arrival of the Expedition Force in Noumea and its departure with French and British cruisers. Also see Allen to Marshall, 5 Sep 1914, AD1/732/9/5. Allen asked Marshall to instruct Malcolm Ross, New Zealand's official war correspondent, to consult Massey before publishing any information on the Samoan Expedition, and to 'give directions for greatest care to be exercised to avoid publication of anything likely to be injurious to Empire interests'. Also see L. P. Leary, *New Zealanders in Samoa*, London, 1920, pp. 45-85. This book provides an excellent first-hand account of the Samoan Expedition from the perspective of the soldier crammed on board one of the transports.

37 'Correspondence Relating to the Occupation of German Samoa by an Expeditionary Force from New Zealand', AJHR, 1915, v. 3, H.-19C, p. 8; SSCols to GovNZ, 19 Aug 1914, G41/1; SNO to GovNZ, 2 Sep 1914, G41/2; SSCols to GovNZ, 4 Sep 1914, G41/2. Harcourt instructed Liverpool that: 'No formal proclamation of annexation should . . . be made without previous communication with His Majesty's Government'. He later told Liverpool that he had 'no special instructions to give regarding Samoa'. Also see J. Sanders, *Dateline - NZPA: The New Zealand Press Association 1880-1980*, Auckland, 1979, p. 47. News of the occupation of Samoa was held up while officials were telegraphing descriptions of the event privately out of Wellington.


40 ODT, 1 Sep 1914, p. 5; Watson, *History of Samoa*, p. 142; Allen to Cresswell, 3 Dec 1914, M1/14, Allen Papers. Allen was keen to dispel the rumour that the Samoan Expedition was 'undertaken more at the desire of the Commonwealth and New Zealand than of the Imperial
The raising of the Union Jack in Apia after German Samoa's capture, *Alexander Turnbull Library.*
'the ultimate disposition of the island was a matter for decision by the Imperial authorities'. Allen tentatively suggested that 'New Zealand might have something to say about it'. Massey attended the press conference but he was content to allow Allen to dominate proceedings. On the few occasions he did contribute to the discussion, his remarks were fairly rudimentary and limited to brief cursory observations. He saw the capture of Samoa as important strategic achievement for New Zealand and Australia. In a reflective mood, the cost of the occupation disturbed Massey's concern with fiscal equilibrium. He believed that administering German Samoa would require a considerable (and expensive) New Zealand military presence for some time.\textsuperscript{41}

Over the next three years, the New Zealand Government agitated for German Samoa's economic inclusion into the British sphere of influence. Massey had no objections to Great Britain's suggestion that German Samoa could be incorporated within the scope of any validating or indemnifying legislation.\textsuperscript{42} The New Zealand Government was concerned, however, that the United States would 'step in and monopolize the trade of Samoa'. To head off American competition, Massey requested a formal declaration from the British Government that German Samoa would remain a 'British possession' after the war.\textsuperscript{43} The New Zealand Government proposed to form a company to take over all German businesses in Samoa. The Foreign Office rejected the proposal, fearing that it would initiate a 'land grab' and similar economic reprisals from Germany against British firms. Grey reaffirmed British Government policy that the possession of Samoa was only 'provisional'.\textsuperscript{44}

The position of the Foreign Office did not weaken the New Zealand Government's resolve over German Samoa. Allen and Massey continued to seek financial compensation to strengthen British occupation over the island. Only after what Allen described as 'considerable correspondence' did New Zealand finally win some recompense. Despite Foreign Office concerns, the Colonial Office agreed that New Zealand could liquidate private German firms based in Samoa but the plantations were to remain strictly off limits. Allen privately admitted to Godley that 'we are putting our foot pretty firmly on to Samoa and I am sure New Zealand will be very greatly disappointed if this fair Island is ever handed over to our enemies again'.\textsuperscript{45}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{41} ODT, 1 Sep 1914, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{42} GovNZ to SSCols, 5 Apr 1915, G25/33.
\item \textsuperscript{43} GovNZ to SSCols, 26 Jul 1916, G41/20.
\item \textsuperscript{44} FO to CO, 26 Aug 1916, CO209/290/348.
\item \textsuperscript{45} SSCols to GovNZ, 31 Aug 1916, CO209/290/349; SSCols to GovNZ, 1 Sep 1916, G41/21; FO to CO, 26 Oct 1916, CO209/290/384; Dom, 1 Sep 1914, p. 6; 'Statement Showing the Whole of the Cost to New Zealand of the Military Occupation of Samoa', AJHR, 1916, v. 1, B.-21, p. 1; Allen to
\end{itemize}
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News of German Samoa's occupation reached Great Britain just before the commencement of the Battle of the Marne. Since the beginning of the war, British and French forces had been fighting a desperate battle to keep the German invaders from the environs of Paris. The Belgian fortress of Liège fell on 16 August and four days later the small Belgian Army was swept aside as the German Army occupied Brussels. The French armies and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) were forced to retreat after the Battles of the Sambre and Mons in late August. The French and British armies took up defensive positions to wait for the French commander-in-chief Joseph Joffre to 'deliver his counterstroke' near the River Marne. The combatant armies were fighting to a state of exhaustion and stalemate. Initial public optimism that the war would be over by Christmas had proved illusory. In this depressing state of affairs, the British Government was delighted by the news that German Samoa had been seized bloodlessly by New Zealand. Harcourt informed Liverpool: 'We have just got news of the capture of Samoa. I am sure your people must be delighted and I congratulate you heartily'. Publicly at least, the Australian Government supported the New Zealand Government's success. Privately, it was annoyed that the New Zealand Government received the imperial praise and public glory for the success of the mission. Munro-Ferguson admitted to Harcourt that 'the occupation of Samoa by New Zealand rankles a little'. He bitterly asserted that New Zealand only achieved its goal 'thanks to the protection of the Australian Fleet, and can only remain there under the same protection. Australia regards the Pacific as her "duck-pond" and scarcely admits New Zealand's right to look-in'.

Australian jealously gave the parochial New Zealand press an added incentive to exaggerate the national and imperial importance of the mission. *The Press* described the landing of the Advance Party a 'gratifying' moment. The editor was 'pleased that this country has done something definite for the Empire'. *The New Zealand Herald* considered it 'intolerable that an unscrupulous and aggressive Power like Prussianised Germany should be permitted to establish and possess naval bases in distant and foreign oceans'. The editor argued that in 'equity Samoa should remain British being a natural outpost of this growing dominion'. There existed an unwritten assumption

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Godley, 13 Apr 1916, WA252/3, Godley Papers. Also see GGNZ to SSCols, 22 Dec 1917, G41/32; SSCols to GGNZ, 15 Jan 1918, G41/32. Despite Massey's insistence, the British Government refused to reconsider their decision of 31 August 1916 with regard to the sale of the German plantations.

48 GGAust to GovNZ, 22 Oct 1914, G41/4; Munro-Ferguson to Harcourt, 13 May 1915, MS696, Novar Papers. Also see Louis, *Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919*, p. 41.
49 *The Press*, 1 Sep 1914, p. 6.
50 *NZH*, 1 Sep 1914, p. 4. Also see *AWN*, 3 Sep 1914, p. 51.
that the future of Samoa depended upon the fierce military struggle taking place in Europe and it would be unthinkable to return the island. The Otago Daily Times editor was only too pleased to see the eradication of German power in the Pacific, predicably arguing against the restoration of the German colonies.\textsuperscript{51} The Otago Witness had no doubt 'that the Imperial Government will hand Samoa over to New Zealand when the war is over'.\textsuperscript{52} The New Zealand Times was annoyed that an expedition was necessary - 'Samoa could have been ours many years ago'.\textsuperscript{53} The Dominion viewed the capture of German Samoa of 'considerable strategic importance'.\textsuperscript{54}

While the capture of German Samoa may have been a publicity coup for New Zealand, Wellington policy-makers were quietly seething over the Admiralty's nonchalant attitude to the safety of the Advance Party.\textsuperscript{55} With von Spee's squadron at large, cruising the waters of the Pacific with impunity, the escort provided by the Admiralty to Noumea was considered inadequate. Allen later recalled that:

\begin{quote}
The Government were [sic] very, very anxious for many days after the transport left . . . It was with great joy and great relief that we subsequently realised that protection had been provided for the transports and that our men had reached Samoa and had occupied that country without any loss of life.\textsuperscript{56}
\end{quote}

At the 1917 Imperial War Conference Massey remembered how New Zealand 'did not feel very comfortable' with the level of escort protection supplied by the Admiralty for the mission to German Samoa. While Massey remained philosophical that in war 'risks must be taken', he argued that the Advance Party was 'saved' by Australia's naval forces.\textsuperscript{57} Even six years later Massey was no less forgiving when he spoke in Parliament of the 'risk there was in sending sixteen hundred or eighteen hundred men to Samoa at the opening of the war'.\textsuperscript{58}

The lack of proper consultation and coordination in the operation against German Samoa merely justified Massey and Allen's worst preconceived fears about the

\textsuperscript{51} ODT, 1 Sep 1914, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{52} OW, 2 Sep 1914, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{53} NZTimes, 1 Sep 1914, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{54} Dom, 1 Sep 1914, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{55} GovNZ to Minister of Internal Affairs, 8 Dec 1914, G41/5. Liverpool was annoyed to see that New Zealand newspapers got wind of the lack of escort for the transports to Samoa. He wanted this story contradicted if Massey could arrange it.
\textsuperscript{56} NZPD, v. 185, 17 Oct 1919, p. 504. Also see Supplementary Notes to Lois Voller's Thesis on Sir James Allen Prepared by Charles Richards Allen, M1/140/A.
\textsuperscript{57} IWConf, 28 Mar 1917, CAB32/1.
\textsuperscript{58} NZPD, v. 187, 6 Aug 1920, p. 17.
Admiralty. Shortly before the outbreak of the war, Massey lamented to Liverpool that the Admiralty 'seem neither to understand the problem nor indeed to have a clear knowledge of the geographical situation' confronting New Zealand with respect to naval defence. Massey had clearly become annoyed and irritated at the delay to replace the three aging 'P'-class ships patrolling New Zealand waters. The provisions of the 1909 Naval Agreement in which two modern cruisers, three destroyers and two submarines would be stationed in New Zealand waters had been 'ignored' by the British Government. The New Zealand Government laid the blame squarely at the feet of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. Massey considered 'it most unfortunate that so many who are in authority in the several Departments at Home fail to grasp the all-important necessity of encouraging Imperial Co-operation in all matters appertaining to Imperial Defence'.

As far as New Zealand was concerned the lack of organisation and the pitiful escort for the Advance Party was intolerable. The Admiralty had shown a complete disregard for the welfare and safety of New Zealand's troops. In Wellington a quiet resolve developed that the NZEF Main Body would not be allowed to suffer the consequences of an inadequate escort. Less than a month into the First World War, British-New Zealand relations had entered troubled waters and a bigger storm was brewing on the horizon.

On 7 August Massey stood up in the debating chamber of the House of Representatives and interrupted the order of business. He asked for a one hour adjournment to enable Cabinet to consider a 'very important communication'. Within the hour, Massey and his Cabinet colleagues had returned to the treasury benches. Massey explained his absence and declared that: 'It is now certain that the Expeditionary Force will be required'. At this stage, Massey refused to divulge its final destination but the British Government asked if the NZEF Main Body could be sent to Great Britain 'as soon as possible'. Three days later Massey confirmed that the NZEF Main Body, under Godley's command, would be heading to Europe 'within

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59 Massey to Liverpool, 16 Jul 1914, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/251, Harcourt Papers; Massey to Liverpool, 16 Jul 1914, G17/17; Liverpool to Harcourt, 17 Jul 1914, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/249, Harcourt Papers. Liverpool was asked by Massey to forward his memorandum 'in order that Mr. Harcourt can have the opportunity of presenting the views of the New Zealand Government, confidentially to Mr. Asquith'. Also see PM to GovNZ, 16 Jul 1914, G17/17. Massey, vehement in his criticism of the Admiralty, stated: 'That the Dominions have not been fairly treated by the Admiralty regarding Naval Defence matters is undeniable; the agreement of 1909 has been ignored, and explanations given, which, in the opinion of the Government, do not meet the situation'.


61 SScols to GovNZ, 7 Aug 1914, G41/1. Also see CAB42/1/2. At the Council of War meeting on 5 August 1914, Lord Haldane suggested that the Dominion contingents could relieve the overseas garrisons of the British Empire. Asquith rejected Haldane's proposal. He argued that Great Britain 'should leave it to each Dominion to decide the strength of the contingent which it is prepared to provide. The contingents should not be asked to relieve our overseas garrison, but should be sent to England'. As a result, the War Office was directed 'to accept the offers of the Dominions to provide contingents, which should be concentrated in England'.
The composition of the NZEF Main Body relayed to the British Government on 7 August consisted of 8,276 men and 3,838 horses. Liverpool promised Harcourt that the NZEF Main Body would 'be ready to sail in about four weeks'. A week later Harcourt wanted the specific date of departure. Liverpool replied that 'if there is urgent necessity my Government can despatch Expeditionary Force about August 27th... Please advise as to route and safety'. Given the danger posed by roaming German raiders in the Indian Ocean and the threat of von Spee's powerful squadron, the Admiralty would not guarantee the 'absolute safety' of any route to the New Zealand Government. In spite of this information, Wellington advised London that the NZEF Main Body would be ready to embark on 30 August. The travel arrangements were left in the hands of the British Army Council.

By the start of September the strength of the NZEF Main Body had increased considerably beyond the numbers first conveyed to the British Government. A fully equipped force of 8,454 New Zealand soldiers, including the first draft of reinforcements, had been organised for the 'great adventure'. This created the inevitable logistical problems and gradually the NZEF Main Body's original departure date slipped by. The military exigencies of the Samoan operation had stretched the capacity of New Zealand's limited resources. Combined with the shortage of suitable transport ships, the New Zealand Government decided to wait for the return of Marshall. Liverpool and Massey wanted his counsel on the safety of despatching the NZEF Main Body, especially in light of reports that the Pacific cable had been tampered with by a German cruiser. The Colonial Office dismissed the threat, 

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62 NZPD, v. 169, 10 Aug 1914, p. 498; War Council Meeting 1#, 5 Aug 1914, CAB42/1/2.
63 GovNZ to SSCols, 7 Aug 1914, G41/1.
64 SSCols to GovNZ, 14 Aug 1914, G41/1.
65 GovNZ to SSCols, 14 Aug 1914, G41/1.
66 SSCols to GovNZ, 19 Aug 1914, G41/1.
67 GovNZ to SSCols, 24 Aug 1914, G41/2.
68 J. Phillips, N. Boyack, E. P. Malone, *The Great Adventure: New Zealand Soldiers Describe the First World War*, Wellington, 1988; C. Pugsley, *Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story*. Auckland, 1984, pp. 11-4 and p. 34. Also see McGibbon, *The Path to Gallipoli*, p. 252; SSCols to GovNZ, 6 Sep 1914, G41/2; GovNZ to SSCols, 7 Sep 1914, G41/2. Harcourt wanted New Zealand to send a larger force but Liverpool was doubtful that New Zealand could easily increase the size of the Main Body. Liverpool did not want to press the New Zealand Government over the issue until he knew the response of the other Dominions to such a request.
69 GovNZ to SSCols, 8 Sep 1914, G41/2. Also see Sergeant S. J. Smith, 'The Seizure and Occupation of Samoa', in Lieutenant H. T. B. Drew, (ed.), *The War Effort of New Zealand*, Auckland, 1923, p. 27; Stewart, *The Right Honourable Sir Francis Bell*, p. 116; McGibbon, *Blue-Water Rationale*, pp. 21-2. The Noumea cable was cut a few miles from shore by *Scharnhorst* and
replying confidently that after 'one month of war the command of the sea is left unchallenged in the hands of Great Britain and her allies'.

The assuredness of the Colonial Office in matters pertaining to the naval balance in the Pacific was understandable. On 23 August Japan had entered the war against Germany in accordance with the provisions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This gave the allies an overwhelming naval superiority in the Pacific. According to British historian V. H. Rothwell, British leaders hoped they would be able to mobilise Japanese military resources to bring an early end to the war. They also possessed strong misgivings about the desirability of Japanese intervention. Great Britain feared that Japan had joined the war against Germany not for altruistic reasons but to satisfy purely selfish territorial ambitions in the Far East. Harcourt, conscious of Dominion sensitivities, reassured Liverpool that the Japanese 'have no intention of seizing territory outside China Seas for instance German Islands in the Pacific'. According to Lord Esher, a member of the CID: 'If Japan were to seize these places, it would probably lead to very serious trouble with the Colonies. So, for the present, the Japanese are being asked to stand fast until we have been able to communicate with the Dominions'. The Japanese were acting as allies, hunting down von Spee's forces around the vicinity of the Caroline and Mariana Islands.

However, the burning question which remained for New Zealand and Australia to ponder was whether or not Japan represented an 'invaluable ally or an imminent aggressor'. While New Zealand's policy-makers found it expedient to publicly praise

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**Gneisenau.** According to McGibbon, a myth developed in which the Samoan Expedition on the night of 19-20 August 'narrowly escaped disaster' and passed within fifteen miles of the German cruisers.

70 SSCols to GovNZ, 9 Sep 1914, G41/2.


72 Greene to Grey, 19 Aug 1914, G48/18/N/18; Honorary Consul for Japan to GovNZ, 25 Aug 1914, G41/2. Liverpool was informed that Japan had declared war on Germany on 23 August at six o'clock at night. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 26 Aug 1914, G41/2. The Japanese were informed of the New Zealand operation to capture German Samoa. Also see ODT, 18 Aug 1914, p. 4. The newspaper reported that the United States of America were apprehensive over Japan entering the war. They feared a Japanese seizure of German Samoa but the ODT felt that Germany will lose Samoa 'but it will not be to Japan that she will lose them'. Also see ODT, 25 Aug 1914, p. 4. The editor believed that the Japanese declaration of war was justified to uphold the integrity of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and to eliminate the German presence in the Asia-Pacific region. For an alternative view see *Dom*, 1 Aug 1914, p. 4. The editor suspected that Japan had entered the First World War to realise its territorial ambitions in China and the Pacific. The editor felt that 'by doing so uninvited she would run a grave danger of a misunderstanding with other nations'.


74 SSCols to GovNZ, 11 Sep 1914, G48/W/2; SSCols to GovNZ, 11 Sep 1914, G41/2.

Japan's involvement in the war, they were deeply suspicious of Japan's real intentions. Their fears were not misplaced. Despite initial British assurances, by the end of October Japan had seized all the German islands north of the equator, including the Marianne and Caroline Islands. At the last minute, the British Government cancelled the Australian operation. The significance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was more important to the British than the interests of the southern Dominions. An apologetic Harcourt explained to Munro-Ferguson that the Japanese naval resources were needed in the Pacific and possibly in European waters. He reluctantly admitted that the British Government would not 'risk a quarrel' with Japan to 'oust them now from those islands which they are occupying more or less at the invitation of the Admiralty'. Harcourt advised Munro-Ferguson to prepare in the 'most gradual and diplomatic way... the mind of your Ministers for the possibility that at the end of the war Japan may be left in possession of the Northern Islands and we with everything South of the Equator'.

In the meantime, preparations for the despatch of the NZEF Main Body had become mired in political controversy. After considerable time and effort, the Admiralty had arranged a strong escort to be waiting in Fremantle on 7 October to accompany the New Zealand contingent across the Indian Ocean. Harcourt told Liverpool that if the NZEF Main Body missed the deadline there would be little chance of organising another escort for at least six weeks. He coldly added: I should be obliged if your Ministers would kindly make arrangements for transport accordingly. Marshall consulted with Massey. They both agreed that the ten transports should leave New Zealand on 25 September escorted by Psyche and

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76 GovNZ to SSCols, 27 Dec 1915, PM5. Also see M. P. Lissington, New Zealand and Japan 1900-1941, Wellington, 1972, pp. 29-30; Gordon, New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power, p. 49; NZH, 30 Oct 1914, p. 6.

77 SSCols to GovNZ, 8 Oct 1914, G41/4; AWN, 29 Oct 1914, p. 51; Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919, pp. 37-8.

78 Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, p. 203. In a letter dated 18 October 1914, Churchill told Harcourt: 'The Admiralty would strongly deprecate any action towards Japan which would appear suspicious or ungracious. We are deriving the greatest benefit from their powerful and generous aid. They have intimated that their occupation is purely military and devoid of political significance and there I trust we may leave the matter for present'. Also see Grey to Harcourt, 23 Nov 1914, FO800/91/481. Grey instructed Harcourt to delay the Australian mission to takeover these islands. He stated 'there are the materials for a tragic row'; GGAust to SSCols, 25 Nov 1914, FO800/91/481.


80 SSCols to GovNZ, 13 Sep 1914, G41/2.
Philomel. From Melbourne it was envisaged that the Pyramus would act as the escort relief for the rest of the journey to Fremantle.\textsuperscript{81}

Two days later the decision reached by Massey and Marshall came in for some sharp criticism from a recalcitrant Reform Cabinet. According to Liverpool’s report, there was: 'Considerable uneasiness in Cabinet regarding escort of P class ships for Expedition between New Zealand and point of junction with Australian Squadron'. Liverpool failed in his attempt to persuade his truculent ministers that little danger existed, informing Harcourt that he had not succeeded 'entirely in allaying doubts as to the safety of the Expedition',\textsuperscript{82} The next day a telegram arrived at Government House from New Zealand’s Administrator in Samoa, Colonel Robert Logan, informing Liverpool that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had appeared off Apia at daybreak on 14 September. No shots were fired and they steamed off in a north-westerly direction.\textsuperscript{83} News also came through that the Australian Naval Board were advising all ships bound for the two southern Dominions to remain in Fiji. Under these circumstances, Massey reported to Liverpool that his Cabinet was feeling 'very uneasy' over despatching the NZEF Main Body to the Tasman Sea protected only by the P-class cruisers. Liverpool warned Harcourt that the:

\begin{quote}
Feeling of Ministers is so acute that certain of them have threatened to resign owing to Admiralty not appearing to appreciate Government's position if they allow transports to proceed to sea protected by cruisers of the "P" class alone when German Warships have only a short way to go to reach the Tasman Sea.\textsuperscript{84}
\end{quote}

The British Government lost patience with the obstinacy of the New Zealand Government. Harcourt could see 'no reason to suppose escort inadequate'. He promised 'that the safety of all military convoys is a matter which is constantly being considered most carefully' and the escort could only be strengthened 'at the cost of considerable delay in departure'.\textsuperscript{85} The Admiralty's blunt assessment of the situation reinforced Harcourt's argument. The British Government felt that it would be 'incredible' for Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to 'steam two thousand miles south into waters where no possibility of coal for them'. The British Government indicated to the New Zealand Government that the Germans were probably cruising towards the

\textsuperscript{81} GovNZ to SSCols, 13 Sep 1914, G41/2.
\textsuperscript{82} GovNZ to SSCols, 15 Sep 1914, G41/2; GovNZ to SSCols, 15 Sep 1914, G48/39/W/2.
\textsuperscript{83} Administrator of Samoa to GovNZ, 16 Sep 1914, G41/3; GovNZ to SSCols, 16 Sep 1914, G41/3; GovNZ to GGAust, 16 Sep 1914, G41/3. Liverpool informed Harcourt and Munro-Ferguson of the sighting.
\textsuperscript{84} GovNZ to SSCols, 17 Sep 1914, G41/3; GovNZ to SSCols, 17 Sep 1914, G48/39/W/2.
\textsuperscript{85} SSCols to GovNZ, 18 Sep 1914, G41/3; SSCols to GovNZ, 18 Sep 1914, G48/39/W/2.
Marshall Islands where they had a coaling station at Jaluit. For these sound reasons, the Admiralty declared the Tasman Sea route to be 'perfectly safe'. The Admiralty offered the New Zealand Government two alternatives. The NZEF Main Body could either leave escorted by the 'P'-class ships or be delayed by another six weeks to allow for other escort arrangements to be made.  

On 22 September Massey's Cabinet met to discuss the latest proposal. Fresh news that von Spee's cruisers were lurking in the vicinity of Fiji and Samoa cast a long shadow over the meeting. While Massey and the rest of Cabinet were prepared to accept the Admiralty's advice, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Leader of the Legislative Council, Sir Francis H. D. Bell, could not be persuaded to agree. Bell later recalled that he was not 'satisfied that the Admiralty knew where the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were'. If the NZEF Main Body went to sea only escorted by the 'P'-class ships, Bell intimidated that he would resign. Liverpool feared the worst. The controversy had the potential to destabilise the New Zealand Government 'at the crucial moment of departure'. According to Liverpool, the only solution to the predicament rested with Australia. He felt that if Australia could be persuaded to send a few cruisers out to meet the NZEF Main Body in the Tasman Sea 'it might help matters'.

The escort crisis compounded the British Government's problems in naval defence. The inability of the Admiralty to wrest the initiative from the Germans had become a constant source of frustration and public embarrassment for Asquith. The

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86 SSCols to GovNZ, 20 Sep 1914, G41/3.
87 Bell to Fergusson, 2 Jul 1925, G49/52/8a. Bell later claimed that he telegraphed Massey in Auckland stating that he must resign but that the Prime Minister persuaded him to await his return to Wellington on 23 September. Bell is mistaken when he claims that Massey returned to Wellington on that day, Massey was more likely to have returned in the small hours of 24 September because Liverpool did not cable Harcourt until one o'clock in the afternoon with the news that New Zealand had decided to send the Main Body on 25 September. Bell's recollection of the sequence of events appears to be out by one day because he also claims that Allen's telegram to Massey was sent on 22 September. See Allen to Massey, 23 Sep 1914, G48/W/2; GovNZ to SSCols, 24 Sep 1914, G48/W/2. Also see Stewart, The Right Honourable Sir Francis Bell, p. 113. The Minister of Marine, F. M. B. Fisher, recollection of the Cabinet meeting of 22 September is vivid but inaccurate. He claims that Bell was 'furious with the attitude and tone of the Colonial Office telegrams. He was horrified at the thought of sending over 8,000 of our young men on a perilous voyage to Australia without adequate precautions. He begged and beseched us collectively and individually not to agree. He informed Massey in plain and outspoken terms, that if Cabinet despatched the Force he would at once resign. He was deeply moved. Other Ministers pointed out that we had promised Britain every man, every shilling, and every gun, and we could not quibble over the advice of the British Government. A vote of the Cabinet was taken and it was decided to send out the ships. Bell wrote out his resignation, handed it to Massey, and left the Cabinet room'.
88 GovNZ to SSCols, 22 Sep 1914, G41/3; Liverpool to Harcourt, 20 Sep 1914, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/265, Harcourt Papers. Liverpool wrote: 'I am sorry to have bothered you so much about the escort for the Expedition, but the Government have been most anxious about its safety, you will probably read between the lines that they do not think the present ships here adequate for the Station, however, they are going to remain quiet until after this trouble is over'.

Troubled Waters
German battle-cruiser Goeben and light cruiser Breslau had evaded capture in the Mediterranean and on 22 September three armoured cruisers, Cressy, Aboukir, and Hogue, were sunk by a single German submarine off the Dutch coast. The three German raiders Emden, Dresden, and Karlsruhe were still at large sinking and capturing British merchant ships in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. While the British Royal Navy enjoyed a considerable numerical advantage over Germany's naval forces, the Admiralty seemed incapable of translating this vast strength into a credible defence of Great Britain's worldwide interests.

From a New Zealand perspective, Liverpool's telegram had the desired effect. The British Cabinet was forced to consider 'carefully' the situation at its meeting on 22 September. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston S. Churchill, could not attend. Instead, Asquith's Cabinet listened to Admiral Sir Henry Jackson's views on the matter. After careful deliberations, Cabinet 'directed Mr Harcourt to reply that the despatch of the N. Zealand force should be postponed until an adequate convoy can be secured'. Asquith informed King George V that this 'may involve a delay (according to the Admiralty) of nearly 6 weeks'. Later that night, Asquith was more forthright in his summary of the day's events in a letter to a close female confidante, Venetia Stanley. 'Things came almost to a climax at the Cabinet to-day', confessed Asquith,

when we learnt that the New Zealanders absolutely decline to despatch their expeditionary force - all in transports & ready to sail to-morrow or next day - unless we can provide them with a sufficiently powerful escort to convoy them in safety from Wellington to Adelaide, where they can join up with the Australian contingent. The Admiralty think there is no real risk, but I am inclined to agree with the New Zealanders, and as there are no available ships at hand of the requisite strength, we have been obliged to tell them to wait for what may be as long as another 6 weeks. This will probably excite a good deal of resentment & indignation in N. Z. . . . I think (between you & me) that the Admiralty have not been clever in their outlying strategy.

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91 British Cabinet Meeting, 22 Sep 1914, R/183, CAB41/35/46.
Under firm instructions from Cabinet, Harcourt suggested to Liverpool 'that the best practicable course for your Ministers is to postpone departure of your contingent until convoy can be provided'. He added this may involve a delay of six weeks but the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) would leave as scheduled. In response to Harcourt's telegram, Liverpool called for an urgent Cabinet meeting. Massey could not attend. His nose for political advantage had led him home to bid farewell to the Auckland volunteers of the NZEF Main Body, suggesting that he considered the matter dead.

The fullest contemporary account of this important Cabinet meeting reinforces this interpretation. According to Allen's report to Massey, 'Bell left himself in hands of Cabinet'. With Bell's simple act of contrition, Cabinet decided that the NZEF Main Body could leave on 25 September. The New Zealand Government did not want to wait for an improved escort. At least two historians have suggested that Cabinet was motivated by the knowledge that the AIF would not be delayed. Even at this early stage of the war, it has been argued that Dominion rivalry had become a prominent feature of inter-imperial politics.

Causation theories aside, Allen firmly informed Massey that: 'We all agreed to embarkation of Expeditionary Force on date fixed and Bell though he disapproves has accepted the position and will stand by us'. He wanted his chief's final approval. Unfortunately for interested scholars, Massey's response was either not recorded or did not survive. Either way, reconstruction of the sequence of events proves that the Prime Minister must have concurred. On the morning of 24 September (the same day he returned to Wellington) the two transports, Waimana and Star of India, escorted by Philomel, sailed out of Auckland at nine o'clock in the morning with the intention of meeting up with the other eight transports from Wellington.

Four hours later Liverpool cabled Harcourt the good news that the NZEF Main Body would be leaving

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93 SSCols to GovNZ, 23 Sep 1914, G41/3; SSCols to GovNZ, 22 Sep 1914, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/267, Harcourt Papers. This is the original handwritten draft telegram by Harcourt.

94 Dom, 24 Sep 1914, p. 6. Massey farewelled the Auckland contingent of the NZEF on the wet Wednesday morning of 23 September. Massey told them: 'In this crisis, the most serious ever experienced in the history of Britain, New Zealand has made up its mind to do its duty to the Empire just as the Empire is doing to humanity by protecting the weaker nations of the world against tyranny'.

95 Pfeiffer, 'Exercises in Loyalty and Troublemaking', Australian Journal of Politics and History, v. 38, 2 (1992), pp. 179-80; Pugsley, Gallipoli, p. 32. Pfeiffer has argued that Cabinet was influenced by its rivalry with Australia and its desire to impress distant British authorities. Cabinet also feared that New Zealand would miss the anticipated glories on the battlefield.

96 Allen to Massey, 23 Sep 1914, G41/3; Allen to Massey, 23 Sep 1914, G48/W/2. Allen told Massey that: 'Secretary of State for the Colonies has stated that if Government of New Zealand desire to press their views as to further escort Expedition must be delayed at least six weeks and the Contingent from Commonwealth will proceed on fixed date'. Also see Stewart, The Right Honourable Sir Francis Bell, p. 113. 'It wasn't pleasant for any of us', Mr Fisher later recalled of the meeting, "I think we all had a feeling that we had done wrong, but it was the only course we could take . . .""

97 Hall-Thompson, 'The Work of the "Philomel"', in Drew, (ed.), The War Effort of New Zealand, p. 67. Also see Dom, 25 Sep 1914, p. 6. Massey must have returned to Wellington on Thursday 24 September 1914 because he farewelled the Main Body at Newtown Park that day.
Wellington early on 25 September. Liverpool blamed the controversy on 'conflicting reports from Naval sources as to the exact position of German warships'.

Just as it seemed that a major British-New Zealand diplomatic crisis had been averted, disturbing news arrived on Liverpool’s desk. Just before seven o’clock at night, a secret telegram from Munro-Ferguson warned Liverpool that New Zealand transports 'run serious risk and that until you consult Admiralty their sailing should be delayed'. The Australian Governor-General’s actions were unprecedented. It was a significant departure from protocol. British appointed officials were extremely reluctant to engage in inter-Dominions communication without the tacit approval of the Colonial Office. Only weeks before, Munro-Ferguson had reprimanded Liverpool for breaching regulations for sending a message directly to the Australian French Consul in Sydney. Yet Munro-Ferguson expressed a desire of 'keeping close touch' with Liverpool 'to secure cordial cooperation between New Zealand Government and that of Commonwealth'.

His involvement also illustrated his genuine concern for the safety of the NZEF Main Body. Munro-Ferguson wanted to alert Liverpool, a colleague he considered to be a 'frank and cordial' neighbour. Realising the urgency of the situation, Liverpool immediately issued countermanding orders. The two transports returned to Auckland the next day, 'much to the astonishment of the soldiers aboard'. According to Hall-Thompson, the soldiers 'had no idea that they had been turned round, and who again found themselves in Auckland, instead of well on the way to France'. Pyramus was ordered to continue her voyage to Australia rather than risk the return journey to New Zealand.

While the New Zealand soldiers on board the transports were unaware of the dangerous situation, Massey experienced an evening of considerable discomfort as he waited for their safe return. He was probably thinking over his political future if news of the debacle leaked out. Only two days previous he had announced in Parliament that the General Election would be held in December.

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98 GovNZ to SSCols, 24 Sep 1914, G41/3; GovNZ to SSCols, 24 Sep 1914, G48/W/2.
99 GGAust to GovNZ, 24 Sep 1914, G41/3; GGAust to GovNZ, 24 Sep 1914, G48/W/2; GovNZ to SSCols, 24 Sep 1914, G41/3; GovNZ to SSCols, 24 Sep 1914, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/268, Harcourt Papers. Munro-Ferguson cabled his opinion to the Colonial Office without consulting the Australian Government.
100 GGAust to GovNZ, 19 Aug 1914, G48/W/10; GGAust to GovNZ, 23 Aug 1914, G48/W/10.
103 SNO to Adm, 25 Sep 1914, N40/I.
104 NZPD, v. 170, 22 Sep 1914, pp. 100-5.
knowledge that the departure of the Auckland Main Body had been approved with only a single obsolete cruiser for an escort and against the wishes of one of his most trusted ministers, the chances of his Reform Government surviving the next election were fairly slim. At the very least, his Government would be accused of negligence and unfit to administer New Zealand's military contribution. His political reputation was hanging in the balance. At midnight, the Minister of Marine, F. M. B. Fisher, dropped in to see Massey and found him sitting at the head of the Cabinet table, his head on his hands, and great beads of perspiration standing out on his large head. Without a word he pointed to a telegram on the table. It was from the Governor-General of Australia (Sir Ronald Munro Ferguson) and was to this effect: 'If your transports have already left advise recall. Am advised German warships probably in New Zealand waters'. A wire of recall was at once despatched.

Later that morning Fisher also decided to visit the remarkably prescient Bell. He advised Bell that the ships were returning back to the safety of New Zealand. Fisher later recalled that 'Bell was most deeply affected, and tears of thankfulness and gratitude streamed down his face'. It did not pay to be correct and this was the last time that Bell was consulted on the departure of the NZEF Main Body.

The safe return of the two transports to Auckland did not signal the end of the escort crisis. The New Zealand Government and the Admiralty both assumed diametrically opposed positions. The Admiralty held firm to its belief that the 'despatch of transports from New Zealand and Australian ports to point of concentration is an operation free from undue risk'. The New Zealand Government would not allow the NZEF Main Body to leave New Zealand without a vastly improved escort. With the return of Churchill from one his 'furtive missions' to Dunkirk, Asquith's Cabinet once again discussed the despatch of the NZEF Main

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106 Stewart, The Right Honourable Sir Francis Bell, p. 113-4. Fisher has claimed that the order of recall was despatched just after midnight. This is incorrect. Liverpool issued countermanding sailing orders at eight minutes past eight that night. See GovNZ to SSCols, 24 Sep 1914, G48/W/2.
107 Stewart, The Right Honourable Sir Francis Bell, p. 114.
108 Bell to Fergusson, 2 Jul 1925, G49/52/8a. Bell argues that Liverpool, Massey and Allen together tried to persuade him not to resign but the telegram from the Governor-General of Australia 'settled the matter'. Bell states: 'Up to that point, therefore, and in relation to the first departure of the first Expedition from Auckland it is absolutely untrue that Lord Liverpool tried to coerce Massey or Allen. The three together tried to persuade me - and failed. But at that stage all three had become angry with me and their anger continued. And for at least a month I was not again consulted on any point relating to the Expedition'.
109 SSCols to GovNZ, 25 Sep 1914, G48/W/2.
Body. On 23 September the British Cabinet decided that the cruiser Minotaur patrolling near Singapore should be ordered 'to proceed at once to Wellington as escort to the convoy'. The British Government also decided to seek the support of the Japanese Government. This resulted in the Japanese battle cruiser Ibuki being sent to Wellington to strengthen the escort.¹⁰ Harcourt informed Liverpool that 'in view of the anxiety felt' by New Zealand these two ships would escort the NZEF Main Body from Wellington, rendezvousing with the AIF on the way. This would only involve a delay of three weeks and it seemed to be an appropriate solution for both countries.¹¹

The movements of the von Spee's Squadron, however, remained unpredictable. The Governor of Papeete in Tahiti reported that on the morning of 22 September Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had shelled and destroyed half the town.¹² Understandably, Massey was unimpressed by Admiralty assurances that the Royal Navy enjoyed command of the sea and that it was protecting the lifeblood of New Zealand's economy - the open safe passage of the seas. Massey expressed his concern that enemy ships marauding the Indian and Pacific Oceans such as Emden and Leipzig 'will tend to hamper trade'.¹³ Insurance costs for New Zealand cargo had already risen dramatically. They were described by Liverpool as 'prohibitive'. The New Zealand Government feared a looming balance of payments crisis if trade continued to be interrupted by the German naval threat. In an attempt to alleviate the situation, the New Zealand Government proposed that all steamers involved in trade should be included in the Imperial Insurance Scheme to encourage the free movement of goods on the high seas. The appropriate British authorities rejected this suggestion. The British Board of Trade would only allow small shipments of cargo to be covered by the war risks insurance, fearing the monetary costs of a wholesale change to the existing policy.¹⁴

While the unchecked German naval threat continued to strain British-New Zealand relations, the British policy of requisitioning transport ships from Dominion trade routes began to attract sharp criticism from New Zealand. Desperate to land essential

¹¹ SS Cols to GovNZ, 25 Sep 1914, G41/3; SS Cols to GovNZ, 25 Sep 1914, G48/W/2.
¹² Administrator of Samoa to GovNZ, 30 Sep 1914, G41/3; GovNZ to SS Cols, 1 Oct 1914, G41/3; GovNZ to SS Cols, 1 Oct 1914, G48/W/2. Liverpool told Harcourt: 'My Prime Minister says this information has very much shaken Admiralty assurances and points out that news with regard to Tahiti cannot be kept secret for very long owing to the expected arrival of the mail steamer from Tahiti. When news becomes public he would be glad to be in a position to state that Admiralty have matter in hand in order to allay apprehension'.
¹³ GovNZ to SS Cols, 1 Oct 1914, G41/3; GovNZ to SS Cols, 1 Oct 1914, G48/W/2.
¹⁴ SS Cols to GovNZ, 8 Aug 1914, G5/14; GovNZ to SS Cols, 17 Aug 1914, G41/1; SS Cols to GovNZ, 22 Aug 1914, G41/2; SS Cols to GovNZ, 28 Aug 1914, G41/2; GovNZ to SS Cols, 28 Aug 1914, G41/2; SS Cols to GovNZ, 31 Aug 1914, G41/2.
supplies and men in France, the British Government requisitioned transport ships involved in the conveyance of Dominion products. This practice inevitably interrupted New Zealand's export trade. As a result, the New Zealand Government began complaining to the British Government that British and Australian authorities, without prior consultation or proper justification, were detaining ships. For the next twelve months, the correspondence emanating from Wellington on this subject became so incessant and persistent, a Colonial Office memorandum concluded that:

'The complaints from New Zealand as to shortage of tonnage have been louder than from any other Dominion.'¹¹⁵ The constant shortage of refrigerating shipping was particularly disturbing to New Zealand's primary producers eager to cash in on the high prices for their products on the British market. The New Zealand Government feared 'serious loss to producers in New Zealand being caused owing to the number of ships with refrigerating plant being taken as transports'.¹¹⁶ Massey pleaded New Zealand's case with the Colonial Office. He requested that all the ships involved in transporting the NZEF Main Body should be returned quickly 'so that export trade of New Zealand may not be greatly impeded'.¹¹⁷

At this stage of the war, the major preoccupation of the British Government was to rush as many men as possible to the front to stabilise the military situation. The Admiralty considered that with von Spee's cruisers more than 2000 miles away and heading for the South American coast, the NZEF Main Body could leave without waiting for the arrival of Minotaur and Ibuki.¹¹⁸ The Admiralty pointed to the fact that 'no single ship appears to have been lost in Australasian waters justifying fully assurances that have been given'.¹¹⁹ Liverpool took the matter up with Massey on the evening of 4 October. As the representative of the British Government, Liverpool probably felt that it was his duty to present the Admiralty's case but Massey was not in a conciliatory mood. After all, only twelve days had passed since the last confirmed sighting of von Spee's forces at Papeete and their exact location remained a mystery. Massey's political instincts, which had temporarily deserted him, were about to return with vengeance. He did not want a repeat performance of the first abortive attempt to despatch the NZEF Main Body to Australia, which saw his judgment embarrassed by

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¹¹⁵ 'Memorandum prepared by the Colonial Office upon the Shortage of Tonnage and the Complaints from the Dominions and Colonies', 28 Sep 1915, [Circulated to members of the Industrial Control Committee], BL/62, Law (Bonar Law) Papers.

¹¹⁶ The official correspondence between Wellington and London on the chronic shortage of shipping was overwhelming. For example, see SSCols to GovNZ, 31 Aug 1914, G41/2; GovNZ to SSCols, 2 Sep 1914, G41/2; GovNZ to SSCols, 29 Sep 1914, G41/3; GovNZ to SSCols, 15 Oct 1914, G41/4.

¹¹⁷ SSCols to GovNZ, 17 Sep 1914, G41/3.

¹¹⁸ SSCols to GovNZ, 4 Oct 1914, G41/3; SSCols to GovNZ, 3 Oct 1914, G48/W/2. The Colonial Office telegram was received in Wellington on 4 October at eighteen minutes past seven at night.

¹¹⁹ SSCols to GovNZ, 3 Oct 1914, G41/3; SSCols to GovNZ, 3 Oct 1914, G48/W/2.
the foresight of one of his own Cabinet Ministers. Massey dug his heels in. At one stage it has been surmised that Liverpool tried 'to assume authority as Commander in Chief, and Mr. Massey told him he would resign if he did'.\(^{120}\) Massey argued that the New Zealand Government would 'consider any alteration, as far as escort is concerned . . . a breach of faith'. Liverpool was adamant in his telegram to Harcourt that under the circumstances 'if transports are not given adequate escort [Massey] would tender his resignation'. Liverpool was afraid that Massey 'could not avoid giving his reasons for doing so'.\(^{121}\)

According to McGibbon, in offering to take responsibility for despatching the NZEF Main Body, Liverpool 'may have been looking for a way round Massey's political difficulties'.\(^{122}\) Noble intentions aside, Liverpool's decision to approach Massey on this question proved incongruous. With the full support of Cabinet, Massey had already decided that it would best to wait for the arrival of *Minotaur* and *Ibuki*. Given the anguish he had endured over the initial departure, Massey was averse to changing his mind on this issue. Besides, Liverpool's attempt at moral suasion was unnecessary. The Admiralty did not expect Liverpool to seek a reversal of the New Zealand decision. The Governor had misjudged Massey's feelings on the matter. The return of the first two transports had damaged Massey's reputation within Cabinet and had soured his relationship with one of his most trusted colleagues. With the benefit of hindsight, Massey's threat to resign was a logical response to Liverpool's move to assume executive command. It was also more an act undertaken for political self-preservation rather than genuine concern for the safety of the NZEF Main Body. Massey had already decided to call a General Election in December. He knew that any publicity over the affair and his firm stand to protect the lives of the New Zealand troops on board the transports had the potential to increase his popularity with the electorate.\(^{123}\)

\(^{120}\) Bell to Fergusson, 2 Jul 1925, G49/52/8a; Captain A. Agar, *Showing the Flag*, London, 1962, p. 63. This book contains a fable about the incident. Agar recalls that Massey said he 'disliked the idea of those two ships, with our soldiers on board, sailing unescorted, when he knew that the German cruiser *Emden*, and perhaps some others, was at large and might be waiting for them somewhere in the Tasman Sea . . . . I took the signal ordering the ships to sail to the Governor-General [Lord Liverpool] asking him to amend the time of sailing by five minutes . . . . Lord Liverpool, who, as Governor-General, was also technically responsible for the executive order to sail, seemed somewhat puzzled, and asked me, 'But why five minutes? . . . 'Because, sir', I replied, 'it will take me exactly that time to write out my resignation!''.

\(^{121}\) GovNZ to SSCols, 4 Oct 1914, G41/3; GovNZ to SSCols, 4 Oct 1914, G48/W/2; GovNZ to SSCols, 4 Oct 1914, G49/52/8a. Also see *NZPD*, v. 187, 6 Aug 1920, p. 17.

\(^{122}\) McGibbon, *Blue-Water Rationale*, p. 25.

\(^{123}\) Stewart, *The Right Honourable Sir Francis Bell*, p. 114. Fisher stated: "Never once did I hear Sir Francis Bell boast or gloat over this crisis wherein he had displayed such fine, firm, strong judgment. Many years later I told him I was going to put this incident on record to his honour and credit. He said, 'Please don't - it's all over and forgotten and in any case nobody would be interested'. Also see Gardner, 'W. F. Massey in Power, 1912-1925', *Political Science*, v. 13, 2 (1961), p. 10;
Liverpool's role in the drama pointedly illustrates the difficult position he was placed in. On the one hand, he faithfully expressed the views of the British Government and Admiralty. On the other, Liverpool remained absolutely loyal to the New Zealand Government in his telegrams to the Colonial Office. He knew that his general demeanour was essential to the harmony of British-New Zealand relations. As the Governor, Liverpool's position remained central to the constitutional and diplomatic relationship. But he was now operating in a complex and shifting environment. Prior to the First World War, the growth of local autonomy and parliamentary democracy in New Zealand had seriously undermined the role of the Governor. Unlike his predecessors, Liverpool did not enjoy the executive power of an absolute monarch. He followed the general prescription for New Zealand Governors. He 'would act on the advice of his ministers, whether he agreed or not'. In matters 'affecting the Queen's prerogative and Imperial Interests generally' he would receive ministerial advice and on certain occasions he would exercise discretion. In theory, Liverpool could still wield formidable powers. He could exercise certain prerogatives including the right to grant or withhold a dissolution, the right to accept or reject nominations to the Legislative Council, the right to choose his ministry and the right to pardon convicted criminals. To a large degree, this depended on the force of the Governor's own personality.

Despite these vast powers, the influence of the Governor slowly diminished in the years before the First World War as the New Zealand Government assumed more of the functional responsibilities of conducting its own affairs. In 1871 the New Zealand Government appointed an Agent-General in London to represent New Zealand's interests. The Agent-General quickly became an alternative channel of

Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward, pp. 7-8. According to Gardner, the relationship between Massey and Bell was one 'of respect and trust, tempered by occasional clashes of spectacular violence. Both men flared suddenly and cooled quickly. Massey generally deferred to Bell's judgment on measures; Bell generally deferred to Massey's on men, and was strictly correct in his relations with 'Mr. Prime Minister'. Massey and Bell together became something greater than they would have been separately; it was a partnership unique in New Zealand politics. The two men had sat together on an Opposition backbench in 1894-6, and had formed a strong mutual regard. It is perhaps not too much to say that Massey would have lived longer without Bell - but it would have been on the opposition benches'. Also see McGibbon, Blue-Water Rationale, p. 25. As McGibbon has pointed out, this telegram was not a sailing order but merely an inquiry if the New Zealand Government would accept the Admiralty's advice.

124 Fergusson to Bell, 2 Jul 1925, G49/52/8a; Fergusson to Cohen, 6 Jul 1914, G49/52/8a. According to Fergusson, Liverpool 'personally thought that Mr Massey was perfectly right in the stand he took, though he thought that the Home Authorities were probably the best judges of the situation and that their view might safely be accepted'.

125 McIntyre, 'Imperialism and Nationalism', in Rice, (ed.), The Oxford History of New Zealand, p. 338; McIntyre and Gardner, (eds.), Speeches and Documents on New Zealand History, pp. 92-3.

126 Dalziel, The Origins of New Zealand Diplomacy, p. 133; McIntyre, 'Imperialism and Nationalism', in Rice, (ed.), The Oxford History of New Zealand, p. 338.
Second Earl of Liverpool, (Lord) Arthur William de Brito Savile Foljambe, Schmidt Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library
communication between Great Britain and New Zealand. In late 1880, the incoming Governor of New Zealand, Sir Arthur Gordon, 'complained how he should hate the life in that colony where he would be 'a puppet - a leaden seal - the mere instrument of his Ministers' and there would be 'no power, no real work, and yet plenty of formal routine taking up one's time and preventing one employing it on better things and continual "Society" of the dreary Colonial type!'\textsuperscript{127}

The Colonial Office encouraged this transformation of the Governor's role. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Colonial Office had consistently supported the principles of responsible government in the colonies. In the Colonial Office's view, the ideal Governor did not jeopardize this approach by promoting British interests or courting controversy. He had to be an administrator not an active politician or policy-maker. Consequently, the Colonial Office would not hesitate to censure a Governor who acted obtrusively in domestic affairs or failed to follow the advice of his ministers. For example, in 1892 the Colonial Office did not support the Governor's decision to refuse the appointment of the twelve men nominated by the Liberal Premier John Ballance to the Legislative Council. The Colonial Office felt 'that it was Glasgow's duty to accept the advice of his ministers and that the responsibility for damaging the constitution was theirs'. The official rebuke compelled Glasgow to question the propriety of the Agent-General's action in supplying the Colonial Office with information. As Governor, he believed that he remained the sole official channel of communication between New Zealand and Great Britain. The Colonial Office promptly informed Glasgow that: 'There is nothing in the practice, or traditions of this Department to prevent an Agent General from communicating any documents or information to the Secretary of State.'\textsuperscript{128} According to historian Raewyn Dalziel, the Colonial Office had clarified its position on two important issues. The Governor was to be a constitutional sovereign only and the Agent General was officially sanctioned as 'the eyes, the ears and voice of the New Zealand Government in Great Britain'.\textsuperscript{129}

By 1914 Liverpool had the unenviable task of trying to balance the interests of the British Government and the wishes of the New Zealand Government at a time his resources and ability to do so were under considerable strain.\textsuperscript{130} His effectiveness


\textsuperscript{129} Dalziel, The Origins of New Zealand Diplomacy, p. 167.

depended upon the strength of his own personality and the malleability of his ministers. By his time the Governor could no longer attend Cabinet meetings without an invitation and he could only communicate with his ministers through his Prime Minister. In June 1905 the status of New Zealand's Agent-General had been elevated to the title "High Commissioner". This effectively ended the Governor's communication monopoly. Policies of successive Liberal Governments accelerated the devolution process. At the 1911 Imperial Conference Sir Joseph Ward advocated the depoliticalisation of the Governor's role. He proposed that the High Commissioners should be become the sole channel of communications between the Dominions and Great Britain.\(^{131}\) The 'anomalous position' of the Governor-General was not resolved until after the First World War. The Imperial Conference of 1926 passed a resolution which stated that the Governor-General was 'not the representative or agent of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain or of any Department of that Government'.\(^{132}\)

Liverpool heeded the lessons of the escort crisis. For the rest of the war, he tried to act as a mediator. He remained conscious of the need to ameliorate the extremes positions sometimes adopted by Great Britain and New Zealand on various issues. After his argument with Massey, Liverpool immediately put this into effect. On the advice of its Governor, the British Government relented and the Admiralty agreed that the NZEF Main Body should wait for the arrival of Minotaur and Ibuki. They were expected to reach Wellington on 13 October.\(^ {133}\) Liverpool made light of the controversy, reassuring the Colonial Office that soldiers of the NZEF Main Body were 'looking forward to joining their Australian comrades in the great Imperial operations in Europe'.\(^ {134}\) Even though intercepted wireless signals from Suva and Wellington confirmed Admiralty suspicions that von Spee was heading towards South America, the NZEF Main Body waited for its escort. Finally on the morning of 16 October, the ten transports carrying the NZEF Main Body under the protection of Minotaur, Ibuki, Philomel and Psyche left Wellington.\(^ {135}\) Under firm instructions


\(^{131}\) Olliver, (ed.), \textit{The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887 to 1937: Volume II: Imperial Conferences: Part I}, p. 60.


\(^{133}\) SSCols to GovNZ, 6 Oct 1914, G41/3; SSCols to GovNZ, 6 Oct 1914, G48/W/2; SNO to GovNZ, G41/4; Allen to Godley, 9 Oct 1914, G41/4.

\(^{134}\) GovNZ to SSCols, 7 Oct 1914, G41/4.

\(^{135}\) Naval Board Melbourne to NIO, 6 Oct 1914, G46/1. Coded wireless signals were intercepted by radio stations at both Wellington and Suva which placed Scharnhorst between the Marquesas Island and Easter Island but the information was not received by the New Zealand Government until two days after Massey threatened to resign. Also see NIO to GovNZ, 16 Oct 1914, G46/1; GovNZ to GGAust, 16 Oct 1914, G48/W/2; GovNZ to SSCols, 16 Oct 1914, G41/3; GovNZ to SSCols, 16 Oct
from Allen, Marshall held authority over the communications and movements of the convoy. It was to proceed to Great Britain where upon arrival Godley could make the necessary preparations to ready the NZEF Main Body for combat in France.\textsuperscript{136}

After a 'rough' overcrowded trip the NZEF Main Body reached Hobart on 21 October. \textit{Pyramus} soon joined the NZEF Main Body. A week later the NZEF Main Body made the rendezvous point with the AIF contingent at King George Sound, Albany, in Western Australia. Even at this late stage, the travel arrangements were subject to imperial interference.\textsuperscript{137} As the convoy prepared for the long journey to Europe, an Afrikaner rebellion led by Lieutenant-Colonel S. G. Maritz threatened to topple the loyal South African Government. On 23 October Harcourt offered the South African Governor-General, Lord Buxton, 30,000 Australian and New Zealand troops sitting in transit while their transports coaled at Adelaide. South Africa, under the guidance of Prime Minister Louis Botha and Defence Minister Jan Smuts, declined the offer.\textsuperscript{138}

By 1 November, as the convoy of thirty-seven transports and their escort left Albany, the tense situation in South Africa had been subdued.\textsuperscript{139} The convoy eventually passed through Colombo, Aden and the Suez Canal before reaching Alexandria on 3 December. The six-week voyage almost sailed by without incident. On 9 November the destruction of the German raider \textit{Emden} by HMAS \textit{Sydney} near the Cocos Islands broke the monotony of the Indian Ocean. Lady Godley claimed to have heard the guns while lying in her bath. Her husband later wrote a letter to Allen

\textsuperscript{136} 'Instructions to the General Officer Commanding New Zealand Expeditionary Force by Minister of Defence James Allen', undated, WA252/7, Godley Papers; Godley to Kippenberger, 31 Mar 1914, WA252/7, Godley Papers.

\textsuperscript{137} Major-Gen Sir A. J. Godley to Col. A. W. Robin, 21 Oct 1914, AD12/C.NF/1; Major-Gen Sir A. J. Godley to Col. A. W. Robin, 29 Oct 1914, AD12/C.NF/1; Hall-Thompson, 'The Work of the "Philomel"', in Drew, (ed.), \textit{The War Effort of New Zealand}, p. 67; Godley to Major-General Sir John Cowans, 28 Oct 1914, WA252/6, Godley Papers. Godley complained to Sir John Cowans that the transports were 'very crowded' and that the New Zealand Government refused to supply another transport ship.

\textsuperscript{138} N. G. Garson, 'South Africa and World War I', \textit{JICH}, v. 8, 1 (October 1972), pp. 69-70. Garson has argued that the incident illustrated the absence of control on the part of dominion governments over the forces they contributed to the imperial war effort, for the Australian and New Zealand cabinets were not consulted about the possible change of plan regarding the use of these troops. Not surprisingly the whole episode was kept secret'. Also see Louis, \textit{Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919}, p. 51-2; Harcourt to Munro-Ferguson, 11 Dec 1914, MS696, Munro-Ferguson Papers. Harcourt told Munro-Ferguson: 'Of course, I should have telegraphed to you if I had found it necessary in the end to make this diversion, but I did not want to do so unless it was absolutely necessary'. The proposed intervention of ANZAC troops was considered by Harcourt to be a 'dead secret'.

\textsuperscript{139} Louis, \textit{Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919}, p. 52.
describing the incident: 'It is fortunate that the Australian convoy was so slow as it turns out, as the _Emden_ must have crossed our bows, and have been very near us.' \textsuperscript{140} Godley remained convinced that had the transport convoy been quicker, _Emden_ would 'have sunk half a dozen of us.' \textsuperscript{141}

In McGibbon's view, the impact of the escort crisis of August-October 1914 on British-New Zealand relations was both 'substantial and lasting'. \textsuperscript{142} The New Zealand Government considered that the episode illustrated the vital need for a British re-think on naval defence requirements of the British Empire. \textsuperscript{143} The Admiralty's strict adherence to Mahan naval doctrine of concentration in European waters afforded New Zealand little comfort in the South Pacific. \textsuperscript{144} Massey and Allen were both convinced that _Sydney's_ victory over _Emden_ was a complete vindication of Australia's naval defence policy; the preference of developing a local navy unit rather than paying a subsidy directly to the Admiralty. Massey reminded Parliament that 'we must never forget that our security was due to a great extent to what is called the Australian Fleet'. \textsuperscript{145} Allen praised the quality of Australia's naval forces to Admiral W. R. Creswell of the Australian Naval Board. He shared Massey's belief that New Zealand 'owed the safety of our Transports to the Commonwealth Navy'. \textsuperscript{146} Liverpool conveyed New Zealand's convictions on naval defence to Harcourt in the New Year. He informed his Colonial Secretary that in the future New Zealand did not want to be in 'the position of being guarded by antiquated war vessels'. In his opinion, 'the principle of local navies has come to stay'. \textsuperscript{147}

The Colonial Office was not immune from the effects of the British-New Zealand escort crisis. The New Zealand Government sharply criticised the Colonial Office for its role in the affair. During the crisis, the Colonial Office's representative in New Zealand appeared unsympathetic to Massey's predicament. Massey held this against

\textsuperscript{140} Godley to Allen, 16 Nov 1914, WA252. Godley suggested to Allen that the New Zealand Government should 'write a nice letter of acknowledgment to the Japanese, for the services of the _Ibuki_.

\textsuperscript{141} Godley to Allen, 16 Nov 1914, WA252; Major-Gen Sir A. J. Godley to Col. A. W. Robin, 24 Nov 1914, AD12/C.NF/1. Also see Pugsley, _Gallipoli_, p. 68.

\textsuperscript{142} McGibbon, _Blue-Water Rationale_, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{143} GovNZ to SSCols, 12 Oct 1914, G25/27. The New Zealand Government advocated the convening of a Naval Conference in 1915 to consider the problem.

\textsuperscript{144} 'Naval Defence: Memorandum by the Minister of Defence together with Speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty as reported in Australia', 13 Apr 1914, N1/16/3/5.

\textsuperscript{145} NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, p. 68.

\textsuperscript{146} Allen to Cresswell, 3 Dec 1914, M1/14, Allen Papers.

\textsuperscript{147} Liverpool to Harcourt, 20 Jan 1915, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/280, Harcourt Papers. Also see GovNZ to SSCols, 27 Mar 1917, G41/26. The New Zealand Government promised to 'adhere to the policy in the New Zealand Naval Defence Act, 1913, but recognize that developments will be necessary as the result of war experiences and the deliberations of Conferences'.
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Liverpool for the rest of the war. The sarcastic and condescending tone of Colonial Office telegrams infuriated several New Zealand Ministers. The Colonial Office appeared out of touch and indifferent to the problems confronting New Zealand. Massey offered a practical solution. He suggested that Colonial Office officials needed to undertake regular visits to New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and Canada to develop a greater understanding of Dominion perceptions and interests. From his perspective, the British failure to empathise with New Zealand's difficulties over the escort crisis represented a fundamental breakdown in the imperial relationship. At the 1917 Imperial War Conference, Massey complained bitterly that 'it was a risk which we should not have been asked to take'. He felt that 'New Zealand deserved better treatment'.

The New Zealand Government found the Admiralty's dismissive attitude totally unacceptable. It bordered on arrogance. The New Zealand Government felt that the Admiralty had no reason to feel superior. Liverpool summed up the New Zealand Government's position at the beginning of October: 'The Government of New Zealand has no desire to embarrass Admiralty but it did not consider it right to take any unnecessary risk either in respect to lives, war material, or transports which are the chief ships available for frozen meat trade.' New Zealand's confidence in the Admiralty was not enhanced by the 'disaster' at Coronel. On 1 November von Spee's forces defeated an inferior British force under the command of Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock off the Chilean west coast at the Battle of Coronel. Five weeks later von Spee finally met his match at the Battle of the Falkland Islands. Numerical superiority enabled Great Britain to detach two battle cruisers from the Grand Fleet. The Royal Navy's victory over von Spee's cruisers on 8 December cleared the seas of all concentrated German naval forces outside of European waters.

For the first time since the outbreak of war, New Zealand enjoyed a measure of security. On 25 December 1914, Harcourt informed Liverpool that Great Britain had no objection to the reduction of the garrisons in New Zealand and suspension of the examination service so long as your Government is prepared to take a very small risk. Should there be any likelihood of the enemy again appearing in New

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149 IConf, 28 Mar 1917, G40/2; IConf, 28 Mar 1917, CAB32/1.
150 GovNZ to SSCols, 6 Oct 1914, G41/3; GovNZ to SSCols, 6 Oct 1914, G48/W/2.
152 McGibbon, Blue-Water Rationale, p. 27. According to McGibbon, only the Dresden managed to escape. This ship was later hunted down and destroyed by the British in the Juan Fernandez Islands in March 1915.
New Zealand did not, however, remain isolated from 'unexpected' enemy action. In the New Year, an intelligence report circulating in Wellington indicated that the German ship Dresden was lurking around Fijian waters. In the middle of 1917 the German armed merchant cruiser Wolf raided British shipping in the Indian Ocean and headed for the South Pacific. It became the only enemy ship to enter New Zealand waters during the First World War. The Wolf laid mines off the North Cape and Cape Farewell, which eventually claimed two New Zealand ships and the lives of twenty-six passengers. These events made the New Zealand Government extremely conscious of 'their incapacity to deal with or even to observe the movement of any such vessels'. The Japanese cruisers employed in the South Pacific failed to prevent Wolf from completing a fifteen-month-long operation.

In terms of British-New Zealand relations, the escort crisis signalled that the next four years would be a testing experience. It had shown spectacularly the dangers of New Zealand dependency on the Royal Navy and the limits of the British security guarantee. In wartime, Great Britain could not always be expected to protect New Zealand's security interests. It did not possess the resources to provide New Zealand with absolute security from enemy aggression. Moreover, the British Government had demonstrated a marked reluctance to meet the wishes of a Dominion especially if they conflicted with the antecedents of prosecuting the war in Europe. The Admiralty was particularly inflexible. Despite the efficacy of New Zealand's case, the Admiralty was reluctant to divert resources away from protecting the major shipping lanes between the United States and Great Britain and the containment of the German fleet. As a

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152 SSCols to GovNZ, 25 Dec 1915, G41/6.
154 Hall-Thompson to Allen, 5 Dec 1918, N1/22/6/8; GovNZ to SSCols, 31 Jan 1917, G41/25. The New Zealand Government was extremely concerned that German submarines would expand their operational zone into the 'unprotected' waters of the South Pacific. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 22 Feb 1917, G41/26. The Colonial Office replied that the 'chance of enemy vessels operating in New Zealand waters is possible but very improbable'.
155 GovNZ to SSCols, 13 Jan 1915, G41/6.
156 L. Brocklebank, 'The Failure to Detect the German Raider 'Wolf' in New Zealand Waters in 1917', B. A. (Hons.) History, Massey University, 1992, pp. 1-4; McGibbon, Blue-Water Rationale, p. 29; SSCols to GovNZ, 16 Mar 1917, G41/26; GGNZ to SSCols, 27 Apr 1918, G41/35; SSCols to GGNZ, 9 May 1918, G41/35; GGNZ to SSCols, 26 Jun 1918, G41/36. In April 1918, the New Zealand Government wanted to know the provisions the British Government was taking to protect New Zealand from other raider incursions. Liverpool suggested that one fast light cruiser or two destroyers would provide an adequate level of defensive cover. The British Government replied that all British cruisers were already 'fully employed', forcing the Admiralty to admit reliance 'upon Japanese assistance in the event of a raider again appearing in the South Pacific'.

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result, the escort crisis convinced New Zealand of the necessity to arrange a firm British commitment to the defence of the Pacific.\textsuperscript{157}

The first few months of the First World War had introduced an element of uncertainty to traditional peacetime patterns of British-New Zealand relations. The war had demonstrated a remarkable capacity to exploit weaknesses in the relationship. It exacerbated pre-existing tensions and created new challenges. The boundaries of New Zealand compliance and British consultation as yet remained undefined. Within a year, the pressures of war would radically transform the political landscapes in Great Britain and New Zealand. Over this time, the need for greater cooperation and consultation between the two countries would become critical.

\textsuperscript{157} PM to GGNZ, 30 Mar 1920, PM9/61, Thomson Papers.
CHAPTER THREE

The Politics of Diplomacy

In this war in which we are all so deeply interested we outside Britain have to trust our all to British statesmen, and it requires a considerable amount of faith and trust.

ALLEN TO CURTIS, 11 NOVEMBER 1915

The political consensus that supported New Zealand's military commitment to the British Empire rapidly disintegrated in the early weeks of the war. Massey's promise to Parliament on 4 August that 'Imperial considerations are looked upon as being above and beyond party' seemed hollow two days later as he signalled his Government's intention to press ahead with the budget presentation.1 The Leader of the Liberal Opposition, Sir Joseph Ward, was furious that such a statement containing 'the most controversial matters relating to party politics' should be considered at time when the British Empire was facing its greatest crisis. Ward announced that he would register his protest by absenting himself during the delivery of the Reform Government's Financial Statement. That evening, every Liberal and Labour member followed Ward out the House of Representatives, leaving the Minister of Finance, James Allen, to deliver his budget in a half-empty chamber.2

Early hopes of bipartisanship were dashed by the conflict. New Zealand politics entered a renewed period of bitter party warfare and acrimonious exchanges. The Liberal Opposition accused the Reform Government of trying to slip controversial legislative measures, such as the Local Railway Bills, the Railways Improvement Authorisation Bill and the Legislative Council Bill, through Parliament at a time when it could not oppose with its usual vehemence. Ward knew that any criticism of the Government would be labelled 'disloyal'. It would be akin to political suicide especially after 22 September when Massey announced that the General Election would go ahead as normal. Massey defended his decision to hold an election during the war, arguing that it was 'a very serious thing to tamper with the constitution'. Ward retorted that it was inappropriate to subject New Zealand to the bitterness and disturbance of an election campaign. He urged Massey to postpone the General Election until the political climate had become more settled in February or March 1915.3

1 NZPD, v. 169, 4 Aug 1914, p. 381.
3 See NZPD, v. 170, 22 Sep 1914, pp. 100-5. and p. 123. George W. Forbes, the junior Liberal whip who later became New Zealand's Prime Minister, outlined the awkward position his party faced
Massey ignored Ward's protestations and scheduled the General Election for 10 December 1914. Ward frantically swung his decrepit party organisation into action. Defeat at the last General Election in 1911 remained fresh in Ward's memory. On 2 November Ward delivered a speech at a meeting of the Women's Social and Political League outlining his party's election manifesto. It was hardly imaginative. The Liberal's naval defence policy remained unchanged, promising to support the Royal Navy on the basis of the defunct 1909 Naval Agreement and a continuation of the naval subsidy. Ward told his audience: 'We stand by the Imperial Navy'. He rejected the Reform plan to establish a local navy unit. In his view, the financial burden would be too much for New Zealand. Ward also reiterated his desire for preferential trade, more commonly known as imperial preference, within the British Empire. In adopting such policies, Ward clearly tried to distance himself from Reform claims that the Liberals were 'lukewarm Imperialists'.

Four days later Massey joined the fray and unveiled his party's election manifesto. The Reform Party deliberately exploited the atmosphere of jingoism engendered by the war. Encapsulated under the title 'New Zealand and the Empire', Reform promised to 'worthily sustain its share in the responsibility and obligations of the Empire'. The Reform Party planned to honour this commitment with 'a vigorous perseverance with the system of national training for defence by which New Zealand's young manhood may become citizens fitted for the safeguarding of the people's hearths and homes, and for helping the Empire in time of need'. Heeding the lessons of the escort crisis, the Reform Party also promised to implement a naval defence policy that would allow New Zealand to develop a local navy unit of its own. Massey argued that this policy would be able to 'adequately protect the Empire as a whole, maintain the supremacy in Opposition: 'If we criticise the Government... An accusation of disloyalty will be made against us. If we criticise the Government that charge will be made against us throughout the campaign, and the endeavour will be show that we are not patriotic because we will be criticising the Government in the present crisis'. Also see Wood, 'The Origins of the National Government', pp. 49-67; Gardner, W. F. Massey in Power, 1912-1925', Political Science, v. 13, 2 (1961), p. 21. Ward favoured a postponement of the General Election because he feared that the right-wing Reform Party would ride the wave of patriotism to victory. He also felt that a three to four month delay would allow him to cement the Liberal-Labour alliance and remedy his party's organisational deficiencies. Massey, on the other hand, felt that calling an election in December enhanced his Party's chances. At the last election in 1911 the Liberals polled 30,000 votes more than Reform and Massey felt that Reform could use the war to secure a popular mandate for the first time in their history. Also see NZ Tab, v. 41, 51 24 Dec 1914, p. 34. The New Zealand Tablet, the Catholic mouthpiece in New Zealand, supported Ward's call for a postponement of the General Election because he feared that the right-wing Reform Party would ride the wave of patriotism to victory. He also felt that a three to four month delay would allow him to cement the Liberal-Labour alliance and remedy his party's organisational deficiencies. Massey, on the other hand, felt that calling an election in December enhanced his Party's chances. At the last election in 1911 the Liberals polled 30,000 votes more than Reform and Massey felt that Reform could use the war to secure a popular mandate for the first time in their history. Also see NZ Tab, v. 41, 51 24 Dec 1914, p. 34. The New Zealand Tablet, the Catholic mouthpiece in New Zealand, supported Ward's call for a postponement of the General Election. The editor wrote: 'No sensible person desires that, at a time when great Imperial interests are at stake, the country should be thrust again into the distraction of a general election'. Also see NZ Times, 23 Sep 1914, p. 4. The editor of this extremely sympathetic Liberal paper also criticised Massey for not postponing the General Election 'beyond the extreme crisis in the Empire's history'.

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of the British flag in the Pacific, and render safe the trade routes so essential to the continuance and prosperity of Empire'.

The fragmented labour political wing poorly served working class interests in New Zealand. Following the industrial disputes of the Waihi Miners' Strike in 1912 and the Waterfront Strike in 1913, the political aspirations of the working class were represented by the ineffectual Social Democratic Party (SDP) and union-controlled trade councils. Both entities were in no position to challenge the dominance of the Reform and Liberal parties at the General Election. Through its official mouthpiece, a weekly publication edited by Harry Holland known as The Maoriland Worker, the SDP professed parliamentary socialism as its ultimate goal. The SDP offered a progressive social and political programme which included proportional representation, a minimum wage bill, a thirty-four hour week, free hospital care and state pensions for the blind, orphans and the helpless. In an effort to save worker from slaughtering fields of the "capitalist war", the SDP promised to repeal the 1909 Defence Act. Instead, the SDP would introduce legislation to allow a citizen army of volunteers to prosecute the war, clearly foreshadowing working class opposition to conscription.

Massey described the 1914 General Election as the 'dirtiest' ever contested in New Zealand's political history. While Opposition elements called Reform the party of 'pretence, promise and non-performance', Massey's own behaviour contributed to unsavoury tone of the campaign. Throughout the country, Massey made derisory remarks, insinuating that Ward would be influenced by the SDP whose headquarters

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6 EP, 7 Nov 1914, p. 9; EP, 13 Nov 1914, p. 6. The editor supported the Reform Party's naval policy for New Zealand. The editor stated: 'As to German superiority in the Pacific, the career of the Emden marks its danger and her destruction the remedy. More of the same medicine is needed, more naval enterprise and self-reliance on the part of the Dominions in the Pacific. Australia's brilliant success as a pioneer should cure New Zealand of her hesitation'. Also see EP, 20 Nov 1914, p. 6. In contrast, the editor criticised Ward's naval policy as one of dependency. The editor was strongly 'in favour of Mr. Allen's policy of self-reliance'. Also see MacKay, The Political Relations Between New Zealand and Great Britain 1914-26, p. 44. MacKay argues that Massey's election manifesto 'was an interesting expression of the growing spirit of nationality in the country, for it meant that the unconditional payment of a subsidy towards the naval defence of the Empire was no longer sufficient to satisfy New Zealanders and also New Zealanders were now conscious of ambitions and also of the dangers in the Pacific'.

7 MW, 2 Dec 1914, p. 1. Also see NZT, 5 Sep 1914, p. 4. As a predominantly left-leaning newspaper, the editor of The New Zealand Truth echoed working class frustration with the state of New Zealand politics and the impact of the war. In the editor's opinion, the real enemy was not Germany but 'the greedy, grasping middleman' who exploited average hard-working Kiwi bloke. The editor argued that 'it would be suicidal in the interests of the people of New Zealand if they subscribed to bogey of sinking political differences during the present international crisis'.


9 NZT, 5 Dec 1914, p. 13.
were allegedly in Berlin, if he was returned to power. He accused Ward of pandering to the interests of radical Labour - the 'Red Feds'. The squalid nature of the campaign ensured intense public interest. Over half-million New Zealanders, equivalent to 85 per cent of those eligible to vote, visited the polls. The result turned out to be 'bitter' and 'huge' disappointment for both Reform and Liberal.\textsuperscript{10} As early as November confident Reform officials had predicted a landslide victory for Massey, feeling they had a realistic chance of winning over fifty seats in the eighty-seat House of Representatives. As it eventuated, Reform lost seven seats and there were some high-profile casualties. Voters in the important seat of Wellington Central dumped the Minister of Marine, F. M. B. Fisher. These losses were partially offset by the gain of three other seats and Reform ended up. The Reform Party's share of the total vote had also increased from 35 per cent in 1911 to 47 per cent in 1914. Independent voters had defected \textit{en masse} to vote Reform, easily making Massey the leader of the most popular political party in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{11}

The Liberal Party experienced similar results. On the night the Liberal Party won seven new seats and lost three, increasing its share of the electorate vote from 41 per cent in 1911 to 43 per cent in 1914. Ward also increased his majority in the South Island seat of Awarua (located near the city of Invercargill). Support for Labour remained steady as the SDP received nearly 10 per cent of the electorate vote. In comparison, support for Independent candidates collapsed from 14.8 percent in 1911 to less than 1 per cent in 1914.\textsuperscript{12}

In the final analysis, the 1914 General Election had produced an astonishing 'deadlock'. It took over six months involving numerous recounts, three by-elections, and four petitions for the final result of the election to become clear on 16 June 1915.\textsuperscript{13} According to Otago historian Erik Olssen, the initial result on 11 December was 'confusingly close'.\textsuperscript{14} Reform and the combined opposition parties each held thirty-eight European seats. Over the next few days, the provisional results for the four Maori seats gave Reform one more seat and the Liberals two. The Northern Maori seat went to Tau Henare whose party political allegiance remained in doubt.\textsuperscript{15} As Sir Francis Dillion Bell laconically remarked: 'Apparently at that stage the electors


\textsuperscript{11} Thorns, and Sedgwick, \textit{Understanding Aotearoa/New Zealand}, p. 166.

\textsuperscript{12} Thorns, and Sedgwick, \textit{Understanding Aotearoa/New Zealand}, p. 166.

\textsuperscript{13} Wood, 'The Origins of the National Government', p. 129.

\textsuperscript{14} Olssen, 'Waging War', in Binney, Bassett, and Olssen, (eds.), \textit{The People and the Land}, p. 301.

had not realised that it was of vital importance to return a strong administration to cope with the immense problems that might be expected to arise from a long war.\textsuperscript{16}

A week later, Liverpool described the election result to Harcourt as 'most unsatisfactory'. Despite the situation, he advised Harcourt that Reform had emerged as the strongest party and the country was in no mood to return Ward to power. As far as Liverpool was concerned, this election result could not have been more untimely. It had failed to deliver a strong government capable of implementing stern measures designed to fulfil New Zealand’s solemn commitment 'to make any sacrifice'. Liverpool promised Harcourt he would broker a deal 'by which the government of the country may be carried on without another General Election as long as the war lasts'.\textsuperscript{17} The British Government refused to pass official judgment on the election result. Harcourt merely observed: 'It will certainly be curious if Ward comes back again to power'.\textsuperscript{18}

Not all observers were as disinterested as Harcourt. The election result rattled Godley. He was astounded by the stalemate. He shared Liverpool's summation of the consequences, fearing that the resultant political uncertainty would jeopardise New Zealand's military commitment to the British cause. 'I wish', Godley confessed to Colonel Alfred W. Robin, the Commandant of the New Zealand Forces, 'either one side or the other (naturally I don't care twopence which) was in, with a decent and workable majority'.\textsuperscript{19} The New Zealand High Commissioner in London and former Liberal Prime Minister, Sir Thomas Mackenzie, candidly admitted to Allen: 'Well, I am not sorry that I am out of it all because whoever has the responsibility of the affairs of New Zealand will have a heavy and anxious time'.\textsuperscript{20}

Over the next six months public pressure intensified for a coalition government in New Zealand. Political stability was seen as a prerequisite for a New Zealand at war. The Liberal Party strongly resisted these calls. Ward insisted that Massey should either resign or call Parliament for a test division.\textsuperscript{21} There is general agreement amongst New Zealand historians that the Massey-Ward rivalry presented an almost insurmountable barrier to the formation of a national administration. According to historian W. J. Gardner: 'On personal and religious grounds, Massey could hardly

\textsuperscript{16} Stewart, \textit{The Right Honourable Sir Francis Bell}, p. 117.
\textsuperscript{17} Liverpool to Harcourt, 17 Dec 1914, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/273, Harcourt Papers.
\textsuperscript{18} Harcourt to Liverpool, 23 Dec 1914, MS Harcourt dep. 490/277, Harcourt Papers.
\textsuperscript{19} Godley to Robin, 16 Dec 1914, AD12/21.
\textsuperscript{20} Mackenzie to Allen, 8 Feb 1915, M1/4, Allen Papers.

strong enough for the job which has to be carried through'.\textsuperscript{29} In contrast, Harcourt's replacement at the Colonial Office, Bonar Law, received favourable press coverage as 'a business man of exceptional ability'.\textsuperscript{30} The editors of \textit{The Press} and \textit{The New Zealand Herald} argued that with the inclusion of Bonar Law, Arthur J. Balfour and Walter Long the new British Government 'will certainly restore confidence throughout the Empire'.\textsuperscript{31}

The New Zealand Government was apprehensive over the political developments in Great Britain. In the middle of a war, the reconstruction of the British Government was perceived as a major risk and it unsettled New Zealand's principal policy-makers. Liverpool informed the Colonial Office that changes to the British Government 'will be deeply regretted in New Zealand'. The New Zealand Government considered that Harcourt had performed his task as Colonial Secretary admirably. With some success, Harcourt had made the difficult transition from peace to war. The New Zealand Government preferred a degree of stability and continuity in a position so crucial to its interests. With Harcourt's removal a new inexperienced British politician would have to be educated to understand New Zealand's particular needs. Massey wisely suspected that Bonar Law would not be fully committed to his new position.\textsuperscript{32} The New Zealand Government did not have a say in the matter. Liverpool and Massey accepted the inevitable and thanked Harcourt for his service over the last four and half years.\textsuperscript{33} Harcourt remained philosophical about his departure. He told Liverpool that 'as a cook cannot make omelettes without breaking eggs, so a Prime Minister cannot make a Coalition without breaking colleagues, and as the incoming Tories had to be fed with big offices, it was natural that mine should be one of them'.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Press}, 20 May 1915, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Press}, 25 May 1915, p. 6. The editor wrote: 'The sudden determination to reorganise the British Cabinet met with the unanimous approval of the whole Empire, and at the same time confirmed a painful misgiving that all had not been going well with the British arrangements for carrying on the war'. Also see \textit{NZ Times}, 28 May 1914, p. 4. The editor of \textit{The New Zealand Times} viewed the changes to Asquith's Cabinet as beneficial. The removal of Harcourt did not concern the editor because 'Mr Bonar Law, has, by accepting the position of Secretary for Colonies, proved his bona fides, for, as leader of the Opposition, he might well have aspired to a more brilliant office'.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Press}, 27 May 1915, p. 6; \textit{ST}, 27 May 1915, p. 4. \textit{NZH}, 27 May 1915, p. 6. The editor of \textit{The New Zealand Herald} labelled the appointment of Bonar Law to the Colonial Office as 'a gratifying intimation that the Overseas Dominions are not among the least of British interests'.

\textsuperscript{32} Liverpool to Harcourt, 21 May 1915, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/333, Harcourt Papers; Gov NZ to SSCols, 21 May 1915, G5/15.

\textsuperscript{33} Liverpool to Harcourt, 28 May 1915, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/336, Harcourt Papers; GovNZ to SSCols, 28 May 1915, G5/15.

\textsuperscript{34} Harcourt to Liverpool, 7 Jun 1915, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/340, Harcourt Papers. Despite Harcourt's fall from grace, Liverpool continued to write to 'Lulu' describing the major events in the Dominion.
In terms of establishing a rapport with the new Colonial Secretary, Andrew Bonar Law was a different proposition for Liverpool. While Harcourt and Liverpool had been close personal friends and shared a similar liberal ideology, Bonar Law was an ambitious Conservative. Despite his initial scepticism, Liverpool vowed 'to assist and cooperate' with Bonar Law. There was a smooth transition period. Bonar Law retained Harcourt's private secretary, John Davidson, and Liverpool alerted him to the outstanding issues in British-New Zealand relations. Much to Bonar Law's appreciation, Liverpool maintained the same level of private correspondence on the public affairs of New Zealand as he did for Harcourt. This service made no real indentation on Bonar Law's lack of enthusiasm for his new assignment. As the leader of the Unionist Party, he felt that Asquith had duped him by assigning him a second-rate post when he was led to believe that he was in line for a major ministry. According to Davidson, Bonar Law made it perfectly clear that his appointment as the Colonial Secretary was a mere stepping-stone in his political career.

The establishment of a coalition government in Great Britain produced a ground swell of public support for Massey to follow Asquith's example. Calls for a coalition government intensified in New Zealand and pressure came from unexpected quarters. At the annual conference of the Auckland Branch of the New Zealand Farmers' Union in May, the president called on Massey and Ward to put aside their personal differences in the formation of a national government. Newspapers throughout the Dominion also began to insist on the creation of a national government of unity to enable New Zealand to efficiently prosecute the war. The Evening Post, which had been advocating a coalition deal for months, pointed out that it was hardly a dramatic step to take since the idea had the support of most New Zealanders. Even the official Liberal newspaper, The New Zealand Times, argued that the only way 'to overcome the arrogant enemy' was 'to form a National Government'.

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35 GovNZ to SSCols, 28 May 1915, G5/15; SSCols to GovNZ, 1 Jun 1915, G41/10.
36 James, Memoirs of a Conservative, p. 25.
39 EP, 16 Jun 1915, p. 6; ST, 16 Jun 1915, p. 4. The editor of The Southland Times noted: 'The one thing that the country will not have at the present time is party wrangling, and it is for Parliament to get rid of it. The national crisis demands harmony and unity alike in the nation and in the legislature, and nothing would jar the people's feelings more unpleasantly than the discords of party warfare'. Also see ST, 22 Jun 1915, p. 4. The editor felt that party interests 'are, indeed, trivial in comparison with the national interests which engross the public mind. Mr Massey would lose nothing by paving the way for a union of political forces to last until the war ends, and we feel sure that if the opening presented itself Sir Joseph Ward would turn it to advantage. The people cannot be expected to regard party politics very seriously at this juncture, and they are certainly in no humour to be amused by them. The obvious thing to do, therefore, is to bury party politics while the war lasts and let us have a united Parliament at the head of a united people'.
40 NZ Times, 20 May 1915, p. 4.
Leading voices from both sides of the political spectrum slowly began to entertain the idea of a Reform-Liberal coalition. As early as January 1915, Allen raised the question with Godley. He argued that a coalition 'is the proper thing to do during the wartime. It is, however, hard to bring it about. Ward is a very difficult person to deal with'. Godley did not dispute Allen's prose over the efficacy of political harmony in New Zealand. He consistently maintained that the formation of a coalition government was the 'right thing' to do. In his eyes, it would guarantee Parliamentary support for the introduction of conscription and a satisfactory output of munitions. Godley remained frank and open about his convictions. In February 1915 he wrote to Ward from Egypt expressing his concerns. He told Ward:

The political situation in New Zealand seems to be very difficult, and I wonder very much what is happening. I rather hope that you may have been able to arrange with Mr Massey for some sort of coalition till the end of the War. In any case, it is very satisfactory to feel sure, as I do from our point of view that, as regards reinforcements and support for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, it does not make any difference what Government is in power in New Zealand.

Speaking at a Reform Club luncheon, Christopher J. Parr, the Reform member for Eden, suggested that if Massey were to invite Ward and two other Liberals to join Reform in a National Government 'the voice of the country would be strongly heard in favour of such an arrangement'. The task of co-ordinating New Zealand's war effort 'called for the best business and organising brains of the Dominion'. Another prominent Reform politician, George J. Anderson of Mataura, stated that: 'Recent developments in the Mother Country have necessarily given a very definite direction to the private discussion of the New Zealand position'. He argued that at 'the present juncture the leaders of the parties should not be fighting little battles . . . the best minds of both sides should be guide the ship of state'. The first senior Liberal to openly support the creation of a wartime alliance with Reform was the member for Auckland East, Arthur M. Myers. During an interview, Myers suggested that a majority of the Liberal caucus were favourably disposed to the idea. However, the

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41 Allen to Godley, 18 Jan 1915, WA252, Godley Papers.
42 Godley to Professor H. Bingham, 13 Jun 1915, WA252/6, Godley Papers.
43 Godley to Ward, 9 Feb 1915, WA252/6, Godley Papers.
44 Press, 22 May 1915, p. 6.
45 LT, 1 Jun 1915, p. 6.
46 Press, 22 May 1915, p. 6.
vast majority of Liberals refused to reveal their opinion. The question of forming a coalition government was left in the hands of Ward.\textsuperscript{47}

On 24 June 1915 Parliament reconvened. After six months of political manoeuvring, Reform entered the new parliamentary session with a majority of two seats. According to Otago political scientist Anthony Wood, Reform had ‘a fairly strong claim’ to the Northern Maori member, Tau Henare.\textsuperscript{48} With Henare’s vote, and after Reform had elected the Speaker, Massey had forty votes to Ward’s thirty-nine. In his opening speech, Liverpool stressed the need for political cooperation and harmony. He stated that ‘no legislation the discussion of which would involve party strife should be submitted to you’.\textsuperscript{49} After meeting with Massey and Ward, Liverpool assured Bonar Law that the Government could continue ‘without great anxiety’ with such a small majority so long as Reform did not ‘bring forward anything of a controversial nature’.\textsuperscript{50} Ward remained open to the idea that Liverpool dubbed ‘public business without friction’. On 24 June he promised Liverpool that the Liberal Party would ‘endeavour to assist the Government in the energetic prosecution of the war’.\textsuperscript{51}

Later that evening Massey revealed a similar disposition. He agreed with Liverpool’s sentiments that his Government would not ‘attempt anything which could not be carried out with unanimity by all sections of both parties’.\textsuperscript{52} In terms of forging a permanent union, Liverpool’s aspirations fluctuated. ‘I am in hopes’, he wrote to Godley, ‘of being able to bring the two parties together, at all events until the conclusions of hostilities’.\textsuperscript{53} On the other hand, he informed Bonar Law that he was prepared ‘to do all in my power to prevent any acrimonious debate of any kind until after the conclusion of the war’.\textsuperscript{54} Liverpool judged ‘that it is impossible for a National Ministry to be formed in this Dominion at the present juncture’.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{LT}, 25 May 1915, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{NZPD}, v. 172, 24 Jun 1915, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{50} Liverpool to Bonar Law, 25 Jun 1915, Item 21/3, Davidson Papers.
\textsuperscript{51} Liverpool to Bonar Law, 25 Jun 1915, Item 21/3, Davidson Papers. Liverpool informed Ward that the Government did not have any intentions of trying to pass controversial legislation. The Government intended to pass the Imprest Bill, the War Loan Bill followed by the Pensions and Finance Bill. Liverpool thought that Ward ‘was most fair minded in all the remarks which he made’. Ward told Liverpool that he was not adverse to the idea of forming a National Ministry but he felt there was not ‘unanimity amongst rank and file’ Liberal and Reform supporters.
\textsuperscript{52} Liverpool to Bonar Law, 25 Jun 1915, Item 21/3, Davidson Papers.
\textsuperscript{53} Liverpool to Godley, 21 Jun 1915, WA252/8, Godley Papers.
\textsuperscript{54} Liverpool to Bonar Law, 25 Jun 1915, Item 21/3, Davidson Papers. Also see Liverpool to Bonar Law, 23 Jun 1915, Item 21/2, Davidson Papers. Liverpool, conscious that his role in the formation of a coalition government might cause some consternation in the Colonial Office, informed Bonar Law that he was ‘bound to go extremely carefully in order that the whole proceedings shall be carried out constitutionally’.
\textsuperscript{55} GovNZ to SSCols, 25 Jun 1915, G48/20/P/5. Ward assured Liverpool that he would ‘assist the Government in all measures connected with the war and endeavour to ensure the passage of all public business without friction. I do not therefore anticipate being faced with any difficulties’.
Over the next five days Massey contemplated his position. He faced a hostile political environment. His Government held a narrow majority in Parliament and he had given his word to Liverpool that it would not pass 'anything controversial'. In effect, Massey's promise abrogated the legislative prerogative of the executive. It amounted to a political truce at a time when tough measures were desperately needed to maintain New Zealand's military contribution. The escalating costs of the war required increased taxation and the casualties suffered by the NZEF Main Body at Gallipoli were placing a heavy strain on New Zealand's volunteer recruitment system. Massey’s Government also faced mounting domestic problems created by the war. Reform appeared indifferent and unwilling to grapple with the socio-economic inequalities produced by inflationary government expenditure and the international commodity boom. The public severely criticised Massey for failing to solve the chronic shortage of wheat and curb the dramatic surge in the cost-of-living.

By the end of June Massey had few alternatives. If he wanted to retain some form of power he would have to form a national administration with Ward. Massey’s reasons were entirely understandable as well as politically expedient. Along with Asquith, Massey deliberately chose the idea of a coalition 'as a means of saving himself from the more distant but more deadly threat of a General Election. In this way he hoped to continue to muffle Opposition attacks ... and hold on to office in hope of presiding over a military victory'. This important point has been overlooked in the historiography. For Massey, the decision to create a coalition with the Liberals was based primarily on a strategy of political survival than a desire to imitate the political situation in Great Britain. With the participation of senior Liberal members in the Secret Defence Committee, a Parliamentary body set up to consider war matters referred to it by the House or the Minister of Defence, an ad hoc national administration was already effectively in place.

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56 Liverpool to Bonar Law, 25 Jun 1915, Item 21/3, Davidson Papers. By the opening of Parliament, Massey knew Reform would need Liberal support to increase indirect and direct taxation by hitting land tax, income tax and stamp duties. They had five other taxation measures and in total the Government expected to raise an additional £400,000 in revenue.


On 29 June 1915 Massey informed Parliament that he was prepared 'to consider any reasonable proposal to establish a national Cabinet in this country, thus following in a small way what has been done in the United Kingdom'. Massey elaborated further on the subject. It was generally recognised that Government business 'in the present session, and perhaps for a very long time to come' ought to be 'of an Imperial character, and should not be dealt with . . . on ordinary party lines'. He added that his proposal referred 'only to the war period'. Massey's offer took Ward completely by surprise. He had no quick riposte. Ward confessed that: 'Until I entered this chamber just now I had no idea that it was proposed by the right honourable gentleman to deal with this very important matter'. He remained cautious, informing Parliament that the offer 'will require to be most carefully considered by myself and those associated with me before I can give any expression of opinion upon it'.

Ward's non-committal attitude was a clever piece of politicking. It was calculated to ratchet up the Liberal price for participating in a national government. He wanted to make sure that he was in a position of strength when it came to negotiating a coalition deal with Massey.

On 1 July the official coalition talks between Reform and the Liberals began. Initially, Massey offered Ward just three seats in a Cabinet of nine and two were without full salary. Massey insisted that Reform should retain the crucial portfolios of Defence and Finance as well as the prime ministership. Ward's caucus rejected the offer as 'unfair' on the basis that it was hardly commensurate with the Liberals' strength in Parliament.

Over the next three weeks Massey came back to the negotiating table with two improved offers but the talks broke down on 28 July. The major stumbling block was Massey's insistence that his party retain the two key ministerial posts in Cabinet, Finance and Defence.

Over this period, the Liberals continued to scrutinise Allen's ability to manage the country's war effort. In late June it became public knowledge that eighteen men had contracted cerebrospinal meningitis at the Trentham Army training camp because of the atrocious living conditions, overcrowding and bad weather. The Liberals argued that Allen's mismanagement of the Defence Department had caused the medical

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61 NZPD, v. 172, 29 Jun 1915, p. 57. Also see ODT, 30 Jun 1915, p. 4. The Otago Daily Times considered the creation of a National Government an 'imperative to triumph in the war' because the most 'ablest' people would be administering New Zealand's war effort.

62 LT, 7 Jul 1915, p. 6.

63 Liverpool to Bonar Law, 7 Jul 1915, Item 21/4, Davidson Papers. Liverpool informed Bonar Law that negotiations for a National Government had begun but two difficulties prevented immediate agreement. Firstly, 'that neither of the Leaders can rely upon the unanimity of his followers'. Secondly, 'both Parties are afraid that if a National Ministry is formed it will mean the elimination of the existing Parties as at present constituted'.
disaster. Five days into the coalition talks, Massey responded to the allegations by appointing a Royal Commission.\textsuperscript{64} Two days later at the Reform caucus Massey relieved the exhausted Allen of the greater part of the administration of the Finance Department to allow him to concentrate on Defence.\textsuperscript{65} On 27 July Massey wrote to Ward proposing a Cabinet of six Reform Ministers, five Liberal and one Maori representative. Massey insisted that he should remain Prime Minister and that he would pick up the burden as Minister of Defence. At this stage, Massey still supported Allen and wanted him to retain his finance portfolio.\textsuperscript{66}

On 28 July the Liberal-Labour caucus took just over two and a half hours to reject Massey's latest offer. The proposal to remove Allen from his defence responsibilities did satisfy Ward's demands. The Liberals considered that the Trentham Affair warranted Allen's total exclusion from any national cabinet.\textsuperscript{67} Ward's own ambitions began to complicate matters as well. He evidently preferred his old domain in the Finance Department, which, as he explained to the Liberals, was a far more important office than defence. The Liberal caucus agreed with Ward's assessment. If they were going to share in the unpopularity of administering the war, they deserved to have ministerial posts equal to their numbers in Parliament. The Liberals were also resigned to fact that if they joined with Reform they risked alienating their Labour caucus members.\textsuperscript{68} The political consequences for the Liberals to join the coalition were potentially damaging. The Liberals maintained that if Reform wanted to form a national government, Massey would have to dance to a Liberal tune.

Just as the political impasse appeared irreconcilable in stepped Liverpool. At the eleventh hour the Governor rekindled hopes of a coalition agreement. With the consent of the major protagonists, Liverpool arranged for the coalition talks to resume at his private residence in Government House. While Liverpool privately blamed the Reform Party for the breakdown in negotiations, no precedent existed in New Zealand's history for such an overt act of political interference by a Governor. Liverpool insisted that his decision to interfere in New Zealand's domestic political

\textsuperscript{65} Press, 9 Jul 1915, p. 6; Wood, 'The Origins of the National Government', p. 189. Also see G. F. Dixon to L. Voller, 9 Jan 1945, AG458/1.
\textsuperscript{66} LT, 29 Jul 1915, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{67} Liverpool to Bonar Law, 5 Aug 1915, Item 21/5, Davidson Papers.
\textsuperscript{68} Wood, 'The Origins of the National Government', p. 200; B. Brown, The Rise of the New Zealand Labour Party: A History of the New Zealand Labour Party From 1916 to 1940, Wellington, 1962, pp. 18-21; Oliver, The Story of New Zealand, p. 170. According to W. H. Oliver: 'The six Labour members had been invited to send a representative to the coalition cabinet, but refused. For many Labour leaders the 'imperialistic' war was to be boycotted; while the nations faced each other across the trenches they, like a socialist remnant everywhere, remained faithful to a class.'
scene was entirely justifiable. In a private letter to Bonar Law, Liverpool rigorously defended his actions. He argued that his intervention was required on the grounds that another election would have meant 'nothing being done for six solid weeks, and in that time all business connected with our reinforcements and equipment of recruits would be at a standstill'.

Before the renewed negotiations, Massey decided that Allen would have to be permanently removed from the equation. He had become a political liability and therefore expendable. Massey tried several times to oust Allen. Initially, Massey sent Bell as an emissary to Allen with an offer of a knighthood as an inducement to resign but he refused to accept the offer. Massey then asked Liverpool to approach Allen. By this time Allen was apparently suffering from severe work related stress and the emotional trauma caused by the death of his eldest son. On 15 June Lord Kitchener had personally telegraphed Allen, passing on his commiserations that Lieutenant John Allen had been killed in action while fighting in Gallipoli. According to his private secretary, Allen 'was working to the point of mental and physical exhaustion day in, day out'. In this frame of mind, Liverpool found Allen to be 'most

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69 Liverpool to Bonar Law, 25 Jun 1915, Davidson Papers; NZPD, v. 172, 4 Aug 1915, p. 651. Massey subsequently revealed in Parliament about a week ago it looked as if negotiations had come to an end. His Excellency the Governor, however, actuated by that wide Imperial spirit which he possesses, and acting quite constitutionally - and with he [sic] consent, I may say, of both the leader of the Opposition and myself - convened a conference of the principal men on both sides of the House to consider this very important proposal'. Also see W. Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, 1968, pp. 82-120; O. H. Phillips, *The Constitutional Law of Great Britain and the Commonwealth*, London, 1952, pp. 54-63; Liverpool to Harcourt, 24 Aug 1915, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/345, Harcourt Papers. Liverpool informed Harcourt that Ward was not the main difficulty in the negotiations. Liverpool calculated that the coalition talks broke down for three major reasons. Firstly, Reform tried to keep all the important Cabinet positions. Secondly, the political fallout from the Trentham Affair. Thirdly, the fear of both parties that a coalition, if the war lasted, 'would disappear'. Also see NZPD, v. 172, 4 Aug 1915, p. 652. Ward was careful to point out that the arrangement was not a permanent union of the two parties and that the Liberals considered it an expedient wartime measure to secure unity of action.

70 Supplementary Notes to Lois Voller's Thesis on Sir James Allen Prepared by Charles Richards Allen, Chapter 8, p. 2, M1/140/A; G. F. Dixon to L. Voller, 9 Jan 1945, AG458/1; Bell to Liverpool, 30 Apr 1919, MS5210/049, Bell Family Papers.

71 Allen to Godley, 16 Jun 1915, M1/15/2, Allen Papers; G. F. Dixon to L. Voller, 10 Feb 1943, AG458/3b; Allen to Godley, 30 Oct 1914, WA252, Godley Papers; NZPD, v. 172, 25 Jun 1915, pp. 28-9. Ward moved a resolution in the House of Representatives to express to the Hon. James Allen, his wife, and family our sincere sympathy with them in the death of their distinguished son and relative, Lieutenant J. H. Allen, an officer of the Imperial Army, who fell at the front fighting for the Empire. John Hugh Allen was called to Bar and was about to return to New Zealand but he cancelled his passage and joined the University Officers Training Corps. He received a Commission in Kitchener's Army. Also see G. F. Dixon to L. Voller, 9 Jan 1945, AG458/1. After receiving news of his son's death, Allen sought greater family support primarily from his daughter, Edina Mary Montgomery, who moved to Wellington to be with him. Also see Allen to Lady Godley, 11 Aug 1915, M1/25/3. In a letter to Lady Godley, Allen confessed: 'We were indeed hopeful that his life might be spared to do more service to his country, but this was not to be. It is indeed sad to think that so many young lives are being spent on these wretched battle-fields; the only consolation is that we cannot believe for a moment that these lives will be spent in vain'. Also see Baker, *King and Country Call*, p. 42. In total, seventy-six sons of the MPs served in the war and nine did not return home.

72 G. F. Dixon to L. Voller, 9 Jan 1945, AG458/1.
uncompromising', Allen refused to be swayed. While he was prepared to relinquish the finance portfolio, Allen informed Liverpool that 'he would not under any circumstances remain a member of a Ministry if both these portfolios were taken from him'. He was not going to be made Ward's sacrificial lamb. In Allen's view, Ward's 'patriotism was skin deep and simply a veneer and beneath the veneer is the desire to have us off the Treasury benches'. Allen calculated that Liverpool and Massey would not want to risk a by-election. His strategy of brinkmanship proved effective. Liverpool and Massey retreated from the idea of removing Allen from office. Their only alternative was to persuade Ward to accept Allen in a National Cabinet; a *quid pro quo* that Massey knew would cost Reform a high price in the negotiations. It may have been coincidental, but Massey omitted Allen from the New Year's Honour's List. Allen's son later recalled that his father never counted Massey among his close personal friends.

The Government House Conference was held on 2 August. According to Liverpool's report, eight Reform and Liberal representatives attended the meeting. On the suggestion of the two leaders, Liverpool opened the conference. He warned the participants that they faced two alternatives: agreement on the formation of a coalition government or the dissolution of Parliament. Liverpool considered that the second alternative 'would be disastrous to the best interests of New Zealand and the Empire'. He asked the participants to suspend temporarily 'lifelong ideas and aspirations' and called on them to make sacrifices to 'achieve the maximum amount of

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74 Liverpool to Bonar Law, 5 Aug 1915, Item 21/5, Davidson Papers; G. F. Dixon to L. Voller, 9 Jan 1945, AG458/2. According to Allen's private secretary, G. F. Dixon, Allen slammed the door after a meeting with Massey over the troubles with Trentham Camp. Allen threatened to topple Massey's Government by resigning altogether and he turned down the offer to accept a K. C. M. G. because it 'had a nasty favour for him'. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 1 Jan 1916, G5/15. Massey managed to persuade British authorities to give the K. C. M. G. to Mackenzie instead of Allen.
75 Allen to Godley, 11 May 1915, M1/15, Allen Papers. Allen's letter is a fairly bitter condemnation of the 'wretched' Liberals.
76 See Liverpool to Bonar Law, 5 Aug 1914, Item 21/5, Davidson Papers. On 24 July Liverpool met with Massey and Ward to find a compromise over Allen's fate. He tried his best to persuade Ward that Allen should remain as the Minister of Defence in a National Ministry but Ward refused to accept this.
77 SSCols to GovNZ, 28 Dec 1915, G5/15; SSCols to GovNZ, 1 Jan 1916, G5/15. Mackenzie was given the KCMG instead.
78 Supplementary Notes to Lois Voller's Thesis on Sir James Alien Prepared by Charles Richards Allen, Chapter 8, p. 1, M1/140/A. He informed Voller that 'Mr Massey had qualities making for popularity which my father may have lacked'. Charles also felt that if Lois's thesis 'is to do justice to my father it should surely record that he was willing in the interests of the country to lay down his portfolio as Minister of Defence'.
79 Liverpool to Bonar Law, 5 Aug 1915, Item 21/5, Davidson Papers. Liverpool was clearly placing the onus on Massey to reach an agreement. Liverpool's threat to dissolve Parliament amounted to an ultimatum to the Reform delegates: form a coalition or face possible defeat at a General Election.
THAT NATIONAL CABINET AT LAST—HIS EXCELLENCY TAKES A HAND.

Governor Liverpool: Now then, Bill and Joe, this is not a time for slogging each other. Here, clasp hands and work and fight together against the common enemy outside. Our soldiers are risking their lives, and everyone else is making sacrifices. Why not you?

Taken from The Freelance, 6 August 1915.
good for the State and Empire'. Liverpool assured Bonar Law that his actions were appropriate, informing the Colonial Secretary that he told them all how difficult it was for one who represented His Majesty the King to touch even the margin of the political arena, but that there were times when it was the duty of the individual to decide to interfere in any way in the political affairs of this Dominion, and would realise the motives which prompted my action.

After his opening speech, Liverpool left the room because he 'felt they would prefer to discuss the matters in dispute amongst themselves'.

An hour and a half later Massey reappeared and asked Liverpool to rejoin the meeting. The two political parties had come to a decision on the arrangements for a coalition government in New Zealand. The terms of coalition agreement represented a major victory for the Liberal team of negotiators. There was to be equal Reform and Liberal representation in the new Cabinet. In addition, Dr. Maui Pomare, the Western Maori member, would act as the Maori representative in Cabinet. Massey retained his position as Prime Minister, Ward would become Minister of Finance and Allen would remain the Minister of Defence. Certain legislative measures were to be postponed and divisions in National Cabinet were to be avoided as much as possible. Each party caucus ratified these terms and they were announced in Parliament on 4 August.

Concealing his true political motives, Massey told Parliament:

> The Empire is passing through the most serious crisis in its history. I think members will agree with me in this: that it is impossible for a Government with a slender majority to do all the work and all the business that require to be done in order to enable the Dominion of New Zealand to do its duty to the Empire of which it is a part. That, Sir, is practically the only reason for the formation of the National Cabinet, and I believe - I hope, at all events - that what is being done today will prove to be both for the good of the Empire and of our own country.

Over the next couple of weeks four other conditions of the agreement were revealed, highlighting 'the extent to which Ward had driven a hard bargain'. The Liberal Party insisted that a Board should be established to investigate allegations of
The Politics of Diplomacy

profiteering and to make recommendations to the Government on price control. The Reform Party also agreed to shelve plans to introduce the Legislative Council Bill. Two other secret stipulations that were not revealed to the New Zealand public at the time were part of the agreement. Both parties agreed that there should not be a general election until at least six months after the conclusion of the war. The most interesting revelation was the notion of dual leadership - Massey was to retain the prime ministership in name only. Apparently Ward won the right to share the Prime Minister's duties in Cabinet, at functions and deputations. According to political scientist L. C. Webb, 'the public knew nothing of the Ward-Massey dyarchy and regarded Massey as the head of the Government'.

The provision that all National Cabinet decisions had to be unanimous nullified the Prime Minister's privilege of possessing the casting vote. This had a significant impact on the decision-making process. Even the most ardent supporter of the National Government, Sir Francis Bell, described the National Cabinet as 'cumbersome in action and perpetually agitated by intrigues and dissensions'. Over the course of the war, the National Cabinet slowly became grid locked and incapable

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84 NZPD, v. 183, 30 Oct 1918, p. 105; Massey to Bell, 15 Feb 1919, MSS210/049, Bell Family Papers; Liverpool to Bell, 29 Apr 1919, MSS210/049, Bell Family Papers; Bell to Liverpool, 30 Apr 1919, MSS210/049, Bell Family Papers; Bell to Massey, 2 May 1919, MSS210/049, Bell Family Papers. Massey informed Bell that it was arranged that if the National Government broke up Liverpool would grant Reform a dissolution. Liverpool denied the existence of such an unconstitutional deal.

85 L. C. Webb, 'The Rise of the Reform Party: A History of Party Politics in New Zealand Between 1910 and 1920', B. A. (Hons.) History, University of Canterbury, 1928, p. 148. Webb obtained this information from Sir Joseph Ward himself. Also see J. O. Wilson, New Zealand Parliamentary Record 1840-1984, Wellington, 1985, p. 282; Gardner, W. F. Massey in Power, 1912-1925', Political Science, v. 13, 2 (1961), p. 13. Ward stated that he intended to continue as Leader of the Opposition but in reality the only opposition in Parliament until the break up of the coalition was the small group of six Labour members. Also see MW, 14 Jul 1915, p. 6; MW, 21 Jul 1915, p. 6; NZPD, v. 172, 4 Aug 1915, pp. 653-4; Press, 5 Aug 1915, p. 6. The position of Labour in relationship to the coalition was confusing. The Maoriland Worker continued to argue that it was in the best interests of Labour to remain aloof from any coalition. While the SDP remained committed to its own independence, the member for Grey Lynn, John Payne, announced in Parliament that he would assist the new Government 'in carrying out what is best for the country'. Labour representatives were also offered a place in the new Cabinet but after the remaining five Labour members (A. H. Hindmarsh, James McCombs, Andrew Walker, William A. Veitch and P. C. Webb) met on 4 August they refused a seat in the new National Cabinet. They decided that the extent of Labour support for the National Government depended upon its measures. In effect, these five members became the Opposition in Parliament for the next four years. On the impact of the Liberal decision to participate in the National Government and its relations with Labour see Wood, 'The Origins of the National Government', pp. 209-13. According to Wood, 'Ward's entry into the National Government gave the Liberal-Labour alliance its death blow, and helped to make possible the formation of the New Zealand Labour Party in 1916'. Also see Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward, pp. 223-5; P. J. O'Farrell, Harry Holland: Militant Socialist, Canberra, 1964, pp. 68-72.


87 Stewart, The Right Honourable Sir Francis Bell, p. 120.
of decisive domestic leadership. In 1920 Massey spoke about the effect of this condition on the operation of Cabinet:

My experience of parliamentary government in this country is that if a Government is going to work well and do its duty to the country, or do any work for the country, the members of the Cabinet must, on the more important questions of the day, be of one way of thinking. The National Government did good work as far as the carrying-on of the war was concerned. Its weakness lay in the fact that there were many questions upon which its members did not agree, and in connection with which we therefore did nothing.\(^{88}\)

On 5 August the members of the National Cabinet were sworn into office. Massey remained Prime Minister and Minister in charge of Lands, Labour, Industries and Commerce and the Electoral Department. Ward became the Minister of Finance and the Postmaster-General. He was also responsible for Telegraphs, the Land and Income Tax Department and the Public Trust Office. Allen stayed at his post as Minister of Defence. The Liberals were given other high offices. Dr. Robert McNab was made Minister of Justice, George W. Russell became the Minister of Internal Affairs, William D. S. MacDonald became Minister of Agriculture and Josiah A. Hanan was given the Education portfolio. The first senior Liberal to recognise the possibility of a Reform-Liberal coalition, Arthur M. Myers, was rewarded with the portfolio of Customs. He was also given charge of the newly created Department of Munitions and Supplies. The Reform Party managed to retain some key ministerial posts. William H. Herries was assigned the Railway and Native Affairs portfolios and was ranked fourth in Cabinet. Alexander L. Herdman became Attorney-General and Minister of Police, William Fraser became Minister of Public Works and Sir Francis H. D. Bell was assigned the Immigration portfolio and remained Leader of the Legislative Council. The thirteenth member of the National Cabinet, Dr. Maui Pomare, was officially designated a member of the Executive Council representing the 'Native Race, and in Charge of Maori Councils, Cook and other Islands Administration'.\(^{89}\) After the formal induction ceremony Massey remarked that every member of the National Cabinet 'felt that in a great Imperial crisis such as that now being experienced, it was his duty to sink personal interests so that the two parties in the State might work together for the good of the country, and the Empire'.\(^{90}\)

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\(^{88}\) *NZPD*, v. 186, 8 Jul 1920 p. 267.
\(^{90}\) *ODT*, 7 Aug 1915, p. 7.
Newspapers throughout the Dominion reacted favourably to the creation of the National Government. The *Otago Daily Times* reported that the Governor had received a telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies congratulating New Zealand's politicians for the move. The editor of *The Otago Witness* 'regretted that the interposition of the Governor was necessary . . . On the whole Mr Massey and Mr Ward have performed a difficult and delicate task wisely and well, and they are to be congratulated accordingly'. *The New Zealand Freelance* argued under the editorial headline 'Patriotism Prevails Over Party' that: 'The formation of the National Ministry cannot fail to be hailed with high satisfaction in the Motherland, proving as it does the heart felt desire of New Zealand's Parliamentarians to sacrifice all personal and party interests for the good of the Empire and the Empire's cause'. The editor of *The New Zealand Herald* was relieved 'that all difficulties have at last been surmounted and the grave Imperial and national crisis will now be faced and dealt with by a cabinet whose personell [sic] could not be greatly improved upon under all the circumstances'.

The National Government officially took office on 12 August 1915. Above and beyond most people's expectations, the coalition lasted precisely four years and nine days. In the early days of the National Government, forecasts of longevity were hard to find. When Parliament reassembled on 19 August 1915, Massey made it clear that the formation of the coalition did not 'indicate any change in the opinions of the members of the new Government or their supporters'. Ward also stressed that it was a 'union for the currency of the war' and it was not the fusion of the two parties. While the two parties did not sacrifice their particular ideologies, Massey was forced to demote a few close friends. Some, like Robert H. Rhodes, had to resign their ministerial posts to make way for the incoming Liberal members of Cabinet. In Gardner's view, 'Allen's political sacrifice was heavy'. He gave up Finance and kept Defence, bearing the brunt 'for the most unpopular aspects of the war administration in New Zealand, while Ward took up again the levers he had so often and so

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91 *NZH*, 5 Aug 1915, p. 6. According to the editor of *The New Zealand Herald*, the formal announcement of a National Cabinet 'is beyond question most satisfactory and reflects the greatest credit upon rival political leaders, whose patriotism has overcome all difficulties'. Also see *ODT*, 5 Aug 1915, p. 4; *Press*, 12 Aug 1915, p. 6.
94 *NZF*, v. 15, no. 788, 6 Aug 1915, p. 6.
95 *NZH*, 7 Aug 1915, p. 6. The editor was highly critical of the enlarged National Cabinet. Nevertheless, the editor was pleased that Allen retained the Defence portfolio and that a Ministry of Munitions and Supplies had been created.
97 *NZPD*, v. 173, 19 Aug 1915, p. 9; *Press*, 20 Aug 1915, p. 6. The editor felt bound 'to complain of the fact that in their speeches the two Ministers both emphasised the fact that the two main parties have made no surrender of their principles'.

successfully manipulated to the Liberal advantage'. Despite the personal cost of the political arrangement, Allen tried his best to remain positive about the fate of the new government. He wrote to Mackenzie: 'I hope you are satisfied with the National Ministry. I do not know how it will work but we shall try and do our best to keep things going in the interests of the Empire and our country'.

Over the course of war Allen developed mixed feelings over the benefit of the National Government. 'One feels', Allen confided to Godley in early January 1916, 'however, that we are sitting upon the top of a volcano which may break out at some unknown time. There is not the same confidence as men of the same political faith'. By the end of the first month, Allen described the impact of the coalition on the New Zealand political scene to Mackenzie in London:

The Coalition Government has been getting on fairly well, but the House is somewhat out of control as the Party organisation is to some extent superseded. Many of the men look upon themselves as free lances. The Government sometimes feels it difficult to realise what the position is on any particular question.

A year later Allen provided a more balanced assessment to his friend and former Reform colleague, William Downie Stewart (who was serving with the Otago Battalion in France at the time). His initial expectations had been exceeded. Allen described Cabinet as 'a more successful institution that at one time I thought it would be'. Despite some teething problems, Reform and Liberal members were working 'pretty well together' but he still considered Ward 'a difficulty', calling him 'vain'. Not everyone involved in the national administration was as fatalistic as Allen. Bell believed that bipartisan political cooperation had some practical value in wartime: 'I think the new move has public approval and we shall be able to do more in union than by party'.

Within hours of taking office, the best and brightest in New Zealand politics were faced with a complex array of problems created by the war. As the new Minister of Finance, Ward's first task was to organise the country's war finances that had fallen

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100 Allen to Godley, 4 Jan 1916, WA252/3, Godley Papers.
102 Allen to Stewart, 7 Jul 1916, MS985/11/3, William Downie Stewart Papers.
103 Stewart, The Right Honourable Sir Francis Bell, p. 120.
into a state of confusion following months of political uncertainty. Ward inherited a policy mess from his Reform predecessor who, for a variety of political and ideological reasons, had been reluctant to apply government solutions to the problem of financing New Zealand's war effort. The Reform Party insisted that greater government intervention in the economy would be counterproductive and fail to combat profiteering, reduce inflation and finance the escalating war costs. As a result, Allen's Financial Statement of 6 August 1914 did not include provision for the cost of the equipping and maintaining the NZEF Main Body.\textsuperscript{104} Reflecting the Government's general hope that the war would be over very quickly, Allen's Financial Statement took no steps towards emergency procurements.

It soon became apparent that vast amounts of money would have to be found to ensure the viability of the country's war expenditure programme. Less than a week after Allen had presented his Financial Statement, the New Zealand Government had accepted 'all financial responsibility' in connection with the NZEF Main Body.\textsuperscript{105} On 21 August Parliament approved Allen's proposal to raise £2 million on Treasury Bills in London for war expenses.\textsuperscript{106} In October 1914 Sir Thomas Mackenzie arranged with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, and the Bank of England, an imperial war loan. The funds were transferred to New Zealand in monthly instalments at an interest rate of 4.5 per cent.\textsuperscript{107} In March Allen admitted that the loan would not cover all of country's war expenses. He conceded that a special war-tax might be necessary.\textsuperscript{108} His difficulties were further compounded by his heavy workload and Massey's refusal to reconvene Parliament after the election. For the next seven months, between November 1914 and June 1915, Allen was forced to raise additional funds in London drawing upon New Zealand's reserve securities as collateral.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{105} GovNZ to SSCols, 11 Aug 1914, G41/1.
\textsuperscript{107} NZPD, v. 171, 30 Oct 1914, pp. 587-90. Under instructions from Allen, Mackenzie arranged a deputation along with South Africa and Canada to secure a scheme whereby the British Government guaranteed the Dominions financial assistance during the war. Allen and Ward clashed in Parliament over who was responsible for this forward thinking. Ward wanted people to think that Mackenzie was the primary instigator of the negotiations. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 26 Nov 1914, G5/14; SSCols to GovNZ, 30 Nov 1914, G1/193. The British Treasury had arranged a further advance of £3.25 million to the New Zealand Government. In the period between December 1914 to March 1915, the British Government advanced the New Zealand Government £5.55 million at £3.10.0 per annum on every £95 advanced.
\textsuperscript{108} Dom, 3 Mar 1915, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{109} NZPD, v. 172, 30 Jun 1915, pp. 75-87. Allen asked if he could raise the total limit of Treasury bill issues to £2 million. According to Allen, 'Treasury bills are an essential part of our finance, and it is necessary we should have this power in order to carry out the necessary arrangements of our finance in war-time'. NZPD, v. 173, 26 Aug 1915, p. 165; Drew, 'War Finance', in Drew, (ed.), The War Effort of New Zealand, p. 233. During the course of the coalition discussions, Allen did manage to pass on 30
On 18 March Massey admitted that New Zealand's war expenditure was running at £300,000 a month and this amount was rapidly increasing.\textsuperscript{110} The Government's failure to indicate how it proposed to raise the extra revenue led to frantic speculation that special war-taxes might fall on wage earners rather than on businessmen and farmers who were making considerable profits out of the war. On average, prices for high quality imported frozen meat on the London market had risen 16 per cent between July and October 1914. Even prices for lower quality grade meat had risen by an impressive 30 per cent.\textsuperscript{111} New Zealand farmers were cashing in on the 'agrarian bond'.\textsuperscript{112} Their prosperity seemed assured with the British Government's decision to 'commandeer the total supply of New Zealand beef and mutton. Because of the unusually large army Great Britain had sent to Europe, on 10 February the British Government asked the New Zealand Government 'to secure on their behalf all the refrigerated beef and mutton available for export, both now and during the continuance of the war'. Bonar Law informed Liverpool that the British Government was taking drastic action to curb inflation. New Zealand authorities were told that Australia was 'co-operating'.\textsuperscript{113} Three days later Liverpool replied that the New Zealand Government 'will do all they can to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government'.\textsuperscript{114}

Massey was pleased by the British request. He saw the imperial commandeering as the best way for the country's primary producers to exploit the benefits of the war. According to the official historian, Lieutenant H. T. B. Drew: 'The Imperial requisition scheme ensured good prices for her produce, and there was ample money in circulation'.\textsuperscript{115} Under the challenging conditions of war, the imperial commandeering was seen as the ideal form of income stability in a volatile market. Before Massey could consult with the frozen meat industry, the British Board of Trade extended the original request to include 'all frozen beef, mutton and lamb now in store or produced at freezing works during the continuance of war and available for export'.\textsuperscript{116} Any surplus meat would be placed on the open market to control inflation.\textsuperscript{117} The British
Government agreed to a payment system whereby the New Zealand High Commissioner would receive a weekly financial imbursement which matched the weekly total of meat leaving New Zealand ports, irrespective if the product reached London.118

The administrative burden of organising the 'food for the fighting men'119 led to the establishment the Department of Imperial Government Supplies. Under Massey's supervision, the Department commenced operations on 3 March 1915. It became the sole agency for purchasing on behalf of the British Government all the New Zealand meat available for export. Over the course of the war, the scope of the Department's operations gradually expanded. On behalf of the British Government, the Department bought large quantities of New Zealand dairy produce, scheelite, sheep and calfskins and requisitioned the 1916-17 wool clip at 55 per cent above 1913-14 market prices. From March 1915 to August 1922, the Department of Imperial Government Supplies ordered products worth a staggering £161 million.120 Not all primary producers in New Zealand were pleased with the arrangement. In October 1915 a British request to procure a third of the cheese output placed the New Zealand Government at odds with the dairy industry who complained that the price was too low.121 In response, Massey threatened to invoke section five of the War Regulations Amendment Act that provided for conflict resolution and arbitration. In the end, Massey persuaded two dairy company chief executives to swear under oath that the British Government price was fair under the circumstances.122

While the imperial commandeer system had its undoubted financial disadvantages for the dairy industry, Massey was prepared to sacrifice higher market prices in return for shipping stability and a guaranteed market. According to Drew, 'the Dominion's ability to play her part in the war financially depended upon her export clearances'.123 Massey hoped the advent of the imperial commandeer would encourage the British

118 GovNZ to SSCols, 25 Mar 1915, G41/8; SSCols to GovNZ, 31 Mar 1915, G41/8. Also see 'Meat Contract, 25 February 1915, Approved in Conference by W. F. Massey', PMI4/58. The first six clauses of the contract are missing from the National Archives copy.
119 W. Lawson with foreword by W. F. Massey, Food-ships for Britain: An Account of the Work of the Department of Imperial Government Supplies in New Zealand to the end of August, 1918, Wellington, 1918, p. 17.
121 SSCols to GovNZ, 27 Oct 1915, G41/13.
122 GovNZ to SSCols, 3 Nov 1915, G41/13.
Government to implement remedial steps to combat the chronic shortage of refrigerated shipping seriously affecting New Zealand trade. In his mind, the two issues were inextricably intertwined. The equation was simple. The more ships that sailed, the more New Zealand earned but Great Britain persisted with its policy of diversion. New Zealand's shipping problem became more 'acute' and 'grave' as Great Britain re-routed transports from non-essential shipping lanes. Australia also began to commandeer transport ships bound for New Zealand and in February Admiral von Tirpitz announced that German submarines would be used in an unrestricted campaign against merchant ships. By June 1915 some 2 million carcasses were glutting cold storage units in New Zealand.

In order to offset the impact the German submarine campaign, the British Board of Trade made it mandatory for all refrigerated ships to carry frozen meat in excess insulated space they possessed on their homeward journey. As more and more ships were withdrawn from service by requisitioning, the owners of ships found it more profitable to concentrate on the shorter crossings to the Americas. A single ship could carry three times as much freight as it could in the time it took to make the round trip to New Zealand. As a result, the produce of Australia and New Zealand was not being shipped. This set of circumstances did not square with Massey's logic. After all, New Zealand had loyally, albeit with certain amount of self-interest, responded to British calls for more men and meat. He felt that if Great Britain wanted all of the mutton and beef produced in New Zealand, it would have to supply the Dominion with the necessary shipping transport. According to British historian L. Margaret Barnett, the British Board of Trade was slow to react to the problem. In April the British finally 'gave up persuasion as a means of inducing shipowners to make refrigerated tonnage available and adopted a more forceful approach'. All insulated British merchant vessels trading with South America, Australia and New Zealand were ordered to give priority to the carriage of meat purchased by the Board and the southern Dominion ship owners were organised into the Australasian Refrigerated Tonnage Committee that operated under the Board's guidance.

127 Barnett, British Food Policy During the First World War, p. 71.
In seeking British Government intervention to relieve the shipping crisis, Massey demonstrated his willingness to place political expediency over imperial concerns. Fundamentally, he held deeply conservative views over the role of the state in the political economy even though during the war Massey saw no contradiction or tension between his laissez-faire economic views and his desire to appease the sensibilities of his constituency of small farmers. Politics ruled his economics. Writing to William Downie Stewart before the General Election in October 1914, Massey confessed 'that it would be very foolish on our part to impose a war tax which is not required'. Massey reasoned that New Zealand could indefinitely loan money from the British Government at a reasonable rate of interest. He considered this option preferable 'than the imposition of a tax which would interfere with business and the wages fund of the Dominion'.128 Speaking nine months later at the National Dairy Show in Palmerston North on 22 June, Massey's views were unchanged: 'There are economic laws, and you might as well try to interfere with them as interfere with the rotation of the earth'.129 During the Bay of Islands and Taumaranui by-elections in June, Massey emphatically ruled out a special war tax. He thought war expenditure could be financed by a small increase in existing taxes and met partly by loans.130 In reality, Massey's optimism had no solid foundations. By the end of March 1915, the war had already cost New Zealand an estimated £2.75 million.131

By the middle of June, Massey's "business as usual" attitude had become untenable. Government-led initiatives were urgently needed to maintain New Zealand's military commitment. It was no longer possible to shield the civilian population from the disruptive effects of the conflict. As the Coetzees have pointed out: 'In the First World War, the unanticipated need to mobilise society's resources for a war of attrition, the unforeseen blurring of gender divisions, and the unrelenting lists of casualties all impelled a significant extension of state authority'.132 The New Zealand Government was already controlling the flow of information and the country's trade 'to safeguard British interests'.133 In June, after New Zealand accepted 'all financial responsibility' for the NZEF Main Body, government intervention became essential.134

128 Massey to Stewart, 27 Oct 1915, MS985/1/7, William Downie Stewart Papers.
130 LT, 3 Jun 1915, p. 6.
134 GovNZ to SSCols, 12 Jun 1915, G25/28; SSCols to GovNZ, 5 Mar 1915, G1/192. The British Government did not want to bear the costs of transporting the NZEF Main Body from Egypt to France or England. Harcourt told Liverpool that the British Government 'have no desire to press upon' the
With the creation of the National Government, New Zealand's war effort could be restabilised. The Liberals provided the political impetus for a proactive state in the management of the nation's war effort. With Liberal support, Parliament could now pass coercive legislation. The Liberals possessed few philosophical qualms over greater levels of state intervention.¹³⁵ As a former Colonial Treasurer and ex-Minister of Finance, Ward's liberalism had already demonstrated a past inclination for state involvement in the economy.¹³⁶ He had no time for the sentiments expressed by some British Liberals such as J. A. Hobson 'that wartime extension of state control amounted to an unwarranted and counterproductive restriction of the very individual liberties the war ostensibly was being fought to protect'.¹³⁷ As a pragmatist, Ward showed little concern for the ethics or the inherent contradictions of a Liberal Minister eroding the liberal elevation of freedom and of the rational, responsible individual.¹³⁸ After all, the British Empire and New Zealand were locked in a Darwinian struggle for survival against the might of Prussian militarism. Even his personal dislike of Massey had been suspended for the time being. In Ward's view, a passive state had the potential to jeopardise New Zealand's war effort. He was determined to preside over a victory and claim the political credit. In August 1915 Ward argued in Parliament that 'the Government would be failing in its duty if it did not . . . make ample provision for raising sufficient additional revenue to enable it to meet its increased obligations' in the war.¹³⁹

New Zealand Government 'the acceptance of any liabilities not previously within their contemplation; but they will no doubt agree that it is desirable, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding in the future, that the wishes of New Zealand with regard to any points of uncertainty in this matter should be clearly defined'. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, G1/197. Bonar Law was happy to learn that New Zealand had agreed to bear the full cost of the NZEF Main Body. 'I shall be glad', Bonar Law informed Liverpool, 'if you will inform your Ministers that the liberal spirit in which this liability has been assumed is highly appreciated by His Majesty's Government'. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 15 May 1917, G1/221. New Zealand and Australia agreed 'that those services in the field carried out by the Imperial Government and which cannot be directly charged to the Dominion Governments, should be adjusted at estimated rates per head based on the average cost of maintaining troops in the particular field of operations'.

¹³⁵ Alien to Godley, 26 Oct 1915, WA252/2, Godley Papers. As Alien pointed out to Godley: 'The Coalition Ministry is getting on well. The main value of it from my point of view . . . is that its formation has enabled the Government to introduce the amount of taxation necessary to carry on the various Departments and to pay interest on our loans. I do think this would have been possible for any Ministry with a strong opposition'.


On 26 August 1915 Ward introduced the National Government's first budget. He immediately imposed £2 million of extra taxation to boost the nation's dwindling coffers.\textsuperscript{140} To raise additional revenue, Ward introduced a 1 per cent tax on imported goods that added to the inflationary pressures within the economy. Parliament also granted Ward the authority to raise fresh loans in London. This enabled Ward to reinstate the Reserve Fund that Allen had promoted as a short-term solution to meet New Zealand's war expenses. Ward realised that the London market could not be exclusively relied upon to New Zealand's financial needs. Interests rates were rising dramatically and the British Government applied controls on the rate of borrowing by Dominion governments.\textsuperscript{141} In late August Mackenzie informed Ward that New Zealand could only raise a maximum of £300,000 per month in London. By the middle of 1916, New Zealand's war expenses were expected to be £700,000 per month. Ward acted decisively, adopting a strategy first suggested by British Treasury officials to his Reform predecessor in July 1915. Ward decided to raise as much money as possible on the local New Zealand market to cover the shortfall from imperial borrowing.\textsuperscript{142} On 27 October 1915, the New Zealand Government began issuing War Loan Certificates and Post Office War Bonds to raise additional capital.\textsuperscript{143}

Over the next year, Ward introduced a wide range of economic regulations to increase the productivity and efficiency of the New Zealand economy. In August 1915, the National Government created the Department of Munitions and Supplies

\textsuperscript{140} NZPD, v. 173, 26 Aug 1915, pp. 182-5.

\textsuperscript{141} SSCols to GovNZ, 4 Aug 1915, G1/197. The British Treasury informed New Zealand Government that the money lent would be at the rate of interest at which the British Government itself had borrowed. Massey noted on this telegram on 22 November 1915: 'The Government of New Zealand does not propose to raise any protest against possible increased rate. The High Commissioner was advised accordingly and to make best arrangements with Imperial Government on 19th July, 1915'. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 7 Dec 1915, G1/202. The rate of interest was increased from 4.5 per cent to 5 per cent; SSCols to GovNZ, 21 Sep 1916, G1/214. The rate of interest was increased from 5 per cent to 5.75 per cent. Also see 'Advances to His Majesty's Self-Governing Dominions', by E. S. Montagu, 19 Nov 1914, MS. Harcourt dep. 468/236, Harcourt Papers.

\textsuperscript{142} SSCols to GovNZ, 6 Jul 1915, G5/15. The British Treasury suggested that the New Zealand Government should tap into public money attracted by 'patriotic and financial grounds'. They asked New Zealand Treasury officials to consider whether war loan might be issued locally with guarantee by Imperial Government of principal and interest of loan. It might be made condition of issue that proceeds should be devoted solely to war expenditure of Empire, to be applied in first place to reducing, avoiding or repaying borrowings from Imperial Government for purposes of war expenditure of your Government, and in second place, if amount is sufficient, be lent to His Majesty's Government at same rate of interest as that at which loan is raised, towards meeting Imperial war expenditure'.

\textsuperscript{143} SSCols to GovNZ, 7 Jul 1915, G41/11. The British Treasury pointed out to the New Zealand Government the 'appreciable amounts of money in Dominions' which could be sourced to finance the war. Bonar Law informed Liverpool that 'it is clearly desirable to take advantage of capital available in Dominions for purpose of aiding prosecution of war'. The British Treasury wanted the New Zealand Government to issue War Loan Bonds with an Imperial Government guarantee of principal and interest of loan.
under the authority of Arthur Myers. Arrangements were made whereby the Minister of Defence specified the quantity, quality, and date of delivery of supplies required while the Minister of Munitions and Supplies undertook responsibilities for drawing up contracts and making purchases. The principal function of the Department of Munitions and Supplies was the arrangement of contracts and letting tenders. It also carried out other important work, assisting sectors of the economy, like the woollen manufacturing industry, to meet military demands without causing acute shortages in the domestic market. Parliament also passed a Cost of Living Act, which established a New Zealand Board of Trade to regulate the prices of food and reduce the harmful effects of inflation.\(^{144}\) In 1916 Ward drafted the War Regulations Act that created the National Efficiency Board to investigate the most appropriate ways to mobilise the labour and industry of the country.\(^{145}\)

As Minister of Finance, Ward possessed a high degree of financial acumen and concern for New Zealand's economic welfare. As a committed economic nationalist, Ward placed New Zealand interests at the centre of his economic philosophy. He was more interested in profit and his own political reputation than appeasing distant British Treasury officials who wanted him to lend surplus loan money to the British Government at the same rate of interest at which it was raised. In the case of extra capital that was not immediately needed to be remitted to London, Ward authorised Mackenzie to invest the money in a wide range of banks and British Treasury Bills at higher rates of interests.\(^{146}\) New Zealand needed all the money it could get. As Ward pointed out to Parliament, 'the rate of expenditure necessarily increases in proportion to the number of men we put into the field'.\(^{147}\)

British authorities were always searching for a greater military contribution from the Dominions. Initially, the New Zealand Government was obliging to such requests. In November 1914, Allen met British requirements and despatched a 25 per cent draft at the end of February and May. This brought total reinforcements up to 80 per cent of the original strength.\(^{148}\) The Army Council asked for more men and once again the New Zealand Government adjusted its reinforcement rate. In December, New Zealand sent 20 per cent in addition to the 10 per cent that travelled with the NZEF Main Body to Egypt. The British demand for New Zealand soldiers appeared insatiable. Allen

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\(^{144}\) NZPD, v. 174, 7 Oct 1915, p. 751.


\(^{147}\) NZPD, v. 173, 26 Aug 1915, p. 165.

\(^{148}\) GovNZ to SSCols, 2 Nov 1914, G41/4.
agreed to send a draft of 40 per cent in February and a draft of 50 per cent every two months. By the start of 1915, New Zealand reinforcements were calculated at a rate of 10 per cent and 15 per cent per month for mounted rifles and infantry.

Allen and Liverpool were extremely conscious that New Zealand could not sustain a large contribution of troops. Both realised that New Zealand's military commitment would have to be carefully managed to reflect domestic constraints. At this early stage in the war, Allen and Liverpool did not want to test the patience of the New Zealand public. They recognised that the introduction of conscription would be an extremely contentious issue. As a result, Allen decided to consolidate public support for the war by concentrating on the mechanisms of the volunteer recruitment system. Within this context, incessant British requests for more men placed Allen in a difficult position. In order to maintain New Zealand's military commitment he had to ensure a steady flow of volunteers without provoking a negative public reaction that the price of this commitment was too high. As early as November 1914, Allen began complaining to the British Government about its military approach to the Dominions. He felt the British decision to maintain the secrecy over the NZEF Main Body's Egypt assignment would militate against the finding of the necessary reinforcements. Allen anticipated 'great resentment against both the New Zealand Government and the Imperial Government' if the first indication of the NZEF Main Body in Egypt was a casualty list. Liverpool assured Godley that his 'Government are most anxious to do their utmost to meet the desires of the War Office'. On 14 December 1914, the first of forty-two drafts of New Zealand reinforcements left for Egypt on the understanding that they would be transferred to France.

The British Government had other plans for the NZEF Main Body. The British Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, wanted the inexperienced contingents from Canada, Australia and New Zealand for the defence of Egypt and other possible

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149 GovNZ to SSCols, 22 Nov 1914, G41/5.
150 SSCols to GovNZ, 8 Dec 1914, G41/5.
151 New Zealand's sacrifice had its limits. For example, see OW, 2 Jun 1915, p. 48. According to the editor: 'The call to the front must be obeyed but not at the cost of sacrificing the agricultural and pastoral resources of this or any other dominion. The welfare of the flocks and the herds, the sowing and harvesting of the cereal and other crops, are of as vital importance as high explosives'.
152 SSCols to GovNZ, 6 Sep 1914, G41/2; GovNZ to SSCols, 7 Sep 1914, G41/2. Harcourt asked Liverpool if New Zealand could send more men with the Main Body, but Liverpool was doubtful. He did not want press the New Zealand Government over the issue until he knew the response of the other Dominions.
153 GovNZ to SSCols, 27 Nov 1914, G41/5; SSCols to GovNZ, 27 Nov 1914, G41/5.
154 GovNZ to SSCols, 27 Nov 1914, G41/5.
155 Liverpool to Godley, 20 Jan 1915, WA252/8, Godley Papers.
156 SSCols to GovNZ, 21 Nov 1914, G41/5; McGibbon, The Path to Gallipoli, p. 256.
The Politics of Diplomacy

The NZEF Main Body was trained in Egypt and briefly saw action on 2 February when the Turks attempted to cross the Suez Canal. Under Godley's supervision, the four New Zealand provincial infantry battalions were amalgamated with four Australian brigades, to form the Australian and New Zealand Army Division. Combined with the Australian First Division, the four New Zealand units formed the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC). This new force was placed under the command of a former Indian Army officer by the name of Lieutenant-General Sir William Birdwood. The New Zealand Government was informed rather than consulted over this new joint arrangement. While Godley considered the formation 'probably the best thing that could have been done under the circumstances', the move provoked an angry outburst from the New Zealand authorities. Liverpool complained that the New Zealand High Commissioner in London was hardly 'the proper medium of communication' for such an important military decision. Nevertheless, the New Zealand Government was 'happy to cooperate with the Australians'.

By the end of February 1915 Kitchener informed Birdwood that his antipodean troops would be required for the Dardanelles campaign. The idea to target the Eastern Front was first conceived by the French after Turkey joined the Central Powers in November. The French proposed to send a British-French force to Greece with the purpose of creating a domino effect by persuading Romania and Bulgaria to turn against Turkey and alleviate the pressure on Russia. Joffre rejected the suggestion but British support for an attack against Turkey gained momentum in the early part of 1915. The plan struck fertile ground. Within British circles there was general agreement that persisting with frontal assaults in France would be a futile exercise. Churchill dreamed that bold alternative strategies beyond the Western Front could break the static military situation. He seized the initiative and began persuading his colleagues. Churchill's persistence paid off. On 13 January the British Government accepted the concept of a naval attack on Turkey. The Admiralty was ordered to

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157 SSCols to GovNZ, 3 Dec 1914, G41/5; D. Winter, 25 April 1915: The Inevitable Tragedy, St. Lucia, Queensland, 1994, pp. 3-4; R. Callahan, 'What About the Dardanelles?', The American Historical Review, v. 78, 3 (June 1973), p. 646.

158 Godley to Robin, 14 Feb 1915, AD12, Unnumbered Files 21.

159 GovNZ to SSCols, 10 Jan 1915, G41/6; SSCols to GovNZ, 16 Jan 1915, G41/6; GovNZ to SSCols, 19 Jan 1915, G41/6.

160 Carrington, 'The Empire at War, 1914-1918', in Benians, Butler and Carrington, (eds.), CHBE, p. 612. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 3 Mar 1915, G41/7; Allen to Godley, 19 Apr 1915, M1/15. Allen Papers. The New Zealand Government was also informed that the NZEF Main Body was on its way to the Dardanelles.

161 SSCols to GovNZ, 6 Nov 1914, G41/4.
prepare 'a Naval Expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective'.

The British naval operation to prise open the Narrows of the Dardanelles began on 19 February. The long-range bombardment of the Turkish forts protecting the Narrows proved ineffective. The Royal Navy failed to silence the Turkish guns and clear the straits of mines. Turkey could not simply be knocked out of the war by British naval guns alone. On 22 March the British decided to switch the operation from a naval one to a military one. Kitchener appointed General Sir Ian Hamilton as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF). His mission was an unenviable one. In less than a month, Hamilton had to organise and plan a coordinated amphibious landing of five Allied divisions including the New Zealanders on the narrow tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The aim of the mission was to capture the Turkish forts guarding the mine-laden passage of the Dardanelles.

On the eve of the attack, Godley described the magnitude of the task to Allen:

I do not suppose any such landing as this, or combined naval and military operations on such a scale, have ever been attempted before in the history of the world, that is landing on an open beach, in the face of enemy, whose entrenchments and obstacles are absolutely down to the water's edge. If it comes off it will be one of the greatest feats of arms that have ever been done . . .

On 25 April 1915 the ANZACs entered martyrdom. The tows of the Royal Navy landed the invading force at a beach, which later became known as ANZAC Cove, one and half miles further north than originally specified in the naval orders. Given the strength of the Turkish fortifications at the designated landing zone, the miscalculation was considered divine intervention. Godley described this 'mistake' as 'the best thing that could have happened'. While the British and ANZAC landing force struggled to overcome the inhospitable terrain and the resolve of the Turkish defenders, news of the daring enterprise reached New Zealand. Within days of the

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164 Godley to Allen, 24 Apr 1915, M1/15, Allen Papers. Also see Godley to Allen, 10 Apr 1915, M1/15, Allen Papers.
165 Godley to Allen, 6 May 1915, WA252/2, Godley Papers. There has been considerable scholarly debate over the causes of this crucial error. See D. Winter, 'The Anzac Landing - the Great Gamble?', Journal of the Australian War Memorial, v. 4 (April 1984), pp. 13-21; Steel and Hart, Defeat at Gallipoli, pp. 54-8; Keegan, The First World War, p. 263.
166 SSCols to GovNZ, 27 Apr 1915, G41/9; Allen to Godley, 28 Apr 1915, M1/15, Allen Papers.
event, all the major newspapers were filled with reports of the campaign praising the heroism of the ANZACs. The audacious event became a potent symbol of national pride and glory. By telegram, the King confirmed that the New Zealand troops had proved themselves 'worthy sons of the Empire'. Allen wrote to Godley describing how 'proud' he was 'to feel that the men who are doing such things belong to this country of ours'. Massey also waxed eloquent: 'No sacrifice on your part is too great to keep the old flag flying with all that it means to us in the way of liberty and freedom'.

Despite the initial failure of the Gallipoli landing, prominent New Zealand newspapers and politicians called for the immediate despatch of 50,000 New Zealand troops to secure victory over the Turks. By the middle of June, there was growing political support for the proposal. According to Allen's private secretary, even Massey 'lent his ear to the idea'. A debate raged in the National Cabinet over the merits of the proposal. Doubts were cast over the British Government's ability to provide the necessary military equipment. Allen called it an 'absolutely ludicrous' idea and he promised to resign if the National Government accepted the suggestion. He wanted no involvement in a scheme that sent untrained and unqualified men to Great Britain. Allen advised Bonar Law that if 'the Imperial Government desire a larger number of men from New Zealand, it would be wiser to continue the training in New Zealand'. He even resisted Godley's call for a greater New Zealand contribution. 'You cannot expect us to send every 18 pounder and every Howitzer out of the country', he informed the general bluntly.

Five months later the enthusiasm generated by Gallipoli quickly subsided as the casualties mounted. The notion of raw colonial invincibility had been replaced by a sense of disbelief and doubt. New Zealand illusions about British military competence

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167 For example, see NZ Tab, v. 42, no. 18, 6 May 1915, p. 3; AWN, 6 May 1915, p. 51.
169 Alien to Godley, 11 May 1915, M1/15, Alien Papers. Alien was prone to expressing nationalist sentiment. See Alien to Godley, 9 Mar 1915, M1/15, Alien Papers.
170 ODT, 30 Apr 1915, p. 5. Also see NZ Times, 21 May 1915, p. 5. Massey was quoted as saying: 'It is scarcely necessary for me to say that not only in this fight for our national honour, but for all time, New Zealand is inseparably linked with the loved Homeland'.
172 G. F. Dixon to L. Voller, 9 Jan 1945, AG458/1.
173 GovNZ to SSCols, 10 Jun 1915, G41/10; SSCols to GovNZ, 13 Jun 1915, G41/10.
174 GovNZ to SSCols, 14 Jun 1915, G41/10.
175 Alien to Godley, 26 Feb 1915, M1/15, Alien Papers.
176 GovNZ to SSCols, 12 May 1915, G41/9. Less than three weeks into the operation, Liverpool informed Harcourt that: 'The people of New Zealand have been much moved by the list of casualties and their anxiety is for the care of the wounded'.

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had been shattered. Churchill's reputation, which had already been tarnished by the escort crisis, had been completely discredited. New Zealand's confidence in British military leadership had been severely shaken. Ironically, Churchill's grandiose plan to capture Constantinople had become a bloody stalemate. Like the German forces on the Western Front, the Turks refused to budge. Over the next eight months, the invading British and ANZAC contingents were surrounded and forced to cling to the steep barren cliffs for survival.

There was mounting criticism in New Zealand over the Gallipoli operation. One Catholic periodical, The New Zealand Tablet, called the Gallipoli plan a 'gamble'. With the death of his eldest son on the battlefield, Allen's feelings over the course of the Gallipoli campaign soured. Two months into the Gallipoli assault, Allen described the amphibious operation as a 'fearful and impossible task'. In his view, the Gallipoli operation was 'so ill-conceived and mad a proposition'; he found it difficult to believe that it 'could have come from British brains'. The British Government had made a grave series of mistakes, allowing its best officers to be wasted in France. Allen felt they could have been put to better use in the training of the reinforcements. The New Zealand Government also questioned the intelligence of British tactics. In New Zealand's view, the original naval operation in February was 'premature', eliminating the element of surprise and allowing the Turks time to prepare their defences. Privately, Allen concluded that New Zealand soldiers had been 'unnecessarily sacrificed' at Gallipoli.

Censorship restrictions were unable to conceal the scale of the Gallipoli disaster. In October, the British War Council made Hamilton the scapegoat and replaced him with General Sir Charles Monro. In his farewell telegram to Godley, Hamilton expressed his sorrow at being separated from New Zealand's 'splendid troops' but

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177 Liverpool to Harcourt, 18 Jun 1917, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/385, Harcourt Papers; Liverpool to Harcourt, 30 Sep 1917, MS Harcourt dep. 490/391, Harcourt Papers.
178 See Godley to Allen, 6 May 1915, M1/15/2, Allen Papers. Godley gave Allen a realistic assessment of the military situation confronting the invading British forces on Gallipoli. In this letter, Godley described how the New Zealanders were perched on 'inaccessible heights and cliffs' surrounded by the dead and dying. However, some of Godley's reporting contained the necessary amount of hyperbole to boost Allen's morale, especially when it came to describing the New Zealanders' performance on 25 April: 'The men may have been rash on first landing, but it was this very dash, and élan, which enabled them to storm these heights in the way they did.
179 NZ Tab, v. 42, no. 42, 28 Oct 1915, p. 34.
183 Allen to Birdwood, 12 Aug 1915, Allen Papers; Allen to Godley, 7 Jan 1918, M1/15 Part 5, Allen Papers; Allen to Godley, 7 Jan 1918, WA252/5, Godley Papers.
nothing could hide the fact that New Zealand's national heroes were losers. By the time they were evacuated from the Dardanelles Peninsula on 19 December, the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign had killed 2,721 and wounded 4,752 New Zealanders. Turkey had not been knocked out of war. This military catastrophe had serious implications for New Zealand. After the initial flush of excitement, Gallipoli had placed an enormous strain on New Zealand's volunteer recruitment system. The flow of volunteers began to ebb and New Zealand experienced trouble filling the reinforcement quotas set by the British Government. The prospects of New Zealand maintaining the promised level of military support were quickly diminishing.

Given the unprecedented scale of the Gallipoli fiasco, it is perhaps surprising that the New Zealand Government did not support the British commission of inquiry into the campaign. In July 1916 political discontent in Great Britain was so strong that Asquith was forced to permit a parliamentary inquiry into the Gallipoli expedition. New Zealand's reaction to the creation of the commission was hostile. New Zealand considered that the commission would only cause bitter controversy, damage public morale and erode popular support for the war. The New Zealand Government also objected to the British Government's unilateral appointment of Mackenzie to the inquiry without prior consultation. In the New Zealand Government's view, Mackenzie was an unsuitable candidate to fulfil the task because of his 'impulsive' tendencies. The National Cabinet feared that he would reproduce this behaviour on the commission by criticising the British authorities, hurting British-New Zealand relations in the process. The New Zealand Government's opposition to the commission may also have been motivated by a fear of culpability; that Mackenzie would expose the inadequate level of medical facilities supplied to the troops during the Gallipoli campaign.

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184 Hamilton to Godley, 17 Oct 1915, MS List 3rd accession, Correspondence and Papers of General Sir Alexander John Godley.
185 Studholme, Record of Personal Services During the War of Officers, Nurses, and First-Class Warrant Officers, p. 383.
186 Allen to Godley, 16 Jun 1915, M1/15/2, Allen Papers. Initially, Allen confidently predicted that the heavy losses sustained at Gallipoli would not affect the number of New Zealanders volunteering for active service. This initial optimism soon changed. Also see Godley to Allen, 3 Sep 1915, M1/15/2, Allen Papers, Godley wrote: 'To give you an example of how denuded we are - When I went round yesterday I found the Otago Regiment Rifles only 49 strong and the Canterbury Mounted Rifles only 59 strong and only with two Officers - a 2nd Lieutenant and the Quartermaster - and in each case they told me they only had about eight or ten men who were really fit for duty in the trenches; this out of an establishment of 544'. On the impact of the Gallipoli disaster on the volunteer recruitment system in New Zealand see Baker, King and Country Call, pp. 23-41.
187 GovNZ to SSCols, 18 Oct 1915, G41/13.
188 Guinn, British Strategy and Politics 1914 to 1918, p. 12; SSCols to GovNZ, 27 Jul 1916, G41/20.
189 Liverpool to Bonar Law, 19 Sep 1915, Item 21/12, Davidson Papers; Massey to Liverpool, 8 Dec 1915, Item 21/23, Davidson Papers. Massey felt that Mackenzie acted on 'important matters
Liverpool sent a telegram to the Colonial Office, registering New Zealand's protest at Mackenzie's appointment. It left New Zealand's position in no doubt: 'The New Zealand Government feel obliged to record an emphatic protest against the course which has been adopted in respect to this question'. Bonar Law replied with a mollifying cable. He defended the British Government's decision to hold the inquiry and the unilateral appointment of Mackenzie. He argued that it was 'desirable' for New Zealand and Australia to be represented on the commission. Bonar Law blamed the Parliamentary situation for the failure to consult with the New Zealand Government. He made it perfectly clear that the British Government 'did not regard the High Commissioners of Australia and New Zealand as representing their respective Governments'. This arrangement suited the New Zealand Government. From this moment, the New Zealand Government insisted that Mackenzie was sitting on the commission in a private capacity and not as a representative of the country.

The British assurance over Mackenzie's official designation did not change New Zealand's antagonistic position towards the Dardanelles Commission itself. Wellington policy-makers continued to oppose the holding of the inquiry. They suspected that the press and a handful of disreputable British politicians had engineered the Dardanelles Commission. New Zealand maintained that a full-scale investigation and public disclosure over the Gallipoli campaign would open 'old sores' and weaken public support for the British cause. The New Zealand Government firmly believed that bad publicity and dissent only served the interests of enemy propagandists. Such defeatism and anti-British sentiment had to be contained. The New Zealand Government had already roundly condemned the controversial British journalist at Gallipoli, Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett. New Zealand authorities blamed Ashmead-Bartlett's seditious reporting for inciting anti-British feeling and reducing the number of men volunteering for active service. He had an 'axe to grind'. As a

without having given the New Zealand Government notice of his intentions. Also see Liverpool to Harcourt, 4 Aug 1916, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/379, Harcourt Papers. According to Liverpool, the appointment of Mackenzie without consultation 'united the Cabinet'. Liverpool said both Liberal and Reform had no one to blame but themselves since they appointed him High Commissioner 'so as to get him out of the way'.

190 GovNZ to SSCols, 27 Jul 1916, G41/20.
191 SSCols to GovNZ, 29 Jul 1916, G41/20. Also see S. Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume I 1877-1918, London, 1970, p. 292; Robertson, Anzac and Empire, pp. 224-34; G. F. Pearce [Acting PM] to Fisher, 24 Jul 1916, MS29197/3, Fisher Papers. The Australian Government adopted a similar attitude. The Australian High Commissioner, Andrew Fisher, was instructed by Acting Australian Prime Minister, G. F. Pearce, that he could accept the invitation to sit on the Commission on the 'distinct understanding' that he could not be regarded as the Commonwealth's representative.

192 GovNZ to SSCols, 1 Aug 1916, G41/20.
193 Liverpool to Bonar Law, 1 Aug 1916, Item 21/37, Davidson Papers. Liverpool informed Bonar Law that public opinion in New Zealand was 'against raking up old sores'.
result, Massey was determined to prevent the maverick journalist from damaging British-New Zealand relations. When Ashmead-Bartlett decided to tour New Zealand in April 1916, the New Zealand Government strictly censored his speeches and assigned an army officer to keep a watchful eye on him. But there were already ominous signs that the New Zealand public were growing tired of the war.

Results of the National Register released on 7 December 1915 confirmed that over 40 per cent of New Zealand men of military age would refuse to serve in an overseas military capacity. According to historian Paul Baker, calls for compulsion became louder as a means of ensuring an 'equality of sacrifice'. The New Zealand Government had more practical reasons for conscription. With the return of the ANZACs from Gallipoli to Egypt, the British Government asked the New Zealand Government to contribute a full division. Allen and Liverpool were hardly enthused by the British request. The military authorities knew that New Zealand's dwindling supply of volunteers would be unable to meet the reinforcement demands of a full division. New Zealand felt that it was being unfairly targeted, complaining that the country had sent more men in proportion to its population than Australia. Allen and Liverpool sharply criticised the British Government's lack of coordination and forward planning. 'We all feel here', Liverpool wrote to Godley in December 1915,

that if the Army Council had wanted this Dominion to find a complete division the Government should [sic] have been informed at an earlier date by the Imperial authorities, for the Government has carried out precisely what they were asked to do under your own supervision and further it is impossible for the New Zealand Government to correspond satisfactorily on these matters with several different authorities.

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194 Liverpool to Bonar Law, 15 April 1916, Item 21/27, Davidson Papers; Liverpool to Bonar Law, 25 May 1916, Item 21/34, Davidson Papers.
195 Allen to Godley, 11 May 1915, M1/15, Allen Papers; GovNZ to SSCols, 29 Oct 1915, G41/13; Liverpool to Bonar Law, 30 Oct 1915, Item 21/16, Davidson Papers; GGAust to GovNZ, 30 Oct 1915, G41/13; SSCols to GovNZ, G41/14; GovNZ to GGCan, 26 May 1916, G41/19. Initially, the New Zealand Government was pleased by Ashmead-Bartlett's 'thrilling' news reports from Gallipoli. However, Ashmead-Bartlett slowly became disillusioned by the whole experience and his reporting began to reflect his pessimistic attitude over how the campaign was being conducted by the British. As a result, Massey did not want Ashmead-Bartlett to tour New Zealand, fearing that his lectures would undermine public support for the war. The Governor-General of Australia, Munro-Ferguson, shared Massey's view of Ashmead-Bartlett. But Bonar Law believed that it would be counter-productive to silence him, fearing that the anti-war brigade would be able to generate greater publicity over the issue of press freedom.
197 SSCols to GovNZ, 29 Jan 1916, G41/16.
198 Liverpool to Godley, 30 Dec 1914, WA252/8, Godley Papers.
Despite its reservations, the New Zealand Government complied with the request on the understanding that a full division was the Dominion's maximum contribution. In March 1916, the New Zealand Division was formed and sent to France in April. To oversee the organisational requirements of the new division, Brigadier General George S. Richardson, became New Zealand's representative at the War Office. His appointment effectively excluded Mackenzie from any military policy role with the British Government. Major-General Andrew Russell, a forty-eight year old New Zealand farmer, was appointed divisional commander. Godley, with a KCB under his belt for services rendered at Gallipoli, was promoted to Commander of the II ANZAC Corps. With the passage of the Military Service Act on 1 August 1916 the reinforcements required by Russell could now be met. In Allen's words, conscription was needed 'to win the war and to secure a lasting peace'. Balloting for service under the legislation's provisions began on 16 November 1916. By this time, both Massey and Ward had secretly escaped the glare of publicity surrounding its application by visiting Great Britain. For the next ten months, Allen was left in charge of directing New Zealand's war effort, while Massey and Ward wined and dined their way through Great Britain.

The first two years of the war had been a sobering experience for British-New Zealand relations. The illusion of a swift painless victory over Germany and its allies had faded along with Great Britain's image as the omnipotent imperial power. Traditional political boundaries had been redefined and the antecedents of the war could no longer be isolated from civil society. Coalition governments had been formed and conscription introduced to both countries. Publicly, the relationship was sound but beneath the surface laid simmering tensions over the economic costs of the war and the quality of British leadership. On the one hand, New Zealand could display exultant pride at participating in Gallipoli while privately questioning the rational behind British military strategy. In the aftermath of Gallipoli, New Zealand's principal policy-makers were scathing about the incompetence shown by the British High Command and certain British Government ministers. Yet this discontent did not

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199 GovNZ to SSCols, 2 Feb 1916, G41/16; Godley to Allen, 24 Mar 1916, M1/15, Allen Papers. Also see Godley to Sir John Findlay, 13 Sep 1915, WA252/6. Godley privately applied the pressure on various New Zealand politicians to contribute a full division.

200 GovNZ to SSCols, 30 May 1916, G41/19; Godley to Allen, 30 Jun 1916, WA252/3, Godley Papers.


202 Godley to Sir James Wilson, 7 Jun 1916, WA252/6, Godley Papers; Allen to Godley, 14 June 1916, WA252/3, Godley Papers.

203 NZPD, v. 175, 30 May 1916, p. 484; NZPD, v. 177, 1 Aug 1916, p. 548.

204 GovNZ to SSCols, 18 Oct 1915, G41/13.
prevent a considerable enlargement in the scale of New Zealand's military commitment. Victory on the Western Front remained the relationship's defining objective but New Zealand expected to have some say in how it was best achieved.

By 1916 a significant degree of mistrust and suspicion had crept into British-New Zealand relations. The problems created by the war were straining the 'special' partnership. While New Zealand's policy-makers refrained from publicly criticising the British Government's handling of the war, their concern manifested itself in the desire to participate in the management of the British Empire's war effort. The competence of Great Britain to manage the war had been called into question by Gallipoli and the military failures on the Western Front. By the time Massey and Ward were ready to visit London, a general consensus existed in Wellington that British-New Zealand relations could no longer function on the assumption that Great Britain always knew best during times of war. By virtue of New Zealand's involvement in the war, British policy-makers were beginning to recognise that the Dominion was as deeply affected and interested as Great Britain in the First World War.
CHAPTER FOUR

The "Siamese Twins" Abroad

It appears that Massey has insisted that Ward is to be invited to all meetings attended by himself; otherwise Ward will go home, and if he does so, Massey will have to go too; otherwise Ward will upset him. In fact they are a set of political Siamese twins, who hate each other. So both had to be invited.

HANKEY DIARY, 1 MARCH 1917

The prospect of a meeting of the British Empire's Prime Ministers had been in the pipeline since December 1914. The Colonial Office asked New Zealand to consider an Australian proposal for an imperial conference to be convened in 1915. Embroiled in domestic politics, the New Zealand Government shared the British view that it was 'impossible' to call a regular conference before the conclusion of the war. Liverpool informed Harcourt that his 'Ministers consider that it would be best if Imperial Conference was not convened until after the war'.

The promoter of the idea, Australian's Labor Prime Minister Andrew Fisher, was actually in New Zealand at the time recovering from the stresses of fighting a successful federal election against the Liberal incumbent, Sir Joseph Cook. On Christmas Eve, a telegram arrived for Fisher at the Grand Hotel where he was staying in Auckland. Munro-Ferguson curtly informed him that New Zealand, along with the other Dominions, was 'strongly against Conference before conclusion of war'. This did not satisfy the determined Scottish migrant. On 31 December 1914, Fisher met with Massey. Fisher argued that in this time of 'business as usual' it was possible 'without fear or apprehension' to hold an imperial conference. Given what Fisher

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1 SSCols to GovNZ, 16 Dec 1914, G5/14. Also see GGAust to SSCols, 11 Dec 1914, MS. Harcourt dep. 468/252, Harcourt Papers.
2 GovNZ to SSCols, 17 Dec 1914, G5/14; GovNZ to SSCols, 17 Dec 1914, MS. Harcourt dep. 468/252, Harcourt Papers. Also see Harcourt to Liverpool, 23 Dec 1914, MS Harcourt dep. 490/277, Harcourt Papers.
3 Undated memo, CP290/1/1/2. While on holiday in New Zealand in January 1915, Fisher visited the most popular tourist attractions in New Zealand and stayed at the Hermitage near Mt. Cook. Also see Munro-Ferguson to Harcourt, 24 Dec 1914, MS. Harcourt dep. 479/217, Harcourt Papers. According to Munro-Ferguson, Liverpool tried to dissuade Fisher from visiting New Zealand, pointing out that the uncertain political environment was 'unsuitable' for the discussion of business. But Fisher insisted on going with 'the object . . . of forming public opinion in favour of a common Defence System'.
4 Munro-Ferguson to Harcourt, 24 Dec 1914, MS. Harcourt dep. 479/217, Harcourt Papers. Also see GGAust to SSCols, 26 Dec 1914, MS. Harcourt dep. 503/113. Fisher believed that Massey would survive the election fiasco by 'poaching' an Opposition member for Speaker.
5 SMH, 3 Feb 1915, MS2919, Fisher Papers. Before heading to the South Island, Fisher met with Liverpool and Ward in Wellington. No archival records can be found of these meetings in either the National Library of Australia or the National Archives in Wellington. However, photos of Mt. Cook had been preserved in the Fisher Papers held at the National Library of Australia. Fisher stayed in
described as 'the peculiar political situation existing in the Dominion', Massey was less than enthusiastic about leaving New Zealand. He fended off Fisher's persistence with a vague assurance that he would participate in 'Inter-dominion Conferences' with Australia to take place alternately in each country.

In the New Year Harcourt finally quashed the idea. After consulting with the British Cabinet and the other three Dominions, the British Government decided it that it would be impractical to hold an imperial conference while the war was being fought. Harcourt assured Fisher the other Dominions were 'unanimously of opinion that the Imperial Conference should be postponed until we are in a position to make peace'. In New Zealand's case, Massey signalled his predilection for a post-war conference that would consider the terms of peace, naval defence, Colonial Office reform and imperial preference. Unexpectedly, the British Government pledged to 'inform all the Dominions . . . to consult them, through their Prime Ministers, fully and, if possible, personally, over the terms of peace'.

The cancellation of the British Empire's most important consultative mechanism did not seem to hurt Asquith's reputation in New Zealand. Despite the military New Zealand for close to a month. He returned to Sydney on 2 February. Upon reflection, Fisher remained extremely positive about his visit to New Zealand, informing the waiting Australian press reporters in Sydney that 'The cordiality of my reception everywhere exceeded all my expectations. Whatever differences of opinion may exist on such matters as defence and trade reciprocity, there is certainly no evidence of dislike on the part of New Zealand towards Australians. On the contrary, there is a feeling of friendliness and brotherhood that has become very pronounced of late. The people were generous to a fault in their expressions of thanks for the services rendered by the Royal Australian Navy in the South Pacific'. For the New Zealand media's reaction to Fisher visit see NZF, v. 15, no. 759, 16 Jan 1915, p. 8. According to the editor of The New Zealand Freelance: The visit to New Zealand of Mr. Andrew Fisher, the Labour Prime Minister of the Australian Commonwealth, has so far been productive of nothing but good . . . Such visits of statesmen from adjacent dominions are fruitful of good and Mr. Massey (if he remains in office) will do himself good if he goes over to Australia pretty soon'. Also see NZF, v. 15, no. 762, 6 Feb 1915, p. 6. Fisher left New Zealand hoping that 'closer relations would be established'.

6 SMH, 3 Feb 1915, MS2919, Fisher Papers.
7 'Conversation with Mr Massey at Auckland, 31 Dec 1914', MS2919/6/163-4, Fisher Papers. Massey and Fisher also discussed old age pensions reciprocity, coinage, cable rates, naval defence, news service, tariff reciprocity, the uniformity of statistics and workmen's compensation. Massey was adamant that 'events since the outbreak of the war had made [sic] thousands of converts to his policy of local navy'. Also see Liverpool to Massey, 8 Apr 1915, G15/11; Massey to Fisher, 12 Apr 1915, PM5/17. Liverpool to Harcourt, 16 Apr 1915, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/319, Harcourt Papers. Fisher invited Massey to attend the State Premiers' Conference in Australia. Massey declined the invitation. He could not leave the country because 'we have now reached a serious stage in the crisis through which the Empire is passing and Cabinet considers it inadvisable for me to be absent from New Zealand in view of emergencies that may arise, and secondly - it is necessary that I should remain in the Dominion to take part in the preparation of business for the approaching session of Parliament'.
8 Harcourt to Fisher, 7 Jan 1915, MS2919/6/73, Fisher Papers; Harcourt to Liverpool, 23 Dec 1914, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/277, Harcourt Papers.
situation on the Western Front where German forces had become entrenched, Massey was not overly attracted to the idea of travelling to Great Britain to attend an imperial conference. The New Zealand Prime Minister seemed content with Harcourt’s unequivocal promise to consult with the Dominions. This represented a positive shift in the Asquith Government’s thinking towards the Dominions and their involvement in the formulation of British foreign policy. During his prime ministership, Asquith had never shown any particular affinity towards the Dominions. Some historians have characterised Asquith’s attitude towards the Dominions as one of ‘contempt’. According to historian C. E. Carrington, ‘Asquith had never fully appreciated the new status of the Dominions and never took their Governments into his entire confidence’. The heavy sacrifices made by the Australian, Canadian, South African and New Zealand soldiers in the Middle East and Western Europe, made Asquith’s position untenable. By the middle of 1915, Asquith had changed his mind over the desirability of consulting with Dominion representatives in person during hostilities. On 21 April Harcourt invited Massey to Great Britain for special consultative talks. Before Massey could reply, the last Liberal Government in British history collapsed.

With the formation of the Reform-Liberal coalition, Massey revived the idea of a bilateral visit to Great Britain. In September, Massey indicated his willingness to leave New Zealand as soon as Parliament had completed its business. This met with the new Colonial Secretary’s approval. While Bonar Law shared his predecessor’s views over the disadvantages of convening an imperial conference during wartime, he supported the concept of personally consulting with the Dominion leaders. Bonar Law informed the House of Commons that it was the ‘intention of Imperial Government to take responsible Ministers of all the Dominions into their confidence with reference to conduct of the war’. He believed that close personal contact between the British Empire’s Prime Ministers ‘would be of the greatest use’. The Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, became the first Dominion leader to accept the offer and visited Great Britain in the early summer of 1915.

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13 GovNZ to SSCols, 12 Sep 1915, G5/15.

14 SSCols to GovNZ, 14 Sep 1915, G41/12.

15 Bonar Law to Liverpool, 17 Sep 1915, Item 21/10, Davidson Papers; SSCols to GovNZ, 23 Sep 1915, G5/15; SSCols to GovNZ, 24 Sep 1915, G41/13.

Massey could not join Borden in Great Britain in 1915. The consolidation of the new political partnership with the Liberals and New Zealand’s war effort remained his top priorities. Gallipoli and the subsequent escalation of the Dominion’s military contribution in early 1916 with the creation of a full division had created a perilous recruiting situation in New Zealand. The strain on the volunteer recruitment system forced defence authorities to admit that some form of compulsory military service would have to be introduced to enable New Zealand to meet its increasing military obligations. Liverpool, conscious that such a drastic solution had the potential to be bitterly divisive and controversial, insisted that Massey’s strong leadership abilities were essential for the successful introduction of conscription. This state of affairs suited Massey. He had no intention of leaving New Zealand with Ward in charge. While this problem could be solved by Ward’s companionship, the next senior Minister, Sir James Allen, was extremely unpopular within the National Cabinet. Liverpool remarked to Harcourt that ‘Col Allen is not always easy to deal with’, adding that ‘he is rather inclined to deal much with detail, and he really has not the time to carry out all he has to do’. Liverpool felt that Allen had severe shortcomings. He privately told Harcourt that Allen ‘is a most difficult man to handle and certainly is most unpopular . . . he is suspicious of everyone . . . I fear that there is a strong feeling against him among the officers in the Defence Department’. The former Colonial Secretary agreed with Liverpool’s assessment. Allen had not endeared himself to the Liberal Government on his visit to Great Britain in 1913. From his own experience, Harcourt found Allen ‘not an easy person in government’.

On 26 October 1915 Fisher resigned to become Australia’s High Commissioner in London. The indomitable William Morris Hughes, a man of Welsh descent who possessed a notoriously fiery temperament, replaced him. Munro-Ferguson described Hughes as a politician of ‘great ability’ despite his profound deafness. Hughes immediately agitated for an imperial conference. In an attempt to enlist New Zealand support for his proposal, Hughes wanted to know if Massey and Ward were planning to visit Great Britain. Clearly this approach demonstrated Hughes’s

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17 GovNZ to SSCols, 18 Oct 1915, G41/13; SSCols to GovNZ, 22 Oct 1915, G41/13.
18 See ‘Newspaper Propaganda - Circulars For Press’, AD/78/16/3. On 28 January 1916, the British Government officially requested the expansion of the NZEF to full division strength. According to the file, this step enabled the New Zealand Government ‘to make decisions in regard to her division without the necessity of consultation with others’.
conviction that Australia and New Zealand possessed a significant congruency of interests. By collaborating, Hughes hoped to conquer the regressive attitudes of the British Government. Both Munro-Ferguson and Liverpool endorsed the strategy - 'idea of action being taken in unison'. They believed that if Australia and New Zealand wanted their respective interests taken seriously by British authorities, it was logical for Massey and Hughes to co-ordinate their travel plans and visit London together.24

Despite the powerful rationale behind the Australian proposal, Massey and Ward were unable to join forces with Hughes.25 The ANZAC spirit forged on the slopes of Gallipoli had yet to transform the intense rivalry that characterised the wider political dynamics of trans-Tasman relations. While it suggested that New Zealand feared playing a supplementary role to its largest neighbour, Massey had failed to negotiate the political obstacles of the Coalition Government. Liverpool reasoned 'that the appointment of the next senior Minister to act in the absence of the two Leaders would undoubtedly lead to discord'. Massey could see no way around this problem. Instead, he produced an invitation for Bonar Law or Harcourt to visit New Zealand for consultative talks. To 'shorten the absence from England of an Imperial Minister', Massey planned to invite Hughes as well.26 Massey's proposal met with a resounding thud in London. Asquith and Bonar Law politely declined the invitation, stating that it was 'quite impossible' for them to leave Great Britain during the present crisis.27

The opportunistic Liverpool quickly offered his services, suggesting that he could travel to Great Britain to represent New Zealand's interests in dialogue with British authorities. In the absence of Massey's trip, Liverpool felt it was important for New Zealand to have a voice in British counsels. Besides, Liverpool believed his faithful service deserved something more than pecuniary recognition. An extended vacation to Great Britain fitted Liverpool's vision of suitable compensation for years of loyal service. At 'express desire' of Massey and Ward, he had just agreed to an extension of

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24 GGAust to GovNZ, 26 Nov 1915, G41/14. Also see Munro-Ferguson to Hughes, 8 Nov 1915, MS1538/16/1662, Hughes Papers. Munro-Ferguson wrote that a regular Imperial Conference in war time does not seem at first light a very practical undertaking . . . No doubt you have placed yourself in communication with New Zealand. Canada seems to have permanent Cabinet representation in England'.

25 GovNZ to SSCols, 10 Dec 1915, G41/14; Massey to Liverpool, 8 Dec 1915, Item 21/23, Davidson Papers. Massey was hopeful that a visit to Great Britain would happen in January or February 1915. Also see Liverpool to Harcourt, 23 Jan 1916, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/359, Harcourt Papers.

26 GovNZ to SSCols, 27 Dec 1915, G41/15. Massey did 'not consider that an Under Secretary or a permanent official would meet the exigencies of the case'.

27 SSCols to GovNZ, 29 Dec 1915, G41/15. Also see GovNZ to SSCols, 27 Dec 1915, MS. Harcourt dep. 446/20, Harcourt Papers. Harcourt did not see the New Zealand invitation until 21 January 1916, almost a full month after the invitation was declined by Bonar Law.
EVERY LITTLE HELPS
NEW ZEALAND DOES ITS BIT.

Little drops of water
From New Zealand's hand,
Make the angry ocean
Wilder, and more grand.

Though 'tis but a cupful,
Every little spot,
If it is repeated
Soon will make a lot.

That's why Bill grows anxious,
And his cheeks turn pale,
For his boat is leaking;
Louder roars the gale.

Soon will come disaster;
From this world he'll quit;
Rest content, New Zealand,
Do your little bit.
THE PURSUIT

Now, hush, hush, hush, here comes the Bagie Man,
If little boys will not enlist he'll catch
Them if he can.
And if these lads won't volunteer and
make recruiting drag,
The Bagie Man with Dave and Dan
will fill his horrid bag.

The Bagie Man brud lots of little
Huns
To play at spy and sail the sky and
wear his horrid guns.
He then began to drench the earth
with blood;
So if you're slow he'll make you go as
an encumbrance should.

The blue-gum bear on fair Australi's
above
Has joined the fun and poked the Hun
and still IEF asks for more.
The Bagie Man won't let Conscription
drag.
So Bluegum's bear he'll quickly snare
in his recruiting bag.
his original four year term only and he had plenty of 'urgent private affairs' to attend to in Great Britain. Liverpool's proposal ran into the same difficulty that plagued Massey's travel plans: the lack of a credible replacement. The wife of his nominated substitute, Chief Justice Robert Stout, had become implicated in the dubious activities of the xenophobic Anti-German League, forcing Liverpool to cancel his trip.28

In contrast, Hughes eagerly accepted the invitation to visit Great Britain. He arrived in London on 7 March 1916. According to Australian historian Eric Andrews, Hughes quickly assumed a 'dangerous prominence'. The British press lionised Hughes and he monopolised the headlines of all the major newspapers. A full programme of guest appearances complete with bellicose speeches ensured that Hughes received maximum publicity. The main thrust of his campaign was simple. He urged a more energetic prosecution of the war.29 Naturally, this allied Hughes with those British politicians who were deeply critical of Asquith's war leadership. New Zealand noted the Australian Prime Minister's meddling in British politics with some concern. Liverpool reported to Harcourt that there was much 'amusement' in New Zealand over the press reaction to Hughes. Liverpool commented on the irony of the situation. Simultaneously, the British press made Hughes 'into such a wonderful lion' while severely criticising the performance of their own leaders.30 Even a cynical Godley prayed for a Massey and Ward visit to Great Britain to act 'as a counter-blast to all that has been done by the Australian Prime Minister'.31

New Zealand considered Hughes's derogatory public comments on the proficiency of British war management as 'injudicious' and counterproductive. Rather than cultivating British sympathy for the Dominion cause, New Zealand's policy-makers feared that the Australian Prime Minister's actions would merely embitter British policy-makers, hurting their common interests in the process. Massey and Ward were 'anything but enthusiastic' over Hughes's intrusive behaviour and his fondness for publicly discussing imperial matters.32 Massey and Ward believed that the discussion

28 GovNZ to SSCols, 14 May 1916, CO537/1174/10; GovNZ to SSCols, 15 Mar 1916, CO537/1174/5-7.
29 Andrews, The ANZAC Illusion, p. 75; W. J. Hudson, Billy Hughes in Paris: The Birth of Australian Diplomacy, Melbourne, 1978, p. 2. Also see GGAust to GovNZ, 24 Jan 1916, G5/15: GGAust to GovNZ, 26 Jan 1916, G5/15. Initially, Hughes was going to visit New Zealand in mid-January before travelling onto Great Britain but he changed his mind and headed directly for the Motherland via the warmer climate of Fiji.
30 Liverpool to Harcourt, 31 May 1916, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/374, Harcourt Papers. Also see Harcourt to Liverpool, 6 Jun 1916, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/377, Harcourt Papers. Harcourt observed that Hughes had 'outstayed his welcome . . . and people are beginning to find that there is no real stuff behind his plentiful discharge of gas'.
31 Godley to Sir James Wilson, 7 Jun 1916, WA252/6, Godley Papers.
of important policy issues such as the future of the German colonies, Japanese ambitions in the Pacific, and the economic benefits of imperial preference, were best conducted in private with the British Government. In contrast to Hughes's approach, Liverpool promised Harcourt that his ministers would never 'do anything in public which will harass you'.

The New Zealand Government disliked Hughes's proclivity of speaking for New Zealand. This partially explains why New Zealand opposed his participation at the Paris Economic Conference in June 1916. In Massey's opinion, the discussion of post-war trade issues was premature and Hughes could not be trusted to represent New Zealand's views. Massey feared that British press reports indicating that he supported Hughes in 'toto' would damage British-New Zealand relations. Liverpool protested to Bonar Law that such an assumption by British officials would be a grave mistake. Massey became so frustrated that he asked Bonar Law to muzzle Hughes to prevent him from making exaggerated statements to the British press. Massey also wanted a British assurance that New Zealand would not 'be pledged to any particular line of policy' if Hughes attended as a British delegate. Bonar Law had no interest in restraining Hughes who had become a useful ally in the plot to unseat Asquith. Hughes had successfully cultivated very close relations with some of Great Britain's most powerful and influential statesmen including Bonar Law. They were both fiercely critical of Asquith and totally devoted to the war effort. Political self-interest was at work. With Hughes charging, Bonar Law's opportunities for political advancement were greatly enhanced.

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34 SSCols to GovNZ, 16 Mar 1916, G41/17. Bonar Law informed Liverpool that the conference was 'for the purpose of discussion only, and this Government will not be committed in any way in regard to trade after the war . . . If as the result of the conference any action should be contemplated, no steps will be taken without full consultation with the Dominions'; SSCols to GovNZ, 13 Apr 1916, G41/18. This telegram illustrates the intense pressure exerted on Bonar Law to extend an invitation to Hughes to attend the Paris Economic Conference. In the end, this pressure overrode his 'doubt as to whether other Dominions might object to Australia alone being represented at the Conference'. Bonar Law indicated that had Massey been in Great Britain at the time, he would have been invited to attend the conference as well; GovNZ to SSCols, 14 Apr 1916, G41/18; Mackenzie to Massey, 8 Apr 1916, PM5. Mackenzie informed Massey of a press statement circulating in the British newspapers which read: 'Mr Massey warmly approves of proposal to invite Mr Hughes to the Paris Conference. New Zealand would appreciate this compliment to her sister Dominion whose views are substantially those held here although more aggressively expressed.' Mackenzie assured Massey that: 'No interview was published here'. Also see SSCols to GGCan, 8 Apr 1916, BL/50/2/3, Law (Bonar Law) Papers. The Colonial Secretary explained to the Governor-General of Canada that Sir Robert Borden was not missing anything important by not attending the Paris Economic Conference. 'In my opinion', wrote Bonar Law, 'this Conference will be only preliminary and of no practical value'. He assured the Canadians that Hughes in Paris did not disadvantage them.
35 GovNZ to SSCols, 24 Apr 1916, G41/18.
36 GovNZ to SSCols, 14 Apr 1916, G41/18; SSCols to GovNZ, 28 Apr 1916, G41/18; James, Memoirs of a Conservative, pp. 34-5. Bonar Law agreed 'to suppress all statements in the Press to the effect that New Zealand or Your Prime Minister are in complete accord with the views of Mr Hughes'.
STARTLING THE NATIVES
BILL AND JOE REACH LONDON.

Bill Massey and Sir Joe, after a secret "get away" from New Zealand, have arrived in London. Judging by the effusions of the cable man, their sudden and unexpected arrival has caused great excitement.

There's great excitement in the land,
All London stands amazed,
There's fourteen riots in the Strand,
The Thames it is ablaze.

What is the cause of all this row,
This uproar, shout and riot?
It's Bill and Joe who've come, and so
Old London can't keep quiet.

Says Bill, "Ten thousand German spies
Were on our track we feared,
And so we gave you a surprise,
And thus their plots we queered."

The Cockneys give a feeble gasp
As Bill and Joe they spy.
The London "slop" falls down kerflop,
The cab horses all shy.

"You want a loan?" says Ikey Mo,
"If so, please step this way,
I'll fix you up in half a tick."
Sir Joseph answers, "Nay."

"Don't worry us with little things,"
They both add with a grin,
"We'd have you know we've come to show
'Em how the war to win."
While Hughes immersed himself in the British political scene, Massey and Ward preferred to keep their distance from the campaign against Asquith. They felt that subtle diplomacy rather than open hostility would win New Zealand more favours. This approach represented a desire to maintain harmonious relations with Great Britain no matter which political party was in power. Whether or not this represented an astute piece of imperial diplomacy or a complete misreading of the political situation in Great Britain is immaterial. At the end of the day Massey and Ward implemented a strategy of risk aversion. They did not want to endanger New Zealand's best interests with Great Britain and potentially isolate New Zealand from the most influential British circles. As a result, the New Zealand Government consciously refrained from active involvement or comment on the British war leadership debate.  

The New Zealand Government found it difficult to accept the enormous success of the Australian Prime Minister's visit to Great Britain. Hughes's flagrant criticism of the British Government seemed to defy the truth of the axiom: you reap what you sow. His aggressive tactics and approach towards the British Government unnerved Massey. Common interests aside, a clear contrast in styles had emerged in how the two Dominions approached the imperial connection. While Australia preferred a belligerent affectation, New Zealand asserted a measured identity by being less overtly critical of British policy. New Zealand sought to exploit this comparative advantage of loyalty. It is perhaps not coincidental that while Hughes attended the Paris Economic Conference, New Zealand offered to purchase a warship from Japan to help replace the losses suffered by the Royal Navy at the Battle of Jutland on 31 May - 1 June 1916.  

With the adoption of the Military Service Act on 1 August, Massey and Ward were finally free to leave New Zealand. They were the last Dominion leaders to visit Great Britain. Even though the Liberals considered Allen to be an austere Tory, he became the Acting Prime Minister. In Ward's absence, Myers accepted responsibility for his

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37 GovNZ to SSCols, 24 Apr 1916, G41/18.
38 Liverpool to Bonar Law, 6 Jun 1916, Item 21/35, Davidson Papers.
40 First Lord of the Admiralty, Minute by A. J. Balfour, 7 Jun 1916, Item 21/35, Davidson Papers; Adm to SSCols, 10 Jun 1916, Item 23/35, Davidson Papers; SSCols to GovNZ, 12 Jun 1916, Item 21/35, Davidson Papers.
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ministerial duties. The Admiralty advised that Massey and Ward should proceed via Cape of Good Hope or the Panama Canal to Canada where they could be protected in an escorted convoy from Halifax.\textsuperscript{41} On 24 August 1916, Massey accompanied by his wife and daughter, Ward and his wife, and two private secretaries, left Wellington on the steamer \textit{Rotorua}.\textsuperscript{42} They planned to return to New Zealand by the end of the year.\textsuperscript{43} The editor of \textit{The New Zealand Truth} questioned the value of the excursion. 'This is not the time for politicians to be flying around, having a good time at the expense of the over-taxed community', the editor lamented. This sort of thing is not going to win the war', he declared firmly.\textsuperscript{44}

After a pleasant voyage through the Panama Canal, the New Zealand entourage reached the safety of London at ten o'clock on Saturday night 7 October.\textsuperscript{45} Mackenzie had organised a welcoming party that greeted the New Zealanders as their train rolled into Paddington Station. According to the \textit{Chronicles of the N.Z.E.F.}, the guard mobilised from New Zealand personnel working at the Record Office, accomplished its ceremonial duties with 'great éclat'.\textsuperscript{46} On the main platform the two leaders gave an impromptu press conference. Massey told waiting reporters that they were in Great Britain to discuss matters of a 'confidential nature', intimating that meat exports and the future of post-war economic relations with Germany would be high on the agenda. Massey reiterated New Zealand's commitment to the British Empire declaring that 'New Zealand is not less imperialistic than any other part of his [sic] Majesty's dominions, and is prepared to make any sacrifice required to carry the struggle to the final issue'. Ward, re-energised by the voyage, enthused that it was 'always a pleasure to get back to the centre of Empire'.\textsuperscript{47} He stated that no war loan was in contemplation.

\textsuperscript{41} SSCols to GovNZ, 10 Aug 1916, G41/21.
\textsuperscript{42} GovNZ to SSCols, 11 Aug 1916, G41/21; GovNZ to SSCols, 19 Aug 1916, G41/21; GovNZ to SSCols, 24 Aug 1916, G41/21; Liverpool to Bonar Law, 31 Aug 1916, Item 21/40, Davidson Papers.
\textsuperscript{43} GovNZ to SSCols, 8 Aug 1916, G41/21; GovNZ to GGAust, 3 Aug 1916, G41/21. Liverpool wanted Munro-Ferguson to make sure that news of Massey and Ward's departure was not published in the Australian press. Also see Alien to Godley, 25 Aug 1916, WA252/3, Godley Papers; SSCols to GovNZ, 22 Aug 1916, G41/21.
\textsuperscript{44} NZT, 14 Oct 1916, p. 1; NZT, 2 Dec 1916, p. 1. The editor wrote: 'We are all aware that the Prime Minister, Mr. Massey and his coadjutor, Sir Joseph Ward, are at present engaged in a sort of Cook's tourist trip of the United Kingdom, and according to the cables, they have been feasted, feted and banqueted wherever they have journeyed'.
\textsuperscript{45} Massey to Liverpool, 9 Oct 1916, G41/22; J. C. C. Davidson to Mackenzie, 7 Oct 1916, CO209/289/89. The New Zealand party sailed from Halifax on board the ship \textit{California} after the Admiralty were unable to arrange an escort for the \textit{Rotorua} to Plymouth. They did not want to delay the sailing of a convoy to accommodate the New Zealanders.
\textsuperscript{46} CNZEF, no. 4, 16 Oct 1916, p. 76. This article gives an excellent account of the New Zealand party's arrival in Great Britain. Also see Bassett, \textit{Sir Joseph Ward}, p. 232. Bassett is incorrect when he asserts that Massey and Ward arrived in London on 8 October. On this day, Massey and Ward were joined by Mackenzie, as they visited convalescing New Zealand troops at the hospital at Walton-on-Thames. According to the \textit{Chronicle}, they were 'cheerily greeted' by the injured soldiers at the hospital.
\textsuperscript{47} The Times, 9 Oct 1916. British press clippings of the trip are found in MS1398, Massey Papers.
for New Zealand as the country was well-financed. Ward promised to visit New Zealand troops in France and explain the Military Service Act to the British Government and public. He called on the Dominions 'to co-operate with the centre in helping to strengthen the general position of the Empire as a whole'.

Massey's first priority with British officials was to 'straighten out' New Zealand's trading difficulties with Great Britain. Over the course of the war, New Zealand farmers had become increasingly acerbic that meat sold on the open market consistently fetched higher prices than they received under the imperial commandeering system. The restrictions of the imperial contract denied New Zealand farmers the same financial benefits as their non-British competitors from Argentina and the United States enjoyed. The imperial commandeering system locked the New Zealand meat industry into a regime of prices set so far below the open market rate that New Zealand farmers began accusing the British Government of discrimination and profiteering. Massey knew that it was only a matter of time before his farming constituency would turn its anger against the New Zealand Government. Securing an improved contract for the New Zealand farmers became one of Massey's prime objectives in London.

Massey pursued a strategy of parity for the New Zealand meat industry. He asked the British Government to match the prices successfully negotiated by the Australian Government. The Board of Trade accepted Massey's proposal, rewarding New

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48 ST, 10 Oct 1916, p. 5; Press, 10 Oct 1916, p. 6. The editor of The Press argued that Massey misrepresented New Zealand's position. The 'New Zealand attitude which is not merely one of firm loyal and unquestioning adhesion to the cause of Britain'. Also see NZT, 21 Oct 1916, p. 1. The editor severely criticised Massey's 'Brand of Imperialism' as 'the same old spin of words. The same old juggle, the same old beating of the air'.

49 Massey to Allen, 21 Sep 1916, Box 9a, Allen Papers.

50 GovNZ to SSCols, 23 Aug 1916, G41/21; GovNZ to SSCols, 3 Oct 1916, G41/22. The Board of Trade accused the New Zealand Government of taking advantage of conditions resulting from the drought in Australia. Liverpool denied that this was the case, adding that New Zealand producers only wanted the same deal as their Australian counterparts. Also see 'Department of Agriculture, Industries, and Commerce: Annual Report for 1916-17', AJHR, 1917, v. 2, H.-29, p. 6; 'Department of Agriculture, Industries, and Commerce: Annual Report for 1917-18', AJHR, 1918, v. 2, H.-29, p. 2.

51 Allen to Massey, 11 Oct 1916, Box 9a, Allen Papers. Allen reported to Massey that 'there is a strong feeling in New Zealand that grave injustice is done to our meat producers owing to the restrictions upon their prices whilst the producers of other countries are allowed to sell free.'

52 Massey to Allen [?], 30 Aug 1915, PM5/16. During the negotiations of the 1915 contract, Massey wrote: 'Producers of beef in the Dominion dissatisfied with price being paid by Imperial Board of Trade. They say that they are paid a lower price than the producers in Argentine [sic] and the United States and that for local requirements even they receive a higher price than for the troops. Personally I think they have a grievance. May I suggest therefore that you ask the Board of Trade to increase the price of beef by one halfpenny per pound'.

53 GovNZ to SSCols, 23 Aug 1916, G41/21; SSCols to GovNZ, 19 Oct 1916, G41/22. The Colonial Office left the matter for Massey's disposal but they were 'confident that settlement satisfactory to all parties will be secured'.

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Zealand with an additional £1 million profit per annum. The Board of Trade would not, however, accept New Zealand's argument for direct control over meat sold on the open market. According to a report in *The New Zealand Herald*, the Board of Trade operated on the premise 'that the seller can have no further control over his goods after ownership in them has passed to another'.

Nevertheless, officials from the Department of Imperial Government Supplies presented Massey's hard-won arrangements to a conference of frozen meat company representatives in Wellington on 26 October. Much to the relief and surprise of the companies, the Board of Trade agreed to subsidise the cost of storing meat-awaiting shipment. The frozen meat companies immediately ratified the agreement.

Massey and Ward's persistent exploitation of British generosity as a means to strengthen the New Zealand economy became a prominent feature of their visit. In early November 1916 discussions between the British and Dominion representatives were conducted to negotiate a purchase agreement for the entire crossbred wool clip produced in New Zealand and Australia. The visiting New Zealand Ministers drove a hard bargain. While Ward played the honest broker, settling on price based on the average prices paid in the season 1913/14 plus 45 per cent, Massey urged the New Zealand Woolgrowers' Association 'not to accept the offer hurriedly'. As a shrewd operator, Massey sensed the British Government's desperation for raw materials and the possibility of another 10 per cent. A week later the British offered a 55 per cent advance on pre-war prices. In a cable to Allen, Massey dryly observed: 'Believe this is better than 1916 prices'. On 27 November, the New Zealand Government accepted the wool contract on behalf of the New Zealand Woolgrowers' Association.

New Zealand's economic opportunism was the most obvious expression of national interest during the First World War. Massey and Ward consistently maintained that it was a morally defensible position to insist on a better deal for New Zealand products while New Zealand soldiers fought and died in the First World War. They did not think that it was a paradoxical position likely to imperil New Zealand's reputation as the British Empire's most loyal dominion. On the contrary, Massey and Ward believed

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55 *NZH*, 27 Oct 1916, p. 6. The agreement with the Board of Trade stipulated that all commandeered meat was to be held in storage for one month free, thereafter 1/8 penny per lb a month with a maximum of 3/8 penny. New Zealand producers calculated that this would cost the Board of Trade £750,000.
56 Brande to Massey, 6 Nov 1916, PM14/57; Massey to Allen, 8 Nov 1916, PM14/57.
57 Massey to Allen, 16 Nov 1916, PM14/57.
58 SSCols to GovNZ, 16 Nov 1916, G41/23; Massey to Allen, 17 Nov 1916, PM14/57. Allen to Massey, 22 Nov 1916, PM14/57; GovNZ to SSCols, 27 Nov 1916, G41/23. Bonar Law pleaded with New Zealand Woolgrowers' Association to accept the deal in order to 'conserve Imperial resources'.
"There's Always Room at the Top!"

Mr. Massey will receive yet another high honor at Edinburgh on January 12, when the LL.D. degree will be conferred on him.—Cable message.

Our Bill he came to Lunnon' Town,
Dressed in his Sunday best;
He wore a most portentous frown
And cut his stuck his chest.
The Old Dart folk cried, "Holy smoke,
Here comes New Zealand's Billy;
This man of beef is some big chief,"
And o'er Bill they went dilly.

In honor to New Zealand's name,
Bill got degrees galore,
And then they thought of "Anzac" fame,
So on him shower'd some more.
More mortals get by mental sweat
Degrees if they are plucky,
But Bill, you see, gets empty-three;
He surely was born lucky.
that New Zealand's sacrifices had been undervalued and gone unrecognised by Great Britain. When Massey learned that the British Government planned to divert more trading ships to the Americas, Massey fired off a sharp letter of protest to the British Shipping Controller, Sir Joseph Maclay, arguing that: 'I am proud of the fact that New Zealand, in proportion to its population, led the other dominions in the assistance she had been able to render during the war, but I am afraid that what is happening now is a somewhat poor return for her loyalty and enthusiasm'. Learning the public relations lesson of Hughes's visit, Massey and Ward were determined to change British perceptions about the importance of New Zealand's contribution to the British war effort.

Improving New Zealand's visibility in British eyes was not an easy task. Massey and Ward faced the traditional problem of scale, an obstacle that had become magnified by the war. Within the traditional boundaries of the British Empire, New Zealand had always been perceived as the least significant of the four Dominions. As the war progressed, this comparative disadvantage became even more pronounced. As historian Robert Holland has argued in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, a relationship between status and war contribution had developed between Great Britain and the Dominions during the First World War. Numerically, New Zealand's contribution to the British Empire's war effort was the smallest. In total, Canada sent 458,000 troops abroad, Australia 332,000, South Africa 136,000 and New Zealand 112,000. This perceived decline in New Zealand's influence over British policy-making seemed to be confirmed by the actions of the British Government. Hughes had been invited to attend the British War Cabinet and General Jan C. Smuts of South Africa had been a regular along with Borden. New Zealand's policy-makers were extremely conscious of these developments. Before Massey and Ward had even reached London, there was talk of making the King's representative in Wellington a Governor-General, to place New Zealand on 'an equal footing with the other Dominions'. New Zealand's policy-makers even became adept at manipulating statistics to portray the country's war effort in a more favourable light.

Massey and Ward were eager to meet the challenge of enhancing New Zealand's status within the British Empire. This made them highly sensitive to any press coverage that belittled or cast dispersions over the country's war effort. In late August,
The Times ran an editorial that questioned New Zealand's loyalty to the British Empire and denigrated the efficiency of its war management. The editor cited the introduction of conscription as evidence of the New Zealand malaise. The Times argued that New Zealand 'found herself unable, while she relied on voluntary service, to fill the drafts which she had promised'.

The New Zealand Government fiercely denied the claims and wanted the erroneous article publicly retracted. Liverpool stoutly defended his Dominion's record, arguing that conscription had been adopted as a precautionary measure to ensure an adequate supply of troops in case of a Parliamentary recess. Liverpool pointed out 'that the numbers of men despatched from New Zealand under the voluntary system would exceed in all probability on a population basis those sent from other British Possessions'. Liverpool blamed the political bias of the Northcliffe press, a large powerful group of newspapers owned by Lord Northcliffe which included such papers as the Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Evening News and The Times, for the spurious story. Allen found an easier target to blame, predictably pointing the finger at the New Zealand High Commissioner, Sir Thomas Mackenzie. The Times allegedly based its comments on Mackenzie's assessment of the Military Service Act.

New Zealand's reaction to the critical editorial forced the Colonial Office into damage control mode. Bonar Law directed his private secretary, John Davidson, to settle the matter with the editor of The Times, Geoffrey Robinson. According to Davidson's account of the meeting, he persuaded Robinson to acknowledge that New Zealand had shown considerable 'foresight' by introducing conscription. Davidson won an assurance from Robinson that an article would appear in The Times praising New Zealand's war effort. True to his word, an article appeared in The Times the following week commending New Zealand's initiative for passing the Military Service Act. As far as Massey was concerned, the damage to British-New Zealand relations was irreparable. The injury to New Zealand's reputation could not be forgiven. 'I have come to the conclusion', Massey told Allen, 'that the Northcliffe press is a real danger... they are no friend of New Zealand'.

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63 GovNZ to SSCols, 28 Aug 1916, G41/21; Gov to SSCols, 28 Aug 1916, CO209/288/816.
64 The Times, 31 Aug 1916, p. 5. Allen ordered Mackenzie to retract his words. The High Commissioner obeyed the command, stating that it was 'quite contrary to the fact'. This did not alter the newspaper's position. The Times still maintained that New Zealand faced a shortage of volunteers.
65 Davidson to Lambert, 1 Sep 1916, CO209/289/3.
66 The Times, 8 Sep 1916, p. 7. In a complete reversal of opinion, The Times argued that there was no shortage of volunteers and that compulsion was introduced to allow New Zealand to build a reserve. The Times called conscription an 'immediate stimulus to recruiting'.
67 Massey to Allen, 2 Jan 1917, Box 9a, Allen Papers.
During the early part of their stay in Great Britain, Massey and Ward undertook a heavy schedule of social engagements. As the *Chronicles of the N.Z.E.F.* remarked, they were not 'having much of a holiday'. In the second week of October Massey and Ward were entertained at the luncheon at the House of Commons by the Empire Parliamentary Association and visited wounded soldiers convalescing at the General Hospital in Chelsea and the New Zealand Hospital at Brockenhurst. On 24 October King George V swore Massey in as a Member of the Privy Council. The New Zealand Prime Minister held a sumptuous reception to celebrate at the Hotel Cecil. The next day Massey and Ward attended a meeting of the British Cabinet where nothing of any consequence was discussed. The following week Massey and Ward left for France and spent five days visiting New Zealand soldiers at the front. In November, they even found time to visit Massey's birthplace, Limavady, situated in County Derry in Ireland. The magazine *Irish Life* lauded him as 'one of Ulster's distinguished sons who has played a foremost part in building up and governing one of the frontiers of the Empire'. At the mayoralty banquet in Londonderry, Massey admitted that he had detected war fatigue in certain quarters of British society. He 'hoped there would be no faltering regarding the prosecution of the war'.

While the pomp and ceremony were familiar to Ward, the visit proved an invaluable education for Massey. He received the Freedom of London, York, Edinburgh, Manchester and Londonderry and was bestowed honorary degrees from the universities of Cambridge and Edinburgh. The accolades Massey received did not alter the New Zealand public's negative perception of the visit. By the time Massey and Ward left on a three-week tour of Scotland, Ireland and the English provinces they had been absent from New Zealand for nearly three months forcing Liverpool to cancel his tour of Samoa and the Cook Islands. By the end of November, Massey indicated that in all probability an imperial conference would be held, delaying their departure until 14 February.

71 For example, see 'Copy of a resolution passed by the City Council of Manchester conferring the Freedom of the City on W. F. Massey, 1917', PM14/109. Also see R. D. Batt, *The Massey Collection: A Description of Items Associated with the Life and Work of the Right Honourable William Ferguson Massey Presented to Massey University By His Family*, Palmerston North, 1977, pp. 1-10.
72 GovNZ to PM, 6 Nov 1916, G5/16.
73 Allen to Liverpool, 21 Nov 1916, G5/16. The original letter from Massey to Allen cannot be found in the archives in either the Allen Papers or the Prime Minister's Department files but Allen obviously felt that it was his duty to inform Liverpool of the news.
On 30 November Massey and Ward returned to London just in time to witness the
dramatic collapse of Asquith's coalition government. Other historians have recounted
thoroughly the developments that led to Asquith's eviction from 10 Downing Street. Needless to say, Asquith's Cabinet was hopelessly divided and there was a general
perception that he was unable to exert energetic control over the deteriorating military
situation. According to historian G. H. Cassar, by the end of November 1916 there
was growing conviction in British political circles 'that Asquith was inadequate as a
war leader'.

Those in power in New Zealand generally held this judgment. There was a
widespread belief that Asquith had become incapable of leading the British Empire to
victory. As early as August, Liverpool reported to Bonar Law that New Zealand
public opinion had swung firmly against the British Government with the
establishment of the Dardanelles Commission. The British decision to investigate
and relive the Gallipoli disaster created the general impression that Asquith's
leadership had become weak and ineffectual. The Easter Uprising in Ireland, the
failure of the Somme Offensive, and the appalling casualties suffered by the New
Zealand Division compounded the country's mood of despair and lack of confidence
in the Asquith regime. The more conservative friendly newspapers began voicing the
general public's concern and disillusionment with British war management. *The Press*
had 'no hesitation, in saying that in our judgment, for what it is worth, it is high time
reconstruction took place'. Asquith was 'not the man to keep the driving power of the
Empire at full blast in the storm and stress of war'. *The Otago Witness* believed that
Asquith was 'responsible for many of the grave errors of judgment and palpable
mistakes of strategy which have marred Great Britain's conduct of the war'. *The New
Zealand Herald* viewed Lloyd George's imminent accession as 'a call to the nation to
insist upon efficiency and co-ordination in the prosecution of the war'.

76 Liverpool to Bonar Law, 1 Aug 1916, Item 21/37, Davidson Papers.
78 *OW*, 6 Dec 1916, p. 41; *OW*, 13 Dec 1916, p. 37. A week later the editor showed a remarkable
level of sympathy for Asquith's plight. "We prefer to remember with gratitude the dignity with which
Mr Asquith represented the nation, the loftiness of his public life, and the great services which Empire
owes to him, rather than sling the garbage of the gutter at a great patriot". So say the [sic] *Sunday
Times*, and the sentiment will be shared by all right-thinking men'.
79 *NZH*, 6 Dec 1916, p. 6. The editor hammered this theme, arguing that the promotion of Lloyd
George marked 'the rallying together of men of foresight and capacity against the casualness and the
THE LESSON TO BE LEARNED

It is Lloyd George's task to teach John Bull and the young Dominions the supreme need of national sacrifice. If the war is to be brought to a victorious and glorious end.

ONLY BY SACRIFICE & STILL GREATER SACRIFICE CAN VICTORY BE WON
Allen echoed the public's frustration with Asquith's indecisive leadership. Privately he told Godley that the British Government was 'badly' in need of reconstruction. In his words, Lloyd George was 'the right man for the country now'. On 8 December, Allen's wish came true. News of Asquith's downfall caught Liverpool completely by surprise. The Colonial Secretary had failed to keep his Dominion servants properly informed of the intrigue enveloping British politics. In an attempt to confirm the rumours, Liverpool telegraphed Asquith asking him to send New Zealand a message of support. Liverpool believed that: 'Such a message would greatly assist the administration of the Military Service Act as attempts... are being made to get the Act repealed'. By the time Liverpool's cable reached London, Asquith had been out of office for nearly twenty-four hours.

During the British political crisis, Massey and Ward did not take an active part in the debate. Massey publicly stated New Zealand's position as one of 'expressly disavowing any intention of interfering in any way with ordinary political affairs in Britain'. In an attempt to avoid controversy, Massey and Ward kept themselves busy. They initiated discussions with the War Office and Army Council over the purchase of New Zealand cheese and demobilisation plans. They lunched at the British Empire Club and inspected the New Zealand Camps at Codford and Sling. Of the two Ministers, Massey remained the most active, tackling the trade problems that threatened to endanger the livelihood of New Zealand's farmers. He publicly

self-complacency of men who see no further than to-day and are satisfied that they are muddling through'.

80 Allen to Godley, 29 Nov [Dec?] 1916, WA252/3, Godley Papers.
81 GovNZ to PM, 8 Dec 1916, G4/23. Allen showed Liverpool a telegram from Massey, but the Governor was adamant that he had 'not received any official information of reported change in Imperial Government'.
82 GovNZ to SSCols, 8 Dec 1916, G4/23; Bonar Law to Lloyd George, 11 Dec 1916, BL/50/2/9, Law (Bonar Law) Papers. Bonar Law suggested to Lloyd George that he should take up Liverpool's idea to send a message of support to each Dominion. He reported to Lloyd George: 'Things are not going too well in the Dominions, and there is especially an ugly spirit in Australia. Conscription, as you know, has broken down and I am warned that it may develop into a campaign against military service and thereafter into a "stop-the-war" agitation. I am sure that it would be of the very greatest advantage if you would send to each Prime Minister a short but stirring message to reach him and to be published at the same time that the statement is made in the House of Commons on behalf of the new Government. The message should include a reference to the urgent need for men, for economy, and for every effort to defeat the enemy. I press this earnestly on your attention as I am certain that it is urgently needed and will have an excellent effect'.
83 ST, 13 Dec 1916, p. 5.
84 SSCols to GovNZ, 8 Jan 1917, G2/34. The question of demobilisation was regarded as 'strictly confidential' and the Army Council wanted 'no public discussion of the matter in New Zealand'. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 25 April 1917, G3/37; SSCols to GovNZ, 17 May 1917, G2/38. Demobilisation was also discussed at the 1917 Imperial War Conference. A resolution was passed on 24 March authorising the Army Council to carry out the demobilisation of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force.
denounced the monopolistic tendencies of the American Meat Trust, predicting that American dominance over the London market 'will be a sorry day for the producers of our country'. On this issue, Massey did not anticipate any satisfactory results from a change of British Government.\footnote{Massey to Allen, 2 Jan 1917, Box 9a, Allen Papers.}

Given the unpredictable nature of the British political contest between Asquith and Lloyd George, the New Zealand position of neutrality seemed logical. Publicly taking sides would have been a risky proposition and could have been disastrous for New Zealand's long-term interests if Massey and Ward had supported the wrong candidate. When Asquith tendered his resignation to the King on 5 December, the possibility still existed that he would be asked to reconstruct another ministry. As it eventuated, this did not occur. Two days later David Lloyd George became the Prime Minister, leading the second coalition government of the war. As for Asquith, Massey surmised that he would never 'be Prime Minister again'.\footnote{Massey to Alien, 2 Jan 1917, Box 9a, Alien Papers.}

Despite Lloyd George's liberal heritage, the conservative press in New Zealand generally endorsed his elevation to 10 Downing Street. *The Press* congratulated Lloyd George on his success, feeling that he 'has captured the imagination of the people, and won their confidence'.\footnote{Press, 8 Dec 1916, p. 6.} *The New Zealand Herald* was pleased Lloyd George had accepted the responsibility of forming the next British Government. The editor said the move will 'satisfy the people of New Zealand that a strenuous effort is to be made to organise war administration on sound and energetic lines'.\footnote{NZH, 8 Dec 1916, p. 6.} *The Southland Times* wrote there was 'undoubtedly a strong feeling that Mr Asquith's direction lacked energy and decision, and that a change was necessary'.\footnote{ST, 11 Dec 1916, p. 4.} In stark contrast, the liberal and radical press struggled to appreciate the change. *The Maoriland Worker* appealed to New Zealand's working class to remain intelligent in 'the midst of so much treachery and potential tyranny'.\footnote{MW, 20 Dec 1916, p. 4.} With conspiratorial overtones, *The New Zealand Truth* speculated that Asquith had been deposed because he wanted to negotiate a peace settlement with Germany.\footnote{NZT, 16 Dec 1916, p. 1.}

The composition of new British War Cabinet reflected the radical political realignment. Lloyd George appointed a small ruling elite to the British War Cabinet, including the Labour incumbent at the Board of Education, Arthur Henderson, two
Conservative peers, Earl Curzon and Lord Milner, and Bonar Law became the new Chancellor of the Exchequer. Former Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, became the new Foreign Secretary. Walter Long, a Conservative Member of Parliament from Wiltshire, became the new Colonial Secretary. Bonar Law described his successor as 'a man of sterling qualities and a great Imperialist', reassuring the Dominions that there 'is no one to whom I could more happily have handed over the care of the Empire with greater satisfaction than to Walter Long'. The editor of *The New Zealand Herald* stated that Long had 'proved himself at the Board of Agriculture and the Local Government Board, a man of character and determination, and should be acceptable to all Dominions. The *Auckland Weekly News* gave Long a glowing reference, describing him as 'a man of character and determination'.

On 11 December Massey and Ward arrived in Leeds to make their first public appearance since the end of the British political crisis. In an address to the Luncheon Club at Leeds University, Massey delivered a speech entitled 'Dominions and the Present Crisis' advocating an increased role for the Dominions in imperial policymaking. In his speech Massey argued that Lloyd George's promotion demonstrated a British determination to prosecute the war with greater vigour and strength. He heartily welcomed the change, reassuring the new British Government that it could depend on 'New Zealand to provide all the assistance and co-operation in its power to win the war'. Ward echoed these sentiments, hoping that Lloyd George would succeed where Asquith had failed - presiding over a victory on the Western Front. Ward later described Lloyd George as 'a strong and powerfully equipped man intellectually'.

The public endorsement of new British Prime Minister was a clever piece politicking by Massey and Ward. It masked their private reservations over Lloyd George's suitability for the role. While Massey and Ward found much to admire in Lloyd George especially his undoubted success with finance, labour and munitions, his other qualities, particularly his judgment and reliability, were open to question. Lloyd George was a bit of an unknown quantity. The New Zealand Ministers were

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93 Bonar Law to Dominions, undated letter, BL/50/2/13, Law (Bonar Law) Papers.
94 *NZH*, 12 Dec 1916, p. 6.
95 *AWN*, 14 Dec 1916, p. 47.
96 *ST*, 13 Dec 1916, p. 5.
97 *ST*, 14 Dec 1916, p. 5.
98 *NZPD*, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, pp. 72-3. Ward gave a first-hand account to Parliament of the political crisis the New Zealand Ministers witnessed in Great Britain.
extremely suspicious of his well-publicised links to the Northcliffe Press. Massey and Ward feared that Lloyd George would favour the larger Dominions over New Zealand. Massey confided to Allen that 'Lloyd George is not trusted by many politicians . . . I have met him once or twice, but cannot make my mind up about him'. Massey's initial trepidation that New Zealand's interests would be forgotten had some solid foundations. Lloyd George candidly admitted to Amery that he did not realise that New Zealand lay to the east of Australia.

The New Zealand Ministers quickly tried to influence the colonial policy direction of the new British Government. They began a concerted public campaign seeking greater Dominion participation in the British decision-making process. Still in its infancy the new British administration had yet to elucidate and announce its intentions towards the Dominions. The early signs were promising if a little contradictory. Lloyd George was said to regard the Dominions with 'a sympathetic eye'. On appointing Long to the post of Colonial Secretary, Lloyd George commented that the 'one predominant task before the Government is the rigorous prosecution of the war to a triumphant conclusion', hinting that he envisaged a greater role for the Dominions than his predecessor. After returning to London, Massey took the opportunity to urge for the imperialisation of British war policy during a speech at Queen's Hall. Such a demand called for unprecedented action. For the first time in the war, Massey publicly criticised British leadership, taking Asquith to task for not properly consulting with the Dominions during the war. Massey argued for increased Dominion involvement in British war management, pointing out that the 'infusion of new blood was always productive of good'.

Massey's prosaic attempt to win favour with Lloyd George was a deliberate distortion of the truth. As we have seen, the cancellation of the imperial conference cannot be solely attributed to Asquith. The decision to postpone the British Empire's most important consultative mechanism, the imperial conference, had been taken with

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99 Massey to Allen, 2 Jan 1917, Box 9a, Allen Papers. Hankey Diary, 29 Mar 1917, HNKY1/1/334, Archives of Lord Hankey. Over the course of his visit, Massey found the great majority of British politicians tiresome and uninspiring. 'British politicians, speaking generally,' Massey confided to Allen, 'are rather a disappointing lot. I suppose I expected too much. Carson is undoubtedly the strongest man in politics here to-day, but he has so many enemies that I do not think he can ever get to the top'.


103 ST, 14 Dec 1916, p. 5.
the full concurrence of Canada, South Africa and New Zealand. Only Australia wanted the imperial conference to proceed as normal. Massey also failed to acknowledge the advances made by Asquith's Government to consult with the Dominions. In January 1915 Asquith had agreed to consult the Dominions over the peace terms with Germany and there is even evidence to suggest that Bonar Law had been directed to organise an imperial conference to take in London in July or August 1917. It could be argued that Asquith's Government represented the first of the new rather than the last of the old-styled British Governments that took the Dominions for granted.

Superficially at least, the administrative changes introduced by Lloyd George did not indicate that his administration would take the Dominions any more seriously than Asquith's regime. In seeking to refine the unwieldy executive structure that inhibited the implementation of Asquith's war strategy, the Colonial Secretary was excluded from the new War Cabinet. According to Lloyd George, 'Long was rather piqued at his exclusion from the War Cabinet'. Long privately agitated for change, arguing that Lloyd George ran the 'grave' risk of incurring the wrath of the Dominions. 'I am afraid', Long wrote to Lloyd George, 'we may have trouble with the Dominions over the exclusion of 'their' Minister from the Cabinet'. Long predicted that the Dominions would complain that the British War Cabinet was unrepresentative and a 'degradation' of their interests. Long called for all the Heads of Departments to be members of the War Cabinet to enable them to safeguard interests committed to their 'trust' and allay Dominion anxieties. Long considered it vital that Lloyd George should make a clear decisive policy statement in Parliament outlining the new British Government's intentions towards the British Empire and the Dominions.

The British Prime Minister dismissed the Colonial Secretary's arguments for the enlargement of the British War Cabinet. Lloyd George remained convinced that a

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104 PM to GovNZ, 2 Dec 1916, G5/16. Massey telegraphed Liverpool with the news on 2 December that: 'It is certain almost Imperial Conference will be held in London July or August next year in which case early meeting of Parliament necessary'. Massey even asked Liverpool to arrange an early meeting of Parliament so he could return to London for the conference. Massey promised Liverpool that they would leave Vancouver by mail steamer on 17 January and arrive in New Zealand three weeks later. Also see NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, p. 72. Ward stated that they had 'actually pencilled our berths for return to this country before the middle of December' with the intention of returning to New Zealand by the end of January.

105 D. L. George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Volume I, London, 1938, pp. 1025-9. According to Lloyd George, Long 'was always conscious of the fact that he was regarded by a large section of the Conservative Party as the most eligible successor to the leadership vacated by Balfour'; Long to Lloyd George, 7 Dec 1916, F/32/4/1, Lloyd George Papers.

106 Long to Lloyd George, 12 Dec 1916, F/32/4/2, Lloyd George Papers. To reinforce the point, Long enclosed a draft telegram to all the Dominions explaining the exclusion of the Colonial Secretary from Cabinet.
small executive was the best way to re-energise the British war effort. The lacklustre performance of Asquith's Cabinet was a vivid reminder for Lloyd George of the dire political and military consequences of lethargic war leadership. Much to Long's chagrin, he was forced to send an apologetic cable to the Dominions explaining that his absence from the new British War Cabinet in no way affected their interests 'prejudicially'. He reassured the Dominions that their 'interests and wishes will certainly continue to receive as full consideration as in the past'. To soften the blow, Long promised a more attentive and consultative British Government, one that would provide 'fuller information' on the progress of war and policy formulation.

On 13 December the two New Zealand Ministers met the new Colonial Secretary for the first time. The passing of Bonar Law was barely noticed and Liverpool's traditional farewell telegram to the parting Colonial Secretary was rather subdued. By all accounts, the meeting was a success. Massey reported to Liverpool that 'good progress' was made. Long found the two New Zealanders to his liking. 'Massey and Ward are delightful fellows to work with', Long enthused to Liverpool. He had known Ward for years and over the next few months Massey left an indelible mark on Long. 'He is a most attractive fellow,' Long described Massey as 'full of strong common sense, brave as a lion, and a tremendous imperialist, and we have become great friends'.

While Long successfully assuaged Massey and Ward, Lloyd George had been carefully surveying his options on imperial policy. His thinking focussed on one key objective: how to achieve total victory over Germany. This ultimate goal inevitably underpinned his attitude towards the British Empire and the Dominions. Lloyd George recognised that 'enormous sacrifices' had be made by the Dominions with little consultation. Lloyd George knew this modus operandi of British imperial policy would have to be refined in his pursuit for the greater mobilisation of Dominion

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108 SSCols to GovNZ, 15 Dec 1916, G41/24. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 2 Jan 1917, WRO947/615/1, Long Papers. The new Colonial Secretary was determined to have the fullest possible exchange of confidential communication between the Governors-General and the Secretary of State. It is the only way in which the increasing difficulties of the relations of Downing Street and the self-governing Dominions can be made smooth and possible. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 7 Mar 1917, WRO947/615/4, Long Papers. Long wanted private and personal letters written 'freely about anybody or anything'.
109 GovNZ to SSCols, 12 Dec 1916, G5/16. Liverpool wrote: 'May I be permitted to say that I shall always retain most pleasant recollections of the time when I had the honour of being associated with you'. Liverpool was probably annoyed that Bonar Law had failed to keep him properly informed of the political crisis.
110 PM to GovNZ, 14 Dec 1916, G5/16.
111 Long to Liverpool, 14 Apr 1917, WRO947/615/7, Long Papers.
resources. But how could Lloyd George distance himself from Asquith's reluctance to involve the Dominions in British policy-making without forfeiting the levers of executive control? In his words, how could he make the Dominions 'feel that they have been consulted'? Lloyd George's solution was hardly revolutionary but its simplicity was brilliantly effective. On 12 December Lloyd George outlined his proposal to Long:

As we must receive even more substantial support from them before we can hope to pull through, it is important that they should feel that they have a share in our councils as well as in our burdens. We want more men from the Colonies. We can hardly ask them to make another great recruiting effort unless it is accompanied by an invitation to come over to discuss the situation with us.112

Historians interested in the development and evolution of the British Empire have been divided over the reasons for Lloyd George's new-found enthusiasm for the Dominions and imperial institutions. Constitutional historians such as A. B. Keith, Kenneth Wheare and Frederick Madden have promulgated a Whiggish concept of progress, emphasising the First World War as the catalyst in the British Empire's inexorable march towards becoming an association of free and equal nations. According to historian Ronald Robinson, their work predominantly 'read back into imperial past the gradual but inevitable triumph of Commonwealth institutions and ethics'.113 As a result, Lloyd George's moves towards greater levels of consultation with the Dominions during the First World War was noble and a sign of the British Empire's growing maturity.

The current literature has adopted a cynical approach placing Lloyd George's politics at the centre of its argument. Recent scholars view British moves to incorporate the Dominions in the decision-making process as moral prerequisite to Lloyd George's attempt to squeeze more war material out of the British Empire. Historian D. C. Watt has argued that 'the motives impelling the British Cabinet to take these steps were as much dictated by British needs as neo-imperialism'.114 Historian Robert Holland, the most recent proponent of this interpretation, has argued that Lloyd George pursued an imperial policy of exploitation - "asset-stripping" - targeting Dominion resources to enhance his prospects of victory. Holland asserts that the

British Empire 'was to underwrite the extended belligerency on which the Lloyd George coalition was based'.

This version of history has considerable merit. It is borne out by Lloyd George's private papers and avoids the inherent functionalism and retrospection of Whig historians. However, Watt and Robert underestimate the influence of the Dominions and their calls for greater levels of consultation within the British Empire. Holland's thesis also underplays the impact of the war on intra-imperial relations. The British Empire, as a worldwide system, was not immune from the effects of war and relationships were bound to change. While Lloyd George had selfish political reasons to convene an imperial conference, the Dominions were clearly dissatisfied with the status quo and wanted a greater say in the running of the war. By the middle of 1916 most of the Dominions considered that the existing level of consultation was inadequate. The Dominions were pouring more and more men into the struggle that seemed eternal. As a result, the Dominions sought to expand their role over imperial policy-making. Even traditional "imperialists" like Massey and Ward argued that the British Government needed to be more attentive to the Dominions. According to Amery, Massey would have been 'bitterly disappointed' if Lloyd George failed to address Dominion relations in the British Empire.

On 19 December Lloyd George, in his maiden speech to the House of Commons as Prime Minister, outlined his government's intention to summon an imperial conference to facilitate 'an early and complete triumph' over Germany. By supporting the formation of an imperial conference, the "Welsh Wizard" had achieved the illusive double. Lloyd George's imperial policy neatly appeased Dominion calls for greater involvement in the war management process without Great Britain having to relinquish executive command over the British Empire's war effort. This public affirmation of the importance of the Dominions in the war seemed in stark contrast to Asquith's indifferent attitude towards the Dominions. The quid pro quo of this arrangement was obvious. In return for full consultation, Lloyd George expected a

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greater military contribution from the Dominions and an escalation of the British Empire's war effort.\textsuperscript{118}

The timing of the imperial conference became a significant issue for the New Zealanders. It was inconvenient. Massey and Ward had been absent from New Zealand for nearly four months but they reluctantly agreed to delay their departure.\textsuperscript{119} In the New Year, Long reported to Lloyd George that Massey and Ward 'do not like the prospect of remaining here indefinitely'.\textsuperscript{120} Because of the commitments of the Australian and South African leaders, Long conceded that a conference before March was unlikely.\textsuperscript{121} The 1916 Rising in Ireland and conscription had split the Australian Labor Government forcing Hughes into frantic coalition talks with Cook. On 9 January the British Government received a cable from Munro-Ferguson confirming that Hughes would not be travelling to Great Britain. Hughes stubbornly refused to send another Australian representative. The South African Government also decided that it was impossible for Prime Minister General Louis Botha to leave the country. Instead, the South Africans nominated their Minister of Defence, Lieutenant-General Jan C. Smuts, to be their principal representative in Great Britain.\textsuperscript{122}

Pressure on the two New Zealanders to extend their visit intensified. On 22 December the British War Cabinet decided to invite the Prime Ministers of the Empire to attend an Imperial War Cabinet to consider 'urgent matters' of war policy, possible peace terms and post-war problems.\textsuperscript{123} The creation of an Imperial War Cabinet was Lloyd George's brainchild. In comparison to the maladroit imperial conference, Lloyd George asserted that the Imperial War Cabinet would recreate the close feeling of intimacy between the British Government and the Dominions.

\textsuperscript{118} 'Correspondence Relating to the Imperial Conference, 1911 and the Imperial War Conferences of 1917 and 1918', Dominions No. 61, Confidential, Imperial Conference Secretariat, September 1920, p. 75, CO886/7; Long to Lloyd George, 19 Dec 1916, F/32/4/5, Lloyd George Papers. Long preferred an early conference; SSCols to GovNZ, 20 Dec 1916, G41/24; GovNZ to SSCols, 22 Dec 1916, G41/24; Allen to Liverpool, 20 Dec 1916, M4/27, Allen Papers. In response to Lloyd George's heartening address in the House of Commons, Allen wrote: 'I can assure you that the people of New Zealand are very grateful for the recognition of their contribution to the common cause and will stand firm in their determination to continue their efforts till final victory is won'.
\textsuperscript{119} WCab Meeting 15#, 22 Dec 1916, CAB 37/162/11.
\textsuperscript{120} SSCols to GovNZ, 21 Dec 1916, G41/24; GovNZ to SSCols, 24 Dec 1916, G41/24; Long to Lloyd George, 12 Jan 1917, F/32/4/20, Lloyd George Papers.
\textsuperscript{121} Long to Lloyd George, 12 Jan 1917, F/32/4/20, Lloyd George Papers.
\textsuperscript{122} 'Correspondence Relating to the Imperial Conference, 1911 and the Imperial War Conferences of 1917 and 1918', Dominions No. 61, Confidential, Imperial Conference Secretariat, September 1920, pp. xvi-xvii, CO886/7.
\textsuperscript{123} WCab Meeting 15#, 22 Dec 1916, CAB 37/162/11. Long told Cabinet to call this a War Conference to overcome the constitutional difficulties raised by India's attendance. But they decided that the invitation should not invite them to attend an ordinary Conference 'but to attend the War Cabinet for the discussion of urgent matters arising out of the war' (italics are mine). Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 26 Dec 1916, G41/24.
engendered by the 1911 CID meetings. The central bureaucratic figure responsible for ensuring the smooth running of the British war machine, the Secretary of the Cabinet, Maurice Hankey, was greatly 'amused' by the proposal. In his diary, Hankey confessed the Imperial War Cabinet had no agenda to consider. When Bonar Law heard about the impending arrival of Dominion leaders, he reputedly commented: 'When they are here, you will wish to goodness you could get rid of them'.

While Massey's position as Prime Minister guaranteed him a seat at the Imperial War Cabinet table, Ward's official status remained a mystery. Long was quick to identify the problem, warning Lloyd George that Massey 'will certainly request permission to bring ... Ward ... with him to assist in some of the discussions'. Long believed it would 'give mortal offences to the other Dominions if through an act of omission on our part they were not in a position to have similar assistance'. He suggested that colleagues of their choice should accompany Dominion Prime Ministers. In terms of the imperial conference, Long advised that it should run in parallel 'to ask any questions for which there is no time in the War Cabinet'. On 1 January the British Cabinet accepted Long's proposal and decided 'that Dominion Premiers should be invited to bring with them any of their Ministers whose presence might be necessary in connection with discussion of special issues'. It was also agreed that larger issues 'of common interest not directly affecting the conduct of the War' should take place in the Imperial War Conference under the chairmanship of the Colonial Secretary.

This latest arrangement did not resolve the issue of Ward's standing at the Imperial War Cabinet. While ministers of 'special knowledge' were welcome to participate at the meetings, the British Government stressed that 'the Prime Minister alone will be a member of the [Imperial] War Cabinet'. Long fully understood Ward's predicament, that he had come to Great Britain 'on terms of absolute equality with Mr. Massey' and that to 'occupy a position subordinate, would be an intolerable insult. Ward, clearly upset that British officials had belittled his status as the de facto leader of New Zealand, requested permission to bring two of his own ministers. The British Cabinet, however, decided that only one minister would be permitted and that it would be the Foreign Secretary. Ward, clearly upset, wrote to Long: 'I should like to continue my observations which I believe would add weight to the conference'. Long, in turn, wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: 'I think it would be advisable if New Zealand were allowed to send two ministers, as it is a question of a treaty and this is going to be a treaty conference. It would be very unfortunate if New Zealand were to feel that they were not treated in accordance with their importance as a Dominion'.

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125 SSCols to GovNZ, 26 Dec 1916, G41/24.
126 Long to Lloyd George, 30 Dec 1916, CAB37/162/30.
128 SSCols to GovNZ, 2 Jan 1917, G41/24. This telegram warned New Zealand that 'it may not be possible for the Prime Minister to preside'. Also see George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Volume I*, p. 1028. According to Lloyd George: 'The cautious wording of this telegram was dictated by the wish to give full opportunities for conference, while avoiding any appearance of summoning a normal Imperial Conference, and becoming subject to the technical limitations which the official constitution of an Imperial Conference would impose'.
129 SSCols to GovNZ, 2 Jan 1917, G41/24.
Zealand, threatened to return home to break up the coalition government. In a letter to Lloyd George, Long predicted: 'I fancy myself it will end in making two Ministers from each Dominion actually members of the Cabinet'.\textsuperscript{130} For the time being, Massey and Ward lingered on in Great Britain, shifting into the Savoy Hotel after the British Government commandeered the Hotel Cecil.

While Massey and Ward enjoyed the plush surroundings of the Savoy Hotel, Allen continued to shoulder the burden of administering New Zealand's war effort. While the strain was showing, Allen had a knighthood to show for efforts.\textsuperscript{131} On 18 January Allen admitted to the Press Gallery that Massey and Ward would remain in Great Britain for the Imperial War Conference.\textsuperscript{132} The \textit{Southland Times} reported that Massey had given his consent to a South African and Canadian request to postpone the Conference until the middle of March.\textsuperscript{133} This filled Liverpool with a terrible sense of foreboding. Parliament had been in recess for over five months and his chances of escaping to the Cook Islands and Samoa were slipping. He wanted his Ministers back by early May.\textsuperscript{134} Massey had little sympathy for Liverpool, advising him that it would be unwise 'for Governor and Commander in Chief and three Cabinet Ministers to be absent from the colony except for special reasons of urgency'. While he was anxious to return to New Zealand, he suggested that Herries could relieve Allen.\textsuperscript{135} Massey's stern words had the desired effect. Liverpool quickly backtracked, apologising for implying that Allen needed to be replaced.\textsuperscript{136}

While waiting for the other Dominion representatives to arrive, Massey and Ward became leading advocates of Lloyd George's recruitment drive. They embarked upon a propaganda campaign, delivering numerous patriotic speeches to raise public awareness of the British Victory Loan and New Zealand's profile. Without thinking about the consequences for New Zealand's 'depleted' industrial labour force, they consistently promoted the need for increased belligerency.\textsuperscript{137} At a War Loan meeting in Eastbourne, Ward argued that the 'copper bullet' would only win the war and he urged a greater amount of support for the war effort.\textsuperscript{138} On 28 January, Ward outlined

\begin{enumerate}
\item Long to Liverpool, 2 Jan 1917, WRO947/615/1, Long Papers.
\item See GovNZ to SSCols, 16 Dec 1916, G5/16; SSCols to GovNZ, 11 Feb 1917, G5/16.
\item \textit{ST}, 19 Jan 1917, p. 5.
\item \textit{ST}, 20 Jan 1917, p. 5. PM to GovNZ, 16 Jan 1917, G5/16; GovNZ to PM, 21 Jan 1917, G5/16. The Prime Minister informed the Governor that the Conference will take place and he optimistically predicted that in 'all probability will be end of March before leaving England'. By the end of January, the Governor had been annoyed with his Prime Minister for failing to reply to his correspondence.
\item GovNZ to PM, 1 Feb 1917, G5/16.
\item PM to GovNZ, 3 Feb 1917, G5/16.
\item GovNZ to PM, 3 Feb 1917, G5/16.
\item Liverpool to Harcourt, 18 Jun 1917, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/385, Harcourt Papers.
\item \textit{ODT}, 31 Jan 1917, p. 5.
\end{enumerate}
his post-war vision at the Australian Corroboree in London. Ward argued against a return to pre-war conditions, expressing his disappointment that the British Government had omitted references to the German colonies in the Allied terms of peace transmitted to President Wilson. According to American historian W. Roger Louis, Lloyd George wanted to counter Russian criticism that Great Britain was 'fighting an imperialistic war'. As a result, Lloyd George brought British 'colonial policy more into alignment with the non-annexationist policy of the United States'.

Undeterred, Ward threw down the gauntlet, proclaiming that 'Australia and New Zealand, whose blood had won the colonies in the Pacific, were determined that they would never go back to the enemy'. Ward suggested provocatively that Australia and New Zealand 'would not allow anybody, not even President Wilson, to suggest our peace terms'. In his view, only combatant nations deserved the right to shape the peace.

Three days later Long swallowed Ward's bait, stating firmly that the British Government would never return the captured German colonies. An assortment of Labour and Liberal members in the House of Commons condemned Long's statement. The members did not want Great Britain's pure and noble mission to liberate Belgium and France from the barbarism of Prussian militarism tainted by the odium of a colonial war of conquest and large-scale territorial acquisitions. Rumours circulated that Lloyd George had censured his fractious Colonial Secretary over the comments. In Parliament, Long denied the allegations, refuting suggestions that he had caused a serious rift in the British Government by straining Anglo-American relations in the process. Long claimed that he was merely 'expressing the opinion of those I am specially bound to represent, namely, our Dominions and our Colonies'. He did not consider that it was 'out of place that the Minister specially called upon to represent them should put what they hold very dearly plainly before his countrymen'.

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139 'Sub-Committee of the IWCab on Territorial Desiderata in the Terms of Peace', Meeting 1#, 17 Apr 1917, CAB21/77/3-4; 'Sub-Committee of the IWCab on Territorial Desiderata in the Terms of Peace', Meeting 1#, 17 Apr 1917, PMI4/34. Massey echoed Ward's disappointment at 'the absence of all mention of the German Colonies in the definition of the Allied terms of peace communicated to President Wilson'. Also see Long to Balfour, 19 Jan 1917, FO800/207/6.

140 Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919, p. 77.

141 ODT, 29 Jan 1917, pp. 4-5; NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, p. 76. Ward repeated his sentiments in Parliament, arguing that it would be a crime against the people of the oversea dominions in the Pacific if these islands were ever allowed to revert either to Germany or to any other foreign country'.

142 Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies, p. 78.

143 Munro-Ferguson to Long, undated draft personal cable, MS1538/16/1671a, Hughes Papers. Ward stated to the British press that 'he was gratified with Mr. Long's announcement.

144 BPD, v. xc, 20 Feb 1917, cc. 1242-4.
Long’s mediocre performance fooled nobody. The British Government was divided over how to manage the issue of the German colonies without offending the United States or the goodwill of the Dominions. At this stage of the war, British policy over the future of the captured German colonies was by no means categorical or clear-cut. Lloyd George wanted to keep British policy flexible, capable of shifting with the important priorities of his administration. At this crucial juncture of the war, appeasing the United States had become a greater priority than sanctioning the annexationist policies of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. The United States had yet to enter the First World War and President Wilson had made clear his devotion to the principle of ‘peace without annexations’. Lloyd George knew that any talk of territorial aggrandisement would only serve to infuriate American policy-makers. In the long term, it remained to be seen whether or not the British Government would be forced to choose sides in the debate or if it could develop a colonial settlement policy acceptable to both the United States and the Dominions.145

Keeping in step with Ward’s controversial campaign, Massey addressed a plethora of British audiences. On 30 January Massey gave a rousing speech at Batley, expressing his confidence in the British Empire’s determination to win the war under Lloyd George’s guidance. In discussing post-war immigration policy, Massey stressed that a concerted effort needed be made to keep the Empire "British". He exhorted that the future of the imperial connection depended on the maintenance of the "British" character in the Dominions. Massey declared: ‘The Empire should be made self-contained and self-supporting’.146 In contrast to Ward, the 1911 champion of imperial federation, Massey was irrevocably opposed to surrendering ‘the least shred’ of Dominion autonomy to an imperial parliament.147

Massey’s trepidation over imperial federation demonstrated the pragmatism of his imperialism. He was not interested in the theoretical imperatives of constitutional relationships. While Massey respected the institutions of the British Empire, his faith always remained conditional that membership had to be mutually beneficial. Veneration for Dominion autonomy also remained a central cornerstone of Massey’s imperialism. With these key concepts in mind, Massey transformed the future of the German colonies into a key vote of confidence for Dominion faith in the British Empire. He pointed out that the security of the southern Dominions depended on the retention of the German colonies. Reinforcing Ward’s fire-eating brand of diplomacy, Massey stated that ‘New Zealand means to retain Samoa, and I am sure that

145 Louis, Great Britain and Germany’s Lost Colonies 1914-1919, p. 77.
146 ODT, 31 Jan 1917, p. 5.
147 ODT, 26 Feb 1917, p. 5; ODT, 7 Jun 1917, p. 6.
Australians feel the same in regard to the islands they have occupied'. Ironically, Hughes complained about Massey's inclination of speaking for Australia. He feared that Massey's utterances on the German colonies would only 'stimulate' similar Japanese claims to the Pacific north of the equator. Eventually Hughes decided that it was not 'undesirable' for Massey to speak on Australia's behalf. Hughes concluded that Massey would be able to bring more public pressure to bear on Great Britain's equivocal stance over the future of the German colonies.

For the most part, Massey and Ward maintained a healthy social life. On successive weekends they were invited to stay with the King at Windsor Castle. In late February, Massey and Borden listened to Lloyd George in the House of Commons speak on the threat posed to British commerce with the resumption of Germany's unrestricted submarine campaign which had started on 1 February 1917. This was one of those rare occasions in which the two New Zealanders were separated. For the most part, Ward and Massey kept a watchful eye on one another, like Siamese Twins. This uncomfortable arrangement did not always sit well with British officials. As Hankey began planning for Cabinet, the demands of the New Zealand pair caused 'much trouble'. According to Hankey:

Massey has insisted that Ward is to be invited to all meetings attended by himself; otherwise Ward will go home, and if he does so Massey will have to go too; otherwise Ward will upset him. In fact they are a set of political Siamese twins, who hate each other. So both had to be invited.

Ward's behaviour had tangible consequences for the Imperial War Cabinet. Initially, Lloyd George envisaged a small intimate body confined to the Dominion Prime Ministers that from time to time their colleagues could attend. When Hankey's chief assistant, Leopold Amery, 'conveyed this to Ward he exploded, asserting that though technically Massey might be Prime Minister, they are really twin stars; and that if he did not attend every meeting to which Massey was invited he would go home and break up the coalition'. The Secretariat 'gave way' and decided to invite

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148 Munro-Ferguson to Long, undated draft personal cable, MS1538/16/1671a, Hughes Papers. Massey's speech was reported in The Argus, 3 Feb 1917.

149 ODT, 26 Feb 1917, p. 5.


151 L. S. Amery, My Political Life: Volume Two: War and Peace 1914-1929, London, 1953, p. 105. Also see W. K. Hancock, Smuts: The Sanguine Years 1870-1919, Cambridge, 1962, p. 428. Hancock has confused the timing of the threat by stating that 'Sir Joseph Ward (the muddled apostle of federalism at the Imperial Conference of 1911) was threatening to break up the wartime coalition unless he was permitted to go to London with his premier, Mr Massey'.
Delegates of the Imperial War Conference [sic] Cabinet 1917, Earle Andrew Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library.

both Massey and Ward. This precedent had consequences the organisation of the Imperial War Cabinet. Borden argued that if New Zealand was to have two representatives, Canada must also have two. Lloyd George relented, deciding that the 'whole caboodle' must be invited. In Hankey's view, the event had been 'badly stage managed'.

During the first week of March the New Zealand Ministers attended two British War Cabinet meetings. The first meeting on 2 March was a lively affair but the second meeting on 6 March was routine and dull. When the shipping situation was discussed, Massey and Ward were strangely silent. British authorities could give them no guarantee that reserve shipping would be sent to alleviate the crisis facing New Zealand exporters. Their timid disposition did not last long. According to Hankey, Massey and Ward became more vocal over the British decision to publish the Dardanelles Report, expressing 'their marked disapproval'. The opportunity to hold Churchill accountable for the Gallipoli fiasco did not alter their position. Alien considered that 'no good purpose could be served' by the Dardanelles Commission, dredging up awful memories of a campaign in which the New Zealand soldier won heroic fame. This did not prevent Mackenzie from submitting a supplementary report to the inquiry expressing his 'stronger views upon certain of the findings'. He criticised British military authorities for underestimating the difficulties of the Gallipoli operation and failing to provide 'the measures necessary to carry out such an expedition with success'.

New Zealand attempts to suppress the Dardanelles Report's publication were futile. Conservative elements within the British War Cabinet were anxious to discredit Asquith by releasing the report. On 10 March The Press commented that the

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153 WCab Meeting 85#, 2 Mar 1917, CAB23/2/6; WCab Meeting 88#, 6 Mar 1917, CAB23/2/17.
154 WCab Meeting 85#, 2 Mar 1917, CAB23/2/6.
155 Liverpool to Harcourt, 18 Jun 1917, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/385, Harcourt Papers. Liverpool informed Harcourt that the New Zealand public 'do not hesitate to attribute any blame which is to be apportioned to Winston... he is very unpopular in this Dominion'.
156 Alien to Godley, 7 Jan 1918, M1/15, Part 5, Allen Papers; Allen to Godley, 7 Jan 1918, WA252/5, Godley Papers.
158 Hankey, *The Supreme Command 1914-1918, Volume Two*, p. 526. Hankey was 'bitterly opposed' to the publication of the Report. In ministerial circles Hankey found little support apart from Balfour, Massey and Ward. However, strong representations made by Hankey and other government departments eventually secured censorship restrictions on some of the more sensitive passages of the Report.
Dardanelles Report confirmed its suspicions that the Gallipoli campaign had been 'one of the most shocking examples of official blundering and malfeasance on the part of British politicians aspiring to the name and rank of statesmen'. The public vituperation certainly resonated with Allen who felt inclined to 'condemn the policy represented by Gallipoli'. Allen had come to the conclusion that the Gallipoli disaster proved that the fundamental weakness in the upper echelons of British Government was 'too much politics'. The lack of planning and co-ordination in the initial planning phases of the attack proved that the British High Command were not 'infallible'. Drawing upon his experience as an army officer, Allen agreed with Godley's assessment that a successful forcing of the Dardanelles needed a large invading army supported by a powerful navy with all the advantages of surprise. According to Allen: 'Not one of these elements were present at the Dardanelles campaign'. He bluntly described Gallipoli as 'one of the biggest blunders' of the First World War.¹⁵⁹

The Imperial War Cabinet finally began on Tuesday 20 March 1917. Altogether there were fourteen meetings. Massey and Ward were normally required to attend three meetings a week on Tuesday and Thursday mornings and Friday afternoons until its adjournment on 2 May. Massey and Ward did not miss a single meeting. The Imperial War Conference began on Wednesday 2 I March. It was held on alternate days. In total there were fifteen sessions of Imperial War Conference with the final meeting taking place on 27 April.

At the inaugural Imperial War Cabinet twenty-seven ministers and secretaries 'crammed' around the table at 10 Downing Street.¹⁶⁰ Lloyd George opened the meeting with a depressing statement on the military and naval position of the British

¹⁵⁹ The Press, 10 Mar 1917, p. 5; Allen to Godley, 7 Jan 1918, M1/15, Part 5, Allen Papers; Allen to Godley, 7 Jan 1918, WA252/5, Godley Papers; Allen to Godley, 27 Jan 1917, WA252/4, Godley Papers. Despite his best efforts to avoid the Dardanelles Commission, Godley was summoned twice in February 1917. Of all the Commission's members, Mackenzie thoroughly cross-examined him. Godley also submitted a written report. See Statement by Lieutenant-General Sir Alexander J. Godley, K. C. B., K. C. M. G., Commanding 2nd Anzac Corps (late commanding New Zealand and Australian Division): On the Conduct of Operations of War in the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, including the Supply of Drafts, Reinforcements, Ammunition and Equipment to the Troops and Fleet, MS1088. Sir James Allen, Ministry of Defence Papers; 'The Dardanelles Commission', 1 Feb 1917, CAB19/33. Godley and Birdwood conducted an extensive correspondence on how to manage giving evidence at the Dardanelles Commission. See Godley to Birdwood, 20 Nov 1916, WA252/10, Godley Papers; Birdwood to Godley, 22 Nov 1916, WA252/10, Godley Papers; Birdwood to Godley, 21 Jan 1917, WA252/10, Godley Papers; Godley to Birdwood, 26 Jan 1917, WA252/10; Godley to Birdwood, 14 Feb 1917, WA252/10, Godley Papers.

¹⁶⁰ For a description of the scene at the first meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet see Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-1918, Volume Two, p. 661; Also see Hankey Diary, 20 Mar 1917, HNKY1/1/329, Archives of Lord Hankey. In his diary and memoirs, Hankey has described how the room 'was crowded with a welter of Dominion Prime Ministers, British Ministers, and Indian Maharajahs who could not find their seats'.
Empire. \textsuperscript{161} The audience listened attentively to the sombre news that Germany would not be defeated in 1917. Lloyd George urged the representatives of the British Empire to contribute more resources to the 'great struggle'. \textsuperscript{162} It was an inauspicious start for the new imperial body. After the fourth meeting, Hankey could see no use in persisting with the shambles. This wretched Imperial War Cabinet', Hankey entered into his diary on 28 March, 'will result in nothing useful, I fear'. \textsuperscript{163}

In contrast, the two New Zealanders found the Imperial War Cabinet to be a rewarding experience. For the first time in the war there appeared to be genuine and salutary consultation between Great Britain and the Dominions. At the final meeting, Massey described the Imperial War Cabinet experiment as an 'unqualified success from the point of view of the Dominions'. \textsuperscript{164} The forum allowed for open dialogue and the frank exchange of views. Massey and Ward relished the opportunity to forward New Zealand's interests. The impact of the shipping crisis on New Zealand's fragile economy remained at the top of their agenda. \textsuperscript{165} Massey argued the policies of the Shipping Controller, Sir Joseph Maclay, were just as damaging to New Zealand trade as the German submarine campaign. Massey brought the Cabinet's attention to the sinking of the \textit{Rotorua}, a ship laden with New Zealand frozen meat, which was sunk on the night of 23 March by a German torpedo in the English Channel. Prior to the tragedy, the ship had safely reached the port of Plymouth only to be told by imperial authorities that it had to proceed to London for unloading. The disaster happened en route. \textsuperscript{166} Massey wanted some answers. Why did British authorities order the \textit{Rotorua} to leave the safety of Plymouth without discharging her cargo? What level of protection did the Admiralty provide for the \textit{Rotorua} in the English Channel? The Shipping Controller, Sir Joseph Maclay, replied meekly that Plymouth did not have the facilities to unload frozen meat. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Edward Carson, pointed out that the Royal Navy did not have the capacity to protect every merchant ship. \textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{161} IWCab Meeting 1\#, 20 Mar 1917, CAB23/40/1; George, \textit{War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Volume I}, pp. 1047-57. Lloyd George's statement is re-printed in full in his memoirs as Appendix A.
\textsuperscript{162} George, \textit{War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Volume I}, p. 1057.
\textsuperscript{163} Hankey Diary, 28 Mar 1917, HNKY1/1/334, Archives of Lord Hankey.
\textsuperscript{164} IWCab Meeting 14\#, 2 May 1917, CAB23/40/43; IWCab Meeting 14\#, 2 May 1917, EA11l2.
\textsuperscript{165} Massey to Allen, 2 Jan 1917, Box 9a, Allen Papers. Massey did not rate his chances of improving New Zealand's shipping position through the Imperial War Cabinet. He informed Allen that: 'Our biggest trouble will be shipping, though the position is slightly easier then it was. We are doing our best here, but nevertheless I am afraid things in this connection will be very serious in New Zealand during the next three months'.
\textsuperscript{166} SSCols to GGNZ, 7 Aug 1917, G2/39; IWCab Meeting 4\#, 27 Mar 1917, CAB23/40/8.
\textsuperscript{167} IWCab Meeting 4\#, 27 Mar 1917, CAB23/40/8; IWCab Meeting 9\#, 12 Apr 1917, CAB23/40/27.
The sinking of the *Rotorua* was a traumatic event for British-New Zealand relations.\(^{168}\) It represented the ultimate failure of British policy-makers to protect New Zealand's interests and the sinking undermined New Zealand's faith in the British system. Massey could not believe that £415,575 worth of cargo had been treated in such a cavalier fashion.\(^{169}\) He made his feelings clear to Mackenzie, expressing 'his great indignation at the manner in which the vessel had been sent from Plymouth to take risks of a voyage in the Channel and through the Straits to the Port of London'.\(^{170}\) Mackenzie reacted quickly to Massey's fury, sending 'a strongly worded letter' to the Colonial Office, hoping 'that more intelligent action would be taken in future by the responsible authorities in the handling of vessels trading with New Zealand'.\(^{171}\) The British Government refused to admit culpability and would not replace the ship. Long referred the matter to Liverpool, who reprimanded Mackenzie, calling his letter 'hardly the way for an official to address one of His Majesty's Under Secretaries of State'.\(^{172}\) As instructed, Mackenzie verbally apologised to the Colonial Office. Six months later, Long replied that the incident in no way impaired 'the cordial relations' existing between Great Britain and New Zealand.\(^{173}\)

Massey remained convinced that the *Rotorua* incident revealed the true extent of British indifference towards New Zealand's shipping problem. In April, Massey brought the Imperial War Cabinet's attention to the large number of insulated ships - seventeen in total - withdrawn from New Zealand trading routes by the Shipping Controller, Sir Joseph Maclay. Massey feared that sustained British requisitioning of insulated steamers was creating a 'permanent dislocation', severely crippling a New Zealand economy dependent on agricultural exports to Great Britain. Maclay, who bore the brunt of Massey's attack, pointed out that it was only twenty-one days to Argentina compared to forty-two days to New Zealand. Massey bitterly retorted 'that this was a sorry requital for all New Zealand's sacrifices in the common cause'.\(^{174}\)


\(^{169}\) 'Department of Imperial Government Supplies: Review of Operations Covering Period From the 1st April, 1917, to the 31st March, 1918, Including an Appendix Showing Results to 30th September, 1918', *AJHR*, 1918, v. 2, H.-38, p. 19.


\(^{172}\) GovNZ to SSCols, 26 Mar 1917, G41/26; SSCols to GovNZ, 10 Apr 1917, G41/26; SSCols to GGNZ, 7 Aug 1917, G2/39.

\(^{173}\) SSCols to GGNZ, 25 Feb 1918, G2/43.

\(^{174}\) IWCab Meeting 8#, 5 Apr 1917, CAB23/40/22-3. Also see 'Meat Export: Correspondence Between the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Shipping Re Withdrawal of Ships, Etc', *AJHR*, 1917, v. 2, H.-21, pp. 1-6.
On 12 May Massey and Ward wrote to Lloyd George pointing out 'the importance to New Zealand of having every reasonable facility provided for the conveyance to the United Kingdom of the Dominion's food products'. They were concerned that New Zealand's primary producers were not receiving payment until their produce had been loaded onto the ship. The letter outlined the 'seriousness' of the position with the onset of winter. In their absence, Massey and Ward suggested a New Zealand representative at the Ministry of Shipping would see 'that the interests of New Zealand were specially attended to'. The British Government avoided the idea, admitting that 'beyond occasional palliatives' it was 'unable to hold out hope of permanent enlarged shipping facilities' for New Zealand.

At the Imperial War Cabinet and Conference trade was never far from the New Zealand Minister's agenda. On 24 April Massey introduced a resolution on imperial preference and immigration at the Imperial War Cabinet. Over the last decade, this initiative had been a consistent New Zealand policy objective at successive imperial conferences. Because Great Britain imposed so few tariffs on goods entering its market, New Zealand exporters faced stiff foreign competition, especially from the large meat exporting countries, the United States and Argentina. If Great Britain could be persuaded to introduce preferential trading rights for the British Empire, New Zealand stood to gain enormous financial benefits from its largest export market.

In February 1917, Massey decided to pursue the adoption of imperial preference. Massey planned to exploit British sympathy generated by New Zealand's war sacrifices to win special custom concessions and tariff privileges. This appeal certainly resonated with some British politicians. Since the beginning of the war, there had been a perceptible shift in British opinion in favour of imperial preference. According to Lloyd George: 'The War had undoubtedly revealed certain fundamental facts which it was necessary to take cognisance of in our Imperial and domestic arrangements'. The First World War illustrated Great Britain's vulnerability and

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175 Massey and Ward to Lloyd George, 12 May 1917, CO209/296/537-8.
176 See SSCols to GGNZ, 16 Jul 1917 in 'Insulated Tonnage: Telegrams and Correspondence Exchanged with London, Canada, and Australia in Connection with the Supply of Insulated Tonnage, etc, to Meet the Requirements of the Dominion Since September, 1914,' AJHR, 1919, v. 2, H.-38A, p. 27.
177 IWCab Meeting 11#, 24 Apr 1917, CAB23/40/32.
178 GovNZ to SSCols, 15 Feb 1917, G41/25; 'Correspondence Relating to the Imperial Conference, 1911 and the Imperial War Conferences of 1917 and 1918', Dominions No. 61, Confidential, Imperial Conference Secretariat, September 1920, p. 80, CO886/7. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 23 Jan 1917, G41/25.
over-dependence on overseas raw materials and foodstuffs. In 1913, 73 per cent of British imports were food and raw materials. There was also no guarantee for Great Britain that there would be a resumption of pre-war trading patterns following Germany’s eventual defeat. The Paris Conference resolutions of June 1916 committed the Allies to make themselves independent in raw materials from supply by enemy countries. With the onslaught of the German submarine campaign, British officials soon realised how important cheap and plentiful supplies of raw materials were to the domestic economy and the stability of British society. As a result, a number of people in Great Britain began advocating imperial preference as the ideal solution to the problems of import diversification and supply. In February 1917, the British Reconstruction Committee, better known as the Lord Balfour of Burleigh's Committee, recommended the 'development throughout the Empire of a system of mutual tariff preferences'.

British support for imperial preference was not unanimous. Powerful elements within the British War Cabinet were strongly opposed to the idea. Bonar Law, an ardent free trade supporter, did not want the British Reconstruction Committee’s Report published let alone be transmitted to the Dominions. In his mind, introducing preferential treatment for the Dominions made little economic sense. Balfour did not think that granting preferential trading rights to the Dominions would serve Great Britain’s interests. The vast bulk of British imports came from foreign countries and predominantly from the United States. His Treasury officials maintained that imperial preference would cost the British consumer and lead to a sharp decline in customs
revenue. Lloyd George remained non-committal about the utility of erecting trade barriers and introducing forms of protectionism for the British Empire. Just when it appeared that Lloyd George might drop imperial preference from the agenda, Long informed him that 'Massey is very Imperialistic and determined to force the issue. Ward ditto'. The Colonial Secretary warned his Prime Minister that 'the people at home and in the Dominions expect that some definite progress will be made'. Long considered the issue a test of his credibility, threatening to resign if imperial preference failed to appear on the agenda.

At the Imperial War Cabinet meeting on 24 April Massey introduced a resolution calling for the creation of an imperial preference system and immigration scheme. The proposal was hotly debated. According to Leo Amery's account of the meeting, Massey stated the case for imperial preference 'rather long-windily'. This evidently annoyed some ministers. Massey pointed argued that a clear majority of the British Empire favoured imperial preference but it had failed to materialise because of British indecision and reluctance. As Bonar Law feared, Massey cited the British Reconstruction Committee's Report as striking evidence that the war had encouraged a favourable change in official British policy. Massey argued that the war had exposed the limitations of British dependency on foreign countries for basic necessities and the importance of the Dominions in meeting British demands. Massey knew the producers of the British Empire could supply Great Britain with all

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182 Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire 1918-1939, pp. 56-8; Hewins, The Apologia of an Imperialist, p. 111-8. Long saw Bonar Law as the 'chief difficulty in the way of Preference'. The British Reconstruction Committee's Report was published and transmitted to the Dominions on 2 March 1917. Also see NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, pp. 60-1. Massey knew of the report's existence because he was given a copy in Great Britain. See 'Reconstruction Committee: Memorandum on German Post-War Economic Policy, Mar 1917', PM14/28. Massey also possessed copies of the Paris Resolutions. See 'Recommendations of the Economic Conference of Allies, 14-17 June 1916', PM14/56.

183 Long to Lloyd George, undated letter, F/32/4/68, Lloyd George Papers; Hewins, The Apologia of an Imperialist, pp. 110-32; George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, p. 1043. Lloyd George later professed that he 'was all for Preference, and would personally assent to any resolution laying down the principle'. But when Hewins met with him on 10 April, he found Lloyd George increasingly equivocal and evasive on the issue, making it difficult to believe Lloyd George's subsequent claims in his memoirs. To be fair to Lloyd George, he did concede to Hewins that if the Imperial War Cabinet should endorse the idea, he would allow the setting up of machinery to introduce imperial preference so long as it was 'tariffs or some other means'.

184 'Confidential. Memorandum on Assistance in the War Rendered by the Dominions other than Naval and Military (Including Munitions) or Financial Assistance', 13 Mar 1917, PM14/19. According to this British report 'in respect of the disposal of their staple products that the co-operation of the Self-governing Dominions has proved most valuable in the economic sphere. Throughout the War the Dominions have done their utmost to place at the disposal of His Majesty's Government their resources in the way of raw materials and to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in all matters relating to the exportation of their products, with the dual object of preventing the enemy receiving supplies of which they are in need and of securing that His Majesty's Government and the Allied Governments receive the supplies of which they stand in need'. Also see 'Memorandum on the Principal Supplies of Food and Feeding-Stuffs Received From the British Empire During the War', PM14/50.
its needs so long as the Royal Navy retained control of the seas. He also pointed out that there was plenty of room in the Dominions for emigration and he advocated immigration financial assistance schemes. The Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, ably supported Massey. He considered imperial preference 'a valuable and fundamental principle'. Borden also supported the idea of adopting an imperial scheme of emigration.185

Lloyd George did not argue with the general principle of the resolution but he objected to Massey's suggested method of imperial preference, 'through its Customs'. Lloyd George believed that such a provision ran the risk of provoking a retaliatory response from Great Britain's principal wheat-and-meat trading partners, Russia and the United States. Sensibly, Lloyd George argued that he could not alienate these two countries; pointing out that such 'a declaration in favour of a Customs Preference might look as if we were attempting to do them an injury'.186 He suggested that Massey should omit these words from his resolution. The New Zealand Prime Minister obliged and the Imperial War Cabinet 'accepted the resolution in principle subject to settlement of its precise wording'.187

With the Imperial War Cabinet's authorisation, Long established a small draft sub-committee consisting of Milner, Borden, Massey, Henderson, Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary State for India, and Lord Robert Cecil, the Minister of Blockade, to finalise the wording of the resolution. While there were a number of minor revisions, the essentials of Massey's draft were unchanged. The emotive economic language of "preference" and "custom duties" no longer appeared in the final version of the resolution. On 26 April the Imperial War Conference passed Resolution XXI which adopted: 'The principle that each part of the Empire, having due regard to the interests of our Allies, shall give specially treatment and facilities to the produce manufactures of other parts of the Empire'. Massey had succeeded where many before him had failed, by persuading a British Government to support a resolution favouring imperial preference. Clause two of the resolution promised that arrangements would be made

185 IW Cab Meeting 11#, 24 Apr 1917, CAB23/40/32-4; Also see NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, pp. 59-60. In a Ministerial Statement to Parliament, Massey spoke of the process he undertook to get the resolution accepted. However, he would not divulge any confidential information about the debate which took place within the Imperial War Cabinet; Barnes and Nicholson, (eds.), with an introduction by Amery, The Leo Amery Diaries, p. 151; Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire 1918-1939, pp. 143-8.
186 IW Cab Meeting 11#, 24 Apr 1917, CAB23/40/32-4; Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire 1918-1939, p. 146.
187 IW Cab Meeting 11#, 24 Apr 1917, CAB23/40/33; SSCols to GovNZ, 8 May 1917, G41/27.
to encourage emigrants from Great Britain 'to settle in countries under the British flag'.

Massey desire to keep the Empire "British" manifested itself in the debate over the future of the German colonies. At the opening meeting the Imperial War Cabinet Lloyd George indicated that the problem of the German colonies could only be resolved by taking into consideration the military situation and the views and wishes of Great Britain's allies. Lloyd George's pedantry failed to impress Massey. He wanted an unqualified British assurance that the colonies would never be returned to Germany. As far as New Zealand was concerned, Germany had been 'very bad neighbours' in the South Pacific region. Massey warned 'that if we have to give back Samoa and allow the Germans to re-establish themselves in the South Pacific it will be the bitterest pill that the New Zealanders ever had to swallow'. Following a discussion on war aims initiated by Smuts and Ward, Lloyd George decided that the issue would best left to the deliberations of a sub-committee under Lord Curzon's guidance.

On 17 April the sub-committee of the Imperial War Cabinet on 'Territorial Desiderata in the Terms of Peace' met for the first time to consider British policy on the future of German colonies. The principal members of the committee were Curzon, Long, Austen Chamberlain, Massey, Smuts and the Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Cecil. Massey and Smuts argued that it was important for the British Empire to retain the German colonies to enhance the security of the Dominions. Massey pointed to the 'very strong feeling in Australia and New Zealand that they should be retained in British possession'. He said there 'was the danger of the establishment of German naval and aviation bases and wireless stations in the future'. Massey believed that 'the Germans should be kept out of the Pacific entirely'.

During the discussions on Japan's control of the German colonies north of equator, Massey did not attempt to renegotiate the secret Anglo-Japanese Agreement. In
February 1917, the British agreed to support Japanese claims to German territory in China and in the north Pacific in the eventual peace settlement in return for a similar Japanese pledge to treat British claims to German colonies in the South Pacific 'in the same spirit'.

Somewhat surprisingly, both the Australian and New Zealand Governments acquiesced without demur. This represented a clear policy shift for the New Zealand Government. Since the beginning of the war the New Zealand Government had been deeply suspicious of Japanese involvement. In May 1915 the New Zealand Government made it patently clear to British officials that it would never be convinced 'that in the future our peril is not from Japan'. The New Zealand Government requested that the British Government 'use every effort to prevent the advance of the frontier of Japan in the Pacific'. The New Zealand Government 'fully understood the urgent present necessity for abstention from comment or protest during the continuance of the War'. Liverpool warned that if British policy-makers doubted New Zealand's assessment over the Japanese threat, Great Britain 'must be prepared for bitter resentment'.

The New Zealand Government accepted the Anglo-Japanese Agreement on 6 February 1917. This decision represented a desire to implement a post-war security policy based on Germany's permanent removal from the Pacific and a continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Long personally consulted Massey, convincing him of the absolute necessity to frustrate German intentions in the Pacific and the desirability of further Japanese military assistance. Massey accepted the pragmatism of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. It reflected the reality of Japanese occupation since October 1914 and enhanced the prospects of securing Germany's total expulsion from...
the Pacific region. The New Zealand Government considered that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement would enhance New Zealand's post-war security. The reciprocal nature of the arrangement also made it less likely that the German colonies would become 'pawns' at a peace conference. The British Empire had now enlisted Japanese support for the direct annexation of captured German territory. As Long informed his colleagues on the British War Cabinet, Massey did not want to sacrifice New Zealand interests or give up the German colonies 'for purely European objects'; Massey did not want the future of the German colonies open to discussion at a peace conference. The Anglo-Japanese Agreement made this eventuality less likely.

Unlike Hughes, Massey praised the value of Japan's naval contribution to the protection of New Zealand's troops and commerce in the Pacific. On the Curzon Committee, Massey argued that 'the Japanese Navy had been of great service to the Dominions in the Pacific' and had 'played the game'. The long-term undesirably of Japanese expansionism in the Pacific was sacrificed for the short-term benefits of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. Massey's only point of debate was the future of Ocean Island and Nauru. Mistakenly believing that the phosphate rich-islands were north of the equator and in Japanese hands, Massey asked that Ocean Island and Nauru be excluded from the agreement. He was informed that both islands were in British occupation and lay south of the equator, consequently being outside the scope of the agreement made with Japan.

197 SSCols to GovNZ, 6 May 1915, G2/23; SSCols to GGAust, 23 Feb 1915, G48/18/N/18. Ironically, in response to an Australian accusation that Great Britain had made a secret agreement with Japan over the disposal of the German colonies, Harcourt replied 'there is absolutely no foundation for such an idea'. See Harcourt to Liverpool, 21 Apr 1915, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/329, Harcourt Papers. Harcourt predicted Japan would claim the German colonies in its possession. He told Liverpool: 'I think in view of the great naval assistance which she has rendered to the Allies in the Pacific she is probably entitled to this'. In another letter to Liverpool, Harcourt described post-war Japanese control of these islands as 'inevitable'. See Harcourt to Liverpool, 9 Oct 1915, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/353, Harcourt Papers.

198 WCab Meeting 63#, 12 Feb 1917, CAB23/1/215.

199 Long to Balfour, 8 Jan 1917, WRO947/532/8a, Long Papers; Long to Balfour, 8 Jan 1917, FO800/207/3. Massey insisted that Long advise Balfour of the New Zealand's wish not to see the German colonies used as a 'pawn' at the peace conference. He made it clear that New Zealand expected to be fully consulted over the disposal of the German colonies. Also see Balfour to Long, 16 Jan 1917, FO800/207/5; Long to Balfour, 19 Jan 1917, FO800/207/6. Balfour wrote that 'it would be mere folly to attempt to consider the fate of German territories conquered by Dominion troops without consulting the Dominions concerned'. Balfour believed 'that there is no ground for Mr. Massey's anxieties on the subject'.


201 'Sub-Committee of the IWcab on Territorial Desiderata in the Terms of Peace', Meeting 1#, 17 Apr 1917, CAB21/77/3-4; 'Sub-Committee of the IWcab on Territorial Desiderata in the Terms of Peace', Meeting 1#, 17 Apr 1917, PM14/34.
The Curzon Committee rejected Massey's attempts to broaden the definition of British security interests in the Pacific. His suggestion that Great Britain should purchase American Samoa received no support. The majority of members on the sub-committee considered that 'no difficulty need arise from the American possession of the adjoining islands of the same group'. While Long remained sympathetic to Massey's idea to acquire French territory in Pacific (especially the New Hebrides) in exchange for British territory in Africa, the sub-committee decided to leave the matter until Australia had been properly consulted. In the end, Massey had to be satisfied with sub-committee's assurance that the colonies in possession of Australia and New Zealand 'should on no account be restored to Germany, but should at all costs be retained by Great Britain'. What had taken the Asquith Government five months to decide, the Curzon Committee was ready to report back to the Imperial War Cabinet in less than three weeks.

The Imperial War Cabinet considered the recommendations of the Curzon Report on 1 May. The report concluded that the British Empire should adhere to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. It also recommended the retention of the German colonies. The report considered that this policy was the most appropriate way to eliminate the German naval threat and enhance the security of the Dominions. In essence, the Curzon Report wanted to secure the future safety of the British Empire by dismantling the threat of the German colonial system. The debate that ensued split the Imperial War Cabinet. Lloyd George did not think that the report constituted 'adequate instruction to British Delegates if they had to face a Conference' especially if Germany managed to retain large tracts of Allied territory in France and Belgium. Lloyd George felt that telegrams from Russia were showing that non-annexation seemed to be 'getting the upper hand' and it would be difficult to implement the report's findings at a peace conference. Smuts chimed in, adding that if it was a question of annexation he was prepared to ask the inhabitants in a plebiscite. Borden remained sensitive to American views on the subject of territorial acquisitions. He felt that it was important to accommodate President Wilson's position on this issue. During the debate, he supported Lloyd George. At the other end of the spectrum,

202 'Sub-Committee of the IWCab on Territorial Desiderata in the Terms of Peace', Meeting 1#, 17 Apr 1917, CAB21/77/3-4; 'Sub-Committee of the IWCab on Territorial Desiderata in the Terms of Peace', Meeting 1#, 17 Apr 1917, PM14/34.

203 Secret. G-118. Committee of Imperial Defence. Sub-Committee on Territorial Changes. Interim Report. 25 January 1917, PM14/1. This inter-departmental body of Colonial Office and Foreign Office representatives was established by Asquith on 27 August 1916. It concluded that 'it would be desirable and politic to retain' the German colonies held by Australia and New Zealand in view of their 'sacrifices' in the 'common cause'. The sub-committee predicted that any other policy would cause Dominion resentment. Also see 'Imperial War Cabinet: Report of Committee on Terms of Peace, 28 April 1917', CAB21/77/42.
Long and Massey wanted no concessions. Fearing that the Curzon Report would be sidelined, Massey exhorted 'that the Report had only been adopted after the most earnest consideration and with a full sense of responsibility'. He argued that the adoption of the report was important for the future security of the British Empire and preventing future military aggression. Massey wanted British delegates at any future peace conference to 'make the best bargain possible on the lines of the Committee's Report'.

Despite Massey's final appeal, the Imperial War Cabinet passed a resolution that was 'entirely harmless'. The Imperial War Cabinet decided that the Curzon Report was only an 'indication of the objects to be sought by the British Representatives at the Peace Conference' and noted that 'the demands of the British Empire will require to be correlated at the Conference with those of our Allies'. Henderson dissented, stating that the British Labour Party believed in a firm policy of no annexations. Massey must also have been disappointed with the outcome. Once again, the British Government had failed to give a definite assurance on the fate of the German colonies.

In contrast to the Imperial War Cabinet, the Imperial War Conference did not have a substantive war policy-making role. The discussions in the Imperial War Conference focussed on post-war problems. The most significant issue for New Zealand was the future of imperial naval defence. Ward played a prominent part in securing a resolution that forced the Admiralty to undertake a review of its naval defence strategy for the British Empire. He argued for 'the vital necessity of having a Navy that is strong enough to protect the scattered interests of the Empire as a whole'. According to Smuts, Ward and Massey 'trounced' the Admiralty for failing to live up to the provisions of the 1909 Naval Agreement and to provide New Zealand with adequate naval defence during the early months of the war. The Imperial War Conference accepted the logic of their argument and passed the Ward-drafted

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204 IWCab Meeting 13# 1 May 1917, CAB/23/40/41; IWCab Meeting 13# 1 May 1917, EA11/2. Also see Andrews, The ANZAC Illusion, p. 133. For some reason, Andrews has stated that Massey 'was silent in the Imperial War Cabinet meeting'.

205 Amery's assessment of the Imperial War Cabinet resolution is a more accurate reflection of the outcome than Olssen's interpretation. See Olssen, 'A Nation 1914-1918', in Binney, Bassett, and Olssen, (eds.), The People and the Land, p. 328. Olssen claims that 'Lloyd George was unhappy but powerless' in the discussion over the Curzon Report. However, Lloyd George successfully frustrated Massey's plan to have the Curzon Report adopted as official British policy.

Resolution IV requesting 'the Admiralty to consider the most effective scheme of Naval Defence for the Empire'.

During the discussions on the future constitutional relations of the British Empire, Massey revealed a disposition that was anything but that of a stereotypical imperial sycophant. Unlike Ward, Massey was not a true adherent of imperial federalism. He cherished the Dominion's status as autonomous components of the British Empire calling it 'the freest and most progressive form of government that the world has ever seen'. In a long speech supporting Borden’s celebrated Resolution IX, Massey expressed his wish to see the continuance of the 'loose' arrangement of the British Empire whereby the Dominions exercised full autonomy yet enjoyed the benefits of close association with Great Britain. Massey preferred the advent of the Imperial War Cabinet as a consultative mechanism to the imperial federalists’ dream of an imperial parliament that risked abrogating a degree of self-government. According to Harcourt, Massey realised that imperial federalism at its highest development was 'very alarming to the Ministers of self-governing Dominions'.

As a result, Massey believed that any re-adjustment of the constitutional arrangements of the British Empire could only be dealt with by a special conference after the war. He was determined, however, to see that the Dominions developed some form of control over the foreign policy of the British Empire. He believed that the Dominions deserved a 'right to a voice in all matters of Imperial concern'. Massey bluntly made this point to the Imperial War Cabinet, arguing that in the past the 'Dominions had been willing to share the burden of Empire, but had no voice. That would not occur again'. The majority of Dominion representatives shared his views. On the 16 April the Imperial War Conference adopted Resolution IX postponing the readjustment of the constitutional relations of the British Empire till after the war. The resolution called for 'full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth... and demanded 'the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy'. Recently, British historian, John Darwin, has labelled the claims embodied in Resolution IX as the complete abandonment of 'Milnerite ideas of Imperial Federation'. Long claimed the resolution was 'designed as a negation, once and for all, of the schemes advocated

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207 IWConf, 28 Mar 1917, G40/2; IWConf, 28 Mar 1917, CAB32/1; Olliver, (ed.), The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887 to 1937: Volume II: Imperial Conferences: Part I, pp. 173-4.
208 Harcourt to Liverpool, 3 July 1917, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/389, Harcourt Papers
209 For example, see The Daily Telegraph, 27 Jun 1921, PM9/3.
211 IW Cab Meeting 14#, 2 May 1917, CAB23/40/43; IW Cab Meeting 14#, 2 May 1917, EA11/2.
with much brilliance in various quarters, for a single Imperial Parliament, with legislative and taxing powers over all the nations of the British Commonwealth.212

In the end, Massey and Ward's ten-month stay in Great Britain achieved modest results. While New Zealand's economy received a considerable boost from the renegotiated imperial contracts, the promised economic windfall from the adoption of imperial preference did not eventuate. When Great Britain finally passed the 1919 Finance Act, the concessions deliberately excluded New Zealand's three main export products, meat, wool and dairy produce. The main beneficiaries were South Africa, Australia, West Indies and Fiji, which grew tea, cocoa, coffee, and sugar. As Ian Drummond has pointed out, New Zealand had to appreciate the irony given that 'Massey made the motion which led directly to the 1919 Act'.213 Even their strenuous efforts to relieve New Zealand's shipping crisis met with constant frustration and failure. The British Government continued to divert shipping to American trading routes. By the end of 1917 the total insulated carrying capacity (measured in 60lb carcases) of the transport ships servicing New Zealand had dramatically shrunk from 8.8 million in 1914 to 5.6 million.214 Finally, Massey's efforts to seek a definitive British statement on the future of the German colonies were frustrated by Lloyd George's ambiguity.

Nevertheless, the participation of Massey and Ward in the Imperial War Cabinet was a vitally important opportunity to influence British policy. It raised British awareness of New Zealand's interests and enabled British policy-makers to gain a greater understanding of the country's problems. Without the distraction of Hughes, Massey and Ward developed an effective working relationship. They were a well-balanced team. Ward's institutional knowledge combined with Massey's strong personality made them a formidable partnership in any policy debate. They managed to forge a strong alliance with Long on certain policy issues such as the future of the German colonies and imperial preference. While British-New Zealand relations were


213 Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire 1918-1939, p. 53. Also see IWCab Meeting 47#, 30 Dec 1918, EA11/5. Massey missed this crucial meeting in 1918 that delineated the range of exports the British Government was prepared to grant unilateral concessions and exemptions on for the British Empire.

214 Department of Imperial Government Supplies: Review of Operations Covering the Period From the 1st April, 1917, to 31st March, 1918, Including an Appendix Showing Results to 30th September, 1918. AJHR, 1918, v. 2, H.-38, p. 18.
strained by these policy differences, in the long-term the relationship benefited from this sense of clarity. Massey and Ward shared a precise understanding of New Zealand's interests within the British Empire. They could speak for New Zealand's interests from a secure political position. These factors gave Massey and Ward a considerable advantage over the other Dominion representatives in the Imperial War Cabinet. It remained to be seen, however, whether or not Massey and Ward could reassert this authority on the home front in New Zealand.
On 25 June 1917 Massey and Ward arrived back in New Zealand. As they disembarked in Auckland, The Otago Daily Times reported that Massey and Ward were looking refreshed and sprightly - 'a little lessened in weight perhaps, but not at all the worse for wear for the perils and hard work of their trip'. The Press welcomed the leaders back from the Great Britain where 'they have been able to do good service both on behalf of the Dominion and the Empire'. Massey and Ward had put their energies into 'looking after the comfort and well-being of our troops, and promoting the interests of the Dominion, particularly in regard to commerce and shipping'.

The country that Massey and Ward had left behind ten months earlier had changed substantially. The polarization of New Zealand society had become more intense as the country reeled from the cumulative impact of two and a half years of war. The protracted military situation and uneven distribution of the economic benefits of the war between the urban and rural sectors of New Zealand society had encouraged increasing public disaffection and war fatigue. The cost of living had increased sharply, the stockpiles of New Zealand meat, cheese and butter had mounted with every passing day and another 4,000 New Zealanders had been killed fighting on remote battlefields in Western Europe and the Middle East. According to one estimate, between July 1914 and March 1918, strong domestic demand for products had raised the cost of living in New Zealand by 34 per cent. Public dissatisfaction became even more pronounced when New Zealand defence authorities let it be known that they were contemplating the formation of a second division from married conscripts. One major newspaper reported that the National Cabinet was divided over the best way to deal with these issues. It was widely held that only with the return of

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1 ODT, 26 Jun 1917, p. 6.
4 Condliffe, 'New Zealand During the War', The Economic Journal, v. 29, 1 (June 1919), pp. 170-1; Thorns and Sedgwick, Understanding Aotearoa/New Zealand, p. 64. Utilising economic data supplied by the Department of Statistics of New Zealand, Thorns and Sedgwick have calculated that between 1914 to 1918 inclusive prices for good and services in New Zealand rose by approximately 35 per cent.
the leaders could solutions to these problems be found.\textsuperscript{5} \textit{The New Zealand Herald} declared that party politics is 'nothing when the life of the nation is at stake'.\textsuperscript{6}

Given that the New Zealand public expected some tangible results, the news Massey and Ward could deliver from their ten-month sojourn in Great Britain was bound to disappoint. The fact that there appeared to be no silver bullet for New Zealand's war problems except total victory did little to stem the vociferous public scrutiny and criticism over their lengthy absence.\textsuperscript{7} Understandably, Massey and Ward were extremely defensive on their return. During his first interview in Auckland, Ward protested that there 'was nothing in the nature of a holiday about our visit'. He argued that:

\begin{quote}
It was a case of hard and continuous duty under circumstances far from ordinary. Attending to important matters affecting the products of New Zealand and the prices to be paid for them was in itself a difficult task, but it was only one of the many matters that took up much time and the closest attention, so that the result would not be detrimental to New Zealand.\textsuperscript{8}
\end{quote}

In a show of solidarity, Massey stated that they 'had a most interesting time' and that 'right up to the hour of our departure from England we had an extremely busy time'.\textsuperscript{9} In an attempt to silence the critics, he defended their stopover in Fiji as work-related, negotiating new shipping arrangements to take advantage of the Panama Canal and to gauge local support for possible New Zealand annexation of Fiji.\textsuperscript{10}

At the civic reception in Auckland, the two leaders paid tribute to Allen for his hard work, outlined the seriousness of the shipping crisis, praised the United States'
decision to enter the war on 6 April and the reaffirmed the historical significance of the Imperial War Cabinet. Ward confirmed the disappointing news 'that no immediate increase of [shipping] facilities for New Zealand can be expected'. There appeared to be little conviction in his assurance that the British authorities were trying 'all that is humanly possible to meet the requirements of New Zealand'.\textsuperscript{11} Massey shared Ward's pessimistic assessment. His laconic reply to the incessant questioning on the subject: 'I could perhaps tell you if you could tell me how long the submarine business will go on'.\textsuperscript{12} He admitted that the New Zealand dairy industry would be severely affected by the chronic shortage of merchant ships. Massey dubbed the shipping crisis 'the big trouble of the day'. He pointed out that real improvement in the situation depended upon the attitude of neutral shipping interests towards the risk of the German submarine.\textsuperscript{13} Ward defended the lack of progress with the British Government on this issue, pointing out 'that New Zealand would have been in a much worse position had we not been on the spot to personally impress upon the British Government, and, especially the Shipping Ministry, the needs and requirements of the Dominion as a producing country'.\textsuperscript{14}

The shipping crisis overshadowed the main achievement of the tour, the adoption of imperial preference. Ward quickly out-maneouvredd Massey, emphasising the importance of Liberal statesmanship at previous imperial conferences and the war for encouraging a re-evaluation in British thinking. Ward also sounded a note of caution. While imperial preference had been adopted in principle, its applicability and machinery had not been finalised by the British Government. However, in terms of the New Zealand's wartime financial position, Ward remained optimistic, forecasting a prosperous economic future for the Dominion. With the decision of the United States to enter the conflict, the outlook looked considerably brighter for the Allied cause. The British Empire would no longer be solely responsible for the burden of fighting and financing the war.\textsuperscript{15} With the addition of the American armies, the Allies

\textsuperscript{11} NZH, 26 Jun 1917, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{12} ODT, 26 Jun 1917, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{13} NZH, 25 Jun 1917, p. 4. The editor was slightly critical of Massey's efforts to solve the New Zealand shipping problem: 'It is possible that the Imperial authorities found Mr. Massey a little pressing in the matter of tonnage, but they could never have felt that New Zealand needed pressing to give all possible assistance to the Mother Country in the common cause'.
\textsuperscript{14} ODT, 26 Jun 1917, p. 4; OW, 27 Jun 1917, p. 40. The editor was highly critical of the British Government for exacerbating the shortage of ships for New Zealand trade. He asked: 'Does this mean that the Empire is in greater need of men from New Zealand than of its meat, its butter, and its cheese, and that therefore the Dominion's industries are to be called upon to suffer in order that the regiments at the front may be replenished?' The editor advocated a limit to the drain on man-power in order to maintain the industrial and agricultural life of New Zealand.
\textsuperscript{15} ODT, 26 Jun 1917, p. 4; ST, 26 Jun 1917, p. 5; NZH, 26 Jun 1917, p. 4. During his speech, Ward signalled his intention to raise more public money for the war. He proudly stated New Zealand had so far provided £15 million for war purposes.
The Hon. G. W. Russell, Minister for Marine, has announced a new set of sweeping War Regulations giving that Minister complete control over all vessels on the New Zealand Shipping Register. This new departure will be connected by most people with the recent announcement that the Y. and O. Company was to absorb the Union Steamship Company of New Zealand. But shortly after the outbreak of war many of the principal U.S.S. Co.'s vessels are stated to have been transferred to the London Register, and have presumably thus been placed beyond the control of the New Zealand Government. And so the Hon. Ricketty's eleventh-hour effort to settle the blood-sucking abducting octopus may prove abortive.

To Out the Octopus — Perhaps!

"Ricketty" Russell's Eleventh Hour Effort.

The Tentacle Shackle
Our "Ricketty" tackles,
Performing a stunt with an axe;
"Tis really inspiring,
The way he's perspiring —
He's landing some 'orrible smacks.

The Octopus cruel
Is taking his gruel,
And doesn't feel flustered or fret;
He grips us too tightly
To be brushed off lightly —
And "Rick" hasn't cut much ice yet.

Still, there's no knowing
If "Rick" keeps a'going,
A brighter day may be in store
But history's behind us
And serves to remind us —
These jobs have been started.
now possessed a superior military capability and could deliver vast quantities of munitions and resources to their armies in Europe. In Ward's opinion, 'the longer the war the greater must be America's part in it and the more profound will be our obligations to the loyal people of the United States'.

Massey's assessment of the visit to Great Britain concentrated on the significance of the Imperial War Cabinet. As members of this body, Massey argued that Dominion representatives 'were advisers to the Crown for the first time in history'. He had forgotten about the consultations over the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1911. Massey told the audience that the Dominion's participation in the discussion of foreign policy and imperial affairs 'marks a great advance in the development of constitutional relations'. He predicted that the Imperial War Cabinet would become a permanent institution of the British Empire.

After a few days rest in Auckland, Massey and Ward travelled south to Wellington. On 28 June Liverpool opened the third session of the nineteenth Parliament. He delivered the most important speech of his career. He announced that: 'In recognition of the services rendered by New Zealand since the outbreak of war and to mark the status of the Dominion, a signal mark of Royal favour has been recently extended in the bestowal by His Majesty the King of the dignity and title of Governor-General upon myself'. This development was not totally unexpected. As early as August 1916 Liverpool informed Bonar Law that Massey and Ward intended to raise this matter with the appropriate British officials. While in London, Massey and Ward argued successfully with Long over the proposal. On 1 May Long recommended that the King should approve of 'this suggestion which appears to be very suitable recognition of the growing importance of New Zealand, and in particular of the services which that Dominion has rendered in the War'. In the words of historian Angus Ross, the King, with 'regal simplicity', returned the letter with 'Appd G.R.I added. By Letters Patent signed by the King on 10 May 1917 and dated 11 May

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16 NZH, 26 Jun 1917, p. 4. Commenting on the arrival of American troops in France, the editor stated: 'Her population, her resources, her national energy, are so immense that the Central Powers must feel deeply concerned as to the use she will make of them'. Also see D. Trask, 'The Entry of the USA into the War and its Effects', in H. Strachan, (ed.), The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War, Oxford, 1998, pp. 239-52.
17 NZH, 26 Jun 1917, p. 4; NZH, 29 Jun 1917, p. 4.
19 Liverpool to Bonar Law, 31 Aug 1916, Item 21/40, Davidson Papers.
20 SS Cols to King, 1 May 1917, CO209/295/301.
1917, the office of the Governor-General was created in New Zealand. At midday on 28 June 1917 Liverpool took the prescribed Oaths administered by the Chief Justice to become New Zealand’s first Governor-General.22

Liverpool’s inaugural speech as Governor-General covered a broad spectrum of issues affecting British-New Zealand relations. He defined the Governor-General’s role within the Dominion and expressed a determination that New Zealand would not falter in its commitment to the British Empire and the war. He trumpeted the recent military successes on the Western Front and the bravery of the New Zealand soldiers at Messines.23 In stark contrast, the Germans were vilified for adopting a ‘policy of unrestricted and indiscriminate submarine warfare’.

Liverpool saw no foreseeable relief for New Zealand exporters, but he acknowledged the efforts of Massey and Ward in trying to alleviate the shipping problem. Liverpool congratulated the United States for entering the war and he stressed the importance of Parliamentary unity for the nation’s war effort. He praised the House for supporting the introduction of the Military Service Act and the establishment of the National Efficiency Board. Liverpool asked them to consider carefully new measures ‘necessary to enable our country to carry out its obligations to assist in bringing the war to an early and successful conclusion’. Government finances required urgent attention. ‘The war expenses must of necessity increase’, Liverpool asserted, ‘but this increased expenditure is essential to give effect to our determination that New Zealand shall bear her full part until victory is gained’.25

appointing Lord Liverpool Governor-General of New Zealand ‘yesterday’. Also see GovNZ to SSCols, 26 Jun 1915, CO209/293/58. Liverpool was informed of the change of title on 15 May.

22 GovNZ to SSCols, 26 Jun 1917, CO209/293/64; Liverpool to Long, 7 Jul 1917, CO209/293/135. Liverpool was extremely pleased to receive a promotion. He wrote to Long: ‘I take this opportunity of expressing the personal gratification which I feel at the change of title, conferring upon me as it does the distinction of becoming the first Governor-General of His Majesty’s Dominion of New Zealand’. Also see Law Officers’ Department to SSCols, 30 Mar 1917, CO209/295/310-3. On 13 February the Colonial Office asked the Law Officers’ Department for advice on the legal and constitutional procedures of changing the Governor’s title. It was their opinion that it could be done by Letters Patent - ‘Imperial legislation not necessary’. For the original papers approved and signed by the King see Letters Patent, 11 May 1917, CO209/295/317. Also see SSCols to GGNZ, 28 Jun 1917, GS/17. The King also made Liverpool a member of the Privy Council in recognition of his appointment as New Zealand’s first Governor-General.


24 NZH, 29 Jun 1917, p. 7. Liverpool’s seminal speech was extensively quoted throughout the newspapers in New Zealand.

With the permission of the Colonial Office, Liverpool spoke on the future of the German colonies in the Pacific. The Governor-General reported that the indigenous inhabitants of the Samoa had no desire to return to German rule. Liverpool promised that the British Government 'fully realise the vital importance to this Dominion of the destiny of the German colonies in the Pacific, and that when the time comes for the decision the fullest consideration will be given to the wishes of the New Zealand Government. He probably knew from Massey and Ward that there was a distinct possibly that he was line to become the High Commissioner for these islands as well. Long signalled to Munro-Ferguson that Massey and Ward had come to an 'understanding' with the British Government about a New Zealand 'sphere of influence' in the South Pacific.

On 29 June Massey and Ward returned to Parliament. The Prime Minister felt they were 'privileged' and 'honoured' to have been invited to the Imperial War Cabinet. With a hint of historical flourish, Massey stated that 'for the first time in the history of the Empire the representatives of the people of the overseas dominion were placed in a position of equality with the statesman of the United Kingdom'. Massey's conciliatory tone was in complete contrast to Ward's frontal assault. The Liberal leader blasted a southern newspaper for insinuating that he should have stayed behind in Great Britain. Ward rejected the Anglophile tag, assuring Parliament that it was source of 'great pleasure' to be back in New Zealand. Ward promised his colleagues that 'if I should ever decide to quit New Zealand I will never do so without giving my friends and my opponents timely warning'.

The official ministerial statement on the visit to Great Britain was made on 3 July. Massey spoke first, emphasising the 'business' nature of their trip and rejecting claims that it was 'anything in the nature of a holiday trip or a picnic'. Massey considered the Imperial War Cabinet discussions to be a 'sealed book'. However, he was prepared

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26 SSCols to GovNZ, 21 Jun 1917, G41/28. The British Government had no objections to Liverpool's speech.
27 NZPD, v. 178, 28 Jun 1917, p. 2; NZG, no. 106, 28 Jun 1917, p. 2558; SSCols to GovNZ, 20 Jun 1917, G41/28. Long assured Liverpool that 'the future of the German Colonies in the Pacific has been under consideration by His Majesty's Government who recognise the vital importance of the matter to Australia and New Zealand. Please inform your Ministers that they need not have any apprehension either that their position is misunderstood or that His Majesty's Government when the time for decision arrives will fail to give the fullest weight to their wishes'.
28 'Memorandum for Governor-General of Australia', 30 Jun 1917, MS696/6665, Munro-Ferguson Papers.
29 NZPD, v. 178, 29 Jun 1917, p. 15.
30 NZPD, v. 178, 29 Jun 1917, p. 16.
31 NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, p. 49 and p. 58. According to Massey: 'The work we had to do in Great Britain was far more important than any work we could have done in New Zealand during the ten months that we absent'.
to publicise his hard-won deals for New Zealand’s agricultural producers. Massey was pleased to announce that he had personally negotiated improved contracts for New Zealand meat, wool and cheese commandeered by the British Government. Massey denied the accusation that he had cruelly exploited Great Britain's vulnerability and the conditions of the Australian drought, pointing out New Zealand producers were entitled to the same price as the other Dominions. Massey stated: 'We went upon the principle that we were not entitled to screw the last farthing out of the Imperial authorities. We only asked for what was fair and reasonable'.

Massey believed that the biggest problems facing New Zealand's agricultural sector were the twin threats of the shipping shortage and the American Meat Trust. He labelled the scarcity of shipping as the 'greatest difficulty' facing the New Zealand economy. He explained that a combination of factors was working against New Zealand, not the least the submarine campaign and imperial requisitioning. Nearly a half of the British mercantile marine had been requisitioned and Massey felt that under these grim circumstances the British Government had no other alternative but to supply the armies 'from countries very much nearer than New Zealand'. In order to refute public criticism that he had done little on the trip to alleviate the shipping crisis, Massey publicly released the correspondence between Wellington and London on the issue.

The operation of the American Meat Trust, that was supposedly making 'colossal profits' at the expense of producers from the British Empire, remained one of Massey’s primary concerns. He felt aggrieved that the British Government refused to take the monopolistic threat of American Meat Trust and how it affected New Zealand's economic interests seriously. Massey believed the United States supplied too much of the British requirements and wanted restrictions placed on American access to the British market. According to New Zealand historian P. S. O'Connor, Massey and Ward 'were by far the most eager participants' during the Imperial War Conference discussions on meat export control. Massey repeated his arguments in Parliament for British regulation 'to prevent either the producer or the consumer being

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32 NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, p. 51 and p. 71. Massey warned that 'when the war ceases war prices will also cease'.
33 NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, pp. 51-2.
exploited. With the help of the President of the Board of Trade, Sir Albert Stanley, Massey and Ward were able to persuade the Imperial War Conference to adopt Resolution XX. This resolution recommended that the British Empire should become self-sufficient in the matter of meat supplies. This development encouraged Massey to establish a Select Committee inquiry into 'the present position and future prospects of the meat export trade of the Dominion and more particularly of the organisation known as the American Meat Trade'.

While Massey could not reveal for reasons of confidentiality the contents of the Curzon Report, he did address the fate of the German colonies in the Pacific. In seeking to bolster flagging public morale for the war, Massey knew that the future of the German colonies depended on the military contest being fought on the Western Front. In his opinion, only a decisive military victory in this theatre would deliver the satisfactory result for New Zealand's war aims. At this stage, Massey ruled out the idea of a negotiated peace because the Allies would not be in a position to dictate the terms. Germany still occupied large chunks of Allied territory and Massey warned Parliament that under this scenario the colonies would become mere pawns in the peace settlement. 'If we entered into negotiations now', Massey argued, 'the first thing Germany would ask for would be the return of the whole of her colonies, including those which we are now occupying'. In the words of Canadian military historian, George L. Cook, Massey fully realised that a 'military victory was even more important than the actual terms of peace, because without it, there would be no chance of achieving any of their aims'.

Massey's message that only total victory for the Allies would lead to the elimination of the threat posed by the German colonial system in the Pacific was a powerful argument against those advocating a reduction in New Zealand's military contribution to the struggle. He believed that any 'premature settlement' would frustrate New Zealand's war aims, lead to the restoration of Germany's colonies and its trading position in the Pacific. The threat of German militarism would remain in place. Massey wanted to eliminate these possibilities by maintaining the current level of New Zealand military involvement in the war. Massey was also concerned that New Zealand would have to accommodate the views of the United States, especially on territorial acquisitions. In seeking to counteract American influence over the

36 NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, p. 68.
37 O'Connor, Mr Massey and the American Meat Trust, p. 6.
38 NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, p. 57.
colonial settlement, New Zealand looked to strengthen its co-operation with Australia to win recognition for policy of direct annexation.\(^{40}\) He also argued that those calling for a negotiated peace threatened New Zealand's future security interests. Massey vowed that he would not allow such an unscrupulous rival as Germany to come into the Pacific, for we know that the German trader is unscrupulous as a trader, as the nation is unscrupulous as a nation, and that if he came into the Pacific it would be to prepare for the day when Germany would be able to attack us more successfully from her point of view than she has been able to do up to the present time.\(^{41}\)

In Great Britain, Massey praised Long for displaying an energetic concern for Dominion interests and aspirations, especially on the vital subject of imperial preference and the German colonies. On the whole, Massey seemed pleased by the new British Government's attitude towards the Dominions. The creation of the Imperial War Cabinet illustrated the growing international importance of the Dominions, allowing them 'to have a say in foreign policy [and] in Imperial affairs'. Massey felt comfortable with the new arrangement because it acknowledged the substantial role-played by the Dominions in the war without radically altering the nature of intra-imperial constitutional relations or challenging the sanctity of Dominion autonomy. Massey confirmed that he was 'utterly opposed to any alteration which would allow our finances to be dealt with a Parliament sitting outside of this country'. While Massey rejected a pure Wardian form of imperial federation, he did favour some sort of representative imperial institution but he was unable to say 'what form it would take'.\(^{42}\)

Sir Joseph Ward was under greater pressure to justify the length of his absence. The performance was not vintage Ward. He was just as rusty as Massey and his speech was erratic and uninspiring. Members of the House listened to Ward recount past Liberal attempts to persuade the British Government to adopt imperial preference. He argued that this groundwork had led to the successful introduction of imperial preference in 1917. Ward also took satisfaction from the creation of the Imperial War Cabinet. He argued that the Imperial War Cabinet represented a triumph of his 1911 imperial federalist vision. Asquith, who had so cruelly denied his imperial federation scheme, by famously stating that Great Britain could never share the

\(^{40}\) NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, pp. 58-9 and p. 67.
\(^{41}\) NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, p. 68.
\(^{42}\) NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, p. 68.
making of foreign policy with the Dominions, was no longer part of the inner sanctum. 'Times have changed', Ward stated ruefully, 'and it is a source of great satisfaction to me personally that many people who opposed my views in 1911 are now strong, active supporters of them'.

Ward extolled the other virtues of the visit. He discussed the demobilisation plans for the NZEF, the miracle of the Panama Canal, and Imperial Non-ferrous Committee and Conference Resolutions. As Minister of Finance, however, Ward took the greatest pride from the financial deals he managed to secure for the New Zealand economy. Ward boasted how he arranged a new repayment schedule for the short-term loans owed by New Zealand amounting to £14 million. In the last weeks of their stay, Ward negotiated a thirty-year extension that saved the New Zealand taxpayer £490,000. At the same time, he informed Parliament he was pleased to announce a £5 million New Zealand investment in the British Victory War Loan. During the visit, Ward predicted that the new prices negotiated for New Zealand wool, meat and cheese, would generate an additional £3.75 million for the Dominion over the coming season. 'Now, if we had not visited the Old Country', Ward argued, 'the odds are ten thousand to one that extra price would not have been obtained'. He boasted that New Zealand's agricultural producers enjoyed more lucrative contracts than their British and French counterparts.

With the return of the two senior policy-makers to New Zealand, British-New Zealand relations resumed their 'normal' service by telegram. Liverpool reverted to his familiar role as the hinge in the relationship. Old problems of policy created by the war continued to plague the relationship and dominate Liverpool's time. The tyranny of distance began to exacerbate tensions within British-New Zealand relations with renewed vigour. Liverpool sent telegram after telegram complaining about the shortage of ships and the reluctance of the New Zealand Government to provide more men for the Western Front. In June, Liverpool's exasperation over the state of British-New Zealand relations became evident. He confessed to Long: 'I fear this is a letter of complaints rather than of information. I find myself called upon to act in the role of peacemaker so often, and I hope with some success, but I feel at the same time to let you in behind the scenes so that you can understand the causes'.

43NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, p. 75.
44See 'Confidential. Note by the Army Council. Demobilization of Dominion Contingents by R. H. Brande. 8 March 1917', PM14/49; SSCols to GGNZ, 26 Jul 1917, G41/29. The Admiralty stated that New Zealand was not in a shipping position to utilise the Panama Canal.
45NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, pp. 89-90.
By the middle of 1917, Liverpool's greatest concern was an apparent weakening in New Zealand's resolve to see the war through to a successful conclusion. According to historian Paul Baker, New Zealanders began calling for a reduction in the country's military contribution. With the entry of the United States, it was generally felt that New Zealand had done more than its fair share of the fighting and that the country's military commitment could be safely modified without endangering the British Empire's war effort. With the return of Massey and Ward, the issue of New Zealand's maximum war effort came to a head. In early July, Massey was challenged by one Member of Parliament to rationalise the National Government's decision to authorise the creation of a new division from existing reinforcements. Clearly annoyed by the question, Massey emphatically rejected the claim, pointing out that it was new brigade. Even though he had sanctioned the request against the better judgment of the National Cabinet and his own party colleagues, Massey stated that the creation of the new brigade was a matter for British authorities in the War Office. The ten-month absence had clearly blunted Massey's parliamentary sharpness. His evasive answer clearly signalled that Great Britain and New Zealand had differences over the level of New Zealand's military contribution to the war. There were also deep-seated divisions within the National Government.

The advent of Lloyd George's new consultative regime had important consequences for New Zealand's military involvement. In an attempt to reinvigorate the British Empire's war effort, Lloyd George wanted more men from the Dominions who would in turn receive a greater say in the running of the war. The British Government estimated that New Zealand possessed a surplus of 76,000 men, more than enough for the creation of a second division. According to British defence authorities, Australia had enough resources to form a sixth division and Canada had adequate supplies of cannon fodder for a fifth and possibly a sixth division. The British Army Council concluded that a 'ready response from New Zealand could hardly fail to stimulate efforts in other Dominions'. The British Army Council was reasonably confident, given the comments made by a Wellington member of the NZEF in The Dominion, that New Zealand would strongly support an escalation in its military deployment.

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47 NZPD, v. 178. 3 Jul 1917, pp. 55-6.
48 'Secret. Note on the Available Resources of Man-Power, Both White and Coloured, in the Overseas Dominions and Dependencies of the Empire, 9 January 1917', PM14/70; Massey to Long, 1 Feb 1917, WRO947/657/218a, Long Papers. Massey bitterly complained to Long that the British Government had taken the comments of Mr S. A. Atkinson, a Wellington solicitor and a member of the NZEF Main Body, as an accurate reflection of the New Zealand attitude towards the war. Also see Baker, King and Country Call, p. 132 and p. 253. In his footnotes, Baker incorrectly asserts that Imperial War Cabinet meetings were held on 1 and 2 March 1917. Of course, the first session of the
In February, the British Government decided to capitalise on the goodwill generated by the creation of the Imperial War Cabinet. On 2 February 1917 Long asked the New Zealand Government to 'earnestly consider' the possibility of forming a second division. In contrast to the British Army Council, Long fully realised that such request would cause some anxiety in Wellington. He pointed out that England, Scotland and Wales had already contributed over 17 per cent of their male population to the Army, adding that more New Zealand troops were essential since the 'climax' of the war was 'imminent'. In short, Long's request amounted to a test of New Zealand's self-declared loyalty and commitment to the rhetoric 'to make any sacrifice'.

The National Cabinet was extremely reluctant to acquiesce to British calls for more men. On 8 February Liverpool reminded Long that the New Zealand Government considered the enlargement of the NZEF complement to a full division as the country's 'maximum effort'. He keenly observed that the continuation of the war was increasingly placing New Zealand's economic interests and imperial interests in conflict. Liverpool informed Long that a greater military contribution would deprive New Zealand's primary economy of precious manpower. He believed that the British proposal would upset the balance between New Zealand's military sacrifice and economic interests. More importantly, the British request for more men had wider implications than simply hurting New Zealand's economic interests. Historian Avner Offer has argued that the decisive victory of the Allies over the Central Powers was based upon a superior capability to produce and deliver large quantities of primary commodities. In other words, the British request for a second division was not in British interests either because 'agrarian resources decided the war'. Liverpool feared that the creation of a second division would threaten New Zealand's involvement in the war as a combatant nation and as a major supplier of staple agrarian commodities to the British war effort. While New Zealand was prepared to provide an adequate supply of monthly reinforcements for the NZEF Main Body, the country wanted to retain a sufficient workforce of able-bodied men to carry out the labour intensive requirements of the farming sector. The National Cabinet considered that New Zealand had already contributed a far greater proportion of its population to the conflict than the other Dominions, a fact verified by the British Army Council's own memorandum. Belying historian James Belich's assertion that the 'New Zealand

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Imperial War Cabinet did not commence until 20 March 1917. He also incorrectly identified the date of the secret memorandum as 9 June 1917.
49 SSCols to GovNZ, 2 Feb 1917, G41/25.
50 Offer, The First World War, pp. 1-3.
51 See 'Secret. Note on the Available Resources of Man-Power, Both White and Coloured, in the Overseas Dominions and Dependencies of the Empire, 9 January 1917', PM14/70. Of the four
government [sic] was careful to ensure that its military contribution in World War was proportionally greater than that of other dominions'\(^{52}\) Liverpool stated that it 'is questionable whether it would be in the interests of the Empire for New Zealand to suffer disproportionately to other Dominions because they had not applied compulsion to maintain their obligations'\(^{53}\) In effect, the New Zealand Government advocated an 'equality of sacrifice' amongst the Dominions of the British Empire.

Undeterred, Long appealed to Massey's flexible conscience arguing that the request was more than reasonable given the precarious military situation on the Western Front. While he recognised the importance of maintaining the vitality of New Zealand's economy essential industries, Long predicted that 1917 would be the most decisive year of the war. The Allies desperately needed to mobilise greater military forces to ensure 'the greater probability of success'\(^{54}\) Long's personal request placed Massey in an awkward situation. In terms of achieving New Zealand's long-term strategic goals at the upcoming Imperial War Cabinet and Conference, Massey also had to consider the political risks of disregarding the wishes of the National Cabinet, New Zealand's preference for managing a sustainable military contribution, and public opinion in favour of a reduced war effort. Swayed in part by Long's arguments and the fact that similar requests were sent to the other Dominions, Massey chose the former. From his perspective in London, it was easier to blithely ignore the consequences for New Zealand's war commitment and the feelings of the National Cabinet than reject a personal British plea for more men. He instructed Allen that the reply of New Zealand Government to the British request 'should be couched in generally favourable terms'\(^{55}\) Three days later Long resubmitted the proposal to the New Zealand Government. He completely disavowed any suggestion that the proposed increase in New Zealand's military contribution was of Godley's making\(^{56}\)

While Massey may have been persuaded by British arguments for a second New Zealand division, Allen and the Cabinet were opposed to the idea. In a robust three-page telegram, the National Cabinet vigorously set forth the reasons behind its opposition to the mobilisation of a second division. New Zealand, as a predominantly

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\(^{53}\) GovNZ to SSCols, 8 Feb 1917, G41/25.

\(^{54}\) Long to Massey, 10 Feb 1917, WRO947/573/85a, Long Papers.

\(^{55}\) Massey to Allen to, 10 Feb 1917, WRO947/573/85a, Long Papers.

\(^{56}\) SSCols to GovNZ, 13 Feb 1917, G41/25.
agricultural country, could not afford 'such a large proportion of her male population for service in Europe as can the United Kingdom'. The National Cabinet believed that: 'Men are essential and cannot be replaced by women to the same extent as in a manufacturing country'. The proposal had the potential to curtail the output of food supplies for the war effort and send the New Zealand economy into a deep recession. Liverpool claimed that New Zealand's current military commitment 'will involve a very heavy strain'. In conclusion, Liverpool stated that the New Zealand Government considered it 'impracticable to raise a new Division'. In a show of loyalty, Liverpool asked that 'New Zealand desires that the Division should fight in every battle to the end and her reinforcements have been arranged with that object in view'.

The British Army Council reassured the New Zealand Government that it had nothing to fear from the proposal. The New Zealand Division would have first claim to all monthly reinforcements drafts. Despite this assurance and pressure from the British Government, various military commanders and his own Prime Minister, Allen refused to change his mind. The evidence suggests that Allen had good and logical reasons for his refusal. From the outset, Allen made his position clearly: that the New Zealand Division represented the Dominion's maximum contribution and keeping it at full strength remained his top priority. In March, Allen informed Godley that in view of New Zealand's position 'as a food producing Country the Government here consider that they have to watch that interest as well as the supply of fighting men for the war'. He observed that New Zealand 'is called upon to make greater sacrifices than Australia or Canada', concluding that it 'would have been a grave mistake to have even hinted to the Country that another Division was asked for'. According to Pugsley, Allen was also 'well aware of the political pitfalls of calling up married men'. In the face of such strong New Zealand opposition, the British Government scaled down its request. Instead of requesting a new division, the British Government suggested a compromise in which a fourth New Zealand brigade could be raised out of the existing reinforcements in Great Britain. In London, Massey and Ward agreed to the new brigade, making it clear to British authorities that New Zealand could send no more than 100,000 men. Allen reluctantly gave his permission on the condition

57 GovNZ to SSCols, 15 Feb 1917, G41/25.
58 SSCols to GovNZ, 7 Mar 1917, G41/26.
59 Allen to Birdwood, 27 Mar 1917, Allen Papers.
60 Allen to Godley, 27 Mar 1917, WA252/4, Godley Papers.
62 NZPD, v. 178, 3 Jul 1917, p. 76. Ward wanted New Zealand to let Great Britain have 100,000 men and no more. He described this as 'an enormous proportion of the physically and mentally fit male population of this country'. Also see Baker, King and Country Call, p. 133; Allen, 'New Zealand and
that extra reinforcements would not be supplied and that the New Zealand Division would be kept at full strength. 63

On 27 March Allen announced that a fourth brigade would be created. The New Zealand Division's Commander, Major-General Sir Andrew Russell, complained that it would place an unnecessary strain on the Division's meagre resources and would demoralise the troops. 64 Allen was receptive to such criticism. Less than two months after the fourth brigade's formation, Allen began calling for its 're-absorption' into the New Zealand Division because of the lack of reinforcements. Annoyed that British assurances that no more reinforcements would be needed had been broken, Allen refused to seek Parliament's sanction for additional reinforcements. If the British Government wanted more men, he advised them to ask Canada, Australia or the United States. 65

Allen continued to seek a reduction in New Zealand's military commitment. He pressurised the British Government to disband the fourth brigade and reduce the monthly reinforcement rate of 15 per cent. In order to disband the new fourth brigade, Allen hoped to reduce New Zealand's military contribution after the Battle of Messines. The New Zealand Division, which had distinguished itself in the campaign to capture the Messines ridge on 7-14 June, suffered 3,700 casualties (700 of whom were killed) in the fighting. 66 Allen hoped these heavy casualties would provide the catalyst for the fourth brigade's reintegration, nullifying opposition calls that New Zealand was sending more men than was necessary. However, momentum for a reduction in New Zealand's military deployment came from unexpected quarters. In July Hughes announced that Australian reinforcements were to drop from 16,500 men per month to 7,000. Australia's monthly reinforcement rate of 8 per cent was now considerably lower than the New Zealand rate. Unsurprisingly, the New Zealand Government sought a reinforcement rate comparable with Australia's. Prompted by Hughes's public announcement and the 'experience of wastage' on the Western Front,
on 17 July Liverpool told Long that the National Cabinet expected the same conditions to apply to New Zealand. There is also evidence to suggest that Liverpool's request was encouraged by the official perception that the New Zealand public had grown tired of the war. Just prior to the commencement of Haig's offensive in the Ypres, Allen wrote to Godley revealing that a combination of political and military reasons motivated his belief in reductionism. He asked Godley to understand 'that the people of New Zealand feel that they have done more than their share and that they are becoming suspicious that they are being bled to death because they have been so willing in the past'. Allen indicated that the New Zealand Government had asked British authorities for reduction of the 15 per cent reinforcement rate. Allen feared that in comparison to the New Zealand Division, Australia's military forces would be 'given tasks where the casualties may be light in order to conserve their Divisions', fast-tracking the mobilisation of married New Zealand men to the Western Front.

In August, the British Government sanctioned a reduction of New Zealand's monthly reinforcement rate to 12 per cent. Massey complained that the offer did not match the Australian rate. The British Government struggled to explain the disparity, arguing that it was necessary given the small size of the NZEF in comparison to the AIF. Even so, the British defence authorities were prepared to accept a New Zealand reinforcement rate of 10 per cent. The New Zealand Government did not accept the offer graciously, complaining that as a matter of courtesy and fairness the Army Council should have advised them when Reinforcements for the Australian Divisions were reduced and should have offered this Dominion a similar concession instead of reducing the New Zealand Reinforcements when the question was raised. While New Zealand is always actuated by a spirit of readiness to shoulder her necessary burdens the Government feel that this spirit should not be taken advantage of.

The terseness of Liverpool's reply indicated the intense level of frustration and annoyance over Great Britain's eagerness to exploit New Zealand's limited resources. The New Zealand Government could not rationalise the British decision to implement an inequitable reinforcement policy. Less than five weeks before the Battle of

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69 SSCols to GGNZ, 5 Aug 1917, G41/29; GGNZ to SSCols, 17 Aug 1917, G41/29.
70 SSCols to GGNZ, 8 Sep 1917, G41/30.
Passchendaele, New Zealand had 'lost confidence' in British military authorities. As a result, Liverpool requested that the Colonial Secretary personally handle all military matters.\(^{71}\)

Allen's quest to disband the fourth brigade became the sole focus of his energies. He wanted the unit dismantled and used as reinforcements for the New Zealand Division, thus delaying the call up of married men. On 11 October Allen effectively ended the fourth brigade's existence, informing Godley that he did not plan to reinforce the unit. Allen feared that New Zealand's current military commitment was becoming politically indefensible. In a veiled reference to some Liberal members, Allen warned Godley that some politicians had become 'weak-kneed', endangering the sustainability of New Zealand's active military role in the war. According to Allen, he was having 'difficulty in Cabinet to keep things going' and he predicted that the New Zealand Government would have to endure 'very many kicks' over the next twelve months.\(^{72}\)

It took the bloodiest campaign of New Zealand's experience on the Western Front to realise Allen's objective. According to historian Paul Baker, the only author to have thoroughly researched the changing nature of New Zealand's war effort, the heavy losses suffered by the New Zealand Division at the Battle of Passchendaele in October led to disbandment of the fourth brigade.\(^{73}\) The documentary evidence confirms the accuracy of Baker's interpretation. Between 4-12 October, during which time the New Zealand Division captured Gravenstafel Spur and were slaughtered in their attempt to secure Bellevue Spur, the second main ridge on the approach to Passchendaele village, there were an estimated 2,700 New Zealand casualties.\(^{74}\) On 29 November the British Government cabled Wellington, regretting that in light of the 'severe casualties' caused by the strategic failure known as the Third Battle of Ypres, the fourth brigade would be used to replenish the losses of the New Zealand Division. Without direct political pressure from the New Zealand Government, this allowed for a further reduction in New Zealand's reinforcement rate. The British Army Council believed that only 800 men per month would be sufficient to maintain

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\(^{71}\) GGNZ to SSCols, 10 Sep 1917, G41/30; GGNZ to SSCols, 21 Sep 1917, G41/30. Liverpool requested that the inference contained in his telegram of 10 September (that the reduction in New Zealand's reinforcement rate was due to the pressure from the New Zealand Government) be withdrawn. After receiving advice from Brigadier-General George S. Richardson, the New Zealand Government considered that the new 10 per cent was an appropriate level given the number of New Zealand casualties at Messines. Also see SSCols to GGNZ, 5 Oct 1917, G41/30.

\(^{72}\) Allen to Godley, 11 Oct 1917, WA252/4, Godley Papers.


\(^{74}\) This figure is taken from McGibbon (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, p. 605.
the New Zealand Division at full strength. As Baker has pointed out, ironically this new level of monthly reinforcements could probably have been provided by the voluntary recruiting system. If the New Zealand Government had responded to the spectre of recruiting shortages by demanding a reduced military commitment in the early stages of the war, conscription might not have been needed.\textsuperscript{75}

Concern over the level of New Zealand's military commitment revealed that Wellington policy-makers were unwilling to compromise the country's economic interests to accommodate British demands. While the British Army Council learned the lessons of unfairly treating New Zealand, there were no quick fixes to the chronic shortage of shipping caused by the German submarine campaign. In July, the British Government asked the New Zealand Government to 'assist the Imperial Government in economising tonnage by imposing restrictions on the importation of non-essentials'.\textsuperscript{76} The Shipping Controller considered that reports of ships being withdrawn from New Zealand trade were 'erroneous'. Long assured Liverpool that the Shipping Controller was trying to fulfil his personal assurance to Massey that he would do his best to relieve New Zealand's shipping position. Long admitted, however, that 'beyond occasional palliatives he is unable to hold out hope of permanent enlarged shipping facilities in view of the present tonnage position'.\textsuperscript{77} Long pointed out that in May alone, the British had lost some seventy steamers to the German submarine campaign and this rate of loss had climbed to twenty steamers per week.\textsuperscript{78}

The British Government began looking for various ways of becoming self-sufficient to reduce the strain on its over-stretched merchant fleet. The British needed

\textsuperscript{75} Baker, \textit{King and Country Call}, p. 138.

\textsuperscript{76} SSCols to GGNZ, 14 Jul 1917, G41/29. Also see SSCols to GGNZ, 7 Mar 1918, WRO947/615/4, Long Papers.

\textsuperscript{77} SSCols to GGNZ, 18 Jul 1917, G41/29. The Shipping Controller's patience was running thin. He observed 'that no specific ships can be considered as peculiarly attached to the New Zealand trade'.

\textsuperscript{78} SSCols to GGNZ, 18 Jul 1917, G41/29. Long concluded that there was little 'hope of the situation as regards Australasian trade improving unless and until equilibrium established between losses and replacements of tonnage'. Also see SSCols to GGNZ, 25 Sep 1917, G41/30; GGNZ to SSCols, 30 Sep 1917, G41/30; SSCols to GGNZ, 15 Oct 1917, G41/30; GGNZ to SSCols, 24 Oct 1917, G41/30; GGNZ to SSCols, 26 Oct 1917, G41/31. The submarine campaign was having such a dramatic impact on the British mercantile marine, that the Shipping Controller requested New Zealand's permission to requisition two steamships. The New Zealand Government asked the Shipping Controller to reconsider his request as the two steamships were 'urgently' required for the conveyance of New Zealand exports. The Shipping Controller pointed out that if the New Zealand Government did not agree to the release, he would effect a decrease in refrigerated tonnage available which 'would be on balance more prejudicial to the interests of New Zealand'. Nine days later, the New Zealand Government agreed to release \textit{Waitemata} and \textit{Aparima}. When the New Zealand Government found out that the ships were diverted to Australia, it predictably complained that New Zealand's needs were far greater. Over 2.25 million carcasses and 125,000 bales of wool were sitting in New Zealand cool stores.
to maintain the flow of essential war products such as oil and munitions while reducing the importation of non-essential goods. In February 1917, the Report of the Inter-departmental Committee on Restriction of Imports recommended the reduction of meat imports by reducing the feeding-food-stuff imports. It suggested that supply shortfalls could be met by a corresponding increase in the British killing rate of cattle.\(^7^9\) Realising that the implementation of such a policy would hurt New Zealand’s economic interests, Long warned Liverpool that it would be ‘difficult’ for the British Government to enter upon a contract for New Zealand meat for the coming season. He sarcastically pointed out to Liverpool that ‘we can live on our own meat’.\(^8^0\)

However, there is some evidence to suggest that the New Zealand Government had distorted the extent of the shipping problem to the British Government. In *The Auckland Weekly News* an article appeared on a report presented to Parliament on the impact of the shipping crisis on New Zealand exports. The writer stated that the report made ‘it clear that in comparison with the dangers infesting the routes of food-laden shipping, the loss of New Zealand produce has been almost insignificant’.\(^8^1\) Official statistics illustrate that Wellington was prone to exaggeration in its correspondence with London that the New Zealand economy was on the brink of collapse. Figures drawn up by the Department of Imperial Government Supplies suggested that, in spite of the German unrestricted submarine campaign and British requisitioning, a very large proportion of the Dominion’s agricultural products reached their final destination. Between 3 March 1915 to 31 March 1918, in ‘abnormal and trying circumstances’, over 98 per cent of the total quantities of meat (beef, mutton and lamb) purchased by the Department of Imperial Government Supplies had either arrived at destination or were *en route* to Great Britain.\(^8^2\) According to the official history of the Department of Imperial Government Supplies, ‘the frantic efforts of the

\(^7^9\) Report of Inter-departmental Committee on Restriction of Imports, 20 February 1917, pp. 1-4, WRO947/511/1b, Long Papers. This suggestion was part of their scheme to reduce imports into Great Britain by 500,000 tons for the last eight months of 1917. Also see SSCols to GovNZ, 24 Feb 1917, WRO947/511/1a, Long Papers.

\(^8^0\) Long to Liverpool, 3 Jul 1917, WRO947/615/17, Long Papers.

\(^8^1\) *AWN*, 1 Nov 1917, p. 43.

\(^8^2\) See Department of Imperial Government Supplies: Review of Operations Covering the Period from 3rd March, 1915, to 31st March, 1917, Including an Appendix Showing Results to 30th June, 1917, *AJHR*, 1917, v. 2, H.-38, pp. 2-3; Department of Imperial Government Supplies: Statement Showing Results of Operations Up to 30th September, 1917, *AJHR*, 1917, v. 2, H.-38A, pp. 1-3; Department of Imperial Government Supplies: Review of Operations Covering the Period from the 1st April, 1917, to the 31st March, 1918, Including An Appendix Showing Results to 30th September, 1918, *AJHR*, 1918, v. 2, H.-38, p. 3. Also see *NZOY* 1919, p. 364. This high percentage of the amount of New Zealand meat exports reaching Great Britain is not surprising. As the shipping problem grew more acute, the amount of meat purchased under the commandeer system by the Department of Imperial Government Supplies declined.
Little New Zealand Will Still "Carry On"

A recent cable message, referring to the pressing need for reinforcements, states that "America can put three million soldiers in France by Christmas, providing sufficient boats are available." It strikes a good many people in New Zealand that the shipping that is diverted to New Zealand to pick up our drafts would be better employed in moving Uncle Sam's millions. However, on Tuesday last, the Prime Minister, in appealing to the Second Division reservists to "carry on," said: "Surely no patriotic citizen will suggest that we should hide behind America, or any other part of the British Dominions."

The Teutonic menace
They tell us again in
A peril that's growing in scope,
Our measures to meet it,
To scotch it and beat it,
Are based on reinforcements and hope.

They want soldiers quickly;
To get them there slickly,
Past haste, is the nut we've to crack;
And Uncle Sam's legions
Could beat reach those regions,
Though Bill says we must not hold back.

The Yanks, through with skilting,
Are frothing for fighting,
They've millions of men, so they say,
To France they'll be shipping,
Providing there's shipping,
So let's give a hip, hip hooray.
Germans to reduce Britain's mercantile fleets had been scarcely felt by the producers of New Zealand up to August, 1918.83

This frank admission did not prevent the New Zealand Government from opposing British shipping policy. Throughout the war period, especially during the height of the German submarine crisis in the middle of 1917, New Zealand constantly reminded British authorities that their policies were having a detrimental effect on the economy and were reducing the opportunities for the country's primary producers to take full advantage of the high war prices. Reflecting the sharp decline in the total insulated carrying-capacity of ships visiting New Zealand ports, the total value of New Zealand exports dropped from £33.3 million in 1916 to £31.6 million in 1917. This trend continued in 1918 as the figure fell to £28.5 million.84 In November, Massey complained that some banks were foreclosing on freezing work companies and many had been forced to suspend operations. Massey saw the position as 'exceedingly serious' and he was worried about the 'undesirable reaction'. He did not want the shipping crisis to endanger the livelihood of his most ardent supporters. In the long term, Massey felt the problem would seriously undermine New Zealand's financial ability to maintain its military contribution to the British Empire.85

If Massey expected some sympathy, he would have been sorely disappointed by the British reaction.86 While the British Board of Trade promised to supply some shipping for New Zealand in December and January, by late February 1918 the British Government secured alternative supplies of crossbred wool in the United States and Argentina. Long hoped that New Zealand would 'see no objection'.87 In March 1918, the British Government finally delivered the coup de grace. Long had the misfortune to inform Liverpool that the British Government had found it 'necessary in National and Allied interests that refrigerated tonnage should be continuously routed to the United States and Canada'. To add insult to injury, South America was to be assigned any surplus tonnage. Australia and New Zealand were last in the pecking order.88

New Zealand's policy-makers were appalled by the news. While they appreciated the British dictum that 'war requirements must come first', they could not understand

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83 Lawson with foreword by Massey, Food-ships for Britain, p. 31. Italics are original.
85 GGNZ to SSCols, 10 Nov 1917, G41/31.
86 SSCols to GGNZ, 29 Nov 1917, G41/31.
87 SSCols to GGNZ, 22 Feb 1918, G41/33.
88 SSCols to GGNZ, 10 Mar 1918, G41/33.
why the British were implementing a policy 'disastrous' to the economic well-being of one of its most trusted Dominions. By March 1918 New Zealand had accumulated in storage over 70,000 tons of frozen meat, 370,000 boxes of butter, 350,000 crates of cheese and 389,000 bales of wool. Liverpool pleaded with Long to 'make every endeavour to keep the primary industries of the dominion going by providing ships for the conveyance of New Zealand products to British ports'.

The Colonial Secretary defended British policy, stating that the Shipping Controller determined tonnage allocated to New Zealand 'by the amount of priority cargo which it is found essential to obtain from New Zealand'. He could only guarantee the allocation of a paltry two ships a month between Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand.

The shipping problem had become so acute during the 1917-18 season that it began to hinder Massey's attempt to secure a lucrative contract for New Zealand's dairy producers. In July 1917, Massey began harassing the British Board of Trade to purchase the total butter output for the 'mutual benefit' of the British consumer and the New Zealand producer. Mackenzie informed Massey that the British Government did not want all of Dominion's butter supply because of the associated transport problems. Massey was furious and angrily accused British authorities of ignorance. He argued that the financial strain of the shipping problem would result in 'the inevitable collapse of this important industry'. Massey's outburst had some effect. The following month, the British were prepared to buy the exportable surplus for the next eight months. The negotiations stalled for the next month prompting Liverpool to protest at the 'extraordinary delay'. He argued that the Food Controller's indecision was leading 'to a most acute position' in the New Zealand dairy industry.

By the end of November 1917, Long replied that shipping would become available for the transport of New Zealand butter and cheese, clearing the way for a renewal of the imperial commandeering contract.

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89 GGNZ to SSCols, 14 Mar 1918, G41/34.
90 SSCols to GGNZ, 2 Apr 1918, G41/34.
91 SSCols to GGNZ, 14 Mar 1918, G41/34; SSCols to GGNZ, 23 Feb 1918, G41/33; GGNZ to SSCols, 14 Mar 1918, G41/33. The British Government asked for the New Zealand Government's cooperation in securing the effective control of foreign shipping engaged in trade outside the war zone. The New Zealand Government cabled the Colonial Office stating that they were prepared to comply with the request.
92 GGNZ to SSCols, 23 Jul 1917, G41/29.
93 GGNZ to SSCols, 4 Sep 1917, G41/30.
94 SSCols to GGNZ, 4 Oct 1917, G41/30; GGNZ to SSCols, 8 Oct 1917, G41/30. The Food Controller offered to purchase all of Australia's butter for a similar period but New Zealand was offered a slightly better price owing to the superior quality of the product.
95 GGNZ to SSCols, 15 Nov 1917, G41/31.
96 SSCols to GGNZ, 22 Nov 1917, G41/31.
On 28 November Government House received information from the Colonial Office that it was time for another meeting of the Dominion Prime Ministers in London. The New Zealand Government was informed that the Imperial War Cabinet would be considering questions relating to the conduct of the war and the Imperial War Conference would discuss 'questions which affect post war policy especially in the economic sphere of influence'. Long wanted to avoid a repeat of the farce that prevented the attendance of Hughes in 1917. The Colonial Secretary asked Dominion leaders for suggestions on the most convenient dates for the Imperial War Cabinet and Conference. The earliest Borden could attend was May and Botha was expected in April. Massey replied that he would be able to attend in June.

Massey and Ward must have been relieved by the arrival of the invitation to travel to Great Britain again. In the six months since their return, they had been domestically ineffectual. British-New Zealand relations were under stress and there seemed little prospect of victory. With Massey and Ward's absence from London, New Zealand interests had been forgotten in Great Britain. While the invitation made no specific mention of Ward, Long made it clear that two Ministers or more from New Zealand could attend the Conference. The Colonial Secretary reminded his Prime Minister of the consequences:

I think it right to warn you that I am sure it will be impossible to confine the representation of the Dominions at the forthcoming Imperial War Cabinet to the Prime Minister only. I sent the usual telegram inviting the Prime Ministers, or if they could not come themselves a representative, but New Zealand promptly telegraphs that Massey and Ward are coming as before and I am convinced that as before they will both insist on being present, with equal rights. Hughes has replied asking if he can bring a colleague, and of course he will not consent to Australia being in an inferior position to that occupied by New Zealand . . . so I recommend that we accept the inevitable and intimate to each that where desired the Prime Minister can bring a colleague with him.

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97 SSCols to GGNZ, 28 Feb 1918, G41/33.
98 SSCols to GGNZ, 28 Nov 1917, G41/31; NZPD, v. 181, 24 Oct 1917, pp. 362-3. Massey refused to comment on further absences from New Zealand during the war. The correspondence on the 1918 Imperial War Conference see 'Correspondence Relating to the Imperial Conference, 1911 and the Imperial War Conferences of 1917 and 1918', Dominions No. 61, Confidential, Imperial Conference Secretariat, September 1920, pp. 163-9, C0886/7.
99 SSCols to GGNZ, 16 Jan 1918, G41/32.
100 GGNZ to SSCols, 18 Jan 1918, G41/33.
101 SSCols to GGNZ, 20 Jan 1918, G41/33.
102 Long to Lloyd George, 14 Feb 1918, F/32/5/7, Lloyd George Papers.
On 8 February the National Cabinet decided that Massey and Ward would represent New Zealand with Allen repeating his role as Acting Prime Minister. With Parliament's 'full concurrence', Massey and Ward planned to reach London by the first week of June.\textsuperscript{103}

For the next five weeks Ward brooded over the temptation of returning to London. While a trip to Great Britain offered him temporary refuge from New Zealand's war problems, Ward had his fair share of domestic issues that required his urgent attention. The Liberal Party's popularity had fallen because of its involvement in the coalition government. As Minister of Finance, Ward had become despised for introducing stern government financial policies that hurt the Liberals traditional urban electorate. For example, by 1917 some 40 per cent of government revenues were generated from tax compared to about 7 per cent before the war. The farmers were becoming rich from the war and this caused resentment in urban New Zealand.\textsuperscript{104}

According to Ward's biographer, Michael Bassett: 'It was Ward, rather than Massey, who always seemed these days to bear the brunt of criticism of the National Government'.\textsuperscript{105} His inept handling of the Finance portfolio and his confusing policies were driving traditional Liberal supporters into the arms of the nascent NZLP that had been formed in 1916. Ward's problems were compounded with the death of his trusted colleague and confidant Dr. Robert McNab in February 1917. In this frame of mind, Ward seriously entertained the idea of escaping to London on the condition that the British Government treated him as Massey's equal.\textsuperscript{106} With Long's promise on 16 March to treat all New Zealand representatives as welcome guests of His Majesty's Government, Ward could leave New Zealand with some dignity.\textsuperscript{107}

It was desperate times for the British Empire. During the last half of 1917 the German High Command under General Erich Ludendorff had been quietly preparing to take the offensive by shifting their eastern armies to the Western Front. The December armistice with the Bolsheviks gave Germany the opportunity of increasing

\textsuperscript{102} GGNZ to SSCols, 8 Feb 1918, G41/33; NZPD, v. 182, 12 Apr 1918, p. 147. Also see Allen to Godley, 27 Nov 1917, WA252/4, Godley Papers. Originally, Massey planned for Allen to attend but this proposal was dropped. Allen felt his that his duty was in New Zealand and he did not relish the opportunity of spending time with Ward cooped up on a ship.

\textsuperscript{104} Olssen, 'Waging War', in Binney, Bassett and Olssen, (eds.), The People and the Land, p. 303.

\textsuperscript{105} Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward, p. 238.

\textsuperscript{106} GGNZ to SSCols, 15 Mar 1918, G41/34. Liverpool wrote: 'I should be glad of your personal assurance in case he should raise the question again, as he is an ex-Prime Minister and is sensitive on the point'. Also see GGNZ to SSCols, 20 Jun 1918, G41/36. Liverpool was highly critical of the standard of Dominion representation. Liverpool wanted future representatives to be 'the ablest and most suitable men available and irrespective of political views'. He felt the British Empire had let itself down in the past with 'men of inferior calibre and their choice has nearly always been dictated by political considerations of some sort'.

\textsuperscript{107} SSCols to GGNZ, 16 Mar 1918, G41/34.
their western forces by a massive 30 per cent. Their plan was 'to deliver an annihilating blow to the British before American aid can become effective. On 21 March 1918 the Germans launched their offensive known as Operation 'Michael' across a sixty-mile front in the Somme. It was a stunning victory. The Germans gained more ground in the west than at any stage since the first six weeks of the war. In two days the British Fifth Army had been routed and the Germans had driven forty miles behind the Somme. In the process, Haig had lost some 290,000 men and 1,300 artillery guns.\textsuperscript{109}

The New Zealand Government anxiously followed progress reports of the German series of attacks. 'We are watching carefully almost hour by hour for news of the present Offensive', Allen wrote to Godley.\textsuperscript{110} Confidence in the New Year of a decisive Allied victory had faded into a distant memory.\textsuperscript{111} The sporadic information the New Zealand Government received seemed to confirm the worst. Allen wrote to Russell, explaining how the National Cabinet was 'desperately anxious' over the success of the German offensive. Allen was 'on tenter hooks . . . watching for telegraphic news and hoping that the great tide of Germans has been stemmed'.\textsuperscript{112} The shock of the German attack compelled the New Zealand Government to offer more reinforcements. In response to Lloyd George's frantic plea for more troops, the National Cabinet also approved the formation of a New Zealand tank battalion. The New Zealand Government also agreed to the early despatch of four reinforcement drafts and authorised the British Government to employ any surplus New Zealand troops stationed in Great Britain on the Western Front.\textsuperscript{113} Massey reaffirmed that 'in this hour of the nation's trial New Zealand is heart and soul with Britain'.\textsuperscript{114} By the start of April the German offensive had ground to a halt. According to Pugsley, the New Zealand Division had played a crucial part in thwarting the German advance, plugging the gap between Beaumont-Hamel and Colincamps in the Somme.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{110} Allen to Godley, 30 May 1918, M1/15/6, Alien Papers.
\textsuperscript{111} GGNZ to SSCols, 5 Jan 1918, G41/32.
\textsuperscript{112} Allen to Russell, 2 Apr 1918, Allen Papers.
\textsuperscript{113} GGNZ to SSCols, 3 Apr 1918, G41/34; SSCols to GGNZ, 4 Apr 1918, G41/34; GGNZ to SSCols, 7 Apr 1918, G41/34.
\textsuperscript{114} GGNZ to SSCols, 30 Mar 1918, G41/34.
On 9 April the Germans renewed their attack and launched the second part of their offensive campaign known as 'Georgette'. The German Army struck in Flanders, punching through the British defensive line and inflicting terrible losses on the British First and Second Armies. This alarming development prompted Haig to issue on 12 April his famous 'Backs to the Wall' Order of the Day. The Germans advanced ten miles and by 25 April they had captured Messines and Mont Kemmel. The German advance had been so rapid and successful that the New Zealand Government began to panic, fearing that defeat was only a matter of days away. Massey offered to place every available New Zealand man at the British Government's disposal even though they were not fully trained. By the end of April the immediate danger had passed. The British Army had managed to regroup and reinforce its positions, stabilising the Allied line of defence on the Western Front. The German attack had petered out. Ludendorff suspended the assault and planned for another offensive in late May. The lull in the battle gave Massey and Ward the opportunity to quietly slip out of New Zealand for their second wartime trip to Great Britain.

For Massey and Ward, their return to the home front in New Zealand was anything but triumphant. They had allowed the outstanding issues to gradually erode the harmonious state of British-New Zealand relations generated by their first extended visit to Great Britain. Their greatest failure had been their relatively ineffective management of the domestic exigencies of New Zealand's war effort, the primary catalyst behind the creation of the coalition administration. The National Government had shown some division over the level of New Zealand's military involvement. As a result, fighting alongside Great Britain had almost become a contestable national interest. It was placing an incredible strain on the New Zealand's economic interests and emotional resources. The shipping problem had deteriorated steadily and popular support for the continuation of New Zealand's military commitment had been undermined because of the heavy sacrifices demanded from general society. Disasters on the scale of Passchendaele reinforced this widespread pessimism. By the end of 1917 a critical lack of trust and confidence in Great Britain to orchestrate a successful military assault against the Germans existed again in New Zealand. History was repeating itself. Just like his predecessor, Lloyd George seemed incapable of leading

116 Allen to Russell, 25 Apr 1918, Allen Papers; Allen to Russell, 17 Jun 1918, Allen Papers. Allen was extremely worried by the reports that thousands of British troops had broken and ran from their lines. He was also concerned by German claims that they had captured many prisoners and munitions. Allen complained to Russell about the lack of reliable information from British sources and he feared that New Zealand had not been told the full story. Russell's reassurances to Allen that German successes were only 'temporary and local' were hard to believe in Wellington.

117 GGNZ to SSCols, 20 Apr 1918, G41/35; SSCols to GGNZ, 23 Apr 1918, G41/35.

the British Empire to victory over Germany. As a result, Massey and Ward felt that they had little alternative but to return to London to win some consolation for a New Zealand jaded by three and half years of war sacrifices.\textsuperscript{119} The visit for Massey and War was 'a serious dose of domestic-issue avoidance'.\textsuperscript{120} For British-New Zealand relations, the visit represented another vitally important opportunity to discuss the conduct of the war instead of just continuing it. More importantly, it provided an opportunity to restore some faith and confidence into a faltering partnership.

\textsuperscript{119} C. Hazlehurt, 'Reviews: Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1949. By P. G. Edwards.', Historical Studies, v. 22, 87 (October 1986), p. 302. According to Halzehurst, Dominion statesmen quickly learned 'that they could achieve more in London by their own force of personality than by a hundred folders of departmental telegrams'.

\textsuperscript{120} Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward, p. 239.
CHAPTER SIX
Towards Victory

The very strongly worded telegram from the New Zealand Government with regard to the German Colonies in the Pacific deserves serious consideration. After all, the views upon these issues of our own Dominions are of much greater importance than those of any ephemeral collection of cranks in Russia. It may be important to humour the "Soviet" but not at the cost of lasting estrangement between the Imperial Government and the Dominions.

WESTERN AND GENERAL REPORT, 12 JUNE 1917.

On 2 May 1918 Massey and Ward departed in great haste for Great Britain on board the Union Steamship Company fast mail steamer called Niagara. Under Admiralty instructions, their wives remained behind in New Zealand because their safety could not be guaranteed in the submarine infested waters of the Atlantic Ocean. For the next four weeks, Massey and Ward were joined by their private secretaries and the Australian representatives, William Morris Hughes and Sir Joseph Cook. Hughes contravened Admiralty rules by taking along his wife for company. The party travelled to Vancouver and then onto New York, where the Admiralty had arranged to transport them across the Atlantic Ocean. On 27 May the delegation left New York on board Melita, accompanied by the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, and the new Prime Minister of Newfoundland, William F. Lloyd, for the eleven-day convoy journey across the Atlantic Ocean. On Memorial Day, Massey addressed the 2,500 American troops on board, telling them in jest that had they been wearing the distinctive 'lemon squeezer' hat they would have been mistaken for New Zealanders. Danger was never far from the New Zealanders as they were forced to wear or carry lifejackets as they approached the city of Liverpool.

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1 GGNZ to SSCols, 27 Apr 1918, G41/35; GGNZ to SSCols, 1 Apr 1918, G41/34; SSCols to GGNZ, 4 Apr 1918, G41/34; GGNZ to SSCols, 25 Jun 1918, CO209/298/58. Their original date of departure was 1 May but they sailed from Auckland on 2 May. Massey would have been most anxious to leave early in order to see his injured son who was recovering in the New Zealand hospital at Walton-on-Thames.

2 See GGNZ to SSCols, 23 Aug 1918, G41/38; SSCols to GGNZ, 3 Sep 1918, G41/38. The New Zealanders were annoyed that Hughes had ignored Admiralty instructions and brought along his wife. In future, Liverpool wanted Long 'to ensure that restrictions apply equally to all Dominions'. Hughes insisted that his wife 'was necessary on account of his health and it seems probable that he would not have attended the Imperial War Conference if she had not been allowed to accompany him'.

3 GGNZ to SSCols, 30 Mar 1918, G41/34. Massey wanted to reconvene Parliament by mid-September. He cabled Long asking for the Imperial War Conference to be over by the end of July so he could also visit New Zealand forces in France. Also see SSCols to GGNZ, 22 Apr 1918, G412/35; GGNZ to GGCan, 19 May 1918, G5/17.

View of the battlefield near Messines, Belgium, ca 1914-1918, *Alexander Turnbull Library.*
On 7 June 1918 Massey and Ward reached the relative safety and comfort of the Savoy Hotel in London.\(^5\) The sullen atmosphere that pervaded the British capital proved a marked contrast to their last visit. The unexpected success of the German offensive along the Chemin des Dames had raised British levels of anxiety and defeat seemed a distinct possibility. By the first week of June, the Germans had taken 50,000 prisoners, cut the vital Paris-Nancy rail link and shelled the French capital from the forest of Crépy.\(^6\) Even the anticipated gathering of the 'Brains of the Empire' could no longer boost public morale. The British public had grown accustomed to Dominion ministerial visits. Massey and Ward were no longer a novelty and a dose of cynicism greeted their latest excursion. When news of their impending arrival reached Great Britain, the editor of the *Chronicles of the N.Z.E.F.*, Clutha Mackenzie, was unimpressed and somewhat bemused:

> Though we shall welcome our Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance with open arms, the sudden news that they would be with us again in a few months filled us at first with astonishment. It seems only a few weeks since they left us, and why Mr. Massey AND Sir Joseph Ward should be returning so soon is rather a puzzle.\(^7\)

For their latest trip to Great Britain, the New Zealand Ministers had three main objectives. First, they wanted to obtain a definitive British assurance that the German colonies would be retained under a policy of direct annexation. Second, they wanted British authorities to sanction the creation of a military award for Gallipoli veterans. Third, they sought the implementation of British policies to control the commercial activities of the American Meat Trust.\(^8\) In light of Hughes's presence, a competitive element had been introduced to the second trip. Alien urged Massey 'to take early steps on arrival Home to protect the interests of this Dominion against the Commonwealth aggressiveness'. Improving New Zealand's post-war security position remained a fundamental concern for Alien. He produced a long list of demands. Alien advised Massey to seek the incorporation of Tonga and Samoa into the British Empire and a renegotiation of the condominium agreement to remove the French presence.

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\(^5\) SSCols to GGNZ, 9 Jun 1918, G41/35.

\(^6\) Herwig, 'The German Victories, 1917-1918', in Strachan, (ed.), *The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War*, pp. 262-3; Haythornthwaite, *The World War One Source Book*, p. 42; Alien to Russell, 30 May 1918, Alien Papers. Alien was confident that the Allies could stem the tide and return the German blow 'with interest'.

\(^7\) CNZEF, no. 37, 13 Feb 1918, p. 3. Clutha Mackenzie was highly sceptical that the Imperial War Conference would 'serve any greater purpose than the exchange of diplomatic courtesies'. He argued that 'it is quite unnecessary for either Mr. Massey or Sir Joseph Ward, much less both, to come so long and expensive a journey'.

\(^8\) GGNZ to SSCols, 14 Mar 1918, CO209/297/381.
from the New Hebrides. Allen also wanted Massey to arrange a British commitment of 'two fast, small modern vessels to undertake patrol work' along the New Zealand coast to defend against raiders. In Allen's view, Japan had become the greatest strategic threat to New Zealand's security, bringing Massey's attention 'to the prospective danger to British Possessions in the Pacific if the Japanese are allowed after the war to continue in occupation of the Marshall Islands'. He encouraged Massey to renegotiate the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement.9

The Imperial War Cabinet began at midday on 11 June 1918 at 10 Downing Street.10 Massey and Ward took their places alongside Borden of Canada and Smuts of South Africa. Botha had decided to stay in South Africa and Hughes was not present. Despite the best laid plans of the Colonial Secretary, the Australian Prime Minister extended his vacation in the United States to win President Wilson's support for Dominion claims over the German colonies and proclaim an "Australasian Monroe Doctrine" in the South Pacific.11 On 31 May Hughes announced in a speech to the Pilgrims Society in New York that the United States, Australia, and New Zealand shared common interests in the Pacific and should work together to provide guarantees against future enemy aggression in the region.12 As a consequence of this sideshow, the Australian entourage did not arrive in Great Britain until the 15 June. In the process, Hughes missed three of the most dramatic meetings in the Imperial War Cabinet's short history.13

On 13 June Borden, Massey and Smuts attacked the mismanagement of the British Army, the slaughter at Passchendaele, the failure to remove incompetent commanders and the need to promote able men. Borden led the charge, speaking for nearly an hour in which he blamed the lack of military success on the Western Front on bad

9 Allen to Massey, 30 Apr 1918, M1/49, Allen Papers.
10 IWCab Meeting 15#, 11 Jun 1918, CAB23/41/9; IWCab Meeting 15#, 11 Jun 1918, EA11/4. This was the first meeting of the second session of the Imperial War Cabinet. In 1917 there were fourteen such meetings in total. Amery persuaded Hankey to number the 1918 meetings in continuation of the 1917 meetings, to treat 'it as a perpetual body in continuous session'. See Barnes and Nicholson, (eds.), with an introduction by Amery, The Leo Amery Diaries, p. 223. There are also procès-verbal of certain meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet meetings of 1918 in CAB23/43.
11 SSCols to GGAust, 30 Apr 1918, CP359/3/1/1.
12 'Hughes at Pilgrims Society - New York 31 May 1918 - Australia and the Pacific', CP351/1/2/7, Garran Papers; Hughes Monroe Doctrine Speech 1918', MS1538/23/2988, Hughes Papers. The idea of Hughes for an Australasian Monroe Doctrine in the South Pacific seems to have come from Amery. See Amery to Hughes, 12 Oct 1917, MS1538/16/1782, Hughes Papers; E. L. Piesse [Director of Pacific Branch] to Secretary of Australian Prime Minister, 7 Oct 1920, MS1538/16/2269, Hughes Papers. Also see NZT, 22 Jun 1918, p. 1. Massey strongly opposed the insinuation of the idea that the American sphere of influence could be extended at the expense of the British Empire. Publicly, Massey stated that the Royal Navy protected New Zealand's interests in the Pacific.
preparation and poor leadership in the British High Command. His anger was understandable. At the Battle of Passchendaele, Canada suffered over 12,000 casualties in a two-week period from 26 October to 10 November for the gain of only a few thousand yards. According to American historian Paul Fussell, thousands of Allied soldiers literally drowned in the mud of Passchendaele. Borden delivered a stinging indictment on the arrogance of the British High Command. He offered a critique of the British Army's inherent class structure, where officers were picked on their status within British society rather than for their ability to lead men in combat. 'I am convinced', wrote Borden, 'that the present situation is due to lack of organization, lack of system, lack of preparation, lack of foresight and incompetent leadership'.

The New Zealand Prime Minister appreciated the 'frankness' of the Canadian Prime Minister's comments. Massey called for an immediate inquiry into the Passchendaele calamity and the collapse of the British Fifth Army during the recent German offensive 'Operation Michael'. He argued that it was 'essential' for the Imperial War Cabinet to gain a clear understanding of these British military failures. Publicly committed to total victory and to a military policy he had no control over, Massey had powerful domestic political reasons to demand greater British accountability. The New Zealand public was clamouring for a reduction in the country's military commitment and the senseless slaughter on the Western Front made it increasingly difficult for Massey to resist these calls.

Indeed, it had been long overdue for Massey to turn his attention to military matters. Since August 1914, the New Zealand Government had shown an inclination to leave the military conduct of the war to the appropriate British authorities. The New Zealand Government had not discussed in any great detail with the British Government military strategy or the use of the NZEF in combat. Initially, the New Zealand Government did not consider that it had the right to comment on the operational plans of the British Army and military matters in general. At the time of

17 IWCab Meeting 16#, 13 Jun 1918, CAB23/41/11; IWCab Meeting 16#, 13 Jun 1918, EA11/4.
19 IWCab Meeting 16#, 13 Jun 1918, CAB23/41/11; IWCab Meeting 16#, 13 Jun 1918, EA11/4.
the NZEF's departure in late 1914, Massey declared in Parliament that they were 'Imperial troops in every sense of the word, and under Imperial authority'. As we have seen, the New Zealand Government even objected to the establishment of the Dardanelles Commission to investigate the reasons of the Gallipoli failure. Times had now changed. When Massey learned of the full horrors of Passchendaele tragedy from NZEF officers he finally began to consider seriously the military situation. Their dramatic accounts of the Battle of Passchendaele provided sobering news for New Zealand's principal policy-maker. With the death of so many New Zealanders, Massey wanted to know more about British strategy, tactics, and plans for the New Zealand Division.

The Battle of Passchendaele in October 1917 dramatically affected Massey. The magnitude of the disaster convinced him that the British military hierarchy were incompetent. The British commander-in-chief, General Sir Douglas Haig, had shown no sympathy towards the New Zealanders. He ordered the New Zealand Division, as part of the II ANZAC Corps under Godley's command, to capture Bellevue Spur (an advance of more than two and half kilometres), the village of Passchendaele and a considerable section of the ridge to its north. On 12 October 1917 New Zealand infantryman advanced across a six hundred yard 'black swamp' into a withering storm of machine-gun and artillery fire, and impenetrable fields of barbed wire. Unsurprisingly, the attack of the second and third brigades of the New Zealand Division failed to reach any of its objectives. Massey, normally so careful in his use of language, pointed out how the New Zealanders 'were simply shot down like rabbits'. One New Zealand survivor, Ormond E. Burton, described a murderous scene of German concrete pillboxes and machine-guns rattling 'through belt after belt while the New Zealanders fell by the scores'. In one two hour period, the New Zealand Division lost 640 men to enfiladed fire. As the Germans machine-guns

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20 NZPD, v. 169, 19 Aug 1914, p. 498. I wish to thank John Milne for pointing me in the direction of this quote.
21 IWCab Meeting 16#: 13 Jun 1918, CAB23/43/27; IWCab Meeting 16#, 13 Jun 1918, EA11/4; GGNZ to SSCols, 1 Apr 1918, G41/34 SSCols to GGNZ, 4 Apr 1918, G41/34. Massey's son was a Major in the 11th Lancashire Fusiliers. He was reported wounded at the New Zealand Hospital Walton-on-Thames. Long kept Massey informed of his son's recovery.
22 Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele, p. 172.
24 IWCab Meeting 16#, 13 Jun 1918, CAB23/43/27; IWCab Meeting 16#, 13 Jun 1918, EA11/4.
"Quite Amuses the Boys"
BILL AND JOE'S LAST MAN AND "BOB."

The above cartoon is from the pen of an ex-member of "Truth's" staff, drawn by him while lying wounded in an English hospital. Commenting on the oft-repeated statements that New Zealand will send "the last man and the last shilling," the soldier says: "It quite amuses the boys in the trenches." Incidentally, the cable recently assured us that Bill and Joe, visited the firing line, made the usual speeches, the usual promises and presumably got the usual hearing, and as customary nowadays, the usual "count out."

At last the news comes o'er the line.
That tells us how our Bill and Joe
Marched boldly to the firing line,
And dared the shells of Britain's foe;
While bullets fell like hail or snow.
They talked awhile our boys to cheer;
Of what they'd do, how they did blow.
When we the Hun from France would clear,
And they safe back in Maoriland so dear!

As they came on armed to the teeth.
We cried, "The Kaiser sure's undone!"
His belly sword he well may sheath,
And recall home his every Hun.
Bucolic Bill, as sure's a gun,
is here, and soon will bring to nought
The Bosches cunning plans each one;
The 'last man' sure has knocked them equal.
While good Sir Joe has the 'last shilling' brought!"
decimated the New Zealand attack, men fell and staggered through the swamp of mud pools. A number of New Zealand soldiers 'drowned in the brimming pools, others choked in the foul ooze, others more fortunate crawled despite ghastly wounds to the sodden lip of some crater and lay there to be hit again, and perhaps again'.

With over 2,700 casualties, the New Zealand Division suffered its worst single day of the war. Military historians disagree over the exact casualty figures for the New Zealand Division but it has been estimated that between 640 and 1190 men were killed on that dreadful October day. Defeated and demoralised for the first time on the Western Front, the New Zealand Division was withdrawn from the line to be replaced by the Canadians. On 10 November, after the Canadians failed to capture the ridge further to the north of Passchendaele village, the Third Ypres campaign petered out. Even today the human cost is still incomprehensible. From the beginning of Haig's Ypres offensive on 31 July, the British had suffered over 275,000 casualties, roughly the equivalent of ten to twelve divisions out of a total strength of sixty, for no appreciable gain. Haig's plan to expel the German forces from Belgium lay in tatters. The largest Allied army had become so gravely weakened that it would be unable to stem the German onslaught in the spring of 1918.

The spectacular failure of Passchendaele was more than Massey could stomach. Reports from Russell confirmed the magnitude of the disaster and the impossibility of the New Zealand task. 'Uncut wire was the cause of our failure', wrote Russell to Allen in November. 'You cannot fight machine guns, plus wire, with human bodies. Without the wire to check them the men would have tackled machine guns in spite of their losses. As it was, they tried heroically to tackle both. This was humanly impossible'. Livid, Massey wanted heads to roll. Somebody 'ought to take the consequences', Massey angrily told his Imperial War Cabinet colleagues. He added

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27 Burton, The Silent Division, pp. 245-6. Also see Russell to Allen, 3 Apr 1918, Allen Papers. Russell described the Ypres Salient as 'a disgusting spot. There is nothing but mud duckboards, carrying parties and general discomfort'.
30 On the impossibility of the Canadian task see the 'Aerial Reconnaissance Photos of Passchendaele', WA250/40, Richardson Papers.
32 Russell to Allen, 7 Nov 1917, Allen Papers.
Massey and Ward addressing the New Zealand’s Division entrenching group in France, July 1918, RSA Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library.
'there is something wrong somewhere and we have got to find it'. This was a far cry from the Massey who had a year and a half earlier boasted to Haig that New Zealand had 100,000 reinforcements for the division. Privately he was now advocating that New Zealand had done its share in the war. Massey wanted to keep enough New Zealand men alive and well for primary production and he was all in favour of letting the Americans finish the war. He argued that a repeat performance of Passchendaele would 'lead to trouble' and undermine Dominion support for the war. It had already undermined public morale and Massey told Cabinet that he could detect 'a great deal of uneasiness' in New Zealand.

Lloyd George was surprised by the ferocity and honesty of the Dominion leaders. He did not expect the ghost of Passchendaele to reappear and he quickly realised that an 'occasional statement' was not going to satisfy Borden and Massey. The British Prime Minister recognised the 'obvious sincerity' of their arguments and accepted that serious notice would have to be given to their charges. Lloyd George implemented two damage-limiting procedures designed to restore his own personal standing and repair British-Dominion relations. Lloyd George felt that Massey and the others were 'entitled to know the reasons why the Government sanctioned the Flanders offensive'. After seeking Hankey's advice, he immediately circulated a copy of the Report of the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, drawing attention to his own misgivings about the operation.

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35 Allen to Massey, 12 Aug 1918, Box 9a, Allen Papers. Much to Allen's consternation, Massey and Ward authorised Mackenzie to make a press statement to such an effect. Allen protested that such official sentiments would undercut his efforts to apply the Military Service Act and would create public pressure to end New Zealand's active military role.
36 IW Cab Meeting 16#, 13 Jun 1918, CAB23/43/29; Allen to Russell, 29 Jan 1918, Allen Papers. The New Zealand Government in no way blamed Russell for the failure of the New Zealand Division at Passchendaele. Allen also detected the same 'uneasiness' in New Zealand that Massey identified. He wrote to Russell: 'I quite understand your position, namely, that you and your Divisional Staff assumed the wire had been cut, and I lay no blame on you, nor indeed, do I blame anybody, but there is a feeling of unrest, and I have it myself. There is no use denying it... Please do not understand that I do not expect our Forces to succeed always'. Allen expected there to be complaints and criticisms over Passchendaele.
37 Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele, p. 187.
39 Lloyd George to Massey, 13 Jun 1918, F/36/4/1, Lloyd George Papers.
40 Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-18, Volume Two, p. 816; Roskill, Hankey, p. 563; Lloyd George to Massey, 13 Jun 1918, F/36/4/1, Lloyd George Papers. Lloyd George wrote: 'It will be observed that the Government felt considerable misgivings about this operation, but were not prepared to overrule their military advisers in regard to strategy of war'. Lloyd George had not changed his mind since visiting France in late 1914. See 'The War Suggestions as to the Military Position', Memorandum by David Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, CID, Secret G-2, 1 Jan 1915,
Towards Victory

Lloyd George also saw a further opportunity to deflect criticism away from his leadership. He authorised the creation of the Committee of Prime Ministers to discuss future British military strategy. This was another political masterstroke by the "Welsh Wizard". Not only had he succeeded in shifting the moral responsibility of military disasters onto the British High Command, he had in effect 'coopted the premiers in his struggle against Haig'. He also needed Dominion support for a planned summer offensive and with the creation of this Committee he could spread the responsibility of future failure. The Dominion Prime Ministers might not have easily co-operated had they known the true extent of Lloyd George's culpability in the Passchendaele offensive. Research by R. Prior and T. Wilson into the Passchendaele campaign has shown that Lloyd George's administration had 'painted themselves into the corner of endorsing Haig's campaign'. During the course of the Third Ypres offensive, the War Cabinet had declined several opportunities to call a halt to the fighting. Lloyd George simply failed to acknowledge that a problem existed. The War Cabinet, under Lloyd George's direct supervision, was more concerned with the exaggerated casualty reports circulating the country than preventing a futile expenditure of life.

On 21 June the Committee of Prime Ministers met to discuss the transfer of further troops from Palestine to France. Hankey, as Secretary of the Imperial War Cabinet, was present to take 'notes' because Lloyd George was afraid the Dominion Prime Ministers 'will talk for the Minutes, instead of what they really think'. Hankey noticed that Massey was 'the only out and out Westerner' on the Committee. Since Gallipoli Massey had developed a marked preference for a Western Front strategy rather than subsidiary operations. He based his wartime strategy on the recognition

BL/56, Law (Bonar Law) Papers. After visiting France, Lloyd George was convinced 'that any attempt to force the carefully prepared German lines in the west would end in failure and in the appalling loss of life'. Also see Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele, p. 26. Lloyd George had developed a profound enthusiasm for a Balkans strategy over a Western Front strategy.


Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele, pp. 187-99. Dubbed 'the last inaction' by Prior and Wilson, Lloyd George refused to accept the calamitous assessment of the Third Ypres campaign. In doing so, he missed his only opportunity to bring down the axe on Haig. Rather, he saw the predictions of impending doom on the Western Front as 'just another trick by the military to fasten attention on that theatre. Thereby they would forestall, yet again, the application of an imaginative strategy elsewhere'. Also see George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Volume II, p. 1315. Lloyd George wrote: 'Passchendaele could not have been stopped without dismissing Sir Douglas Haig'. Lloyd George said he tried but most of the War Cabinet 'were under the spell of the synthetic victories distilled at G.H.Q.'

Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume I 1877-1918, p. 566. Hankey's 'Notes of the Meetings of the Committee of Prime Ministers' are in CAB23/44.

Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume I 1877-1918, p. 565; Turner, 'Cabinets, Committees and Secretariats', in Burk, (ed.), War and State, p. 72. Hankey did not share Massey's opinion. In fact his anti-Western views and his manifest loyalty to the office of Prime Minister rather than the man enabled him to move easily into Lloyd George's confidence after the change of government, and he was able thereby to add to his own influence and consolidate the position of his secretariat.
that what mattered most to New Zealand was how it could help secure victory for the British Empire. In his view, strengthening British forces on the Western Front had the best chance of quickly ending of war. Ironically, such a belief allied Massey with those who conceived the Passchendaele disaster; the British High Command. He considered Hughes arguments for a Eastern option - a strike against Austria - as a complete waste of the British Empire's limited resources. However, Massey arguments fell on deaf ears, literally in the case of Hughes. Lloyd George made no secret of his anti-Western views, generically referring to Massey's attitude as 'Wully redivivus' - a reference to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) General Sir William 'Wully' Robertson's preference for military offensives centred on the Western Front.45 The Committee 'reluctantly' agreed to transfer only one division to France and the Australian mounted troops were to stay in Palestine.46 The draft report also contained a good deal of criticism against Haig. However, by the time the Committee finalised its draft report in early August it had become irrelevant.47 On 8 August Haig had launched a successful counterattack near Amiens.48 According to Hankey, the Committee of Prime Ministers sent its congratulations to Haig and from that moment onwards there was 'no question of replacing him'.49

Like their first visit, the usual cluster of social engagements and functions punctuated Massey and Ward's second stay in Great Britain. On 21 June the Dominion representatives were invited as guests of honour at the dinner of the Empire Inter-Parliamentary Association held at the library of the House of Lords.50 Massey had prepared a speech for the occasion. To Massey's astonishment his name did not appear on the official programme of guest speakers. Inconsolable, he stormed out and

50 'Parliamentary Supper of Welcome to Dominion Prime Ministers and Ministers: Notes for the Prime Minister', 21 Jun 1918, F/117/3, Lloyd George Papers. Lloyd George was advised that his speeches should 'refer either to "Dominions" or "Nations", and avoid all reference to "Colonial" or "Colonies"'.


Australian, Indian and New Zealand delegates at the Imperial War Conference 1918, National Library of Australia.

provoked, recalled Hankey, 'an international incident'. Massey accosted Lloyd George saying that his treatment was 'an insult to New Zealand, as he had been invited by telegraph to speak, and had prepared a polished speech'.

With tempers fraying, a solution presented itself to the British Prime Minister in the form of the Supreme Council meeting scheduled for 2 July at Versailles. According to Hankey, Lloyd George had a 'happy inspiration' and arranged for the Dominion representatives to visit their own military contingents in France and attend a meeting of the Council. After a 'long journey' by steamer, rail and car, Massey and Ward arrived on Saturday evening on 1 July at the Headquarters of the New Zealand Division on the Western Front. That night, Massey and Ward attended a performance of the Divisional Theatricals and during the interval they delivered well-worn speeches about New Zealand and the British Empire and the need for victory. The official correspondent described the scene as Massey and Ward spoke to the soldiers. 'For the moment this wood in France became a little bit of New Zealand and the spirit of democracy invaded a portion of republican France that not so far back in history had been part of a ducal demesne'.

Of the two New Zealand Ministers, Massey received the most vocal abuse from the soldiers of the NZEF. The men hooted and jeered him, yelling out "Bill". The soldiers believed that Massey was responsible for coining the phrase: 'last man and last shilling'. With their lives on the line, the New Zealand soldiers considered this style of rhetoric to be inappropriate. Surprised by the reception of the troops, Massey wrote to Allen: 'Regret to say I have found feeling among troops in France unsatisfactory. This applies to all ranks. Defence Department and our side of Government being serious [sic] blamed'. Much to the dismay of both Allen and Liverpool, Massey tried to improve morale by stating that he would be very happy to listen to their complaints and grievances in order to rectify them. On behalf of the

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51 Hankey Diary, 21 Jun 1918, HNKY1/3/249, Archives of Lord Hankey;
53 *CNZEF*, no. 48, 19 Jul 1918, p. 276.
55 Massey to Allen, 14 Jul 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers; Massey blamed the Defence Department for his unpopularity amongst the troops.
56 Massey to Allen, 11 Jul 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers; Massey to Allen, 26 Jul 1918, Thomson Papers. Officers complained to Massey about Colonel C. M. Gibbon's attitude towards returned soldiers and the little value of New Zealand training. Massey wrote: 'Unfortunately, you and I come in for the whole of the blame. So much for Burton's description of the New Zealand contingent in France as the 'Silent Division'. See Burton, *The Silent Division*.
57 *CNZEF*, no. 48, 19 Jul 1918, p. 276; Allen to Godley, 6 Sep 1918, WA252/5, Godley Papers. Allen felt the presence of Massey and Ward presented the soldiers with 'an opportunity to manufacture complaints'. Allen felt the visit was 'subversive to discipline'. Also see Godley to Allen, 9 Jul 1918, Godley Papers; Godley to Allen, 15 Aug 1918, Godley Papers. Massey and Ward received over one
New Zealand Government, Massey agreed to special furlough leave for NZEF officers who had been absent from the Dominion for more than three years.\(^5^8\)

In contrast, Ward received a warm welcome from the New Zealand soldiers on the Western Front. The trip to France seemed to reinvigorate Ward and he revelled in the task of speaking to the troops. No wonder he expressed his great pleasure at seeing so many New Zealanders in France. In this spirit of optimism, Ward reaffirmed the New Zealand Government's commitment to a decisive victory over Germany. He reassured those sceptical of the value of their latest trip to the heart of the British Empire that it had been undertaken 'purely in the interests of the Empire'. Ward believed that it was important for New Zealand to have representation at the imperial meetings. Later that night, the two ministers dined with the staff of the General Headquarters.\(^5^9\)

The following morning, Massey and Ward attended a Church Parade near Bois du Warnimont to inspect the Second Infantry Brigade consisting of the Auckland Regiment and the First Otago Battalion.\(^6^0\) One soldier on parade cynically remarked in his diary how Massey and Ward 'tore through the ranks as hard as they could'.\(^6^1\) They briefly addressed the troops and Massey stressed the importance of their journey to Great Britain. He pointed out that: 'They were representing New Zealand in conferences in which previously the Dominions had no say'. Massey was delighted to see soldiers from his hometown constituency and he promised to maintain the Division's strength until 'a satisfactory victory was attained'. He was optimistic that the war would be ending in the next few months. For the future, he emphatically stated that Germany 'should never again be allowed to get a footing she had before in the British Empire. The German must go out and keep out'. Ward shared these sentiments, stating that they would only return to New Zealand when 'Prussian militarism' was crushed.\(^6^2\)

\(^5^8\) Massey to Allen, 11 Jul 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers. According to Massey, officers and nurses 'bitterly' complained that they were the worst paid in the whole British Army and that their allowances were inadequate. Massey felt that Allen needed to address these issues or 'else serious difficulties will result'.

\(^5^9\) CNZEF, no. 48, 19 Jul 1918, p. 276.

\(^6^0\) Byrne, *Official History of the Otago Regiment*, p. 302.


\(^6^2\) CNZEF, no. 48, 19 Jul 1918, p. 276.
For the next two days Massey and Ward spent the remainder of the time travelling the dusty roads of the Somme to inspect and address other New Zealand soldiers. The two Ministers were anxious to see as many New Zealanders as possible, to foster support for the war effort and maintain troop morale and their somewhat dubious political reputations. Massey and Ward effortlessly slipped back into campaign mode, talking to thousands of soldiers and going out of their way to listen to their demands. Massey and Ward were eager to prove that the New Zealand authorities had not abandoned them. The Ministers were quick to promote the demobilisation plans of the New Zealand Government. Massey and Ward promised that the soldiers would return to a "land fit for heroes".

After surviving a maddening cross-country chase and a German artillery bombardment, the New Zealand pair was summoned to Paris to participate in the obligatory American Independence celebrations. Later that day Massey and Ward travelled to Versailles where they were entertained at a luncheon by Lloyd George. The last meeting of the Seventh Session of the Supreme War Council was held in the afternoon and all the Prime Minister of the Dominions were invited to attend. The French President, Georges Clemenceau, who bore an uncanny physical resemblance to Massey, welcomed their attendance in the form of a 'nice anecdote'. Clemenceau remarked that the Dominion Prime Ministers must have felt like the surprised Doge of Venice who visited Louis XIV at Versailles! The exchange of pleasantries represented the high point of the afternoon. According to Hankey, the proceedings of the Supreme Council were 'relatively tame'.

With the close of the seventh session of the Supreme War Council, the Dominion Prime Ministers headed back to London to continue their important discussions. At the Imperial War Conference, which opened on 12 June under the chairmanship of Long, the Dominion representatives turned their attention to intra-imperial communication. Sir Robert Borden and William Morris Hughes wanted to improve imperial consultation and they introduced a resolution to the Conference to have the subject considered by the Imperial War Cabinet. Borden had been an early advocate of a more direct line of communication between Dominion Prime Ministers and the

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63 Massey to Allen, 6 Jul 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers. Massey reported to Allen that they saw 'not less than 20,000' troops of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force.
64 CNZEF, no. 48, 19 Jul 1918, p. 277; Godley to Allen, 4 Jul 1918, WA252/5, Godley Papers.
65 CNZEF, no. 48, 19 Jul 1918, p. 277.
British Prime Minister.\(^67\) In July he had approached Lloyd George in writing on the subject and he was well-supported by Amery and Hughes.\(^68\) The Australian Prime Minister had become a fierce opponent of the Colonial Office and its appointed officers in the Dominions, the Governors-General. Hughes's own personal relationship with Munro-Ferguson had deteriorated to the point where he wanted the Dominions to acquire the right to appoint their own Governors-General.\(^69\)

When Hughes first alluded to this dramatic proposal at the Imperial War Conference on 18 July, he pulled no punches, describing the mode of intra-imperial communication as 'tortuous', 'archaic and 'too indirect'. He saw the Colonial Office as an 'unnecessary conduct pipe . . . whose functions have become atrophied'.\(^70\) Five days later at the Imperial War Cabinet, Hughes became more animated with the issue, declaring that the 'Colonial days' were over and that the Colonial Office should cease 'to exercise any powers of administration as regards the Dominions, and that, inter alia, the appointment of Governors-General should be a matter for the Prime Minister'. He did not want the creation of another British department but 'real recognition of the fact that the Dominions were participants in the councils of the Empire on a footing of equality'. He warned Massey that if he did not support this idea, he might return to London 'to find the principle of the League of Nations, or the Freedom of the Seas, accepted, and the Empire no longer, as a reality, in existence'. Borden supported the Australian proposal.\(^71\)

Understandably, Long viewed the proposal as a direct threat to the importance of Colonial Office. He was opposed in principle to the elimination of the Colonial Office and the idea to allow direct communication between the Dominion Prime Ministers and their British equivalent. Long attacked the impracticality of the scheme, casting doubt on the ability of the British Prime Minister's office to cope with the burden of intra-imperial communication. He argued that Hughes and Borden did not understand the adverse consequences of the proposal. Long pointed out that the British

\(^{67}\) Hankey, *The Supreme Command 1914-18, Volume Two*, p. 832; Morton, 'Junior but Sovereign Allies', *JICHI*, v. 8, 1 (October 1972), p. 56. Morton has argued that the war turned Borden 'from a devout imperialist to a determined nationalist'.


\(^{71}\) IWCab Meeting 26#, 23 Jul 1918, EA11/4.
Government would be less responsive to Dominion interests. On this issue, however, Borden and Hughes were said to be 'very insistent'. Lloyd George informed Long that the British Government would have to look at modifying the channel of intra-imperial communication.

The two New Zealanders adopted a moderate approach to the issue of intra-imperial communication. They were not in the mould of Hughes on this issue. Massey and Ward were imperial reformers rather than advocates of revolutionary change. They were decidedly frightened by the idea of eliminating the Colonial Office. Massey and Ward wanted the imperial system refined to incorporate the concerns of the Colonial Office and the changes wrought by the war on the structure of the British Empire. It was a quickly fashioned policy that best suited New Zealand's interests. While they wanted the Conference to discuss the question of Dominion representation and 'the best means of developing and consolidating the Empire', Massey and Ward were not enthusiastic supporters of Hughes's resolution. They considered any move to introduce a direct form of communication at the expense of the Colonial Office would be detrimental to New Zealand's interests. Massey and Ward could see no benefits from the proposal to relegate the office of the Colonial Secretary to an administrative figurehead. While they both acknowledged that the Dominions could never go back to the pre-war system in which the Dominions had no say in imperial affairs, Massey and Ward gave little encouragement to either Hughes or Borden. The Dominion representatives did not constitute a monolith of agreement and there was no sign of the ANZAC spirit of co-operation.

At the Imperial War Conference Massey made it clear that New Zealand had been served well by the Colonial Office and that he would not support initiatives which threatened to weaken the Colonial Secretary's position. Massey suggested that the difficulty could be surmounted by the establishment of a 'resident Minister' from each Dominion in London - 'at the heart of the Empire' - to sit in the Imperial War Cabinet which he expected to become a permanent institution. Massey believed that his proposal had the potential to avert Dominion dissatisfaction with the current arrangement that only allowed Dominion representatives to visit Great Britain 'for a

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72 Long to Lloyd George, 28 Jun 1918, F/32/5/57, Lloyd George Papers; Long to Lloyd George, 10 Jul 1918, F/33/1/5, Lloyd George Papers.
73 Lloyd George to Long, 9 Jul 1918, F/33/1/4, Lloyd George Papers.
74 GGNZ to SSCols, 1 Apr 1918, G41/34.
75 GGNZ to SSCols, 29 Nov 1918, G26/9. New Zealand did not support the Canadian proposal to abolish all shorthand reports of the debates of the Imperial Conference. Lucky for this historian, the New Zealand Government considered that they would 'be a serious loss to students of Imperial questions'. Moreover, government departments were dependent on the shorthand reports for information regarding the government's position on matters dealt with by the conference.
month or six weeks at year'. Ward remained cautious about Massey's idea. He did not believe 'for one moment that the present transference of some of the work connected with the oversea [sic] countries to a War Cabinet is going to meet the aspirations and the necessities of the oversea [sic] countries in the years to come'.

Yet Massey's relatively benign proposal for moderate change found support within the most influential circles of the British Government. Lloyd George's most trusted adviser on constitutional matters, Leopold Amery, suggested that the British Government should not seek massive changes to the constitution. He proposed that 'small administrative changes' could make simultaneously the Imperial War Cabinet a 'reality' and 'satisfy the insistent demand of the Dominions equality of status'. Amery reassured Lloyd George that the adjustments would not involve 'any serious departmental changes or throw any extra work on yourself'. He told Lloyd George 'to be quite firm with Walter Long and insist that they shall be carried out'. Hankey, whose job it would be to administer any new intra-imperial correspondence, opposed Borden's reforms on logistical grounds. Hankey suggested to Lloyd George that the Imperial War Cabinet 'might be developed on line analogous to that of the relationship between a Cabinet Minister and the Prime Minister'.

On 23 July Massey put forward New Zealand's case for a resident minister at the Imperial War Cabinet. Massey argued that the Colonial Office, under the direction of Harcourt, Bonar Law and Long, had 'been more courteous, painstaking, and more successful in dealing with the problems which they had taken in hand'. He did not think that the office of the British Prime Minister would be able to cope with the responsibility of intra-imperial communication. Massey could see that in any new

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77 Amery to Lloyd George, 24 Jul 1918, F/2/1/28, Lloyd George Papers. Also see Amery to Smuts, 8 Jul 1918, in W. K. Hancock and J. van der Poel, (eds.), Selections from the Smuts Papers: Volume III June 1910-November 1918, Cambridge, 1966, pp. 664-5. Amery felt it was 'urgent to settle the question of securing greater continuity of consultation, and the question of enabling communication between members of the Imperial War Cabinet on matters of common Imperial concern to be conducted direct through Hankey and not through the Colonial Office'. Amery felt the 'real remedy, of course, is to take all Dominion business out of the Colonial Office'.
78 Hankey to Lloyd George, 11 Jul 1918, F/23/3/4, Lloyd George Papers.
79 IWCab Meeting 26#, 23 Jul 1918, CAB23/41/37.
80 IWCab Meeting 26#, 23 Jul 1918, CAB23/41/37; Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914-18, Volume Two, pp. 832-3. Hankey saw Borden's suggestion as an inconvenience 'because the Prime Minister's office had always consisted of a few private secretaries who changed with every new Prime Minister, and the War Cabinet Secretariat was treated as a war expedient likely eventually to disappear'. Also see Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume I 1877-1918, pp. 573-4; Hankey to Lloyd George, 11 Jul 1918, F/23/3/4, Lloyd George Papers. In response to Borden's famous letter to Lloyd George on 10 July 1918, Hankey replied the next day to his Prime Minister outlining his opposition to the Canadian proposal. He argued that the Prime Minister's Office was not equipped to handle the avalanche of Dominion correspondence - over 40,000 communications a year. He felt the
arrangement outside the Colonial Office sphere would marginalize New Zealand interests. He felt that the British Prime Minister would have to prioritise demands and New Zealand’s views and problems would not rank in importance alongside those of Canada and Australia. Massey knew that size, population and geography all counted against New Zealand. He therefore proposed an alternative policy based on the idea he first mooted in the Imperial War Conference. Massey promoted an idea that appeased simultaneously Dominion calls for greater consultation and protected New Zealand’s interests. He suggested that each Dominion should maintain a ‘resident Minister’ so as to enable the Imperial War Cabinet to meet at regular intervals. Massey argued that this would be the best way to improve greater consultation over the formulation of British policy and overcome the logistical problems of travelling for Dominion leaders.81

The debate in the Imperial War Cabinet lasted for three days. After listening to the views and arguments of the other Dominion speakers, Ward finally stood up and made, according to Amery, ‘a very sensible speech insisting on permanent ministerial representation’ for the Dominions.82 As the elder statesmen of the Cabinet, Ward felt that it was his duty to add a moderating voice of wisdom to the proceedings. Ward agreed with the general consensus that an evolution had taken place within the British Empire over the course the war. He argued this change needed to be recognised in the channel of communications between Great Britain and the Dominions. He saw no future for the current system where the Dominion Governments ‘were in a position of having to inform their people about decisions after they had been taken’. Ward believed that the Dominions ‘backed up these decisions loyally in order to prevent friction, but the situation could not continue’. Ward and Massey were finally in agreement. The British Empire needed greater levels of consultation and the most sensible option to achieve this result would be to allow the Dominions to appoint a ‘resident Minister’ in London to represent their interests. Ward felt there would be severe logistical problems for the Prime Minister’s Office in handling imperial communications because the Dominions would have to have their voice on all questions of foreign policy, defence and trade. At this point, Hughes interjected, charging mischievously that this would involve some sort of imperial federation.

British Prime Minister should be kept free from all this detail. He suggested the same right of access for Dominion Prime Ministers that British Ministers enjoyed and that only questions of Cabinet importance should be referred to the British Prime Minister.

Ward replied that this was not necessarily the case. He retreated to his seat, suggesting that whole issue should be 'settled calmly and dispassionately' after the war.\textsuperscript{83}

On 30 July the Imperial War Cabinet entered the final phase of its deliberations on the future of intra-imperial relations. Massey decided to support the idea of direct communication with British Prime Minister although he intended to continue following the normal procedure of communications through the Governor-General and the Colonial Office. While he favoured 'the closest possible union' between the constituent parts of the British Empire, he admitted his opposition to imperial federation. Massey reasoned that: Imperial Federation meant Imperial Parliament and a right to levy taxes. New Zealand, loyal as it was, would never consent to be taxed by a Parliament outside its own boundaries'. Massey did not want to see 'a repetition of the Boston Tea Party'. In the long term, he argued that the central issue that needed to be resolved was how the Dominions were 'to have a share in the framing of the foreign policy and defence policy of the Empire'. Massey supported Ward's idea and wanted the British Empire to move slowly in constitutional matters because: 'One rash step might postpone development for years'.\textsuperscript{84}

The Imperial War Cabinet passed two of the three resolutions drafted by Hankey.\textsuperscript{85} The first resolution established the right of the Dominion Prime Ministers and the British Prime Minister to communicate directly with each other on questions of Cabinet importance. It stipulated that the 'Prime Ministers themselves are the judges of such questions'.\textsuperscript{86} New Zealand hopes of moderation had prevailed over the more exacting demands from Australia and Canada.\textsuperscript{87} The Colonial Office would remain the conventional and pivotal channel of communication and Massey and Ward were satisfied with this result. They had clearly outperformed their Dominion counterparts in the Imperial War Cabinet on constitutional issues.\textsuperscript{88}

The second resolution adopted Massey's proposal, allowing the Dominions to choose a representative in London 'to secure the continuity of the Imperial War

\textsuperscript{83} IWCab Meeting 27\#, 25 Jul 1918, CAB23/41/41; IWCab Meeting 27\#, 25 Jul 1918, EA11/4.

\textsuperscript{84} IWCab Meeting 28\#, 30 Jul 1918, EA11/4.

\textsuperscript{85} See Hall, \textit{Commonwealth}, p. 302. Hall argues that Hughes, Amery, Hankey and Borden were primarily responsible for this development. He gives no credit to Massey's input. Also see Roskill, \textit{Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume I 1877-1918}, p. 584.

\textsuperscript{86} See Olliver, (ed.), \textit{The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887 to 1937: Volume II: Imperial Conferences: Part I}, p. 343.

\textsuperscript{87} See P. Spartalis, \textit{The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes}, Sydney, 1983, pp. 68-70. Spartalis has failed to acknowledge the significant role played by Massey in this debate.

\textsuperscript{88} IWCab Meeting 28\#, 30 Jul 1918, EA11/4.
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Cabinet'. Here was the ultimate irony. Massey had outflanked the other Dominions with a suggestion that he personally did not care for very much. Just prior to his departure, Massey confessed to Hankey at the Savoy Hotel that he did not want to take advantage of the Resident Minister proposal. First, he wanted to consult with Cabinet and Parliament before coming to a definite decision. Massey hoped that Australia and Canada would lead the way. Back in New Zealand, Massey stalled the appointment process till after the peace settlement. As Rolf Pfeiffer has pointed out, Massey's idea was excellent in theory but not in practice. New Zealand also faced the problem of finding a suitable candidate to fill the position. As Mackenzie's behaviour had proven, there were inherent dangers with a de facto prime minister residing in London.

The Imperial War Cabinet rejected the third resolution, which encapsulated Ward's idea to postpone constitutional change of the British Empire until after the war. Prior to the penultimate meeting, evidently the Dominion representatives had come to an agreement to sink the proposal. This did not prevent Long from making one 'last plaintive kick' on behalf of the Colonial Office. He complained that the deliberations of the Imperial War Cabinet on intra-imperial communication had been rushed. He had already attempted to head off moves towards direct consultation between the British Prime Minister and the Dominions by suggesting the appointment of a Secretary of State for Imperial Affairs. Long proposed that an informal committee could thoroughly investigate the complicated issues involved but his protests were ignored. With the defeat of this proposal, Amery proudly declared that 'a great step onward has been brought about without effort almost, and certainly without the public being aware of it.'

On 13 August the Imperial War Cabinet reconvened to discuss British war aims. Only the Dominion Prime Ministers were present and much to Ward's annoyance he

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92 NZPD, v. 183, 28 Nov 1918, p. 540.
96 Long to Lloyd George, 23 Jun 1918, F/32/5/55, Lloyd George Papers. Long was also concerned that Smuts's position on the War Cabinet had set a dangerous precedent. He felt that if the Dominion Prime Ministers were given the same status it would 'create a serious constitutional problem'. Long believed that any proposed change to the position of the Dominion Prime Ministers needed 'serious consideration'.
was not invited. Lloyd George had finally assembled an intimate Cabinet. Against the backdrop Haig’s successful counter-offensive on the Western Front, the Imperial War Cabinet began to discuss the British Empire’s plan for peace and post-war vision. According to Amery, Balfour gave ‘an amiable and mildly interesting survey’ of British war aims. Balfour stated that he was ‘vehemently opposed’ to the restoration of the German colonies and stated that he supported Dominion claims for the conquered territory but he did want it to look like a ‘land grab’. Borden, whose country had little direct interest in the subject, agreed with Balfour. He responded that Canada would be ‘perfectly ready to let any of these Colonies pass under the direct protectorate or even the actual ownership and control of the United States’.98

Borden’s comments raised the ire of Massey and Hughes who finally began to work constructively together in the absence of their colleagues. Both shared similar views on the fate of the German colonies in the Pacific and they worked hard to influence British policy on this issue. While Hughes demonstrated his talent for contributing memorable and snappy one-liners to the debate, Massey applied himself diligently and stated the Australasian case in succinct geopolitical terms. He was determined to see the British Government adopt the Curzon Report as its official position on the German colonies at the peace conference. Massey wanted a watertight assurance from the British Government that the German colonies would not be returned. Massey had already extracted a significant admission from the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir R. E. Wemyss. The Admiral conceded that with the advent of submarine warfare, the German colonies had become an increased security threat to British interests in the Pacific and Africa.99 Massey enjoyed the tacit support of an incapacitated Long in his struggle to confirm British policy on the future of the German colonies. Illness had prevented Long from attending the important discussion on war aims. In absentia, Long presented a memorandum to the War Cabinet in support of Massey and Hughes. Long was convinced that ‘any attempt to surrender the [Pacific] islands now in our possession would provoke violent opposition in Australia.

98 WCab Meeting 457# (IWCab Meeting 30#), 13 Aug 1918, CAB23/42/8; WCab 457# (IWCab Meeting 30#), 13 Aug 1918, EA11/5. Barnes and Nicholson, (eds.), with an introduction by Amery, The Leo Amery Diaries, p. 233. For administrative purposes, Hankey decided to treat the meetings as two separate identities to distinguish them from the War Cabinet proper and the full Imperial War Cabinet.
99 IWCab Meeting 21#, 27 Jun 1918, CAB23/41/22; IWCab Meeting 21#, 27 Jun 1918, EA11/4; ‘Memorandum: Naval Conditions For Peace with Germany’, by the First Sea Lord R. E. Wemyss, 28 Feb 1919 [?], CP351/1/3/2. Garran Papers. Wemyss argued that the restoration of these colonies to Germany would give her exceptionally well-placed bases from which submarines or surface raiders could operate effectively in the important focal areas of the world’s trade. From this it is clear that the question directly affects Naval policy, and it is urged that the decision that colonies are not to be returned to Germany should be included in the document which is to be presented for signature to the Germans containing the Naval, Military and Air Conditions of the Terms of Peace’. 
and New Zealand, and would be accompanied by immense dangers to these two great sister nations'. He warned his British colleagues that it 'might even strain their loyalty to breaking point'.

Lloyd George did not yield to the pressure. He was not going to allow Massey, Hughes and the Colonial Office to dictate British policy. He was determined to maintain a flexible colonial settlement policy and he was not going to start a fight with the United States over a few captured German colonies. Only three days prior to Wilson's enunciation of his Fourteen Points in January 1918, Lloyd George had publicly proclaimed that the principle of national self-determination was just as applicable to the captured German colonies as those in occupied territories in Europe. This had been preceded by a Colonial Office telegram to the Dominions warning them that it would be necessary to provide evidence to the international community that the indigenous peoples of the German colonies would prefer to live under British rule. The British Government was trying its best to demonstrate a belief in Wilson's concept of self-determination. Liverpool considered that it was inadvisable to consult with the local inhabitants on this issue. He informed the Colonial Office that the Samoans resembled 'children' and lacked the education 'to understand' the principles that the Allies were fighting for.

Predictably, Massey did not agree with this summation. He saw no reason to accommodate the views of the United States, a country which had rather belatedly 'realised its duty to civilisation' let alone entrusting German territory to an international form of control - a 'Development Board'. In fairness to Massey, he did not totally oppose the idea of international trusteeship as has been suggested by at

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100 W. H. Long, 'Memorandum for War Cabinet: War Aims', 24 Aug 1918, WCab Meeting 457# (IWCab Meeting 30#), 13 Aug 1918, CAB23/43/151; WCab 457# (IWCab Meeting 30#), 13 Aug 1918, EA11/5. Long's memorandum was attached as an appendix to the meeting on war aims.

101 Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919, pp. 96-7. Also see Allen, 'New Zealand and the Imperial War Cabinet', p. 107.

102 Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919, pp. 97-8; GGNZ to SSCols, 16 Nov 1918, G5/96. Liverpool asked Long that his references to the Samoans resembling children 'should be deleted or modified as its inclusion might offend native susceptibilities'. Also see SSCols to GGNZ, 4 Jan 1918, G41/32; SSCols to GGNZ, 5 Jan 1918; G41/32; GGNZ to SSCols, 10 Jan 1918, G41/32.

103 WCab Meeting 457# (IWCab Meeting 30#), 13 Aug 1918, CAB23/42/8; WCab 457# (IWCab Meeting 30#), 13 Aug 1918, EA11/5. Also see Barnes and Nicholson, (eds.), with an introduction by Amery, The Leo Amery Diaries, pp. 151-3. It is important to remember that in the earlier discussions on the Curzon Report in 1917, Lloyd George wanted to keep British policy on the German colonies relatively undefined. On 30 April 1917 Lloyd George admitted to Amery over dinner that he did not 'quite like Curzon's Report'.

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least one prominent scholar. Massey could tolerate future American control of Palestine.¹⁰⁴ But as historian Rolf Pfeiffer has pointed out, Massey's 'generosity' did not extend to the Pacific Islands.¹⁰⁵ New Zealand's future security interests remained Massey's prime concern and he could not 'agree to the idea that America should be given any of the Pacific Islands which we had conquered'. A paranoid Massey wanted the British Empire to protect itself against all possible future threats: 'We do not know what may happen in the next twenty years; we may be at war with America'.¹⁰⁶

Conscious that the British were reluctant to make a firm commitment to adhere to a policy of direct annexation, Massey decided to concentrate on New Zealand's key interest in the Pacific region, the elimination of the German colonial system and the retention of Samoa. For the time being, Massey left the matter of control to one side. Massey argued that for military and naval reasons it would be dangerous to hand Samoa back to Germany. Disgruntled with the British decision to allow German Samoa to exist in the first place, he presented the British Government with an opportunity to rectify its past mistake. Recalling his harrowing experience during the 1914 escort crisis, Massey described how New Zealand had been 'saved' by the Australian navy from the threat of the German squadron roaming the waters of the South Pacific. His exaggerated account emphasised the strategic risks British policymakers were taking if they accepted American policy of a disinterested peace settlement or restored Samoa to German control. Massey appealed to the Imperial War Cabinet to be 'united on one point': that the German colonies 'will not go back to Germany, and that we shall have nothing in the way of a condominium'. He declared 'that nothing would be satisfactory to the people of Australia and New Zealand except the retention by the British of the Samoan Islands. The South Pacific is practically British now, and we want to keep it British'. Hughes ably supported Massey. The Australian Prime Minister stated that 'as regards the Pacific Islands his attitude was that if anyone wanted to shift Australia from them they would have to come and do it!'¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ WCab Meeting 458# (IW Cab Meeting 31#), 14 Aug 1918, CAB23/43/154; WCab 458# (IW Cab Meeting 31#) 14 Aug 1918, EA11/5.
¹⁰⁷ WCab Meeting 458# (IW Cab Meeting 31#), 14 Aug 1918, CAB23/43/154-5; WCab 458# (IW Cab Meeting 31#) 14 Aug 1918, EA11/5.
The united front presented by Massey and Hughes produced some results. The following day, Lloyd George made a firm statement to the Imperial War Cabinet that it was 'essential that Germany should be deprived of her colonies'. With this announcement, the Imperial War Cabinet turned its attention towards the manner of disposal. At this stage, only two viable alternatives were open to British policy-makers: internationalisation or annexation. Lloyd George 'was all in favour of inviting America to take in hand the trusteeship' of East Africa. In his mind, 'the thing which really mattered was that they should be properly developed in the interests of their inhabitants'. In the end, the Imperial War Cabinet left this matter unresolved. All the ingredients of a confrontation between Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain were in place.

In between sessions of the Imperial War Cabinet, Massey concentrated on improving New Zealand's shipping position. In the first couple of his weeks of his stay, Massey furiously telegraphed Allen seeking cool storage figures to enable him to build a strong case for the New Zealand cause. On 19 June Massey met the Shipping Controller, Sir Joseph Maclay, who painted a bleak picture of the shipping situation. At this meeting Maclay wisely made no promises to Massey to alleviate New Zealand's plight. The British Government expected a shipping shortfall of approximately 58,000 tonnes for the cheese and butter exports from Australia and New Zealand for the coming season. This constituted an infuriating position for Massey. Without shipping relief, he could not arrange contracts for the sale of New Zealand butter and cheese to the British Government. The British attitude towards the commandeering of New Zealand food showed a degree of callousness and practicality. Massey informed Allen: 'They will not purchase more than can be shipped by steamer. I will hold back as long as I can hoping that shipping position will improve'.

On 11 July Massey introduced a motion to the Imperial War Conference on shipping. His resolution sought to establish an Inter-Imperial Commission to

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108 For example, see 'Address by the Rt. Hon. W. M. Hughes to members of the Empire Parliamentary Association at the Royal Court, House of Lords, on Wednesday 24 July, 1918', CP351/1/2/7, Garran Papers.
109 WCab 459# (IWCab Meeting 32#), 15 Aug 1918, EA11/5.
110 Massey to Allen, 11 Jun 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers; Massey to Brash [Secretary of Dominion Butter Committee], 19 Jun 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers.
111 Massey to Allen, 19 Jun 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers; Massey to Allen, 22 Jun 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers; Massey to Allen, 26 Jun 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers.
112 Massey to Brash [Secretary of Dominion Butter Committee], 19 Jun 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers.
113 Massey to Allen, 12 Jul 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers.
imperially regulate shipping to protect the trading interests of the outlying Dominions. Massey argued that the producers needed some sort of mechanism to control the rates of freight. He rationalised his call for regulatory intervention on the basis that when it comes to businesses which are of a national character, then it is the duty of the Government to step in and see that on the one side exploitation is avoided, and that on the other side sufficient encouragement is given to the individuals or firms interested to provide a proper service, and one which will be satisfactory to the travelling and trading public.\textsuperscript{114}

The President of the British Board of Trade, Sir Albert Stanley, lent support to the idea. Hughes also gave Australian backing to the proposal because his country had suffered a similar wartime fate on the shipping front.\textsuperscript{115} The Conference accepted the general thrust of Massey's resolution pending further consideration by committee. On 26 July the committee reported back and recommended the establishment of an Inter-Imperial Board to review shipping relations between the constituent parts of the British Empire. Resolution XXIV was passed unanimously. Massey had succeeded in his goal to establish a representative body for the regulation of Inter-Imperial shipping.\textsuperscript{116}

In the meantime, Massey continued harassing British officials from the Shipping and Food Ministries in the hope of finding more ships for New Zealand. After one meeting in the middle of July, Massey felt that the outlook had brightened considerably, 'though not sufficiently good enough to enable me to do any business'.\textsuperscript{117} He became increasingly frustrated that various British government agencies were wasting his time. At another meeting with Maclay, Massey expressed his surprise on learning that the New Zealand negotiations for a new commandeer contract for butter had been stalled not because of the lack of available shipping but due to the bureaucratic incompetency of the Ministry of Food. He wrote to Allen,

\textsuperscript{114} Olliver, (ed.), \textit{The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887 to 1937: Volume II: Imperial Conferences: Part I}, p. 312.
\textsuperscript{115} See Watt to Hughes, 14 Jun 1918, CP360/8/1/1. The Australian Government was also annoyed and frustrated by British shipping policy, especially when it was asked to send ships to New Zealand. See Acting PM [Pearce] to Hughes, 23 Jun 1916, CP359/2/1/18.
\textsuperscript{117} Massey to Allen, 18 Jul 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers. Massey instructed Allen to inform dairy interest 'on no account should speculation in butter or cheese be countenanced'. 
complaining bitterly that the British Government cared 'little' for New Zealand's economic interests.\textsuperscript{118}

By the start of August Massey had nothing to show for his hard work.\textsuperscript{119} With time at a premium Massey delegated authority to Mackenzie to negotiate agricultural contracts with the British Government subject to the National Cabinet's final approval. In doing so, Massey cast his personal doubts aside about Mackenzie's ability and suitability for the task. Massey also decided to take up New Zealand's economic problems with the Imperial War Cabinet.\textsuperscript{120} On 14 August, Massey warned the Imperial War Cabinet that unless immediate steps were undertaken by the British Government to relieve the shipping crisis, the financial position of the Australasian Dominions 'would be so seriously affected that their capacity for carrying on the war would be materially hampered'.\textsuperscript{121} Beyond victory itself, there was little that could be done to appease Massey's demands.

On 26 August Massey's frustration boiled over. In a letter to Lloyd George, Massey brought his attention 'to the purchase of Meat in New Zealand by the Imperial Government and the difficulty which is arising owing to the withdrawal of so many insulated ships on the New Zealand trade'.\textsuperscript{122} He enclosed a copy of his letter written to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Bonar Law, on the subject. Massey pleaded for the British Government to give the problem 'serious consideration'.\textsuperscript{123} His letter to Bonar Law illuminated the deep sense of his concern for New Zealand's economic interests. He wanted top British officials to acknowledge 'the position in which New Zealand has been placed by the withdrawal of its shipping'. In the last twelve months, Massey argued that New Zealand trade had suffered tremendously from the severe shipping shortage. He pointed out how this had intensified by the British redirection of shipping traffic to the North Atlantic trade routes. Unfortunately this policy had resulted in frozen stores being 'full to the roof' in the Dominion, causing 'very serious loss and inconvenience' to New Zealand's meat industry. With the new season commencing on 1 September, Massey imagined that 'the very serious financial and

\textsuperscript{118} Massey to Allen, 30 Jul 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers.
\textsuperscript{119} Massey to Allen, 8 Aug 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers.
\textsuperscript{120} Massey to Alien, 31 Jul 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers. Massey indicated his intention to Allen to take up the matter with the Imperial War Cabinet in order to 'make the best of things before leaving England'. Also see Massey to Allen, 7 Aug 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers. Massey successfully negotiated a new wool contract. In terms of dairy produce, Massey admitted that he was having 'much trouble with Ministry of Food' and he suspected 'wire pulling by interested parties'.
\textsuperscript{121} WCab Meeting 458# (IWCab Meeting 31#), 14 Aug 1918, CAB23/42/12.
\textsuperscript{122} Massey to Lloyd George, 26 Aug 1918, F/36/4/2, Lloyd George Papers.
\textsuperscript{123} Massey to Lloyd George, 26 Aug 1918, F/36/4/2, Lloyd George Papers.
industrial difficulties that will arise unless relief is afforded by more shipping being provided'.

By the end of August, Massey's persistent lobbying finally paid off. The Ministry of Food indicated its willingness to purchase all of New Zealand's butter and cheese. The Ministry of Food offered a generous contract for the butter and cheese that lasted for a year after the war. The shift in attitude to buy New Zealand produce had been made because the Shipping Ministry was allocating more ships to the Australasian trade route. On 25 August the Food Controller confirmed that the proposals were before the Treasury Department. The British Cabinet was expected to approve the proposals. A relieved Massey cabled Allen the good news: 'I have done more for Dairying Industry than any other man could have done and propose to lay whole correspondence and papers before Parliament'. Massey sharply criticised the British authorities handling the negotiations, confessing to Allen that he 'found serious fault with the... Shipping Ministry [and] Food Controller'.

American competition on the London meat market remained another serious threat to New Zealand's economic interests. Massey portrayed the American Meat Trust as the real enemy of the tireless New Zealand farmer and the unsuspecting British consumer. He considered British Government inertia and vacillation over this issue as a major irritant in British-New Zealand relations. In Massey's view, the American Meat Trust supplied too much of British requirements, undercutting New Zealand's market share. He accused the American Meat Trust of exploiting New Zealand's shipping difficulties and dumping its 'inferior' meat products on the London market to accumulate huge profits. The fact that the British Government was making tidy sums of money selling surplus New Zealand meat on the open-market to subsidise its purchase of American meat particularly rankled Massey. In his words, this arrangement was

adding insult to injury and will cause a very bitter feeling among the New Zealand producers, with the majority of whom the meat trusts are anathema. The New Zealand producers have not complained of the prices paid to them, but they will complain bitterly when they know that the profit on their meat is really benefiting those whom they consider as being the worst type of exploiters.

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124 Massey to Bonar Law, 23 Aug 1918, F/36/4/2, Lloyd George Papers.
125 Massey to Allen, 10 Aug 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers; Massey to Allen, 28 Aug 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers.
126 Massey to Allen, 26 Aug 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers; Massey to Allen, 28 Aug 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers; Massey to Allen, 2 Sep 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers. Massey advised Allen that it was not worth going into the expense of canning meat to save insulated space.
Massey felt that American exploitation of the war conditions was 'really placing another weapon in hands of our pacifists and other people of that ilk which they will not be slow to take advantage of'. He concluded that the situation was 'sufficiently serious' enough to warrant 'thorough examination by British Ministers'. At the Imperial War Conference, the British pacified Massey's calls and agreed to investigate the matter further.

By the start of September, Massey and Ward had completed their business in London. Over the course of their stay, the strategic momentum on the Western Front had swung dramatically in favour of the Allies. The Germans were now permanently on the defensive. On 18 July the new Allied commander-in-chief, General Ferdinand Foch, launched a series of co-ordinated counterattacks with French and American forces, which wiped out the German salient around the River Marne. On 8 August, Haig attacked the German lines in the vicinity of Amiens with nineteen divisions including New Zealand troops. Hais combined his attack with tanks, infantry and artillery support. The offensive forced the Germans to withdraw to the defensive perimeter known as the Hindenberg Line. Described by Ludendorff as the 'black day' of the German Army, those German soldiers not killed or wounded in the attack either surrendered or fled in panic. The Allied pressure on the German Army had become relentless. American reinforcements were pouring in and by late August Péronne had fallen into the Allies hands. By late September, Foch had begun making plans to storm the Hindenberg Line and finish off German resistance for good.

Before returning to New Zealand, Massey attended his last Imperial War Cabinet on 20 August. With Bonar Law in the chair, discussion was confined to only minor matters and according to Amery, 'Bonar showed himself more than usually terrified about any sort of decision'. In total, Massey attended four meetings of the condensed Imperial War Cabinet without Ward. This undermined the working relationship of the two Ministers and the prospects of the coalition government surviving beyond the cessation of hostilities on the Western Front.

The New Zealand Minister's second wartime trip to Great Britain was less successful than the first. In seeking to advance New Zealand's interests, Massey and

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127 Massey to Bonar Law, 23 Aug 1918, F/36/4/2, Lloyd George Papers.
Ward found the British Government less amenable and accommodating. This is part reflected the fact that the Lloyd George’s administration had been in power for over an year and a half, dampening its enthusiasm to consult with the Dominions. It also reflected Lloyd George’s determination to realise British war aims and maintain harmonious relations with the United States. In addition, Massey and Ward’s partnership was not as effective. Partly as the result of Lloyd George’s decision to conduct more private consultations with the Dominion Prime Ministers, and Hughes’s vocal presence stealing the limelight for Australian interests, New Zealand did not occupy centre stage. The New Zealand pair had begun to show signs of fatigue and strain. Over the course of their second visit, Massey and Ward disagreed openly with one another over New Zealand’s best interests. During the Imperial War Conference on imperial meat supplies, Ward labelled Massey’s attempt to restrict American trading opportunities with the British Empire as ‘fatuous stupidity’. In the end, this seriously undermined Massey’s attempt to impose imperial regulation on the American meat exports to Great Britain. The Imperial War Conference passed a more benign Australian drafted resolution on the matter.

Despite Liverpool’s bold declaration in Parliament that Massey and Ward were able to ‘advance the interests of New Zealand in many important respects’, they had little to show for their efforts. They had minor achievements to parade. Massey pointed to the renewal of the Imperial War Cabinet experiment as a consolidation of the close ‘partnership’ between Great Britain and the Dominions. He sounded almost relieved that this had been achieved without sacrificing Dominion autonomy or introducing a system of imperial federation. Massey’s rhetoric disguised the fundamental and unequal nature of the British-New Zealand partnership. Imperial shipping regulation, in the form of the Imperial War Conference resolution, offered a long-term solution to exorbitant freight rates but Massey and Ward did not ameliorate the acute shortage of ships facing New Zealand exporters. In terms of New Zealand’s economic interests, the British remained reluctant to restrict American meat

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130 Allen, ‘New Zealand and the Imperial War Cabinet’, p. 113.
131 IWCon, 8 Jul 1918, G40/2.
133 NZPD, v. 183, 7 Nov 1918, pp. 279-80. Massey emphatically stated that ‘no dominion of the Empire, not even New Zealand - and New Zealand is supposed, and rightly, to be the most Imperialistic of the whole of the dominions - that would submit to be taxed by a Parliament sitting outside its own borders’.
134 Massey to Allen, 18 Jul 1918, PM9/1, Thomson Papers; NZH, 14 Oct 1918, p. 4; ODT, 14 Oct 1918, p. 4. On his return, Massey complained about the lack of understanding from British officials handling New Zealand exports and shipping requirements.
exports to Great Britain. Preserving the sanctity of New Zealand’s immigration policy at the Imperial War Conference also merely protected the status quo.

In short, the failures of the second trip outnumbered the successes. Massey and Ward failed to accomplish any of their three objectives and remove the major obstacles affecting British-New Zealand relations. Serious differences still existed between Great Britain and New Zealand over the future of the German colonies. Australian historian, Rolf Pfeiffer, has described Massey's position during the discussions at the Imperial War Cabinet over the future of the German colonies as 'moderate'. Yet the full documentary record exposes the weakness of this interpretation. During the debate over the fate of the German colonies, Massey and Hughes advocated a firm policy of direct annexation. Massey made no secret of New Zealand's intention to seek a punitive peace treaty with Germany. He believed that a harsh peace would serve New Zealand's economic and strategic interests.

As a result, Massey displayed a willingness to criticise the British Government's vacillation over the future of the German colonies. According to Long, Massey spoke 'fearlessly and plainly' on the subject. While he had obtained a definitive British assurance that the colonies would not be returned, the method of control remained a question to be decided at the peace conference. This made Massey nervous. He feared that British policy-makers would concede to American demands for an impartial peace settlement and international control for the colonies in return for British demands in other facets of the peace treaty of secondary importance to the Dominions. Massey wanted the British Government to adopt an uncompromising policy of direct annexation but Lloyd George remained cautious and did not commit himself. Long informed Liverpool that the ‘difficulty is President Wilson with his diction [sic] of no accession of territory except with the consent of the peoples concerned’.

135 See SSCols to GGNZ, 10 Oct 1918, G41/39; SSCols to GGNZ, 12 Oct 1918, G41/39; GGNZ to SSCols, 19 Oct 1918, G41/39; Massey to Long, 28 Aug 1918, WRO947/573/85c, Long Papers. The British Government denied that New Zealand meat exports were subsidising American meat exports and refused to allow the discussions on meat exports at the Imperial War Conference to be disclosed for public dissemination for fear of arousing the anger of the United States.


In terms of strengthening the naval defence policy of the British Empire, Massey and Ward were disappointed for different reasons. The Admiralty's response to Ward's resolution passed at the 1917 Imperial War Conference, tabled at the Imperial War Cabinet on 27 June 1918, was virtually a rehash of the traditional Admiralty belief in a single Imperial Navy. While Ward showed sympathy for the concept (which is not surprising given his past support for such a naval policy), Massey did not feel that the Admiralty had adequately recognised the importance of the Dominions in its long-term strategic plan. Along with Allen, Massey favoured the concept of a local navy unit for the Dominions enabling them to have the flexibility to respond to their own naval security requirements in the event of another major war. Massey believed firmly that the war had exposed the flaws of relying upon Great Britain for naval defence. During the early months of the war, the Royal Navy did not have enough resources to patrol or escort the southern waters around Australia and New Zealand. Massey wanted to apply this lesson to future New Zealand naval defence policy.

When the matter came before the Imperial War Conference on 24 July 1918, Ward favoured consideration of the Admiralty's report. The majority of participants including Massey rejected this idea. Instead, the Admiralty decided to consult directly with the Dominion representatives in a separate meeting. With the exception of the Newfoundland Prime Minister, most Dominion representatives considered the Admiralty scheme for a single imperial navy unsatisfactory. The general consensus felt that the experiment of the Royal Australian Navy had demonstrated the practicalities of local navy units during times of war. The Admiralty was forced to re-evaluate its position and agreed to despatch a 'highly qualified representative' to the Dominions in the form of the Jutland hero, Admiral John Jellicoe, to prepare an acceptable imperial naval strategy. The Imperial War Cabinet ratified his nomination on 18 December 1918.

139 Allen, 'New Zealand and the Imperial War Cabinet', p. 130; IWCab Meeting 21#, 27 Jun 1918, EA11/4.
141 McGibbon, Blue-Water Rationale, pp. 36-7; IWConf, 24 Jul 1918, G40/2. McGibbon has incorrectly identified the date of the discussion at the Imperial War Conference as 26 July 1918. Also see Allen, 'New Zealand and the Imperial War Cabinet', pp. 130-2. A copy of the Admiralty's memorandum can be located at the National Archives in New Zealand. See 'Naval Defence of the British Empire', 17 May 1918, N1/22/5; SSCols to GGNZ, 9 Dec 1918, G5/96; GGNZ to SSCols, 11 Dec 1918, G5/96. For the Dominion Prime Ministers' reply to the Admiralty's memorandum see 'Naval Defence and Dominion Autonomy: Memorandum of Dominion Ministers, 1918', in A. B. Keith, (ed.), Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions 1918-1931: From Self-Government to National Sovereignty, London, 1948, p. 11.
Before boarding the steamer, Massey finally turned his thoughts towards the approaching peace talks. He wrote to Lloyd George expressing his opposition 'to handing over any of the German colonies or Palestine to the United States either in trust or in any other way'. In the space of two weeks, Massey had changed his position, declaring himself to be a complete annexationist. Massey now felt that 'anything of this nature would be exceedingly unpopular with British citizens all over the Empire and would be looked upon by neutrals as an indication of weakness'. Massey also signalled his intention to fight for New Zealand's interests, stating that: 'We may not get on as well as we expect and deserve at the Peace Conference but if we lose there, it will not be looked on as a surrender which would certainly be the case if we made arrangements beforehand, such as have been suggested'.142 Lloyd George had been warned. The pursuit of peace would be no easier than the pursuit of victory.

142 Massey to Lloyd George, 2 Sep 1918, F/36/4/3, Lloyd George Papers.
CHAPTER SEVEN

New Zealand
and the
Paris Peace Conference

Without doubt New Zealand could claim to have the most 'chaotic end' to the First World War.¹ Just before eleven o'clock on the morning of 11 November 1918 a telegram from the Colonial Office arrived on Liverpool's desk at Government House which read: 'MOST URGENT Armistice signed 5 a.m. this morning. (Signed) LONG'.² For the next fifteen hours Liverpool withheld news of the armistice from the New Zealand Government and the general public. The following morning at a quarter past eight on Tuesday 12 November Massey finally announced that a general armistice had been signed with Germany. A battery gun salute greeted the residents of Wellington and every postal station in New Zealand received a simple note that read: 'Armistice signed'.³ Consequently, 'New Zealand was about the last place in the whole world to hear the news'.⁴ But this did not interrupt the planned festivities. Despite the severity of the influenza epidemic, Massey declared the day a national holiday. There

² SS Cols to GGNZ, 11 Nov 1918, G43/2. There were actually two telegrams sent by the Colonial Office. One simply announced news of the armistice and the other instructed Liverpool not 'to publish pending further communication'. Also see NZH, 13 Nov 1918, p. 7. Hostilities were to cease that day at eleven o'clock Monday morning French time and half past ten at night New Zealand time.
³ On the controversy surrounding news of the German Armistice see NZPD, v. 183, 5 Dec 1918, p. 823. The Australia public officially received the news nine hours before Massey's press conference. In Parliament, Massey was asked why there was such a delay in announcing the news. Massey responded that he did not receive official confirmation of the German Armistice from Liverpool until two in the morning on 12 November, some fifteen hours after the original telegram from the Colonial Office was received in Wellington. By this time, the ceasefire have been in effect for nearly three and half hours. He stated that Cabinet 'decided that unless the news arrived before midnight it was not to be published until nine o'clock on the following morning, when the public of Wellington were to be made aware of the fact by gun-fire'.
⁴ Sanders, Dateline - NZPA, pp. 53-4. The New Zealand Government censored the news to allow Massey to make the official announcement at a press conference but it was leaked and a Wellington newspaper actually published the news before it was announced. The New Zealand Press Association sent a letter of complaint to Massey over the mismanagement of the affair. Also see H. Strachan, 'At the closing of the Great War', Times Literary Supplement, 11 December 1998, p. 7. Also see C. Pugsley, 'New Zealand: "The Heroes Lie in France", in H. Cecil and P. H. Liddle, (eds.), At the Eleventh Hour: Reflections, Hopes and Anxieties at the Closing of the Great War, 1918, Barnsley, 1998, p. 206.
were spontaneous scenes of wild public celebrations in the streets of all the major towns and cities of New Zealand.\(^5\)

The principal impact of the armistice for New Zealand was immediate. German acceptance of Allied terms acknowledged defeat and so New Zealand was on the winning side. It was vindication of New Zealand's decision in August 1914 to contribute militarily to the war. On 21 November 1918 the British Government ordered Allen to suspend the despatching of reinforcements, saving New Zealand from potentially the greatest financial and traumatic costs of sending married men.\(^6\) For some, the euphoria of the armistice was short lived. While New Zealand's soldiers could look forward to demobilisation, the farming community viewed the approaching peace with considerable anxiety. Over the duration of the war, New Zealand farmers had been riding the crest of a wave in the form of high prices for their primary products. Even though the Armistice signified the end of the shipping crisis because Germany surrendered its submarine fleet as part of the deal, New Zealand farmers quickly realised that their generous incomes were about to come to an end.\(^7\)

On 7 November Massey received a deputation from meat producers seeking government support to negotiate a one-year extension of the imperial commandeering. With an upcoming election and keen to preserve a buoyant economy to enhance his political prospects, Massey eagerly took up the challenge and asked the British Government to give 'favourable consideration to it'.\(^8\) His political imperatives clearly outweighed Long's request to 'make clear the difficulties which led His Majesty's Government to secure increased supplies of meat from North America'.\(^9\) Post-war prosperity remained a key component of Reform's post-war political fortunes. In this vein, Massey continued to berate the British Government for failing to combat the American Meat Trust. In early November, Massey declared 'that he had no confidence of the Food Controller's Department'. Owing to the severe shipping restrictions, the

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\(^6\) SSCols to GGNZ, 21 Nov 1918, G41/40; Baker, *King and Country Call*, p. 151.

\(^7\) SSCols to GGNZ, 27 Jan 1919, G41/42; IWCab Meeting 43#, 18 Dec 1918, EA11/5. The Shipping Controller told Cabinet that 'the armistice had brought with lightning speed an entire change of conditions' to the shipping position. Great Britain was now 'flooded with foodstuffs'. He advocated the end requisitioning to re-establish British trade.

\(^8\) GGNZ to SSCols, 9 Nov 1918, G41/40. On the transition of British food policy from wartime to peace see Barnett, *British Food Policy During the First World War*, pp. 209-18. Also see NZH, 7 Dec 1918, p. 11. While New Zealand producers of wool, cheese and butter enjoyed contracts at good prices for a period of twelve months after June 1919, the British Government would only purchase New Zealand meat for a three month period past June 1919.

\(^9\) SSCols to GGNZ, 12 Oct 1918, G41/39.
British Government had brought large amounts of American meat. Massey labelled it unfit for human consumption. He was extremely dissatisfied with British policy. During the war, New Zealand's geographical isolation had seen it clearly disadvantaged in the British allocation of shipping resources, and, now the British were accumulating vast profits from selling New Zealand meat to subsidise the purchase of American meat. This ludicrous situation made Massey even more determined to seek an extension of imperial commandeering contract to ensure a continuation of the high incomes for New Zealand's farmers.

In New Zealand, the cessation of hostilities on the Western Front had been expected for some weeks. After the initial successes of the Spring Offensive, the war had quickly turned sour for Germany. In the face of massive Allied counterattacks, Germany's allies had steadily fallen one by one. On 29 September Bulgaria signed an armistice with the Allies at Salonika following the Battle of Monastir-Doiron and the Austrians were on the verge of doing so after defeat on the Italian front at Vittorio Veneto in late October. On 3 November Austria-Hungary finally severed its alliance with Germany and signed the Armistice of Villa Giusti. On 30 October Turkey was knocked out of the war. This helped to pave the way for Turkey's Gallipoli saviour, Mustafa Kemal Pasha Atatürk, to become the nation's first president on 29 October 1923. Under the terms of the Mudros Armistice the Allies were handed control of Constantinople and Turkish forces had to withdraw from Transcaucasia.

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10 GGNZ to SSCols, 5 Nov 1918, G41/40; Liverpool to Long, 6 Nov 1918, WRO947/615/100. Long Papers. According to Liverpool, Massey was 'down' on the Food Controller because he felt that he was under the influence of the American Meat Trust.

11 See NZPD, v. 183, 6 Nov 1918, p. 200. In the first week of November Wellington was inundated by rumours of peace. On 8 November newspapers reported erroneously that an armistice had been signed, sparking off wild celebrations in the city. These rumours probably originated from Government House, where a Long telegram in late October predicted that the 'Germans will accept the terms of the Armistice'. In Parliament, Massey was asked what preventative measures the Government had taken to avoid a repeat of this situation. He promised rashly 'that if news of the kind was received it would be given to the public at the earliest possible moment'. See SSCols to GGNZ, 28 Oct 1918, G43/2. Also see Rice, Black November, pp. 33-4. According to Rice: 'On 8 November a cable arrived from an American news agency which said that Germany had signed an armistice'. Even though this was a mistake, the news 'spread like wildfire' and produced spontaneous celebrations in the streets of Auckland.

The defeat of Turkey had deep emotional and political significance for New Zealand. The landing of the ANZAC's at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915 had become enshrined as a national day of mourning - a theme which has been laboriously explored by New Zealand and Australian historians alike. News of Turkey's surrender encouraged Massey's penchant for patriotic rhetoric and provided a welcome distraction from the devastating effects of the influenza epidemic sweeping the country. In Parliament, Massey stated, with a degree of eloquence, that Gallipoli 'will never be forgotten: it will remain for all time throughout the world as a standard of heroism, gallantry, discipline, and endurance'. Seizing the moment he impulsively asked the British Government to consider the possibility of sending the ANZACs to garrison the Dardanelles. Massey told Parliament that

it is only fit and proper that we should ask the British Government to pay this compliment to honour both the dead and the living. It is undoubtedly their due, and it will be some recognition of the great services of the Anzacs to the Empire in the early days of the war.

The capitulation of German forces on the Western Front was just as dramatic and rapid as the Turkish collapse. On 27 September Foch launched a massive offensive along the whole line of the Western Front. Haig counter-attacked in the Cambrai area, overrunning the Hindenburg Line and capturing Cambrai by the second week of October. As part of the IV British Corps, the New Zealand Division distinguished itself in the advance, helping to capture the Welsh and Bon Avis Ridges in the heart of the Hindenburg Line and storming the ramparts of Le Quesnoy on 4 November. In the last three months of the war the New Zealand Division had fought continuously, advancing over one hundred miles without a break. This hard-won reputation came at a high price. Since the end of March 1918 the New Zealand Division had sustained close to 10,000 casualties with over 3,000 killed.

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14 NZPD, v. 183, 1 Nov 1918, p. 169.
15 GGNZ to SSCols, 1 Nov 1918, G41/40; NZPD, v. 183, 1 Nov 1918, p. 170; SSCols to GGNZ, 8 Nov 1918, G41/40. A week later Long informed Liverpool that the British Government would look in the practicalities of Massey's suggestion.
17 Baker, King and Country Call, p. 245.
Faced with domestic unrest and a deteriorating military situation the German Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, requested an armistice under the terms of Wilson's Fourteen Points. On 26 October Ludendorff admitted defeat and resigned to facilitate the peace negotiations. Two days later Lloyd George cabled Massey telling him that he 'ought to be prepared to start for Europe without any delay'. The Australian Prime Minister, William Morris Hughes, had anticipated victory by staying in London and the journey for Borden was just a short dash across the Atlantic Ocean. Considering the distance involved, the British wanted to give Massey as much time as possible to organise his travel plans. Long informed Liverpool that 'Mr. Massey should be here to participate in the deliberations which will determine the line that the British delegates will take up at these Conferences'. Lloyd George felt these conferences were of 'at least equal importance' to the Peace Conference because they would determine the nature of the settlement. As L. F. Fitzhardinge has pointed out, 'at this stage Lloyd George clearly did not envisage actual participation in the peace conference, but prior discussions, and it is probable that he was "not enthusiastic" at the idea of dominion representation as such'.

For acute political and domestic reasons Massey and Ward could not immediately return to Europe. Within the National Government tensions were high. Massey and Ward had just arrived back in the country and found themselves surrounded by controversy. The two Ministers were popularly blamed for the introduction of the influenza epidemic, which caused the deaths of over 8,000 New Zealanders in the space of six weeks. In Parliament, Massey and Ward came under fire for apparently circumventing quarantine procedures upon their arrival in Auckland. On 9 December, Massey announced the National Cabinet's decision to establish a royal commission of enquiry. While the final report eventually exonerated the Ministers, concluding they took no part in the decision to allow the steamship *Niagara* to dock in Auckland on

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20 SSScols to GGNZ, 28 Oct 1918, G43/2; Lloyd George to Massey and Lloyd, 27 Oct 1918, F/36/4/4, Lloyd George Papers.
12 October without quarantine, popular suspicions lingered on that Massey and Ward had brought pressure to bear on custom officials.\textsuperscript{23}

The chief difficulty behind an immediate return for the Peace Conference was Ward's omission from the final meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet. Ward complained to Liverpool over his exclusion: 'I feel that I am labouring under such a sense of injustice, humiliation and indignity'. Clearly upset, Ward pointed the finger at Liverpool and British officials for the 'slight'.\textsuperscript{24} Liverpool quickly tried to remedy the situation and conferred with Massey.\textsuperscript{25} The New Zealand Prime Minister knew he could not contemplate a solo journey to the peace talks without Ward's approval for fear of breaking up the National Government.\textsuperscript{26} Both options entailed consequences that were equally unpalatable to Massey so he began to petition for Ward's inclusion at the peace talks. Once again the question of Ward's status threatened to ruin New Zealand's representation at an international event of unparalleled importance.\textsuperscript{27}

New Zealand complaints over Ward's exclusion became so vociferous that the Colonial Office brought the issue to the British Prime Minister's attention. Long felt that it was outside his power to settle the dispute and asked Hankey to show Lloyd George the correspondence between London and Wellington.\textsuperscript{28} The New Zealand cables highlighted Lloyd George's difficulty in consulting the Dominions. It raised the larger question of separate Dominion representation at the Peace Conference. Despite clear British assurances to consult the Dominions on peace terms, Lloyd George was deliberately avoiding bringing Dominion representatives into the discussions. Hughes and Smuts were both excluded from a whole series of meetings and they were not invited to the crucial meetings of the Versailles Council in late October. The inevitable result was another Hughes explosion in Cabinet and complaints to the British press. On 5 November, with the resumption of the Imperial War Cabinet, Hughes attacked the very basis of the Armistice, Wilson's Fourteen Points, claiming that they were not the terms of peace. He was annoyed that the Dominions had not


\textsuperscript{24} Ward to Liverpool, 27 Oct 1918, G48/20/P/3.

\textsuperscript{25} Liverpool to Massey, 29 Oct 1918, G48/20/P/3.

\textsuperscript{26} GGNZ to SSCols, 7 Nov 1918, G48/20/P/3.

\textsuperscript{27} GGNZ to SSCols, 30 Oct 1918, G48/20/P/3; Liverpool to Long, 6 Nov 1918, WRO947/615/100, Long Papers. Liverpool believed that 'misunderstandings' between Great Britain and New Zealand would disappear if British officials visited the Dominion. Also see SSCols to GGNZ, 1 Nov 1918, G48/20/P/3; Long to Liverpool, 7 Nov 1918, WRO947/615/95, Long Papers.

\textsuperscript{28} Batterbee to Hankey, 1 Nov 1918, F/23/3/18, Lloyd George Papers. Also see Roskill, \textit{Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume I 1877-1918}, p. 625. Roskill believes that Hankey sent Batterbee's letter 'at once' to Lloyd George but the British Prime Minister ignored the protests.
been consulted and he did not consider himself 'bound to the chariot wheel of the Fourteen Points'.

Without success, Hughes tried to enlist the support of Massey and Ward in his campaign against the British Government and its acceptance of the Fourteen Points. He considered British actions in not consulting the Dominions as 'serious breach of faith'. He forcibly argued that a provision for the retention of the German colonies, 'essential to the safety of Australia and New Zealand', should have been inserted in the Armistice. Lloyd George responded to Hughes on 11 November that such 'an assurance to Australia and New Zealand in regard to some of the German Colonies would have meant similar assurances to other Dominions and to Allies'. He did not want to provoke American hostility before the peace conference had even started.

Despite the obvious merits of Hughes's proposal, Massey and Ward were unwilling to support him. Possibly fearing British reprisals over the number of New Zealand delegates at the peace conference, Massey and Ward seemed content by Long's assurance that the British reserved the right to pursue imperial interests on certain points. Personality also came into it. According to Liverpool, Massey and Ward felt that Hughes had assumed a position in Great Britain 'altogether outside his real standing in Australasia'. Yet the New Zealand Prime Minister did share the conviction of Hughes and Borden that the Dominion should have their own representation at the Peace Conference. At least one prominent New Zealand historian

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29 WCab Meeting 497# (IW Cab Meeting 36#), 5 Nov 1918, EA11/5; Hughes to Lloyd George, 6 Nov 1918, F/28/2/8, Lloyd George Papers. Hughes told Lloyd George that as the representative of Australia, he could have been at least asked to express the views of the Dominions on the Peace terms. Also see Barnes and Nicholson, (eds.), with an introduction by Amery, The Leo Amery Diaries: Volume I: 1896-1929, p. 242. Amery wrote in his diary entry for 8 November: 'His explosion may possibly do good if things haven't gone too far, by forcing the Government to face the issue of really making Dominion representation adequate'. Also see G. W. Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 1914-1919, Chapel Hill, 1978, p. 82.

30 Hughes to Lloyd George, 9 Nov 1918, F/28/2/9, Lloyd George Papers; Lloyd George to Hughes, 11 Nov 1918, F/28/2/9, Lloyd George Papers.

31 GGNZ to SSCols, 14 Nov 1918, G49/52; Long to Liverpool, 7 Nov 1918, WRO947/615/95, Long Papers. According to Liverpool, Massey and Ward told him 'in great secrecy that Mr. Hughes, the Prime Minister of Australia has telegraphed to them asking them to support him against the Imperial Government. Both Ministers have emphatically declined to do so'. Of interest is Godley to Allen, 15 Nov 1918, WA252/5. Godley was glad that Massey and Ward did not side with Hughes over his complaint that the Dominions were not consulted over the armistice terms. According to Godley: 'It really is the greatest nonsense, as they have been most thoroughly consulted all through, and I am told that it is merely a little hurt to his [Hughes] personal vanity at not having been asked to go to Versailles the other day'.

32 GGNZ to SSCols, 3 Oct 1918, CO209/298/435. Also see GGNZ to GGAust, 7 Sep 1917, G41/30. Massey refused to cooperate with a Hughes request to censor news on the political and industrial unrest in Australia.
is mistaken on this point. On 7 November Massey not only demanded representation, he expected New Zealand to be allocated two representatives. Through the Colonial Office, Lloyd George was made fully aware of New Zealand's expectations. The New Zealand Government had 'implicit trust' in Long. Moreover, Massey and Ward felt their rejection of Hughes's suggestion deserved British recompense.

After much discussion and debate between London and Wellington, Long advised Lloyd George that it was 'of the utmost importance to keep Massey and Ward on our side'. The following day, Long cabled his Prime Minister's personal assurance to Liverpool that he 'will do what he can to ensure that Sir Joseph Ward is present at our deliberations'. Lloyd George, however, rejected Massey's claim for two representatives. He argued that it would be impossible to limit the arrangement to New Zealand as all the other Dominions would claim the privilege of having two representatives present at all the deliberations. The latest telegram merely provoked

33 See Morrell, Britain and New Zealand, p. 40. Morrell asserted that Massey viewed the issue of Dominion representation with 'uneasiness' and that he took no part in forcing the issue.

34 GGNZ to SSCols, 7 Nov 1918, G48/20/P/3. Mackenzie sent a message to Massey from The Times which stated that it was high time for the Dominion representatives to assemble in England. This stirred Massey into action and he wanted to know who would be representing New Zealand at the Peace Conference. Liverpool told Long: 'It is taken for granted that Sir Joseph Ward will be invited in view of the fact that there is a National Government in office here'. This telegram is strikingly similar to Borden's reply to Lloyd George on 29 October, where he raised formally for the first time the question of Dominion representation. Like Hughes and Borden, Massey took Dominion representation at the Peace Conference for granted. See Fitzhardinge, 'Hughes, Borden, and Dominion Representation at the Paris Peace Conference', The Canadian Historical Review, v. 49, 2 (June 1968), p. 162; L. F. Fitzhardinge, 'W. M. Hughes and the Treaty of Versailles, 1919', JCPs, v. 5, 2 (July 1967), p. 132; R. C. Brown, 'Sir Robert Borden and Canada's War Aims', in B. Hunt and A. Preston. (eds.), War Aims and Strategic Policy in Great War 1914-1918, London, 1977, p. 58. Borden believed that Canada's contribution had been so great 'that his nation had an irrefutable claim to recognition as a principal combatant in its own right rather than as a subordinate part of the British Empire'. Also see Pfeiffer, 'Exercises in Loyalty and Troublemaking', Australian Journal of Politics and History, v. 38, 2 (1992), p. 184. As early as December 1916, Massey had called for Dominion representation at the peace negotiations. Also see SSCols to GGNZ, 8 Nov 1918, G48/20/P/3; GGNZ to SSCols, 8 Nov 1918, G48/20/P/3; NZPD, v. 183, 6 Nov 1918, p. 198. Liberal MPs were bringing pressure to bear on Massey and they expected Ward to be included. In Parliament, the Liberal member for Timaru, James Craigie, argued that in view of the Dominion's sacrifice, 'it was quite imperative that New Zealand should be represented at that peace table'. Massey 'had no doubt that New Zealand would be asked to send one or two representatives to the Peace Conference when it was arranged'.

35 Massey to Lloyd George via GGNZ to SSCols, 28 Nov 1918, F/33/1/40, Lloyd George Papers; Liverpool to Long, 28 Nov 1918, WRO947/615/98, Long Papers.

36 Batterbee to Davies, 15 Nov 1918, F/33/1/30, Lloyd George Papers. Also see Long to Lloyd George, 19 Dec 1916, F/32/4/4, Lloyd George Papers. Long advised Lloyd George that Harcourt's pledge to consult the Dominions over the terms of peace 'should be borne in mind with the German peace proposals and any reply made to them'. However, Long only wanted to inform the Dominions 'shortly before, or at least at precisely the same moment as any public intimation is made on the subject here'. For Harcourt's formal pledge to New Zealand see SSCols to GovNZ, 22 Jan 1915, G41/6. He also privately reiterated this promise to New Zealand in Harcourt to Liverpool, 26 Mar 1915, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/311, Harcourt Papers. Also see SSCols to GGNZ, 8 Dec 1918, G41/41. Long informed New Zealand of the Inter-Allied Conference held on 2 December 1918.

37 SSCols to GGNZ, 16 Nov 1918, G48/20/P/3.
A JOLT FOR SIR JOE

The conferring powers have decided that New Zealand is to be allowed only one delegate at the Peace Conference. This is a nasty one for Sir Joseph Ward, whose trip Home would appear to be in vain and unnecessary. Some folk will regard it as another "insult to Liberalism."

BILLIE HUGHES: Who's your little friend over there?
BILL MASSEY: Oh, that's a bloke who came Home on the same boat with me.
another furious reaction from Wellington. Massey asked that further consideration be
given to his request 'in order that the Dominion may not be involved in a very serious
political crisis'.

Meanwhile, Dominion representatives were slowly making their way towards
London. On 17 November Sir Robert Borden reached Great Britain to discuss the
question of Dominion representation. Lloyd George suggested that Borden alone
could represent the Dominions as the last-man on the five-person British Empire
Delegation (BED). Hughes rejected the idea, declaring that no one Dominion leader
could represent the others. Lloyd George's next proposal was for the creation of a
rotational 'Dominions panel' to fill the fifth slot. Once again Hughes objected and the
issue was left for the Imperial War Cabinet to decide. Before the meeting on 20
November, Borden saw Lloyd George and agreed with him that the desire of both
Ward and Massey to attend the conference was 'absurd'. In Cabinet, Borden brought
up the fate of the German colonies. In order to avoid Anglo-American conflict, he
suggested that each Dominion 'principally interested' should put forward its claim for
the retention of any German colony rather than the British Government. The British
Prime Minister agreed with these sentiments and informed the Cabinet that he had
told Colonel Edward House, Wilson's most trusted adviser, that the colonies should
not be returned and that the Dominions should get to keep them. The Imperial War
Cabinet agreed that 'at the important Allied Conference which should precede the
Peace Conference, India and each self-governing dominion should be given the fullest
opportunity to express their views on those questions which may closely concern
them'.

On 24 November the Imperial War Cabinet's decision was transmitted to
Wellington. Long told Massey 'to come prepared with all material' to present New
Zealand's case for Samoa. Massey cabled back, seeking British permission to release
the contents of the telegram to the public. He wanted to persuade a sceptical
Parliament of the importance of New Zealand being represented at the peace talks.
Massey felt that Parliament 'is too inclined to regard the question of the destiny of the
German Colonies as settled'. Long took Massey's request to the Imperial War
Cabinet meeting of 26 November, where Smuts's memorandum proposing for the fifth

38 GGNZ to SSCols, 18 Nov 1918, G48/20/P/3.
39 See Borden, (ed.), Robert Laird Borden, v. 2, p. 868; Fitzhardinge, 'Hughes, Borden, and
Dominion Representation at the Paris Peace Conference', The Canadian Historical Review, v. 49, 2
(June 1968), p. 163; Andrews, The ANZAC Illusion, p. 204.
40 IW Cab Meeting 37#, 20 Nov 1918, EA11/5.
41 SSCols to GGNZ, 24 Nov 1918, G43/2.
42 GGNZ to SSCols, 25 Nov 1918, G43/2.
place in the British Empire Delegation to be filled in rotation from a panel of all the Dominions according to the subject under discussion was being considered. Even though it was considered British policy, the Imperial War Cabinet decided that permission could not be given to Massey's wish as British policy on this point was still subject to the final approval of the other Allied powers. But as far as the issue of New Zealand representation was concerned the news was a little better. On 27 November Long told a white lie, informing Massey that two representatives would be 'readily given' to New Zealand.

With the issue of Ward's representation apparently resolved, the "Siamese Twins" began to outline their vision of the post-war world to the New Zealand public. On 28 November Massey addressed Parliament, ignoring British instructions in the process by revealing that the fate of the German colonies was open to debate at the peace conference. As a result, he argued that without a New Zealand presence at the peace table, there was no guarantee that German Samoa would remain in British hands. Massey warned that: 'I have been given to understand that we must not take it for granted that we shall be able to retain possession of the Pacific Islands without a struggle'. Massey urged Parliament to quickly consider the finance, licensing and repatriation legislation to allow them a speedy return to Europe.

During the course of his speech, Massey favoured a punitive peace settlement that stripped of Germany of its colonies, destroyed its ability to wage war, and financially compensated the Allies. In short, Massey shared the sentiments held by many New Zealanders that Germany represented an unrepentant evil and deserved hideous punishment from the victors. This popular view was encapsulated by the newspapers of the day in such headlines as 'Wilhelm the Culprit'. Massey held Germany responsible for the war and he insisted that the punishment handed to Germany

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44 JW Cab Meeting 38#, 26 Nov 1918, CAB23/42/41; JW Cab Meeting 38#, 26 Nov 1918, EA11/5; SSCols to GGNZ, 27 Nov 1918, G48/20.

45 SSCols to GGNZ, 27 Nov 1918, G48/20/P/3. Long did qualify himself. He felt 'that it is quite impossible for me to carry the matter further in the present condition of affairs here'. But he thought 'that the assurances already given should satisfy both Ministers'.

46 NZPD, v. 183, 28 Nov 1918, p. 538. Also see ODT, 29 Nov 1918, p. 4.

47 ODT, 11 Dec 1918, p. 6. Massey told a group of reporters that it was the duty of those at the coming conference to see that there was no possibility of such a condition of affairs again arising as had been seen under Germanism. Those responsible for war crimes must be made to pay the penalty.

48 AWN, 31 Oct 1918, p. 43. The editor argued that 'Wilhelm the super-criminal cannot purchase with his crown the goodwill of the world... he must pay the full penalty for his crimes... Justice demands that he suffer, and the highest prudence urges that no false sentiment be allowed to minimise the punishment'
should be commensurate with its crime. He wanted to impose a 'Carthaginian peace' that would cripple Germany's capacity of military revival. Massey was singularly focused on the future security of New Zealand and sought a peace settlement that would eliminate the German presence in the Pacific. Ever the supreme realist, Massey knew this depended not only on the destruction of German power in the Pacific but in Europe as well. At the same time, he recognised that New Zealand's peace aims would not be achieved without British support and the potential existed for the United States to frustrate his designs.

Massey predicted a 'serious alteration' of the world map would occur at the peace conference. He speculated that France would retain Alsace-Lorraine and that a new Slavic state would be created in the Balkans. Massey saw this last arrangement as an essential 'block' to German expansionist tendencies of building an Empire from 'Berlin to Baghdad'. Massey wanted the German Empire crushed and he did not favour the return of East African colonies, as it would endanger the vital trade route of the British Empire, the Suez Canal. He deemed Nauru vital to New Zealand's interests as a source to 'procure fertilizers cheaply'. Japan had 'played the game' and he stated that New Zealand would 'do the right thing so far as that country is concerned'. He was not, however, prepared to accept any peace detrimental to the interests of the British Dominions. Massey declared that: 'We are going to retain the right to manage our own affairs'.

In terms of indemnities, Massey wanted to extract a share for New Zealand 'in proportion to her population and her expenditure on the war'. He did not share American concerns about the instability of Germany's economy. In his view, Germany as an 'exceedingly wealthy country ... with immense deposits of raw materials' could meet the reparation payments. His final hope for a lasting peace lay in the destruction of the German Navy. Massey even hoped that New Zealand might be able to claim 'a handy little cruiser or two ... for policing the South Pacific'. He vehemently stated that: 'The power of Germany has got to be broken now - and broken effectually - so that she will not again become dangerous for a century, or perhaps centuries, to come'.

49 On three previous occasions Massey used this phrase to describe Japan's war effort. For example see NZPD, v. 183, 1 Nov 1918, p. 171; 'Minutes of the Sub-Committee of the Imperial War Cabinet on Territorial Desiderata in the Terms of Peace 1917; Meeting 16, 17 Apr 1917, FM14/34; D. H. Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris with Documents, Volume XX. New York, 1926, pp. 313-7.

50 NZPD, v. 183, 28 Nov 1918, pp. 537-40. Also see NZH, 7 Dec 1918, p. 3. Under the heading 'Germany Should Pay', the editor stated; 'The almost universal feeling throughout New Zealand that Germany should be made to pay the costs of the war in now becoming articulate'. The Chairman of the
Mr. Keith Murdoch, writing on January 22, says: "Immediately on their arrival here the New Zealand delegates took up a vigorous crusade for increased representation. Mr. Massey points out that the understanding Britain made prior to his departure for New Zealand clearly provided for dual representation. Sir Joseph Ward strongly criticises the decision of the Conference. . . . Sir Joseph Ward is thoroughly dissatisfied, and his present inclination seems to be to go home."
The Parliamentary session, the first to be held in the new buildings, lasted for another eleven days. On 9 December Massey and Ward gave their valedictory speeches. Massey considered it a 'great honour and privilege to represent this grand little country of New Zealand' at the Peace Conference. He felt it was their duty at the Paris Peace Conference 'to make it impossible, at all events for a very long time to come, for any ambitious, unscrupulous nation such as Germany was to again plunge the world into war'. He thanked the House for its patience and support. Massey guessed that the New Zealand delegation would be away for six months.\(^5\)

For the first time, Ward turned his attention and thoughts to the approaching Peace Conference. He echoed Massey's sentiments that 'tremendous responsibilities' rested on their shoulders for the 'present mission'. He was 'not egotistical enough to believe' that their presence was 'a real necessity'.\(^5\) Rather, it was their duty to 'cement the bond of Empire ... to make it a stronger and more powerful Empire to ... withstand an even stronger and more powerful aggressor' in the future. In memory of the fallen, Ward wanted to exact revenge for their relatives. He wanted those responsible for the 'wholesale butchery and murder' to be punished. As Minister of Finance, Ward argued that hefty reparations were the best method to mete out this punishment. He ignored critics like Lloyd George who argued that large reparations would bankrupt the countries who were forced to pay.\(^5\) Under Ward's scheme, Germany and Austria would have to pay 5 per cent of the Allies total war cost a year until it was paid off. In his estimate, this amounted to £1.25 billion per annum for the next twenty years.\(^5\) Ward denied that his peace was vindictive. He based his conception of the peace
settlement on the logic that the 'loser always pays; and the loser in this war will be called upon to pay'. In contrast to Massey, Ward was an enthusiastic supporter of Wilson's League of Nations. There were shades of Wilson's 'new diplomacy' to Ward's thinking on a new liberal world order. He viewed the creation of a new international organisation as a 'necessary for the protection of humanity, in order to prevent those horrible wars on such a gigantic scale ever taking place in the years to come'. Ward saw optimistically the creation of a League of Nations as a 'great thing' for the future of the world.56

Much to the disappointment of the British Government, the New Zealand delegation did not board the steamer Remuera until 11 December.57 The party of nine consisted of Massey, his wife and daughter, and his private secretary. Ward's wife, son and his private secretary were also on board. Massey asked Press Gallery journalist, Robert Riley, to accompany the delegation to maximize publicity for the trip.58 The rumoured military attache never eventuated and New Zealand's most informed external policy adviser, the Minister of Defence, Sir James Allen, for the third and last time became the Acting Prime Minister.59 Shortly before Remuera left

56 NZPD, v. 183, 9 Dec 1918, pp. 1036-41.
57 GGNZ to SSCols, 11 Dec 1918, WRO947/615/108. Long Papers: Long to Liverpool, 3 Jan 1919, WRO947/615/102. Long Papers. Long was ‘very sorry’ that Massey and Ward did not leave earlier but he did not think that any harm had been done yet. New Zealand press opinion over the importance of Massey and Ward’s attendance was extremely divided. For example, see OW, 11 Dec 1918, p. 36. The departure of the Remuera was delayed twice due the proceedings of Parliament. The editor thought it was a ludicrous situation that two New Zealand Ministers had to attend the Peace Conference. According to the editor: ‘An arrangement where by either he or Sir Joseph Ward had represented the Dominion at Peace Conference while the other looked after domestic legislation would have straightened out a difficulty created solely by the extraordinary suspicion with which the leaders of the National Government regard each other, resulting in the farcical determination not to lose sight of one another no matter what the consequence’. Also see MW, 4 Dec 1918, p. 4. The Maoriland Worker could not understand why Mackenzie could not represent New Zealand at the Peace Conference. They felt that it was ‘an expensive and quite unnecessary picnic trip’. For a contrasting view, see Press, 13 Dec 1918, p. 4. The editor had ‘no doubt that New Zealand will be worthily represented, and our interests will be carefully guarded, consistently with a due regard for the interests of the Empire as a whole’.
58 GGNZ to SSCols, 12 Dec 1918, G48/20/P/3; ODT, 12 Dec 1918, p. 5. Also see EP, 17 Jul 1947, p. 6. According to his obituary, Robert Riley came to New Zealand from Scotland in 1901 at the age of 19 and after working at various labouring jobs, he joined the staff of the Dunedin Star, where he came into prominence as a leader writer. He was also in the Parliament Press Gallery for the Dunedin Star and was chairman of the Gallery in 1916. He also worked for The Press, the Christchurch Sun, the New Zealand Herald, Auckland Sun and The Dominion. After World War II he worked in Australia for The Sydney Sunday Times. After working for Massey, he moved to Australia where he was pressman on the staff of Hughes. He also worked for Prime Ministers Michael J. Savage and Peter Fraser and he was on the latter’s staff at the time of his death. At his funeral on the 19 July Peter Fraser was in attendance along with numerous other MPs and other Parliamentary Staff including A. D. McIntosh. The pallbearers included McIntosh and his son-in-law S. H. Barnett. According to The Evening Post obituary: ‘As a conversationalist and raconteur he excelled and his anecdotes and memories of people and events were vastly entertaining. He was ever frank and outspoken in his opinions, without fear of favour, sometimes to his own disadvantage.’
59 ODT, 9 Dec 1918, p. 4. It was rumoured that Major-General Sir Alfred Robin would accompany them to the Peace Conference.
the safety of Wellington harbour in the early hours of 12 December, Massey spoke these words:

On our departure to represent New Zealand at the great congress shortly to be held in Europe, I desire to wish my fellow citizens a merry Christmas and a bright and prosperous New Year. Let us hope that when peace is finally and definitely arranged it will be worthy of all it has cost in the lives of our brave men and the sacrifices that have been made by our citizens. Kia ora to all.  

By all accounts, the New Zealand ministers had an 'interesting journey' to Great Britain. In Colon near the Panama Canal, the HMS Ophir had been arranged to take them quickly to Plymouth. After a rough crossing of the Atlantic Ocean, the New Zealand delegation arrived in London on 19 January. As they stepped on to the platform at Paddington Station they were greeted once again by a guard of honour and a 'crack brass band'. Amongst the notable dignitaries, were two New Zealand Prime Ministers, one past and one future, in the form of High Commissioner Sir Thomas Mackenzie and Lieutenant Joseph Gordon Coates. Men from the Mounted New Zealand Artillery unit escorted the motor cascade to the Savoy Hotel.  

During the five-week voyage, Massey and Ward were completely cut off from events in London and Paris. As a result, they missed the crucial meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet held on 31 December where Hughes and Borden successfully argued for separate Dominion representation at the Peace Conference. The Imperial War Cabinet decided that the Dominions should be 'on an equal footing' with Belgium, and that a rotating Dominion panel system should be formed on which the British delegation might draw as appropriate. On 13 January, at a meeting of the Council of Ten, Lloyd George accepted Wilson's proposal that Australia, Canada and South Africa would have two delegates and New Zealand only one. Largely thanks to the efforts of Hughes, Borden and Smuts, the Dominions had secured 'a double status'. Not only were Dominions separately represented as small powers; their
representatives could also serve as alternate members of the BED. Through this body,
which met daily, the Dominions 'were not only kept in touch with all the various
committees and commissions on which one or another served, but were able also to
bring their influence directly to bear . . . on the Great Powers'.65 On 18 January the
French President, Georges Clemenceau, incorporated this arrangement into the rules
of the conference at the first Plenary Session.66

When Massey and Ward first heard the news they felt betrayed as it discredited
earlier British assurances. Ward talked openly of returning home and Massey
described the decision as 'a sort of slap in the face'.67 There was now a serious breach
of trust in British-New Zealand relations. The New Zealanders put on a brave face
and refrained from criticising the British Government until they had consulted with
the proper authorities.68 Long, who was preparing to leave the Colonial Office for the
Admiralty, had already anticipated New Zealand's discontent. In the absence of the
new Colonial Secretary, Lord Milner, Long initiated a War Cabinet response to the
Conference's decision.69 While this task was superfluous to his new duties as First
Lord of the Admiralty, he probably felt guilty that his earlier personal assurances had
fallen through and Massey appreciated his efforts.70 In light of New Zealand's
'splendid' war effort and the fact that her white population was equal to South
Africa's, the War Cabinet 'regretted' the Conference's solitary allocation to New
Zealand. The War Cabinet felt 'it a pity to risk serious dissatisfaction for the sake of a

66 Peace Conference Protocol 1#, 18 Jan 1919, FO/608/156/511/1/5; FRUS: PPC, v. 3, pp. 531-3
and pp. 539-41; SScols to GGZNZ, 16 Jan 1919, G44/1; SScols to GGZNZ, 21 Jan 1919, G41/42. Also
132-3; Fitzhardinge, 'Hughes, Borden, and Dominion Representation at the Paris Peace Conference',
67 NZH, 30 Jan 1919, p. 5; NZT, 8 Feb 1919, p. 1; Massey to Allen, 13 Feb 1919, Box 9a, Allen
Papers; Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward, p. 242; P. S. O'Connor, 'Some Political Preoccupations of Mr
to the British press see ODT, 21 Jan 1919, p. 5; ODT, 23 Jan 1919, p. 5; ST, 20 Jan 1919, p. 5. Also
see Lord Hankey, The Supreme Control At the Paris Peace Conference 1919: A Commentary, London,
1947, pp. 36-7. Hankey believed that with a General Election due in New Zealand there had been 'a
gentleman's agreement' between Massey and Ward that they should have equal status at the
Conference. To date, this author has found no archival evidence to verify Hankey's claim. New
Zealand press reaction was mixed to the news that New Zealand would only have one delegate. For
example see ST, 20 Jan 1919, p. 5; AWN, 23 Jan 1919, p. 43; ODT, 24 Jan 1919, p. 5.
68 ODT, 21 Jan 1919, p. 5.
69 Hughes to Long, 11 Jan 1919, ADD62424/11-12, Long Papers; 'Sworn in as First Lord of the
70 Massey to Long, 27 Jan 1919, WRO947/573/85g, Long Papers. Massey thanked Long for his
'splendid work' as Colonial Secretary. Also see Long to Massey, 30 Jun 1919, WRO947/573/85, Long
Papers.
single member'. One member of Cabinet, who was leaving for Paris, even promised to undertake personal representations on this point to Lloyd George.71

On 21 January Massey and Ward left for Paris confident that a solution would be found. Before their departure, Massey down played his disappointment with the British Government stating that 'the trouble is with certain of the Allies, who reckon each dominion representative as one additional vote for Britain'.72 Clearly the two New Zealanders were blaming the United States and France for the decision.73 Later that night they arrived in Paris, settling themselves into the luxurious Hotel Majestic. Massey's first priority was to confer with Lloyd George as Ward was making noises that he would have to go home.74 For the first time, Massey saw that public loyalty and silence did not pay off and the decision provoked a critical public outburst. Massey insinuated that Great Britain had ignored the interests of New Zealand. He stated that 'New Zealand looks a small country from here, but on the basis of sacrifices, she is more entitled to two representatives than certain other nations'.75 He had a point. New Zealand's war effort had demanded a considerable investment of manpower and resources. During the First World War, New Zealand had mobilised 124,211 men, which represented about 20 per cent of the male population. This was highest figure for any of the Dominions involved in the First World War - a fact recognised by Lloyd George himself in his War Memoirs.76

Under these circumstances, Massey believed that New Zealand had a legitimate grievance. While the overtly critical Australia received two representatives, New Zealand received only one. Massey embarked on a three-pronged offensive to win dual representation for New Zealand. First, he decided to support the call for separate Dominion representation on the League of Nations, questioning the right of Great Britain to control foreign policy for the British Empire in the process. Massey

71 WCab Meeting 516#, 15 Jan 1919, CAB23/9/13; Acting War Cabinet Secretary to Hankey [Paris], 15 Jan 1919, CAB23/9/14; Acting Secretary War Cabinet to Secretary British War Cabinet, 15 Jan 1919, F/23/4/3, Lloyd George Papers.
72 ODT, 24 Jan 1919, p. 5; Godley to Allen, 21 Jan 1919, WA252/5, Godley Papers.
73 See Fitzhardinge, 'W. M. Hughes and the Treaty of Versailles, 1919', JCP5, v. 5, 2 (July 1967), pp. 132-3. According to Fitzhardinge, Wilson feared a Dominion 'block' at the Peace Conference. Also see Hancock, Smuts, p. 497. Hancock considered France the 'main obstacle' to Dominion representation at the Peace Conference.
75 ST, 25 Jan 1919, p. 5.
declared that if the other Dominions asked for representation on the League of Nations, he would demand the same for New Zealand. Second, he made the debate for an extra New Zealand peace delegate a public issue. Massey staked New Zealand's claim for two delegates upon the country's war effort and sacrifices. Lloyd George was 'sympathetic' but pointed out that his hands were tied by the Conference decision and he feigned regret that he was unable to secure dual representation for New Zealand. Thirdly, and most importantly, Massey indicated that he would risk the harmony of Anglo-American relations by pressing annexationist claims for the German colonies. He told the press that New Zealand's would never compromise on its peace motto: "Never again; no more Germans in the Pacific."79

Press reaction in New Zealand generally disapproved of Massey's behaviour. The editor of *The Press* did not consider the number of delegates of 'vital interest to New Zealand as it would not adjust the nation's voting power at the Conference'. The editor felt that 'the struggle to get a second representative included is merely placing New Zealand in a somewhat undignified position'.80 *The Otago Witness* felt that he had an exaggerated sense of his own self-importance.81 The editor of *The New Zealand Herald* saw further protest as 'useless' and believed that 'there will be general relief in the Dominion if Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward now allow the matter to drop'.82

Massey and Ward ignored this advice. On 23 January they forced the issue on to the agenda of the Imperial War Cabinet, now designated the B/D. After the formal welcoming, a long debate ensued. Initially the New Zealand pair pressed for the same arrangement as the other three Dominions. Massey argued that in view of New Zealand's enormous sacrifices one representative was deeply insulting and 'unsatisfactory'. He was clearly annoyed 'that for the first time, and on debatable grounds, South Africa had been given precedence over New Zealand'. Massey considered that South Africa 'had done little or nothing for the Allies' cause' in the war and he could not see the logic in giving them greater representation.83 The British Government could extricate itself by persuading the Conference to change its mind. Lloyd George lent a sympathetic ear to Massey's argument and blamed Wilson for New Zealand's misery. However, he told the meeting that there was absolutely no chance of the decision being reversed. In what appeared to be a conciliatory gesture

79 ODT, 23 Jan 1919, p. 5.
80 Press, 29 Jan 1919, p. 6.
81 OW, 29 Jan 1919, p. 35.
82 NZH, 30 Jan 1919, p. 6.
83 ODT, 3 Feb 1919, p. 5.
Lloyd George stated that there would be opportunities for New Zealand to be represented on the delegation panel of five representatives of the British Empire.\textsuperscript{84}

Ward interjected, saying that he could not defend a decision to remain in Paris and he would be obliged to go home. Lloyd George promised to take Ward's comments into account but the best he could offer was an occasional place on the five-member British Empire contingent.\textsuperscript{85} After much negotiation and contemplation, Ward finally accepted the offer. As a concession to New Zealand, Massey's private secretary became part of the BED Secretariat and it was officially announced to the press that Sir Joseph Ward 'was appointed a member of the British Empire Delegation on every possible occasion', enabling him to attend its regular meetings twice a week.\textsuperscript{86} The King issued a warrant affording Ward 'the full powers' of a British plenipotentiary.\textsuperscript{87} To console him further, the BED nominated Ward to be the first Dominion representative to attend a plenary session as a British delegate.\textsuperscript{88}

The New Zealanders learnt a harsh lesson from the controversy. Their absence from the Imperial War Cabinet had been a telling factor and British statesmen could not be trusted to speak for New Zealand. Massey and Ward felt they had been badly let down and they were highly critical of the British failure to secure dual representation for New Zealand. 'Naturally we are disappointed', Massey wrote to

\textsuperscript{84} 'Peace Conference Regulations', 16 Jan 1919, FO608/161/515/1/1; 'Peace Conference Protocol 1#', 18 Jan 1919, FO/608/156/511/1/5. Lloyd George had given up nothing. Under the protocols established by the Peace Conference in the opening meeting, New Zealand was already entitled to have representation on the British Empire by means of the panel system.

\textsuperscript{85} BED Meeting 3#, 23 Jan 1919, in M. Dockrill, (ed.), \textit{British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print: Part II: From the First to the Second World War: Series I: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919: Volume 3: Supreme Council Minutes, March - July 1919; British Empire Delegation Minutes, January - March 1919}, Frederick, 1989, p. 333. Also see BED Meeting 3#, 23 Jan 1919, CP351/1/4/7, Garran Papers. A brief précis of this meeting can be found in MS762/1, Cook Papers. Massey and Ward only missed two meetings of the BED. However, they crucially missed fifteen meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet held between 1 October 1918 to 31 December 1918; 'List of Secretaries of the Various Sections of the British Delegation, 28 Jan 1919, CAB21/143/16. The Prime Minister of Newfoundland, Sir William F. Lloyd, was also included on the rotating BED panel.

\textsuperscript{86} ODT, 31 Jan 1919, p. 5. Also see Hankey, \textit{The Supreme Control At the Paris Peace Conference 1919}, p. 36. Hankey saw the Ward arrangement as an inconvenience to the BED. Also see 'Peace Conference Provisional Organisation for the Relations of the British Secretariat, the British Empire Delegation and Departmental Missions', by M. P. A. Hankey, 22 Jan 1919, FO608/162/515/1/5. Thomson and the other Dominion secretaries were asked to form a panel to assist the Secretary of the BED, Captain Clement Jones Massey's press secretary, Robert Riley, became New Zealand's designated 'Political and Diplomatic' technical expert. See \textit{FRUS: PPC}, v. 3, p. 13; Massey to Allen, 26 Apr 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers.

\textsuperscript{87} Ward to Balfour, 11 Apr 1919, FO608/162/515/1/12; Balfour to Ward, 19 Apr 1919, ADD. MS. 49697/81, Balfour Papers.

\textsuperscript{88} 'Preliminary Peace Conference Protocol 2#', 25 Jan 1919, FO608/156/511/1/5; ST, 27 Jan 1919, p. 5; \textit{ODT}, 27 Jan 1919, p. 5; \textit{NZH}, 30 Jan 1919, p. 6. The editor wrote that if Ward 'is not required in Paris he will find plenty of urgent business in New Zealand to engage his attention till Parliament meets'.
'At a meeting of the Liberal Party held last week, with the approval of Sir Joseph Ward, it was unanimously resolved that the Liberal Party will contest the next general election separate and apart from the Reform Party, with a definite progressive and radical policy.

JOE KNOWS OF A BETTER 'OLE

JOE: "The blinding war's over now, Bill, so I'm goin' to leave you."

OL' BILL: "Well, if you knows of a better 'ole, Go to it!"
Allen, 'at the action of the Conference in giving only one representative to New Zealand'. His only solace was from the fact that Ward would attend all the meetings of the BED. Massey figured that 'it really doesn't matter and I do not think that the Dominion will suffer in the slightest'. In fact, he was more concerned with the impression left by the newspaper reports on the New Zealand public of the representation wrangle. Conscious of public opinion, Massey asked Riley to issue a press statement for New Zealand circulation explaining his decision to criticise and 'lecture' the British Government.

The fight for dual New Zealand representation left an indelible mark on Massey. Quickly he realised that at the Peace Conference only Ward and himself could speak assuredly for New Zealand's interests. He could not assume that Great Britain would always defend or promote policies which best suited New Zealand. In Paris, Massey knew he would have to employ the most effective political and diplomatic means to achieve his goals of punishing Germany and rewarding New Zealand, even if this meant angering the most powerful nations at the Peace Conference. In three crucial areas, he would assert a distinctive New Zealand voice: first, over the fate of the German Samoa; second, over the final disposal of phosphate resources of Nauru; and third, over the severity of reparations.

The fate of the German colonies in the Pacific presented Massey and Ward with a vexatious problem: whether they should be returned to Germany, and if not, who should get them and under what terms. Massey and Ward had argued consistently for the retention of the German colonies, especially Samoa. As a member of the Curzon Committee, Massey argued that they should be retained to prevent future naval danger from Germany and he did not want the colonies to be used as a negotiating tool. After much hesitation, British policy finally accepted that Germany should forfeit its colonies in any settlement. The decisive military victory on the Western Front had made this possible. In a private letter to Liverpool in early November, Long admitted that British opinion had 'undergone a vast change in the course of the last few weeks. . . It is now quite definitely held that, whatever happens, these Colonies can never be returned to Germany . . . they should remain with us'. In late December, Lloyd

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89 Massey to Allen, 13 Feb 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers; Massey to Allen, 26 Apr 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers.
90 Massey to Allen, 23 Jan 1919, G46/3. Massey made arrangements with Allen to have Riley's statement distributed to the press. For the precise text of Riley's press release see ODT, 3 Feb 1919, p. 5.
91 Long to Balfour, 8 Jan 1919, FO800/207/3; Long to Balfour, 8 Jan 1919, WRO947/532/8a, Long Papers.
92 Long to Liverpool, 7 Nov 1918, WRO947/615/95, Long Papers; SSCols to GGNZ, 30 Oct 1918, G2/47. Liverpool was informed that the British War Cabinet had agreed that the 'former Colonial
George reiterated this pledge to the Dominions in the Imperial War Cabinet: 'One thing was quite certain', he stated, 'that none of Germany's colonies would be returned to her'.

By the start of the Peace Conference it was generally agreed within British circles that returning the colonies would be unthinkable. The last Liberal Colonial Secretary, Lewis Harcourt, believed that in any 'ultimate settlement ... Samoa should pass to New Zealand'. Four days before the German Armistice was signed, Long told Liverpool that the German Colonies 'must remain with those who by their sacrifice and volour [sic] have won them'. On 19 December Hankey wrote to Lloyd George, informing him that: The British Government have agreed that those north of the Equator should fall to Japan. It is generally agreed that those south of the Equator should fall to Australia and New Zealand. The following day at the forty-fourth meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, Lloyd George felt that it was certain 'that those colonies which had been captured by Dominion troops must be retained by the Dominions concerned, such as the Pacific colonies south of the Equator, and German South-West Africa'. But he maintained that the principle of self-determination should be applied to the indigenous inhabitants of the colonies.

On the second issue Massey and Ward agreed that Samoa should remain in British hands. Whether this equated to direct administration by Great Britain or New Zealand is still open to debate. The evidence is somewhat contradictory and historians cannot seem to agree. At least two prominent historians argue that New Zealand was reluctant to assume the burden of administering Samoa. Pfeiffer argues that Massey only considered making Samoa part of New Zealand when he was told by Long in November 1918 that he would have to present New Zealand's case for Samoa at the possessions of Germany, lost by her in consequence of her illegal aggression against Belgium, shall in no case be returned to Germany'.

93 IW Cab Meeting 44#, 20 Dec 1918, EA11/5. Also see IW Cab Meeting 43#, 18 Dec 1918, EA11/5. With the prospect of Wilson's visit to London in late December, Lloyd George reiterated to the Cabinet that it was British policy that the German colonies should not be returned. Also see Hankey to Lloyd George, 18 November 1918, F/23/3/17, Lloyd George Papers. In Lloyd George's absence, the British Cabinet came to an agreement of the disposal of the German Colonies. Also see 'Preliminary Draft of Conclusions of the Imperial War Cabinet', 21 Dec 1918, F/23/3/31, Lloyd George Papers.

94 Harcourt to Liverpool, 21 Apr 1915, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/329, Harcourt Papers. Harcourt also felt that the other German possessions South of the Equator should pass to Australia and the German Islands North of the Equator should go to Japan. Also see 'Memorandum for Cabinet: The Spoils', 25 Mar 1915, MS. Harcourt dep. 468/266, Harcourt Papers.

95 Long to Liverpool, 7 Nov 1918, WRO947/615/95, Long Papers.

96 Hankey to Lloyd George, 19 Dec 1918, F/23/3/30, Lloyd George Papers.

97 IW Cab Meeting 44#, 20 Dec 1918, EA11/5.

98 WCab 459# (IW Cab Meeting 32#), 15 Aug 1918, EA11/5; GGNZ to SSCols, 16 Nov 1919, G41/40. Liverpool felt that the Samoans did not really understand what the Allies were fighting for.
peace conference. According to Pfeiffer: 'This was precisely what the New Zealand Government had avoided doing since taking the islands in 1914'.

New Zealand historian Barrie Macdonald has argued that Massey had little choice but to accept responsibility for Samoa on a permanent basis. The Colonial Office assumed that since Great Britain did not want to administer Samoa, Massey would want Samoa to be under direct New Zealand administration. Macdonald has even suggested that Massey selfishly 'adopted an expansionist stance on Western Samoa in order to strengthen his claim to Nauru'. Massey conceded New Zealand control of Samoa as an added inducement to secure British support for the disposal of Nauru's valuable phosphate minerals. Macdonald has pointed out that the close conjunction of decisions makes such a thesis not unreasonable. While Macdonald has no evidence to validate his assertion, Massey's intense ambition for the phosphate resources of Nauru for his predominantly farming constituency is undeniable. This explanation would also be logical given Massey's traditional criticism of Seddon's imperialism and colonial ambitions.

Yet there is some evidence to show that the New Zealand always coveted annexing Samoa. With some credibility, it could be argued that the New Zealand Government only avoided making direct references to annex German Samoa to placate British Liberal misgivings over territorial acquisitions. Harcourt's initial instructions made it clear that Samoa had been captured on 'a great and urgent Imperial Service'. As early as 1915, Liverpool advised the Colonial Office that if Samoa passed to New Zealand, 'I know such a view would be in accordance with the aspirations of this Dominion'. Australian authorities believed that Massey would seek Samoa's incorporation into New Zealand's Pacific sphere of influence. In August 1916, the

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99 SSCols to GGNZ, 24 Nov 1918, G43/2.
102 NZPD, v. 184, 2 Sep 1919, p. 46.
103 SSCols to GovNZ, 7 Aug 1914, G41/1; Liverpool to Harcourt, 25 Apr 1916, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/367, Harcourt Papers. Liverpool promised Harcourt that Massey and Ward would never discuss Samoa with newspaper reporters or do 'anything in public' to harass the British Government. Also see FRUS: PPC, v. 3, p. 722. Smuts employed this excuse in the Council of Ten stating that: 'The reason why [German] South-West Africa had not been annexed to the Union was the dilatoriness of the Imperial Government'.
104 Liverpool to Bonar Law, 11 Jun 1915, Item 21/1, Davidson Papers.
105 Munro-Ferguson to Long, undated draft personal cable, MS1538/16/1671a, Hughes Papers.
CID recognised that New Zealand attached 'a high sentimental value to this first conquest of a young people' because it represented a 'valuable buffer zone between the mainland and possible Japanese encroachment'. The New Zealand Government also began declaring its interest in keeping German Samoa. In 1917 Massey announced that: 'New Zealand holds Samoa, and means to retain it'.

New Zealand claimed that the German surrender technically meant that Samoa could not be returned. New Zealand troops were in occupation of Samoa and a New Zealand officer, Colonel Robert Logan, at considerable financial expense to the Dominion, controlled the island for the duration of the war. The New Zealand Government considered that at any peace conference it would be 'unable to consent to the restoration to Germany' of Samoa. In its opinion, to do so would be to establish a constant menace to peace and trade in the Pacific which would involve future unnecessary sacrifices by our people; nor can we Britishers in New Zealand abandon the Native population of Samoa for by descent and language they are intimately associated with our Maori brethren.

In the final analysis, Massey and Ward probably did not care who controlled Samoa so long as it was not Germany. In fact, British control of Samoa had significant financial and strategic advantages for New Zealand. Not only would it ensure the elimination of the German naval threat, New Zealand would avoid the direct monetary costs of administering an island of little economic value. As a result, Massey kept his options open. Just prior to his departure for the Paris, he was asked in Parliament whether the New Zealand delegation favoured control of Samoa by Great Britain or New Zealand. He replied that it was not possible to say what the attitude of the New Zealand delegation would be until the question came up for discussion at the Peace Conference.

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106 WCP 64#, ‘General Staff Memorandum Submitted in Accordance with the Prime Minister's Instructions, CID Nov 1916: War Committee Conclusion No. 1, 30 Aug 1916’, PM14/1.
108 See 'Statement Showing the Whole of the Cost to New Zealand of the Military Occupation of Samoa', AJHR, 1916, v. 1, B.-21, p. 1; GGNZ to SSCols, 13 Dec 1918, G41/41. The New Zealand Government estimated that the cost of occupying Samoa at £4,200 per month.
109 GovNZ to SSCols, 12 Jun 1917, G41/28.
110 Gustafson, Massey, William Ferguson 1856-1925, Farmer, Politician, Prime Minister, in Orange, (ed.), The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, p. 317. It is interesting to note Massey’s opposition to the Liberal Government’s plans in the late 1890s to annex the Cook Islands and Niue. Massey argued that the Cook Islands and Niue would be a considerable drain on the New Zealand taxpayer. Also see NZPD, v. 119, 9 Oct 1901, p. 298.
111 NZPD, v. 183, 24 Oct 1918- 10 Dec 1918, addendum, p. 1117. Also see Liverpool to Bonar Law, 28 Jan 1916, Item 21/24, Davidson Papers. Liverpool wrote: In my opinion, there is in this country a great tendency to consider most things from an insular point of view and if I am right in this
The most prominent critic of New Zealand's colonial ability to administer Pacific territories, Lord Liverpool, did not share Massey's indifference. After visiting the Cook Island dependencies in June 1914, Liverpool held no illusions about New Zealand's poor colonial record. He held deep reservations over New Zealand's ability to administer Samoa properly in the long term. 'I am not quite satisfied', he wrote to Bonar Law, 'that such an arrangement would be to the best advantage of the islanders unless there was a definite understanding that more was done for the Samoans than has been done for the inhabitants of the Cook Islands'. Liverpool was 'convinced' that there had been 'considerable neglect' in the islands due to New Zealand's poor administration and because Parliament had made them a 'political shuttlecock'.

Liverpool was 'convinced' that there had been 'considerable neglect' in the islands due to New Zealand's poor administration and because Parliament had made them a 'political shuttlecock'.

Little money had been spent on developing the social and economic infrastructure of the islands. As a result, he questioned whether New Zealand, being so far removed from Samoa, was in the best 'position to control in the most practical and effective way the administration' of the islands. Liverpool argued that if Lloyd George was serious about his concern for the indigenous inhabitants of the islands, Samoa should be made a Crown Colony administered by a British-appointed Lieutenant Governor.

On 4 December 1918 Liverpool sent a telegram to Long reiterating his opposition to New Zealand control of Samoa. New Zealand faced post-war problems of declining export receipts and demobilisation costs of repatriating returning soldiers. He feared that post-war budgetary restraints would leave Samoa lost and forgotten. He predicted that the New Zealand Labour Party would not cooperate in securing cheap labour for Samoa's economic development. Again he outlined New Zealand's poor track record in the Cook Islands, adding that his Dominion is 'hardly ready to possess detached dependencies of its own'. He recommended that the High Commissioner for the

 conjecture, the interests of outside Islands are likely to be regarded as of secondary importance. I do not think, therefore, that the interests of the inhabitants of the Samoan Group ought to be carefully considered before any definite decision is arrived at. At the same time I think it well to add that there would be most bitter resentment here if Samoa were handed over to any Power other than Great Britain, or given to Australia.'

Liverpool to Bonar Law, 11 Jun 1915, Item 21/1, Davidson Papers. Liverpool first used this expression in a private letter to Harcourt. See Liverpool to Harcourt, 23 Jan 1916, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/359, Harcourt Papers; Harcourt to Liverpool, 11 Mar 1916, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/365, Harcourt Papers. Harcourt agreed with Liverpool's assessment but he knew 'that New Zealand will insist on keeping her plum and that she would not tolerate administration of it by the Colonial Office and the High Commissioner for the Pacific'.

Liverpool to Bonar Law, 11 Jun 1915, Item 21/1, Davidson Papers; Liverpool to Harcourt, 23 Jan 1916, MS. Harcourt dep. 490/359, Harcourt Papers. Liverpool even felt that Samoa was better off under German rule.
Western Pacific in Fiji should administer Samoa and the Cook Islands. Liverpool reported that Massey 'did not share his views entirely'.

In the last months of 1918, the ravages of the influenza pandemic confirmed Liverpool's doubts over New Zealand's ability to manage Samoa. On 7 November New Zealand authorities, in a gross breach of quarantine procedures, allowed the island trader *Talune* from Auckland to berth at Apia. Within a few days of arrival, two of the ship's passengers had died and pneumonic influenza began to spread with startling rapidity, and with appalling results throughout the islands. The death toll was catastrophic. A commission of inquiry later estimated that 8,500 Samoans died, over a fifth of the population of Western Samoa. About two hundred local chiefs were so angered by Colonel Robert Logan's incompetence they petitioned Liverpool for his removal. They even asked 'that Samoan Government should ultimately come under Colonial Office and not under New Zealand'.

In a cruel twist of irony, the Americans proved themselves to be very capable colonial Administrators. Their effective quarantine measures prevented the spread of the influenza in American Samoa, completely contradicting Massey's fears over the ability of the United States to control Palestine.

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114 GGNZ to SSCols, 4 Dec 1918, G26/9. Also see Liverpool to Long, 7 Dec 1918, WRO947/615/108, Long Papers. Liverpool informed Long that Massey and his views over Samoa 'differ'. Liverpool did not want the future of Samoa decided 'without careful consideration of the whole Pacific question'. For an excellent discussion on New Zealand and the future of Samoa see Allen, 'New Zealand and the Imperial War Cabinet', pp. 96-125; Pfeiffer, 'Exercise in Loyalty and Troublemaking', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, v. 38, 2 (1992), p. 185. Also see NZPD, v. 185, 17 Oct 1919, p. 517. Liverpool's prediction concerning Labour's stance on the indentured labour question proved well-founded. Holland asked Parliament to reject the proposal to allow indentured labour in Samoa. According to Holland, 'however you camouflage it, indentured labour means slave labour'.

115 SSCols to GGNZ, 19 Dec 1918, G1/238; Administrator of Samoa to GGNZ, 2 Feb 1919, G41/42; SSCols to GGNZ, 2 Feb 1919, G44/1; Acting Administrator of Samoa to GGNZ, 20 Feb 1919, G41/43. In December it was reported by Colonel Robert Logan that there was 'unanimous' support for British rule amongst the chiefs. Six weeks later the chiefs presented a petition to Logan on 28 January, complaining that the epidemic was 'negligently introduced into Samoa'. Not only did they seek Logan's removal, they wanted New Zealand provision for the orphans. Ironically, on the same day a telegram arrived from the Colonial Office reporting Massey's speech to the Council of Ten (Supreme Council) of 28 January 1919 trumpeting the 'success of New Zealand in dealing with the Natives' in Samoa. On 20 February the petition was withdrawn. Also see GGAust to GGNZ, 21 Nov 1918, G5/96. New Zealand authorities in Samoa were so under-prepared and overwhelmed by the influenza epidemic they had to seek Australia's help for medical personnel and supplies. Also see NZPD, v. 185, 17 Oct 1919, p. 514. Allen denied Holland's accusation that Samoa was 'wholly anti New Zealand' as a consequence of the influenza epidemic. Also see Boyd, 'The Military Administration of Western Samoa, 1914-1919', *NZIH*, v. 2, 2 (October 1968), p. 161. According to Boyd, the petition also included a suggestion that Samoa could become part of American Samoa.

116 'Report of Samoan Epidemic Commission', *AJHR*, 1919, v. 2, H.-31C, pp. 1-12. Also see Rice, *Black November*, p. 12 and pp. 139-40. To New Zealand's shame, Western Samoa had the worst recorded death rate in the world of 190 deaths per thousand. Also see Allen to Massey, 1 Aug 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers. With the publication of the report Allen admitted 'that Logan's administration during the last twelve months has in all aspects been satisfactory. I think the climate must have affected him . . . with the result that he got into a nervous excitable condition which warped his judgment'. 
In the eyes of the NZLP the inept handling of the influenza epidemic crisis merely demonstrated that New Zealand colonial rule in Samoa was not guided by a 'humanitarian imperial ideology'.\footnote{117} Under the leadership of Harry Holland, the NZLP were committed to international socialist principles and British socialist doctrines for any peace settlement. In 1917 a committee, which laid down NZLP aspirations for the type of peace they envisaged, committed the party to a policy slogan of 'no annexations or no indemnities'. The NZLP predictably opposed any peace settlement that included a 'division of spoils', arguing that it would infringe the right of the Samoa people to self-determination and it would unduly burden the New Zealand taxpayer.\footnote{118} In January 1918 the NZLP reaffirmed its pledge to fight for the 'frank abandonment' of every form of imperialism and remained totally opposed to 'wars of aggrandisement'. In the NZLP view, 'the only basis for a satisfactory peace must be "no annexations and no indemnities"'. The NZLP supported international control of Germany's colonies under the watchful eye of the League of Nations or the application of self-determination. The NZLP called on every 'sane New Zealander . . . [to] . . . pause before associating himself with that small but very loudmouthed clamouring for the annexation of Samoa to this Dominion'.\footnote{119}

The NZLP had cleverly aligned itself with emerging international opinion over the future of the colonies. The horrors of the First World War were widely blamed on the rivalry of great powers and 'imperialism'. The idealism of Wilson's 'new diplomacy' expressed this belief by championing a just peace on the basis of self-determination for former enemy held colonial possessions. He argued that Turkish and German colonies should be administered as a 'sacred trust of civilizations' under the League of Nations. Wilson latched onto Smuts's mandatory idea, arguing 'that all conquered

\footnote{117} M. Boyd, 'Racial Attitudes of New Zealand Officials in Western Samoa', \textit{NZJH}, v. 21, 1 (April 1987), p. 139. Also see H. J. Hiery, \textit{The Neglected War: The German South Pacific and the Influence of World War I}, Honolulu, 1995, pp. xiii-xiv and p. 263. German scholar H. J. Hiery is particularly scathing about New Zealand's record in Samoa, claiming that 'New Zealand's policies in Samoa may appear theoretically more liberal than those of its German predecessor, but in practice they proved to be more authoritarian'. Hiery has argued that 'modern New Zealanders' cannot be blamed for what their great-grandfathers did in Samoa as it 'would be reminiscent of the kind of racism which claims that once a cannibal, always a cannibal'.

\footnote{118} See M. Boyd, 'The Record in Western Samoa to 1945', in A. Ross, (ed.), \textit{New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century}, Auckland, 1969, pp. 123-5; Snelling, 'Peacemaking, 1919', \textit{JICH}, v. 4, 1 (October 1975), p. 19; Brown, \textit{The Rise of New Zealand Labour}, p. 109. In 1917 the NZLP set up a committee to establish the party's peace policy. The committee confirmed Labour's commitment to the right of small nations to self-determination. Also see \textit{NZPD}, v. 183, 5 Nov 1918, pp. 190-5. The MP for Grey Lynn, Mr Payne, could not understand the British socialist doctrine of "No annexations ad no indemnities".

\footnote{119} \textit{MW}, 23 Jan 1918, p. 4; \textit{NZPD}, v. 184, 2 Sep 1919, p. 63; \textit{NZPD}, v. 185, 17 Oct 1919, p. 514. Initially, Holland thought that Samoa should have been placed under the direct control of the League of Nations. By October, Holland believed that Samoa was 'capable of governing itself in accordance with its own genius and in light of its own historical development'.
territories be placed under the League of Nations - even South-West Africa and the Pacific islands'. By the time he reached Paris, Wilson clearly favoured a disinterested colonial settlement by incorporating the mandate principle into his drafts of the League of Nations' Covenant.

On the eve of the Peace Conference, the position of the British Government on the future control of the German colonies remained somewhat of a paradox. While there was general consensus that the German colonies could not be returned, the method of control had not been decided. On the one hand, Lloyd George did not want to create 'a very bad impression if the British Empire came out of this war with a great acquisition of territory'. This meant British acceptance of a mandate system. On the other hand, British policy 'aimed at securing the Imperial lines of communication [which] meant the retention of as many German colonies as possible'. Conversely, this equalled British support for the Dominions' annexation demands in the Pacific and Africa. Lloyd George did not see any problem with this inconsistent policy. No other alternative or formula had yet presented itself to him that would allow Great Britain to maintain cordial Anglo-American relations and its close relationships with its Dominions. The British Government also attached great importance to the legitimacy of the peace conference and it did not want the peace talks to be seen as a mere 'land-grabbing' exercise. By advocating this policy, Lloyd George and his colleagues hoped to appease simultaneously Wilson's idealism and Russian demands for a "peace without annexations". At the same time, Lloyd George needed to protect British interests, maintain Dominion support for the peace process, and honour the secret obligations to Japan, France and Italy. All indications were, however, that Massey and Hughes were in danger of becoming completely out of touch with British and American idealistic opinion.

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120 Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919, p. 129.
122 IWCab, Meeting 44#, 20 Dec 1918, CAB23/42/68; IW Cab Meeting 44#, 20 Dec 1918, EA11/5.
124 IW Cab Meeting 44#, 20 Dec 1918, EA11/5. Hughes asked what policy the British were going to 'adhere to' in the peace discussions. Lloyd George agreed with Borden's policy that the British Empire had not entered the war for 'territorial aggrandisement'. Borden stated he would only support Australia and New Zealand's retention of the Pacific Islands if 'their acquisition was necessary for the future security of the Empire'. He supported Smuts's mandatory idea for the remaining colonies. Also see Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume II 1919-1931, pp. 37-8. Borden reluctantly accepted the desire of the three southern Dominions to annex the German territory in their possession. An excellent study of British-American relations at the Peace Conference over the future of the German colonies can be found in S. P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Princeton, 1961, pp. 90-100.
125 Hughes to Watt, 26 Jan 1919, CP360/8/1/3. Massey was not the only person out of touch with 'idealistic opinion'. On 25 January Hughes, Massey, Borden and Botha discussed the future of the German colonies. According to Hughes, Botha 'stated definitely that he would not accept the
On 24 January Lloyd George succeeded in placing the disposal of the German colonies on the agenda of the Supreme Council, popularly known as the Council of Ten. With very little discussion, all the major powers quickly agreed that the colonies would not be returned to Germany. Lloyd George then considered the three possible terms of control for the German colonies: internationalisation, control by the League of Nations and annexation. Lloyd George assumed that they all agreed the first proposal was impracticable. As to the second, he stated that Great Britain would be willing to administer and undertake the trusteeship of former enemy territories on behalf of the League of Nations. In terms of the colonies captured by the South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, he favoured 'frank annexation'. The British Prime Minister argued that Samoa 'would be best administered directly by New Zealand'.

Lloyd George pointed to New Zealand's considerable war effort where a small Dominion of 'a population of little more than one million souls' had incurred massive war debt and had suffered 60,000 casualties including 16,000 dead. He predicted that Samoa would not enjoy rapid development if the country given the task of administering the island was only given mandatory charge. On behalf of the southern Dominions, he then called on Hughes, Smuts and Massey to present their cases.126

Hughes argued that the islands claimed by his Dominion 'were as necessary to Australia as water to a city'. Smuts claimed that German territory in South-West Africa and South Africa were 'geographically one' and that the colony could only be developed 'from within the Union itself'. Massey then pleaded New Zealand's case for Samoa, resting his arguments on the island's strategic importance in the Pacific and New Zealand's war sacrifices.127 Using the example of the New Hebrides, Massey emphatically rejected the idea of 'joint control of native races' in regard to the German Colonies. He rested his case for Samoa on the plea 'that the island should be allowed to remain under British control'.128

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127 Hayes, 'British Foreign Policy and the Influence of Empire, 1870-1920', JICH, v. 12, 2 (January 1994), p. 114; Beloff, Imperial Sunset Volume I, p. 191. As Beloff has pointed out: 'it is not surprising that their leaders were unimpressed by American moralizing over the selfishness of their war aims'.

128 FRUS: PPC, v. 3, pp. 720-7. Also see SSCols to GGZN, 1 Feb 1919, G44/1. The National Cabinet received summaries of the proceedings from the Colonial Office. Also see Hankey, The Supreme Control, p. 57. Hankey described Massey's speech as a 'prophetic moment'. On the
Three days later Wilson clarified his position on the application of the mandatory principle. After listening to the Japanese claims for Shantung in China and the German islands north of the equator, Wilson argued that the mandatory power should 'not exercise arbitrary sovereignty over any people'. In a direct challenge to the British Dominion's Wilson stated that: 'The fundamental idea would be that the world was acting as trustee through a mandatory, and would be in charge of the whole administration until the day when the true wishes of the inhabitants could be ascertained'. Ominously Wilson felt that Australian claims were 'in the lap of the gods'. Hughes remained obstinate, insisting there 'was nothing to be gained by the mandatory system that could not be got by direct Government, except that the World was said to dread annexations'. Before Massey's views could be heard, Lloyd George intervened, asking for more time to investigate the concept of the mandatory system.

Later that evening the BED discussed Wilson's position. Balfour, who could not attend the meeting, submitted a memorandum stating that he was 'personally in favour of attempting the Mandatory system, but it is full of difficulties'. From an economic point of view, Massey opposed the very basis of the mandate system, saying that 'no country to which the mandatory principle was applied could be properly developed, owing to the difficulty of financing the necessary undertakings'. Massey had consistently maintained his hostile opposition to a form of control he considered no better than the Liberal Party's evil policy of leasehold. He believed the mandatory system would stifle the developmental initiatives so critical to Samoa's success. Australian and New Zealand objections produced the desired outcome and British policy remained committed to a dual course: that the mandatory system was acceptable in principle but that it should not apply to the colonies claimed by New Zealand, South Africa and Australia. Even at this stage, Lloyd George still hoped

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132 BED Meeting 4#, 27 Jan 1919, CP351/1/4/7, Garran Papers.

133 BED Meeting 4#, 27 Jan 1919, CAB29/28/1; Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919. p. 133.
that he would be able to bring together the diametrically opposed sides, appeasing American concerns without endangering imperial unity.\textsuperscript{134}

The following morning on 28 January Lloyd George opened the Council of Ten meeting, stating that 'he saw no insuperable difficulties in reconciling the views of Great Britain with those expressed by President Wilson'. He did feel, however, that the Dominions had a 'special case' and he hoped that Wilson would reconsider their views. Massey then gave what historian Roger Louis has described as 'a rambling defence of New Zealand's claims to Samoa'.\textsuperscript{135} Encouraged by Hughes's fire and brimstone, Massey delivered a bellicose speech.\textsuperscript{136} He began his denunciation of the mandatory principle by trying to discredit Wilson's 'toy' - Hughes description of the League of Nations - by comparing it to the historical failure known as the Holy Alliance.\textsuperscript{137} In Massey's view, Australia and New Zealand were 'in the same boat' and that 'Samoa was of vital importance to New Zealand'. He did not believe that the mandatory system would automatically lead to the 'betterment' of the indigenous inhabitants, arguing that in the Cook Islands New Zealand had achieved this end 'as well as any mandatory power was ever likely to do'. He then turned to the so-called excellent record the New Zealand Government had in administering the Cook Islands since 1901. Under New Zealand's guidance, the Cook Islands had made rapid progress developing its agriculture, education, and health systems. Massey claimed that New Zealand had implemented the same development policy in German Samoa since its occupation in late August 1914. He avoided mentioning the catastrophic effects of the influenza epidemic on the Samoan population. Massey even listed New Zealand's very own 'highly successful' race relations record with the Maori who 'were highly respected by the whites, and every trade and profession was open to them'. To emphasise how progressive and enlightened New Zealand society had become, he pointed out that one of his cabinet colleagues, Dr. Maui Pomare, was a Maori.\textsuperscript{138} Borden felt that Massey had made a 'good point (that Samoans and Maoris are of the same race) but he seemed hardly to understand the strength of his position'.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{134} Hughes to Watt, 29 Jan 1919, CP360/8/1/3; Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, p. 70.

\textsuperscript{135} Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919, p. 133.

\textsuperscript{136} Hankey, The Supreme Control At the Paris Peace Conference 1919, p. 59. Hankey considered Massey's speech just as strong and persuasive as those delivered by Hughes or Smuts.

\textsuperscript{137} IW Cab Meeting 47\#, 30 Dec 1918, EAII/5; Hughes to Ferguson, 17 Jan 1919, MS696/2756, Munro-Ferguson Papers.

\textsuperscript{138} FRUS:PPC, v. 3, pp. 749-52.

\textsuperscript{139} Borden, (ed.), Robert Laird Borden, v. 2, p. 906; P. H. Kerr to Milner, 31 Jan 1919, MS. Eng. hist. 700/193, Milner Papers. Lloyd George instructed his private secretary, P. H. Kerr, who was a member of the Round Table, to write to Milner. Lloyd George wanted Milner to know 'what really happened about the disposition of the ex-German Colonies at the Peace Conference because a great many misleading and mischievous statements have been published in the Press'. Kerr told Milner that 'Massey took the Hughes line only much more moderately and produced the strong additional
Massey continued his frontal assault on the mandatory system. Reminiscent of New Zealand land reform debate, Massey, the staunch freeholder - "every man his own landlord" - argued that the difference between the mandatory principle and the system instituted by New Zealand in its Pacific territories was between leasehold and freehold tenure. He argued that no individual would put the same energy into a leasehold as into a freehold property, and so with governments. If improvements had to be made in accordance with the terms of the mandate, these had to be financed, but who would be prepared to do so without a guarantee of tenure? In his opinion, the mandate system was revocable in theory as well as in practice because the mandatory power would exercise only temporary control and would, like an agricultural tenant, exhibit very little interest in long-term improvement of the economic potential. Massey rejected his views belonged to the 'divisions of spoils' attitude given Samoa's relative lack of economic importance and the £100 million war debt New Zealand had incurred. He then asked Wilson to recall the period immediately after the American War of Independence. He wondered: 'What would Washington have done had it been suggested to him that a mandatory power . . . should be given charge of the vast territories in North America not at that time colonised?' Massey was convinced that the American settlers would have 'protested' at such an offer, just as New Zealand was doing.

argument that New Zealand contained a large native population which was represented in Parliament, that the inhabitants of Samoa were the same race and that it was therefore right and natural that Samoa and the islands should form part of the New Zealand Dominion'. Also see J. R. M. Butler, Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 1882-1940, London, 1960, p. 74. Also see Long to Massey, 30 Jan 1919, WRO947/573/85g, Long Papers. Long viewed Massey's speech with 'great admiration and . . . complete agreement. He confessed to Massey that he never believed in the mandatory principle and he did not think that it would succeed. Also see NZPD, v. 184, 2 Sep 1919, p. 46. Even Massey himself was 'very much surprised' to find out that the members of the Council thought that this was one of his 'strongest arguments' for New Zealand control of Samoa.


141 The freehold versus leasehold metaphor used by Massey was remarkably similar to that used by Balfour in his opposition to the mandatory principle in the British Cabinet's 'Eastern Committee' held in December 1918. See Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919, p. 128.

142 FRUS:PPC, v. 3, pp. 752-3. Also see SCCols to GGNZ, 2 Feb 1919, G44/1. A summary of the days proceedings and Massey's speech were sent to Liverpool and the National Cabinet by the Colonial Office. Also see GGNZ to SCCols, 11 Dec 1918, G41/41/. The New Zealand Government calculated that the total cost of the First World War to the Dominion at £92,000,000.
According to Lloyd George, this was one argument which 'perceptibly nettled' Wilson. The President emphatically refuted Massey's version of history, arguing that no 'historical precedent' existed for the League of Nations. In Wilson's opinion, the League of Nations would end 'the system of monarchical and arbitrary government in the World'. That afternoon the French Minister for the Colonies, Henry-Louis Simon, presented France's case for 'annexation, pure and simple' over the Cameroons and Togoland. Wilson exploded, observing 'that the discussion so far had been, in essence, a negation in detail - one case at a time - of the whole principle of mandatories'. He stated that the 'League of Nations would be a laughing stock if it were invested with this quality of trusteeship'. Clemenceau quickly distanced himself from the views of his Colonial Minister and the Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando suddenly expressed his desire for a comprehensive mandatory system. The Dominion leaders held out and the meeting was adjourned. As Hankey pointed out, with all the major powers 'favourably disposed towards the mandatory principle ... the Dominions were rather isolated'.

Later that afternoon Lloyd George convened a meeting of the BED to work out a compromise. In order to placate Wilson, restore Anglo-American harmony and faith in the peace process, he realised that the Dominions would have to modify their stance. The major problem for Lloyd George was trying to convince the Dominions to accept the mandatory principle without compromising their annexationist desires. Lloyd George felt that the only way forward was for the chief protagonists, Hughes, Botha and Massey, to work out a solution. As a result, the meeting agreed that three Prime Ministers of the southern Dominions should draft a resolution to express the delegation's views on the mandatory system. That night a member of the Australian delegation, J. G. Latham, penned a resolution defining the terms of the mandates. Three different classes of mandate were devised: A class - which generally applied to former territories in the Ottoman Empire, securing them a great deal of autonomy and freedom; B class - for those territories in Central Africa where the mandatory power would have a greater degree of responsibility, ensuring the prohibition of slavery, arms trafficking and the movement of liquor; C class - which accounted for territories such as South West Africa and the South Pacific Islands, allowing them to be administered as 'integral portions' of the mandatory state.

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143 George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, v. 1, pp. 522-3. Lloyd George gives the impression that Massey asked this question on 24 January but this was not the case.
146 Over the years, a number of historians have attributed the C class formula to a number of British and Dominion statesmen and officials. For example see J. G. Latham, 'Reviews: Prosper the
On 29 January Lloyd George tabled the 'Draft Resolutions in Reference to Mandatories' at the 'rather stormy' meeting of the BED.\textsuperscript{147} The American delegation had already seen a copy and Wilson thought it was the 'basis for an agreement'.\textsuperscript{148} In the words of Hankey, Massey and Hughes now constituted the 'principal difficulty'.\textsuperscript{149} They were not even willing to accept a weakened form of the mandate principle as embodied by the $C$ class mandate. Lloyd George told his colleagues that 'he feared a deadlock, and that the President would leave this country before an agreement had been reached'. To overcome the obstinate pairing of Massey and Hughes, Lloyd George wisely played on their fears of Japanese expansionism, stating that he wanted to keep Japan out of the $C$ class mandate while establishing simultaneously the case of the Dominions.\textsuperscript{150} Lloyd George assured his colleagues that the $C$ class mandate would close the 'open door' and give the Dominions complete control over trade and immigration. The British Prime Minister was probably thinking in terms of a $B$ class mandate for Japan, restricting its ability to fortify the islands north of the equator and ensure an 'open door' for Allied commerce. After a brief row between Hughes and Lloyd George, the BED finally accepted the draft. Without British support, the Dominions had 'no alternative'.\textsuperscript{151} Borden had played a crucial role in shifting Dominion opinion by 'abating the pugnacity' of Hughes and Massey.\textsuperscript{152}

\textit{Commonwealth}. By Sir R. R. Garran', \textit{Historical Studies: Australian and New Zealand}, v. 9, 33 (November 1959), p. 105; Roskill, \textit{Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume II 1919-1931}, p. 54; Fifield, \textit{Woodrow Wilson and the Far East}, p. 133; Fitzhardinge, 'W. M. Hughes and the Treaty of Versailles, 1919', \textit{JCPS}, v. 5, 2 (July 1967), p. 136; Louis, \textit{Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919}, p. 134; Spartalis, \textit{The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes}, p. 133. According to Latham: 'The 'C' mandate was not originated between Sir Cecil Hurst and myself. I drafted the clause and showed it to Sir Maurice Hankey who immediately took it to Lloyd George who, Hankey told me, approved it at once'. Latham's view is shared by Louis, who argues that Latham 'penned the actual draft that evening [of 28 January] under the supervision of Smuts and Hankey'. Fifield believes that Lloyd George's private secretary, Philip Kerr and General Jan Smuts, set forth the formula. In contrast, Roskill favours Hankey as the author and Fitzhardinge believes that Latham and Hankey were co-authors. Spartalis sides with Fitzhardinge stating that 'this appears to be the most likely interpretation'.

\textsuperscript{147} Hughes to Watt, 29 Jan 1919, CP360/8/1/3.


\textsuperscript{149} Hankey, \textit{The Supreme Control At the Paris Peace Conference 1919}, p. 60; Roskill, \textit{Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume II 1919-1931}, pp. 53-4.

\textsuperscript{150} See L. F. Fitzhardinge, 'Australia, Japan and Great Britain, 1914-18: A Study in Triangular Diplomacy', \textit{Historical Studies}, v. 14, 54 (April 1970), p. 257. Hughes feared that Japan would occupy the vacuum left by Germany's elimination from the Pacific. On his way to London in 1916 Hughes was supposed to visit New Zealand and tried to establish a 'common front' with Massey over Japan's expansion into the Pacific but he changed his mind. He did travel with the New Zealanders on his way to the 1918 Imperial War Conference and Cabinet. In the end, Massey probably did share Hughes' concern that Japan would come to dominate the Pacific. For example, see Liverpool to Harcourt, 13 May 1915, C0537/1173; GovNZ to SSCols, 13 May 1915, G48/18/N/18.

\textsuperscript{151} Hughes to Watt, 29 Jan 1919, CP360/8/1/3.

\textsuperscript{152} BED Meeting 6\#7, 29 Jan 1919, CAB29/28/1; George, \textit{The Truth About the Peace Treaties}, v. 1, p. 538. In the words of Lloyd George, 'I urged them not to take the responsibility of wrecking the Conference on a refusal to accept a principle which Great Britain was quite ready to see applied to much more extensive and important territories in East Africa'. Also see Borden, (ed.), \textit{Robert Laird Borden}, v. 2, p. 906; Spartalis, \textit{The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes}, pp. 134-5; Louis, \textit{Great Britain
On 30 January Lloyd George submitted the British Empire’s mandatory system to the Council of Ten. The discussion that followed, according to Lloyd George, 'was the only unpleasant episode of the whole Congress'. Wilson lost his temper in the morning session after the appearance of articles in Le Matin, as well as The Times and the Paris edition of the Daily Mail. The latter reported that the British Prime Minister was sacrificing the vital interests of the Dominions and threatening the unity of the British Empire 'for the sake of beaux yeux of America'. Hughes was portrayed as being clearly 'at the bottom of the whole thing', but Lord Riddell noted that Botha and Ward played a significant hand in the conspiracy. Ward's involvement had shown a remarkable insouciance of this threat to the harmony of the Anglo-American relationships at the Peace Conference.

Wilson protested at what he considered to be a breach of 'privilege' and argued that if these type of articles continued to be published it would prove 'fatal at this juncture' to the Peace Conference. Having cleared the air, the President resumed the debate and labelled the draft resolution a 'very gratifying paper'. While he accepted it as a 'precursor of agreement', in Wilson's view it did not constitute a 'rock foundation' as a final decision could not be reached before the establishment of the League of Nations. Lloyd George declared that Wilson's statement 'filled him with despair' and Hughes charged that Wilson had destroyed the whole basis of the proposed compromise, which had only been accepted by the Dominions to make an immediate decision possible. The moderate and disinterested Borden also favoured a definite decision and Wilson retreated and asked for an adjournment.

During the break the Dominion Prime Ministers held a quick informal meeting. Borden, 'whose chief concern was Anglo-American accord, played peacemaker' and


154 Link, (ed.), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson: Volume 54, p. 386. Colonel Edward M. House, the President's confidant, felt that Wilson had made a mistake in losing his temper as the British had 'come a long way, and if I had been in his place, I should have congratulated them over their willingness to meet us more than half way'.


156 Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After 1918-1923, London, 1933, pp. 16-7; Borden, (ed.), Robert Laird Borden, v. 2, p. 907. Riddell and Borden both condemned Hughes for orchestrating the media campaign against Wilson. Also see P. H. Kerr to Milner, 31 Jan 1919, MS. Eng. hist. 700/193, Milner Papers. Kerr told Milner: 'We have since learned that Hughes saw his article in proof and made corrections in it in his own hand'.

urged Massey and Hughes to moderate their claims. Borden also explained to Wilson that Lloyd George had great difficulty in trying to broker a compromise between the United States of America and the Dominions. He told Wilson that Lloyd George could be in no way held responsible for Dominion recalcitrance and 'that he could neither control their policies nor fail to support them'. Borden's sympathy for Lloyd George did not prevent his fellow Dominion colleagues from feeling 'bitterly disappointed' at being 'abandoned' by the British Government.

After the interval Massey provided the occasion for the most serious disagreement between the Dominions and the United States during the Paris Peace Conference - a fact that has been overlooked by Australian historians in their portrayal of Hughes as the "conquering hero".

Massey told the Council that he 'expected some fairly clear and definite statement from President Wilson' with regard to the C class mandate proposal as it was of the 'utmost importance' to the Dominions. He would only accept the compromise because 'he did not want to waste any more time than he could possibly help, or place any more difficulties in the way of settlement'. Deliberately excluding Japan from the proposal, Massey argued that the C class mandate 'had been inserted to meet the cases of Australia, South Africa and New Zealand'. He still believed that 'direct annexation' was preferable because it would allow the Dominions 'to proceed very much more quickly with the development of the territories concerned'. To underline New Zealand's commitment to the intended spirit of harmony, Massey confirmed his support for the creation of the League of Nations. He saw the development as a 'good thing' and he hoped that 'it would do much to prevent war in the future'. His country 'was prepared to shoulder that responsibility'.

Massey's final soothing words had little effect on Wilson who fired back and asked if New Zealand and Australia had presented an ultimatum to the Conference? He also wondered if the proposed compromise was their maximum concession, and that if they did not get this they would try to stop the whole agreement? Clearly stunned by

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159 Hughes to Watt, 30 Jan 1919, CP360/8/1/3.
160 Australian historians have been guilty of trying to champion a new form of nationalism and boost Hughes' profile as the enfant terrible. For example, see Hudson, Billy Hughes in Paris, p. 26; Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes, pp. 138-9; Fitzhardinge, 'W. M. Hughes and the Treaty of Versailles, 1919', JCPs, v. 5, 2 (July 1967), p. 137; Hall, The British Commonwealth and the Founding of the League of Nations Mandate System', in Bourne and Watt, (eds.), Studies in International History, p. 345. Hall has argued that Australian historians have failed to examine critically Hughes's contribution to the peace negotiations. Also see Eggleston to Fitzhardinge, 18 Nov 1952, MS423/6/6, Eggleston Papers.
Wilson’s accusation, Massey weakly replied: ‘No’. At this stage Hughes’s hearing aid malfunctioned and he began to launch into a subject irrelevant to the exchange. Wilson interrupted sharply, asking Hughes if he had heard the question. Hughes began fiddling with his hearing aid and said that he had not. Wilson repeated his statement and asked if New Zealand and Australia were prepared to take part in the agreement if the proposed compromise was not passed. Hughes then made his famous reply: ‘That’s about the size of it, President Wilson’. Lloyd George later recalled that ‘Massey grunted his assent of this abrupt defiance’.  

General Botha came to the rescue with a ‘friendly and most impressive’ speech, imploring both sides to accept the draft resolution in the ‘spirit of the cooperation’. He appealed to Wilson to support Lloyd George’s hard-won resolution from the Dominions and he apologised on the British Empire’s behalf for the press attacks. Massey, having regained his composure, wanted the opportunity to answer Wilson’s direct challenge. He distanced himself from Hughes, pointing out that New Zealand and Australia were ‘not on all fours’ over the mandate system. In contrast to Hughes, who was in regular communication with his Cabinet in Canberra, Massey was prepared to support the proposal without the assent of his National Cabinet. He reassured the President that no threats were implied and that ‘he was prepared to accept and support the provisional proposal put forward by Mr. Lloyd George’. The British Prime Minister appealed once again for the acceptance of the resolution as a ‘provisional decision subject to revision’.

After Lloyd George brought the Council’s attention to the ‘big nigger armies’ that the mandate package strictly forbade, the Council rapidly moved towards agreement. Lloyd George wanted the Council to issue a communiqué to avoid making ‘the impression of a royal row between America, Japan, Great Britain and her Dominions’. He suggested that the press release should emphasise the co-operative nature of the talks and announce that they had reached ‘a satisfactory provisional agreement’ on the future of the German colonies. Wilson agreed ‘that they had arrived at a satisfactory provisional arrangement on with regard to dealing with the German and Turkish

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162 FRUS: PPC, v. 3, pp. 799-800; George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, v. 1, p. 542; Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes, pp. 138-9; Fitzhardinge, ‘W. M. Hughes and the Treaty of Versailles, 1919’, JCPS, v. 5, 2 (July 1967), p. 137. The official version reported Hughes as saying that ‘President Wilson had put it fairly well’. However, Lloyd George recalled that Hughes adopted this Americanism for his reply. For Hughes’ summation of this heated exchange to the Australian Cabinet see Hughes to Watt, 31 Jan 1919, CP360/8/1/3.

163 George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, v. 1, pp. 542-6. According to Lloyd George: ‘It is difficult to convey the power of General’s Botha’s deliverance by a mere summary of the words. Behind it was the attractive and compelling personality of this remarkable man. President Wilson was obviously moved’. Also see FRUS: PPC, v. 3, pp. 800-2.
territory outside Europe'. The German colonies had now been granted unofficially to the Dominions so Massey and Hughes no longer insisted on an immediate assignment.

The decision of the Council of Ten on 30 January produced an illusion of victory for both sides. While President Wilson gained his chief objective with the placing of all the German colonies under a League of Nations mandatory system, the Dominions had secured direct control over their occupied territories in all but name. Massey and Ward were the first to appreciate the strength of the Dominion's triumph. In Massey's estimation, 'a satisfactory arrangement' had been made respecting Samoa. When Godley called in to see them at the Hotel Majestic they 'seemed quite pleased about the Samoan arrangement'. Massey had gained freedom from the leasehold restrictions he feared and had succeeded with the removal of the German threat from the Pacific. As Godley pointed out to Allen: 'After all once in possession and applying your own laws it does not seem to make much difference what your power is called'.

The question of how to secure New Zealand and Australia from the imminent Japanese threat in the Pacific became the next priority for Massey and Hughes. On 20 February the BED entrusted Lord Milner with the task of clarifying the nature of the mandatory rule. Massey was optimistic of the BED reaching agreement. On 8 March Milner submitted his memorandum to the BED, explaining that Australia and New Zealand were particularly 'anxious' that no naval bases should be built on the

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164 FRUS:PPC, v. 3, pp. 804-17; SS Cols to GGNZ, 5 Feb 1919, G44/1.
165 The press in New Zealand had mixed feeling over the country acquiring Samoa. See ODT, 23 Jan 1919, p. 5; Press, 23 Jan 1919, p. 6; NZH, 29 Jan 1919, p. 6; OW, 29 Jan 1919, p. 35. Also see Snelling, 'Peacemaking, 1919', JICH, v. 4, 1 (October 1975), p. 19.
166 For contrasting views on this point see Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, p. 97; Hiery, The Neglected War, p. 209. Tillman has argued that Wilson 'achieved a notable victory, establishing a principle of tremendous importance'. In stark contrast, Hiery views 'the success of 30 January 1919 ... like David's victory over Goliath'. Also see Fitzhardinge, 'W. M. Hughes and the Treaty of Versailles, 1919', JCPNS, v. 5, 2 (July 1967), p. 137. Fitzhardinge has argued that: 'Neither party had got what they wanted, but in retrospect each was reasonably satisfied'.
167 Massey to Bell, 17 Mar 1919, MS5210/102, Bell Family Papers; Massey to Guthrie, 3 Mar 1919, PM9/49, Thomson Papers.
168 Godley to Allen, 7 Feb 1919, WA252/5, Godley Papers; Godley to Allen, 7 Feb 1919, MI1/15/6, Allen Papers. Also see AWF, 20 Feb 1919, p. 43. Massey and Ward made it known that: 'Subject to broad conditions governing all the trusts, New Zealand is given a free hand in Samoa'.
169 P. Boston, 'Wartime Allies: The 1916 Japanese Naval Visit to Rotorua', in R. Peren, (ed.), Japan and New Zealand 150 Years, Palmerston North, 1999, pp. 87-8; Y. Takahashi, 'On the Essay, 'Friend to Foe', in R. Peren, (ed.), Japan and New Zealand 150 Years, Palmerston North, 1999, p. 86. Takahashi has argued that: 'The reality is that Japan had never posed a threat to New Zealand, and is unlikely to do so in the future'. Massey may have felt that Japan as wartime allies 'played the game' but he was not willing to take their friendship for granted.
Pacific Islands, especially those islands north of the Equator. This was hardly surprising. Allen had warned Massey of the dangers to British shipping if the Japanese occupation of the Marshall Islands went unchecked. By occupying these strategic islands, Allen believed that Japan had made its intentions 'to rule the Pacific Seas' loud and clear. Massey's options to frustrate Japanese expansionism, however, were extremely limited. As Tillman has pointed out: 'By its largely successful advocacy of its own claims in the Pacific, the British Empire almost automatically secured for Japan the islands to which it laid claim'. The Council had given its tacit agreement for Japan's possession of the islands, which Massey knew that only military force could probably dislodge. Lloyd George had told the Dominions that the British Navy would not be used to secure their position. Massey's best hope to salvage some security for New Zealand from the Japanese threat lay in building safeguards into the mandate package.

As a result, when Milner's memorandum came up for discussion at the BED meeting on 8 March, Massey again joined forces with Hughes and insisted that Japan should be granted a C class mandate for the Pacific Islands north of the Equator. As far as the southern Dominions were concerned, such an arrangement would serve a double purpose. Under the terms of a C class mandate, Japan would be prohibited to raise indigenous armies, the erection of military and naval bases and would be obliged to report to the League of Nations. This would afford the Dominions at least some measure of security while maintaining the right to control trade, immigration, and navigation laws in their own mandates. Australia and New Zealand did not want to any restrictions placed on the application of their own laws of immigration and navigation in New Guinea and Samoa. In exchange, Massey and Hughes were

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170 BED Meeting 9#, 20 Feb 1919, MS. Milner dep. 389/17, Milner Papers; WCP 211#, 'Mandates', by Lord Milner, 8 Mar 1919, FO608/242/1634/1/1; Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919, p. 144. Louis has listed the date as 28 February but clearly this is an error. Also see SSCols to GGNZ, 5 Feb 1919, G44/1; WCP 255#, 'Commission on Ex-German Colonies', by M. P. A. Hankey, 14 Mar 1919, MS1009/21/1309b, Latham Papers.

171 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 98.

172 Hughes to Watt, 30 Jan 1919, CP360/8/1/3.

173 Allen to Massey, 17 Jan 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers. Allen wrote: 'You know how we regret what happened with regard to Samoa and some other islands in the Pacific, and I am perfectly satisfied in my own mind that we shall live to regret even more the conditions in the Pacific if we allow the Japanese to remain where they are. We shall study with interest the proceedings of the Peace Conference and I hope that the conclusions arrived at will be sound and in the interests of our Empire and of New Zealand'.

174 GGNZ to SSCols, 4 Mar 1918, AD10/17/32; SSCols to GGNZ, 20 Mar 1918, AD10/17/32. The New Zealand Government felt it was 'inadvisable' to allow four Japanese to settle in Samoa. The British Government was concerned that the New Zealand Government's approach would provoke a similar Japanese response against British citizens. However, the British Government had 'no objection provided that refusal is treated temporary not necessarily prejudging position after war'.
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prepared to see Japan have the same freedom of action, as they wanted to enjoy. According to Duncan Hall, Massey and Hughes argued that ‘it was better to allow the Japanese to close the door in the north in order that they should be able to exclude the Japanese from the south’. The allocation of the mandates took place at the meeting of the Council of Ten on 7 May 1919. Massey’s fears that the influenza epidemic would complicate matters never eventuated. New Zealand and Australia were given C class mandates for Western Samoa and New Guinea respectively and Japan for the islands north of the Equator. The Australasian Dominions had successfully denied Japanese calls for equal opportunity in trade and commerce under a C class mandate and had secured the prohibition of naval bases and fortifications. In effect the BED draft resolution became ratified, virtually unaltered, as Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Finally, on 17 December 1920 the Council of the League of Nations approved the terms of the C class mandates and invested the mandatories. The Pacific Islands now delineated the new international frontier between the Japanese

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175 Hughes to Watt, 10 Feb 1919, CP360/8/1/3; WCP 71#, ‘Australia and the Pacific Islands’, by W. M. Hughes, 6 Feb 1919, MS762/3, Cook Papers. Hughes argued that the Dominions must have ‘full power to control immigration . . . and . . . trade’. Also see WCP 97#, ‘New Zealand and the Pacific Islands’, by W. F. Massey, 14 Feb 1919, MS762/3, Cook Papers. Massey stated that he agreed with the ‘greater part’ of Hughes’ memorandum except over who should receive the mandate for Nauru. Also see ‘Minute’, 31 Mar 1919, FO608/211/642/2/1; Cecil to Balfour, 10 Mar 1919, FO608/211/642/2/1. The Foreign Office felt it was ‘bad policy’ of Hughes and Massey to antagonise the Japanese by insinuating that the character of their mandates should be more restricted in scope. Baron Makino visited Cecil complaining about Hughes’ memorandum. He impressed on Cecil that Japan must have the same class of mandates as the Dominions, especially since his Government supported New Zealand’s claim to Samoa.


177 Massey to Allen, 26 Apr 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers.


179 H. D. Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship, Washington, 1948, p. 308. On 17 December 1920 the C class mandates were ratified by League of Nations. Article 4 of the Japanese ‘Mandate for the German Possessions in the Pacific Ocean Lying North of the Equator’ read that ‘no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory’. On Japanese efforts to secure the ‘open door’ for the C class mandate see Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East, pp. 135-7.

180 Hiery, The Neglected War, p. 330; M. Boyd, ‘New Zealand’s Attitude to Dominion Status 1919-1921: The Procedure for Enacting a Constitution in her Samoan Mandate’, JCPS, v. 3, 1 (March 1965), pp. 64-70. According to Hiery, the C class mandate certificates were sent out from Geneva by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations on 11 February 1921. New Zealand became the last country to receive its certificate. It did not arrive until 30 April 1921.
and the British Empire, representing the manifestation of the sphere of influence doctrine espoused in the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1917.

The interest of the Dominions in the Japanese mandates was directly related to their opposition of the racial equality clause in the League of Nations Covenant. On 13 February Japan formally introduced its proposal on racial equality to the Commission on the League of Nations:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of States members of the League equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.181

On 25 March the Dominion Prime Ministers met with Japanese representatives in Borden's apartment to work out a compromise. The Japanese submitted a draft that called for 'equal and just treatment to be accorded to all alien nationals of states members of the League'. Borden proposed that the term 'equal' be dropped in favour of a resolution which endorsed the 'principle of equality between nations and just treatment of their nationals'. Borden felt that Smuts and Massey would have agreed to it 'without hesitation but Hughes would not consent to anything'.182 The Australian Prime Minister remained defiant, privately threatening to walk naked into the Seine before agreeing to the amendment!183

The attitude of Massey towards Borden's amendment calls in question his so-called racist credentials and the nature of his relationship with Hughes. Historian Sean Brawley has called him the Australian Prime Minister's 'closest ally in the fight against racial equality'.184 Yet Massey, with an apparent disregard for ANZAC cooperation, supported Borden's compromise resolution with the Japanese. Australian historian Eric Andrews has also suggested that Massey's support for Hughes on this issue was not as unequivocal as Brawley makes out. Andrews has pointed out that Massey did not even publicly support Hughes on the issue of racial equality - unusual behaviour for a supposedly close ally.185 We can only guess the motives behind

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181 Taken from Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes, p. 172.
Massey's decision to support Borden's amendment. It certainly did not equate with the preference of New Zealand's domestic immigration laws of 'keeping New Zealand white'.\textsuperscript{186} Massey appears to have been impressed by Japan's trusted service to the Allied cause during the war, consistently pointing out that the Japanese had 'played the game'. In the first months of the war, the Japanese Navy had come to the rescue by escorting the NZEF Main Body across the dangerous waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, keeping the threat of Von Spee's German cruisers at bay.\textsuperscript{187}

The driving force behind Massey's motivation probably lies in his long-term strategic thinking. The clue is his consistent support for the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In the absence of the credible British naval presence in the Pacific, Japan represented the next biggest threat to the Dominions. It is pure conjecture, but Massey probably thought that by supporting Borden's resolution, it would protect Anglo-Japanese relations and the security interests of the Dominions. It was better to keep the Japanese as friends rather than make them foes. Consequently, Massey does not appear to have been motivated by a genuine desire to promote human rights. It is important to remember that his government passed the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act in 1920. According to historian P. S. O'Connor this piece of legislation 'brought to a successful end the long search for an instrument of policy which would both keep New Zealand white and be acceptable to the imperial government'.\textsuperscript{188} Whatever the outcome, New Zealand could live with the outcomes of ratifying or rejecting the resolution. Massey had cleverly exploited the situation to enhance his own reputation at the Peace Conference. He seemed reasonable and moderate knowing full well that Hughes's opposition would defeat the passage of the clause.

Massey's brief flirtation with the racial equality clause came to an end on 26 March. Confronted by an immovable Hughes, Smuts reported to the Japanese delegation that 'Massey felt bound to follow Hughes'.\textsuperscript{189} Once the Australian Prime Minister made his position non-negotiable, Massey felt obliged like the rest of the Bed to stand beside Hughes to avoid an acrimonious split on the issue. He was quite prepared to see Hughes shoulder all the blame while retaining New Zealand's right to racially exclude immigrants. He appeared moderate and reasonable, even liberal, in

\textsuperscript{187} Minutes of the Sub-Committee of the Imperial War Cabinet on Territorial Desiderata in the Terms of Peace, Meeting 1#., 17 Apr 1917, PM14/34; Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris with Documents, Volume XX*, pp. 313-7. On 13 September Massey and Ward were invited guests at a dinner at Columbia University Club.
\textsuperscript{189} Spartalis, *The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes*, p. 178.
comparison to his Australian colleague. Massey had intelligently played both sides. After all, this was the same Massey who voted at the 1917 and 1918 Imperial War Conferences to make immigration policy an 'inherent function' of the Dominions. He wanted to protect New Zealand's right to 'enjoy complete control of the composition of its own population by means of restriction on immigration from any of the other communities'. On 29 March Smuts told the Japanese delegate, Baron Makino, that if his country insisted on bringing up the issue at a plenary session, 'I must warn you that . . . if Hughes of Australia opposes it, as he undoubtedly will, I shall have to fall in line and vote with the Dominions, like a "good Indian"'. In analysing the situation, the Japanese delegation had come to the same conclusion, arguing that 'Massey believed he had to support his Australian colleague [and] that the British Empire Delegation as a whole had to stand together'.

On 11 April the issue of racial equality came swiftly to an end at the League of Nations Commission. Much to Lord Robert Cecil's shame and embarrassment, Lloyd George instructed him to support the Dominions and place the British vote against Japan. The defiance of Hughes left the British Government with little option but to oppose the racial equality clause. While Cecil personally favoured the idea he could not vote for the Japanese amendment to the Covenant to include 'by the endorsement of the principle of the equality of Nations and the just treatment of their nationals'. Cecil argued that the BED opposed the clause because it would be an intrusion into the domestic legislation of members of the League and infringe their sovereignty. One American delegate observed that after making the statement, 'Cecil sat with his eyes fixed on the table, and took no part in the subsequent debate'. At this stage the numbers still favoured the clause and Wilson decided to act. Colonel House had passed him a note warning that: 'The trouble is that if this Commission should pass it, it would surely raise the race issue throughout the world'. Makino did not wish to continue in unprofitable discussion and forced the matter to an official vote. Eleven out of seventeen on the Commission voted in favour of the Japanese proposal - a clear majority. To their astonishment Wilson, as chairman, ruled the amendment invalid because it failed to achieve the unanimous approval of the entire Commission. A fortnight later Makino promised that the Japanese would 'continue in their insistence for the adoption of this principle by the League in the future'.

191 Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes, p. 164.
With the successful defeat of the Japanese racial equality clause, Massey and Hughes resumed their fierce rivalry over the future of the tiny phosphate rich island of Nauru. As early as January 1915 the New Zealand Government had shown an interest in securing a cheap source of fertilisers, asking the Colonial Office on what terms it could be given control of one of the Marshall Islands. The British Government replied that the future of the Marshalls, occupied by the Japanese, would be settled at the conclusion of the war. Undeterred, Massey took the matter up with British authorities in 1917 as a member of Lord Curzon's Committee. He managed to extract a promise from the British Government that it would not dispose of the German colonies without consulting the Dominions.

The most serious challenge to Massey's aspirations for Nauru were Australian demands. Supported by Long, Hughes wanted to establish Australia's title to Nauru at the Peace Conference. When in January 1919 the Pacific Phosphate Company, which owed the phosphate rock mining rights, asked for the withdrawal of the Australian garrison, Hughes could see 'no legitimate reason whatsoever [sic] why our Administrator should not administer Nauru'. Hughes had made it perfectly clear that he was not going to let Nauru go without a fight. He viewed Nauru as Australia's by right. Australian troops had taken the island in November 1914 and had administered it throughout the entire war. The Australian Government considered Nauru was the only 'spoil' of the war that it wanted to retain. Massey, under pressure from the New Zealand Farmers' Union, 'strongly' favoured keeping Nauru a British possession. Long signalled British interest in Nauru. He notified Hughes that

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194 GovNZ to SSCols, 22 Jan 1915, G25/28; GovNZ to SSCols, 22 Jan 1915, AJHR, v. 1, 1915, A.-1, p. 33.
195 SSCols to GovNZ, 30 Mar 1915, G1/192.
196 Massey to Mackenzie, 21 Sep 1917, G1/229; Massey to Mackenzie, 21 Sep 1917, CO209/295/108; SSCols to GGNZ, 16 Jan 1918, G1/229; GGNZ to SSCols, 4 Dec 1918, G1/229; GGNZ to SSCols, G41/40; 'Minutes of the Sub-Committee of the Imperial War Cabinet on Territorial Desiderata in the Terms of Peace', Meeting 1#, 17 Apr 1917, PMI4/34 and CAB21/77/3.
197 Long to Hughes, 9 Jan 1919, MS1538/24/985, Hughes Papers.
198 Hughes to Long, 3 Jan 1919, MS762/3, Cook Papers; Hughes to Long, 3 Jan 1919, MS1538/23/309, Hughes Papers.
the Economic Development Committee was looking into the question from a 'British point of view'. Given the competition, on the eve of the peace talks, Long predicted that the question over who should control Nauru would 'bring in an element of controversy'.

With the acceptance of the mandatory principle by the Council of Ten, Nauru could no longer be directly annexed by Great Britain, Australia or New Zealand. The focus of the dispute now centred on which country would act as the trustee and the type of mandate it would receive. On 6 February, Hughes submitted a memorandum, surprisingly revealing that 'Australia would be satisfied with any form of mandate satisfactory to the British Government'. The ambiguity implied by this statement caused confusion within the BED. Did it indicate the Australian Prime Minister's willingness to accept Great Britain as the mandatory power for Nauru or had he merely announced that Australia, if named as the mandatory, would be satisfied with any class of mandate for Nauru? The British authorities certainly felt that Hughes had abrogated Australia's claim to the island. The Foreign Office noted that 'Mr. Hughes has adopted a different attitude with regard to Nauru to that taken a month ago. Presumably he would be willing to leave it to the U.K.'

Massey had no faith in the Foreign Office's assessment. In the close intimate setting of the BED in the Hotel Majestic, Massey was better placed to gauge the real intentions of his Australian counterpart. He felt that the Foreign Office had overlooked the crucial point: Hughes had not abrogated Australia's claim to the Nauru mandate. On 14 February, Massey responded to Hughes's memorandum, outlining New Zealand's claim to the high quality phosphates on Nauru at a 'most reasonable rate'. He pointed out that Auckland was just as close to Nauru as Sydney and that a 'good supply of phosphates at a reasonable price is absolutely essential' to New Zealand's agricultural sector. Massey hoped that an arrangement, 'satisfactorily to both New Zealand and Australia', could be worked out by the British Government. The Foreign Office, based on its poor analysis of Hughes's memorandum, judged that

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201 WCP 71#, 'Australia and the Pacific Islands', by W. M. Hughes, 6 Feb 1919, MS762/3, Cook Papers; Hughes to Watt, 10 Feb 1919, CP360/8/1/3.
202 'Minutes', 12 Feb 1919, FO608/175/555/2/1. Also see 'Memorandum Regarding the Pacific Islands', by W. M. Hughes, 8 Feb 1919, MS1009/21/1305, Latham Papers. Hughes wanted the Peace Conference to appoint Australia 'as the Mandatory for the whole of the South Pacific - other than Samoa'.
203 NZPD, v. 184, 2 Sep 1919, p. 48.
204 WCP 97#, 'New Zealand and the Pacific Islands', by W. F. Massey, 14 Feb 1919, MS762/3, Cook Papers.
Massey had 'misunderstood' Hughes intentions. The Foreign Office concluded that Hughes was not opposed to Great Britain being the mandatory power.205

On 20 February the BED authorised the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Milner, to draft the mandate agreements for the Dominions. On 8 March Milner circulated a memorandum suggesting that the Nauru mandate should be granted to Great Britain. In fact, Milner confided to Massey that the whole process of distributing the mandates could be made easier if all the colonies came under the British flag.206 When the matter came up for discussion in the BED meeting on 13 March, Hughes pressed his country's claim to Nauru even though one of his own staff described Australia's case as 'not strong'.207 Hughes immediately rattled off another two memoranda outlining the strengths and merits of his case, asking 'that the matter be reconsidered and Nauru handed over to Australia'. He was prepared to recognise the claims of Great Britain and New Zealand in some arrangement for the phosphate but he remained adamant that Australia's case was 'overwhelming'.208 The Foreign Office became highly critical of Hughes for his selective memory and was unimpressed by his apparent u-turn.209 Massey entertained the same thoughts. He informed his close Reform colleague, Sir Francis D. Bell: 'Our friend Hughes is like no other politician with whom I am acquainted; he is very unscrupulous in his methods and requires careful watching'.210 Massey reassured Bell:

I am fighting Australia for control over Nauru and Ocean Island, the two phosphate Islands in the Pacific which are at present in dispute. As a matter of fact I do not think that either Australia or New Zealand will get the Islands but that the British Government will finally obtain control and this will ensure our getting our supplies of phosphates at a reasonable price.211

205 'Minutes', 18 Feb 1918, FO608/175/555/2/2.
206 Milner to Massey, 30 Jan 1919, MS. Eng. hist 700/246, Milner Papers. Milner considered the interests of the Dominions in the future of the German colonies as 'paramount'.
207 'Mandatory System and the German Pacific Islands', by J. Latham, 22 Feb 1919, MS 762/1, Cook Papers.
208 WCP 240#, 'The Control of Nauru Under the Mandatory System', by W. M. Hughes, 13 Mar 1919, MS 762/3, Cook Papers. A copy of this memorandum can also be found in MS1538/24/60, Hughes Papers; WCP 345#, 'The Control of Nauru', by W. M. Hughes, 21 Mar 1919, MS 762/3, Cook Papers. Also see Hughes to Watt, 12 Mar 1919, CP 360/8/1/3. Hughes informed his Cabinet and the Acting Prime Minister, W. A. Watt, that he would be pressing Australia's claim at the BED meeting.
209 'Minutes', 18 Mar 1919, FO608/175/555/2/1.
210 Massey to Bell, 17 Mar 1919, MS5210/102, Bell Family Papers. Massey's assessment of Hughes is borne out by Fitzhardinge's research. See Fitzhardinge to Hankey, 6 Dec 1957, HNKY 24/2/209, Archives of Lord Hankey. Apparently Hughes was selling Australian wheat to the French without the British Government's knowledge and subsequently using this as a pretence to claim a larger share of the shipping allocation.
211 Massey to Bell, 17 Mar 1919, MS5210/102, Bell Family Papers.
Over the next two months Hughes unsuccessfully lobbied the British Government to accept the idea of an Australian mandate for Nauru. In April, Massey reported to Allen that 'Hughes has been moving heaven and earth to get possession of the phosphate island of Nauru for Australia, and it is quite uncertain what its fate will ultimately be.' Hughes wrote to Lloyd George, suggesting that an agreement on the distribution of the phosphate could be reached between the three countries 'based on the assumption of a mandate to Australia in respect of the island of Nauru identical with that in respect of the other Pacific Islands to be administered by Australia.' Hughes believed that all the proprietary rights should be transferred to Australia and that the phosphate output should be allocated on proportion to the agricultural requirements of each country. Milner agreed with the bare bones of Hughes's plan but he still insisted that the mandate should go to Great Britain.

To counter balance Hughes, Massey joined the fray and entered into correspondence with Milner and Lloyd George. By this time he had abandoned all hope of either acquiring Nauru for New Zealand or of sharing a joint Australasian mandate. His sole objective was to frustrate Australian designs and hold on for a phosphate settlement with the British Government. To accomplish this goal, Massey suggested to Milner on 9 April that the creation of a commission representing the three countries could reconcile the problem of British control and Dominion access to the phosphate. Before the penultimate BED meeting which would decide Nauru's fate, Massey wrote to Lloyd George 'to see that the interests if New Zealand in this connection are protected'. Massey added that if 'the mandate is not taken up by Britain - as I think it should be - then I am strongly of opinion that there should be some controlling authority to see that New Zealand and other British countries are not exploited or neglected by any company or authority having the opportunity to do so'.

In the meantime, Milner had been busy negotiating a settlement to protect British agricultural interests in Nauru. He also had to contend with the interests of his colleague, Arthur Balfour, who happened to be the Chairman of the Pacific Phosphate Company. Under these difficult political circumstances, Milner consulted with his

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212 Massey to Allen, 26 Apr 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers.
214 NZPD, v. 184, 2 Sep 1919, p. 48.
215 Massey to Milner, 8 Apr 1919, FO608/175/555/2/2; Massey to Milner, F/36/4/8, Lloyd George Papers.
216 Massey to Lloyd George, 5 May 1919, F/36/4/12, Lloyd George Papers.
Prime Minister, Milner wanted to place Nauru under the control of the British High Commissioner in Fiji. He told Lloyd George that: 'If we keep control we can see fair play as between Australia and New Zealand, who would otherwise quarrel over it, besides looking after the interest of our own agriculturists'. Milner informed Lloyd George that Massey and Hughes agreed to his proposal 'without demur': that the mandate should be given to Great Britain and a Joint Commission should be established to distribute the resources of Nauru. Milner saw this as the 'best means of exploiting them with fairness to all parties mentioned'. At the eleventh hour Hughes decided to 'jump a claim for Australia' and backed out of the agreement against the advice of his own Cabinet. This merely convinced Milner of the 'absurdity of Australian claims'. Lloyd George concurred with this assessment.

Before the BED meeting on 5 May the British Government had decided to accept the Nauru mandate on behalf of the British Empire. This development did not prevent Massey and Hughes from quarrelling over Nauru at the meeting. Their heated exchange marked the end of the 'ANZAC front' at the Peace Conference. Hughes insisted that Nauru was Australia's by right: 'we took it, we garrison it, and we expect to be allowed to keep it'. Hughes argued that New Zealand and Great Britain had no rightful claim to Nauru. Clearly annoyed by Massey's position, Hughes felt that Australia deserved Nauru because the other Dominions 'grew rich on the sale of their produce at war prices whilst Australia was stripped of her shipping for the Empire'. Hughes threatened that 'non-recognition' of Australia's claim 'would have a most unfortunate effect in every way'. In a more conciliatory tone, Hughes repeated his willingness to enter into an agreement with Great Britain and New Zealand over the distribution of the phosphate deposits.

Hughes complained to his Cabinet that 'Massey objected in most offensive way to Australia having mandate, insisting that it should go to Britain'. Overstating his case,
Massey argued strongly that the Nauru's resources were far more valuable to New Zealand because Australia was a country of 'little agriculture'. In the best interests of New Zealand, Massey and Ward agreed that the British Government should hold the mandate for Nauru. Massey and Ward did not want Australia to possess the authority to restrict New Zealand's access to the valuable mineral deposits on Nauru. Hughes reacted violently, calling New Zealand's opposition an 'intolerable insult to Australia'. He could not understand why New Zealand objected to Australia holding the mandate. Hughes even accused Milner of corruption in trying to protect Balfour's share-holdings in the Pacific Phosphate Company. His frustration escalated into a general condemnation of the peace process. He became illogical, irrational and angry, remonstrating how Australia had made 'very great sacrifices' and would not get an indemnity 'worth speaking about'. He promised Watt that if Australia was 'robbed' of Nauru he would not to sign the Peace Treaty. Alarmed at this turn of events the Australian Cabinet baulked at this strategy of brinkmanship by Hughes, thinking that it would be 'improper' not to sign to treaty over the fate of Nauru. The Australian Cabinet feared that such an action would be portrayed as a selfish attempt by Australia to acquire a 'valuable asset'. In the end, Watt advised Hughes to put up the 'best fight' possible and rely upon negotiation to extract some financial compensation.

On 6 May Massey achieved a major breakthrough for New Zealand on Nauru. Milner, having recovered from illness, advised Lloyd George that Nauru 'should be left to Imperial Govt'. The following day it came as no surprise when the Council

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223 'Question of the Distribution of the Mandates Meeting', 5 May 1919, MS1538/24/1003, Hughes Papers; 'W. M. Hughes at the Paris Peace Conference 1919', By Sir Clement Jones, HNKY 24/2, Archives of Lord Hankey. The meeting took place at the Hotel Majestic and both Milner and Lloyd George were absent. For a New Zealand perspective see 'The Peace Conference', in Drew, (ed.), The War Effort of New Zealand, p. 207.

224 This is probably a fair call from Hughes. The Foreign Office, under Balfour's command, keep an unusually watchful eye on the fate of Nauru. The Australian official history is quick to point out Balfour's sinister role in frustrating Hughes' attempts to secure Nauru. See Scott, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, pp. 797-801.

225 Hughes to Watt, 7 May 1919, CP360/8/1; Hughes to Milner, 9 May 1919, MS762/3, Cook Papers; Hughes to Watt, 4 Jun 1919, CP360/8/1/4. A copy of this telegram can also be found in MS1538/16/2094-5, Hughes Papers. Hughes told Watt that if Cabinet had of supported him Australia would have received 'full control of Nauru and its phosphates'. Also see Scott, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, p. 800. According to Scott, Watt 'strongly blamed Hughes for his mismanagement of the Nauru incident, and resented the imputation that Australia failed to secure a mandate for the island because of a lack of support from the Government'.

226 Watt to Hughes, 9 May 1919, MS1538/6/2094, Hughes Papers; Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes, pp. 149-50.

227 Milner to Lloyd George, 6 May 1919, F/39/1/17, Lloyd George Papers; Milner to Lloyd George, 6 May 1919, FO608/175/555/2/2, Massey encouraged Milner to write to Lloyd George. Also see 'Minutes', 7 May 1919, FO608/175/555/2/2. The Foreign Office offered its own solution, arguing that the Pacific Phosphate Company should remain British and that a High Commissioner for the Western Pacific should administer the island.
of Ten allocated the Nauru C class mandate to the British Empire pending settlement between Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. But this proved to be a far more difficult proposition than it initially appeared. Massey and Hughes continued to 'row' in meetings and flood Milner and Lloyd George with pertinent information to strengthen their respective positions. On 9 May Hughes sent no less than three letters to Milner and Lloyd George. Hughes pointed out that the German surrender in New Guinea incorporated Nauru and that Australia, as a large grain growing country, vitally needed the phosphate, disproving 'Mr. Massey's statements as to the predominating interest of New Zealand in the settlement'. He repeated his assurance that 'Australia would be perfectly willing to enter into an arrangement with Great Britain and New Zealand for the apportionment of the output on a fair basis; and that answer completely removes any possible ground of objection on the part of New Zealand'. Massey did his best to match Hughes' prolific and vigorous campaign by passing on an Alien telegram to Milner and Lloyd George, stressing 'that phosphatic manures are absolutely necessary to maintain the productivity of the lands of the Dominion'.

By the middle of May Lloyd George had become so exasperated with the dispute that he instructed Milner not to leave Paris a second time without reaching a definitive agreement over Nauru. The protracted negotiations lasted for another six weeks. Milner left the BED's legal adviser, Sir Cecil J. B. Hurst, and the Attorney-General of Australia, Sir Robert Garran, in charge of drafting an agreement. On 4 June Hughes informed Watt that he had come to an arrangement with Milner that placed Nauru under a British mandate, with the three countries sharing control of the civil administration. For the first five years an Australian Administrator would control Nauru. The three countries would buy out arbitrarily the Pacific Phosphate Company. Australia's share would be equal to Great Britain's with New Zealand contributing.

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228 WCP 745#, 'Mandates', by M. P. A. Hankey, 7 May 1919, FO608/152/509/1/1; Massey to Lloyd George, 8 May 1919, F/36/4/13, Lloyd George Papers. When Massey heard the news he gave Lloyd George his 'most cordial thanks' for his 'sympathetic interest and willing support in seeing New Zealand's interests protected in this important matter'.
229 Hughes to Watt, 10 Jun 1919, CP360/8/14.
230 Cook to Hughes, 31 Oct 1918, MS762/1, Cook Papers; Hughes to Milner, 9 May 1919, Copy 1, MS762/3, Cook Papers; Hughes to Milner, 9 May 1919, Copy 2, MS762/3, Cook Papers; Hughes to Milner, 9 May 1919, Copy 3, MS762/3, Cook Papers. Also see 'Memorandum on Disposition of Nauru', by Sir J. Cook, 7 May 1919, MS762/3, Cook Papers. A copy of this memorandum can also be found in MS1538/24/1005, Hughes Papers. Hughes's argument that Australia had 'wrested' Nauru from Germany failed to convince the BED. See ODT, 18 Mar 1919, p. 5.
232 Lloyd George to Milner, 14 May 1919, F/39/1/18, Lloyd George Papers.
233 Garran to Davies, [Secretary to Lloyd George], 4 Jun 1919, F/28/3/39, Lloyd George Papers.
The phosphate would be distributed along the same lines. Australia would also be reimbursed the cost of garrisoning the island and the replacement value of the wireless station. Massey had yet to give his assent to the draft agreement but on the whole Hughes reflected that 'it might be worse'. The Australian Cabinet congratulated Hughes, feeling that under the circumstances he had 'done mightily well'.

On 23 June Massey perused the draft agreement prepared by Cecil and Garran. He deliberately excluded Ward, as the major shareholder in a New Zealand fertilising company, from the negotiation process. Massey's only concern was the unilateral right of Australia to appoint the first Administrator. Massey wanted this decision to be taken in consultation with the other two countries, or otherwise Australia would be, in effect, the mandatory power. Nevertheless, Massey felt that he could still submit the agreement to his Government. He told Milner that: 'I do not notice anything to which serious objection can be taken'. On 27 June Milner finally succeeded in meeting both Massey and Hughes. According to Macdonald, Massey disputed two points of the draft that gave Australia the right to choose the first administrator and the ratio of phosphate distribution. After a 'heated discussion' Milner's perseverance paid off and an agreement was reached that guaranteed the British mandate with Australia acting as the administering authority in consultation with Great Britain and New Zealand. The distribution of Nauru's phosphate rock was split three ways, Australia and Great Britain each receiving 42 per cent and New Zealand 16 per cent.

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234 Hughes to Watt, 4 Jun 1919, CP360/8/1/4. A copy of this telegram can also be found in MS1538/16/2094-5, Hughes Papers. Also see Watt to Hughes, 30 May 1919, CP360/8/1/4. Also see 'Note', by W. M. Hughes, undated, MS1538/24/1043, Hughes Papers. Under the agreement, Hughes felt Australia could still swindle New Zealand on the distribution of the phosphate, especially when Great Britain would not require all its full share. Hughes wrote: 'Australia would be entitled to be allotted rather more than two-thirds and New Zealand rather less than one-third of the amount which Great Britain did not take up'. Also see Fiddes to Milner, 11 Dec 1919, MS. Eng hist. 700/38, Milner Papers. Milner did not mention to Hughes or Massey that the Pacific Phosphate Company retained the option of over 100,000 tons for five years.

235 Watt to Hughes, 14 Jun 1919, MS1538/16/2095, Hughes Papers.

236 Macdonald, Massey's Imperialism and the Politics of Phosphate, p. 14; NZPD, v. 184, 2 Sep 1919, pp 48-9. In a 'schoolboy squabble' with Massey, Ward complained in Parliament that he was 'never consulted' over the Nauru Agreement. Also see NZPD, v. 185, 23 Oct 1919, pp. 797-9. Ward attacked the financial cost of buying out the Pacific Phosphate Company because the price had not been fixed. He likened the agreement to that of 'buying a pig in a poke'. Despite Liberal misgivings, the New Zealand farming community were satisfied with the Nauru deal. See 'Report on Nauru and Other Phosphate Islands in the Pacific', AJHR, 1919, v. 2, H.-29B, pp. 1-6. In the Board of Agriculture's opinion, 'it would be greatly to the advantage of New Zealand that the proposed agreement ... be ratified'. The Board was satisfied that Massey had obtained a 'sufficient proportion of the output from Nauru' to 'be of the greatest value to farmers and to the community generally'.

237 Macdonald, Massey's Imperialism and the Politics of Phosphate, p. 20.

238 Massey to Milner, 23 Jun 1919, MS. Eng hist. 700/264, Milner Papers. This author has found no trace of Massey's submission to Cabinet. It seems that he decided to leave this until he arrived back in New Zealand.
The same ratio was applied to the cost of buying the Pacific Phosphate Company, estimated at £3 million. On 2 July Hughes, Lloyd George and Massey officially signed the Nauru Island Agreement.

With the fate of Samoa and Nauru sealed, direct interest in the Peace Conference faded rapidly for the New Zealanders. Massey, however, was kept busy with his membership on the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of War and Enforcement of Penalties. This body was under the chairmanship of the American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing. According to American historian James. F. Willis, the Commission was established to 'study questions concerning the origins of the war and culpability for it, offences against the laws and customs of war in its conduct, and the constitution of a tribunal to try the accused'. Massey's appointment signalled Lloyd George's commitment to implement his hard-hitting election pledges on war crime punishment. Massey, a well-known hardliner, believed that the 'Kaiser was a criminal, and should be made to answer for his crimes'.

Between 3 February and 29 March Massey attended eleven meetings of the Commission. The plenary sessions provided the ideal forum for the New Zealand Prime Minister to vent his spleen. These meetings were often the scenes of prolonged and rather stormy conflict between the American and British delegates. Massey insisted that Kaiser Wilhelm II should not be granted immunity because the Commission would be failing in its duty to all those who had suffered. Besides, according to Massey, 'one British King had been tried and executed'. He advocated that the Kaiser should be extradited from the Netherlands to be tried in a court of justice on the criminal charge of being an accessory to murder. Massey's obdurate stance brought him into direct conflict with Lansing, who had little respect for men like Massey whose 'intellect was prostituted to political ends'. Lansing vehemently

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239 ODT, 5 Jul 1919, p. 9. The existence of this newspaper report contradicts Weeramantry's claims that the agreement was a secret. See Weeramantry, Nauru, p. 55.


241 'Preliminary Peace Conference Protocol 29', 25 Jan 1919, FO608/156/511/1/5; 'Minutes', 4 Feb 1919, FO608/148/489/1/1. On 25 January Lloyd George nominated Massey to be one of the two British delegates on the Commission.


243 NZPD, v. 183, 5 Dec 1918, p. 822.
THE FATE OF FRITZ
A Just Peace—or, Just a Piece?

The Allied Council having granted Germany an extension of time in which to sign the Peace Treaty, or to dodge, or otherwise decide its fate, the mailed announcements that no little anxiety existed in Europe as to whether the Peace bells would ring on Thursday or the agony be prolonged. Owing to rumors of intrigue, of liberal concessions in the Treaty, and the early admission of Germany to the League of Nations, France is said to be apprehensive of Germany emerging from the war with diplomatic victory superior to the Allied military victory—in which case Fritz may yet wake up and wonder the winners.
'opposed the international punishment of war crimes, believing observance of the laws of war should be left to the discretion of military authorities of each state', stressing the lack of precedent and innovation involved in bringing the Kaiser to justice. Massey labelled the exemption of heads of states from war crimes as a 'very extraordinary doctrine'. The British Solicitor-General, Sir Ernest Pollock, privately informed Lloyd George that the Americans remained 'reluctant to create the possibility of their President ever being incriminated'.

As Chairman of the Sub-Commission on Criminal Acts, Massey zealously catalogued no less than thirty-two criminal acts. Massey's report concluded that the Central Powers waged war 'by barbarous or illegitimate methods'. He recommended the creation of an investigative body to complete the list of the crime allegedly committed by the Central Powers. Massey's efforts won high praise from Pollock and the British Attorney-General, Sir Gordon Hewart. Pollock wrote to Massey informing him that: 'Without skill and judgment this task might have proved an interminable one, and it is to your power of getting the Sub-Commission to work discriminatingly, and its members to co-operate together, that we owe the succinct, yet sufficient and accurate table of crimes that forms part of our completed report'. The New Zealand Prime Minister was also proud of his work. He told Bell: 'Occasionally I am left for a week on my own resource as sole representative for the British Empire. When I come back to New Zealand I shall be passing as an authority in International Law!!'

On 12 March the full Commission reassembled to finalise its report. Lansing renewed his objections, stating that his unalterable opposition to any judicial prosecution of the Kaiser. The American delegation remained firmly opposed to the idea of international war crimes trials. He informed the Commission that the American judges would seek the freedom to boycott any planned trial in which they did not wish to participate in. The Commission was left with no choice and both sides began working on separate reports. According to Willis, 'the European delegates

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245 Pollock to Lloyd George, 29 Mar 1919, F/27/1/2, Lloyd George Papers.

246 Pollock to Massey, 30 Mar 1919, MS1398, Massey Papers; OW, 12 Mar 1919, p. 35. The Otago Witness reported that the members of the sub-commission 'appreciated his practical views of policy matters, his directness of method, and his shrewd judgment'.

247 Massey to Bell, 17 Mar 1919, MS5210/102, Bell Family Papers.
ranged against the Americans and the Japanese, whose imperial government did not want to call into question the inviolability of any monarchs.²⁴⁸

On 29 March the Commission released the two reports. Both sides affirmed Massey's finding that Germany and the Central Powers initiated a premeditated plan of aggression designed to provoke the Allied Powers into war. The Commission concluded that Germany had worked deliberately to defeat conciliatory efforts of the Allied Powers and had violated the neutrality of Belgium. The European report proposed that enemy persons, including heads of state, should be liable for criminal prosecution in violation of the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity. They proposed the creation of an international court composed of five Allied judges to try all persons. The Americans rejected the establishment of an international court to try heads of state on the grounds that it was unprecedented and would lead to the erosion of the very conception of sovereignty. The American delegation opposed the trial of the Kaiser and questioned the right of the Allies to constitute a tribunal composed solely of belligerents. Instead, the Americans proposed that various Allied national military tribunals should try all persons, except heads of state.²⁴⁹

On 2 April Lloyd George raised the question of responsibilities in the Council of Four. There were early signs that Lloyd George would bow to American pressure as he distanced himself from apportioning blame for the war on the Austro-Hungarian Emperor Karl.²⁵⁰ Strongly supported by Clemenceau, Lloyd George defended the European report, insisting that the Kaiser should be extradited and brought to justice by an international tribunal under the auspices of the League of Nations. Lloyd George saw this issue as a crucial test of the League's credibility as a strong international organisation. Wilson offered some token resistance, casting doubts over the Kaiser's culpability and the legality of bringing individuals to trial for acts committed under military orders. He pointed out that they would be setting a 'dangerous precedent' with the creation of an ex post facto tribunal for the punishment of international war crimes. Wilson feared that not all future victors would dispense justice as impartially. At this stage, Wilson made no mention of the fact that the ex-President of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis, was indicted for treason and imprisoned for two years by his conquerors.²⁵¹

²⁴⁸ Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg, pp. 74-5.
²⁴⁹ Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg, pp. 75-7.
²⁵¹ Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, pp. 312-3; Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg, pp. 77-9. Also see G. C. Ward with R. Burns and K. Burns, The Civil War:
Meeting of British Empire Delegation and War Cabinet in Lloyd George’s flat, Paris, 1 June 1918, Daily Mirror, HNKY 2/2/42, Archives of Lord Hankey of the Chart, Churchill Archives Centre.

On 9 April the Council accepted two clauses on war crimes drafted by the American delegation. The first clause established the right to trial enemy persons accused of violating the laws and customs of war before Allied national or mixed military tribunals. Lansing had thus managed to exclude civil or international tribunals and violations of the laws of humanity. The second clause provided for the extradition and creation of a five-member tribunal to bring Wilhelm to trial. The Kaiser would not face a criminal charge but 'a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties'. With slight amendments these proposals became the basis of the articles 227 to 230 inserted in the Treaty of Versailles.252

At least two prominent historians disagree over whether this compromise represented a victory for American or British aims. Willis argues that the arrangement heralded a 'triumph' for Lansing and Wilson. Lloyd George had failed to establish the principle that national leaders could be held criminally accountable for their actions. The United States had succeeded in its opposition to international war crimes punishments and the Kaiser would be indicted on the lesser charge of violating Belgium's neutrality. On the other hand, Tillman believes that Wilson 'yielded' to the demands of Lloyd George and Clemenceau. The articles incorporated European proposals for war crime trials of individuals accused of violations of the law of war and the trial of the Kaiser by an international panel of five Allied judges.253

Massey was disappointed at the Council's decision to moderate the conclusions of the European report. He remained opposed to the leniency the American clauses represented and he wrote to Lloyd George seeking modifications to the war crimes clauses. Massey informed Lloyd George that if the American clauses were included in the final draft of the peace treaty, the changes would constitute an unjustifiable interference 'with the recommendations and intentions of the Commission'. Massey considered the first clause a 'serious limitation' to the dispensing of justice and punishment. It narrowed the range of criminality by excluding violations of the laws of humanity, opening up the possibility that 'perpetrators of the atrocities' would escape unpunished. Massey was particularly vexed by the clause's intention that a

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An Illustrated History, New York, 1990, p. 407. It should be remembered that Jefferson Davis was never put on trial. He was released on bond and he could not bring himself to ask for a pardon.

252 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, pp. 311-4; Massey to Lloyd George, 24 Apr 1919, F/36/4/9, Lloyd George Papers. Tillman argues that British views on the question of responsibilities prevailed over the moderate American position. But Massey saw the Council's decision as a serious interference with the 'recommendations and intentions' of the Commission's report.

253 Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg, pp. 80-1; Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, p. 313.
military tribunal could only convict all persons guilty of violating the laws of war. He could not help thinking that in the majority of cases 'a satisfactory result' was more likely to be obtained from civil proceedings. Massey wanted the option of civil or military trials fully restored in the war crimes articles of the treaty.²⁵⁴

The composition of the Allied tribunal to prosecute the Kaiser greatly disturbed Massey. He opposed the right of the United States to be represented on the five-panel judiciary. Massey felt that Lansing's threat to the Commission disqualified the United States from assuming the responsibility and privilege to take part in a 'tribunal constituted by the opposite party'. Massey certainly remained committed to a trial of the Kaiser but he was more interested in the actual punishment he would receive. He feared that the charge of 'a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties' held no punitive admonition from the court. Even if the Kaiser was found guilty on these charges, Massey knew 'he could not be shot, or hanged, or put in gaol, for the simple reason that he is not being tried as a criminal'. He remained 'convinced that such a proceeding will not do justice to the millions who have suffered miseries from the crimes committed during the war period, nor will it give satisfaction to the citizens of the Allied countries'. Massey's perception of justice remained simple: 'either the ex-Kaiser is responsible for, and guilty of, the offences attributed to him, or he is not'. Reminiscent of those Allied nations seeking rectitude in the aftermath of the Second World War at Nuremberg, Massey appealed to Lloyd George to see that the conference administered justice 'without fear or favour'.²⁵⁵

Lloyd George informed Massey that his points were 'under consideration'. Beyond that he made no promises. Within the BED the punitive aspects of the treaty were causing headaches for Lloyd George. The South African delegation led by Smuts and Botha objected to the war crimes articles for not specifically identifying individual war criminals. But Lloyd George remained committed to strengthening the clauses. Despite the stubborn resistance of the Council Lloyd George's persistence paid off and he managed to secure on 1 May the elimination of the statement that the Kaiser was not charged with a criminal offence.²⁵⁶ The whole episode disillusioned Massey and he later recalled how 'astonished' he was to find differences of opinion in Paris on how to proceed with the punishment of war crimes. He could not 'understand the doctrine which would allow the head of a State to escape being tried by . . . a Criminal

²⁵⁴ Massey to Lloyd George, 24 Apr 1919, F/36/4/9, Lloyd George Papers.
²⁵⁵ Massey to Lloyd George, 24 Apr 1919, F/36/4/9, Lloyd George Papers; Massey to Allen, 26 Apr 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers; 'Peace Conference in Drew, (ed.), The War Effort of New Zealand, p. 211; NZPD, v. 184, 2 Sep 1919, p. 42.
²⁵⁶ Lloyd George to Massey, 30 Apr 1919, F/36/4/10, Lloyd George Papers; Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg, p. 82.
Court, and for a criminal offence, if he was alleged to be guilty'. As a realist, Massey accepted the inevitable. He reconciled himself to the fact that the Kaiser would never be brought to justice.\textsuperscript{257}

Disappointed by the frustration of his efforts to punish those guilty of war crimes, Massey followed up his 1917 Imperial War Conference suggestion that the Gallipoli Peninsula should be placed under British control. Massey wanted to ensure that Gallipoli became a shrine to New Zealand's participation in the war 'so that in years to come the relatives of the men who took part in the fighting there may be able to visit and so pay a last tribute of respect to the memory of the soldiers whose service to the Empire was equal to the best British traditions'.\textsuperscript{258} He asked Sir Louis Mallet, the Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to stake an ANZAC claim to 'some hundred of acres in Gallipoli'. Massey wanted this provision inserted in the peace treaty with Turkey so that the ground where the fallen ANZAC troops lay could be 'preserved and consecrated as a memorial to them'.\textsuperscript{259} To facilitate New Zealand's part in making peace with the Turks, Massey ensured that Mackenzie was granted with 'Full Powers' to enable him to sign the treaty.\textsuperscript{260} As far as Massey was concerned, this was the only direct New Zealand interest in the protracted negotiations over the fate of the Ottoman Empire.

In contrast to Massey's valuable contribution, Ward played a diminutive role at the conference. Ward's presence in Paris came in for some harsh scrutiny. The \textit{Otago Witness} could not see the 'necessity of dual representation of New Zealand' at the conference. The editor considered it 'decidedly obvious, even to the neatest intelligence, that the presence of Sir Joseph Ward might easily have been dispensed with'.\textsuperscript{261} This was in part attributable to Massey's failure to secure him a seat on the Reparations Commission, a position eventually assigned to the uncompromising Hughes. As a result, Ward's direct participation was restricted to attending BED meetings twice a week and a handful of plenary sessions, which he found to be of little use.\textsuperscript{262} Isolated from the intimate meetings of the Dominion Prime Minister's

\textsuperscript{257} NZPD, v. 184, 2 Sep 1919, pp. 41-2.
\textsuperscript{258} Massey to Lloyd George, 5 Feb 1919, F/36/4/7, Lloyd George Papers; Massey to Bell, 17 Mar 1919, MSS210/102, Bell Family Papers; Massey to Allen, 26 Apr 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers; \textit{ODT}, 15 Apr 1919, p. 5. Massey informed Bell that on his 'recommendation, I think that Great Britain will secure title to the Gallipoli Peninsula'.
\textsuperscript{259} Minutes', 18 Feb 1919, FO608/116/385/3/3.
\textsuperscript{260} Massey to Hurst, 26 Jun 1919, FO608/162/515/1/12; Curzon to Balfour, 21 Jul 1919, FO608/162/515/1/12.
\textsuperscript{261} OW, 12 Mar 1919, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{262} Massey to Lloyd George, 24 Jan 1919, F/36/4/5, Lloyd George Papers; Massey to Lloyd George, 24 Jan 1919, F/36/4/6, Lloyd George Papers; Massey to Lloyd George, 24 Jan 1919, PM9/8, Thomson Papers; Massey to Allen, 26 Apr 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers; 'Peace Conference Protocols',
and the Council of Ten, Ward found that he could exert little influence over Massey and he complained that he was never consulted. Inevitably, their wartime relationship began to unravel as peace drew closer. Both leaders became restless and turned their attention towards the New Zealand political scene. The major question confronting Massey and Ward related to the future of the National Government: would the wartime coalition government survive the peace and the two parties merge? Both leaders obviously did not think so. The National Government had outlived its useful purpose by helping to provide a stable political platform in which New Zealand's war effort could be managed. Even the spectre of Bolshevism failed to bridge the personal animosity. While they remained leaders of their respective parties, a permanent union of Reform and Liberal elements would prove impossible to forge. In Paris Ward began working on a new radical Liberal manifesto and Massey instructed Reform members to make his own election 'safe'.

As the post-war political landscape began to dominate New Zealand thoughts in Paris, the reparations question came to be debated as part of the general peace settlement. At the BED meeting held on 11 April Massey and Hughes were 'bludgeoned' into submission by Lloyd George to accept a compromise, which allowed an impartial Inter-Allied Reparations Commission to assess Germany's liability and capacity to pay. Massey initially opposed the proposal, fearing that the postponement of the imposition of a final figure on Germany would merely extend the wrangling over reparations and Germany would escape payment of the whole costs of the war. Having committed himself so publicly to making Germany pay an indemnity in proportion to the Dominion's population and war expenditure, Massey could not return to New Zealand and confront his opponents in a general election empty handed. He was bitterly disappointed that the Reparations Commission could not reach a consensus calling the meetings a 'fiasco'.

Eventually Massey dropped his objections in the face of hostile criticism from the whole BED. Lloyd George warned that Wilson would leave Paris and Botha predicted

FO608/156/511/1/5. Initially Massey asked Lloyd George to consider Ward for a position on the commission dealing with national ports, waterways and railways.

263 Bassett, Sir Joseph Ward, p. 243; Allen to Stewart, 26 Mar 1919, MS985/1/1/3, Downie Stewart Papers.

264 GGNZ to SSCols, 5 Jun 1919, CO209/300/457.


266 Massey to Allen, 26 Apr 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers.
THE BING BOYS COMING HOME AGAIN
HAIR-RAISING RECEPTION AWAITS THEM.

New Zealand's official tourists, Prime Minister Massey and Sir Joseph Ward, are due to arrive by the H.M.S. Niagara again next Tuesday, the 6th instant, after their third trip to old London. No doubt many hands will be extended to welcome them, and it is to be hoped the two great Statesmen will be able to satisfy the multitudinous demands of the people, who have exercised much pathetic patience during their absence.
that exorbitant reparations would encourage a Bolshevik putsch in Germany. The whole issue threatened the stability of Europe and the peace conference was in danger of collapsing if demands for greater reparations persisted. Lloyd George asked the members of the BED if they were prepared to remobilise their military contingents for the maintenance of a large occupying force. Faced by such convincing arguments Massey retreated from his hard-line stance and reluctantly endorsed the majority verdict of the BED. In doing so, Massey had left his options open and he appeared to be far more accommodating than Hughes, who insisted that Germany should have to pay the full costs of the war. Massey felt there was no point in fixing a final sum if Germany could be made to pay more.

On 7 May Massey and Ward witnessed the presentation of the draft treaty to the German delegation in the Trianon Palace at Versailles. The Allies gave the German Government delegation fifteen days to submit its written observations on the draft treaty. Massey expressed his disappointment at the leniency of the reparation clauses, which did not force Germany to pay the 'full cost' of the war. He admitted that Great Britain and the Dominions could only expect to recover 25 per cent of their war costs. Massey was careful to point out that extreme reparation demands would only serve to spread the Bolshevik message in Germany. He told the press that it would be very easy to find 'flaws' and 'imperfections' in the treaty but he called for unity to counteract the weaknesses of the treaty. On 29 May the Germans issued a damning critique of the draft, refusing to sign the treaty because it violated the principles of Wilson's Fourteen Points and the pre-armistice agreements. Over the next two days Lloyd George's summoned the BED to his apartment to discuss Germany's reaction to the peace treaty. On 1 June Lloyd George asked the delegation if they favoured the draft treaty in its present format and if not, were they prepared to negotiate concessions with Germany to encourage an early signing.

Massey experienced great 'difficulty' in answering 'yes' or 'no' on the subject and he suggested that the important points of the draft should be closely studied one by one. He blamed the current difficulties on the American domination of the peace talks and

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267 M. L. Dockrill and J. D. Goold, *Peace without Promise: Britain and the Peace Conferences, 1919-23*, Hamden, 1981, p. 56; Massey to Lloyd George, 23 Jun 1919, F/36/4/19, Lloyd George Papers. Massey informed Lloyd George of his fear that 'it may be some time before any dividend will be forthcoming as a result of payments from the enemy by way of reparation. I trust, however, that when that time does come, the interests of New Zealand will receive fair and equitable consideration'.

268 See 'Peace Conference Protocols', FO608/156/51/1/5.

269 *NZH*, 9 May 1919, p. 6; *NZH*, 10 May 1919, pp 9-10.

he frankly admitted that he did not understand the position of the Fourteen Points.\footnote{Hughes to Munro-Ferguson, 17/19 May 1919, MS696/2800, Munro-Ferguson Papers. Hughes considered the Fourteen Points a 'mill stone' around the necks of the BED.} Given America's opposition to excessive reparation demands, Massey reported to Allen that 'Wilson seems to be able to exercise a dominating influence and British interests very often appear to be compelled to take second place in consequence'.\footnote{Massey to Allen, 26 Apr 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers.} Despite the 'sustained pressure' of practically the whole BED, Massey supported Lloyd George's refusal to renegotiate the reparation clauses and settle on a fixed sum. Even though he considered the clauses 'dangerously indefinite', the Inter-Allied Reparations Commission now represented Massey's best hope to recover some of New Zealand's staggering war debt under the contentious heading of pensions and disablement allowances.\footnote{NZH, 10 May 1919, p. 9; Massey to Lloyd George, 23 Jun 1919, F/36/4/19, Lloyd George Papers.} New Zealand had incurred a debt roughly the equivalent of £100 per capita and he doubted that Germany had suffered proportionately as much. Massey feared that any fixed sum now would be too small, as the BED had clearly swung in favour of a more moderate peace. Ironically, one of the reparation clauses greatest opponents had now become one its greatest champions. In Massey's opinion: 'Germany caused the war, Germany lost the war, and Germany should be compelled to pay as far as possible'.\footnote{BED Meeting 33#, 1 Jun 1919, CP351/1/4/7, Garran Papers; Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise, pp. 69-75; Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, pp. 344-56; George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, v. I, pp. 691-720; A. Lentin, 'A Comment', in M. F. Boemeke, G. D. Feldman and E. Glaser, (eds.), The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years, Cambridge, 1998, p. 225. Also see ODT, 19 Mar 1919, p. 5. Massey informed the press that 'Germany was responsible for the war. Germany must be compelled to pay every sovereign which it is possible for us to collect'.}

Smutts mounted a comprehensive attack on those sections of the treaty that he considered too harsh and observed that Massey's version of a Carthaginian peace would end in renewed hostilities. Massey dismissed Smuts's criticism by arguing 'that immunity from punishment encouraged crime'. Massey was no apostle of a soft peace. He wanted to prevent any resurgence of German militarism. The League of Nations was no guarantee of security and he refused to reimburse Germany for property confiscated in Samoa and New Zealand. He even doubted that a treaty firmly committed to Wilsonian principles could produce a lasting peace. Logic dictated that there was nothing to be gained from granting concessions to the Germans. He did not want the BED to alter the German colonial settlement or repudiate the war guilt clauses. Massey feared that 'the next generation would probably see a still more
terrible war' anyway. To underline his conservative hardline approach, Massey wanted the Kaiser charged on a 'moral offence'.

Ward argued that on the grounds of expediency compromises should be made to induce Germany to sign. Ward belonged to a group which British historian Michael Graham Fry has identified as the 'tactical revisionists' and his views closely resembled Churchill's. The War Office feared that a renewal of hostilities would have catastrophic effects on Great Britain's dwindling military power and that Great Britain would be unable to defend British interests in India, the Middle East and Turkey. Ward was therefore against prolonging the naval blockade and a march into Berlin. In Ward's view, Germany was entitled to early membership of the League of Nations as soon as its armed forces were reduced to 100,000 men. At this point, Ward argued that the Allied occupation of the Rhineland should cease. Ward saw the League as 'an insurance scheme for the future peace of the world'. He wanted to conciliate German democracy and not drive it in desperation toward Bolshevism. Germany's entry would provide a bulwark against Bolshevism. Ward would respect territorial readjustments where possible but the reparation clauses were his principal concern. Unlike Massey, Ward agreed with the rest of the BED that the reparation clauses were not 'workable'. He considered the arrangement to leave the final sum to be imposed on Germany to the assessors of an Inter-Allied Reparation Commission till after the Peace Conference as a severe 'weakness'. In Ward's mind, Germany would never 'undertake an unknown liability' and he urged the imposition of a moderate fixed sum of £11 billion without interest. Under perfect circumstances, Ward considered himself to be one who 'would not concede an inch to an enemy' but he beseeched Lloyd George to make the 'necessary concessions to the Germans to bring about peace'.

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276 M. G. Fry, 'British Revisionism', in M. F. Boemeke, G. D. Feldman and E. Glaser, (eds.), The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 575-6. Fry has pointed out that two groups emerged during the BED meetings to discuss the German reply to the peace treaty - 'the tactical and the ideological revisionists, the realists and the enragés'. He has concluded that Lloyd George led the former and Smuts the latter and that Ward 'stood with Churchill, against Bolshevism and in fear of a Russo-German alliance'.

277 Ward to Lloyd George, 2 Jun 1919, F/36/4/17, Lloyd George Papers. Lloyd George made no reply to Ward's letter. According to Dockrill and Goold, he neither had 'the time nor the inclination to read much of this material'. See Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise, p. 75. Also see Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, p. 352. It is interesting to note that Lloyd George used Ward's phrase 'unknown liability' in the Council of Four on 2 June when he submitted the BED's concessions on the reparation clauses. Lloyd George explained the BED's scheme and stated 'there was something in the contention that Germany should not be presented with an unknown liability'.

At the end of the meeting Lloyd George secured a resolution outlining the concessions the BED was prepared to offer Germany. British interests were seemingly unaffected by the proposals. It was agreed that the Council should be persuaded to allow modifications of Germany's eastern frontier, leaving the predominantly German speaking parts outside Poland's borders. Germany should be promised early membership of the League of Nations provided that it fulfilled its treaty obligations. The occupation of the Rhineland should be reduced both in terms of time and numbers. A fixed sum of reparations should be sought three months of the signing of the treaty, with the stipulation that if the German offer was unacceptable, the original clauses would be invoked. To Massey's relief no alterations of the German colonial settlement or pension reparation clauses were included. The BED agreed that if the Council refused to cooperate with its proposal the British Army and Navy would not participate in the invasion or blockade of Germany.278

On 2 June 1919 Lloyd George submitted the BED's proposals to the Council of Four. Over the next fortnight the Council debated the changes recommended by Lloyd George. In that time he managed to persuade Clemenceau and Wilson to accept the idea of a plebiscite along the German-Polish border in Upper Silesia and that the reparations clauses should remain unaltered, unless Germany made an offer of an acceptable fixed sum for the restitution of damages within four months of the signature of the treaty. Germany would also be admitted to the League of Nations 'in the near future' on that condition that the country was meeting its treaty obligations. In terms of the occupation of the Rhineland, Lloyd George met heavy resistance from Clemenceau who remained firmly opposed to any modifications. On 16 June Lloyd George and Wilson achieved a modest breakthrough, and Clemenceau agreed that if Germany produced evidence of genuine goodwill the fifteen-year occupation period might be reduced. On the same day the Allied counterproposals were delivered to the German delegation and the Council agreed that no further concessions would be granted. On 22 June the Allies issued an ultimatum to the German Government and it was given twenty-four hours to accept the treaty unconditionally or face the termination of the armistice. The shattered German Army was too weak to resist an Allied invasion and the next day the German Government agreed to sign the treaty. The historic event was scheduled to take place on 28 June in the magnificent surroundings of the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles.279

Within the BED there was some debate as to whether or not the Dominions would be allowed to become separate signatories. Despite Colonial Office fears that it would undermine the diplomatic unity of the British Empire, Borden forced the issue. On 12 March he circulated a memorandum based on his profound conviction that the time had arrived when 'the Dominions should be recognized in the Family of Nations and should take in international councils the place which they had gained by their intervention and effort in the War and by the valour of their armies'. Borden received Massey's concurrence and support from the BED's legal adviser, Sir Cecil J. B. Hurst, who admitted that 'it is impossible now to relegate the Self-Governing Dominions to the positions which they occupied in the ancient days in which the Colonial Office still appear to dwell'. The formula adopted by the BED would see the Dominions sign separately and the treaty would have to be ratified by their Parliaments before the Crown could give assent for the whole British Empire.

On the 28 June 1919 Massey lined up with other Dominion representatives in the Hall of Mirrors. Right up until the last minute his participation in the ceremony remained in doubt. Massey faced a revolt from some of his Reform backbenchers and Allen warned him that if Ward returned first he could take control of the National Government. From this position Ward could set the legislative timetable and strengthen his election chances. Allen informed Massey that his absence from New Zealand had been a 'disturbing element' and he advised Massey to return at the earliest possible convenience. To make matters worse, Liverpool had reneged on a promise to grant a dissolution to Massey in the event of the National Government separating. Liverpool strenuously denied that he made such an unconstitutional bargain with Massey. Bell informed his leader that Liverpool was secretly conspiring with the Liberals to return Ward to power. Bell shared Massey's rather paranoid view that

280 Borden, (ed.), Robert Laird Borden, pp. 920-1, pp. 953-61; Hurst to Milner, 23 Apr 1919, FO608/162/515/1/12. Hurst told Milner that it would be 'impossible to put the clock back and say on this occasion that the Dominion Delegates were not authorised to act on behalf of their particular Dominion'. For Colonial Office opinion see Tilley to Hurst, 2 May 1919, FO608/163/515/4/8. The Colonial Office insisted that nothing should appear in the preamble or elsewhere in the treaty to show that the Dominions had the power to sign only for that part of the Empire. On Hurst's reaction to this suggestion see 'Minute', by C. J. B. Hurst, 7 May 1919, FO608/163/515/4/8. Also see Wall, 'William Ferguson and the Paris Peace Conference, 1919', p. 73. Also see Keith, (ed.), Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions 1918-1931, pp. 14-6.

281 Sir P. Griffiths, Empire into Commonwealth, London, 1969, pp. 250-1; Keith, Dominion Autonomy in Practice, p. 57; 'Versailles Peace Treaty, 1919', IA20/5. The treaty stipulated that there was 'no obligation upon any of the Dominions of the British Empire unless and until it is approved by the Parliament of the Dominion concerned'. Also see Keith, (ed.), Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions 1918-1931, pp. 12-6; New Zealand Consolidated Treaty List as at 31 December 1996, pp. 6-10 and p. 60.

Liverpool liked the prospect of a crisis: 'I think you are nearly right in your idea that he thinks more of Ward and Myers than of us'.

Some weeks before the signing of the peace treaty Sir Joseph Ward and his entourage left Paris for New Zealand. Lloyd George wrote to Massey asking him to remain behind for the final settlement, expressing his 'anxious' need to have Massey's 'counsel and support'. The British Prime Minister did not have to worry as Massey had already decided that as New Zealand's sole representative he would have to stay and sign the peace. For the occasion, Massey searched Paris and found an ancient seal bearing the initials 'N.Z.'. After South Africa's General Jan Smuts, Massey scribed his initials and surname to become the seventeenth signatory. With this act, Massey had established New Zealand's right to accede to the treaty and had simultaneously secured membership of the League of Nations in all respects the same as that of the other members of the international community. He told the throng of journalists that 'universal relief' would greet the news and he was looking forward to a period of rest and normalcy. At this time he reminded them of the suffering caused by German war atrocities and the 'treachery' at Scapa Flow. He declared: 'Never again'. Massey wasted no time so he did not hang around for the elaborate French celebrations. Thanks to trains, planes and automobiles and a Royal Navy destroyer, Massey raced down the English Channel in a desperate attempt to catch Ward. Twelve hours later Massey boarded Mauretania at a quarter past two in the morning near Portsmouth.

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283 Massey to Bell, 15 Feb 1919, MSS210/049, Bell Family Papers; Liverpool to Bell, 29 Apr 1919, MSS210/049, Bell Family Papers; Bell to Liverpool, 30 Apr 1919, MSS210/049, Bell Family Papers; Bell to Massey, 2 May 1919, MSS210/049, Bell Family Papers. Massey accused Ward of 'intriguing' with the Red Feds and instructed Bell to make this known to Liverpool to persuade him to grant a dissolution.

284 Balfour to Massey, 3 Apr 1919, FO608/162/515/1/12; Balfour to Massey, 3 April 1919, MS1398, Massey Papers; Balfour to Ward, 19 Apr 1919, ADD. MS. 49697/81, Balfour Papers; Crowe to Curzon, 8 Jul 1919, FO608/162/515/1/12. On the eve of Ward's departure, his 'full powers' of Sir Joseph Ward were restored to him by the British Government. But Balfour asked Massey to explain to his Liberal colleague that the 'possession of a Full Power must not therefore be taken as necessarily implying a right to sign the Treaty'. Also see NZPD, v. 184, 2 Sep 1919, p. 48. I have not been able to date Ward's exact departure from Paris but in Parliament Massey claimed that it was 'some weeks' before the 28 June.


286 Massey to Allen, 18 Mar 1919, PM9/8, Thomson Papers; Massey to Allen, 2 Jun 1919, PM9/8, Thomson Papers. Also see NZPD, v. 184, 2 Sep 1919, p. 39. Massey admitted to Parliament that at one time he had made up his mind to leave Paris without signing.

287 *ODT*, 3 Jul 1919, p. 5.

288 *Versailles Peace Treaty, 1919*, IA20/S.


290 *ODT*, 3 Jul 1919, p. 5.

291 Long to Massey, 30 Jun 1919, WRO947/573/85, Long Papers; *ST*, 30 Jun 1919, p. 5; *OW*, 30 Jul 1919, p. 39; *Dom*, 11 May 1925, p. 10. The Otago Witness carried a classic editorial on Massey's journey: The political jealousy so apparent all the way through culminated in Mr. Massey's headlong
It is surprising that so few New Zealand historians have concentrated on Massey and Ward at the Paris Peace Conference considering that their diplomatic achievement was substantial for such a small country. Massey may not have been a 'force' at the conference yet his contribution was in no way 'bland' or invisible as one historian has described it. Up until this point no other New Zealand statesmen had been so aggressively independent and successful. While some of their aims were compromised and unrealised, the core of their objectives was accomplished. The New Zealand delegation accepted this truth of diplomacy. Massey described the peace process as 'the effort to adjust all sorts of Allied difficulties and differences'. Massey and Ward knew that compromise was the very essence of peace making. Without it there would be no peace. The salient factor for them was New Zealand's separate representation at Paris. Ignoring public opinion Massey and Ward had fought, in the words of Keith Murdoch, 'a vigorous crusade' for dual representation in Paris and New Zealand moved briefly to the centre stage. Not only could they pose as British statesmen, but also as representatives of a small nation as part of the British Empire.

At the Peace Conference, Massey had shown a certain amount of finesse and cunning, especially in his partnership with Hughes. Initially, Massey and Hughes worked harmoniously to serve their congruent interests, which embraced the colonial settlement, reparations, and the sanctity of their domestic immigration laws. They worked effectively as a team to blunt what they considered to be the main threat to their inimical interests: Wilson's idealism. Their co-operation provided a formidable barrier to the other delegates. Eventually, as the issues were settled one by one, the Massey-Hughes relationship began to deteriorate. The fate of Nauru sealed Massey's reputation as Hughes's bête noire. Massey had shown tenacity when his suggestion that the island should be held in a joint mandate was flatly rejected by Hughes and he quickly came up with a winning formula that Great Britain should hold the mandate. Massey's success can be attributed in a part to the personality of Hughes. The Australian Prime Minister's aggressive character and bullying tactics contrasted nicely with the New Zealand Prime Minister's relaxed style and seemingly reasoned approach to the peace talks. While the relentless Hughes juggernaut collided into one

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292 Bell to Massey, 2 May 1919, MS5210/049, Bell Family Papers. Bell described Massey as a 'force'; Gordon, New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power, p. 48.
293 NZH, 9 May 1919, p. 10.
294 NZT, 8 Feb 1919, p. 1.
problem after another, Massey carefully avoided the bloodletting, enhancing New Zealand's reputation as Great Britain's most loyal Dominion. From an Australian perspective, it might be considered that he took the coward's way out, allowing Hughes to bear the brunt of the criticism in his fight for an 'Australasian Monroe Doctrine' in the South Pacific. But Massey had little sympathy for Hughes. He found his Australian counterpart to be 'rather troublesome', suffering 'from the great disability of not being trusted to speak for his Country and of having to refer everything back to Australia'.

In his relationship with Hughes, Massey could be accused of ignoring New Zealand's post-war interests. Trade relations between the two countries deteriorated in the inter-war years. Australia refused to grant New Zealand reciprocal preferential treatment. Massey complained of Hughes and the fact that he was 'most unreliable and done nothing to assist me in anything where the interests of New Zealand have been concerned'. However, the Australia-New Zealand relationship remained a partnership of convenience. It could be renewed at any time when the common interests of the two Dominions were threatened by the diplomacy of the British Empire. For example, at the 1921 Imperial Conference Massey and Hughes repaired their alliance to fight for a continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Both considered harmonious Anglo-Japanese relations essential to ANZAC security in the South Pacific. At the 1921 Imperial Conference, Massey warned that if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not renewed, 'the British Empire ran the grave of turning a "loyal friend into a very dangerous opponent"'.

Compared with Hughes, Massey became respected by his peers for his usual 'plain straight forward manner' and his qualities of 'honesty and common sense'. He brought a pragmatic vision to the BGD and showed an ability to respond to international idealism where possible despite a natural inclination to promote 'a definite firm peace with Germany'. Apart from his vitriol during the discussions over the mandate system, Massey advocated policies that did not endanger the

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295 See 'Hughes Monroe Doctrine Speech 1 June 1918', MS1538/23/2988, Hughes Papers; Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes, pp. 55-65.
296 Godley to Allen, 7 Feb 1919, WA252/5, Godley Papers; Godley to Allen, 7 Feb 1919, MI15/6, Allen Papers; Hughes to Watt, 31 Jan 1919, CP360/8/1/3.
297 Massey to Allen, 26 Apr 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers.
300 NZH, 9 May 1919, p. 6.
goodwill generated by New Zealand's valuable military contribution to the British war effort. While his motives were just as selfish as Hughes's, Massey did not share his Australian counterpart's abrasive manner or aggressive tendencies. British leaders preferred him to Hughes and members of the British secretariat like Amery were greatly impressed by Massey's ability considering his lack of formal education. He did not seem as precious or as egotistical as Hughes. In fact, Massey's relationship with Lloyd George came to fruition as the Peace Conference. It could be argued that Massey was useful to Lloyd George as the perfect foil to both Hughes's petulance and Wilson's impractical idealism. Even though Massey may not have possessed Botha's great oratory skills, Milner's 'bold originality' or Ward's 'easy fluency', the New Zealand Prime Minister 'got on very well' with Lloyd George and the other political heads including his kindred spirit Clemenceau. So well in fact, Lloyd George wished Massey a 'hearty' good Christmas. In return, Massey offered Lloyd George advice on the Irish problem.

On other hand, Massey's relationship with the American delegation represented his greatest personal failure at the Peace Conference. Massey's intense Anglo-centrism and realist conception of diplomacy brought him into direct conflict with President Wilson. Ward's meddling hand also played a part. Massey missed a vital opportunity to establish good relations with the United States and to bring American weight to bear on Japanese expansionism in the Pacific. In cooperating with the Americans, he might have been able to enhance New Zealand's security. Instead, Massey appeared intransigent and extreme in his attempts to punish Germany and annex Samoa. He conveniently blamed the United States for frustrating his own peace aims and making the Paris Peace Conference 'unbusinesslike'. Massey felt that 'it would have been far better had the Conference began with the discussion of the actual peace terms rather

303 SSCols to GGAust, 5 Oct 1921, CAB21/217/244; GGAust to SSCols, 26 Oct 1921, CAB21/217/242; Massey to Hankey, 9 Aug 1921, CAB21/217/247; Clement Jones to Hankey, 11 Sep 1957, HNKY 24/2/209, Archives of Lord Hankey. Hughes refused to permit the publication of Clement Jones' book, the BED Secretary, on the British Dominions at the Peace Conference. Massey did not object to its publication. Also see Eggleston to Fitzhardinge, 18 Nov 1952, MS423/6/11, Eggleston Papers. Eggleston, a Liberal in politics, left the Australian delegation after two months in protest over Hughes' performance in Paris. He described Hughes as 'egotistical', 'greedy for publicity' and that his policy 'was narrowly Australian and unidealistic'.
304 George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Volume I, p. 1034. Lloyd George described Massey as '[s]hrrewd, sensible, direct and single-minded, [and] his very appearance inspired a feeling of strength in the fight'.
305 Massey to Bell, 17 Mar 1919, MS52101/02, Bell Family Papers; Massey to Allen, 13 Feb 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers; George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, v. 1, pp. 257-62.
306 Lloyd George to Massey, 22 Dec 1919, F/36/4/20, Lloyd George Papers; Massey to Lloyd George, 11 Nov 1921, G49/43; Massey to Lloyd George, 11 Nov 1921, F/7/4/32, Lloyd George Papers; Lloyd George to Massey, 13 Nov 1921, G49/43.
than take up so much time with such matters as the League of Nations'. He found Wilson to be a rather 'specious' politician and he resented Wilson's domination of the peace conference. Massey found Clemenceau's company far more convivial.

Personalities aside, Massey and Ward achieved significant results for New Zealand. Along with Hughes, Massey shifted temporarily the focus of British policymakers to the Pacific region where the interests of New Zealand and Australia predominated over imperial concerns. On Samoa and Nauru, Massey achieved the substance of what he wanted. He worked tirelessly for New Zealand's interests in this region, securing Samoa as an integral portion of the British Empire, acquiring cheap phosphates for the economic development of the Dominion and eliminating the German threat in the Pacific. With the establishment of the mandate system and the defeat of the racial equality clause, Massey could also claim to have contained Japanese expansionism. According to the New Zealand diplomatic historian Anne Trotter: 'Superficially at least, New Zealand's security seemed to be enhanced by these arrangements.' New Zealand would not have been quite as comfortable in 1939 had it not been for Massey's efforts at the Peace Conference in liquidating Germany's empire and preventing Japan from fortifying its Pacific Islands.

With the benefit of hindsight, some of Massey's aims, while seemingly successful at the conference, did not develop as hoped. He failed to conclude the whole Pacific question once and for all. Massey had delusions of grandeur that the entire Pacific would become a British sphere of influence. Whether this represented a manifestation of his British Israelite convictions requires further investigation and it is well beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet we can say with some assurance that Massey saw the Peace Conference as an excellent opportunity to revisit the whole Pacific question. Massey wanted a complete readjustment in the government of the New Hebrides, Fiji and Tonga, advocating the exchange of territory as the basis of any negotiations. In spite of his persistence, the French refused to discuss the fate of the New Hebrides. Balfour bluntly informed Massey that the New Hebrides 'had nothing to with the Peace Conference. This is clearly the French view also'. The British were just as

307 Godley to Allen, 7 Feb 1919, WA252/5, Godley Papers; Godley to Allen, 7 Feb 1919, M1/15/6, Allen Papers; Massey to Allen, 13 Feb 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers; Massey to Allen, 26 Apr 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers; Massey to Guthrie, 3 Mar 1919, PM9/49, Thomson Papers.
308 Barrington, 'New Zealand and the Search for Security 1944-54', p. iii.
310 Massey to Guthrie, 3 Mar 1919, PM9/49, Thomson Papers.
311 Massey to Milner, 3 Feb 1919, MS. Eng. hist. 700/243, Milner Papers; Milner to Massey, 11 Feb 1919, MS. Eng. hist 700/244, Milner Papers; WCP 157#, Massey to Balfour, 27 Feb 1919, FO608/175/555/1/1; WCP 246#, Balfour to Massey, 12 Mar 1919, FO608/175/555/1/1; Massey to Milner, 28 Mar 1919, FO608/175/555/1/1; Minutes of the Sub-Committee of the Imperial War Cabinet
reluctant as the French to approach issues outside the immediate scope of the peace talks. Milner deflected Massey's suggestion that New Zealand could administer Fiji, by promising that the British Government would consult the New Zealand Government over any future adjustment to Fiji's administration.\textsuperscript{312}

It could be argued that Massey's short-term objectives also undermined the viability of New Zealand's long-term security interests. The harshness of the Treaty of Versailles did not effectively crush German power and it only encouraged the development of resurgent nationalist Germany under the Nazis in the 1930s. New Zealand's decision to support the Anglo-Japanese Secret Agreement of 1917 could also be criticised as shortsighted. The acquisition of the islands north of the equator encouraged and legitimised Japanese expansionism. Japan had increased its geographical proximity to Australia and New Zealand and the restrictions of the C class mandate were deceptively weak. The conditions of the mandates were mere paper tigers in reality. In the end, Massey finally acknowledged the reality of the Japanese threat to New Zealand security by promoting the need for a powerful British naval presence in the Pacific and the development of a first-class naval base at Singapore.\textsuperscript{313}

In terms of winning an indemnity for New Zealand, Massey's aspirations were severely dented by the peace process. Initially, Massey left Wellington promising to extract the full cost of the war to New Zealand from the peace treaty, which he calculated to be £100 million.\textsuperscript{314} Over the peace negotiations, Massey's hopes were dashed and he gradually reduced his reparation demands as it became clear that the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{312} Massey to Milner, 3 Mar 1919, MS. Eng. hist 700/257, Milner Papers; Milner to Massey, 15 Mar 1919, MS. Eng/ hist. 700/260, Milner Papers. Also see Escott to Hughes, 4 May 1918, MS1538/23/56, Hughes Papers. The Governor of Fiji suggested to Hughes that the United States should control Western Samoa and New Zealand should be allocated Fiji, 'if they find the limits of their own Dominion too confined'. Escott saw no reason why the indigenous population could not send three or four members to sit in New Zealand's Parliament.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{313} See McGibbon, \textit{Blue-Water Rationale}, pp. 93-114.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{314} Massey to Lloyd George, 23 Jun 1919, F/36/4/19, Lloyd George Papers.}
BED would not support hefty payments.\textsuperscript{315} On his return to New Zealand Massey admitted defeat, claiming that 'one man's opinion does not go far in a Conference of sixty or seventy members'. He had to be satisfied with the right to confiscate all German property in New Zealand and Samoa and the reparation clauses that included reimbursement for disablement allowances and pensions for the civilian dependents of combatants.\textsuperscript{316} Massey tried to put a brave face on the settlement. He predicted that New Zealand could reasonably expect £12 million for the pensions and disablement fund over the next thirty years.\textsuperscript{317}

The New Zealand delegation had gone to Paris expecting to crush Germany and solidify the power of the British Empire. Of the two ministers, Massey played the more prominent role in ensuring that New Zealand's interests were not forgotten by Great Britain. He even found time to negotiate an extension of the imperial commandeering.\textsuperscript{318} The debates concerning important issues of policy at the Peace Conference confirmed the simple fact that Great Britain could not have pursued a peace settlement entirely separate from Dominion interests. For Massey, the Peace Conference demonstrated that New Zealand's interests could be safeguarded with the imperial framework. This in part helps explain what has been termed by scholars as Massey's 'sceptical' or 'lukewarm' attitude towards the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{319} While he could find no 'fault with the object or the theory of the League of Nations', Massey did not think that the League constituted an adequate replacement for the security provided by the British Empire. While he stressed his 'hearty support' for the new international institution, he did not want the New Zealand public to be ' lulled into a false sense of security'. With remarkable prescience, Massey did not believe that the League of Nations would 'put an end to war'. Instead, he wanted New Zealand to accept that its 'existence as a nation' depended upon a strong Royal Navy capable of defending the whole British Empire.\textsuperscript{320} At the Peace Conference, Massey had fought

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\textsuperscript{315} Massey to Bell, 17 Mar 1919, MS5210/102, Bell Family Papers; Massey to Allen, 26 Apr 1919, Box 9a, Allen Papers. \textit{NZPD}, v. 184, 2 Sep 1919, p. 43. Massey told Allen that he expected to receive £20 million in reparations for New Zealand.

\textsuperscript{316} Massey to Lloyd George, 23 Jun 1919, F/36/4/19, Lloyd George Papers.

\textsuperscript{317} \textit{NZPD}, v. 184, 2 Sep 1919, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{318} 'Department of Imperial Government Supplies: Review of Operations Covering the Period From the 1st April, 1918, to the 31st March, 1919, Including An Appendix Showing Results to 23rd August, 1919', \textit{AJHR}, 1919, v. 2, H.-38, p. 2. In January 1919, the British Government agreed to purchase all New Zealand meat up until 30 June 1920.


\textsuperscript{320} See \textit{NZPD}, v. 184, 2 Sep 1919, pp. 39-40; BED Meeting 9#, 20 Feb 1919, CP351/1/4/7, Garran Papers; Miller, \textit{My Diary at the Conference of Paris with Documents, Volume XX}, pp. 313-7.
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doggedly to ensure that New Zealand's voice had been heard on this point. After all, the maintenance of a strong and powerful British Empire had consistently been New Zealand's paramount national interest during the First World War.
Conclusion

The war had brought notable changes within the Empire. Before that great conflict the Dominions were more or less dependencies of Britain, and they looked to her and her navy and army for their defence in the event of trouble. The war taught them - and it taught the rest of the world also - how really strong they had become.

PRIME MINISTER WILLIAM MASSEY
The New Zealand School Journal, 1922.

The First World War of 1914-19 was the bloodiest in New Zealand's history. The official statistics reveal the human cost for New Zealand society. Out of a population of just over 1 million people, 59,483 New Zealanders were killed, wounded or captured. An estimated 18,166 New Zealanders were killed and 41,317 were wounded. Overall, New Zealand casualties in the First World War exceeded the combined total number of casualties suffered by New Zealand in all the other wars of the twentieth century.¹

Given the unprecedented scale of human and material sacrifice exacted by the conflict, the First World War represented a crucial test of British-New Zealand relations. Sleeman was correct on this point.² The effects of the prolonged struggle on the relationship were, however, more ambiguous than historians have traditionally assumed. This conclusion is in keeping with the latest historical research. In his excellent study on Anglo-Australian relations during the First World War, Australian historian Eric Andrews has referred to this phenomenon as the 'schizoid impact'.³ Historian Robert Holland has argued in The Oxford History of the British Empire that during the war the British Empire was both 'united and divided; it fuelled British solidarities, and defined emergent nationalities; it was driven by continental commitment, yet it reinforced a bias beyond Europe; it encouraged the liberality of reform, but accentuated the temptation of repression'.⁴ In his recent examination of the First World War's impact on the British Empire, British historian Stephen

¹ Studholme, Record of Personal Services During the War of Officers, Nurses, and First-Class Warrant Officers, p. 383; McGibbon, (ed.), The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History, p. 80. According to McGibbon: 'The term 'casualty' encompasses all those who become ineffective through death, injury, illness, or capture'; NZOY 1923, p. 52. In 1914, New Zealand's total population was estimated at 1,084,662 persons.
Constantine has also argued that the war created an 'illusion of imperial unity' yet encouraged the emergence of more assertive Dominions.\(^5\)

The impact of the First World War on British-New Zealand relations was just as confusing and variegated. While close wartime co-operation seemed to represent an affirmation of New Zealand's loyalty to the British Empire, the war provoked a practical assertion of national self-interest by New Zealand. Early indications in August 1914, however, suggested that New Zealand would live up to its reputation as the most loyal Dominion in the British Empire. New Zealand's leaders offered to send an expeditionary force and were committed publicly to support the British Empire to 'the last man and the last shilling'.\(^6\) This imperial rhetoric was followed swiftly by military assistance to the British Empire. In August 1914 New Zealand sent a force on 'a great and urgent Imperial Service' to occupy German Samoa. Without question, New Zealand sent troops to the remote battlefields of Gallipoli, the Middle East, and Europe. In February 1915 New Zealand also agreed to have all its exportable meat purchased by Great Britain under an imperial commandeer system. In contrast to Australia, New Zealand introduced conscription in August 1916 to ensure a steady supply of combat troops for the Western Front.

At the official level, the First World War strengthened the bonds of the British Empire to New Zealand. As the Dominions were required to contribute more and more of their resources to the Western Front, New Zealand was vaulted into the inner circle of imperial policy-making. As Andrews has pointed out: 'At the time it seemed to bring nearer the dream of the imperial federalists'.\(^7\) Paradoxically, the Imperial War Cabinet proved to be the ideal forum for New Zealand to voice its concerns and interests. Far from being content to follow the British line, the New Zealand Government monitored British behaviour rigorously in order to ensure that its interests were not compromised. If New Zealand's interests were neglected, the Colonial Office received a telegram of complaint from Wellington. New Zealand 'disloyalty' or protest often shocked Great Britain sufficiently into modifying its policies or act in a direction congruent with New Zealand's interests. In the sphere of imperial relations, New Zealand did not always act alone. Sometimes in conjunction


\(^7\) Andrews, The ANZAC Illusion, p. 5.
with the other Dominions, New Zealand had to discourage the British instinct to guide the British Empire over certain policy issues.

The realities of power politics during the First World War reinforced Great Britain's importance to New Zealand. The mechanisms of wartime co-operation gave New Zealand the vital opportunity to influence the formation of British war policy. Throughout the war, Wellington received privileged information and at times, especially after the resignation of Asquith in December 1916, intimate consultation. The direct link between New Zealand and Great Britain through the Colonial Office, the Governor, and the Imperial War Cabinet, enabled New Zealand to protect its interests in the relationship. The advent of the Imperial War Cabinet gave Massey and Ward an unprecedented voice and status in the running of the British war effort. New Zealand historian and diplomat, Brook Barrington, has noted the importance of such channels of communication. Not only did they provide New Zealand policy-makers with intelligence and a range of other information on international affairs which they otherwise would have had no chance of gathering but they also provided an opportunity for New Zealand policy-makers to influence the policies of that country which had the mantle, at least until the Second World War, of the world's greatest power. No other country so small could claim such an esteemed patron-client relationship.8

The British Empire, with Great Britain at its centre, was a powerful alliance of which New Zealand wanted to be a part. It offered New Zealand a privileged place in world affairs. Consequently, New Zealand's principal policy-makers believed that the country's interests were served best by remaining an integral part of the British Empire. At the same time, New Zealand considered Great Britain owed its central place in the partnership to being the most powerful and influential member rather than the progenitor of the Dominions.

From the British point of view, New Zealand's attitude during the First World War demonstrated that its support could not be taken for granted. British policy-makers realised that they could not expect New Zealand to follow the British lead with blind subservience. They recognised that New Zealand's support was based on a combination of consultation and shared interests rather than unconditional loyalty. Conversely, New Zealand learned the sharp lesson that Dominion concerns did not always rank as important as the various other considerations British policy-makers

8 Barrington, 'New Zealand and Search for Security 1944-54', p. 4.
had to take into account while fighting a war. British policy-makers expected a greater degree of understanding and sympathy from New Zealand on problems created by the war such as the shipping policy. It was not within British power to appease or underwrite New Zealand's national interests during the war. Other issues invariably took precedence in the British pursuit of victory. British policy-makers were forced sometimes to implement policies detrimental to New Zealand's interests to achieve this ultimate goal.

In hindsight, the impression that New Zealand consolidated its loyalty to Great Britain during the First World War is misleading. While New Zealand's contribution to the war effort had been substantial it was not as overwhelming, or as impressive, as has been popularly believed. A comparison with the other Dominions is instructive. While New Zealand led the Dominions with the highest percentage of its male population serving abroad with close to 20 per cent, the introduction of conscription inflated this figure. In comparison, Australia and Canada sent almost 14 per cent and South Africa 11 per cent all without resorting to compulsion. The figures for volunteering also suggest that eligible New Zealand men were not as enthusiastic as their Australian counterparts to die for the British Empire. According to Paul Baker, the proportion of Australian men who volunteered was consistently higher than in New Zealand during the war. Australia also suffered the highest death rate as a percentage of those mobilised with 14.5 per cent, followed by New Zealand at 12.4 per cent, Canada at 9.7 per cent and South Africa at 5.1 per cent. Contrary to Andrews's view, if bare statistics do represent a nation's courage and devotion, then Australia should at least share the podium with New Zealand as the British Empire's most loyal Dominion.

The New Zealand Government's decision to participate in the First World War was also not simply an instinctive manifestation of imperial loyalty or the automatic response of a country exhibiting a sharp "mother complex". New Zealand had its own reasons to fight Germany, a fact obscured by the constitutional arrangements of the British Empire and the frequent expressions of loyalty. The New Zealand Government's willingness to send troops into combat demonstrated that it had a keen appreciation that a British victory would protect New Zealand's vital interests. By August 1914, over 78 per cent of the total value of New Zealand exports were sent to

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Great Britain and over 95 per cent of the country's population were of British origin.\textsuperscript{12} The decision to commit military resources to the conflict also reflected the congruency of interests that existed in British-New Zealand relations. Both countries had a keen interest in defeating Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. New Zealand's active participation in the war, therefore, represented the culmination of a line of thinking based on the primacy of Great Britain, the concept of collective security obligations and the stark assumptions about the menace of German militarism. The identification of these issues made it clear that New Zealand's decision to play an active military role in the First World War was based on perceived national interest.

The New Zealand Government concluded that the importance of the British link for the Dominion's long-term interests justified the contribution of an expeditionary force. The New Zealand Government was convinced that New Zealand's involvement was necessary to preserve its standing with Great Britain and to defeat Germany. This argument was not controversial. Throughout the war, there was widespread political and domestic support for active military involvement. The country's future was deemed inextricably intertwined with the fate of Great Britain and the outcome of the war. Prior to the war, alongside an undercurrent of pro-imperial sentiment, there were real apprehensions about the threat of the German Empire and aggressive militarism. Within this context, a more nationally-oriented policy could not have been articulated than Liverpool's phrase; 'to make any sacrifice'.\textsuperscript{13} It is difficult to see how the country could have averted the terrible costs of the war without endangering New Zealand's vital relationship with Great Britain on which its national interests hinged.

Having adopted a policy that New Zealand would be served best by a British victory, New Zealand's policy-makers strove to achieve this objective without impinging on the country's other interests. In other words, New Zealand support for the British Empire was qualified. New Zealand's leaders were extremely conscious of the need to limit the country's military involvement to meet those ends without diminishing public support for the war effort. It was at times a difficult balancing act. Although supportive of the British war effort in public, the Government remained reluctant to expand its military contribution in the First World War to the detriment of its own political and economic interests. In this context, military catastrophes were unwelcome. Such disasters discouraged the number of volunteers, decreased New Zealand's manpower, and created an unfavourable political environment for the

\textsuperscript{12} NZOY 1919, p. 349 and p. 89.
\textsuperscript{13} GovNZ to SSCols, 5 Aug 1914, G41/1.
continuation of the war effort. The failures at Gallipoli and Passchendaele fed a growing New Zealand awareness of British fallibility and the inability of the British military hierarchy to mastermind a decisive victory. This made New Zealand authorities extremely conscious of the costs of an expanded military commitment and the impact on public support. They were unwilling to use married conscripts and they were sensitive to domestic political criticism.

The difficult task of managing New Zealand's war effort fell principally on Alien's shoulders. While he bore the brunt of public criticism for the wastage of New Zealand life, Alien did his best to contain such hostility by limiting New Zealand's sacrifice. By adopting the stance that the maintenance of a division represented the absolute ceiling of New Zealand's military commitment, he did his utmost to ensure the sustainability of the country's military contribution and support for the war. Alien actively sought to balance New Zealand's various domestic considerations such as the well-being of the economy against the need to safeguard New Zealand's perceived longer term interests by preserving harmonious relations with Great Britain and defeating Germany. Accordingly, he always reacted very cautiously to British requests for more men and advocated an "equality of sacrifice" amongst the Dominions of the British Empire. The entry of the United States also produced the very real possibility that New Zealand's military contribution would be modified without imperilling the military situation on the Western Front. In spite of these developments, Alien could still claim that New Zealand maintained the strongest division of the Allied armies until the end of the war.14

While British-New Zealand relations remained intact at the end of the First World War, the imperial partnership had been strained. To some extent, this was unavoidable given the protracted nature of the war and the heavy human and material costs involved. But unlike Vietnam fifty years later, the First World War did not provoke widespread public criticism, or dissent regarding the close association with a great power. Even during the worst days of the military quagmire on the Western Front, there was little domestic questioning of New Zealand's active support for the British cause and the fearful consequences it entailed. There were several reasons for this. Prior to the war, there were real apprehensions about the rise of the German Empire and the threat that it posed to the British Empire on which New Zealand's livelihood and existence depended. Massey spoke of the need to protect 'the weaker nations of the world against tyranny'.15 Great Britain was New Zealand's most

15 Dom, 24 Sep 1914, p. 6.
important trading partner and source of capital investment, technology and people. The British Empire also provided the defence framework on which New Zealand based its security. There was general public acceptance that a Germany victory would have had disastrous consequences for New Zealand. Public support for the war remained strong because of the widespread consciousness of what the German threat meant for the British Empire. New Zealand had tangible national interests at stake in pursuit of victory during the First World.

The two major political parties, Reform and Liberal, were united on the need for New Zealand's involvement in the war. With the creation of the National Government in August 1915, this political consensus on the war became formalised. New Zealand's political power focussed itself on developing an optimum wartime strategy, which could best help secure victory for the British Empire. The management of public support became a key element for the continuation of New Zealand's involvement. With this in mind, the media were censored and could not trigger widespread domestic questioning about New Zealand's combat role. While there were challenges to the level of New Zealand's military contribution, especially during the middle years of the war, New Zealand's active participation was never questioned seriously. The weakness of the opposition was another major factor. The nascent labour movement remained fatally divided until 1916, and the few dissenting voices that did exist to challenge the prevailing orthodox were ruthlessly oppressed, gaoled, or forcibly sent overseas. This was after all 'illiberal' New Zealand.\(^\text{16}\)

It seems clear from this study that New Zealand, in comparison with the other Dominions, did not enjoy a 'special relationship' with Great Britain during the First World War. The idea of a loyal New Zealand sacrificing its own interests in pursuit of victory underestimates the congruency of British and New Zealand interests. It also ignores the numerous instances where Great Britain and New Zealand disagreed. The initial wave of New Zealand enthusiasm and euphoria that greeted the outbreak of war in August 1914 could not survive the rigours of a four-year war of attrition. Within the first months of the First World War, Massey illustrated his determination to protect New Zealand's economic interests and, during the escort crisis, his own political reputation. He wanted to have the best of both worlds. He hoped to demonstrate New Zealand's support for Great Britain without placing undue strain on New Zealand's resources.\(^\text{1}\)

As the war dragged on this balancing act became increasingly difficult. Gradually, as the military casualties and unexported agricultural surpluses accumulated, New Zealand became disillusioned with British leadership. There appeared to be little commensurate gain for New Zealand’s enormous human sacrifices, forcing the National Government to voice its concern over the shortage of shipping, the price paid for New Zealand meat under the imperial commandeer system, and the failure of the British Government to curb the monopolistic tendencies of the American Meat Trust. New Zealand’s policy-makers considered that those in Whitehall forgot New Zealand’s interests in regard to the allocation of merchant shipping, the price of New Zealand meat, and the level of reinforcements. By 1916, as the British weaknesses and failures became more apparent, New Zealand wanted a greater say in the overall management of the British war effort. While the creation of the Imperial War Cabinet placated New Zealand calls for real consultation and a mutually beneficial partnership, it was also symptomatic that the First World War had reinforced New Zealand’s awareness that it had recognisably different interests from Great Britain.

In retrospect, there is little doubt that New Zealand consistently pursued a policy based on a pragmatic assessment of its national interests during the First World War. By sending an expeditionary force overseas to the Middle East and Western Europe New Zealand was following its own analysis that an Allied victory over Germany was vital to its interests. Admittedly such a decision was predicated and justified in terms that stressed New Zealand’s loyalty to Great Britain. Ironically, such a strongly imperialist policy cleverly disguised a positively nationally orientated decision. By making the Dominion a combatant nation, New Zealand’s policy-makers demonstrated that the country was prepared to actively maintain the price of a strong prosperous British Empire.

In terms of assessing the long-term implications of the First World War on British-New Zealand relations, our understanding is restricted by the lack of in-depth historical analysis of the inter-war period. Some commentators, seeking to promote the advantages of an "independent" New Zealand in world affairs, have argued that New Zealand stepped back from the mainstream of Dominion thought, eschewing any notions of autonomy or independence advanced by the First World War. They have

17 Ross, ‘Reluctant Dominion or Dutiful Daughter? New Zealand and the Commonwealth in the Inter-War Years’, JCP, v. 10, 1 (March 1972), p. 36; McGibbon, Blue-Water Rationale, pp. 376-7; Barrington, ‘New Zealand and Search for Security 1944-54’, p. 9. According to Barrington: 'The association of independence with belligerence perhaps explains why those who subscribe to this view have recognised an independent foreign policy as only a relatively recent phenomena' [sic].

18 For an interesting historiographical discussion on the intellectual origins of this interpretation see McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, pp. 54-5.
presented a bleak picture of New Zealand's involvement in external relations, criticising Massey for seemingly being devoid, or incapable of national thought, and content to rely upon the wisdom of Whitehall when it came to foreign policy issues. The most forceful proponents of this interpretation have been economic historian J. B. Condliffe and J. C. Beaglehole. Writing on the New Zealand contribution of the £1 million towards the construction of Singapore Naval Base in the post war years, Condliffe remarked how New Zealand, under the influence of Massey's "robust imperialism", had been more 'unreasoning' and 'uncritical' than any other Dominion. 

Beaglehole argued that New Zealand shunned the idea of equal nationhood and 'preferred not to smoke and drink with its emancipated sisters' during the inter-war years. In his view, New Zealand 'remained a colony' and a harbinger of 'psychological retardation' in the immediate years following the First World War. Historians such as I. G. F. Milner and W. P. Morrell shared these views. Milner characterised New Zealand prior to 1930 as an 'almost uncritical disciple of the British Government' while Morrell stated that Massey considered loyalty as the first 'political virtue' when it came to dealing with Great Britain.

Following the Second World War this interpretation gained wider recognition. It became standard practice to argue that prior to the First Labour Government, New Zealand showed little interest in foreign policy issues separate from Great Britain. New Zealand historians such as F. L. W. Wood referred to Massey and Ward as 'staunch Imperial statesmen' while Angus Ross argued that 'Massey sought to reinforce all the more or less natural tendencies in New Zealand towards an unquestioning loyalty to the British Empire'. This theme of regression became engrained in the emerging literature on New Zealand diplomatic history - a lasting legacy of Condliffe's influence. Historian B. K. Gordon considered that seventeen-year interval between the First and Second World Wars 'proved a low point in the development of [New Zealand] nationalism, and there was little disagreement between her and the mother country'. New Zealand historian Mary Boyd pointed out

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21 Milner, New Zealand's Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York, 1940, p. 9; Morrell, Britain and New Zealand, p. 40 and p. 53.
23 Gordon, New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power, p. 50.
that 'Massey's government refused to be dragged along the road to freedom and independence by South Africa or Canada'.

Some modern historians have uncritically accepted this version of history. The strength of Massey's nationalism continues to be underestimated. Jock Phillips has argued that Massey's lightning quick response to Lloyd George's request for military support during the Chanak Crisis in September 1922 illustrated that the mindset of imperial militarism continued to retain its hold over New Zealand society. While Canada and Australia procrastinated over the British request to pledge military support, Massey had positioned New Zealand to offer combat troops within fourteen hours of the original British request. In his seminal study on the origins of New Zealand conscription, Paul Baker concluded that the major legacy of the First World War for New Zealand was 'unprecedented Imperial loyalty'.

This type of interpretation has been unhelpful and misguided. It has skewed our understanding of the changing and complex nature of British-New Zealand relations over the twentieth century. This historical bias has denigrated the significance of the preceding years, reinforcing the dominant interpretation's claim that the arrival of an independent New Zealand foreign policy coincided with the advent of the First Labour Government. Such history is too simplistic and theoretically naïve, reducing its explanatory value. The evolution of an independent New Zealand foreign policy has been far more complex than a story of revolutionary change in 1935. As Barrington concluded in his study on New Zealand's search for security after the Second World War: 'Simply because New Zealand leaders saw it in the best interests of New Zealand to be a loyal and agreeable member of the Empire or Commonwealth did not mean that this policy was a policy decision any less independent than a decision to be belligerent'. New Zealand historians need to be more accepting of Massey's contribution to the development of a distinctive New Zealand voice as well as recognising the logic of his hesitancy in moving New Zealand away from the British sphere of influence. Until 1941 the United States remained isolationist and New Zealand had no alternative but to implement an international policy mediated through the framework of the British Empire.

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27 Barrington, 'New Zealand and Search for Security 1944-54', p. 11.
There are also some grounds for supposing that British-New Zealand relations in the 1920s and 1930s did not perhaps comprise years of regressive inactivity implied by historians. Some strands of continuity from the British-New Zealand war experience showed remarkable persistence and resilience. While substantial work on British-New Zealand relations in this period has not been published, there is evidence that Massey still remained a force to be reckoned with especially over the construction of the Singapore Naval Base, New Zealand’s labour needs in responding to Great Britain’s post-war assisted emigration schemes, and his declaration at the 1921 Imperial Conference that the Dominions had earned the right to be consulted on matters of imperial policy. The sacrifices of the First World War had made this possible. In the most unlikely place, *The New Zealand School Journal*, Massey expounded his views on the impact of the First World War on the British Empire. According to Massey, the military resource supplied by the Dominions during the First World War was the ‘deciding factor’ in the outcome of the war. He concluded:

Without these men it is probable the war would not have been decisively won. The Dominions also paid their share in the cost of the war. Recognizing this, the British Ministers took the lead in suggesting that they, as young partners in the Empire, should have a voice in its concerns. It was as if a family of sons had grown to manhood, and the father had recognized their ability by taking them into partnership in his firm.

In the immediate post-war years, Massey insisted that New Zealand and the rest of the Dominions had earned the right to have an ongoing voice in the British Empire. Massey believed that the First World War had led to the creation a new egalitarian partnership. In his view, the Imperial War Cabinet had reconciled the apparent ‘paradox’ between imperial defence policy and imperial foreign policy that existed before the war; namely, that Great Britain alone spoke for the British Empire on foreign policy issues yet when it came to matters of war and peace the Dominions were expected to supply resources to defend British decisions on these issues. At the first post-war meeting of the British Empire, the 1921 Imperial Conference, Massey expressed his concern at the re-emergence of this ‘anomaly’. Without the support of

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the other Dominion leaders, he expressed his disappointment that the consultative basis of the partnership that underpinned wartime co-operation had failed to become a permanent feature of imperial post-war relations. Massey argued that Great Britain had quietly defaulted to its pre-1916 preference of informing rather than consulting with the Dominions.\textsuperscript{31} In his view, the advent of the Imperial War Cabinet had established a principle beyond intimate consultation: 'the right to recommend some definite course to the Sovereign'. Massey considered the post-war state of imperial relations between Great Britain and the Dominions as fundamentally undemocratic. Massey warned that the British Empire, as an organic institution, needed to 'progress or decay'.\textsuperscript{32}

Massey's insistence that the Dominions had won the right to participate in imperial decision-making dominated post-war British-New Zealand relations. He employed this argument as a defensive measure against those Dominions seeking to cultivate an international profile independent of the British Empire. Massey considered the profligate tendencies of the other Dominions ill conceived in that their pursuit of independent policies threatened the imperial unity on which New Zealand's interests were based. He believed that the Imperial War Cabinet represented the pragmatic model of compromise, preserving imperial unity without interfering in Dominion autonomy, or introducing some form of imperial federalism. While he emphatically rejected the notion that the Dominions had acquired the status of independent sovereign nations by signing the Treaty of Versailles, they had consolidated their right to participate in imperial foreign policy-making. The First World War had ensured the increasing importance and status of the Dominions. In Massey's view, the Dominions had 'ceased to be dependencies of the Empire. They have become partners - partners with all the duties, responsibilities, and privileges that belong to a partnership'.\textsuperscript{33}

There is further evidence of continuity in British-New Zealand relations in the inter-war period. Following the First World War, New Zealand continued to adhere to a set of principles and modes of behaviour in conducting its relations with Great Britain. Massey consistently applied that principle of collective security to define New Zealand's longer-term security interests. New Zealand's response to the Chanak

\textsuperscript{31} See Bennett, 'Consultation or Information? Britain, the Dominions and the Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1911', \textit{NZH}, v. 4, 2 (October 1970), pp. 178-94. The British Government's "consultation" with the Dominions over the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1911 seems to be the exception.


\textsuperscript{33} NZPD, v. 184, 2 Sep 1919, p. 36. Also see Holland, 'The British Empire and the Great War, 1914-1918', in Brown and Louis, (eds.), \textit{OHBE}, p. 133. According to Holland, during the First World War the Dominions were able 'to enjoy the benefits of Imperial partnership and yet increasingly to assert a measure of independence whenever it suited their interest'
Crisis in September 1922 is a case in point. Often cited as damning evidence of New Zealand's marked "mother complex" during the inter-war years, it could be argued with equal force that New Zealand's willingness to provide military support against the Turks in September 1922 reflected tangible interests of the perceived need to meet alliance expectations. Great Britain still remained New Zealand's sole guarantor of security and most important trading partner. Massey probably believed that the failure to respond affirmatively might have weakened that guarantee and may have undercut his attempts to strengthen British defences in the Pacific. New Zealand's approach was certainly distinctive when one compares it to the reticence of the other Dominions.34

Given that the First World War seemed to secure the British Empire's position in the world, such a reflex action from New Zealand in 1922 was a logical response for its policy-makers. It was the corollary of collective security and consistent with Massey's partnership rhetoric following the war. This implicit reasoning lay behind the decision to send a military contingent to Turkey. The decision also reflected the emotive symbolism generated by the heroic sacrifice of the ANZACs in that part of the world. During the 1920s, the New Zealand public retained a firm belief in the achievement of battle as 'the essence of nationhood'. Within a week of the New Zealand Government's affirmative reply of support, over 12,000 New Zealanders enlisted to fight the Turks even though volunteers had not been called. The ANZAC soldier remained the quintessential heroic image for New Zealand society. The First World War turned few New Zealanders into pacifists.35 Even today thousands of Australians and New Zealanders make the pilgrimage to the rugged slopes of the Gallipoli Peninsula to experience the emotion and pride generated by the ANZAC Day ceremony on 25 April.

Following Massey's death on 10 May 1925, other conservative New Zealand leaders continued to protect vigorously the country's interests in the relationship with Great Britain. At the 1930 Imperial Conference the New Zealand Prime Minister, George Forbes, was just as obstinate and tumultuous as any other Dominion leader who attended, forcefully arguing New Zealand's case on a number of issues while professing support for imperial unity. Reminiscent of British-New Zealand relations during the First World War, the policies and interests of both countries sometimes overlapped, just as often they diverged. This led inevitably to personal clashes.

between New Zealand and British policy-makers. At the end of the 1930 Imperial Conference, one British official commented: 'Mr Forbes, we are delighted to meet you, but thank God you are going'.

Powerful reasons of national self-interest continued to shape New Zealand's approach towards Great Britain. The benefits of the close association with Great Britain clearly outweighed the consequences of following a solitary path. New Zealand's economic prosperity depended on the British market. British naval and military power made New Zealand secure. Even the First Labour Government adhered to these fundamental principles in conducting its relations with Great Britain. While it embraced the League of Nations as an alternative instrument to promote international co-operation, the First Labour Government recognised the primacy of maintaining harmonious relations with Great Britain when it came to war. New Zealand remained relatively privileged in the British market and the League of Nations could not provide a security guarantee no matter how much New Zealand support it received. On the eve of the Second World War, the First Labour Government still considered that New Zealand's interests were served best within the framework of the imperial partnership. New Zealand's first Labour Prime Minister, Michael Joseph Savage, acknowledged this point in his resounding declaration of support for the British cause against German aggression: 'Both with gratitude for the past, and with confidence in the future, we range ourselves without fear beside Britain. Where she goes, we go, where she stands, we stand'.

British-New Zealand relations during the First World War have received scant attention from historians. This thesis has gone some way to fill the gap. As has been argued right throughout this thesis, some historians have been working on a misguided assumption that New Zealand's leaders, by consistently following the British lead, had dismissed any thoughts of pursuing a nationalistic foreign policy. Such an approach is flawed. It reduces the significance of New Zealand's involvement in the First World War and demeans the contribution of thousands of New Zealanders who fought and died on the battlefields of Europe and the Middle East. Moreover, it

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37 See McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, pp. 1-36. McKinnon argues that: 'The experience of a Labour Government in office and the advent of the Second World War had underlined the continuity of New Zealand's foreign relations. The idea of an independent foreign policy was a version of New Zealand's status as a self-governing colony, a loyal Dominion'.
38 Barrington, 'New Zealand and Search for Security 1944-54', p. 17.
39 Savage quoted from Rabel, "Where She (Britain) Goes, We Go" But With Eyes Wide Open', Defence New Zealand Quarterly, no. 27, Summer 1999, p. 27. Also see M. Bassett, with M. King, Tomorrow Comes the Song: A Life of Peter Fraser, Auckland, 2000, p. 294.
ignores the many instances where Great Britain and New Zealand disagreed over the best way to pursue victory and the high degree of congruency in the relationship. Pfeiffer has cleverly referred to this duality in British-New Zealand relations during the First World War as 'exercises in trouble-making and loyalty'.

The simplistic orthodox interpretation also confuses legal independence with military, political, and emotional nationalism. While New Zealand may not have had the constitutional framework to conduct an independent foreign policy prior to 1947, New Zealand's leaders knew that the interests of the country were served by a powerful British Empire. It can be argued with some confidence that New Zealand had developed an international stance consistent with its own interests long before the early 1950s. Indeed, it is well overdue for New Zealand historians to embrace this perspective: that loyalty and independence are compatible. The development of nationalism does not always coincide neatly with major constitutional shifts. Equally, imperialism and nationalism are not necessarily contradictory forces; sometimes they overlap and reinforce one another. History that allows for some paradox will be able to explain the evolution of New Zealand's most important and historically defining relationship. In the process, it will be revealed how two nations developed from nominally one sovereign entity, the British Empire. In the age of globalisation, this is the most tangible way that New Zealand historians can ensure that the experience of the First World War will remain an integral part of the nation's memory rather than be seen through a muddled misinterpretation as a tragic consequence of blind and ill-judged loyalty.


42 Barrington, 'New Zealand and Search for Security 1944-54', p. 9. According to Barrington, 'commitment to alliance membership and the pursuit of an independent foreign policy need not be incompatible, and that independence might be expressed in ways more subtle than open disagreement'. Also see Ross, 'Dominion and Empire', in Stewart, (ed.), *Contemporary New Zealand*, p. 169. Ross identified this destructive historiographical trend in the late 1930s. According to Ross: 'This tendency to dismiss in a short section the Dominion's foreign policy is easily explained, because for the greater part of its history the Dominion has been well content to follow the lead given by Great Britain in such matters'.

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