The role of New Zealand Official Development Assistance in the Building of Sustainable Peace

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Abstract

New Zealand’s Official Development Assistance (NZODA) programme claims to support the construction of peaceful societies in aid recipient countries. This thesis evaluates this proposition by assessing the NZODA programme in relation to peacebuilding criteria. One theoretical framework that analyses the nature of peace implemented by international aid agencies separates peacebuilding into two different types: liberal peace and hybrid peace. This framework argues that the form of peace constructed can be determined by assessing aid agencies in relation to the following variables: method, actors, threat and geography.

In this thesis two distinct eras of the NZODA programme are assessed in relation to peacebuilding. Firstly, NZAid (NZODA from 2001 to 2008) and secondly IDG (NZODA from 2009 to present), are assessed in relation to the Building Peace Gradation to determine which form of peace NZAid wished to promote, and what form of peace IDG is currently pursuing. The findings suggest there has been a distinct shift in New Zealand’s development and foreign aid programme over the last 12 years. My conclusion is that NZAid was orientated towards hybrid peace while IDG is inclined towards liberal peace.

The peacebuilding literature argues hybrid peace holds greater legitimacy in the local context as it builds upon pre-existing structures, utilises local actors and local methods of implementation, and works to counteract locally perceived threats. Consequently, hybrid peace is arguably more emancipatory, just, durable, sustainable, and leads to the eventual exit by the external aid agency. The peacebuilding literature maintains liberal peace is less legitimate as it introduces foreign structures, utilises external actors, introduces external threats and implements programmes through foreign top-down methods.

Consequently, liberal peace tends to be more unjust, weak, unsustainable and the foreign agency is unlikely to exit during its implementation. This research concludes that IDG’s current orientation towards liberal peacebuilding has been driven by a government with a neoliberal approach to aid effectiveness.
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Key Terms and Acronyms

**Key Terms**

**Bilateral Aid:** Aid that is distributed directly from a donor country to a recipient country.

**Development Assistance Committee (DAC):** The group with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that deals with development matters. Countries within the DAC include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Commission.

**Global North:** Refers to the 44 countries that have a Human Development Index (HDI) above 0.8 as reported in the United Nations Development Programme Report 2011. This also includes Monaco, San Marino, Taiwan and the Vatican State who do not provide the information necessary to ascertain their HDI. These countries are predominantly located in the Northern Hemisphere.

**Global South:** Refers to the 133 countries that have a HDI below 0.8 as reported in the United Nations Development Programme Report 2011. This also includes the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Somalia and Tuvalu who do not provide the information necessary to ascertain their HDI. These countries are predominantly located in South and Central America, Africa, Asia and Oceania.

**Official Development Assistance (ODA):** "Grants or loans to countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA recipients (developing countries) and to multilateral agencies which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer payments..."

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3 Ibid.
to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance payouts) are in
general not counted."  

**Multilateral Aid:** Aid from donors that is channelled through organisations that
participate in development assistance (e.g. United Nations, World Bank).

**Tied Aid:** "Official grants or loans where procurement of the goods or services
involved is limited to the donor country or to a group of countries which does
not include substantially all aid recipient countries. Tied aid loans, credits
and associated financing packages are subject to certain disciplines concerning
their concessionality levels, the countries to which they may be directed, and
their developmental relevance so as to avoid using aid funds on projects that
would be commercially viable with market finance, and to ensure that recipient
countries receive good value."  

**Untied Aid:** "Official Development Assistance for which the associated goods
and services may be fully and freely procured in substantially all countries."  

**Abbreviations and Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Council for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWS</td>
<td>Christian World Services (New Zealand)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEV</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (British ODA)</td>
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4 OECD, "Development Co-operation Directorate: DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts".
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
EU European Union
EUPF European Union Peacebuilding Fund
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNI Gross National Income
HDI Human Development Index
IDG International Development Group (NZODA 2009 to present)
IGO International Government Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
KOHA-PICD Kaihono hei Oranga Hapori o te Ao - Partnerships for International Community Development (NZODA Contestable Fund during the era of NZAid)
MFAT Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand)
NGO Non-Government Organisation
NZ New Zealand
NZADD New Zealand Aid and Development Dialogues
NZAid New Zealand Aid (NZODA 2001 to 2008)
NZODA New Zealand Official Development Assistance
NZPfID New Zealand Partnerships for International Development Fund (NZODA Contestable Fund during the era of IDG; began October 2012)
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OIA</td>
<td>Official Information Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<td>PCIA</td>
<td>Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAB</td>
<td>Semi-Autonomous Body</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Semi-Autonomous Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Fund (NZODA Contestable Fund during the era of IDG; expired October 2012)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAps</td>
<td>Sector Wide Approaches</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War One</td>
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<td>World War Two</td>
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Introduction
I. Overview

New Zealand Official Development Assistance (NZODA) is the term used to describe the New Zealand government’s international aid and development programme. Although the New Zealand government’s transfer of funds and assistance can be traced to the beginning of the 20th century, the NZODA programme did not formally begin until the second half of the 20th century. Over the last fifty years New Zealand’s foreign aid budget has fluctuated between 0.17 and 0.50 per cent of New Zealand’s Gross National Product (GNP), and through bilateral and multilateral means, the NZODA programme has affected development in Oceania, Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe.

Over the last 12 years the NZODA programme has been subjected to two major restructurings. In 2001 the NZODA programme was rebranded as NZAid, assigned the mandate of poverty elimination and institutionally reformed as a Semi-Autonomous Body (SAB) inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). In 2009 the NZODA programme experienced another major transformation. NZAid was rebranded internally as the International Development Group (IDG), its Semi-Autonomous Status (SAS) was removed and reintegrated into MFAT and the mandate was changed to sustainable economic development.

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8 While some New Zealand Government publications maintain that NZODA began at the beginning of the 20th century, Overton (2009) argues early NZODA was a feature of New Zealand’s colonial relationship with South Pacific nations. New Zealand joined the ranks of imperial powers in 1901 when it was granted authority and responsibility for governing the Cook Islands from Great Britain. This was soon followed by the transfer of Niue, the Tokelau Islands and Western Samoa, to New Zealand administration before 1920. The relationship with these four South Pacific nations came to dominate the entirety of NZODA pre-WWII. See J. Overton, "Reshaping Development Aid: Implications for Political and Economic Relations " in Eliminating World Poverty: Global Goals and Regional Progress, ed. Jonathan Boston (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, 2009), 87; R. Debreceny, "Some Aspects of projects in the New Zealand Programme of Official Development Assistance" (Victoria University of Wellington, 1979), 26.

This thesis examines the two major restructurings the NZODA programme has undergone by assessing the nature of peace sought by NZAid and IDG. It is a comparative analysis identifying where the two respective periods of NZODA are positioned in relation to the Building Peace Gradation. While a number of stakeholders and academics have commented upon the changes to the NZODA programme over the last 12 years, there has been no examination of these modifications through the lens of peace studies.

In this thesis, NZAid (NZODA 2001 - 2008) and IDG (NZODA 2009 - present) are assessed in relation to a development and peacebuilding framework. Adopting, in part, Richmond's (2006) Graduation of the liberal peace model, the framework assesses four variables that indicate the peace goals of the respective eras of NZODA.

This thesis subsequently discusses the implications of implementing different forms of peace. The literature argues a hybrid peace that does justice to locality creates a more emancipatory, legitimate, sustainable and durable construct, while liberal peace tends to be more unjust, illegitimate, unsustainable and weak. Finally, this thesis concludes by discussing possible reasons for shifts in relation to the Building Peace Gradation.

II. Research Question

The three central research questions ask:

What form of peacebuilding has been, and is currently being, implemented by New Zealand’s Official Development Assistance programme?

What are some of the substantive implications of New Zealand’s approach to Official Development Assistance?

If there has been a change to the form of peacebuilding implemented by New Zealand’s Official Development Assistance, what has caused the change?
To answer these central questions, four areas of investigation are addressed in chapters one and two. The first area of investigation involves an examination of literature surrounding NZODA. The second area of investigation considers the link between development studies and peace studies. The third area of investigation considers different definitions of peace and peacebuilding. The fourth and final area of investigation considers different methods of assessing peacebuilding.

III. Purpose of the Study

While development studies has traditionally critiqued international aid implementation, peace studies is intrinsically concerned with development operations because the central concern of peace research is “understanding those processes which lead to a more desirable human condition”.10 This involves determining the means and processes that facilitates harmonious societies and sustainable peace. By firstly clarifying the link between international development and peace studies, and secondly outlining different forms of peace foreign entities can construct in the Global South, this thesis will explore the examination of the NZODA programme through a peace studies lens.

Although there is continuous review and analysis of NZODA, a thorough examination through the lens of peace studies has not been conducted, further the form of peace the NZODA programme is aimed at has not been identified. This research contributes to the continuing evaluation of the NZODA programme by determining what form of peace is being pursued by the NZODA programme and what the implications of pursuing certain forms of peace are.

With a central focus on how to create harmonious societies, the peace studies lens enables us to examine if the NZODA programme is working towards sustainable development and stable peace in ODA recipient countries. Further,

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examining the NZODA programme through a conflict sensitive peace lens will deepen our knowledge of New Zealand’s foreign assistance programme. Expanding our understanding of New Zealand’s ODA and assessing if the NZODA programme is forming sustainable peace is of interest to recipients of NZODA, stakeholders working with NZODA, the NZODA programme, other foreign aid agencies, and the funders of the NZODA programme - the New Zealand taxpayer.

IV. Delimitations

In order for the thesis to remain manageable, I limited the number of interviewees to six key actors. However, all participants have had intimate association with the NZODA programme over the last 12 years and possess an in-depth understanding of the impact and effectiveness of NZAid and IDG. The six interviewees represent a good cross-section of official and non-official perspectives on NZODA. Further, while critical to this research, interviews are only one of several sources of information.\textsuperscript{11}

V. Methodology

This thesis is an analysis of a government agency that has experienced two major organisational transformations since 2001. While operating under different brands, NZAid was, and IDG is currently, responsible for implementing New Zealand’s Official Development Assistance programme. As NZAid and IDG are both the same government agency responsible for foreign aid and development the comparative analysis method is particularly well suited to this research.

The comparative analysis is conducted by assessing NZAid and IDG in relation to a theoretical framework based primarily on Richmond’s (2006) \textit{Graduation of the liberal peace model}. While altered slightly, Richmond’s model provides the basis for the theoretical framework of the analysis. The framework of Lederach

\textsuperscript{11} See Appendix for a description of participants.
(1996), Bush (2003), Heathershaw (2008), Richmond et al. (2011) and Natorski (2011) are also influential in the construction of the theoretical framework.

Information inserted into the framework is gathered from several sources including: interviews, Non-Government Organisations (NGO) and Intergovernmental Organisations (IGO) reports, academic journals and government reports. Interviews gathered from six participants provide the primary source information, while secondary sources include, peer reviews by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), reviews by the New Zealand Government and publications by the NZODA programme.

It is important to emphasise here the significance of the six interviews as an information source. Three interviews were conducted with staff from the NZODA programme, and the three remaining interviews were conducted with stakeholders who have each had close associations with the NZODA programme for over a decade respectively. Of the three NZODA interviewees, one worked at the NZODA programme during the periods of NZAid and IDG, and the two remaining NZODA programme employees have worked at NZODA since the creation of IDG in 2009. The three stakeholders selected have had consistent and intimate interaction with the NZODA during the eras of NZAid and IDG. One of the stakeholders interviewed previously worked at the NZODA programme.

VI. Structure

This thesis consists of an introduction, six chapters, and a conclusion:

Chapter One: Is a literature review of NZODA, development and peacebuilding. Part One summarises the critical assessment of NZODA. Part Two explores the link between development and peace studies. This connection is established by outlining postdevelopment theory and Galtung’s formulation of peace studies in

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12 Movement between different theories is not always apparent in a discrete or explicit fashion. Similarly, the form of peace implemented by an entity can be difficult to detect because of the complex nature of international aid agencies. Interviews assist in highlighting key themes and actions that cannot be extracted from data available in publications and reviews.
relation to development. Part Three introduces common themes and theories surrounding international peacebuilding in relation to development, before outlining the definition of peacebuilding appropriate for this research.

Chapter Two: Explores macro-level approaches for assessing peacebuilding, before introducing the theoretical framework for assessing what form of peacebuilding has been, and is currently being, implemented by NZODA. The indicators, and method for measuring the indicators, are also explained in this chapter.

Chapter Three: Introduces NZAid and presents a brief background leading up to its creation in 2001. Following this is an outline of NZAid's operations from 2001 to 2008. Utilising this outline and information gathered from interviews, NZAid is assessed in relation to the theoretical framework.

Chapter Four: Introduces IDG, which was formed in 2009 and is currently responsible for the NZODA programme. Firstly, a brief background leading up to the creation of IDG is presented, followed by an outline of IDG's operations from 2009 to the present. Secondly, utilising the outline and information gathered from interviews, IDG is assessed in relation to the theoretical framework.

Chapter Five: Is divided into two parts, results and analysis. Part One reflects upon the previous two chapters and summarises the findings by clearly outlining NZAid's and IDG's respective positions in relation to the Building Peace Gradation. Part Two presents an analysis of the results by outlining the implications of orientating towards different forms of peace. Arguments supporting and opposing different forms of peace are presented.

Chapter Six: Discusses possible explanations for changes between IDG and NZAid in relation to the Building Peace Gradation. This chapter explores the argument proposed by the National-led Government that changes to NZAid were undertaken to improve accountability, efficiency and effectiveness. It is suggested that NZAid was transformed to IDG because of the National-led
Government’s neoliberal approach to development policy. A peace studies and postdevelopment perspective on the neoliberal advancement in aid policy is subsequently presented.

Conclusion: Briefly revisits the central questions and areas of investigation before suggesting some recommendations and areas of future research.

VII. Stylistic Note

As stated previously, the New Zealand government’s international aid and development agency has undergone several brand restructures since its inception. For the purpose of consistency and clarity, this research generally refers to the New Zealand government’s international aid and/or development operations as New Zealand Official Development Assistance and/or the NZODA programme. It should be noted that:

- NZODA from 1990 to 2001 is referred to as DEV
- NZODA from 2001 to 2008 is referred to as NZAid
- NZODA from 2009 to present is referred to as IDG

On another matter, literature commonly refers to liberal peacebuilding as ‘the liberal peace’. The use of ‘the’ implies a dominance, lack of alternative or an unchallenged notion. In an attempt to preserve neutrality, this thesis, presents different forms of peacebuilding, both liberal and hybrid, without the definitive article.
Chapter One: NZODA, Development and Peacebuilding

If ‘development equals peace,’ then conflict should decrease as a country or region ‘develops.’ But this does not always happen. In fact, we often see that violence increases as the living conditions for some groups in a region improve. In many cases, development itself creates conflict. . . . It is more accurate to say that development initiatives sometimes contribute to peace and sometime contribute to conflict.13

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1.1 Chapter Outline

Chapter One is separated into three parts. Part One summarises the critical assessment of NZODA by dividing previous examination into three different eras. Firstly, analysis of NZODA from 1900 to 2000 is explored. Secondly, critical review of NZODA from 2001 to 2008 is explained. Finally, critical review of NZODA from 2009 to the present is outlined.

Part Two introduces development theory and peace studies. Firstly, contemporary development theories are summarised followed by a deeper exploration of postdevelopment theory. Secondly, the link between development and peace studies is explained by outlining some common themes present in both postdevelopment and peace studies.

Part Three introduces peacebuilding literature. A definition of peacebuilding is established by examining exclusive and inclusive approaches, and the gradualist and synergistic perspectives of peacebuilding. Subsequently, liberal and hybrid peacebuilding is presented by examining respective foundations and examples of implementation.
Part One: New Zealand Official Development Assistance

1.2 Introduction: Critical Review of NZODA

Since its inception, the NZODA programme has been subject to several external reviews, audits, internal assessments and academic critiques. These examinations include, but are not limited to: DAC reviews, ministerial reviews, the Office of the Controller and Auditor-General audits, and industry stakeholder assessments. While these documents provide valuable insight into NZODA, the following sections will outline critical assessments solely from academic sources.

As previously stated, this research is a comparative analysis between two different eras of the NZODA programme. While NZODA pre-2000 is not part of this comparative analysis, reviewing the critical literature surrounding NZODA prior to the formation of NZAid (2001) provides essential background information.  

Therefore the critical review of NZODA will be explored by dividing previous examinations into three different eras. Firstly, analysis of NZODA from 1900 to 2000 is summarised. Secondly, analysis of NZODA from 2001 to 2008 is explained. Finally, analysis of NZODA from 2009 to the present is outlined. The strategic separation of the critical literature surrounding NZODA not only reinforces the comparative nature of this study, but also facilitates a better understanding of these two distinct periods of NZODA.

1.2.1 NZODA: 1900 to 2000

Given the size, complexity and implications of New Zealand’s foreign aid programme, there is relatively limited academic assessment of NZODA prior to 2000. However, Thompson (1967) provides historical documentation on NZODA activities from its creation up to the mid-1960s. Thompson (1967) suggests that although the New Zealand government claimed to implement

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14 The lack of data and information on NZODA prior to 2000, and wording constraints of this thesis, makes it difficult to accurately place NZODA from 1900 to 2000 within the Building Peace Gradation.

15 Thompson, New Zealand's International Aid: 12.
NZODA “to protect and preserve the rights of the Polynesian inhabitants to their own land and culture, and to help them to develop the island economies”\textsuperscript{16}, the principles and style guiding the ODA programme were colonial in nature. Debreceny (1979) concludes the NZODA programme faced similar challenges to those of most Western donors, in that several variables influenced ODA. These factors included, but were not limited to: humanitarianism, historical connections, foreign policy, the private sector, administrative influences and the role of the recipient country in the international community.\textsuperscript{17}

Scheyvens and Overton (1995) suggest that during the mid-1990s there was an increased focus upon advancing New Zealand’s private sector in ODA, while emphasis on poverty alleviation had faded. Although the NZODA programme was increasingly focusing upon new themes, including women and the environment, Scheyvens and Overton (1995) claim the programme was largely driven by neoliberalism and a “doing well out of doing good” approach to development.\textsuperscript{18} Overton (2009) retrospectively reflects upon NZODA formative years, summarising NZODA’s primary principles and modality of implementation (Table 1 below) since its creation to 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Aid principles</th>
<th>Aid modality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1960</td>
<td>Colonial relationships</td>
<td>Costs of administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Decolonisation</td>
<td>Budget support</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Welfare, infrastructure, and rural development</td>
<td>Budget support and projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Structural adjustment</td>
<td>More project aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000–2008</td>
<td>Poverty alleviation</td>
<td>Project aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009–</td>
<td>Sustainable economic development</td>
<td>Move to sector-wide approaches (SWAps)</td>
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\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 21.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 280.

\textsuperscript{18} Scheyvens and Overton, "Doing well out of our doing good: a geography of New Zealand aid," 207.

\textsuperscript{19} Overton, "Reshaping Development Aid: Implications for Political and Economic Relations “ 87.
1.2.2 NZODA: 2001 to 2008

In 2001 the New Zealand ODA programme experienced significant change. NZODA was rebranded NZAid, transformed into SAB and assigned a new mandate that directed focus towards poverty elimination. While examination of NZAid post-2009 has flourished, during the years of NZAid's implementation, it experienced limited academic examination.

Overton (2009), Thompson (2009), Spratt (2012) and Banks et al. (2012) argue that during these years New Zealand began to catch up with international trends through the change in mandate, organisational structure and modality of delivery. Overton (2009) claims the adoption of poverty alleviation mirrored international trends and the growing consensus among aid agencies and development orientated IGOs. The formation of NZAid as a SAB, allowed NZAid to recruit development staff and provide greater separation between the diplomatic and trade objectives of MFAT, and the poverty alleviation goals of NZAid. Further, the move towards a modality of Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) remedied international calls for local ownership.

Banks et al. (2012) comment upon the changing volumes and geographies of NZAid; stating that NZAid brought increases in aid volumes and a geographic shift away from Asia and traditional Polynesian partners (excluding constitutional partners), towards Melanesian nations with low human development indicators. Banks et al. (2012) also suggest that the 2005 DAC Review and 2005 Ministerial review, “[b]oth gave the agency remarkably good

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reports”\textsuperscript{23} While Thompson (2009) claims the DAC labelled NZAid the “best focused aid agency in the world”\textsuperscript{24} Banks et al. (2012) argue that the two audit reports assessing NZAid in 2007 found “no serious misconduct or misappropriations”\textsuperscript{25} but, “there were findings that pointed to some deficiencies in the management control environment and contract management systems, processes and practices”\textsuperscript{26} Banks et al. (2012) argue the issues detected in the audit reports could be expected because the diverse nature of aid work is ill-suited to rigid auditing methods and Western management systems.\textsuperscript{27}

The former head of NZAid, Dr Peter Adams, offers insight into the organisational changes adopted by NZODA during the years he was Chief Executive. Adams (2010) argues the focus on horizontal communication and a culture of collective leadership encouraged innovation, participation and was in part responsible for the positive assessments of NZAid’s culture in the 2005 Ministerial Review and the 2005 DAC Review.\textsuperscript{28}

1.2.3 NZODA: 2009 to Present

In the lead up to the 2008 elections, the National party that indicated if they were to form the next government they would “[r]eview the operation of NZAid to ensure aid expenditure is effective, and to make sure problems identified in recent reports are rectified”.\textsuperscript{29} Consequently, after establishing a governing coalition, the National-led government conducted a review of NZODA\textsuperscript{30} that

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 177.
\textsuperscript{24} Scott Thompson, ”Aid Directions for Depression Days [online],” \textit{New Zealand International Review} 34, no. 4 (2009): 16.
\textsuperscript{25} Banks et al., ”Paddling on One Side of the Canoe? The Changing Nature of New Zealand’s Development Assistance Programme,” 177.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Peter Adams, ”Why does New Zealand have an Aid Programme?,” \textit{New Zealand International Review} 35, no. 5 (2010).
\textsuperscript{30} For debate regarding this review see Joanna Spratt, ”A Bolt from the Blue: Examining the 2009 Changes to the New Zealand Aid Programme and What They Mean Now,” (Wellington: New Zealand
resulted in a change in mandate to sustainable economic development, removal of the SAB model and a new name: International Development Group. During this latest era of NZODA, critical academic analysis has increased significantly.

As part of the New Zealand Aid and Development Dialogues (NZADD) collective, Spratt (2012) examines the changes between NZAid to IDG by investigating whether the changes that occurred were necessary, and if they would impact on the effectiveness of NZODA. According to Spratt (2012), no review took place in the lead up to the changes to the NZODA in 2009. Secondly, when examining why the changes took place, Spratt (2012) concludes that the National-led government was primarily motivated by “a doing well while doing good approach” to ODA, arguing that New Zealand’s short term interests were primarily responsible for the changes from NZAid to IDG. Finally, the paper concludes that the changes made to NZODA, coupled with the motivations for the changes, will result in inefficient, low quality aid.

Challies et al. (2011) again comments upon IDG’s relationship with civil society after the 2009 amendments. Here it is argued that the process of change from NZAid to IDG was particularly damaging for civil society as large sums of funding were withdrawn with the transition to IDG. Further, partner civil society groups in recipient countries were adversely affected. Challies et al. (2011) claim the issues outlined above illustrate the danger of civil society aligning too closely with government, as well as, a need for consultation and/or dialogue between civil society and government when significant change occurs.

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31 NZADD is a group of academics and practitioners working together to promote dialogue and critical thinking on New Zealand’s ODA programme. Their aim is to “expand analysis, understanding and open discussion of New Zealand’s aid and development work.” Beginning in 2011, in its first year NZADD produced, four Working Papers, three Commentaries, and hosted four talks across the country. See New Zealand Aid and Development Dialogues, “About NZADDs,” New Zealand Aid and Development Dialogues, http://nzadds.org.nz/about/.

In light of IDG’s new mandate, several authors have investigated whether a focus of economic development is an appropriate and effective approach for an aid agency. In examining the relationship between economic development and development, Wood (2011) argues that while an increase in a country’s economic development usually results in a rise in broader development indicators, “aid is not, on average, a particularly effective tool for promoting economic development”.33 Further, Overton (2009) and Bridgman (2011) argue that the new mandate may be ineffective as it risks exacerbating inequality through concentration on economic indicators rather than human development indicators.34

Banks et al. (2012) criticise the change in mandate, removal of the SAS and the forecasted shift from Melanesia to Polynesia. It is argued that the changes initiated by the National-led government “can be seen as paddling directly against the gathering global consensus on best practice on aid delivery and effectiveness”.35 Echoing Spratt’s (2012) thesis, Banks et al. (2012) argue “[t]here has been an explicit return to the notion of achieving measurable positive outcomes in terms of New Zealand’s interests.”36 Further, the latest reforms and policy “harks back to the modernist phase with strong elements of neoliberalism”.37

1.2.4 Conclusion

When exploring the first area of investigation: considering critical review of NZODA, it is evident that the NZODA programme has attracted increased

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33 Terence Wood, "Is Economic Development an Appropriate Focus for an Aid Programme?" (New Zealand Aid and Development Dialogues, 2011), 17.

34 Tess M. Bridgman, "The Efficacy of New Zealand Aid: An Analysis and Critique of New Zealand’s Aid Programme" (University of Toronto, 2011); Overton, "Reshaping Development Aid: Implications for Political and Economic Relations ."


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., 183.
analysis over the last five years. Several authors have critically assessed the transformation of NZODA from NZAid to IDG; asking *where* the changes have taken place, *what* they mean and *why* they happened. From my analysis it would appear that most informed opinion is critical of the changes from NZAid to IDG.

In exploring the first area of investigation, several authors have previously compared NZAid and IDG. None, however, have analysed the changes through a peace studies lens. The following section emphasises this gap by outlining development theory and peace studies literature.
Part Two: Development and Peace Studies

The objective of Part Two, and the second area of investigation, is to introduce development theory and peace studies and explore the link between the two fields. It also involves explaining why the contemporary development literature is not used as the basis for this thesis. Therefore, the first section outlines prominent development theories, while the second section introduces peace studies as an alternative lens for the analysis of NZODA.

Clarifying the relationship between development theory and peace studies is critical to this thesis. As the school of development studies generally has a monopoly over ‘issues of development’, the link between peace studies and development is essential to explain why this research does not employ development theory as the primary foundation to assess the NZODA programme.

In the following section it is argued that postdevelopment theory provides an exit-portal from development studies because postdevelopment seeks alternatives to, rather than, of development; meaning postdevelopment searches for ‘development solutions’ outside of the contemporary development sphere. As, postdevelopment and peace studies align on several key themes and peace studies possesses a particular focus on how to create lasting peace among peoples, it is suggested that one alternative to the contemporary development discourse is peace studies.

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1.3 Development Theory: Introduction

The aim of this section is to introduce contemporary theories of international development. Potter et al. (2008) maintain that development theory “may be regarded as sets of apparently logical propositions which purport to explain how development has occurred in the past and/or should occur in the future”. While several development theories have been advanced post-World War II (WWII), this introductory section outlines the four most prominent theories of development. The following sections introduce modernisation theory, dependency theories, neoliberalism and postdevelopment by outlining their primary influences and arguments.

1.3.1 Modernisation Theory

Because it provided the dominant framework for the “development” of poor, postcolonial countries, modernisation theory ranks among the most important constructs of twentieth-century social science. The post-WWII environment brought extensive expansion to the development sphere. According to Preston (1996), the reconstruction of Europe, the advent of Third World nationalist developmentalism and political pressure from the USA to order the post-war world were all influential in the ascendency of modernisation theory. In its simplest form, modernisation aims to facilitate the shift from traditional society to modern society. Largely associated with Rostow’s (1959) Stages of Economic Growth model, the basic logic of modernisation outlines that non-industrialised societies might be expected to modernise by following the steps industrialised nations took in their attainment.


of economic, social and political affluence. Subsequently, by identifying and auctioning the social variables that lead to social progress, the traditional society can progress through the five stages of economic growth and achieve widespread prosperity and a modern society.\textsuperscript{44}

1.3.2 Dependency Theories

Emerging in opposition to the modernisation model, dependency theory and/or structuralist theory presents an explanation as to why societies in the Global South were not developing themselves. Influenced by Marxist, neo-Marxist and Structuralist thought, dependency theories\textsuperscript{45} principally address the economic, social and political structures leading to underdevelopment. Dependency theorists argue the conditions of underdevelopment “are to a significant extent [caused] by the global structures within which . . . [the Global South] found themselves, in particular the dominance of the West”.\textsuperscript{46} The continued supremacy of the Global North is perpetuated by a construct of economic dependency\textsuperscript{47} where the peripheries (Global South) supply low value, primary products to the First World in exchange for high value, high-tech goods.\textsuperscript{48} Solutions to amending the status quo range from the Global South forming trading blocs or common markets, implementing trade barriers and controls on multinationals, altering the investment behaviour of elites in the Global South, and/or political revolution.

\textsuperscript{44} K. P. Clements, \textit{From Right to Left in Development Theory}, vol. 61, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore: Eurasia Press, 1980).

\textsuperscript{45} For the purpose of this research dependency theory, structuralism and world systems theory will be known as dependency theories.

\textsuperscript{46} Preston, \textit{Development Theory: An Introduction}: 195.

\textsuperscript{47} Supported by political and cultural dependency.

\textsuperscript{48} In this model there is a direct connection between the development of the North and the underdevelopment of the South with elites in both developed and developing communities having a shared affinity of interest with each other in opposition to non-elite groups in the North and in the South.
1.3.3 Neoliberalism

Since the 1980s, neoliberalism has been the dominant development theory in both policy and practice.\textsuperscript{49} Driven by the 'New Right',\textsuperscript{50} neoliberalism primarily draws upon parts of modernisation and Adam Smith’s thought on neo-classical economics.\textsuperscript{51} Contemporary neoliberal notions centre on the deregulation of the market, rolling back of the state and promotion of free trade to effect desirable change in underdeveloped societies. Practical polices rising from these ideals include the privatisation of state-owned enterprise, encouraging foreign investors from the Global North, allowing free markets to prosper, elimination of government regulation and protectionist policies, and promoting free trade and expansion.\textsuperscript{52} These measures have been implemented in the Global South through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). Exported via the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and most Western governments, SAPs were based firmly upon the notion that a self-regulating global market maximises benefits for all participants.\textsuperscript{53}

1.3.4 Postdevelopment Theory

The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crime have been the steady companions of development and they tell a common story: it did not work.\textsuperscript{54}


\textsuperscript{50} The New Right refers to groups in the 1980s that advocated for liberal free-market policy. Chief proponents included Ronald Regan, Margaret Thatcher and Milton Friedman. See Potter et al., \textit{Geographies of Development: An introduction to Development Studies} 94.

\textsuperscript{51} Chant and McIlwaine, \textit{Geographies of Development in the 21st century: An Introduction to the Global South}: 40.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{53} Preston, \textit{Development Theory: An Introduction}: 269.

The foundations of postdevelopment\textsuperscript{55} theory are situated within post-colonial and poststructuralist theory.\textsuperscript{56} Originally labelled a critique of modernisation, dependency theories, neoliberalism and the other theories associated with these dominant development models, Herlin (2006) argues postdevelopment searches for “alternatives to – rather than of – development”.\textsuperscript{57} The postdevelopment school endeavours to remove itself from the discourse(s) of development in the search for another means of learning from, and working with, the Global South. While criticised for lacking concrete alternatives,\textsuperscript{58} postdevelopment’s primary themes are a rejection of metanarratives in relation to issues in the Global South, the support of context-specific perspectives from the Global South and the support of diversity in relation to modernisation.\textsuperscript{59}

With anti/post-development rejecting many of the foundations, commonalities and fundamentals of conventional development theory, the postdevelopment school searches for an alternatives to development\textsuperscript{60}; meaning postdevelopment pursues ‘development solutions’ outside of the current development sphere. While such a stance can be interpreted as a call for the ‘end of development’, according to Rahnemna (1997), the end of development is not “an end to the search for new possibilities of change”, but the beginning of

\textsuperscript{55} Also termed post-development or antidevelopment.

\textsuperscript{56} While postdevelopment contains echoes of the dependency school, Escobar argues “postdevelopment arose from a poststructuralist and postcolonial critique, that is, an analysis of development as a set of discourses and practices that had profound impact on how Asia, Africa and Latin America came to be seen as ‘underdeveloped’ and treated as such.” See Arturo Escobar, Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012). xii; C. Sylvester, "Development studies and postcolonial studies: disparate tales of the “Third World”," Third World Quarterly 20, no. 4 (1999).

\textsuperscript{57} Herlin, "Fakalakalaka: The impact of a Tongan notion of development in a contemporary transnational world," 13; Ziai, "The ambivalence of post-development: between reactionary populism and radical democracy," 1045; Escobar, Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World.


\textsuperscript{59} Chant and McIlwaine, Geographies of Development in the 21st century: An Introduction to the Global South: 49.

\textsuperscript{60} Escobar, Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World; Herlin, "Fakalakalaka: The impact of a Tongan notion of development in a contemporary transnational world."
“a relational world of friendship, or for genuine processes of regeneration able to give birth to new forms of solidarity”. Postdevelopment should mean the “inhumane and the ultimately destructive approach to change is over. It should resemble a call to the ‘good people’ everywhere to think and work together”. The following section examines one such alternative to development – peace studies.

1.4 Peace Studies: Introduction

It has been suggested postdevelopment theory is searching for alternatives to the contemporary development discourse. The following sections explore the suitability of peace studies as one such alternative. This is performed by firstly outlining the core position of peace studies in relation to development. Here Galtung’s (1980, 1996) theories on development are examined. Secondly, the suitability of peace studies as a postdevelopment alternative is assessed by revisiting the core themes of postdevelopment, including: rejection of metanarratives, emphasis on context-specific perspectives, encouragement of diversity in relation to modernisation; and assessing peace studies position on these key themes.

1.4.1 Peace Studies on Development

... peace theory is intimately connected not only with conflict theory, but equally with development theory. And peace research defined as research into the conditions – past, present and future – of realising peace, will be equally intimately connected with conflict research and development research; the former often more relevant for positive peace, but with highly important overlaps.

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62 Ibid.
63 Galtung is the commonly referred to as the founder of Peace and Conflict Studies.
At the heart of peace studies lies an understanding of the conditions necessary for the elimination of violence and the creation of both positive and negative peace. Negative peace is the absence of direct violence. Positive peace is also concerned with the absence of violence; but understands violence as an expanded concept that includes structural and cultural forms. These forms of violence include “any avoidable insult to basic human needs, and more generally life, lowering the level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible”. Based within these notions, the central aim of peace studies is to work towards a more desirable human condition and a sustainable peace among peoples.

According to Galtung (1980, 1996), the issue of creating a more desirable human condition is where peace studies and development converge. Galtung (1980) claims that if peace studies is defined too narrowly it is only concerned with the absence of war, while defined broadly it addresses the “absence of direct and structural violence between and within states, which means realisation of survival, well-being, identity [and] freedom for all”. Similarly, if development is narrowly defined it is comparable to economic growth and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, defined broadly development holds the same concerns as a broad definition of peace studies: satisfying needs, reducing structural violence and essentially facilitating “survival, well-being, identity [and] freedom” for all.

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67 Dugan, "Peace Studies at the Graduate Level," 74.


69 Ibid. (Authors’ emphasis) Galtung’s position is affirmed in later work when he argues: “Defined narrowly, peace studies has a negative focus: reducing direct violence = reducing the suffering, when basic needs are insulted. Development studies reaches beyond that, not only meeting the needs but also developing the needs further. At that point, peace studies enters again, focusing on the reduction of structural and cultural violence.” See Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 1996). 127.
While peace studies is concerned with development and the creation of lasting peace, to assess its suitability as a postdevelopment alternative it must be examined in relation to postdevelopment's key themes. The following section revisits the core themes of postdevelopment, including: rejection of metanarratives, emphasis on context-specific perspectives and encouragement of diversity in relation to modernisation; simultaneously, peace studies' position on each key theme is explained.

1.4.2 Rejection of Metanarratives

Knowledge about the development process in a particular environment at a particular time does not exist in transferable form, rather it is the product of the development process itself. 70

As outlined above, postdevelopment rejects the metanarratives that arguably persist within contemporary development theory. It is claimed that those with a particular agenda and bias have dominated the creation and implementation of such narratives in the development space. This position becomes dangerous, as those in a position of power believe they have the mandate to transform people and societies according to the supposed universal standards. The implementation of universal standards ignores the heterogeneity that exists within humankind, destroying diversity.71

Similarly, peace studies is equally aware of the “exclusionary, totalizing metanarrative of the West that threads through all realms of social thought”.72 When speaking on this development issue Galtung (1996) claims “Western civilization understands itself as the universal civilization, and universalizes its history for others.”73 As a result Western civilisation largely perceives development as: “A. Development = Western development = Modernisation, and


B. Development = Growth = Economic growth = GNP growth.” The field of peace studies rejects this single simplistic narrative which is perpetuated in contemporary development policy and practice. Subsequently, on this key theme peace studies aligns with postdevelopment’s rejection of the key metanarratives contained in development theory.

1.4.3 Context Specific Perspectives from the Global South

Development has relied exclusively on one knowledge system, namely, the modern Western one. The dominance of this knowledge system has dictated the marginalization and disqualification of non-Western knowledge systems.

Reflecting upon the rejection of metanarratives, postdevelopment theory promotes initiatives that originate from very specific geographic, cultural and historical contexts. The postdevelopment school argues that contemporary development theory mirrors the Global South’s development on the experiences of a few Global North nations. Duffield (2007) argues this formula is akin to “culturally coded racism”, claiming that by lumping people into groups of the “included and excluded”, current development practice eliminates the culture of those who do not want to “develop” within the Western-liberal paradigm. In contrast, postdevelopment argues any entry into another context must begin “by examining local constructions, to the extent that they are the life and history of the people, that is, the conditions for and of change”.

Similarly, peace studies recognises that development theory and implementation has largely come from “a Western imperialist father and a Christian missionary mother”. Galtung (1996) argues development assistance

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74 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
has predominantly been a formula to ensure “worldwide reproduction, even survival of Western culture and structure, by planting the socio-cultural seeds with that particular code everywhere, making use of local poverty and misery for legitimation”\textsuperscript{80}. Peace studies maintains that locating answers to development issues within the Global South is the only way to locate sustainable and legitimate solutions. \textsuperscript{81} Again, because peace studies argues formulae can and should, be located in the context in question, it is aligned with postdevelopment on this key theme.

1.4.4 Diversity in Relation to Modernisation

\ldots if the development of one culture is imposed upon another culture, it will sooner or later be experienced as a straitjacket – even if it is liberating, providing some degree of freedom, in some new direction\textsuperscript{82}.

Once more, postdevelopment maintains diversity of cultures should be upheld in relation to the modernisation thesis, which arguably penetrates contemporary development theory and policy. Postdevelopment expresses frustration at standardised constructs that are based upon the experiences of a few industrialised nations, at the same time excluding “much of the richness and diversity of societies that produces different trajectories of development”.\textsuperscript{83} Escobar (1995) argues that there needs to be greater understanding and acknowledgement, not only of the others’ culture and capacities, but further, an authentic examination of the historical process that saw them arrive at this certain place in time.

Again, Galtung (1996) argues that ignoring the historical progression of Global South countries, coupled with the trampling of difference in the development process, “provides a background for a number of negative phenomena in our

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 127.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 130.
While developers often perceive themselves as freeing the underdeveloped, peace researchers argue that if the liberating is done at the expense of a loss of culture, the feelings of liberation are typically lost. Peace studies holds that since the world possesses “several cultures” there should be “several developments”. As peace studies calls for a total restructuring of the relationship between the donor and recipient within the development paradigm in order to accept the diversities of societies, in this process, it is aligned with the core themes of postdevelopment theory.

1.4.5 Conclusion

While contemporary development theories largely dominate the development discourse, the past two decades have seen postdevelopment established as an important field within the development literature. Advocating for the rejection of metanarratives, diversity opposed to modernisation, context-specific formulas, and significantly, an alternative to - rather than - of development; postdevelopment finds considerable resonance in the peace studies literature.

As affirmed by Galtung (1980, 1996), peace studies is inextricably linked to development because its central concern is the forming of a more desirable human condition. Furthermore, it has been suggested peace studies strongly aligns with postdevelopment themes. Both advocate for the rejection of metanarratives, diversity in development strategy and context-specific formulas. Further, peace studies adds another dimension to the analysis of ‘development issues’ because it remains fixated upon the processes that lead to the creation of lasting peace among peoples. Explaining the link between development and peace studies addresses the second area of investigation.

However, the next challenge and area of investigation surrounds whether peace studies can provide a means of assessing development or international aid operations. The following section explains one discipline of peace studies that

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85 Ibid.
assists in assessing the form of peace constructed by the New Zealand Government in its ODA programme.
Part Three: Peacebuilding

1.5 Introduction: Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is an elastic concept. It may be broadly or narrowly defined, there is no agreement on precise parameters. Peacebuilding is a field within peace studies that can assist in assessing what form of peace is being constructed by a development agency. In recent times increased attention has been given to peacebuilding, and its relationship to development and international aid. While the term ‘peacebuilding’ is frequently used in academia, the United Nations (UN), major international and regional organisations, states and NGOs, the term is still contentious as there is “considerable variation in the meaning of peacebuilding”.

The following sections address the second area of investigation: considering the different definitions of peacebuilding, by outlining the definitional debate concerning peacebuilding. Firstly, inclusive and exclusive perceptions of peacebuilding are explained. Secondly, synergistic and gradualist assessments of peacebuilding are outlined. Finally, the definition of peacebuilding used for the purpose of this thesis is presented.

1.5.1 Exclusive and Inclusive Peacebuilding

According to David (1999), the concept of peacebuilding can be understood through its relationship with development. On the relationship between development and peacebuilding, two dominant schools of thought can be identified. The exclusive school, proposed by Cockell (1998) perceive

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89 Ibid.
90 Smoljan, "The relationship between peace building and development."
peacebuilding and development as “two distinct stages of a phased process, undertaken separately and under different conditions.”

Exclusivists claim peacebuilding is conducted over a limited period of time in response to security problems, while development is a relatively longer process conducted in generally peaceful conditions.

In contrast, inclusivists argue, “development underlies the philosophy of peacebuilding”, therefore the two are naturally intertwined. Proponents of the inclusive school possess a holistic view of peacebuilding, maintaining poverty and deprivation are not only issues of development but also primary drivers of antisocial behaviour that encourages conflict. An inclusive definition maintains that in practice peacebuilding and development cannot be separated, as peacebuilding operations will always include some dimension of development. Consequently, development and peacebuilding are not mutually exclusive, but working towards, and reinforcing, the same processes and goals.

1.5.2 Gradualist and Synergistic Peacebuilding

David (1999) argues another common debate when forming a definition of peacebuilding surrounds distinguishing when peacebuilding takes place. Once more, two opposing schools of thought exist. A gradualist perspective maintains peacebuilding is conducted after ‘peace’ is established and not prior to a political settlement, a ceasefire enacted (peacekeeping), or a ceasefire imposed

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94 Evident in The European Peacebuilding Liaison Office statement, which suggests that “Development and peacebuilding are intrinsically linked. . . . At the heart of both development and peacebuilding is the need to strengthen resilience and the capacity within society to manage change and resolve differences.” See European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, "Linking Peacebuilding and Development," (Brussels: European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, 2011), 1.
(peace-enforcement). Consequently, gradualists only refer to peacebuilding as the activities and operations that are conducted in the aftermath of a conflict.

In contrast a synergistic definition holds that peacebuilding is not only conducted throughout the duration of peace missions, but is also, complementary to pre or post conflict strategies.\(^95\) The synergistic school argues peacebuilding not only contributes to, but also benefits from, involvement in peace-making, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and other pre or post conflict strategies.\(^96\) Therefore any activities or operations performed to prevent further conflict can be classified as peacebuilding.

### 1.5.3 A Definition of Peacebuilding

There is a growing recognition that . . . social and economic development is seen as an integral part of all peacebuilding efforts designed to attain lasting and sustainable peace. . . . \(^97\) It is obvious that many of the elements of peace-building are the same as measures taken to promote development in peaceful situations/areas.\(^97\)

This research utilises a broad definition of peacebuilding in line with inclusive and synergistic perspectives.\(^98\) Consequently, peacebuilding can take place

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95 David, "Does Peacebuilding Build Peace? Liberal (Mis)steps in the Peace Process," 27.

96 UN descriptions of peacebuilding are typically defined in such terms as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary-General," United Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agdev.html. Again the Brahimi Report appears to support a broad definition of peacebuilding by defining it as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.” See United Nations, "Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects: Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," ed. General Assembly Security Council (New York: United Nations, 2000), 3.


98 Although there is a space for a narrower approach to peacebuilding influenced by exclusive and gradualist perspectives, the broader definition used for the purpose of this research is not uncommon among actors involved in peacebuilding. In a survey of several governmental bodies currently active in peacebuilding, Barnett et al. found that countries including: The United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada and Japan, had a government agency that perceived peacebuilding in broad terms.\(^96\) Of these counties, France, Canada and Japan, possessed governmental bodies whose definition of peacebuilding included reference to conflict or crisis prevention. See Barnett et al., "Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?,” 42.
before or after a conflict and is an activity closely tied to development. In this thesis peacebuilding is a “range of measures aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, by strengthening national capacities for conflict management and laying the foundations for sustainable peace”. Consequently, in the current research “peace-building is a matter for countries at all stages of development”, and not exclusive to post conflict situations.

By suggesting peacebuilding is closely tied to development and can be utilised to prevent conflict, Galtung’s (1980, 1996) position on the relationship between peace studies and development is extended into the peacebuilding definition. If peacebuilding “refers to the long-term project of building peaceful, stable communities and societies”, then the form or nature of peace crafted by IGOs, NGOs and various aid organisations should be assessed and understood. Therefore, it is a natural progression to investigate what form of peacebuilding organisations implement.

Utilising this definitional framework, this research assesses the form of peacebuilding implemented by the NZODA programme. However, in order to determine what form of peacebuilding has been implemented by NZODA, it is necessary to explore what different forms of peacebuilding exist in the current literature. The following section addresses this issue by outlining the themes and foundations of common forms of peacebuilding.

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100 Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary-General".
101 Galtung holds that development and peace studies should work towards the same aims which surrounds satisfying needs, reducing structural violence and essentially facilitating “survival, well-being, identity [and] freedom”. See Galtung, "The Changing Interface between Peace and Development in a Changing World,” 145.
1.6 Liberal Peace

One form of peacebuilding commonly implemented by intergovernmental organisations and nation states is what is known as liberal peace. Herring (2011) argues liberal peace is an informal and formal commitment to core elements of a liberal democratic governing system, market-orientated economy and security and structures based upon a strong central state.\textsuperscript{103} In order to clarify liberal peace further, the following sections explore its philosophical foundations and instances of liberal peace implementation.

1.6.1 Liberal Peace: Foundations

As the name suggests, the liberal peace manifesto is primarily based upon liberalism. This includes Kantian themes\textsuperscript{104} of democratic peace theory,\textsuperscript{105} and Wilsonian ideals\textsuperscript{106} of the market economy. These two pillars rest on the notion that a democratic governing system and market economy will foster political representation and sustainable economic growth respectively. These elements in turn are thought to create the conditions for economically prosperous societies with equal political representation; in turn cultivating a durable, sustainable peace. Additionally, Richmond (2006) and Clements et al. (2007) argue liberal peace is heavily influenced by Augustinian notions of the ‘tranquillity of order’,\textsuperscript{107} and Weberian\textsuperscript{108} and Westphalian\textsuperscript{109} descriptions of strong rule of law by the State.


\textsuperscript{108} K. P. Clements et al., "State Building Reconsidered: The Role of Hybridity in the Formation of
The second part of liberal peace philosophy is the notion that it can be exported into foreign societies. According to Heathershaw (2008), the exportation of liberal peace was a key part of former United States President Woodrow Wilson’s formula for world peace. In the years to follow, Milton Friedman and colleagues at the Chicago School advocated liberal peace should, and could, be transplanted “via international interventions and institution building”.110 Subsequently, democratic governance, a market-based economy and state-led rule of law, was not only prescribed as the tripartite formula for a sustainable peace, but furthermore, a formula that could be grafted upon all nations and peoples.

1.6.2 Liberal Peace: Implementation

... liberal peace is defined as the dominant form of peacemaking and peacebuilding favoured by leading states, international organizations and international financial institutions.111

In the years since the Cold War, the UN has embedded liberal peace themes throughout their policy and implementation. In An Agenda for Peace the UN asserts that when operating in countries, they will work towards the “transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions”.112 Further, this document argues there “is an obvious connection between democratic practices - such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making - and the achievement of true peace”.113

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113 Ibid.
Subsequently, in the years after the fall of the Berlin Wall the UN implanted liberal peace through post-conflict recovery operations, conflict prevention programmes and other development strategies. This was primarily evident in the unprecedented number of ‘democratic’ elections and UN-led operations conducted during the early 1990s. According to Paris (2010), these interventions “pursued a strategy of promoting peace by encouraging political and economic liberalisation of the host states”. These operations were conducted under the assumption “that rapid liberalisation would create conditions for stable and lasting peace”.

Major IGOs and the Global North nations have largely exported liberal peace models as their primary peacebuilding strategy. While the UN’s implementation of liberal peace is more obvious, major IGOs and Global North states generally conceal liberal peace themes under the banners of ‘good governance’, ‘structural adjustment’ and ‘poverty reduction’. In light of unwavering support from the UN, major IGOs and the Global North, liberal peace and its core themes have largely been immortalised as the end point of humankind’s ideological evolution. Subsequently, the implementation of liberal peace by Global North actors illustrates “[t]his is an era dominated by liberal peace”.

However, while we live in an era dominated by liberal peace, some claim this peacebuilding framework is ineffective. Several scholars have questioned if

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114 Post-conflict interventions were conducted in Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor.


116 Ibid.


120 Mac Ginty, "Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace,” 395.
Another form of peacebuilding would be more effective. The following section will outline an alternative form of peacebuilding.

1.7 Hybrid Peace

Any version of peace should cumulatively engage with everyday life as well as institutions from the bottom up. It should rest on uncovering an ontology, perhaps indigenous, on empathy and emancipation, and recognise the fluidity of peace as a process, as well as the constant renegotiation of ‘international’ norms of peace. ... This involves an exploration of different and hybrid ontologies of peace.121

An alternative to liberal peace is hybrid peacebuilding. The primary stance of hybridity is that an indigenous paradigm should “co-exist with, or ... gradually transform during the creation of, modern institutions”,122 in order to create a legitimate, just and sustainable peace. It does not seek to impose an external form of peace, but instead nourish the legitimate and organic socio-cultural constructs in particular social and political milieux. Although the discourse may sometimes appear to encompass a battle between Western and non-Western views, Mac Ginty (2010) claims hybridity moves the debate away from contemporary binaries that square-off traditional versus modernity or colonial versus local towards a process of blending, combining, or mixing of elements and norms.123

While hybridity is commonly employed within several academic fields,124 the very nature of the term somewhat rejects orderly categorisation. The following sections will clarify the concept of hybridity by exploring its philosophical foundations and providing examples of hybrid peace implementation.

124 Fields include, but are not limited to: biology, linguistics, anthropology, sociology, institutional and organisation studies, and post-colonial studies. See ibid.
1.7.1 Hybrid Peace: Foundations

Hybrid peace emerges from critical theory. Although the spirit of critical theory was evident well before the 18th century, the Frankfurt school was responsible for assembling the contemporary core of this theory in the 1930s. While the critical theory school can appear fragmented, its offshoots share an understanding on at least one key factor - an orientation towards achieving emancipatory politics.

It is generally agreed that emancipatory politics is only possible if knowledge, and a society's historical and social developments, are critically examined and understood. Critical theorists argue the primary inaccuracy of traditional theories is a failure to recognize themselves as non-objective observers in their formation of theories. Knowledge, however, "is always, and irreducibly, conditioned by historical and material contexts"; therefore examining human behaviour and social life requires a strategy of self-reflection on the part of theorists. Lastly, schools based in critical theory do not settle for identifying mechanisms that create a negative drain on societies, but rather, to study such abuses for the purpose of moving past them and realising true emancipation.

1.7.2 Hybrid Peace: Implementation

We are all hybrids. Our politics, societies, and economies are the result of long processes of hybridisation. Our cultures are intertwined. The

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127 Devetak, "Critical Theory," 139.

128 Without self-reflection, critical theorists reject the notion that one can possess an ability to extract oneself from their biases and predisposed ideologies. Self-Reflection “must include an account of its own genesis and application in society.” See ibid.
story of human development contains much mixing of norms and practices.\textsuperscript{129}

Proponents of hybridity argue it is a construct that does not require an introduction, but should be \textit{acknowledged} as the organic status quo. Hybridity illustrates that historically humans have constantly been lending and borrowing between cultures and societies. No society can lay claim to a zone of purity, given all experiences and cultures are a continuous process of transculturation.\textsuperscript{130} In recognition of the flows of people, resources and ideas brought on by globalization, the hybrid stance “underscores the fluidity of human societies, even societies that may be labelled as traditional or indigenous”.\textsuperscript{131} While hybrid peace is evolutionary and organic, it is not accepted by rigid implementers of liberal peace and therefore, it does not enjoy the same encouragement or support that liberal peace receives.

While hybridity, hybrid peace or hybrid orders have been stunted by liberal peace implementation; several authors discuss its emergence in various locations and circumstances.\textsuperscript{132} Clements et al. (2007) confirm the hybridity proposition in the formation of hybrid political orders in six Melanesian and Polynesian communities. \textsuperscript{133} Boege et al. (2009) maintain hybridity is evident in governance structures of Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Timor Leste and


\textsuperscript{131} Mac Ginty, "Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace," 397.


\textsuperscript{133} Clements et al., "State Building Reconsidered: The Role of Hybridity in the Formation of Political Order."
Papua New Guinea; hybridity is also widespread and important in Somaliland and Bougainville.\textsuperscript{134}

Finding varied combinations of local-customary and Western-influenced governance, Boege et al. (2008),\textsuperscript{135} supported in a later study by Richmond (2011),\textsuperscript{136} found constructive interaction between the two spheres (of traditional and modern institutions) bodes well for “the emergence of networks of resilient governance which are not introduced from the outside, but are embedded in societal structures on the ground”.\textsuperscript{137} Richmond et al. (2011), argue hybrid peace has possibly emerged in the Northern Ireland context.\textsuperscript{138} Mac Ginty (2011) confirms that hybrid peace is present in Northern Ireland’s civil society while suggesting that hybrid security has arisen in Afghanistan, hybrid economy in Iraq, hybrid state-building in Bosnia and hybrid governance in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{139}

\textbf{1.7.3 Conclusion}

Part Three has argued that several descriptions of peacebuilding exist and there is little consensus on one concrete definition. For the purpose of this research peacebuilding is defined in holistic terms as a “range of measures aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, by strengthening national capacities for conflict management and laying the foundations for sustainable


\textsuperscript{136} Richmond focused primarily upon Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands. See O. P. Richmond, "De-romanticising the Local, de-mystifying the International: Hybridity in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands," \textit{The Pacific Review} 24, no. 1 (2011).

\textsuperscript{137} Boege et al., "States emerging from hybrid political orders–Pacific experiences," iii.


\textsuperscript{139} Mac Ginty, \textit{International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace}. 
peace”. Further, by utilising this definition it is possible to investigate the form of peacebuilding implemented by the NZODA programme while maintaining a peace studies focus upon the processes and means that lead to the creation of sustainable peace among peoples.

Through examining the philosophical foundations and implementation of both liberal peace and hybrid peace it is evident liberal peace is widely applied by major IGOs and Global North nations, while hybrid peace is more challenging to conceptualise and operationalize in programmes. By formulating a definition of peacebuilding and discussing contemporary forms of peacebuilding, this section has explored the third area of investigation: considering different definitions of peacebuilding.

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1.8 Chapter Summary

This opening chapter has surveyed three bodies of literature. Part One explored the first area of investigation by considering critical review of NZODA. While several authors have addressed questions concerning the changes between NZAid and IDG, the changes have not been examined through a peace studies lens. Consequently, the form of peacebuilding or the nature of peace that NZAid and IDG have pursued has not been investigated.

Part Two addressed the second area of investigation by explaining the link between development and peace studies. Here it was suggested that postdevelopment theory encourages the exploration of ‘development issues’ outside of the traditional development discourse. Given its alignment with key postdevelopment themes, peace studies was suggested as an appropriate lens to examine NZODA.

Part Three addressed the third area of investigation by considering different definitions of peacebuilding. Here, various definitions of peacebuilding were explored before adopting a definition that states peacebuilding is a “range of measures aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, by strengthening national capacities for conflict management and laying the foundations for sustainable peace”. By utilising a broad definition of peacebuilding, it is suggested that the peacebuilding literature can be used to examine New Zealand’s ODA programme. Lastly, Part Three outlined two prominent forms of peacebuilding in academic literature.

Like previous studies of the NZODA programme mentioned in Part One, this research is interested in assessing: where the changes between NZAid and IDG have taken place; what the changes mean for the NZODA programme; and why the changes happened. However, by conducting a review through a peace studies lens, these questions are approached from another perspective, which brings with it a persistent focus upon the means and processes that lead to the

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141 Ibid.
formation of lasting peace within societies. Employing an appropriate but different means of analysis broadens the collective knowledge and understanding of the NZODA programme.

While it is clear that peace studies and peacebuilding literature will be employed in this comparative analysis, it has not been made clear how it will be utilised. The following section addresses the fourth and final area of investigation: considering different methods of assessing peacebuilding by exploring methodologies for assessing peacebuilding and/or the form of peace implemented by macro-level actors.
Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework

Development co-operation should at least be organised so that it does not aggravate the situation, but really we should be more ambitious than that. The first step is to prevent our assistance from having adverse results; the next, even more challenging, is to achieve the best possible results. The challenge is to make sure that development co-operation helps to prevent conflict and promote peace, thus paving the way for poverty reduction and development. Co-operation must be sensitive to conflict-related issues, and this requires good tools.142

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2.1 Introduction: Assessing Forms of Peace

It has been argued that postdevelopment theory and peace studies are strongly aligned on key themes and both search for development solutions outside of the contemporary development sphere. Further, it is suggested that the peace studies and peacebuilding literature offers a unique lens of examination as they maintain a concentrated focus on the processes and means that lead to the formation of a sustainable peace among peoples.\footnote{Dugan, “Peace Studies at the Graduate Level,” 74; Johan Galtung, Conflict transformation by peaceful means (the Transcend method) : participants' manual ; trainers' manual (Geneva: United Nations, 2000). 46; Johan Galtung, “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding,” in Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research, (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976).} Also, an examination of the critical literature surrounding the NZODA programme finds that although critical review of NZODA has increased during the last decade, a thorough analysis through the peace studies lens has not occurred.

While commentary on the above forms of peacebuilding is extensive, frameworks assessing the nature of peace and peacebuilding are scarce. The first part of this chapter addresses the fourth and final area of investigation by considering different methods of assessing peacebuilding. Models identifying forms of peacebuilding include frameworks from: Lederach (1996), Richmond (2006), Heathershaw (2008), Richmond et al. (2011) and Natorski (2011).

The second part of this chapter is a detailed description of the theoretical framework used in this research. While the models above are all influential, the theoretical framework used in this research is primarily based on Richmond’s (2006) Graduation of the liberal peace. Building upon Richmond’s (2006) model, I outline the four variables that are employed to for the purpose of the comparative analysis, including: method, actors, threat and geography.
2.2 Peacebuilding Frameworks: Literature Review

Lederach (1997) provides a starting point for assessing forms of peace and peacebuilding. In *Building Peace – A Conceptual Framework*, Lederach explains how different approaches to building peace produce different outcomes, and identifies the different actors prevalent in each approach. Categorising the types of actors and approaches into three separate levels, Lederach argues that top-level, middle-range and grassroots-level, are all essential in forging a sustainable peace.¹⁴⁵

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¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 60.
Richmond (2006) constructed the *Graduation of the liberal peace model* (Figure 3), which suggests that by assessing an operation(s) or actor(s) characteristics it can be assigned a form of liberal peace (Figure 4). Richmond argues that the

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146 Richmond, "The problem of peace: understanding the 'liberal peace'."
different forms of liberal peace implementation can be located along a continuum (x axis), these include: hyper-conservative, conservative, orthodox and emancipatory. Determining what form of liberal peace an actor implements is assessed by analysing the variables located along the y axis, which include: geography, threat, method and actors. By utilising this model the form of liberal peace implemented by organisations such as the UN, IGOs, aid agencies and NGOs can be determined. This model also suggests that the form of liberal peace implemented dictates when the operation will exit, and the nature, ontology and sustainability of the peace.

Figure 3: Current Examples of the Liberal Peace

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147 Ibid.
Heathershaw (2008) builds upon Richmond's work by 'unpacking' liberal peace, presenting it within the categories of: democratic peacebuilding, civil society, state-building and meta-discourse of pragmatic peacebuilding.

Table 2: Summary of discursive development of peacebuilding, 1989-2006.148

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse of peacebuilding</th>
<th>Spatial ideals</th>
<th>Ethical ideals</th>
<th>Temporal ideals</th>
<th>Discursive Antecedents</th>
<th>Practical Antecedents</th>
<th>High point(s)</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Low points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Peacebuilding</td>
<td>Formal institutions; structures which will lead to strengthening and solidifying peace*</td>
<td>Liberal Democracy; Human rights; Constitutionalism; Private property</td>
<td>Short-term post-conflict progress</td>
<td>Wilsonian/ Liberalist writing (1970s &amp; 30s); Democratisation lit (since 1970s); Democratic peace lit in IR</td>
<td>1989 and end of the Cold War</td>
<td>Early-1990s</td>
<td>AIP*</td>
<td>Somalia (1997–1999), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1992–1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society peacebuilding</td>
<td>Communities, grassroots, (global) civil society, bottom-up participation</td>
<td>Justice; Universality, neutrality and impartiality (humanitarianism)</td>
<td>Pre-, during and post-conflict progress</td>
<td>Constitutions and programmes of humanitarian aid agencies; religious non-violence literature</td>
<td>Failures of Rwanda, Bosnia and others in early–mid 1990s</td>
<td>Mid- to late-1990s</td>
<td>Carnegie, Lederach*, Anderson*</td>
<td>11 Sept 2001, attacks and rising concern over terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meta-discourse of pragmatic peacebuilding</td>
<td>Inter-textually produced: top-down and bottom-up shift towards privileging of state sovereignty in recent years</td>
<td>Inter-textually produced: neoliberal, technical-rational (denial of contesteddness of standpoint)</td>
<td>Inter-textually produced: shift to longer-term since early 1990s</td>
<td>Democratic, civil society and statebuilding discourses</td>
<td>At moments of increased inter-textuality between discourses: c. 1995; c. 2000; c. 2004–?</td>
<td>Supplement to AIP; Brahimi Report; R2P*; Paris; M34P*; HRW*</td>
<td>At moments of the domination of one discourse and reduced inter-textuality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Heathershaw describes the four different discourses of peacebuilding through spatial, ethical and temporal ideals. Furthermore, Heathershaw's framework includes when each discourse formally entered into academic prominence, when the discourse was practically implemented, academic proponents of each discourse and its low/high points over the last two decades.

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148 Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses."
Richmond et al. (2011) elaborates upon earlier attempts to assess peacebuilding by assessing the European Union Peacebuilding Fund (EUPF) within the *Graduations of the liberal peace model*. While an analysis of EUPF further clarifies Richmond's *Graduations of the liberal peace model*, specific detail regarding how the entity (EUPF) is measured, and subsequently placed within the framework, is lacking.

### Table 3: Dynamics of the EUPF (European Union Peacebuilding Framework).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hyper-conservative</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Orthodox</th>
<th>Emancipatory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of peace</strong></td>
<td>Victory's peace</td>
<td>Institutional peace</td>
<td>Constitutional peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hegemonic and imposed peace</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach</strong></td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Partially top-down, partly bottom-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coercive inspired by first-generation approaches to ending conflict</td>
<td>Coercive inspired by first- and second-generation approaches to ending conflict</td>
<td>Inspired by third-generation approaches to ending conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Militaryized peace</td>
<td>Partly bottom-up, Inspired by third-generation approaches to ending conflict</td>
<td>Development of EUPF since 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUPF dynamics</strong></td>
<td>Key role in external trustworthiness</td>
<td>Peacekeeping/SSR/DDR activities, trustworthiness</td>
<td>Regional association, neighbourhood, possible integration/stability, stable liberal/social democratic state institutions/local ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Means</strong></td>
<td>Military forces, EU rules in Bosnia, Kosovo, DR Congo, from 1995</td>
<td>EU commission, neighbourhood association, international transitional administrations</td>
<td>EU commissioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In Focus</strong></td>
<td>Security and territoriality EUPF</td>
<td>State institutions</td>
<td>Democratic framework of governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective</strong></td>
<td>Building the Wesophian/Weberian state EUPF</td>
<td>Building liberal market-oriented states</td>
<td>Building liberal states, neighbours, associates, possible members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entrants and potential neighbours</strong></td>
<td>Western Balkans</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non Entrants/neighbours</strong></td>
<td>Israel/ Palestine, DR Congo, etc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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149 Richmond, Björkdahl, and Kappler, "The emerging EU peacebuilding framework: confirming or transcending liberal peacebuilding?,” 465.
Lastly, Natorski (2011) constructed a similar framework for the purpose of assessing the main patterns of European Union (EU) peacebuilding practices.

Table 4: Graduations of the liberal peace approaches to peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of peace</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Orthodox</th>
<th>Emancipatory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional peace</td>
<td>Constitutional peace</td>
<td>Civil peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Liberal market-oriented states</th>
<th>Peace and liberal states</th>
<th>Just and durable peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In focus</td>
<td>Order: institutions of government, rule of law, anti-terrorism</td>
<td>Democratic liberal governance: human rights, constitutionalism, private property</td>
<td>Justice: welfare and social justice, identity, rights and needs of civil society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Approach and means    | Exclusive, top-down activities; coercive, conditionality, dependence; international transitional administration | Exclusive and inclusive, Mix of top-down (dominant) and bottom up activities; cooperative custodianship with consent and local ownership; consensual negotiations at the elite level | Inclusive, bottom-up participation; local participation and integration |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rights and needs in focus</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Political and material</th>
<th>Socio-cultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of insecurity in focus</th>
<th>Armed violence</th>
<th>Political and economic violence</th>
<th>Social violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiaries in focus</td>
<td>State elites</td>
<td>State elites and some organized civil society</td>
<td>Civil society and local groups; society in general</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly to Richmond's *Graduations of the liberal peace model* (Figure 3), Natorski (2011) developed criteria to enable an in-depth analysis of the European Unions' primary peacebuilding fund (see Table 3). Natorski's (2011) indicators are relatively similar to Richmond's in that they include; the beneficiaries in focus, approach and means, rights and needs in focus, source of insecurity and the overall focus or concern of the operation.151 However,

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151 Ibid.
Natorski furthers our understanding of assessing peacebuilding by detailing how he measured each indicator.

Natorski investigates each operation the EU peacebuilding fund has undertaken since its conception. By measuring the variables mentioned above, Natorski determined if the EUPF was implementing an emancipatory, orthodox or conservative version of liberal peace. Subsequently, Natorski was able to draw conclusions regarding the overall objectives of EU peacebuilding strategy, the nature of the peace EU peacebuilding is constructing and significantly, whether a conservative, orthodox or emancipatory version of liberal peace is being implemented.
2.3 A Peacebuilding Framework to Assess NZODA: Building Peace Gradation

As outlined above, Richmond (2006, 2011) uses a number of indicators to determine where the UN, IGOs, state aid agencies and NGOs are located upon Graduation of the liberal peace. However, Richmond’s framework does not present an in-depth analysis justifying operations and actors respective placement upon the graduation. Natorski (2011) furthers our understanding of Graduation of the liberal peace by detailing the criteria used to assess the form of liberal peace implemented by the EUPF.

Adopting similar criteria and indicators as Richmond and Natorski, the theoretical framework used for this research strives to answer the question, what form of peace is being, and has been, pursued by NZODA. The indicators employed to determine where NZODA is positioned in relation to the Building Peace Gradation include: method, actors, threats, and geography. Readings taken from these variables will indicate whether NZODA is orientated towards liberal peace or hybrid peace.

2.3.1 Method

This indicator measures the manner in which ODA operations are implemented. The method that operations are delivered can vary substantially from a liberal approach dominated by top-down coercive activities layered in conditionality (tied aid\(^{152}\)), to a hybrid approach encouraging forms of bottom-up delivery where the local participates significantly (untied aid\(^{153}\)). More specifically, top-down activities can be described as externally inspired projects, while a bottom-up approach is locally driven. In other words, this indicator measures the extent to which aid operations take into account the ideals, customs and desires of the local.

\(^{152}\) See Key Terms for definition.
\(^{153}\) See Key Terms for definition.
Although this spectrum can be labelled the international verses the local, it also falls within what Easterly (2006) labels the Planners versus Searchers. Easterly argues:

Planners determine what to supply; Searchers find out what is in demand. Planners apply global blueprints; Searchers adapt to local conditions. Planners at the Top lack knowledge of the Bottom; Searchers find out what the reality is at the Bottom. Planners never hear whether the Planned got what they needed; Searchers find out if the customer is satisfied.154

Easterly claims that Searchers recognise the issues facing the Global South consist of a complex concoction of historical, social, political, geographical, institutional and technological factors, therefore, as the foreigner, he/she does not know all the answers in advance. In contrast, Planners know what needs to be done in the Global South and simply unravel pre-constructed blueprints upon designated areas, implementing a ‘one size fits all’ approach.155

This indicator assesses the Planner and Searcher divide in NZODA by suggesting that Planners can be associated with a top-down approach, while Searchers are aligned with a bottom-up approach. Adopting a similar position to Richmond (2006), this indicator argues that liberal peace is characterised by a top-down approach to ODA, while hybrid peace is more focused on bottom-up implementation of ODA.

2.3.1.1 Measuring the Method
The first step in measuring this indicator is differentiating between what constitutes top-down and bottom-up. Richmond (2006) and Natorski (2011) maintain bottom-up initiatives are characterised by heavy local consultation, participation and integration. Conversely, a top-down approach is external or state-elite focused rather than individual centred and characterised by coerciveness, conditionality and dependence.


155 Ibid., 3.
Similarly, this framework defines bottom-up as characterised by substantial local consultation and participation in ODA, while top-down is limited to external or state-elite consultation in the implementation of ODA. Therefore, central to this indicator is the need to measure the extent to which the international takes into account the desires of the local making it a difficult indicator to measure. Although, NZODA and the DAC record which countries and/or actors receive aid, there are no records that distinguish between top-down and bottom-up aid implementation. Consequently this indicator relies largely upon the views of interviewees.

Furthermore, this indicator is also concerned with the amount of conditionality versus the amount of unobstructed aid distributed from NZODA. One way of assessing this is through identifying the amount of tied and untied aid distributed by NZAid and IDG respectively. The DAC Review reports upon the amount of tied and untied aid distributed by member countries; therefore these specific statistics are utilised to determine this indicator. Following Richmond (2006), this indicator states that tied aid is aligned with liberal peace, while untied aid is aligned with hybrid peace. The table below outlines the method indicator of the Building Peace Gradation.

**Table 5: Method- Building Peace Gradation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal peace</th>
<th>Hybrid peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top-down, international initiatives, maximisation of donor countries resources (services and goods) in implementation of ODA (tied aid)</td>
<td>Emancipatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination of top-down and bottom-up. Mostly international Some western-local initiatives, utilisation of both donor and recipient country resources (goods and services) in implementation of ODA.</td>
<td>Bottom-up, local-local initiatives, maximisation of recipient countries resources (services and goods) in implementation of ODA (untied aid)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2.3.2 Actors**

The actors that entities employ serve as a primary indicator in determining where an operation is located along the Building Peace Gradation. The
development arena has widened to include a variety of personnel and organisations that arguably fall under the aid umbrella. These actors include, but are not limited to: the military, the private sector, financial institutions, IGOs and NGOs. These actors can be from the same country or region, and can be externally or locally led.

While the international aid regime has agreed upon the principle of local ownership in theory,\textsuperscript{156} in practice, this seldom occurs.\textsuperscript{157} Once more, this framework follows Richmond (2006) by arguing that emancipatory hybrid peace occurs when local led initiatives are the primary actors, and conservative liberal peace persists when actors are externals or Western-local elites.

2.3.2.1 Measuring Actors

This indicator is assessed by determining which actors NZAid and IDG respectively utilised in implementing their programmes. NZODA funding is directed to several different actors, including, but not limited to: partner governments, IGOs, the private sector, the state sector and NGOs. Once more, the New Zealand aid programme and the DAC provide information on who is funded by NZODA. However, these sources lack essential detail to categorise them as external/state-elites or local actors. Consequently, this indicator is primarily determined by information gathered from interviewees. The table below outlines the actors indicator of the Building Peace Gradation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal peace</th>
<th>Hybrid peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Orthodoxy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External entities and state-elites</td>
<td>International/Regional organisations, Externally led civil society and NGOs. Some local involvement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{156} The Paris declaration of aid effectiveness stressed the importance of local ‘ownership’; subsequently OECD, UN and nation state have incorporated this principle in much of their documents. See OECD, ”The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,” (Paris Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005).

\textsuperscript{157} Murray and Overton, ”Neoliberalism is dead, long live neoliberalism? Neostructuralism and the international aid regime of the 2000s.”
2.3.3 Threat

This indicator encompasses what the aid agency views as the primary scourge faced by peoples in the recipient nations. Within aid discourse, the primary threats or sources of insecurity are located within the NZODA programmes mandates, policy statements and press releases. Richmond (2006) argues that external actors target a variety of threats including, but not limited to: war, capacity for war, obstacles to necessary resources and trade, terrorism, identity conflict, barriers to norms and regimes, under-development, structural violence, free communication and representation and social justice.158 Natorski (2011) simplifies the threat indicator further by placing social violence within an emancipatory or hybrid peace, while claiming a focus upon obstacles to political and economic liberalisation equates to an orthodox or conservative version of liberal peace. This theoretical framework agrees that aid programmes focused primarily upon democratic governance, economic liberalization and the rule of law correspond to a conservative liberal peace, while concentration upon social justice typifies an emancipatory hybrid peace.

2.3.3.1 Measuring the Threat

This indicator can be measured by way of donor country statements, policy documents and crucially, official mandates. NZODA’s own policy releases, coupled with DAC Reviews detail the primary ideals and themes driving the New Zealand aid programme. Although an aid agency often lists several concerns, the official mandate provides a clear outline of an agency’s. The table below outlines the threat indicator of the Building Peace Gradation.

Table 7: Threat- Building Peace Gradation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal peace</th>
<th>Hybrid peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

158 Richmond, "The problem of peace: understanding the ‘liberal peace’," 297.
2.3.4 Geography

Aid interventions can lay their focus upon certain regions, continents, ethnicities, provinces or villages. Richmond (2006) outlines four primary geographic categories: limited areas of strategic allies, limited areas of norms sharing allies, still geographically bound but aims at universal coverage, and aims at universal coverage. Richmond suggests that interventions aimed at areas that consist of strategic allies constitutes a conservative liberal peace, while focus upon universal coverage typifies an emancipatory hybrid peace. Similarly, this theoretical framework argues hybrid peace occurs when an intervention is aimed at universal coverage, compared to liberal peace, where actors are geographically bound by their own strategic interests.

2.3.4.1 Measuring Geography

This indicator appears easily measured. The amount of ODA distributed to each region and country is well documented by the New Zealand Government and the DAC. These sources will be used to establish NZODA’s geographical coverage between regions and countries. Comments from interviewees are also utilised to assess this indicator.

Table 8: Geography- Building Peace Gradation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal Peace</th>
<th>Hybrid peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited focus on regions and countries providing strategic advantage for donor aid agency</td>
<td>Geographically bound but aims at universal coverage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4 Chapter Summary

By outlining the various methods of assessing peacebuilding this chapter addresses the fourth and final area of investigation of considering different
methods of assessing peacebuilding. While it is clear that evaluating peacebuilding is still in its infancy, Richmond (2006, 2011) and Natorski (2011) comparable frameworks offer a solid base for assessing the form of peace implemented by external entities. Reflecting upon these two frameworks, and adopting the core indicators, the Building Peace Gradation (Table 9 below) provides a theoretical framework for conducting a comparative analysis of different periods of NZODA.

As stated previously, while the framework could be perceived as attempting to orderly categorise NZAid and IDG under liberal or hybrid peace headings; given the size and complexities of the NZODA programme, NZAid and IDG cannot be conclusively pigeonholed as implementing a single form of peace. However by gathering sufficient information on NZAid and IDG, both eras of NZODA can be considered in relation to each indicator. Assessing the indicators presents a picture of where NZAid and IDG are positioned in relation to each other on the Building Peace Gradation. Subsequently, conclusions can be drawn regarding what form of peace NZAid and IDG orientate towards. The following section begins this process by outlining NZAid and assessing it in relation to the Building Peace Gradation.
Table 9: Building Peace Gradation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Orthodox</th>
<th>Emancipatory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
<td>Top-down, international initiatives, maximisation of</td>
<td>Combination of top-down and bottom-up. Mostly</td>
<td>Bottom-up, local-local initiatives, maximisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>donor countries resources (services and goods) in</td>
<td>international, some western-local initiatives,</td>
<td>of recipient countries resources (services and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>implementation of ODA (tied aid)</td>
<td>utilisation of both donor and recipient country</td>
<td>goods) in implementation of ODA (untied aid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>resources (goods and services) in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>implementation of ODA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>External entities and state elites</td>
<td>International / Regional organisations, Externally</td>
<td>Civil society and local groups; society in general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>led civil society and NGOs. Some local involvement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threat</strong></td>
<td>Obstacles to economic liberalisation, obstacles to</td>
<td>Obstacles to economic liberalisation, obstacles to</td>
<td>Obstacles to social justice and needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>democracy, obstacles to state-led rule of law</td>
<td>democracy, obstacles to state-led rule of law.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Some focus upon social justice and needs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geography</strong></td>
<td>Limited focus on regions and countries providing</td>
<td>Geographically bound but aims at universal</td>
<td>Universal coverage between countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>strategic advantage for donor aid agency</td>
<td>coverage, between countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Three: NZAid and the Building Peace Gradation
3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is, firstly to introduce NZAid, and secondly, to discuss NZAid in relation to the *Building Peace Gradation* variables. A brief background leading up to the creation of NZAid is presented, followed by an outline of NZAid’s operations from 2001 to 2008. An overview of NZAid is presented through the description of its institutional arrangements, mandate and policies, modality of delivery, geographic focus and volume of ODA delivered.

Reflecting upon the outline of NZAid, and utilising information gathered from interviewees, NZAid is discussed with relation to the *Building Peace Gradation* variables of: method, actors, threat and geography. Through placing NZAid on the *Building Peace Gradation* the form of peace orientated towards during the era of NZAid can be identified. Given this research is a comparative analysis; both IDG and NZAid must be assessed in relation to the theoretical framework before any conclusions regarding the form of peace orientated towards can be made. Therefore, an explanation of the form of peace NZAid is orientated towards is reserved for Chapter Five.

3.2 NZAid: The Lead Up

By the time the New Zealand Labour Party formed a government in 1999, pressure to reform NZODA had been mounting for several years. The organisations and individuals calling for changes held similar concerns and articulated comparable visions for the future of NZODA. In 1999, the Council of International Development (CID) presented a report calling for substantial changes to NZODA, but primarily arguing a need to focus on poverty reduction.159 The 2000 DAC Review echoed similar concerns, and voiced similar

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159 Although the consortium of NGOs had previously voiced concerns on aid individually, and in an arguably sporadic manner, the Davenport and Low report galvanized the organisation’s collective frustrations. The report called for “the adoption of a poverty focus, a shift to regions and countries where poverty was greatest, a move from tertiary education to scholarships to a focus on primary education, and greater involvement of civil society in the delivery of New Zealand’s aid”.159 See Banks et al., “Paddling on One Side of the Canoe? The Changing Nature of New Zealand’s Development Assistance Programme,” 174.
recommendations. Subsequently, in September 2000, the then Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Hon. Matt Robson, commissioned an extensive and detailed review of NZODA. The Ministerial Review largely reiterated the comments and recommendations made in the DAC and CID reviews, however, it went further in its critique of NZODA. Among a variety of issues, the report argued NZODA lacked a clear mission, it had several management issues and staff were pursuing poorly defined objectives, there was confusion of priorities, no overall strategy in delivery existed and NZODA was lacking a strategic analysis to examine the performance of its programmes. While also critical of the NZODA mandate, or lack thereof, the Ministerial Review claimed the organisational structure negatively affecting other areas of NZODA; arguing that institutional arrangements bred “an extremely repressive and unproductive culture that does not encourage innovation or reward excellence”.

In light of the issues above, the Ministerial Review made fifteen recommendations. The most prominent being an appeal that “poor people

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160 The 2000 DAC Peer Review argued that New Zealand’s attention should be focused upon targeting poor people and the sources of poverty, therefore making poverty reduction the overwhelming objective. Furthermore the review recommended that NZODA should appoint staff with development expertise and foster “a core group of development orientated officers through a strategic approach to staffing”. Other recommendations included: Strive to maximize the use of developing countries’ own goods and services in the implementation of projects. Ensure that its bilateral aid programme is appropriately balanced between priority for main partner countries and selected outreach to other developing countries. Expand public information and development education to build up confidence and aid and show New Zealand’s programme is well-managed and achieving results. See J.C. Faure, “Development co-operation: efforts and policies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee: 2000 report,” The DAC Journal Development Co-operation 2000 Report International Development 2, no. 1 (2001): 121.

161 Robson was one of the prominent voices arguing for fresh discussions of New Zealand’s ODA at the highest levels of power. See Banks et al., “Paddling on One Side of the Canoe? The Changing Nature of New Zealand's Development Assistance Programme,” 174.


163 These recommendations included: a need to adopt the six international development targets (latter incorporated into MDG’s), reduce the amount of bilateral partners, direct aid towards the poorest parts of the Pacific and develop a new framework based upon international consensus of best practice in ODA. Further, the aid budget should not be used to deliver on constitutional payments to Niue, Cook Islands and Tokelau, set up monitoring and evaluation systems and incorporate gender, environment and human rights issues throughout its programmes. See ibid., 5.
and the basic sources of poverty”, 164 should be the primary focus, therefore, “NZAID should have one, unambiguous goal: the elimination of poverty.” 165 Further, the Ministerial Review argued that in order to implement the recommendations and amend the entrenched institutional issues mentioned above, the New Zealand Government needed to create “a new autonomous institution to support a staff of development professionals”. 166 The Ministerial Review team made it clear that they did “not believe that effective reform ... [could] be instituted without having an autonomous aid agency”. 167

3.3 NZAid: Implementation

The Ministerial Review was presented to relevant ministers in May 2002 and two months later the government announced its agreement and subsequent approval of a number of core recommendations within the review. Although the call to separate assistance to Niue, Cook Islands and Tokelau from the ODA programme was not implemented, the majority of recommendations were applied. Furthermore, alterations within human resources, internal organisational chart, internal evaluation, public education and image rebranding, meant NZODA had undergone arguably its largest restructure and reorientation in its history. NZAid’s new institutional arrangements, policy and mandate, modality, geographic focus and volume of ODA are outlined in the section below.

3.3.1 Institutional Arrangements

On 10 September 2002 Cabinet announced the establishment of a new semi-autonomous body within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, with its own

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164 Faure, "Development co-operation: efforts and policies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee: 2000 report," 121.
166 Ibid., 6.
167 Ibid.
vote, “a distinct identity, its own budget and minister”. NZAid recruited from abroad and within New Zealand to locate “a high calibre of specialist staff with significant experience in ODA from NGOs, other development agencies, the private sector and academics”. The figure below illustrates NZAid’s organisational structure in 2005.

Figure 4: NZAid Organisational Structure


169 In 2001, NZAid consisted of 58 percent MFAT rotational staff, this figure was cut to 10 percent by 2005 with an array of staff many of whom had been seconded from other specialised development agencies such as DFID, AusAID and CIDA. See Marilyn Waring, “Ministerial Review of Progress in Implementing 2001 Cabinet Recommendations Establishing NZAID,” (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2005), 47; DAC, "DAC Peer Review New Zealand," (Paris Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005), 58.

170 DAC, "DAC Peer Review New Zealand," 82.
3.3.2 Mandate and Policy

When creating NZAid the government announced the assistance programme would be driven by one clear mandate, to work “towards a safe and just world free of poverty.” As recommended by the earlier reviews, poverty elimination was central to all future policy considerations and subsequent creation. Cabinet recommended a complete overhaul of existing policy in order “to produce a strategic, accountable and focused policy framework with poverty as its central focus and which integrated the international development targets.”

Overhauling all existing policy and starting from ‘scratch’, new policies were created covering pro-poor growth, livelihood development, conflict prevention, humanitarian action, HIV and AIDS, education, health, the environment, and trade and development. All documents were driven by the core focus of poverty reduction, while taking into account ‘cross-cutting’ concerns from newly formed environmental, human rights and gender equality divisions.

According to Waring (2005) and the 2005 DAC Review, evidence of the mandate’s influence is clear in NZAid’s education policy. Prior to the creation

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174 Ibid., 23.

175 Ibid., 13.


180 The provision of social infrastructure and services has historically accounted for a large portion of NZODA. Within this sphere, education has dominated assistance contributions usually accounting for about one third of NZODA bilateral aid, making it the largest sector of ODA. See ibid., 73; DAC, “DAC
of NZAid, assistance within the education sphere was predominately directed towards scholarships for tertiary students studying in New Zealand. In 2000/01 80.3 percent of education expenditure was granted for scholarships, while 2.9 percent was reserved for in-country basic education. NZAid’s focus upon poverty elimination prioritised basic education as a means to assist individuals out of poverty. Consequently, the proportion of the education budget devoted to basic education rose to 30 percent by 2004, while tertiary scholarships dropped to 50 percent. This measure reduced the income recycling for the New Zealand Government, and a focus on basic education was implemented to reduce de-populisation of the Pacific, while also providing a basic human right to more people.

3.3.3 Modality

The creation of NZAid saw the continuation of budget support and project aid, however, there was also movement towards SWAps. NZAid argued

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182 Funding scholarships means funds are directed from New Zealand Government into New Zealand tertiary institutions. In 1993, MFAT stated that the “broad rationale for assistance for education and training is grounded in foreign policy and in New Zealand’s wish to establish co-operative bilateral and regional relationships”. See ibid.
183 The switch to basic education aligned with international ‘best practice’ but was also influenced by the on-going issue of de-populisation in the Pacific Region. Research suggested that the movements of Pacific Islanders between New Zealand and their home countries, shows “that return flows, though small, have not been dominated by persons who have experienced significant skill acquisition while in New Zealand”. See R.T. Appleyard and C.W. Stahl, "South Pacific migration: New Zealand experience and implications for Australia," (Canberra: Australian Agency for International Development, 1995), 8; P. Cashin and N. Loayza, "Paradise lost? Growth, convergence, and migration in the South Pacific," Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund (1995).
184 The 2005 Ministerial Review argues: “i) education is a human right; ii) education is an end in itself; iii) the international community has a collective commitment to ensuring human rights and achieving the Education for All goal; and iv) education contributes to poverty elimination, effective governance and leadership and the achievement of other development goals”. See Waring, "Ministerial Review of Progress in Implementing 2001 Cabinet Recommendations Establishing NZAID," 73.
185 Policy is one of several variables in the overall composition of an aid programme. The modality in which aid is delivered impacts heavily upon the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of a programme.
186 DAC, "DAC Peer Review New Zealand," 68.
187 Overton, "Reshaping Development Aid: Implications for Political and Economic Relations " 87.
that SWAps\textsuperscript{188} provide an attractive approach for recipients, as assistance to a particular sector is co-ordinated by all interested donors and recipient leadership facilitates capacity building within partner countries. A “SWAp reflects an approach or philosophy that is based on working in support of partner government policies, strategies and systems.”\textsuperscript{189} With recipients taking the lead it is hoped the process will strengthen “national ownership, and help build nationally managed systems, with the support of development partners and lenders.\textsuperscript{190}

Challis et al. (2011) assert NGOs and civil society played a leading role in the implementation of NZODA during the era of NZAid.\textsuperscript{191} According to the 2005 DAC Review, increased cooperation between NZAid and civil society was evident in the establishment of the Kaihono hei Oranga Hapori o te Ao - Partnerships for International Community Development (KOHA-PICD) contestable fund. This $21 million\textsuperscript{192} fund focused upon health, education, “partnership, gender equity, participation and strengthening the capacity of developing country counterparts”.\textsuperscript{193} However, unlike previous contestable funds, the KOHA-PICD fund was transferred to CID who would then distribute funding between 63 registered NGOs through a peer assessment process.

\textsuperscript{188} The OECD argues SWAps occur when “[a]ll significant donor funding support a single, comprehensive sector policy and independent programme, consistent with a sound macro-economic framework, under [recipient] government leadership.” See OECD, "Glossary of Statistical Terms " Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7240.


\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 5.


\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
3.3.4 Geography

During the period of NZAid, New Zealand foreign assistance narrowed its focus to the Pacific region. Many old Asian partners including China, Mongolia, Thailand and the Philippines’ budgets were phased out or remained at modest levels. Similarly, the small African and Latin American budgets continued to remain relatively constant at comparatively low levels. Further, given the relatively superior performances on HDI, traditional partners including the, Samoa, Tonga Cook Islands and Fiji received steady or reduced assistance. However, given the special constitutional relationship outlined in the 2001 Ministerial Review, Niue and Tokelau, experienced large increases in allocations. Niue went from $6.25 million in 2000/01 to $24.6 million in 2004/05. Similarly, Tokelau’s allocation went from $6.5 million to $16.29 million over the same time period.

Geographical focus within the Pacific shifted to countries with a low HDI. The three Melanesian nations of PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu respectively received between $5.0-5.75 million in the 1999/00 financial year. Less than a decade later, allocations had grown to $27 million, $36 million and $18 million respectively. Further, core bilateral partners were reduced significantly, while the amount of bilateral aid given to core bilateral partners increased.

3.3.5 Volume

Under NZAid the volume of the aid budget went from 0.22 percent of GNI in 2002, to 0.30 percent of GNI in 2008. In the year following the creation of NZAid cabinet reaffirmed its commitment to meet the agreed OECD target of 0.7

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194 Ibid., 77.
195 Who were also performing above regional average on development indicators
197 Note: Authors did not give an indication whether these figures are at constant prices or whether any attempt has been made to adjust for inflation. See Ibid., 17.
198 DAC, "DAC Peer Review New Zealand,” 75.
percent of GNI, when resources permitted.\textsuperscript{199} In 2007, the government confirmed its aspiration to reach the 0.7 percent target by setting an intermediate target of 0.35 percent of GNI by 2015.\textsuperscript{200} In 2008, New Zealand ranked as the smallest DAC donor for volume, while ranking 17\textsuperscript{th} out of the 23 DAC nations in terms of its ODA/GNI ratio.\textsuperscript{201} The graph below illustrates the volume of aid distributed during the era of NZAid.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{ODA_graph.png}
\caption{ODA net disbursements 1994 - 2008\textsuperscript{202}}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{200} Banks et al., "Paddling on One Side of the Canoe? The Changing Nature of New Zealand’s Development Assistance Programme," 178.

\textsuperscript{201} DAC, "New Zealand: Development Assistance Committee Peer Review 2010," 14.

\textsuperscript{202} At constant 2008 prices and exchange rates and as a share of GNI. See ibid., 77.
3.4 NZAid in Relation to the Building Peace Gradation

3.4.1 Introduction

This following section assesses NZAid in relation to the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two. Supplementing the outline above with information gathered from interviewees; NZAid is assessed in relation to the variables: method, actors, threat and geography. It should be noted that interviewees often compare NZAid and IDG when discussing each variable.

Due to the comparative nature of this study the assessment of NZAid in relation to the Building Peace Gradation will be reserved for Chapter Five when a comparison can be made with IDG.

Table 10: Building Peace Gradation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Liberal Peace</th>
<th>Hybrid Peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top-down, international initiatives, maximisation of donor countries resources (services and goods) in implementation of ODA (tied aid)</td>
<td>Combination of top-down and bottom-up. Mostly international, some western-local initiatives, utilisation of both donor and recipient country resources (goods and services) in implementation of ODA.</td>
<td>Bottom-up, local-local initiatives, maximisation of recipient countries resources (services and goods) in implementation of ODA (untied aid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>External entities and state elites</td>
<td>International / Regional organisations. Externally led civil society and NGOs. Some local involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Obstacles to economic liberalisation, obstacles to democracy, obstacles to state-led rule of law</td>
<td>Obstacles to economic liberalisation, obstacles to democracy, obstacles to state-led rule of law. Some focus upon social justice and needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>Limited focus on regions and countries providing strategic advantage for donor aid agency</td>
<td>Geographically bound but aims at universal coverage, between countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4.2 Method

This indicator is separated into two parts. Firstly, the method of top-down and bottom-up implementation is assessed. Secondly, any differentiation between tied and untied aid is determined.
3.4.2.1 Top-down and Bottom-up

It has been suggested previously that NZAid utilised SWAps as a means of promoting recipient leadership and increasingly in-country ownership.\(^{203}\) When interviewees were asked if they could differentiate between NZAid and IDG in relation to operating in a top-down or bottom-up approach, all participants labelled NZAid as operating in a bottom-up manner. This observation was put clearly by the National Director of Christian World Services (CWS) and current Chairperson of CID, Pauline McKay, who states that "top-down is IDG, bottom-up is NZAid."\(^{204}\) Furthermore, a current NZODA programme employee argues:

> with NZAid there was greater commitment to bottom-up and we were funding some pretty interesting grassroots initiatives, . . . so it was more capacity building and livelihoods and that kind of stuff.\(^{205}\)

Another, NZODA programme employee measured the change in numeral form; claiming under IDG there was:

> probably a slight increase to top-down rather than bottom-up. . . . If you had a continuum, maybe previously it was 4/10 if 1 was top end of community and 10 is a pure state, maybe we've shifted from 4 to 6.\(^{206}\)

McKay claims staff recruitment and the institutional structure of NZAid as a SAB also encouraged a bottom-up approach to implementing programmes. When asked what was driving a shift from bottom-up to top-down implementation, McKay maintains it was due to the new:

> government policy. It [is] . . . what we feared when NZAid got reintegrated back into foreign affairs. Foreign Affairs has a foreign policy agenda, which is about putting New Zealand first, that's the role of Foreign Affairs. Aid has a different agenda. It's about putting the needs of the poor first. And that's why you have different people. People who work in NZAid were aid and development practitioners.

\(^{203}\) Overton, "Reshaping Development Aid: Implications for Political and Economic Relations " 96-99.

\(^{204}\) Field Interview: Pauline McKay

\(^{205}\) Field Interview: NZODA programme employee

\(^{206}\) Field Interview: NZODA programme employee
People who work in MFAT are foreign policy and diplomats they have different skill sets. It’s one of the reasons why NZAid was created.\footnote{Field Interview: Pauline McKay}

On this indicator it is apparent that interviewees perceive NZAid as utilising a more bottom-up approach to aid implementation.

### 3.4.2.2 Tied and Untied Aid

In the lead-up to the creation of NZAid, the DAC review specifically states that the NZODA programme should “strive to maximize the use of developing countries’ own goods and services in the implementation of projects”.\footnote{Faure, "Development co-operation: efforts and policies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee: 2000 report," 121.} In the follow-up review in 2005, the DAC review commented that although “there is still a significant share of ODA which directly returns to New Zealand”\footnote{DAC, "DAC Peer Review New Zealand," 71.}, NZAid had made substantial improvements in its untying of aid since its creation in 2001. The DAC review team note that several recent decisions concerning tied aid demonstrated that the trend of untying aid was likely to continue. In particular:

- Trust funds with the World Bank, which were set up for the purpose of promoting New Zealand’s private sector, have been phased out and two scholarship schemes have been discontinued. Within bilateral country programmes, increased focus has been given to capacity building relying on local or regional expertise.\footnote{Ibid.}

In 2004 a new contracting system\footnote{Titled: The Approved Contractor Scheme} was introduced in order to broaden “the type of expertise that can be called upon in the region, including in partner countries”.\footnote{DAC, "DAC Peer Review New Zealand," 71.} These trends led the DAC review team to state:

> [t]he share of goods and services procured in New Zealand has fallen to under half of total procurement, from a level of over two-thirds in 2001. As New Zealand moves towards partner country led initiatives
based around SWAps and capacity building for local and regional institutions, the share is likely to continue to fall.\textsuperscript{213}

It is evident that during the period of NZAid there was significant untying of New Zealand ODA.

### 3.4.3 Actors

It has been suggested previously that NZAid formed strong bonds with civil society, evident in the structure and distribution of the KOHA-PICD fund.\textsuperscript{214}

When participants were asked if there had been a change in the primary actor(s) utilised by NZODA over the last 12 years, and particularly between IDG and NZAid, five out of six participants identified a stronger relationship with NGOs during the NZAid era. A NZODA programme employee states:

> there has been a shift from NZAid [which] very much had a community based focus, local NGOs plus international NGOs [were] strong partners and community groups, far more engaged at the local level, as well as traditional partners like the UN, state government. ... So therefore the loser is the small scale local initiatives because they don't have the staff and time to manage, to engage, the winner has been the large scale, state level initiatives as well which has supported the shift to economic development, which is largely focused at state and big business.\textsuperscript{215}

Another NZODA programme staff member comments:

> that with NZAid, . . . we were funding some pretty interesting grassroots initiatives. . . . With the move back into the wider Ministry, there's more political considerations given, so there's greater commitment to make sure things line up with other countries commitments and things. Whereas before [under NZAid], we could fund a tin-pot grassroots little group who was doing some really cool work and shove them a bit of money.\textsuperscript{216}

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid., 73.


\textsuperscript{215} Field Interview: NZODA programme employee

\textsuperscript{216} Field Interview: NZODA programme employee
Again, a stakeholder of the NZODA programme affirms:

there was a change from DEV\textsuperscript{217} to NZAid, a lot more emphasis going on building a good relationship with NGOs, the whole idea of consulting with NGOs and trying to consult more with country partner governments. The whole Paris Declaration. NZAid was heavily engaged in that policy dialogue with countries and trying to meet what they perceived to be their needs and they are very country driven. ... The private sector found it a lot easier to get aid work, and then under NZAid, it tried really hard to engage with the private sector but they weren’t that interested because the emphasis had gone off the win-win stuff where New Zealand might be able to benefit New Zealand businesses while doing good overseas, that change under NZAid was much more context driven.\textsuperscript{218}

When participants were asked if the change in actors utilised would affect the amount of local engagement, participation or utilisation in programmes; four interviewees felt they did not have enough knowledge or evidence to comment. However, two interviewees stated that the change in actor would mean there would be less local engagement, participation or utilisation in programmes. A NZODA programme employee states that under IDG:

the loser is the small scale local initiatives. ... The sub-national local has lost out, whereas the national-local, as in the government level local, has been the winner as well as perhaps the sub-regional and big regional bodies [for example] ASEAN.\textsuperscript{219}

Further, Pauline McKay comments:

the traditional pattern of how you develop your ODA programmes paradigm was you gave y work on the role based, that community based, type of work. You gave your bilateral to government and that was your high-level infrastructure stuff but they weren’t competitive, they were compatible. Now we seem to get more confusion.\textsuperscript{220}

\textsuperscript{217} DEV is the abbreviation for Development Cooperation Division; NZODA prior to the creation of NZAid in 2001.

\textsuperscript{218} Field Interview: NZODA programme stakeholder

\textsuperscript{219} Field Interview: NZODA programme employee

\textsuperscript{220} Field Interview: Pauline McKay
These statements indicate NZAid had greater utilisation of NGOs and/or grassroots organisations. Two interviewees have equated this relationship with greater local engagement, participation and utilisation in implementing NZODA.

3.4.4 Threat

As NZAid emerged from its restructuring and reorientation in the early 2000s, it was clear dramatic shifts in policy were to take place. A new mandate was developed “to produce a strategic, accountable and focused policy framework with poverty as its central focus and which integrated the international development targets”.

A number of additional polices were created including: pro-poor growth, livelihood development, human rights, gender equality and women’s empowerment, conflict prevention, humanitarian action, HIV and AIDS, education, health, the environment, and trade and development. As illustrated above, these sub-policies were created primarily as the means to assist the overarching goal of poverty reduction.

When interviewees were asked if there had been a change in overall focus over the last 12 years, particularly between NZAid and IDG, five out of the six participants stated that NZAid had a focus on poverty reduction or poverty elimination. A former NZODA programme employee and current stakeholder of the NZODA programme responds that in both eras of NZODA “state poverty reduction is what they are there for, NZAid was more holistic while IDG is focused on sustainable economic development”. The interviewee argues “under NZAid it was reducing poverty that was the focus, a much more holistic view in that health and education, human rights was the real focus, along with our cross-cutting issues were around those areas”. These results show NZAid was focused upon poverty reduction and perceived poverty as the major threat.

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223 Field Interview: Former NZODA programme employee and current NZODA programme stakeholder
224 Field Interview: Former NZODA programme employee and current NZODA programme stakeholder
3.4.5 Geography

As stated previously, NZAid narrowed its focus upon the Pacific, while African and Latin American budgets continued to remain relatively constant at comparatively low levels and some Asian countries budgets were cut or remained at modest amounts.225 Within the Pacific traditional partners in Polynesia received steady or reduced assistance while Melanesian nations experienced substantial increases.226

When participants were asked to comment upon geographical shifts between NZAid and IDG, four participants reported NZAid had an internationalists agenda. One NZODA staff member states:

when it was NZAid, from what I observed from outside . . . New Zealand had a far more internationalist agenda, . . . which did include the Pacific but it also included a larger focus on New Zealand being a good international partner more broadly, or a credible donor based on the principle of where there’s greatest need. So I think [under NZAid] there was far more focus on Latin America, Africa.227

Another current NZODA programme employee affirms that NZAid “had a slightly broader focus, more than at the moment. On Africa, obviously they’re more focused on poverty elimination, perhaps was a bit more elastic in terms of going beyond the Pacific”.228

Reflecting upon the literature and interviewees comments, it is suggested that while NZAid narrowed its geographic focus, in comparison to IDG, NZAid had a broader focus on areas outside of the Pacific.

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226 As noted above, traditional partners including the Cook Islands, Samoa, Tonga and Fiji received steady or reduced assistance, while Niue and Tokelau, who were also performing above regional average on development indicators, experienced large increases in allocations. PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu also experienced substantial increases.

227 Field Interview: NZODA programme employee

228 Field Interview: NZODA programme employee
3.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter outlines the transformation undertaken by NZODA from the years 2001 to 2008. The creation of a semi-autonomous body, adoption of a new mandate, formation of new policy throughout the agency, and image re-branding meant New Zealand’s ODA had undergone arguably its largest restructure and reorientation in its one-hundred year history.

Utilising the outline, and interviewees’ comments, NZAid is discussed in relation to the four assessed variables: method, actors, threat and geography. Here it is suggested NZAid was orientated towards bottom-up implementation, untied aid, using civil society as a key actor, focusing upon poverty elimination, and, while narrowing the focus upon the Pacific, it still had a strong internationalists agenda.

Given this research is a comparative analysis, IDG’s relationship with the four variables must be determined before an overall comparative assessment of NZAid’s position in relation to the Building Peace Gradation can be identified. The following chapter discusses IDG, before determining its location in relation to the Building Peace Gradation.
Chapter Four: IDG and the Building Peace Gradation
4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is, firstly, to introduce IDG, and secondly, to discuss IDG in relation to the *Building Peace Gradation* variables. A brief background leading up to the creation of IDG is offered, followed by an outline of IDG’s operations from 2009 to the present. An overview of IDG is presented through the description of its institutional arrangements, policies and mandate, modality, geographic focus and volume of ODA.

Reflecting upon this outline of IDG, and utilising information gathered from interviews, IDG is discussed with relation to the *Building Peace Gradation* variables of: method, actors, threat and geography. These measures assist in clarifying the form of peace implemented during the era of IDG. However, given this research is a comparative analysis, the discussion regarding what form of peace IDG is aligned with in comparison to NZAid is reserved for Chapter Five.

4.2 IDG: The Lead Up

In the lead up to the 2008 elections, the National party indicated if they were to form the next government they would “[r]eview the operation of NZAid to ensure aid expenditure is effective, and to make sure problems identified in recent reports are rectified.” Consequently, after establishing a governing coalition, the National-led government completed a two-part review of NZAid.

Firstly, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Minister Murray McCully, commissioned “officials of MFAT and NZAID to review the mandate and policy settings of NZAID to reflect the priorities of the Government as set out in the pre-election manifesto”. Secondly, a review of NZAid’s institutional arrangements was conducted by the State Services Commission,

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230 For a debate as to whether a review of NZAid was conducted see Spratt, "A Bolt from the Blue: Examining the 2009 Changes to the New Zealand Aid Programme and What They Mean Now," 19-22.

231 From here on out referred to as Minister McCully.

the Minister of Foreign Affairs and NZAid, with comments from The Treasury, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.233

The first review found adjustments to NZAid's mandate and policy settings were needed in order to reflect the priorities of the Government. The primary modifications proposed were a change in the mandate from the elimination of poverty to sustainable economic development, an increase in NZODA directed towards the Pacific; "and to give greater priority to interventions that have self-sustaining measurable impacts with demonstrable value for both recipient and donor".234 Secondly, the review of NZAid's institutional arrangement also recommended changes to the status quo. Although Treasury and NZAid saw no need for institutional reforms the paper recommended Cabinet "make technical changes to the institutional arrangements ... by removing the particular management and accountability arrangements that establish NZAID as a semi-autonomous body". 235

4.3 IDG: Implementation

In May 2009, Minister McCully (2009) proclaimed the National-led Government would alter the policy mandate from ‘poverty alleviation’ to ‘economic development’ and reincorporate NZAid back into the MFAT. Additionally, Minister McCully (2009) stated the government would narrow the official development budget in order to “see a greater share of resources expended within our own region”236, continuing the trend of devoting the majority of aid

233 These papers were presented in conjunction with an overview paper which provided “Ministers with political context and some broader strategic rationale for [the] two papers presented to Cabinet.” See Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Office of the Minister of Trade, “Pacific Island Forum Countries: NZ Policy on Aid, Trade and Economic Development: Overview Paper,” (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2009), 1.


funds towards the Pacific. Internal rebranding accompanied the publicly announced changes which saw the name NZAid replaced by IDG. IDG's institutional arrangements, policy and principles, modality, geographic focus and volumes are outlined in the sections below.

4.3.1 Institutional Arrangements

On 20 April 2009, Cabinet made significant changes to the institutional arrangements of the NZODA programme by reincorporating NZAid back into MFAT. The cabinet papers argue the alterations were not “structural in the traditional sense of either establishing or disestablishing a separate body”; rather, they were modifications in the management and accountability arrangements. However, commentators have argued the changes essentially amount to the reincorporation of the NZODA programme back within MFAT.

While several adjustments eventuated from the change in institutional arrangements, according to the DAC 2010 Review the “main changes have involved the merging of the human resources, audit, information services, financial management and communications functions”. MFAT's Chief Executive also gained the ability to determine the number of staff, although IDG retained contract management and the Deputy Secretary reserves the right to

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239 Other practical changes included: the foreign affairs sector of MFAT becoming “responsible for the management of New Zealand’s ODA, including policy advice, design, and delivery of development assistance programmes and activities”. NZAid became the International Development Group (IDG), accompanied by a new logo and image; and the removal of the ‘Chief Executive’ title within NZAid, which was replaced by ‘Deputy Secretary’ within the IDG framework. The deputy secretary now reported to Chief Executive/Secretary of MFAT, as opposed to previously where the head of NZAid would report directly to the Minister of government concerned. Furthermore, “the provision of corporate services for IDG not already shared with the Ministry … [was] moved progressively onto the same footing as for other parts of the Ministry.” See DAC, "New Zealand: Development Assistance Committee Peer Review 2010," 47.

240 Ibid.
appoint specialist staff to vacant positions.\textsuperscript{241} IDG’s institutional arrangements are outlined in the diagram below.

Figure 6: IDG Organisational Structure\textsuperscript{242}

4.3.2 Mandate and Policy

The Cabinet papers responsible for the change from NZAid to IDG stated there was a need “to shift the focus and direction of New Zealand’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the elimination of poverty to the support of sustainable economic development”.\textsuperscript{243} When examining Minister McCully’s statements\textsuperscript{244} and policy releases, it is evident that the new mandate has become the penultimate focus of IDG’s operations. While IDG outlines four

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{242} Ibid., 48.

\textsuperscript{243} Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, “New Zealand Agency for International Development: Mandate and Policy Settings ” 1.

\textsuperscript{244} For example Minister McCully states, “the Government has set a new mandate by which it and NZAID can be judged in relation to the effectiveness of our aid. That mandate requires a clear focus on sustainable economic growth as the means by which we seek to improve the lives of our poorest neighbours.” See Murray McCully, “Aid overhaul essential to ensure our dollars reach those in need,” http://www.nzherald.co.nz/opinion/news/article.cfm?c_id=466&objectid=10570326.
major themes of focus, it has been suggested that the concept of supporting economic growth is the primary influence shaping direction of subsequent policy.

IDG’s 2011 *International Development Policy Statement* argues economic development is essential in achieving the overall mandate of sustainable development, reducing poverty and contributing to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world. In stimulating economic growth IDG has identified three main *driver* sectors, which it argues will be instrumental in advancing development within the Pacific. IDG empowers the three *driver* sectors by accompanying them with several *enablers*, whose function is to support the main sectors. The *International Development Policy Statement* lists the enablers as strengthening the “relationship with the private sector at home and abroad”, “making markets function better”, and improving infrastructure. Further improving the business environment generally by providing business mentors, assisting with the availability of finance, “cutting

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245 Including: investing in economic development, promoting human development, improving resilience and responding to disaster and building safe and secure communities.

246 Banks et al., “Paddling on One Side of the Canoe? The Changing Nature of New Zealand’s Development Assistance Programme.”


248 The three main driving sectors IDG has identified are agriculture, fisheries and tourism.


250 IDG maintains that growth within partner economies can be drastically accelerated if they capture the benefits international trade has to offer. By investing in “improved trade facilitation and market chain development”. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "International Development Policy Statement Supporting Sustainable Development,” 6.

251 IDG maintains that infrastructure development is a key enabler, particularly improving recipient nations’ transportation systems. In doing so, IDG can target the three key driver sectors by assisting partner nations’ ability to sustain the movement of tourists, enable international trade and enhance movement within agricultural and fisheries industries. Again, IDG argues that investment in renewable energy will also bring partner nations closer to realising economic development objectives. As a number of partner nations rely on the importation of diesel, supporting options to improve energy security will once again assist the main sectors of fisheries, agriculture and tourism, further ensuring momentum in achievement of sustainable economic growth.
red tape for businesses, . . . and reducing the cost and uncertainty of doing business”.  

The renewed focus upon economic growth is most evident in the MFAT 2011 Annual Report that states during “2010/11, in line with the government mandate, the amount of ODA spent on sustainable economic development activities increased by nearly 40% (from $72 million to $100.6 million).” Further, the report maintains “[t]hese are positive results in line with Government policy directions and the new business model”.

4.3.3 Modality

Since the announcement of the new ODA policy, a number of development commentators have expressed confusion regarding the modality in which IDG will deliver ODA. However, what has been made clear is IDG’s desire to increase their involvement with the private sector at the expense of civil society and the NGO community. As stated above, during the era of NZAid, civil society involvement increased significantly, evident in the cooperation between NZAid and CID in the management of the KOHA-PICD contestable fund.

Upon taking office, Minister McCully (2009), claimed that under KOHA-PICD scheme “NGOs were simply handed over $21 million a year to distribute amongst themselves with no accountability.” Consequently, the KOHA-PICD

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254 Ibid.

255 Overton, "Reshaping Development Aid: Implications for Political and Economic Relations " 87.


fund was replaced by the Sustainable Development Fund (SDF) in 2010. The SDF's primary objective was established as focusing “on sustainable economic growth, improving incomes, and reducing poverty”. While under the KOHAPICD system CID assisted in distributing funding throughout the NGO community, the advent of SDF saw the removal of CID from the decision making process.

The SDF has recently been cancelled and replaced by the New Zealand Partnerships for International Development fund (NZPfID). The new fund is not only contestable for NGOs and charitable groups, but also the New Zealand private sector and state sector. Introduced in October 2012, the consultation document makes it clear the “NZPfID will prioritise activities that have a sustainable economic development benefit”. The consultation document states that the fund is primarily aimed at “supporting economic activity that benefits developing countries through private sector development, market development, the generation of jobs and income, and the transfer of skills and knowledge”.

The evolution of NZODA contestable funding illustrates IDG’s intent to increase the involvement of the private sector (from New Zealand and abroad) at the expense of civil society and the NGO community in implementation of ODA.

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258 The SDF guidelines state that the fund will provide increased effectiveness, efficiency and long-term economic stability. Although the fund makes mention of supporting some human development and basic needs activities, the foremost priority is sustainable economic growth. The SDF guidelines document goes on to list examples of activities that may be funded through SDF, including: a) Income generating initiatives, including: Small and medium business development, Microfinance services, Improving production and/or marketing of goods and services, Improving infrastructure to support production and/or marketing. Potential sectors include agriculture, horticulture, fisheries and tourism. And b) Meeting basic needs, including: Access to quality health care services, Access to quality preschool, primary or secondary education, Technical and vocational training, Improved access to potable water and sanitation. See New Zealand Aid Programme, “Sustainable Development Fund Guidelines” (Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2011), 2-3.


260 The NZPfID consultation document mentions “[a]ctivities will also be considered that contribute to better access to quality social services such as health and education, basic human needs such as water and sanitation, building safer communities, and improved community resilience to disasters – particularly where these can be linked to enabling economic development.” See ibid.
4.3.4 Geography

When Minister McCully (2009) announced the modifications to NZODA, he maintained that the National-led government wants “to see a greater share of resources expended within our own region”. He argued New Zealand needed to focus on “areas which are important to us, and in which we can aspire to excellence. In relation to the aid budget, that means being truly effective within our own Pacific region”. As a consequence, ODA outside of the Pacific, including: Africa, Latin America and Central Asia, was reduced.

Although the focus of NZODA is continuing upon the Pacific, the new government has demonstrated that the direction of aid within the Pacific will not remain as it was under NZAid. As discussed previously, NZAid redirected much of its focus towards Melanesia. Although, Melanesian nations still feature prominently among the top recipients of ODA under IDG, the DAC observed that the National-led “government has indicated that future increases will give a special focus to strengthening economic development in Polynesia”. Although the National-led Government has not explicitly confirmed this trend, several speeches suggest an increased focus on the Polynesian region.

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265 McCully, although not explicitly stated, largely confirms the DAC’s observation in a speech to the Lowy institute. When discussing where New Zealand should focus its ODA, he argued that: “[t]here is one feature of note that distinguishes New Zealand: we have a substantial and growing Pasifika population that has a marked and growing influence on our evolving identity. As a consequence, we have a vast web of family and other personal connections between New Zealand and the smaller nations of the Pacific. Let me briefly illustrate my point. The current population of Samoa is around 180,000. According to our most recent census, there are 131,000 Samoan New Zealanders living in New Zealand. There are a little over 100,000 Tongans living in Tonga, and over 50,000 Tongan New Zealanders in New Zealand. There are 12,000 Cook Islanders in the Cooks, and 60,000 in New Zealand – a natural consequence of the fact that Cook Islanders, as New Zealand citizens, have free access to our country. For similar reasons, the number of Niueans in Niue is now around 1000, but there are 22,000 Niueans in New Zealand. And while there are 1500 Tokelauans living on those distant atolls, there are nearly 7000
4.3.5 Volume

When announcing the changes to the formulation and implementation of NZODA, Minister McCully (2009) stated there would be “steady increases in the ODA budget”\textsuperscript{266}, although the target of achieving 0.35 percent of GNI by 2015 was dropped by IDG. \textsuperscript{267} The Minister went on to claim that the ODA will increase to $500 million for the 2009 financial year, “rising to $525 million in 2010-11, $550 million in 2011-12, and to $600 million in 2012-13”.\textsuperscript{268}

The OECD equated these increases to 0.28 percent of GNI in 2009, ranking New Zealand 17\textsuperscript{th} among 23 DAC donors for its ODA/GNI ratio, slightly below the weighted “DAC average of 0.31 percent, and well below the unweighted average country effort of 0.48 percent in 2009.”\textsuperscript{269} DAC data maintains that in 2008 NZODA volume was 0.30 percent GNI, since then it has fallen to 0.27 percent in 2009, 0.26 percent in 2010 and 0.28 percent in 2011.\textsuperscript{270} Banks et al. (2012) have criticized these increases, arguing they are “less than those that had been planned under the Labour government”\textsuperscript{271}, therefore there has been “a reduction in dollar terms of New Zealand’s future ODA commitments”.\textsuperscript{272}

\textsuperscript{266} McCully, “The National-led Government’s Approach to the Provision and Delivery of Overseas Aid,” 26.


\textsuperscript{268} McCully, “The National-led Government’s Approach to the Provision and Delivery of Overseas Aid,” 27.

\textsuperscript{269} DAC, "New Zealand: Development Assistance Committee Peer Review 2010," 39.


\textsuperscript{272} Ibid.
4.4 IDG in Relation to the Building Peace Gradation

4.4.1 Introduction

The following section discusses IDG in relation to the *Building Peace Gradation* variables: method, actors, threat and geography. Supplementing the outline above with information gathered from interviewees, this section determines IDG’s position within the *Building Peace Gradation* in relation to NZAid.

It is important to restate here that given this examination is a comparative analysis therefore variables are often discussed in specific relation to IDG and NZAid. Interviewees often compare IDG and NZAid when discussing each variable.

Table 11: Building Peace Gradation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal Peace</th>
<th>Orthodoxy</th>
<th>Hybrid Peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Top-down, international initiatives, maximisation of donor countries resources (services and goods) in implementation of ODA (tied aid)</td>
<td>Combination of top-down and bottom-up. Mostly international, some western-local initiatives, utilisation of both donor and recipient country resources (goods and services) in implementation of ODA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodoxy</td>
<td>Bottom-up, local-local initiatives, maximisation of recipient countries resources (services and goods) in implementation of ODA (untied aid)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emancipatory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>External entities and state elites</td>
<td>International / Regional organisations. Externally led civil society and NGOs. Some local involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodoxy</td>
<td>International / Regional organisations. Externally led civil society and NGOs. Some local involvement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emancipatory</td>
<td>Civil society and local groups; society in general</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threat</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Obstacles to economic liberalisation, obstacles to democracy, obstacles to state-led rule of law</td>
<td>Obstacles to economic liberalisation, obstacles to democracy, obstacles to state-led rule of law. Some focus upon social justice and needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodoxy</td>
<td>Obstacles to social justice and needs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emancipatory</td>
<td>Obstacles to social justice and needs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geography</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Limited focus on regions and countries providing strategic advantage for donor aid agency</td>
<td>Geographically bound but aims at universal coverage, between countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodoxy</td>
<td>Geographically bound but aims at universal coverage, between countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emancipatory</td>
<td>Universal coverage between countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4.2 Method

This indicator is separated into two parts. Firstly, the method of top-down and bottom-up implementation is assessed, and secondly, any differentiation between tied and untied aid is considered.

4.4.2.1 Top-down and Bottom-up

When interviewees were asked if they could differentiate between NZAid and IDG in relation to operating in a top-down or bottom-up approach, all participants labelled IDG as operating in a top-down manner. Current and former NZODA programme employees were unanimous that the structural changes implemented under IDG were responsible for a shift from bottom-up to top-down implementation. A former NZODA programme employee and current NZODA stakeholder reports:

I felt in NZAid we were doing our best to work at a bottom-up approach, and then because of the requirement we were to meet under IDG, it was easier to use a top-down approach. So you had to make a choice to fight to do bottom-up, which is what we had been taught as the way to do it, the way to build capacity is what we need to be doing, but because we weren’t allowed to focus on capacity anymore and we had to show outputs, or we would risk losing funding. ... Maybe it was more effective to go with top-down, but that wasn’t going to be as sustainable.273

Similarly, a current NZODA programme staff member identified structural changes between IDG and NZAid as the primary reason for a shift from bottom-up to top-down implementation:

I think that it’s been through both eras, if you like a commitment to the bottom-up or the local participatory approach and local ownership. I think what’s changed is that the bottom-up approach requires quite intensive analysis and engagement, and understanding of the context. That requires resources, time, staff, so in the reframed resourcing structure that we have [under IDG] that’s not possible, therefore even

273 Field Interview: Former NZODA programme employee and current NZODA programme stakeholder
though there’s still this commitment, I guess it’s become pragmatic and we try to, ... however, its nowhere near what it was.274

Another IDG staff member argued that the new themes, mandate and driving principles were also responsible for a shift to top-down implementation of NZODA. The NZODA programme staff member states:

[W]ith the old focus on poverty, work with communities [and a] strong relationship with NGOs [there was] probably more room for bottom-up, not to say that IDG still doesn’t come up from the bottom-up, but my sense is probably more top-down especially with the focus on economic development [and] infrastructure, those are slightly more top-down types, with a very active minister who likes to come with ideas certainly feels like a more top-down feel.

On this indicator it is clear that IDG is perceived as implementing its aid programme in a top-down fashion.

4.4.2.2 Tied and Untied Aid

The 2010 DAC Review states IDG’s “aid is almost fully untied (84%)”.275 The review maintains that the “remaining tied aid relates to the costs of refugees in New Zealand, and New Zealand-based delivery mechanisms such as scholarships and deployment of New Zealand Police”.276

When participants were asked to comment upon any distinction between NZAid and IDG in relation to tied or untied aid; half the interviewees felt they had insufficient information to comment, while the remaining half suspected that more aid was tied under IDG. A NZODA programme employee argues under IDG there may have been “a slight shift to tied [aid]. Just [because of] the nature of projects and programmes”.277 Pauline McKay argued that while New Zealand has a good reputation in untied aid, she is uncertain about the future, commenting:

274 Field Interview: NZODA programme employee
276 Ibid.
277 Field Interview: NZODA programme employee
New Zealand generally has been quite good in terms of untied aid. I think that was prominent in NZAid [and] that’s what came through. ... I don’t know if in ten years’ time if these policies continue whether we’ll score as well. Certainly, there’s a definite push by government to use New Zealand expertise.278

While participants suspected an increase in tied aid under IDG, the 2010 DAC report illustrates that IDG is increasingly untining NZODA.

4.4.3 Actors

It has been suggested that IDG wishes to promote the private sector as a means of implementing NZODA. Increased support for the private sector is evident in the 2011 International Development Policy Statement279, statements from Minister McCully280 and in the transformation of NZODA contestable funding scheme. While NZAid’s contestable fund (KOHA-PICD)281 was accessible to NGOs and charitable groups only, the new NZPfID contestable fund is open to NGOs, the New Zealand state sector and private sector actors.

When participants were asked if there had been a change in the primary actor(s) utilised by NZODA over the last 12 years, and particularly between IDG and NZAid, all participants stated that IDG is increasingly utilising the private sector to implement NZODA. A current NZODA programme employee argues under IDG:

there’s been a greater emphasis on the private sector, partnering with them, and there are a couple of reasons for that. We do have international reputation in some areas so we are trying to capitalise on that. But it's also for a benefit to New Zealand companies as well.282

Again, a prominent stakeholder of NZODA claimed that while NZAid had a strong relationship with NGOs:

278 Field Interview: Pauline McKay
279 See section …
280 McCully, "An Ambitious Plan For The Pacific- NZ’s perspective”.
281 See Chapter … section … for a description
282 Field Interview: NZODA programme employee
IDG sort of changed again, mostly through the minister. NGOs have been side-lined, put in their place, but there’s no sense of meaningful engagement or real desire to gain from their experience of development NGOs in their entirety. … Strategic framework between NGOs and NZAid has gone. [There’s] much greater emphasis on the state sector preference for New Zealand government departments/ministries to be engaged in aid work so of course the preference toward the private sector, … so the shift has gone away from NGOs and civil society to private sector. … [Which] it might not necessary match the needs of the poorest people.283

As discussed above, two participants felt this change in actor(s) will impact on the degree of local engagement, participation or utilisation. Four interviewees felt they did not have enough knowledge or evidence to comment on this indicator. One NZODA programme employee claims “the sub-national local has lost out, whereas the national-local, as in the government level local, has been the winner”.284 On the topic of changes to the amount of local participation or utilisation in programmes, a stakeholder of NZODA states that under IDG:

the agenda is set in Wellington now, and Wellington driven out so it’s very top-down. Then again through very limited consultation in-country and talking to elites and leaders of the country when getting feedback, you hear Minister McCully say the leaders of X Y Z country really love what we are doing, so there is engagement with the elite of a country for confirmation of what we’ve decided in Wellington is right. So it’s very top-down from the metropoles and elites in the developed country, to elites of the developing country.285

These statements indicate IDG has shifted to the private sector to implement NZODA. Furthermore, two interviewees have equated this relationship with lesser local engagement, participation and utilisation in implementing NZODA.

4.4.4 Threat

The penultimate threat identified by IDG is inhibitors to the advancement of economic growth. As outlined above, the new mandate states the core focus of

283 Field Interview: NZODA programme stakeholder
284 Field Interview: NZODA programme employee
285 Field Interview: NZODA programme stakeholder
IDG is the pursuit of sustainable economic development.\(^{286}\) Although the current policy statement asserts that promoting human development, improving resilience and responding to disaster, and building safe and secure communities, are also priorities,\(^ {287}\) all are pursued in the hope of assisting the overarching focus of economic development. The renewed focus upon sustainable economic growth is most evident in MFAT's 2011 Annual Report which noted during 2010/11, in accordance with the National governments renewed mandate, the volume of ODA allocated to "sustainable economic development activities increased by nearly 40% (from $72 million to $100.6 million)".\(^ {288}\)

When interviewees were asked if there had been a change in overall focus over the last 12 years, particularly between NZAid and IDG, five out of the six participants stated that IDG is now pursuing a mandate of economic development. A former employee and current stakeholder maintains "IDG ... is focused on sustainable economic development. This was drilled into us, really explicitly."\(^ {289}\) IDG's mandate and policies, coupled with interviewees' perspectives demonstrate that its core focus is the pursuit of sustainable economic development.

\(^{286}\) Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, "New Zealand Agency for International Development: Mandate and Policy Settings " 1.


\(^{289}\) On this question the interviewee went on to state “I remember being in a meeting when our mission statement was going to be, reducing poverty through sustainable economic development to increase material wealth, and everyone just went what? What do you mean increase material wealth? What does that mean. And … [they] said the mission statements locked down it’s what we’re having, and we just went no that’s a terrible mission statement and in the end it was taken off the end there. But this made it clear … under IDG it just seemed to be about the money increasing the GDP regardless of whether that meant a portion of society fell further into poverty while another portion increased and therefore the GDP was able to go up. It didn’t really take the social side of things into consideration.” See Field Interview: Former NZODA programme employee and current NZODA programme stakeholder.
4.4.5 Geography

The literature above indicates that IDG is increasingly directing NZODA to the Pacific region. While, a change in focus from Melanesia to Polynesia is not yet obvious in NZODA statistics, the current government has hinted at a renewed focus on Polynesia.290

All interviewees agreed that IDG was increasingly focusing upon the Pacific region, while reducing focus on areas outside of the Pacific. A NZODA programme employee stated that the period of IDG has seen a “reorientation to the Pacific. The plan is to get 50 percent of our current budget on the Pacific and to grow that to 75 percent”.291 Furthermore, two other NZODA programme employees claim that under IDG there has been a “reprioritisation to the Pacific so the percentage of ODA directed to the Pacific by the aid programme has increased up to 50 percent now targeted at the Pacific.”292 Further, commenting IDG “have certainly scaled back their Latin American and African programmes”.293 The results show that IDG has narrowed its focus upon the Pacific, and particularly Polynesian nations.

4.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter outlines the changes implemented by the National-led government upon NZODA from the years 2009 to the present. The re-absorption of NZODA into MFAT, adoption of a new mandate, shift in geographical emphasis, and formation of new policy throughout the agency, meant NZODA underwent another significant restructuring and reorientation.

290 McCully, "An Ambitious Plan For The Pacific- NZ's perspective".; The 2010 Ministerial Review maintained that the new “government has indicated that future increases will give a special focus to strengthening economic development in Polynesia (Niue, Cook Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Samoa).” See DAC, "New Zealand: Development Assistance Committee Peer Review 2010,” 40.

291 Field Interview: NZODA programme employee

292 The interviewee goes on to state: “The bases of NZ political, historic economic ties to the region if there is anywhere we can make a significant difference in the development space it is obviously the Pacific, vice versa other areas not to say obviously we aren’t making impacting other areas as well there has been that shift in focus in the Pacific.” See Field Interview: NZODA programme employee

293 Field Interview: NZODA programme stakeholder
Utilising the outline and interviewees’ comments, IDG is discussed in relation to the four assessed variables: method, actors, threat and geography. Here it is suggested that IDG orientated towards a top-down implementation, untied large amounts of aid, increasingly utilised the private sector, focused upon economic development, and narrowed its focus upon the Pacific, particularly to Polynesia.

Now IDG and NZAid have both been assessed in relation to the Building Peace Gradation. The following chapter will compare the results of NZAid and IDG in relation to the Building Peace Gradation.
Chapter Five: Results and Analysis
5.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter is divided into two parts; results and analysis. Part One reflects upon the previous two chapters and summarises the findings by clearly outlining NZAid’s and IDG’s respective positions in relation to the Building Peace Gradation in relation to each indicator and each other.

Part Two presents an analysis of the results by outlining the implications of occupying a certain position in relation to the Building Peace Gradation. Here arguments supporting and opposing different forms of peacebuilding are presented.

Part One: Results

5.2 Introduction

This chapter summarises the findings by reflecting upon NZAid’s and IDG’s respective positions in relation to the Building Peace Gradation. The following sections outline the key findings by commenting on the differences between NZAid and IDG in relation to the variables: method, actors, threat and geography. Given the comparative nature of this study, outlining NZAid’s and IDG’s respective locations within the theoretical framework will be discussed by positioning them in reference to each other.

The results suggest that there is a clear difference between IDG and NZAid in relation to the Building Peace Gradation. While NZAid is orientated towards hybrid peace, comparatively IDG is inclined towards liberal peace.

5.2.1 Method

This indicator was separated into two parts. Firstly, the method of top-down and bottom-up implementation is assessed, and secondly, differentiation between tied and untied aid is determined. When interviewees were asked if they could differentiate between NZAid and IDG in relation to operating in a top-down or bottom-up method of implementation, all participants labelled
NZAid as employing a bottom-up approach, while IDG was identified as employing a top-down approach. Secondly, while participants suspected an increase in tied aid under IDG, the 2010 DAC Review states that IDG had untied 84 percent of ODA, while the in 2005 DAC Review states that NZAid had 50 percent untied aid.

This indicator has produced mixed results. IDG is perceived as utilising a top-down approach to implementing ODA compared to NZAid’s bottom-up approach. This inclines IDG towards liberal peace and NZAid towards hybrid peace on the Building Peace Gradation. However, in relation to tied and untied aid, NZAid is orientated towards liberal peace, while IDG is inclined towards hybrid peace. Consequently, judging by this indicator, IDG’s and NZAid’s relationship to liberal and hybrid peace is unclear.

5.2.2 Actors

This indicator shows a shift in the actors utilised by IDG and NZAid. Banks et al (2012) and Challies et al. (2011) assert that NZAid increasingly employed civil society to implement NZODA, while IDG has reduced the utilisation of civil society and increasingly employed the private sector. Ministerial statements, NZAid and IDG policy statements and the evolution of NZODA’s contestable fund confirm the shift in actors employed.

When participants were asked if there had been a change in the primary actor(s) utilised by the NZODA programme over the last 12 years, particularly between IDG and NZAid, five out of six participants identified a stronger relationship with NGOs under NZAid. Furthermore, all participants stated that IDG was increasingly utilising the private sector to implement NZODA.

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295 McCully, "An Ambitious Plan For The Pacific- NZ's perspective”.

296 While NZAid’s contestable fund (KOHA-PICD) was accessible to NGOs and charitable groups only, IDG’s new NZPfID contestable fund is open to NGOs, the state sector and private sector actors. See Chapter … section … for a description.
When asked if changes in actors utilised would influence the amount of local participation or utilisation in programmes, half of the participants felt they did not have enough knowledge or evidence to comment. However, three participants felt that under NZAid there was a stronger relationship with local NGOs and grassroots community organisations. Furthermore, two interviewees equated NGOs as enabling heavy local participation in implementing NZODA programmes.

These two trends clearly illustrate that during NZAid there was heavier NGO utilisation, while IDG is more focused upon the private sector to implement programmes. Still, this does not mean that there will be any less local engagement in implementing programmes; the repositioning by IDG could arguably remain static, or increase, levels of local engagement. When participants were asked if these changes in actors utilised would have an affect on the amount of local engagement, participation or utilisation in programmes, four interviewees felt they did not have enough knowledge or evidence to comment. However two interviewees stated IDG’s change in actor(s) would mean there would be less local engagement, participation or utilisation in programmes.

Consequently, a heightened use of NGOs, civil society and local participation suggests NZAid is orientated towards hybrid peace in relation to the Building Peace Gradation. In comparison, IDG’s employment of the private sector is inclined towards liberal peace in relation to the Building Peace Gradation.

5.2.3 Threat

This indicator illustrates a clear difference between IDG and NZAid. The change is primarily evident in the different mandates. While NZAid’s mandate concentrated upon poverty elimination, IDG’s central focus is the pursuit of sustainable economic development. IDG’s change to sustainable economic

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development is also evident in the MFAT 2011 Annual Report, which stated that during 2010/11 the amount of ODA spent on sustainable economic development activities increased by nearly 40 percent.\textsuperscript{299}

Five out of six participants commented that NZAid's primary focus was poverty elimination or reduction, while IDG's primary focus is sustainable economic development or economic growth. Given NZAid's mandate is focused upon social justice and needs, it is suggested NZAid, when compared to IDG, inclines towards hybrid peace on the \textit{Building Peace Gradation}. Although it can be argued that a focus upon sustainable economic development is aimed at curbing social justice issues, such as obstacles to health and education, Pauline McKay maintains, social justice is not the primary focus under IDG. Consequently, IDG is orientated towards liberal peace on the \textit{Building Peace Gradation} when compared to NZAid.

\subsection*{5.2.4 Geography}

This indicator assessed geographical shifts between NZAid and IDG in relation to their respective focus upon countries and regions. While NZAid "had a far more internationalist agenda"\textsuperscript{300}, implementing more programmes in Africa and Latin America, IDG narrowed its global focus upon the Pacific. Furthermore, while NZAid and IDG both prioritised the Pacific region, NZAid had a greater focus on Melanesia, while IDG is reprioritising Polynesian nations.\textsuperscript{301} IDG's narrowing focus upon the Pacific, in particular Polynesia, indicates increased investment in areas that offer strategic advantages. A narrowing of focus inclines IDG towards liberal peace in relation to the \textit{Building Peace Gradation}. In comparison, NZAid is orientated towards hybrid peace in relation to the \textit{Building Peace Gradation}.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{298} Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, "New Zealand Agency for International Development: Mandate and Policy Settings " 1.
\item\textsuperscript{299} Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Annual Report: For the year ended 30 June 2011," 33.
\item\textsuperscript{300} Field Interview: NZODA programme employee
\item\textsuperscript{301} This shift has not yet been reflected in statistics.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
5.3 Conclusion

Overall, it has been suggested that NZAid orientates towards hybrid peace in relation to the Building Peace Gradation. In comparison, IDG is more inclined to liberal peace in relation to the Building Peace Gradation. Although the indicator: method is split in relation to where IDG and NZAid are positioned in relation to the Building Peace Gradation; all remaining indicators suggest NZAid is orientated towards hybrid peace, while IDG is consistently inclined towards liberal peace. These results (illustrated clearly in the table below) answer the first central question: what form of peacebuilding has been, and is currently being, implemented by the New Zealand Official Development Assistance programme?

Part Two of this chapter outlines the effects of implementing these differing forms of peacebuilding and investigates the significance of orientating towards liberal or hybrid peace for the NZODA programme. In addition, implications for development assistance and in particular for NZODA are explored. In doing so, the following chapter will address the second central question: what are some of the substantive implications of New Zealand’s approach to Official Development Assistance?

Table 12: Results

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Part Two: Analysis: Different Forms of Peacebuilding

5.4 Introduction

The results found NZAid was orientated towards hybrid peace, while IDG is orientated towards liberal peace. Part Two of this chapter outlines the implications of implementing different forms of peacebuilding by discussing liberal and hybrid peace in greater detail. While these key concepts were introduced in Chapter One, to understand the significance of the results, it is necessary to investigate the implications of orientating towards liberal or hybrid peace.

By examining the major arguments supporting and opposing liberal and hybrid peace, the implications of orientating towards a particular form of peace become evident. While several authors' hold reservations concerning hybrid peace, the literature overwhelmingly argues the acute limitations of liberal peace significantly outweigh the uncertainties hybrid peace presents. Investigating liberal and hybrid peace facilitates the answering of the second central question: What are some of the substantive implications of New Zealand’s approach to Official Development Assistance?

5.5 Liberal Peace: Support

5.5.1 Introduction

While criticism is mounting in opposition to liberal peacebuilding, leading nation states, IGOs and some areas of academia zealously support the implementation of liberal peace. Paris (2010) claims that while liberal peacebuilding has some flaws, its implementation has “done more good than harm; and … [deserting] the existing peacebuilding project would be tantamount to abandoning tens of millions of people to lawlessness, predation, disease and fear”.302

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Proponents of liberal peace typically outline two bodies of literature that support its continued implementation. The following section will examine the primary arguments of liberal peace; the proposition that economic interdependence brings about peace and that democratic governance leads to peace.

5.5.2 Economic Interdependence and Peace

Advocates of liberal peacebuilding argue that economic interdependence generated by liberal peace promotes peace. Influenced by Kantian notions, Cobden (1903) and Angell (1933) were among the first modern theorists to affirm the notion that economic interdependence supports peace. Domke (1988) argues that while democratic governments went to war as often as non-democracies, states that had an extensive foreign trade sector went to war less than those who had a less extensive foreign trade sector. Further, Mansfield (1994), Copeland (1996), Kim (1998), and Oneal and Russett (1999) affirm the notion that meaningful economic trade “has statistically significant and substantively important benefits for reducing interstate violence”.

Oneal (2001) uses new data collected between 1886-1992 to suggest that there is a “pacifying influence of economic interdependence ... [providing] unqualified support for liberal theory”. Gartzke et al. (2001) claim that while much of the

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309 Ibid., 423.

310 John R. Oneal, "Empirical Support for the Liberal Peace," in Economic Interdependence and

5.5.3 Democratic Governance and Peace

Advocates of liberal peacebuilding argue the democratic governance generated by liberal peace implementation promotes peace. Fukuyama (1992), Russett (1993), and Maoz and Russett (1993) claim Kant was correct when proposing global democratic governance would result in world peace. As the Cold War thawed, proponents of democratic peace claimed that humankind had not only witnessed the passing of hostilities between the world’s two superpowers, but moreover, the endpoint of our ideological evolution with the triumph of Western liberal democracy as the final form of mass governance. Russett (1993) claims:

the end of ideological hostility matters doubly because it represents a surrender to the force of Western values of economic and especially political freedom. To the degree that countries once ruled by autocratic systems became democratic, a striking fact about the world comes to bear on any discussion of the future of international relations: in the modern international system, democracies have almost never fought each other.

References:


312 Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*


315 Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*

Proponents of democratic peace theory state that democracies rarely go to war with one another as they "have other means of resolving conflicts between them." Furthermore, democracies not only develop alternatives to interstate violence but:

they perceive that democracies should not fight each other. ... By this reasoning, the more democracies there are in the world, the fewer potential adversaries we and other democracies will have and the wider the zone of peace.  

While attracting several critics primarily questioning the causal assumptions democratic peace theorists make; supporters of democratic peace theory claim they:

have addressed many methodological concerns with prior studies, creating a consensus within the field that the empirical relationship between joint democracy and peace is genuine.  

5.6 Liberal Peace: Criticism

5.6.1 Introduction

Models of liberal peace have attracted multiple critics. Associated with such labels as a hopeful experiment, illiberal, universalist, a feckless pluralism, illegitimate, hubristic, elite enriching, ethically bankrupt
and even tinged with racism, liberal peace has largely found itself abandoned by some parts of academia and policy makers.

Reflecting on this weight of critical review, the section below attempts to encapsulate the concerns surrounding liberal peace into the following criticisms: imperial, eliminating local constructs, destabilising and illusionary.

5.6.2 Imperial

Peacebuilding is not a therapy the United Nations can attempt to impose on an unwilling patient. The degree of condemnation exerted by liberal peace critics varies significantly. Paris (2010) acknowledges that while there are echoes of colonialism within liberal peace agendas, given the unjustifiable nature of colonialism today and the limited gain for Western nations, this is far from affirming their equivalence. At the other end of the spectrum, Duffield (2001) argues the current agenda is not implemented to better people but is content in containing and maintaining disorder within the Global South. Duffield (2007) claims liberal peace is implemented to defend an unsatisfiable mass consumer society, or as Pugh (2006) puts it, to maintain “an integral part of the world ordering project that has accompanied projects for stabilizing capitalism”.

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326 Richmond, "De-romanticising the Local, de-mystifying the International: Hybridity in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands," 119.
330 Paris, "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding," 350. (Authors emphasis)
332 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples.
 Liberal peace emulates colonial practice by intervening in underdeveloped societies in order to bestow upon them the habits and systems of developed societies. The underdeveloped is bombarded with new modes of governance, justice, morals and economic interaction; effectively endorsing the mantra: the West to teach the rest. Boege et al. (2011) maintain the true idea of the liberal state only exists in OECD nations that formed as a result of centuries of evolution, specific to Western and European nations. Put simply, the concept of nationalism did not spread far from its Western European origins. Suggesting liberal peace is the ultimate model of human organisation ignores the historical processes and constructs that developed and thrived in the Global South prior to colonisation. Subsequently, implementing liberal peace:

only makes sense if one accepts that an externally driven ‘social (re)engineering project can accelerate or substitute for a more ‘organic' historical process of state-building that would otherwise be driven by local actors”.

Critics of liberal peace claim its colonial characteristics are primarily evident in its method of implementation. Mac Ginty (2010) claims that while key transmission agents of liberal peace may be local actors, “the DNA is Western”. Further, Richmond (2011) suggests it is implemented by romanticising “the local in very Orientalist ways as well as romanticizing their own superior capabilities”. This leads Heathershaw (2008) to label liberal

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337 Ibid.


peace as little more than a “normative approach to intervention”\textsuperscript{341}, joining others who claim it is “practically imperial”.\textsuperscript{342}

5.6.3 Eliminating Local Constructs

Critics of liberal peace claim it sabotages genuine social and political activity already functioning within Global South societies. Brown et al. (2011) suggest liberal peace implementation pays little attention to the indigenous social constructs in societies it infiltrates. Enquiring as to what maintains order or constitutes governance in the Global South goes unquestioned by contemporary implementers of liberal peace theory. Furthermore, little is done to formulate how the Global South may interact with new institutions and sources of authority that liberal peace enforces.\textsuperscript{343}

Observing the Bosnian mission, Chandler (2006), maintains that although some development operations acknowledge this dilemma, in reality:

there is currently little thought given to the problems caused by this marginalisation of the domestic political sphere. For international administrators and policymakers, it is well-nigh inconceivable that local actors could be better placed to take their own societies forward than international ‘experts’.\textsuperscript{344}

Furthermore, any Global South engagement and consultation usually takes place at the national level,\textsuperscript{345} with those Richmond (2011) labels, the ‘Western-local.’\textsuperscript{346} In contrast to the local-local, the Western-local, are those whom appear

\textsuperscript{341}Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses," 602.


\textsuperscript{343}Brown et al., "Challenging Statebuilding as Peacebuilding: Working with Hybrid Political Orders to Build Peace," 106.


\textsuperscript{346}Richmond, "De-romanticising the Local, de-mystifying the International: Hybridity in Timor Leste
to exhibit, or could potentially exhibit, Western ideals concerning liberal peace. By targeting a specific group, Richmond (2011) argues such an approach misses the real local,\(^{347}\) consequently rendering exercises in liberal peace ineffective.

### 5.6.4 Destabilising and Harmful

As stated above, proponents of liberal peace argue the economic interdependence and democratic governance resulting from its implementation results in a reduction in interstate conflict. However, several authors have questioned these core assumptions of liberal peace, while others claim its implementation has done more harm than good.

Spiro (1994), Gowa (1999) and Rosato (2003) argue the data, time frames and definitions used by proponents of democratic peace are not sufficient enough to justify the causality claims of liberal peace theory.\(^{348}\) Schwartz et al. (2002) reject the notion that democracies exhibit a greater tendency for peaceful resolution of conflicts claiming war has taken place between democracies as much as war has taken place between other nation states.\(^{349}\)

While economic interdependence is a significant part of liberal peace argument, Barbieri (1996) claims economic interdependence increases violence between nations. In various studies, Barbieri (1996) uses large-n empirical evidence over varied time frames and employs a dyadic approach. Breaking down interdependence into salience and symmetry dimensions, Barbieri (1996) finds that “extreme interdependence, whether symmetrical or asymmetrical, has the greatest potential for increasing the likelihood of conflict”.\(^{350}\)

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While the above commentators attack the core assumptions of liberal peace theory, others claim liberal peace implementation has been “provocative”, “counterproductive”\textsuperscript{351} and “culturally devastating”.\textsuperscript{352} Call (2008) argues attempts at implementing liberal peacebuilding in Angola, Rwanda\textsuperscript{353} and Burundi\textsuperscript{354} in the early 1990s are obvious examples of the ultimate failure of liberal peacebuilding. While some perceive liberal peace missions in Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti, Liberia and Timor Leste as successes, closer examination reveals mixed results. Cambodia and Liberia both emerged from turbulent conflicts to have the international community impose post-conflict elections; however, both cases were characterized by strongmen restructuring the governance and election systems to meet their interests. Economic liberalization in El Salvador and Nicaragua reinforced and increased socio-economic inequalities that were the very causes of conflict. Chandler's (2000) observations of elections and economic liberalization in Bosnia, again details several pitfalls typical of liberal peace missions\textsuperscript{355}

Such failures have led Richmond (2010) to claim that although the UN attempted eighteen transformations to democratic governance in the fifteen years since the end of the Cold War, thirteen “suffered from authoritarian regime . . . underlining the wider implications of peacebuilding beyond any simplistic assumptions that holding free and fair elections means that peace is automatically self-sustaining”.\textsuperscript{356}


\textsuperscript{352} Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security: 122.

\textsuperscript{353} In these two instances post accord casualties surpass pre-accord deaths. See Call, "Knowing Peace When You See It: Setting Standards for Peacebuilding Success.”

\textsuperscript{354} Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).


5.6.5 Illusionary

Heathershaw (2008) claims the failings of liberal peace and its genuine disconnection with clientele has led to “elusive and illusory” results. The ideal of all nations emulating ‘Denmark’ by creating transparent, accountable, democratic governments, operating within a just society free from poverty, is obviously an exciting concept. However conceptually attractive, in reality, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible to conceive. Richmond (2005, 2006) describes implementation of liberal peace as a “virtual peace,” leading him to question whether such operations are “a virtual construction by outsiders for the consumption of their own audiences?”

Those who challenge the idea of liberal peace claim its illusionary traits are further evident given its focus upon prevention of negative peace. Although it is valiant to work towards a society free from violence, Mac Ginty (2010) argues the implementation of liberal economies will do little towards truly emancipating those within Global South societies.

5.7 Hybrid Peace: Support

5.7.1 Introduction

With criticism of liberal peace mounting, the concept of hybrid peace has been increasingly explored. While liberal peace is associated with imperialism, the elimination of social constructs, destabilisation and illusionary formulations; supporters of hybrid peace argue this alternative formulation alleviates such concerns.

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357 Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses," 600.
358 Call, "Knowing Peace When You See It: Setting Standards for Peacebuilding Success."
360 Richmond, "The problem of peace: understanding the ‘liberal peace’," 309.
Proponents claim hybrid peacebuilding is guided by a commitment to fostering legitimate and emancipatory formulations. With these guiding principles at the forefront, it is suggested hybrid peace is sustainable and durable. The following section outlines the arguments that hybrid peace is legitimate, emancipatory and consequently facilitates sustainable and durable peace.

5.7.2 Legitimacy

Although proponents of liberal peace argue its failings are typically due to inaccuracies in time frames and/or resources, Richmond (2009) argues its primary failing is a lack of legitimacy. Advocates of hybrid peace claim the majority of Western interventions are unsuccessful because the international agent has lacked, or often neglected, to construct legitimacy with the local:

This means that liberal peacebuilding does not represent the local. It is very top down oriented, and provides the answers on how to build peace before the questions have even been asked about how one constitutes this local, more locally sustainable, and, fitting form of peace.

In contrast hybrid peace rejects the implementation of standardised, “off the rack” packages that “lack the roots” in the societies they are artificially grafted into.

As outlined in the opening chapter, hybrid peace’s primary difference to liberal peace is its determination to co-exist, blend and mesh with indigenous constructs. Proponents of hybrid peace claim that while liberal peace constructs societies akin to “empty shells” hybrid peace’s foremost objective is to create connections with constituencies, consequently forming legitimate peace.

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The process of acknowledging and incorporating indigenous constructs into the formation of societies arguably creates legitimacy with the local. Referring to the use of hybridity in state-building, Clements et al. (2007) suggest hybrid peace:

> genuinely blend[s] or combine[s] traditional and modern norms and practices[, and therefore] are more likely to deliver effective, functioning and legitimate outcomes precisely because they build on the hybridity and multiplicities.\(^\text{367}\)

### 5.7.3 Emancipatory

ODA is meant to be for the benefit of the Global South. However, within the current liberal peace framework development strategies equate to a set of Western rules and demands enforced upon individuals in Global South countries. Duffield (2007) claims the prevailing liberal peace is not concerned with how the people of the Global South look at life, what they value or why they think in such ways,\(^\text{368}\) but preoccupied with strategies that will replicate how people in the Global North looks at life, what they value and why they think in such ways. Therefore, liberal peace implementation does not emancipate, but prescribes the way society ought to be constructed.

In contrast, hybrid peace searches for:

> an emancipatory form of peace that reflects the interests, identities, and needs of all actors, state and non-state and aims at the creation of a discursive framework of mutual accommodation and social justice which recognizes difference.\(^\text{369}\)

Instead of prescribing from a pre-formulated recipe, hybrid peace requires learning from other's "struggles for existence, identity and dignity and together challenging the world we live in".\(^\text{370}\) Duffield (2007) claims there is a need to


\(^{368}\) Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples: 228.


\(^{370}\) Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples: 234.
move away from perceiving societies that have different values, customs and practices as deficient and in need of advancement from an external source. He maintains there is a need for a new construct that does not contain the psychological barriers encountered within the current dominant paradigm. Duffield (2007) suggests the Global North must have the courage and “willingness to engage in unscripted conversations and accept the risks involved, including the inability to predict or control outcome”. 371

Hybrid peace moves away from the prescriptive nature of liberal peace by supporting a form of peace that explores and acknowledges the social and historical constructs in different contexts within the Global South. This practice supports a process where indigenous constructs are not terminated, but co-exist and/or blend with other ways of existence. This process ensures “an emancipatory form of peace”372 where people’s interests, identities and needs are incorporated into the formation of any social constructs.

5.7.4 Durable and Sustainable

Alongside local participation, sustainability is the second key idea from development and humanitarian interventions that has fuelled renewed interest in traditional and indigenous approaches to peacemaking.373

Proponents of hybrid peace claim its legitimacy and emancipatory aspirations make it more durable and sustainable. The reasoning of this argument appears straightforward; implementing locally-owned, locally-legitimate solutions “are more sustainable, or particularly, more self-sustaining and locally sustainable”. 374 Mac Ginty (2008) maintains that:

[m]uch of the discourse on sustainability in development and humanitarianism arose from frustration at repeated, short-term

371 Ibid.


374 Richmond, "Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal–Local Hybridity via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding," 327.
interventions that dealt with the manifestations of underdevelopment and failed to build or enhance capacity to deal with future problems. ... The logic of sustainability was that if communities could access their own resources and capacities over the longer term, then their reliance on external assistance would be reduced. 375

Proponents of hybrid peace claim external actors using external blueprints cannot form peaceful, harmonious societies for the long term. It is suggested that enforcing foreign concepts while ignoring local constructs will exacerbate conflict rather than relieve it. Sustainable peace requires an acknowledgment of local constructs and local actors, implementing locally conceived solutions.

Richmond (2008) argues hybrid peace “would be based upon empathy, emancipation, and cooperation”. 376 Further this formulation:

represents an everyday ontology of peace, enabling political, social, and economic organisations and institutions that respect the communities they are in a contractual relationship within its specific circumstances and environment, requiring also the flexibility to respond to any changes. As a consequence, this notion of peace would be locally and transnationally constituted, self-sustaining, socially, politically, economically, and environmentally, and would provide a via media between different identities and interests. 377

5.8 Hybrid Peace: Criticism

5.8.1 Introduction

It has been suggested liberal peace presents several flaws while hybrid peace offers a legitimate, emancipatory alternative, which would deliver sustainable and durable outcomes. However, Paris (2010) argues the alternatives to current liberal peace models offer little “other than ... attractive but vague appeals for a new formula for sharing the world with others”. 378

375 Mac Ginty, "Indigenous peace-making versus the liberal peace," 142.
376 Richmond, "Reclaiming peace in international relations," 461.
377 Ibid.
Critics of hybrid peacebuilding claim its formula is not only vague, but moreover, its implementation can be destabilising, it is based in a neo-colonial framework and it romanticises the local. The following section will examine these primary criticisms of hybrid peace.

5.8.2 Destabilising

Critics of liberal peace label it a destabilising force, however it is argued hybrid peace can also exacerbate conflict and injustice. Chopra’s (2009) examination of peacebuilding in the *Arid lands of Kenya* found that while some form of local-peacebuilding was demanded in areas where the state does not have a presence, some of these approaches ran counter to the official laws of Kenya.\(^{379}\) Additionally, local methods of peacebuilding “can be at odds with democratic decision-making, inclusiveness and gender equity. ... [Further], they provide yet another tool for abuse by politicians and other local leaders”.\(^{380}\) Chopra (2009) found that local:

> peace committees can also be used to deepen existing rifts between communities. Instead of uniting, they can reinforce divisions and have the opposite effect to what was intended. In one example, community members complained that committee members behaved in a very partisan way and did not have the calling to be peacemakers. Rather than cooperating with other committees, this had the effect of strengthening the identity of each community against all others. In another location, the peace committee called itself the ‘security committee’. Members were convinced that their main task was the provision of security for their own community. They perceived their neighbouring community, with a different ethnic identity, as the enemy and they patrolled their area in order to provide security and protect their community.\(^{381}\)

Chopra’s (2009) research illustrates that hybrid peace can run counter to gender equality, democratic governance, human rights and other Western norms. However, hybrid peace advocates that Chopra’s claim of knowing

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\(^{380}\) Ibid.

\(^{381}\) Ibid., 543.
Kenyan norms in the arid lands is conceptually flawed. Proponents of hybrid peace maintain that it is universalistic narratives such as this, which have driven the illegitimate constructs that have caused so much instability in the Global South.

While liberal peace has been comprehensively supported by major IGOs and leading nation states, hybrid peace has not been privy to the same support. Given hybrid peace has not been thoroughly supported, it is tenuous to suggest the hybrid peace has a destabilising effect.

5.8.3 Neo-colonial

It is demeaning by suggesting that the pursuit of development, which is central to many people around the world, is somehow illegitimate and that such people need to be re-educated to pursue imaginary alternatives.\textsuperscript{382}

Hybrid peacebuilding has also attracted criticism for possessing a neo-colonial approach. Critics argue, “no society has a single, unambiguous ... structures (traditional of otherwise) that can automatically be activated”,\textsuperscript{383} therefore, if foreign peace-builders wish to support local initiatives they will have to choose some structures above others, effectively deciding who is the local, or what the indigenous construct is.\textsuperscript{384}

Opponents of hybrid peace argue it is not only neo-colonial to advocate for the idealised local but patronising to disregard people’s desire to develop.\textsuperscript{385} Paris (2010) maintains that for foreign parties, decisions will inevitably:

be made to privilege some structures and not others – and, as much as peacebuilders might view themselves as referees in their decisions, in


\textsuperscript{383} Paris, "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding," 359.

\textsuperscript{384} Pauline Peter, "Who's local here? The politics of participation in development," \textit{Cultural Survival Quarterly} 20, no. 3 (1996).

fact they will always be ‘players’ simply by virtue of their relative power to the domestic setting.\textsuperscript{386}

The only way to ensure countries of the Global North are not engaging in neo-colonialism is to avoid all intervention in the Global South. Herbst (2004) among others\textsuperscript{387} suggests there is no way to remain impartial; therefore the West should let states fail in order to form organic centres of political authority and boundaries reflecting new outcomes. \textsuperscript{388}

5.8.4 Romanticising the Local

The view of indigenous knowledge as an untainted, pristine knowledge system is unhelpful. It cannot be assumed at all that indigenous knowledge will necessarily provide a sustainable answer to . . . challenges in poor rural communities.\textsuperscript{389}

The use of local peacebuilding methods is claimed as yet another attempt to romanticise local or indigenous culture. While postcolonial literature has led to a resurgence in recognition of indigenous societies, it has at times ignored and masked the cannibalism,\textsuperscript{390} extreme gender inequalities,\textsuperscript{391} disease, famine, dislocation\textsuperscript{392} and intense suffering that has persisted in many indigenous societies. The celebration and uncritical examination of ‘traditional’ societies has been coupled with the demonization of Western societies and convenient

\textsuperscript{386} Paris, "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding." 359.


\textsuperscript{390} Hughes, "Aid has Failed the Pacific," 10.


oversight of the rises in life expectancy, improved health statistics and advances in human rights.\textsuperscript{393}

Several authors have expressed concern at the increasing romanticising of community-based approaches.\textsuperscript{394} Briggs (2005) argues that:

there exists a real danger of over-valorising and over-romanticising indigenous knowledge in practice. In an important way, indigenous knowledge serves to empower local communities by valuing local knowledge and, for example, supporting notions of the ‘African renaissance’. This is reinforced by the contemporary trend of promoting development and environmental programmes at the local level by governments, NGOs and some development agencies. However, . . . such approaches may end up romanticising such communities. The difficulty then is that indigenous knowledge tends not to be problematised, but is seen as a ‘given’, almost a benign and consensual knowledge, simply waiting to be tapped into.\textsuperscript{395}

Furthermore, a leading voice on Pacific development, Helen Hughes (2003), argues that the loss of traditional societies and movement towards development is “[c]ompensated by higher personal security, personal freedom, better education, health and longevity, higher incomes to buy manufactured goods and a richer social and cultural life”.\textsuperscript{396}

Proponents of hybrid peace argue that while some the customs of societies in the Global South may appear appalling, it is egoistical and narrow minded to enforce an alternative way of life on others. Further, it is ineffectual to implement liberal peace agendas without acknowledgement of local constructs. Richmond (2009) claims liberal peace advances itself “with little concern for

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Kiely, ”The last refuge of the noble savage? A critical assessment of post-development theory.”
\item Briggs, ”The use of indigenous knowledge in development: problems and challenges.”
\item Hughes, ”Aid has Failed the Pacific,” 10.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
cultural and social appropriateness or sensitivity and little chance of establishing a locally self-sustaining peace.” In order to enforce liberal peace, the external:

[r]eproduces the “romanticisation of the local”, which sees the local population as being of four key types, all justifying blueprint top-down approaches rather than local engagement: 1. exotic (or indeed quixotic), informal, and unknowable: 2. unable to play a constructive role because they effectively lack ‘capacity’ in building formal liberal order; 3. devious and uncivil; 4. or a repository of indigenous capacities that internationals can co-opt.

While acknowledging concerns present in the Global South, proponents of hybrid peace argue enforcing drastic change upon unwilling populations will exacerbate such concerns. A greater process of co-existing and/or blending norms is more likely to generate an acceptable change.

### 5.9 Chapter Summary

Although proponents of liberal peace claim economic interdependence and democratic governance leads to the formation of desirable societies, the literature critical of liberal peace is substantial. Categorised as imperial, eliminating local constructs, destabilizing and illusionary, the dominant peacebuilding construct has increasingly been abandoned by academia.

Hybrid peace has also attracted criticisms, however, it is suggested that these criticisms are less substantiated. While framed by some writers as destabilising, hybrid peace has not had support from leading IGOs and nation states which makes it difficult to accurately assess this claim. Again, although hybrid peace is considered neo-colonial and romanticises the local, proponents of hybrid peace claim self-sustaining peace is impossible without the basic exploration and acknowledgement of the indigenous social constructs. It is therefore suggested

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398 Ibid.
that because hybrid peace focuses upon forming legitimate and emancipatory relationships, it is more likely to form sustainable and durable outcomes.

Orientation towards a particular form of peace has significant repercussions for the results presented earlier. This analysis suggests IDG’s orientation towards liberal peace is likely to facilitate the formation of a more unjust, illegitimate, unsustainable and weak outcome, therefore impacting negatively on the form of ODA implemented by NZODA. In comparison, NZAid’s inclination towards hybrid peace facilitates the formation of a more emancipatory, legitimate, sustainable and durable outcome, which would have a positive impact upon the form of peace being created by New Zealand’s ODA. The above analysis addresses the second central question, which asks: what are some of the substantive implications of New Zealand’s approach to Official Development Assistance?

Although, it suggested that IDG’s current orientation towards liberal peace is having a negative impact upon the NZODA programme, it is unclear why IDG has pursued changes that move backwards towards a form of peace that has been subject to severe and convincing criticisms. What is driving the change from hybrid peace orientation to the current inclination towards liberal peace? Why is the NZODA programme now implementing a retrograde form of peace? The following chapters outline possible reasons for the changes to NZODA during IDG era. In doing so, the third and final central question: what has caused the changes to the form of peacebuilding implemented by New Zealand Official Development Assistance, will be addressed.
Chapter Six: Discussion of Changes to NZODA
6.1 Chapter Overview

We made an election commitment to conduct a review of NZAID – our aid agency – to improve the effectiveness and efficiency. In the preceding chapters it has been suggested NZAid was orientated towards hybrid peace, in comparison, IDG is inclined towards liberal peace. Although hybrid peace has been criticised, limitations of liberal peace significantly outweigh the uncertainties of hybrid peace. It is argued the legitimate and emancipatory aspirations of hybrid peace are the only formula for creating a sustainable and durable peace within Global South societies. Consequently, findings suggest that in comparison to NZAid, IDG is currently pursuing a retrograde form of peace.

The objective of this chapter is to investigate why IDG is pursuing a retrograde form of peace. In doing so, this chapter addresses the third and final central question: what has caused the changes to the form of peacebuilding implemented by New Zealand Official Development Assistance?

When Minister McCully (2009) announced the reform of NZODA in 2009 he argued changes were needed to alleviate the accountability, efficiency and effectiveness issues present within NZAid. To investigate this argument this chapter is separated into three parts. Part One examines the argument that NZAid had issues of accountability. Part Two investigates the claim that NZAid was inefficient. Part Three assesses the proposition that NZAid was ineffective. It is suggested the National-led Government’s arguments, that NZAid had issues with accountability and efficiency, were used to disguise a belief that NZAid was ineffective and neoliberal development strategies would increase the effectiveness of New Zealand’s ODA. This chapter closes with an examination of neoliberalism through a peace studies and postdevelopment lens.

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McCully, "An Ambitious Plan For The Pacific- NZ's perspective".

Ibid.
Part One: Accountability

6.2 Introduction

NZAID's semi-autonomous status within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade will be removed. The change is largely technical, but will improve the management and delivery of ODA through clearer accountabilities and responsibilities.\(^{401}\)

As previously stated, the founding of NZAid as a SAB effectively removed a portion of influence MFAT had upon NZODA. The formation of a SAB enabled NZAid to create its own human resources system, policy and make more decisions independent of MFAT. Consequently, a significant portion of accountability was transferred from MFAT to the Chief Executive and directors within NZAid. According to the National-led government, NZAid's institutional arrangements resulted in several issues of accountability.

In an attempt to discover why IDG is now implementing a retrograde form of peace, the following section explores if NZAid had accountability concerns. An investigation is performed by examining arguments supporting and opposing the proposition that NZAid had issues of accountability.

6.2.1 NZAid had Accountability Issues

The National-led government argued that NZAid's institutional arrangements brought inherent issues of accountability that could only be addressed by removing NZAid’s SAS. The review responsible for the changes to NZAid argued issues of accountability frequently occurred on offshore headquarters where MFAT and NZAid staff shared the same workplace. Given the SAS of NZAid, there was confusion as to who staff should report to, creating "blurred lines of responsibility and accountability".\(^{402}\) While MFAT’s Head of Mission had official responsibility for all undertakings and ventures in the operational country,


NZAid staff were officially obligated to report back to NZAid headquarters in Wellington, effectively bypassing the Head of Mission.

In the National-led Government Review of NZAid, it was argued that this ‘accountability risk’ had repeatedly come up as a contentious issue for in-country Head of Mission(s), who felt they had not been privy to vital information of great importance to in-country operations. Given the Head of Mission had to officially communicate with NZAid in Wellington instead of NZAid staff in the offshore headquarters, the National-led Government Review maintained this accountability issue had impacted negatively on the overall efficiency of NZODA and MFAT operations.

Minster McCully (2009) claimed NZAid’s accountability inadequacies were highlighted in the Controller and Auditor-General’s report, which stated, “NZAid needs to clarify the responsibilities and accountabilities of staff in Head Office.” Further, NZAid needed “to work with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to ensure that guidelines for Head of Mission funds are followed at overseas posts”. According to Minister McCully (2009), these issues of accountability impacted negatively on the effectiveness and efficiency of the NZODA programme, essentially decreasing the amount of funding received in recipient countries.

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403 ibid.


405 Ibid., 23. Further, Minister McCully argued that given the nearly half a billion dollars in Aid is donated by tax payers to foreign nations, the citizens of New Zealand “are entitled to look to their elected government to ensure that those funds are allocated in a manner that is well targeted. This is public money, [therefore] its expenditure should be overseen by elected office-holders able to be held to account at the ballot box – not by faceless, unelected, unaccountable, aid bureaucrats.” See McCully, "The National-led Government’s Approach to the Provision and Delivery of Overseas Aid,” 29.

6.2.2 NZAid did not have Accountability Issues

Spratt (2012) and Banks et al. (2012) question the assertion that NZAid possessed accountability issues. Banks et al. (2012) argue the issues found in the report by the Controller and Auditor-General’s Office was “not surprising given the diversity of work that the agency was involved in.” It is argued audit reports are not appropriate for assessing aid agencies because it is difficult to apply “rigid Western auditing and management systems” to an agency that works in diverse overseas environments where similar systems of auditing or practice do not exist.

Banks et al. (2012) argue previous reviewers of NZAid acknowledged the existence of accountability concerns, however the issues were minimal and minor adjustments would alleviate the glitches identified. The 2005 Ministerial Review stated the new SAB model brought with it new challenges to the relationship between NZAid and MFAT, but overall, the “SAB has been satisfactorily established and is working well.” Further, the 2005 Ministerial Review found NZAid and MFAT had put in place several measures to avoid issues of coherence and accountability to ensure a productive relationship. Weekly meetings were scheduled between the Executive Director of NZAid and the Secretary of MFAT, and consistent discussion occurred between MFAT and NZAid on several levels. Regarding the relationship between NZAid and MFAT, the 2005 Ministerial Review found while the nature of NZAid as a SAB

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408 Ibid.

409 Further, the Office of the Controller and Auditor-General follow up reports found “NZAID responded positively and comprehensively to our recommendations. For 11 of our 17 recommendations, NZAID either completed work to implement them or incorporated work to address them as part of its “business as usual”. NZAID has partially completed work to implement our other six recommendations.” See Controller and Auditor-General, "Performance Audit Report: New Zealand Agency for International Development: Management of Overseas Aid Programmes," 24.


411 “The boundaries of day-to-day relationships between NZAID and MFAT are laid down in the Relationship Document” This document outlined which sections within NZAid and MFAT would meet and the frequency of these meetings. See ibid., 59.
facilitated “debates and tensions [NZAid and MFAT] have very professional relations and good systems in place which ensure these issues are addressed and resolved”\(^{412}\).

The Executive Director of NZAid from 2001 to 2009, Dr Peter Adams, claimed, “accountability risks . . . that are deemed inherent in the SAB model have been managed and mitigated in the MFAT/NZAID context”\(^{413}\). While accountability issues could potentially arise from NZAid operating as a SAB, it is argued both agencies managed to adapt suitably to minimise accountability issues\(^{414}\).

### 6.2.3 Conclusion

While the National-led government claimed accountability and efficiency issues present in NZAid were part of the reason for extensive changes to NZODA, when conducting a closer examination of these arguments, they appear weak. Although the National-led Government claim that accountability issues were present within NZAid, a Ministerial Review and DAC Peer Review did not uncover such issues. Further, while the Office of the Controller and Auditor-General found that there were “some deficiencies in the management control environment and contract management systems, process and practices”\(^{415}\) this is hardly surprising given the unique nature of ODA in comparison to other government agencies. Furthermore, in the follow up report NZAid was described as responding “positively and comprehensively”\(^{416}\) to the recommendations. Therefore, it is suggested the arguments that NZAid needed

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\(^{412}\) Ibid., 44.


\(^{414}\) Again, the 2005 DAC Review noted coherence worked well within the NZAid SAB structure. The DAC Review states “[o]ne reason for the Cabinet’s decision that NZAID would be a semi-autonomous body attached to MFAT was that this would facilitate coherence between development policy and other aspects of foreign policy. In practice, thanks to a healthy and robust dialogue between NZAID and MFAT, policy coherence has become progressively easier to achieve.” See DAC, "DAC Peer Review New Zealand," 53.

\(^{415}\) Banks et al., "Paddling on One Side of the Canoe? The Changing Nature of New Zealand’s Development Assistance Programme," 177.

transformation because of accountability issues is unconvincing. The above section finds opposition to the justification that NZAid was reformed due to accountability issues. Hus, it is unclear why IDG is implementing a retrograde form of peace. Part Two investigates if the reason for changes to NZODA was because NZAid was inefficient.
Part Two: Efficiency

6.3 Introduction

In keeping with the current economic situation, the government’s international aid agency, NZAID, will be required to demonstrate greater value for money in its work, to ensure our aid is being used as efficiently as possible.\textsuperscript{417}

When making the 2009 changes to NZODA, the National-led Government claimed operating a SAB inside MFAT was an unnecessary cost to the taxpayer. Reabsorbing NZODA back within MFAT would increase the efficiency of New Zealand’s development assistance dollars and allow for more funds to be directly distributed into recipient countries.

In an attempt to uncover why IDG is now implementing a retrograde form of peace, the following sections outline if NZAid was inefficient. An investigation is performed by examining arguments supporting and opposing the proposition that NZAid had issues of efficiency.

6.3.1 NZAid had Efficiency Issues

Minister McCully’s May 2009 speech argued one of the major reasons for the reintegration of NZAid into MFAT was due, not only to the high cost of establishing NZAid as a SAB, but moreover, the continued cost associated with operating it. Critics of granting NZAid SAS in 2001 argued the taxpayer would be faced with the unnecessary task of staff increases\textsuperscript{418} and the implementation of other costly services associated with forming a new government body, including: separate workspaces, information technology systems, personnel systems and financial management systems.\textsuperscript{419}

\textsuperscript{417} McCully, “Aid increases as NZAID changes focus”.

\textsuperscript{418} This was proved correct as of 2001/02 there was 102.4 staff, this number increased to 141.4 in 2005/06 and 252.5 in 2009/10. See DAC, ”New Zealand: Development Assistance Committee Peer Review 2010,” 52.

\textsuperscript{419} Grossman and Lees, ”Towards Excellence in Aid Delivery: A Review of New Zealand’s Official Development Assistance Programme Report of the Ministerial Review Team”. 
Minister McCully (2009) claimed assistance funding was being wasted in bureaucracies because “the aid budget is subjected to an unacceptable level of ticket-clipping on the way to its intended destination”.\textsuperscript{420} The ‘ticket-clipping’ translates to transaction costs associated with operating a SAB, in particular, the need to generate new “policies and processes at each intersect between NZAid and the broader department and the need for continuous relationship management to ensure alignment of foreign policy and aid policy advice”.\textsuperscript{421}

Minister McCully (2009) pointed to particular inefficient practices that resulted from divergent policy perspectives between MFAT and NZAid. After NZAid was given more autonomy, MFAT and NZAid had several disagreements, at times resulting in policy stalemates. Here it is argued policy and strategy coherence between ODA and Foreign Affairs is more efficient when NZODA is part of MFAT. Under MFAT, officials and senior staff can easily align their procedure and become more familiar with each other’s approach.

The 2009 review of NZODA found that transaction costs were also incurred “with management challenges, [such as] formalised engagement and interaction ... [which] manifest in areas such as human resources, information technology, audit review and records services”.\textsuperscript{422} In later statements Minister McCully (2009) argued that eight percent or an extra $40 million\textsuperscript{423} of the total aid budget was ‘squandered’ on the managerial and administrative needs of NZAid. He maintained if taxpayers understood the amounts “soaked up in bureaucracy and process, as opposed to providing services and resources to the poorest people on the planet, they would assuredly be demanding ... changes”.\textsuperscript{424}

\textsuperscript{420}McCully, "The National-led Government’s Approach to the Provision and Delivery of Overseas Aid." 29.

\textsuperscript{421}Office of the Minister of State Services and Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, "New Zealand Agency for International Development: Institutional Arrangements," 6.

\textsuperscript{422}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{424}McCully, "The National-led Government’s Approach to the Provision and Delivery of Overseas
6.3.2 NZAid did not have Efficiency Issues

It is obvious the creation of a separate SAB increases government costs, however, proponents of the NZAid/SAB model maintain it is a small price when the benefits are explored. When NZAid was formed the central argument for forming a SAB was NZODA and MFAT have distinctly different missions and objectives. NZODA asks, “what are your needs and how can we help them? [While Foreign Affairs asks] what are our needs and how can we advance them?” The 2001 Ministerial Review argued that NZODA within MFAT had been tarnished by political interference and obstruction. Therefore, the establishment of NZAid as a SAB was done to ensure decisions could be made in an impartial way and NZODA was focused upon the needs of individuals in partner countries rather than New Zealand’s foreign policy interests.

The National-led Government saw the cost of a SAB to be too inefficient, the 2005 Ministerial Review argued that the SAB “has worked relatively harmoniously and efficiently in the delivery of NZODA.” It is accepted that there had “been adjustment, transaction and opportunity costs in the transition [to a SAB], but these have been insignificant when weighed against the

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425 One of the primary conflicts of interest identified by a number of development commentators is the proposed free trade agreement between Australia, New Zealand and fourteen Pacific Island nations. Several development commentators have voiced their concerns regarding the process and implications of a free trade agreement between New Zealand, Australia and small Pacific Island Nations. Many observers, including the DAC, conclude, “New Zealand (and Australia) hopes to achieve trade liberalisation faster than several of their partner countries, who fear the impact on their economies and want more time to assess the implications.” See DAC, “New Zealand: Development Assistance Committee Peer Review 2010,” 24; Nick Braxton et al., ”PACER Plus and its Alternatives: Which way for trade and development in the Pacific?” (Auckland: Oxfam New Zealand & Oxfam Australia, 2009); Aid/Watch, ”PACER Plus Resources” Aid/Watch, http://www.aidwatch.org.au/publications/pacer-plus-resources; People's Health Movement Australia and Public Health Association of Australia, ”Improving access to medicine? The implications of including intellectual property rules under PACER-Plus” (Melbourne: People's Health Movement Australia and Public Health Association of Australia., 2010). CID, ”PACER Plus: Fact sheet 8,” Council for International Development, http://www.cid.org.nz/assets/Resources/Fact-Sheets/PACERPlus-CID-Fact-Sheet.pdf.


recruited expertise in NZAID”. Further, the “efficiencies in the new agency and its strategies and delivery” outweighed the costs associated with operating a SAB. These comments are especially significant because the Terms of Reference of the 2005 Ministerial Review included assessing the efficiency of NZAid.

Policy stalemates between NZAid and MFAT could lead to some inefficiencies, however, proponents of the SAB argue it is an insignificant cost compared to the value of having less political influence in ODA, more development expertise and increased debate between ODA and Foreign Affairs on issues of development. Policy stalemates can occur between MFAT and other government departments including: Defence, Customs, Immigration, and Pacific Island Affairs, however these bodies are not incorporated into MFAT because it is recognised these entities need a degree of autonomy to fulfil their mandates.

Former Executive Director of NZAid, Dr Peter Adams, argues “the norm that has emerged, under the SAB, for policy transactions between NZAID and core MFAT is that they are usually conducted in a constructive atmosphere”. Further, the constructive atmosphere worked so well that on the majority of occasions both parties ended up unearthing middle ground that met both NZAid’s and MFAT’s overall goals.

6.3.3 Conclusion

The argument that NZAid was inefficient is unconvincing. While the National-led Government argues $40 million was lost in the SAB model, both the 2005 DAC Review and 2005 Ministerial Review argues these cost were “insignificant when weighed against the recruited expertise in NZAID, and the outcome

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428 Ibid., 45.
429 Ibid.
430 Ibid., 42.
432 Ibid.
efficiencies in the new agency and its strategies and delivery".⁴³³ Therefore, the argument that NZAid needed transformation because of efficiency issues is tenuous. Further, the above section does not clarify why changes were made to NZAid and subsequently, why NZODA is now implementing a retrograde form of peace. Part Three investigates if the reason for change to NZODA was because NZAid was ineffective.

Part Three: Effectiveness

6.4 Introduction

With finite resources available to us, we need to make choices that will result in long-term economic sustainability for our aid recipients – a hand up, not a hand out.434

Minister McCully (2009) argues there is a need to see greater results from the NZODA programme. In announcing the changes to NZODA, Minister McCully (2009) claimed the mantra of poverty alleviation was ‘nebulous’, ‘lazy’ and ‘incoherent’.435 Further, that “you could ride around in a helicopter pushing hundred-dollar notes out the door and call that poverty elimination”.436

Minister McCully (2009) states “the Government has set a new mandate by which it and ... [IDG] can be judged in relation to the effectiveness of our aid. That mandate requires a clear focus on sustainable economic growth”.437

According to Banks et al. (2012) this change, and others that accompanied it, “harks back to the modernist phase, with strong elements of neoliberalism”.438

Part Three examines if the changes to NZAid were driven by a commitment to increase the effectiveness of NZODA by implementing a neoliberal aid policy. The argument that the National-led Government transformed NZAid into IDG in order to pursue a more effective neoliberal aid policy is explored by dividing Part Three into three sub-sections. The first sub-section revisits neoliberalism by re-examining key neoliberal themes and arguments. Secondly, Banks et al. (2012) claim that IDG possesses strong elements of neoliberalism is assessed.

434 McCully, "New priorities for New Zealand Aid: Speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs”.
435 Ibid.
437 Emphasis added. See McCully, "New priorities for New Zealand Aid: Speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs”.
438 Emphasis added. See Banks et al., "Paddling on One Side of the Canoe? The Changing Nature of New Zealand's Development Assistance Programme,” 183. This observation also confirms the earlier finds that IDG is orientated towards liberal peace in comparison to NZAid.
Thirdly, postdevelopment theory and peace studies are reintroduced to examine the effectiveness of neoliberalism in aid.

6.5 Neoliberalism as Effective Aid

As outlined in Chapter One, neoliberalism has been the foremost development policy implemented by the Global North for the last two decades. The overarching logic of neoliberalism is that the free market maximises human welfare. This central claim relies on several interlinked claims related to free market economics that predict how humans behave in relation to their needs and wants.\textsuperscript{439} The primary argument of neoliberalism is that by creating environments where the free market can flourish, the Global South can obtain the same levels of prosperity enjoyed in the Global North.

Implemented through SAPs, foreign aid has essentially reshaped the economies of underdeveloped countries by encouraging the creation of conditions ripe for economic growth.\textsuperscript{440} However, when the detrimental implications of these policies became evident\textsuperscript{441} the international aid system refocused upon poverty reduction, local ownership and crosscutting issues such as gender equality, human rights and the environment. Although leading IGOs and states have

\textsuperscript{439} The neoliberal model argues the free market consists of “atomistic individuals who know their own autonomously arising needs and wants and who make contracts with other individuals through the mechanisms of the market place to satisfy those needs and wants”. The market provides a venue for the transmission of information regarding needs and wants, and exchanging goods and services, which will satisfy needs and wants. In the free market model, the state is solely concerned with legal and security frameworks to accompany individual interaction. The logic of neoliberalism is that creating the environment where the free market can flourish will enable individual needs and wants to be met, and subsequently create prosperity for those engaged in a free market. See Preston, Development Theory: An Introduction: 253.

\textsuperscript{440} In practice creating ripe conditions involved privatisation, reduction of civil service, economic liberalisation, tax reductions and export promotion. However, it soon became clear that the inequalities of the global trading system, the infancy of social and economic structures in the Global South and volatility of international financial markets meant SAPs were not having the desired effect. See Chant and McIlwaine, Geographies of Development in the 21st century: An Introduction to the Global South: 42.

\textsuperscript{441} Reports such as Adjustment with a Human Face released by UNICEF in 1987 highlighted the detrimental affects the structural reforms were having on social services, children, women and the environment. See Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Richard. Jolly, and Frances. Stewart, Adjustment with a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
replaced SAPs with PRSs (Poverty Reduction Strategies) in theory, the international aid regime is largely still implementing "an extension of the neoliberal orthodoxy designed to sustain free market capitalism".\textsuperscript{442} The following section outlines the argument IDG is increasingly implementing neoliberalism to improve aid effectiveness.

### 6.6 IDG and Neoliberalism

Banks et al. (2012) suggest while poverty reduction was the focus of NZAid, the policy that informs IDG possesses “strong elements of neoliberalism”.\textsuperscript{443} It is suggested here that neoliberalism echoes through the foundations of the National-led Government responsible for the changes to NZODA, while neoliberal policy is becoming increasingly evident in relation to IDG policy and implementation.

The New Zealand National Party positions itself as centre-right upon the political spectrum. Among its core principles are strong neoliberal themes of free enterprise, market and private sector over state involvement, and the preference for limited government.\textsuperscript{444} Influenced by these core values, neoliberal tendencies have become increasingly evident in IDG policy.

The 2011 *International Development Policy Statement*\textsuperscript{445} illustrates a strong desire to liberalise economies when stating IDG will enable private sector development by “cutting red tape for businesses ... and [the] uncertainty of doing business”.\textsuperscript{446} The policy document also emphasises the need to open up


\textsuperscript{443} Banks et al., "Paddling on One Side of the Canoe? The Changing Nature of New Zealand's Development Assistance Programme." 187.


\textsuperscript{445} Arguably IDG’s primary policy document as stakeholder working with IDG are routinely referred to this document when pursuing collaboration or applying for funding.

\textsuperscript{446} Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "International Development Policy Statement Supporting
markets and increase trade by “making markets function better”, through the creation of a “unique regional free trade agreement” in the Pacific. Further, the aspiration to encourage foreign investment in Global South markets is evident in the involvement of the new contestable fund, NZPfID, which aims to “strengthen its working relationship with the private sector at home and abroad”.

It is suggested IDG policy and implementation is increasingly leaning toward neoliberalism. Although the National-led Government argues new direction of IDG is more effective, an investigation through postdevelopment and peace studies lens’ maintains neoliberalism is an ineffective aid strategy.

6.7 Neoliberalism: A Postdevelopment and Peace Studies Critique

6.7.1 Introduction

. . . the philosopher needs to be added to the development team; without a clear concept of the philosophy of development, the team becomes ‘a simple ad hoc mission’.

It has been argued that the National-led Government is now pursuing a retrograde form of peace because of a belief that neoliberalism is a more effective aid strategy. Given this research is based within postdevelopment theory and peace studies, the final section examines neoliberalism through a postdevelopment and peace studies lens. A critique of neoliberal aid is presented by revisiting the themes prevalent in postdevelopment and peace studies identified in Chapter One. Although Chapter One briefly outlined the positions of postdevelopment and peace studies, the following section explains

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447 Ibid.

448 McCully, “An Ambitious Plan For The Pacific- NZ’s perspective”.


in greater detail why the two fields reject the proposition that neoliberalism provides a more effective aid policy.

### 6.7.2 Rejection of Metanarratives

What is thought right within one culture may be utterly abhorrent to the members of another culture and vice versa. Neoliberalism's perpetuation of the metanarrative is of foremost concern for peace studies and postdevelopment. Neoliberalism, like its predecessor modernisation, constructs a singular notion of how the Global South should look and progress. It categorises 80-90 percent of the world's population as underdeveloped, while the minority in the Global North are construed as the norm or ideal form of subsisting. The minority can then instruct the underdeveloped how to progress, based exclusively upon the Global North's experience. Williams (2006) argues liberals believe "quite sincerely in the creation of a better world and that they are the exemplars of what that world should look like".

Of fundamental concern to postdevelopment and peace studies is the perpetuation of the "dominant voice that secretes definitive accounts of intellectual and social practice". Both fields argue universal sentiment does not have any place in the study of social behaviour and especially in the development discourse. The position of postdevelopment and peace studies is there are "several cultures" thus there should be "several developments". Accordingly, the totalising narrative of neoliberalism makes it an ineffective development strategy.

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452 Brohman, "Universalism, Eurocentrism, and ideological bias in development studies: from modernisation to neoliberalism" 125.
6.7.3 Diversity in Relation to Modernisation

We live in a time when humankind faces a major crisis, the crisis of Western modernity. It is a global crisis in the sense that it engulfs the globe, also in that it covers all aspects of human life and human civilisation, political, military, economic, financial, cultural and social.457

While the term modernisation lacks legitimacy within contemporary development theory, it has strong links to the neoliberal agenda.458 As argued by Hughes (2003) “development implies a change from traditional to modern society”.459 While the loss of culture is part of this equation, the undeveloped are "compensated by higher personal security, personal freedom, better education, health and longevity, higher incomes to buy manufactured goods and a richer social and cultural life”. 460 Hughes (2003), a prominent neoliberal,461 argues the loss of custom and tradition is subsidised by the instalment of a better life.

Postdevelopment and peace studies reject notions that disregard and degrade others cultures and the historical process that saw them arrive at these points. Further, both of these fields argue it is egotistical to intervene in another context, deliver 'badly needed' goods or SAPs, and devastate the culture during the process. Escobar (1995) claims, that neoliberalism's disdain for the cultures of the Global South not only deprives the world of the beauty of diversity and difference, but further, the trampling of other culture will not bring about the


458 Brohman argues “From the more traditional modernization paradigm to the newer neoliberal framework, mainstream development theory has been almost entirely rooted in the historical and social experiences of a few Western industrialised societies”. See Brohman, "Universalism, Eurocentrism, and ideological bias in development studies: from modernisation to neoliberalism " 121. Also see Lynne Phillip, The Third Wave of Modernization in Latin America: Cultural Perspectives on Neoliberalism (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1998); Tariq. Banuri, Economic Liberalization: No Panacea The Experiences of Latin America and Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

459 Hughes, "Aid has Failed the Pacific,” 10.

460 Ibid.

fulfilment of basic human needs that development arguably strives for. Instead this process breeds hostility and depression in the Global South as culture is stripped away from the people.⁴⁶²

6.7.4 Context-Specific Solutions from the Global South

The aims of the post-development perspective is effectively a transfer of power, the power to define the problems and goals of a society; from the hands of outside ‘experts’ to the members of the society itself, which adds up to a radical democratic position.⁴⁶³

Postdevelopment and peace studies argue that although different theories of development have appeared post-WWII, the leaders, experts and executers of the dominant development paradigms remain Western and bring with them Western paradigms. Again, neoliberalism preserves this cycle by encouraging Global South nations to embrace the global free market. Here it is argued engagement in this system will deliver fulfilment and prosperity societies in the Global South are not yet experiencing.

Peace studies and postdevelopment reject the notion that a preconceived blueprint from the Global North will deliver prosperity to societies in the Global South. Postdevelopment argues that for real development to transpire there is a need to “transfer the power of defining the problems and goals of a society from the hands of outside experts to the members of the society itself”.⁴⁶⁴ By transferring power and supporting context specific formulas from the Global South, the solutions adopted will be sustainable, durable and fulfil the actual needs of those in the Global South.

⁴⁶² Escobar, Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World: 44.
While the rhetoric of the global aid regime suggests there is a movement towards transfer of power or local-ownership, the ownership still begins from a neoliberal foundation. Consequently, any agenda formulated from this base is already encompassed within the Western blueprint. To exit this foundation, Duffield (2007) calls for a reordering in the relationship between the Global North and South. He argues the West must gain the courage and:

willingness to help without expecting anything in return, that is, abandoning the security prescription which argues that in helping others we should also help ourselves.

6.7.5 Conclusion

It has been suggested that the changes from NZAid to IDG were influenced by a desire to increase the effectiveness of NZODA. When examining the policies and focus of IDG it is argued the changes have been driven by the notion that neoliberal implementation is a more effective development strategy. It has also been suggested that while neoliberalism is still the dominant development ideology, when assessed through a postdevelopment and peace studies lens, it is not an effective development approach.

Although neoliberal policies are enacted to better the lives of those living in ODA recipient countries, peace studies and postdevelopment reject the proposition that the Global North knows what a better life looks like. From the perspective of postdevelopment and peace studies the construction of the neoliberal metanarrative not only destroys culture and diversity, but also, is not effective in advancing the fulfilment of the basic needs and desires of the Global South.

465 The Paris Declaration principle of Ownership states “Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions.” See OECD, “The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,” 3.

466 Murray and Overton, “Neoliberalism is dead, long live neoliberalism? Neostructuralism and the international aid regime of the 2000s.”

6.8 Chapter Summary

Chapter Six investigates why IDG is now implementing a retrograde form of peace in relation to NZAid. When Minister McCully (2009) announced the reform of NZODA in 2009 he argued changes were needed to alleviate the accountability, efficiency and effectiveness issues present within NZAid.\(^{468}\)

While the propositions that NZAid had issues of accountability and efficiency appears unconvincing, it is evident the National-led Government believes NZAid was ineffective. When examining some of the changes made since the creation of IDG, it is argued IDG is increasingly implementing neoliberal policies to increase NZODA effectiveness. However, reflecting upon neoliberalism through a peace studies and postdevelopment lens it is argued neoliberalism is an ineffective development strategy.

\(^{468}\) McCully, "An Ambitious Plan For The Pacific- NZ's perspective".
Conclusion
I. Summary

The NZODA programme has experienced two considerable transformations since 2000. While these changes have been assessed within the development literature, this research presents the transformation through a lens which remains fixated upon on the processes that lead to the creation of lasting peace among peoples. When assessing the method, actors, threat, and geographic implementation of two different eras of NZODA it was suggested that NZAid was orientated towards hybrid peace, while comparatively, IDG is orientated towards liberal peace.

These results demonstrate that the New Zealand’s development and peacebuilding agenda has been understood in two very different and somewhat contradictory ways over the past 12 years. NZAid’s inclination towards hybrid peace shows it understood stable peace in terms of doing justice to locality, consequently orientating towards a more emancipatory, legitimate, sustainable and durable form of peace. In contrast IDG’s inclination towards liberal peace illustrates it understands stable peace as the order that flows from stable markets, stable governance and a civil society that operates within bounded frameworks, however its argued this form of peace is unjust, illegitimate, unsustainable and weak. These different perspectives generate very different ideas of justice, equality, peace, community and sustainability.

When discussing why IDG is currently implementing a retrograde from of peace three major arguments were assessed. Firstly, it was suggested that the National-led government’s claim that the changes to NZAid were needed because of efficiency and accountability issues is unconvincing. Secondly, the argument that the changes to NZAid were performed because of the National-led governments’ commitment to neoliberalism in aid policy was affirmed. Lastly, it was suggested that while neoliberal aid policies are being pursued, when examined through a postdevelopment
and peace studies lens, it is argued that neoliberalism is not an effective
development strategy.

II. Implications and Recommendations

The analysis of the peacebuilding literature argues that gravitating
towards hybrid or liberal peace has significant consequences for
recipients of overseas development assistance in general and New
Zealand’s ODA in particular. The research suggests that IDG’s orientation
towards liberal peace is likely to have negative consequences on the form
of ODA implemented in NZODA recipient countries as the form of ODA
pursued by IDG is suggested to be more unjust, illegitimate, unsustainable
and weak. In comparison, the research suggests that NZAid’s orientation
towards hybrid peace was more likely to have a positive impact on the
form of ODA implemented in NZODA recipient countries as the form of
ODA that was practised by NZAid is suggested to be more emancipatory,
legitimate, sustainable and durable.

NZAid’s orientation was towards a more desirable hybrid form of peace
because, in comparison to IDG, it was described as possessing a bottom-up
approach to aid, utilising civil society and local actors, pursuing issues of
social justice and pursued wider geographical coverage. In contrast, IDG is
orientated towards a less desirable liberal form of peace because, in
comparison to NZAid, it is described as possessing a top-down approach
to aid, utilising the private sector and external entities, not directly
focusing upon social justice and pursuing a narrower geographical focus
then NZAid.

For the NZODA programme to orientate towards hybrid peace it should
place greater focus on bottom-up implementation, utilisation of civil
society and local entities, emphasis upon social justice and pursue a
broader geographical focus. This requires relinquishing neoliberal policy
in relation to New Zealand’s ODA. It is suggested that implementing these
measures will also assist NZODA in creating a more emancipatory,
legitimate, sustainable and durable peace.
III. Further Research

It is important to have higher levels of clarity about what kind of peace might follow from different types of development strategies. It is to be hoped that current perspectives will yield some positive impacts for the marginalised and poor. However, it is certainly worth considering whether some idea of a hybrid peace grounded in locality will generate higher levels of social and political capacity, effectiveness and legitimacy. It is my contention that they will and that they will have to be addressed by those responsible for New Zealand’s ODA at some stage in the not too distant future.

Although the central concern of peace studies is “understanding those processes which lead to a more desirable human condition”\(^{469}\), the issue of development is seldom addressed within this lens. By exploring the connection between postdevelopment and Galtung’s conception of peace studies this research reaffirmed the link between development studies and peace research. However, the interdisciplinary nature of peace studies invites further collaboration with fields that address the pursuit of a more desirable human condition. Because development studies is primarily concerned with the condition of all the humans in the 133 Global South countries,\(^{470}\) peace research must increasingly investigate its contribution to development studies.

As noted in Chapter Two, while commentary about different forms of peace is extensive, formulas assessing or measuring the nature of peace or peacebuilding are scarce. While the movement between different forms of peace is not always apparent in a discrete or explicit fashion, this thesis adds to Richmond’s (2006, 2011) and Natorski’s (2011) previous work by demonstrating that forms of peace implemented by external actors can be assessed.

\(^{469}\) Dugan, “Peace Studies at the Graduate Level,” 74.

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Appendix

I. Appendix 1: Participants and Interviews

Interview Guide

Pre-Interview

Thank participants for their time.

Ask participants if they’d like to remain anonymous or not. Remind participants that they can change their anonymity at any time during or after the interview.

Remind participants that this project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of questioning includes international development, peacebuilding and changes performed by NZODA over the last 12 years. However, the precise nature of the questions which will be asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops.

Remind participants In the event that the line of questioning does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant or uncomfortable you are reminded of your right to decline to answer any particular question(s).

Guiding Questions

1) This question concerns general geographical shift in focus by the NZODA programme over the last 12 years. Aid agency can focus upon certain continents, regions, or countries, more so even different ethnicities, provinces or villages.

• Has there been any general geographical shifts in focus in relation to regions or countries by NZODA over the last 12 years? Particularly between NZAid and IDG?
2) NZODA bestows funding towards a variety of actors to implement programmes. This includes, but is not limited to: governments, IGOs, private sector, state sector and NGOs.

- Has there been a change in the primary actor(s) NZODA employs/uses over the last 12 years? Particularly between IDG and NZAid?

- Does this mean there has been a difference between utilisation of external actors used versus local actors?

3) The next questions concern the method or approach used by NZODA over the last 12 years. ODA can be divided in categories of top-down and bottom-up method of delivery. Bottom-up initiatives are characterised by heavy community or sub-national, local participation and integration. Conversely, a top-down approach is state or external centred.

- Has there been a shift between top-down (external, state, elite centred) and bottom-up (community, local, civil society) aid within NZODA over the last 12 years? Particularly between NZAid and IDG?

- Has there been a shift between in tied - untied aid in the last 12 years? Particularly between IDG and NZAid?

4) Aid organisations can target particular threats / areas of concern

- Has there been a shift in the threat / area of concern addressed by NZODA over the last 12 years? Particularly between IDG and NZAid?

Description of Participants

In order for the thesis to remain manageable, the number of interviews was restricted to six. While the number of participants is controlled all have an in-depth understanding of the operations and policies of NZAid and IDG.
Three interviews were conducted with staff from the NZODA programme, and the three remaining interviews were conducted with stakeholders who have each had close associations with the NZODA programme for over 12 years respectively. One participant declined anonymity and the remaining participants elected to remain anonymous while agreeing to a short description.

1) Participant One - Pauline McKay: Is the current National Director at Christian World Services New Zealand and is the current Chair of New Zealand’s Council for International Development. She has been working within international development in New Zealand and abroad for over 20 years. Her current roles facilitate close interaction with the NZODA programme. My supervisor introduced Pauline to me.

2) Participant Two - NZODA stakeholder: Former Director of a NGO with close ties to the NZODA programme. This participant has worked for the New Zealand Government in various foreign affairs roles and is an active commentator on issues surrounding the NZODA programme. I made contact with this participant.

3) Participant Three - Former NZODA programme employee and current stakeholder of the NZODA programme: This participant worked at the NZODA programme during the period of NZAid and IDG. This participant is now working for a NGO with close ties to the NZODA programme. I was introduced to this participant through a colleague.

4) Participant Four - NZODA programme employee: This participant has worked at the NZODA programme during the period of NZAid and IDG. Prior to this the participant worked at an organisation that is a key stakeholder to the NZODA programme. I know this participant through personal association.
5) Participant Five - NZODA programme employee: This participant has worked at the NZODA programme since 2009. Prior to that the participant worked abroad for various international development organisations. I know this participant through personal association.

6) Participant Six - NZODA programme employee: This participant has worked at the NZODA programme since 2010. I know this participant through personal association.

II. Appendix 2: Presented Papers

During my Masters, a number of the aspects of my research have been presented at hui and symposium:


I have had abstracts accepted at the following conferences where I plan to present:

Bedggood, P. "New Zealand ODA and Building Peace." Paper to be presented at The Challenges for Participatory Development in Contemporary Development Practice Conference, Australian National University, 28 November 2012.