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Immigration and National Identity in 1970s New Zealand

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Otago, Dunedin New Zealand

July 2003
Abstract

This thesis is an attempt to understand the evolution of national identity in New Zealand through an examination of New Zealanders' evolving attitudes to immigrants and immigration. It begins with the premise that through selecting whom to admit to New Zealand as immigrants and become New Zealanders, we are collectively expressing what we believe a New Zealander to be.

A rapidly evolving body of international literature sparked by Benedict Anderson's 1991 work *Imagined Communities*, places the self and the process of identification at the heart of understandings about national and other forms of collective identity. I draw on these models of national identity to critically evaluate the 'ethno-cultural' model of the New Zealand nation adopted by writers such as Keith Sinclair and James Belich. I contend that, in trying to write national histories which stress the unique cultural elements of the nation, these writers have produced artificially homogenous and static models of New Zealand's cultural identity. My thesis proposes that a model of national identity as a state of shared consciousness attained by a defined and mutually understood group of people is inadequate. Instead, I argue that notions both of what constitutes the nation and who belongs within its boundaries are a source of constant debate and evolve over time. I examine national identity in relation to immigration on two levels: at the level of immigration policy, which determines who is formally admitted to the nation-state, and at the level of public debate over immigration which is a more popular expression of a nation's boundaries.

The 1970s in New Zealand provides excellent material for examining both of these aspects of the relationship. The decade witnessed both significant changes in immigration policy and bitter public debate about immigration. Before the 1970s, New Zealand's immigration policy was based around a popular identification with Britain and the assumption that New Zealand was part of a British family of nations. Consequently, immigration policy strongly favoured white people from Great Britain. Britain's entry into the European Economic Community in 1973, however, forced New Zealanders to reevaluate the idea that New Zealand identity was part of a broader British identity category and this had implications for immigration policy and attitudes to British immigrants. At the same time, the arrival of an increasing number of Pacific Island immigrants, a group which fell without the boundaries of a culturally
defined nation, contributed to debate about cultural diversity and national culture. The presence of Pacific Islanders presented a challenge to the idea of the nation should or could be defined in terms of a single unitary culture. In this way, the 1970s debate over immigration can be understood as part of a broader debate about the place of multiculturalism in New Zealand.

This thesis interprets the 1970s as a pivotal time in the evolution of New Zealand identity. At the same time, by examining contestation over immigration as a manifestation of a broader uncertainty and debate about national identity, it makes a case for a broader understanding of New Zealand identity as a debate and as an evolving process.
Acknowledgements

I originally set out to write this work as a Master's thesis in 1997, believing that I would 'knock something together' in six months and then depart on a working holiday in France. While amused at my own naivety, I believe that the growth of my work in scope, in complexity and in length has reflected my own growth as an academic historian. Like all growth it has been at times both painful and extremely rewarding and I owe an enormous debt to my supervisors Barbara Brookes and Brian Moloughney in guiding me through the process. I have learnt more from both of you than I ever imagined. I also acknowledge the early input of Roberto Rabel and Judy Bennett in their capacity as supervisors.

I would also especially like to thank my wife Roopali Johri and my parents Janet and Stuart Mitchell. Both your support and criticism have been invaluable. In facilitating access to archives I would like to thank Anthony Moss and Reinold Disse at the Immigration Division, Graeme Eskrigge, formerly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Sherwood Young of the New Zealand Police, and to recognise the work of the late David Macdonald and his staff at the Hocken Library. You run the friendliest and most efficient historical research archive in the country. Others to whom I am indebted include those who I interviewed especially Frank Corner, Don Bond and Gavin Jackson. Thanks also to Ali Clarke and James Croot who cheerfully read my drafts, to my friends and colleagues among the postgrads at the University of Otago History Department and at Canterbury, your camaraderie helped to keep me sane. To Erik Olsen and Dot Page for your periodic advice and help, and to the many others who have contributed both professionally and personally to my project including Margaret and John Chetwin and Alan and Jeanette Scott, and Hung Lam, I offer my sincere thanks. Finally I would like to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the University of Otago for their financial support.

Ka nui te mihi ki a koutou katoa.

James.
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<td>AA</td>
<td>Amnesty Aroha</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACORD</td>
<td>Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination</td>
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<td>ADMC</td>
<td>Auckland District Maori Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJHR</td>
<td>Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Citizens Association for Racial Equality</td>
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<td>CARP</td>
<td>Campaign Against Rising Prices</td>
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<td>CCI</td>
<td>Cabinet Committee on Immigration</td>
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<td>CM</td>
<td>Cabinet Memo</td>
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<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
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<td>CORSO</td>
<td>Council of Organisations for Relief Service Overseas</td>
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<td>COV</td>
<td>Committee(s) on Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUSA</td>
<td>Canterbury University Students Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOL</td>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOL</td>
<td>Federation of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>HART</td>
<td>Halt All Racist Tours</td>
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<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>Housing Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>Herald</td>
<td>New Zealand Herald</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hons.</td>
<td>Bachelor of Arts with Honours</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAC</td>
<td>Immigration Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>ICCI</td>
<td>Inter-Church Committee on Immigration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICI</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDCR</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Committee on Resettlement</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEG</td>
<td>Labour and Employment Gazette</td>
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<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Department of Maori Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Master of Arts</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minfa.</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Minimmign.</td>
<td>Minister of Immigration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minlab.</td>
<td>Minister of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOOHR</td>
<td>Maori Organisation on Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWWL</td>
<td>Maori Women’s Welfare League</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Council of Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCW</td>
<td>National Council of Women</td>
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<td>NZCPD</td>
<td>New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings</td>
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<td>NZFAR</td>
<td>New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review</td>
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<td>NZFUW</td>
<td>New Zealand Federation of University Women</td>
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<td>NZHC</td>
<td>New Zealand High Commissioner</td>
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<td>NZIIA</td>
<td>New Zealand Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<td>NZIH</td>
<td>New Zealand Journal of History</td>
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<td>NZIPA</td>
<td>New Zealand Journal of Public Administration</td>
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<td>NZMC</td>
<td>New Zealand Maori Council</td>
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<td>NZMR</td>
<td>New Zealand Monthly Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZNA</td>
<td>New Zealand National Archives</td>
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<td>NZOY</td>
<td>New Zealand Official Yearbook</td>
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<td>NZPA</td>
<td>New Zealand Press Association</td>
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<td>NZPD</td>
<td>New Zealand Parliamentary Debates</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZUSA</td>
<td>New Zealand University Students Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACC</td>
<td>Pacific Affairs Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Doctorate of Philosophy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIAC</td>
<td>Pacific Island Advisory Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIM</td>
<td>Pacific Island Monthly</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Polynesian Panther Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRC</td>
<td>Race Relations Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secfa.</td>
<td>Secretary of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seclab.</td>
<td>Secretary of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPAN</td>
<td>South Pacific Action Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>Star</td>
<td>Auckland Star</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom (United Kingdom of Great Britain)</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>VPGA</td>
<td>Vegetable and Produce Growers Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>YWCA</td>
<td>Young Women’s Christian Association</td>
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Preface

Personal Identity and National Identity

I was born on 11 December, 1973 and consequently my memories of the 1970s while precious to me (and detailed in the family photo album in a series of slightly flared corduroy overalls and hand knitted woollen jumpers) are limited tools for historical inquiry. Consequently, I have discovered the cultural and political history of the decade through books and archives, which makes my experience of the 1970s quite different from almost all of the faculty in which I wrote this thesis. While for many historians today, whose understandings of the 1970s are coloured by personal memory, my own experience of the 1970s as a historian must confront the issues of designing a project based primarily around documentary sources.

One thing that is readily apparent to me is that the New Zealand I grew up in is very different from the one which went immediately before. The 1970s was a pivotal time of economic, social and political change and this was reflected in changes in the way in which New Zealanders collectively saw themselves as a nation. Before the 1970s, New Zealand’s main economic and cultural reference point was Great Britain. By the end of the decade, this relationship could at best have been described as contested. Britain’s 1973 entry into the European Economic Community send New Zealand into a period of economic uncertainty which was heightened by the effects of the 1970s oil shocks.

Simultaneously, the idea of a national culture based loosely around British values was undermined by the United Kingdom’s 1973 Immigration Act, which denied many New Zealanders the right to reside in the United Kingdom and forced them to confront the question of whether or not New Zealand was still a British nation. Alternative discourses of national identity which highlighted elements which were distinct from Britain grew stronger with New Zealanders also placing increased emphasis on Polynesian and Asia-Pacific identity.

At the same time, the very terms in which a nation was defined were evolving. As was the situation in many Western countries, the 1970s in New Zealand was a time where unified and unitary notions of cultural national identity gave way to politicisation and dispute. There was a breakdown of domestic consensus over
national identity and the idea of a single national culture became contested. The decade witnessed a great coming-out of difference. In New Zealand, Maori activists, feminists and gay rights activists joined immigrant groups in claiming recognition and acceptance of their cultural values within the institutions of the nation state.

Conversely, political activism could also appeal to nationalism. Protest movements such as the anti-Springbok tour movement, the anti-Vietnam War movement, the anti-nuclear movement and the environmental movement appropriated national values in pursuit of broad public support. One of the major tasks of this thesis will be to place changing patterns of immigration and attitudes to immigrants within the broader context of the politicisation of identity and emerging discourses of multiculturalism.

As well as the growth of identity politics, the early 1970s were a time of rapid change in parliamentary politics. Between 1972-1975, New Zealand had five different Prime Ministers. In 1972, the National Government which had been in office for nearly twelve years chose to try and refresh a tired looking government by replacing Prime Minister Keith Holyoake with Jack Marshall. Labour, however, campaigning under the slogan ‘its time for Labour’, won a landslide and Norman Kirk, who had waited patiently as leader of the opposition through two elections, became Prime Minister only to die eighteen months later in 1974.¹ Kirk was replaced by Bill Rowling, but history was against this mild mannered economist. Rowling’s Government suffered from a world economic downturn and from the brilliant populist political campaign of National’s new leader, Robert Muldoon, who restored National to government in a landslide in 1975.

Unlike the previous National Government, the three terms of National leadership that followed were neither a period of political nor economic stability. Despite Muldoon’s fundamental conservatism - he was he declared “a preserver rather than a reformer,” New Zealand was becoming increasingly divided over social issues and the idea of national values was often the terrain over which these battles were fought.²

Immigration

One of the social issues which caused greatest division was immigration. This is not surprising in light of the important changes in numbers and sources of immigrants which occurred. The period between 1971 and 1975 saw the highest rate of immigration New Zealand had ever experienced, with a net immigration of over 100 000 people and 1976-80 saw the most rapid loss of population though emigration of over 80 000 people (Appendix 1). Immigration was dominated by New Zealand’s traditional sources: Britain with a net 70 000 immigrants from 1972-8 and Australia with 35 000, but the period also saw the rapid growth of Pacific Island immigration with a net increase of almost 26 000 immigrants from Western Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, Niue and Tokelau from 1972-8 (Appendix 2).

National Identity and Immigration

What was the relationship between evolving national identity and immigration? This thesis will begin with the premise that in selecting who they thought should be allowed to enter New Zealand as immigrants and become New Zealanders, New Zealanders were expressing what they thought a New Zealander was or should be. This process occurred at two levels, at the level of government which sets immigration policy and which defines citizenship in a formal way, and on a more popular level through public opinion about immigration and about immigrants.

Most contemporary studies of the relationship between immigration and nationhood around the world have chosen to explore the question of where governments define the limits of citizenship through immigration policy. However this denies an important element of national identity, which is identification among the populous with the idea that they collectively belong to a nation. The nation is, as Ernst Renan wrote, “a daily plebiscite,” and, according to Benedict Anderson, “an imagined political community.” National identity, these two scholars argue, is not merely a question of citizenship defined by the state, but one of popular identification. A nation

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only exists as long as a group of people identify with the idea that they collectively belong to it. The material of which nations are built is the social contract.

This thesis will attempt to explore evolving notions of New Zealand national identity both through a study of the evolution of immigration policy, and through a careful study of evolving popular attitudes to immigrants and immigration. This dual approach immediately raises a myriad of methodological issues. To examine evolving immigration policy is a relatively uncomplicated process, and can be based around study of archives of relevant government agencies. But to examine popular attitudes to immigration is another matter. There is no definitive source because there has never been a single public idea of what a New Zealander is nor of who should be allowed to enter New Zealand as immigrants. Identification with the nation and defining its boundaries through attitudes to immigrants is a subjective process which, to an extent, takes place at the level of each individual. And yet, it is this very diversity of opinion, in the form of public debate over immigration, which provides the clearest picture of evolving popular understandings of the nation.

To illustrate the immigration debate, I will examine political discourses and media representations of immigrants and immigration and make cautious use of letters to the editors of a range of newspapers. Fortunately, working on the 1970s presents the historian with other tools: the relatively new field of sociometrics and opinion polling. Although such studies were sometimes flawed in their design, they offer an array of quantitative data on a range of social issues and I will make full use of these alongside more traditional sources of information about public opinion.

Contestation and change in attitudes to immigrants stretched through the 1970s. In 1970, debate over immigration centred around a new regulation requiring all Western Samoan women entering New Zealand to submit to pregnancy testing. Nineteen seventy three and four saw a major review of policy by the Labour Government, accompanied, in 1974, by a joint Police and Immigration Division campaign of night-time raids on the houses of Pacific Islanders in Auckland in pursuit of those who had overstayed visitor’s permits. Immigration was a bitterly debated issue in the 1975 election and 1976 saw a renewed series of dawn raids and later random checks of Pacific Islanders in the streets of Auckland. Finally, in 1977, the National Government launched its own review of the Immigration Act.
This study is not a history of the immigrant experience. This topic has been well treated in other works.\textsuperscript{5} It is a history of New Zealanders and how we define ourselves as a nation through our interactions with other groups. In writing it, I hope to move beyond merely identifying and condemning racist attitudes to an attempt to analyse and understand them in terms of the complexities of group identity.

The cultural landscape of New Zealand in 2002 is very different from that of 1972. Attitudes to cultural diversity have changed. Once seen by many New Zealanders as a threat to a unified national culture, it is now celebrated as the basis of a ‘bi-cultural’ or a ‘multi-cultural’ nation.

In this thesis I do not seek to obfuscate the differences between the ideologies of biculturalism and multiculturalism, but hope to place them in a historical context. As recent debate over immigration and cultural identity indicate, this shift of attitudes from assimilationism to forms of multiculturalism, began in the 1970s is still incomplete. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a multicultural identity in New Zealand is one of the most important social changes of the last thirty years, and this is due, in no small part, to immigration. This thesis will explore the unsettled beginnings of this process.

Chapter 1: Introduction

We often hear that New Zealand is a ‘nation of immigrants.’ The expression is, on reflection, a strange one. The term ‘nation’ implies a degree of group cohesion, while immigrants to any nation are, by definition, outsiders to that group coming in. The implicit challenge of developing group cohesion among a group with a constant flow of new members provokes a whole series of questions. How does an immigrant become a part of the national polity and culture? Where do the boundaries between New Zealander and non-New Zealander lie? Does the mere arrival of an immigrant in New Zealand make them a New Zealander? And if not, what are the conditions that an immigrant must meet to become an accepted member of the national community? My study is based on the premise that a study of who New Zealanders have historically chosen to accept as new members of their national community will reveal what they consider a New Zealander to be.

Most definitions of the nation ascribe to it two elements, a political entity and shared ethnicity or culture. I will, therefore, examine attitudes to immigration as they relate to national identity on two levels. Immigration policy is the expression of who is legally allowed to enter as immigrants and is set at the level of government. But the concept of a nation is more complex than the boundaries of a state. As Ernst Renan described it, a nation is a ‘daily plebiscite’ and public attitudes to and debate about immigrants are equally important in defining a nation’s boundaries.

Most systematic studies of New Zealand national identity and general histories have defined New Zealand identity in terms of the evolution of a shared national culture. Because New Zealand gained political autonomy gradually and at times unwillingly, studies of New Zealand identity have, with a few exceptions, focused on the evolution of New Zealanders’ shared cultural attributes. Historians have looked for and found elements of the New Zealand nation in literature and the arts, New Zealand’s race

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1 In fact this phrase has been attributed to John F Kennedy, Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany and Great Britain, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.


3 Renan cited in Hutchinson and Smith, pp. 15-6.
relations, sporting and military history, cultural practices, beliefs, ritual and linguistics. Many writers have identified the birth of a New Zealand nation with the country achieving economic and cultural independence from Britain.

The most notable of the cultural nationalist writers was Keith Sinclair. Sinclair, in *A History of New Zealand* (1959), demonstrated that New Zealand history could be understood as the history of the evolution of a nation. A quarter of a century later, Sinclair’s *A Destiny Apart* (1986) was written as an attempt to understand the development of New Zealand national culture.

Sinclair, however, was more than a detached observer of New Zealand nationalism, he was a nationalist and perhaps in his attempt to justify his model of New Zealand as a unified nation distinct in its culture from Britain, he presents an unrealistically homogeneous image of national culture. The last chapters of *A Destiny Apart*, which examine the experiences of women, Maori and children separately, place these outside his substantial description of the evolution of cultural nationalism in New Zealand. Sinclair’s failure to integrate the experiences of these groups into his description of the New Zealand nation is a product of two major factors; firstly, the failure of the particular cultural model chosen by Sinclair to accommodate diversity and secondly, of historical changes which occurred between the writing of *A History of New Zealand* and *A Destiny Apart*. In this period, minorities in New Zealand had become much more politicised and began to agitate for the recognition of their distinct cultural elements within the national framework.

The generation of historians who followed Sinclair in writing about identity, including James Belich and Jock Phillips, have noted that by the late 1960s or early 1970s, the definition of the New Zealand nation had become rigid and left little room for cultural diversity and that this contributed to upheaval and debate over national identity. Belich chooses 1973 as the year in which New Zealand became a truly whole and distinct nation. My study will further examine the 1970s as a turning point in New Zealand nationalism. It will show that from this decade, the boundaries of New Zealand national identity and especially of cultural national identity became increasingly contested. It will also place this historical change within the broader

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context of the challenge posed to cultural nationalism by globalisation and trans-national identity throughout the world.

I will begin this introduction with a critique of the ethno-cultural model of national identity upon which A Destiny Apart is based. I will then proceed to argue that a richer understanding of national identity and its evolution can be gained through an understanding of where New Zealanders have historically drawn the boundaries between themselves and others. Finally, I will argue that the evolution of the way in which national identity is defined and understood has substantially changed as a consequence of a rise in identity and minority politics which began in the 1970s and that this change has both influenced and been influenced by New Zealand’s immigration history.

In A Destiny Apart, Sinclair describes New Zealand’s evolving sense of nationhood as a product both of the evolution of a set of unique cultural elements in New Zealand and of growing cultural difference from Britain. In so doing he relies on what I will call an ‘ethno-cultural’ definition of the nation.

Ethnic and cultural definitions of a nation describe it as having both an ethnic (or cultural) and a political element. In his Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, Benedict Anderson summarises this relationship by describing a nation as “an imagined political community.” While vague, this definition implies the subjective, the voluntary and the political nature of the entity.\(^5\) Anthony Smith describes a nation as “an uneasy symbiosis of ethnic and civic elements,” while Bowker’s definition of a nation as a “self-aware ethnic group,” and Pearson’s as a “politicised ethnic group” stress the bonds of ethnic identity such as race, religion, territorial integrity, customs and traditions.\(^6\)


In many Pakeha interpretations of New Zealand national identity, such as that of Sinclair, cultural aspects of ethnicity are emphasised over racial. It is shared and distinctive culture that defines people as New Zealanders, not race. This does not, however, make Sinclair’s cultural definition vastly different from the ethnic nationalism described by European theorists. Ethnicity itself, after all, is culturally defined.

The other element commonly identified with the ethno-cultural nation is modernity. Gellner and Anderson identify the development of the idea of a nation around the world from the late eighteenth-century with the growth of capitalist print media, vernacular languages, national education and administrative systems. In line with the cultural definition of the nation, Sinclair looks for and finds evidence of New Zealand’s evolving identity in New Zealand’s political culture, military culture, sport, literature, the arts and ceremony. At the same time, he traces New Zealand’s move towards nationhood through the nation’s cultural and political shift from Britain.

The ethno-cultural model of the nation favoured by Sinclair has been increasingly challenged, questioned and undermined by new understandings of nations in recent years. The first challenge comes from those who point out that the model of a nation is not as simple as a politically coherent ethnic or cultural group which spontaneously vests sovereignty in a ‘nation-state’. Numerous scholars have cited examples of cases where a sense of national community is fostered by those in power to reinforce the authority of the state. Eric Hobsbawm, and to a lesser extent Anderson, explore the deliberate creation of myths of national unity by governments of dominant ethnic or class interest, and both stress the importance of national administrative, linguistic and education systems in creating national cohesion.

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This point is more vigorously taken up by those studying non-European nationalist movements. Prasenjit Duara, writing about Chinese and Indian nationalism, argues that written narratives of national history involve a subjective interpretation of the past which serves to justify the current power structure of nation-states.\textsuperscript{10} Etienne Balibar draws closer to Anderson’s definition of a nation as an imagined political community in support of this view. He claims “the imaginary singularity of national forms is constructed daily by moving back from the present into the past.” National identity, he argues, is taught not inherited, in the same way that religion, economics and politics are.\textsuperscript{11}

However, if we accept that historical representations of the nation are a reflection of contemporary national structures, this is not a death-blow for the historical investigation of national evolution. The ways in which the nation is represented through national myths, rituals and historical writing are in themselves products of historical circumstances and by studying how these representations change we can learn much about a society’s evolution. Thus, Sinclair’s attempt to define the nation should not just be understood as writing about national identity, but as an important part of the process of nation building.

With this interpretive framework in mind, I will argue that before the 1970s, New Zealand identity could be understood as revolving around a series of national myths based on an interpretation of New Zealand’s post-European settlement history. The most widely accepted of these myths were those of the classless society, racial harmony, physical toughness and versatility, a nation born of military and sporting exploits and a socially progressive and caring society. In this introduction, I will examine the evolution of these myths while much of the rest of the thesis will explore the ways in which they were challenged, contested and reinterpreted in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{12}

With few exceptions, previous studies of New Zealand national identity have focused on the country’s evolving relations with Britain. This is because the numerically and


\textsuperscript{12}Claudia Bell provides a detailed exploration of some of New Zealand’s identity myths. Claudia Bell, \textit{Inventing New Zealand: Everyday Myths of Pakeha Identity}, Penguin, Auckland, 1996.
economically dominant group since the late nineteenth century has irrefutably been New Zealanders of United Kingdom origin. Prior to the 1970s and 1980s, they defined New Zealand national political, cultural and social institutions and, through this process, were able to control and define national identity. This does not mean that New Zealand identity has always been British. It could more accurately be said that New Zealand national identity has always been defined relative to Britain. For this reason, the historical debate over New Zealand identity has been framed in such a way that New Zealand’s birth as a nation is seen as the time when New Zealanders ceased to imagine themselves as British. Debate about New Zealand’s nationhood has centred on when this occurred.

James Belich, in *Paradise Reforged*, argues that, despite New Zealand gradually gaining political autonomy, British culture in New Zealand persisted into the 1970s because of the nation’s continuing economic dependence on the United Kingdom. Other important factors in this close relationship were personal and family links reinforced by a constant flow of migrants from the British Isles. From the 1880s, New Zealand immigration policy became an expression of this attachment to Britain. Belief in British racial and especially cultural superiority also served to justify the cultural, religious, territorial and economic domination of Maori and legal restrictions placed on Chinese and Dalmatian immigrants. The 1920 Immigration Act declared what had previously been an unstated preference for migrants from the British Isles in view of New Zealand’s ‘natural affinity’ with Europe and with Great Britain in particular.

From the first Wakefield settlements, immigrants from the British Isles usually came to New Zealand in search of their idea of ‘a better life’ in a British colony or dominion. It is therefore not surprising that they came to define their new home relative to Great Britain. Indeed British settlers came to believe they had both retained British culture and improved on it. The migration process was central to this notion of improvement. The idea of a better life was both the objective of and the

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13 Belich, pp. 11-2.
14 Pearson, pp. 7-10, pp. 44-5.
16 Belich, p. 21.
justification for the long, expensive and alienating process of migration. Nineteenth-century New Zealanders aspired to build a new “Britain of the South Seas,” free of many of the evils of the parent society.\(^{17}\) In this way, New Zealand identity came to be defined both as British and against Britain, as Sinclair put it, a “distinctive blend of British and pioneering traits.”\(^{18}\)

This strangely ambivalent and seemingly contradictory notion of New Zealand’s relation to Britain is best understood within the context of recent work on British identity by Linda Colley. Colley argues that British identity, rather than an ethnic, or even a rigid cultural identity, should be understood as an umbrella identity which was imposed over the top of cultural and ethnic differences within the British Isles and throughout the Empire. British identity, she argues, was sustained both through definition in opposition to other European cultures and later through shared political and legal values and the incorporation of local elites into the government of empire.\(^{19}\)

Ian Baucom, in *Englishness, Empire and the Locations of Identity*, also defines a general cultural Britishness as it came to be understood in the late twentieth century as being distinct from particular cultural Englishness. Britishness, he argued, was a homogeneous, interchangeable shared culture of empire which left room for more than one specific cultural and ethnic identity within it.\(^{20}\) With this in mind, because New Zealand was predominantly a white settler society, its inhabitants were able to define their collective identity as different from that of the people of the United Kingdom, while still adhering to the idea that they were British in a broader sense.

James Belich argues that the particular locus-specific Pakeha British identity that emerged was a homogenous compound of British cultures - that Pakeha New Zealanders shared common elements borrowed from Scottish, English Irish and “local” cultures in different proportions to those of other white British peoples. While this framework goes some way in explaining specific distinct aspects of New Zealand culture - such as linguistic and culinary peculiarities, it does not move beyond the problems associated with Sinclair’s cultural-nationalist model of the New Zealand


\(^{18}\) Sinclair, *Destiny*, pp. 24-5.

nation. Like Sinclair’s model, it imposes an artificial uniformity on Pakeha culture and under-values the role of Anderson’s imaginary self-identification in identity formation.21

The most potent myth of New Zealand superiority to Britain was the idea that New Zealand was an egalitarian and especially a classless society.22 This idea was born among the first settlements where skilled tradesmen and labourers were able to earn much higher wages than in the mother country.23 Essential to maintaining this state of affairs was the shortage of labour and New Zealand’s relative wealth as a colony.24 This myth is one of the strongest components of the cultural boundary that New Zealanders have drawn between themselves and the British, hence it has been one of the strongest components of our national identity.

In 1959, Keith Sinclair wrote that “New Zealand must be more nearly classless... than any other society in the world.” 25 This myth was still very strong in the 1970s. In 1973, future Prime Minister Robert Muldoon wrote that “last century, many left England to get away from a class conscious society and New Zealand quickly fashioned itself an enduring egalitarian tradition.”26

Closely linked to the idea of New Zealand as an egalitarian society was the nation’s image of itself as a socially progressive and caring society. This was often identified with Seddon’s social welfare legislation, the granting of the vote to women in the 1890s and the First Labour Government’s ‘applied Christianity’ in founding a comprehensive welfare-state in response to the suffering of the Depression.27

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21 Belich does not ignore the mythology of New Zealand identity, but it does not feature in his major chapter on New Zealand identity. Belich, Chapter 7. A similar argument to Belich’s about New Zealand identity being an assemblage of other British identities in unique proportions was expounded by Miles Fairburn in his address on New Zealand identity to the New Zealand Historical Association in 2001.
24 Ausubel, p. 8.
26 Truth, 18/9/73, p. 6
Another dimension to the egalitarian myth was beliefs about sport and, in particular, rugby union. Rugby was seen as a game which fostered bonds between men across the divisions of race, class, belief and background.\(^28\) It thus provided a vehicle for the New Zealand male institution of ‘mateship.’\(^29\) New Zealand’s international success at rugby was seen as proof of the superiority of this ‘classless’ social model.\(^30\) In the words of one 1911 commentator

> All grades of opinion from the university professor to the navvy, the socialist, the free thinker, aye, any class or religious thought - Roman Catholic or Protestant - the black man, the brown man and the white man have all one common place on the football field.\(^31\)

For much of the twentieth century, New Zealanders also believed that New Zealand grew as a nation distinct from Britain through its military exploits.\(^32\) New Zealand soldiers in the Boer War and World War One revelled in their reputation as physically and morally tougher than the British. This reinforced the idea that New Zealand was a superior colonial sort of Britain.\(^33\) It is also often argued that Kiwi soldiers felt that the loose informality and mateship, particularly between officers and their men set them apart from the more hierarchical British military.\(^34\) New Zealand’s World War Two mythology records that when a British officer remarked to New Zealand commander Bernard Freyberg that few New Zealand soldiers bothered to salute he replied “don’t worry old boy. You wave to them, they always wave back.”\(^35\)

Finally, the egalitarian myth rested on Pakeha New Zealand’s pride in the nation’s race relations. By the time of the census of 1858, Pakeha had become numerically dominant over Maori and through their military and economic strength they came to

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\(^29\) Cited in Phillips, p. 19.


\(^33\) Phillips, p.153.


control much of the land. Pakeha settlers attempted to use their economic and political domination to impose upon the Maori a conformity to their British-based political and cultural norms. By the end of the nineteenth century, traditional Maori political institutions had lost much of their control and could effectively be ignored by colonial rulers.

Cultural domination was justified by the almost unquestioned assumption of British cultural and indeed racial superiority. Most Pakeha felt that it was in the best interests of Maori to assimilate as quickly as possible into the neo-British culture and economy. This was aided by the fact that, through their reputation as soldiers and sportsmen, Maori were seen as a superior non-white race, quite capable of assimilating. There was less racial legislation than in many other countries and Pakeha were proud that individual Maori could be fully accepted as equal to Europeans if they conformed to the ‘norms of society.’

Because most Pakeha under-valued traditional Maori cultural and political institutions, it did not seem to them that the demise of such institutions represented a failure of race relations. If stereotypes of Maori as lazy, happy-go-lucky or uneducated became prevalent in twentieth century New Zealand, that some individual Maori were able to overcome them and succeed in the Pakeha world seemed to prove that Maori at least had equality of opportunity. As David Ausubel wrote in 1965 “The Maori is judged on his merits as an individual. If he behaves as a European, he is treated as one.” Thus, before the 1980s, few aspects of Maoritanga were acknowledged as part of New Zealand national culture at home.

Before World War Two, many Pakeha saw the relative lack of racial tension in Aotearoa as a final proof of fair and equal relations between the two races. But this lack of tension was partly due to the pre-World War Two isolation of Maori in outlying rural communities and the infrequency of contact between the two ethnic groups. This isolation ended with massive urban migration in the post-war period.

36 *New Zealand Official Yearbook (NZOY)*, Department of Statistics (Statistics New Zealand), Wellington, 1990, p. 158.
38 Ausubel, p. 150.
39 This is ironic because Maori icons were and are frequently used to distinguish New Zealand in the international arena. Department of Labour: Immigration Division, *Living in New Zealand*, 1972, p. 11.
In reaction to Maori urbanisation, governments increased their efforts to assimilate them into the Pakeha system. The influential Report of the Department of Maori Affairs of 1962, known as the Hunn report, recommended that the best way of dealing with many emerging Maori social problems related to urbanisation was to accelerate their assimilation into Pakeha society. It concluded that “the painless absorption of the fast growing Maori population into the economic and social structure of the European is the great problem facing both races in New Zealand today.”\textsuperscript{40} The most important elements of the report concerned reform of land titles, the gradual removal of legislation which applied specifically to Maori and a push to better adapt Maori students to the school system.\textsuperscript{41} However through the mid and late 1960s, such assimilationist policies drew increasing criticism. Erik Schwimmer described them as “without true regard for traditional Maori values” and threatening to “make Maori into ‘Brown Pakeha.’”\textsuperscript{42}

The central Pakeha narrative of New Zealand cultural identity which developed before the 1970s was a form of improved-Britishness. The idea of improvement rested upon a series of beliefs or myths about New Zealand such as classlessness and racial harmony which both justified the migration process and defined New Zealand identity. Pakeha were willing and even proud to accept Maori as equals as long as they conformed to the cultural norms of their particular form of British society. However, such acceptance of individuals left little room in the national culture, or in the institutions of the nation-state, for the culture of the Maori or the smaller ethnic groups which made up New Zealand’s population.

Schwimmer’s critique of the Hunn report’s assumptions about the virtue of a homogenous national culture highlights not just cultural domination of Maori, but brings into relief a problem with the whole ethno-cultural model of the nation which attempts to define it solely in terms of a set of shared cultural values. It makes the unjustified assumption that all members of a nation agree on what the cultural elements which comprise it are. This leads to the question of where and how the

\textsuperscript{40}J K Hunn, \textit{Report of the Department of Maori Affairs}, Wellington, 1960, p. 78.
boundaries are drawn in popular definitions of a nation. In the perfect ethno-cultural nation system, all the members would agree on who was a member and who was not, but in no real nation is this the case.

These two points are addressed in European political sociology by post-modern critiques of identity theory. Keith and Pile note that all objects of scrutiny in the social sciences are incompletely constituted because of their location in relation to an observer. Thus ideas, such as the idea of the nation, are defined not in terms of absolutes, but in terms of the observer’s changing and individual relation to them. The logical implications of this are that each member of the nation perceives it slightly differently and that his idea of what constitutes his nation can also evolve over time. Identities, argue Keith and Pile, are best understood in relative terms, in terms of the constantly changing and contested boundaries that those who identify with a nation draw between those who belong and those who do not.43

If identity is inconstant and defined according to its boundaries, it is also important to understand that an individual’s identity is fractured and that her national identity does not exist in isolation from her other identities. A member of a national community may also consider herself a member of her family, her social class, her gender, her religion and a supporter of her favourite sports club. It follows that different individuals attach different levels of importance to their national identity. For example, loyalty to a nation might come into conflict with an individual’s religious beliefs as is the case of religious objectors called to fight in wars between nations. Such diversity has always posed problems for nation-states in their attempts to maintain meaningful political coherence.44

Jock Phillips, in his 1987 study of New Zealand identity A Man’s Country identifies some of these problems with unitary and unified models of the cultural nation with reference to New Zealand identity. A Man’s Country describes the historical evolution of a series of widely held beliefs about national character or identity but in so doing, it also comments on the way in which this cultural identity became rigid, conformist and intolerant of diversity. The title of the work hints at the marginalised

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place of women in the traditional Kiwi identity. Feminist and Maori critiques have also identified the gendered and ethno-centric nature of New Zealand identity, while studies of the experience of other groups have suggested that, for much of New Zealand’s history, some ethnic minorities such as Chinese were not recognised as part of the New Zealand nation.\textsuperscript{45}

These critiques led inevitably to questions about identity boundaries. Who is included in the definition of ‘New Zealander’ and who is excluded? How are the boundaries drawn and how have they evolved? As I suggested earlier, New Zealand identity, as the nation entered the 1970s, was inseparable from New Zealand’s relation to Britain, but New Zealand’s relation to Britain is clearly not the only boundary to be examined.

The substantial body of work in this field in European and North American history and political sociology provides a useful guide. Harbsmeier, for example, observes that the concept of defining a collective self and other is an important part, not just of defining, but of uniting an identity group.

        Probably every culture has its other, its own barbarians, heathens, unbelievers, savages, primitives or whatever specific “counter-concepts.” Such binary oppositions between us and them serve the dual purpose of reinforcing and defining group identity while simultaneously ordering complex difference into a simpler, homogenous entity which is more easily appropriated.\textsuperscript{46}

Thus the process of defining a group of people as a nation and identifying with that group also implicitly and inevitably involves defining who does not belong. Because a nation-state is both a cultural and a political entity, these cultural boundaries often

\textsuperscript{44}Hobsbawm, p. 8. Duara, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{46}Cited in James Duncan and David Ley, ‘Representing the Place in Culture’, in James Duncan and David Ley eds., \textit{Place/ Culture/ Representation}, Routledge, London, 1993, p. 44. Joan Scott also explores this in relation to gender and class and Linda Colley in relation to
come to be delineated politically through a state’s immigration policy and through the
civil status accorded to immigrant groups.

A study of attitudes to immigrants and immigration policy can therefore be an
important tool in understanding evolving national identity. Giraud and Stoetzel, in
studying French national identity, argue that national consciousness is strengthened
by contact with immigrants. “National consciousness,” they write,

   Is a group consciousness, which in the presence of foreigners, experiences
   the limits or the strength of its collective personality and of its identity. A
certain idea of foreigners in France gives a certain idea of what France is.47

An example of this would be that the collective term for the diverse Polynesian tribes
of Aotearoa, ‘Maori’, did not evolve until after they came into contact with Europeans
to whom they assigned the term ‘Pakeha’.48

As well as immigration heightening national consciousness, those studying European
national identities have observed that national mythologies influence the way in
which nations respond to immigrants. Rogers Brubacker, in his comparative study of
post-war German and French immigration, argues that Germany has defined its
national citizenship in terms of German descent and this has made the political and
social integration of post-war migrants from Turkey and other non-Germanic sources
difficult. In contrast, he argues that the French nation, founded around universal
principles in the French revolution, has proved more open to accepting immigrants
and their children as national citizens albeit on condition of the immigrants’ cultural
assimilation.49

Christian Joppke also finds that the ways in which the United States, Germany and
Britain have responded to immigration have been strongly influenced by the

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47 “La conscience nationale qui est une conscience de groupe, ressent en présence des
étrangers, les limites ou la force de sa personnalité collective et de son identité...Une certaine
idée des étrangers en France donne une certaine idée de la France.” Cited in Olivier Milza, Les
230.
49 Rogers Brubacker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Harvard University
particular national discourses of each state. In support of his contention, Joppke notes that in Britain at the end of World War Two, the definition of national identity was complicated by empire. As well as inhabitants of the British Isles, there were more than 800 million British subjects of whom some were of British descent and others not. Many of these subjects held British passports. In the 1960s, this situation led to tensions as immigration to the British Isles from former colonies increased. In order to control immigration, the United Kingdom turned to a racial definition of a core nation and allowed only those of ‘British descent’ to enter. This, in turn, had a profound effect on the acceptance of ‘Coloured’ immigrants and their children as part of the national community. In contrast, in the United States, the nation was defined by its constitution guaranteeing individual rights. While this left the door open for acceptance of individuals of diverse races as Americans, the identity politics of the 1960s and 1970s, including the Black Civil Rights movement was founded around arguments that specific groups were being denied supposedly universal rights as American citizens. This questioning of the myth of American individual equality in terms of America’s defining national narrative led to racialised claims for resources within the framework of the American nation-state.50

The main threads of New Zealand’s evolving national identity can be traced through the evolution of its immigration policy and nowhere is the inflexibility or the ethnocentrism of New Zealand national culture prior to the 1970s more apparent than in attitudes to immigration. For more than 130 years, at the centre of New Zealand national identity stood the nation’s relation to Britain and this was clearly reflected in New Zealand’s immigration policy. The history of controlling immigration prior to the 1970s is part of the history of building an improved ‘Britain of the South Seas’.

One policy statement from 1953 declared that

The emphasis in New Zealand’s immigration policy is, and always has been, preference for British people from the United Kingdom and selection from non-British sources has been availed of only to the extent that people

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Immigration policy was designed to encourage British migrants, including whites from Ireland and Australia and to exclude all other groups. But, as well as responding to the desire to keep New Zealand British, at times it expressed the ideals of the ‘better-Britain’: the desire to protect the working man’s paradise, the classless society and racial harmony between Maori and Pakeha.

From 1840, when the Treaty of Waitangi was signed, a technical distinction could be made between British subjects and others as immigrants. From this time, settlers, mostly British or British-Australian, began to trickle into the colony in significant numbers and, because New Zealand was a British colony, these immigrants had unrestricted rights of entry. While this freedom for British would not change before 1974, high barriers would later be erected against immigrants from elsewhere and especially against non-Europeans.

Not the least of the barriers to non-British immigration was New Zealand’s isolation. The cost and time of travel to New Zealand meant that more than any other country, governments in New Zealand could control immigration through the selective offering of assisted passages. British migrants were encouraged to come through assisted passage schemes which operated in response to the demand for labour in New Zealand. These schemes were in operation from 1874-1891, from 1903 until World War One and in the 1920s. However, heavy demand for labour and a shortage of British migrants in the 1870s forced the New Zealand Government to deviate from its strictly British policy on assisted migration and 2 000 Germans and 4 000 Danes were admitted to the schemes. Despite being considered the most assimilable of the continental Europeans, these groups were the last to be added and the first to be cut from the assisted scheme when the demand for labour receded.

The most significant other groups in New Zealand prior to World War Two were Chinese, Indians, and Dalmatians. Collectively these groups never numbered much

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more than around one percent of the population, but the way in which they were treated reveals much about New Zealanders’ perceptions of their own identity as an improved British society. These minorities were at best tolerated and at worst persecuted. From the 1880s, increasingly prohibitive legislation discouraged non-British from immigrating. From 1881, the Government placed limits on the number of Chinese a single vessel could bring, and later a poll tax, fingerprinting and strict language tests were introduced. In 1908, a law required Chinese visiting New Zealand to pay a £200 bond and other non-British £100. Chinese were also the subject of discriminatory legislation after crossing the border. They were excluded from the Pensions and Family Allowances Act in 1926, and in 1927 police were given the right to raid Chinese premises without a warrant. The Dalmatians in New Zealand had a similar experience. In 1898, they were barred from the gum fields of Northland where many of them worked and, in 1926, a law was passed restricting their number in New Zealand to 3,500.

One reason for New Zealanders’ fear of non-British immigration, especially in the nineteenth century, was Social Darwinism which entailed the idea that different racial groups competed for survival. Many New Zealand Europeans saw themselves as being in a fierce biological competition with other races. Premier Richard John Seddon, for example, told Parliament that there was as much intellectual difference between a European and a Chinaman as there was between a Chinaman and a monkey.

57 McKinnon, p. 29.
58 Brooking and Rabel, p. 24.
At least as strong as the biological arguments, objections to non-British immigration were related to a fear that ‘alien’ groups would form tight-knit communities resistant to the process of cultural assimilation. Perhaps because of their isolation from the mother country and their small numbers, nineteenth and early twentieth century European New Zealanders felt their British identity was threatened by an influx of culturally different migrants.\textsuperscript{59} Brian Moloughney and John Stenhouse argue that defining Chinese as ‘other’ to New Zealand society provided a basis for colonial unity and “helped an otherwise bondless atomised society to cohere.”\textsuperscript{60} Because they were considered to foster closed communities, Chinese women in particular were deterred as immigrants and were strictly excluded as a matter of policy from 1920 to 1945.\textsuperscript{61} As one politician declared in 1896, the arrival of Chinese would “paralyse all our efforts at social reform” and destroy “our endeavours to make the colony one to be looked up to and respected among the nations of the world.”\textsuperscript{62} A further argument advanced was that Asians were prepared to work long hours for low wages and that this would undercut living conditions for working class New Zealanders.\textsuperscript{63} In this way, restrictions on Asian immigration can be seen as an expression of white New Zealand’s belief in the ‘working man’s paradise’ and the ‘caring society’.

World War One, sometimes cited as the birth of the New Zealand nation, witnessed a strengthening of New Zealanders’ suspicions of non-British. This was reflected in wartime immigration and citizenship legislation. The 1918 Undesirable Aliens Exclusion Act gave the Governor General the power to prevent anyone from entering New Zealand who might be disloyal to Britain, and the 1917 Registration of Aliens Act required ‘enemy aliens’ to register with the police.\textsuperscript{64} The latter act also brought


\textsuperscript{62}Moloughney and Stenhouse, p. 48.


\textsuperscript{64}McKinnon, p. 17. Dominion Population Committee, p. 35.
into relief the gendered nature of nationality in New Zealand. British or New Zealand born women who married ‘aliens’ were not allowed to retain their nationality and those who had married Germans or Austrian subjects were forced to register as enemy aliens.65

The wartime trend towards tighter governmental control over immigration was consolidated into a piece of comprehensive new legislation, the 1920 Immigration Restriction Amendment Act. Education tests for Asians were dropped. Instead, all immigrants were required to obtain a permit to enter New Zealand from the Customs Department, which undertook to judge each individual case ‘on its merits’. This legislation was considered to satisfy New Zealand’s imperial obligation not to discriminate among British subjects on grounds of race. However, in recognition of New Zealand’s “natural affinity” to the United Kingdom, those of “British birth and parentage and European race and colour” were exempt from the permit requirements. In the words of Prime Minister William Massey this policy was “the result of a deep seated sentiment on the part of the large majority of people of this country that the Dominion shall be what is often called a ‘White New Zealand.’”66

The 1920s also saw a renewed suspicion of Asians. The formation of a small but vocal ‘White New Zealand League’ in 1926 can be attributed to economic driven racial prejudice. The impetus behind this movement came from the competition between white and Indian market gardeners in South Auckland. Members claimed that Asians took jobs and houses from white New Zealanders and undercut living standards, by implication threatening the ‘working man’s paradise.’67

In what would become a much repeated refrain, the myth of racial harmony between Maori and Pakeha was also used as an argument against ‘coloured’ immigration. The 1929 Ngata report was commissioned to look into the issue of intermarriage between Maori and Indians principally in South Auckland and found that this miscegenation represented a threat to the assimilation of both groups into Pakeha society.68

65This condition did not apply to male New Zealanders who married female aliens. Page, pp. 165-6. The right to retain nationality in marriage did not come until 1934-5. p. 168.
66Pearson, p. 80.
67Leckie, p. 122.
With the exception of the entry of a few hundred Jewish and Polish refugees from Europe, the rise of the First Labour Government and World War Two saw little change in immigration policy. As the 1945 census reveals, successive governments had been remarkably successful in keeping New Zealand a country of British and Maori. The population was made up of 93.6 percent Europeans, almost all of whom were of predominantly British origin, 5.76 percent Maori and just 0.63 percent others.

World War Two represented a turning point in New Zealand immigration. The post-War economic boom fuelled demand for labour, especially in the manufacturing and construction sectors. In the early 1950s, up to 4.5 percent of jobs in New Zealand remained unfilled. In response, the decade brought a huge increase in numbers and also a diversification of the sources of New Zealand's immigrants. Assisted immigration resumed and when the supply of labour from Britain was unable to keep pace with demand, Dutch, Scandinavians and later Swiss and Germans were offered assisted passages. The result was a small but significant shift in the focus of immigration policy from one of strictly excluding non-British to one of accepting them on condition of their cultural assimilation.

The years from 1946-60 saw a net immigration of 179 000 of whom 107 000 were from the United Kingdom, 15 000 were from Australia and Ireland, and 57 000 were from other countries. As Figures 2 and 3 show, this represents a significant diversification in the sources of immigrants to New Zealand when compared with the previous period of significant immigration, the 1920s. The Dutch in particular were seen as good assimilators and rapidly became the largest non-British group of immigrants New Zealand had ever seen. Twenty-thousand white Dutch, leaving a war ravaged Holland and Indonesia, entered as permanent migrants from 1946-60, of whom 6 000 were assisted.

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70New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings, 1945.
71Mitchell, p. 13, p. 34.
72Mitchell, p. 59.
Figure 1: National Origin of Net Permanent Immigrants 1922-28

Source: NZOY 1923, 1924, 1930.

Figure 2: National Origin Of Net Permanent Immigrants 1946-60


New Zealand’s growing commitment to internationalism also contributed to the diversification of the sources of immigrants. New Zealand took 4 594 displaced persons from Central and Southern Europe between 1949-51 and 1 068 Hungarians in 1956. Peter Fraser’s First Labour Government also granted residency to around 2 700 wives and children of its Chinese permanent residents, many of whom were visitors
who had been stranded in New Zealand since the beginning of World War Two.\textsuperscript{76} Humanitarianism was blended with pragmatism and most refugees were carefully selected for their ability to work and assimilate.\textsuperscript{77}

From the end of World War Two, New Zealand’s new immigration policy involved selection on the basis of perceived assimilability. After the British, a clear hierarchy of preference among sources of immigrants was established. A Cabinet Committee on Immigration report from 1950 stated that “it is broadly accepted that immigrants should be drawn from White (European) peoples and that admission of coloured races should be closely restricted.” It went on to rank immigrants in order of preference as follows:

1. Britain, Commonwealth and the United States
2. Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden
3. Other non-Germanic Baltic Nations and Austrians
4. French, Swiss and Mediterranean peoples but in low numbers.\textsuperscript{78}

One of the reasons immigrants from Great Britain were seen as naturally the most assimilable was that many New Zealanders still saw New Zealand as a British nation. The Labour and Employment Gazette of 1951 asked New Zealanders to show immigrants “those attitudes of British fairness that are a tradition of our race”\textsuperscript{79}, and R A Lochore, a New Zealand immigration official wrote that “we British are a very great people... A central European has much to learn in this respect if he is to become one of us.”

If we admit European aliens, it is on the tacit understanding ... that they are prepared to make such concessions to language and customs as are

\textsuperscript{75}NB The reason that there is no net immigration from Australia in this graph is that there was a small net loss of migrants to Australia in this period.
\textsuperscript{76}Mitchell, pp. 55-6.
\textsuperscript{77}LEG, v. 9 no. 3, 1959, p. 27. Mitchell, pp. 54-5.
\textsuperscript{78}Report of Cabinet Committee on Immigration, 20/3/50, NZNA EA1. 32/3/54, p. 16. The place of Irish in this hierarchy in the year after the Irish Republic was recognised is unclear.
\textsuperscript{79}LEG 1/1/51, p. 58.
necessary if they are to blend with our predominantly British community. If they are not willing to make that sacrifice, let them go elsewhere.\textsuperscript{80}

The growing importance of perceived assimilability relative to race as a factor in selection of immigrants is further illustrated by the policy on immigration from the Pacific Islands. Despite being from New Zealand territories, in the 1950s non-white immigrants from Samoa and the Cook Islands required permits to leave the islands for New Zealand. In order to gain these, they needed to demonstrate that they were “living according to European standards” and had a reasonable knowledge of English, attributes which, it was believed, would allow them to assimilate easily into New Zealand society.\textsuperscript{81}

A more assimilationist outlook is apparent in changing attitudes to Chinese. With the arrival of the wives and children of Chinese men in New Zealand, commentators expressed the belief that Chinese children raised and schooled in New Zealand could evolve into a second generation of Chinese, more attached to New Zealand than to China. A\emph{Listener} article in 1960 announced that “we have in the last few years seen a reasonably adapted community with New Zealand ways and Oriental faces [who are] ... in fact turning into New Zealanders.”\textsuperscript{82}

This idea that people with Chinese faces could now become New Zealanders and that Pacific Islanders were acceptable as long as they were “living according to European standards” illustrates the point reinforced by the Hunn report, that as long as minority races assimilated to Pakeha cultural norms, they could be completely accepted as New Zealanders. New immigrants were invariably judged by their ability to assimilate, but the most widely accepted definition of a New Zealander was changing to become a cultural and not a racial one. The acceptance of small numbers of ‘assimilated’ brown or yellow people as New Zealanders allowed the myth of the harmonious multi-racial society to remain intact.

By the 1960s, the emergence of post-colonial nations on the world stage brought a new force to act on immigration policy. This was international relations. There was a

\textsuperscript{80}R A Lochore, \emph{From Europe to New Zealand}, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs and AH Reed, Wellington, 1951, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{81}Memo to Overseas Posts from Department of Labour and Employment 9/9/51, in NZNA L1 32/3/1 pt. 8 p. 6, cited in Mitchell, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{82}\emph{Listener}, 22/7/60.
growing tension between New Zealand’s desire to keep its immigration British and condemnation of racial discrimination on the world stage.\textsuperscript{83} New Zealand officials sought to deflect international criticism of an immigration policy which explicitly favoured white British through the Immigration Amendment Act of 1961. This act removed the exemption of those of “British birth and parentage” from requiring a permit to enter New Zealand. However, in practical terms, nothing changed because white British were now automatically given a permit on arrival. At the same time, the absolute discretion of the Minister over the issuing of permits remained a means for immigration officials to set unpublished criteria which restricted non-British immigration.\textsuperscript{84}

In the Pacific Islands, decolonisation forced New Zealand to address the question of the immigration status of the inhabitants of its and Britain’s former colonies. After Samoan independence in 1962, an agreement was signed allowing an annual quota of 1 100 permanent immigrants from Samoa to New Zealand and in 1964, New Zealand signed an agreement to allow Samoans to visit New Zealand on three month work visas.\textsuperscript{85} Similarly, the Fiji Work Scheme, established in 1967, allowed a limited number of Fijians to come to New Zealand and work for up to six months at a time on temporary work visas and after a bad hurricane hit Tokelau, the 1966 Tokelau Resettlement Scheme undertook to bring half of the territory’s 1900 inhabitants to New Zealand and to find employment for them.\textsuperscript{86} The result was an exponential growth of the numbers of Pacific Islanders living in New Zealand (Figure 3).

While assimilability was important in immigration policy, individual applications were not, as policy stated, judged on their merits, but national and racial groups were

\textsuperscript{83} Sean Brawley, “‘No White Policy in New Zealand’: Fact and Fiction in New Zealand’s Asian Immigration Record 1946-78”, NZJH, v. 21 no. 2, 1993.

\textsuperscript{84} As W. T. Roy told a conference in 1966 “New Zealand practices a White New Zealand policy more stringent but less publicised than its [infamous] Australian counterpart.” ‘How White is Our Policy?’, Listener, 26/1/68, p.8.

\textsuperscript{85} Pearson, p. 119.

classified or stereotyped as having a collective ability to assimilate.\textsuperscript{87} An Immigration Division summary of policy in 1966 stated that

[Policy] is dictated by the relative ease with which different groups of people can be assimilated ... people who share a common heritage of language and tradition integrate very quickly ... The greater and more obvious the difference between the immigrant and the average New Zealander, the longer and more difficult the period of assimilation and the greater the tendency of immigrants to hive off into little colonies which become self-sufficient and resistant to the process of assimilation.\textsuperscript{88}

**Figure 3: Pacific Island Population in New Zealand 1916-81**

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The policy went on to define British, Irish and Northern Europeans as the most easily assimilable, Southern Europeans as less easily assimilable and Asians and Africans as the least assimilable and thus the least desirable immigrants of all.\textsuperscript{89}


\textsuperscript{88}Cited in Richard Nor taxpayer and Brian Lythe, \textit{How White is Our Immigration Policy}, CARE Wellington, 1972, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{89}Ibid.
Within an immigration policy which centred around nationality, racial and gendered distinctions were also made. It was more difficult for a black Briton to gain entry to New Zealand than a white one, Asian husbands of eligible Dutch or English female migrants were refused admission and in 1970 single Samoan women entering New Zealand on temporary permits were forced to submit to pregnancy tests.\footnote{Seclab to Minimmig, 28/9/70 in MFAT 32/3/WSA/3 v. 1. see Ross, p. 47 for Samoans. The case of ‘Coloured Wives’ is addressed in ‘Revision of Immigration Policy Background Paper no. 7 July 1973 in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 2. for a statement of this policy. The Black Briton issue is evident in the policy of granting permits on arrival on only to those of “British birth and parentage” and “European race and colour.” All of these issues are addressed in Chapter 4 in more detail.}

In summary, as New Zealand entered the 1970s, it had evolved into a culturally defined nation at the centre of which stood its relation to Britain. New Zealand national identity was not defined by descent but by culture, and this culture was one of received and improved Britishness. This idea of improvement rested upon a series of national myths which had evolved through New Zealand’s history and included ideas of egalitarianism, classlessness, racial harmony, physical toughness and versatility. Within this framework, anyone could be accepted as a New Zealander as long as they were willing to undergo cultural assimilation.

In 1970, immigration policy and the attitudes of New Zealanders towards immigrants were an expression of New Zealanders’ desire to retain both a British cultural heritage and protect the aspects of New Zealand culture that made New Zealand a superior sort of British nation. But since World War Two, other influences on immigration policy had grown in importance. Demand for labour had forced New Zealand to compromise its almost exclusively white British policy to one of admitting non-British on condition that they assimilate. At the same time, international condemnation of racial discrimination and New Zealand’s international responsibilities including those to its former colonies in the Pacific and its responsibility to take refugees had broadened New Zealand’s immigrant base. Immigrants who were not British and were less willing or able to assimilate, particularly labour migrants from the Pacific Islands population, presented a challenge to the rigid cultural basis of the New Zealand nation. This diversity contributed to debate about the nature of New Zealand identity which will be further explored in later chapters.
While related to New Zealand’s particular national identity, tension between migration and the ethno-cultural nation can be understood in a global context. Between the end of World War Two and the late 1960s, many industrialised countries including Britain, France, Germany and Canada, had experienced a build up of communities of culturally different labour migrants. In most cases, the immigrant cultures had been largely ignored by their host nations. Immigrants, while welcomed for their labour, had either not been considered to be part of the nation or, as was the case in New Zealand, in order to be fully accepted, they were expected to become culturally assimilated.\textsuperscript{91}

The 1970s brought together a set of circumstances which would challenge this expectation to assimilate. The first was the accumulation of politicised second generation immigrants in Western industrialised nations. These groups often shared elements of both the host and immigrant culture, but were accepted by neither community as full members. The second was a rise in hostility to immigrants fuelled by the petrol shocks and recession, and the third was the more general movement of identity politics among marginalised groups including pre-existing ethnic minorities, women, and homosexuals who, along with immigrants, clamoured for recognition of group identity within the power structure and culture of the nation state.

In the 1970s, Western countries struggled with the common question of how to deal with the cultural diversity brought by immigrant minorities. Some writers contend that ethnic diversity undermined and weakened the institution of the ethno-culturally defined nation-state, while others argue that the nation-states have evolved to meet this challenge.\textsuperscript{92} May Joseph, an American sociologist of East-African-Asian origin, argues that in societies with large immigrant groups, the unitary-cultural basis for nationhood has been eroded by the presence of migrant diasporas. To illustrate this, she describes the rise of politicised identity groups which transcend national boundaries, including not just immigrant groups but feminist, black-nationalist and labour movements. She also describes ‘third space’ or ‘cultural-hybrid’ identity,

\textsuperscript{92} Yasemin Soysal, \textit{Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe}, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994. Christian Joppke, in his study of immigration and the nation state in Britain, Germany and the United States, adds that these states’ subscription
arguing that British-Asians should be seen not as incomplete members of either group, but as a distinct hybrid identity, a unique combination of both British and Asian cultures.\textsuperscript{93} The growth of hybrid and trans-national identities across the world since the 1970s, part of a broader process of social and economic Globalization, she argues, has undermined the importance of the nation-state itself.\textsuperscript{94}

If the power of the cultural nation state is eroding, this does not signal the end of the nation-state itself. Audrey Kobayashi, in her study of the official doctrine of multiculturalism in Canada, argues that the nation-state can adapt to the cultural challenge posed by immigration and ethnic diversity. She demonstrates that immediately after World War Two, the Canadian nation was based largely around an ethno-centric assumption of British-based culture and immigration policy reflected this by favouring UK immigrants and expecting cultural assimilation of other groups. From the late-1960s, minority ethnic groups in Canada questioned these assumptions and staked claims for official recognition of their cultures within the institutional framework of the Canadian state. This led to the evolution of an official policy of multiculturalism in which a range of cultural identities and languages are now actively supported by the Canadian state.\textsuperscript{95}

The challenge to mono-culturalism posed by politicised immigrant groups and the growth of identity politics among other cultural groups which had been marginalised within the framework of nation-states co-existed in the 1970s. These groups found common cause in challenging the existing culture of state power which they saw as intolerant of diversity and found common ideological bases for their movements in the discourse of universal human rights. They claimed the right to be British and Black, British and Women, or British and Gay in the same way that immigrants

\textsuperscript{93}This third space identity in New Zealand is described by Roopali Johri, ‘Stuck in the Middle of Clued Up On Both? Language and Identity among Korean, Dutch and Samoan Immigrants in Dunedin’, PhD University of Otago, 1998.


sought a way to be both British and Asian or British and Muslim. These movements were, Joseph argues, ideologically and, to a lesser extent, organisationally international movements and thus, at least partially, existed in an ideological space which transcended national boundaries.

What can the New Zealand experience contribute to this broader debate about immigration and national identity? To what extent were New Zealand’s responses to immigration in the 1970s mediated by the particular way in which the New Zealand nation had been defined? Did the arrival in unprecedented numbers of a culturally different ‘other’ in the post-World War Two period strengthen New Zealanders’ collective sense of self, or have the international forces of universalism and transnational identity politics eroded the cultural basis of nationalism in New Zealand? To what extent has the model of the nation with which New Zealanders identify changed to become more multicultural in response to the increasing diversity of its population brought by immigration?

By the 1970s, New Zealand identity was becoming politicised, contested and changeable. The decade presented a number of challenges to the narrow cultural definition of the New Zealand nation. Not only did New Zealand face an unprecedented influx of migrants who fell outside the traditional definition of cultural assimilability, but Maori groups, feminists, and the youth movement also challenged mono-culturalism with increasing vigour by demanding recognition of their own cultural values within the framework of the nation’s institutions. At the same time, New Zealand’s Eurocentric immigration policy drew increasing criticism from politicised ethnic minorities within New Zealand and from its Pacific neighbours. This politicisation of identity and immigration coincided with the crumbling of one of the pillars of New Zealand identity. New Zealanders’ belief that they were part of a global British community was shaken as Britain joined the European Economic Community and British patriality legislation excluded many New Zealanders from

living in Britain. Challenges of this nature were presented to many other
industrialised nations in the 1970s. But, as the rest of this thesis will demonstrate,
New Zealand’s response to them was mediated by the unique way in which the nation
has been historically defined.
Chapter 2: Economic and Foreign Policy Factors Affecting Immigration Policy

The 1970s was a time of turbulent change in immigration. In the first half of the decade, net inflow through immigration was greater than ever before and the latter half saw record outflow of population through emigration. At the same time, New Zealand’s changing economic and foreign policy objectives now placed demands on immigration policy that ran contrary to a policy of free entry for British immigrants and limited selection of other immigrants. In response, Prime Minister Norman Kirk launched a major review of immigration policy.¹ This chapter will examine the way in which changing economic and foreign policy objectives influenced the Governments' approaches to immigration and will demonstrate how these new approaches, which placed less emphasis on perceived cultural assimilability, helped to redefine the ‘official’ boundaries of New Zealand identity.

The Relationship between Economics and Immigration Policy

Until the 1970s, New Zealand’s economy depended heavily on the export of primary produce to Britain and in return, Britain accounted for a significant proportion of New Zealand’s imports. Belich argues that these economic links helped to cement the nation’s cultural attachment to Britain and the idea of New Zealand as a fundamentally British society.² This cultural attachment, in turn, led New Zealand governments to maintain an immigration policy which favoured British and those who could assimilate into New Zealand’s British-based culture.

Economic factors had long been important in determining the rate of immigration to New Zealand, but, before the 1970s, had seldom encroached upon the policy of national and ethnic selection. The number of British who came had roughly reflected New Zealand’s demand for labour. On the few occasions when the economy had demanded more labour than Britain could provide, particularly in the 1870s and 1950s, New Zealand governments had stretched this policy of ethnic selection to one of selection for ability to culturally assimilate and had admitted carefully selected

northern-Europeans to fill the gap. With this limited flexibility, New Zealand’s ethno-cultural immigration policy had proved adequate to meet the nation’s fluctuating labour demands. The heightened pace of economic change in the 1970s, however, found this system of immigration control unresponsive.

The rapid economic changes of the 1970s included major structural change, boom and recession. In the early part of the decade the manufacturing sector expanded fast, creating a heavy demand for labour that domestic supply was unable to meet. Between 1971 and 1976, exports of manufactured goods grew three-fold and while the New Zealand economy had previously depended on its exports of primary produce to Britain, the largest markets for these new products were Australia and Japan.³

The New Zealand economy then suffered two major reverses. Britain's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) and the worldwide recession related to the oil shocks of 1973 contributed to a fall in the value of trade between New Zealand and its main market by more than a third.⁴ New Zealand’s terms of trade fell by 43 percent in one year and significant unemployment began to appear for the first time since the Great Depression. By 1976, New Zealand was running a trade deficit of one billion dollars and had turned significant foreign reserves into foreign debt. New Zealand was dogged by an inflation rate of 16.9 percent while wages were growing at around 3 percent and standards of living, which had been among the highest in the world in the 1950s and 60s, were falling behind other countries.⁵ At the same time, extremely rapid growth of Auckland, a symptom of the wider structural changes, placed pressure on housing and other resources.

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⁴This was between 1970-75. Ibid., p. 174.
A driving force behind the 1973-4 review of immigration policy was the growing realisation that existing policy could not respond to changes in the labour market. In the 1960s and early 1970s, economic growth led to shortages of labour and a strong pressure for more immigrants. In October 1969, 3.5 percent of jobs in New Zealand were unfilled with the greatest scarcities in manufacturing, the professions, and commerce. Under these circumstances, a near record flow of immigrants from New Zealand’s greatest traditional source, Britain, was welcomed. However, when the boom gave way to recession in 1974 and unemployment, which had been virtually nil since World War Two, began to rise steadily, British immigrants continued to come. Almost 60,000 came in 1974-5 (gross), and the Government was forced to regulate to better restrict immigration.

Fluctuations in the labour market also influenced policy on immigration from the Pacific Islands. Prior to 1974, immigrants from Tonga, Samoa and Fiji were seen as

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8 Review of Immigration Policy, Resolutions Adopted by the Immigration Advisory Council’ in NZNA HD 1/53/a pt.1. ‘Immigration Inquiries, Resolution Number 6,’ Cabinet Committee on Immigration minutes of meeting of 14/12/73 in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 3.
useful for meeting the short-term labour requirements of the boom in manufacturing. Many Pacific Island migrants came on three or six month permits either as visitors or on government work schemes but had no right to remain in New Zealand after this period. In the words of National Member of Parliament John Luxton, this made them an effective “recession buffer” who could be expelled if unemployment appeared.\textsuperscript{9}

Because their labour was needed by Auckland employers, the thousands of Pacific Islanders who overstayed their permits were overlooked by authorities as were irregularities and falsifications in applications for temporary permits.\textsuperscript{10} The result was a \textit{de facto} migrant labour scheme which was so ‘successful’ that by 1974, Minister of Immigration Fraser Colman admitted “the Government has to face the fact that New Zealand industry was dependent on illegal Island labour” and that “unless they used such labour, production and export targets would not be met.”\textsuperscript{11} It was, however, still assumed that this pool of workers would leave if jobs became scarce.

Employers not only needed labour, they increasingly needed a specialised and skilled workforce. Thus, the free entry of British migrants, irrespective of skills, was increasingly out of step with the demands of New Zealand industry.\textsuperscript{12} The Immigration Advisory Council’s 1973 review spoke of the need for a policy “easily regulable to the short term needs of the economy ... not just quantitatively but qualitatively.”\textsuperscript{13} Following the major 1974 policy review, New Zealand tied its immigration policy more tightly to skills criteria. Migrants could no longer enter New Zealand just because they were white and British, but usually needed skills and a job

\textsuperscript{9}New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), v. 401, 1975, p. 4301.


\textsuperscript{11} Tonga Chronicle 25/5/74, cited in Hegarty, p. 46.


\textsuperscript{13}Review of Immigration Policy, Resolutions Adopted by the Immigration Advisory Council’ in NZNA HD 1/53/a pt.1. A Cabinet Committee on Immigration meeting came to the same conclusion. Minutes of Meeting of 14/12/73 in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 3. Don Bond, then Deputy Head of the Immigration Division, suggested that “New Zealand [was] slowly moving into the professional and technical area a lot more and... places like Singapore and Malaysia and Hong Kong and Europe ... could provide that technical ability... equally as Britain.” Interview with Don Bond, 24/1/01.
offer. As Labour Member of Parliament Aubrey Begg pointed out, this represented a move from a policy based on “preference for people from Britain or of European race” to one “based on skills.”

The introduction of the skills criterion was, however, a restriction on British and European migration rather than a removal of barriers to non-European immigrants. In most cases, skilled migrants could still only come to New Zealand from an approved list of “traditional source countries” all of which were European or North American. The increase in skilled non-European migration in the late 1970s was negligible.

Pacific immigration statistics contradicted Begg’s assertion that skills became the basis of immigration policy. Almost none of the estimated 25,000 Pacific Islanders who entered from 1972-8 went into skilled work. Rather than a quest for skills, Pacific Island immigration was justified in terms of New Zealand’s obligations to South Pacific regional development. Labour Party Junior Whip Jonathan Hunt told Parliament that “we have a responsibility to the Pacific Islands to train people who are unskilled but that should be the only area from which unskilled people come…”

This helps to explain the bipolar nature of statistics from the late 1970s which show that New Zealand’s immigration continued to be dominated by British and Pacific Islanders. It also helps to explain the stratification of the workforce along racial lines.

A second economic force that drove reform of immigration policy was pressure on housing and other resources created by uncontrolled immigration. A *New Zealand Herald* editorial of 1974 declared

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14 An exception was made in cases of humanitarian entry such as family reunion.


16 The Traditional Source Countries were all European or North American and included Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, West Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. This composition is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. ‘Occupational Priority List: History of Occupational Controls 1974-8’ in DOL 22/1/358-2 pt. 2.


18 A 1978 Department of Labour survey of Pacific Island migrants in the Wellington region showed that half of them had no education beyond third form level and ninety percent of them had left school before the sixth form. ‘Survey of the Work Experience of Pacific Island Migrants’, LEG, v. 28, no.1, Mar. 1978.
The Government has little alternative but to reduce the pressures of immigration... A great tide of Commonwealth Citizens of European descent - overwhelmingly British - has threatened to swamp the country's resources.20

The demand for houses and other goods and services that the flood of British immigrants created provoked debate about their overall effect on the economy. In 1973-74 the Government received contradictory advice on this question. Reports by the Department of Labour and the National Development Conference noted that the short term pressures on infrastructure, housing and consumer goods created by immigrants were outweighed by their long term contribution to production.21 This confidence was not shared by major reports of the Treasury and Reserve Bank. Both argued that for three to five years after arrival, immigrants would increase the critical problems of labour shortages and inflation.22 The Reserve Bank also cited social problems in the big cities as consequences of rapid unplanned immigration and recommended government intervention to reduce immigrant flows.23

Uncontrolled British immigration prior to 1974 made economic planning extremely difficult. The National Development Conferences of 1966, 1969 and 1973 were interdepartmental efforts to co-ordinate the long-term economic goals of the country and sought to synchronise immigration policies with broader goals of economic growth.24 In line with these goals, the 1966 conference set a target of 5 000 immigrants per annum for the period until 1978, but by 1974 the rate of immigration was six times this.25

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23Ibid.
A further attempt to grapple with resource issues came in 1974 when the Interdepartmental Committee on Population Questions was established to co-ordinate policies on immigration, family planning, farm subsidies, medical and social welfare schemes and employment. The committee questioned the assumption that increased immigration meant a more efficient economy and suggested that too rapid a population growth in relation to New Zealand’s resources was a threat to New Zealand’s “unique way of life.”

The idea that a high rate of immigration could threaten a unique national way of life tapped into one of the strongest better-Britain myths of New Zealand identity. Since the nineteenth century, New Zealand had defined itself as an agrarian escape from dreary industrial British cities. New Zealanders’ close relationship with the land was presented as a reason that many of the country’s unique national qualities had developed. As a consequence, many New Zealanders were concerned about the rapid rate of population growth. The Federation of Labour, churches, academics and some in the public service expressed fears that a large increase in population brought by uncontrolled immigration could threaten the nation’s uncrowded, clean-green aspect. The National Taskforce on Economic and Social Planning like the Reserve Bank argued that social problems could be created by rapid urban growth related to immigration and that there was a “need to balance growth needs with environment, quality of life and culture.”

A perceived threat to housing, education and even hospitals posed by uncontrolled immigration also tapped deeply into the New Zealand national psyche. For a generation since the rise of the First Labour Government, a comprehensive social welfare system, home ownership and good publicly funded social services had been uncontested values in New Zealand politics. Social welfare had become a part of the national mythology. By 1974, uncontrolled immigration appeared to be placing

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26 It included representatives of the Ministries of the Environment, Health, Labour and Maori Affairs and received 138 public submissions. NZNA MA Acc W. 2490 76/2/6 pt.4, p. 1, p.7.
28 Between 1945 and 1972 New Zealand’s population increased by 71 percent from 1.72 million to 2.95 million, NZOY, 1997, p. 108.
29 Holmes, p. 2.
these treasures under threat. Prime Minister Kirk cited pressures on resources as one of the main reasons for the introduction of restrictions on white British migrants.\textsuperscript{31} He declared that of 30,500 new homes built in New Zealand in 1973, new immigrants had moved into 7,500 and that immigration was responsible for an increase in waiting lists for state houses. At the same time, he noted that 18,000 children of school age had entered New Zealand, placing pressure on educational resources.\textsuperscript{32} Immigration policy as it stood before 1974 was unable to respond to the dramatic fluctuations in New Zealand’s labour needs and unprecedented pressure on resources created by immigrants and this was a significant factor in the Government’s review of policy.

**Foreign Policy and Immigration**

Through the 1950s and 60s, New Zealand’s foreign policy centred around its relationships with Britain and the United States.\textsuperscript{33} Foreign policy was an expression of New Zealand’s identity as an outpost of European civilization. From the 1970s, the nation’s traditional links with Britain became less important and governments increasingly worked to establish New Zealand’s credentials as a member of an Asia-Pacific community of nations. Economic circumstances and a growing independent nationalism among policy-makers contributed to this change. They affected the way in which New Zealanders saw not just their national interests, but also their collective identity and this, in turn, had implications for immigration policy.

New Zealand’s commitment to the idea that it was an Asia-Pacific nation and that its interests lay in building relations with the region was most evident under Norman Kirk’s Third Labour Government.\textsuperscript{34} Kirk took a very active interest in foreign affairs

\textsuperscript{31}Review of Immigration Policy, Policy Announcements, p. 14, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{32}Herald 3/4/74, p.1.
\textsuperscript{33}Even where New Zealand had engaged with Asia, through its participation in the Korea, Malay, and Vietnamese conflicts, it did this as a part of its commitment to alliances with Britain and the United States. W. David McIntyre, ‘From Dual Dependency to Nuclear Free’ in Geoffrey Rice ed., *The Oxford History of New Zealand*, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992.
\textsuperscript{34}Frank Corner, then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, suggested that Holyoake had recognised New Zealand’s need to build such links, but that it was Norman Kirk as Prime Minister who brought the energy and commitment to achieve this. Interview with Frank Corner, 25/1/01.
and worked hard to foster increased regional trade, aid and the construction of South Pacific organisations and cultivated warm personal links with the region’s leaders.35

The Labour Government’s vigorous protest against French nuclear testing in the Pacific was a powerful symbol of this turn away from Europe towards the Pacific region. The Government sent the frigate ‘Wellington’ to Mururoa Atoll to protest against atmospheric tests, challenged France’s right to test before the World Court and attempted to build regional consensus behind the idea of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.36

Minister of Foreign Affairs Joe Walding told the public that “for the New Zealander of today the South Pacific is the region with which he identifies himself ... We are Islanders too.”37 There was increasing support among the public for the idea. The New Zealand Herald described the South Pacific as “New Zealand’s closest commitment in overseas policies” and the National Council of Churches and the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs declared 1971 ‘Pacific Year’ proclaiming that “we are not part of the European, American or Asian continents, but belong to the South Pacific.”38

While Muldoon’s National Government was not as strong an exponent of New Zealand’s Asia-Pacific identity, it did not entirely abandon Labour’s regional focus. Brian Talboys, National’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote that “[until recently] physically we were here in the Pacific but through culture and sentiment our focus was drawn beyond the Pacific to the other side of the world. Now we appreciate that

38Herald 22/7/76, p. 6. “We are very much aware,” the Federation of Labour stated “that New Zealand is a Pacific country and that its relations with other Pacific and Asian countries must become stronger ...our future lies increasingly with the rest of the Pacific and Asian nations who are our nearest neighbours and must become our principle trading partners.” ‘Address of NZFOL delegate L A Hadley to South East Asia Trade Union Conference-Tokyo Mar. 1973’, New Zealand Federation of Labour Bulletin, June 1973, p. 8. Paul Reeves ed., South Pacific Year: Meeting Point ’71: Five Discussions about our Unique Social and Geographical Problems in 1971, National Council of Churches, Christchurch, inside cover.
our geography and history are inseparable.” Talboys was particularly focused on strengthening political and economic links with Australia. His efforts led to the Nareen Declaration of 1978 which entailed progressive removal of trade barriers between New Zealand and Australia and work towards complementary industrial development policies and closer consultation at government level.

The Labour Government’s greater focus on the Asia-Pacific region had important consequences for its immigration policy. The Government did not want a racist immigration policy to embarrass it in its endeavour to build regional links. In 1971, Kirk declared that

> New Zealand’s future lies with Asia and the Pacific and this country should participate fully in the restructuring of Asian and the Pacific institutions ... It is vitally important to establish our sincerity in the eyes of the Asians. A fair and just immigration policy would be a way of showing good faith.

Foreign policy concerns were an important force behind Labour’s decision to hold a comprehensive review of immigration policy and, in 1973, the first announcement of the review made it easier for up to 3 000 private Asian students to study in New Zealand. Immigration Minister Fraser Coleman described this change as “a reflection of our closer relations with the countries of the Pacific and Asia.”

Foreign policy commitments explain why immigration from the Pacific remained high throughout the 1970s when both the skills and assimilation criteria continued to

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39. Deputy Prime Minister’s visit to the South Pacific 21 January to 12 February 1977, NZFAR, v. 27, no. 1, Jan. 77, p. 54. Frank Corner asserts that while Muldoon cut New Zealand’s overall aid budget, he did not cut aid for the Pacific, interview with Frank Corner 25/1/01.
40. Talboys speech to Otago University Foreign Policy School, Dunedin 20/5/78 in DOL 22/1/83 pt. 1.
41. Assistant Secretary of Labour Jones wrote that maintaining New Zealand’s reputation for good race relations through an even handed immigration policy was “linked with the need for the goodwill of governments with whom we wish to enter into trade agreements.” Peter Jones, ‘Considerations for a Policy of Planned Immigration’, NZJPA, v. 34, 1971, pp. 75-6.
43. Interview with Don Bond.
44. Review of Immigration Policy Announcements, p. 5.
favour Europeans. Immigration from the Pacific Islands was justified in terms of a post-colonial moral, and in some cases legal, responsibility to the region. In 1972, the Immigration Division acknowledged that “New Zealand has always recognised a special responsibility towards the people of the Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau and Western Samoa.”

The New Zealand Government wanted to take a role as a regional leader as Britain’s influence in the region diminished with Fijian and Tongan independence in 1970. A 1974 Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefing paper called on the Government to work to preserve its ‘nice-guy’ image in the region for diplomatic, economic and strategic reasons. This led the Government to adopt regional immigration policies that went beyond its own former colonies. In 1973, the Tongan and Fijian Governments complained that New Zealand admitted Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans freely and allowed 1 500 Samoans to settle in New Zealand per year, but that it virtually excluded other Pacific Islanders as immigrants. New Zealand responded by launching new short-term migration schemes for Fijians and Tongans.

Short term immigration from the Pacific Islands was also claimed as a form of international development aid. Fraser Coleman described special immigration rules for Pacific Islanders as

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45Listener, 9/2/74, v.75, no. 1785, p. 9.

46Entry to New Zealand, 1972, p. 2. This responsibility was confirmed in the immigration review of the following year but qualified with the statement that “in view of the sheer numbers wishing to come, New Zealand must restrict South Pacific immigration.” Caucus Committee on Immigration minutes of meeting of 14/12/73, p. 3, in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 3.


48In 1974 Graeme Ansell, New Zealand High Commissioner in Suva wrote “given the developing relations between New Zealand and the Commonwealth countries of the South Pacific, it would be appropriate to treat the latter as a special case and I believe this argument to be of even greater relevance today at a time when New Zealand is endeavouring to strengthen links with its Pacific neighbours,” NZHC Suva to Secfa 27/2/74 in DOL 22/1/279-8.

49The Samoan quota was increased in the late 1960s. ‘Standard Criteria for Persons Requiring Prior Permission to Enter New Zealand’, Background Paper 7:2, Aug. 73 in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 2. Memo NZHC Suva to Secfa 27/2/74 in DOL 22/1/279-8.

50Department of Labour, Review of Immigration Policy, Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives (AJHR), G34, 1975, p. 6.
Providing for the coupling of immigration policy with aid programmes, the objective being to help improve standards of living and provide better opportunities for purposeful employment in the South Pacific Islands.\textsuperscript{51}

One consequence of this was that by the mid-1970s, Island economies had become structurally dependent on remitted money from labour migrants to New Zealand which, in the cases of Tonga, Western Samoa, Niue and the Cook Islands, earned them more revenue than the export of any single commodity. The flow of money from New Zealand wages into Pacific Island countries clearly played a role in their development, but New Zealand’s labour requirements were a much more important factor in the admission of Pacific Islanders than aid.\textsuperscript{52} The repatriation of thousands of Pacific Island overstayers in 1974 and 1976 when recession in New Zealand made them obsolete to the New Zealand economy makes this clear. The effects on Pacific Island economies were harsh. Monthly remittances to Tonga fell from $250 000 to $4 000 per month in the year to 1976 and the repatriations upset Pacific leaders.\textsuperscript{53}

Britain’s entry into the EEC in 1973, which signalled a change of orientation by Britain away from her colonies towards Europe, was a shock not just to the New Zealand economy, but to New Zealanders’ feelings of Britishness. New Zealand which, until then, had enjoyed favoured access to British markets for its agricultural exports, felt betrayed by the prospect of tariffs and quotas which were to begin in 1977.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{51}NZPD, v. 92, 1974, p. 3276.
\textsuperscript{52} This led Frank Corner to describe remittances from migrant workers as “a more crucial development factor than project aid or other forms of assistance from New Zealand.” Secfa to Minfa 12/12/75 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 2. A similarly unequivocal statement about the relationship between immigration and aid was made by National’s Minister of Immigration A G Malcolm in 1980 “Our Immigration policy towards the South Pacific could be worth more than millions of dollars of aid funds.” ‘Minutes of a meeting of South Pacific Immigration Attaches’, Wellington 5/8/80 in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 1. With this in mind, to compensate for the expulsion of the Tongan overstayers in 1974, New Zealand promised the Island governments a scheme to encourage manufacturers to set up operation in the islands. This idea however, received little interest from New Zealand companies. Cabinet Committee Paper on Scheme to Encourage Factories to set up in the Islands, July 1974, in DOL 22/1/190.
\textsuperscript{53} The value of emigration and remittances as aid was also questioned by economists as it draws the best and brightest of the workforce away from the home economy. Department of Labour- Research and Planning Division, The Work Experience of Pacific Island Migrants in the Greater Wellington Area, 1979, pp. 50-1.
\textsuperscript{54} Hun, p. 33.
The British Government’s introduction of patriality laws was another profound shock in New Zealand’s relations with its mother country. The Immigration Act of 1973, restricted free entry into Britain to those Commonwealth citizens who had British grandparents. New Zealand officials lobbied vigorously against this change and when it took effect, continued, at first, to grant free access to all white British in the hope that they could regain the same privilege for New Zealanders travelling to Britain.\(^{55}\) Personal approaches by Norman Kirk and Deputy Prime Minister Hugh Watt followed but were politely refused by their British counterparts.\(^{56}\)

This led to calls for New Zealand to retaliate. The Caucus Committee on Labour and Immigration expressed the hope that “the threat of imposing restrictions on the entry of British migrants to New Zealand could be used as a lever in gaining some sort of bilateral agreement with the British.”\(^ {57}\) In 1974, when New Zealand imposed new restrictions on British migrants, the Government was careful to make it clear in public that this was not an ‘anti-British’ move or retaliation for Britain’s joining the EEC, but below the surface, these restrictions were at least partially a reaction to Britain’s move.\(^ {58}\) In 1973, New Zealand’s Chief Migration Officer in London, Len Cross, noted that there had been some verbal criticism of his officers by Foreign Affairs staff for not slowing the processing of immigration applications as part of a general slow-down of relations with Britain. “The 1973 report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” he wrote,

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\(^{55}\) Submission to the Home Secretary on the Forthcoming Immigration Bill’ and memo New Zealand High Commissioner in London to Wellington 18/2/71, (Greater detail about the diplomatic toing and froing can be found in the rest of this file), DOL 67/1/4 pt. 2. Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Review of Immigration Policy, 17/9/73, pp. 3-5 in DOL 22/1/279 pt.2. MFAT 67/1/4 pt. 2 also addresses New Zealand’s efforts to change Britain’s mind.


\(^{57}\) Report of the Caucus Committee on Immigration Meeting of 29/11/73’, p. 3, in DOL 22/1/279, pt. 3.

\(^{58}\) Herald 27/10/75, p. 4. In 1971, a joint paper by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Immigration Division argued that New Zealand should re-evaluate its immigration policy in light of these changes. ‘ Review of Immigration Policy: Background Paper Number 7,’ July 1973, p. 1, in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 2.
implies some ‘cooling off’ of normal past relations with the United Kingdom... It has been said that if we are to slow down present relationships then migration recruitment should also be slowed down.\(^{59}\)

While New Zealand restricted British immigration in 1974, it did not impose similar controls on its second largest source of immigrants - Australia. Despite a net immigration of 34 000 Australians from 1972-8, free access to New Zealand for its trans-Tasman neighbours was barely considered in the review of policy.\(^{60}\) Had skills and pressure on resources been the only consideration in the tightening of entry for British, logically these same restrictions would have been placed on Australians. The best explanation for the fact that they were not was New Zealand’s deteriorating relations with Britain and the growing importance of its relations with Australia.

A desire on the part of New Zealand governments to maintain good relations with their trans-Tasman neighbours gave Australia some leverage over New Zealand in immigration. In 1975, a new regulation requiring all trans-Tasman travellers to carry passports was brought in at the insistence of the Australian Government which feared ‘back-door’ entry to Australia of illegal immigrants posing as New Zealand citizens. Pressure from Australia was responsible for New Zealand abandoning plans for visa-abolition agreements with six South-East Asian countries and with Italy, Greece and Spain.\(^{61}\)

**Humanitarian Immigration?**

Refugees, accepted in line with New Zealand’s responsibilities as part of the United Nations, contributed more than a thousand immigrants to New Zealand between 1972-8.\(^{62}\) However, beneath a humanitarian veneer, New Zealand’s refugee policy applied the selection criteria of skills, foreign policy objectives and potential pressure on resources almost as strictly as it did to other groups of immigrants.

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\(^{59}\)Memo from Chief Migration Officer London to Seclab 2/8/73 in DOL 22/1/285.

\(^{60}\)The 34 000 figure from 1972-78 comes from NZOY 1976, 1979.


\(^{62}\)PM to Secfa 15/5/75 in DOL 22/1/230 pt. 3. and Deputy Secfa to Seclab 29/10/73 in DOL 22/1/246 pt. 1 are two examples of requests from the UNHCR to take Vietnamese and Chileans.
The most important groups of refugees who came in the 1970s were Asian families from Uganda in 1972 (244 individuals), Chilean supporters of Allende from 1974-6 (236 individuals) and refugees from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia after 1975 (a group which would reach a total of more that 5,000 at the end of 1981). These new major sources represented a significant change in focus from the predominance of European refugees of the preceding three decades.

The change in the source of refugees partially reflected New Zealand’s increasingly broad foreign policy focus and changing relations with Britain. In the case of the Ugandan Asians, the Immigration Division advised cabinet that New Zealand should take Asian refugees because it had recently accepted Hungarians and Czechs and did not want to appear to other countries to be practicing racial selection in its refugee policy. New Zealand officials also noted pressure from Britain to take Ugandans in 1972 as New Zealand was keen to preserve British goodwill, and pressure from Australia and the United States to take Indo-Chinese refugees in 1975.

The most important single criterion for refugees was skill. A memo from the Labour Department to the Minister of Immigration indicates that New Zealand officials saw themselves as competing with other host nations for the most skilled Ugandan Indian refugees.

If and when a decision is taken to accept Ugandan Asians we must be prepared to move quickly, otherwise we will miss the opportunity of accepting applications with desirable skills and could be under pressure to accept migrants no other country wants.

It went on to note that “in the selection of applicants a heavy weighting would be placed on the possession of professional, technical and trade qualifications.”

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65 Minister of Immigration (F Gill) ‘Memo for Cabinet,’ 21/11/78, DOL 22/1/274, pt. 1. References to such pressure from Britain also occur throughout DOL 22/1/27-24 pts. 5-6.

66 Fitzgerald, p. 47.

made New Zealand officials wary of the World Council of Churches as an agent in refugee selection because of its “persistence in promoting refugee applications which do not comply with the stated criteria.”

They told the British who ran refugee camps for the Ugandans that they “want[ed] professional people, technicians, and tradesmen in that order,” with no more than 10 percent of the breadwinners unskilled.

In 1975, New Zealand sought Vietnamese refugees with “professional or technical qualifications recognised in New Zealand” who were “readily employable in a job equal to or near equal to their present qualifications and experience and with English language skills.” The Immigration Division’s press release on the arrival of the first draft of Vietnamese in 1977 stressed that they would not “be a burden on the taxpayer” because “they are hardworking people, many have skills as tradesmen and are adaptable to New Zealand working conditions.” Similar occupational criteria applied to Chilean refugees.

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69 Memo Minimmign to Cabinet, 5/3/73 in MFAT (PM) 32/3/72 pt. 2.
70 South Vietnamese Refugees, Suggestions for Elements for Inclusion in a Points Rating System,’ 17/4/75 in DOL 22/1/230 pt. 3.
71 Press Release from Inter-Church Committee on Immigration 20/9/77 in DOL 22/1/27-24.
72 Minfa to Ambassador Santiago 16/11/73 in DOL 22/1/246 pt. 1.
Skilled refugees were in demand from all recipient countries and although New Zealand offered 200 places for refugees from Uganda, only twenty-six applications covering eighty-six people who met the criteria of lawyers, dentists, engineers and teachers were received. In the end, the Government backed down and took 243 Ugandans including a sizeable proportion of less skilled workers.

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74 Jacqueline Leckie, ‘South Asians: Old and New Migrations’ in Stuart Grief ed., Immigration and National Identity in New Zealand: One People, Two Peoples, Many Peoples, Dunmore, Palmerston North, 1995, p. 148. Herald, 5/12/78, p. 3. ‘South Vietnamese Refugees, Suggestions for Elements for Inclusion in a Points Rating System,’ 17/4/75 in DOL 22/1/230 pt. 3. It was also difficult for highly skilled and specialised non-European professionals to find jobs in New Zealand. In 1974 the Secretary of Labour lamented that five veterinarians and two economists accepted as refugees from Chile had been unable to find work. He conceded that in recruiting highly specialised refugees “it now appears that ... our basic thinking may have been wrong from the start.” Seclab to Secfa 16/7/74 in DOL 22/1/246 pt. 2.
Successive governments were keen to ensure that refugees would not be a burden on the state’s resources. A policy statement of 1979 noted that “the basic philosophy behind refugee resettlement requires ... that they should be helped to become financially self-supporting as soon as possible.” As a consequence, no refugees were admitted unless they had housing arranged or guaranteed by a sponsor. In order to get refugees who would have a longer working life in New Zealand and would place a minimum of strain on economic resources, the Government also expressed a preference for refugees under the age of 45, with fewer than four dependents, and without large numbers of close relatives who could subsequently enter on grounds of family reunification.

**Conclusion**

Before 1970, New Zealand’s immigration policy was focused above all on preserving its relative cultural homogeneity. In line with this goal, it granted free entry to British and selected others based on their perceived ability to assimilate. In this way, immigration policy reflected New Zealanders’ perception of the New Zealand nation as an improved British society.

Economic factors, in the early 1970s, undermined this basis for selection. Growth in manufacturing and construction led to an influx of unskilled and culturally different immigrants from the Pacific Islands. At the same time, an increasingly specialised economy demanded migrants with skills and this made a policy which favoured white

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75 Prime Minister Rowling argued that “The ability to resettle Vietnamese and Chilean refugees satisfactorily is related to the present employment and economic situation.” *Herald* 27/5/75, p. 1.


77 Until 1978, the resettlement of refugees in the community, including finding them houses and jobs, was undertaken by sponsors coordinated through the multi-denominational Inter-Church Committee on Immigration (ICCI). Most of these sponsors were churches (From 1964 to 1976, 92 percent). Fitzgerald, p. 9, p. 19 p. 76. Through the ICCI, formed in 1970, the churches also became strong advocates for the rights of refugees and other migrants. Example of lobbying include NCC resettlement officer R. Ogrady to Minimmign, 19/10/73, *Christchurch Star* 30/1/74 in DOL 22/1/246 pt. 1 and correspondence between NCC and Minimmign of 1972 in DOL 22/1/274 pt. 1. In 1976, the ICCI split into a separate Inter-Church Commission on Immigration and an Inter-Church Committee on Immigration with the former receiving government funding to settle refugees and the latter lobbying on refugee and migrant issues. Summary of Immigration Policy, 19/8/76, p. 7, in DOL 22/1/27-24 pt. 1.

British without skills over skilled non-British increasingly obsolete. Finally, the pressure on resources created by a massive uncontrolled influx of British immigrants forced governments to reconsider entry criteria.

But the economic pressure created by immigrants went beyond these changing material circumstances. Elements of New Zealand’s identity - its unique lifestyle, its uncrowded, clean green aspect and its treasured social welfare system, were thought to be in jeopardy. Policymakers’ attitudes were also shifting away from the idea that New Zealand was part of a British family of nations. Now British immigration, which had been seen as a way of maintaining national identity, was increasingly seen as a threat to its essential elements.

In December 1975, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Frank Corner told his minister that “all immigration questions have foreign policy implications” and foreign policy factors were also important in driving change to immigration policy.79 As New Zealand sought to define itself as an Asia-Pacific nation and as a nation distinct from Britain, this was reflected in decisions about immigration policy including greater restrictions on British immigrants and limited relaxation of entry for Asians and Pacific Islanders. The forces of foreign policy and economics, once subordinated to New Zealand’s desire for assimilable immigrants in the formulation of immigration policy were now beginning to override it in importance.

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79 Corner (Secfa) to Minfa 12/12/75 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 2.
Chapter 3: Immigration Policy and Cultural Change in New Zealand

One of the most powerful myths of New Zealand identity was the idea that New Zealand was a racially harmonious society and the 1970s became the site of a mighty battle over the interpretation of this myth.\footnote{As Belich puts it “White New Zealand’s good relations with its indigenous people, real and alleged, were considered a central plank of national identity.” James Belich, \textit{Paradise Reforged: A History of New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000}, Allen Lane Penguin, Auckland, 2001, p. 519.} Many in New Zealand still expressed the belief that racial harmony would be best preserved by the assimilation of Maori into Pakeha society and culture and through selection of those immigrants who could most easily assimilate.

The presence of Maori and the diversity of the British cultures which contributed to Pakeha culture ensured that this assimilationist paradigm was more complex than a strict and prescriptive set of cultural norms. A certain range of cultural attributes was accepted as New Zealand attributes. Nonetheless, national culture was considered to be unitary - not a series of separate cultures, but a single continuous culture.

In the 1970s, a new paradigm of race relations gained momentum - the idea of cultural pluralism. Cultural pluralists argued that the expectation to assimilate was a form of racial and cultural oppression and that true equality could only be achieved through official recognition and accommodation of more than one distinct culture within the framework of the nation-state and its institutions.

The rise of cultural pluralist ideas had profound implications for immigration policy. Through the 1970s, and especially under the Third Labour Government, the paradigm of a unitary national culture into which immigrants must assimilate was increasingly questioned from within New Zealand. As this happened, an immigration policy designed to protect cultural homogeneity became anachronistic and policy slowly changed to reflect emerging ideas about cultural pluralism.

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the emergence of a culture of social and political protest in New Zealand. A generation of New Zealanders born since World War Two was more educated, more urbanised and more highly skilled than its parents and grew
up in an environment exposed to global media. Lifestyles were changing. “To describe a New Zealander,” wrote Rahman Khan in 1971,

as “rugby playing, beer drinking tough country man who cuts his hair short” today would be marginally correct. Today’s New Zealander is a success-motivated, urbanised and sophisticated individual ... Once the “jack of all trades,” today he is seeking to specialise in one field. Unlike his predecessor, he is now trying to define himself through his leisure activities. Therefore one sees the proliferation of sports-clubs and sport activity, licensed restaurants and entertainment spots. His eating habits have become more sophisticated. The New Zealander’s change in attitudes towards wine is case in point. Once considered not manly, today it is accepted in humblest company.  

Politics were changing to reflect this diversity. Single issue and identity political movements grew in importance. Feminists, environmentalists, Maori activists, pacifists, the anti-racist movement, gay-rights activists and the anti-Springbok tour movement emerged as forthright critics of the social and cultural order in New Zealand. These protesters represented a challenge to the politics of the centre and the culture of conformism that had dominated New Zealand politics of the 1950s and early 1960s. The growing strength of such movements was demonstrated in April 1971, when more than 20 000 people marched nationwide in opposition to New Zealand’s involvement in the Vietnam War.

Several of the issues of small pressure groups became national issues through the vehicle of the Labour Party which included an increasing number of young educated liberal members alongside the traditional working-class union men. Labour’s rise to power in 1973 brought several people with histories of involvement in anti-nuclear

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3He was, however, apparently still a male. Rahman Khan, ‘Social Effects of Immigration’, New Zealand Journal of Public Administration, v. 34, 1971, p. 55.

protests and anti-tour protests into caucus and three members of the Citizens Association for Racial Equality into cabinet.\(^5\)

Some of these movements looked for inspiration beyond New Zealand to contemporary protest movements in the United States and Europe but they also politicised New Zealand identity.\(^6\) Many of them appropriated widely accepted national values such as egalitarianism, racial equality, a pure environment and fair social legislation in support of their causes. Anti-tour protesters, for example, not only drew on universal discourses on human rights in expressing opposition to sporting contacts with South Africa, but on the idea that New Zealanders did not want their nation’s tradition for good race relations sullied by such contacts.\(^7\)

The most important groups to challenge the unitary cultural assumptions of the New Zealand nation were Maori activists. Representatives of Maori increasingly claimed the right to recognition of their language, institutions and separate identity within the culture of the nation and the institutions of state.\(^8\) A powerful signal of this political


\(^{6}\) Shields describes the women’s movement as looking both to United States models and to New Zealand experience. Margaret Shields, ‘Women in the Labour Party During the Kirk and Rowling Years’ in Margaret Clarke ed. Three *Labour Leaders: Nordmeyer, Kirk, Rowling*, Dunmore, Palmerston North, 2001, p. 136.

\(^{7}\) The Values Party, the first Green party in the world, called on New Zealand’s historical tradition of radical social legislation in promoting a policy of environmental conservation and zero economic growth. *New Zealand Values Party, Manifesto*, 1972. Belich, p. 519 comments on the way in which national identity myths were employed by the anti-springbok tour movement. Les Cleveland discusses the way in which the ‘save Manapouri’ movement appropriated national symbolism In support of its cause. Les Cleveland, *The Anatomy of Influence: Pressure Groups and Politics in New Zealand*, 1972, Hicks Smith and Sons Limited, Wellington, pp. 27-8, p. 41. I will devote Chapter 8 to these links.

The renaissance was the land march led by Whina Cooper in 1975 which drew 30,000 participants. Other prominent Maori protests which grabbed media attention included the Ngati Whatua ‘occupation’ of land on Bastion Point, protests over the Raglan golf course led by Eva Rickard of the Tainui Awhiro and the Haka Party incident where members of the urban Maori protest organisation Nga Tamatoa attacked Canterbury University engineering students who were performing an obscene version of the Haka as part of capping celebrations.

The so-called ‘Maori renaissance’ had begun. Maori language newspapers such as *Te Maori* and *Mana* arose, a Polynesian language radio station in Auckland was mooted, urban Marae sprang up in response to the threat to Maoritanga of urbanisation and articulate Maori became increasingly effective in airing their people’s grievances and calling attention to the obligations of the crown under the Treaty of Waitangi.

The rise of Maori protest challenged the belief expressed by many Pakeha that New Zealand was an example to the world of racial harmony. Prime Minister Jack Marshall articulated this stance in 1972. “It is my firm belief,” he declared, “that equality of opportunity, irrespective of racial origin, already exists in New Zealand. New Zealanders are fortunate to live in a multi-racial society where racial problems in past years have been insignificant.” Like Marshall, many New Zealanders appear to have believed that, because Maori had equality of opportunity in the Pakeha world, there was racial equality. One National MP reflected the pride that many felt about the nation’s race relations when he declared “We are not Maori, we are not European we are all New Zealanders.” From this perspective, Maori ‘activism’ was a separatist threat to racial harmony.

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12Cited in MOOHR Newsletter, Sept. 1972, p. 3.

Maori voices denouncing the idea that assimilation had brought racial harmony were increasingly heard in Pakeha fora. Among the most prominent critics of the assimilationist paradigm were Auckland University lecturer Ranginui Walker and Maori Affairs minister Matiu Rata. Both men called for a multi-cultural conception of the nation and for the state to take an active role in the maintenance of Maori language and culture through such intervention as the teaching of Maori language and culture in schools.\textsuperscript{14} In 1979, after leaving the Labour Party where he had previously been Maori Affairs Minister, Rata argued that

> The 139 year experience of the “We are one people” concept has been an abject failure. We as a people have never felt more let down, more insecure and more economically and socially deprived than we are today. There would be many who would claim that as a nation we have made progress and that the principle of equality is an entrenched part of our nation’s life. That is a myth... If we are to achieve the dream of being “one people” then we must learn to not merely respect one another but to think and act in one another's valued terms... Let me therefore stress that we will no longer tolerate policies which take no account of our language, customs and lifestyle, nor will we continue to accept being governed or administered by anyone who does not understand the way we think or understand our terms and values... We will master our own affairs - we must command our own destiny and we want every acre of land wrongfully taken from us back.\textsuperscript{15}

Rata’s claim that the assimilationist model of race relations was a failure was backed up by statistics on Maori health and education. An article in \textit{Te Maori} pointed out the value of institutional recognition of Maoritanga. It noted that 36 percent of students in Maori schools gained school certificate while only 12 percent of those in mainstream schools did.\textsuperscript{16}

A youthful urban Maori population gave rise to radical youth movements including the Maori Organisation on Human Rights (MOOHR), formed in 1967, and Nga Tamatoa, formed in 1970, which responded to the challenges that Maori culture faced in the Pakeha urban environment. They argued for official recognition of a separate

\textsuperscript{14}Truth, 21/5/74, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{15}Tom Newnham and Keith Sorrenson, \textit{25 Years of CARE}, CARE, Auckland, 1989, p. 78.
Maori identity and criticised the way in which Maori were presented in the media and treated by the institutions of state. The main target of these movements was ‘institutionalised racism’ which was the tendency of institutions such as government departments, welfare institutions, schools and the media to be geared towards the culture of the majority and to fail to accommodate minorities.

The Labour Government of Norman Kirk tried to respond. Waitangi Day was given new status as New Zealand’s national day and in his speech at the first “New Zealand Day” celebration, Kirk expressed the emerging acceptance by Pakeha that the New Zealand nation was a partnership between Maori and Pakeha, founded at Waitangi and based not on assimilation, but on the mutual respect of two cultures.

We commemorate New Zealand Day ... as an act of trust, a pledge of co-operation. This is part of our national inheritance. We must not forget it ... Already we are a distinctive nation unlike any other in the world and this is largely so because Maoritanga is woven as rich gleaming threads into the fabric of our society.

Beyond the realm of symbolism and rhetoric, the Third Labour Government took some tentative steps to breathe life into this vision. The number of secondary schools teaching the Maori language was increased from 30 in 1970 to 90 in 1975 as affirmative action programmes encouraged Maori into teaching. Labour’s most important move was the 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act which set up a tribunal to “advise the Government on all future applications of the Treaty of Waitangi principles affecting the crown and its institutions.” However, it was not until after a

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nine year interlude of National Governments that, in 1985, the Tribunal’s powers were expanded to examine historic grievances.  

One consequence of Maori ‘activism’ and the Government’s response, was that even those Pakeha who felt threatened by the more radical political elements of the Maori protest movement were forced to seriously consider the place of Maori and other minorities in their society. A new word entered the national vocabulary - ‘multiculturalism.’ New Zealand was a ‘multicultural society.’ By the 1970s, everyone in New Zealand was debating multiculturalism, from radicals like the Citizens’ Association for Racial Equality (CARE), the Race Relations Council and Nga Tamatoa, to churches, the public service, the main political parties and mainstream newspaper editorials. 

The meaning of a ‘multicultural society,’ however, was contested. Two camps evolved, each claiming to want to safeguard New Zealand’s tradition of racial equality but from two very different perspectives. ‘Assimilationists’ saw equality among individuals as being the most important element of a racially harmonious society, while ‘cultural-pluralists’ saw the official and institutional recognition of minorities’ separate cultural identities as being the essential elements. 

Tensions which emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s between the bicultural and multicultural currents of the cultural pluralist movement, if they existed at all in the 1970s, were rare. At this time, the common adversary for all minority political movements was assimilationism. The potential for a multicultural New Zealand to undermine the status of Maori as a treaty partner and the claims for political and

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economic resources that flow from that status were less apparent in a pre-Waitangi Tribunal settlement era.

Maori, the churches and the intelligentsia were among the most prominent cultural pluralists. “Race equality,” the New Zealand Maori Council argued, “is based generally on the doctrine of integration, and our prime concern is to focus attention on ... the concept of equality in diversity.”\(^\text{23}\) It called for changes in the institutions of state, such as multi-ethnic programmes in school curricula, and demanded that New Zealand law recognise “that Maori cultural practices, organisations and institutions have an important place in New Zealand society.”\(^\text{24}\) The Maori Women’s Welfare League, at its 1974 conference, passed a remit asserting that New Zealand was a “multi-racial society” and that “Maoritanga ... needs to be revived in the nation.” One way forward, the League suggested, was increased representation of Maori and Polynesians on public health boards and committees.\(^\text{25}\)

New Zealand’s New Left adopted a rhetoric of cultural pluralism. The Values Party argued in favour of “build[ing] a truly plural society - as opposed to one based on assimilation or integration” and suggested that Pakeha had a lot to learn from Maori in their approaches to “community, co-operation, work, land and decision making.”\(^\text{26}\) The Polynesian Panther Party (PPP), modelled on the American Black Panthers, argued that “this society must be changed to serve a multi-racial population. We want an end to the racist laws that are mono-cultural in nature, and the institutions that are dominated by racial or mono-cultural values.” The Presbyterian Public Questions Committee suggested that “The Pakeha cannot assume ‘my way is in the majority, therefore mine should be the only way’.”\(^\text{27}\)

\(^{24}\)ibid, p. 2.
\(^{25}\)Maori Women’s Welfare League (MWWL), Minutes of 22nd Annual Dominion Conference, Hamilton, 1974, Remit 2, Turnbull.
Cultural pluralists had a valuable ally in New Zealand’s first Race Relations Conciliator, Guy Powles, who was installed in 1972. The Race Relations Office was set up under a United Nations covenant and reflected growing international condemnation of racial discrimination. It was less a punitive organisation than one with educative, investigative and mediation roles. As well as investigating and seeking resolution and restitution for various complaints about discrimination in the real estate industry, the workplace and the media, it investigated issues of institutionalised racism and, on several occasions, criticised government departments for failing to accommodate the cultural values of minorities.

Such criticism forced the public service to respond. The government Taskforce on Social and Economic Planning of 1976, chaired by Frank Holmes, argued that

The administration of public affairs in New Zealand grew out of a single cultural tradition (nineteenth century Britain) and was molded into a Dominion model long before urbanisation, before the reversal of the falling Maori population and the subsequent rebirth of cultural identity, before the development of an industrial service sector economy and before the growth of a significant Pacific Island community.

The failure of institutions to respond to the needs of minority cultures, it argued, was driven by the “mistaken conception that ‘minorities’ should somehow be content to discard their identity and merge with the dominant group.” The taskforce recommended a modification of public service institutions to give them a ‘multicultural bias’ and concluded that respect for other cultures should become “a guiding principle for all administrative and planning structures both in the context of their work and of the methods adopted.”

Other public service studies reached similar conclusions. The Interdepartmental Committee on Population Questions of 1975 concluded “individuals must feel able to belong to their own culture and to society as a whole without contradictions” and Race Relations Conciliator Powles argued that New Zealand must acknowledge its

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30 Holmes, p. 77. p. 79.
31 Ibid., synopsis, p. xviii.
‘multicultural identity’. He declared “we must banish the idea that the future of Maori is to be a pale brown Pakeha.” Increasing calls were heard for Maoritanga to be taught in schools. A 1977 report on education argued

New Zealand is a multicultural nation in the South Pacific and education is having a role to foster in society positive attitudes towards the acceptance of cultural diversity as a strength. Programmes need not aim merely at the development of tolerance of cultural and racial differences but to go beyond to the reinforcement of cultural diversity and recognition of diversity as bringing richness to society.

Linked to this idea was a deeper realisation that national identity itself could be derived from more than one cultural tradition. In the words of Deputy Prime Minister Talboys in 1977

New Zealand is host to two distinctive cultural traditions, the Polynesian and the Pakeha. It is from their interplay that our national identity is derived. And it is only by drawing upon the best that is to be found in the traditional values of both cultures, that New Zealand will be able to develop a hugely multi-cultural society with a distinctive identity and place in the world.

The move towards a cultural pluralist model in the administration of public affairs was viewed with mistrust by assimilationists who saw it, not as a step forward for race relations, but as a divisive separatist movement that threatened New Zealand’s tradition of racial harmony. 1970s newspapers contained many letters denouncing cultural pluralism as divisive. Their catch cry was “we are all New Zealanders.”

One submission to the Racial Harmony in New Zealand report of 1979 argued that

35 Deputty Prime Minister’s visit to the South Pacific, 21 January to 12 February 1977’, New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review (NZFAR), v. 27, no. 1, 1977. p. 54.
according a special status to Maori culture in New Zealand society was wrong because “no special treatment is given to Chinese, Indian, or any of the white groups that make up the New Zealand community on the grounds of race. All manage quite amicably to be New Zealanders.” Likewise, a *New Zealand Herald* editorial argued against a proposed Polynesian radio station for Auckland because “it can only emphasise differences of race and colour when the great need is surely to bring Maori and Pakeha together.”

Prominent among the assimilationists were older members of the National Party. At the Waitangi Day celebrations in 1979 former National Prime Minister, now Governor General, Keith Holyoake represented the old guard in calling for “two races, one people” as did Minister of Maori Affairs Ben Couch when he told the Maori Women’s Welfare League that Maori must adapt or perish. Soon to be Prime Minister Robert Muldoon tried to define multiculturalism not in pluralist terms, but as a form of assimilation claiming

[Previous immigration] is why we have the unique multi-racial, multi-cultural society of which we are so proud. As far as the immigrant is concerned, once he is here, he is a New Zealander ... His origin may differ but he is welcomed as an ordinary member of our community provided he complies with a small number of requirements ... as to behaviour and we all know what they are.

Many Pakeha simply could not understand why Maori, who seemed to have quietly accepted the unequal status of their culture in the institutions of society, were now complaining about it. After Nga Tamatoa protested to the Race Relations Conciliator about an offensive newspaper cartoon, a *Truth* editorial lamented

*What has happened to that open handed good natured, tolerant fellow so well known here and overseas as the ‘happy Hori?’ ... We are convinced*

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38 Blackburn, p. 7.
40 Holyoake’s comment, Ballara p. 4. Couch told the Maori Women’s Welfare League that Maori must adapt “Scientists... tell us that the reason some species survive and other don’t is that the survivors are adaptable. It is true for people too. So we must adapt.” Speech of Minister of Maori Affairs B. Couch to MWWL Annual Conference 1979. Turnbull.
the vast bulk of Maoris remain the happy-go-lucky good blokes of old with better things to fret about than supposed insults.42

At stake in the battle between cultural pluralists and assimilationists was New Zealand’s reputation for racial harmony. Both assimilationists and cultural pluralists accepted the idea that racial equality was an essential element of the New Zealand nation, but placed very different interpretations on how this racial harmony should be preserved. The former advocated equality of the individual within a single national culture, while the latter argued that true racial equality could only be achieved through the recognition that the nation comprised more than one culture and that the institutions of the nation-state should recognise this.

**Assimilation, Cultural Pluralism and Immigration Policy**

The ideological dispute over race relations in New Zealand manifested itself in changing immigration policy. Through the 1950s and 60s, as Maori were expected to assimilate into a unitary Pakeha-based national culture, there was also a strong expectation for immigrants to assimilate. In the 1970s, as cultural pluralism increasingly became the accepted model for race relations between Maori and Pakeha, an immigration policy that was based on assimilation was brought into question.

Prior to 1972, assimilability of immigrants was seldom considered at the level of the individual, but generalisations were made in policy formulation about the ability of whole nationalities or races to ‘fit in’. Immigration policy was based, in the most literal sense of the term, on racial discrimination.43 The application of assimilability as an immigration criterion was exercised in two distinct ways; through the exclusion of immigrants who officials considered would have difficulty assimilating and through resettlement programmes to aid the assimilation of groups who could not be excluded, such as Pacific Islanders from New Zealand’s overseas territories.

42Truth 26/9/72, p. 6.

43An Immigration Division paper of the review defined assimilation in relation to integration as follows - “Integration refers to the process of making a whole by adding together or combining the separate parts, whereas assimilation is understood to mean the process of making similar by absorption into the system.” 'Review of Immigration Policy Background Paper 6', 1973, in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 1.
The exclusion of immigrants according to the perceived characteristics of their ethnic or national group was evident under Holyoake and Marshall’s National Government. In the words of the 1970 policy statement

The purpose of the basic rules by which eligibility to come here is decided is to limit the extent of migration from various nationalities to numbers which have been found by experience can be absorbed in New Zealand without serious upset to the racial balance of our country.44

British were seen as sharing a “common heritage and tradition” with New Zealanders.45 David Thompson, National’s Minister of Immigration, declared that New Zealand’s policy had always expressed a preference for “British born immigrants wholly of European origin,” and that “experience has shown us that these people, as indeed do those from other European countries, fit easily into our way of life.”46

The idea of the desirability of immigration from traditional European sources was again expressed in a policy statement.

Those who have already settled here, mostly from Britain, the Netherlands and northern Europe, have generally assimilated into the community and contributed usefully to the country’s life and progress. We still hope to draw people from these well tried sources.47

Southern and eastern Europeans were discouraged as immigrants because of perceived cultural differences from New Zealanders which made them hard to assimilate.48 Finally, a 1970 policy statement justified the exclusion of African and Asian immigrants on grounds of their lack of assimilability.

The people of Africa and Asia, being of a culture alien both to the European and Polynesian New Zealanders, present more difficult problems of assimilation than any others and because of population pressure and very large numbers of dependants there is a tremendous

48Northey and Lythe, p. 1.
desire for emigration to New Zealand. These factors have caused us to place even stricter limitations upon people from these countries than upon Southern and Eastern Europeans.49

Assimilability was often judged according to race. Although an earlier memo noted that the Indian community in New Zealand “prove[d] to be law abiding and industrious citizens [who did] not arouse any feelings against them within the New Zealand community,” the Labour Department argued against any loosening of restrictions on immigrants from India on the grounds that “they do not assimilate, they are still sending their children back to India for education and caste indoctrination, they continue to live in substandard conditions and in no way change their customs, their houses, [or] their dress.”50

Racial discrimination in entry criteria for immigrants was not seen by Government or by officials as incompatible with New Zealand’s harmonious multi-racial society. In contrast, New Zealand’s supposedly pristine record in race relations was used to justify exclusion of non-Europeans. Before 1972, official statements frequently argued that a rapid inflow of ‘coloured’ immigrants should be avoided because it would upset the delicate balance of race relations between Maori and Pakeha.51 An Immigration Division memo of 1970 justified restrictions on Chinese immigration from Hong Kong on the grounds that

> It is necessary to operate an immigration policy in such a way that we do not build up our racial minorities so quickly that we jeopardise our future race relationships in this country. Any disharmony on the grounds of colour could disturb seriously the relations between Maori and Pakeha.52

Minister of Labour Marshall employed a similar argument against increasing immigration from the Pacific, telling the Evening Post that “the Government was sympathetic to the plight of Pacific Islanders but, our first duty is to our own Maoris,” and “we must be careful to ensure that persons coming here will fit in and will be

49Ibid, p. 3.
easily assimilated ... otherwise the harmonious race relations now enjoyed in New Zealand may be jeopardised.”

Following this lead, the official 1972 policy statement claimed that New Zealand’s selective immigration policy was “designed to maintain the distinctive pattern of our society resulting from the intermingling of European and Polynesian peoples and some smaller racial groups.”

Ironically, the New Zealand Government also used the relatively small permanent Pacific Island immigration as an excuse for virtually excluding non-European immigrants from other parts of the world. A 1970 policy statement noted that “because we are taking so many people from the Pacific area, we are not able to offer the same number of opportunities to people from other parts of the world” including Asia and Africa.

After Labour came to power at the end of 1972, many of these references disappeared from policy statements. This was largely because they were inconsistent with an increasingly cultural pluralist approach that was adopted by the new Government.

After the 1973-4 review of policy, the ability of immigrants to assimilate became less important in immigrant selection. Labour removed the formal preferential treatment

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54 Immigration Division, Entry to New Zealand, Wellington, 1972, p. 1. ‘Consular Instructions Chapter 11: Entry to New Zealand’ July 1971, in DOL 22/1/244 pt. 3. In the following year Associate Minister of Immigration David Thompson also warned that “[no one] can predict with reasonable certainty the rate at which we can accept people of alien culture without running the risk of disturbing our relatively harmonious race-relationships.” LEG 22/4/72 p. 10. A 1970 policy statement produced by the Immigration Division noted that while “The Immigration Act does not prescribe, nor does the Government apply a policy of excluding entry because of race or nationality... the purpose of the basic rules by which eligibility to come here is decided is to limit the extent of migration from various nationalities to numbers which have been found by experience can be absorbed in New Zealand without serious upset to the racial balance of our country.” Department of Labour Immigration Division, A Look At New Zealand’s Immigration Policy 1970, in MFAT 32/3/1 pt. 13.
55 Department of Labour Immigration Division, A Look At New Zealand’s Immigration Policy 1970, in MFAT 32/3/1 pt. 13. Preserving race relations in New Zealand was also used to deflect criticism of the relatively small number of Ugandan Asian refugees accepted in 1972. Press Statement from Minister of Foreign Affairs 12/9/72 in MFAT 32/3/72 pt. 2.
for white-British immigrants which had existed since 1920 and placed increased emphasis on the skills that immigrants could bring.\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{Resettlement Policy}

New approaches to immigrant resettlement signalled an evolution of attitudes. Prior to 1972, all resettlement activity undertaken by government departments had focused on helping immigrants to assimilate, but Labour’s approach was based around acceptance of cultural pluralism. One of the background papers of the policy review of 1974 suggested

\begin{quote}
Up to the present time New Zealand has followed a philosophy of maintaining a relatively homogeneous population ... A fundamental question to be answered is whether the present policy is still in New Zealand’s best interests ... or whether we should adopt a policy designed to encourage a more heterogeneous society.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

The 1974 Interdepartmental Committee on Resettlement’s (IDCR) report outlined the key elements of a new resettlement programme for Pacific Island immigrants. As well as recommending classes for migrants in how to adapt to living in a Western material society, it proposed programmes to educate New Zealanders about the cultural differences faced by Pacific Islanders in New Zealand and recommended the adaptation of public service organisations to the needs of the Pacific Island community. Resettlement was taking on a new meaning. Now, not only did it mean teaching immigrants how to adapt to Pakeha society, but it also engendered the idea of adapting New Zealand institutions to make them more accessible to immigrants from other cultures.

Government departments came under pressure to accommodate immigrant cultures. The State Housing Corporation, for example, was called on in an IDCR sponsored report, to provide larger houses for Polynesians to take into account their extended family structures. The Immigration Advisory Council recommended the increased use of public radio for broadcasting in Pacific Island languages and public service


\textsuperscript{57}Review of Immigration Policy, Background Paper Number 8’, pp. 6-7 in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 1.
organisations such as the Ministry of Housing, hospitals and police began publishing information in Pacific Island languages.\(^{58}\)

Recruitment policies responded to the changing outlook. Teachers’ colleges, the Consumer Institute, the Ministry of Housing and the Police actively recruited Pacific Islanders. Police in Auckland also worked to establish strong links with Pacific Island communities by taking community leaders on patrol.\(^ {59}\) One of the most striking aspects of the new approach to cultural pluralism was training programmes within government departments in Pacific Island culture. Two examples of this were a course in Polynesian cultures and migrant settlement for basic grade public servants established in 1977 and a pilot course on cultural awareness run for Auckland Police in the same year.\(^ {60}\)

Public service organisations attempted to make the general public more aware of and accepting of Pacific Island cultures and of the problems faced by new immigrants.\(^ {61}\) An IDCR paper noted a need to "raise New Zealanders’ awareness of problems faced by migrants” and called for schools to “promote awareness and appreciation of different values systems.”\(^ {62}\) A significant step in this process was the Vocational Training Council’s 1975 publication of the *Understanding Polynesians* series of

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\(^{61}\) An Immigration Advisory Council report noted that, as well as educating immigrants in New Zealand ways, “New Zealanders need to be informed of and understand the characteristics and traditions of different groups of migrants. They must appreciate the difficulties which any new settler will face,” ‘The Elements of a Resettlement Program’, IAC Paper 19, p. 14, in DOL 22/1/279-9.

booklets, which were aimed at helping employers of Pacific Island workers to understand the culture of their employees.63

One of the major themes of the IDCR’s focus on cultural pluralism was the need for a broader consultation by Government with Pacific Island communities, Maori and other groups in formulating resettlement policy. The result was a proliferation of consultative bodies. The inter-departmental Pacific Affairs Co-ordination Committee’s Sub-Committee on Resettlement consulted with community groups, churches, and other non-governmental organisations.64 Pacific Island Advisory Councils (PIAC) were also formed. Established in Auckland and Wellington in 1974, they were collective bodies made up of leaders from all of the major Pacific Island communities and sought to represent the interests of their people with different arms of Government and with the broader public. In September 1975, for example, the Wellington Pacific Island Advisory Council established a liaison service between the courts and Pacific Island community leaders.65

Maori increasingly claimed the right to have their culture recognised in New Zealand’s institutions, and Labour responded by welcoming Maori input into immigration matters. In 1971, a request from the Secretary of the New Zealand Maori Council to the Immigration Division for a copy of a report on Pacific Island migration had been curtly refused on grounds of confidentiality.66 However, under Labour, Ministry of Maori Affairs representatives were invited onto the Inter-Departmental Committee on Resettlement and the Pacific Affairs Coordinating Committee, while at a community level, a Maori and Pacific Island Advisory Committee on Social Welfare needs in Auckland was formed and worked with the IDCR to produce a major report in 1975. The Committee included politicians, academics, representatives

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64Interdepartmental Committee on Resettlement, ‘Agenda Item 2: Developments in the Fields Related to the Activities of the Committee’ 30/8/76 in DOL 22/1/289 pt. 5. Minutes of Meeting of Resettlement Committee of Pacific Affairs Coordinating Committee (PACC), 20/6/77, DOL 22/1/289 pt. 7.


66Letter Eddie Macleod Secretary of New Zealand Maori Council (NZMC) to J L Fouhy (Immigration Division) 7/9/71 and reply Division Office Immigration to Secretary of NZMC 8/9/71 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 24.
of police, CARE and the Auckland City Mission and had a heavy representation of Maori and Pacific Islanders.67

Throughout the 1970s, booklets and films were produced for Pacific Islanders coming to New Zealand. In the early 1970s, this information focused on aiding their assimilation into New Zealand society by teaching them how to fit-in and become good New Zealanders. By 1975, their focus had changed to one of helping Pacific Islanders to understand and negotiate differences from within their own cultural frame of reference.

In 1971, the Department of Maori and Island Affairs published the booklet *Living in New Zealand: Some Notes for Pacific Islanders in New Zealand*. Its tone varies from the practical to the condescending and it gives an insight into what were considered the main aspects of assimilation with which Pacific Islanders had problems. “You will probably have much more money,” it advised them, “than you have ever had before, but you have to spend it carefully. If you don’t look after your money, it could lead you into trouble and you might have to live in bad housing and be cold and hungry.”68

The booklet provided detailed lists of what clothing people would need, down to how many pairs of underwear (four) and singlets (three) were considered acceptable in New Zealand and laid particular emphasis on cleanliness, warning Pacific Islanders that “no-one respects a family that is not clean” and “keep your grass cut and your section tidy. If it is tidy people will respect you.”69 Similarly it advised keeping food in a cool clean place where no flies can go, and that “if you don’t eat the right food you can get sick. Fresh meat, vegetables, fruit and milk are important … too much fish and chips and foods with a lot of sugar or fat are bad for you.”70 The booklet reminded Islanders of the importance of education and was particularly firm on good work habits.

Don’t change job every time you hear that there is more money somewhere else … Get to work on time. Be proud of how you look- dress

69 Ibid., p.9, p. 29.
70 Ibid., p. 15.
tidily. Do your job well. Don’t be shy. Only stay away from work if you are sick or for urgent reasons (or you may be fired).

It emphasised the virtue of thrift and warned against hire purchase, door to door salesmen, used car salesmen, auctions and excessive use of taxis. It advised Pacific Islanders to consider buying cheaper second hand goods.

The booklet tried to channel Pacific Islanders’ leisure into acceptable activities

A good way to meet people is through organisations such as church groups. For those who have left school, there are many organisations such as sports clubs. Encourage older boys and the girls to take an interest in such things - it does them no good to hang about with nothing to do and nowhere to go.

It concluded with emphatic advice on how to be accepted by New Zealanders

Generally speaking, people in New Zealand respect those who are tidy, neatly dressed, quiet, sober and polite. This doesn’t mean you can’t have fun and enjoy yourself - it just means you have to think more about how other people see you.

In 1975, the Vocational Training Council published another booklet for Pacific Islanders entitled *Understanding Pakeha* which, when compared with the 1971 booklet, reflected a shift in attitudes towards cultural pluralism. Rather than a list of instructions on how to fit in, it attempted to explain Pakeha society from a Polynesian perspective. Thus, it implicitly acknowledged the validity of Polynesian ways of doing things. It addressed Polynesians less as childlike primitives who needed to learn how to behave in a sophisticated Western environment, and more as people from another culture who were adjusting to differences in New Zealand. *Understanding Pakeha* told new arrivals that “everything in Western society emphasises the individual” and that “individuals rather than the family are important.” It focused on social mores such as the need to knock before entering a door or joining a queue at the back and advised Polynesians on Pakeha protocol as a guest or as a host.

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71 Ibid., p.13
72 Ibid., p. 16.
73 Ibid., p. 29.
74 Ibid., p. 30.
When friends call at your home, you offer them food and drink without asking if it is wanted. A Pakeha always asks first. This doesn’t mean he is being insincere or that he wants you to refuse. He asks you because he wants to spare you the embarrassment of having to eat something you dislike, or of leaving it untouched.\(^{76}\)

Whereas *Living in New Zealand* had told Pacific Islanders “don’t be shy”, the new booklet explained to them “when Polynesians walk with someone they respect, they walk behind. Pakeha may see this as reluctance, unwillingness, laziness or slowness.” It also warned them that many Pakeha had trouble with Polynesian names and customs and advised them to be tolerant of these difficulties. It helped Pacific Islanders to navigate the difficulties of colloquial language - “Often Pakehas use terrible words in a joking way. It is his tone of voice, rather than the words he uses which tell you whether he is being funny or angry, friendly or hostile.”\(^{77}\)

Finally, while suspicion of Polynesian hygiene remained, the new booklet acknowledged that this was part of an unfair Pakeha stereotype:

> People often blame Polynesians when they see untidiness and dirt around even though some Pakeha have bad habits themselves. If every Polynesian observes the proper hygiene rules for New Zealand, people may stop putting the blame on them unfairly.\(^{78}\)

The latter booklet, while still demanding that Pacific Islanders adapt, showed an awareness of cultural differences and acknowledged that Pakeha misunderstanding of Polynesian culture was a big factor in Pacific Islanders’ resettlement difficulties. It tried to help them to interpret and navigate these differences without demanding wholesale changes in their own ways of doing things. In contrast to the booklet of 1971 which told Polynesians what to do to become like New Zealanders, the latter booklet was indicative of a broader trend towards cultural pluralism over assimilation in New Zealand in the mid-1970s.\(^{79}\)

\(^{76}\)Ibid., p. 10.
\(^{77}\)Ibid., p. 14.
\(^{78}\)Ibid., p. 19.
In contrast to material published for Polynesians, publicity and pre-departure material for British whites and English speaking Americans and Europeans did not give instructions on how to fit-in, nor did it tell them not to eat too much fish and chips. Instead it provided an idealised vision of what New Zealanders thought were the features of their nation that made it attractive and distinct from the countries that migrants were leaving. In so doing, this material provides a distilled form of the ‘better-Britain’ myth of New Zealand identity.\textsuperscript{80}

\textit{Living in New Zealand} and \textit{A New Life in A Young Country}, which were the pamphlets supplied to prospective British, American and European migrants, stressed the advantages of New Zealand in terms of lifestyle, job opportunities, education, wealth, welfare, a lack of crowding, lack of pollution and mild climate. An Air New Zealand advertisement in Canadian magazines noted that “unemployment and urban blight are virtually unheard of” and “we’ve read about smog, we’ve never seen it.”\textsuperscript{81}

Perhaps the most interesting of New Zealanders’ visions of themselves is provided by a film prepared at the request of the IDCR for prospective British and European migrants in 1978. This film for ‘English speaking migrants’ from Europe, America, South Africa and Australia stressed the classless, the multi-racial, the voluntarist, the do-it-yourself, and the sporting aspects of society and emphasised the social welfare system. It presented a supposedly typical New Zealand family.

The script for the film noted:

A family will be found with the following, or similar characteristics and followed for five or more days to show prospective immigrants the type of society New Zealand is trying to build with particular emphasis on ideals of multiculturalism and equal opportunity ... The couple will be 25-35 years old with preschool, primary and intermediate age children ... Dad is a skilled tradesman working for a small firm and does not need to work weekends. ... They recently acquired their own home, on a quarter acre section. They maintain a vegetable and flower garden and Dad is laying a concrete path. He has a toolshed. They own a second hand car ... Dad is in a service club. He occasionally visits the pub ... Mum is employed

\textsuperscript{80}The ‘better-Britain myth’ is one of the central themes regarding identity in James Belich’s book \textit{Paradise Reforged}.

\textsuperscript{81}\textit{Herald} 23/12/78, p. 6.
preferably part-time. She helps at play centre. She sews and knits for her family. She preserves fruit and vegetables. She has musical and dramatic interests. She takes a continuing education course. Mum receives the family benefit ... The youngest child is at preschool. The primary school child attends a visibly multiethnic school ... The children go on school outings. They receive free dental care. The family have strong sporting interests, individual, team, and in town and on the hills, rivers and coastline.82

New Zealand’s multicultural environment was consciously emphasised in the film’s script. Scenes involved “kids leaving multi-ethnic intermediate school setting. Maori teacher in evidence”, “Dad at home, digs vegetable garden and then has beer with Island neighbour” and “Mum at work with Maori and other staff.” Social welfare was highlighted in comments about free public education and in scene fourteen where “Mum goes to part-time job, leaving preschooler at play centre [and] stops at post office to collect family benefit.” The do-it-yourself ethic was in evidence with Dad digging the ‘vege’ garden and laying a concrete path, mum stewing fruit, cooking and sewing at home, making children’s lunches, bringing a plate to a social event and contributing to play-centre. These activities also underline the assumptions about gender roles in a supposedly model New Zealand family.83

The two versions of advice to Pacific Island immigrants and the image of New Zealand given by the film for British and Europeans provide a distillation of what were considered by those who administered immigration and resettlement to be the qualities necessary to make a New Zealander of the 1970s. Information provided for the British showed New Zealand as a classless, do-it-yourself, resourceful, socially progressive society that valued its open spaces. It was also careful to present New Zealand as enjoying harmonious race relations.

The information for migrants also illustrates that national identity in New Zealand was, and perhaps is, defined not just in terms of common elements of the members of a nation, but also in the boundaries that it draws between itself and others. New Zealand defined itself as a European country for Pacific Island migrants and as a

82Asia Pacific Research Unit Limited, ‘Information Film for English Speaking Migrants Film Technique’, Nov. 1978, in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 4.
83But that would be another thesis in itself. Ibid.
multicultural nation of the South Pacific for British migrants, in each case stressing
difference rather than similarities with the immigrant group.

**Conclusion**

Immigration policy reflects national identity. In selecting immigrants whom it is
thought will make good New Zealanders, immigration policy indicates what those in
power think a New Zealander is. In this way immigration criteria give some idea of
how national identity is constructed and provide a sort of identikit picture of the ideal
New Zealander. Before the 1970s, national identity was defined according to quite
narrow cultural criteria. The ideal New Zealander was someone who could assimilate
into a relatively conformist British based culture and this expectation applied both to
ethnic minorities in New Zealand and was used as a selection criterion for
immigrants.

As New Zealand entered the 1970s, this assimilationist attitude to national cultural
identity was challenged from within the country by ethnic and cultural minorities who
demanded recognition of their unique elements within the culture of the nation and its
institutions. A new paradigm of national culture - multiculturalism - gained favour.
Cultural identity became entangled with national identity, not least because the battle
between assimilationism and multiculturalism became a battle of how to preserve
racial harmony which was widely believed to be one of the key elements of New
Zealand national identity.

By the mid-1970s, the idea that national identity derived from a single ‘national’
culture was contested. The cultural pluralist model of national identity gained
influence in New Zealand, and this had implications for immigration policy. If the
accepted definition of a New Zealander became multicultural, then an immigration
policy designed to select immigrants who could assimilate into a unitary national
culture and resettlement policy aimed at making immigrants into cultural New
Zealanders became increasingly illogical. The result was a broadening of the selection
criteria for immigrants and a demonstrable increase in accommodation of immigrant
culture in government and public service organisations.
Chapter 4: Evolution of Legislation and Policy

The evolution of immigration policy in the 1970s reflected New Zealand’s changing economic circumstances, its changing foreign policy orientation and evolving narratives of race relations and national identity. But these background forces were translated into immigration policy unevenly by three different governments and by a sometimes intransigent civil service. Each Government gave weighting to economic, foreign policy and cultural factors according to their differing ideologies, conceptions of the nation and the changing currents of economics and public opinion. Detailed study of immigration policy formulation will show that the three Governments’ differing immigration policies reflected a deeper debate about national identity.

Immigration Policy under National pre-1972

As Chapter 3 suggested, under the Second National Government from 1960-72, the most important principle in immigration policy was that of bringing to New Zealand immigrants who would assimilate easily into New Zealand society. Within this framework, it was assumed that people from the United Kingdom and other white British countries would make the best immigrants, and while this policy did not formally preclude the immigration of non-Europeans, the ability of individuals to assimilate was routinely judged according to their nationality and race.

In the post-colonial world of the 1960s, an explicit policy of national or racial discrimination in immigration would have been very damaging to New Zealand’s international reputation. New Zealand managed to avert such damage by maintaining an unobtrusive system of control that effectively allowed selection of immigrants on racial grounds without needing to publicly divulge criteria. The key to this was the Immigration Restriction Act of 1920 which was so versatile, invisible and brilliant in its simplicity that it had remained virtually unchanged for half a century.

The Immigration Act required all permanent immigrants to obtain a permit from the Immigration Division before leaving for New Zealand. There was no legal restriction on who could be granted a permit. However, those of “British (or Irish) birth and wholly European origin” were effectively exempt from the requirement and had free
right of entry.\textsuperscript{1} The immigration regulations went on to define “wholly European origin” as “those who originate wholly from the races of Europe including that part of Russia to the west of the Urals and including Malta and Cyprus.”\textsuperscript{2} By granting white United Kingdom and Irish migrants the same entry status as New Zealand’s own citizens, the Immigration Act was a strong statement that New Zealand’s identity was essentially British.

The criteria for granting permits for other immigrants were not stipulated by published regulation. Instead they were left to the absolute discretion of the Minister of Immigration and, under the Second National Government, Immigration Ministers revealed little of the criteria.\textsuperscript{3} Official policy was that each application was considered “individually on its merits in the light of current immigration policy” and that “it is not usual to give reasons for refusing entry.”\textsuperscript{4} As former Head of the Immigration Division Don Bond put it, the Act “gave the Minister of Immigration the power to do what he wished.”\textsuperscript{5}

In formulating and administering immigration policy, the Minister relied on the Immigration Division of the Department of Labour and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Individual applications for a permit to immigrate to New Zealand were made through New Zealand’s consular posts and were processed by diplomatic staff or by immigration officials seconded to the posts.\textsuperscript{6} Posts were generally allowed to issue

\textsuperscript{2}Consular Instructions: Chapter 11, Entry to New Zealand’, 5/7/71 in DOL 22/1/244 pt. 3, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{3}In the words of a 1972 policy statement “The Immigration Act gives full discretion to the Minister of Immigration to apply conditions relating to entry. The Minister works within broad guidelines laid down by Cabinet and his powers are largely delegated to officers of the Labour Department and to our representatives overseas to enable the day to day work to be done.” ‘Immigration: Address by Honourable David Thompson’, Labour and Employment Gazette (LEG), v. 22, no. 4, Nov. 1972, p. 12. A similar statement was made in 1974, ‘Review of Immigration Policy,’ New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review (NZFAR), v. 24, no. 5, 1974, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{5}Interview with Don Bond, 23/1/01.
\textsuperscript{6}In 1975, immigration officials were seconded to London, the Hague, Apia, Suva, Nuku’alofa. Summary of Immigration Policy 22/1/2 pt. 30, p. 36.
permits in straightforward cases, but more complicated applications were forwarded to Wellington for consideration and difficult test cases were referred to the Minister.\textsuperscript{7}

According to policy documents, immigration criteria were designed “to limit the extent of migration from various nationalities to numbers which have been found by experience can be absorbed in New Zealand.”\textsuperscript{8} A secondary goal was selecting immigrants with skills of value to the New Zealand economy. Because race was considered the best indicator of a person’s ability to assimilate, maintaining the existing racial composition of New Zealand was one of the “principal objectives” of immigration policy. The consular instructions of 1971 stated:

\begin{quote}
Immigration [policies] are ... controlled and selective and constantly reviewed in light of conditions in New Zealand. They are also designed to maintain the distinctive pattern of our society resulting from the intermingling of European and Polynesian peoples and some smaller racial groups.\textsuperscript{9}
\end{quote}

Not all Europeans were treated as equals. The consular instructions expressed a preference for northern and western Europeans over southern and eastern Europeans.

\begin{enumerate}
\item[7] The Minister was in theory also responsible to Cabinet, but in practice very few decisions relating to immigration matters were referred to it. ‘Review of Immigration Policy Background Paper Number 8’ in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 1, p. 5. Cabinet discussed the Immigration Act of 1974 and was consulted in instances where major changes were made and especially where increased spending was required such as additional funds for enforcement of the overstayer campaigns and decisions on how to cut immigration to the 5 000 promised by Muldoon in his 1975 election campaign. Cabinet was also the body which made all decisions regarding the admission to New Zealand of refugees. Decisions that went to Cabinet included Cabinet Memo, CM 16/2/76 in 22/1/279 pt. 1. regarding cutting bilateral agreements to reduce numbers of immigrants, Cabinet Memo CM 20/12/76 with surrounding correspondence and Treasury Report in DOL 22/1/311 pt. 1. Memo Seclab to NZHC London re: Use of Occupational Priority List, 10/3/76 in DOL 22/1/358-2. Decision to admit immigrants from non-Traditional Source Countries. Cabinet Memo from meeting of 11/9/78 in DOL 22/1/137 pt. 3, ‘Increase in Enforcement Staff and Work Permit Schemes’, Cabinet Memo CM 74/1/8 Meeting 74(11), 1/4/74 in NZNA AAFD 807 Acc. W 3738. Memo Secfa to PM re: Chilean and Vietnamese Refugees 22/5/75 in DOL 22/1/230 pt. 3. The question of whether or not to accept refugee Whites with the fall of the Smith Regime in Rhodesia was put to Cabinet. Memo to MFAT from Secfa 2/8/76 in DOL 22/1/240 pt. 3. Secfa to PM 6/11/73 and Cabinet Paper 73/51/77 of meeting of 12/11/73 in DOL 22/1/246 pt. 1. re: Chilenos. Cabinet Paper 72/37/29, from meeting of 11/9/72 in DOL 22/1/274 re: Ugandans. ‘Review of Immigration Policy Background Paper Number 8’, 22/1/279 pt. 1, p. 5. Cable Seclab to London and Other Diplomatic Posts, 2/12/75 in DOL 22/1/279-10.
\item[9] Consular Instructions, Chapter 11: Entry to New Zealand’, 5/7/71, p. 2 in DOL 22/1/244 pt. 3.
\end{enumerate}
Dutch, Scandinavians, Swiss and Germans were usually eligible for a permit if they had trade or higher skills, had skills in industries short of labour, if they were single men sponsored by friends or relatives regardless of skill level, or single women with a job offer. Greeks, Yugoslavs, Cypriots and Maltese were considered only if they were single and sponsored by close relatives, married with skills and sponsored by close relatives, had “particularly good qualifications” and no language difficulties, or if they were sponsored by an ex-serviceman on the basis of assistance given in World War Two. In the words of Secretary of Foreign Affairs G R Laking “a southern European is very unlikely to be admitted to New Zealand.” Applicants from communist countries and stateless persons, other than in exceptional circumstances, were rejected as a matter of policy.

‘Wholly European’ United States citizens and South Africans were accepted on roughly the same basis as northern and western Europeans and were admitted if they had either skills in demand in New Zealand or a job offer. Otherwise white South Africans could enter if they had $2 000 to invest, or white Americans $5 000, or members of either group if they had a special skill in demand in New Zealand. The status of non-white Americans and South Africans was not explicitly stated, but they were implicitly excluded by the instructions stating that it was ‘Europeans’ from these sources who were eligible.

The criteria for immigrants from non-European countries were set on a country-by-country basis related to each country’s racial composition. An Immigration Division report noted that “there is no policy which deals with [non-European] people as a whole. An applicant may be dealt with in accordance with the rules governing the ethnic group to which he belongs e.g. Chinese, Indians.” The criteria for Chinese

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10 However a special scheme which allowed a number of unskilled migrants to come applied to migrants from the Netherlands. Memo Seclab to Immigration Attaché Hague, 8/10/70 in DOL 22/1/72 pt. 13.
were strict. Only six Chinese refugee families from Hong Kong as well as wives and minor children of Chinese men who had been in New Zealand since before 1951 were allowed to enter per year. In the two year period to September 1972, only seventy one Chinese applicants were accepted.\(^\text{15}\)

Criteria for Indians were almost as restrictive. An Immigration Division memo of 1972 noted:

> New Zealand does not actively encourage ... permanent immigration from India ... Generally approvals are limited to spouses of New Zealand citizens or residents and their legitimate or legitimised minor children and to fiances and fiancées who are to marry shortly after arrival in this country (or in exceptional humanitarian cases).\(^\text{16}\)

After 1966, shortages of skilled professionals and tradesmen in New Zealand meant that, in very specific circumstances, economic needs were allowed to over-ride racial criteria. Chinese, Indian and Ceylonese doctors, engineers and teachers were admitted. This did not, however, reflect a significant change in the principle of maintaining an immigration policy based on cultural assimilation because this group represented an exceedingly small elite who, through their education in ‘Western disciplines’, were considered more assimilable than their compatriots.\(^\text{17}\)

Skills of value to the New Zealand economy could also tip the balance in favour of candidates of mixed race whose potential for assimilation was unclear. British-Fijians, British-Indians and British-Tongans were considered for entry if they had a trade or equivalent technical qualifications.\(^\text{18}\)

Non-British spouses of British immigrants could also be admitted ‘despite’ their race. “Wholly-European alien” (meaning not British) wives of white British could enter under the same conditions as their husbands but the individual cases of “non-white aliens”, or “coloured wives” needed to be referred to the Secretary of Labour for a

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\(^\text{16}\) Immigration Activities India: Indians in New Zealand’ 18/2/72 in DOL 22/1/134 .

\(^\text{17}\) NZFAR, v. 21, no. 9, p. 17, cited in Brawley, ‘No “White Policy”,’ p. 31.
decision. In such ‘borderline’ cases, consular officials were sometimes asked to interview the applicant and to submit their impressions.\textsuperscript{19}

In countries with a mixture of racial groups, immigration officials judged the assimilability of individual applicants according to their race rather than their nationality. Fiji, as a neighbour which contained a mixture of significant numbers of whites of British origin, Melanesians and Indians, provides a particularly good example of this. In 1972, High Commissioner to Fiji Graeme Ansell suggested that entry should be made easier for Fiji-Indians because they were “more European in their habits and attitudes of mind” than Fijians and hence better adapted for life in New Zealand. Similarly, he described part-European Fijians as having “adopted European customs, mores of living and outlook” and argued that consequently they would be “generally well equipped to fit easily into the New Zealand way of life.”\textsuperscript{20}

These differences in perceived assimilability of each group were reflected in New Zealand’s policy on immigration from Fiji which stated that

\begin{quote}
Persons wholly of British birth who are also wholly of European origin do not require prior permission to enter this country provided they are of good health and character.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

However ...

Under present policy, acceptance for permanent entry to New Zealand of Fiji citizens or residents who are not British subjects of full European descent is normally possible only in the case of 1: Husbands, wives and legalised children of New Zealand citizens ... 2: Fiancés of citizens or permanent residents 3: Parents over 45 all of whose children are permanent residents in New Zealand 4: Special humanitarian cases 5: Part-Europeans who have a particular skill in urgent demand in New Zealand

\textsuperscript{18}Review of Immigration Policy, Background Paper Number 7” in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 2.
\textsuperscript{19}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20}Immigration and Entry of Fiji to New Zealand’ memo from Immigration Attaché to Secfa, 1/9/72, pp. 3-5 in DOL 22/1/135 pt. 12. ‘New Zealand’s Immigration Policy in the Pacific with Particular Reference to Fiji’, 27/2/74 memo from G K Ansell NZHC Suva to Wellington in (MFA) PM 32/3/22/1 v. 2.
“Persons not wholly European” were allowed in only on three month visitor’s permits and were required to prove that they had 50 dollars per month for the length of their stay. Similar racial distinctions were applied to immigrants from Tonga.

Exclusion of groups through the permit system was not the only mechanism of immigration control. Because of New Zealand’s isolation and the resultant high cost of travel, subsidising travel costs had worked well to control immigrants numbers and origins. In the 1950s and 60s, both the Assisted Immigration Scheme and the Subsidised Immigration Scheme allowed the Government to encourage selected immigrants by paying all but ten pounds (or $22) of their fares.

The Assisted and Subsidised Immigration Schemes were available to immigrants from the United Kingdom, Ireland, the United States and western and northern European countries. To be eligible, immigrants usually had to be single men or women between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, married men without children or men with special skills and few children. Lower skills requirements for British and Dutch migrants meant that they were favoured over the other nationalities in the scheme, and those not of “wholly European origin” were excluded.

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23 Ibid.
25 European countries included Switzerland, Austria, Holland and Scandinavia. Also eligible were France, Belgium, West Germany and Italy, however partially because of restrictions on advertising for immigrants, the numbers coming from these countries were minimal. The difference between the two schemes was that the Subsidy Scheme involved a contribution to the fares from an employer in New Zealand, while through the Assisted Scheme, the New Zealand Government met all of the costs except for the immigrant’s ten pound contribution. Richard Northey and Brian Lythe, How White is Our Immigration Policy, CARE, Wellington, 1972, p. 6. Memo Seclab to All Posts 1/10/70 in MFAT 32/3/1/20 pt. 1.
26 Northey and Lythe, p. 3. J C Cooper, The Emigrant’s Guide: Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Emigration, Demographic Research Organisation, London, 1975, p. 178. The criteria for subsidisation varied among the countries involved. For example, immigrants from Britain had to be between the ages of 18-45 and “of good health and character,” with some restriction on family size. However those from the United States and western European countries except Holland were also required to be above the unskilled level and to have two years experience in their occupation. ‘Immigration: Extension of Subsidy Scheme to Western Europe and the United States: Notes for a Meeting With National Employing Organisations’, 4/9/1970 in DOL Auckland Office NZNA BBAI Acc. A. 251, 53d 22/1/27. Under the Dutch
March 1972, the Assisted Scheme admitted 483 immigrants of whom all but fifteen were from Great Britain and the Subsidised Immigration Scheme brought in 4088 white British, 434 Dutch, 106 Americans and 37 from other Western European countries.\textsuperscript{27}

In summary, prior to 1970, New Zealand’s immigration policy was based above all on the perceived assimilability of immigrants and judgements about this assimilability were routinely made according to race. The potential economic contribution of immigrants, measured through skill levels, age and number of dependents, was a secondary consideration as were family links with New Zealand. Except in the case of New Zealand’s former colonies in the Pacific, before 1970, the foreign policy implications of immigration did not greatly influence policy. New Zealand’s hierarchy of preference for immigrants can be described as follows:

1. British and Irish of Wholly European Origin, Australians
2. Northern Europeans (Dutch, Scandinavians, Swiss, Germans) and North Americans and South Africans of wholly European Origin
3. Whole or Part Europeans from the Pacific
4. Pacific Islanders from Tokelau, Niue, Cook Islands and Western Samoa
5. Southern Europeans (including Yugoslavs)
6. Other Pacific Islanders
7. Indians, Chinese, Europeans from European communist countries (except Yugoslavia)
8. All others

In the early 1970s, racial selection of immigrants became increasingly difficult to sustain in the face of growing public awareness and criticism of New Zealand’s policies. “There is reason to think,” a Ministry of Foreign Affairs memo of 1970 noted,

that the public is more interested in … the racial aspects of immigration policy than it used to be. The views of the ‘silent majority’ of New Zealanders may now well be more liberal than the Government’s.\textsuperscript{28}

Anecdotal claims by churches, anti-racist groups and the Labour opposition of non-white people from nations such as Australia, South Africa and Britain being treated differently from whites reinforced the Ministry’s view.\textsuperscript{29} In 1970, Labour MPs criticised the Government over the case of two Indians, a skilled electrician and a fitter and turner, who had job offers and relatives in New Zealand and were willing to pay their own fares, but who had been refused immigration permits; the case of an Indian-born Australian doctor with a New Zealand wife who, unlike other Australians, was obliged to seek a permit each time he wanted to enter; and the case of a Malaysian man who, despite being married to a New Zealander, had been refused New Zealand residency.\textsuperscript{30}

The exclusion of black Americans from the assisted and subsidised immigration schemes also aroused much criticism.\textsuperscript{31} This policy was defended by Immigration Minister John Marshall in a 1970 television interview. He declared that “we could not allow in more than a very few highly qualified American Negroes or Chinese in one year” and:

Discrimination on the basis of skin colour would be a factor in the selection of assisted immigrants, in particular from the United States, on the grounds that we could not afford to have our racially harmonious society upset by people who couldn’t be assimilated into the New Zealand social structure.\textsuperscript{32}

Marshall also defended the distinction made between British of ‘wholly European origin’ and those not of ‘wholly European origin,’ claiming that it was “a very

\textsuperscript{28}The memo continued “I think that it is also true that most New Zealanders are fortunately ignorant of the extent of the restrictions in New Zealand policy” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, internal memo, 13/11/70 in DOL 32/3/1/5 v. 1.
\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Ibid.}
soundly based policy in the interests of New Zealand and accepted by the great majority of New Zealanders.”

In 1970, the requirement that all single Samoan women between the ages of eighteen and forty-five entering New Zealand on temporary permits provide proof that they were not pregnant brought forth a storm of criticism at home and abroad. The Government initially attempted to justify the policy by arguing that 10-15 percent of Samoan women visitors were coming for the purpose of having New Zealand born children which would entitle them to New Zealand social welfare benefits. After intensive criticism from the Western Samoan National Council of Women, a number of newspapers and the parliamentary opposition, the Government dropped the policy.

All Chinese entering New Zealand on three month visitors’ permits were required to sign a declaration that they would not exercise their right to have their stay extended to six months, a right that was otherwise legally accorded to all temporary visitors. The Chinese community lobbied hard to have this policy changed and gained much sympathy in the media. In a stinging attack, the Sunday Times claimed that “New Zealand’s immigration system is so racist that it compare[d] in many ways with South Africa’s” and that

Even highly qualified Chinese holding British passports, have been refused permits ... yet an unskilled white person from Hong Kong who has a British passport can enter New Zealand merely by providing the documents when he arrives in the country.

The Ombudsman, Guy Powles, tipped the scales in favour of the Chinese. His office wrote to Secretary of Labour E G Davey questioning the legality of the practice and claiming it was “contrary to the intentions and the spirit of the Immigration Act” and that it represented an abuse of the power vested in the Minister. The Crown Law

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34 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs documented the issue comprehensively in the file MFAT 32/3/WSA/3 v. 1. See also NZPD v. 369, 1970, p. 3602, 3605-6.
37 Voluminous correspondence between the office of the Ombudsman and the Immigration Division can be found in DOL 22/1/265. Of particular note are letter Smith (Office of Ombudsman) to Seclab 6/10/72 and Ombudsman to Seclab 8/11/72.
Office then advised the Immigration Division that the policy was “highly objectionable as well as ultra-vires” and elaborated that it was wrong to exercise ministerial discretion against a category of people rather than against individuals. The result was a directive from the Minister to stop the practice.

The implications of the Crown Law Office opinion were not, however, as far reaching as might have been expected. Although a particularly objectionable practice with regard to temporary entry of one group was ended, the Immigration Division continued to systematically exclude the permanent entry of Chinese on the grounds of their race and to exercise ministerial discretion to exclude other racial groups.

Criticism from overseas, particularly among the emerging post-colonial nations of the Pacific, was at least as important as domestic pressure for change. Fijian Prime Minister Ratu Mara repeatedly attacked racial elements of New Zealand’s policy and was joined in his criticism at the 1972 South Pacific Forum meeting by Samoan Prime Minister Tupuola Tamasese. A member of the Fijian Legislative Council was reported as describing New Zealand’s policy as “one of the most racial” in the world.

Changes in New Zealand’s source countries also created pressure for New Zealand to modify its policy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and some Immigration officials noted that, because of the increasingly multi-racial characteristics of British society, it was becoming difficult to conceal racial criteria and several of these staff argued that the distinction should be dropped.

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38 Mathieson (Crown Counsel) to Seclab 30/4/73 in DOL 22/1/265 pt. 2.
39 Seclab to NZHC Hong Kong 18/5/73, Seclab to Race Relations Conciliator (Powles) 16/5/73 in DOL 22/1/265 pt. 2.
40 Submission to the Minister of Immigration on behalf of the New Zealand Chinese Association, 28/8/73 in DOL 22/1/115 pt. 6.
41 “Immigration May Top the Bill at Canberra Forum,’ Fiji Times 21/2/72 and ‘Hon K C Ramrakha Exposes New Zealand and Australian Immigration Policy’, Pacific Review, 17/4/71 in MFAT (PM) 32/3/22/1 vol. 2.
42 Herald 2/7/70 in MFAT 32/3/1/4 pt. 1.
43 A paper produced for the review of immigration policy in 1973 noted “The existence of fairly substantial numbers of non-Europeans who have been born in the United Kingdom ... is a fairly recent phenomenon and the selectivity adopted in this case is difficult to explain because of the transparent differences in the policy toward them compared to that applied to British born persons of wholly European ancestry living in the same country.” ‘Review of Immigration Policy, Background Paper Number 7”, July 1973 in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 2. A letter from the Secretary of Labour E Davey to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in 1972 illustrates
Don Bond, who was an immigration officer in London, described the embarrassment that many officials must have felt when faced with non-white applicants.

I look back in horror now ... at the things that we used to say in the sixties. I mean I could stand at the public counter at the New Zealand High Commission at New Zealand house in London and have a ‘non-European’ boy who was born in Liverpool and probably his parents born in Liverpool come to the counter and have to look him straight in the eye and say “if you’ve got a British passport and you’re European you can get on a plane and as long as you’ve got a ticket to get there you’re all right, but YOU can’t.” And we did. And a lot of thinking staff were agitating for some change. 44

Consular officials at overseas posts were finding it difficult to justify or disguise racial criteria.45 In Suva, High Commissioner Graeme Ansell described an elaborate subterfuge that was needed to disguise racial criteria in cases where Fijian government officials of different races were visiting New Zealand together and recommended an end to racial distinctions in policy.46

Growing demand for labour in New Zealand created pressure for more diverse immigration and increasing numbers of Tongans and Fijians came on three month visitor’s permits to work in New Zealand.47 From 1971, the Labour Department instituted a short term labour scheme in association with the Hutt Valley Chamber of Commerce which brought 100 Tongans on a rotating basis for six month periods for

44Interview with Don Bond, 23/1/01.
45Seclab to Minlab 16/12/70 and ‘Immigration Activities: India, Indians in New Zealand’, 16/2/72 in DOL 22/1/134 pt. 5. New Zealand Consul General Los Angeles to Secfa 11/2/72 and Secfa to Seclab 14/2/72 in DOL 22/1/69 pt. 7.
46New Zealand’s Immigration Policy in the Pacific with Particular Reference to Fiji’ G K Ansell NZHC Suva, to Secfa 27/2/74 in MFAT (PM) 32/3/22/1 v. 2. op. cit. DOL 22/1/279-8. A similar dilemma was encountered with regard to United States national’s from America’s Pacific territories. Letter Seclab (K Coveney) to Secfa 2/3/73, memo ‘Immigration: Authority Delegated to Posts: Los Angeles’, 22/5/72 in MFAT 32/3/63. Secfa to Seclab 14/2/72 in DOL 22/1/69 pt. 7. Consular Instructions, Ch 11, p. 201.
industrial work in the Hutt Valley and a similar short-term labour scheme applied to Fijians who visited New Zealand as seasonal farm workers for four to six months. In 1971, this scheme brought 640 Fijians to New Zealand.

The Second National Government stood firm in the face of pressure from the public within New Zealand, from foreign governments, from the opposition, and from within the public service to change racial aspects of its immigration policy. Despite this pressure, one of its last major decisions on immigration was not to eliminate the distinction between white and other British, upholding the principle of excluding ‘racial minorities not already represented in New Zealand’. This decision can best be understood within the context of National’s broader views of New Zealand identity. The Government saw the New Zealand nation as being defined by its culture as British based and unitary. In order to preserve this status quo it was necessary to select immigrants who could assimilate and assimilability was most closely identified with their race. As Jack Marshall put it, New Zealand “could not afford to have [its] racially harmonious society upset by people who couldn’t be assimilated into the New Zealand social structure.”

Immigration under Labour 1972-75

In November 1972, Labour swept to power with a mandate for change, a reformist enthusiasm and a nationalistic ideal of building a more independent nation and a fairer society. Prime Minister Kirk saw a review of immigration policy as a part of building this new society and described it as “a major development in our social history.” New Immigration Minister Fraser Colman told the press that the review

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47 Among the Fijians around two-thirds were Fiji-Indians. NZHC Suva to Minfa 10/7/72. Extract from Annual Report from Suva for Labour Department in DOL 22/1/135 pt. 12. Hegarty, pp. 44-5.
48 Under the Tongan scheme, employers were required to notify the Labour Department of job vacancies which were passed on to the Tongan civil service which selected their employees. The New Zealand employers were then required to provide airfares and accommodation for the workers. Hegarty, p. 53. The Fiji scheme dated from 1967 and details of its workings can be found in DOL Auckland Office NZNA BBAI 69a Acc. 251 22/1/96.
51 Ibid.
was driven by “economic, social and foreign policy objectives.” The new Government’s greater willingness to reform the policy based on racial preference can also be understood on an ideological level as many in the Labour Party were more receptive to ideas about cultural pluralism than the previous Government.

Labour’s review was a reworking, not of immigration law, but of immigration regulations within the existing legal framework. The principle of absolute ministerial discretion remained and would continue virtually unchanged until 1987. Instead, the review was a change of how this discretion was exercised. It was released in a series of policy announcements between October 1973 and May 1974.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Immigration Division of the Department of Labour dominated the review process. The importance of the role adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is particularly striking. The review was overseen by former senior Foreign Affairs official Ray Perry who was appointed to the Department of Labour as Assistant Secretary. Consequently, the review strongly reflected New Zealand’s changing relation to Britain and other foreign policy.

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54 This can be seen in Labour’s resettlement policy which is described in detail in Chapter 3.

55 The Caucus Committee on Labour and Immigration (CCI) was the main engine of policy formulation and its meetings on immigration matters were also regularly attended by representatives of the Department of Labour, Foreign Affairs and other government departments. In formulating policy the committee was advised by the Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration (ICI), a body made up of representatives of the Departments of Labour and the Ministries of Trade and Industry, Foreign Affairs and the Treasury. Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Review of Immigration Policy, 17/9/73 in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 2. Background papers for both bodies were produced by the Immigration Division of the Department of Labour and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See DOL 22/1/279-8 pt. 1 and DOL 22/1/279-9. The public was represented in the review process through the Immigration Advisory Council (IAC). This body contained representatives of the Employers and Manufacturers Federations, Chambers of Commerce, The Federation of Labour, Federated Farmers, the Department of Labour and two ministerial appointments. The IAC had limited input and was presented with selected pieces of policy which had been approved by the Caucus Committee and asked to comment. Summary of Immigration Policy in DOL 22/1/306. For its composition and terms of reference see ‘Summary of Immigration Policy’, p. 33 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 30. ‘Consular Instructions Chapter 11: Entry to New Zealand’, 5/7/71 p. 7 in DOL 22/1/244 pt. 3. Memo for Cabinet from the Minister of Immigration Mar. 1974 in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 4. Memo Dep. Seclab. (A R Perry) to Minister of Immigration, 26/3/74 in DOL 22/1/31 pt. 8. IAC Minutes of Meeting of 24/4/75 in DOL 22/1/279-9 pt. 1.
concerns.\textsuperscript{56} The Immigration Division was part of the Department of Labour and a heavy weighting given to labour market issues.

The single most important element of the new permanent entry policy was an end to the automatic right of entry for British of wholly-European origin, an important symbol of New Zealand’s growing independence from Britain. White British, like other permanent migrants, were now required to gain a permit before leaving for New Zealand.\textsuperscript{57} Kirk gave two major justifications for these changes: a desire to remove racial overtones in immigration criteria which were damaging to New Zealand’s image in the international arena and a need to control the flood of British immigrants which was putting pressure on New Zealand’s economic infrastructure.\textsuperscript{58}

Through this change, Labour symbolically declared that New Zealand nationality was no longer a vassal to British nationality. United Kingdom citizens living in New Zealand, who had until then enjoyed all of the privileges of citizenship without needing to become naturalised, were henceforth required to obtain a permit to re-enter New Zealand every time they left. Kirk was careful in public to make it clear that the new measures were not an act of retaliation against the United Kingdom’s patriality laws and entry into the EEC. They were, he declared, a reflection of New Zealand taking stock of its own independent social and economic interests and were designed to protect New Zealand’s economy and its “serene and enjoyable” way of life from the pressure created by mass uncontrolled United Kingdom immigration.\textsuperscript{59} However, in making entry for white British harder, Labour did not make entry any easier for non-white British or for immigrants from non-British sources.

The second major element of the new policy was the formal recognition of a ‘special immigration relationship’ with South-Pacific countries, a victory for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials on the review panel. In 1974, New Zealand acknowledged a responsibility to take immigrants from the region who fell outside of the normal skills criteria and immigration was made easier for Samoans by the removal of the

\textsuperscript{56} In the words of Don Bond “I think that the Immigration Division itself had not been very proactive towards [removing racial aspects of policy], the influence [came] from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through Ray Perry, through the wider political concerns of having such a discriminatory policy.” Bond interview 24/1/01.
\textsuperscript{57} Kirk and Colman, \textit{Policy Announcements}, 2/4/74, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{58}Ibid., pp. 14-16, pp. 21-22.
requirement of a job offer before gaining long term admission. The new policy also attempted to reduce the imbalance between New Zealand’s former territories and other Pacific nations by allowing small numbers of Tongans and Fijians to enter permanently.\textsuperscript{60} As part of a broader Asia-Pacific foreign policy, the Government also allowed easier temporary entry for students from Asia.\textsuperscript{61}

Labour’s new Pacific policy represented, in part, a desire to regain control over the illegal overstaying by visitors from the region. In April 1974, immigration officials and police launched a series of raids on the houses of suspected Pacific Island overstayers in Auckland. The raids were followed by a partial amnesty for overstayers and attempts to rechannel Tongan labour migrants through a more easily regulated temporary migration scheme.\textsuperscript{62}

The new Tongan scheme was designed to allow a continuing flow of temporary labour migrants in a tightly controlled manner.\textsuperscript{63} Entries were short term and linked to specific job-offers. Consequently, they were described in a policy document as “self regulating to the job market.”\textsuperscript{64} Employers advanced fares and, upon arrival in New Zealand, immigrants exchanged their passports for an identification slip specifying their assigned place of work and could stay for a limit of four to six months.\textsuperscript{65}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{60} Samoan Immigration: Guarantees of Employment’ in DOL 22/1/127, 27 July 1973, p.1. For more detail see DOL Auckland Office NZNA BBAI 59d Acc. 251 22/1/76.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Kirk and Colman \textit{Policy Announcements}, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{62} HO to All Districts, June 1974, DOL Auckland Office NZNA BBAI 61f Acc. A. 251 22/1/91-5.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Joris De Bres, \textit{Migrant Labour in the Pacific}, CARE, Auckland, 1974, p. 2. Deputy Director of Immigration (Don Bond), note for file, 22/4/74, Letter to Employers of Tongan Workers from Auckland Manufacturers Association, 30/4/74 in DOL Auckland Office NZNA BBAI 61f Acc. A. 251, 22/1/91-5.
\item \textsuperscript{64} \textit{Polynesians in New Zealand’}, Aug. 1976 in NZNA BBAI 59d A. 251 22/1/76.
\item \textsuperscript{65} De Bres, \textit{Migrant Labour}, p. 2. Once again, the criteria for the schemes were not binding and the final decision with regard to whether or not people were allowed to enter rested with the Minister of Immigration. ‘Restricted Persons/ Policy, Instructions, Inquiries and Correspondence- Miscellaneous’ in DOL Auckland Office NZNA BBAI A.251 56a 22/1/59. ‘Procedure for Temporary Entry for New Zealanders from Tonga, Four Month Work Permit Scheme’, 3/12/74, ‘Memo of Understanding: Temporary Entry from Tonga’, 24/10/74 in DOL 22/1/109-4 pt. 5. ‘Memo of Understanding with Western Samoa’, 20/1/76 in DOL 22/1/127 pt. 14. By 1978, the maximum stay had been extended to eleven months and advances for workers’ tickets had been consolidated into a centralised fund administered by the Department of Labour. Immigration Division: Department of Labour, \textit{Immigration and New Zealand: A Statement of Current Immigration Policy}, Wellington, 1978, p. 9. Memo Seclab to Apia, Suva and Nuku’alofa, Feb. 1977 in DOL 22/1/127 pt. 15. Office of Minister of Immigration, Press Release 4/3/77 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3. ‘Summary of Immigration Policy’
\end{enumerate}
The third key element of Labour’s new policy was the occupational priority list. The list, which came into operation in December 1974, was a mechanism for matching immigration to skills shortages in New Zealand. A list of skills in short supply was compiled by the Department of Labour and updated every three months in light of changing economic circumstances. Immigration was then allowed from a list of defined ‘traditional source countries’ to fill these gaps and applicants had to possess a skill from the list as well as meet other criteria including age and family size and, in most cases, needed to have a job offer.

The list reflected the two most important economic goals of the review; the Government’s desire to reduce pressure on resources created by immigrants and its desire to select immigrants with skills, but it also proved useful in the hands of successive governments at controlling total numbers of immigrants. In December 1974 when it was established, the list contained 179 occupations, but in late 1975 as immigrant numbers were considered too high, it was reduced to 53 and then 32 occupations. In September 1976, as New Zealand faced the problem of net emigration, the list was expanded to 120 occupations, and in May 1977 when New Zealand had a worrying level of net emigration, it included 243.

Since the list applied almost exclusively to ‘traditional source countries’ it allowed the Government to strictly specify from which countries it would accept immigrants. Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America were the ‘traditional source countries’. Only six occupations could apply from other countries. These were


66Establishment of a System of Occupationally Based Controls to Limit Immigration Intakes,’ Appendix 3 to papers prepared for CCI meeting of 26/6/75, 24/6/75 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 1.


69Ibid.

70Memo HO to All Districts ‘Immigration: Extension of Temporary Permits’, v. 4, Circular no. 144, 8/12/76 in DOL 22/1/403-7 pt. 3.
accountants, civil and mechanical engineers, medical doctors, medical technicians and registered nurses. Other applications from non-‘traditional source countries’ without humanitarian consideration such as family reunion or other “exceptional circumstances” were still declined as a matter of policy.\textsuperscript{71}

Even the six occupations supposedly open to professionals from non-‘traditional source countries’ had hidden barriers. For example, the New Zealand Medical Council would not permit incoming doctors to register in New Zealand unless they had trained in either New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Canada or South Africa, and granted only provisional registration to doctors who had trained in Hong Kong and Singapore.\textsuperscript{72} New Zealand was also a party to an agreement among Pacific Island nations not to accept nurses as immigrants.\textsuperscript{73}

Labour’s new immigration policy reflected well its desire to better link immigration to New Zealand’s new foreign policy and economic interests, but it clearly continued to express a firm preference for European and North American immigrants to the almost total exclusion of other groups.\textsuperscript{74} These distinctions are difficult to reconcile with one of the stated goals of the review which was to remove racial discrimination. They were also inconsistent with Labour’s moves towards a greater accommodation of cultural diversity in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{75}

This inconsistency can best be explained by the economic recession and rapid change in New Zealand’s labour market and place in the world of the mid-1970s. In response to these developments, the direction of the review changed between its institution in the boom time of early 1973 and its major announcements in 1974. The terms of the review laid down at the start of the review in 1973 had been the removal of racial discrimination from the legislation, the role of immigration in the labour shortage of the time, New Zealand’s changing skills needs, pressures on economic and natural resources, humanitarian aspects of policy, the ‘social strain’ created by immigration.

\textsuperscript{71}Cable Wellington to Port Moresby 4/2/76 in DOL 22/1/244 pt. 5.
\textsuperscript{72}One exception to this was foreign trained doctors who had previously worked in ‘British Countries,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Consular Circular ‘Entry of Doctors into New Zealand,’ 16/10/76 in DOL 22/1/244. pp. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{73}Cable Wellington to Port Moresby 4/2/76 in DOL 22/1/244 pt. 5.
\textsuperscript{74}Extract from ‘New Zealand Consular Instructions, Chapter 4’, 22/1/2 pt. 30. Full details of the development of the occupational priority lists are in DOL 22/1/358-2 pts. 1-2.
\textsuperscript{75}These are described in detail in Chapter 3.
and public opinion. However, in response to a near record inflow of immigrants, in the 1974 version of these criteria, the object of opening up entry to groups who had been excluded was pushed to the background and the Government now sought, above all, a policy that would reduce the total number of immigrants. At the same time, public opinion, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had described in 1970 as sympathetic to removing racial aspects of policy, had also now hardened against immigrants in general.

A second factor in the failure of the review to remove racial criteria was institutional inertia. At the Labour Government’s first caucus meeting, Kirk told his new Ministers that “government departments were resistant to changing their ideas. They wanted only to incorporate new ideas into their way of thinking, to mould us to their way of life rather than vice versa.” Under a Minister of Immigration, Fraser Colman, who was virtually absent from the paperwork produced by the policy review process, the 1973-4 review became more a reflection of the interests of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Treasury and the Department of Labour than a reflection of Kirk’s vision of social reform.

The main goals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were to remove visible aspects of racial discrimination which might damage New Zealand’s international relations and to build relations with the Pacific through immigration. The occupational priority list achieved the former goal by burying racial discrimination in a skills criterion and did not interfere with the latter which was provided for in New Zealand’s ‘special immigration relationship’ with the Pacific. The main goals of the Department of Labour and the Treasury were to link immigration policy to demand for skills and to restrict immigration to reduce pressure on resources.

The continuing practice of ministerial discretion and non-disclosure of criteria enshrined in the Immigration Act were instrumental in allowing racial criteria to

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76 An additional factor identified was the potential for increased administrative cost of imposing controls on British migrants. Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Review of Immigration Policy 17/9/7 in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 2. ‘Appendix A: Questions Arising out of Part One of Review of Immigration Policy: Background Paper Number Seven’, July 1973 in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 2.
78 Issues of public opinion and immigration will be considered in Chapters 5-7.
continue. The revision of the instructions sent to overseas diplomatic posts in the month following the last announcement of the new policy began ominously.81

In the instructions which follow, frequent use is made of the expression “European race and colour.” This phrase is expressive and useful as a practical guide in administration. On the other hand it is unscientific and its public use might give offence. The term is therefore not used in official publication or in correspondence with the public.82

The document instructed that a distinction be made between the right of entry of white and non-white British. It noted that “it would not be practicable to give unrestricted rights of access” to people of non-European origin from Britain “without almost inevitably upsetting the present pattern of population in New Zealand.”83 It also instructed that nationals of non-European countries were to be discouraged as immigrants and continued that favourable consideration should be given to white Americans and South Africans over other races from these countries. “Applications can be granted permits at posts in the United States of America,” it ran, “without reference to the Department of Labour in Wellington as long as the applicant (and his family) are wholly European.”84

Correspondence between the Embassy in Ottawa and the Secretary of Labour of the following year confirms that racial discrimination continued.85 In November 1975, the Secretary of Labour issued the following instructions:

Applications from British or Canadian Citizens with little or no ethnic affinity with New Zealand should be declined unless likely to make good settlers in which case details should be referred to Wellington with appropriate comment and recommendations.86

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80 Interview with Don Bond 24/1/01.
81 ‘Consular Instructions Chapter 11: Entry to New Zealand’, 18/6/74, p. 1 in DOL 22/1/244 pt. 4.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., p.2.
84 The consular instructions noted that “Citizens of the Republic of South Africa require prior permission of the Secretary of Labour to settle in New Zealand and are subject to visa requirements. In considering applications from white South Africans, the Secretary of Labour will apply a policy similar to that of White United States citizens.” Ibid., p. 11.
85 Bond however, explains the examples of instructions that apply racial discrimination that follow as erroneous products of inexperienced staff. Interview with Don Bond.
86 Seclab to All Posts 2/12/75 in DOL 22/1/244 pt. 5 and. DOL 22/1/279-10.
By 1975, public opinion, swayed by continued pressure on housing, jobs and welfare services, forced the Government to further tighten immigration policy. In an election year, the Government of new Prime Minister Wallace Rowling felt vulnerable to political attack and Labour responded by abolishing the Assisted Passage Scheme and drastically reducing the number of occupations available to migrants on the Subsidised Scheme.\textsuperscript{87}

Through 1975, Labour continued to work towards an immigration relationship with the South Pacific which was more tightly tied to New Zealand’s economic goals. Colman worked hard in the two months preceding the election to negotiate short-term labour schemes with Fiji and Samoa to complement and reinforce the one introduced for Tonga. At the same time, he reduced most visitors’ permits from these countries to one month in an effort to encourage working visitors onto the new official schemes.\textsuperscript{88} Colman also initiated negotiations to restrict permanent immigration from Tonga and Fiji to quotas of 150 and 300 respectively and gained agreements in principle for such quotas to be introduced on an informal basis.\textsuperscript{89} Finally, in January 1975, he sent a memo to the New Zealand High Commission in Suva asking it to “go slow” in processing applications to enter New Zealand as a means of reducing the flow of Fijians to New Zealand in a way which would not be “domestically sensitive.”\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{87}“Subsidy Scheme Policy and Instructions’, Memo HO to All Districts, Apr. 1975 in DOL Auckland Office NZNA BBAI Acc. A. 251, 53d/22/1/27.

\textsuperscript{88}None of the three temporary Pacific schemes was successful. This was due to a general decrease in the demand for labour from 1975 and to the slowness of the scheme’s administration. An employer’s request to the Labour Department would not be filled for more than two months. In addition, the requirement on employers to find accommodation, advance airfares and pay for accident insurance made the schemes unattractive. It was much more attractive for employers to fill vacancies with illegal workers. In the first seven months of the Samoan scheme, only one permit was issued and in the year to March 1977, 501 Tongans came as part of the scheme while 5 418 came on one or three month visitor’s permits. Many of the latter had reportedly continued to find work informally. IAC memo to Minister of Immigration 18/6/74 in DOL 22/1/109. Memo for Cabinet from Minimmign 22/1/311 pt. 1. Auckland Star 2/6/76 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 31. Tamara Ross, ‘New Zealand’s Overstaying Islander: A construct of the Ideology of Race and Immigration’, MA Victoria, 1994, pp. 67-9.

\textsuperscript{89}Fraser Colman, ‘Report on Visit to Pacific’ (to PM and Minlab) 18/8/75 MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 2. Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, 5/10/75 and ‘Briefing for Colman’, undated ca. 5/10/75 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 1.

\textsuperscript{90}Minister of Immigration to NZHC Suva, 27/1/75 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 1.
These new measures did little to save Labour from charges of letting in too many immigrants. The momentum of applications already in the pipeline, as well as a substantial number of uncontrolled family reunification cases from Britain and the Pacific and uncontrolled immigration from Australia, Niue, the Cook Islands, Samoa and returning New Zealanders kept immigrant numbers high up until the time of the election.91

In summary, since the nineteenth century, New Zealand had defined its national identity relative to Britain and the Kirk Government’s 1973–4 review of immigration policy marked a major symbolic step towards an independent nationalism. After 1974, British were no longer given the automatic right to enter New Zealand and were treated in the same fashion as other European groups. At the same time, a desire to establish New Zealand’s credentials as an Asia-Pacific nation led the Government to remove the most visible racial aspects of policy and to offer a special immigration relationship to Pacific Island countries and to make temporary entry easier for private Asian students.92

Labour’s immigration policy placed greater emphasis on skills, economic factors and foreign policy considerations than its predecessor, and a lesser emphasis on immigrants’ race, national origins and perceived ability to assimilate. This change represents a move away from a strictly cultural definition of the nation which had been reflected in the immigration policy of the previous Government. However, while skilled migrants from Europe and North America were now considered better immigrants than unskilled British, Labour only partially dismantled racial and

91 The Immigration Division had no control over returning New Zealanders who totalled 17,000 in 1974–75, Australians who constituted 30 percent of long term immigrants, Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans who were New Zealand citizens, and it had limited control over entry of Samoans. Added to these were immigrants who entered on grounds of family reunification who made up 24–40 percent of British entries and 42 percent of admissions granted through other posts in 1975. Finally, there was still no effective mechanism for controlling the illegal overstaying of people entering New Zealand on temporary permits who totalled an estimated 12,000. ‘Permanent Entry’, Appendix 1 to paper prepared for CCI meeting of 26/6/75, p. 1 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 29. ‘Immigration’, Memo prepared for the Minister by the Information and Press Section: Tourism and Publicity Department, Immigration Division, 29/10/75, pp. 4–5 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 30. Seclab to Minimmign 11/12/75 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 30. ‘Summary of Immigration Policy’, DOL 22/1/2 pt. 30, p. 4. Memo, Minister of Finance to Secretary of Treasury 7/4/75, Minimmign to Cabinet Committee on Policies and Priorities 7/4/75, Cabinet Committee on Policy and Priorities minutes of meeting of 16/4/75 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 29.

92 Kirk and Coleman, Policy Announcements, 1974, p. 5.
national criteria. Skilled non-Europeans were still not admitted on the same basis as skilled Europeans. Labour’s changes were a tightening of access for racial and national groups which had been favoured rather than freeing access to groups which had previously been excluded.

**Immigration Policy 1975-78: The Third National Government’s First Term**

The National Party under Robert Muldoon came to power in November 1975, and while its immigration policy fluctuated during its first term, National placed economic imperatives and domestic public opinion above foreign policy factors in its decisions about immigration. Culturally, National was more attached to the old white Commonwealth than to the Asia-Pacific region and this also influenced its approach to immigration.

In its election campaign, National promised to ‘cut immigration to the bone,’ claiming that Labour had allowed in too many immigrants from Britain and the Pacific, harming the economy and causing social problems such as crime. Once elected, National brought in a series of measures to slow immigration. One of its first moves was to call a temporary halt to the issuing of permits for British migrants. This was followed by severe cuts in the occupational priority list and an end to the Subsidised Immigration Scheme.93

National’s crack-down on immigration, however, was short lived. The ban on British immigration lasted only two weeks and the number of occupations on the occupational priority list was soon restored to above the levels set by Labour. Even more surprisingly, while a year of concerted campaigns against Pacific Island overstayers followed its election, National changed little of the fundamental policies on entry from the Pacific. New Minister of Immigration Frank Gill signalled this in February 1976 when he told Fijian media that “the immigration policy of the new Government will remain about the same ... there will be little change.”94 The lack of change was partly because Labour’s measures to regulate the flow of Pacific Islanders of 1974 and 1975 were slowly starting to take effect. The introduction of the work

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permit schemes and Labour’s reduction of visitors’ permits to one month for most Tongans and Fijians had already reduced the estimated flow of Pacific Island immigrants to fewer than 2,000 for the whole of 1976.95

National’s greatest change was the 1977 Immigration Amendment Act, an attempt to address the problem of rising crime attributed to immigrants. The Act gave the Minister of Immigration discretion to deport any immigrant convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment within two years of his or her arrival or within five years of arrival where the prison sentence was for more than twelve months. It also addressed the perceived problem of overstaying by making it illegal both to employ illegal immigrants and for those in the country on a visitor’s permit to work.96

The principal reason National did not cut immigration was that economic factors, which were largely beyond the control of the Government, were now turning an overwhelming net flow of immigrants into a worrying net flow of emigrants. It rapidly became apparent that new legislative or even policy initiatives were not necessary to slow the rate of immigration. By March 1977, New Zealand was confronted by a spiralling net emigration including a loss of many skilled workers. The country was losing 12,000 migrants per annum and the Government was now criticised by the public, and by both manufacturers and trade unions, for not doing enough to encourage immigration.97 In response, less than a year after National’s promise to ‘cut immigration to the bone’, Gill circulated a memo to Cabinet proposing new measures to increase it.98

95Office of the Minister of Immigration, ‘Immigration from the South Pacific’, memo for Cabinet, 12/2/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 2. National’s most important new measure in Pacific immigration policy was to require Cook Islanders to have job offers in New Zealand before immigrating, but this had been agreed to by the previous Government. De Bres ‘Government Immigration’, p. 3.


98Memo from Office of Minister of Immigration to all Government Ministers 26/8/76 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 30.
National Cabinet Ministers Frank Gill and Donald McIntyre who had come to power on a promise to “cut immigration to the bone” were now accused of being responsible for mass emigration (National Business Review 15/2/78).

National’s measures to encourage immigration were noticeably focused on European and particularly British immigration. They once again made it easier for British than immigrants from all other sources to migrate to New Zealand. The Government resumed acceptance of unskilled British migrants, setting a target of net migration from Britain of 8 400 per annum and introduced subsidies on airfares for long term or permanent British migrants. The number of occupations on the occupational priority list for Western countries was substantially increased and those in New Zealand on temporary permits were now allowed to extend them to permanent residency, although this provision explicitly excluded Pacific Islanders.99 Finally in 1978, a new policy to encourage immigration of business people from selected countries with capital to invest was approved.100

National attached less importance to foreign affairs in its immigration policy than Labour and this was particularly apparent in instances where foreign policy considerations came into conflict with the Government’s economic goals. The two Governments’ different approaches to the long standing Dutch assisted passage scheme illustrate this. The scheme allowed selected Dutch to immigrate to New Zealand.


100. "Achievements of the National Government in Immigration" 27/9/78 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 32.
Zealand with their fares paid jointly by both Governments and was described by Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff as a means of maintaining the goodwill of an important European friend. In 1975, when Labour sought to cut immigration for economic reasons, it considered halting the arrangement but accepted advice from the Immigration Division and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that this would be “foolish in foreign policy terms.”

National, however, in its drive to cut immigration of the following year, overrode this advice and unilaterally ended the scheme, a move which upset the Dutch.

The cases of South African and Rhodesian immigration also suggest that National placed economic considerations, domestic public opinion and old white Commonwealth ties over new foreign policy considerations in decisions about immigration. New Zealand was a party to the 1968 United Nations Declaration on Southern Rhodesia which forbade, except in humanitarian cases, all immigration of persons travelling on passports issued by the Smith regime or anyone from Southern Rhodesia believed to be a supporter of it. Labour, and especially Kirk, had cultivated relations with post-colonial African states and strongly upheld these sanctions, but the Third National Government showed considerably more sympathy to Southern Rhodesian whites. In the words of Secretary of Foreign Affairs Frank Corner:

> We were very conscious of ... [the] sensitivity of all Africans and Asians towards attitudes to race. Kirk was in tune with this, Muldoon and others were not. They were more sensitive to public opinion.

There was a degree of sympathy for white Rhodesian farmers among National’s farming constituency and the Minister of Immigration Frank Gill recommended interpreting the humanitarian provisions in the sanctions broadly. Families of Southern Rhodesians where one member was travelling on a non-Rhodesian passport

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101 Minister of Immigration to Cabinet Committee on Policy and Priorities 8/4/75 and ‘Implications of Tightening Assisted Immigration Schemes’, Seclab to Secretary of Treasury, 14/3/75 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 29.
104 Interview with Frank Corner, 25/1/01.
and Southern Rhodesian passport holders with relatives in New Zealand were now admitted.\textsuperscript{105}

As well as reflecting different priorities in foreign policy, the two Governments’ policies reflected different interpretations of how to defend New Zealand’s tradition of fair race-relations. Labour, from a more cultural-pluralist perspective, expressed suspicion of the ability of white South African and Rhodesian immigrants to adapt to New Zealand’s multi-cultural environment, while a more assimilationist Third National Government expressed the belief that White South Africans and Rhodesians came from a similar culture to Pakeha New Zealanders and consequently would assimilate well. Labour Prime Minister Rowling declared that “White Rhodesians fleeing Black majority rule would not be welcome in this country” because he “[found] it hard to understand why people should object to living in a country where there is majority rule” and two years later, in opposition Labour MP Richard Prebble denounced the long term entry granted to a boatload of South African and Rhodesian whites and questioned whether such immigrants would “accept New Zealand’s multi-racial and multi-cultural society.”\textsuperscript{106}

This suspicion contrasted with the views of the National Minister of Immigration Air Commodore Frank Gill who had fought alongside Rhodesians in World War Two. Gill described New Zealanders as “hav[ing] a sort of affinity with White Rhodesians.” They were, he asserted, “our sort of people.”\textsuperscript{107} He went on to describe Rhodesians as “nice ordinary chaps” who seemed to “get along all right with coloured people.”\textsuperscript{108} Gill told the public that New Zealand would look favourably upon the entry of (white) Rhodesians after majority rule came.\textsuperscript{109}


\textsuperscript{106}\textit{ Herald}, 8/5/75, p. 6 and \textit{Auckland Star} 13/4/77 in DOL 22/1/240 pt. 3.


\textsuperscript{108}\textit{Dominion} 14/4/77 in DOL 22/1/240 pt. 3.

\textsuperscript{109}\textit{Dominion} 14/4/77 and 15/4/77 in DOL 22/1/240 pt. 3.
Gill was equally sympathetic towards white South Africans and actively pushed for their immigration.\textsuperscript{110} Citing the skills they could bring to New Zealand, in 1978, Cabinet instructed the Immigration Division to give white South Africans the same immigration status as migrants from traditional source countries.\textsuperscript{111} The issue was, however, so politically sensitive that twice over the following month Gill denied in Parliament that the Government was making such a change. It was then decided to apply such a policy ‘informally’ so as to avoid criticism.\textsuperscript{112}

National also appeared to be less concerned by the need to maintain good relations with New Zealand’s Pacific neighbours through immigration policy. In 1976, the Government unilaterally cut the Samoan quota from 1 500 to 1 100 per annum.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{111}Frank Gill memo for Cabinet 23/8/78 and Cabinet memo from meeting of 11/9/78 in DOL 22/1/137 pt. 3.
\textsuperscript{112}Note on Parliamentary Question from R Prebble to Gill of 27/9/77 in DOL 22/1/137 pt. 3. and NZPD, v. 412, 1977, p. 1909. Question by T J Young and Letter Assistant Seclab (Jones) 29/3/78 in DOL 22/1/137 pt. 3. By 1978, the dissimulation of this policy was becoming increasingly difficult. “I am...” Wrote P E R Jones, Assistant Secretary of Labour “mildly apprehensive that the flexible approach we are adopting might pose political questions which you may not wish to answer at this time ... Newspaper reporters are aware that South Africa is not a traditional source country and if they start making inquiries they may well find that we are taking in South African citizens who do not come within normal criteria.” Letter Assistant Seclab. to Minimmign, 29/3/78 in DOL 22/1/137 pt. 3. Gill Memo for Cabinet 23/8/78 and Cabinet Memo 78/35/8 of 11/9/78 in DOL 22/1/140 pt. 4.
\textsuperscript{113}Cable Minfa to Secfa 16/6/76, NZHC Apia to Secfa 16/6/76 in DOL 22/1/127 pt. 14.
Aghast diplomatic officials persuaded the Government not to proceed with a planned further cut to 700 in 1977 because of the potential for damage to New Zealand’s relations with all Pacific Island countries. Administrative delays proved to be a less obtuse way of controlling numbers. In 1978, despite the fact that the Samoan quota was no longer being filled, the delay between application and acceptance even in straightforward cases was three years. National’s lesser concern for damage to relations with Pacific governments was also demonstrated through its resumption of campaigns against Pacific Island overstayers of February and October 1976 which Labour had abandoned in 1974.

The mass expulsion of the Pacific Islanders and cuts to the Samoan quota are particularly significant when considered alongside the measures that National took to increase immigration of white British, Europeans and South Africans. National cut Pacific Island quotas and forced around 1700 Pacific Island overstayers to leave while encouraging even unskilled migrants from Britain by paying a portion of their fares. This suggests that cultural considerations influenced National’s policy. National felt more comfortable with building a British-based community through immigration than a multi-cultural nation of the South Pacific.

**Conclusion**

In 1970, immigration policy reflected the New Zealand Government’s perception of the nation’s place in the world as an outpost of European and especially British civilisation. As a result, immigration policy was subordinated to an assimilationist vision of national culture and the assimilability of immigrants was judged according to their race and nationality. Policy reflected the state of the nation’s race relations. Economics and the country’s demand for labour were only secondary factors in the immigration equation and this was reflected in the form as well as the content of selection policy.

By the time Labour came to power in 1972, new economic, foreign policy and social forces were making this policy both obsolete and indefensible. Labour’s 1973-4 review produced an immigration policy more closely linked to New Zealand’s desire for skills and pressure on resources. In removing the formal preference for British

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114 Cable Apia to Wellington, 2/2/78 in MFAT 32/3/WSA/1.
115 This will be the subject of Chapter 9.
migrants, the new policy was also an important symbol of Labour’s vision of New Zealand as an independent power of the Asia-Pacific region. It was now not to Britain, but to Australia and its Pacific former territories that New Zealand granted freest access for immigrants.

Labour’s new immigration policy was more accommodating of cultural diversity brought by immigrants but it failed to end racial selection criteria. This goal was lost in the review process because it was not a priority for either of the departments charged with conducting it. From a Foreign Affairs perspective, as long as ministerial discretion remained the basis of immigration policy, removing those racist elements of policy which were visible was effective in averting harm to New Zealand’s foreign relations. From the labour-market perspective adopted by the Immigration Division, the review’s priority was to cut the number of immigrants and restrict entry to those with skills rather than to increase access for groups which had been excluded. By 1974, economic pressures were also causing public hostility to immigration and this weakened the Government’s resolve to remove racial criteria and encouraged it to focus on cutting immigration.

Finally, the Third National Government placed its economic priorities and public opinion above all other considerations in immigration policy. As Labour had done, it continued to exercise racial criteria in the selection of immigrants, but its outlook on national culture was different from that of Labour. By returning to a formal preference for British over all other groups, by improving access for white ‘old-Commonwealth’ migrants from Southern Africa, and by giving a lower priority to building links with the Asia-Pacific region through immigration, National showed that it was less resolute about building a multicultural New Zealand identity independent of Britain and centred on the Asia-Pacific region. Belich’s description of the Muldoon Government as the “last stand” of an anglocentric New Zealand is at least partly borne out by National’s approach to immigration.116

Chapter 5: How Do You Know that a Plane-Load of Poms Has Just Arrived? Public Attitudes to British Immigration

A nation-state seldom exists without a broad public identification with the idea that they collectively belong to a national community. While governments define the boundaries of the state through immigration policy, public attitudes towards immigrants and immigration constitute a more popular expression of national boundaries. Where there is public debate about national identity, this may be reflected in debate about who should be accepted as immigrants.

Until the 1970s, New Zealand national identity had always been defined in terms of Britain. In popular New Zealand mythology, the idea of ‘better-Britain’ rested upon a series of oppositional relationships. Great Britain was class-bound - but New Zealand was classless, Great Britain was crowded, industrial and polluted - but New Zealand was uncrowded, natural and clean, Great Britain was plagued by old-world industrial poverty - but New Zealand had a tradition of a cradle-to-grave social welfare and Great Britain had race relations problems - but New Zealand had achieved a unique racial harmony.

Most New Zealanders saw their nation as essentially British, but at the same time defined it according to its differences from the mother country. This paradox is best understood within the context of evolving notions of the meaning of British identity, not just in New Zealand, but also in Great Britain. Linda Colley describes Britishness as an identity category that evolved not as a blend of its component cultures - English, Scottish and Welsh, but as an umbrella category that was imposed over the top of these regional variations. She adds that a key factor in maintaining shared British identity was the boundary drawn in the popular imagination between Britain and Continental Europe.¹

In Out Of Place: Englishness, Empire and the Locations of Identity, Ian Baucom makes a categorical distinction between Britishness and Englishness as it had evolved by the beginning of the twentieth century. He argues that subjects of the British Empire saw British values as universal, homogenous and interchangeable while Englishness and implicitly other British sub-cultures were local, unique and

differentiated. It was this difference between universal Britishness and localised identity that allowed New Zealanders to see themselves at the same time as British and as distinctly New Zealanders.²

The 1970s were a time of contestation and change in New Zealand national identity. Tensions in New Zealand’s relations with the mother country led to a growing debate about national identity and this in turn manifested itself in debate about United Kingdom (UK) immigration. Through the 1950s and 60s, policy makers and the public had assumed that those from Great Britain would make the best immigrants. White citizens of the United Kingdom and Ireland (Great Britain) had free access to New Zealand and once here were accorded the same rights as New Zealand citizens, including suffrage, without needing to be naturalised. These privileges were now questioned. The British, who had been frequently described as New Zealanders’ ‘kith and kin,’ increasingly fell outside the popular boundaries of New Zealand identity. They had truly become immigrants.

As hostility to British immigrants increased, it was often framed in terms of the popular mythology of New Zealand’s distinct national identity. British immigrants were described as imperilling New Zealand’s classless society, its racial harmony, its tradition of home ownership and its clean-green aspect. This chapter will explore the factors which influenced public attitudes to United Kingdom immigrants, the evolution of these attitudes in the 1970s and the discourses of national identity that surrounded them.

**Sociometrics and the Nation**

The field of sociometrics flourished, in 1970s New Zealand. Academic sociologists attempted to quantify social phenomena including the assimilation of immigrants, while the press and public relations agencies, such as the Heylen Research Centre, began to poll the public on social issues. These quantitative studies are a useful starting point for qualitative analysis of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.

Sociologists Theodore and Nancy Graves attempted to understand New Zealanders’ identity in relative terms by surveying their perceptions of themselves and a range of

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² Ian Baucom, *Out Of Place: Englishness, Empire and the Locations of Identity*, Princeton
other national and ethnic groups. In two studies, published in 1974 and 1976, they asked samples of New Zealanders to describe what they saw as favourable and unfavourable character traits. They then asked the same group to describe various ethnic groups and compared the results in an attempt to measure the ‘social distance’ between New Zealanders and others.

The surveys found that the character traits that New Zealanders valued most highly were ‘happy’, ‘friendly’, ‘generous’, ‘hard-working’, ‘easy-going’, ‘self-confident’, and ‘kin orientated.’ The attributes most disliked were ‘snobbish’, ‘quick-tempered’, ‘materialistic’, ‘brash’, ‘dominating’, ‘loud’, ‘conservative’ and ‘critical.’ The group which New Zealanders described most in terms of the positive attributes and least in terms of the negative were Maori and the group which they described in the least positive terms were the English. The ethnic groups were rated in the following order: Maori, Cook Islanders, Canadians, Chinese, Pakeha, Indians, Yugoslavs, Dutch, Germans, Australians, Americans and English.3

The terms used most often to describe the English were ‘conservative’, ‘nationalistic’, ‘critical’, ‘self-confident’, ‘friendly’, ‘reserved’ and ‘snobbish’. The English were considered to be least likely to be ‘easy-going’, ‘brash’, ‘loud’ or ‘generous.’ In contrast, Maori and Cook Islanders were frequently described as being ‘easy-going’, ‘friendly’, ‘kin-orientated’, ‘generous’ and were seldom described as ‘snobbish’, ‘materialistic’, or ‘critical.’ Chinese and Indians rated highly for ‘hard-working’, ‘reserved’, ‘kin-orientated’, ‘friendly’, ‘clean’ and ‘conservative’. Australians rated highly for ‘friendly’, ‘loud’, ‘brash’, self-confident and ‘easy-going’ and low for ‘snobbish’, ‘reserved’ and ‘hard working’. The Dutch were considered a mix of contrasting attributes. Described as ‘hard working’, ‘friendly’, ‘clean’ and ‘self-confident,’ they were also considered particularly ‘materialistic’ and lacking in generosity or an easy-going nature. Finally Pakeha were most often described as

‘friendly’, ‘easy-going’, ‘sport-minded’, ‘conservative’, ‘generous’ and ‘materialistic’ while lacking the traits of snobbishness, loudness, brashness or quick temperedness.\(^4\)

Andrew Trlin conducted a ‘social distance’ survey of New Zealanders’ attitudes to a range of national groups using a different methodology. Trlin asked a sample of New Zealanders to specify the degree of social interaction they would feel comfortable having with members of each group, ranging from marriage, inviting them into their homes and accepting them as friends to working with them, allowing them to enter New Zealand as a visitor or not allowing into the country at all. He found that New Zealanders rated fourteen national groups in descending order as follows: United Kingdom, United States of America, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Italy, China, Western Samoa, Japan, Niue and India.\(^5\)

The social distance surveys of Graves and Graves and Trlin, by describing British as the furthest and the closest ethnic groups to New Zealanders respectively, illustrate the ambivalent way in which New Zealanders defined their identity relative to Britain. Trlin’s study shows that New Zealanders still felt more comfortable in social interactions with people from the United Kingdom than any other group while Graves and Graves’ survey, which concluded that English were the ethnic group which New Zealanders saw as least like themselves, reinforced the idea that New Zealanders continued to define their own national identity in terms of the nation’s differences from its mother country.

**The EEC, Patriality Laws, Retaliation**

In the 1960s, many Pakeha probably saw little contradiction between being New Zealanders and being British in a broader sense. However, New Zealand’s relations with Britain and New Zealanders conception of Britishness were irrevocably changed in 1973 when the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community (EEC)

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and its new Immigration Act restricted the free entry to the United Kingdom for Commonwealth citizens to those with grandparents born there.

For the inhabitants of Great Britain the definition of Britishness was changing. The definition of Britishness in contrast to Continental Europe described by Colley, no longer made political or economic sense. Great Britain had chosen to place its identity as part of Europe above the identity of global Britishness of the Commonwealth. At the same time and perhaps related to this, the Government of Great Britain moved to redefine its national identity less in terms of location and more in terms of race. The 1973 Immigration Act known as the ‘patriality laws’ was a manifestation of this.6

Britain’s joining the EEC and its introduction of the patriality laws were seen by many New Zealanders as nothing short of a betrayal.7 If New Zealanders were still British, it was clear that the mother country considered them second-class British. New Zealanders were forced to re-examine their identity. In 1971, as Britain prepared to enter the Community, a Heylen Research Centre survey showed that 43 percent of New Zealanders favoured looser bonds with Britain while 29 percent thought they should stay the same and 24 percent believed that they should be strengthened.8

There were two distinct reactions among New Zealanders towards Britain’s moves. Some affirmed their Britishness with renewed vigour. They argued that their British birthright was being taken away from them and called on the United Kingdom to recognise its links of kinship with New Zealanders. An editorial in the populist national weekly New Zealand Truth read “a wave of revulsion has greeted the decision to make alien Kiwis in Britain. ... The British people are ratting on their own kith and kin” and soon to be elected Prime Minister, Norman Kirk appealed to Britain not to “deny New Zealanders access to their Queen” or to “make New Zealanders alien in the land they call home.”9

6Baucom, p. 15, pp. 22-3.
7Evening Post 26/10/73 in MFAT PM 67/1/4 pt. 2.
9Truth, 23/1/73 p. 1. Former Governor General, Sir Bernard Ferguson, who was himself British, also argued that New Zealand’s “ties of blood were closer to Britain than any other colony’” Entry of New Zealanders into Britain.’ Cable Wellington to London, 21/11/72 and Evening Standard 20/11/72, undated ca. 1970, both in MFAT (PM) 67/1/4 pt. 2.
The second common reaction was a rejection of the notion that New Zealand was British. As Britain’s Immigration Bill became law on 1 January 1973, New Zealanders increasingly expressed their anger, outrage, resentment, sense of betrayal and a desire to retaliate against what was seen almost as a form of treason. *Truth* led the charge. The paper argued that “now that the umbilical cord has been severed, New Zealand must develop her own sense of nationhood without sentimentality for the good old days of the Empire.”

The level of hostility was greatest in 1973-4. As well as the much publicised “Punch a Pom a Day” campaign organised by Auckland radio disk jockey, Ian Bickerstaff, Table 1 shows that feelings of betrayal were the second most important subject of letters to the editor and to the Minister of Immigration about British immigration from 1972-8. Comments included “forget all that ‘British inheritance’ stuff. We’re New Zealanders, a race on our own. What are we meant to be grateful to the Poms for?”, “to imply that New Zealanders are simply ‘little Britons’ is an absurdity” and “now that Britain denies equal treatment to all New Zealanders wanting to enter Britain, is it time to ask: ‘Are we British any more?’” While letters to newspapers and the Minister do not provide a representative sample of public opinion, they do indicate the main themes of public debate and provide useful qualitative sources to complement quantitative studies of public opinion.

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10Under the headline “Beat it Pommie Bludger!” it declared “The Poms had better think again ... and ponder on the worth of severing old ties with the Commonwealth to woo their European neighbours who happen to include wartime foes. New Zealand need not and must not take it lying down.” *Truth*, 12/12/72, p. 1. *Truth*, 26/3/74, p. 2.

11Vernon Wright, ‘If You Don’t Like it Here Why Don’t You Go Home?: The Whingeing Pom, Does He Exist?’, *Listener* 20/11/76, p. 15. *Truth* 23/4/76, p. 25, 2/4/74, p. 39, 27/7/73 p.7. Newspaper correspondents are not a representative sample of society and this data cannot be seen as a quantitative survey of changing attitudes. There is also the question of editorial discretion over which letters to publish and which to admit. For example the *New Zealand Herald* published only a small proportion of the more than 70 letters to the editor that it received in one week surrounding the dawn raids of 1976. However, the letters are a useful starting point in illuminating some of the reasons behind New Zealanders attitudes to immigration and should be read alongside contemporary public opinion studies such as those of Cowan and Hills.
Table 1: Ideas Expressed About British Immigrants in Letters to the Editors of *Truth* and the *Herald* and the Minister of Immigration 1972-78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Idea</th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Herald</th>
<th>Letters to Minister</th>
<th>All Letters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti British Ideas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British take houses from NZers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Betrayed us by joining EEC</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British bludge or moan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British immigration brings trade union troublemakers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified anti-British</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British do not naturalise well or assimilate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants contribute to Unemployment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-British as they don’t support anti-nuclearism</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All anti-British ideas</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>119</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pro-British Ideas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-‘Pom-Bashing’/Fairness</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We are British</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified pro-British</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All pro-British</strong></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideas Associated with Immigrants in General</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure on Resources/ Need to keep population down</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants upset NZ race relations</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for racial tolerance</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants won’t upset race relations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of communism other than British Unionists</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among those who expressed sentiments that Britain had betrayed New Zealand, the theme of Britain’s betrayal of New Zealand’s wartime loyalties was a strong one. One writer called for New Zealand to become a republic: “to think we helped them
win two wars and lost thousands of lives ... Like most Kiwis, I have had a gutsful of being told to bend the knee to Britain.”13 Another called for an end to “God Save the Queen” as the national anthem and was scathing of British immigrants.

Britain is now no longer interested in New Zealand except to dump her third rate citizens, as was the case in the early days when she used Australia to dump her convicts. Britain at the moment is very busy crawling to the French, the polluters of the Pacific.14

Better than any other source, this letter shows New Zealanders’ adolescent view of the ‘mother country’. Many had previously seen New Zealand as an equal part of a British community covering the world.15 However after 1973, New Zealand public opinion moved closer to the post-colonial perception of Britain held by non-white former colonies in Africa and Asia, which felt they had been used and exploited by the United Kingdom as a source of natural resources, as a receptacle for surplus population, and as an expendable source of soldiers to pursue imperial military aims. Once seen as the basis of a universal set of values, Britishness was now seen as a front for UK imperial exploitation. The United Kingdom’s move away from its former colonies was a shock to the national psyche. As poet and satirist Denis Glover wrote “I was once proud of being a colonial, now apparently I have to call myself a Commonwealthsman.”16

Hardening attitudes to Britain inevitably found form in changing attitudes to UK immigrants.17 In 1974, Leader of the Opposition Robert Muldoon declared that “we must treat Britons like nationals from any other country. They no longer regard New Zealanders as special cases ... I say we should start shutting the door. We have to get tough.”18 The editorial staff of Truth agreed, adding that “under Prime Minister Kirk, New Zealand set out to consolidate its own position as an independent nation with its
own interests and aspirations and its own destiny ... Let the dissatisfied Poms row their lifeboats to Europe for the better life they seek ... We owe them nothing.”

M D Hills, in his 1974 study of New Zealanders’ perceptions of British immigrants, found that young people were more anti-British than the old. This could have been due to the fact that young people competed with new arrivals for jobs and houses, but as Vernon Wright pointed out in the Listener, this could also be attributed to post-war cultural change. The youth of New Zealand were, he argued, “a generation not spoon fed on a diet of direct Britishness.”

While the focus of media and public attention on British immigrants was on negative aspects, many correspondents wrote in their defence (Table 1). Issues of identity were frequently at the heart of these arguments. A significant proportion of those defending British immigration did so because they believed New Zealand to be a British country. Especially for older people, those who were born in Britain and those who had parents from Britain, feelings of Britishness persisted in the 1970s. One letter to the Herald argued that

As a third generation New Zealander in descent three-quarters English and one-quarter Scot, I protest that I am neither Bulgar, Malagar, Greek, Latin, German, Dutch, Slav or Norse, nor any other race that inhabits Europe. About fifty percent of New Zealand’s population is of British stock and proud of it. All of us, whether native born or otherwise are British and our allegiance is to the British Queen.

Another wrote “Sir, I cannot understand why British migrants are treated as unwelcome outsiders, after all they are our kith and kin.” A third wrote to the Minister of Immigration

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19Truth 29/1/74, p. 6 and a Herald correspondent wrote that “Britain is preparing to ditch us over the EEC. We owe them nothing.” Herald 10/9/72, p. 6.

20Wright, p. 16.


23“We are all New Zealanders, British and New Zealanders alike in New Zealand.” ran one letter to the Herald, 10/1/74, p. 6. Another contended that “we are all Poms. Why make a distinction against new Poms?” Herald, 18/11/72, p. 6. See also Truth, 12/3/74, p. 40.
My grandparents arrived here in a sailing ship a hundred years ago, suffering hardship and a death in the family *en route*, and they helped build this country from a wilderness and defend it in war. We have always been proud to be British.\textsuperscript{24}

The logical consequence of such views was that New Zealand should not draw lines between Britain and itself in immigration policy. “Middle Age Maude” of Christchurch wrote to *Truth* that “we should continue to take British because Britain is overcrowded,” and National’s former Minister of Immigration, David Thomson, described the permit requirement for British migrants brought in by Labour in 1974 as “socialist policy [which] discriminates against those who helped build our society.”\textsuperscript{25}

Others wrote because they were alarmed at the wave of xenophobia and national stereotyping against British. ‘Pom-bashing’ was variously described as un-Christian, illegal and contrary to New Zealand’s tradition of racial tolerance. Writers argued that British immigrants were becoming scapegoats for New Zealand’s economic downturn. “What has happened to the average Kiwi’s sense of fair play ... bash a Pom a day tee-shirts - come on!” wrote one *Truth* correspondent, and the *Listener* argued that New Zealanders’ scapegoating of British immigrants was a product of irresponsible oversimplification of immigration issues in the media and in political propaganda which occurred in a climate of uncertainty over New Zealand identity.\textsuperscript{26} “The Whingeing Pom,” it observed “is as much a creation of New Zealand insecurities as he is a reality.”\textsuperscript{27}

**British Immigrants and Assimilability**

Part of New Zealanders’ hostility to UK immigration can be attributed to sentiments of national betrayal over the EEC issue, but this does not fully explain their animosity towards individual British immigrants evident in the “punch-a-pom-a-day” campaign. Despite British being culturally closer to New Zealanders than anyone except Australians, New Zealanders increasingly expressed hostility to British on a much

\textsuperscript{24}Letter to Minister of Immigration 18/2/74 in DOL 22/1/279-1, pt. 2.
\textsuperscript{25} *Truth* 26/12/72, p. 30. NZPD, v. 391, 1974, p. 2322.
\textsuperscript{26}*Truth*, 9/7/74, p. 41.
more personal level. When grouped together, problems of British immigrants’ moaning and British immigrants lack of willingness to assimilate were the largest group of letters to editors in the 1970s (Table 1).

Source: New Zealand Listener Cover 20/11/76.

The reasons for this hostility lie in the way in which New Zealanders had always ‘imagined’ their nation in terms of similarities with and differences from the United Kingdom. As a consequence, they expected migrants from the UK to be instantly assimilable and were disappointed to find that, in reality, these immigrants were
culturally different from themselves in significant ways. For their part, the UK immigrants were also victims of the ‘better-Britain’ myth. They had been fed a heavy pre-migration diet of publicity about New Zealand’s similarities to the United Kingdom. Unlike European or Asian migrants, many did not come with an expectation of needing to adjust to a new culture, felt cheated that New Zealand did not live up to their expectations and became bitter and reluctant to try and adapt.  

A willingness to adapt to New Zealand society was very important to the way New Zealanders judged groups of immigrants. Bruce Jesson of the small but vocal New Zealand Republican Movement wrote:

In practice Poms make the worst possible immigrants. Of all the people that come here they are the most nationalistic. They are fanatically loyal to England, not realising that if they want to make a go of it in New Zealand, they have to give up their own obligations.

Truth and its correspondents echoed this sentiment. “A Proud Kiwi” of Tauranga wrote that “this sure is God’s own country, and they must realise they are to live as Kiwis when they come” and “Rewi” of Christchurch wrote that “if British migrants were prepared to accept that New Zealand were different ... that they have to change themselves to become assimilated, then they would be absorbed as painlessly as the Dutch have been”. Denis Glover satirically wrote “We can’t assimilate any more of them over here. Let them drown in their own football pools.” These comments illustrate a radical reconceptualisation of Britishness away from a familiar identification with UK people seen as coming from the centre of the British Commonwealth to seeing UK immigrants as foreigners.

New Zealanders’ resentment was compounded by the fact that British immigrants gained all of the privileges of citizenship without becoming naturalised. When

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29 For example a survey of Police in Auckland found that in all districts around 85 percent of police felt that the onus was always or sometimes on immigrants to adapt to New Zealand society. New Zealand Police, South Auckland Police Development Plan, 1984, p. 75.
30 Jesson, p. 6.
31 Truth 23/1/73, p. 36. Truth, 2/4/74, p. 17. A Herald correspondent wrote that there were clearly problems “assimilating such a large number of people from a single foreign culture [British] into our style of life,” Herald 8/1/74, p. 6.
reconceptualised as truly foreign nationals, this seemed unfair and was made worse by the fact that UK migrants were reflected badly in naturalisation statistics. The United Kingdom expatriate community which numbered some 275 000 had a naturalisation rate one tenth that of Samoans or Dutch and one twentieth that of Indian born. This was interpreted, according to Vernon Wright, as a lack of willingness “to make a personal long-term commitment [to] living in New Zealand as New Zealanders.”

One of the strongest negative stereotypes that New Zealanders developed of British immigrants was that they moaned excessively. A joke went as follows:

Q: “How do you know that a plane load of Poms has just arrived?”

A: “The whining doesn’t stop after the engines are shut off.”

The term ‘Whingeing Pom’ like the term ‘Pom’ itself, reputedly entered the national vocabulary via Australia and was widespread throughout the 1970s. Hills found that 56 percent of New Zealanders agreed or tended to agree with the statement “too many British immigrants think they are better than us.” New Zealanders felt that British, more than any other group, were ungrateful for being allowed to immigrate. “Three Working Blokes” who shared a workplace with English migrants wrote to the Herald that “they may indeed look like New Zealanders, but they often do not act like them.

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33 Wright, p. 16. In the 1971 Census there were 180 000 English born, 48 000 Scottish and 7 000 Welsh in New Zealand and in 1976 there were 220 000 English, 48 000 Scottish and 8 400 Welsh. From these figures one can infer that 97 percent of the British intercensal increase was made up of English. New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings, v. 7, 1976, p. 8. An Auckland writer to Truth called for a poll tax on non-naturalised British in New Zealand. “I hate to think that some of my taxes went to assisting to pay these peoples’ passages to New Zealand and after all these years, they still think their first allegiance is to Pommie-land ... we belong to the new world not the old.” Truth also argued that “if a migrants wishes to enjoy all the rights and privileges of settling in New Zealand, we can see no reason why he should object to becoming a New Zealand citizen.” Truth, 12/12/72, p. 63. Similar arguments in Truth, 21/1/73, p. 6. Truth 9/1/73, p. 6. Truth, 23/1/73, p. 36. It appears that many of the British did not naturalise because they took a purely utilitarian view of their citizenship. Before 1974, they had almost all of the advantages of citizenship without naturalising. This interpretation is supported by the rush to become naturalised New Zealanders when the legislation changed requiring non-naturalised New Zealanders to seek a re-entry permit every time they left the country. In 1973, 5 000 British became naturalised New Zealanders but this figure leapt to 10 000 in 1974. Herald, 26/7/76, p.1


35 Wright, p. 14. Hills, Appendix, Table 1.
Their constant moaning becomes trying after a time and we wonder what it takes to please them.”36 “No more Poms” of Whakatane told Truth:

Everywhere you turn these days there are Poms, Poms, Poms. They grab everything they can get their hands on - our land, businesses, jobs, government handouts etc. then turn around and moan like hell. I’ve never come across such an ungrateful race of people.37

And Vernon Wright in his Listener essay “IF YOU DON’T LIKE IT HERE WHY DON’T YOU GO HOME?: THE WHINGEING POM. DOES HE EXIST?” satirically wrote of New Zealand’s working classes being subjected to complaints about being “years behind in Coro’ Street and marmalade brands.”38 He described one of the first experiences of Irish born broadcaster Brian Edwards in Christchurch where, after complaining about twisting his ankle on a gutter, a passer-by suggested that “if you don’t like it here, why don’t you go home.”39

The dissatisfaction that many UK migrants felt and the reason that their difficulties evoked a hostile response resulted from the considerable gap between the expectations that immigrants had of New Zealand and the reality. Bruce Cowan, in his 1974-5 study of British migration, showed that most United Kingdom migrants left for New Zealand expecting not so much to find a different country to which they would have to adapt, but a United Kingdom transposed to the South Seas, not merely a replica of the home country but the better-Britain that their compatriots had set out to build more than a hundred years before. In describing their perceptions of New Zealand to Cowan before leaving the UK, intending migrants made frequent references to “sun, mountains, hills, clean, unspoilt and peaceful” and to New Zealanders as “friendly, sporting, easy-going, slap-happy, more fond of beer than

36 Herald 22/1/74, p. 6.
37 Truth 12/10/76, p. 20.
38 Another wrote that “they should accept that things aren’t the same in New Zealand and try to get along with the Kiwis, but they continually talk about going home. They aren’t giving us or our country a chance.” Truth 13/2/73, p. 36, and “Kiwi and Proud of It” of Foxton also wrote “Pommies moan about things in this country. No doubt about it, they are rats leaving a sinking ship. I say deport the whole damn lot of them.” Truth 26/10/72, p. 30.
hard-work, and [evoked] images of sun-hats and walk shorts.” They most frequently cited among their reasons for coming “better conditions to raise a family”, “economic stability”, “standard of living”, “[lack of] crowding”, “climate”, better wages and to own their own homes.40

Cowan found that most United Kingdom immigrants had gained their preconceptions about New Zealand from tourist brochures and magazine features.41 Their expectations were further inflated by information distributed to prospective migrants by New Zealand House in London which tended to provide glossy advertising rather than realistic information. Living in New Zealand, and A New Life in a Young Country, which were the pamphlets supplied to prospective British migrants, stressed New Zealand’s advantages in terms of lifestyle, job opportunities, education, wealth, lack of crowding, lack of pollution and mild climate and featured photos of bronzed people in beautiful locations. They also pointed out that 90 percent of the New Zealand population was of ‘British descent.’42 A UK

40 Cowan, pp. 84-6.
41 Ibid., p. 59.
publication, *The Emigrant’s Guide*, told migrants that “of all the countries normally considered by British emigrants, New Zealand is perhaps the most British of all, and mutual acceptance by immigrants and residents is that much easier.”

Such advertising appears to have been enormously successful. In 1974, New Zealand House in London received up to 2,000 inquiries a day about emigration. Almost a third of those surveyed by Cowan cited New Zealand’s supposed similarities to Great Britain as being the primary reason for choosing it over other emigrant destinations, the most popular reason after the presence of friends and relatives. As one immigrant told Megan Hutching “[we] assumed that we were coming to join a people which was just another county of England.” With such inflated expectations, the reality for many migrants when they arrived could not have been other than disappointment. Jesson wrote that because UK migrants found New Zealand different from their expectations and felt misled “Many Poms became positively ‘anti’, continually comparing New Zealand with Britain.”

Cowan found that UK immigrants, when surveyed after arrival, complained about problems with delays in the arrival of furniture, cars and other personal belongings shipped from the UK (33 percent), housing assistance (42 percent) and jobs they had arranged before coming (40 percent). But the greatest shock they faced was cultural differences including New Zealanders’ attitudes to work and recreation. Two-thirds saw cultural and entertainment facilities in New Zealand as poorer than those they were used to and many of them complained of missing their local pubs, homes, friends, family and football.

In turn, many New Zealanders were disappointed with the UK immigrants, whom they perceived as ungrateful for the opportunity to come and who, contrary to

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45 Cowan, p. 51.
47 Cowan, pp. 93-5. Hutching also found that British complained about lack of theatres, galleries and concerts, accommodation and food (Marmalade brands and ‘Coro’ Street did not feature). Hutching, pp. 128-30, pp. 148-9.
expectations, were among the groups least willing to adapt to New Zealand society. These reactions were amplified by the media with all of the major papers carrying articles either criticizing UK immigrants or at least investigating the phenomenon of public animosity towards them. Only the Chambers of Commerce and Manufacturers’ Federation journals carried positive stories about the adaptation of UK immigrants to life in New Zealand.49

The result of this mutual disappointment was that the UK immigrants felt unwelcome and responded with homesickness and complaints. This in turn aggravated hostility towards them among the community and led to a spiral of ill will. Cultural differences between New Zealanders and UK migrants were less important to their difficulties in assimilation than a gap in expectations about the need to assimilate.

Identity, Immigration and Popular Interpretation of Economic and Social Change

From 1975, the New Zealand Herald surveyed people about the issues that they saw as the most important to the nation. For the first three years, 20-35 percent of those surveyed considered the economy to be New Zealanders’ greatest concern. Other big issues were inflation (7-25 percent), industrial relations (4-11 percent), overseas trade, (7-12 percent), unemployment (2-21 percent), social climate/morality (6-11 percent) and government (2-20 percent). Immigration was never considered to be the biggest concern by more than 2 percent of those surveyed.50 This suggests that the public controversy over immigration issues may be best understood in relation to other contemporary concerns.

The way in which New Zealanders interpreted the relationship between immigration and economic and social problems was filtered through the changing popular


50Herald, 14 /10/75, p. 1, 17/11/75, p.1, 21/6/76, p. 1, 8/12/76, p. 1, 18/11/78, p. 1. In 1972, a Heylen Poll found that, in response to the question of whether New Zealanders thought that racial discrimination existed in their country and whether people thought it was serious, 72 percent agreed that racial discrimination existed but only 20 percent thought it was a serious problem. Heylen Research Centre, The Heylen Poll, September 1970-April 1972, 1972, p. 26, p. 61. Another Heylen poll in 1975 asked people about the issues about which they were most concerned. The greatest of these were crime and violence, the cost of living, drug addiction, pollution and the environment. Cited in Gordon McLachlan, The Passionless People, 1976, p. 61.
boundaries of national identity. For example, immediately after World War Two when New Zealanders had seen their country as a British nation, its citizens had accepted rationing of foodstuffs in order to ship meat and butter to the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{51} In contrast, by the mid-1970s, Great Britain and UK immigrants were seen as a contributing factor to New Zealand’s economic problems and it was argued that New Zealand should better control immigration from the UK in pursuit of distinct national economic interests.

New Zealand in the 1970s faced problems in housing, industrial relations, employment, the environment and race relations and these were all attributed to varying degrees to UK immigrants. The supposed harm done by UK immigrants in these areas was frequently described in the language of better-Britain mythology. The effect of concerns about diverse economic and social issues on New Zealanders’ attitudes to British immigrants is demonstrated in M D Hills’ 1974 survey on New Zealanders attitudes to British immigrants. Hills asked a sample of New Zealanders to express the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements. Those which were strongly endorsed included: “British immigrants are more of a benefit than a burden to the country”, “British immigrants should be encouraged because they boost the economy”, “as a young country New Zealand can benefit from the United Kingdom immigrants’ past experience,” and “immigrants from Britain are hard workers.” However, there was also strong support for the ideas that “British immigrants live in houses that we New Zealanders need”, “British immigrants are racially prejudiced”, “British immigrants are trouble makers on the industrial scene”, “too many British immigrants think they are better than us” and “the New Zealand Government spends too much money on helping British immigrants.”\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{Economic Considerations}


\textsuperscript{52}Hills, Appendix, Table 1. Hills found that New Zealand born residents with New Zealand born parents were most likely to be antipathetic to the British while those born in the UK or with UK born parents held more favourable attitudes. Those with tertiary qualifications or in white collar jobs were less likely to be negative about British, as were those who had travelled to Britain. Maori and young people were significantly more anti-British although the sample size for Maori was only thirteen. The survey found no significant relationship between the sex of individuals, income levels, marital status or home ownership and attitudes. Trlin also found that the old were more in favour of British immigration. A D Trlin,
The early 1970s was a time of economic turmoil in New Zealand with a minor economic boom giving way in 1973-4 to recession and the uncertainty created by oil shocks and the UK’s entry into the EEC. Immigrants from the United Kingdom, as the largest group, became the main focus of public concerns about the economic impact of immigration. These concerns were debated by Government and academics in terms of cost-benefit analysis, with the economic benefits of an increased workforce and larger domestic market for goods weighed against the costs in infrastructure of settling new immigrants. However, this rather abstract argument was often simplified in the eyes of the public to whether immigration would exacerbate or solve the problems of unfilled job vacancies, unemployment, housing shortages, and the need for more skilled workers.

Especially before 1974, many business people argued that New Zealand would gain greater economic efficiency with the economies of scale which population increase through immigration would bring. They contended that New Zealand’s economic and especially industrial development was being impeded by shortages of labour. In 1970, a representative of the Manufacturers’ Association complained of “production bottlenecks” caused by shortages of labour and warned that if demand for workers exceeded supply, this would push wages up and cause inflation. This view was shared by former secretary of the Department of Industries and Commerce W B Sutch who claimed that New Zealand’s manpower was 60 000 short of its optimal level. Others refuted this conclusion. Union leaders and some academics claimed that total economic growth was less important than ‘real income per head’ and that consequently New Zealand should focus its immigration policy on skilled migrants who would bring the best cost-benefit ratio, rather than seeking to increase the overall

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56 *Listener* 28/9/70, pp. 6-7.
number of immigrants at all cost.\textsuperscript{57} By 1974 these views had won over the Government.\textsuperscript{58} They also gained broad public support. Following the economic downturn of 1974-5, unemployment rose to second place in the regular \textit{Herald} survey of public concerns and calls for mass immigration to increase economic efficiency evaporated.\textsuperscript{59}

\textbf{Housing and Resources}

Housing was a particular source of public concern in the mid-1970s. The national average price of housing sections nearly doubled in the year to 1974 and the average house price rose by 20 percent.\textsuperscript{60} In the same year, it was estimated that there was a national shortage of 15 000 houses and despite a significant increase in the numbers of state houses being built, this figure increased to more than 17 000 in 1975.\textsuperscript{61} Because housing problems coincided with an unprecedented level of immigration, it is not surprising that many associated immigrants with the problem. There were more letters to the newspapers and to the Minister’s office arguing against UK immigrants on the grounds of the pressure they created on housing (twenty-five) than for any other single reason (Table 1).

The Federation of Labour and the Otara Citizens’ Advice Bureau were among the organisations that protested to the Government. Lack of control over UK migrants was said to be placing pressure on both housing prices and availability for New Zealand’s urban poor.\textsuperscript{62} Similar opposition to migration from Great Britain was expounded by \textit{Truth} and by the \textit{Herald}, which called for cutbacks in the numbers of

\textsuperscript{57}Brian Philpott and W B Hayward, ‘Are People Really Necessary’ \textit{New Zealand Economist}, v. 32, no. 9, Dec. 1970, pp. 18-9. W B Sutch and Peter Jones, ‘Migrants: Do We Need Them? (Viewpoints of Seven New Zealanders)’ \textit{Listener} 28/9/70, p. 6. In the words of FOL leader Tom Skinner “There are a number of fields in which New Zealand is deficient in workers and it would be to our advantage to bring in people to fill these vacancies. On the other hand, there is no point in bringing people into the country unless there is work available for them without displacing the workers who are already employed.” \textit{NZFOL Reports of Annual Conferences}, 1974, pp. 20-1, 1975, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{58}See Chapter 2.


\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Truth} 13/7/75, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Herald} 25/9/73, p. 5, p. 21. G McGowan (Otara Citizens Advice Bureau) to Minimmign (F Colman) 27/3/74 in DOL 22/1/279-10 pt. 3.
British immigrants because of problems in “providing for their housing, education and health requirements.”

Popular concerns about the effect of immigrants on the housing market went deeper than economic arguments. The idea that anyone in New Zealand could aspire to own their own home was a powerful national symbol and because fair social welfare was seen as elemental to the New Zealand nation, protests about the issues of housing, and particularly state housing, were expressed in terms of national identity. Hills, in 1974, found that 47 percent of New Zealanders agreed with the statement that “British immigrants live in houses that we New Zealanders need.” The Auckland District Maori Council asked the Government “to suspend all immigration into this country until the housing shortages are overcome” and argued that the ideals of social and racial equality, which had long been part of the New Zealand identity, were threatened by the poor housing available to Maori and Pacific Islanders as urban migrants who were competing with ‘foreign’ immigrants.

Nonetheless, some ambivalence existed about whether UK immigrants were the victims or creators of the housing problems and this reflected uncertainty over whether or not UK immigrants should be considered as outsiders or as kin to New Zealanders. An article in New Zealand Manufacturer of 1972 described British immigrants not as the cause, but as the greatest victims of housing shortages and Hill’s survey found that 42 percent of New Zealanders still believed that British immigrants should be eligible for state houses.

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64 Hills, Appendix Table 1.
65 Letter R. Walker Secretary of ADMC to PM Kirk, 6/10/73, DOL 22/1/2 pt. 28.
66 Hills, Appendix, Table 1. Prince, p. 13.
Pressure on Environment and Lifestyle

It was part of New Zealand’s national mythology that the ancestors of New Zealanders had fled a dirty, overcrowded, industrialised Britain to found a life in a new land. Through the 1970s, environmental issues gained increasing attention in New Zealand and pressure on the environment, natural resources and a unique way of life were associated in the minds of many with the unprecedented level of immigration, especially from Great Britain. Some expressed the fear that a heavy increase in population through immigration would recreate in New Zealand the very industrial conditions that the nation’s Pakeha pioneers had fled. These concerns are apparent in editorials and letters to newspapers and the Minister with 34 letters linking immigration to pressure on lifestyle, resources and the need to keep population down (Table 1).

Arguments about lifestyle and the environment followed two broad themes. Firstly, it was argued that New Zealand was distinguished from other nations by the close and harmonious relationship that its inhabitants had with the land, and secondly, it was argued that immigration threatened to undermine this. Because pollution, congestion and overcrowding were seen as alien and un-New Zealand it fell naturally to many to associate these growing problems with immigrants.

The idea of an environment in peril from population growth was first expressed on the left of the political spectrum by academics, unionists and environmentalists. The head of Zoology at Canterbury University G A Knox warned that “to us who remember our youth, it means wide open spaces, lush green forest, clean sparkling lakes and rivers, clean air and the opportunity to get close to nature. This life as we once knew it is fast disappearing.” In response to this environmental malaise, in 1970, political scientist Austin Mitchell launched the ‘Keep New Zealand Empty’ movement declaring that it was “crazy to pack an enviably empty land with people.” The popular extent of such concerns was further demonstrated by the rise to prominence of the Values Party which, despite being handicapped by the first past the

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69 Herald 12/6/70 in Buckland.
post electoral system, won 2.1 and 5.2 percent of votes in the 1972 and 1975 general elections.\textsuperscript{70} Values, the world’s first green party adopted a policy of zero population and economic growth. The party’s 1972 manifesto argued that population growth threatened essential New Zealand values by placing pressure on the environment, leading to “urban growth and the associated social ills” and fuelling social change and the stresses associated with it.\textsuperscript{71}

Radical ideas sparked mainstream public debate over the impact of immigration on the environment and help to shape this debate in terms of national identity. A \textit{Herald} editorial cautioned that “unless population is stabilised, many of the desirable qualities of life in New Zealand will be lost” and a letter to the paper expressed concern:

at the ways in which migrants are being encouraged to come to New Zealand at a time when our traditional good way of life is acquiring all the problems of major cities overseas - housing, traffic, unemployment and pollution.\textsuperscript{72}

New Zealand’s clean environment was often defined in contrast to other countries. Denis Glover evoked images of the smog of Sheffield and Birmingham as the possible end result of a massive immigration of British. He argued that New Zealand’s “burgeoning population reduces quality of life” and that “surely three million people is population enough.”\textsuperscript{73} Likewise a \textit{Sunday News} columnist evoked “a smog choked California or a shark infested Sydney” in warning New Zealand not to “open handedly invite all of these escapist from their crippled or badly organised environments to come and sample the pristine wonders of ours.”\textsuperscript{74}

Through the 1970s, the idea that a unique New Zealand lifestyle was threatened by immigration even filtered through to the political right. The Chamber of Commerce

\textsuperscript{72}\textit{Herald} 22/11/72, p. 6. A similar idea was expressed in another editorial of 1973 which attacked immigration from Britain as causing “unwarranted and unwanted” strains on the population. \textit{Herald} 22/9/73, p. 7. See also \textit{Herald}, 8/1/74, p. 6. The \textit{Listener} noted that while “New Zealand can support several times its present population, the question is whether such an increase is desirable.” \textit{Listener} 9/2/74, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{73}Denis Glover in \textit{Truth} 30/4/74, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{74}W P Reeves in \textit{Sunday News} 27/12/70 cited in Buckland.
representative on the Immigration Advisory Council wrote that “most would agree that any immigration policy should first pay regard to the preservation of those special attributes that living in New Zealand can offer; social stability [and] our natural environment.” By 1978, following three years of rapid population loss through immigration, even the National Party used ideas about New Zealand’s unique ‘way of life’ in contrast to an overcrowded Europe to appeal to voters.\textsuperscript{75}

New Zealand could be described as one great outdoor recreation. Only people who have experienced the crowded beaches and sports facilities in most developed countries can truly appreciate the unique value of our mountains, rivers, parks, beaches and sports grounds.\textsuperscript{76}

**The Classless Society and British Immigration**

One of New Zealand’s most important national myths was that it was a classless society. This was also one of the most important distinctions that New Zealanders drew between themselves and the people of Great Britain. Consequently, as industrial relations deteriorated in the early 1970s, many New Zealanders blamed the sizeable flow of UK migrants. In the media and other public fora, UK militant unionists were described as corrupting New Zealand’s unions and importing confrontational militant style industrial relations to a supposedly reasonable negotiated industrial relations scene.\textsuperscript{77}

These attitudes are evident across the spectrum of New Zealand’s newspapers. A *Herald* editorial declared that:

One of the great characteristics of a New Zealander has been that he holds no thought of occupying any settled place in society. Traditionally, he looks neither ‘up’ nor ‘down’ at other people, he is their equal and they are his.

\textsuperscript{75} Steel, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{76} New Zealand National Party, *As We Step into the Eighties You’ll Have to Decide If You’re Ready for the Future, If You’re Coming with the Tide*, Pamphlet National Party Election Pamphlets, 1978, Hocken.

\textsuperscript{77} This attitude developed at a time when Britain itself had been suffering a wave of industrial strife. This must have reinforced in the eyes of New Zealanders that this was a characteristic of British life. It is ironic that many British immigrants stated among their reasons for coming, escaping from a class bound society. Hutching, pp. 82-3, p. 136. Cowan, p. 51, p. 70.
but that while “forty or fifty years ago, a child could grow up without being made conscious of class or of having much idea of what it meant,” this was no longer the case. For the editor, class was foreign to New Zealand and the growth of class consciousness among New Zealanders could be attributed to the immigration of UK unionists. They were, he wrote, “a few rather sad stirrers who seek to promote the foreign notion of ‘class struggle’ among an essentially egalitarian people.”

A letter to the Listener added:

The national character of the New Zealander, because of the necessity of our pioneer forefathers and their example, is a ‘do it yourself’ type who will tackle anything, succeeding when he uses his brains and initiative to the limit ... Then what happens? From the British Isles come good union men, steeped in the demarcation way of life who said ‘vote us into a position of power and we guarantee you an easier life, less work and more pay’ based on ‘do this and only this and as little of it as possible,’ always looking for a trifling reason to strike, never thinking of the harm it will do to other segments of the community, even when they have less, and work harder than you do.

Truth was at the forefront of the attack on UK unionists as immigrants to New Zealand. Under the headline “GO HOME COMMIE,” it argued that “most New Zealanders will wholeheartedly support any move to deny citizenship to overseas born discontenters bent on transferring their petty class hatreds to this country.” It particularly singled out Bill Anderson of the Northern Drivers’ Union, Frank McNulty of the Meatworkers’ Union and Peter Jackson of the Storemen and Packers’ Union, describing these men as a “cancer” on New Zealand industrial relations, asking why they “don’t just pack up and leave decent New Zealanders to solve their own problems?”

A Truth correspondent of 1973 agreed:

One of the main reasons for the increase in industrial unrest in New Zealand is that we have too many migrants from Britain in key positions

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78 Herald 27/12/78, p. 6.
79 Listener 15/12/73 cited in Roberton, p. 23.
80 Truth 30/11/76, p. 20.
81 Ibid.
in our unions ... This has always been God’s own country. Let’s keep it that way and not be corrupted with the Old World’s industrial blight.  

These sentiments were widespread. Hills found that 58 percent of those he surveyed agreed with the statement “British immigrants are troublemakers on the industrial scene” and the Listener in a more circumspect way noted that, fuelled by some in the media, “the public ear has become abnormally sensitive to the sound of a grievance aired in an English accent.”

Some New Zealanders also expressed resentment that a privileged UK class of skilled immigrants were being appointed to positions of responsibility in New Zealand workplaces over the heads of aspiring local candidates, thus inhibiting the social mobility which was an element of the classless society. One Herald correspondent wrote that “the main reason for New Zealanders’ antipathy to the English immigrants is that we are disgusted with people who walk straight in to high positions then get a job for all their friends.” The Auckland District Maori Council and former Secretary of Labour Noel Woods were among those who agreed. The Maori Council contended that “the Government’s first duty is to the people of New Zealand. We refute the rationale ... of the need of importing skilled people. We should train our own people.”

82 Truth, 11/9/73, p. 39. “Ban the Pom” of Otahuhu wrote that “ninety percent of the trouble in the freezing works where I work is caused by greedy egotistical UK immigrants.” Truth 12/4/74, p. 40. See also Truth, 5/3/74, p. 38.

83 Hills, Appendix, Table 1. Dunedin’s Evening Star also examined the issue of British unionists in New Zealand noting, that British were seen by many as “importing the class system and industrial militancy to New Zealand.” Evening Star, 12/4/76 cited in Cowan, p. 104. Wright, p. 15. Truth 11/9/73, p. 39. The more highbrow Listener cautioned that a change in the pattern of industrial relations from conciliation and arbitration to a more confrontational approach after the zero wager order of 1968 was more likely to be the cause of increased tensions. Wright, p. 16.

84 She continued, “foreigners shouldn’t be able to walk into high level jobs as immigrants...This is a do it yourself paradise, you have to swallow your pride and start off a bit low and build your own ivory tower later” Herald 10/11/72, p. 6.

85 Noel Woods ‘Migrants: Do We Need Them? (Viewpoints of Seven New Zealanders)’Listener 28/9/70. p. 7. Noel Woods, ‘Conference: Towards an Immigration Policy for New Zealand: Synopsis, Chairman’s Summary’, NZJPA, v. 34, no.1, Sept, 1971, p. 4. This sentiment was echoed by one letter to the editor of the Listener which ran “it is perhaps understandable that the young New Zealander should be envious of the success of his Pom counterpart as the result of a technical education which the New Zealander did not have the opportunity to acquire.” Listener 11/12/76, p. 6.
British Immigration and Race Relations

For many years before the 1970s, New Zealanders had seen their nation as an example to the world of harmonious race relations and this influenced public opinion about immigration. Newspapers and the Minister’s office received many letters citing concerns over the effect of immigration in general on New Zealand’s race relations. A significant proportion of this concern was directed at British immigrants (Table 1).

Race relations was also an issue in the United Kingdom of the early 1970s where declining wealth and unemployment combined with immigration from Britain’s former colonies in South-Asia and the Caribbean to produce racial tensions.86 This in turn contributed to the increasingly racialised definition of British identity entrenched in the Immigration Act. In response to this perceived increased racism in the United Kingdom, some New Zealanders such as the Reverend Don Borrie of the New Zealand Race Relations Council, expressed the fear that recent European immigrants from Great Britain were fleeing multi-racial cities and would hold racial views incompatible with racial harmony in New Zealand. This conclusion is supported by Hill’s survey which found that 43 percent of New Zealanders agreed with the statement “British immigrants are racially prejudiced.”87

Ironically, a desire to preserve New Zealand’s ‘pristine’ record of race relations was also used in defence of a policy of racial selection in immigration. Some New Zealanders drew parallels between West Indian and South-Asian immigration to the UK and Pacific Island immigration to New Zealand and argued that the UK’s experience demonstrated that immigration of ‘coloured’ people into a ‘white’ society was not a good idea.88 Prime Minister Jack Marshall, in 1972, argued that “if we are careless or neglectful we may face ... the problems that have confronted London, New York and other large cities, the build-up of racial friction, the growth of racial ghettos, gang warfare, racial lines and a divided society.”89 Likewise a Dominion editorial argued that “there are sound economic, political and social reasons why New Zealand

87Hills, Appendix, Table 1.
88Herald 21/5/73, p. 6.
should not repeat the folly Britain indulged in when it opened the gates to West Indians. New Zealand can learn a lesson from that.”

**Conclusion**

Changing attitudes to British immigrants in the 1970s were the product of a shift in the way that New Zealanders saw their nation and the way in which they interpreted contemporary events and circumstances in light of this identity shift. Britain’s entry into the EEC and its 1973 Immigration Act represented a fundamental change in the nature and importance of British Commonwealth identity in the United Kingdom. This in turn forced New Zealanders to re-evaluate their identity as a ‘British’ nation. Many New Zealanders no longer accepted that their national identity was a branch of Britishness and this had profound implications for popular attitudes to British immigration. While still seen by some as kin to New Zealanders, UK immigrants in New Zealand were seen by an increasing number of New Zealanders as outsiders who should have no greater privileges than other immigrants.

At the level of the individual, increasing hostility to the British was also a product of an expectation gap between UK immigrants and New Zealanders. New Zealanders, who had been brought up with the idea that New Zealand was a ‘British nation’, had unrealistically high expectations about how easily UK migrants would adapt to New Zealand society. For their part, the migrants, who also subscribed to the better-Britain myth of New Zealand identity, held unrealistic expectations about how similar New Zealand would be to the home they were leaving.

A model of New Zealand identity as a sub-category of a broader category of British identity was, because of political and economic change in New Zealand and in Great Britain, no longer widely accepted. New Zealanders, albeit with some reluctance, were forced to reconceptualise their country’s relations with Great Britain as those between two distinct and wholly separate nations. Because record flows of British immigrants seemed not to reflect this national shock, UK immigrants became the unwitting and undeserved victims of a New Zealand identity crisis.

As public opinion moved away from the idea that New Zealand was British, popular discourses of identity increasingly focused on those elements of New Zealand identity

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which made the nation distinct from the United Kingdom. British immigrants became the scapegoats for many of the economic and social problems facing New Zealand and this scapegoating was also expressed in the language of better-Britain national identity myths. United Kingdom immigrants were variously described as threats to the classless society, to New Zealand’s clean-green image, to New Zealand’s traditions of fair race relations and to home ownership. It is clear that changing attitudes to British immigration in the 1970s can only be fully understood within the context of shift in popular New Zealand identity.
Chapter 6: Public Attitudes to Pacific Islanders

In Chapter 1, I identified a shift in the nature and importance of identification with the nation in the 1970s in a number of countries. One reason for this was the rise of alternative loci of identity including gender and ethnic politics. Another was the changing human geography of many states which had hitherto maintained a degree of cultural cohesion and homogeneity through selective immigration policies. This had been the case in New Zealand. But like other Western industrialised states in the post-war period, demand for labour brought increasing cultural and ethnic diversity which challenged this cultural basis for selection.

Such immigration forced governments in countries such as Britain, France, Germany and Canada to re-evaluate the cultural definition of their nations. As the works of Brubacker, Joppke, Kobayashi and other writers have shown, at the level of defining citizenship, states faced a range of choices from denying citizenship to immigrants of ‘alien’ cultures, or insisting on immigrant cultural assimilation, to redefining national culture to include recognition of a diversity of cultures.¹

However, while the limits of citizenship and the rules delineating it are clearly defined at the level of the state, how a nation is defined and understood in the imagination of the community is less clear-cut and are more often the subject of debate. In New Zealand, increase in the Pacific Island community forced the New Zealanders collectively to re-evaluate the definition of their nation. Two predominant schools of thought emerged: the assimilationist and the cultural pluralist.

Pacific Island immigrants, who came in increasing numbers through the 1960s and 1970s, were the largest group of non-European immigrants New Zealanders had ever seen. Their coming was a response to the demand for labour in New Zealand’s industrial cities, especially Auckland, and was partially a reflection of the Government’s feelings of post-colonial responsibility to the region. Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans were New Zealand citizens and New Zealand also had an agreement to accept migrants from its former trust-territory of Western Samoa. Through a combination of migration and natural increase, from 1961 to 1971, the Pacific Island populations in New Zealand rose from 12 000 to 48 000 and had

¹See Chapter 1 for this analysis.
reached around 90,000 by 1981. An estimated 25,000 permanent, and many more short term migrants, came from the region from 1972 to 1978 and this made them collectively the third largest group behind British and Australians.\(^2\)

**Table 2: Subjects of Letters to *Truth*, the New Zealand *Herald* and the Minister’s Office about Pacific Island Immigration 1972-78**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Idea</th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Herald</th>
<th>Min’s office</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td><strong>Anti-Pacific Island Ideas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Pacific Islanders contribute to crime</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>Pacific Islanders do not assimilate</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific Islanders contribute to unemployment</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Anti-Scapegoating or Anti-Police tactics in Dawn Raids</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</table>

Attitudes to Pacific Islanders must also be understood within the context of a decade of torrid political, social and economic change. Pacific Islanders in New Zealand

\(^2\)See Chapter 1 Figure 1 and Appendix.
were often blamed for rises in crime, unemployment, shortages of housing and inflation. While hostility towards them might not have been as acute without these problems, this scapegoating also related to identity boundaries. In order for New Zealanders to blame Pacific Islanders for taking New Zealanders’ jobs and houses, there was an implicit assumption of what a New Zealander was and that Pacific Islanders in New Zealand collectively fell outside of this definition. This chapter examines the 1970s debate over Pacific Island immigration in light of issues of popular identity.

Table 2 shows the main ideas expressed about Pacific Island immigration in letters to New Zealand’s biggest daily newspaper the Herald, to its biggest weekly publication Truth and the Minister of Immigration from 1972-8. While it is clearly not a representative measure of public attitudes, it does indicate the terms in which public debate over Pacific Islanders was framed.

Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism

For Pacific Islanders, most of whom came from cultures quite different from that of Pakeha, it was particularly difficult to conform with New Zealanders’ traditional expectation that immigrants culturally assimilate. They suffered frequent charges that collectively they would not or could not assimilate and their difficulties were highlighted by the fact that they were a very visible minority. Pacific Islanders in New Zealand, irrespective of citizenship or residency status, came to be defined by many ‘assimilationist’ New Zealanders as ‘other’.

A growing number of ‘cultural pluralist’ New Zealanders, however, including some politicians, civil servants, academics, the churches, unionists and Maori reinterpreted national identity as being able to accommodate more than one culture. They argued that Pacific Islanders and other minorities need not become part of a unitary national culture dominated by Pakeha values and tradition in order to be accepted as part of the national community.


4See Chapter 1 for an exploration of this theme.
The idea that Pacific Islanders were undesirable immigrants because they did not assimilate well was the third most common theme of letters about them to newspapers and the Minister’s office and received considerable support in newspaper editorials. “FIT IN OR GET OUT” was one prominent Truth headline.\(^5\) Truth reported the comments of the wife of the victim of a bar-room brawl in Porirua - “The Samoans will not mix with people. They don’t make any effort to learn English and they stick together in gangs ... most of the Samoans out here will not make any effort to fit into society.”\(^6\) Sixty-two percent of Auckland company managers surveyed by Paul Spoonley in 1978 agreed. They expressed the belief that the typical Pacific Islander “continued to practice his traditional lifestyle” and that they should be encouraged to adopt New Zealand’s “local lifestyle.”\(^7\)

Pacific Islanders clearly felt oppressed by pressure to assimilate. According to Vaiao Ala’ima Etueti, co-chair of the Auckland Pacific Island Advisory Council

As a rule Aucklanders, Pakehas, blatantly refuse to accept the fact that this is a South Pacific country, Auckland is a South Pacific city and the Pacific Islanders are here to stay. A large and very vocal section of the population would like us to ‘kill’ our cultural differences and peculiarities and become ‘Kiwis’.\(^8\)

He gave an example - “We would like to cook in an umu but the neighbours don’t like the smoke. We had one once and they called the fire brigade.”\(^9\)

Most New Zealanders expected immigrants to undergo geographical assimilation as part of the process of cultural assimilation. Ninety-four percent of those surveyed by Trlin in 1971 agreed that “one of the best ways for immigrants in Auckland to become New Zealanders is not to live in their own communities and to spread out and

\(^5\)Truth 12/2/74, p. 10. An editorial claimed that “[Pacific Islanders] are less adaptable than Europeans, as seen in the ghetto phenomenon that has developed in recent years.” Truth 9/4/74, p. 6.
\(^6\)Truth 20/7/74, pp. 6-7. One letter to the Herald read “It is [Europeans] who have created in New Zealand the European way of life which so many non-Europeans seem to want to share but do not uphold.” Herald 13/10/76, p. 6.
\(^9\)Ibid.
live alongside New Zealanders.” However Pacific Islanders, partly because of discrimination on the real estate market and out of a desire to live among their communities and near to their workplaces, did not. They tended to be concentrated heavily not just in certain cities, but also in certain suburbs.

The media reinforced the association between geography and race and the word ‘ghetto’ entered the lexicon of both newspapers and their readers to describe the areas where they lived. A Herald editorial called for government intervention to help spread out Pacific Islanders arguing that “they tend to congregate, if not segregate themselves, in decadent areas which could become ghettos if action was not taken.” Truth’s editor, not to be outdone for populism, wrote of the Pacific Islanders’ “self-imposed communal isolation” as a threat to New Zealand society claiming that “the Islander ghettos of Auckland starkly illustrate the folly of our [immigration] policies.”

Modernity was also used as a distinction between New Zealanders as an ‘us’ and Pacific Islanders as a ‘them.’ A commonly expressed public concern over the non-assimilation of Pacific Island immigrants was that they lacked basic skills necessary for living and working in a ‘Western’ material society. A Listener article wrote of Islanders having “great difficulties in adjusting to the new way of life.”

According to Truth, many Pacific Islanders had never come into contact with electricity, did not

10 However 43 percent of the same sample agreed with the statement “It harms no-one if immigrants live together in their own communities.” AD Trlin, ‘Social Distance and Assimilation Orientation’, Pacific Viewpoint, September 1971, p. 154.
11 See Appendix for material on residential concentrations.
12 “Thousands are swarming into New Zealand each year [and] are permitted to crowd into small slum areas which quickly degenerate into ghettos” wrote one Truth reporter and a letter to the paper also argued that “Auckland is beginning to look like a huge ghetto. If the trend is allowed to continue without further restriction on the entry of unskilled semi-primitive immigrants, then the housing and job shortages can only get worse.” Truth 12/2/74, p.10. Truth 1/5/73, p. 40.
13 Herald 16/9/69 in Department of Labour Auckland Office Archives NZNA BBAI Acc. A. 251, 51b. DOL 22/1/13 . In 1974, the paper warned that “the hazards of importing large pools of unskilled labour, especially when such people tend to group themselves together in their own communities are plain in other countries.” Herald 9/5/74. One of the paper’s correspondents wrote that “unless the government spreads the Polynesian intake throughout the country, it is building up a problem in Auckland.” Herald 1/5/73, p. 6.
14 Truth 12/2/74, p. 11. Truth 8/8/73, p. 6
15 Dianne Farmer, 'Integrating our Exotic Neighbours', Listener 27/7/70, p. 43.
know how to use a kitchen stove, understand power bills or have any knowledge of social services and welfare organisations available to help them.\textsuperscript{16}

Media coverage reinforced such ideas. Graphic and sad anecdotal accounts of these problems were frequent in the media. A \textit{Listener} article reported that “welfare officers, inquiring about a Tokelauan girl’s absence from school, stumbled upon a family of ten with inadequate clothing, furniture and heating, broken windows and flour alone for food.”\textsuperscript{17} It also reported on a ‘Polynesian baby’ who had got rickets because its mother did not understand the Plunket nurse’s feeding instructions.\textsuperscript{18} The \textit{Pacific Island Monthly} in turn reported that

\begin{quote}
A family lived in darkness for a week because none of them knew how to change a light bulb, and none knew the word bulb. Another family cooked on a backyard fire because no one knew how to put 20c in the gas meter.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

Industrial accidents involving Pacific Islanders were interpreted as an indication of their lack of readiness for life in modern New Zealand. A New Zealand Medical Association study of 1977 reported that 40 percent of hand injury patients in the Hutt Valley were, ‘recent Island migrants.’ The report attributed this “disturbingly high” rate to their working in factories with poor training and instruction, misunderstanding by supervisors and employers of their level of experience with machines and a lack of safety instructions in Polynesian languages. It described one ‘Islander’ who lost his arm trying to retrieve an object from a vat of acid and a machinist who, ten days after leaving ‘the Islands,’ was put on his third new machine in one day and lost seven fingers.\textsuperscript{20}

Pacific Island immigrants had high rates of industrial accidents and some clearly experienced difficulties with the material culture of New Zealand society. The conclusion that many New Zealanders drew from this was that as a group, they were not prepared for life in New Zealand. A distinction was made between New

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16}\textit{Truth} 12/2/74, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{17}Mona Williams ‘Women as Immigrants’, \textit{Listener} 7/6/75, p. 18.
\item \textsuperscript{18}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{19}Language Problems Spell Disaster-New Zealand’s Mr Muldoon Annoying Sir Albert’, \textit{Pacific Island Monthly} (PIM), v. 47, no. 1, Jan. 1976, p. 17. An \textit{Auckland Star} article reported on Pacific Islanders lighting fires in electric ovens to cook. ‘Packed in to Pay the Rent’ in \textit{Auckland Star, The Islanders}, p. 4.
\end{itemize}
Zealanders who were modern and ‘Westernised’ and the stereotype of the Pacific Islander who was not.

Ideas about modernity thus influenced assimilationist attitudes to Pacific Islanders. Conceptualising Pacific Islanders’ difficulties as due to a lack of modernity led to the conclusion that Pacific Islanders faced not ‘cultural differences’, but an inferior level of modernity. This framed Pacific Islanders differences not in terms of cultural relativism, but as a value judgement which placed Pacific Islanders on a lower level to New Zealanders. The consequences of this framework for interpreting cultural difference was a belief that, rather than New Zealand institutions needing to adapt to accommodate Pacific Islanders’ cultural differences, Pacific Island immigrants should be selected for their level of Westernisation.21

**Cultural Pluralism**

Counterpoised against the argument that Pacific Islanders must be made to culturally assimilate to be accepted into New Zealand society was the view of “cultural pluralists” that Pacific Island culture, rather than being a threat to a monolithic New Zealand culture could, through bringing diversity, enrich it. Cultural pluralists related this assertion to questions of New Zealand identity. They argued that acceptance of cultural diversity was an important part of preserving New Zealand’s tradition of harmonious race relations.

The *Listener*’s editor, Alexander MacLeod argued

> One would have thought that a newcomer prepared to do an honest days work, to observe the law and to pay his taxes was meeting his side of the bargain. Or does New Zealand expect some sort of a cultural sacrifice as well. Do we prefer that immigrants should suddenly begin to talk, eat and dress like us, merging with the countryside and speaking in whispers?22

Some writers to the *Listener*, *Truth*, the *Herald* and other periodicals agreed. Political scientist Peter Jones argued that “new attitudes, new skills, new tastes ... they can

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22 *Listener* 21/9/71, p. 5.
enrich our way of life.”

“But,” he warned, “we must tolerate or even welcome cultural difference for this to work.” A Listener reporter wrote “it could be argued that the Islanders can enrich our society a good deal by teaching us some of their ways or simply by walking around the streets dressed in their own much more colourful style of clothing,” and company director Fred Turnovsky argued that varied sources of immigrants represented an antidote to the cultural stagnation of “Anglo-Saxon homogeneity.”

Representatives of Maori, who sought greater recognition of Maori culture in society, were vocal exponents of a cultural pluralist approach to the integration of Pacific Island immigrants. Vern Penfold, Inspector of Maori and Island Education in Auckland noted that “peoples’ culture stays with them a very long time. The old idea of integration, making everyone all of a kind just doesn’t work.” Instead he expressed a hope that “Pacific Islanders in New Zealand could be accepted both as a distinct group as part of the community.” And Merimeri Penfold, vice-president of the Maori Women’s Welfare League, called for settlement of Pacific Islanders in areas where they would have access to their own people, arguing that people settled into new cultures better if they approached them with the support of their own community.

Finally, at an Auckland Regional Authority meeting, Dr Pat Hohepa of the Auckland District Maori Council challenged the assimilationist assumptions of a colleague who remarked that it was not desirable to allow communities of Pacific Islanders to grow up in certain suburbs by retorting “what about communities of Pakeha?”

New Zealanders who adhered to the “Kirk doctrine” that New Zealand was an Asia-Pacific nation also argued that New Zealand could strengthen its relationship with the

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24 Listener 27/7/70, pp. 43-4. Pacific Island business consultant Kevin O’Brien argued that “there is so much for us to learn about Islanders’ customs and culture.” Truth 16/11/76, p.55. ‘Migrants: Do We Need Them?’, Listener 28/9/70, pp. 6-7.
region through increased immigration links. Amnesty Aroha, an organisation which arose to oppose the dawn-raids of 1976, affirmed that “the central goal for the development of New Zealand is the creation of a truly multicultural society as a member of the Pacific community” and the Polynesian Panther Party, modelled on the American Black Panthers, argued that “New Zealand is a Polynesian country in a Polynesian area, therefore there should be no racist immigration laws to prevent non-Maori Polynesians migrating to this land.”

These ideas were sometimes mixed with Seddonesque ideas of New Zealand’s ‘destiny’ as a political and cultural leader of the region. Kevin Ryan, an Auckland lawyer with a long work history in Samoa argued that “it is New Zealand’s destiny to be the leader of Polynesia” and that this was a justification for New Zealand to strengthen immigration links with the region. Economist Wolfgang Rosenberg suggested the value of an immigration policy centred on the Pacific rim including Asia, Latin America and the Pacific, to enhance links with New Zealand’s rapidly growing trading partners in this region.

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29 Amnesty Aroha, Submission to Government, Wellington, Nov. 1976, p. 3. Polynesian Panther Party (PPP), Newsletter, Mar.–Apr. 1975, p. 1. Herald 29/9/73, p. 2. A submission on behalf of the Fiji community to the Minister of Immigration in 1976 cited New Zealand’s Pacific identity in calling for an increase in Fijian immigration “We are Pacific people and we have a common cultural heritage with the New Zealand Maori and we easily fit in to the New Zealand tradition of racial tolerance and harmony.” Submission to the Minister of Immigration on behalf of the Fiji Community, undated, ca. Mar. 1976 in DOL 22/1/310 pt. 2.

30 Former Ombudsman and Race Relations Conciliator Guy Powles wrote that “the New Zealand blend of imperialism and paternalism towards the Pacific at the turn of the century still exists to some degree.” cited in Herald 2/8/77, p. 6. Also in Dominion 11/8/77 in DOL 22/1/310. Amnesty Aroha argued that “a fair, humane and just policy [should] be developed that takes into account New Zealand’s leadership role in the South Pacific.” Amnesty Aroha, Submission to Government, pp. 14-5.

31 Truth 7/12/76, p. 28, p. 33. Wolfgang Rosenberg ‘Economic Aspects of Immigration’, New Zealand Journal of Public Administration (NZJPA), v. 34, no. 1, 1971, p. 27. Seventy-seven percent of New Zealanders surveyed agreed or somewhat agreed with the statement “New Zealand has a moral obligation to help Pacific Islanders in former New Zealand administrative territories,” although this question, posed by sociologist A D Trlin, did not specify the nature of this obligation. Trlin, ‘Social Distance’, p. 157.
Language

Conflicting assimilationist and pluralist visions of New Zealand society were apparent in the debate over the public use of Pacific Island languages. New Zealand society, at the beginning of the 1970s, was quite monolingual and the expectation was that both Maori and new immigrants would learn English. Because New Zealand was geographically isolated and culturally focused on Britain and the United States, most Pakeha would have had little exposure to people who spoke other languages and to speak another language in public marked an individual as an outsider.

A large influx of Pacific Islanders appeared to threaten this monolingualism because they tended to live and work with members of their own ethnic communities. English was a second language for most and the Vocational Training Council informed employers that “because of shortcomings in education, a relatively small proportion of Polynesians, including the Maoris, have more than elementary knowledge of English.” A 1979 survey found that while 87 percent of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand spoke English all or most of the time in their jobs, 40 percent also spoke a Pacific Island language at work and most would have spoken their native languages at home.32

Assimilationist attitudes to language were strong. Eighty-eight percent of the New Zealand born population, according to Trlin, agreed with the statement that “one of the biggest social problems faced by non-British immigrants and New Zealanders is the language barrier between them” and 93 percent agreed that “immigrants in New Zealand whose native language is not English should attend English language classes.”33 Nowhere was the pressure on immigrants to speak English more clearly expressed than in the workplace. Nearly all of 49 company managers surveyed by Trlin saw language as a serious problem for their Pacific Island employees and many spoke of tensions between Pacific Islanders and other workers caused by a ‘refusal’

on the part of Islanders to speak English. The Vocational Training Council booklet *Understanding Pakeha* explained this to Polynesian migrant workers.

Some Pakehas get very upset when they can’t understand what is being said. They think they are being criticised or laughed about. So if you are working with people who can’t understand your language, make an effort to talk in English. You will get on better with them.

One response among employers to the perceived problems was to ban the speaking of Pacific Island languages at work. This practice of enforced English, however widespread it may have been, was technically an offence under the Race Relations Act.

From the mid-1970s, however, attitudes to language slowly began to change. A growing institutional acceptance of cultural pluralism led to increased support for the use of Pacific Island languages among public service organisations. Publications in Samoan, Tongan, Cook Island Maori, Fijian, Niuean, Tokelauan and Maori languages became more common. The New Zealand Superannuation Corporation, the National Council of Women, the Police and the Planning Committee on Consumer rights were among the organisations which published material in these languages.

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34Paul Spoonley, ‘The Multicultural Workforce in New Zealand’, *New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations*, v. 3, no. 2. p. 65


36An example of this was the ‘Zip’ factory in Christchurch. Another Christchurch employer with 90 percent Samoan employees told a journalist “We insist that wherever possible English is spoken; so that this not only improves their own command of English, but we can also understand exactly what they are saying.” ‘When Samoans meet the Pantyhose’, editorial in *New Zealand Company Director*, v. 6. no. 56, April 1972, p. 5. Joris de Bres of CARE wrote that “it is not uncommon for managers or employers to forbid migrants to speak their own language at work and even for fellow workers to resent migrants who speak in any language other than English.” Joris De Bres, *Migrant Labour in the Pacific*, CARE, Auckland, 1974, pt. 5. p. 2. Vocational Training Council, *Understanding Samoans*, Wellington, 1975, p. 11.

37See Chapter 3.

A significant amount of support for Pacific Island language preservation also came from Maori. The Maori Council lobbied not only for Maori classes to be offered at high school, but also classes in Samoan and its “Young Maori Leaders Conference” supported the proposed establishment of a Maori and Pacific Island language radio station in Auckland.\(^{39}\) The Maori Women’s Welfare League, in turn, called for interpreters to act as community liaison officers in hospitals to help Maori and Pacific Islanders to understand medical language and for interpreters to be employed to provide guidance for these communities in signing legal documents.\(^{40}\)

**Race Relations Mythology and Pacific Island Immigration**

Opponents of Pacific Island immigration drew on New Zealand’s national mythology of harmonious race relations. They argued that the influx of Pacific Islanders threatened New Zealand’s race relations balance. Twenty eight letters to the newspaper editors and the Minister of Immigration expressed such fears.\(^{41}\) Their arguments were that New Zealand could only assimilate so many people at a time, that New Zealand’s good race-relations were a product of a delicate balance between two similar races which could be disturbed by the presence of a significant third race and that Maori rights would be ignored if they had to compete with other minorities.

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\(^{41}\)Although this count does not relate specifically to Pacific Islanders. “It is a question of balance” wrote the editor of Wellington’s *Dominion*, “Many New Zealanders might already be wondering whether the number of Islanders entering New Zealand and the population growth of those already here are not changing the ethnic make-up of the country too rapidly. There is no doubt that the Polynesian strain on New Zealander society is widening.” *Dominion* ed. 23/9/72 cited in MOOHR Newsletter, Sept. 1972, p. 3.
Eric Geiringer, secretary of the Medical Association, argued that “we must not allow a sudden influx of large numbers of racially and culturally different people - and deliberately cause problems which this country has so far escaped.”42 Truth’s correspondents concurred. “Let’s keep New Zealand for ourselves and our Maori people” wrote one and “we have two fine and similar races in this country living in harmony with the population increasing steadily. Why bring in trouble through immigration?” asked another.43

Assimilationists also drew on New Zealand’s national myth of racial equality to oppose cultural pluralist measures taken by public service organisations. Educational scholarships for Maori or Pacific Island students, places reserved for minorities in university courses such as medicine, ethnic awareness courses and ‘affirmative action’ programmes targeting welfare services at Pacific Islanders were frequent objects of criticism. Their critics described them as ‘reverse racism’ or ‘racism against whites’ and argued that race relations in New Zealand had been best served by the model which granted equality of opportunity to all (within the existing British based cultural framework).44

Language was one of the major areas where claims of reverse-racism were made. The Maori and Pacific Island language radio station idea was heavily criticised. A newspaper correspondent wrote that immigrants should be made to learn English and that the proposed station was an example of ‘reverse racism’ because no such ‘privileges’ existed for other minorities in New Zealand. A Herald editorial protested

42 Listener 28/9/70, p. 6.
43 Truth 5/3/74, p. 38. Truth 26/10/76, p. 21. Other non-white migrant groups faced similar criticism. The arrival of Ugandan Asians in New Zealand was, according to one correspondent, “not in the best interests of our developing Maori-Pakeha race” Truth 23/5/72, p. 47. Truth 29/7/72, p. 52. Another wrote that “we have harmonious race relations in New Zealand because there are no Coloured immigrants.” Truth 29/1/73, p. 32. One man wrote to the Minister “It would be wise to remember that our first duty is to our Maori people and I feel that they will suffer if the immigration policy becomes too liberal because their requests will be drowned by the clamour of demands of new migrants.” 16/5/73 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 26.
44 “In this civilised multi-racial society, we would like all our countrymen to have equal opportunities,” wrote one Herald correspondent in attacking Polynesian scholarships at Auckland University. Herald 19/11/76, p.6. Truth 22/2/72, p. 37. 13/3/73, p. 36. ‘Ethnic awareness’ courses planned by the Presbyterian Church were criticised by some diocese because they could “emphasise difference and [lead] to apartheid.” Public Questions Committee Report of Sub-Committee on Race Relations, pp. 7-8, Knox Archives, Item 14/2, Acc. GA21.
that “it can only emphasise differences of race and colour when the great need is surely to bring Maori and Pakeha together.”

There were also objections to government departments publishing publicity material and information in Pacific Island languages on the grounds that this “could undermine English as our universal national language.” In 1977, The Office of the Race Relations Conciliator received complaints of racism over use of Maori and Pacific Island languages in district council pamphlets, three complaints against pamphlets in Pacific Island languages informing people how to enrol for the election and a complaint against a church notice in Samoan. The Office rejected all of these, ruling that, as New Zealanders who spoke Pacific Island languages, Pacific Islanders in New Zealand had a right to information in their own languages. In this way, it implicitly endorsed a cultural pluralist model of New Zealand society.

In contrast, New Zealand’s national myth of harmonious race-relations was appropriated by advocates of cultural pluralism including CARE, the Maori Organisation on Human Rights and the Maori MPs in support of a more accommodative attitude to Pacific Islanders. For example, “New Zealand pride[s] itself on its race relations and it [is] disturbing to see the discrimination against the women of Western Samoa” argued Maori MP Paraone Reweti in a 1970 parliamentary debate over pregnancy testing of Samoan immigrants.

Racial Stereotyping and Scapegoating

Political scientist Linda Hamilton, in 1974, found that 30 percent of Samoans in Christchurch felt they had experienced “prejudice or racial discrimination” at some time and the Labour Department’s 1979 survey The Work Experience of Pacific Islanders found that 13.5 percent of Pacific Islanders in Wellington had experienced problems with “racial discrimination or unhelpfulness of New Zealanders” in the

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46Presbyterian Public Questions Committee Report of Sub-Committee on Race Relations, pp. 7-8.
48Northey and Lythe, p. 4. Truth 26/9/72, p. 53.
preceding twelve months. It is, however, important to clarify the term ‘racial discrimination.’ While racial discrimination existed in some New Zealanders’ attitudes to Pacific Island immigrants, this discrimination was seldom a product of ‘ideological’ racism - a belief in the biological, genetic and moral superiority of one race over another. Much more common, was the tendency of the public to form prejudicial stereotypes about one racial group and particularly about their social conduct.

Stuart Hall, in his 1997 essay “The Spectacle of the ‘Other’,” relates such racial stereotyping to majority group identity and its boundaries. He defines stereotyping as involving the reduction of a person’s essential characteristics to a few simple unchanging elements supposedly fixed by nature which function to maintain a symbolic order. Stereotyping, he writes

Works to set up a symbolic frontier between the normal and the deviant, excluding those who are defined as not belonging. Stereotyping ... facilitates the binding or bonding together of all of “Us” who are normal into the “imagined community” and it sends into symbolic exile all of them - “the Others” - who are in some way different - “beyond the pale.”

This relationship was apparent in New Zealand of the 1970s where stereotypes of Pacific Islanders as having tendencies towards criminal behaviour, drunkenness, immorality, fecundity, disease and ghettoism strengthened popular perceptions of them as outsiders. This distinction, in turn, justified the desire of many to exclude them as immigrants and left Pacific Islanders vulnerable to scapegoating for a range of social and economic problems.

The process of racial stereotyping was aided by widespread lumping of people from all Pacific Island countries into a single externally-imposed and artificial category - ‘Pacific Islanders’. Pakeha seldom made categorical distinctions among Tongans,

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50It appears that in neither of these studies was racial discrimination clearly defined. Linda Hamilton, ‘The Political Integration of the Samoan Immigrants in New Zealand’, MA Canterbury, 1974, p. 69, p. 114. Work Experience, p. 101.
Fijians, Western Samoans, Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans. It was more common for politicians, government officials and members of the general public to talk about the ‘Pacific Islanders’ as a group. Spoonley, in 1978, found that even most of those who employed Pacific Islanders did not know the difference between Polynesians and Melanesians or which Islanders were New Zealand citizens.

This ‘lumping’ contrasted with Pacific Islanders’ complex conceptions of their own identities. Pacific Islanders in general would have identified most strongly with their village, their tribe or island, their church then their individual nation, putting all of these loyalties before any pan-Pacific Island or pan-Polynesian identity. The Reverend Ta Upu Rae of the Pacific Island Congregational Church told a 1977 conference, “When I first stepped on the shore of New Zealand, the first thing that made me react was that I was called an ‘Islander’. I always regarded myself as a Maori in the Cook Islands.”

The vocabulary of many New Zealanders was one indicator of this lumping process. W G Copwell in a *Pacific Island Monthly* article commented that “it comes as a shock to hear a friend, headmaster of a large primary school, refer to the Polynesian pupils under his control as ‘Coconuts’, and to be everywhere assaulted with the use of racist names such as ‘head-hunter’, ‘tarpot’, ‘spear-thrower’, ‘wog’, and ‘wop.’” The Vocational Training Council, in its booklet *Understanding Polynesians* felt it

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53 As one National Council of Churches pamphlet pointed out “We hear that Auckland is the largest Polynesian city in the world, but New Zealanders cannot tell one Islander from another. National Council of Churches Youth Council, *South Pacific Youth (SPY) Kit*, Christchurch, 1972.


57 W G Coppell, ‘Problems of Polynesia’s Biggest City’, *PIM*, v. 45, no. 11, Nov. 74, pp. 35-6.
necessary to warn employers that “even the term ‘Coconut’ or ‘Islander’ to describe a Pacific Island Polynesian is much more offensive than most people realise.”

New Zealanders’ lumping of all Pacific Islanders together allowed them to assign negative attributes of some Pacific Islanders to the group as a whole. For example, Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans, who were legally New Zealand citizens, became victims of the negative sentiments associated with Pacific Island overstayers. The distinction made by Pakeha between Maori and Pacific Islanders was also fuzzy. Graves and Graves, found that almost twice as many Pakeha saw Maori as having similar character traits to Pacific Island groups as Maori themselves did. Like the term ‘Pacific Islander,’ the adjective ‘Polynesian’ was frequently used in public and political debate to describe social problems such as ‘Polynesian housing’ or ‘Polynesian crime.’

This association served both to aid and to hinder the acceptance of Pacific Islanders into New Zealand society. Some argued that because of their cultural similarity with Maori, Pacific Island immigrants could be easily assimilated. Senior Labour Department official P E R Jones wrote, “Islanders arriving in New Zealand may be thought of almost as a special case of Maori migration” and Kevin Ryan wrote that “New Zealand is a Polynesian country, Polynesians have a place here by right of migration long ago of Maori ... Today we are witness to the second exodus, something we must accept.” However, Tamara Ross in her study of 1970s

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60 Theodore and Nancy Graves, ‘As Others See Us: New Zealanders’ Images of Themselves and Migrant Groups’ (lecture presented to NZIIA, 11 Mar, 1974), in D R Thomas, N B Graves and T D Graves eds., *Patterns of Social Behaviour: New Zealand and the South Pacific*, Waikato University Press, Hamilton, 1974, pp. 165-6. In 1977, a report of the Maori and Pacific Island Advisory Committee on Social Welfare Needs in Auckland noted that “Maori and some Pacific Island people have stated that they object to the word Polynesian. They see it as a blanket term which tends to obliter ate Maori, Samoan or Cook Island identity” in DOL 22/1/289 pt. 6.

61 P E R Jones, ‘Considerations for a Policy of Planned Immigration’, in *NZJPA*, v. 34, 1971, p.84. However Jones was careful to note that Pacific Islanders did not conceive of themselves as a single group, p.90. *Truth* 7/12/76, p.28, p. 33.
stereotyping of Pacific Islanders disputes this, suggesting that because of the association made between Pacific Islanders and Maori, Pacific Island immigrants automatically inherited many Pakehas’ negative stereotypes of Maori. From 1970 to 1980, New Zealand’s rate of criminal convictions rose by 58 percent from 7.0 to 12.0 per thousand and a Heylen Poll of 1975 found that “crime and violence” was the issue that concerned the greatest number of New Zealanders. One of the most powerful stereotypes of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand was that they had a propensity for crime. This impression, at first glance, appears to reflect crime statistics. Figure 5 shows that the rates of conviction of Pacific Island born in New Zealand courts in the 1970s were extremely high. Indeed as a predominantly young community freed from the rigid social control of island village life, rates of crime, especially those involving drunkenness and brawling, were higher for Pacific Island communities than other groups.

Pacific Islanders and Crime

Letters to the editors of Truth and the Herald and to the Minister show that the two most common public objections to Pacific Island immigration were that Pacific Islanders were responsible for increasing crime in New Zealand and that they were flaunting the law by overstaying (Table 2). However, while more than 95 percent of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand were not convicted of crime each year, because the idea of crime was attributed to race, crime became associated with Pacific Islanders as a whole.

The significance of ‘Polynesian crime’ was magnified in the eyes of the public by the way in which it was reported in the media. A 1977 article described a rapist as “a big fat Islander with a pot belly” and an article with the headline “HUNDREDS NABBED” noted that “hundreds of Pacific Islanders are convicted of criminal offences in New Zealand every year.” It reported that in 1974, 2 645 Pacific Islanders had been convicted before the Magistrate’s Court, including 393 for assault.

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62Ross, p. 22.
64This argument is explored in greater detail by Cluny Macpherson. ‘The Samoan Migration An Alternative Perspective’, pp. 23-7 in Stanhope.
881 for vagrancy and drunkenness, twenty-six for sex offences and 243 for offensive conduct or language. In similar fashion, an Auckland Star article noted that, while Pacific Islanders made up only around 2 percent of the population, they comprised fifteen percent of all those charged with drunkenness and vagrancy.\textsuperscript{66} Neither article put these numbers within the context of the type or number of crimes committed by other groups and this sort of reporting fostered the idea that criminal behaviour was a product of the race of the offender.\textsuperscript{67}

**Figure 5: Convictions per Thousand per Year in the Magistrate’s Court by Birthplace 1972-78**

Source: New Zealand Statistics of Justice 1972-79. Note that there are separate categories for English, Scottish and United Kingdom because of inconsistencies in the taking of court records. These categories in themselves could be seen as indicative of the way in which British people saw their own identity.

Because of Pacific Islanders’ tendency to live, work and socialise with members of their own groups, their concentration in a small range of jobs and residential areas, and language difficulties, few Pakeha would have had the personal contact with Pacific Island immigrants as individuals which would have led them to question this

\textsuperscript{65} Truth 29/3/77, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{66} Auckland Star, *The Islanders*, p. 22.
stereotype. Andrew Trlin, in a 1972 study of Aucklanders’ attitudes to Western Samoan immigrants, found that 83 percent agreed or somewhat agreed that Western Samoans had a reputation for bad behaviour.68

The conclusions that many newspaper correspondents drew about immigration of Pacific Islanders and crime are clear - New Zealand could resolve the problem of crime by restricting Pacific Island immigration. One demanded “how much longer have the long suffering people of New Zealand got to put up with the invasion of crime from the Pacific Islands?” and another wrote that “there seem to be more and more Islanders becoming drunk and resorting to violence… I strongly suggest we send all Islanders home and stop others from coming here.”69

A Herald editorial assumed a link between immigration and criminal gangs, stating that “a constant flow of immigrants can hardly make the task [of dealing with gangs and delinquency] easier” and in an article entitled “HOW TO BEAT CRIME”, Truth affirmed that “many Polynesians are charged too frequently with crimes involving violence and liquor” and suggested the solution of making immigrants sign a declaration that they would leave the country if convicted of a crime.70 The Auckland Star added that Pacific Islanders convicted of crimes should be deported even if they were New Zealand passport holders, apparently defining even Pacific Islanders who were New Zealand citizens as probationary New Zealanders.71

Media reporting of official or authoritative testimony reinforced the stereotype. In September 1975, High Court Justice Speight, in sentencing a single offender who was Tongan for manslaughter, noted that “one must have the gravest anxiety as to the placement of these unsophisticated people in an environment which many of them are totally unfitted to cope with,” and added that “the exposure to liquor was totally

69 Under the headline “THEY’RE TROUBLE” Truth published a letter which ran “there has been nothing but trouble with illegal and other recent immigrants ever since they flooded in; how many women (and men) have been attacked, terrified and some murdered by them?” Truth 8/7/75, p. 12. Truth 7/3/72, p.36
71 Star 27/1/76, cited in Ross, p.78. op cit. Roberton, p. 42.
dangerous to a person of unsophisticated background.” The New Zealand Herald followed the statement with an editorial urging Aucklanders to sit up and listen to a “highly respected member of society dealing in facts” and the story was carried by almost all of the nation’s daily newspapers.

With an election looming, leader of the opposition Muldoon, who two weeks earlier had been defending Pacific Island immigrants as being in the majority “upright law-abiding citizens,” seized on the judge’s comments to attack the Government’s immigration policy. He paraphrased, generalised and embellished them, citing Speight as blaming “the problem of unsophisticated Pacific Islanders being exposed to a pocketful of money and the wide open tavern door.” The following week in his column in Truth, he claimed the support of the “vast majority of New Zealanders” in calling for “criminal Islanders” to be sent home.

The media took up the issue. At the height of Muldoon’s anti-immigration election campaign, Truth's reporting became particularly sensitive to ‘Pacific Island crime.’ Two weeks after Muldoon’s second column, under the headlines “RAPE CITY” and “POLYNESIANS INVOLVED,” Truth reported that “growing numbers of Polynesians are becoming involved in the most serious cases of rape and sexual assault…[and] use of knives in sexual attacks also seems to have increased particularly with Polynesian offenders.” The paper noted that twenty rapes had been reported in Auckland that year and described the circumstances of some of them. Reporting was selective and focused on the race of the offender. In nine of the twelve cases detailed, the offender was described as “Polynesian” or “Pacific Islander” with few other physical details given. The unfortunate implication of this was that it could be any Polynesian. Some examples were:

A 24 year old woman is abducted from a city street at knife-point, driven to a quiet spot in the nearby domain and raped. Her attacker is identified in court as a Polynesian...

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73 Herald 13/9/75, p. 6.
74 Truth 22/7/75, p.6.
75 Truth 30/9/75, p. 6.
A pregnant girl, 14, is raped in bed at her Grey Lynn house by a Polynesian wielding a knife…

A night duty waitress…arrives home to find a Polynesian stranger hidden under her bed…

A sixteen year old girl is dragged into a car by two Polynesians who take her to a suburban park and rape her…

A housewife is raped by a man with a knife who broke in to her Pukekohe house. Police said they were looking for a Polynesian.76

Some weeks later, the Auckland Star noted that “In a number of … rape and assault reports in recent months the consistent identification description has been that the suspect is Polynesian, probably an Islander.”77

The large numbers of Pacific Islanders pursued for overstaying temporary immigration permits became entangled with issues of violent crime by Pacific Islanders. The syllogism was made in the minds of many that if overstayers are Pacific Islanders and overstaying is a crime then Pacific Islanders are criminals. The media played an important role in creating and fostering this association. An Auckland Star article began by discussing the issue of Pacific Island overstaying.

They are prepared to go to extremes to get here - to fake health certificates, jump queues and break laws. Pregnant women hide the fact to have New Zealand born kids in order to get their deportation hindered or child support mailed to the Islands.

It then moved seamlessly to the question of violent crime noting that of nine cases involving death before Auckland’s courts in the previous year, six had resulted in the conviction of a Pacific Islander and that of sixteen grave assaults, seven involved Islanders.78 In more direct fashion, an editorial in Outlook, the Presbyterian Church’s magazine, questioned whether, if New Zealand chose to overlook the offence of overstaying, overstayers would take other laws seriously.79
The stereotype of Pacific Islanders having criminal tendencies did not go unchallenged. Pacific Island organisations, academics and race relations lobby groups such as CARE and Amnesty Aroha argued that the media, politicians and cultural bias in the justice system were as responsible for the stereotype as the actions of Islanders. These groups observed that the race of offenders in court reporting was given only if the offender was not white, an observation that was endorsed by a number of correspondents to the papers. After reported comments about rapes committed by Polynesians ‘Young Wife’ complained to Truth that “everyone gets up in arms when a girl is raped by a Polynesian, but there is hardly a murmur when the offender is European.”

High rates of Pacific Island convictions were also attributed to social factors. New Zealand’s first Race Relations Conciliator, Guy Powles, suggested that the socio-economic status of Polynesians, their concentration in urban areas, and their younger age structure contributed to their rates of crime because young and urbanised people of all races were statistically more likely to commit crime than other groups. D F Mackenzie observed that crime statistics could be distorted by the types of crimes committed by Polynesians such as public drunkenness which were more easily detected and prosecuted than those which were more prevalent among Pakeha, such as white collar crime. The way in which race was defined also influenced crime statistics. An offender who was half-Pakeha and half-Samoan was classified as a Samoan.

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80 Geoff Chapple, ‘Through the Eyes of the Islander’, Listener 25/10/75, p. 16. Chapter 7 will deal with the protest movement in more detail.
82 Truth 7/12/71, p. 46.
83 Guy Powles, ‘Polynesians and the Law’ in Ao Hou, no. 72, 1973, pp. 28-30. Ballara, p. 144. Raymond Cherry, ‘Sympathy Cannot Alter the Facts’, Listener 17/9/77, pp. 36-7. D F Mackenzie’s study of ethnicity and crime in New Zealand provides more detailed results for one group - Samoans. It shows that they had extremely high conviction rates for drunkenness and vagrancy and for assault, but that their rate for burglary, theft and fraud were not as high. Drunkenness and Vagrancy (31.7 per 1000 per year compared with 5.4 for Pakeha and 16.0 for Maori), Assault (Samoans 13.0, Pakeha 0.5 and Maori 3.8), Burglary, theft and fraud (Samoans 7.26, Pakeha 0.5, Maori, 25.5). Mackenzie, p. 171, p. 176.
84 Mackenzie, p. 272.
Police attitudes were also scrutinised. A 1971 survey of police showed that, while crime by Pacific Islanders constituted 4.5 percent of total crime, when surveyed, police officers’ estimates of it varied between three and seven times higher. A 1984 survey showed that more than 90 percent of Auckland police somewhat agreed with the statement “Pacific Island immigrants are troublemakers.”

Sociologist L S W Duncan argued that, because police had such expectations, they were more likely to suspect and pursue Pacific Islanders than Europeans and in light of the fact that 80-90 percent of juvenile crime went undetected, there was considerable scope for this sort of bias to influence conviction rates.

A particularly strong example of police stereotyping of Pacific Islanders comes from the comments made by an Auckland senior police sergeant at a meeting with immigration officials in 1975.

The number of Island men in New Zealand appears to outnumber Island women, and when once liquor is taken quite an appreciable number of the men appear to be overcome by their sexual urges, resulting in prowling around houses, apparently looking for women, indecent assaults or accosting women -usually of another race - waiting for buses and taxis.

Cultural pluralists argued that Polynesians were discriminated against by a justice system based on ‘British’ law and ‘British’ culture which failed to accommodate Polynesian values. The Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination (ACORD) argued that “the white colonists of the last century who believed that the English system was the highest form of justice implemented it directly to New Zealand” and that:

We cannot claim that our courts offer justice to all manner of people if their atmosphere, their ways and their procedures are seen as alien, intimidating or unintelligible by members of minority cultural or racial groups...we have no right to demand that members of these groups

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85 The police were given the choice of ‘always’, ‘sometimes’ and ‘slightly’ and in all three Auckland police districts, over 90% chose ‘sometimes’. New Zealand Police, South Auckland Police Development Plan, Wellington, 1984, p. 75.
should accept the forms, trappings and conventions of justice that we have copied from nineteenth century England.88

Amnesty Aroha argued that juries which judged Polynesians were supposed to be representative of society but almost invariably turned out to be disproportionately white. While Polynesians made up 11 percent of the Auckland population, they represented only 5 percent of the names on the common jury book and the more radical Polynesian Panther Party called for “trials by their own people” for Polynesians.89

ACORD illustrated the difficulties faced by Pacific Island families in understanding and dealing with the justice system by detailing the case of a fourteen year old Rarotongan “Kahu” who had been arrested for being ‘idle and disorderly’ on Queen Street, Auckland late at night. Scared and without adequate legal advice, the boy lied about his age in court. His parents, who spoke poor English, did not understand the process involved in recovering their child from custody and failed to receive legal advice before his hearing. As a result, Kahu spent time in Mount Eden prison and later a boys’ home before it was established that he was too young to be held in prison, and that he had a home to go to, at which time he was released.90

In its simplest form, the debate over Pacific Islanders and crime became one between a stereotype of an entire race as having a propensity for crime, or of them being the victims of stereotyping, scapegoating and media and justice systems that failed to accommodate non-European cultural values. In this way, the debate over ‘Pacific Island crime’ can be linked with the struggle between cultural pluralist and assimilationist conceptions of the New Zealand nation.

Economics, Scapegoating and Stereotyping

The see-sawing from heavy demand for labour in the early part of the 1970s to a labour glut and unemployment in the later part affected the way in which New Zealanders perceived Pacific Islanders. Until 1974 the employment market was buoyant. The *Pacific Island Monthly* noted that “a man reporting himself out of a job in the morning is suitably placed by afternoon.”91 In this climate, Pacific Islanders were generally accepted as a temporary reserve labour force and an invaluable part of New Zealand’s programme of industrial expansion. They had a higher rate of workforce participation than almost any other group, were generally willing to work overtime in menial jobs and 67 percent were involved in the labour starved industrial sector.92

Encouraged by this demand for labour, alongside the several thousand legal Pacific Island migrant workers, there was a steadily increasing number of Tongans, Fijians and Samoans who entered New Zealand on three month visitors permits to work and did not leave. Until 1974 an estimated 4-5000 of these illegal ‘overstayers’ were overlooked by officials. A *Listener* article of 1973 observed that

Many thousands of Auckland's Polynesian workers are disguised in the statistics as tourists … this contribution to the workforce is considerable … nobody asks too many questions. With the current labour shortage, industry, the trade union movement, and the immigration authorities seem to be content to ignore this unofficial and temporary immigration.93

The media frequently observed that industry could not survive, let alone expand, without Pacific Island labour. The *Listener* wrote that “In South Auckland some industries would collapse if the Polynesian workforce was withdrawn” and the *Pacific Island Monthly* argued that hospitals, where many Pacific Islander women found work in the kitchens, cleaning and as orderlies, would not function without their labour.94

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92 They also had one of the highest rates of job stability which, according to sociologist Paul Spoonley made them a group especially favoured by large employers. *Work Experience*, pp. 15-6, p. 51. Spoonley, ‘Multicultural Workforce’, p. 65.
93 ‘Paradise Lost or Regained’, *Listener* 1/12/73, p. 12.
Public attitudes to Pacific Island immigrants became much more hostile as significant unemployment appeared with the economic recession which began in 1974. Once seen as the solution to the country’s labour needs, in the eyes of some politicians, press and members of the public, Pacific Islanders resident in New Zealand were now the cause of the country’s unemployment. In letters to Truth, the Herald and the Minister’s office from 1972-78 this was the fourth most commonly cited reason for hostility towards them (Table 2).  

The arrival of unemployment brought to light the fundamental misunderstanding among most New Zealanders about the role of Pacific Island immigrants. Unlike the British, Pacific Island migrants had seldom been seen as settlers, but as a temporary

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95Truth 7/3/72, p. 36.
source of foreign labour - not new New Zealanders, but Pacific Islanders in New Zealand who would return home when they were no longer needed. However, when recession hit, this proved not to be the case.

Other New Zealanders, more sympathetic to the idea that Pacific Islanders were a hard working section of New Zealand society, rejected this interpretation and presented them as the victims both of unemployment and of the scapegoating that came with it.\(^96\) One letter asserted that Pacific Islanders “do eight hours work for eight hours pay and have no houses laid on for them. They pay high rents and share houses.”\(^97\) Those who saw Pacific Islanders in New Zealand as the cause of unemployment constructed them as outsiders, while those who saw them as the victims constructed them as part of the national community. In this way, debate about the economic role of migrants can be understood as part of a debate over identity boundaries.

**Housing**

Shortages of housing and steep increases in prices were two of the most important popular issues in 1970s New Zealand and the ‘housing crisis’ inevitably had consequences for Pacific Island immigrants. As well as being an economically vulnerable group, their cultural and physical distinctiveness made them susceptible to negative stereotyping and discrimination in the housing market and, in turn, this led to their becoming the scapegoat for national housing shortages.\(^98\)

Twenty-seven percent of complaints to the Race Relations Office within its first three years of operation from 1972-5 were made under the section of the Race Relations Act which dealt with discrimination with regard to ‘land, housing and other

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\(^96\) One prominent member of CARE, Joris De Bres wrote that “Factories would have closed if it had not been for these immigrants ... Most of those who are now here came at the instigation of employers hungry for workers in a period of rapid industrial expansion. Now all of a sudden, these same people are ‘taking the jobs of New Zealanders’ and with the interests of ‘full employment’ there is talk of ‘flushing them out’ and sending them back to the islands.” Joris De Bres ‘Government Immigration’, in NZMR, v. 17, no. 177, May, 1976.

\(^97\) Truth 5/10/76, p. 18. And the Auckland Manufacturers’ Association President described Pacific Islanders as ideal employees. “In many instances, they are doing work which is noisy and/or dirty and which is unattractive to the ‘locals’ who can still obtain more benign employment. Because of their eagerness to earn they are more willing than the locals to accept shift work or to work in areas where transport is difficult.” K G Fraser (President of the Auckland Manufacturers Association), “Position Paper: Problems of the Islanders in New Zealand,” 31/5/78, p. 3 in DOL 22/1/310 pt. 4.
discrimination.” Examples included: a landlord who changed his mind about letting a flat to two couples after discovering that one of the individuals involved was “not white”, a landlady who asked an applicant for a flat whether his fiancée was white, a Samoan who was quoted a higher rent than two Pakeha friends for the same house, and an advertisement for a flat to rent that specified “no Maori or Polynesians.” R G Lawson, in his 1972 essay ‘Race Relations and the Law,’ noted that “most of those who telephoned a prospective landlord have been asked forthrightly or covertly, about the colour of their skin.”

Such racial discrimination went beyond the level of individual landlords to real estate agencies. Race Relations Office studies found that the illegal selection of buyers and tenants on grounds of race was widely practised. The reasons that real estate agents cited most often in justifying the stereotype of Pacific Islanders as bad tenants was that they overcrowded flats and tended not to know how to use household appliances properly. Some landlords and agents appear to have drawn conclusions about whole racial groups based on the example of one bad tenant. One claimed that he no longer rented flats to Samoans after having previously had bad Samoan tenants and another would not let flats to Indians because a previous Indian tenant had “cooked foods which gave the property an undesirable odour.”

Racial stereotypes could be quite detailed as a 1971 list produced by an Auckland real estate agent indicates.

1a. White Males (non-Australian). Liable to be unclean, but very conscious of money and so good payers.

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99This category was second only to the much vaguer “inciting racial disharmony” (36.9%). Ibid.
102Reports of the Office of the Race Relations Conciliator, 1973-75. One report noted that “Pacific Islanders and to a lesser degree, Maoris were regarded as unsuitable tenants by a large proportion of landlords” and that often discrimination occurred because real estate agents were “trying to comply with the requirements of landlords.” Race Relations Conciliator, 1975, p. 13.
103Ibid.
104Race Relations Conciliator, 1974, p. 7.
1b. White Females (non-Australian) Very clean, usually prepared to pay higher rents, listen to landlord and act according to his [sic] requirements.


2b. Australian females. Good tenants, similar to 1b.

3. European-Maori or European-Islander married tenants. Very good and reliable, but as marriages are often de facto, tenancy is sometimes brief.

4a. Maori males. Good tenants when sober, appalling when not.

4b. Maori females. Usually good tenants but sometimes have too many friends visiting at odd hours.

5a. Religious Pacific Islanders. Very satisfactory tenants but large numbers of friends create noise problems.

5b. Non-religious Pacific Islander. Bad tenants, know little of Western ways, poor payers, have drink problems.\textsuperscript{105}

One consequence of their reputation as undesirable tenants was that Pacific Island immigrants ended up living in the worst housing available. A National Council of Churches publication of 1971 reported that 21 percent of houses rented by Maori and Pacific Islanders in Auckland had no piped water supply, 17 percent had no hand basins and 50 percent had no safe for food storage, let alone a refrigerator.\textsuperscript{106}

Some saw Pacific Islanders as ‘bringing housing standards down’ because of their poor standards of care, hygiene and overcrowding and willingness to accept poor conditions. One \textit{Auckland Star} story described twenty-two Tongans who were paying $15 each in rent for a Ponsonby house without hot water. It also described a two

\textsuperscript{105}Paul Reeves, \textit{South Pacific Year: Meeting Point '71: Five Discussions about Our Unique Social and Geographical Problems in 1971}, National Council of Churches, Christchurch, 1971, p. 17. The Housing Division also came in for attention from the Race Relations Office in response to a claim that the standard of housing it provided for Pacific Islanders in Wellington was inferior to that of other tenants. The Office attributed this not to a conscious policy, but to institutional racism including a lack of building inspectors who spoke Pacific Island languages, a lack of information in Pacific Island languages about tenants’ rights and a lack of state houses large enough to be suitable for the extended family structures of Polynesians. Don Borrie, ‘Institutional Racism and the Housing Corporation’, \textit{NZMR}, v. 19, no. 205, Nov. 1978, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{106}Reeves, p. 17.
bedroom house with only one bathroom, which had sixteen people living in it and cited ‘hundreds’ of similar houses inhabited by Pacific Islanders with “no carpet, exposed wiring and sleeping bags on the floor.”107 *Truth* carried similar stories emphasising the moral fault of the tenants. In a story about twenty-seven Niueans living in a three bedroom state house in the South Auckland suburb of Otara, it declared that “not one of the several couples in the house was married” and that “officials had difficulties finding to whom the many children belonged.”108

The perception of Pacific Islanders as bad tenants led to a widespread belief that having Pacific Islanders in any street would force down values of surrounding properties. This, of course, was a self-fulfilling prophecy which contributed to Pakeha avoidance of Pacific Island areas and increased ethnic segregation of the housing market. Trlin, in a 1972 survey of attitudes to Pacific Islanders in Auckland, found that 81 percent of Aucklanders agreed or tended to agree that the settlement of Western Samoans in their street would cause a drop in property values.109

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107 In 1976, the *Star* published a feature on accommodation of Polynesians in Auckland, in which it described the confused and lonely state of one elderly Niuean woman “[Her] house is on gas. She doesn’t know much about it so she uses only one ring on the stove to heat the water for tea... The kitchen smells. Years of dirt have built up on the walls and cupboards and gone mouldy... toilet and bathroom are dark and dank. Both leak. She washes her clothes and dishes in cold water. There’s no hot water. There’s a fuse missing from the fuse box.” *Auckland Star, The Islanders*, p. 1, p. 7. See also *Auckland Star, 1/11/74* in DOL Auckland Office NZNA BBAI A. 251, 51b, 22/1/13.


109 Forty percent responded that if they had the choice they would “particularly avoid having next door neighbours from Western Samoa” while only 32 percent said that they would not. A D Trlin, ‘Attitudes Towards West Samoan Immigrants’, p. 54. Such attitudes are also explored by Terrance Loomis. Loomis, p. 54. p. 105.
The stereotyping and scapegoating of Pacific Islanders as poor tenants who were responsible for poor housing was challenged by New Zealanders who saw them less as its cause than as its greatest victims. For those who took the side of the Islanders, they were not outsiders who were responsible for the poor conditions in which they lived, but victims of racism and stereotyping by landlords who took advantage of their poverty, their naivety and their desperation to rent them sub-standard over-priced accommodation. One Herald article suggested that “landlords are having a ball” letting houses that were “dilapidated rabbit warrens” to naïve Pacific Island immigrants and the New Zealand Monthly Review argued that illegal immigrants, afraid to pursue their rights as tenants, were being blackmailed by landlords.110

110 The Maori Organisation on Human Rights (MOOHR) argued that Maori, Polynesian and Indians were most likely to be living in poor accommodation with high rents because
Pacific Islanders Breed Fast and are Taking Over

One instance where racial stereotyping in New Zealand crept close to the eugenics arguments of the ideological racists was ideas about the size of Pacific Island families. Some in the media argued that Pacific Islanders, because of their large families, placed undue pressure on national resources such as housing and schools. In the more extreme form of the stereotype, Pacific Islanders were seen as threatening to swamp New Zealand with fast breeding brown races. This stereotype also illustrates the perceived popular boundaries of New Zealand identity because it was based on the assumption that all Pacific Islanders, irrespective of place of birth or citizenship, were not New Zealanders.

While it is difficult to gauge how widespread such views were, thirteen letters to newspapers and the Minister cited fears of Pacific Islanders fecundity. One Truth correspondent wrote that “Auckland is being over run by Islanders ... they breed like rabbits”, “Polynesians, Indians and Chinese come to this country in twos and in no time there are thousands of them” wrote another and a Herald correspondent asserted that “racial harmony or disharmony is only a matter of arithmetic.”111 In 1974-5, when general concerns about overpopulation in New Zealand were increasing, public claims that immigration of Pacific Islanders to New Zealand was a product of the Island governments’ inability to institute effective birth control programmes grew in prevalence.112

Pacific Islanders Bring Disease and Create Pressure on the Health System

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111Truth 9/11/76, p. 21. Others wrote that Pacific Islanders “usually have large families so bringing a threat of overpopulation” Herald 22/1/74, p. 6. and that “if they want to breed like rabbits they should have to put up with the consequences and not hand over their offspring to we ‘warblers’ to rear and give a home to.” Truth 9/11/76, p. 21. See also Herald 14/10/76, p. 6. Truth 11/3/75, p. 37. Herald 8/6/73, p. 6. “Islanders breed like rabbits. Give them contraception or keep them out.” Truth. 5/7/77, p. 19.

112“Most New Zealanders are limiting their families...however Island people continue having larger families regardless of the housing overcrowding conditions or finances” wrote one Auckland. Herald 5/11/74, p. 6. “Their solution is to overpopulate and then to suggest that we do something about it” wrote another. Herald 1/5/73, p. 6.
In many areas of health, Pacific Islanders were statistically worse off than the community as a whole. In 1977, 88 percent of child tuberculosis cases reported in Auckland were Pacific Islanders and the infant mortality rate among Pacific Island communities was more than one and a half times the national average.\textsuperscript{113} Those New Zealanders who constructed Pacific Islanders as outsiders, saw them as the cause of stresses on health systems rather than as victims of poor health.\textsuperscript{114} The results were a stereotype of Pacific Islanders as unhealthy, the scapegoating of Pacific Islanders as responsible for pressure on public health services and the belief that better control over immigration would relieve this pressure.

The \textit{Auckland Star} was a particularly scathing critic of Pacific Islanders in regard to health. “Name almost any disease, Islanders have more of it” read one feature article which went on to cite an Auckland professor of medicine in blaming a high rate of Pacific Island admissions for stresses on accident and emergency services. Its author concluded that an unwillingness and a lack of knowledge about how to seek help, combined with poor living conditions, diet and clothing contributed to the poor health among the Pacific Island community and the article criticised immigration officials for failing to keep individuals with diseases out.\textsuperscript{115}

\textit{Truth} was even less charitable. Under the headline “POLYNESIAN KIDS JAM HOSPITALS,” it reported that “sick Maori and Pacific Island children are straining to the limit children’s facilities at Auckland hospital.” It attributed the fact that 60 percent of outpatients at paediatric facilities were Maori and Pacific Islanders to sick Polynesians tending to go to hospitals rather than through the proper channel of their GPs.\textsuperscript{116} “The cold facts,” its editorial told an estimated 600 000 readers, “are that Pacific Islanders from the dawn of history have been noted for the number and the nastiness of their endemic diseases.” He then criticised immigration officials for not adequately screening Pacific Island visitors.\textsuperscript{117} The \textit{Herald} also attributed pressure on

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Herald} 24/11/77, p.1.
\textsuperscript{114} According to Oarsman, National’s Minister of Immigration Frank Gill in 1977 also linked overstayers with ‘communicable disease’ and talked of an ‘overstayer epidemic’. Harry Orsman, \textit{The Oxford New Zealand Dictionary}, 1977.
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Truth} 8/7/75, p. 12.
the hospital system to Pacific Islanders, reporting a hospital board spokesman as saying that “our own people are being kept out of beds because of the situation.”

In election year, National MP George Gair associated Pacific Island immigration with outbreaks of leprosy and tuberculosis in Auckland and used this to attack the Government’s immigration policy. He argued that

The Auckland Hospital Board had a problem in coping with the needs of sick people from the Pacific Islands... Disproportionately many patients in Auckland public hospitals had come comparatively recently from the Pacific Islands, and many of them had complaints which should have prevented them coming to New Zealand in the first place.

The distinction between Pacific Islanders as a ‘them’ causing health problems and New Zealanders as an ‘us’ who were the victims of these problems is apparent in the reporting of all three papers and in Gair’s comments. However, important voices in the health system dissented from this view. The Chairman of the Auckland Hospital board, Dr Frank Rutter framed a call for compassion from New Zealanders in terms of New Zealand’s Pacific identity. He argued that services provided to Pacific Island visitors should be considered as “a humanitarian contribution to the South Pacific.”

Conclusion

The question of the extent to which Pacific Islanders in New Zealand were seen as part of the national community is crucial to understanding the construction of stereotypes of Pacific Islanders and scapegoating of them. Pacific Islanders’ visibility, that many Pakeha made few distinctions between Pacific Island groups or individuals and that they viewed them all as outsiders were preconditions for the evolution of stereotypes. These stereotypes, which included the ideas that Pacific Islanders overcrowded houses, had criminal tendencies, were violent, diseased and ‘bred like rabbits’ made them vulnerable to scapegoating for the contemporary problems of rising crime, pressure on the health system, housing and unemployment.

118 Herald 24/2/76 in DOL Auckland Office, NZNA BBAI A. 251 51b 22/1/13.
119 NZPD, v. 401, 1975, p. 4300, see also 1974, p. 4302.
120 Herald 24/2/76 in DOL Auckland Office, NZNA BBAI A. 251 51b 22/1/13. A Herald editorial spoke out on one occasion defending Pacific Islanders over their cost to the health system and arguing that they should not be used as scapegoats for pressures on hospital services caused by other internal factors within New Zealand. Herald 22/11/72, p. 6.
For those who defended Pacific Islanders, it was necessary to deconstruct these stereotypes and to reconstruct Pacific Islanders, not as outsiders responsible for New Zealand’s problems, but as Pacific Island New Zealanders who were victims of these problems. In this way, debate over Pacific Island immigration, even when framed in terms of economics and pressure on resources, cannot be separated from questions about national identity boundaries.

Pacific Island immigrants in the 1970s caused more heated debate than any immigrant group since the Chinese of the late nineteenth century. Pacific Islanders were to New Zealand what South-Asians and West Indians were to Britain, Arabs were to France, Hispanics were to the USA and Turks were to Germany. They were an immigrant minority who had arrived as a product of pre-oil shock demand for labour. They were culturally distinct, concentrated geographically, large enough in number to resist pressure for assimilation and unwilling, especially among second generation immigrants, to return ‘home’.

To the extent that the above Western states had defined nationhood by culture, each was forced to respond to the cultural challenge of diversity. Those who have studied this phenomenon at the level of state defined citizenship have emphasized the specific way in which different states responded as being defined by each one’s unique narratives of national identity.121 While this model useful, it de-emphasises both the global nature of the challenge to culturally defined nations and the contestation and public debate which occurred in each host-state over the place of immigrants.122 If, as Anderson argues, national identity is a product of popular imagination, in the politics of immigration in New Zealand of the 1970s, it also became a subject of popular contestation. Debate over the place of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand was implicitly a debate over the nature of New Zealand identity.

Throughout this chapter, I have identified two schools of thought in the 1970s in categorising New Zealanders responses to Pacific Island immigrants - the assimilationist and the cultural-pluralist. Each of these drew the line between New Zealander and ‘other’ in a different place.

122 Such models assume a uniform understanding of the nature of its national identity.
Despite this, I would conclude by cautioning against interpreting the attitudes of New Zealanders as extremely bi-polar. Assimilationism and cultural-pluralism could perhaps better be understood as two ends of a continuum of attitudes to cultural diversity and the nation. While the 1970s witnessed an increased debate and increased tension between these two positions, many New Zealanders might have sat somewhere in between, willing to accept varying degrees of cultural diversity and to demand varying degrees of assimilation. However, as cultural pluralism gained momentum throughout the decade, positions became more and more entrenched and, as the following chapters covering the 1975 election and the dawn raids will argue, these two events forced New Zealanders to increasingly chose between two distinct positions.
Chapter 7: Pressure Groups, Identity and the Immigration Debate

Gather ... three Irishmen and you’ll have a fight, three Australians and you’ll have a wager, three Englishmen and you’ll have a ceremony, three Polynesians and you’ll have a song ... but gather three New Zealanders and you’ll have a quorum and they’ll hold a meeting and pass a remit.¹

So wrote Gordon McLachlan in his 1976 critique of New Zealand society - *The Passionless People*. New Zealanders were, he argued, inherently political animals. In 1974, Alan Robinson estimated that there were approximately 500 pressure groups in New Zealand and Robert Muldoon described New Zealand as a country “bedevilled” by them.²

New Zealanders’ attitudes to British and Pacific Island immigration, even when framed in the language of national identity, were not unified across society. They were determined by a variety of distinct factors including the individual’s multiple identities and their perceptions of their own interests, such as their housing and employment situations. It follows that organisations representing different interest groups held varying positions on immigration. Because of this, a study of pressure groups is important for understanding both the complexities of public attitudes to immigrants, and the politics of immigration.

The relationship of political pressure groups to power in New Zealand is complex. Traditionally, the most powerful pressure groups had been those representing economic interests such as farmers, employers and unions and by 1970, these groups had become an integrated part of the political system.³ However, in the late 1960s and

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³ Cleveland defines “pressure groups” as “organised interests... which try to bring influence to bear on government in favour of their particular causes and ideas.” Les Cleveland, *The Anatomy of Influence: Pressure Groups and Politics in New Zealand*, Hicks, Smith and Sons, Wellington, 1972, p. 4. Stephen Levine use the term ‘interest groups’ to describe political pressure groups which they defines as “private concentrations of power devoted to the achievement of goals that may not necessarily be shared by the majority of the population.” Introduction to Section on Interest Groups, pp. 199-201, in Stephen Levine ed., *New Zealand Politics: A Reader*, Chelshire Publishing, Melbourne, 1975.
early 1970s, there arose a new wave of ‘cause groups’. These were movements devoted to moral or ideological causes and included the environmental, the anti-Vietnam War, the anti-nuclear, the anti-apartheid and second-wave feminist movements.4

Les Cleveland, in his *Anatomy of Influence* of 1972, attributed the rise of such movements to the structure of the political system. He argued that groups which appealed to emotions and values were not finding an outlet within the existing system of political parties.5 Keith Jackson, two years later, built on this idea in describing the rise of political cause groups as part of a broader social and ideological evolution centred on an emerging post-war generation, that was occurring throughout the Western world. He argued that a youthful population raised in affluence, educated in the liberal arts and with new attitudes to authority combined with a ‘vague cyclical feeling that change was overdue’, found that protest movements offered them an outlet for radical ideas.6

Colin James in his 1986 book, *The Quiet Revolution* posits that cause groups represented the first political stirrings of the ‘Vietnam Generation’ in New Zealand, “an affluent young generation [that] was turning violently against its parents’ values” and which looked to radically change society. James argues that this generation which cut its teeth in ‘cause’ politics of the late 1960s and 70s, finally found vent for its goal of radical change through the Labour Government of 1984.7 These are at best partial explanations for the rise of protest. After all, youth has always rebelled against the values of their parents. The protest movement was founded on more than an uncritical desire for change. Its rise related to the politics of identity. The new cause groups embodied a growing cultural and political diversity in New Zealand and collectively they demanded a greater recognition of this diversity in government and in broader society.

4Williams in her 1976 study of three cause groups: the Committees on Vietnam (COV), Citizens’ Association for Racial Equality (CARE) and Campaign Against Rising Prices (CARP) differentiated these cause groups as a distinct class from economic interest groups. Christine Williams, ‘Three New Zealand Cause Groups: A Look at Motivation’, MA Canterbury, 1976, p. 1.


6Jackson, p. 2.
The new cause groups of the late 1960s and early 1970s should also be understood within the context of Globalisation. While the anti-war, anti-nuclear, indigenous rights, environmental, gay rights, anti-racist, youth and women’s movements all had distinctive New Zealand characteristics and New Zealand organisations, none of them existed in a vacuum from overseas counterparts. In a world brought closer together by global media and communications, New Zealand movements drew inspiration and support from protest movements overseas. Global communications meant that it was increasingly possible for New Zealand ‘radicals’ to identify with ideological and identity based communities which transcended national boundaries.

How these new loci of identity affected identification with the nation is a point of debate. Linda Colley describes identities as being “unlike hats” in that you can wear more than one of them at once and argues that multiple levels of identity can be unproblematic. May Joseph, in contrast, suggests that the growth of alternative loci of identity to the nation weakened the importance that people attached to cultural national identity relative to other cultural identities. This chapter will show that in New Zealand, hybrid identities did evolve, but that they did not create alternative loci of identity to the nation. Instead, the interpretation of national mythologies became the battleground for competing narratives of New Zealand identity as various movements co-opted supposedly national values in search of broad support for their causes.

In examining pressure groups and immigration, this chapter will adopt two approaches. The first is to identify where attitudes to immigrants and immigration split in New Zealand society. For example, if trade unions held a different view of immigration from employers then this might indicate that class was an important factor in determining attitudes. The second part of the chapter will be devoted to an examination of the nascent protest or cause groups and how their emergence related to changing visions of national identity, changing attitudes to immigration and to the evolving nature of identity itself. Because none of these movements was large, in assessing their importance, it is vital to understand their relationship to public opinion and to each other. I will argue that the protest movements shared a cultural pluralist vision of national identity and this provided the ideological basis for their advocacy of

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7 James, p. 29.
more diverse immigration to New Zealand. I will also examine the way in which they employed discourses of national values and national identity in rallying public support for their causes.

**Economic Interest Groups**

**Employers**

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there was a broad division of opinion between employers and unions over immigration policy. In general, employers favoured high rates of immigration to increase both the supply of labour and the base of consumers for the goods and services they produced. Unions, in contrast, were more suspicious of immigration, which they perceived as undermining wages and conditions for the existing working class.9

The attitudes of employers to immigration in the early 1970s fit this traditional pattern. The 10 000-strong Chambers of Commerce, the Employers’ Federation and the Manufacturers’ Federation pursued common interests. They argued that a lack of employees was creating production bottlenecks and a ‘wage-price’ spiral that threatened the viability of their businesses.10 In their submissions to the Government at the time of the 1973-4 review of immigration policy, the Manufacturers Federation warned that New Zealand manufacturing was “desperately short of available labour.” “The serious shortage of labour now developing and endangering manufacturing output”, they argued, “confirms the need for the Government ... with urgency ... to lift

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its immigration targets.”

Company director Fred Turnovsky also argued that increased numbers of consumers created by immigration would benefit the New Zealand economy. In 1970, he suggested New Zealand should aim to increase its population by immigration to four million.

Because of Pacific Islanders’ heavy concentration in industry, representatives of manufacturers were among the strongest advocates for Pacific Island immigration and critics of the expulsion of overstayers in 1974. The Auckland Manufacturers Association argued that its members employed between 1 500 and 2 000 Tongans, many of whom were illegal immigrants, and that ‘sections of plants would have to close’ if these workers were expelled. Manufacturers convinced the Government to provide an extension of stay for “key workers” and successfully lobbied for the Tongan work scheme, that was put in place following the expulsions, to be extended from four to six months.

Many industrial employers saw Pacific Islanders as ideal workers because they had very high rates of job stability and were often willing to work overtime. “We don’t have any problem with absenteeism. We find them extremely reliable, very loyal very good workers” declared one large employer of Samoans. Employers’ views of the value of Pacific Islanders were, however, often narrow. Paul Spoonley found that only eight of forty four companies which employed Pacific Islanders employed them

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12 Fred Turnovsky ‘Migrants: Do We Need Them? (Viewpoints of Seven New Zealanders)’ Listener 28/9/70, pp. 6-7.
13 Don Bond, ‘Note for File’ 22/4/74 in DOL 22/1/91-5.
14 Dep. Sclab to Minister of Immigration 11/7/74 in DOL 22/1/91-5. Employers took a similar line in calling for extension of the work scheme during National’s anti-overstayer campaign of 1976. Report of visit to Auckland by Minister of Immigration (Minimmign) 24/9/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 2.
15 A Labour Department study found that “commitment to the company is generally higher for Pacific Islanders than its for New Zealand workers.” Department of Labour- Research and Planning Division, The Work Experience of Pacific Island Migrants in the Greater Wellington Area, Wellington, 1979, p. 51. See also Vocational Training Council, Understanding Samoans, Wellington, 1975, pp. 12-3.
in supervisory positions and none employed them in middle or senior management.\textsuperscript{17} Reports of the Race Relations Conciliator also show a number of complaints of Pacific Island workers being passed over for promotion on grounds of race.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{Unions}

Despite its traditional hostility, the union movement of the 1970s was not uniformly opposed to immigration. Fractured working class identity created divisions and contradictions between two union positions. Some in the movement saw immigrants as outsiders who threatened wages and conditions for New Zealand workers and argued that labour migration should be limited, while others, who identified with migrants as a vulnerable fraction of an international working class, sought to ensure that they were not exploited in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{19}

In 1974, as the economic situation and housing shortages worsened, concerns among unions about immigration increased.\textsuperscript{20} A delegation from the Canterbury Trades Council called for the Minister to halt all immigration. “It would be extremely dangerous,” they claimed,

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to allow any migrants into New Zealand until world and local economic conditions are clarified. Extreme caution should be exercised by the Immigration Department by the holding up of immigration unless job opportunities, housing and full educational facilities can be guaranteed.
\end{quote}

In 1975, after unemployment reached 2 000, its highest level for eight years, Federation of Labour (FOL) Secretary Tom Skinner called for a halt to all immigration until the labour market stabilised, and his successor W J Knox wrote to the Minister later that year calling for a review of Pacific immigration schemes “in

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\textsuperscript{17}One reason given by employers for this was that “public reaction would not be favourable.” Others suggested that Pacific Islanders in senior positions were “not part of the company image” and that they feared unrest if Pacific Islanders were given authority over Pakeha or Maori. Paul Spoonley, ‘The Multi-Cultural Workforce: The Role of Employers as Gatekeepers’, \textit{New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations}, v. 3, 1978, p. 67.
\textsuperscript{19}Lai Chee Hun argues that while the New Zealand movements instincts were towards restriction of immigration, solidarity with the international labour movement led it to oppose racial discrimination in immigration policy. Lai Chee Hun, ‘New Zealand’s Immigration Policy Towards Asians 1960-74: A Policy of Racial Exclusion’, MA Canterburdy, 1974, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{20}See Chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Press} 10/1/74 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 26.
light of the employment situation in New Zealand.”\textsuperscript{22} This suggests that the FOL was firmly opposed to immigration. In fact its consistent position was more moderate and its opposition to immigration more qualified.\textsuperscript{23} On numerous occasions, Skinner and the FOL expressed their support for controlled immigration targeted at areas where skilled labour was required.\textsuperscript{24}

The humanist and internationalist traditions in the New Zealand labour movement were also responsible for some union support for immigrants. In 1973, the Clothing Workers Union sent a deputation to the Minister of Immigration to protest against the refusal of a visa to a skilled “Coloured” clothing worker from South Africa and a Council of Organisations for Relief Service Overseas (CORSO) sponsored trade union seminar of 1974 called for union awards, papers and newsletters to be published in Polynesian languages and for measures to educate Tongans and other Pacific Islanders in industrial relations matters.\textsuperscript{25}

These sentiments led unions to join employers and manufacturers in expressing strong support for Pacific Islanders during the expulsions of overstayers in 1974 and 1976.\textsuperscript{26} Skinner described the 1976 raids as “not acceptable in a democratic society” and called for an amnesty for the overstayers.\textsuperscript{27} The raids seem to have finally united the union movement behind its internationalists in support of Pacific Islanders. At its annual conference in 1976, the FOL called for easier entry for Pacific Islanders, for

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\textsuperscript{22} *Evening Post* ed. 23/1/75 in DOL 22/1/279 pt. 5. Letter W J Knox to Minimmign (F Colman) 8/10/75 in DOL 22/1/109-4 pt. 7.

\textsuperscript{23} As Skinner told the FOL National Conference in 1973, “It is not uncommon for public statement to be made by people who should know better, to the effect that the trade union movement is opposed to immigration as a matter of principle. This is completely incorrect ... We favour a flow of immigrants if they are able and willing to contribute to New Zealand and if New Zealand has the facilities and the amenities which will be needed to settle them.” ‘Address of Tom Skinner’ in *FOL Report of Annual Conference*, 1974, p. 20.


\textsuperscript{27} *Dominion* 27/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3. W J Knox (FOL Secretary) called the checks “shameful, degrading and humiliating to the persons concerned,” *Herald* 25/10/76.
half of the income tax paid by migrant workers to be returned to their country of origin and for a lengthening of Pacific Island work permit schemes.\textsuperscript{28}

**Farmers’ Organisations**

The third major traditional economic lobby in New Zealand was the rural sector, led by Federated Farmers with an imposing 600 branches and about 43 000 members.\textsuperscript{29} The farming lobby is also important for understanding the attitudes of the National Party which was sometimes torn between the differing interests of its two largest support bases, farmers and urban business people.

In the early 1970s, Federated Farmers was strongly opposed to those economic policies of the Second National Government that sought to encourage the growth of the industrial sector through import licensing and tariffs. This made them unsympathetic to calls for immigration that would fuel manufacturing. Federated Farmers argued that a subsidised industrial sector increased costs for farmers and expressed this by refusing to endorse either political party in the 1972 election.\textsuperscript{30} As rural employers, however, farmers were not opposed to immigration of farm workers. In 1972 they were concerned enough about labour shortages to lobby for the institution of a scheme to bring Fijian scrub-cutters to New Zealand on a temporary basis.\textsuperscript{31}

Federated Farmers contributed little to the immigration debate after 1972.\textsuperscript{32} The most important immigration issue involving farmers was the dispute between New Zealand’s two largest produce growers associations, the Vegetable and Produce Growers’ Association (VPGA) and the Chinese Commercial Growers Association.

\textsuperscript{28}Letter Secretary of FOL (W J Knox) to Minimmign (F Gill) 6/10/76 in DOL 22/1/311, pt. 4.

\textsuperscript{29}Cleveland, p. 83.

\textsuperscript{30}A *Straight Furrow* editorial of 23/8/72 pp. 2-3, laid out farmers’ opposition to government support for the industrial sector and an editorial of 29/11/72 p. 3. The article was careful to note that Federated Farmers endorsed neither political party, but that it represented the interests of farmers.

\textsuperscript{31}*Straight Furrow* 29/11/72, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{32}It is hard to document an absence of contribution to the debate, but the substantial files of the Labour Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which included files on the Immigration Advisory Committee contained sparse reference to farmers opinions and the contribution of farmers’ representatives to the debates of these bodies was much smaller than those of employers, manufacturers, unions and the public service. *Straight Furrow* the Federated Farmers magazine mentioned immigration issues only once in editorial comment in the 1970s.
The two groups disagreed over a special scheme instituted by the Labour Government to allow the immigration of Chinese to work in Chinese market gardens. The Chinese growers argued that in order for their family market gardens to continue they needed to bring in family members from Hong Kong and China to replace retiring older workers while other growers represented by the VPGA argued that this would give Chinese growers an unfair market advantage.\(^{33}\)

At stake in this debate was whether or not the Government should recognise an ethnically defined category of business - that a Chinese market garden needed specifically Chinese people to work it and that this was a justification for specifically Chinese immigration. The Labour Government’s allowing Chinese immigration for Chinese market gardens could be interpreted as an acceptance of multi-culturalism or as making an exception on racial grounds to a general set of immigration criteria. To the extent that the existing immigration criteria could be seen as ‘general’ and colour-blind, it was both.

**Cause Groups, The Protest Movement**

In her book *Peace People*, Elsie Locke describes the opening of Parliament in 1968:

[It] was greeted by a forest of banners: pro and anti-Vietnam war groups, trade unions protesting at a nil wage order, seamen on safety at sea, the CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) on French nuclear testing, students on their bursaries, CARP (Campaign Against Rising Prices) on the cost of living and Maori activists on the 1967 Maori Affairs Amendment Act concerning the land question. The steps of parliament were completely blocked and the Governor General and other dignitaries had to enter by a rear door.\(^ {34}\)

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, radical protest movements or ‘cause groups’ emerged as a new and increasingly important political force.\(^ {35}\) The most important of

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\(^{33}\) For Vegetable and Produce Grower’s Association: Letter D W Gobble of NZ Vegetable and Produce Growers’ Association to K Peterson (Secretary of IAC) in DOL 22/1/31 pt. 9. The complexities of the story and its ripples in national and international politics can be discerned from the file DOL 22/1/115-2 pt. 2.


these were the environmental lobby which succeeded in rallying support behind the ‘Save Manapouri’ campaign, the peace movements which opposed nuclear weapons and New Zealand’s involvement in the Vietnam war and the anti-Springbok tour movement. The broad public support that each of these movements managed to muster belies the fact that the organisations that spearheaded them were often small, diffuse and regional.

These various movements were focused around a series of discrete issues, but they shared roots in a common political and social climate, their core memberships flowed from the same demographic catchment of young urban educated and there was considerable crossover between the various organisations.\(^{36}\)

The Values Party, which rose to prominence in the early 1970s, expounded many of the ideas shared by the protest movement as a whole. The party described itself as a reaction to a depression not of economics in New Zealand but of values, criticising a growing “spiritual poverty” in government where political decisions were governed not by human needs but by the needs of capital, consumerism and bureaucracy. It spoke of “affluence without direction” and promised to put environmental issues, lifestyle and the social well-being of New Zealanders at the top of the political agenda.\(^{37}\)

From this ideological base, Values questioned the assumption that economic growth was a good thing, proposing policies of zero economic and population growth and environmental protectionism. It explored the idea of a four day working week and called for ethical and ideological rather than expedient values to dictate foreign policy. Finally, it championed cultural pluralism in New Zealand with a policy of state encouragement for Maori institutions and a non-discriminatory immigration policy.\(^{38}\) Despite the first-past-the-post electoral system which meant that it had almost no chance of winning a seat, Values found a degree of popular support for its

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\(^{36}\)Studies of the membership of the various groups time and time again cite academics, unions, churches, youth and Maori as strong support bases. See Williams, James, Jackson, Roberto Rabel ‘Vietnam Anti-War Movement in New Zealand’, *Peace and Change*, v. 17, no. 1, 1992, p. 9.


radical ideas, winning 2.1 and 5.2 percent of votes in the 1972 and 1975 elections respectively.\(^{39}\)

Unlike the more traditional interest groups, the new political activists often lacked direct access to power. They sought to bring about pressure on governments by gaining the support of the public. With this goal in mind, the use of symbolic issues and appeals to the supposedly common national ‘values’ of New Zealanders were useful tools.\(^{40}\) Les Cleveland suggested that the successful mass mobilisation of New Zealanders from a wide range of backgrounds against raising the level of Lake Manapouri was a result of small movements appealing to national identity by manipulating “a superb unassailable symbol of national purity and potency.” The protest movement convinced people that New Zealand’s identity as a clean, green and beautiful land was symbolically threatened by the raising of the lake.\(^{41}\)

An appeal to New Zealand nationalism was also characteristic of the anti-Vietnam War movement. Keith Jackson writes that the movement called upon the “traditional New Zealand beliefs in equality and dignity of man and elements of pacifism and morality ... combined with nascent New Zealand nationalism.”\(^{42}\) While pacifism no doubt drove many of those who opposed the war, in light of New Zealand’s long tradition of involvement in overseas conflicts, the idea that it was a widely accepted national value is less convincing. The nationalistic appeal of the movement, which grew out of the Campaign For Nuclear Disarmament (CND), could better be understood as the Vietnam generation’s desire to distance their nation from the American military alliance which was dragging New Zealand into an unjust war and threatening to make it a target in an immoral and destructive global conflict.\(^{43}\)


\(^{40}\)As Colin James observed “Radicals are minorities. If they want to make big change they must get the majority to go with them.” Other writers identified the increase in political activism in the 1970s with an increased optimism about the ability of direct action to effect political change. Levett et al., p. 246. James Belich, *Paradise Reforged, A History of New Zealanders from the 1880s to the year 2000*, Allen Land Penguin, Auckland, 2001, p. 519.

\(^{41}\)Cleveland, pp. 27-8, p. 41.

\(^{42}\)Jackson, pp. 164-5.

\(^{43}\)This appears to be the position of Rabel who argues that the protest movement “challenged New Zealand’s alliance dependent strategy in foreign relations”. Rabel, p. 4. This was also the attitude of the movement which opposed American Satellite Bases in New Zealand. Owen Wilkes, *Protest: Demonstrations Against the American Military Presence in New Zealand*, A
The most important protest organisations in relation to immigration issues were the Citizens’ Association for Racial Equality (CARE), Amnesty Aroha and the New Zealand Race Relations Council (RRC). These groups also drew on national myths in support for their causes, including the ideas of New Zealand as an example to the world of racial equality and social justice, and appealed to the increasingly accepted vision of New Zealand as a member of the Asia-Pacific community as opposed to a far-flung offshoot of Europe.

**The Citizens Association For Racial Equality (CARE)**

The Citizens’ Association for Racial Equality (CARE) was the most important protest group concerned with immigration issues. It was formed in Auckland in 1964, in response to concerns about a variety of race relations issues. Three of the four people who launched the association had a history as ‘activists’ from involvement in the Campaign For Nuclear Disarmament (CND), the Committee For Resolute Action against French Nuclear Tests and the 1960 “no Maori, no tour” campaign. CARE’s stated goal was working to “improve race relations at home and abroad” and its charter stated that “the very basis of New Zealand’s social life was a compact between two races, Maori and Pakeha, supposedly on a basis of complete equality.”

CARE’s 1972 pamphlet *How White is Our Immigration Policy?* reflected the organisation’s cultural-pluralist outlook. It attacked the widespread “arrogant assumption that the New Zealand way of life is superior, cannot be disturbed, varied, developed or enriched.” The existing policy of selecting immigrants on the basis of race, it argued, was inconsistent with racial harmony in New Zealand and immigration from homogeneous white European countries would bring in immigrants who were poorly adapted to New Zealand’s “multi-cultural society.” CARE contended that “this nation’s cultural and social development was retarded because people who could bring cultural diversity and enrichment were actively discouraged.

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44 Sorrenson et al., *Ten Years of CARE*, CARE, Auckland, 1974, p. 3.
45 Locke, p. 289.
46 Williams, p. 22. Sorrenson, p. 3.
48 Ibid., p. 15.
or prevented from being immigrants.” The organisation also appealed for New Zealand to recognise its responsibility to the Pacific region with freer entry of Pacific Islanders.  

CARE’s community work included establishing homework centres in areas with high concentrations of Maori and Pacific Island immigrants, organising English language classes for immigrants and classes in Maori and Polynesian languages for Pakeha and staffing New Zealand’s first Citizens’ Advice Bureau. Its political work involved submissions and delegations to the Government as well as lobbying aimed at the public through research and the production of reports and pamphlets on racial issues, press releases, speaking tours and symposia.  

In 1974, the organisation made immigration the main focus of its activities. It became heavily involved in the debate over Tongan overstayers when the immigration authorities launched their campaign of dawn raids and expulsions. Auckland CARE produced and distributed a series of pamphlets on South Pacific immigration and organised public meetings to plead the case of the Tongans before the Government and the media.  

CARE was highly critical of the Tongan work scheme that was instituted after the raids, claiming that it allowed insufficient time for workers to pay back airfares and save money to take home. Its assertion that, after expenses were deducted, Tongan workers had a take home pay of an average of $20 per week was presented on the front pages of several major newspapers. CARE also successfully petitioned the Government for an extension of permits for those on the work scheme who were stuck in New Zealand without work over the Christmas holiday period in 1974.  

50 Sorrenson et al., Ten Years of CARE. Williams, p. 22.  
54 Memo Minimmign 23/1/75 re. Deputation from CARE, CARE press release, 13/12/74, Letter D Williams (CARE) to Minimmign (F Colman) 18/12/74, Star 21/2/75 all in DOL 22/1/109-4.
Flushed with these minor victories, the organisation was vigorous in its criticism of National’s 1975 election campaign which blamed British and Pacific Island immigrants for New Zealand’s economic and social woes. It then condemned the new Government’s renewal of the anti-overstayer campaigns and called for an amnesty for illegal overstayers.\footnote{Joris De Bres, ‘Government Immigration’ \textit{NZMR}, May 1976. Joris De Bres ‘Naught for their Comfort’ \textit{NZMR}, Aug, 1976, put the Tongan community perspective. See also letter CARE to Minister of Immigration Frank Gill, 23/2/76 in DOL 22/1/310 pt. 1.} Unlike much of the mainstream media, CARE’s publications were careful to put the point of view of the Pacific Islanders themselves on the raids.\footnote{Joris De Bres, ‘The National Party’s Immigration Policy and the Need for and Amnesty’ Speech Given to OUSA, 18/3/76 (Hocken). Joris de Bres and Rob Campbell, \textit{The Overstayers: Illegal Migration from the Pacific Islands to New Zealand}, CARE, Auckland, 1976.}

CARE was one of the larger of the protest groups. In the mid-1970s, at the organisation’s zenith, membership reached about 800 and it had branches in Auckland, Christchurch, Dunedin, Hamilton, Rotorua, New Plymouth and Palmerston North.\footnote{Newnham and Sorrenson, \textit{25 Years}, p. 3. Sorrenson et al. \textit{Ten Years}, p. 11, p. 18. James F Brock, ‘CARE: An Analysis on Middle Class Radicalism’, in Stephen Levine ed. \textit{New Zealand Politics a Reader}, Chelshire Press, Melbourne, 1975, p. 213. Estimate based on distribution of CARE magazine. Sorrenson et al., p. 28. \textit{Herald}, 20/1/76, p. 7.} Apart from its relative size, the association’s importance lies in its acceptance by the news media as a spokesman on a range of racial issues. Especially through its prominence in organising public opposition to the Springbok tours in 1970 and 1973, the group gained the ear of the media which routinely sought its opinion on racial issues. CARE claimed to be the voice of a large section of society on a narrow range of issues. In contrast, its harshest critics saw it as a small minority group attempting to subvert the democratic process. The organisation’s founders found their first supporters by approaching members of the universities, unions and churches and it maintained solid support bases among these groups. Brock’s 1974 study of 153 of CARE’s 319 members in Christchurch shows that 73 percent had attended university and 87 percent were either students, white collar workers or professionals.\footnote{Brock’s 1974 study of 153 of CARE’s 319 members in Christchurch shows that 73 percent had attended university and 87 percent were either students, white collar workers or professionals.}

In the 1960s, CARE was predominantly a Pakeha organisation. As it gained confidence in the 1970s, it also worked to foster links with emerging Maori and Pacific Island protest organisations such as Nga Tamatoa, the Polynesian Panther
Party and the Matakite movement.\textsuperscript{59} By 1975, its membership had become more multi-racial and five of its twelve Auckland committee members were Polynesian.\textsuperscript{60}

CARE helped to foster cohesion among the diverse protest movements and CARE members were instrumental in the formation of Halt All Racist Tours (HART).\textsuperscript{61} Two-thirds of Christchurch members were or had been members of other groups which ‘had tried to influence political thinking’ including HART, the Committee on Vietnam and the CND.\textsuperscript{62} CARE also worked with Nga Tamatoa and the Polynesian Panther Party on a project by project basis, helping promote Nga Tamatoa’s petition for the inclusion of Maori language in the school curriculum in 1974 and acted with Nga Tamatoa, the Polynesian Panthers, the Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination (ACORD) and the Young Christian Workers to monitor the activities of the Police Special Task Force on Polynesian Offending.\textsuperscript{63}

By 1974, it had become an umbrella organisation with a good national network coordinating the activities of a range of smaller single issue groups.\textsuperscript{64} One way in which it did this was through joint publications such as the pamphlets \textit{How White is Our Immigration Policy} with the Race Relations Council, \textit{Task Force- An Exercise in Oppression} with the Polynesian Panther Party (PPP), ACORD and the Peoples’ Union and \textit{The National Party’s Immigration Policy and the Need for an Amnesty} with the Wellington based South Pacific Action Network (SPAN).\textsuperscript{65}

As well as helping small organisations to develop, CARE’s alliance with them as with other political groups concerned with identity, brought the increased credibility of numbers to its own campaigns. In 1974, CARE claimed support for its campaign

\textsuperscript{58}Those who had attended university were disproportionately from humanities and education faculties. Those surveyed included 12 University Lecturers, 27 school teachers, 30 students and 13 ministers of religion. Brock, \textit{An Investigation}, p. 7.


\textsuperscript{60}Williams, p. 58, p. 60.

\textsuperscript{61}HART, according to CARE’s president Richard Northe, was established to attract those who were opposed to the sporting contacts with South Africa, but who were reluctant to join the ‘radical’ CARE. There was subsequently “considerable co-operation between the two movements at the committee level.” Williams, pp. 51-2.


\textsuperscript{63}Williams, p. 52, p. 57. Sorrenson, \textit{Ten Years}, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{64}Williams, p. 60.

\textsuperscript{65}Sorrenson, \textit{Ten Years}, p. 28.
against the raids on Pacific Island homes from Auckland Trade Unions, The FOL, Nga Tamatoa, the Samoan Branch of the Labour Party, the Polynesian Panther Party, the Peoples’ Union, ACORD, the Race Relations Council, the Free Church of Tonga, Auckland Students and the Auckland Council for Civil Liberties (headed by future Prime Minister David Lange).66

CARE’s broad focus on issues of race relations in New Zealand was guided by a belief, set down in its charter, that New Zealand was a multicultural society. The organisation sought to foster cultural pluralism. Its cultural pluralist interpretation of national values and its appeal to humanism were the key to CARE’s ability to mobilise other New Left groups and to its appeal to the public on issues as diverse as sporting contacts with South Africa, Maori language and immigration.

Amnesty Aroha

Amnesty Aroha was formed in Wellington, the only major centre not to have a Citizens Association for Racial Equality, in October 1976. It was constituted at a public meeting about the dawn raids organised by members of the Pacific Island Advisory Council and the Council for Civil Liberties. This meeting was attended by 500 people and after this, Amnesty Aroha’s meetings regularly attracted 50-100 people. Its focus was almost exclusively on the issue of Pacific Island overstayers. However, it is clear that it shared the cultural pluralist vision of the nation, the appeal to humanitarianism and many of the tactics of its larger cousin.

Like CARE, the group claimed a basis for its actions in a vision of New Zealand as a multi-cultural society. At its inaugural meeting it declared that “the central goal for the development of New Zealand is the creation of a truly multi-cultural society as a member of the Pacific community.” Later meetings affirmed that its members shared “an awareness of the fact that New Zealand is a multicultural society and that a great deal of work and commitment would be needed if this was to be accepted as a part of New Zealand’s heritage.” Linked to this was the idea of New Zealand having a Pacific identity.67 “Our society is enriched economically and culturally by the Pacific Islanders and the immigration policy should reflect this” argued one poster.68

66Ibid., p. 30.
68Amnesty Aroha, They’re Neighbours Not Criminals, poster in DOL 22/1/310 pt. 5.
Amnesty Aroha appealed to New Zealanders’ belief in fairness and social justice. A pamphlet published jointly with ACORD asked

What happened to the human rights New Zealanders once fought for?
Police knocking on the door early in the morning and taking innocent people from their beds sounds like Nazi Germany, but it is happening here ... This whole case exemplifies the racism that is deeply entrenched in our institutions.69

Amnesty Aroha called for an end to dawn raids and random checks, an amnesty for all overstayers and a review of the immigration policy which had allowed the problem to develop.70 It sought to act as a channel for the sentiments of a diverse range of groups on a single issue. The organisation shared links with the anti-apartheid movement and, in 1977, produced a joint publication with the National Anti-Apartheid Committee.71 It also claimed support for its cause from the Public Service Association, Auckland Trades Council, the New Zealand Association of Social Workers, Gay Liberation, the Seamen’s Union, the Wellington Drivers’ Union, the Maori Graduates Association, communists, socialists, the Values Party, Maori groups, Young Christian Workers, the Anglican Archbishop of Wellington, the New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties, the Student Christian Movement and CORSO.72

Amnesty Aroha’s tactics were typical of the new protest movements. They included rallies, pamphlets, posters, teach-ins, submissions to Government and a regular photocopied newsletter. They published material in Pacific Island languages and in English informing Islanders of their rights if stopped by a police officer and, like CARE, they sought to put the Polynesian perspective on the raids before the public, with pamphlets giving personal accounts of Pacific Islanders who were awoken in their beds by police and asked for papers.73

69Dawn Raids: The Ugly Reality, pamphlet in DOL 22/1/310 pt. 5.
72AA Newsletter, no. 8, 1977.
73AA Newsletter, no. 8, 1977. Amnesty Aroha, Dawn Raids the Ugly Reality. . . Amnesty Aroha pamphlet in DOL 22/1/310 pt. 5. Amnesty Aroha also sent a representative to various Pacific Islands to report on Minister of Immigration Frank Gill’s visit after Gill had refused to allow members of the mainstream media spare seats on his RNZAF plane in Nov. 1976. ‘SUCCESS
Because of its narrow focus on the question of the dawn raids, the organisation faded fast after 1977. Its activities, however, illustrate well the links that protest groups built among themselves and with the traditional left in an effort to gain leverage on specific issues. The glue that helped to cement these links was a belief in the value of diversity and a shared vision of a multi-cultural New Zealand.

**Race Relations Council**

The New Zealand Race Relations Council (RRC) was another Wellington based organisation which sought to build a national network of groups with interests in race relations. Formed in 1970, the RRC was less radical than CARE or ACORD and contained a broad mix of the new protest groups and the more established liberal organisations. It chose Sir Edmund Hillary as its patron and affiliated bodies included the National Council of Churches, Nga Tamatoa, trade unions, student unions, the Maori Council, Maori Women’s Welfare League and the Maori Organisation on Human Rights. The RRC also shared strong links with CARE, but perhaps because of its unwieldy attempt to build a broad base, both in terms of affiliation and geography at the expense of a core of activists, the RRC was less active than CARE or Amnesty Aroha. However, it shared with these groups the goal of fostering a multicultural New Zealand and an appeal to the broader public through the national mythology of social justice and harmonious race relations.

The Race Relations Council equated a more diverse immigration policy with its goal of promoting a more “multi-cultural society.” This is illustrated in the resolutions on immigration of the RRC’s annual conference of 1972.

> We consider that New Zealand’s immigration policy includes invalid and racially discriminatory criteria. The Government appears to believe that it should try to maintain social and cultural homogeneity in New Zealand by erecting cultural barriers against the entry of non-Europeans ... This view is invalid because New Zealand has not been socially homogeneous.

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since the European culture was brought to co-exist with the Maori ... We recognise that New Zealand is culturally, socially and racially diverse, we believe this diversity is valuable and enriching for all our citizens, and that our immigration policy should recognise and develop this diversity.\textsuperscript{76}

Reverend Don Borrie, the organisation’s secretary, criticised New Zealand’s focus on immigration from Europe at a time when he felt New Zealand should be working to foster its Pacific identity.\textsuperscript{77}

\textbf{Other Groups}

The goal of cultural pluralism was shared by many other groups with less direct interests in immigration policy. In 1965, the New Zealand University Students Association (NZUSA) called for “culturally diverse immigration.” “We are,” they argued, “a small people placed far from the beaten track of the world and we need [culturally diverse immigrants] or some of them to make good those deficiencies in our experience to which every such isolated country is prone.”\textsuperscript{78}

In 1973, the National Council of Women (NCW) called on the Minister of Immigration to take action to help immigrant women learn English. Its president R K Dell wrote that “language is the key to successful integrated immigrants, and therefore to a harmonious multi-racial, culturally-enriched society.”\textsuperscript{79} Other foci of the NCW and the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) were working to improve services for immigrant women in the home and successfully lobbying against those immigration criteria that discriminated specifically against female migrants.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{77}Northey and Lythe, p. 23. \textit{Herald} 29/9/73, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{78}New Zealand University Students’ Association, \textit{Whom Shall We Admit}, undated ca. 1965, p. 1. David Caygill as President of the Canterbury University Students Association wrote to protest at racial discrimination in immigration policy in a letter to the Minister of 8/7/71 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 23. The NZUSA joined the chorus of protest at the Dawn Raids of 1976. \textit{Auckland Star} editorial, 20/2/76 in Department of Labour Auckland Office NZNA BBAI A. 251 51b 22/1/13.
\textsuperscript{79}Letter R K Dell (NCW President) and K Rowe (Convenor Immigration Standing Committee) to Minimmign (F Colman), 23/11/73 in DOL 22/1/279-1 pt. 1.
\textsuperscript{80}“Working to Improve the Lot of Immigrant Women: YWCA New Zealand Incorporated United Women’s Convention,’ Jun. 75 in DOL 22/1/279-9 pt. 1. \textit{Dominion} 24/9/75 in 22/1/279-9 pt. 1. The purge of the legislation was finally completed in 1976 and appears to have been strongly promoted by Marilyn Waring. ‘Report to Minister Legislation and
Protest groups of the 1970s should not be seen as a series of isolated single issue groups. The cohesion of a broad protest movement was based around a shared contemporary humanist ideology which embodied a belief that humanitarian, environmental, lifestyle and other intangible values were ignored in the established political system, and that there was a need to replace assimilationist assumptions of society with a greater tolerance of diversity. A web of personal connections between members allowed for cooperation between different groups as any given issue became acute. Within this web, the crossover between those who protested about racial issues such as immigration policy and contacts with South Africa was particularly frequent.81

The interplay between the international nature of movements and the particular national discourses of their New Zealand manifestations is clear in relation to issues of apartheid and immigration. Discourses of universal human rights and the tactics and ideologies of similar anti-racist movements overseas were used alongside an appeal to distinctly New Zealand values. The belief that New Zealand should strive to recognise cultural diversity underpinned many of the protest organisations. It was through linking this goal to the national myth of the racially harmonious society and New Zealand’s tradition of social justice as well as to the universal declaration of human rights that CARE, the RRC and Amnesty Aroha succeeded both in drawing a range of other groups to support their causes and appealing to the broader public.

**The Churches**

The protest groups which appealed to humanitarian and multiculturalist arguments on immigration issues had links with the traditional voice of social conscience in society—the church. Church people were prominent within groups like the RRC, CARE and the peace movement, but the churches were also effective lobbyists in their own right. In 1968, the National Council of Churches (NCC) combined with the Catholic Church, the Society of Saint Vincent de Paul and the Jewish Welfare Agency to form

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81 Williams, p. 72.
the Inter-Church Committee on Immigration (ICCI) which served both as a lobby group and as a welfare organisation for immigrants.82

The ICCI was unequivocally devoted to the principle of cultural-pluralism. It defined this as:

A nationwide way of living which offers freedom of choice, through allowing for essential unity in areas demanded by the common good, to people who wish to be culturally different in one or several aspects of life. To achieve such a way of life within the nation, the dominant culture or society must not merely accept the migrant cultures but it must be prepared to go out and learn from them, to value them ... If the needs of the migrant group differ from the needs of the dominant society, then services must be different in education [and] in housing.83

In a report of 1978, the Presbyterian Church’s Committee on New Settler Policy asked “do we want a multi-racial society?” and argued:

If so we are not in the business of making Kiwis ... New settlers have an enrichment to contribute to the fabric of our nation. The leveling factors are numerous (education system, work, language). Let the church not be too quick to promote the leveling ... The Church has to accept that we are increasingly becoming a multi-cultural society in which the Christian faith bridges differences.84

In line with this principle, the Church called for special schooling in Polynesian areas “so that the people were able to effectively preserve their identity in our country.”85

Implicit in the ICCI’s vision of multiculturalism was a rejection of immigration policies that were based on the principle of assimilation.86 In line with these beliefs,
the National Council of Churches and its constituents lobbied against racial discrimination in immigration policy and churches were vigorous critics of the dawn raids of 1976.\textsuperscript{87}

Another issue of identity that attracted the churches’ attention was immigration from South Africa. The NCC stood firmly against apartheid and, from 1976, the ICCI produced a series of pamphlets and press releases condemning the assertion by Immigration Minister Gill that white South African and Rhodesian immigrants shared a white British colonial identity - that they were New Zealanders’ “kith and kin.” The Churches argued that instead, white immigrants from Southern Africa represented a threat to elements of New Zealand national identity because they could bring with them “attitudes and assumptions” about race that were counter-productive to “New Zealand’s multi-cultural goals.”\textsuperscript{88}

The Churches repeatedly reminded the public and the Government that New Zealand’s identity lay as a part of a Pacific community. A 1971 NCC booklet argued that “we are not part of the European, American or Asian continents but belong to the South Pacific.”\textsuperscript{89} As a consequence, it argued that New Zealand had a moral obligation to accept immigrants from the region. An ICCI paper contended that:

\begin{quote}
New Zealand is set in the South Pacific and as such our future as a nation is bound up with South Pacific peoples. Therefore, in formulating
\end{quote}


immigration policies and programmes we should recognise our special responsibilities to the countries of the South Pacific.  

However, if church leaders were strong advocates of cultural pluralism and New Zealand’s Pacific identity, at the level of individual parishes and churchgoers, there was sometimes resistance to these ideas. The ICCI acknowledged:

One of the greatest barriers to a new departure in immigration policies is the entrenchment, and in some cases prejudice, of the community. Whenever we have undertaken to cooperate in a new programme involving ethnic groups other than western-Europeans, we have been made aware of the deep-seated prejudices which exist in the minds of many citizens.

In 1978, an article on the integration of Polynesians from Pacific Island Church (PIC) backgrounds into established Presbyterian congregations noted that in several congregations which had sought to welcome Pacific Islanders, ‘European’ churchgoers had left “because they did not want to associate with the Islanders.”

Maori

Maori were central to the 1970s debate about cultural pluralism and New Zealand identity. The decade will be remembered above all for their aggressive pursuit of the perennial goal of land rights, but it was also the beginning of a new Maori cultural assertiveness. Maori repudiated, with increasing vigour, the principle of equality through assimilation championed by the Hunn report and demanded recognition of the place of their language and culture within the institutions of the New Zealand state.

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91 Inter-Church Committee on Immigration, ‘Submission to the Honourable Minister of Immigration on Behalf of the Inter-Church Commission on Immigration’ 11/9/1973, Correspondence Social Worker/ Ministry Committee, 1973, p. 17. Knox Archive.
93 Brookes discusses this in relation to the book Washday at the Pa suggesting that “the debate over the publication led to questioning of the idea of a historically seamless and stable national identity … By the 1960s the question of New Zealand identity was becoming an increasingly contested issue.” Barbara Brookes, ‘Nostalgia for ‘Innocent Home Pleasures: The 1964 New Zealand Controversy Over Washday at the Pa’ in Gender and History, v. 9, 1997, p. 243.
Post-World War Two New Zealand was characterised by rapid urban migration of Maori. The era gave birth to two new national organisations - the Maori Women’s Welfare League (MWWL), formed in 1951, and the New Zealand Maori Council (NZMC), formed in 1962, and to an extent these groups came to represent the interests of the Maori establishment to national Government alongside the four Maori MPs. In the climate of political divergence of the late 1960s and early 1970s, these groups were joined by a number of small but vocal urban radical groups, including the Maori Organisation on Human Rights (MOOHR), Nga Tamatoa and the Polynesian Panther Party. These groups, dominated by the young, were more radical than the established voices of Maoridom and were sometimes highly critical of them.

Maori attitudes to immigrants were not uniform. The most apparent division was between urban youth organisations and the older establishment. The ‘Maori establishment’ represented by the NZMC, was more focused on ‘Maori issues’ as distinct from ‘Polynesian issues.’ However, Maori urban organisations and their members shared challenges of cultural alienation in the city with Pacific Island immigrants and, as a consequence, often expressed a belief in a shared Polynesian identity. At the NZMC sponsored Young Maori Leaders Conference of 1970 there was some conflict between visions of identity of young Maori and their elders as well as suggestions of an urban/rural divide. Te Maori reported that “the city element at this conference saw themselves not only as Maori, but sometimes as Polynesian in the wider sense.”

The Maori ‘Establishment’

On several occasions, the press reported tension in industrial suburbs between Maori and Pacific Islanders. The Second National Government and a number of newspapers and their correspondents argued that immigration of non-Europeans should be limited

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95 Pat Hohepa criticised the NZMC for its support of the 1970 Springbok tour and called for pan-Polynesian opposition. MOOHR Newsletter, Oct. 1972, p. 3. Members of Nga Tamatoa described the Maori Councils and MPs as “government institutions.” MOOHR Newsletter, Sept., 1971.
because it would harm race relations between Pakeha and Maori. However, such arguments were absent from the discourse of groups that represented Maori. The Maori Councils, the Maori MPs and the MWWL were nonetheless driven by the sometimes contradictory urges to call for limitation on immigration in order to preserve Maori opportunities in urban housing and jobs and the desire to support vulnerable Pacific Island ‘kin’. The latter view generally prevailed and these organisations adhered to a vision of a plural society and expressed feelings of common interests and of kinship with Pacific Islanders.

The strongest advocates for Pacific Islanders among the Maori Councils were the Auckland Branch which counted among its executive the young politically engaged academics Pat Hohepa and Ranginui Walker. The idea that Maori should support Pacific Island immigrants was expressed by Hohepa.

I see the need for closer liaison between different Polynesian groups. There has to be a cooperative effort to raise living standards, educational standards etc. The Maori leaders must be positive mediators between groups and extend some aroha to their newly arrived kinsfolk.

Along with Maori MP Matiu Rata, Hohepa criticised the Government for not offering Polynesian immigrants the same assistance with housing and travel costs as Europeans. Ranginui Walker, in turn, defended both Maori and Pacific Islanders

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97 See Chapter 6.
100 *Herald* 25/9/73, p. 5. *Herald* 7/10/73 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 26 and Letter R Walker (Secretary of ADMC) to PM (N Kirk), 6/10/73 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 28.
against media criticisms of drinking and violence, pointing out that alcohol was a nationwide problem affecting all ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{103}

The MWWL, in its role as an advocate for Maori interests, also defended rights of Pacific Islanders who it perceived as sharing many of the problems of contemporary Maori. Such lobbying included calls for land to be made available for youth recreational facilities for young Maori and Pacific Islanders, for recognition of Maori and Pacific Island values in the health sector and for trade training facilities for Maori to be extended to Pacific Islanders.\textsuperscript{104} The League fostered links with Pacific Island groups by offering two scholarships to Pacific Island women for study in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{105} The Young Maori Leaders Conference of 1970 also adopted a dual advocacy pattern, calling for both Maori and Samoan language to be offered in schools, for a job placement service for new arrivals from the Islands and for the Maori Council to take in representatives from other Polynesian communities.\textsuperscript{106}

**Radical Maori Youth Groups: Nga Tamatoa, Maori Organisation on Human Rights, Polynesian Panther Party**

The views of young urban Maori were represented by a range of small organisations including the Maori Organisation on Human Rights (MOOHR), formed in 1967, Nga Tamatoa which was formed in 1970, and the Polynesian Panther Party, formed in 1971.\textsuperscript{107} These groups shared the tactics, some of the objectives and some organisational links with other protest movements while striving to represent distinctly Maori and Polynesian interests.

Nga Tamatoa was the largest and most vocal of these organisations. It became involved with the causes of housing, conditions for urban Maori and police harassment, and launched a successful petition for more Maori language teaching in schools.\textsuperscript{108} Its community work included offering free legal advice and running an employment bureau and crèches for ‘Polynesians’ in Auckland. Nga Tamatoa formed

\textsuperscript{105}MWWL Annual Conference Minutes, 1972, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{107}Bernard Kernot described Nga Tamatoa as urban young and “[impatient] with their elders for being too accommodating to Pakeha pressures.” Kernot, p. 232.
links with CARE, and saw one of its roles as keeping the larger organisation focused on domestic race relations issues.109

The organisation called for a more cultural-pluralist society. In a letter to Prime Minister Jack Marshall in 1972, its president Taura Eruera summed up the conflict of identity faced by Maori in an assimilationist Pakeha dominated New Zealand: “It is basically an individualistic, competitive system at odds with a group orientated/ cooperative system.” “You have a simple choice,” he concluded, “to concentrate on the development of an indigenous system which will satisfactorily accommodate those Polynesians and Pakehas who want to be part of it, or to invite racial strife.”110

The MOOHR was constituted in Auckland in 1967 with the objective of opposing all forms of racism and discrimination and its constitution demonstrates the interplay of international ideas about racial equality and national values in calling for upholding of what it saw as the “positive aspects of the Treaty of Waitangi and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.”111 It drew support from the small body of Maori at Auckland University. Like Nga Tamatoa, the MOOHR was concerned with issues of cultural pluralism. These included the status of Maori culture within the official culture of New Zealand, including Maori language teaching in schools and Maori broadcasting rights. It was most active, however, as a media watchdog and was highly critical of media reporting of crime and overcrowding as ‘Polynesian’ issues. Many of its grievances were expressed on behalf not just of Maori but of the broader ‘Polynesian’ community and at times on behalf of other ethnic minorities. For example, it called for a ‘Polynesian’ radio station in Auckland, it attacked press reporting of ‘Polynesian’ crime, and defended the rights of “Maori, Polynesians and Indians” who it saw as being open to exploitation by landlords.112

Concern about media images of Maori and other Polynesians led the MOOHR to help launch Mana in Auckland in 1977. Mana was a tabloid newspaper with articles in

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108 Nga Tamatoa, Te Reo Maori: Maori Language and the New Zealand Education Department, pamphlet, 1974 (Hocken Library).
110 Letter Eruera to Minister of Maori Affairs, undated 1972 in NZNA MA1 36/1/21 v. 21.
111 MOOHR Newsletter, Mar. 72.
112 MOOHR Newsletters, 1971-73.
English, Maori and Pacific Island languages, which drew support from many prominent Maori as well as Amnesty Aroha and the Auckland Council for Civil Liberties. However, it appears to have lasted only about a year.\textsuperscript{113}

The Polynesian Panther Party was a small, passionate, urban youth movement which also drew ideology from the global and the local. It drew its inspiration from the American Black Panthers, but its goals were distinctly Polynesian. The PPP demanded radical change in New Zealand’s political environment to recognise Polynesian values as separate from those of the Pakeha-dominated state. Its three main foci were an attack on institutionalised racism, the ideal of pan-Polynesian unity and a vision of a plural society.

The PPP campaigned against institutionalised racism which it linked to ‘Capitalism’ or an abstract and ill defined ‘system,’ or ‘power structure’. Its members worked with CARE to ‘monitor’ the actions of the Police Special Taskforce on Polynesian Offending, called for court trials of Polynesians by their own people, campaigned for Maori language in schools and the right to speak Polynesian languages at work and riled against exploitation by landlords of vulnerable Polynesians tenants. “No-one should own a house they don’t live in,” it argued.\textsuperscript{114}

The PPP was strongly pan-Polynesian in outlook, arguing “we constantly face the damaging tactic of divide and conquer which the oppressor is using in regard to separating the Maori people from the rest of his Polynesian race,” and “the PPP believe in getting brown unity before getting brown-white unity.”\textsuperscript{115} The organisation claimed Maori, Samoan, Niuean and Tongan members.\textsuperscript{116}

Despite being small and presenting the appearance of a radical fringe, the PPP fits well with the pattern of the protest movement, both in terms of tactics which combined political activities with community work, and through its vision of a multicultural society. It declared that

\textsuperscript{113}Mana Interim Committee, \textit{Mana Newspaper}, 1977. Hocken.
\textsuperscript{114}PPP Newsletter, Aug. 1974.
\textsuperscript{116}PPP Newsletter, Mar./Apr. 1975.
This society must be changed to serve a multi-racial population. We want an end to the racist laws that are mono-cultural in nature and the institutions that are dominated by racial and monocultural values.\footnote{PPP Newsletter, Aug. 1974. Community work involved staffing homework centers, social workers, providing legal advice and prison visits. \textit{PPP Newsletter}, Aug. 1974. As one member put it “At first we would help people with boy scout type jobs like cutting hedges, trying to promote good vibes among the community. But we soon found that they had more problems than overgrown hedges.” \textit{Auckland Star}, \textit{The Islanders}, 1976, p. 10.}

It attacked assimilationism as an approach to race relations and argued for what it called an ‘inter-communal society.’ “This separate living is not in different areas as in South Africa, but just recognising each other’s different values, ideas, cultures and way of doing things.”\footnote{PPP Newsletter, No.\text{v.}/Dec. 1974.}


The new groups shared many of the goals of the older articulators of Maori interest, including the vision of a society based around cultural pluralism. However, they also had much in common with the broader protest movement. Not only did they have links with CARE, ACORD and the Race Relations Council through joint projects, publications and membership, they also shared their tactics and a young urban support base and inspiration both in tactics and in ideology from minority civil rights movements overseas.\footnote{Walker cited in Evan S Te Ahu Poata Smith, ‘He Pokoko Uenuku i Tu Ai: The Evolution of Contemporary Maori Protest’, in Paul Spoonley ed. \textit{Nga Patai: Racism and Ethnicity in Aotearoa/ New Zealand}, Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1996, pp. 97-8.} Most importantly, they were more comfortable with the idea that Maori and Pacific Islanders in New Zealand shared interests and Polynesian cultural identity.

\textbf{The Assimilationist Reaction}

The multi-culturalist vision of New Zealand race relations loosely shared by the protest movement, including Maori organisations, presented a challenge to the entrenched assimilationist pattern of race relations which claimed the fundamental Liberal value of equality of the individual and New Zealand’s tradition of racial equality as arguments against cultural-pluralism. The result was inevitably a strong reaction. CARE and HART, as the most visible articulators of the cultural-pluralist
vision, were seen by some, not as defenders of racial harmony, but as a threat to it. Their members were reviled by sections of the community and were frequently attacked as ‘reverse racists’ who stirred up racial tensions. Those who opposed them presented them as a small radical minority seeking through noisy protest action to drown out the wishes of a hypothetical silent majority.

This assimilationist reaction was articulated by members of the parliamentary National Party. In 1976, National Party officials accused those who expressed opposition to the dawn raids as “police haters” who were “inciting racial disharmony.”121 Under the headline “GRAVE MENACE TO OUR DEMOCRACY” the Herald quoted National MP George Gair as declaring “we see narrow racialism preached in the name of race rights and a new and ugly attitude by a militant minority ... but where is the counter protest by the great majority?”122 He later attacked CARE by name, claiming that they “react emotionally and make wild allegations of racial discrimination.”123 Following protests against the dawn raids, Immigration Minister Gill also described Amnesty Aroha as “a group of people jumping up and down” and Prime Minister Muldoon attacked what he called ‘inverted racism against Whites’ by such groups as “extravagant and distorted criticism of imagined acts and attitudes of white people or their establishment towards dark skinned people.”124

National found a strong resonance for such attitudes among the readers and editorial staff of Truth and in the new medium of talkback radio.125 In 1974, a Truth editorial bemoaned that critical discussion of the issue of crime by Pacific Islanders was stifled by “minority pressure groups crying racism” and continued “we have too many zealots intent on destroying the New Zealand way of life by exploiting racial differences while claiming to be working in the interests of Polynesians.”126 Many readers agreed. “CARE and HART are vociferous minorities lacking support” wrote one. Robert Muldoon harnessed these sentiments in his 1975 election campaign,

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120 Smith also discusses links and membership crossover with other protest organisations. Smith, p. 100.
121 Ross, p. 108.
123 NZPD, v. 396, 1975, p. 441.
portraying the best interests of ordinary New Zealanders as being threatened by minorities who were seeking to violate the principle of individual equality and thus subvert the democratic process.\textsuperscript{127}

**Conclusion**

Special interest groups, like election campaigns, are a point where public opinion is channelled into politics. It is clear from studying special interest groups in relation to the immigration issue of the 1970s that New Zealanders’ views on immigration were determined by a variety of factors. Their perception of their economic interests was one of these and an evaluation of economic interests explains the various positions taken by unions and employers. Public opinion and political behaviour, however, are about more than a rational pursuit of interests. They are also about values, about identity and about ideology and it was to these concerns that the new wave of radical cause groups appealed.

While the evolution of the New Left and the politics of protest in the 1970s was a global phenomenon, and New Zealand’s movements drew inspiration and learned tactics from movements overseas, almost all of the protest movements used a discourse of ‘national’ values or national identity in pursuit of broad public support for their causes. In the case of the groups that were concerned with immigration, the national myth to which they appealed most often was that of New Zealand as a society that valued harmonious race relations. CARE, Amnesty Aroha and the Race Relations Council shared the conviction that cultural pluralism was a key to achieving this ideal.

The pursuit of cultural pluralism in New Zealand was the common ideological thread that united cause groups, the churches and representatives of Maoridom in their criticism of immigration and immigrant resettlement policy. These groups often shared a vision of New Zealand as a Pacific rather than a European nation. They embodied growing political diversity and collectively represented a reaction to the assimilationism of New Zealand society of the 1960s.

\textsuperscript{126} Truth ed. 20/7/74, p. 6. Truth 7/12/76, p. 28, p.33.

\textsuperscript{127} One correspondent wrote that “Statistics show that some Pacific Island races make undesirable citizens. They have had their chance in the welfare state with HART, CARE and churches bending over backwards to help them. In return we are called racist.” Truth 30/8/77, p. 7. 1/11/77, p. 18. 13/12/77, p. 21. See Chapter 9 for discussion of the election.
Multiculturalist discourse, because of its inherent nature of tolerating different modes of living, allowed groups with different interests to find common ideological ground. However, a belief in cultural pluralism and Pacific identity were not values that were universally accepted in New Zealand. Indeed, for many New Zealanders, they represented a threat to the entrenched European assimilationist paradigm of fair race relations based on individual equality.

Emerging diversity of cultural identity was described by May Joseph as presenting alternative sites of identity to the nation in 1970s Britain. However, protest movements in 1970s New Zealand linked a multicultural vision of race relations with national mythology of racial harmony and social justice and to specifically local issues. In so doing, these movements did not undermine popular identification with the nation, but made national identity and identity myths the locus of the debate. Even though the debate divided New Zealanders, it reinforced rather than undermined some fundamental shared beliefs about the nature of New Zealand national identity.
Chapter 8: Electoral Politics, Immigration and National Identity

What is the relationship between politics and national identity? Is national identity a popular process of identification in which a discrete and definable group of people choose to identify with a shared polity, as social-contract theorists such as Renan and Bowker would argue? Or is it better understood as a construct cultivated by those in power within nation states to justify their positions of authority, as Hobsbawm and Duara would have us believe? In almost all cases it is both these things and the two propositions are not mutually exclusive. This chapter will address this broader issue in relation to 1970s New Zealand and the immigration debate.

The 1975 general election was one time in New Zealand's history when issues of national identity became part of the struggle for power. In this chapter, I will argue that New Zealanders across the political spectrum loosely shared a set of beliefs about their nation and I will explore the narratives of national identity adopted by the two main parties in their election campaigns to appeal to these beliefs.

The main issues of the 1975 campaign were the economy, industrial relations, crime, housing, the environment and the personalities of the party leaders. But questions of national identity were lurking just below the surface. ‘Was the New Zealand value of classlessness being eroded by unemployment and hard-line unions?’ ‘Were urban-sprawl, crime, and population increase threatening the environment that made New Zealand a great place to bring up children?’ ‘Was the New Zealand dream of owning your own home being eroded by soaring housing prices?’ ‘Was New Zealand's proud record in race relations under threat from radical stirrers and from an influx of non-European immigrants?’ and ‘Was New Zealand's tradition of political fair-play and democracy threatened by a Leader of the Opposition who was a dictatorial bully?’ In the discourses of the two main parties, the issues of the election went to the very heart of what being a New Zealander was supposed to mean.

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This chapter will demonstrate that the immigration issue became the battleground in the divide between the two visions of New Zealand presented by the two main political parties and their leaders. It will examine the extent to which the two parties’ electoral rhetoric reflected a deeper division in New Zealand about identity issues, and to what extent national identity was merely a political tool manipulated by shrewd politicians in pursuit of power.

**Nationalism in 1970s New Zealand - The Labour Party**

Political scientist Robert Chapman described National’s leader Robert Muldoon’s use of immigration in 1975 as a “masterpiece” of political campaigning. National blamed immigrants let in by Labour's lax immigration policy for many of the social and economic problems facing New Zealand and presented the public with a vision of a traditional national way of life under threat. Muldoon was a populist and a master of nationalist rhetoric, but he was not the only great populist of his generation. Three years earlier, Labour's Norman Kirk had stormed to power amid a cloud of nationalist rhetoric. However, the ways in which Kirk appealed to New Zealand nationalism, and indeed his whole vision of New Zealand identity, were quite different from those of Muldoon.

Prior to the late 1960s, national identity had seldom been contested in the political arena. There was a fundamental consensus between the two dominant parties that culturally, in international relations and in economic focus, New Zealand was essentially a European society. However, under Kirk, Labour’s discourse of national identity changed. Kirk stressed New Zealand’s identity as an independent international power, as a nation of the Pacific region and as a culturally plural society. In turn, National continued to represent a vision of society that was more conservative, assimilationist and centred on the idea that New Zealand was a British nation.

Kirk’s political rhetoric drew heavily on an appeal to national values. The introduction to the published collection of his speeches of 1969, *Towards Nationhood*, boasted that “the keynote of Norman Kirk’s speeches is his attachment to New Zealand. His New Zealandism [and] his regional viewpoint colour his entire

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3Ibid.
thinking and make a new departure in New Zealand politics.”

Nowhere was this nationalism more evident than in his foreign policy. Kirk articulated a vision of New Zealand as an independent, assertive small nation. Unlike his predecessors, he made no apologies for differences with Britain or the United States where they conflicted with the distinct interests of New Zealand. No longer was the nation’s individuality measured as degree of difference from a mother country, but in a broader relationship as one of the world’s sovereign states. A vision of a compassionate, multicultural and independent New Zealand also drove Kirk’s Government into anti-nuclearism, anti-apartheid policies and increases in foreign aid.

Kirk employed a discourse of ‘New Zealand values’ on social issues at home. His speeches frequently referred to supposedly shared national values of social justice and equality and it was to these values that Labour appealed in bringing in the controversial Domestic Purposes Benefit for solo-parents, in 1973, and extending the Accident Compensation Scheme. “Let us have a sense of pride in being New Zealanders,” he wrote, “let us recognise the value of the unique way of life we have here - a humane, non-violent society, free from the social and economic injustices that plague so many societies.”

Kirk’s Government also began New Zealand’s journey towards institutional cultural pluralism through steps to accommodate minority cultures in education and the civil service and by passing the Treaty of Waitangi Act. Kirk was particularly strong on the symbolism of multiculturalism, as two photos indicate. The first, from 1973, shows Kirk at Waitangi hand in hand with a small Maori boy in traditional clothing, while a photo from the Herald of the following year shows him taking part in a ritual Kava ceremony with members of the Samoan Branch of the Labour Party in

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5Frank Corner, ‘New Zealand Presents a New Face to the World’, manuscript supplied by the author which was later published in edited form in Margaret Clarke ed., *Three Labour Leaders*, Dunmore, Palmerston North, 2001, p. 6.
Auckland. Ranginui Walker wrote in his eulogy to Kirk, “we who are left will fulfil your vision of a nation united in the diversity of our cultures.”¹⁰


Kirk’s new approach to New Zealand’s place in the world and his Government’s re-examination of the assimilationist paradigm of race relations had consequences for immigration policy. A greater acceptance of cultural diversity at home made acceptance of immigrants from non-European cultures easier, while a desire to strengthen New Zealand’s links with Asia and the Pacific made it imperative for him to remove immigration criteria that were seen to discriminate against Asians and Pacific Islanders.¹¹

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⁹ See Chapter 3.
Kirk’s re-evaluation of social and foreign policies reflected changes that were occurring within his party and within society as a whole. Labour, which had traditionally been the political arm of the union movement, was becoming
increasingly dominated by liberal white-collar members of the so called ‘New Left’. Gustafson records that, between 1960 and 1970, the ‘white-collar’ proportion of party membership rose from 23 to 51 percent. Young well-educated liberals brought pressure for change in the party’s focus towards non-economic ‘moral’ issues such as Vietnam, sport with South Africa, abortion, homosexual law reform and race relations and this created a certain tension with the traditional blue collar rank and file party members who favoured a focus on ‘bread and butter’ issues such as public health, social welfare, employment.12

Nationalism offered Kirk a way of papering over this ideological gap. By adopting nationalism alongside socialist ideology as a Labour Party value, Kirk was able to refocus his party away from its divisions. “The New Zealand Labour Party is the New Zealand party,” he told one audience, “the words New Zealand are as important as the word Labour. We are for New Zealand ... we aim to ... accelerate New Zealand’s journey towards nationhood.”13 In this way, changes in the New Zealand Labour Party reflected a much broader move in Western democracies in the early 1970s, from the politics of ideology to politics of identity.14

**The National Party, Muldoon and Nationalism**

The constitution of the Labour Party stressed the values of freedom and political, cultural and social welfare, justifying these through an ideology of ‘democratic socialism’.15 The National party’s constitution, in contrast, while including the ideas of freedom and democracy, substituted British identity for socialist ideology as the basis for these principles. It stressed “loyalty to the Queen”, “democratic government”, “British justice” and “British freedom.”16 This greater attachment to Britain is evident in its 1972 manifesto which tempered remarks about the growing

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13 Colin James, p. 21.
14 See Chapter 1.
importance of Asia and the Pacific to New Zealand with a promise that New Zealand would “maintain close contact with Britain” and “affirm loyalty to the Queen.”

National’s greater attachment to New Zealand’s British heritage meant that its supporters’ attitudes to race relations were generally more assimilationist than those of Labour or the minor parties. One National MP David Highet told the house in 1974 that discrimination in immigration policy was “not against any person because of the colour of his [sic] skin, it is in the interests of all those people who are in New Zealand at present,” adding that “we are not Maori, we are not European we are all New Zealanders.”

Robert Muldoon, who took the leadership of the National Party in July 1974, was a populist leader who appealed to the public through a vision of the New Zealand nation. However, his vision of identity was very different to that of National Party tradition and also very different from that of Norman Kirk. Muldoon’s appeal to national identity can best be understood in terms of two key elements: conservatism, in the sense of resistance to change, and populism. For him, New Zealand national values were not something to be developed and nurtured as Kirk sought to do, but to be ‘preserved’. Much of his nationalist rhetoric from 1974-5 portrays a traditional New Zealand way of life under threat.

Muldoon was above all a conservative, by his own admission - “a preserver rather than a reformer.” He looked back to a primary production fuelled welfare-state, secure in a strong relationship with a great power, that was New Zealand of the 1940s and 50s. When questioned as to his essential conservatism on Television One’s “Seven Days” in July 1975, Muldoon responded that he was a “preserver, who [had]
lived in a very good time in New Zealand” and when asked how he would like to be remembered he replied “that when I go, I left this country at least as good as when I took it over.”

Muldoon reiterated this attitude at National’s conference in the same year. He told delegates “we will not create a new society. We will preserve and enhance the one we have and the one we want to keep” and “National will preserve and enhance the things that made New Zealand the way we like it,” a phrase that was later moulded into National’s election slogan “New Zealand the way you want it.” Muldoon contrasted his ‘preservationist’ approach with the rapid change brought about by Labour. His party’s 1975 manifesto accused Labour of being “an inept government” which sought to “replace our traditional values with alien ideas,” and Muldoon told a television audience that “I think the people will say ‘we want New Zealand a bit as it used to be, not the way these people are trying to make it’.” Through this conservatism, Muldoon appealed more to older voters and less to the post-war generation who were more heavily represented among the social critics of the New Left.

Muldoon was an exponent of the classic better-Britain mythology. Like many older New Zealanders, he saw no contradiction between being a New Zealander and being British in a broad sense. He wrote that “my grandparents on both sides came to New Zealand nearly 100 years ago and yet, I still regard Britain as my home country.” However, in the same article, he went on to contrast New Zealand’s classless society with Britain. Muldoon also stood on ceremony when taking over as Prime Minister in 1976 by insisting that his first official engagement abroad should be a visit to the

27*Truth* 18/9/73, p. 6.
Queen. When Secretary of Foreign Affairs Frank Corner suggested that this idea was old fashioned, Muldoon retorted “I AM old fashioned.”

The conservatism of Muldoon and his Government was reflected in its foreign policy. National’s first year in office saw the end to what Waite calls Kirk’s ‘moral’ foreign policy with the return of nuclear warships to New Zealand, the end of moves to construct the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and a retreat from Labour’s stand against sporting links with South Africa. One implication of Muldoon’s conservatism for immigration was a rejection of cultural-pluralism and a reassertion of the principle of assimilation in immigrant selection. In response to a question about his ideal settler for New Zealand, Muldoon replied:

The ideal settler could come from any race and many countries, any one of them, but the essential is that he comes here prepared to be a New Zealander, regardless of his racial or ethnic origin, he comes here prepared to be a member of the New Zealand community. In other words, he comes here prepared to live as a New Zealander, look outwards from New Zealand rather than say ‘I am a Scotsman who happens to be living in New Zealand’.

The second key element of Muldoon’s nationalism was its populist base. He did not have a political ideology, indeed, he defined himself politically against ideology. While the Second National Government had appealed to ‘British fairness’ and ‘British justice,’ and the Labour Government claimed its legitimacy from the doctrine of democratic socialism, Muldoon claimed legitimacy for his policies from his political straw-man - the ordinary New Zealander.

Muldoon’s populist conception of the nation cannot be separated from ‘the ordinary bloke.’ The ‘ordinary bloke,’ the ‘ordinary citizen,’ or ‘the decent bloke’ was a frequently repeated motif of his political rhetoric. “A fair go for the decent bloke”

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30 See Chapter 4.
became the slogan of National’s 1974 annual conference. As Colin James points out, Muldoon’s speeches portrayed the ordinary bloke as the “font of wisdom and the touchstone of political legitimacy.” Politics was not a matter of complex ideology, but of ‘common sense’, and the master of common sense was the common man. In 1975, for example, he defended himself against charges of racism after he advocated in his Truth column that Pacific Islanders convicted of a crime should be sent home, by claiming that it represented the views of the “vast majority of New Zealanders.”

For Muldoon, the ordinary bloke was the quintessential New Zealander. Muldoon described New Zealand identity as follows.

If we have a philosophy of life in New Zealand, it is that the average bloke is king and that’s not a philosophy of leveling down. At the same time we have to preserve the opportunity for a man to do what he wants in his own way; to… rise as high as his energy and his talents will take him … Always in this country we are going to have concern for the man who simply wants to be an ordinary citizen doing an honest days work, living in the style he wants without fuss, without flamboyance, but enjoying the unique qualities of life in New Zealand.

Instead of defining ‘ordinary blokes’ as a group of people who had common characteristics or interests, Muldoon chose to define them negatively according to who was not included. In so doing, he chose minorities who were either visible or vocal and who were ostensibly responsible for the problems confronting the nation and so avoided alienating many potential voters. Muldoon defined immigrants, militant unionists and the New-Left of Maori radicals, anti-tour protesters, radical students and intellectuals as threats to New Zealand values and held them responsible for the country’s problems. In this way, he defined his political opponents not just as wrong, but as bad New Zealanders. However Muldoon was careful in these criticisms not to single out whole categories of New Zealanders. By attacking student

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32 Alan Blackburn, ‘Political Symbols and Propaganda: The New Zealand National Party and the 1975 Elections’, MA Waikato, 1977, p. 100. The gendered nature of this rhetoric does not seem to have aroused much comment.
33 Colin James, pp. 84-5.
34 Truth 30/9/75, p. 6.
36 Colin James, p. 86. Gustafson, His Way, p. 150.
radicals and militant unionists he attempted to avoid alienating all students or moderate unionists.

In his weekly *Truth* column of 1974, Muldoon blamed anti-racism groups like CARE, who had criticised his racial policies, for fomenting racial tensions. New Zealand has great race relations, he argued, but they were spoilt by ‘stirrers’ who were trying to poison them by misinterpreting and distorting his own remarks. On a later occasion, he accused anti-Apartheid groups of treason.

**The 1975 Election**

It was an abrasive, polarising election fight and disagreement on racial issues was at the heart of it.

The 1975 election campaign is remembered in New Zealand as ‘the one with the dancing Cossacks’ from one of National’s television advertisements created by American cartoon giant Hannah Barbera. The advertisement, which attacked Labour’s supposedly hidden socialist agenda, portrayed the map of New Zealand turning red while cartoon Cossacks danced.

The election was a bitter, personal, often underhanded battle for the minds and the emotions of the New Zealand people. Political scientists often stress three reasons for National’s crushing victory: the ruthless efficiency of its campaign in identifying and exploiting the anxieties of the people, the crushing dominance of Muldoon’s persona over Kirk’s replacement, the more moderate Bill Rowling and a disjointed campaign by the Labour Party. While all of these things are true, they overstate the importance of the three week electoral campaign and do not examine in detail the background reasons for public anxiety that turned Labour’s twenty-three seat majority from 1972 into a twenty three seat defeat. The election was not just a clash between two political competitors and their advertising agencies. Part of the acrimony that ran through the campaign was a deeper debate about what sort of society New Zealand was and should be. While Labour represented a desire for social change, National

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37 *Truth* 15/10/74, p. 6.
adopted a discourse of preserving a national way of life which was under threat from governmental mis-management.

New Zealand National Party Advertisement 1975 (Source NZFA).

The biggest issues of the campaign were the economy and inflation, but the Labour Party could hardly be blamed for the world economic downturn. Immigration offered National one way around this. National blamed the country’s economic woes as well as problems of pressure on housing, industrial relations, the environment and crime, on the record numbers of immigrants who had entered New Zealand in the preceding three years. It then blamed the Government’s immigration policy for the flow of immigrants and presented National’s promised hard-line approach to immigration as the solution to all these problems and as a way of restoring New Zealand’s ‘traditional way of life.’

National’s mastery of television as a medium of political propaganda was key to getting this message across. Christopher Wilkes, in his study of Christchurch voters, found that 96 percent of them had a television and 91 percent had seen at least one television presentation on the election.42 Television was less geared towards complex

42Christopher Wilkes, ‘Politics and Television: In which Hanna Barbera Win an Election by Giving Us What We Want the Way We Want It’, MA Canterbury, 1976, p. 64.
debate of issues than towards ‘snappy sound bites’, slogans and simplifications and all of this favoured the simple repeated messages of Muldoon over the more complex, carefully reasoned arguments of economist and former academic Rowling. In the words of Muldoon’s Cabinet colleague Hugh Templeton, “Instinctively he knew the importance of short sharp statements: The sound-bite came naturally to this politician. People loved his quirkiness, his outspokenness [and] his willingness to knock down idols.”

Mountains, lake, tranquillity, nature, bloke in a bush shirt (National Party Advertisement 1975 Election (Source: New Zealand Film Archive NZFA).

Muldoon’s direct style and ability to present issues simply allowed him to appeal to blue collar workers who would never have ordinarily voted for National. He managed to convince many traditional working-class Labour voters that a New-Left agenda adopted by the Rowling Government had drawn the party away from its concern for ordinary people. Muldoon also appealed particularly to voters in

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44 Templeton, pp. 39-40.
Auckland where the problems of housing, crime and pressure on resources were greatest and it was in Auckland that a massive swing brought National to power.46

In the hands of Muldoon and National’s public relations firm, Colenso, the immigration issue became a credible political tool. The cartoon format of National’s advertisements lent itself splendidly to the symbolic simplified representation of immigration as a cause of the nation’s problems of the later part of National’s campaign. But such representations were only effective within the context of an earlier campaign of developing the key ideas presented in them. This is what political scientist Alan Blackburn called National’s “pre-propaganda.”47

The Economy and Inflation

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, New Zealand had been one of the wealthiest countries per-capita in the world and, in the lead up to the 1975 election, New Zealand’s diminishing relative wealth, its worsening balance of payments and inflation were the issues that worried New Zealanders most.48 Labour presented these problems as being due to the worldwide economic recession and argued that the Government’s actions in using the country’s overseas reserves to prop-up the economy had sheltered New Zealanders from the worst of it. National, in contrast, contended that Labour had mis-managed the economy. As already noted, it argued that economic problems were a direct result of a massive increase in immigration in the preceding three years which was due, in turn, to a failure of Labour’s immigration policy. Thus, through the intermediary issue of immigration, National was able to blame the Government for the recession.

The appeal of National’s interpretation was that it offered an explanation for the recession that non-economists could understand and Muldoon reinforced it not by elaboration but by repetition. He began putting National’s message directly to the people over a year before the election, with public meetings in large towns and

47 Blackburn, p. 162.
through his weekly column to the estimated 600 000 readers of *Truth*. In February 1975, he declared that “there is no doubt that we can only support a population which increases at the rate of about 30 000 a year ... by continued overseas borrowing at a level that cannot be sustained.” Muldoon argued that each immigrant created $11 000 in costs of new infrastructure and from this drew the conclusion that the 64 000 immigrants who had come in the preceding two years had contributed $704 000 000 to the national deficit.

Because it had been publicly repeated for almost a year, at the start of the official election campaign in November, the argument that immigrants caused the recession was familiar to the electorate and Muldoon set about hammering it home. In the televised leaders’ debate, he told the public that immigration was the “number-one cause” of the economic downturn and that “the quickest and easiest way to take pressure off the economy is to cut-back hard on immigration.”

The last stage in National’s campaign included the cartoon advertisements made by Hannah Barbera. One advertisement featured caricatured British and Polynesian immigrants with price tags of ‘only $11 000’ tied around their necks. The idea that immigrants cost a defined sum of money was now presented as established fact. The animated television advertisement added - “The Government let into New Zealand 30 000 immigrants a year at a cost of $11 000 each. So the Labour Government decided to borrow money- a lot of money.” This borrowing was then linked to the economic issues that worried New Zealanders most, inflation and unemployment.

Through its cartoon advertisement, National was not attacking real immigrants but symbolic representations. Had it accused real individuals of being responsible for inflation, National would have been both confronted by the complexities of their individual circumstances and more open to charges of racism. In the latter part of the

50 *Truth* 4/2/75, p. 6.
52 On November 11th, he told readers that the “rush of 60 000 immigrants into the country in the last two years has placed intolerable pressures on the economy.” *Truth* 11/11/75, p. 6.
53 Dryden et al.
54 Blackburn, pp. 167-9.
advertisement, Muldoon again told the public that under a National Government, “growth through immigration will be reduced from 30 000 annually to around 5 000 - a saving of about $275 million in resources.”

Finally, National associated the pressure on the economy created by immigrants with its theme of a national way of life under threat. Its manifesto declared that “National is concerned by the undue pressure created by excessive immigration in the last three years and will act to protect the quality of life and living standards of all New Zealanders by strictly controlling immigration from all sources.”

55 Ibid., p. 169.
Crime and the Urban Environment

The idea that New Zealand is a ‘great place to bring up children’ is a much repeated national refrain but, in the lead-up to the 1975 election, this safe quality of life seemed to be in danger and crime was one of the issues that particularly worried voters. Many associated increasing crime with rapid urban growth related to immigration. National, in its campaign, cultivated this anxiety as a way of attacking the Government’s immigration policy.

Muldoon’s appeal to public sentiment on the link between immigration and crime began before he took the leadership of the National Party in July 1974. In his Truth column, he advocated deporting immigrants convicted of crimes. In response to charges that such a law would be racist, Muldoon responded that it would “also apply to Europeans.” Nonetheless, through the imagery and the examples he chose, it is clear that Pacific Islanders were the target of his comments.57 “For the Pacific Islanders,” he argued, “there is no doubt that the penalty he would regard as the greatest deterrent would be the threat to send him back to his own home.”58

The idea that Pacific Islanders were responsible for crime and a threat to the New Zealand way of life was already familiar to voters when the formal election campaign started. Muldoon raised the issue three times in his column in the weeks leading up to the election and was largely supported in his views by the paper’s editorial staff and by a large number of letters to the editor. In an article a week before the election, he called for the deportation of recent immigrants convicted of crimes, commenting that “many an outbreak of violence comes because a semi-inebriated Pacific Islander fails to understand that a jocular comment is not an insult but an off-the-cuff remark.”59

Muldoon went on to portray his policy as a way of defending a safe New Zealand, a great place to bring up kids, from being swamped by foreign criminals. “The New Zealand way of life is too precious,” he argued, “to be threatened by those who cannot adapt to our normal social customs.”60

57 Truth 6/7/74, p. 6.
58 Truth 23/7/74, p. 6. Muldoon also suggested that Maori offenders should not be allowed to live in the city. Truth 16/7/74, p. 6 (Mike Moore’s Column).
60 Ibid.
National’s television advertisement told the public that

There was a time when New Zealand’s cities were quiet and clean. People said they were ‘nice places to bring up children.’ But the cities grew alarmingly. People poured in, not just from the country, but from other countries as well - 60,000 in two years. Nobody could build enough houses, so the price went up and nobody could afford one. Soon there were not enough schools ... or hospitals. Then one day there weren’t enough jobs either. The people became angry and violence broke out - especially among those who had come from other places expecting great things.61

The text of the advertisement was a good example of the way in which the political discourse of immigration and national identity were linked. It began by painting an image of an idyllic New Zealand, “clean”, “quiet” and “a nice place to bring up children.” It then presented the image of these national treasures as well as public access to houses, schools and jobs as being threatened and defined this threat as coming from outsiders allowed in by the Labour Government. It concluded by implying that an outbreak of violence in society had been caused by immigrants.

The issue of crime was simplified in the advertisement’s images. “There was a time when New Zealand’s cities were quiet and clean. People said they were ‘nice places to bring up children,’” was presented with music box music and the image of a storybook being opened. Inside the book was the image of a young couple pushing a pram, birds twittering and a small boy playing among some flowers with a ball.

“But the cities grew alarmingly. People poured in, not just from the country, but from other countries as well - 60,000 in two years,” was accompanied by the image of Auckland with its harbour bridge over-run as the skies became heavy with planes, helicopters and ships disgorging people onto the waterfront.

National Party advertisement 1975 (Source NZFA).

National Party advertisement 1975 (Source NZFA).
“The people became angry and violence broke out—especially among those who had come from other places expecting great things,” was accompanied by the image of a caricatured Polynesian and a bald European ejected from a pub and then kicking and punching each other in the road outside shouting in an unintelligible language.

The powerful symbol of the drunken troublemaking Pacific Islander was presented in the form of a cartoon. The symbolic representation of the cartoon image was more detached from the context of critical debate than an actor employed by National to stage a pub brawl or a member of the National Party talking about Pacific Islanders hitting people would have aroused.

Blaming outsiders for crime and the deterioration of the urban environment left scope for National to once again blame Labour’s immigration policy and to offer voters a simplified solution to crime by promising to get tough on immigration. National implied not just that violent crime was alien to the New Zealand way of life, but that it would save New Zealand from crime and restore a traditional safe way of life by deporting the criminals and by cutting immigration. It concluded its television advertisement: “remember that we have a plan to make our cities nice places to bring up children again.”

62 Ibid.
Housing

One of New Zealand’s most important national myths was the idea that anyone could aspire to own their own home. In 1975, National blamed the Labour Government, through its immigration policy, for placing this pillar of Kiwi identity in peril. Between 1972 and 1975, not only had the national average price of houses and sections almost doubled, but waiting lists for state housing were also growing. It seemed that the dream of a family owning its own home was being pushed out of reach of ordinary New Zealanders.

National faced the problem in criticising Labour’s housing policy that, in the preceding three years, Labour had built record numbers of state houses. Once again, the intermediate issue of immigration provided National with a means of blaming the Government for the problem. National’s argument was that Labour had caused housing shortages by letting in too many immigrants from Britain and the Pacific who increased demand, pushed prices up and pushed New Zealanders down the waiting list for state houses.

Muldoon first built the association between immigrants and the housing crisis in his Truth column in February 1975 and in parliamentary debates in April.63 By the time of the election, National had already done much work to reduce the complex issue to a simplified causal link between housing, foreign immigrants, and Labour’s immigration policy. National’s pamphlet “Why Is There a Housing Problem?” argued that

Labour has allowed inflation to run on largely unchecked and its immigration polices have permitted a flood of immigrants who have had to be housed and whose needs have driven up demand - and their prices.64

In the leaders’ debate, Muldoon conceded that Labour had built 5,000 houses per annum but argued that new immigrants were creating demand for 7,000. Thus,

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64New Zealand National Party, Why There is a Housing Problem, in National Party Pamphlets, 1975, Hocken.
through its immigration policy, he argued, Labour had made the housing situation worse by 2 000 houses.65

Once again, National used its cartoon advertising format to present the problems symbolically. The cartoon dedicated to housing defined immigration as the “number one cause of the housing problem” and argued that “in two years, Labour has let into New Zealand 60 000 immigrants which is one reason why the average deposit on a house in Auckland jumped from $5 000 to around $10 000 and why state house rental lists are now the longest in New Zealand’s history.” The accompanying image was that of a map of New Zealand being progressively over-run by a mass of black flea-like creatures.66

Having defined the housing problem as due to immigration, and in particular to Labour’s policy on immigration, common sense dictated that, by cutting immigration, National could solve it. The advertisement concluded with a reference to National’s theme of protecting a New Zealand way of life from immigrants let in by the Labour Government - “the National Government is going to do a lot more than just build houses. We’re going to build decent communities and give every New Zealander the

65Dryden et al.
chance to live in them.” In this way it implied that it would restore to New Zealanders the dream of owning their own homes.67

Industrial Relations

New Zealand’s most powerful national myth is that of the ‘classless society’ and our supposed classlessness is defined most often in contrast to a ‘class-bound’ Britain. However, a rise in industrial conflict in the early 1970s fuelled fears that the classless society was under threat.68 As Chapter 5 showed, even before 1975, this threat was associated in the minds of many with the involvement of British immigrants in the union movement.69

The industrial relations issue provided a ready made opportunity for Muldoon to appeal to a vision of a traditional national way of life under threat. Muldoon was direct in his attack on British ‘militant’ unionists, telling a campaign rally “we will deal with the militants and the wreckers according to their just deserts. We will not have a class man of the Clydeside in New Zealand and that is fair and public warning.”70 As the election neared, Colenso and Hannah Barbera worked skilfully to associate Labour’s immigration policies with this perceived problem and to paint unionism as a threat to New Zealanders’ security and a ‘New Zealand way of life’. National’s television advertisement on industrial relations noted that some unions were good and others bad.

Then there are the unions that are run by people who import class prejudice and industrial anarchy. They can close your business, take away your job and bring down our shaky economy and there is nothing you or the Labour Government can do about it.71

67Gustafson, p. 171.
68See Chapter 6.
70Blackburn, p. 177.
National Party advertisements 1975 (Source: NZFA).
This dialogue was overlaid with the image of cloth capped immigrants descending the gangplank of a large ship and with images and the sounds of scavenging seagulls. The implication of the word and image was that industrial unrest was something that was ‘imported’ and was alien to the New Zealand way of doing things. According to National, the reason there was industrial unrest was that Labour’s immigration policies had let in British militant unionists who, like the seagulls, were scavengers out to take anything they could get. The words ‘immigrant’ and ‘British’ were not mentioned because they did not need to be. National’s earlier campaign meant that the meaning of the phrase “people who import class warfare” accompanying the image of people descending a ship was understood. National’s message was that ‘the classless society was under threat because Labour was letting British industrial troublemakers into the country.’

In each of the problems associated with the economy, housing, industrial relations and crime, National took an issue that concerned New Zealanders and blamed immigrants for the problem and the Labour Government for letting the immigrants in. It then proposed the common-sense solution as its own ‘get-tough’ approach to immigration.

The theme of all of National’s advertisements was a sentiment that New Zealand’s traditional way of life was under threat and needed swift action to preserve it. It was an appeal to nationalism, but an appeal to a conservative nationalism. Muldoon was, after all, ‘a preserver rather than a reformer.’ In the simplified cartoon world of Hannah Barbera ‘New Zealand the way you want it’ was under threat from outside forces and Muldoon, as the superhero preserver and protector of the ordinary bloke, was the man to save it.

**Labour’s Response**

Labour, in its campaign, defined ‘Muldoonism’ as alien to New Zealand values. It assumed that the best way of combating National’s campaign was to cultivate the disquiet that many voters, even many traditional National voters, felt about Muldoon’s personal style. Muldoon, Labour argued, was a threat to the New Zealand traditions of democracy, fairness and racial tolerance. Back-bencher Michael Bassett compared Muldoon to Hitler, Powell and McCarthy for blaming outsiders for the
nation’s problems. He accused Muldoon of “cultivat[ing] hate” against British and Pacific Islanders.

In place of reason, bigotry must reign. In place of good honest Kiwi attitudes, there must be a bit of South African, Northern Ireland or Dixicrat reasoning ... I think that in November, the decent people of New Zealand will treat [National] as it deserves to be treated.72

Former Labour candidate Brian Edwards also expressed a view that many Labour people must have felt, that Muldoonism ran contrary to something fundamentally ‘New Zealand.’

I would have said that New Zealanders were reasonable, tolerant, liberal and fair minded. I would have expected them to reject the election of a party that promoted itself on a platform of fear such as fear of the immigrants.73

The centrepiece of the campaign to cultivate feelings of unease about Muldoon was the ‘Citizens for Rowling’ campaign. It was organised by former current affairs presenter David Exel and Labour’s public relations consultant Bob Harvey. The campaign involved a series of advertisements with prominent New Zealanders ostensibly expressing support for the Prime Minister. In fact, it was a thinly veiled series of attacks on the personal style of the Leader of the Opposition. In the words of Barry Gustafson, Labour attempted to contrast the “authoritarianism, confrontation, intolerance and demagoguery” of Muldoon with the “reason, conciliation, tolerance and moderation” of Rowling. The implication was that “the election of Muldoon would change New Zealand from a tolerant caring community into a bitterly divided and callous society.”74 One of the Citizens for Rowling, law professor Geoffrey Palmer, described Muldoon’s political style as ‘alien’.

In my opinion a new and alien political style has emerged in New Zealand with the ascension of Mr Muldoon to the leadership of the National Party.

72NZPD, v. 97, 1975, p. 1515.
73Vernon Wright, ‘If You Don’t Like it Here Why Don’t You Go Home?: The Whingeing Pom, Does He Exist?’, Listener, 20/11/76, p. 15.
74Gustafson, p. 167.
So far as I can judge, the fundamental characteristic of his style is cynical opportunism.\textsuperscript{75}

\textit{Labour Party Television Advertisement ‘Sunrise’ (New Zealand Film Archive).}

Labour’s television advertisement ‘Sunrise’ developed this theme on a symbolic level. It began with an image of a huge sun rising out of the sea followed by scenes of beautiful New Zealand, snow capped mountains, empty beaches, farmers, children playing, trout swimming, Polynesians and Pakeha playing sport and Rowling chatting with people at their work and in the street. Then suddenly the images change. A developer’s plans for a subdivision appear and a “no public access” sign goes up on a green piece of farmland, a beach is tracked out by car tyres and covered in litter and barbed wire closes off the scenic shots. Over the top of these images is the song “Don’t need a Dictator” with the lyrics - “You don’t know what you’ve got. Oh no, You can’t let it be lost. Oh no, ’cos your freedom’s the cost. Oh no we don’t need a dictator!” The implication presented symbolically, but understood by a public who had seen the Citizens for Rowling campaign, was that it was the ‘dictator’ Muldoon who represented a threat to the New Zealand way of life.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{75}Bassett, p. 287.

\textsuperscript{76}New Zealand Labour Party, \textit{Sunrise}, 1975, NZFA C1594.
Muldoon’s response to the ‘Citizens for Rowling’ campaign was a populist one. He attacked its members as ‘ivory-tower academics’ and ‘do-gooders’ who were out of touch with the concerns of ordinary New Zealanders. They were, he asserted, “precious people who presume in their arrogance [to advise] the ordinary bloke.”

Keith Holyoake organised a counter campaign, ‘telegrams for Rob’ while Muldoon’s political ally Bob Jones organised a ‘Citizens for Muldoon’ campaign. His inclusion of fourteen former All Blacks, the ‘Rugby men for Rob,’ reminded New Zealanders that New Zealand’s greatest virtues were not reason, conciliation and tolerance, but that these emblematic Kiwis had to be tough, direct and uncompromising like Muldoon himself.

Labour’s specific response to Muldoon over the immigration issue could be summarised by Labour’s election slogan “trust Labour, it’s working.” Labour’s leaders naively believed that their hard work in developing policies would speak for itself. Labour told the public that their measures to restrict immigration of 1974 had cut British immigration by 61 percent and that numbers of Pacific Islanders would fall as a result of new regulations on temporary visitors introduced in the lead-up to the election. They argued that high current rates of immigration were due to immigrants who could not be stopped such as the 34,000 returning New Zealand citizens.

One flaw in this approach was that it did not question the shaky associations drawn by National between immigrants and the problems of the economy, housing, industrial relations and crime. Labour’s carefully reasoned, logically presented explanations also failed on another level. Muldoon’s attack on immigrants was essentially an appeal to the emotions and Labour’s response, while presenting policy and statistics, failed to respond to public fears on an emotional level. Minister of Immigration Fraser Colman responded to Muldoon’s promise to ensure that immigrants convicted of crimes would be deported by telling the media such a policy would “be treated

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78Gustafson, pp. 166-7.
80Levine and Lodge, p. 17.
82Labour's Manifesto noted that there had been a 21 percent drop in immigrant numbers since its policy review of 1974 and claimed that the new policy had reduced immigration “to a level manageable without social or economic strain.” New Zealand Labour Party, Manifesto, 1975, p. 23.
with the disdain it deserved by right thinking people in New Zealand.”

In contrast Muldoon argued that, in a democracy, it was the popularity of ideas that was important. “I think there are some people who believe National should be the party of the ‘correct’ people. But there aren’t enough correct people of that kind to win an election in this country, the election is won by the ordinary bloke.”

An exit poll confirms that Muldoon was able to reach beyond National’s traditional support base of the blue rinse and into Labour’s blue collar strongholds, bringing sections of the population to vote for National who had never before voted for the party. He drew disproportionately high support among manual and low-wage workers, those with lower education and housewives. Many of these sections of the population, who were traditional Labour voters, moved to Muldoon because they felt alienated by a Labour Government which they perceived as increasingly dominated by ‘radical’ values and which failed to address the immediate economic concerns of the ‘person in the street’. One Auckland Labour supporter wrote that he intended to vote for Muldoon over the issue of immigration because of crime caused by “Island and British immigrants who cannot adapt themselves to our way of life” and a trucking contractor wrote to the Minister telling him that 99 percent of his drivers had objected to the rate of immigration “and this was a factor that made them think seriously to vote National.”

Muldoon understood that in New Zealand’s democracy, power was decided by the vote and people voted not just according to rational arguments and presentation of policy but also according to ‘gut-feelings’, fears and suspicions. He encouraged people to associate their very real fear for the security of their jobs, houses, and crime on their streets with a suspicion of the increasingly visible immigrant minority. Through a discourse of a national way of life under threat, he presented such suspicions not just as the rational common-sense approach of ordinary New Zealanders, but as a nationalist’s response to a threat to the nation, thus ennobling fear, xenophobia, prejudice and scapegoating.

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83 Minister of Immigration (F Colman) press statement, 19/5/75 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 30.
84 Gustafson, *His Way*, p. 150.
The 1975 election result was a profound shock to Labour and forced the party to rethink its organisation and its tactics. One legacy was Labour’s retreat from the self-confident multi-culturalism of the Kirk years. By the 1978 election, the dawn raids along with other high profile racial issues such as the Bastion Point occupation and the All Black tour of South Africa of 1976 had left a scar on New Zealand’s race relations. But Labour chose not to challenge National’s record on racial issues. Perhaps mindful of the socially conservative blue-collar voters who had gone to Muldoon over what was seen as a soft line on immigrants in 1975, Labour chose instead to fight the 1978 election on the issues of the economy and taxation. It left it to the minor parties to carry the torch for institutional recognition of multiculturalism and New Zealand’s liberals would have to wait until 1984 for a government which was prepared to move in this direction.

Conclusion

The 1970s was a time of uncertainty both over New Zealand’s place in the world and over internal cultural politics. In the politics of national identity of the decade, Labour came to represent what might be called ‘progressive nationalism’, a nationalism based around independence and cultural pluralism, while National’s vision of the nation was a ‘conservative nationalism’ looking to preserve traditional international links and cultural models. The controversy over immigration can be understood as part of this debate over identity.

Discourses of national identity and values were employed by both parties in pursuit of electoral support. The National Party drew on widely held national identity myths in its campaign. These included the idea that New Zealand was a classless society, an unspoilt and uncrowded place, a place where anybody could aspire to own their own home and a ‘nice place to bring up children’ and portrayed these values as under threat from Labour’s mis-management of immigration. Labour, in turn, appropriated

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87 Labour’s 1978 Manifesto sub-titled To Rebuild the Nation consisted almost entirely of economic arguments. Where it strayed into social policy, it focused on health, education and welfare. There was no mention of a Maori affairs, a culture and heritage or an immigration policy, nor were there policy statements on nuclear issues, abortion, women’s issues, disarmament or nuclear testing. New Zealand Labour Party, To Rebuild the Nation (manifesto), 1978.

88 In 1978, Values promised “to build a truly plural society as opposed to one based on assimilation or integration.” It promised to foster cultural diversity and argued that many
what it saw as a threat to New Zealand’s traditions of democracy, fairness and racial tolerance as a tool to discredit Muldoon. The nature of New Zealand values was not contested but two very different interpretations were presented of where the threat to these values came from. From this perspective the place of national identity in the election was that of a political tool.

In 1975, ideas of national identity were appropriated and interpreted in pursuit of power in the national election and television provided a brilliant format to represent these threats symbolically. But such an appeal to National values would have been useless without a pre-existing and widely recognised notion of what the elements of New Zealand’s national identity were. In this case the politicians did not create national myths to support their pursuit of power, but appropriated and interpreted myths that were already common to a sizeable part of the population.

Maori grievances over land were justified and that Maori culture should be recognised and accommodated by the institutions of state. New Zealand Values Party, *Manifesto*, 1978, p. 34.
Chapter 9: Night Raids, Dawn Raids and Random Checks

Anyone who speaks in a non-Kiwi accent or looks as though he was not born in this country should carry a passport.

So warned Auckland Police Chief Superintendent Berriman on Saturday 22nd of October 1976, two days after the Police had launched a highly controversial campaign to pursue illegal Pacific Island overstayers.¹

On the 26th of October, the *Auckland Star* published this account of Mrs Hinerangi Burnley, a Maori of Tuhoe descent living in Auckland, who was stopped by police.

I was going to work last Friday morning. We got off the bus at Rawene Road, Highbury about 7:30. There was myself, a Samoan girl, a European and two Fijians. A police car stopped across the road from us. One called ‘can we see you?’ They asked me and the Samoan girl which island we were from. The Samoan girl said Western Samoa. I realised what it was all about and I said ‘I’m a Maori’, The policeman said ‘I hope you’re a good Maori.’ There were two men cops and a lady. They were sniggering through it. They didn’t ask me anything else after that. He then questioned the Samoan girl, who luckily had her papers. The Fijians look like Maoris and weren’t questioned. They didn’t know any of our names and didn’t ask questions about anything else.²

The following night, police set up a checkpoint outside the Crown Hotel in Karangahape Road. Chairman of the Samoan Advisory Council, Pua Sofi describes it:

I saw four policemen on one side of the road and six on the other stopping anybody with a brown skin from passing ... No one was arrested, they were just asked who they were, where they were born and if they had their passports. Included in those stopped were my own two sisters from Papatoetoe and Manurewa who were walking home to my place after shopping. The only people they were letting through were Europeans.³

This account is in keeping with that of Malu Odaufavea, a young Tongan legally in New Zealand, who was stopped three times.

¹*Auckland Star* 22/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
²*Auckland Star* 26/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
³*Auckland Star* 26/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
On Thursday night I was drinking in the Rising Sun Hotel. At 9:30 I left the pub and walked along Karangahape Road towards Ponsonby. A police car stopped and a policeman stopped me and asked me which island I came from, how long I had been here, and where my passport was. I showed him my letter from the Labour Department ... and he let me go. He did not know my name, he did not ask me anything else. I continued to the Star Hotel for a drink. A policeman inside stopped me and asked the same questions. I left and started walking home about 10 o’clock. Along Great North Road, a police car pulled up close to the Labour Department. A policeman got out and asked me the same questions. I showed them the form and they left. Then I went home. 4

The three individuals in question were witnesses to an extraordinary weekend in New Zealand’s race relations. From Thursday to Sunday, police in Auckland launched ‘Operation Pot Black’ in which they stopped and questioned more than 800 Polynesians, many of them at random, about their immigration status. At the same time, police launched a series of raids on Pacific Islanders’ homes in the early hours of the morning. Their goal was to detect illegal overstayers. 5

Some Polynesians were arrested for failing to produce their papers. Iakopo-Tevaga Sio, a post office linesman, was stopped by police in a Grey Lynn street and asked for his papers. Although he was a legal resident of New Zealand, when Police discovered that his passport had expired they arrested him and held him in custody overnight. 6

On Sunday, a middle aged Tongan couple, Sione and Setaita, were woken and arrested during a 6:00am raid on their Grey Lynn home. Both had signed the overstayer register allowing them to stay in New Zealand legally, but partly due to poor English skills, they were unable to convince police of this fact and were arrested. After a court hearing, which they did not understand, both were remanded for a week to Mount Eden prison. Friends of the couple then contacted a lawyer who established their legal status and they were released two and a half days after their arrest. 7

4 Auckland Star 27/10/76 in DOL Auckland Office Archives, NZNA BBAI A. 251 51b 22/1/13.
6 Auckland Star 22/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
7 Amnesty Aroha, They’re Neighbours not Criminals, 1976, pamphlet in DOL 22/1/310 pt. 5.
asked why only Polynesians were being pursued in this way, Chief Superintendent Berriman responded that they were the easiest overstayers to identify.\textsuperscript{8}

Police actions caused a furious debate. The Polynesian communities, trade unions, civil libertarians, Pacific Island governments and many members of the public accused police and the Government of blatant racism. However, the newspaper columns were also full of letters from ordinary New Zealanders writing in support of the raids. The public debate over the dawn raids was not so much between a group that supported illegal overstaying and a group that opposed it, but encompassed questions of whether police should specifically target Pacific Island overstayers. This in turn brought into question the myth of New Zealand’s harmonious race relations and provoked public debate about the place of Pacific Islanders within the New Zealand national community.

This chapter will explore the complex bureaucratic and political process that led the Government to choose dawn raids and random checks on Polynesians as its method to control overstaying. It will examine how stereotypes of Pacific Islanders which defined them as outsiders influenced police action and it will explore the controversy that surrounded the raids as a manifestation of a broader debate over the boundaries of New Zealand identity.

\textbf{The 1974 Raids}

While ‘Operation Pot Black’ is the only time in New Zealand history when authorities have systematically targeted a racial group for random street checks, it can also be seen as the culmination of an increasingly vigorous series of campaigns against Pacific Island overstayers. These included campaigns of late night raids on houses occupied by Pacific Islanders in March 1974 and a campaign of dawn raids in February 1976.

In 1974, when the first series of raids began, there were an estimated 6 000 illegal overstayers in New Zealand, most of whom were resident in Auckland. At the time of the 1976 raids, there were 10 000-12 000. Many of these were Pacific Islanders, but an estimated 40 percent were from other countries including Great Britain and the

\textsuperscript{8}\textit{Auckland Star} 22/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
United States. How did so many illegal immigrants come to be living in New Zealand? Why were they perceived as a problem? Why could no better method be found for detecting them than the controversial dawn raids and random checks? and why were specifically Polynesian overstayers chosen as the target of the campaigns?

As Chapter 2 showed, the overstayer problem had its seeds in the manufacturing boom of the early 1970s when rapid expansion of the industry created a demand for labour that could not be met from within New Zealand. Visitors who came from the Pacific Islands of Tonga, Fiji and Samoa found work easily in Auckland and Wellington where they could earn up to ten times the wages they would earn at home. Manufacturers, desperate for labour, asked no questions and a de-facto Pacific Island labour scheme evolved. In 1973, more than 6 000 Pacific Islanders came to New Zealand to work on three month visitors permits and in 1975, the number was more than 16 000.

A proportion of these guest-workers chose not to return home at the expiry of their permits, but efforts to pursue ‘overstayers’ were sporadic and unsystematic. Overstayers were most often detected when police stopped individuals in relation to other matters or when police and immigration officials raided homes on the basis of tip-offs from members of the public. A slow stream of overstayers were detected in this way through the late 1960s and early 1970s.

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10 “Paradise Lost or Regained”, Listener, 1/12/73, pp. 12-3.

11 ‘Paradise Lost or Regained’, p. 12. New Zealand’s High Commissioner in Suva also reported a 50 percent increase in Fijian ‘holiday’ entries in one year. New Zealand High Commissioner (NZHC) Suva (G K Ansell) to Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Secfa.) F Corner, 27/2/74 in DOL 22/1/279-8 ‘Summary of Immigration Policy’, accompanying letter Seclab (Gavin Jackson) to Minister of Immigration (F Gill), 11/12/75, p. 14 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 30.


13 See for example Discussions between Richardson Immigration Head Office, A Smith and W J Dove(Auckland office), Sept. 1967 in NZNA BBAI 69a A. 251 22/1/96. Cable Wellington to Apia and Suva High Commissions 9/12/71 in MFAT 32/3/31/1 pt. 1.
After four illegal overstayers from Tonga were arrested at the New Zealand Dairy Board’s processing plant in Dominion Road Auckland, in March 1972, it was discovered that 52 other Tongans of indefinite immigration status were also employed there. The Immigration Division was forced to acknowledge that its methods of preventing overstaying were inadequate and investigated other methods of controlling the problem. The most accurate way of detecting overstayers would have been the systematic matching of arrival and departure cards from the country’s ports and airports but, by 1975, there would be more than a million of these produced each year and the task of checking them was becoming both slow and costly. The Division dismissed a prohibition of working on a visitors’ permit as being no easier to police than overstaying itself. A reduction of the length of visitors’ permits for Pacific Islanders would have left New Zealand open to charges of racism from Island governments and increasing the minimum amount of money that visitors had to bring was discarded because many Pacific Island overstayers were already borrowing the money to come and the imposition of additional charges would have just increased the money that they would have had to borrow. In the end, no new initiatives were taken.

When the effects of the first oil shock hit New Zealand in 1974, inflation, housing shortages and fears of unemployment led to public resentment of the fast growing and very visible Pacific Island community and pressure on the authorities to act against overstayers grew. The Auckland Office of the Immigration Division initiated concerted action in early 1974. On the night of March 12th-13th, police and immigration officials launched the first series of night raids. The raids targeted the houses of Tongans living in Onehunga. They began at 11:00pm in an attempt to catch overstayers at home and ended at between 2:00am and 3:00am. Fifteen people were arrested. Further raids were carried out on the 18th when six houses were raided and

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14 Further inquiries revealed that Auckland manufacturers employed between 1 500 and 2 000 illegal Tongans including 60 at New Zealand Forest Products, 350 at Alex Harvey, 100 at Crown Lynn, 110 at Amalgamated Brick and Tile and 35 at the Ford Motor company. D Bond ‘Note for File’, 22/4/74 in DOL Auckland Office Archives, NZNA BBAI A. 251 51b. 22/1/91-5. Seclab. (K Coveney) to Minimmign (D Thompson), 7/3/72 in (MFA) PM 32/3/82/1 pt. 2.

15 Summary of Immigration Policy’, 20/8/76 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 30. see also Seclab. to Minimmign 11/12/75 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 30.

16 ‘Temporary Entry’, Appendix 2 of paper prepared for Cabinet Committee on Immigration (CCI) meeting of 26/6/75 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 29. Memo Auckland Office to Head Office, 26/9/74 in 22/1/279-12.
twenty-one more Pacific Islanders were arrested on the 19th when among the raids, immigration officers and police with dogs interrupted a prayer meeting of the Free Church of Tonga and arrested four people including the minister.17 In the space of a little over a week, about eighty people, apparently all Pacific Islanders, were arrested.18

The raids produced considerable public outcry. While there were few in New Zealand who defended the right to overstay a temporary permit, the Tongan community, the Federation of Labour (FOL), The Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE), the Polynesian Panther Party, the Race Relations Council and Nga Tamatoa all expressed concern at the very narrow targeting of one ethnic group. They argued that the Tongans had been encouraged to come by New Zealand employers and that most were well settled and should be granted a general amnesty.19

These groups also criticised police heavy-handedness. They claimed that some Tongans, who had left their papers with travel agents, had been wrongly arrested and that others had not been given a chance to dress properly and appeared in court barefoot, in pyjamas or in clothing loaned to them in the cells. One Tongan community spokesman complained that “it is as if these people have committed some ghastly crime, a murder or a rape. Does any person deserve to be hurried away in the middle of the night because he has over-stayed a permit?”20 The Tongan community also strongly objected to the use of dogs in the raids, which was considered insulting in their culture.21 “Do Tongans have to carry their passports on them all the time? If so we are no better than South Africa with its pass laws” ran one letter to the Herald. Prominent Tongan lawyer Clive Edwards protested that the Government’s attitude to

18 Ross, p. 62.
19 Ibid.
21 A CARE pamphlet described a raid “At one house two police dogs were used, one was stationed at the back door and one was brought into the sitting room. When one resident asked a policeman to show a search warrant one dog was moved forward and began growling. The policeman threatened to set the dog on anyone who tried to move away.” De Bres, The Overstayers, p. 21.
Pacific Island immigrants in New Zealand had made racial prejudice “a respectable thing.”

Prime Minister Norman Kirk, who was trying to develop New Zealand’s relations with the Pacific region, was in a particularly embarrassing diplomatic position because the raids coincided with the South Pacific Forum and, on March 21st, the

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22Herald 23/3/74, p. 6. Paper given by Clive Edwards at Inter-Church Committee on Immigration (ICCI) seminar, St Johns College Auckland, 10/4/76, p.7 in DOL Auckland Office Archives, NZNA BBAI A. 251 74f 22/1/121.
Government ordered a halt to the raids.\textsuperscript{23} Minister of Immigration Fraser Colman declared that the tactics chosen were “alien to the New Zealand way of life” and told the media that “firm action is necessary, but until we have a concerted plan, sporadic raids can only damage New Zealand’s image at home and abroad.”\textsuperscript{24}

This halt to the raids, however, did not end the controversy surrounding them. The Immigration Division intended to deport forty of the overstayers to Tonga aboard the British crewed cruise ship \textit{Ocean Monarch}, but a strengthening alliance of anti-racist groups, ethnic minorities and unions launched a vigorous protest. Police discussed options for avoiding a waterfront confrontation with protesters, including loading the prisoners in a surprise stop at Devonport, or mid-stream from smaller boats.\textsuperscript{25} In the end, CARE outflanked the authorities when it succeeded in convincing the crew of the ship to refuse to sail with the Tongans on board.\textsuperscript{26} The prisoners were then returned to Mount Eden Prison and, despite government fears that it could spark a strike by aircraft engineers, they were flown out in secret the next day aboard a scheduled Air New Zealand flight.\textsuperscript{27}

The Government then sought to resolve the overstayer problem by offering a partial amnesty. The amnesty was announced on the April 1st, 1974 at the same time as a two month suspension of all temporary entry of Tongans, other than on humanitarian grounds.\textsuperscript{28} Overstayers who signed a register would not be prosecuted and became eligible for an extension of their stay of two months to allow them to earn enough money to pay for their fare home. Around 3,500 Tongans signed the overstayer register by the June 1st deadline and following representations to Government from the Tongan Church, a committee of Pacific Island community leaders and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23}A memo from Colman described Kirk as “annoyed about the publicity almost on the eve of his meeting with other Pacific Island leaders at the South Pacific Forum.” Minimmign to Seclab. 19/3/74 in Police 1/1/27, v. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{24}Ross, p. 62.
\item \textsuperscript{25}Auckland District Commander to Police National HQ, 29/3/74 in Police 1/1/27 v. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{26}\textit{Herald} 1/4/74, p. 1. De Bres et al., \textit{Migrant Labour}, pp. 6-8.
\item \textsuperscript{27}Memo Acting Police Minister (N King) to Deputy Commissioner (Burnside), 31/3/74 in Police 1/1/27 v. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{28}There was, at the time, a backlog of 6,000 applications in Tonga for visitors permits to New Zealand. \textit{Herald} 2/4/74, p. 1. This was about 7 percent of Tonga’s total population.
\end{itemize}
immigration officials was set up to select 300 ‘well settled’ Tongans to be granted permanent residency.29

Auckland manufacturers also petitioned the Government. They argued that the expulsion of the 1 500-2 000 Tongans they employed, including 350 at one single factory, would damage production. The Government responded by allowing businesses to nominate a limited number of ‘key workers’ who would be allowed to stay a further two months.30 Two-thousand-one hundred Tongans were nominated and, along with a shortage of passenger berths for travel to Tonga, this meant that the reprieve was eventually extended for eight months from its announcement to December 1st.31 There is no record of how many of those instructed to leave actually did.

The 1976 Raids

During the remainder of its term in office, Labour concentrated its efforts on developing short-term migrant labour schemes for Tongans, Fijians and Samoans, but these were largely unsuccessful. They required employers to advance airfares and find accommodation for workers and it remained easier for Auckland manufacturers to employ overstayers who knocked on their doors ready to work than to go through the process of applying for workers through the schemes. The result was that the number of overstayers in New Zealand continued to increase.

As chapter 8 showed, the National Party capitalised on popular fears about immigration to win the 1975 election. Its candidates advocated helping overstayers’ home countries develop so that their citizens would not overstay in New Zealand. It is clear that they were not talking about economic assistance to the American, British or


30D Bond ‘Note for File’, 22/4/74 in NZNA BBAI A. 251 DOL 22/1/91-5.

31Memo Office of the Minister of Immigration to all districts, 9/10/74 in DOL 22/1/109-4. Herald 10/7/74 p. 1
Australian economies. In National’s campaign, the idea of the overstayer was clearly and repeatedly associated with the image of a Pacific Islander.32

New Prime Minister Muldoon signalled a ‘get-tough’ approach to immigration by appointing Air Commodore Frank Gill to the portfolio.33 Gill, like Muldoon, saw the easiest way of fulfilling National’s promise to crack down on immigration as being another anti-overstayer campaign and, in February 1976, immigration officials and police resumed raids of Pacific Islanders’ houses. The renewed campaign began at dawn on the morning of February 17th. Eighteen houses in Onehunga were raided, followed the next night by four raids in Ponsonby. Twenty-three overstayers were found, but only half of the raids were successful and several complaints of police harassment were laid. One of the complainants was Mrs Telesia Topping, a Tongan married to a New Zealander who had lived in New Zealand for ten years. She described a raid on her home as follows.

At six o’clock we were all asleep except for one, who had to be at work at seven. He was making breakfast when he saw a policeman trying to push up the window. He was pointing towards the door. As the door opened, they burst inside. Four were inside, four more outside the house.

A young policeman, about twenty-two years old, came to my room. I’d just opened my eyes because of the noise. I asked him what he was doing in my bedroom. He did not answer. I was really frightened. He went to the bathroom, inspected it, came back and pulled the covers off my bed, looked under the bed. I called out to him again what he was doing in my bedroom. He ignored me.

He pulled open the wardrobe, fiddled with the clothing, checked everything. The same policeman went into the adjoining room where my two nephews, aged 19 and 20 were asleep. The policeman shone the light into their eyes, saying “get up and get out.” Another policeman was also there. My nephews were very frightened.


33Gavin Jackson Seclab. in 1975 said that Muldoon phoned him before appointing his Cabinet and told him that he was going to appoint someone tough to ‘clean-up’ immigration. Interview with Gavin Jackson, 25/1/01.
police then started dragging them out to their van. One of them said they were taking us in because we were illegal immigrants.34

Fuelled by such accounts, the dawn raids of February drew stern protests especially from CARE, Pacific Island community groups and church leaders. The Borough Council of Onehunga, where most of the raids had taken place, also protested and called for an amnesty for overstayers. The protests were against authorities’ methods and the apparent focus of the campaign on only Pacific Island overstayers. The Tongan Society along with the Tongan Church organised a 3 000 signature petition calling for an amnesty.35

The press were predominantly critical of the raids. The Christchurch Star accused Police and Immigration of “gestapo tactics” and the Auckland Star argued that the broader Pacific Island community suffered unfairly as a result of the raids.

Even illegal immigrants should not be subjected to this distress, but when the raids are the result of “information received” legitimate migrants are inevitably exposed to it too. It adds unmercifully to the difficulties they are already encountering in getting accustomed to New Zealand life.36

Police saw this publicity and complaints from some of those raided as harmful to police-public relations and a report into the policing of the Immigration Act was commissioned.37 The report, written by Superintendent R P Silk, while finding that specific complaints including that of Mrs Topping contained factual inaccuracies, concluded that police procedures in pursuing illegal immigrants were a mess.38

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34 Auckland Star 19/2/76 in NZNA BBAI A. 251 51b DOL 22/1/13.
37 A police memo noted that “The very bad publicity directed at the Police and the outcry from civil liberties groups made it vital that the position be regularised”. ‘Notes Regarding Illegal Overstayers’, 15/7/76 in Police 1/1/27 v. 1.
38 Much of Topping’s version of events was discredited in the Police report by Superintendent Silk. For example, the Silk report found that Mrs Topping had opened the door and invited the police in and had not been awoken from her bed. The Police also reported that they had asked the nephews for passports and that neither of them was taken from the house, facts confirmed in subsequent police interviews with the nephews. R P Silk, ‘Illegal Immigration Enquiries, Police Participation’, 26/2/76 in Police 1/1/27 v. 1.
As procedures stood, raids were carried out in response to tip-offs from members of the public and the vast majority of these informants were Pacific Islanders. At the time of the raids, Auckland immigration officials had records of over 1 500 such letters or phone calls of denunciation.\footnote{Christchurch Star 20/2/76 in DOL 22/1/310 pt. 1. The Auckland Star reported that there were 1927 calls received about overstayers between August 1975 and April 1976 including 900 concerning Tongans, 367 concerning Fijians and 660 concerning Samoans. Auckland Star 13/4/76 in DOL 22/1/310, See also, Silk, p. 1.}

As the report explained.

People write in; others telephone; often the letters come from the islands themselves from perturbed wives whose husbands have overstayed and entered into \textit{de facto} relationships in New Zealand, or from persons with a personal interest.\footnote{Memo, Snr. Sergeant I V Edwards to Chief Inspector Newmarket, 1/9/75 p. 2, in Police 1/1/27 v. 1. See also Silk, p. 1. In the words of former Director of the Immigration Division, Don Bond “A terrific number come to notice through one another potting each other ... I would say that in that day and age, we shouldn’t be concentrating too much on the Pacific, but it’s a fact of life that’s where it happened. If a couple of Tongans who were sent home, the family of those Tongans in New Zealand who were perhaps legally here, would make sure immigration were told where there were another half a dozen who should get the same treatment. Immigration did not have to go looking. They could go and know where to find those who were unlawfully in New Zealand. It was just purely potting one another and it was very prevalent amongst the Fijians, the Fiji-Indian population, the Samoan population and the Tongan population.” Interview with Don Bond 23/1/01.}

There was no formal procedure for apprehending overstayers. Usually the Immigration Division would ask the police to assist them in a raid and \textit{ad hoc} raiding parties were made up of two to six police assigned to one immigration officer.\footnote{Silk, p. 16.}

The raids were carried out without search warrants. Silk described the convoluted relationship between police and immigration officials as “Gilbert and Sullivan.”

The Immigration Act is administered by the Department of Labour. The Immigration Division Officers collate the information re. probable location of the illegal immigrants. The Police act as chaperone on these enquiries. The Police use bluff to gain entry into the premises and to make searches for illegal immigrants. There is no power at law to authorise such course of action and they can only result in problems. Once a suspected illegal immigrant is located in a premises, because none of the immigration officers have a warrant, as required by their act, the police are then called upon to require the production of the person’s passport, permit or other documentary evidence. If the enquiries establish that the person is an
illegal immigrant, the immigration officer lays the information and then requests the constable to arrest him, as the immigration officer has no power of arrest. No police file is prepared and the Crown Solicitor acts as prosecutor on behalf of the Immigration Division. If bail is granted the bailee reports to the Police ... 42

While the Silk report was critical of police procedures, it laid most of the blame for the debacle on the Immigration Division. It found that the Division was not fulfilling its responsibility to prevent a situation where dawn raids were required and that it was failing to accept its full responsibilities in carrying out the raids. This, in turn, had forced police to play a role in the apprehension of overstayers which harmed both their public image and their relations with minority groups.43

After the report, police became more reluctant to participate in the pursuit of overstayers. Auckland District Commander J W Overton advised his officers to reduce their role in raids to one of waiting outside the properties in case immigration officials required police protection, declaring that it was of questionable legality for them to visit properties based solely on ‘hearsay evidence’, to use bluff to gain an invitation to enter, or to take people into custody for failing to produce a permit. He also instructed that police should not participate in raids between the hours of 10:00pm and 6:30am.44

The 1976 Stay of Proceedings

The controversy over the raids discouraged the Government from extending them. A week after they started, Gill told Cabinet that dawn raids were “somewhat hit and miss,” that they “rarely resulted in the discovery of overstayers who are not Pacific Islanders” and that “a high level of activity in this field can bring forth claims of discrimination and harassment.”45 On April 10th, he announced a twelve week stay of proceedings to allow overstayers to register and escape prosecution. Those who registered could ask either for a short stay to allow them to make arrangements to

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42 Ibid., p. 15.
43 Ibid., p. 12, p. 15.
44 Memo Overton to Police Commissioner, 5/3/76 in Police 1/1/27 v. 1.
45 Memo Minimmign to Cabinet 23/3/76 in DOL 22/1/310 pt. 1.
leave, a longer stay to wrap-up their affairs in New Zealand, or they could apply for permanent residency.⁴⁶

The Government’s announcement drew mixed reactions. Some newspapers called for a complete amnesty for overstayers as the only way of resolving a difficult situation, while others such as the Star and the Herald cautiously endorsed the plan.⁴⁷ Pacific Island church and community leaders were ambivalent. Many of them were upset that the Minister used a meeting called to discuss the problem to announce his policy as a fait accompli. They were also uncertain about encouraging members of their communities to sign the register when the government had refused to state the criteria by which it would judge applications or how many would be allowed to stay. Despite this, they agreed to help and many of them worked hard to encourage overstayers among their peoples to come forward.⁴⁸

By trying to encourage registration through the active co-operation of Pacific Island church and community leaders, the stay of proceedings clearly targeted specifically Pacific Island overstayers and this focus was very successful. When the overstayer register closed on July 5th, of the 4 647 overstayers who had registered, all but seventy were Pacific Islanders.⁴⁹ Despite this, the Minister of Immigration expressed his disappointment at the numbers of Pacific Islanders who had registered and a Labour Department official bemoaned what he saw as the low rate of Pacific Island participation, telling the media that “most Islanders haven’t registered.”⁵⁰ These

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⁴⁶ The criteria by which applications would be judged were not announced because it was believed that this would discourage those who did not meet them from coming forward. Minimmign to Cabinet 25/3/76 in DOL 22/1/310 pt. 1.


⁴⁸ Herald 3/6/76 p. 5. HO to all districts 15/6/76 in NZNA BBAI A. 251 51b 22/1/121. Because of administrative delays, the period for applicants to apply for permanent residency was extended until July 5. The Immigration Division received little prior warning from Cabinet of the announcement of the amnesty and did not produce the application forms or publicity for the amnesty until the start of June. Immigration Division, ‘Diary of Stay of Proceedings Events’, Mar. 1977 in DOL 22/1/30 pt. 6.

⁴⁹ These included 2 338 Tongans, 2 050 Western Samoans, 267 Fijians and 81 others. Of these 4198 were in Auckland, 241 in Wellington, 87 in Lower Hutt and 33 in Christchurch. Joris De Bres, The Overstayers, 1976, p. 28.

comments are astounding in light of the fact that of the estimated 3,300-4,000 British overstayers in the country at the time, only eighteen had signed the register. Media coverage of the raids and the stay of proceedings criteria also helped to define overstaying as an exclusively Pacific Island problem. Use of the term ‘Islander’ to mean ‘overstayer’ was endemic. In February, the Herald published a story about overstayers, noting that “most tip-offs come from other Islanders.” In June, the paper ran a feature which sought to explain “WHY TONGANS OVERSTAY” and in August, the Auckland Star carried the headline “MINUTES FOR EACH ISLANDER” in explaining the procedure of the committee examining registered overstayers’ requests for residency. One of the stated criteria of the amnesty was, according to the Immigration Division, “whether or not the overstayers had family in the Islands,” which was not a criterion that many of the American or British overstayers would have met.

The public were in little doubt about who were the subjects of the overstayer campaign. One letter to the editor of the Herald described the amnesty as being for “law breaking Pacific Islanders,” and another argued that “Islanders are overstayers and law breakers and should be sent home.” Variations on this idea were expressed in a further 28 letters to the Herald, Truth, and the Minister of Immigration (Table 2). However, when computerised immigration records were introduced in 1977 and gave the first accurate picture of overstaying patterns, they revealed that 40 percent of overstayers did not come from the Pacific sources of Samoa, Tonga and Fiji. This 40 percent included mostly British and Americans.

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51 Truth, 2/11/76, p. 3. The Auckland Star estimated number of British overstayers and this figure was also reported in the Pacific Island Monthly but its origins are unclear. Auckland Star 1/7/76 in NZNA BBAI A. 251 51b DOL 22/1/13. Maurice Dick, ‘Islander’s Black Letter Day’, Pacific Island Monthly, Nov. 1976, p. 12.

52 Herald 21/2/76, p. 1.


54 Auckland Star 9/10/76 in NZNA BBAI A. 251 51b DOL 22/1/13.


On August 16th, a committee of three Labour Department officials began considering
the written applications for permanent residency from registered overstayers. The
main criteria included family grounds, length of New Zealand residence, skills and
workplace responsibility, letters of support from employers, stable employment
history and “strong community support.” When, in late September, the applications
had all been processed, it was announced that 1723, or just under half, had been
accepted with the other 1754 required to begin leaving. Pacific Island governments,
faced with a wave of unemployed returnees to their fragile economies, were unhappy
at the number of repatriations, but could do little about it.

On the surface it appeared that a difficult situation for the Government had been
resolved. However, as events would soon reveal, the long term problem of how to
stop visitors overstaying and the question of how to make those who had not signed
the register leave had yet to be considered. On July 19th, three months after the
amnesty was announced, Cabinet discussed how to deal with overstayers who had not
registered. It deferred a proposal to appoint twenty new immigration officers to
enforce the overstayer regulations and instead instructed the Ministers of Police and
Immigration to work out a plan using existing resources.

Such an operation, however, was hampered by the Police decision to reduce their
participation in overstayer operations. An angry spat between the two departments
ensued. On August 10th, Police Minister Alan McCready wrote to Gill, reiterating

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Also in Auckland Immigration Division Archives NZNA BBAI A. 251 74f DOL 22/1/121 pt. 4.
58 The criteria were approved by Cabinet. ‘Overstayers: Criteria for Consideration of Cases’,
Aug. 1976 in DOL 22/1/310 pt. 5. Other criteria included degree of assimilation, age, marital
status, number of close family members in the home country who could subsequently apply
for entry on grounds of family reunification, accommodation, character and health. Office of
Minister of Immigration to Auckland District Office 23/8/76 in NZNA BBAI A. 251 74f DOL
22/1/121.
59 Auckland Star 25/9/76 in NZNA BBAI A. 251 74f DOL 22/1/121. The most common
reason for acceptance was employer representations, followed by humanitarian grounds and
marriage to a New Zealand citizen or resident. Auckland Office to HO 21/7/76 in NZNA
BBAI A. 251 74f DOL 22/1/121.
60 Auckland Star 2/9/76, Herald, 20/9/76, Auckland Star 13/10/76 in NZNA BBAI A. 251 51b
DOL 22/1/13.
61 Cabinet Memo CM 76/29/22 of 19/7/76 and CM 76/29/22 of 19/7/76 in MFAT 301/1/5
pt. 2.
62 On 29 June, Deputy Director of Immigration (D Bond) rung B W Gibson, at Police National
Headquarters to express concern at the new Police policy that officers should reduce their
the refusal of Police to be directly involved in a drive against overstayers. As well as citing the dubious legality of police involvement, he expressed the Police's desire to shed “extraneous tasks” and concentrate on the apprehension of serious criminals. He also noted the serious damage to police-community relations that could be done by further dawn raids, concluding that “police involvement with immigration laws could cause irreparable damage to New Zealand’s image both at home and abroad.”63 Gill, who one official described as being in a “shirty mood” over the police refusal, responded by accusing police of “declin[ing] to accept assumption of their proper responsibilities.” The Immigration Division did not have the manpower or the training to perform raids by itself and the matter remained at an impasse.64

The Government, for its part, felt that it had no option but to pursue those overstayers who had not signed the register. It had defined immigrants as responsible for rising crime in its 1975 election campaign and pursuing overstayers had become an issue of law and order as well as an issue of government credibility. Cabinet discarded the idea of letting all those who had signed the register stay and Muldoon described a renewed series of raids as “the next logical stage after the amnesty.”65 Further pressure also went on the Government to resume pursuit of overstayers after the press revealed that not one of the first group of 28 registered overstayers directed to leave had done so by the appointed date.66

role in apprehending overstayers. Gill had declared that the Police regulations were “no good to [him]- The Police will have to change them.” Gibson had curtly refused to even meet Immigration officials and rebuked Bond over Immigration’s lack of effort to increase the role of its staff in the apprehension of overstayers. The following day, Gill wrote to McCready to express his displeasure. Record of telephone message, Bond to Gibson, 29/6/76. Gill to McCready 30/6/76 in Police 1/1/27 v. 1.

63‘Notes Regarding Illegal Overstayers’, 15/7/76 and McCready to Gill, 10/8/76 in Police 1/1/27 v. 1.
64McCready to Gill 11/10/76. “Shirty mood” comment of Don Bond’s in ‘Record of Telephone Message’, Bond to Gibson, 29/6/76 in Police 1/1/27 v. 1.
65Cabinet considered giving all those who had registered the right to stay, but discarded this idea on the grounds that it would reward law breakers. Cabinet’s consideration of the matter is discussed in a number of sources. Memos for Cabinet 8/7/76 and 9/7/76 in DOL 22/1/310 pt. 4. Cabinet Memo to Minister of Immigration 9/7/76 and Memo Minimmign to Cabinet 8/7/76 in DOL 22/1/310 pt. 3. Muldoon’s Press Statement, 26/10/76 and ‘Diary of Stay of Proceeding Events’, Mar. 1977, p. 4, in DOL 22/1/30 pt. 6. Muldoon Press Conference Transcript, 26/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3, p. 6. Cabinet Memo of 19/7/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
66Herald 8/10/76, and 9/10/76 in NZNA BBAI A. 251 DOL 22 /1/13 On Oct. 5th, a limited series of dawn raids was resumed with 20 houses visited in South Auckland and three in Wellington. None of the twenty raids in Auckland was successful, while in Wellington, five
The Government was forced to act to break the impasse between the Immigration Division and the Police. On October 18th, Cabinet directed Police to take-over the pursuit of overstayers. McCready instructed Police Commissioner Burnside that for three months, police should give priority to the apprehension of overstayers over other police duties and that there were to be “no limitations on [the] operation, Police [were] to do as they [saw] fit.” He ordered an end to the restriction on raids between 10:00pm and 6:00am. Prime Minister Muldoon, for his part, described the Immigration Division as ‘inefficient’ and reportedly told the Commissioner that he “had never heard anything so ridiculous as not being able to arrest an overstayer before 6:00am.”

Burnside expressed his displeasure that this task, which he saw as the responsibility of the Immigration Division, had been given to the Police. He told the Minister that he thought it was a “bad decision by Government,” but accepted to undertake the work. He then called a meeting of the three District Commanders and told them that “through the inefficiency and incompetence of the Labour Department,” the Government had decided that its policy on overstayers was not being carried out and was asking Police to “tidy up” the situation. By doing a good job, he told them, police could build up their standing with Government and as a result “could get some spin off in terms of resources in the future.”

Burnside told the District Commanders of Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch that he wanted action immediately and that police would only slow down the operation by trying to co-ordinate with the Immigration Division. District Commanders were given discretion as to the time and the nature of their activities and

Fiji-Indian overstayers were apprehended. Letter Seclab to Minimmgn, 6/10/76. Notes for Minister’s television interview, 6/10/76 in DOL 22/1/30 pt. 6.
67Deputy Commissioner (R J Walton) to Minpolice (A McCready) 21/10/76 in Police 1/1/27, v. 2.
68Minpolice to Commissioner, 26/10/76 in Police 1/1/27 v. 2.
69‘Minutes of Meeting with Officers re: Arrest of Immigrant Overstayers’, Auckland Central Police Station, 22/10/76 in Police 1/1/27 v. 2.
70The principle of maintaining the independence of the police from the executive meant that the Minister should not have given such orders. R J Walton, ‘File Note Immigration: Policing of Overstayers’, 21/10/76. Minpolice to Commissioner 20/10/76 in Police 1/1/27 v. 2. The discrepancy between this and Burnside’s instructions described earlier which said 6:30am is noted. It is a product of inconsistencies in the sources.
71Notes on meeting held at National Headquarters at 08:40 hours on 21/10/76 in Police 1/1/27 v. 2.
it was emphasised that results were expected. Five special squads were formed, two each in Auckland and Wellington and one in Christchurch, and a directive was given that “all other personnel who are not engaged full-time on these duties must be briefed to accord priority to the detection and arrest of overstayers.”

Burnside then wrote to McCready to inform him of the instructions he had given.

This decision to proceed without the cooperation of the Immigration Division meant that police deprived themselves of records of the names and addresses of suspected overstayers. This left them little basis for detecting overstayers other than random stopping of members of the public on the streets. Auckland’s senior officers were briefed by Chief Superintendent Berriman. He told them that “the whole situation has come down to the fact that for three months now the Police are going to round up as many illegal immigrants and overstayers as they can possibly get ... There is complete discretion as to the time of arrest. [The Government] is only concerned with results.”

Berriman appeared to see the Police as being in direct competition with the Immigration Division for overstayers’ scalps:

> The Police will do all the work. We took this over and we are doing it ... [The Immigration Division] of course, can still operate and arrest these overstayers themselves and if they continue at the same rate they won’t detract from our record.

The whole objective of the exercise, he told his men, was that the Commissioner could then go back to Government with a list of expenses from the operation and ask for increased funding. He instructed that “any contact that the police have with a prospective illegal immigrant, they are to invoke the Immigration Act powers we have to ensure he is not an illegal immigrant or overstayer before we let go.”

This of course prompted the question of what constituted a ‘prospective illegal immigrant.’

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72 Auckland District Commander J W Overton was on holiday and acting District Commander Chief Superintendent Berriman attended in his place. Ibid.
73 Burnside to McCready 22/10/76 in Police 1/1/27 v. 2.
74 Minutes of Meeting with Officers re: Arrest of Immigrant Overstayers’, Auckland Central Police Station, 22/10/76 in Police 1/1/27 v. 2.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
But Berriman appears to have left this key point to the interpretation of more junior members of staff.\(^{77}\)

Because of the widespread stereotype of Pacific Islanders as overstayers, by the time the directive had reached police on the beat, this point had been resolved. One officer described his instructions from his Senior Sergeant regarding the overstayer operation: “We were to locate and arrest all persons whom we had good cause to suspect were illegal immigrants. The operation was to be pursued with vigour with no holds barred including dawn raids.” Examples given to officers of ‘good cause to suspect’ illegal overstaying included

1. If a person obviously appeared to be a foreigner e.g. Polynesian, we should approach him [sic] and establish his identity. If the man admitted he was a foreigner we should request his passport and visa. If that person refused to supply the documents we should, after warning him, arrest that person as a good cause to suspect would exist.

2. ... If a Polynesian claimed he could not understand the language and had no passport he should be arrested.

3. If a person found to be a foreigner claimed he had the necessary documents at his home, he should be given the opportunity of furnishing the documents by our taking him to his address. If that person refused to accompany the police to the address where it was claimed that the documents were kept, he should be arrested.\(^{78}\)

Through this series of ‘Chinese whispers’, a directive from Cabinet urging police to take control of the overstayer situation and stating that results were expected came to be interpreted as an instruction to police on the beat to stop Polynesians and ask for their papers and that if they could not produce them, to arrest them. This interpretation was a product of both an entrenched association in society at large of

\(^{77}\)Some indication of what was considered ‘just cause to suspect’ an individual of illegal overstaying comes from a Police departmental memorandum addressed to all officers in the South Auckland Division, “All members both UB and CIB are to take part in this operation by questioning persons in custody and on the streets and at any place they may be found where there are reasonable grounds to believe that they may be illegal immigrants or overstayers ... Staff are encouraged to check credentials of all likely suspected illegal immigrants and overstayers and beat staff are to take an active part also. Positive results are expected.” 21/10/76 cited in Auckland Police Association, ‘Police Action Regarding Illegal Immigrants’, press release, 25/10/76 in Police 1/1/27 v. 2.

the idea of overstayers with Pacific Island race and of fundamental flaws in the way in which immigration and particularly the pursuit of overstayers was administered by Police and the Immigration Division.

**Random Street Checks**

The weekend of October 22nd, 1976 was Labour Weekend and Auckland Police District Commander J W Overton had hitched up his caravan and headed north leaving Chief Superintendent Berriman in charge. During this weekend, Auckland police stopped and demanded the passports of 856 mostly Polynesian people. In addition, more than 200 houses were raided. A total of twenty-three overstayers were located.79 Wellington Police did not launch random street checks but they did raid 141 addresses, questioning 172 people and arresting sixteen for violations of the Immigration Act.80

The inefficiency of detecting overstayers by questioning and arresting Pacific Islanders who did not have papers should have become apparent to police on the first night of their campaign. The Auckland raids and street checks began at 7:00 pm on Thursday 20th October. On this night, police took twelve people into custody, but eventually released ten of them. Of those, four were Samoans in New Zealand legally under the continuing residence scheme, one was a permanent resident, another was a Tokelauan - and thus a New Zealand citizen - and two were overstayers who had signed the register.81 Unperturbed, police pushed on with the ‘road-block’ on Karangahape Road and questioned hundreds of Polynesians about their immigration status.82

Berriman told the media that police would stop and question “anyone who does not look like a New Zealander, or who speaks with a foreign accent.” “These people,” he declared, “must expect to arouse some suspicion.” The implication of this was clear: ‘Pacific Islanders did not look like New Zealanders’. This belies the fact that, by 1976, there were over 79 000 Pacific Islanders in New Zealand, of whom 60 000 were

80E J Trapitt Chief Superintendent to Head of Training and Personnel (B Gibson) 17/11/76 in Police 1/1/27 v. 2.
81Ross, p. 105.
82*Auckland Star* 22/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
permanent residents or citizens, around 12,000 were in New Zealand on short term visas or under the continuing residency scheme for Samoans and a further 4,700 of whom had been granted temporary legal status through having signed the overstayer register. This left no more than 2,500 or around 3 percent of the Pacific Island population as illegal overstayers. However, by defining all Pacific Islanders as overstaying suspects, Berriman demonstrated the popular perception that Pacific Islanders, irrespective of citizenship, fell outside the boundaries of New Zealand identity.

On Saturday 22nd, Berriman told the *Auckland Star* that the checks were “completely at random” but admitted that almost all of those questioned were Polynesians. His justification for this was that “naturally we’d look twice at someone we did not think was New Zealand born.” He also defended the location of the random checks in the inner city and in predominantly Polynesian suburbs: “You look in the likely places if you are after something. Why would you look in Kohimarama or Remuera,” which were two of Auckland’s wealthiest, predominantly white suburbs. One can only speculate as to whether the name of the police operation “pot black” was a tasteless pun about ‘potting’ blacks.

Police Minister McCready, for his part, asserted that this was a normal part of police business. He denied that police were “launching a major campaign” or that there would be widespread spot checks and claimed that he could not see what all the fuss was about. McCready compared the checks to being asked for a driving or a fishing licence: “You have to produce a licence even if you have been fishing for twenty years ... people who look like overstayers will have to put up with a little inconvenience.” When asked why only Polynesians were being questioned when there were also European overstayers he replied “if you have a herd of Jerseys and two Friesians, the Friesians stand out.” In the eyes of McCready, a legal resident of

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83Statistics derived from official estimate of overstayers of the Immigration Division based on the number who came forward in the amnesty and the accurate figures available from 1977 when immigration records were computerised. Immigration Division, ‘Polynesians in New Zealand’ Aug. 1976, in NZNA BBAI 59d A. 251 DOL 22/1/76.

84At least one overstayer who was not Polynesian was questioned, a Canadian Hare Krishna. *Auckland Star* 22/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.

85*Auckland Star* 22/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.

86Ibid.

87Cited in Ross, p. 105.
New Zealand could be identified by their physical appearance and those who looked like Pacific Islanders did not look like New Zealanders.

By Sunday, the official line on the checks was becoming confused. Prime Minister Muldoon vigorously denied that checks had been carried out at random. “I can say categorically,” he told the media, “that there have been - and there will be - no random checks on potential overstayers. No one will be stopped on the streets on suspicion of being an overstayer.”88 The paper also reported that Chief Superintendent Berriman was now denying that checks were ‘random’. He told reporters that “the Police are making routine inquiries as a result of information received by them from the Labour Department.”89

Cooperation between Police and the Labour Department was, however, clearly still limited. Monday was Labour Day and police faced the embarrassment of having to release a number of those whom they had arrested because the Labour Department in Auckland was closed and no arrangement had been made for immigration officials to come in and lay charges against those arrested.90

On Tuesday, when Parliament resumed, the raids drew heavy criticism from the opposition. Labour’s Deputy Leader Bob Tizard called for the resignation of the Ministers of Police and Immigration and the MP for Onehunga, Labour’s Frank Rogers, described the raids as “sickening and sad”, declaring that “Hitler used these tactics and so did Mussolini.”91 The raids were also causing some dissension within the government ranks. National backbenchers Jim McLay and Aussie Malcolm described them as “disturbing” and “concerning,” while an un-named National MP told the media that he and several colleagues were “angry at what had happened and would look for answers.”92 Both ministers denied that random checks had taken place, arguing that media reports of checks were a campaign orchestrated by the Government’s political enemies to embarrass it.93

88Sunday News 24/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
89Ibid.
90Herald 26/10/76 in NZNA BBAI A. 251 51b DOL 22/1/13.
91Auckland Star 23/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
92Auckland Star 25/10/76. National Party Dominion Councillor Ross Baxter called for the government to come clean about the raids and show “frankness and remorse.” Auckland Star 23/10/76 both in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
93Prime Minister Muldoon’s press statement, 26/10/76 in DOL 22/1/310.
The Government’s denial provoked a tide of indignation and anger among the anti-racist movement, the Federation of Labour, the Values Party, Maori and civil libertarians. The protesters argued that it was a violation of civil liberties to stop people at random and to ask them to prove their innocence. Chairman of the Auckland District Maori Council Ranginui Walker argued that the raids were “reprehensible” and that they debased “not only the people checked on the streets but they also debase all the rest of us.”

Pacific Island community leaders felt that the trust they had placed in the Government by supporting the stay of proceedings had been betrayed. The Pacific Island Advisory Council declared that the police raids had “confirmed more than ever our suspicion that your Government is setting out to legalise racial prejudice.”

The most common arguments against the checks were that it was immoral to pursue a group based solely on race, that Pacific Islanders had come at the instigation of New Zealand employers and were being made the scapegoat for the economic downturn, and that the raids were a product of racism within the Immigration Division and the Police.

For many of the protesters, the raids were also a violation of the New Zealand tradition of fair race relations. Time and time again police action was compared to state sanctioned racism of Nazi Germany, of Uganda and above all of South Africa, which was seen as the antithesis of New Zealand’s harmonious multi-racial society.

Pua Sofi of the Samoan Advisory Council argued that “the indiscriminate questioning...
of Islanders in the streets by police is outrageous because it highlights the hypocrisy of this so-called harmonious and multicultural society.” An Auckland Star editorial argued that the raids had “frayed New Zealand’s image as a harmonious multi-racial haven for Polynesian and European,” and Clive Edwards argued that the raids had heightened New Zealanders’ awareness of ethnic difference.

99 Auckland Star 23/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
100 Auckland Star 27/11/76 in NZNA BBAI A. 251 51b DOL 22/1/13.
One of the few groups to benefit from the raids were political cartoonists as two cartoon of Air Commodore Frank Gill show. (Top: Comment, v.1, no. 1, October 1977. Below: NBR October 1976 cited in ‘The Unauthorised Version’.

Spurred on by the Government’s continued refusal to acknowledge that the raids had taken place, the Auckland Trades Council took out a full page advertisement in the Auckland Star condemning police tactics and calling for an amnesty. It contained statements from a loose coalition of organisations which included the Maori Women’s Welfare League, the Auckland Tongan Society, the United Nations Association, the Presbyterian Church, the Pacific Islands Council, the Auckland District Maori Council, the Pacific Islands Housing and Welfare Association, CARE, the Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination, the Inter-Church Trade and Industry Mission and the Samoan Action Organisation.101 Other groups which petitioned the Government or acted separately to condemn the raids and call for an amnesty included the Public Service Association, the Federation of University Women, branches of the Post Primary Teachers Association, the Methodist Church and twenty Anglican churchmen, including the Bishop and the Dean of Auckland, all of whom signed a statement describing the raids as lacking “compassion and humanity.”102

101 Auckland Star 30/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
102 PSA General Secretary W E B Tucker to Muldoon 26/11/76. D M McLean Town Clerk, Auckland City Council to Minimmign 15/12/76, Methodist Church General Secretary to Minimmign 20/1/77 all in DOL 22/1/310 pt. 5. The Mayor of Auckland Sir Dove Meyer Robinson described the checks as “the most potentially dangerous crisis in Auckland’s history.” M Norrish (Chair of Pacific Affairs Coordinating Committee) to Minfa, 9/11/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3. J Fish of NZFUW to Minimmign, 8/6/77 in DOL 22/1/2 pt. 31.
While support for the random checks and dawn raids was not formally expressed by any organisation, within the community, and especially in Auckland, they received much approbation. The Herald received more than 70 letters on the issue in the week after Labour Weekend which ran three to one in favour of the police campaign. The most commonly made point was that overstayers had broken the law and must accept the consequences.\(^\text{103}\)Truth firmly supported the raids. It claimed that it spoke for the “average New Zealander” in calling for the expulsion of illegal overstayers. “They don’t have a God-given right to live permanently here” it argued, “they aren’t wanted here.”\(^\text{104}\) Its readers agreed. “Since so many of these unwanted visitors have broken the law within a few months of their arrival, their suitability as candidates for permanent residency is questionable,” wrote one, and “New Zealand doesn’t want law breakers as citizens,” wrote another.\(^\text{105}\) Truth argued that the media had been hijacked by minority pressure groups who were seeking to turn an issue of law and order into one of race.\(^\text{106}\) Muldoon agreed and blamed “certain journalists in the parliamentary press gallery” who were “telling lies and inflating a difficult situation.”\(^\text{107}\)

By the Tuesday after Labour Day, the opposition to the checks was beginning to crystallise into a concerted movement. In Wellington, a meeting condemning the raids was attended by 500 people including representatives of Pacific Island community groups, unions, Maori, church and anti-apartheid organisations, students and civil libertarians. These groups established the Amnesty Aroha.\(^\text{108}\) In Palmerston North 500 people descended on the house of their MP J L Lithgow to protest at the raids and even in Whangarei, a meeting called to criticise police tactics and lobby for an amnesty attracted 80 people.\(^\text{109}\)

The largest demonstrations were in Auckland, where a meeting at the town hall attracted 600 people. Those present included seven members of the city council, which earlier in the day had passed a resolution calling for the resignation of the Minister of Police. Councillor Jim Anderton, who described the random checks as

\[^{103}\text{Herald 3/11/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.}\]
\[^{104}\text{Truth 2/11/76, p.1}\]
\[^{105}\text{Truth, 9/11/76, p. 21, 16/11/76, p. 23.}\]
\[^{106}\text{Truth 2/11/76, p.1}\]
\[^{107}\text{Dominion 29/10/76 in NZNA BBAI A. 251 51b DOL 22/1/13. Truth 9/11/76, p. 9.}\]
\[^{108}\text{Amnesty Aroha Newsletter, no. 8, April/May 1977. See Chapter 8 for detailed study of AA.}\]
\[^{109}\text{Herald 25/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.}\]
showing “apparent disregard for normal legal procedures” and accused police of “persecution of minorities,” received a standing ovation. The meeting was then addressed by a courageous Assistant Commissioner Overton, returned early from holiday, who admitted that there had been raids and assured those present that they would cease.\textsuperscript{110}

Overton’s admission was a major embarrassment to the Government. A police record of events shows that when informed of Overton’s comments, Muldoon exclaimed “what the hell does he want to make statements like that [for] when everything is going so smoothly?”\textsuperscript{111} Overton’s admission must have also embarrassed Berriman, who on the same day told the media that there was no policy of random checks. Berriman had attempted to explain mounting evidence in the press by suggesting that some individual police might have incorrectly followed orders.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{110}Herald 26/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
\textsuperscript{111}Police Summary of Events Surrounding Overstayer Operation, undated (author was probably Walton), p. 1, in Police 1/1/27 v. 2.
\textsuperscript{112}Ibid.
Berriman’s suggestion incensed his staff and split the force. Chairman of the Auckland branch of the Police Association, the police officers’ union, Sergeant Peri Ngata responded that police had “clear instructions” to carry out random checks and leaked the internal Police memo that had ordered them. An anonymous policeman

also told the papers that “our orders were to grab anyone who looked like an overstayer. We were told that Polynesians were an obvious target.”

The following day, October 26th, the Government was placed under further pressure in Parliament. Muldoon stated his belief that raids should not be carried out between 11:00pm and 6:00am, a restriction which a week before, he had described to Commissioner Burnside as “ridiculous.” He dismissed Assistant Commissioner Overton’s admission that random checks had occurred as being due to a misunderstanding of the meaning of the term ‘random.’ Nobody, he reiterated, had been stopped solely for the purpose of checking their immigration status. The Auckland Star replied by presenting him with six sworn affidavits from people claiming to have been subjected to random checks.

Overton, although now publicly silent, continued to argue with his seniors that police should admit to the checks. He wrote to National Headquarters:

> Things are pretty hot up here with both the Island community leaders and the Police Association. I have had meetings with both groups today ... and they are hopping mad with Mr Muldoon, Mr McCready and Mr Gill. The Islanders include a doctor and a padre. I know and respect these people and they trust me. We have got to come clean and tell the truth. There were random checks and we have to say so.

Deputy Commissioner Bob Walton also met Police Association officials who called for an admission and apology. They told him that the repeated denials of the random checks were “damaging the credibility of policemen generally in the eyes of the Island community.”

On the 27th, Police National Headquarters advised their Minister to “lay off emphatic denials of random checks” while police looked into the allegations. Unbelievably,
McCready and Muldoon ignored this and continued to deny the checks. However, their position was definitively undermined when on the 29th, Police National Headquarters instructed that staff should admit that random checks had taken place “through misunderstanding of orders.”

On October 30th, the Minister was forced to publicly admit that raids had taken place, but now denied both that he had earlier denied the checks and that the order to carry them out had come from him. He blamed the media for much of the storm surrounding them and announced an inquiry. While the Government refused to declare an amnesty, as a conciliatory gesture to angry Pacific Island governments, Gill announced the re-opening of the overstayer register for six weeks and the re-examination of all of the applications from the first register that had been declined. A further 635 overstayers registered and the final result of the two amnesties was that 5,381 overstayers registered, of whom 70 percent were eventually given permission to stay permanently.

The internal police inquiry into the random checks was carried out by Chief Superintendent W R Fleming of the Hamilton police. His report found that of 856 people questioned in Auckland about their immigration status over the weekend of October 22nd, 201 had been questioned at random. Minister of Police McCready only released sections of the report and chose the last working day before New Zealand shut down for the Christmas holidays to do this. The sections he released found that the operation in Auckland had been badly planned, that instructions were not communicated clearly and that police were not sufficiently aware of their rights and

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121Herald 28/10/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
122A press statement was prepared for the Minister to this effect. McCready was angry that he had been allowed to make statements denying the raids over the preceding days while police were preparing to admit them. “Why have I been lied to?” he demanded. Deputy Commissioner Walton replied that he had warned the Minister several times to “lay-off” the denials. Walton also explained to him “that we are in a war situation, a constantly changing scene and what is the position today may not be the same tomorrow. Before continuing a stand, he should check.” ‘Police Summary of Events’, p. 6.
123He told the Herald that he had not denied the random checks but that he had stated that there was no proof of them. Herald 3/11/76 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 3.
responsibilities under the Immigration Act. According to McCready, blame for the bungle did not fall on any one person.

The sections of Fleming’s report which McCready chose not to release suggested that blame for the raids rested with Chief Superintendent Berriman or above with a strong suggestion of Ministerial involvement. It also found that police actions had partially been motivated by the sentiment that “this new type of work may be used to gain leverage for more equipment, vehicles and possibly pay.” Finally, while there was no direct order from Cabinet for random checks, the report found that Cabinet’s demand for immediate results placed pressure on police which contributed to the institution of the policy of random checks.

The Consequences of the Raids

The dawn raids and random checks did not end the problem of overstaying in New Zealand. In November 1977, the Star reported that 2 000 Pacific Islanders had overstayed temporary permits in the year following them and that only 300-400 of the 1669 asked to leave after signing the register had done so. By March 1978, the Immigration Division estimated the number of overstayers conservatively at 5 618. The number continued to grow through the late 1970s and early 1980s and subsequent governments came to tolerate a certain level of overstaying.

The most concrete consequences of the dawn raids were changes in Police and Immigration Division procedures. In the months following Chief Superintendent Fleming’s report, police took action to ensure that raids could now only be undertaken during the day, following a written request from the Immigration Division

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126 Deputy Commissioner (R J Walton) to Chief Superintendent (W R Fleming), 1/11/76, in Police 1/1/27 v. 2.
127 The report found that “Whilst verbal orders were given for the implementation of the operation, they lacked sufficient detail as to law, policy and execution.” Minister of Police (A McCready), Press Release 23/12/76 in DOL 301/1/5 pt. 3.
129 Ross, pp. 113-9.
130 Auckland Star 20/9/77 in MFAT 301/1/5 pt. 4.
131 In November 1977, the computerised immigration records the Immigration Division estimated that there were 965 Western Samoan Overstayers, 942 Tongans, 443 UK citizens, 269 Fijians, 260 USA citizens, and 762 others in New Zealand. But these figures probably only included those who had overstayed since computerised records were introduced in March of that year. ‘Overcoming the Overstayer Problem’, NZFAR, v. 27, no. 4, 1977, pp. 54-6.
and with express approval of the Police Commissioner. Police also made an effort to better train their staff in their rights and responsibilities under the Immigration Act.132 For its part, the Immigration Division was given funding to recruit a field force of twenty-five officers to pursue overstayers, while computerisation of records of arrivals and departures of short term visitors, from 1977, gave it a greater capacity to detect them without recourse to random checks.133

The raids also damaged New Zealand’s international image in a year when it had already been considerably battered by an All Black tour of South Africa. The dawn raids were an especially important issue in New Zealand’s relations with its Pacific neighbours. Both the Samoan and Tongan Governments expressed moral outrage at them and one Member of the Tongan Parliament declared that “Tongans have been treated as less than human beings.”134 The Muldoon Government was well aware of the damage the raids would do but, as had been the case with the tour, these were overlooked because of their relative domestic popularity.135 Nonetheless, the Island Governments could only afford what Secretary of Foreign Affairs Frank Corner called a “temporary anger.” Their dependence on New Zealand aid, and hard work by Muldoon at subsequent South Pacific Forum meetings were responsible for the rapid healing of official relations.136

Conclusion

Chief Superintendent Fleming, in his report, was quite right in describing the dawn raids as a product of police system failure and poor communication. Like Henry II’s cry of “will no one deliver me from this low born priest,” Muldoon’s Government’s insistence that police do something about the overstayer problem came to be interpreted by police in Auckland as an order to stop Polynesians in the street and arrest them if they could not prove that they were legally in New Zealand.

The dawn raids and random checks were not however, simply a product of poor communication in the bureaucracy. The controversy which surrounded them was a

133Ibid.
manifestation of a broader public debate about race relations and the boundaries of New Zealand identity. Overstayers are, by definition, outsiders and many New Zealanders had come to associate the term ‘overstayer’ with Pacific Islanders.

The 1970s were a time of national economic and social transformation. Because they were culturally and physically distinct, Pacific Islanders were made the scapegoat for a range of social and economic problems. By defining Pacific Islanders as illegal overstayers and hence outsiders, critics of Pacific Islanders including the National Government, were able to provide a pseudo-legal justification for this scapegoating. This stereotype became so strong that by the end of 1976 the press contained a widespread use of “Pacific Islander” to mean “overstayer” and “overstayer” to mean “Pacific Islander.” However, not only were many overstayers not Pacific Islanders but the vast majority of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand, around 97 percent, were not illegal overstayers.

Police actions were informed by these stereotypes. In his statement “anyone who speaks in a non-Kiwi accent or looks as though he was not born in this country should carry a passport,” Chief Superintendent Berriman rather bluntly expressed the unspoken assumption of many New Zealanders that the typical New Zealander was an English-speaking white and that it was through the magnanimity of such ‘typical’ New Zealanders that Polynesians who conformed could be accepted. Those who criticised the raids argued that it violated New Zealand’s tradition of racial equality to pursue overstayers by specifically targeting members of Pacific Island communities. 137

The dawn raids and the controversy that grew around them were partly a product of rapid economic and social change. They were also a symptom of a growing uncertainty about national identity and a growing tendency to confrontation within the country over the form and direction of New Zealand’s multi-racial society.

136 Interview with Frank Corner, 25/1/01.
137 Ross, p. 62.
Conclusion

This thesis began with the premise that through their attitudes to immigration and immigrants, members of a nation express where they believe the boundaries of their nation to lie. With this in mind, I proposed to produce a fuller understanding of New Zealand national identity and of national identity in general through an examination of New Zealanders’ attitudes to immigration. It can be concluded that boundaries of national identity are fluid, contested and constantly re-evaluated in light of changing historical circumstances.

By defining who belongs to the nation through immigration policy and attitudes to immigration, one is implicitly or explicitly defining who does not belong. Where increasing social and economic problems coincide with rising rates of immigration, as they did in 1970s New Zealand, the almost inevitable consequence is scapegoating of ‘out’ groups for the problems. The perception of immigrants as a threat to national economic interests and shared national values, however, is contingent on assumptions about the boundaries of the nation which place certain groups outside the definition of ‘New Zealanders.’ These boundaries were highly controversial.

The United Kingdom’s entry into the European Economic Community and its introduction of ‘patriality laws’ provoked the greatest debate and possibly the greatest shift in identity boundaries in 1970s New Zealand. The ‘mother country’s’ turn towards Europe forced New Zealanders to confront the question of whether or not New Zealand as a nation was still part of a broader identity category called British. This debate took place through contention over immigration policy and the place of immigrants from the United Kingdom in New Zealand society. At the same time, the increasing importance of the Asia-Pacific region to New Zealand was reflected in debate over immigration and particularly in the immigration policy of the Third Labour Government.

Debate over Pacific Island immigration in particular contributed to a popular re-evaluation of national identity boundaries and the cultural definition of the nation. Before the 1970s, New Zealand identity had been defined largely in terms of supposedly shared national cultural values. Consequently, Pakeha expected both immigrants and Maori to culturally assimilate in order to be fully accepted as members of the national community. In immigration policy, this cultural nationalism
had been expressed through selection of immigrants based on their perceived ability to assimilate and at home through an official policy of encouraging Maori to assimilate. From the late-1960s, this assimilationist paradigm was challenged with increasing vigour by immigrants and by New Zealand’s existing cultural minorities. By the 1970s, these groups could not be ignored. They proposed a reinterpretation of the definition of the New Zealand nation according to a multicultural model.

Public debate over multiculturalism was important because at stake in the national identity politics of the 1970s was the relationship between identity and power. The growing acceptance of cultural pluralism as a national value had implications for the practices of national institutions. The public service was encouraged to cater for cultural difference in the services it provided. The increased acceptance of multiculturalism, in turn, had consequences for immigration policy. If the nation was acknowledged to be based around a multi-cultural model, the selection of immigrants for their ability to assimilate became anachronistic.

All of this change in New Zealand can only be fully understood within the context of one of the most important historical trends in the late twentieth century world - Globalisation. Advances in technology and increased flow of people and ideas throughout the world presented challenges to the ethnic and cultural basis of many Western industrialised states. They did this by bringing sizeable communities with cultures alien to the central ‘national culture’ within the boundaries of the state and creating new ethnic and cultural loci of identity which were separate from the nation. In New Zealand, these new foci were strongest in the forms of the Women’s movement, anti-nuclearism, environmentalism, and minority ethnic politics.

In recent years, international writing about national identity has focused around how the nation-state has responded to these challenges. In the introduction, I identified three important schools of thought about the inter-relation of immigration and national identity. Writers such as Brubacker and Joppke argued that the way in which the inhabitants of nations responded to immigrants were influenced by the particular discourses of national identity which had evolved prior to their arrival. Some members of this school, such as Giraud and Stoezel, argued that the presence of foreign cultures, by bringing national communities into direct contact with cultural difference, strengthened national cultural consciousness. A second school of thought, of which May Joseph provides an example, argued that the alternative sites of
identification in a global world have undermined the relative importance of the
nation-state as a locus of identity. Finally, writers such as Audrey Kobayashi have
argued that the very nature of nations has changed - that the nation in states like
Canada has evolved from adhering to an assimilationist narrow definition of national
culture to a multi-cultural model with an institutional acceptance that the entity can
comprise more than one distinct culture.

To an extent each of these theorists is able to produce credible examples to illustrate
their point. Indeed, examples of all three sets of circumstances could be drawn from
New Zealanders’ responses to immigration in the 1970s. The reason for this is that, as
Anderson reminds us, at the heart of any form of collective identity is the individual
process of identification.¹ Each individual perceives his or her nation slightly
differently. While a nation is a collective entity, its nature can be contested among
those who identify with it. In New Zealand, as in many other nations of the 1970s,
debate over immigration led to contestation over the way in which the nation was
defined.

As this study has shown, at the centre of the debate over national identity in New
Zealand sat core beliefs or historical myths with which there was broad popular
identification. These included the values of egalitarianism, classlessness, racial
harmony, social-welfarism, home-ownership, and a close relationship with nature. As
New Zealand values, these were scarcely contested, but at stake in the debate was
how these values were to be interpreted. Many of the arguments against more diverse
immigration were framed in terms of the threat it posed to these elements of the
nation, while those who defended immigration drew particularly on a nationalist
discourse of New Zealand as a society which valued racial tolerance.

With this in mind, the idea that cultural and ethnic diversity, and in particular the
diversity brought by immigration, weakened popular identification with the nation in
New Zealand can be largely discarded. The proposition that immigration strengthened
cultural nationalism because contact with immigrants heightened a sense of collective
identity among a culturally defined national community is partially borne out. For
some New Zealanders, the arrival of unprecedented numbers of Pacific Islanders and
British immigrants contributed to a realisation that New Zealand culture was unique,
distinct from Britain, and needed to be protected. For other New Zealanders, the identity politics of the 1970s, of which debate over immigration became a part, led them to reconceptualise the New Zealand nation as a multicultural entity. Thus, the immigration debate can partly be understood as a debate between assimilationist and multiculturalist conceptions of national culture.

One failing of many of the international models that attempt to show how nations respond to immigration is that they consider the national entity at the level of citizenship and immigration policy. This focus on the state half of the nation-state obscures the public identification element of the nation - what Renan called the ‘daily plebiscite.’

Another trap is that where writers have chosen to focus on cultural aspects of the nation, too often they have attempted to create a case for distinct and shared national qualities and have failed to acknowledge that national identity is a product of personal identification and is as frequently a subject of debate as it is of consensus. Some of the most important writers on New Zealand identity have followed this path. Keith Sinclair, in *A Destiny Apart* identifies the birth of New Zealand nationalism with New Zealand’s gradual increase in cultural and political difference from Britain. In so doing he does not acknowledge either cultural diversity or debate over identity within New Zealand. James Belich, in *Paradise Reforged*, takes a similar approach. He identifies the birth of the New Zealand nation with New Zealand ceasing to identify with Britain and building a wholly distinct culture. From this perspective, he concludes that the process of decolonisation began in the 1970s, but suggests that Pakeha have yet to replace attachment to Britain with a strong indigenous national cultural identity.

This persistence of the cultural conception of the nation does not adequately take account of the complexity of national identity. Nationhood is not a state that is attained by a discrete community and remains immutable. As this work has shown,

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the boundaries of a nation, like the elements which comprise it, are constantly contested and re-evaluated. Nationhood is better understood as an evolving process, a debate rather than a state of being. Like Peter Geyel’s definition of history itself, national identity is an argument without end.4

A better description of the diversity of interpretations of New Zealand national identity comes from Jock Phillips who identifies both the central place of identity myths in the process of national identification and of contestation over identity. Phillips, however, does not extend his study into an exploration of accommodative models of cultural diversity as responses to the challenges faced by unified notions of national culture from the 1970s. This thesis has been an attempt to do this.5

Another proposition examined in the introduction was the idea, expounded separately by Prasenjit Duara and Eric Hobsbawm, that a sense of national identity can be fostered by those who hold power within nation states to justify their positions. Examination of political discourse surrounding national identity and immigration in New Zealand of the 1970s, both at the level of parliamentary politics and at the level of pressure-group politics, shows that national identity and national values were indeed appropriated in pursuit of popular support for political ideas and organisations.

The National Party, in the 1975 election, successfully appealed to a vision of national values such as home ownership, social services, the classless society and racial harmony being under threat from immigrants. At the same time small single-issue pressure groups used discourses of national values in pursuit of broad popular support. This was the case of those groups opposing the dawn raids which called upon New Zealand’s tradition of racial tolerance in the same way as environmentalists appealed to visions of a clean-green country in opposition to the raising of Lake Manapouri and nuclear ship visits. However, in none of these cases were myths of national identity created to support these political causes. Their political value was in that they appealed to historical myths with which many people already identified and linked them to specific political causes. In this way identity and cause politics, rather

than presenting alternative loci of identification to the nation in New Zealand of the 1970s, reinforced national mythologies.

After the controversy of the 1976 dawn raids, the immigration debate subsided. This was partly because economic forces had turned the mass immigration of the early 1970s into a worrying net loss of population through emigration. Controversy over racial issues and cultural pluralism, while not diminishing in its bitterness or its capacity to divide New Zealanders, moved on to other issues including Springbok tours and Maori land and cultural rights. As these battles were fought and after the Treaty of Waitangi was accepted into law as the foundation document of New Zealand’s race relations in the 1980s, Maori narratives of race relations were increasingly based around the idea of biculturalism. While the Maori critique of assimilationism remained, the common ground Maori had shared with other minorities was reduced. The 1990s and 2000s have seen an unresolved tension between exponents of biculturalism and multiculturalism.

The shift from a popular belief of an assimilationist conception of national identity to an acceptance of the idea that the New Zealand nation is comprised of two or more cultures is one of the most important social changes of the last thirty years. To say that this transformation is complete would be untrue. ‘New Zealand First’, New Zealand’s third highest polling political party in the 2002 election, owes much of its support to its appeal to the malaise that many older Pakeha feel about multiculturalism. This has been expressed in attacks by its leader on non-European immigrants and the instruments of Maori autonomy. Nonetheless, the tide has turned. Where assimilationists in 1970 and even in 1975 were in the majority and cultural pluralists such as CARE could be painted as the radicals, it is now New Zealand First and its followers who present the appearance of a reactionary minority swimming against the tide of history.
Appendix: Measuring Immigration

Figure 6: Net Immigration to New Zealand for Five Year Periods Ending Date Shown from 1865-1985


Table 3 gives net immigration figures. These figures are a product of arrival and departure statistics for long term and permanent migrants (arriving or leaving for more than twelve months). While the best shorthand for immigrant flows, these net figures do not give a complete picture. Separate arrival and departure figures are presented in Figure 7. They show that the heavy net gains of 1973-75 were a product of increasing net inflow and stable outflows of migrants. The massive decline in net immigration of 1976-78 was a product both of more New Zealanders leaving and fewer immigrants arriving.
Table 3: Net Permanent Immigration of Various Groups 1972-8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Net Immigr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>70 531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>35 029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Samoa</td>
<td>10 887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks and Niue</td>
<td>7 458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>4 060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>3 153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2 968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2 234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>1 762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue</td>
<td>1 388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1 013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokelau</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Pacific Islands</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Commonwealth</td>
<td>3 355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB These figures while the best available contain some inconsistencies. No separate figures were published for net immigration of Other Commonwealth, China, Germany or Ireland for the years 1976-8 so the figures for these countries are 1972-5. The figures for Tonga and Western Samoa, for reasons which will be addressed shortly are derived not from official long term migration figures, but from arrival and departure figures.

Figure 7: Immigration and Emigration Rates 1970-78 (Immigration Black Bars Emigration White Bars)

While net permanent migration figures give the most accurate picture of immigrant numbers for most national groups, this is not universally the case. In Figure 8, I present not net permanent migration, but net arrivals for several Pacific Island groups. This is because the number of immigrants who arrived and stayed from these sources was very different from the number who were officially recorded as permanent or long-term migrants. Temporary arrivals from the Islands who were eventually granted the right to stay during the overstayer amnesties were not recorded as permanent immigrants. Similarly, until 1975, Samoan immigrants were granted six-month permits on arrival in New Zealand which were renewed at six monthly intervals until they had been in New Zealand for five years at which time they were granted permanent residence. Because their initial entry visa was short-term, Samoans arriving were not recorded in permanent migration statistics. Some of these anomalies are shown in Figure 8 which compares official permanent and long term migration statistics with net arrivals and departures for Pacific Island groups.

Figure 8: Permanent Arrivals versus Total Arrivals of Pacific Island Groups 1972-78

NB: Tongans comprised 4060 of the 4701 net immigrants recorded as Other Pacific. (Separate other Pacific permanent figures not available for 1976-78)


Table 4 shows the concentrations of various groups in the four largest cities in 1976. It demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of Pacific Islanders settled in Auckland. Auckland, which contained 26 percent of the total New Zealand population, contained three quarters of the nation’s Niuean born, more than four-fifths of the Tongans and almost two-thirds of the Western Samoans. While Auckland also had a higher proportion of British than the national average, this was less dramatic than for Pacific Island communities.

After Auckland, the predominance of overseas born was greatest in Wellington and, with the notable exceptions of the English in Christchurch and the Scottish in Dunedin, the South Island’s cities had significantly lower proportions of overseas born than the North’s. Table 4 also demonstrates that the overseas born fragment of the New Zealand population was generally more urbanised than the national figure of 69 percent. The most urbanised were Pacific Island groups. Ninety-two percent of Pacific Island born lived in cities, including 98 percent of Niueans, 96 percent of Tongans and 94 percent of Western Samoans. Irish, British, Australians and Dutch, while more urbanised than the New Zealand population as a whole, were some of the least urbanised of the overseas born.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
<th>Akld.</th>
<th>Welln.</th>
<th>Chch</th>
<th>Dud.</th>
<th>All Urban Areas</th>
<th>All NZ</th>
<th>% in Urban Areas</th>
<th>% in Akld Area</th>
<th>% of NZ popn.</th>
<th>% of Akld popn.</th>
<th>% of Well.p popn.</th>
<th>% of Chch popn.</th>
<th>% of Dud. popn.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>19621</td>
<td>6910</td>
<td>6295</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>40490</td>
<td>50830</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>39</td>
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Bibliography

A note on the format of the bibliography

I have divided this bibliography into two principal sections: ‘Interviews’ and ‘Other Sources’. Many other thesis bibliographies are divided into ‘primary’ and ‘secondary source’ sections which are sometimes further divided into sections for ‘published’ and ‘unpublished’ sources. The relative lack of segmentation in my own bibliography reflects both a desire for utility – all references are simply indexed by last name of author – and a desire to avoid the sometimes artificiality of the division between primary and secondary sources and between published and unpublished work. To give just two examples of this, the CARE Pamphlet written by Brian Lythe and Richard Northey in 1972 ‘How White is Our Immigration Policy?’ provides a summary of National’s immigration policy, which is useful as a secondary source. At the same time it is a primary source in that it provides data about the methods of the anti-racist movement. In a similar vein, it is perhaps difficult to categorise the Polynesian Panther Party Newsletter or the ACORD newsletter, photocopied and distributed to members as either published or unpublished sources.

Interviews

Interview with Don Bond, former Director of Immigration Division, Lower Hutt, 23/1/01, 2001.

Interview with Frank Corner, former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, 25/1/01, 2001.

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