‘More than just a road?’
A case study exploring implementation challenges for sustainable city redevelopment.

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Abstract

*Implementation cannot succeed or fail without a goal against which to judge it (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1972, p. xiv)*

Wellington City Council’s key strategy for urban development envisions a future of sustainable population growth focusing on the development of key centres along a public transport growth spine. To implement this strategy Council began to develop a series of place-based plans, including The Adelaide Road Framework. This Framework incorporated key ‘smart growth’ or transit-oriented development strategies including: improving the environment for active modes of travel; mixing of land-uses to enhance liveability; and encouraging increases in population density along the growth spine. Council’s prioritised implementation plan included: District Plan changes; a more active Council role in facilitating development; and enabling improvements for each travel mode through a significant widening of Adelaide Road, a key city arterial.

Early challenges to funding resulted in a scaling back of the road improvements, and a range of internal and external pressures ultimately resulted in a much more constrained set of improvements for the area, when compared to those aspired to in the Framework. Through a detailed case study, this research explores Council’s role in attempting to implement the Framework from 2008 to 2011 drawing on: interviews and meetings with Council staff; and, key implementation documents and plans. A literature review explores: social theories outlining why urban areas can be difficult to change; the challenges to implementing more sustainable development in New Zealand; and relevant policy and political shifts over the period.

Drawing on these theories, the thesis illustrates the difficulty of implementing more sustainable urban redevelopment. It highlights the importance of recognising and addressing the strong influence of entrenched professional viewpoints; overarching values and traditions; as well as the complex interrelationship of systems, if cities are to be made more sustainable. Failing to do so will reduce the extent to which our cities can capitalise on a range of significant co-benefits for health, wellbeing and the local environment that arise from the implementation of smarter growth approaches.
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Chapter One: Background

Introduction

In recent years, urban planning philosophies promoting ‘smarter’ growth and compact cities have emerged in response to a range of serious and complex national and international issues. The issues range from: sustainably managing population growth; reducing greenhouse gas emissions associated with global warming; addressing the inefficiencies of sprawling development; to the health impacts of increasingly inactive populations and more obese populations (Witten, Abrahamse, & Stuart, 2011, p. 189).

Evidence shows that smarter growth approaches to urban planning, which aim to more sustainably integrate land-use and transport planning, can help to mitigate and adapt to future predicted climate change, as well as provide multiple co-benefits for health and wellbeing, economic, environmental, and social sustainability goals (Ewing, 2008; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007; The Lancet, 2009). This type of planning is seen internationally in cities such as Portland, Oregon, and Stockholm, where mixed-use and compact development is coupled with better public transport access and less dependence on private vehicles (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, p. 367).

In New Zealand local and central government policy and strategies have shown an increasing focus on smart growth approaches. In recent years, public health activity to influence urban form has focused on the potential health impacts of various urban development plans, policies and strategies. (Canterbury District Health Board, 2006; Jaine, 2008; Public Health Advisory Committee, 2005; Quigley, 2005). However, despite the international evidence base and national policy support, there are few successful examples of these planning philosophies being implemented in New Zealand. Since 2008 in particular, government policy support for smart growth approaches has rapidly dissipated.

This thesis follows the implementation of Wellington City Council’s Adelaide Road Framework, a planning process following smarter growth principles. It explores the making
and remaking of the Framework during implementation and the subsequent reshaping of the outcomes initially sought. The importance of addressing climate change through urban form, alongside concurrent opportunities to improve community wellbeing, affirm the importance of investigating how ‘plans’ for more sustainable places in New Zealand are implemented. Through a detailed case study on the early implementation phase of the Adelaide Road Framework, this thesis illuminates a number of issues that can erode attempts to more sustainably redevelop our places.

This chapter:

- introduces the thesis objectives, aims and design;
- introduces the relationship between health and more sustainable urban form;
- briefly summarises New Zealand policy encouraging sustainable urban form;
- introduces the Adelaide Road Framework as a detailed and manageable ‘case’ to explore the challenges to implementing more sustainable urban redevelopment.

**Research objectives and design**

The research addresses the following question:

*How and why do ‘plans’ for more sustainable urban redevelopment change during implementation, and what are the effects on the outcomes originally sought?*

The following objectives were developed to answer this research question.

Objective 1: Describe relevant social theory explaining why cities can be hard to change.

Objective 2: Describe the challenges to implementing more sustainable redevelopment in New Zealand.

Objective 3: Explore Wellington City Council’s (WCC) experience of early implementation challenges for the Adelaide Road Framework (2009 – 2011).

Objective 4: Analyse and discuss these challenges using relevant social theory and WCC practitioners’ perspectives.
This chapter will briefly outline the relationship between sustainable urban redevelopment and public health. It provides an overview of the supportive policy context, and introduces the case of the Adelaide Road Framework through which the research question and objectives are explored.

Chapter Two describes a range of social theories that may explain why urban areas are difficult to change. It outlines the challenges to implementing more sustainable redevelopment as described in New Zealand literature (up to 2010) and describes relevant central government policy changes that occurred during the Framework’s early implementation phase.

Chapter Three describes the case study methods and their limitations, and introduces the theoretical analytical framework, built from the literature outlined in Chapter Two. It describes the techniques of thematic narrative analysis and explanation building in developing the case.

Chapter Four examines the Framework’s planning processes, early implementation actions and the first critical challenge to the Framework, the loss of funding for road redesign through widening of Adelaide Road. Chapter Five describes the implications of a move away from road widening and describes broader implementation challenges experienced during the period 2009 – 2011.

Using a framework of social and practitioner theory, and concurrent government reform, Chapter Six provides insight into the challenges in making and remaking urban areas, and the possible ramifications of these challenges. The thesis concludes by offering a series of recommendations to councils and other urban change makers, aimed at supporting successful implementation of more sustainable redevelopment.

**Health and sustainable urban development**

Approximately 86% of New Zealanders now live in urban areas, and the form and quality of these environments has significant potential to influence health and wellbeing in both positive and negative ways. (Public Health Advisory Committee, 2010) It is well accepted that public
health and wellbeing is affected by a broader set of factors outside the locus of both health service and individual control.

In Barton and Grant’s determinants of health model, the built environment sphere includes processes of urban planning and development (Fig. 1). Activities within and across the spheres interact, resulting in complex and interrelated processes and impacts affecting wellbeing. For example, plans to build more roads will influence: the local and global environment through air quality and levels of greenhouse gas emissions, peoples’ travel patterns and choice of walking, cycling, driving or public transport, as well as social connections in communities (Barton & Grant, 2006).

Conversely, plans to reduce motor vehicle usage, through increasing walking, cycling and public transport “…will not only diminish transport emissions but should also reduce obesity, lower the rate of chronic diseases caused by physical inactivity, lessen the health-damaging

Figure 1: The determinants of health and well-being in our neighbourhoods

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1 Source: WHO Collaborating Centre for Healthy Cities and Urban Policy, University of the West of England, Bristol, URL: [http://www.bne.uwe.ac.uk/who/researchthemes.asp](http://www.bne.uwe.ac.uk/who/researchthemes.asp)
effects of air pollution, and make the roads safer for pedestrians and cyclists” (The Lancet, 2009, p. 4).

In regard to vehicle use, one-fifth of New Zealand’s greenhouse gas emissions come from road transport and these have increased by 70% since 1990 (Ministry for the Environment, 2009; Ministry of Transport, 2008, p. 6). A key principle in reducing these emissions to a sustainable level for the climate is reducing the amount of vehicle travel undertaken on a daily basis (Ewing, 2008, p. 155).

Historically New Zealand urban planning has encouraged car dependency through low-density residential areas sprawling away from our main centres. This type of development, apart from its global climate impacts, also contributes to reduced opportunities for active transport and recreation, reduced opportunities for social interaction, poorer air quality as well as traffic-related injuries (Frumkin, Frank, & Jackson, 2004; Public Health Advisory Committee, 2010).

By creating more compact urban areas, we have an opportunity to simultaneously address: the health effects of increasing levels of overweight and obesity, declining physical activity, and global issues such as climate change (Ewing, 2008; Ewing, Schmid, Zlot, & Raudenbush, 2003; Giles-Corti, 2011, p. 14).

Smart growth urban development philosophies share a number of principles including:

- encouraging population density increases along key transport spines or nodes, and within existing towns and city centres;
- mixing of land-uses to enhance liveability for increasing population density; and,
- specific improvements to create more walkable environments e.g. through increased pedestrian priority, more equitable sharing of space among modes, and improved street connectivity (Ewing, 2008, p. 19; United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2001).

Transit-Oriented Development (TOD), a subset of smart growth, encourages increased residential and commercial density around high quality public transport stations or corridors. TOD’s are cycle friendly and walkable, with features that encourage public transport use,
support easy access, and manage parking by reducing the amount of space dedicated to vehicles (Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2012).

While these principles collectively can support healthier development, a variety of unintended consequences can erode their overall goals. For example, if residential density increases without the public and active transport infrastructure improvements, negative impacts for health, wellbeing and the local environment could arise. These include: potential increases in local vehicle travel; poorer air quality; reduced sense of safety and walkability; and reduced social connections (Giles-Corti, 2011; Melia, Parkhurst, & Barton, 2011). If residential density increases without corresponding mixing of uses, local populations could become more vehicle dependent, as greater distances need to be travelled to access services and amenities.

An evaluation of urban design initiatives and planning effectiveness in New Zealand, emphasised the need to support and promote good local examples of urban design, alongside “bold political and civic leadership” (Higgins, 2010, p. 19), as critical steps in building confidence in sustainable urban redevelopment. It stated that while urban planning can make a contribution to quality urban environments and design:

…no amount of worthy words on paper at either national or local level will guarantee good design on the ground, the devil is in the implementation… (Higgins, 2010, p. 19).

By following the implementation journey of smart growth or TOD plans, this research intends to:

- identify the range of obstacles and barriers that may frustrate or transform plans; and,
- identify and resolve any negative and unintended consequences that arise during implementation, even when faithful to the plans original aims.

The important and complex interrelationship between health and urban planning make it important to draw attention to learnings from local projects during implementation. Taking a “hands –on” and inclusive approach to assessing the implementation of urban plans, and considering and debating the influence of overarching values and interests will help in understanding how to improve health through urban change (Rydin et al., 2012).
Sustainable urban development policy (1998-2008)

Central Government

Between 1999 and 2008 New Zealand had a Labour-led government, which took a lead in developing policy on sustainability issues including addressing issues of climate change and population growth through more integrated planning for transport and land-use.

Reports during this time highlighted concerns on the sustainability of urban planning approaches (Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, June 1998) and encouraged governments to introduce measures to implement more sustainable development (Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, June 2002). Various reports and discussion papers began to be published focusing on sustainable urban development and design (Ministry for the Environment, June 2002, March 2002).

In 2003, Sustainable Development: A Programme of Action for New Zealand was released. The programme highlighted the need for “liveable cities that support social wellbeing, quality of life and cultural identities” (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2003 p. 19). It outlined the importance of improvements to transport infrastructure, better enabling medium to high-density housing, promoting economic development and improved urban design.

The New Zealand Urban Design Protocol (Ministry for the Environment, 2005a) identified “seven essential design qualities that together create quality urban design” (p. 17). This enabled central and local government agencies, private companies, institutions and other groups to commit to quality urban design, implement action plans, and select an urban design champion, and provided a range of supportive resources (Ministry for the Environment, 2005a, 2006, 2005b, May 2008).

During this time, central government also began to emphasise, through legislation and policy, the need for sustainable transport. The Land Transport Management Act (New Zealand Government, 2003) outlined the government's vision for an affordable, integrated, safe, responsive, and sustainable transport system.
It also provided the legislative framework for The New Zealand Transport Strategy (NZTS) and its five objectives of:

- assisting economic development;
- improving safety and security;
- improving access and mobility;
- protecting and promoting public health; and
- ensuring environmental sustainability (Ministry of Transport, 2002).

A national strategy for walking and cycling was introduced in 2005 with goals to: ensure local environments and transport systems support cycling and walking, increase the number of people walking and cycling, and improve safety for pedestrians and cyclists (Ministry of Transport, 2005 February).

The NZTS was updated in 2008 and gave increased priority to: integrated planning, existing networks and infrastructure, and increasing the availability of public transport, walking and cycling and active modes (Ministry of Transport, 2008). Policy guidance followed outlining key supportive urban design characteristics for walking and cycling such as: connectivity, density, mixed use, safety and high quality public spaces, high quality public spaces and integrated transport planning (Ministry of Transport, 2008a).

**Local and regional authority responses**

In line with national and international policy direction, local and regional planning increasingly began to encourage ‘smarter growth’ and more sustainable transport. Local and regional councils began to develop sustainable growth and transport plans and strategies as well as initiatives encouraging active transport (Greater Wellington Regional Council, October 2008; Hutt City Council, 2009; Kapiti Coast District Council, 2008; Wellington City Council, 2008a November).

Regional development strategies emerged to guide the sustainable management of future growth and to encourage economic development, including the Auckland Regional Growth Strategy (Auckland Regional Council, 1999), Wellington Regional Strategy (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2007 June) and the Greater Christchurch Urban Development
Strategy (Christchurch City Council, Environment Canterbury, Transit New Zealand, Selwyn District Council, & Waimakiriri District Council, 2007). All shared similar approaches including a shift toward more compact, mixed use and connected development (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008, p. 18).

Wellington’s Regional Strategy encouraged appropriately located, high-quality residential intensification, affordable housing, strengthening of key centres, and integration of transport and land-use. It stated that:

“…a well-configured and compact community enhances the quality of life for residents and businesses. It’s easier to get around, transport costs are lower and suitable housing is available. Each community not only looks good, but also works well and is cohesive…” (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2007 June, p. 32).

The Adelaide Road Case

In the mid 2000s Wellington City Council undertook a comprehensive work programme which resulted in the adoption of an Urban Development Strategy (Wellington City Council, 2006 July). The strategy was in line with Transit-Oriented Development (Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2012), and envisioned more sustainable population growth through the redevelopment of key centres along a public transport growth spine (See Fig. 2 over).

A series of place-based plans began to be planned, which concentrated population growth around town centres along the public transport spine and improved the local environment for increased residential density.
Our 50-year growth concept

Figure 2: Wellington City Growth Spine

(Wellington City Council, 2006 July)
The Adelaide Road Framework (Wellington City Council, 2008 November) was the second of these place-based plans. The area was described as needing actions to stimulate and support development because:

- Change has already begun in the area with several developments in recent years, including new townhouses, apartments and student accommodation, as well as the redevelopment of Wellington Hospital;
- It is within walking distance of Wellington CBD, Wellington Hospital, Newtown shops and Massey University; and
- Adelaide Road is a key arterial route to the southern suburbs with excellent public transport links (Opus International Consultants, 2011, p. 13).

The Framework introduced a long-term vision of: “A high quality mixed-use area that is more vibrant, attractive, better connected, accessible and safe place which meets the needs of all people living in, working in, and using this area” (p. 11).

An action plan prioritised three areas for early implementation. The one-to-three year priorities were considered foundational to more sustainable urban redevelopment in the area, and included:

- increasing Council’s role in actively facilitating the change in development desired;
- rule changes to encourage increased residential density and mixing of uses; and
- street upgrade activities to improve the environment for multiple modes.

The case study explores the research question through a detailed examination of the Framework’s early implementation challenges (2009-2011), analysing the complexity and difficulties of urban change from Council staff perspectives. It shows how during implementation, different forces can work to entrench rather than transform aspects of the landscape, and offers recommendations to counter these challenges.

The Chapter Two literature review provides context for the research by reviewing relevant social theory and New Zealand literature on urban redevelopment challenges.
Chapter Two: Implementing sustainable urban redevelopment

Introduction

This chapter provides a backdrop to the challenges in implementing the Adelaide Road Framework, using theoretical and policy accounts of urban change challenges. It begins by describing three useful sets of theories to explain challenges in implementing urban change. It then summarises recent government reports across the land-use, environment and transport sectors, which describe challenges to implementing more sustainable urban development in New Zealand. Documents outlining relevant central government policy changes for local government and the land transport sector from the period 2008 – 2011 are also reviewed.

Social theories on changing cities

Social theory from the field of Science, Technology and Society provide useful tools to examine why urban areas might resist or succumb to change. A review of urban history research prior to the 1980s (Konvitz, Rose, & Tarr, 1990) found that a large amount of research focused on the direct influence technology such as new modes of transport or communication had on society but that little attention was given “to the question of how specific urban circumstances shaped the design of technologies” (Hommels, 2005a, p. 327). In this framing, technology “develops according to its own logic and that it imposes that logic on human actions and human social forms” (Kirkman, 2009, p. 236).

Social constructivism provided an alternative view to technological determinism, and emphasised the “social shaping of technology” (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985). This view gained prominence from the 1980s and many studies emerged (Hughes, 1998; McShane, 1994; Rosen, 1986), emphasising interactions between the social and the technological, and criticising more determinist approaches (Hommels, 2005a, p. 328). Adapting this approach, Bijker introduced the concept of cities as complex “sociotechnical ensembles” (1995), made up of, among other things, “streets, buildings, distribution networks, development plans,
politicians, and pressure groups” (Hommels, 2000, p. 650). Research over this time rejected the idea that technology was “autonomous and unchangeable” (Hommels, 2000, p. 654), and acknowledged the interrelationship between technology and society, shaping, and being shaped by each other (Kirkman, 2009, p. 237).

Hughes, a proponent of social constructivism, described a “seamless web” (Hughes, 1986) of interaction, and emphasised the importance of networks, systems, and their interactions occurring across multiple levels, agents and institutions, not just science and technology (Hommels, 2000, p. 654). Following Bijker, Hommels describes cities as “large socio-technological artefacts” (Hommels, 2005a, p. 15), explaining that:

… in order to understand the development (and the re-development) of cities, it is necessary not only to understand technological processes but also to look at social processes and interactions taking place in the urban context (Hommels, 2005a, p. 15).

Through three case studies of city redesign in the Netherlands, Hommels described “confrontation between ongoing attempts to change cities…and the obduracy of existing urban structures” (2005a, p. 7). Hommels posited that how and why cities are difficult to change or ‘obdurate’ can be tested through exploring the efforts to change them. By examining these challenges in changing urban form, Hommels theorised that we will ultimately be able to understand “the circumstances under which urban change eventually becomes possible” (Hommels, 2005a, p. 11).

Hommels provides a useful description of the tension between flexibility in the city, and the qualities of cities that make them difficult to change:

Despite the fact that cities are considered to be dynamic and flexible spaces, numerous examples illustrate that it is very difficult to radically alter a city’s design: once in place, urban structures become fixed, obdurate. As a consequence, urban artefacts that are remnants of earlier planning decisions, the logic of which is no longer applicable, may prove to be annoying obstacles for those who aspire to bring about urban innovation (2005a, pp. 10-11).

Monstadt (2009, p. 1928) describes this “fixity” and the enduring nature of urban infrastructure alongside the influence and involvement of various interest groups, as resulting in significant hurdles to implementing urban change.
Parallel to the idea that cities are obdurate or resist change is the notion that cities also have momentum (Hughes, 1994). Momentum describes the notion that the complex technical and social system of the city develops “mass and velocity…which makes it increasingly difficult for people to stop the development of the system or to deflect it on to some other course” (Kirkman, 2009, p. 237).

**Three models of obduracy**

In *Unbuilding Cities* (2005a), Hommels uses three different sets of theories of obduracy to help explain why urban areas resist change. These theories which she categorises as: ‘Dominant Frames’; ‘Embeddedness’; and ‘Persistent Traditions’, draw on a variety of social constructivist approaches conceptualising how, why and for whom, cities might become difficult to change. These are summarised below.

**Dominant Frames**

The concept of *dominant frames* (or technological frames (Bijker, 1995)) focuses on urban obduracy as a natural developmental stage reflecting the interaction of multiple different points of view of various groups, and the process by which one point of view gains dominance, determining the nature of any given “artefact” (Hommels, 2000, p. 655). Hommels describes this as “an interactionist conception of obduracy…[which] highlights the struggles for dominance between groups of actors with diverging views and opinions” (Hommels, 2005a, p. 22).

This approach to obduracy highlights the points of view and interactions between different professional groups, such as architects, planners, engineers, pointing to their sometimes conflicting and sometimes overlapping points of view and practices. This plays out practically in terms of conflict over how problems are defined, and the various goals, visions, objectives, standards, procedures, which are set, reinforcing or challenging the dominant frame (p. 656). These frames also influence how groups interactively shape solutions to problems as they arise.
Hommels establishes, that the dominant frames model is particularly useful when two or more groups are “opposing each other and have strong and multiple interactions” (p. 176), and distinguishes two types of obduracy (closed-in and closed-out), depending on the degree of inclusion of actors in determining the resolution of planning issues. Actors who are part of the dominant group may have a ‘closed-in’ obduracy where their actions and thoughts cannot easily operate outside of the dominant paradigm. On the other hand, actors who have little involvement in the dominant paradigm, could be seen as ‘closed-out’, and “for them the technology may present “a ‘take it or leave it’ choice” (Hommels, 2005a, p. 24). To the extent that a single viewpoint dominates over time, the contested object becomes less flexible to change and its meaning and future pathway becomes more ‘fixed’ or obdurate (Hommels, 2005b, p. 331).

**Embeddedness**

The notion of *embeddedness* focuses on the relationships between different elements of a system or network and the impact that each has on the other (Hommels, 2005b, p. 334). The degree of obduracy in a particular system or artefact is influenced by its level of “embeddedness in socio-technical systems, actor networks, or socio-technical ensembles...[and] because the elements of a network are closely interrelated, the changing of one element requires the adaptation of another” (Hommels, 2005a, p. 27).

Hommels derives the notion of embeddedness from Actor-Network Theory (ANT). In a review of urban Actor-Network Theory, Madden states that “ANT, the ‘sociology of associations’...sees all things as networks of actors” and that actors are anything, “human as well as non-human, animate as well as inanimate, material as well as ideational, large and small, those things called ‘natural’, ‘cultural’, and ‘social’” (2010, p. 584). In *Reassembling the Social*, Latour (2005) proposes that followers of ANT “have to follow the actors themselves” (p. 12), “tracing their associations” (p. 5) in order to understand how a networked system develops and grows.

Madden describes this ‘sociology of associations’ as “…that which appears to be one thing is actually a temporary negotiated settlement between many different things…” (p. 584). However, one of the criticisms of ANT is that it gives too much power to the interactions of
these individual components or actors in an ensemble and does not give enough credence to “existing structures of power and interests” (Williams & Edge, 1996, p. 890).

Hommels clarifies the obduracy created by embeddedness as the “difficulty of changing elements of socio-technical ensembles that have become closely entwined” (2005a, p. 30). She explains that the concept is particularly well suited to cities given the complex systems and networks that make up urban areas. However, over time she suggests that this complexity and intertwining increases, making “them more difficult to disentangle and change in later phases of a city’s development” (p. 180).

Monstadt (2009, pp. 1926-1927) explains that the embeddedness of cities is associated with significant economic and social investment, increasing obduracy, as their large and complicated systems are quite literally “sunk” into social and technological networks and physical structures.

**Persistent Traditions**

The concept of *persistent traditions* addresses the idea that “long-term shared values and traditions keep influencing the development of a technology...” (Hommels, 2005b, p. 338), and that large urban systems begin to be seen as “permanent and fixed” (Hommels, 2000, p. 650) once they have been built up over time. Examples of persistent traditions might include traditional approaches to architecture and planning (p. 38), or, commonly shared values around the centrality of private motor vehicle use in traditional approaches to city planning.

To distinguish persistent traditions from the other versions of obduracy, Hommels describes them as focussing on “longer term and structural developments” (2005a, p. 30). This version of obduracy emphasises the broader and enduring cultural background and values (built up in part by dominant frames and embeddedness), but which ultimately “transcend local contexts and group interactions...” (p. 38).

To explain the “mass and velocity” built up by large technical systems and the persistent traditions underpinning them, Kirkman (2009, p. 237) gives the example of the automobile and provision of parking as “entrenched in local public policies” and that the system response
is “in large measure a function of societal expectations and patterns of use” (p. 243). In this way, the ongoing interactions between professional groups and the multiple elements of systems interrelating in the city, can be seen as both leading to, and being led by the backdrop of cultural values and traditions. Combined these interactions and elements can lead to the “development of a supersystem - a socio-technical one- with mass, movement and direction” (Hughes, 1983, p. 140), with consequent challenges for urban change.

**Toward an integrated approach to theories of urban obduracy**

Hommels explored the theories’ power in explaining obduracy for three case studies of urban change (2005a, p. 38). She outlined the strengths and weaknesses of each model (See Table 1) arguing that applying the models in an integrated way offered a “more sophisticated understanding of obduracy in urban contexts” (p. 184), and helped to overcome the limitations of each individual model.

**Table 1 Strengths and Weaknesses of the three conceptual models (Hommels, 2005a)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model of Obduracy</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Frames</td>
<td>Powerful model for explaining obduracy when two or more relevant social groups are opposing each other and have strong and multiple interactions.</td>
<td>Relatively static by focusing on closed-in or closed-out obduracy. Less attentive to wider, structural and contextual developments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embeddedness</td>
<td>Does most justice to the networked character of cities, and the historicity of its structures.</td>
<td>Fails to address broader economic structures of power and interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistent Traditions</td>
<td>Long-term structural developments that transcend local groups get more attention.</td>
<td>Material factors get less attention.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Utilising this integrated conception of obduracy may help urban change makers to understand the significance of challenges in redesigning cities and may assist “policy makers or citizen groups to determine which strategies may be helpful, or doomed to failure, in a next wave of urban unbuilding” (p. 187).
New Zealand challenges to implementing plans for more sustainable places

This section draws on recent government reports across the land-use planning, environment and transport sectors, and New Zealand professional discourse, to summarise the key implementation challenges for more sustainable urban development.

The Ministry for the Environment (MfE) in introducing a report entitled Catalysing Positive Urban Change in New Zealand, stated:

Many (contemporary regional strategies) seek to deliver different development outcomes to that currently being provided by the market, often based around urban intensification around nodes and transport corridors, urban containment, increased residential densities and mixed land uses…Experience so far has shown that it may be difficult to deliver these desired outcomes through regulation and advocacy alone…(SGC Economics and Planning, June 2006, p. 5).

The transport planning sector has commissioned a number of key reports exploring the issues, challenges and solutions for more integrated approaches between the transport and land-use sectors (CityScope Consultants Ltd, 2009 July; Hunter, Allan, Heslop, Winefield, & McDavitt, 2008; MWH New Zealand Limited, 2008; Ward, Dixon, Sadler, & Wilson, 2007). For example, a study focussing on the practical issues of organising integrated urban development projects (CityScope Consultants Ltd, 2009 July), compared four New Zealand case studies of complex urban development projects with international case studies and literature (including Portland Oregon, and regeneration projects in London and Australia). These highlighted the importance of public/private sector partnerships, and clearly prescribed governance arrangements in successful integration. Integration barriers identified included:

- fiscal, arising from lack of funding and poor feasibility;
- organisational, including structural barriers imposed by government agencies;
- political, including NIMBYism [Not In My Back Yard]; and
- land assembly and infrastructural barriers (p. 21).

The report outlined the following problems related to Transit-Oriented Development:

- Higher density development still increases vehicle traffic and impacts local mobility.
• The concept of ‘place’ for residential living can conflict with ‘transport nodes’, which may be busy, noisy and complex.

• The balance between parking and development - can stimulate or extinguish investment.

• Organising and coordinating mixing of uses can be difficult (p. 21).

A study commissioned by the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) explored barriers and issues affecting local authorities’ ability to adapt local transport networks in response to changing transport demand (Lee, Allat, McGimpsey, & Parsons, 2009). The study, based on surveys of council staff, found a tendency to plan and fund infrastructure for private vehicles ahead of public transport, walking and cycling; a lack of evidence gathering for non-car modes; local and political barriers; and a lack of integration within and across agencies. This was despite staff awareness of broader national transport objectives associated with reducing greenhouse gases, and the importance of prioritising active modes of travel.

Other authors write of prevailing attitudes and knowledge paradigms underlying central and local planning, funding, and implementation decisions. These include the idea that “urban areas must be primarily designed around road” (Slepian & Stephenson, 2006, p. 19), that transport growth must be accommodated through roads (Ward, et al., 2007, p. 8), as well as council planning and transport policy still prioritising cars over other transport modes (Lee, et al., 2009).

One planning commentator claimed that an overarching consequence of the many unresolved challenges to implementing sustainable urban development in New Zealand, was that “…policies… often reflect idealised, undeliverable visions”, and that as a result, “market participants continue to deliver more familiar approaches” (Munro, 2010, p. 1).

The following sub sections organise key challenges to more sustainable urban development using a structure outlined in: Building Sustainable Urban Communities: A discussion document exploring place–based approaches to sustainable urban development in New Zealand (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008). This provided an overview on the context, problems and potential solutions to achieving more sustainable urban development in New Zealand.
Problems with the national regulatory and policy framework

A 2006 report commissioned by the Ministry for the Environment (MfE) concluded that our current system (of existing legislation for urban change) was insufficient and that “NZ requires new legislation enabling an expansion of urban change mechanisms…involve[ing] a palette of levers which can be invoked by any sphere of government – local, regional and central” (SGC Economics and Planning, June 2006, p. 5). Other reports described a range of issues warranting legislative change including: a lack of tools to catalyse urban change; fragmentation of land holdings; and no systematic processes to help fund significant urban regeneration projects (CityScope Consultants Ltd, 2009 July; Hunter, et al., 2008; MWH New Zealand Limited, 2008; Ward, et al., 2007).

A paper responding to the MfE report, while not going as far as suggesting extensive new legislation, also found major shortcomings in the urban regulatory system:

New Zealand’s existing regulatory framework has the potential to deliver urban transformation projects, although there are major shortcomings, especially in its ability to delegate planning and regulatory authority, and help fund development through value capture mechanisms (R. Gray, 2006, p. 17).

A later NZTA report summarised key issues for integration between land-use and transport with recommendations including:

…the need for improved integration of strategic and spatial planning across land use and transport legislation in general, the need for legislative change that enables regions to manage/control land development, and ways of embedding resources and funding allocated in Regional Land Transport Programmes and Long Term Council Community Plans (Hunter, et al., 2008, p. 14).

The report went on to recommend a National Policy Statement (NPS) for land-use and transport integration, formalising the links between the Regional Land Transport Strategies, Regional Policy Statements and other RMA plans (p. 32).
Effects Based Planning – Resource Management Act

The effects-based focus of the Resource Management Act (RMA)\(^2\) is commonly referred to as a hindrance to integration between land-use and transport and sustainable development. Authors described the narrow legislative focus of the RMA on the adverse effects of single activities on the environment as hampering the remaking of more sustainable cities (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008; Freeman, 2007; Rae, 2009; Ward, et al., 2007).

An evaluation of urban design initiatives and planning effectiveness in achieving design quality in New Zealand claimed that our colonial history of “prioritising individual property rights”, alongside the effects focus of the RMA have “worked against a strong urban design tradition within public policy” (Higgins, 2010, p. 1).

In a paper to the 2010 New Zealand Planning Institute (NZPI) conference, Wellington City Council planners described the RMA as “effectively turned planning on its head with its philosophy of managing the effects of activities and removing the statutory focus on long-term planning” (S. Gray, Kos, & Troy, 2010).

In the official journal of the Resource Management Law Association of New Zealand, Rae (2009, p. 18) concluded that, “There is thus a fundamental disharmony between the sustainable management of resources and sustainable urban design” and that “the importance of human settlements is lost to resource management.” He went on to recommend ten legislative changes that would begin to rectify some of the legislative shortcomings. These included: amending and extending the purpose of the RMA to explicitly promote “sustainable development of human settlements”, and to “include consideration of balancing beneficial and adverse effects on the environment”, so as to ensure that cumulative effects on human settlements are positive (2009, p. 19).

The built environment is not given special recognition within the RMA (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008; Ministry for the Environment, 2010, October). Instead its focus is on natural and physical resource management, resulting in urban plans for built environments having to satisfy the same requirements as natural environments, such as within rural settings.

\(^2\) The Resource Management Act 1991 is the key legislation governing land use in New Zealand.
However “unlike the natural environment (already created), the built environment is under constant change by planning, design and development processes” (Rae, 2009, p. 17).

The distilling down of decisions to individual effects means that cumulative adverse effects are able to be seen in hindsight only with legislation “emphasis[ing] a reactive and possibly bureaucratic rather than progressive approach to planning and development in accord with wider social and economic development goals” (Freeman, 2007, p. 18).

Zollner describes the bio-physical, effects-based focus of the RMA, and the lack of overarching central policy guidance, as forcing urban and local government issues to be dealt with sector by sector, and as “not city friendly” (2004, p. 223).

Many submitters to a consultation led by the Department of Internal Affairs on Building Sustainable Communities, agreed with the challenges resulting from the RMA’s focus on adverse effects.

The RMA does not support and encourage efficient quality planning because the ‘effects-based’ focus of the RMA promotes negative planning (dealing with adverse effects) rather than positive planning to achieve positive outcomes…[submitters 32, 49, 50, 82] (Department of Internal Affairs, March 2009, p. 7).

When introducing a RMA reform package in 2010 the National government acknowledged that the narrow ‘effects-focus’ did not allow sufficient consideration of the wider benefits to cities of high quality urban development, and that a resulting risk averse culture tended to ensure the maintenance of the status quo, despite the potential benefits of change (Ministry for the Environment, 2010, October, p. 6).

**Development uncertainty due to time frames**

A number of authors describe challenges related to lengthy planning processes, and a resulting uncertainty for development that increases development costs and associated risks (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008; Mckay & Mein, 2010; Ministry for the Environment, 2010, October).
Building Sustainable Communities (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008, p. 10), describes the length and nature of New Zealand’s planning and development control processes as a key barrier to implementing more sustainable urban redevelopment. The resulting planning uncertainty makes controlling the costs of more sustainable development challenging as well as often significantly extending project timeframes.

In 2010, the Government supported the assessment that legislative complexity of land-use planning; lack of integration between legislation; and uncertainty from multiple processes and long timeframes, makes long-term planning for more sustainable development difficult for both the private and public sector (Ministry for the Environment, 2010, October, p. 6).

**Lack of national policy guidance**

The literature shows an increasing call for central policy guidance on urban environments. Recent governments have acknowledged this and considered increased central guidance on urban design through the development of a National Policy Statement (under the RMA) (Ministry for the Environment, August 2008). With no government as yet utilising this option (Ward, et al., 2007, p. 7), many local councils have attempted to fill the policy vacuum by developing urban development strategies and urban design guides. However these still exist within the same framework, “…narrowly focused on the avoidance, remediation and mitigation of adverse effects on the existing environment” (Rae, 2009, p. 19).

Submissions to government consultation on a proposed National Policy Statement (NPS) for Urban Design, revealed strong support for its potential role in addressing barriers to more sustainable urban development (Department of Internal Affairs, March 2009).

… if appropriately implemented this would ensure a supportive regulatory regime that enabled sustainable urban development…While the existing legislation may work in theory, history has shown that it does not in practice, particularly for complex or large scale developments [submitter 74] (p. 19).

While supporting the need for an NPS, some commentators still held the view that “…its ability to impact will be limited by the permissive nature of the RMA, which is focused on limiting adverse effects rather than supporting goal-oriented planning as such” (Chapman, 2008, p. 96).
The release of the discussion paper Building Competitive Cities by the National Government in 2010 continued to explore the lack of national policy guidance raised through previous documents, and supported the development of an NPS. However the scope of proposed guidance altered somewhat to focusing on councils “provid[ing] an adequate supply of land” to meet the demands for future population growth, as well as “requiring the consideration of housing affordability in all decision making” (Ministry for the Environment, 2010, October, p. 21).

Legislative complexity and ‘dis-integration’ between land-use and transport planning

Legislative complexity is also described as a barrier to more integrated sustainable development. In a report for Land Transport New Zealand, Ward et al. (2007, pp. 6,7) described the existing separate legislative framework for land-use and transport planning as often resulting in the sectors working independently of each other.

New Zealand legislation providing the overarching framework for central, regional and local planning and policy for transport and land-use includes:

- the Resource Management Act (RMA) 1991;
- the Local Government Act (LGA) 2002; and
- the Land Transport Management Act (LTMA) 2003.

Ward et al (2007, pp. 6,7) discussed a lack of common goals to guide processes between sectors, planning functions that are carried out across a range of different agencies and a lack of linkages across transport and land-use plans in general.

In a report commissioned to explore options to improve integration at a regional level, the authors stated “the legislative requirement for the integration of land-use and transport is inferred rather than explicit” (Hunter, et al., 2008). Moreover, land-use and transport are managed under separate and complex legislation (RMA and the Land Transport Management Act (LTMA)), within different agencies, across different professional frameworks and

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3 Transit New Zealand and Land Transport New Zealand were amalgamated in 2008 into a newly created New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA).
expertise, and for local authorities, within the overarching framework set by the Local Government Act (LGA) in 2002. The report concluded that changes to the LGA, the RMA and the LTMA were required to explicitly guide their interrelationship, as a result of the “complex matrix of legislative requirements, organisations, and strategic and operating arrangements” (pp. 27-28).

Rae (2009) explained that most strategic urban planning exercises demonstrating a more sustainable approach to our urban areas are undertaken under the Local Government Act. However councils need to ensure that plans under the RMA, such as the District Plan, integrate with these approaches. He also recommended that legislative change occur to enable better integration between the Local Government Act and other planning documents.

This legislative complexity and lack of integration between legislation plays out at a practical level, with organisations fragmented, and implementation split across different teams and organisations, as well as across professions and sectors. Beattie (2010) in a case study investigating whether urban planning documents under the RMA achieve their outcomes, described the separation of different aspects of the planning process within councils as “creating a silo mentality leading to a knowledge disconnection between plan developers and implementers” (Beattie, 2010, p. 5). Beattie raised concerns that the overwhelming majority of the case studies were lacking in their ability to give effect to District Plan\(^4\) policy intentions.

*Building Sustainable Communities* described ineffective levels of integration at a sector level between land-use and transport planning; and transport, utility and other service providers.\(^5\) All are described as focused on their own priorities, timing, and funding decisions, with the cost being reduced integration of their combined activities in urban planning and development (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008, pp. 9-10).

Sector coordination is a significant challenge from planning through to implementation. The diversity in roles and institutions across government and industry require a large degree of coordination at both planning and implementation phases to support the implementation of more sustainable urban development. This is described as occurring in a very limited way

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\(^4\) The District Plan is the key document under the RMA that manages and guides land use and development planning and proposals within local councils’ boundaries.

\(^5\) Service providers include: education, public health, fire and police. Utility providers include: electricity, telephone, water, and wastewater providers.
(Department of Internal Affairs, 2008, p. 9) and may, in part, result from some of the barriers previously mentioned.

A survey of New Zealand local authorities found the lack of integration between organisations and between planners and transport officers specifically contributes to inadequacies in the promotion and delivery of non-car based transport networks. This was perceived as undermining the ability of agencies to change their transport approaches (Lee, et al., 2009, pp. 6-7).

**Current urban form pattern**

Land assembly processes pose a particular challenge for urban redevelopment in New Zealand. The current urban form patterns of many areas tagged for redevelopment are often of varying size, ownership and in different uses. This creates challenges for amalgamating redevelopment land of any significant size. An existing piece of land in a strategic site such as near a railway station may be being utilised for other purposes, and “acquiring these sites or getting the agreement of all owners to their redevelopment can be difficult” (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008, p. 10).

A report for Ministry for the Environment explained that fragmentation of land holdings could be particularly frustrating to the implementation of urban change plans, as:

…land owners attempt to use their monopoly position to extract unrealistic prices from bona fide developers. Similarly, fragmented land holdings in major suburban activity centres may make it impossible for developers to assemble economic parcels to support intensification of residential, retail, commercial and other uses in the centre. (SGC Economics and Planning, June 2006, p. 27)

In summing up the key opportunities and challenges associated with implementing regenerative development a 2009 Ministry for the Environment report stated:

…because regenerative development looks at the built environment as a holistic system, it poses challenges to our current methods for dividing land into discrete parcels that do not relate to each other (Ministry for the Environment, November 2009, p. 14).
Planning commentators describe similar difficulties including that the aggregation of land for rezoning can lead to increased costs and uncertainty due to requirements for District Plan changes and as a result “…location [is] often based on area[s] where consent is easiest to achieve – not necessarily based on growth areas” (Mckay & Mein, 2010). The fragmentation of land, and domination of small lot sizes, creates challenges for some city councils that openly describe their limited ability to influence development and achieve the objectives and goals of more sustainable urban plans (S. Gray, et al., 2010).

**Funding**

Transport and land-use planning is strongly influenced by funding arrangements and overall, funding processes and assessment mechanisms do not support land-use and transport integration (CityScope Consultants Ltd, 2009 July; Department of Internal Affairs, 2008; Ward, et al., 2007). A lack of integration within and between agencies contributes to funding continually being allocated towards cars, at the expense of increased funding to public transport and other modes (Lee, et al., 2009, p. 6).

Chapman (2008) describes the critical need for greater strategic funding of public transport systems from central and regional authorities to support clusters of more sustainable and compact urban development, and reduced travel demand. However, while funding for public transport has increased nationally, investment remains low when compared to the dominance of road expenditure (2008, pp. 96-97).

The development or redevelopment of urban areas requires significant funding before income from the investment can be generated. This includes: acquiring appropriate land; designing the project and providing infrastructure; and ultimately building the project. Key funding difficulties include: accessing start up funding, accurately determining the level of risk, determining who pays for the development and when, and how public good elements of the development are funded (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008, p. 10).

Successful international mechanisms to fund integrated transport and land-use projects include principles of value capture where increased land values brought about through transit
improvements and general urban renewal, are leveraged at an early stage to help fund the development (CityScope Consultants Ltd, 2009 July). An example of this, Tax Increment Financing (TIF) has been successfully used for urban renewal projects in the United States. For TIF areas “an assessment of property values was conducted and any incremental tax payable on the increased values over the next 23 years could be spent, in advance, on renewal projects” (p. 55).

A report identifying and addressing barriers to integrated transport and land-use projects, and commissioned by the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA), found that funding assessments traditionally focus on a Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) emphasising travel time-savings for vehicles over other objectives (CityScope Consultants Ltd, 2009 July). While assessments are supported by broader criteria, in essence, “the weight of analysis is still focused on the BCR” (p. 40). The report concluded that transport assessment processes need to be broadened to reflect the wider range of objectives in integrated plans and “rely less on the traditional importance of travel time savings” (p. 8). These objectives might for instance include broader health and wellbeing benefits associated with a more walkable urban form.

The report explained that while NZTA encourages support for integrated transport and land-use packages, actual funding generally only relates to transport elements, which have to meet assessment criteria weighted toward travel time savings. To address this, the authors concluded that increased emphasis must be placed on managing integrated projects “as such” at an early stage through to completion and that central guidance is required for urban development projects from planning to implementation. Key issues to be resolved during planning included: the forming of partnerships to develop joint funding packages (between a range of agencies), and detailed feasibility testing of project components reflecting the broad objectives sought (pp. 65-66).

A report commissioned by the NZTA in 2008 (Hunter, et al., 2008) summarised previous recommendations to improve access to funding for integrated solutions. These included: amending transport assessment frameworks and funding procedures to test for integration; providing funding incentives for integrated projects; and use of financial and development contributions to invest in transport at the time of development (p. 18).
Heslop and Oliver in a paper presented to the 2010 New Zealand Planning Institute conference stated that while community and council seek to achieve quality development, there is a fundamental lack of willingness of ratepayers and developers to pay for this quality (Heslop & Oliver, 2010). In assessing councils’ approaches to funding transport packages, Lee found that they begin by accommodating the overarching community travel preference. While walking, cycling and public transport are supported, this is not at the expense of cars, and is generally only within available leftover space and funding (Lee, et al., 2009, pp. 6-7).

Lee (2009) also described council staff as potentially finding it easier to achieve political and community buy-in for funding directed towards the current car-dominated system, even when change is necessary. This ‘ease’ may be fostered by existing transport funding assessments with a narrower and more detailed base, tested and “rigorous methods of analysis” (CityScope Consultants Ltd, 2009 July, p. 14). However, more complex, integrated land-use and transport strategies may not have sufficiently robust or consistent supportive data to make strong funding cases for benefits to non-vehicle modes (Lee, et al., 2009, p. 7).

Public resistance

Public opposition to more sustainable urban development has been focussed mainly on proposals for urban intensification of existing residential areas. There is uncertainty whether this is due to a preference for retaining existing patterns of urban form, or to a lack of good examples of urban intensification that can add to, rather than take away from, the character and quality of urban areas (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008, p. 11).

Even slight increases to density are often vehemently and emotionally opposed by the public. Wellington City Council’s attempts to create a long-term plan for Johnsonville was met by opposition from the local Member of Parliament who made headlines by accusing Wellington City Council of plans to make Johnsonville a ghetto (Dunne, 2009).

Opposition also often comes from the private sector. In researching barriers to progressing sustainable transport, Preval (2009) identified ‘squeaky wheel opposition’ with cycle lanes having to compete with ‘parking for businesses’, and business opposition often winning out.
Limits of Market Mechanisms

The property development market in New Zealand has not demonstrated an ability to create more sustainable urban development. However, as early as 2002, the Office for the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment described an “ideological commitment to let market solutions and non-intervention by government resolve a wide range of environmental decisions on a case-by-case basis” (Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, June 2002, p. 15), and that this acted as a “substantial impediment” to sustainable urban change.

The Department of Internal Affairs identified significant “…limits to achieving social outcomes and public benefits (such as affordable housing) through market mechanisms” (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008, p. 11). The areas most in need of significant urban improvement are not necessarily attractive investment options for developers, and investments that happen may be too small to unlock broader benefits for the wider community (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008).

A report detailing smart growth implementation issues in the Bay of Plenty (March 2009, p. 5), found among other things, that developers’ shorter-term focus toward more immediately profitable projects, and low existing demand for intensive housing, meant they were slow to support intensification, and their practice often fell short of the smart growth targets.

Many broader urban development plans, while having significant potential benefits for regions, localities and their communities, may not accrue their benefits sufficiently to the developer or investor and therefore may not attract their interest. Barriers to investment may also include stigma associated with concentrations of public housing or the presence of industry (SGC Economics and Planning, June 2006, p. 27). A study of integrated urban development plans in New Zealand, found that larger urban development plans conducted by local authorities, and requiring public subsidy, did not undertake the “rigorous feasibility studies” necessary to thoroughly assess development risks, despite the fact that this “appeared to be a pre-condition for successfully integrated development” (CityScope Consultants Ltd, 2009 July, p. 19).
The role of public agencies being limited to an encourager or enabler of urban change and the reliance on the market to provide the land-use change has acted to limit the “guarantees that can be made with respect to the land-use change components of plans” (p. 15). A solution supported in a number of government reports involves the establishment of independent implementation partnerships, essentially the creation of development agencies (CityScope Consultants Ltd, 2009 July; Department of Internal Affairs, 2008; R. Gray, 2006; SGC Economics and Planning, June 2006).

**Political commitment and leadership**

New Zealand’s three-year political cycle has a significant impact on the implementation of more sustainable urban projects. This is especially true when contrasted with the long time frame associated with implementing large-scale urban change. The short political cycle means that changes to centrally and locally elected council members, and therefore to existing policies and priorities, are likely within the time frame of a significant urban development plan.

A NZTA report on better integrating land-use planning and transport described this risk as:

> …the likelihood that political change will alter or degrade an intended agenda before or during its implementation. It can arise from a general, specific or temporary unacceptability to either involved politicians or involved public (Hunter, et al., 2008, p. 20).

The same report concluded that if such risk was not systematically planned for and managed, it could have the “extreme consequence of destroying both consensus and strategy” (pp. 21,22).

Members of the planning profession describe a lack of long-term political commitment as a barrier. Heslop and Oliver, while stating that planners need to reclaim their role as champions of place-making, leading from planning to delivery, acknowledged “that this requires a level of commitment from council and land developers that goes beyond most current practices” (Heslop & Oliver, 2010, p. 2). Wellington City Council planners describe a current culture of non-intervention, where Council’s role is limited to introducing plan changes, processing
resource consent applications and making basic infrastructure improvements (S. Gray, et al., 2010).

Local and central government reforms during the 80s and 90s, alongside the Resource Management Act, are described as resulting in the separation of policy development from operational and implementation activities. This separation does not support integration of planning across sectors (Beattie, 2010; Sweetman, March 2006; Ward, et al., 2007). Ward described this view of planning as continuing to dominate and leading to largely permissive planning environments, and, “ambiguity about mandates… give[ing] rise to a hands-off culture” (2007, pp. 7,8).

Central government actions at times are described as scuppering recent urban policy initiatives. Government decisions can sometimes serve to “derail local attempts at changing the ways cities work” (Zollner, 2004, p. 228). A recent example in Wellington is the New Zealand Transport Agency plans to build an Expressway, replacing the existing state highway route, and bypassing two large towns in the Kapiti Coast District. The Expressway passes through a planned area of significant, extensive, and low impact sustainable urban development. Kapiti Coast District Council in a submission to the NZTA stated:

   It remains an incontrovertible fact…that the Expressway has a profound impact on the developable land, design, intent and quality of the proposed long-term sustainable development vision for this area (Kapiti Coast District Council, 2011 January, p. 3).

Capacity and Capability Issues

Capacity and capability have both been identified as significant challenges in the implementation of more sustainable urban areas. In 2008, a cross-agency Sustainable Urban Development Unit (SUDU) characterised these issues as crossing all levels of government and the development industry itself. It noted challenges in achieving a common understanding of sustainable urban design; a lack of skills and experience in sustainable urban development; and existing skills being thinly spread across the country as key barriers to more sustainable cities (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008, p. 9).

In the private sector the majority of developers remain experienced in traditional stand-alone
single dwellings, and there is a shortage of practitioners skilled at developing and delivering comprehensive redevelopment and medium-density development. This often results in development that falls short of aspirations adding to negative perceptions surrounding medium-density development (Zollner, 2004). A shortage of project managers with larger scale and more complex urban development project experience has also been identified (Mckay & Mein, 2010).

A number of authors (Beattie, 2010; Sweetman, March 2006) discuss the split of planning professions resulting from reform in the 1980s and 1990s as a “catalyst for the dilution of good policy” (Sweetman, March 2006, p. 11). Sweetman describes the impact of reforms on planning and the common response of councils to “separate planning activities through the creation of distinct units for policy development and resource consent processing” (p. 9).

Planning was regularly split between regulatory planning, policy planning, plan making, and the administering of rules. However, planning by its nature is bigger picture, requiring the synthesizing of multiple issues and needs in communities. Its separation is described as undermining its effectiveness, reducing the robustness of policy and resulting in little follow through to implementation (Sweetman, March 2006, p. 11).

The lack of integration described earlier alongside legislative complexity has accentuated the effects of this planning separation. Beattie describes it as creating a “knowledge disconnection between plan makers and plan implementers” (Beattie, 2010, p. 6). General skill shortages have been identified at both central and local government level in urban design and spatial analysis; as well as a general lack of understanding on the important role that policies have in influencing cities (Zollner, 2004).

Capacity and capability issues for the planning profession include a lack of:

- in-depth understanding of how property markets work and the economy of redevelopment;
- understanding and ability to coordinate all the processes (including funding) associated with implementation across land-use, transport and local governance systems;
- experience in large-scale urban redevelopment; and
- structures within councils to ensure effective implementation such as: urban
development agencies, council coordination and champion roles (Heslop & Oliver, 2010; Munro, 2010).

Ward et al’s report (2007) on transport and land-use integration recommended increased best practice advice for collaboration, professional development on the different professional cultures, and increased tertiary opportunities that facilitate interdisciplinary learning as methods to address capacity and capability issues (Hunter, et al., 2008, p. 17). Heslop (2007) in a NZTA report, recognised that “the main barriers to integration were institutional in nature”. She proposed a framework that included the idea of distributed intelligence “encompass[ing] the need for the breaking down of ‘silos’ between departments, between professions and between hierarchies within an organisation” (Hunter, et al., 2008, p. 19).

Capacity and capability issues, alongside the range of issues discussed, can diminish the opportunity to achieve broader urban development objectives, focusing practitioner efforts towards those aspects of the environment that they have more direct control over.

Central Government Policy Change 2008-2011

This section briefly outlines centrally led discussion and legislative reform relevant to local government roles in land-use and transport from late 2008 – 2011, and to the early implementation phase of the Adelaide Road case. The policy discussion generated from the various professional and government documents outlined above, continued to influence potential reform to land-use and transport planning frameworks investigated by the new National Government elected in late 2008.

Reform of the Resource Management Act

The key purpose of the Resource Management Act (RMA) is to “enable people and communities to provide for their wellbeing and health and safety” (s5(2)), while sustaining the potential natural and physical resources, and managing the elements that affect them. It is the key tool through which urban planning and development is undertaken. At a local level, the District Plan is the key document under the RMA that manages and guides land-use and
development planning and proposals within local councils’ boundaries. Any changes to urban areas must fit within the District Plan rules or work through consent processes to go outside these rules.

The National Government began a series of reforms, which have included key changes to the RMA, and scoping of further mechanisms under the Act to enhance urban planning and management of our natural and physical resources. This has included further investigation into the possible development of a National Policy Statement (NPS) on Urban Design. In late 2008 the Ministry for the Environment (MfE) published a discussion paper on the potential scope of a National Policy Statement (Ministry for the Environment, August 2008). The resulting summary of consultation found broad, but conditional support for a NPS (Ministry for the Environment, March 2009).

In 2009, the Government passed the Resource Management (Simplifying and Streamlining) Amendment Act. The Government intended to remove development roadblocks and improve the timeliness of decision-making processes by: changes to the plan development process and decision-making processes, and establishment of specific approval processes for proposals of national significance.

The second phase of this reform (RMII) focused on urban design and infrastructure issues. It built on previous reforms, but addressed more complex challenges, focusing on particular sectors’ issues and better interaction between the RMA and other legislation (Ministry for the Environment, 2010, October, p. 3). It also included an independent review of sections six and seven of the RMA 1991 to reflect contemporary values, priorities and issues “such as managing natural hazard risks and urban and infrastructure development.”

To continue reform discussion, MfE released for public consultation Building Competitive Cities: Reform of the urban and infrastructure planning system: A discussion document (Ministry for the Environment, 2010, October). This continued to address issues raised in the previous Government’s Building Sustainable Urban Communities document, but focused efforts on exploring reform to the Resource Management Act. The 2010 consultation was

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6 While National Policy Statements were enabled under the RMA in 1991, relatively few governments in New Zealand have chosen to develop them.

based on recommendations from two government-appointed advisory groups on urban environments and infrastructure respectively. Among the Urban Technical Advisory Group’s final recommendations was that “planning for urban growth and encouraging housing affordability can be better promoted with a National Policy Statement for the Built Environment” (Urban Technical Advisory Group, 2010, p. 9). However, their recommendations opposed the setting of Metropolitan Urban Limits, in contrast to smart growth notions of urban containment, that the previous Government and councils including Auckland had introduced to more sustainably manage growth.

An objective of the proposed RMII changes was “providing stronger central government leadership, reducing unnecessary bureaucracy and replacing lengthy litigation with more collaborative processes” (Ministry for the Environment, 2010, October, p. iii).

**Local Government Act**

A comprehensive review of local government led by the Labour-Alliance Government in 1999 culminated in a new Local Government Act (LGA) 2002. This significantly broadened the mandate of local government and represented a strong commitment to principles of more sustainable development. Amongst the most significant changes were:

- The replacement of a highly prescriptive statute with a general empowering clause…
- A new purpose, which requires all district and regional councils to promote social, cultural, economic and environmental well-being, with an emphasis on taking a sustainable development approach.
- A requirement for each council to facilitate the identification of desired social, economic, environmental and cultural community outcomes for the intermediate and long-term future of its district or region….  
- A requirement to prepare and implement strategic long-term council community plans (LTCCP) to deliver these outcomes… taking a ‘whole of government’ approach.
- A requirement to consult and to report back to the community progress made every three years towards the achievement of outcomes (Thomas & Memon, 2007, p. 172).

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8 ITAG- Infrastructure Technical Advisory Group, and UTAG – Urban Technical Advisory Group  
9 Councils have sometimes set urban limits within District Plans in an attempt to limit sprawling development.
Amendments to the LGA in 2010 by the National Government revoked the requirement of local authorities to develop separate community outcomes, and enabled incorporation of outcomes into a Long-Term Plan (renamed from Long Term Council Community Plan). The amendments also included a strong requirement for councils to focus activity on ‘core services’. Core services as described in the amendment included: network infrastructure; public transport services; solid waste collection and disposal; avoidance and mitigation of natural hazards; libraries and museums; reserves and recreational facilities; and other community infrastructure. Debate was ignited around the notion of core services, with concerns that local authority autonomy to plan and act for the broader wellbeing of their communities would be constrained. This contrasted with the Government’s concern that authorities were incurring significant costs by acting outside of their responsibilities.

Land Transport Reform

The Land Transport Management Act 2003 was amended in 2008 and required the:

- development of three-yearly Government Policy Statements (GPS) on land transport;
- New Zealand Transport Agency to develop a National Land Transport Programme;
- development of three-yearly integrated regional transport programmes, by Regional Transport Committees, that prioritised transport activities (including activities on the state highway network, and proposals from regional and local authorities);
- Development of Regional Land Transport Strategies six-yearly, as opposed to three-yearly.

The development of Government Policy Statements on transport would outline government funding priorities for land transport. The first was released in August 2008 and detailed the then Labour Government’s desired outcomes and priorities for the land transport sector, The GPS introduced several targets including reducing kilometres travelled by single occupancy vehicles in urban areas on weekdays by 10 % per capita by 2015. It sought to achieve this target by:

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10 Council would now only be required to report on outcomes that it intends to achieve in order to maintain or improve the four wellbeing’s, and not outcomes identified through separate community consultation.

a) setting funding ranges for activity classes that support:
   - increased use of public transport, walking and cycling
   - giving priority to active and shared modes on congested road networks
   - encouraging people to change to other modes

b) encouraging the NZTA to evaluate and approve funding for programmes that facilitate:
   - the growth of homes and businesses around public transport systems
   - local community developments that make public transport, walking and cycling safe, easy and attractive options (Ministry of Transport, 2008 August, p. 10).

These targets and funding strategies aligned with principles of sustainable development, smarter growth and more transit-oriented development.

The New Zealand Transport Strategy was updated in 2008, by the Labour Government and set stretch targets to 2040 under each transport objective. It outlined seven challenges to achieving the various transport goals including:
   - funding and affordability;
   - climate change;
   - increases in the environmental and social impacts of transport;
   - change in demographics; and
   - land-use development and its impact on transport demand.

The Labour Government also committed to giving increased priority and emphasis to a further seven areas including: integrated planning, making best use of existing networks and infrastructure, investing in critical infrastructure and the transport sector workforce, increasing the availability of public transport, walking and cycling and other shared and active modes (Ministry of Transport, 2008).

In May 2009, the newly elected National Government replaced the first Government Policy Statement on land transport with a new GPS. This reflected the new Government’s “…main priority of national economic growth and productivity” (Ministry of Transport, 2009 May, p. 5), and a reduced focus on the objectives of the New Zealand Transport Strategy. It outlined a
focus on infrastructure development through significant investment in seven Roads of National Significance (RoNS).\textsuperscript{12}

Terminology changed from encouraging modal ‘shifts’ away from car use and toward active and public transport modes, to modal ‘choice’. The GPS 2009 reflected a significant shift in policy from the previous Labour Government. The GPS stated the new government’s view that moving too quickly toward modal shift “will have a negative impact on environmental and economic efficiency”, and that carbon mitigation was expected to occur “primarily…via new fuels…plus some modal shift actions…”(p. 11).

In 2011, the Government proposed further changes to the Land Transport Management Act 2003. The changes “…intend to make the transport planning process simpler, more streamlined and less prescriptive” (Joyce, June 2011) and were to go before Parliament during 2012. The resulting changes if passed would include:

- changing the purpose of the Act to: ‘contribute to an effective, efficient, and safe land transport system to support NZ’s economic, social, cultural and environmental wellbeing’;
- removal of the five transport objectives in the act – replaced with ‘efficient, effective safe’;
- reduction in size of Regional Transport Committees, through removal of the appointed members. These members represent the five transport objectives including; public health, safety and security, access and mobility.\textsuperscript{13}

**Conclusion**

The range of challenges in implementing more sustainable urban areas is broad and encompasses issues related to: the private sector; local and central government practices and politics (within and between organisations); professional attitudes and capacity; legislative and funding systems; community perceptions and overarching values, cultures and traditions.

\textsuperscript{12} Including the Wellington Northern Corridor (Levin to Wellington airport) – State Highway One. This incorporates a route through Wellington City to Wellington Airport, and adjacent to the Adelaide Road area.

Social theory explanations provide a useful and encompassing method of examining challenges to sustainable urban development in New Zealand. Theory focusing on professional points of view, interactions within and between systems, as well as overarching societal values and traditions gives a holistic view of the challenges faced, without privileging any single explanation.

New Zealand planning and government literature provides detailed descriptions of the range of challenges facing urban change makers. It focuses on the complex and embedded systems across the land-use and transport sectors, highlighting issues with: legislative frameworks and funding mechanisms; existing land patterns; market mechanisms; sector skills and capacity; as well as the influence of local and central political leadership. However it does not explore in any depth the influence of professional group ‘points of view’, or overarching values and traditions, on the implementation of more sustainable urban development.

Political change and reform of central and local government legislation has an undeniable influence on the future of sustainable urban development in New Zealand. Political parties have demonstrated different philosophical standpoints to addressing sustainable development issues, which will no doubt affect outcomes, as well as the issues to be addressed. This was demonstrated most clearly in the stark differences between the Labour and National Governments’ Government Policy Statements on land transport, and on recent reform discussion suggesting a move away urban containment as a means of focusing growth. The role of local government is heavily constrained by central legislative action especially where definitions on the role and purpose of local government is concerned.

The challenges outlined in this chapter will be explored later in this thesis through an integrated analytical framework provided by the social theories: Dominant Frames, Embeddedness and Persistent Traditions. This framework can usefully combine the challenges described by social theory, New Zealand literature and central government policy changes and will also help to determine the circumstances by which more sustainable urban change may become possible. The following chapter outlines the case study methodology of this thesis and describes the analytic framework in more detail.
Chapter Three: Methodology

Introduction

This chapter describes the suitability of a case study methodology and analysis in exploring the question: *How and why do ‘plans’ for more sustainable urban redevelopment change during implementation, and what are the effects on the outcomes originally sought?* It also outlines the choice of the Adelaide Road Framework as the ‘case’ through which the research aims and objectives will be pursued, summarises the data collection and analytical methods, and outlines the limitations of the study.

A Case Study Approach

Undertaking a case study was a clear choice for the overarching methodology of this thesis. Case study approaches allow the researcher to “act as an explorer who is mapping out, and suggesting, new areas of investigation” (Evans & Gruba, 2002, p. 96). It encourages investigations that build and test theory, generate hypotheses and examine the consequences of decisions (p. 95).

A key feature of case study research is ensuring pragmatic inquiry into a “contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evidently clear” (Yin, 2003, p. 13). The case study approach requires the gathering of:

…comprehensive, systematic, and in-depth information about each case of interest. The analysis process results in a product: a case study. Thus, the term case study can refer to either the process of analysis or the product of analysis, or both (Paton, 2002, p. 447).

By utilising a current and ‘real-life’ attempt at urban change, the research details issues that might inhibit or enhance the creation of more sustainable cities. The case is both descriptive
and exploratory in that it seeks to understand and describe the challenges to implementing more sustainable redevelopment from Wellington City Council’s perspective, and attempts to analyse these challenges drawing on relevant social theory and urban planning and policy literature.

**The case for the Adelaide Road Framework**

From the mid 2000s many councils in the Wellington region began to explore issues of more sustainable population growth and change. In my role as a Senior Public Health Advisor for the Regional Public Health service, I often responded to council plans in terms of their potential to impact on health and wellbeing. While public health actively supported the premise of ‘smarter’ approaches to growth for reasons of public health gain and climate change mitigation, I had growing concern at whether plans would be fully implemented. For instance, plans to increase residential intensification, without corresponding activities to improve the movement network for active modes, or to increase the mix of land-uses could erode potential benefits for public health, creating a negative impact on health and wellbeing. Studying the various challenges to implementation was one way to increase public health understanding of the potential ramifications of urban change proposals on the future health of communities.

A case study approach was a useful methodology to build my understanding of the implementation of local urban plans, and provided useful methods to pursue the research objectives. As Stake (2000, p. 449) explains, the researcher’s “first and foremost responsibility consists of doing justice to each individual case. All else depends on that”.

I began the research by exploring possible local authority ‘cases’ of urban renewal plans in the areas covered by Wellington City Council, Hutt City Council, Upper Hutt City Council, Kapiti Coast District Council and Porirua City Council. This analysis involved a brief description of each ‘case’, its phase of implementation, and the range of activities relevant to components of ‘smarter growth’ that it proposed to implement. Focusing research within the Wellington region was my first priority, given my knowledge of local urban plans, and the benefits associated with working closely with local council planners.
This process highlighted Wellington City Council’s (WCC) Adelaide Road Framework as a possible case. WCC had recently developed a citywide Urban Development Strategy, which was to be implemented in part by a series of place-based plans. These plans, including the Adelaide Road Framework, would attempt to: increase the residential density of key centres along the public transport spine; make a range of improvements to the movement network and other aspects of the built environment; as well as enable various rules changes to improve the quality of residential development, increase residential density and encourage mixing of uses. These elements are generally agreed as foundational aspects of a smarter and healthier approach to growth, linking closely to public health and sustainability outcomes.

The Framework had a sufficient number of timely activities which I could focus on in ‘real time’, whereas other council plans across the region were either insufficiently, or too far progressed, or had limited smart growth objectives of direct health relevance. While there are limits to researching a single case, the in-depth nature of the study, as well as the Adelaide Road Framework’s similarity to other ‘smarter’ growth urban plans both regionally and nationally supports the generalisability of the study findings and their potential to influence similar place-based plans in Wellington and beyond.

Initial contact was made with a WCC Councillor with a keen interest in transport, urban development and health. The Councillor scheduled a meeting with officials to discuss the topic area and potential cases. This meeting confirmed the relevance of the topic to Council, and, in line with my review of potential cases, Council staff suggested a focus on the Adelaide Road Framework. A draft working plan was developed with input from Council officers who agreed to support the research.

**Case Methods**

The case methods include: a literature review; key informant interviews; observational analysis; and key document analysis. Multiple sources of evidence were acquired through this process. Yin (2003) describes this as a major strength of case study, “…allowing the investigator to address a broader range of historical, attitudinal, and behavioural issues”, and validating findings through the development of multiple and “converging lines of inquiry, a process of triangulation” (pp. 91-92).
The case data comprise all the information available on the implementation phase of the Framework, including: reports; policies; plans; external consultants’ reports; interview transcripts and meeting notes; concept and engineering plans; and photos. To support the organisation of this large accumulation of data, a case record focusing on relevant implementation records from 2008 - 2011 was developed (Table 5, Chapter 4). The case record “…pulls together and organizes the voluminous case data into a comprehensive, primary and secondary resource package and includes all the major information that will be used in doing the final case analysis and writing the case study” (Paton, 2002, p. 449).

Literature Review

The literature review began with general background reading on urban planning concepts of ‘smart growth’, ‘transit oriented development’, and their relationship to health. I read widely on the relationship between urban sprawl, climate change and health, as well as practitioner and academic theories on the challenges to changing our urban areas. I also investigated the role of local, regional and national government in influencing urban form, including Wellington City Council’s policy activities going back to the year 2000. This material provided an informed context for the study, and helped make explicit the links between various ideas of more sustainable urban planning, and health and wellbeing, e.g. through enabling increased physical activity and enhancing social connections.

The more formal literature review topic was defined after the key informant interviews were complete. The wealth of issues generated through key informant interviews and meetings helped to focus my literature review more keenly on attempts to implement more sustainable redevelopment in New Zealand. I identified the topics for formal review as:

- potential social theories explaining why urban areas are hard to change;
- New Zealand challenges to implementing more sustainable transport and urban redevelopment; and,

A narrative review that provides an overview of the relevant literature was chosen as the most suitable approach. A narrative or traditional literature review “critiques and summarizes a
body of literature and draws conclusions about the topic in question” (Cronin, Ryan, & Coughlan, 2008, p. 38). An approach such as systematic review providing “as complete a list as possible of all the published and unpublished studies relating to a particular subject area…” (Cronin, et al., 2008, p. 39) was considered, but deemed infeasible in relation to the research aims and objectives.

While a formal systematic review was less relevant for the purpose of this research, the literature review was still planned with systematic processes in mind. The following general approach was taken for both the background literature and the formal literature review.

1. Topics and sub-topics were defined
2. Key databases and websites were identified for search purposes
3. Search techniques included:
   a. Key word searches for each topic (and alternative word list)
   b. Manual searches in journals of interest
   c. Searching bibliographies of useful literature reviews, academic articles and books.
4. A focus on material after the year 2000
5. Literature was grouped according to the sub topics and according to the source type
6. Summaries were written for each document illustrating the purpose for the document, its key points, limitations etc. (Cronin, et al., 2008)

The literature search was conducted primarily though online e-journal and e-book records, databases, and catalogue material in the University of Otago Library Electronic Academic Resources Network (LEARN) system. Databases searched included: Index New Zealand, Te Puna, Proquest, Google Scholar, ScienceDirect, Scopus, and all EBSCO data bases.

Use of Key Informants

Yin describes key informants as “…critical to the success of a case study. Such persons not only provide the case study investigator with insights into a matter but also can suggest corroboratory evidence – and initiate the access to such sources” (Yin, 2003, p. 84).

At Wellington City Council I developed two strong and on-going key informant relationships. The first key informant, a Strategic Policy Planner, provided input to the drafting of the
research topic, assisted in accessing key Council staff and setting up of interviews, and was interviewed on the planning phase of the Framework. The second key informant was the Project Manager of the Adelaide Road improvements, with whom I had a formal interview and a set of regular meetings over an eighteen-month period on the implementation of the planned road improvements. The second informant helped me to keep abreast of specific change points (and the reasons for these) in the implementation of road improvements.

**Interviews**

The WCC Strategic Policy Planner provided a list of potential interview participants, and was also an active participant in the research due to her responsibility for the Adelaide Road Framework planning phase. Staff invited to participate in the interviews included those with an active role in the Framework’s planning and implementation phases at Council, as well as those with managerial oversight and political roles. Involvement from a diverse range of professional groups assisted in determining the extent to which challenges were perceived and attributed differently across groups within Council, and was in line with the theoretical considerations of the study.

The Strategic Policy Planner distributed background information on the research, a letter from the researcher, and informed consent material to potential participants. The researcher followed up with each participant by email and phone to answer questions, and to personally request their involvement. All staff invited to participate in key informant interviews consented. Participants included two staff who had left Council, but who held important roles during planning and early implementation.

Nine interviews with a total of nine current and two ‘ex’ WCC staff were held between May and August 2010 (Table 2 over). Each interview lasted approximately 1.5 hours and permission was attained to audio record all interviews to enable later transcription. Each data extract remained identifiable to interviewees through to the final analysis; however most identifiers from interviews were removed in the final version to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees, where necessary. Data from ongoing key informant meetings with the Project Manager remained identifiable due to their importance in tracking the project during implementation.
An interview protocol was developed which included: a set of questions and prompts organised under key issues or objectives; the opening and closing interview procedure; potential sources of data; the field procedures; and the interview schedule. Interviews were characterised by open-ended questions and were often conversational in nature. The questions within the interview protocol did not necessarily represent how questions were actually posed, but rather served as a guide to focus questioning on key topics and issues related to the research objectives. As such, they were only occasionally referred to within each interview. Some interviews were more focused on a particular topic, in line with the nature of the participant’s work however all interview participants were given the opportunity to provide opinions related to broader research questions.

The interviews attempted to elicit matters of fact, as well as opinion and intended to allow the informants the opportunity to propose their own insights, issues and solutions to the implementation challenges faced. Each interview generated new insights or issues that could be explored in subsequent interviews. The relaxed and exploratory nature of the interviews meant that a large amount of data was obtained from each interview, and the data covered a
wide range of implementation issues as raised by the different professional groups. I also recorded my own personal observations following interviews with each informant. Participants agreed to be available for follow up questions by telephone or email and this opportunity was taken up for two interviewees. All participants were sent the transcribed interview data and were given an opportunity to make any amendments or changes. Once amendments were received, or a clearly defined deadline had passed without amendments being provided, the interviews were accepted as being accurate.

*Key informant Meetings and Observations*

After the formal interviews, the Project Manager of the Adelaide Road improvements offered an opportunity to observe on-going implementation processes through a series of one-on-one meetings. The Project Manager’s role was to ensure planned road improvements kept to budget and timeframes. We agreed to meet over the following eighteen months as required, to discuss implementation progress and hurdles.

Seven meetings between January 2010 and October 2011 were held with the Project Manager, and comprehensive notes were taken in each meeting, summarising progress with various components of the road improvement plans. These notes, and my personal observations were typed up as soon as possible following each meeting to ensure that observations and details, not written at the time, could be captured with the meeting close to mind. The Project Manager also regularly forwarded relevant documentation including; concept maps and plans, consultants’ reports, and photographs. He also made himself available to clarify details from the meetings via email or telephone.

The Project Manager gave practical and detailed insights into: various trade-offs, issues and discussions that occurred on a month-by-month basis, through his role in facilitating project working group meetings, interaction with consultants and business owners, and with the project steering group and Council Committee members. The Project Manager also detailed relevant views and events across professional groupings as they occurred, serving to both corroborate and question issues raised within the formal key informant interviews. While key informant interviews allowed an understanding of the very early implementation challenges
and broader issues, ongoing meetings with the Project Manager enabled detailed insight into the chain of events as implementation of the planned road improvements progressed.

Yin (2003, p. 84) cautions about becoming overly dependant on a key informant, especially because of interpersonal influence. He suggests that a reasonable way of dealing with this pitfall is to rely on other sources of evidence to corroborate insights by such informants and to search for contrary evidence as carefully as possible. To manage this issue I attempted to keep a clear chain of evidence related to changes in the design, not only from meetings with the Project Manager, but also in the form of Council papers and minutes, and concept and detailed plans for Adelaide Road as implementation progressed. I attempted to link the various changes in design to issues and trade-offs identified within the key informant interviews and meetings.

I had regular opportunities for direct observation of the road corridor through my regular journeys through and across Adelaide Road. I took opportunities to drive and walk down the corridor and was able to observe people’s use of the road at different times, for instance the condition of buildings and workplaces, how cyclists and pedestrians used the road, and how the road improvements progressed. I took photos to support these observations where useful. “Observations of relevant behaviours or environmental conditions serve as another source of evidence in a case study” (Yin, 2003, p. 87).

Key Documents

I undertook regular searches of the Council website for meeting minutes, background papers and reports of relevance to the Framework. I also undertook searches of local news and opinion websites, particularly when significant changes to the plans arose. Through my key informant relationships I was able to amass a significant amount of documentation relating to the Framework’s implementation, which helped to corroborate findings from interviews and meetings. This helped to validate data provided by participants and reduced the risk of inaccuracy. Key documents for analytic purposes focused on the Adelaide Road implementation phase and are detailed alongside their relevance to the case in Chapter Four.
Analytical Techniques and Strategies

A range of analytical strategies and techniques were utilised to explore the research objectives. The analysis phase was inductive, involving “…a journey of discovery; mapping the local terrain, gathering data, listening, observing, retracing one’s steps, and often, taking a different path” (Nicholls, 2009, p. 531).

While a grounded theory approach to analysis was considered, this was ruled out due to the early use and influence of existing theories in determining the research objectives (both social theory and practitioner theory, are outlined in Chapter Two). Grounded theory generally avoids use of any prior theory during the early stages of research (Riessman, 2008, p. 74), while on the other hand narrative thematic analysis frequently uses existing theory to guide study, while still encouraging “…novel theoretical insights from the data” (p. 74). Narrative thematic analysis also preserves the “story” of the case as a whole, and Reissman distinguishes the critical difference between the two approaches as being the “case-centred commitment” of narrative analysis (2008, p. 74).

Thematic Narrative Analysis

Thematic analysis was used in analysing data from both key informant interviews, meetings, and from implementation documents, and laid the foundation for more detailed consideration of key theoretical concepts.

In line with a case study approach, I focused on the ‘broader story’ of the case, and its telling through the different worldviews of individual participants and groups. Reissman (2008) explains that this approach pays more attention to the broader context of the narratives or their “point”, and that the type or style of language used is not as relevant as the overarching “moral of the story” (p. 62). In examining four exemplars of thematic narrative analysis, Reissman found that overall:

…there was considerable attention to macro contexts, as all the authors make connections between the life worlds depicted in personal narratives and larger social structures – power relations, hidden inequalities, and historical contingencies (p. 76).
For this study, a step-by-step guide from a paper entitled “Using thematic analysis in psychology” directly influenced the application of thematic analysis methods (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Braun and Clarke describe thematic analysis as “…a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes your data set in (rich) detail. However, frequently it goes further than this, and interprets various aspects of the research topic” (p. 79).

**Key Informant Interviews and Meetings**

Key informant interview and meeting data was manually transcribed through a process of repeated listening, recording and re-recording, supporting immersion in the data. Initially all audio data was included as comprehensively as possible, and participants had the opportunity to make corrections or amendments to typed transcripts before they were finalised.

The data were continually assessed for direct relevance to the research aims and objectives. From the reading and re-reading process, an initial list of ideas about “what was in” the data and “what was interesting” about the data was generated (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 88). These ideas, alongside discussion with my research supervisors, formed the basis of an initial coding of the data. Although codes were generated as ‘openly’ as possible from the data set, the study objectives and social theories outlined in the Literature Review chapter also influenced this process. Codes were refined with each subsequent interview and coded data was ultimately grouped and re-read to identify potential themes. Individual segments of data remained linked to each interviewee through interviewee codes during the analysis (Table 2 previous). At this point, grouping of data by social theories outlined in the literature review was considered, but discarded as too deductivist in approach. Instead thematic grouping was based on a more inductive view of the data, creating themes directly related to experiences of participants (Nicholls, 2009, pp. 531-532). These were developed into a thematic map (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 89). Overarching thematic groupings included: the feasibility of original plans to widen the road, various political and organisational influences on the Framework’s implementation, and the decision-making processes and challenges in creating detailed designs for Adelaide Road improvements.
Data groups were then reviewed and refined until they represented fair and full summaries of the raw data. Particular extracts from each grouping were selected that represented the range of interviewee and key informant data on a given theme, and which captured the ‘essence’ of each theme. The case data are represented in the Results chapters. During this process individual data segments were “cleaned up” (Riessman, 2008, p. 57) where necessary, erasing duplicate words and phrases, ums and ahs and other normal aspects of speech. This supported an appropriate focus on the case’s wider story, with emphasis “on ‘the told’- the events and cognitions to which language refers…Consequently, “messy” spoken language is transformed to make it easily readable” (2008, p. 58). The language of these excerpts was not a particular focus of study, instead “…language is viewed as a resource, rather than a topic of inquiry” (Riessman, 2008, p. 59).

**Analysis of Key Documents**

Documents were sorted into broader background documentation on urban development policy and projects within Council, and documents specific to the development and the implementation phases of the Framework. Documents for close analysis were limited to those of relevance to the Framework’s early implementation phase only. These were organised into a temporal sequence, and specific relevance to the research objectives was highlighted. Thematic analysis was undertaken involving a similar process to the key informant interviews, and focused on the temporal sequence of decision-making, reasons for changes and challenges in implementing the planned road improvements, as well as the impact of changes on outcomes. I read and re-read documents examining texts, and extracting statements of direct relevance.

**Explanation - Building**

The ‘how ‘ and ‘why’ questions of this research naturally suited a case study approach, and indicated a more explanatory study (Yin, 1994, p. 6). According to Yin, explanation-building from case studies is strengthened when possible explanations “…have reflected some theoretically significant propositions. For example, the causal links may reflect critical insights into public policy process or into social science theory” (Yin, 2009, p. 141). While an initial inductive approach to the narrative data helped ensure the integrity of the case ‘story’, a
more theoretically-based analysis sought to contribute to and extend theory that “explains the journey” of the case (Nicholls, 2009, p. 531).

To assist in this aim, grouped data were subject to a second stage of thematic analysis in line with theories of urban obduracy, or factors that make cities more or less resistant to change. Riessman states that “With a strong theory as a resource, an investigator can link everyday, seemingly insignificant acts that people engage in…with social change processes” (Riessman, 2008, p. 62).

Yin explains the analytic technique of explanation - building as iterative in nature. In this sense, the final explanation for changes and challenges in implementing Adelaide Road improvements was not clear at the beginning of the study; instead “the case study evidence is examined, theoretical positions are revised, and the evidence is examined once again from a new perspective, in this iterative mode” (Yin, 2009, p. 143). The goal of such analysis is “not to conclude a study but to develop ideas for further study” (Yin, 1994, p. 110).

To prepare for this analysis I read widely on theories of urban change from the field of socio-technical studies. The work of Anique Hommels (Hommels, 2000, 2005a, 2005b), an academic in the field of urban change, stood out as particularly applicable to this topic. In Unbuilding Cities Hommels utilised three sets of theories of urban obduracy to explain the challenges faced in implementing three different cases of urban redevelopment in the Netherlands. These theories were:

- Dominant Frames: The interaction and the influence of dominant networks and actors;
- Embeddedness: The complex networks of planning systems, traffic systems, land-use policies and in legal regulations; and
- Persistent Traditions: Cultures and values that persist over time. (Hommels, 2005a)

The data grouped inductively from Council staff experiences and documentation were overlaid and interwoven with analysis from theoretical approaches provided by Hommels. To do this, criteria covering key attributes from each theory were borrowed from the literature and guided the close examination of the data for narrative excerpts that illustrated the theoretical criteria. Data were examined for each theory’s potential explanatory power, in
explaining the key implementation challenges. The purpose was to move from describing the range of challenges to explaining them, and ultimately to putting forward a series of recommendations to support continual improvement of policy implementation to improve urban form.

Hommels also outlined three “unbuilding strategies” (2005a, p. 186) designed to help people involved in urban redesign overcome challenges. Examining the results from the perspective of the three sets of theories, as well as from the “unbuilding strategies” enabled deeper theoretical insights and solutions to the challenges detailed in the case data by participants, and supported the development of recommendations from the case. The potential theoretical explanations, alongside practitioner theory of challenges during implementation are explored both in the literature review and within the discussion and concluding sections of this thesis.

**Limitations of the research**

The following are the main limitations of this thesis.

1. *Early implementation focus (2009 -2011)*

   Focusing on early implementation, particularly for the movement network, does not tell the complete implementation story. This focus was necessitated by the stage of the Framework’s development, but is a crucial phase due to the importance of early building blocks for more sustainable development described in Chapter One. Future implementation will still remain highly dependant on a range of factors including those described in the discussion (both inside and outside of Council control), as well as a wider set of influences not actively explored by this thesis. The importance of early implementation actions in shaping ongoing redevelopment makes this a worthy focus of study, which can inform future implementation of Council urban redevelopment projects.

2. *Focus on Council staff experiences and perceptions*

   A second limitation was the sole focus on Council staff perceptions of challenges and reliance on a single key informant during later phases of the study. While I have triangulated these accounts with the wider New Zealand literature, central government policy and political shifts, as well as Council reports and plans, it must be stated that much of the data reflects the professional perspectives and experiences of Council staff. Some sets of actors who were
revealed as having consequential involvement in early implementation lay outside of my interview network. These include: staff from the New Zealand Transport Agency; community stakeholders; and private developers. Perspectives across these networks may be a useful focus of further implementation study. However, due to Council’s lead role in the Framework development and early implementation phase, gaining an in-depth understanding of their own points of view and practices is an important focus of study.

3. 限定一般化性：由于单个局部案例

一个单个案例可能不会与更一般性的案例共享重要特征。这可以通过精心选择案例以及采用的分析策略来缓解。框架目标和早期实施所需的操作在许多城市再开发计划中是共同的。文献描述了这些机制对创建更可持续的城市再开发至关重要。这使研究超越其独特的地方设置变得相关。讨论结果与城市顽固性理论的关系将使单个案例中的教训适用于单一案例的个别细节，从而产生更广泛的关于过程变化本身的见解。这具有广泛的相关性，适用于所有参与城市变化的机构和个人。

结论

本章证明了案例研究方法的深入性质是回答研究目标和目的的合适方法。与惠灵顿市议会工作人员建立的密切和开放关系在两年的期间内使我们能够收集丰富数据。使用现有社会理论分析城市变化的挑战提供了新西兰文献中提供的解释的补充，并允许通过访谈信息和委员会记录建立解释。以下两章概述了案例研究结果。
Chapter Four: Adelaide Road Framework – The Planning Phase

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the processes taken to develop the Adelaide Road Framework as well as relevant planning and implementation documentation and organisational details. The chapter then explores Council staff perceptions on the first serious hurdle to implementation: enabling a comprehensive road redesign to support public and active transport modes through the potential widening of Adelaide Road.

Developing the Framework

Council began public consultation on redeveloping Adelaide Road with a student survey in August 2007, and a brochure released for consultation between November and December of the same year. This asked people to describe what they liked and disliked about the Adelaide Road area, what concerned them, and what opportunities there might be to improve the area in the long-term (Wellington City Council, March 2008).

This provided the background to a workshop in early 2008, facilitated by Council and their consultant UrbanismPlus Ltd.\(^\text{14}\) The workshop focused on the area’s potential, what was good about it, what needed to change, and how the area was used for travel (Wellington City Council, February 2008). Five groups were represented at the workshop:

- Developers and investors
- Major institutions
- Transport providers
- Local businesses and land owners
- The public.

\(^\text{14}\) An Auckland based urban planning and design company.
Following this, Council and UrbanismPlus Ltd facilitated a four-day ‘Inquiry-by Design’ interactive and multi-disciplinary workshop (Fig. 3).

Council described the workshop as enabling a collaborative process involving community, key stakeholders and technical specialists, and that it resulted in a “viable” plan for the area which:

… enabled an extensive understanding of the land use and transport complexities facing the Adelaide Road area to be canvassed over a short timeframe (Wellington City Council, 2008 November, p. 09).

Council participants included: Transport; City Planning and Policy; Urban Design; Community Planning; Parks and Recreation; Infrastructure; and Heritage. Public and stakeholders were invited to presentations and workshop sessions, and a public drop-in session was also held.

A wide range of participants from outside Council attended the workshop including:

- Local community, residents, users of the area;
- Local landowners, businesses, industries;
• Residents’ associations and other community groups;
• Developers, investors and architects;
• Institutions including Wellington Hospital and other health organisations,
• Massey University, other tertiary institutions e.g. School of Dance and Drama,
• Government House, local schools, Basin Reserve Trust, Wellington Housing Trust, Housing New Zealand;
• Transport agencies and groups including Transit NZ, Land Transport New Zealand, Greater Wellington Regional Council, Cycle Aware, Living Streets, and Sustainability Trust. (UrbanismPlus Ltd, et al., 2008 p. 10)

The workshop’s findings, alongside those of previous consultation and background documentation, were reflected in a Draft Framework (Wellington City Council, September 2008), which through a public consultation and public feedback process (Wellington City Council, 2008c November) was used to develop the Adelaide Road Framework, approved by Council in November 2008.

The Framework outlined that significant benefits for the wider city would result from better integrating land-use and transport, better planning and managing growth, and improving the capacity of the transport corridor and efficiency of public transport in the area (Wellington City Council, 2008 November, p. 5).

The Framework’s vision encapsulated the expected outcomes:

A high quality mixed-use area that is a more vibrant, attractive, better connected, accessible and safer place which meets the needs of all people living in, working in, and using the area (p. 11).

The Framework contained an action plan outlining a range of potential activities to support the vision across the Framework’s key themes of: Open Space Networks, Social and Community Networks, Movement Networks, Heritage and Character, and Mix of Uses. Artists’ interpretations of the future ‘look’ of the area were scattered throughout the document (See Fig. 4 over).
Organisational structure and key Council actors

Besides public consultation and the ‘inquiry-by-design’ workshop, key people and groups within and external to Council were important to the Framework’s development and implementation. These are outlined in Table 3 (See over). Structure changes within Council were also relevant to understanding the process of implementation.
### Table 3: Key players in the development and implementation of the Adelaide Road Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Actors</th>
<th>Role in relation to Adelaide Road</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Groups/Committees</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy and Policy Sub-Committee</td>
<td>Made final decisions on council policy, plans and budgets for strategy and policy matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Upgrade Project Team</td>
<td>A project team guiding consultants and aiding decision making for Adelaide Road plans. Members: Project Manager (PMO), Transport Network Manager, Urban Designer, Urban Design and Heritage Manager, Consultants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Upgrade Steering Group</td>
<td>Provided final approval of road improvement plans and oversaw Project Team activities. Members include: Directors of Strategy and Policy, Director Infrastructure, and Director Property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Council Staff (current and ex), and Interviewee Codes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Planning Manager (ex) (CPM)</td>
<td>Managed City Planning Team (now disbanded). Responsible for development place based plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Advisor Urban Strategy and Centres (ex) (PAU)</td>
<td>Member of City Planning Team (now disbanded). Led development of Council urban strategy policy and background papers (including Adelaide Road) and development of Kilbirnie Place Based Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Policy Planner (SPP)</td>
<td>Member of City Planning Team (now disbanded). Led development of Adelaide Road Framework, Johnsonville and Newlands Plans. Now member of Urban Design and Heritage Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager Urban Design Heritage</td>
<td>Management representative on Road Upgrade Project Team. Not actively involved in Framework development phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Designer (DES)</td>
<td>Member of City Planning Team (now disbanded). Involved in Framework planning phase. Design representative in Road Upgrade Project Team. Now member of Urban Design and Heritage Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Network Manager (TNM)</td>
<td>Member of Transport Planning Team in Infrastructure Directorate. Previously member of Urban Development and Transport Directorate. Responsible for major transport infrastructure projects and implementation of Council Transport Strategy. Involved in planning phase of Adelaide Road and in implementation through role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Responsibilities and Tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Manager (PM)</td>
<td>Member of the Office of the Chief Operating Officer, Project Management Office Team. Assigned responsibility for Adelaide Road upgrade in 2009. Responsible for ensuring timelines, budgets, outputs and outcomes are met. Coordinator and member of the Road Upgrade Project team. Reported to the Road Upgrade Steering group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Consents Manager (RCM)</td>
<td>Member of Property Consents and Licensing Directorate. Participated in Adelaide Road Planning phase. Manages team responsible for processing and responding to resource consent applications for the South area (including Adelaide Road).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Planner (CPL)</td>
<td>Member of Policy Team. Primarily responsible for the District Plan and its changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Policy Advisor (SPA)</td>
<td>Member of Policy Team. Leadership role - District Plan changes 72 and 73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**External agencies and consultants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UrbanismPlus Ltd</td>
<td>Urban planning and design company contracted to facilitate the ‘inquiry by design’ process, and draft the report upon which the Framework is based.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opus International</td>
<td>Consultancy company contracted to provide traffic assessments and reports necessary for the subsidy application to NZTA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHD and Isthmus</td>
<td>International engineering consultancy developing design of Adelaide Road from concept to construction drawings. GHD subcontracted urban design consultancy Isthmus. Both are represented on the Road Upgrade Project Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Transport Agency (NZTA)</td>
<td>Manages and funds the State Highway network and provides subsidies for local and regional transport projects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Shortly after adopting the Urban Development Strategy (UDS) in 2006, the Council was restructured to combine land-use planning and transport planning professionals into one Directorate of Urban Development and Transport, for the purpose of encouraging greater integration across professions and functions (Fig. 5).

Members of this integrated team alongside consultants led the Adelaide Road planning process. The project won a Highly Commended award in the New Zealand Planning Institute 2009 Awards for Excellence in Planning. The awards committee considered “…the methodology developed for this planning project, its outcomes and the quality of the presented material exhibits creativity, innovation and best practice in planning…” (New Zealand Planning Institute, 2009, p. 11).

However, this integrated Directorate did not last long. Shortly after the Framework was finalised, the Director resigned and a new Director led a restructure in early 2009, renaming the group the Directorate of Strategy, Planning and Urban Design. A ‘City Planning’ team remained responsible for developing the place-based plans, but transport-planning staff moved back to the
Infrastructure directorate. One year later, the City Planning team was also disestablished and staff were split between a Policy Team (responsible for Long Term and Annual Plans and District Plan Changes), and an Urban Design and Heritage Team. During the various restructures many staff who had been involved in developing the Framework left Council, a factor that influenced implementation according to many interviewees.

**Early Implementation Actions**

Figure six (see over) provides a general timeline of relevant activities to the planning and early implementation of the Adelaide Road improvements specifically. It particularly highlights the phase from early 2010 to mid-2011 on which this thesis is focused.
Figure 6: General timeline of Adelaide Road improvements 2008-2012 (Source: Author)
A large number of potential actions were included in the Framework’s implementation plan. High priority (year 1-3) activities included: Council’s role as leader and advocate in facilitating the desired development, specific work to prepare Adelaide Road for redesign, widening and upgrade, and, policy review and amendments on District Plan objectives, policies, rules and design criteria (Table 4).

Table 4: Priority One Actions, adapted from Adelaide Road Framework Implementation Action Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority One Areas</th>
<th>General Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Facilitating Development                            | • Communicate the vision  
• Investigate and recommend options for Council to take a more active role (e.g. land purchase, land development agencies).  
• Work with landowners, developers and investors to implement the vision. |
| Adelaide Road Corridor Upgrade (capital and operational activities) | • Land acquisition study, amend District Plan (DP) to designate future widening, and roll out notices of requirement to land owners.  
• Design, reconfigure, widen and upgrade Adelaide Road.  
• John Street/Riddiford Street intersection upgrade |
| Policy Review and Amendment                         | • Review and amend DP objectives, policies and rules in relation to building heights, urban design quality, corridor designation, mix of uses, and location of infill.  
• Review and amend DP design criteria and guidelines |

Early implementation challenges for some high-priority activities soon emerged. In regard to an active Council role in facilitating development (outside of resource consents applications), and in altering the boundaries and layout of the road, it became clear that the activities were contestable and vulnerable to external and internal influences. This was despite the entire Framework having been formally adopted by the whole of Council. In terms of rule changes, while these were a significant task, they were mainly ‘business as usual’ and because of this Council understood and were comfortable with activities related to changing rules and regulations.
Summary of Relevant Documents

The following table (see Table 5 over) provides an overview of key Council documents and plans of relevance to the Adelaide Road Framework implementation. It provides a picture of the key Framework implementation decision points on which the study is focused, through the lens of Council official reports and documentation. Interview data and data from key informant meetings are used alongside these documents to expand the case story as Council officers negotiated various challenges.
Table 5: Key documentation relevant to Adelaide Road Framework Implementation 2008 - 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Relevance to Adelaide Road Framework Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>Adelaide Road Land Acquisition Proposal Report 6, Appendix E (Wellington City Council, 2009a)</td>
<td>Report to Strategy and Policy Sub-Committee recommending that $12.568 million capital expenditure be allocated to the road widening project to enable land acquisition, with potential funding from NZTA at 53% subsidy. Linked the importance of the project to the implementation of key Council documents including: Bus Priority Plan, Urban Development Strategy, Transport Strategy and links to Basin Reserve improvements. Road widening of up to 5.5. metres was stated as enabling improvements to: road capacity, pedestrian environment and amenity improvements, and supporting intensification and redevelopment. Overall funding would come from borrowings, NZTA subsidy, and Development Contributions that allowed growth components to be recovered through contributions levied at citywide and centre based levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>Long Term Council Community Plan 2009-2019 (Wellington City Council, 2009)</td>
<td>Emphasised preparation of Adelaide Road area for urban intensification and improved transport linkages, in line with Council’s strategy of encouraging compact urban development around key centres along a ‘growth spine’. Stated that improvements would increase road capacity (dealing with congestion), help redevelop and revitalise the area, complete a missing link in the bus priority routes, support the Basin Reserve state highway development, and improve access to the regional hospital, airport and community services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Relevance to Adelaide Road Framework Implementation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>Development Contributions Policy (Wellington City Council, 2009b)</td>
<td>This policy included allocation of development costs for Adelaide Road on a citywide as well as local basis due to the wider benefits of the Framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2009</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>Annual Report 2008/2009 (Wellington City Council, 2009c)</td>
<td>Reported on proposed DP changes, including Adelaide Road as a proposed area of change. Reported on the adoption of the Framework and key activities including: 18 metre maximum building height, street widening, more pedestrian crossings to improve transport access, landscaped median, more street trees, and upgraded reserves to improve the area’s look and feel. Highlighted the Framework’s achievement of Highly Commended at the New Zealand Planning Institute 2009 Planning Awards. Provided an update on development of other centre plans for Johnsonville and Kilbirnie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2009 (Notified)</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>District Plan Change 72: Residential Review (Wellington City Council, 2010a September) Change 73: Suburban centre Review- Centres (Wellington City Council, 2010b September)</td>
<td>Endorsed nodal intensification in Johnsonville and Kilbirnie, and confirmed the Central City and Adelaide Road as key centres on the growth spine. The changes introduced policies, rules, design guides and maps to manage growth by encouraging less ad hoc development and sought to enable improvements to the quality and amenity of Wellington’s residential areas. Changed zoning of, and allowed increased building heights on Adelaide Road to support ‘mixed use’ and encourage residential intensification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>OPUS</td>
<td>Adelaide Road Growth Node</td>
<td>The findings of the Traffic Assessment report would be included with an</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Relevance to Adelaide Road Framework Implementation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transport Options: Assessment Report (Opus International Consultants, 2010a February)</td>
<td>Application to the NZTA for subsidy toward the cost of property acquisition and street works associated with Road widening. The report concluded that a wider Road would provide minimal transport capacity improvements and minimal reductions in travel times. This was due to widening not providing additional travelling lanes, and enhancements to pedestrian amenity countering any potential reductions in travel times. Its overall Benefit to Cost ratio was assessed as less than one, meaning it was unlikely to be successful in gaining a subsidy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 March 2nd</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>Adelaide Road Framework Implementation: Report tabled to the Strategy and Policy Sub-Committee. (Wellington City Council, 2010 March)</td>
<td>This report highlighted the funding issue above, and set out three alternatives to the original option. It recommended an un-widened corridor (apart from where necessary to achieve intersection improvements) with a constrained set of improvements. The Sub-Committee ultimately approved recommended option (Option Three), and resulted in reducing the capital expenditure requirements in the 2009/19 LTCCP to approximately $10 million. Committing to progressing the project in its original form would have meant Council covering an additional $10 million. Subsidy would still be available for intersection improvements and bus priority lanes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2010</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>Delivering on Place-Based Plans in a free market economy: the WCC experience. (S. Gray, et al., 2010)</td>
<td>Council officer presentation to the New Zealand Planning Institute Conference in 2010. Highlighted place-based planning challenges including: funding shortfalls (related to NZTA subsidy criteria), culture of non-intervention – development facilitation, lack of structures and experience in land development activities, lack of on-going project management, and public opinion on intensification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>Drummond Street Upgrade Flyer (Wellington City Council, 2010a)</td>
<td>Delays in negotiating land purchase to enable the John Street intersection upgrade (scheduled originally for 2009/2010), delayed the design process for the whole Road. A decision was made to progress landscape improvements on Drummond Street, a side street on the Western side of Adelaide Road (initially a priority two project). This enabled Council to make earlier progress on this area of work, despite overall project delays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Relevance to Adelaide Road Framework Implementation</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2010</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>Annual Plan 2010/2011 (Wellington City Council, 2010b)</td>
<td>The Annual Plan revealed the loss of anticipated funding toward Road widening, stating a change in alignment of NZTA funding towards government priorities of Roads of National Significance, and a reduction in funding to safety and bus lane improvements only. It outlined the decision to reduce the planned parking provision on one side of the Road, and introduce a shared bus/cycle lane. It indicated new concept designs would be developed within the existing road corridor, removing the need for land acquisition except to facilitate intersection improvements at John Street Intersection. It signalled that Council was under budget due to delays in John Street and Drummond Street components of Adelaide Road, and stated that the recession would create short-term impacts on the likelihood of achieving positive change in Centres due to a slowing of development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2010</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>Annual Report 2009/10 (Wellington City Council, 2010c)</td>
<td>The report signalled delays in the Adelaide Road project due to need for detailed redesign work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>GHD and Isthmus</td>
<td>Draft versions of concept and detailed designs for Adelaide Road. (GHD, 2010-2011)</td>
<td>The consultants prepared a number of versions of the Adelaide Road improvement plans. These were developed with input from the Road Upgrade Project Team, and the various iterations of the plans, challenges and decisions were the focus of discussions in key informant meetings with the Project Manager from mid 2010 to late 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2010</td>
<td>Statham Consulting Ltd</td>
<td>Adelaide Road Upgrade- Concept Design – Road Safety Peer review (Statham Consulting Ltd, 2010)</td>
<td>This Road Safety review was required for applications for an NZTA subsidy. This reviewed the draft concept designs, identifying minor and serious safety concerns. Serious concerns focused on vehicle turns across the road, and potential for cross centre line crashes in vicinity of John Street intersection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Relevance to Adelaide Road Framework Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2011</td>
<td>Opus</td>
<td>Adelaide Road: Transport Assessment and Funding Application (FINAL) (Opus International Consultants, 2011)</td>
<td>Identified 1.3 BCR for John Street Intersection, and BCR of 1 for improvements North of this, on the reminder of the Adelaide Road area. Outlined: signalised controls at King and Drummond Street, addition of a southbound bus lane (all day), and extension of hours of northbound bus lane, raised central median, pockets of road widening to allow safe right hand turn bays and parking on the road's Western side. The report concludes in its funding assessment profile that the project had a High Strategic Fit, Medium Effectiveness but Low Efficiency rating (64).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>Annual Report 2010/2011 (Wellington City Council, 2011b)</td>
<td>Reported on the issuing of DP change decisions and the completion of the Drummond Street upgrade, including new steps and planting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>Annual Plan 2011/2012 (Wellington City Council, 2011a)</td>
<td>Indicated plans to complete first stage of upgrading Adelaide Road. Focusing on: widening the Adelaide Road/John Street intersection to provide an additional turning lane, improving pedestrian safety and redeveloping street frontage of Adelaide Road South and John street. Stated that the Framework of the Adelaide Road project was adjusted to align with the approved local share of funding, due to change in government priorities, and the need for Council to reduce burden on ratepayers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2011</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>Bus Priority Plan: A report tabled to the Strategy and Policy Sub-Committee. (Wellington City Council, 2011)</td>
<td>Report recommending introduction of: A southbound evening bus lane on Adelaide Road from 4pm to 6pm weekdays to complement the existing northbound 7am-9am bus lane.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To widen or not to widen

A key aspect of the Framework, contested early in implementation, was the widening of Adelaide Road from the Basin Reserve (at the Northern end) to John Street (at the Southern end). This section explores the loss of anticipated NZ Transport Agency (NZTA) subsidy (in the region of $10 million), the subsequent decision to move away from widening the length of the street, and key outcomes resulting from this change in plans.

A significant amount of policy and planning work to enable road widening was embarked upon including: work to effectively reinstate lapsed road widening designations of previous years and preparations to acquire private land. The idea of road widening to support multi-modal transport improvements as well as contributing to broader urban development outcomes was not new, and in fact spanned more than 100 years\(^\text{15}\). In recent times Council had an active road widening designation on Adelaide Road as the Transport Network Manager (a Council employee of more than 30 years) recalled:

\begin{quote}
Previously, probably 15 years ago we already had a road widening designation on Adelaide road, knowing that we wanted it to be a major corridor into the city...we weren’t able to keep those designations on unless we could effect them within 15 years.
\end{quote}

A number of artistic renditions of the widened road were provided in the final Framework (Wellington City Council, 2008 November, pp. 18-21), including a longer-term vision incorporating light rail in the road centre and dedicated cycle lanes. Many of the interviewees described Adelaide Road as a future ‘boulevard’ or ‘avenue’ and the artists’ interpretation of the future road supported these concepts (see Fig. 7 over).

Getting the NZTA subsidy

A significant challenge to road widening emerged in early 2010 when it became apparent that half of the funding relied upon by way of an NZTA subsidy would not be forthcoming. In the 2009-2019 Long Term Council Community Plan, Council allocated more than 21 million dollars to enable the widening and redevelopment of Adelaide Road. In early 2010 a Council report to the Strategy and Policy Sub-Committee stated:

…the funding approved by the Council in the Long –Term Council Community Plan 2009-19 (LTCCP) assumed that the total land acquisition and construction costs would be eligible for a 53% subsidy from the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA), equivalent to approximately $10 million. Whilst the costs of the bus priority works and associated land acquisition is consistent with NZTA funding criteria, the amenity improvements and urban regeneration benefits are not…(Wellington City Council, 2010 March, p. 1).

Management staff, planners and the Councillor interviewed agreed that during the Framework’s planning, a subsidy from the NZTA was looking likely. This confidence came from NZTA attendance at early planning workshops, and through ongoing personal communication between Council planners and the NZTA as the project progressed. However,
the language interviewees used demonstrates more of a funding hopefulness than a funding certainty.

_We had bargained on getting a subsidy from the NZTA for helping with the cost of the road widening, and back in the day...they were making really positive sounds..._

_[The NZTA signalled] Adelaide Road would be eligible for a subsidy and it was probably in the order of fiftyish percent of the costs, that it fitted really well, that it integrated really well...and it would help deliver transport benefits ...and wider.'_

_We were under the impression from our previous conversations [with NZTA] ...that what we were trying to achieve was eligible for subsidy._

_I got the feeling...when we were going through the process originally that we were getting the [funding] ...'we [NZTA] think this is a good idea, the urban development side is very important to us..._

Other staff, particularly Project Management and Transport indicated that there was less certainty in regard to receiving a subsidy.

_..there were very unclear messages from NZTA on how much they were prepared to come in...in terms of their subsidy...we were told different things at different times..._

_There was this grand assumption that we would get pretty much fifty percent of the cost of the project...but that hadn’t been established._

_(I: There seems to have been some confidence that NZTA were going to help fund?) They always say that, you know generally speaking...that’s the sort of thing that they fund but the thing is, the devil is in the detail..._

Some interviewees believed the loss of subsidy showed a significant difference in priorities between NZTA and Council, which were not sufficiently taken into account during planning. These interviewees felt that a change occurred in the NZTA position; away from a wider interest in urban development outcomes related to transport and back to a primary focus on transport flow efficiency and safety objectives. This was blamed partially on the new Government’s focus on Roads of National Significance (RoNS), a view also seen in the 2010/2011 Annual Report (Wellington City Council, 2011b).
....for a while the NZTA were very much interested in taking a wider view of the transport...trying to incorporate some of the urban development objectives...and I think the focus has been pulled back to just transport...

We were piggy backing a lot of that [Framework actions] on an assumption that the NZTA were starting to look more broadly at the benefits, including community regeneration not just transport. But no it doesn’t [fund that].

That did change [the support from the NZTA] ...the confirmation and clarification that we got was – ah no it wasn’t [eligible for subsidy] ...Its just the criteria of their funding model.... it funds the transport and safety improvements only...

...NZTA have essentially said that they’re not going to provide that extra funding for widening the road... not for buying a whole lot of property...

One interviewee suggested that there was no change in funding criteria but rather a difference between policy and practice. In other words, NZTA at a policy level supported the contribution of wider urban redevelopment to transport, but when it came to providing funding, the assessment criteria had not moved toward this broader perspective and focused on a narrower view of possible benefits for motorised traffic flow and safety. This interviewee emphasised that while signals from NZTA may have given cause for hope, the funding criteria remained the same.

Primarily it’s done on vehicular traffic because it’s only a transport economics assessment so it doesn’t assess all those wider benefits that you might get from it...all it takes into account are safety improvements, a reduction in the cost of accidents, (and) the time savings that you give to people through there...

... I believe that they say in their words that they want to link it to strategic things...but when they want to part with their money, well a lot of those strategic things that are for the development of your city, well development should pay, so why are we paying...

The interviewee went on to surmise a possible policy shift in the other direction, with a lessening focus on interconnectedness between transport and urban development, and an increasing of NZTA funding criteria assessments on benefits to vehicle traffic.

(I: So... the funding criteria have always been the same?)

Yeah, exactly right, that’s my perception, if not actually starting to skew the other way because you know there’s so much emphasis on doing
improvements to the state highway...there’s no new money really going in there...its just a shifting of the money...

... in terms of their funding criteria, they’re looking at efficiencies...from the network... they look at the seriousness of the issues from a national perspective...in terms of local roading...it’s actually quite hard to get any funding, cause they are looking at motorways and things to get people more efficiently through...

The Adelaide Road Project Manager agreed that national objectives around sustainable transport had not filtered down to how subsidies were decided. The only change from his perspective was that Government was now focusing on Roads of National Significance and less so on local projects (May 2010 - Meeting Notes Project Manager).

A decision by the National Government in late 2011 to reduce the subsidy available to local government for road activities (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2011b) in order to divert more funding toward the Roads of National Significance adds weight to the perceptions shared by Council staff.

The traffic assessment undertaken by Opus International Consultants (Opus International Consultants, 2010a February) clearly shattered Council’s initial Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) expectations (of the widened corridor) from around two, to a BCR of less than one, explaining that there would be minimal benefits for extra traffic capacity or travel times compared to the existing road layout. As various design iterations progressed on the revised option the BCR continued to change (See Table 6 over).

Initially the full road widening project was estimated as being cost-benefit viable (over two), however in latter stages this yo-yoed between a negative, neutral and positive cost-benefit, despite the BCR assessment criteria remaining static. The Opus report explained the BCR changes as largely due to amenity improvements for pedestrians countering vehicle travel time improvements. A BCR greater than or equal to 1.0 and below 2.0 receives a low efficiency rating from the NZTA and is unlikely to be funded.16

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Table 6: The Changing Benefit to Cost Ratio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Road Design</th>
<th>BCR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 2008</td>
<td>Original widened corridor (estimate)</td>
<td>Approx. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2010</td>
<td>Opus - initial traffic assessment report – widened corridor</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2010</td>
<td>Un-widened option (Option Three). Estimate given reduced overall cost.</td>
<td>&gt; 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2010</td>
<td>Peer reviewed assessment of draft plan based on transport economics</td>
<td>1.5-1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2011</td>
<td>Opus Final report</td>
<td>&lt; 1 Whole road, 1.3 - John Street</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Opus International Consultants, 2010a February, 2011), October 2010 Meeting Notes - Project Manager, Interviews

NZTA funding was never guaranteed and anything with a BCR of less than two created uncertainty. Despite the likely loss of subsidy to widen the length of the Road, some aspects of the road improvements, including small scale road widening for John Street intersection and bus priority measures were still likely to be subsidised as they would yield travel and safety benefits. The Project Manager described that funding outside of these improvements was looking less likely, and that once a detailed programme of works was developed there would be even more scrutiny (October 2010 Meeting Notes - Project Manager).

…it was identified...that it would be a struggle to get a cost benefit [for the whole corridor]...so we’ll look at pockets in that corridor to get funding...like making an intersection improvement...But for the whole route you can’t actually make it work.

The causes of the low BCR were outlined in a Council implementation report to the Strategy and Policy Sub-Committee:

- the proposal does not increase the number of traffic lanes;
- any future increase in travel demand, through and in the area is deemed likely to be satisfied principally by increased public transport...which can be accommodated at the expense of parking without the need for road widening;
- the proposed amenity improvements, principally the provision of additional pedestrian crossings...counter any reductions in travel time that may accrue to increased use of public transport (Wellington City Council, 2010 March, p. 5).

The Council report requested a Committee decision on a revised option for implementation, stating that the likelihood of gaining a subsidy was now extremely low due to:
…NZTA’s reliance on cost-benefit assessment mechanisms, which are primarily based on travel time savings…(and which) do not take sufficient account of the benefits to pedestrians and public transport or the related urban development outcomes that are identified in the Framework as the primary objectives of the road widening… (Wellington City Council, 2010 March, p. 5)

This statement supports opinions put forward by many interviewees that improvements for non-vehicle modes of travel, and wider urban development benefits had less weighting in funding decisions, making it more difficult to acquire funding. In this case the wider urban improvements were seen as reducing the financial viability of the overall project.

The high expense of road widening was not balanced by major benefits for vehicle flow and safety even though wider urban improvements, especially for non-vehicle modes, could be achieved. Inclusion of signalised crossings for instance, while increasing safety for pedestrians worked against the vehicle flow efficiencies that were such an important part of the BCR assessment. The Transport Network Manager explained this counter-productive situation:

...you’ve got some competing needs...for pedestrians you look at providing signals...but as soon as you introduce traffic signals, you actually inherently slow down the [traffic]...So the benefits...in terms of widening the road and putting more traffic lanes in is usually swallowed up by stopping the traffic to allow pedestrians to get across and to allow side traffic to get out...

Two interviewees agreed that there was probably insufficient justification for the widening on the basis of the minimal benefits expected by the New Zealand Transport Agency.

I can understand why NZTA would say there probably wasn’t sufficient justification to spend that much money for the benefit that we were going to get.

...we’ve done some modelling work around what the value of those improvements [road widening] are in terms of transport efficiencies and safety and they don’t stack up in terms of the cost of the overall project, the cost of buying land and the physical works...

One interviewee raised the possibility of different values being assigned to different modes in funding decisions. He proffered that walking in your local community was not valued and that
You were only ‘counted’ for travel to work or shops, especially in a vehicle. The interviewee also suggested that NZTA ‘value’ public transport users less than private vehicle users because of assumptions around the greater economic value of people who own their own car.

... I mean you’re not going anywhere so you’re not being economically useful, so the benefit/cost ratio you’re not counted.

...the way you measure the benefits of infrastructure improvements is if you’re reducing delays, then there is an economic benefit because people are able to get to work and make money. Whereas, why would you encourage people to hang around and not make money... I’m not sure if NZTA still do that, but...they valued the time of private car users higher than public transport users, because they are likely to be richer and hence there is more economic cost of delaying someone in their BMW.

Not long after the Christchurch February 22nd earthquake in 2011, the Project Manager asked: “How will NZTA look at subsidies for these programmes now given the significant expenditure required in Christchurch, alongside the significant expenditure on RoNS projects?” His concern was that further reprioritisation of transport funding toward rebuilding Christchurch’s transport network may occur (February 2011 Meeting Notes – Project Manager).

Central Government Influence

Some interviewees described Government policy changes led by the National Government elected in late 2008 as contributing factors to the loss of subsidy. They described a government policy shift away from local urban development improvements toward prioritising vehicle movement on national roads to increase economic productivity. The Government had instituted a national transport focus prioritising Roads of National Significance (RoNS), including the Basin Reserve on State Highway One adjacent to Adelaide Road. The Government, early in its tenure also replaced the first Government Policy Statement (GPS) on transport created by the Labour Government in 2008 (Ministry of Transport, 2008 August). The previous GPS with a greater focus on multi-modal, sustainable travel, changed to a GPS with a focus on economic productivity (Ministry of Transport, 2009 May).
...the only thing that I could put it down to [the loss of funding] was a change in government... basically, they changed the GPS and money is all going into Roads of National Significance...

...losing the funding basically comes down to...a change in government priorities and we see that in so many areas and I know that that’s felt by councils up and down the country.

It [NZTA] doesn’t [fund these projects], well certainly not any more...certainly once the change of government occurred, and it’s not a Road of National Significance...

Some interviewees shared their belief that national roads receive priority over local roads and public transport, especially in regard to funding decisions by the NZTA, making it difficult for councils to implement local improvements.

...if you’re talking about a state highway, well a lot of money flows into that...millions and millions of dollars for Basin Reserve Flyover, tunnels...but something as simple as realigning a bus lane...we have to find the funding ourselves..

...there’s so much emphasis on doing improvements to the State Highway...there’s no new money...it’s just a shifting of the money...it does give a squeeze on these projects because they want to spend it on ones which show bigger benefits.

There was a perception that central government does not value the contribution of local urban improvements to the economy and to city life as much they value between-city movements through the state highway network, especially on Roads of National Significance.

...because it’s a state highway it has this elevated role, and ...that’s [Adelaide road] seen as local whereas a state highway is seen as national significance...state highways are about getting between cities...somehow more important than getting about within cities...

...they really spend a hell of a lot more money on state highways than on local roads, and this is a local road, and the only way that we can sort of tease it out...is it’s a direct connection to the hospital, a regional facility...

Early in planning, the adjacent Basin Reserve improvements were disaggregated from Adelaide Road in terms of the funding and package of works. Some attributed this to the Basin Project getting too big, but ultimately the Basin was viewed as part of the state highway network, whereas Adelaide Road was a local road.
(NZTA) were making really positive sounds because it was so connected with the Basin Reserve improvements... at one stage it was all in one big package of roading improvements...

There was a movement...to get NZTA to actually adopt this as part of the Basin Reserve project and...no...it was in their view already growing too big as a project and they didn’t want to...but clearly...the interlinkages are crucial...one without the other isn’t going to make sense.

Planning Failures

The majority of interviewees, including planners, went into considerable detail describing a lack of planning and funding analysis on the feasibility of road widening. A number of interviewees referred to road widening as just a ‘picture’ in the framework, and one that lacked the detail necessary to give confidence on implementation.

It’s just that missing stage of analysis. This was only ever a strategic plan...What should have happened next was...more analysis of those options, confirm the preferred option and then deliver...it was really only a picture, with half a day’s work behind it...it needed to have more detail...decisions were made when perhaps they needed a little more forethought.

That [Framework] ...is a community conversation about...a consensus driven as opposed to an evidence-based outcome...the level of technical rigour behind the assumptions...and the economic feasibility of what you’re proposing in terms of ‘a picture’ is the missing element...the assessment and the assumptions, they are rule of thumb applications as opposed to understanding the site.

...when there’s...going to be a substantive cost you really need...more of that analysis before it becomes such an ingrained part of your bigger strategic plan.

...the plans identified that it would be beneficial to develop a wider street...but at the end of the day they can’t afford it. So should we have recognised that in the [Framework], or is it teased out by a process like this?

Some staff drew a parallel between planners’ more idealistic views and project-focused staff having more practical views.
people are a little bit daunted by pretty pictures coming out as... ‘this is what we’re aiming to achieve’, but for the hard and fast practical people who are doing operational business...the reality is that that’s a long way removed from where we are currently.

Well in terms of the workshop and the planning, you come from a more idealistic view about what you actually want to achieve... those elements [major road widening] are very expensive, so in reality you’re never going to do them, but at the same time you don’t want to...lose sight of them because...there might be the opportunity to do it.

...a fairly major role of the PMO is taking...a good idea and a concept and actually saying ‘this is what will work’..., and I think that bit...was missing [from planning].

Three interviewees highlighted the pressure of Council’s own funding allocation processes and that staff may have been overly optimistic that funding would be allocated from both Council and the NZTA.

...there was...a rush to try and take the key budget implications out of the plan and into the LTCCP. It needed to go through another step before we set the budgets...and it was a bit of a guesstimate...21 million...had everyone’s hearts racing because ‘Oh my god’...how are we going to afford that?

If you...don’t meet their time lines...then you miss out...it hasn’t been very well linked in; I guess there was an assumption that the funding would just be allocated when the plan was signed off...it’s one of the big learnings...

It was perhaps a little optimistic of Council to expect it [NZTA funding] to happen anyway...

The Project Manager implied that the necessary planning work to increase implementation certainty hadn’t been done, but was left until after the Framework’s finalisation. He explained that the Project Management Office (PMO) often had to pick up the pieces, and that feasibility needed to be assessed at an earlier stage before a public commitment was made. In his opinion the Framework’s options for Adelaide Road would not have passed early tests and that a lack of realistic planning set up implementation to fail (May 2010 – Meeting Notes – Project Manager).

Before...committing ourselves down a line which actually ultimately we couldn’t deliver on...I think there was a fairly clear view...it’s just...a little bit, not pie in the sky, but hadn’t really been thought through in terms of how it
could literally be delivered.... there wasn’t a hard dose of reality bought to the process.

...it comes back to... doing the work that’s necessary to take a good idea and turn it in to a realistic project...grounded in reality....

Planning staff while admitting a lack of detailed analysis for the road widening and budget still emphasised that considerable planning research was accumulated supporting the general direction of the Framework. A compilation of Council background research on place-based planning approaches supports this (see Table 8 Chapter 6), as does the New Zealand Planning Institute Award presented to Council (New Zealand Planning Institute, 2009).

...and very far back, looking at the documents that have come out of that [Framework] the amount of research that has gone into that...is excellent, and has informed a lot of the decisions that get made.

Deciding on the option

In response to the loss of subsidy Council reconsidered options for the Adelaide Road improvements. The implementation report to Council’s Strategy and Policy Sub-Committee explained that continuing widening without the full subsidy would require Council funding an additional nine million dollars. Three options for the Committees’ consideration were outlined:

**Option One:** Continuing with the road widening, but with acquisition and works staged over a longer period.

**Option Two:** Improving the John Street intersection, alongside installation of bus priority lanes only.

**Option Three:** Revising a general programme of improvements without the road-widening (Wellington City Council, 2010 March).

Officers recommended that Councillors agree to Option Three, which they subsequently did. The Project Manager described what happened:
...we said... ‘if you want to carry on and achieve the original objective...the Council itself has got to pay more money... and are you up for that, and if you're not, here are some options?’...Council demonstrated that it didn't have an appetite to put more money in...so we’ve ended up with a more constrained project...that better fits the funding...

Carrying this decision through into the budget debate alongside the 2010/2011 Annual Plan was not as simple. The vote for implementing Option Three was close (9:6), with six Councillors voting against any work along the whole corridor. In the view of one interviewee some dissenting Councillors preferred abandoning the project and using the money for other purposes.

When we had the budget debate... one [option] was to essentially abandon the project, but thankfully the majority of us said yes to it [option three]. But there were a few who said we should just abandon it, which would have been a kick in the teeth to the consultation process and all the work that’s been done as well as to the Urban Development Strategy.

...it was... only a 9:6 vote to keep the funding in at all...people as I said were probably saying ‘let’s cannibalise this money and use it for something completely unrelated’...one or two of them... had aspirations to build a pool at Kilbirnie, which was not exactly the way that you do urban planning.

Interviewees discussed the Sub-Committee’s decision to choose Option Three in relation to the ongoing costs and uncertainty of potential road widening benefits. The Project Manager believed that some Councillors were not prepared to spend an extra ten million dollars for benefits they were uncertain of (May 2010 – Meeting Notes – Project Manager).

...they didn’t want to spend that level of money...because there’s no appetite to do that in terms of the budget...and so...they said that they’d rather try and achieve it for a smaller budget and accept those constraints...

I suspect...there were some sceptical councillors already. That’s probably where they were coming from... ‘do I want to put an extra ten million in...for something that...we don’t know for sure will happen?’...
General impacts of an ‘unwidened’ corridor

Interviewees had mixed views on the impact of the loss of subsidy and the move away from a significant road widening programme. Some interviewees suggested that despite this, Adelaide Road would develop in a positive direction due to its location in the city, its functional transport role, the District Plan changes set in motion, and other actions that would continue to be taken in line with the Framework.

*I don’t think it’ll change the nature of the corridor, it is a transport corridor...having buses and cycling and passenger transport along there will still be facilitated...businesses...will always have ground floor commercial, retail...residential would be elevated...in terms of planning controls.*

*...decisions [are] being made in line with the plan all along the way that’s actually going to have a significant benefit in the future...whether the roads smaller, not as wide as it was, I don’t think it is critical...*

*... the more space we’ve got, the more ability we have to separate modes and create that really nice boulevard, but we’re still providing nearly all of those, we’ll still get ninety percent of the benefit for half the cost...*

However many interviewees believed that the change would undermine the Framework’s broader goals. In discussing Option Three, some described the negative impact for the achievement of wider outcomes, and a potential reduction in the quality of improvements over all.

*...you lose a whole lot of integrated outcomes purely because...they [NZTA] only fund one element of it...*

*...delivering the road widening and infrastructure project Council clearly is the leader...[but] you could actually achieve a lot else if you think about your wider opportunities...*

*...we’re doing the...infrastructural piece... not as well as we would have liked, but we’re going to make sure that we do it as well as we can, and try to incorporate some integrated thinking...*

Some interviewees described a likely reduced ability to improve the public realm, due to less space for landscaping and street furniture, the utilisation of more basic materials, and a general reduction in the proportions necessary to deliver high quality outcomes.
...the main losers from this are partly the quality of the street... we’re probably just going to be playing around with some very ordinary materials...it takes away the chance to do something a bit more imaginative...the opportunity to make something a good public space is probably going to get lost first...

...you can’t do all this other nice stuff...you can’t create a nice wide tree boulevard

...it is watered down and you couldn’t obviously call it a boulevard... we just haven’t been able to produce the proportions...

Part of me still says that it’s going to be an improvement...I’m just worried...that it’s going to be sub-optimal...the whole idea of squishing as much as we can into the corridor...

The loss of planned subsidy, in some ways was considered to speed up of the schedule of planned road improvements, due to fewer requirements to negotiate property purchases. The bringing forward of side street improvements at Drummond Street (a priority two in the implementation plan) was another positive effect of the slow progress at key intersections such as John Street. However, apart from the speeding up some capital works, Option Three, without comprehensive road widening was described as probably resulting in a longer time frame to achieve the Framework’s overarching development vision. Widening the length of the road was seen as a potential catalyst for property owners to change the nature of their properties in line with the Framework’s vision.

In terms of pace of development...[widening] might have been the crisis that made them... have to do something... ‘well I’ve got this 2 storey building, and I’m losing the car park at the front...but now that I have to do something well it might be a good time to put a six storey apartment building in there...

... without [widening] happening... there’s less of that immediate incentive...

There’s not that trigger for redevelopment...it’ll happen over a much longer time frame.

...Adelaide Road will get there by its own natural forces...but whether that’s a good outcome...something that takes 40 years as opposed to something that takes twenty.

Council, stakeholders and the public invested a large amount of time and energy into agreeing the future for Adelaide Road throughout the planning phase. Interviewees raised concerns
about negative perceptions that could be generated from changing Adelaide Road plans and for similar Council place-based plans.

So…you can’t create a nice wide tree boulevard… well part of me says I understand that and another part of me says, but politicians and the public who were consulted extensively…don’t think that… We risk alienating a whole lot of people…who are going to say ‘well that’s not what you promised us’…

The Transport Network Manager described his concern that public expectations are not necessarily in line with what Council organisation considers achievable or realistic, and that Council needs to be more careful communicating its commitments. The Councillor however raised the legitimacy of communities’ expectations, and the importance of making progress toward the agreed vision.

…we can churn them out [plans] …and we do quite a good job of them…but often we fall short because we don’t deliver on them… I expect [we] should be…more clear and maybe not so optimistic in terms of what we’re going to achieve.

…any time you start engaging with the public…you’re raising their expectation…and as much as you might try and play that down…you’re creating a lot of expectation and I sometimes think we don’t think that through enough.

…the risk is embarrassment…where someone says in four to five years time ‘look you did all this wonderful planning, what’s happened?’…I mean if you get yourself into that position you lose faith in your own planning processes…The community will lose faith and if you’re thinking about doing any other planning exercises…they’ll go ‘look why should we bother?’ And I think that’d be a legitimate question…

**Conclusion**

This chapter has summarised important aspects of the planning process for the Adelaide Road Framework and its early implementation, and has detailed the first major challenge to the Framework’s plan to widen Adelaide Road from the Basin Reserve to the John Street Intersection. In essence, the reduced likelihood of a significant NZTA subsidy resulted in Council amending its plans for Adelaide Road, moving away from significant road widening and focusing instead on a narrowed set of improvements in the area. Road widening in the
revised option was restricted to enabling intersection improvements. The change in plans had the potential to reshape the transport and wider urban development outcomes sought by the Framework, and as such was a significant event in early implementation.

Chapter Five explores in more detail how Council set about assigning space in the narrower version of the road corridor, and the potential impacts of decisions on different transport modes. It also explores broader political and organisational hurdles to the ongoing implementation of the Framework’s objectives from interviewees’ perspectives.
Chapter Five: Results - The Changing Design

Introduction

This chapter outlines interviewees’ accounts of the implications across transport modes of not widening Adelaide Road, and summarises key conflicts, issues and decisions during the development of detailed designs for the revised road improvements. These are grouped into sections entitled: Sharing the Space: pedestrians, cyclists, public transport, parking; and interactions with business and landowners. The chapter also describes broader issues raised by interviewees in moving the Framework from a ‘vision’ to reality, including Council organisational and political challenges and differing viewpoints on some Framework priorities.

Sharing the Space - Pedestrians

A key concept of the Framework was to improve the movement network and safety for all transport modes without changing the role of Adelaide Road as a key arterial. Improved pedestrian movement and flow through widening and reconfiguring the corridor was to make:

…journeys safer, more pleasant, interesting and direct by making pedestrian routes clearer and safer, proving pedestrian crossing points at strategic locations along Adelaide road, providing regular visible micro-open spaces at key places along movement routes…(Wellington City Council, 2008 November, p. 19).

Keeping the existing width however meant that the space available for pedestrians would not increase and in some parts of the road less space would be available. The revised programme of works included narrowed bus lanes and some narrowing of pedestrian paths in part to accommodate the priority of retaining permanent parking (but at the expense of cycling and walking improvements) on the Western side of Adelaide Road (July 2010 - Meeting Notes).
The initial plans had enabled a footpath of between three and four metres, however without road widening, these now needed to be ‘squeezed’ at various points to ensure that dedicated bus lanes, travelling lanes and parking on the Western side could be achieved. Council also wanted to make a feature of the existing straight corridor through a clear avenue of sightlines and trees. This meant that any potential kink in the road corridor could detract from this feature and so the project working group agreed that the footpath would be narrowed or moved at various points. The urban design consultants were expected to address any issues created through these ‘narrowings’ (October 2010, February 2011- Meeting Notes).

Interviewees described the potential impact of less footpath space on pedestrians’ walking experience and on the ability to incorporate street planting.

...we’ve had to squeeze the footpaths...(which) is still a generous footpath in terms of providing for people to move through, but it’s not generous in terms of creating a feel of, you know, ‘opulence... It’s not far from what’s there now, it’s three metres in parts...in reality it’s probably a little bit narrower...

...we just don’t have the generosity of space for people to congregate... to pull to the side and have conversations...

The opportunity to have say planting both in the middle and the sides has been reduced...there’s probably less opportunity for both widening the paths here or for creating little pocket parks on corners.

One of the planned road improvements for pedestrians included the introduction of two more sets of traffic signals.

...for pedestrians we’re increasing the formal pedestrian crossings so we’ve introduced two new sets of signals here to help people get across the road.

The need for further traffic signals was largely a function of projected increases to residential population resulting from more intensive development, signalled in the Framework. This would increase the number of pedestrians and side-street traffic wanting to cross or enter Adelaide Road (July 2010 – Meeting Notes). However, while signals would make it easier and safer for pedestrians to cross the road, and would allow more side traffic to enter and exit, they would also slow and interrupt traffic flows particularly at commuter times. This, as described in the previous chapter, had a negative effect on the project’s benefit cost ratio (BCR) due to the associated reduction in vehicle flow efficiencies.
...obviously in that scenario you don’t get the travel time benefits for the majority of the vehicles that are moving through that area...the benefit...is usually swallowed up by stopping the traffic to allow pedestrians to get across and to allow side traffic to get out.

Another benefit for pedestrians, outlined in the transport options report for the road (Opus International Consultants, 2010a February, pp. 61-67), was the creation of a central raised median strip. Alongside offering safe refuge points for pedestrians not utilising the traffic signals, it would protect all road users from traffic attempting to turn across the road into incoming vehicles.

*Primarily it’s to reduce turning movements into all these businesses...from a safety perspective because you’ve got two lanes of traffic to cross.*

The working group decided that pedestrians would not be encouraged to jay walk outside of the signalised crossings, but if they did it was important it could be done safely. The Transport Network Manager specifically took the position of making the medians safe but not providing encouragement to pedestrians.

*It provides a facility... for pedestrians to get across the street... a safe refuge...but you don’t promote it by putting footpath materials in... no, it’s for the fleet - footed able - bodied.*

The idea of the median not being designed to encourage casual crossing led to some conflict in the project team. This was demonstrated at the northern end of Adelaide Road at a Bus stop opposite the McDonalds (see Fig. 7 over).
The designers wanted to have an improved median at this location due to the likelihood of casual crossings. The bus stop was described as often having a large number of young people congregating before and after school. The Project Manager explained:

*People do not get off the bus, go back down the road to the lights and then back up to McDonalds. They cross at the bus stop once the bus has moved on – it’s what people will do.* (April 2011 – Meeting Notes)

The designers wanted to safely enable this through a paved refuge in the median; however transport was of the view that this would promote casual crossing. This latter view ultimately won out with a decision to have the majority of the median planted with crushed lime in spots where crossing might be likely, and definitely no paving or spacious refuge. The consultant designers expressed their disagreement (April 2011 – Meeting Notes).

**Sharing the Space - Cyclists**

Improving the environment for cyclists was also an important element of the Framework. It aimed to increase safety “by minimising conflicts between different modes of transport including vehicles, passenger transport and pedestrians” (Wellington City Council, 2008 November, pp. 18-19). The primary design feature was “one much wider lane provided in each direction for cyclists to share with buses” (p. 19).
The Framework also described a longer-term vision (Fig. 9) of a “dedicated cycle lane between on-street parking and general vehicle travel lane”, and “dedicated bus lanes…in the centre of the road…(which) could be possibly replaced with a higher quality bus service or light rail if appropriate in the future” (Wellington City Council, 2008 November, p. 21).

![Figure 9: Adelaide Road corridor - Possible longer-term vision](image)

(Wellington City Council, 2008 November, p. 21)

The Transport Network Manager explained that the Framework’s long – term vision, which had included scope for providing a dedicated cycle track, was no longer tenable.

...that opportunity was in the wider road, so if you want to have a dedicated cycle facility then you need to go back to your colleagues and get support for the wider corridor.

A wider corridor also allowed a shared bus/cycle lane of approximately 4.2 metres wide, allowing buses and cyclists to safely pass each other and travel side-by-side without crossing into other traffic lanes.

...we had a bus lane of 4.2 metres. 4.2 metres comes from the fact that you can run a bus and a cycle alongside each other. They’re not separated lanes...but a cycle and a bus can co-exist in 4.2.
The return to the existing road width resulted in significant narrowing of the proposed shared bus/cycle lane. Space was crimped by removing car parking from the Eastern side of the road, and reducing footpath and median width. The requirement to maintain a straight corridor of trees and sightlines also contributed to the need for narrower bus lanes and squeezing of footpaths at certain points (October 2010, February 2011 – Meeting Notes).

Council had to decide how much width could be taken from the lane, while still enabling cyclists and buses to safely share the space. The project team concluded that the safest option was to return to a very narrow bus lane (three metres), where cyclists and buses would not have the option of passing each other. This decision was made on the basis that either cyclist and/or buses could overtake without going into other traffic lanes or it was best not enabled at all, through significantly reducing the width. In this scenario, cyclists and buses would have to make a clear signal before leaving their lane.

...if you go to...4 metres or 3.9 then it becomes a bit of a squeeze for the cyclist and the bus and so we erred [on the side of caution] to go down to 3 - 3 ½...because then the cyclists are forced to stay in the lane...they have to come out of their lane to pass the bus and vice versa and...that’s safer than giving them a false expectation that they can both pass ... there is no halfway house between 3, 3-½ metre to the 4.2, 4.5 metre.

...if it’s really narrow they’ve actually got to signal and pull out in to the other lane which is safer in [transports’] view.

Interviewees highlighted the narrowing of the bus/cycle lane as a significant compromise in the design, with cyclists being the biggest losers.

...the whole idea of squishing as much as we can into the corridor.....someone’s going to come off worse and it’s probably going to be the cyclists.

Beyond buses and cyclists not being able to safely pass each other in the narrower lane, interviewees also raised the perception that the narrower lane would result in no benefits over and above what currently exists for cyclists, if not a potential reduction in overall safety. However one interviewee justified this on the basis that it was at least consistent with the levels of service elsewhere in the city and that the city did not have the necessary width of corridors to support separate cycling facilities.
...you're going to end up with buses and bikes not able to pass each other... unless the traffic volumes are low enough to allow them to pass safely... it's a less safe arrangement and also slightly more frustrating arrangement than there is currently.

...the main losers are going to be cyclists because rather than sort of four metre bus/cycle lanes which theoretically do work for cyclists... these are now just going to be a bus lane and cyclists are going to do just as they do at the moment.

...they'd [cyclists] rather have a dedicated facility on their own, but we've had to compromise on that score. But at the same time I don’t think that is terribly bad, because a lot of our networks across the city, that’s what we achieve anyway, so...it is consistent...

Parking was raised as a key barrier to enabling a shared bus/cycle lane. If both parking lanes had been removed, more space could have been provided for footpaths and the wider bus/cycle lane. One interviewee highlighted that achieving the wider bus lanes within the existing width was always feasible, so long as parking was removed. A councillor supported this view.

You can do it [bus lanes] within the existing carriageway if you just remove the parking, so without any change to the space available for cars...it’s...an entirely possible thing.

...there’s a debate about parking spaces, having them on one side or taking them out and frankly I would tend to the view of making the bus and cycle lane wider and remove the car parking off both sides...the lane widths...for the bus and cycle lanes, are if you put parking in, sub optimal, so the question is how do you widen those and provide more space for the buses and the bikes and less for...well take parking away.

The Project Manager questioned whether Councillors understood that Option Three, by retaining parking, would put buses in direct conflict with cyclists. However direct approaches from Councillors to staff regarding these concerns demonstrate that at least two Councillors knew this to be an issue and were sufficiently concerned to raise it directly with staff (July 2010 – Meeting Notes).

... I mentioned we’ve had [Councillor ‘x’] and [Councillor ‘y’] sort of quizzing... saying well you know that’s not very safe for cyclists ...and they’re right.
Some interviewees commented on the relative priority given to different transport modes in plans for the Road. One interviewee made it clear that improvements must focus on improving the space for public transport alongside cyclists.

*They’re the most vulnerable … cyclists are always going to come off worse when they get hit by a bus…this is what the corridor debate is about… it should improve most for public transport and cyclists.*

Other interviewees emphasised that improvements and priority for investment should focus on public transport and walking, and that cycling, while needing to be managed in the space was less important due to the smaller number of cyclists compared to other modes.

*…the challenge will be the compatibility between cycling and other forms of vehicle movement…It is…the primary corridor for buses…the issue is how do you manage cycling in that space.*

*Cycling is so much in the margin…you can’t make the same inroads. They [cyclist] see that as a viable mode and…it is in its own right. But in terms of the money…available and the improvements we can make, we get a bigger bang for our buck out of public transport and walking.*

Council’s response to cycling safety was described as focusing on increasing safety for current cyclists but not actively encouraging cycling. One interviewee suggested that until space was taken away from cars e.g. through parking or number of vehicle lanes, cycling would become more dangerous. Their assumption that removing parking was “politically untenable” is examined later in this thesis.

*… cyclists get forgotten… we weren’t going out to encourage more cycling, we were going to make it safer…maybe in the long term we’ll do some research into encouraging that but at the moment, cycling is dangerous and the only way to make it less dangerous is probably to take some space away from cars…and that’s politically untenable… since then…cycling has increased…and I don’t know if we’ve actually done much for safety…we do need to start taking cycling seriously.*
Sharing the Space - Public Transport

The Framework’s plan of road widening and reconfiguration was also intended to contribute to public transport, through enhanced road capacity. It outlined a review of bus stop locations, and potential reconfigurations of the road to cater for future public transport initiatives such as light rail.

Bus priority and the development of full-time bus lanes had been signalled in Council’s Bus Priority Plan (Wellington City Council, 2007). Adelaide Road initially had a single bus lane extending approximately 200m north of John Street, toward the Basin Reserve. The lane was prioritised for buses (and cyclists) through a clearway between 7:00am and 9:00am, and outside of these times was available for general traffic or parking. In 2011 the Strategy and Policy committee also approved, “A southbound evening bus lane on Adelaide Road from 4pm to 6pm weekdays between Rugby Street and John Street” (Wellington City Council, 2011, p. 3).

The ability to use the bus lane, as an additional vehicle lane, outside of peak time was discussed by the Transport Manager who concluded that extra space (outside of peak time) for private vehicles was not required. Instead he emphasised the importance of encouraging mode shift to public transport, and the consequences of not doing so.

...the question is ‘is that a full-time bus lane, or is it a part-time one?’...the dilemma...is that you actually need the capacity at peak times, so you need the two traffic lanes at the time when you’ve got a bus lane. There’s no use giving it back to the traffic afterwards because they don’t really need it...

...well, in the network we can’t build our way out of providing for the demand for people to go by private transport...we need people to shift to public transport and we’ll increase the amount of priority...and we’ll make it more attractive...But unless we get that shift...we won’t be able to manage the number of people wanting to move around.

One interviewee shared his belief that improvements to public transport would always play second fiddle to providing for private vehicles and that this was reinforced by central government’s approach to transport planning in New Zealand.
...we are hamstrung... as urban designers [we] might have grand visions for how we can integrate transport and land-use planning and also changing attitudes...but really when central government has the attitude that ‘the car is king’ and will continue to be so, then public transport is very far down the list...

The long-term vision for Adelaide Road included potential for dedicated/permanent bus lanes and cycle lanes in both the North and South direction (Wellington City Council, 2008 November, p. 21).

The Project Manager however, described a move to permanent lanes as “questionable” (July 2010 – Meeting Notes). The reason given was that patronage off peak had not yet provided a ‘tipping point’ for a move to permanent bus lanes and that plans for permanent bus lanes would only result from greater density and associated increases in public transport use. While Option Three detailed two permanent bus lanes it was likely that in the medium term, these would be a bus lane during peak hours with cars and/or parking sharing the space alongside cyclists during off peak hours.

A report to the Strategy and Policy Committee in 2011 outlined the Council’s position:

Where justified by demand, or safety considerations, or where road space is not required for other traffic then bus lanes are operational 24/7…In other cases where there is a clear peak bus demand and there are other competing demands for road space, e.g. kerbside parking, then the bus lane will operate only at peak times …There is also a strong emphasis on minimising adverse impacts on other road users, so that for example where there is established kerbside parking then every effort is made to retain this…by the use of peak hour (Wellington City Council, 2011).

Given the gaps in the permanent bus lane network across the city, it was unlikely that the Adelaide Road lanes would become permanent before more central city areas (February 2011 – Meeting Notes).

*They...would phase in the bus lanes so that out of peak period, you would originally have them for peak period both directions north and south bound and then you would gradually phase in...[full time lanes].*

Interviewees highlighted this demand-driven approach, and differing views as to the likelihood of a permanent bus lane on the city-bound side. There was general agreement that
peak only bus lane was all that was required on the Eastern side due to the need for off-peak parking.

*We can probably only realistically get these schemes over the line if there’s a demand for them... it’s not at a point where...that could be purely dedicated to buses... we already run a bus lane in the morning direction so to complement that with an evening one is fine.*

...on the western side...because we’ve got permanent parking, we can make this [bus lane] permanent. Going in to the city [Transport’s] view is it should be permanent. But on the other side it has to...be peak time ... so that these businesses still have access to some parking.

The Transport Manager explained that the western side would effectively be a permanent travelling lane due to the permanent parking made available on that side in designs.

*...in the short term...these will be part-time bus lanes. The western side...it will be a full time bus lane and travelling lane, but on the eastern side because we haven’t got the parking and we don’t need it necessarily to move buses during the off peak...then we’ll turn that back to parking...*

He went on to highlight that while a gradual move to permanent lanes would improve bus reliability and encourage bus usage, the whole network could be put in immediately if the vision was accepted, but losing parking would create significant challenges.

*...that’s what we’re going to find with all our bus priority stuff, it won’t actually be taking street space away from private motorists but it’ll be taking it away from parking...we’re trying to make the bus more reliable in terms of timing... more attractive...you could put that whole network in today...if you accept the vision, but the reality is there’d be quite a bit of opposition to it because they’d be losing the convenience of parking....*

He also raised that in getting some issues ‘across the line’, the idea of full-time bus lanes was introduced to the Committee without implementation details such as: impacts on other modes and the staged approach to bus lanes, as too much information had the potential to “sink the ship”.

*...when it goes to Committee...it’s sort of seen as a full-time bus lane, full-time parking, but the subtleties about how you’re going to manage it gets lost...it’s that old story of too much detail can sink the ship. It’s just the main message...to get it across the line...It’s not that you’re trying to keep it from*
them, it’s just that you’re trying to get the main message that it’s got public transport, it’s got the general traffic.

Future Public Transport Options

Light rail from Wellington Railway station through to the hospital and airport was mooted through the Ngaurangana to Airport Corridor plan (Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2008, p. 11). The Framework included potential for light rail (Wellington City Council, 2008 November, p. 21), and the study to officially investigate the option commenced in 2010 led by Greater Wellington.

One interviewee was concerned that maintaining the existing width might reduce future potential for light rail, or make it more contestable given the loss of off-peak parking that might occur as a result.

...there’s less scope in the long run for returning to light rail – there was always a lot of lip service to the idea that once we’ve got dedicated bus lanes, then we’ve got the corridor for light rail, but... there’s probably going to be more contention between the transit and the parked cars in this case than the wider one...it’s more likely to be a battle in the future...

The Project Manager indicated that the existing width would still be sufficient for future light rail. However he explained that this could be more difficult to achieve as ideally light rail would run down the middle of the corridor, as the inside lane is less suited to light rail. The project team would ensure that this was ‘future proofed’ in the design but would not amend plans to second-guess what may or may not happen in the future (October 2010 – Meeting Notes).

Sharing the Space - Parking

Parking was included under the Framework’s movement network outcome: improving the corridor for multiple forms of transport, and was an important aspect to be negotiated in the road layout. Activities included:

…undertaking a parking study for Adelaide Road…encouraging on-street
Parking (during the day) to...support employment/business uses, and other parking to be integrated into the overall design of new developments...(Wellington City Council, 2008 November, p. 19)

Parking was also addressed under mix of use outcomes: “Recognising and protecting employment opportunities while enabling a transition to suitable ‘new economy’ activities”, and “Providing for more intensive high-quality residential growth along the northern part of Adelaide Road” (2008 November, pp. 23-24). Key concepts included: attracting businesses and institutions through providing good parking as well as parking that supported more intensive residential development.

Opportunities to encourage landowners to relocate car parking to the rear of sites as part of future redevelopment were also flagged within Council’s role in facilitating development (2008 November, p. 29).

The original widened road concept allowed for provision of permanent on-street parking and street trees at regular intervals on both sides of the street. After reverting to a smaller width, the decision was made to retain parking on the Western side, and to remove permanent parking on the Eastern side. On the Western side, this one lane of permanent parking would provide more parking than the off-peak parking previously available.

...we’ve had to...give up one of the parking lanes, narrow the footpaths to get a full time bus lane in each direction, a parking lane and two travelling lanes...we took one parking lane out on the Eastern side. It’s only on the Western side because we can provide more parks...

The road widening option had required the removal of some business frontages, in some instances used for off-street parking. No longer requiring this land enabled these landowners to continue to use their frontages for parking, and to get the benefits of that space, alongside permanent parking on the Western side.

...there’s probably a few who were using their frontages for car parking...I think without that happening [road widening] they can just carry on with the hire places and car yards and panel beaters and stuff ...

After approving Option Three, two Councillors approached staff requesting that removal of parking on the Western side be reconsidered, to enable the creation of wider (4.2m) cycle/bus
lanes. While the Project Manager was sympathetic, management directed staff to continue to work toward the mandate given through the Committee’s approval of Option Three. The decision was made not to re-litigate the decision unless the matter was subject to a re-vote, and that staff were to focus on putting the option out for tender (July 2010 – Meeting Notes).

...to take all the parking out...it's beyond the scope of what we’ve had approved...

Another reason as to why this decision could not be reviewed was the potential for political pressure related to ensuring access to businesses.

...we’ve provided some parking... so you address those businesses...that are concerned about loss of parking because otherwise that's a whole political issue...that’s why I don’t see that that can be relitigated.

...the issue ...is parking, the management of parking and businesses, and access to them is going to be an issue going forward...whether the road is wider or not...

...it's about the businesses saying that they didn’t want to lose parking...and the general public...want access to those areas....They're going to have to give on the parking, because...they'll be peak time bus lanes...they need to make that adjustment in terms of their business activities...I could force that earlier [by removing parking]...but politically its probably going to be a bit of a push.

The potential to relook at parking also came up within the project team. Consultants were interested in exploring the removal of parking entirely by better utilising side streets. This would enable an extra lane of width and help to address other challenges regarding space for pedestrians and cyclists. However, this was deemed not consistent with future intensification of the sides.

...[the consultant] was saying... ’what if we can somehow remove this parking so that...we’ve got an extra lane to play with by...looking at how people park...on the side streets?’...But that's not consistent with bringing in more residents...So it’s funny, everyone...says they’re more than happy to lose parking but no one’s actually ready to bite the bullet and do that.

The Transport Network Manager explained that removal of car parking might happen over time as public transport demand grew as well as permanent bus lanes encouraging the behaviour change desired. However he explained the perception of valuable space being
assigned to just a few buses, particularly during off peak times. Instead permanent lanes and removal of parking could be gradually ramped up as demand grows and as businesses adjust to the planned future.

...the benefits here will be that you’ve actually put in place the public transport priority, and over time you ramp it up because as the number of buses grow...you’ll actually take the parking out. But as an interim you’re allowed to park in there and these businesses need to be told that in the future it will become a permanent lane and that they need to make that adjustment.

…it’s…. about managing what people have now, to changing their behaviour...and they’re saying they’re not ready to go there, and there’s not the need to go there, so why do we have to suffer this in the meantime...why should I give up my park for one or two buses?

**Interactions with Businesses and Landowners**

The changing road design had a number of implications for businesses and landowners that Council would need to manage. Council did not actively include businesses and the wider community in the design itself, instead taking the approach of informing property owners. In December 2010 property owners were sent a draft concept design and letter detailing Council’s ideal solution of a continuous median strip (with no right hand turns), the permanent bus lane concept and the removal of parking on the Eastern side (Feb 2011 – Meeting Notes).

Some businesses contacted Council prior to Christmas 2010, unhappy with the plans, and Council agreed to meet to discuss their concerns. The following issues became apparent:

Some did not feel consulted during the Adelaide Road Framework process.
Significant tension was identified between existing business needs (5-10 year) and future aspirations for the area (25-30 years), as well as Council issues in communicating these goals. Businesses had not picked up on the Framework’s suggested move away from the light industrial nature of the street, and a future that did not necessarily include them.
Council had not fully recognised difficulties in putting restrictions on businesses now, for an outcome to happen gradually over 15-25 years (Feb 2011 – Meeting Notes).
Businesses expressed concern that the continuous median would seriously impact on business access with people finding it too difficult to find a turning point, and instead driving past. Council decided to revisit the design despite believing the argument was spurious due to most people consciously choosing to go to these ‘destination businesses’. Initially Council looked at two extremes, the continuous median with no breaks, and breaks in the median for all major businesses. The design catering for all businesses was seen as ridiculous and a major safety concern (Feb 2011 – Meeting Notes).

The Transport Network Manager believed that Council still needed to compromise, however consultants did not agree due to potentially significant safety impacts on pedestrians, cyclists and general traffic (Feb 2011 – Meeting Notes). The project team agreed to explore a fall-back option out of a desire to meet the needs of businesses in the short/medium term. In part, the Project Manager considered a situation of ‘group think’ had occurred partly due to the domination of Transport’s view. Consultants explored a ‘u turn option’ but found that there was insufficient room to undertake this safely (Feb 2011 – Meeting Notes). The project team forged ahead approaching the issue on a block-by-block basis, ultimately deciding to accommodate right-hand turns in/out for vehicle-based businesses only, with the exclusion of the two end blocks due to proximity to major intersections.

The Project Manager expressed a growing tension between urban designers and Transport over this time. One member of the project team had left Council, and overall progress was slower than expected. However, the group aimed to provide business and property owners with a mock up of the compromise design (including rationale), and more detailed parking information by mid 2011 (Feb 2011 – Meeting Notes). The Project Manager explained that from this point on only minor tweaks could be made and there was to be no further consultation. A copy of the design was also sent to the Newtown Residents Association who in contrast to business, were primarily concerned for cyclists, pedestrian environments, public transport, as well as parking (October 2011 – Meeting Notes).

In the letter to property owners Council had not explained that the bus lane was a permanent ‘peak time only’ operation. Business owners thought that parking on the East side would be completely removed, crippling businesses. Council agreed to undertake immediate parking analysis and explore mitigation methods such as introducing strict time limits for parking to
encourage efficient use, but would not alter the permanent bus lanes during peak times (Feb 2011 – Meeting Notes).

Businesses were also concerned that trees would block business signage and obscure access. Council agreed to examine this, but only where there might be impacts for safety, particularly for pedestrian and cyclists and not on the basis of business pressure. A section-by-section review resulted in the removal of some street trees from the Eastern side. City-bound, trees were retained, but moved into footpaths to improve sightlines (February, April 2011 – Meeting Notes). While consultants wanted to retain an avenue of trees some staff were more willing to compromise to avoid further project delays. The Project Manager explained that making progress on the big picture and avoiding further delays might result in giving in on smaller issues, so long as safety was not compromised (October 2011 – Meeting Notes).

Through the section-by-section design process, Council still found that it needed to negotiate with around ten different property owners and tenants. These negotiations slowed the completion of the concept design, added uncertainty and increased costs. This also delayed Council’s ability to go back to property owners with definitive designs as promised (April 2011 – Meeting Notes). Negotiations had the potential to:

- impact on the attainment of an NZ Transport Agency (NZTA) subsidy if benefits to travel were eroded;
- require additional Council funding for property acquisition and overall build;
- result in rescinding of certain design principles.

Safety improvements at the John Street intersection required the purchase of a three-to-four metre strip of land on the northern corner of Adelaide Road and John Street involving three separate properties with one owner (Zip Plumbing, NZ Safety, and the ground floor of Loafers Lodge -a multi story building) (See Fig. 10 over). The land would enable an extra Southbound lane toward the intersection, which was intended to ease traffic flow and improve the pedestrian environment (July 2010 – Meeting Notes).
Council employed an architect to help the owner explore potential residential development above ZiP Plumbing as mixing of uses would fit with the Framework’s aspirations (Feb 2011 – Meeting Notes). A challenge emerged in terms of the ground floor of the Lodge, which required a colonnade to replace the existing footpath (the space being required for the additional vehicle lane). However, as the Lodge was a unit title building, any structural changes required the permission of all titleholders. In a stroke of luck there was only one other titleholder in the building, however if they did not agree to the changes, a compulsory purchase would be needed to override their rights, delaying the project further. Council saw the alternative of reducing the length of the widened carriageway as untenable due to reduced efficacy and safety at the intersection.

A financial offer from Council (based on the value of the land required) was made to the landowner. This was initially rejected however and there was little leeway to give more (October 2011 – Meeting Notes). If Council had undertaken compulsory purchase from the beginning there would be few doubts about progressing the work; however starting now, it would delay the project significantly by 12-18 months, with significant project management and timing ramifications. At the time Council felt there was more to be gained from working with landowners as it:

- was faster (normally);
- provided better outcomes for business; and
- influenced changes to land-use in context with the Framework. (October 2011-Meeting Notes).

In another example of business interests influencing the road improvements, a large area of road reserve (at the time utilised for retail parking) was required for landscaping. The business was for sale at the time and Council alerted existing and potential owners to the issue. The suggested design would remove the company’s Adelaide Road entrance (relying instead on a side street entrance) and would mean fewer car parks. The business claimed that 99% of their business came by private vehicle from the South and that this necessitated the ability to turn across Adelaide Road into the side street. This however, would be precluded by a proposed central median.

The project team agreed to explore a compromise, resulting in the reinstatement of the Adelaide Road entrance and reductions to the median. Consultants were not pleased with the compromise as the entrance was in the middle of a new signalised intersection and would result in vehicles turning through the intersection to access the business. The Project Manager stated that Council would reverse this position, should the landowner or land-use change in the future (April 2011 – Meeting Notes).

The development of detailed designs was influenced by differing viewpoints within the project working group and across Council, and through Council’s interaction with businesses. This resulted in a range of section-by-section compromises, some of which were not in line with the Framework’s broader objectives.

**Politics and Priorities**

Many interviewees also described the impact of broader organisational and political issues on implementation. These include: a lack of overarching coordination and championing, differing expectations of the Framework as a vision; the emergence of other Council priorities; and lack of agreement on Council’s role in actively facilitating development.
Staff discussed the ‘long-term’ nature of the Framework and that management had instructed staff to be careful in communicating this, allowing room for Council to adapt should implementation not go according to plan.

…it is a vision that may or may not come to pass… all we were ever really going to do was put in place some building blocks that may or may not… support the regeneration that we would like to see there…

…going into that finalisation stage… making the wording more general, making it very clear that this was a LONG term plan…that there was not necessarily any…commitment…well maybe that’s the wrong word but…that things might change…

The influence of management expectations as to what Council should implement given the financial situation and potential risks, versus what the Framework had set out to do, was raised by some staff.

…later in the process when… we were trying to work out ‘okay…what can council realistically do?’...the management board had very clear…ideas about how far Council should be taking these things…how much risk we should be taking, how much it’s going to cost.

…the CE [Chief Executive] specifically highlighted this project as one that could potentially blow the budget and had to be economically feasible and not be over ambitious, so there was a real concern about what liabilities are we setting Council up for…

Challenges in moving from planning to implementation were highlighted by a number of staff. The Director, in considering the level of buy-in to the Framework mentioned a lack of flow through to different parts of Council planning. Other staff also spoke of the challenges in taking the suggested actions through to the business of Council.

I would go ‘low’ [buy in]...because I could see none of the work picked up by any other parts of the organisation in terms of implementation or recognition in asset planning...So Council signed up...but it hadn’t really made its way in to...[implementation] ...

…it’s a bit like going to a training course...you’re going to come back and do them but you end up back in your old rut... you’ve already got your commitments…and the pressure is on the budgets all the time and to get a new injection of money…is very problematic.
One of the challenges is always trying to get Council singing from the same song sheet...parks, infrastructure, planning, district planning...it’s quite a lot of people to at least have their heads vaguely in with where you’re trying to get to...

The Transport Network Manager reinforced this challenge, emphasising his own commitment to implementing the Framework, while expressing a lack of confidence in Council-wide processes to get the budgets and implementation plans in train. A planner also noted that by continuing to develop more place-based plans, implementation becomes harder.

...where a lot of these plans fall to bits...is that you’ve got...strategy unit doing them...but then to get them into the asset management plans or the budgets...is not particularly well done, and therefore they’ll end up sitting on the shelf till somebody picks it up again... I’ve made it my business to make sure that we’ve got a budget...but I’m not sure how the other elements have been picked up and put into budgets... into the streams and the units that actually deliver these things...

...the more of these things that we roll out the harder that’s going to get because all those are like competing. It’s the same pool of funding, the same resources, the same people trying to deliver on it all, on more and more.

Planners described how the Project Management Office (PMO) was brought in to improve the implementation process. While the immediate focus was Adelaide Road, planners spoke of the role in a more overarching way.

One of the holes in the council structure was that while City Planning...had responsibility for planning.... there was no one team responsible for implementation... so it fell into a bit of a hole...Eventually the project management office was brought in...to give more project management focus...But...they weren’t there during the preparation process which was...a bit of a flaw.

...the PMO recognised the...importance of actually making something happen... they appointed a dedicated person to take over the implementation... because what we needed was.... a much more detailed implementation plan, setting out exactly what happens when, by who, how much it’s going to cost and the PMO is ideally placed to do that...

However the PMO’s responsibility for implementation focused on the road improvements, with other aspects of the Frameworks implementation plan, such as ‘social and community networks’ seen as outside of their responsibility. The Project Manager explained this and raised a concern about the implementation of other activities. Other interviewees shared this
concern and felt that the Director of Strategy and Planning would have to take on this wider role.

*Certain work streams are not actually within the ambit of the project, work on the District Plan...promoting mixed use development...One of the key questions I asked early on was, ‘Am I...the keeper of the flame?’...in which case I’ve got to...always have in mind that long-term programme and keep progressing the elements within that...or, ‘Am I just focused on this road?’*

*I’m not taking any responsibility for... implementing that bigger framework, but I am always conscious of it...are we going to get a lot of grief from people...say[ing] ‘well we went through this massive public consultation process, came up with all these ideas which you claim to have taken on board and now you totally ignored them all.’*

*The overall ownership is not at all clear, and I think that will probably fall at [the Director’s] door in terms of... putting resourcing in to the ongoing implementation and project management overall.*

Most interviewees agreed that during planning there was high-level agreement with the direction and activities set out in the Framework and by place-based plans generally.

*When we initially went to Councillors with...town centre plans...everyone was very comfortable and we had a budget set aside...and we were doing a programme.*

*...these [plans] all came out of a process where we looked at our whole strategic direction, reviewed that all and went to the Council...and said ‘well these are the list of priorities across Council...tell us what you think is most important...All this came out... as being the most important thing...*

Despite this agreement, many interviewees described that as the organisation changed and time progressed, different priorities emerged that conflicted with the Framework’s vision, and made achieving Council funding and ongoing support to implement the various activities more challenging.

*we’re...in the process of rethinking our total strategic overlay from an urban design perspective which might have led you to an entirely different conclusion for Adelaide Road... it’s easy for us to say that now, because that’s a product of having a new Director who’s come in with a...fairly substantially different vision of... the work they need to do... the Adelaide Framework had come out of the previous regime’s view...*
...[the Director] thinks that ... the justification for the...Framework is a bit flawed and...if you're talking regeneration and economic benefit, the funding that’s gone in to Adelaide Road would have been far better put in to something in the CBD.

...change in Councillors, change in management board... there’s not much willingness to hang on to a previous plan... priorities change and that affects where this fits...

Some staff described the impact of competing and more ‘tangible’ transport projects and less complex but large projects such as swimming pools and sports field upgrades on Council’s decision making.

Competing priorities... transport, road and public transport... things like stadiums, and huge projects, which suck up a whole heap of money and where the objectives are...quite limited.

...we’ve had some difficulty about competing priorities, its always going to come up against a range of other capital projects and in this case it could be an artificial turf or indoor sports facilities, or sports stadium...which are all higher priority when you have...political support.

The long-term nature of the Framework was described as working against maintaining a high level of political priority, with actions such as altering the road seen as more in Council’s control, as opposed to actively changing the long term development face of the area.

...doing this... a regeneration project that delivers its benefits over twenty or thirty years and enables private sector redevelopment...now that’s much less immediate...than building a sports centre... it’s always going to struggle...

The time frame is so long ...if you change the road and plant some tress that’s...instant and that’s why we’ve been able to get funding for that...

...when politicians get elected...they have public pressure to do something but... pressure dies down...and it’s tempting to move on to...the next issue... artificial turf or whatever... trying to keep that longevity of purpose it’s really hard.

Affordability became a big issue for Council with the economic recession late in 2008. Council began cost cutting, and the budget and resources required to implement the project came under increasing scrutiny. This coincided with the realisation that the 50% subsidy
would not be forthcoming from the NZTA, and that Council, if it wanted to continue with the original road widening plans would have to increase its funding share.

.... Council went into this whole cost cutting affordability phase and...Adelaide Road and centre-planning work got questioned... ‘Do we actually need to do this? Is it saving Council money? Or, is it just costing us bucket loads...for no gain?’

...in the middle of the process, we had the economic recession and that hit it with...a brick wall...the budget issue, the economic recession...and the timing... it was a decision that came down to money.

The funding has gone way down... just Council funding now so... anything we want to do is going to be heavily scrutinised.

The Christchurch Earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 were also seen to have an impact on future insurance premiums and to increase the pressure to speed up earthquake proofing of buildings in Wellington. Councillors considered the possibility of a significant rates increase, but as this was considered politically untenable, expenditure across Council needed to be cut. Increasing pressure was also being applied from central government for Councils to focus on core services and to be financially prudent. Despite this, the Project Manager stated that while more Councillors may question the costs associated with the Framework, the project team would continue with the mandate to plan for Option Three until they heard otherwise (February and October 2011- Meeting Notes).

**Facilitating Development**

The development of an active Council role in facilitating development was a ‘priority one’ activity in the Framework implementation plan. Despite this, Council’s role in early implementation focused on its traditional role as rule maker and regulator.

Planners described Councillor support for a more active role, but that disagreement from Council management stymied this. Interviewees described management as averse to taking on the potential financial and political risk, perceiving such a role as outside Council’s core business. An emphasis on ‘core roles’ and debt reduction had also been raised by the new National Government with the implication that councils were taking on roles better suited to
central authorities and the market. Instead they wanted councils to focus on roles of infrastructure provision, regulation and enforcement, as opposed to active engagement in ‘market’ activities.

...Councillors are very keen for Council to take a more active role...BUT...the management board in particular, see that as very risky and somewhere that they don’t really think Council should be heading...

... this would be a big risk financially and politically and ...there’s not really the appetite, especially at the time when the National Government was trying to pin you back on your core functions...and so the facilitative role...that's still missing...

There’s still a deep ‘laissez faire’ strain in the thinking in Council, even though maybe urban designers don’t have that sort of thinking.

If Council wants to achieve some of these things, it actually needs to put some of its own money into achieving it... are you going to let the market buy it up and maximise the development potential...or does Council actively go in there, buy this stuff up and then sell it and...set some rules around how they see it being developed ... so they have a little bit more control. But then you start to get out of your core business...

While exploration of a more active role in development was supported politically as seen through the formal adoption of the Framework, the Council management board had not entirely bought in to this concept. One interviewee described his frustration that despite ‘signing off’ on the Framework, the Council remained risk averse when it came to an active development role.

...it was in all the Council reports...'Council should only be approving this if its prepared to...actually consider taking on direct development activities, including investigating an urban development corporation.'.... and there was a lot of buy-in from the politicians...it was just that risk averse culture within the Council organisation itself – didn’t provide the necessary leadership or resources to actually go there...

The new Director, a member of the management board, shared her view that a more active role in land development was not always necessary in achieving outcomes, especially if plans were well developed and feasible for markets to deliver.

Council see their contribution [through existing council projects] ...not as a land developer. I think the assumption is here in New Zealand that you need to
be the developer to make things happen. Not the case. You need a clear line of sight between public and private investment and the economic reality that you’ve got a feasible development. So if a developer cannot make money ... you’ve actually got a very poor plan.

The counter view was that an active Council role was required to both push and partner the market in providing the desired future for the area and that without this, ‘sea change’ would not happen.

...to get to this future when the market we’ve currently got isn’t necessarily heading in that direction needs some interventions. If you don't nudge the market in a different direction, well how are we going to get there...and in the future there will be transport costs going up, peak oil, climate change and all these other issues.

If you provide something that’s high quality right in the middle of it [the road] and you are working with the private sector who own the land ...If we’re active in that space as well then hopefully we start seeing a change in the streetscape that Adelaide Road has...

Staff emphasised that Council’s role in facilitating development ultimately focused on a traditional role in: rule development; enforcement; and development incentives. It did not include investigating more active mechanisms such as land development agencies.

I don’t think we’ve done much of that yet...except through raising height levels...more control on development...reasonably well-received design guides...

We haven’t to date been actively involved. I suppose our active involvement along there has been around facilitating works on Council projects...

...it’s really about waiting for the market...it may be that we start to take a more proactive role in going to the market ...working together and maybe doing some land swaps...but I don’t think that’s on the table...

Staff also identified that, as well as lacking organisational agreement, there was a lack of tools and funding mechanisms for Council to access that would support a more significant role in facilitating development.

...all the plans, Johnsonville, Adelaide Road and Kilbirnie, all talk about the need for facilitation and leadership and direct development activities and yet there is no real tool to deliver a lot of that.
...basically you’ve got to find public money to do that...particularly when your budgets are under stress anyway and you’re not wanting to raise rates, but at the same time if you want to influence these things then you actually need to put the money in... somebody needs to make that initial injection.

I’ve been sort of agitating for this for some time to have an urban development agency of our own, now it could be that we set one up, or it could be on the back of the waterfront company or ... some demonstration projects...you know, ‘this is what it should look like.’

**Conclusion**

This chapter has described the various impacts of the redesign of Adelaide Road improvements as well as wider issues influencing how implementation progressed. The redesign of the road to fit the existing road corridor width generally had a negative impact on planned improvements for cyclists and pedestrians. Active modes lost out with less physical space being assigned, and priority was given to the allocation of permanent parking on one side of the street. This particularly affected cyclists with the loss of the planned side-by-side bus/cycle lane virtually eliminating the prospective improvements for cyclists outlined in the Framework.

The slower ramping up of public transport priority, to enable continued provision of some off-peak parking facilities, was a demand-driven approach to public transport planning, belying the importance of public transport priority and Council’s overarching plans for permanent 24/7 bus lanes. The significant influence of businesses and landowners due to their land holding power, and Council’s desire to meet their short-medium term needs resulted in considerable and ongoing negotiations, multiple design changes and project delays. Wider issues such as: a lack of championing roles; changing priorities over time; a shifting political and economic environment; and differing views on appropriate Council roles in development, also contributed to a gradual watering down of the original plans for the area.

The next chapter will discuss the wide-ranging challenges experienced in the implementation of the Adelaide Road Framework utilising social theories that help to explain urban obduracy. It will illuminate Council’s story of early implementation (outlined in both Chapters Four and Five) within a theoretical context, drawing potential connections to New Zealand literature as well as recent government reforms.
Chapter Six: Discussion

Introduction

This thesis has explored:

- three theoretical models that suggest why urban areas may be hard to change;
- policy literature and professional discourse describing challenges to implementing sustainable urban development in New Zealand;
- the impacts of relevant central and local government reform; and
- the experiences of Wellington City Council staff in implementing key components of the Adelaide Road Framework.

This chapter analyses and explains the progressive re-making of the Adelaide Road Framework’s early implementation plans. It utilises a theoretical framework of three possible explanations for urban obduracy: dominant frames, embeddedness, and persistent traditions. It draws together: wider New Zealand literature and policy discourse, influences of central and local government change between 2008 – 2011, and Council staff explanations for the implementation challenges. The theoretical framework enables a comprehensive understanding of complex factors. As well as focusing on the interaction of multiple networks or systems, this chapter aims to explain the influence of different viewpoints across professional groups, and overarching cultural values and traditions that influenced the early implementation of the Framework.

Dominant Frames

The dominant frames conceptualisation focuses analysis on the points of view and interactions between different professional groups. Professional groups are seen to bring in different frames to their work and interactions. These develop, with groups vying for, and gaining dominance over many interactions, resulting in so-called dominant frames that are
played out at various stages of a project and that in turn continually reinforce the dominant views (Hommels, 2000, p. 655).

During the development and early implementation phase of the Framework, two different professional points of view or frames, ‘The Place’ and ‘The Road’, vied for dominance within Council interactions. ‘The Place’, a more flexible conceptualisation of Adelaide road dominated during early planning, but ‘The Road’ frame gained dominance during implementation, and was closer to traditional conceptions of Adelaide Road in form and function (see Table 7 over). Aspects of the Adelaide Road plans became more or less obdurate for groups, depending on their degree of inclusion in the dominant frames throughout planning and implementation phases. For example: the ‘walkable boulevard’ concept dominated whilst planners were in control, but diminished and was harder to bring to effect during implementation, when other professional viewpoints dominated.
Table 7: Two Dominant Frames during Planning and Implementation

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<tr>
<td><strong>CHALLENGING</strong></td>
<td><strong>ENTRENCHED</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key Proponents include:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Key Proponents include:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Councillor (COU)</td>
<td>Director (DIR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning Manager (PLM)</td>
<td>Transport Network Manager (TNM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Principal Advisor (PAU)</td>
<td>Project Manager (PRM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>City Planning Manager (CPM)</td>
<td>Consultant (GHD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Policy Planner (SPP)</td>
<td>Chief Planner (CPN)</td>
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<td>Designer (DES)</td>
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<td>Consultant Design Contractor (CDC)</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Key Ideas</strong></th>
<th><strong>Key Ideas</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Compact centres, medium density, mixed use</td>
<td>Primarily a traffic arterial Places to move ‘through’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Places to ‘be’ not just to move through”</td>
<td>Road safety</td>
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<tr>
<td>Better connected and accessible</td>
<td>Reducing traffic delays, travel time benefits</td>
</tr>
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<td>High quality amenities and street design</td>
<td>Vehicle flow efficiencies (throughput)</td>
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<td>Urban villages</td>
<td>Intersection improvements</td>
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<td>Liveable (‘live-work’ areas)</td>
<td>Improvement for all modes</td>
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<tr>
<td>More sustainable transport, public transport, walking and cycling</td>
<td>Parking supply</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Improving the look of the thing”</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>The Adelaide Road Framework</strong></th>
<th><strong>The Adelaide Road Framework</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Described future vision for the area (longer term plans)</td>
<td>“A community conversation”, lacking technical rigour, rule of thumb</td>
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<tr>
<td>In line with Urban Development Strategy but “needed more ground work”</td>
<td>Lacking feasibility, “pie in the sky”</td>
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<tr>
<td>“VERY long term” vision</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Role of Council</strong></th>
<th><strong>Role of Council</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Champions and Coordinators</td>
<td>Administering Rules</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change makers</td>
<td>Balance short-term needs with future needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actively shaping the area through facilitating development, and significant multi modal road improvements</td>
<td>Limited involvement outside core roles</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Passive role in development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Keeping to deadlines and budget</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ensuring value for money, affordability, realism</td>
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During each phase, professional groups defined the problem, goals and solutions within the context of their own points of view, and as these views built up over multiple interactions, different groups had varying degrees of dominance as to how the Framework was to progress. Whether individuals or groups were deemed to be members of ‘The Place’ or ‘The Road’ frame was based on an assessment of their primary tasks, their involvement in key documents, the stage of their involvement; and how interviewees described different points of view.

‘The Place’ frame dominated from the Framework’s planning phase through to its finalisation by Council in late 2008. After this point the control of the Framework’s implementation
became less clear. ‘The Road’ frame began to dominate, with the discovery that a subsidy from the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) for the original road widening plans was unlikely, despite the wider potential benefits for place making. The points of view in ‘The Place’ frame began to be ‘closed-out’ once the focus of funding assessment criteria on traffic movement became clear, and as other officials became more dominant in decision-making. Decisions on how to apportion space in the resulting narrower version of road improvements were dominated by ‘The Road’ point of view. The shift in frame was also influenced by changes within Council as well as wider factors including political change and underlying values (discussed in following sections).

‘The Place’ Frame

During the early to mid 2000s, points of view built up within the strategy, policy and planning arms of Council, seeking to focus Council’s approach to planning and population growth toward more sustainable, compact, transit-oriented, and liveable city and centres.

The Framework, led by Council planners, provided a new direction for Adelaide Road, away from primarily ‘transport throughput’ toward strengthening its role as a ‘place’, and better integrating land-use and transport functions. This aligned with national and regional points of view, focusing on more sustainable growth and integrated land-use and transport planning.

Strategy and policy documents, research reports, and plan changes within Council (See Table 8 over) point to the growing dominance of these points of view, and included the development of Wellington’s Urban Development Strategy and its growth spine concept in 2006. These documents confirmed Adelaide Road as a location for more Transit Oriented Development, and ideal for more liveable, compact and sustainable growth, as part of the growth spine (Wellington City Council, 2008a May). The development of place-based plans was seen as “the mechanism to integrate Council’s aspirations for centres” (Wellington City Council, 2008b). Staff responsible for the Framework’s planning had a strong place-based planning and sustainability ethos, and much of the following background documentation, which fleshed out this approach, was prepared under their watch.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Document/ Project</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>• Wellington Residential Intensification Review</td>
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</table>
| 2004 | • Infill Development Project  
|      | • Wellington – Our Sense of Place: Building a future on what we treasure  
|      | • Wellington City Profile and Policy Stock take 2004 |
| 2005 | • Public Spaces and Public Life Study  
|      | • Preliminary Ideas – directing new growth  
|      |   – *Draft Principles and Direction for Urban Development*  
|      |   – *Place Based Workshops – Key Findings from internal place-based workshops – Forward Planning* |
| 2006 | • Council programme to review infill housing commences  
|      | • Social and Environmental Effects of Residential Intensification in New Zealand.  
|      | • Adelaide Road Study on Residential Intensification.  
|      | • Identifying Sites for Residential Infill Development in Wellington City  
|      | • Walkability and access to transport and town centres  
|      | • The Urban Development and Transport Strategies  
|      | • Qualitative Research Report: Residential infill in Wellington: The Residents’ View  
|      | • Quantifying the Growth Spine – supply, demand and capacity for residential development in Wellington |
| 2007 | • Development Drivers: Residential Intensification and the Wellington Urban Development Strategy – creating the right conditions for intensive residential development along the growth spine  
|      | • Promoting quality of place – A targeted approach to infill housing  
|      | • Plan change 56 notified – Managing Infill Housing Development  
|      | • Roading Constraints and Opportunities for Infill housing and Intensification  
|      | • Intensification and the District Plan – Issues and options for facilitating and managing intensive residential development in Wellington city |
| 2008 | • Wellington City – Urban Character Assessment  
|      | • Discussion Document ‘How and Where will Wellington Grow’ – proposals for change and character protection.  
|      | • Summary of consultation on Draft Centres Policy and Final Centres Policy |

The ‘inquiry-by-design’ process and community consultation during the Framework’s planning supported ‘The Place’ point of view. The engagement processes gained buy-in from
the wider community, from multiple professional groupings and sector interests, as well as from councillors. An award given by the New Zealand Planning Institute, acknowledged the buy-in from the planning profession nationally, as well as the significant levels of transport and land-use integration achieved through planning processes.17

Interviews with Council staff highlighted a high level of agreement with broader aspirations for Adelaide Road and the Council’s Urban Development Strategy. However some interviewees questioned the likelihood of Adelaide Road changes continuing beyond the paper-based planning phase.

The Framework’s objectives demonstrate the breadth of ‘The Place’ point of view: open space networks, social and community networks, movement networks, heritage and character, and mix of uses. However ‘The Place’ frame is best described by the vision:

A high quality mixed-use area that is a more vibrant, attractive, better connected, accessible and safer place which meets the needs of all people living in, working in, and using the area (Wellington City Council, 2008 November, p. 11).

Early implementation actions prioritised in the plan named Council as a leader, coordinator and advocate of both statutory and non-statutory actions:

1. Changing the rules to encourage mixed use, active street frontages and greater residential living,
2. Actively coordinating and championing development investment and potential for demonstration projects,
3. Widening Adelaide road to enable improvements focused on public transport, walking and cycling.

Only the first of these actions was directly within Council’s control. The second and third required the collaboration of outsiders including: investors, NZTA, property owners and residents. ‘The Place’ frame posited the widening of Adelaide Road as integral to achieving the desired development change as well as improving transport safety and sustainability. In the Long Term Council Community Plan (Wellington City Council, 2009), planners had

successfully embedded this view as demonstrated by Council’s allocation of $21 million dollars for the road improvements and widening (incorporating the expected subsidy from the NZTA).

The increasing dominance (or ‘closed-in’ obduracy (Hommels, 2005a, p. 23)) of ‘The Place’ frame was reflected in the assignment of such significant funding and also through the goals and objectives of the Framework itself. A large number of other professional points of view were contributed during the planning phase, as evidenced by the ‘well thought of’ transport and land-use integration of the plan’s development. These differing views may to some degree have been ‘closed out’ however due to the dominance of planners in controlling the Framework’s development. The challenge represented by ‘The Place’ frame would be tested once implementation began, and other professional groups took more active roles.

‘The Road’ frame

The early focus for implementation (apart from changes to District Plan rules and regulations) was the Adelaide Road widening to enable movement network improvements. The holistic focus seen through the planning phase (2008) then narrowed toward a road focus. ‘The Road’ frame could be described as back-to-basics, focusing on Council’s core role in infrastructure provision, road improvements and changes to rules and regulations, and which deferred or disregarded other components of ‘The Place’ frame.

‘The Road’ frame increased in dominance during early implementation, especially when the road improvements were adjusted to fit the reduced funding, and views of the Framework emerged that discounted previous planning work. Staff involved during implementation, while supporting ‘The Place’ frame aspired to in planning, no longer saw its objectives as immediately relevant or realistic during implementation.

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18 New Zealand Planning Institute Award, 2009 Nancy Northcroft Highly Commended Award
A change in funding

Early in 2010, Council became aware that the road widening subsidy from the NZTA was unlikely and abandoned plans to widen the road, outside of intersection improvements at each end of the Adelaide Road study area. While early implementation actions would still focus on road improvements, the loss of funding heralded a shift toward a narrower conception of ‘The Road’. This sought basic improvements to the status quo and moved away from road widening as an instrument to encourage new development patterns.

Council realised that the NZTA would not take into account the broader urban benefits of road widening in assessing the subsidy application. This was largely due to vehicle flow and safety improvements of proposed changes dominating the assessment of benefit-cost ratios as opposed to broader benefits of urban improvements. The project working group presented an implementation report to the Strategy and Policy Sub-Committee detailing the hurdle. It recommended a more constrained set of improvements (within likely subsidy scenarios), removing the need for widening along the full length of the road.

The Committee supported this option and as a result, the road improvements were reduced to basic intersection, traffic flow and safety improvements with some minor amenity improvements. These changes were more in line with assessment criteria favouring improvements to vehicle flow. A wider Adelaide Road went from being important in meeting the place-making objectives, to one deemed no longer necessary to achieve the same vision in ‘The Road’ frame.

From Planning to Implementation

While ‘The Place’ frame dominated during planning, after the plan was finalised, there was uncertainty regarding how implementation would progress and who was responsible. Staff heavily involved during the planning became somewhat ‘closed-out’ during implementation (See Table 9 over).
Table 9: Closed In or Out - Key leadership across phases of the Adelaide Road Framework

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<td>Planners</td>
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<td>• Strategic Policy Planners</td>
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<td>• Principal Advisor</td>
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<td>• City Planning Manager</td>
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<td>• Councillor</td>
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<td>• Ex-Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementers</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Project Management Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Project Working Group (Transport, Planning, Design)</td>
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<td>• Project Steering Group (new Director)</td>
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</table>

Responsibility for implementing the road improvements was passed to a Project Manager from the Project Management Office (PMO) and a working group, which included representatives from across Council and the contracted consultants. The planning team, who led the planning phase moved on to develop the next place-based plans (Kilbirnie, Miramar and Wellington 2040), contributing to implementation mainly through advisory roles. Planners assigned to the project working group had not been significantly involved in the Framework’s early development.

Early implementation saw the Framework focus on just a few of its priority parts. District Plan rule changes were progressed early in implementation and the other main priority activity were road improvements. Activities focused on green space and social and community networks had lesser priority and were not a strong focus during early implementation. The Project Manager, acknowledging that the Project Management Office was not responsible for overall implementation, raised concern regarding “who carries the flame?” for the Framework’s wider objectives. Other interviewees in discussing the lack of overarching management believed that the Director of Strategy and Policy was broadly accountable. The Director however argued that ‘the broader flame’ was not the responsibility of a single role but that the plan naturally fell into elements of Council activity and asset plans. However she acknowledged that this had not happened, as she would have expected.

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19 The Project Management Office did not exist prior to 2009.
20 Two key planners and managers involved in the Adelaide Road planning phase had left Council by early 2009.
Between 2009 and 2010 there was significant change to Council’s organisational structure, including the departure of a number of planning staff and the arrival of new staff. New staff were not involved in developing ‘The Place’ frame for Adelaide Road, and arrived at Council with their own points of view. The newly appointed Director of Strategy and Policy questioned the value of the Adelaide Road planning exercise: “...what can you hope to get out of what was just a ‘three-day planning exercise?’”

The Director disestablished the integrated team responsible for the Framework’s planning. Many staff were moved back to previous teams, some left, and the staff member previously seen as ‘championing the framework’ was now involved in an advisory capacity only. This original champion became ‘closed-out’ of decision-making despite her significant historical knowledge and early leadership role. Some interviewees indicated that the Strategy and Policy Directorate became focused on more detailed urban design approaches to new place-based plans, as opposed to the more conceptual planning provided for Adelaide Road. One interviewee stated that the Framework would never have happened under this new regime.

The lack of planning staff involvement in implementing the Framework resonates with New Zealand literature describing reforms splitting the planning profession, into smaller functions such as regulatory planning, policy planning, and rule administration and away from a more synthesising approach to planning (Beattie, 2010; Ward, et al., 2007, p. 8). Some commentators ascribed a lack of coordination and integration between planning and implementation phases and overall reduced follow-through to implementation to these reforms (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008; Sweetman, March 2006, p. 11).

Some implementers questioned the realism of the Framework describing the planning profession as idealists and less practical than their own professions. This was particularly noticeable for those not actively involved in developing ‘The Place’ frame, and belied the significant support internal and external to Council that was achieved during planning.

On the other hand, Council management (CEO and Directors) who were primarily involved in decision-making and assigning budgets were described by planners and implementers as “risk averse”, “focused on the bottom line” and less concerned with the overall direction. Planners spoke of “deep-seated laissez faire” attitudes surrounding a more active Council role in
facilitating development. While ‘The Place’ frame posited that this was critical to the Framework’s objectives, those involved in ‘The Road’ frame minimised its importance, focusing instead on Council’s more traditional roles.

Three Contested Objects

Throughout early implementation, Council’s role in changing rules, regulations and providing design guidance was seen as core business and went largely uncontested. However two issues illustrate the tension between ‘The Road’ and ‘The Place’ dichotomy. A more active role in facilitating development, and significant improvements for cyclists and pedestrians began to be identified as ‘nice to haves’ as opposed to essentials of place making.

Facilitating Development

Most interviewees acknowledged that an active Council role in facilitating development was the least likely aspect of the Framework to be implemented. Actions: A1 and A2 (see Table 10 over) did not carry through into implementation, largely due to a lack of budget and no staff being assigned. The only action adequately resourced was A3; essentially activities relating to Council’s existing role in working with resource consent applicants.

The Director expressed her disagreement that Council needed to actively facilitate development, explaining that the market would respond to a feasible plan on its own. Even staff that supported a more active Council role acknowledged a lack of appropriate structures and funding tools to support this.
Table 10: Facilitating Development - Priority One Operational Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Actions</th>
<th>Council Role</th>
<th>Indicative timing</th>
<th>Priority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1. Communicate the future vision for Adelaide Road to the community, other public sector organisations and the private sector</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>1-5 years</td>
<td>Priority 1 Essential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2. Investigate and recommend options for the Council to take a more active role in facilitating development in Adelaide Road e.g. through purchasing land and facilitating development to achieve the vision, establishment of a Land Development Unit, private/public partnerships, demonstration projects, Business Improvement Districts.</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>1-3 years</td>
<td>Priority 1 Essential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3. Actively work with landowners, developers and investors to ensure new development/redevelopment contributes towards the achievement of the Framework’s vision...</td>
<td>Advocate/Coordinator</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Priority 1 Essential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Wellington City Council, 2008 November, p. 29)

The growing dominance of ‘The Road’ frame - with its focus on implementing the road improvements, core council roles and affordability - meant prioritising a more active development role was unlikely. As this discussion reveals, this would have required significant investment of money, staff and time by Council to develop the capacity to carry out this role. While Council has achieved this before as demonstrated through waterfront development, in that instance Council already held significant landownership (Wellington City Council, 2001).

Improving the environment for cyclists and pedestrians

‘The Road’ frame prioritised Adelaide Road as an arterial and illustrated how road space for private vehicle lanes and parking became incontestable, despite significant ramifications for other road users. For cyclists and buses, this meant that a shared (side-by-side) bus lane was no longer feasible, and that cyclists would gain no more space through the road improvements. This was counter to the Framework’s objective of improving Adelaide Road for all modes.
Two Councillors attempted to sway the decision to prioritise parking over improvements for cyclists, by approaching staff and management, and suggesting the removal of parking. However, the majority of Councillors voted in favour of Option Three (which incorporated parking) when it was presented to the Strategy and Policy Committee. The Transport Network Manager highlighted that the full implications for cyclists of retaining one lane of permanent parking may not have been clearly understood by all Councillors, as only enough information was given to “get the option over the line”.

The project steering group decided that a much narrower bus lane was the safest option due to potential safety issues caused by slight reductions in width. The final application for subsidy described the dilemma:

> Unless the bus lanes can be widened to 4.5m then it is best to keep them at their current width of 3.0m. The narrower width will ensure bus drivers and cyclists are more conscious of each other and reduce the incidence of risky passing manoeuvres. However, some cyclists may feel intimidated by travelling in such close proximity with buses (2011, p. 44).

Internationally the standards for shared bus and cycle lanes vary from 3.7m to 4.5 m, however in New Zealand no explicit standards are provided, possibly illustrating a lack of national priority to cyclists. Reducing space for cyclists was considered justified due to: the primary importance of public transport and other traffic on the route; the marginality of cycling; the similar levels of service provided elsewhere in the city; and the need to retain parking spaces.

Making it easier for pedestrians to cross the street was also not a simple issue. This was demonstrated in disagreements on the median design, where Transport staff believed that pedestrians should not be encouraged to cross at other than signalised crossings, despite knowing such crossings were inevitable. To create a safe crossing near a bus stop opposite McDonalds at the northern end of Adelaide Road, the designers explored potential for safe and spacious refuge in the median. The Transport view was that people should use signalised crossings and that an ‘inviting median’ would encourage them to cross unsafely at

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undesignated points. Transport’s view won, despite opposition from some working group members, who felt that people would continue to cross at the more logical point. The design view did not fit with a road system prioritising vehicle movement, and where pedestrians are allocated key ‘crossing points’ rather than being given broad use of the space.

**Embeddedness**

*Embeddedness* is the notion that any aspects of an urban system such as transport or land-use networks are made up of multiple elements (both human and non-human). When aspects of the system change, it requires the reshaping of other elements within the system (Hommels, 2005a). In the Adelaide Road case, three overarching elements of embeddedness included: land-use, transport, and Council organisation.

Within this version of obduracy, the Adelaide Road space can be seen as a “temporary negotiated settlement of many different things” (Madden, 2010, p. 584). Over time these become entwined, and networks are built up through continued social, economic and political investment. This makes change complex and difficult because change to any element or layer in the network requires adaptation of other elements. Multiple related elements make up the Adelaide Road system (See Table 11 over).
Table 11: Some elements in the Adelaide Road transport and land-use network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hard Urban</th>
<th>Softer Urban</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>People and Groups</th>
<th>Rules and systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Footpaths</td>
<td>Trees and parks</td>
<td>NZTA subsidy criteria and processes</td>
<td>Consultants and council activities</td>
<td>Engineering and design standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>Marked space for modes</td>
<td>Council funding criteria and processes</td>
<td>NZTA staff practice</td>
<td>Council rules, regulations, policies, plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road edges, structures, set backs</td>
<td>Traffic signals, street signs</td>
<td>Development Contributions</td>
<td>Businesses, utility providers</td>
<td>Existing transport network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjoining Roads, entrances and exits</td>
<td>Concept plans and designs</td>
<td>Transport and parking charges</td>
<td>Residents, landowners, developers, community</td>
<td>National legislation (local government, transport, land)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median structures</td>
<td>Timetables and bus priority</td>
<td>Central funding</td>
<td>Public transport providers</td>
<td>National transport plans (RoNS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings, lot sizes</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Market</td>
<td>Travel behaviours</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the Framework began to be implemented, Council attempted to change elements of the land-use and transport networks, as well as Council organisation. This required the adaptation of other elements within the networks. The level to which they resisted adaptation demonstrates the obduracy of the local land and transport networks. Much of the New Zealand literature on implementation challenges covered in Chapter Two focuses on the obduracy of networked systems and explores challenges to better integrating land-use and transport systems in New Zealand.
Land Use

The land-use pattern on Adelaide Road is in part a product of many previous Council planning decisions, and the responses to them by businesses and residents. The Council purchase, amalgamation and zoning of residential land as ‘light-industrial’ from the 1940s encouraged the current land-use pattern, with the dominance of light industry and commercial businesses. Council’s decision to sell the land during this time resulted in a ceding of power to multiple individual titleholders, with whom Council would now have to negotiate. If Council had retained land ownership, Adelaide Road widening would have been less complex, as a large proportion of road widening costs and activities were associated with land purchase.

Council’s introduction of various road setbacks, and allowing these to lapse over time resulted in the current ‘mixed’ alignment of buildings on the Road. The Council’s rules and regulations from the 1940s, through to the first District Plan in 1994 and its various changes have enabled the existing built form, which Council freely admits is generally of low quality.

The Resource Management Act’s focus on individual adverse effects as opposed to long-term cumulative effects of planning decisions has reinforced Council’s role in setting rules, and assessing development on a case-by-case basis. To change the area, Council has naturally had to address the rules and regulations that have created the existing land-use patterns. Utilising rules to implement gradual land-use changes, as land is sold and new buildings were developed, is a traditional Council response. Plan changes rezoning Adelaide Road as a ‘centre’, relaxing building height restrictions and requiring active frontages, would take the emphasis away from light industry. This would encourage a shift toward greater mixing of uses, and increased quality residential intensification. These changes alongside sustainable transport improvements were key strategies to improving ‘liveability’ in the Adelaide Road area.

The Framework, while outlining a longer-term vision for the area was not, in a statutory sense, able to direct future development. Instead it served as a guide to staff, who were primarily driven by existing land-use and transport legislation and processes. At the same

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25 District Plan changes 72 and 73
time, National Government reforms reduced the previous Government’s emphasis on more compact development. Changes to the Local Government Act in 2010 gave clear messages to local authorities to ‘stick to their knitting’. Staff described this refocus toward core business as directly and indirectly impacting on the Framework’s implementation.

To develop the detailed road designs, Council had to negotiate with a number of individual business owners along the length of the road regarding land purchases and other significant impacts. Local businesses had contributed to the area over time, with some having been in Adelaide Road for multiple generations and seeing it as ‘their place’. This added weight to the Road’s existing function as a light industrial and commercial area.

The long-term future depicted in the Framework was perceived to be at odds with the current reality of many businesses. To maintain goodwill and assist individual negotiations, Council decided that business needs in the short-to-medium term must be addressed given that the alternative ‘future’ looked ahead more than twenty years.

In negotiating land purchases, Council could use either a ‘hammer’ (through legislation enabling compulsory purchase) or a ‘carrot’ (‘quid pro quo’ negotiations). To negotiate one purchase Council supported the owner by paying for plans to redevelop the property in line with the mixed-use aspirations for the road, and made significant financial offers. Council at times had to reconsider the option of compulsory purchase (a long drawn out process) as complex negotiation processes delayed progress.

**Transport**

Since the turn of the 20th century, Adelaide Road has been an integral public and private transport route for the city (servicing both Southern and Eastern areas). The road itself is embedded in a complex matrix of existing traffic flows, legislative requirements, engineering standards, design standards, policies and funding practices, all involving multiple players. The Framework was susceptible to changes in legislation, funding and politics as seen through the new Government Policy Statement for Land Transport introduced in 2009 (Ministry of Transport). The Statement emphasised Roads of National Significance, economic productivity,
and had a lesser emphasis on mode shift, all of which potentially reduced the national funding priority of the Road.

Adelaide Road’s role as a key arterial was enshrined in Council’s public transport network map, growth spine and wider transport network, and would always affect the scope of any redevelopment. Activities on the road were determined in part by the rollout and extension of the bus network as well as the range of bus priority measures outlined in Council’s Transport Strategy, and Bus Priority Plan. A variety of overarching rules and regulations would also determine how the road would be managed. Interviewees agreed that its role as an arterial, along with the range of rules and expectations as to how it functioned, would not be contested.

Interactions between and across consultants, Council staff, and private business interests during the development of detailed designs, as well as with NZTA staff, shaped Council’s approaches to changing the road in a very real sense; for example, alterations to the road design to meet the needs of car-based businesses. In one sense however, transport changes were easier to influence, as Council at least owned the basic infrastructure, unlike land use where the private market largely held control of properties.

**Funding**

Changes to roads are expensive and require the changing of much ‘hard’ (e.g. sealed roads) as well as ‘softer’ infrastructure (e.g. traffic lights, crossings). Council was heavily reliant on the NZTA subsidy (50% of costs); but to get funding it needed to demonstrate that the project met funding assessment criteria set by the NZTA. The impact of not getting the subsidy was immediately a scaling back of the road widening plans.

The Opus traffic assessment report in 2010 confirmed that the original plans for road widening would be unlikely to receive a subsidy based on a benefit-cost ratio of less than one (Opus International Consultants, 2010a February). Council concluded that while increased land-use and transport integration was supported in principle by central government, the funding and assessment criteria that make up the BCR primarily focused on improvements to traffic flow, efficiency and safety improvements. Council acknowledged that some of the improvements for Adelaide Road as a ‘place’ compromised the benefits for more efficient
transport flow. A range of assumptions (both written and unwritten) underlies the BCR. For instance, improving and increasing traffic flow is seen as generally supporting economic productivity, despite the potential to negatively impact outcomes for health, sustainability and climate change, none of which was economically valued in the assessments.

This resulted in Council having to look to its own resources to fund the project. In anticipation of NZTA’s negative response, staff developed new options for the road and Councillors voted for a reduced set of improvements. Council’s decision not to provide the additional funding was, apart from the recessionary times, blamed on a lack of available funding alternatives (outside of standard use of development contributions and rates). It was also viewed by interviewees as “reflecting a lack of political commitment and leadership” for the Framework at Council. New Zealand planning literature confirms the difficulties in sourcing funding alternatives for these types of projects (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008; Hunter, et al., 2008; Ward, et al., 2007).

Sharing the Road Space

Adelaide Road physically dominates the local landscape, and numerous Council and market decision over many years have resulted in the current built environment. The “fixity” (p. 1928) of the road landscape, and the buildings around them, has left the road (as with most roads) largely unchanged for more than 130 years.

The Framework contested the road’s basic boundaries through plans for large-scale road widening, and then through smaller pockets of road widening in subsequent redesigns. While large-scale road widening could have enabled wider footpaths, a wide cycle/bus share lane, and permanent parking on each side, the return to the existing width meant that the sharing of space needed to be reviewed. However the space between the road edges was already made up of assigned and unassigned spaces that were more or less contestable. Retaining the road as an arterial meant that the road would always have at least one lane of private vehicle traffic in each direction, two public transport lanes, and footpaths. However, some elements of this infrastructure are more adaptable for example: the amount of parking; pedestrian and cycle facilities; the median; and street planting.
The amount of space for each mode was heavily intertwined and changing one element required changes to other elements. According to the Transport Network Manager the future opportunity for separate cycle lanes was “in the wider road” and was not tenable with the return to the existing width.

While space for travelling vehicles, public transport and footpaths, was determined in part by minimum service levels, permanent parking was a new feature planned for the road. Previously parking mostly existed in travelling lanes outside of peak time, with cars and buses reduced to sharing one lane. While this situation would continue on one side, a decision was made to retain permanent parking on the other side.

This decision alongside the design vision of a straight corridor meant that the footpath was narrowed at key points and the bus/cycle share lane reverted to a narrow bus lane that would not allow for passing. The bus lane on the side with permanent parking, would be available for buses and cyclists all day, without having to share the lane outside of peak times with parked cars. While physically possible to create a wide bus/cycle share lane, if parking was removed, this option was discounted due to potential business and political backlash, despite safety ramifications for cyclists.

The reduction in bus/cycle lane width effectively meant that cyclists did not gain space, and were the only mode not assigned dedicated space within the road boundaries. The lack of existing ‘embedded’ cycling infrastructure may have played against further cycling improvements. While vehicle parking, footpaths, and travelling lanes already had space carved out in the landscape, space for cyclists was not physically assigned. One interviewee stated “I guess it’ll be no better than it is now”, meaning that the existing lack of facilities for cyclists was likely to persist in future designs.

The narrowing of footpaths at certain points reduced space for pocket parks, street furniture and greening. The Transport Manager described footpaths as being satisfactory to move through, but no longer to congregate in, an opinion shared by the Designer. Additional traffic signals, while enabling pedestrians to cross safely and conveniently, negatively impacted on public transport and private vehicle flow, reducing the likelihood of an NZTA subsidy.

Negative impacts for vehicle flow from increasing residential density was acknowledged as
likely, as more traffic (across modes) is introduced to the network and would need to exit and enter Adelaide Road.

When a draft design of the road was released to landowners, Council indicated two permanent bus lanes, planting sites, and a continuous median strip. Businesses complained to Council, arguing that the continuous median would reduce access to businesses; trees would reduce visibility; and that a loss of parking (from the introduction of permanent bus lanes) could have dire economic consequences.

Some businesses began to suspect that the future ‘form and function’ of Adelaide Road did not necessarily accommodate them. Businesses rallied to support each other and collectively demanded change. Council responded with compromises including: putting cuts in the median for car-based business, reconsidering tree planting, and reassuring businesses that a permanent bus lane was a long-term, not immediate, consideration.

Council staff stated that given the potential backlash from businesses associated with loss of parking they did not intend to introduce permanent bus lanes, and would only consider this when public transport patronage increased significantly. Alongside Council’s desire not to relitigate decisions already made, the paramount importance of the car and parking (embedded through historic and current patterns of use) ultimately held greater sway than improvements for cyclists and pedestrians, introduction of full time bus lanes, and aesthetic improvements more generally.

Council Organisational Issues

Changing Adelaide Road was also affected by Council as an organisational entity including; structures; professional groupings and coalitions; knowledge bases; and decision-making processes.

Skills, knowledge, tools

Most interviewees acknowledged implementation difficulties in terms of both ‘who’ was responsible, and in ‘how’ to implement the Framework. Despite three ‘priority one’ activities
being included in the Framework for facilitating development, Council lacked the available staff, skills and political wherewithal to implement anything outside of Council’s day-to-day role administering the District Plan.

Council openly described a lack of access to alternative funding tools, but also that they lacked sufficient experience and knowledge of implementation tools such as mixed private/partnership models and land development agencies that would enable an active role in facilitating development. New Zealand literature describes capacity and capability issues including: a lack of council structures and experience to ensure effective implementation e.g. through urban development agencies, a lack of coordination and champion roles, and lack of understanding on redevelopment economics (Heslop & Oliver, 2010; Munro, 2010).

As discussed in the dominant frames section, changing views of the Framework at Council were in part affected by organisational and staff changes including a new Director for Strategy and Policy, and the loss (or relegation) of key planning staff. The Council decision to restructure resulted in the demise of the integrated planning team of urban design, transport, and planning professionals and may be seen as contributing to the shift in power from planners, to project and transport managers.

The range of separate roles and activities within transport and land planning could be seen as diffusing the holistic planning undertaken. Staff at Council focused on their individual tasks, and not on the Framework as a whole. As the Resource Consents Manager put it: “[The District Plan] is my bible, ‘that’ [the framework] is nice, but my work revolves around this”. For the Transport Network Manager, work focused on the implementation of bus priority, and ensuring the road configuration worked for traffic. Planners and designers moved on to site-specific designs, and to other place-based plans. The large number of activities at Council, alongside the range of network elements affected by the Framework, required considerable Council coordination, but no overarching coordination was assigned.

The Framework was acknowledged as a ‘useful guide’ to development, but lacking any real teeth to influence implementation. District Plan reviews were already set in motion and were influencing a number of place-based plans, but other activities specific to Adelaide Road required insertion into various Council work programmes. The Director indicated that much of this work had not been translated into work programmes. While the Transport Manager
saw it as his role to include transport activities in future planning, the extent to which other work areas took the same approach was less clear.

**Coalitions and Council support**

The initial supportive Council coalition established during planning was dismantled during implementation in part due to: Council structural changes; a ‘changing of guard’ at Council; and key events such as the loss of subsidy, and the economic recession.

Key implementation activities such as: rule changes; road design; or roles to facilitate development; required the demonstration of on-going managerial and political support. When the road subsidy for extensive widening became unlikely, Councillors within the Strategy and Policy Sub-Committee made a decision on a more basic set of improvements. Their decisions were strongly influenced by recommendations in a report provided by the Project Working Group (Wellington City Council, 2010 March). This report was written after the 2009 restructure and after the baton was passed from planners to implementers.

Implementers saw the loss of subsidy as partly a product of unrealistic planning. Their recommended revised option (Option Three) incorporated some of the urban improvements at lower cost, and in some way accepted that road widening was not necessary. It is not possible to know whether a similar recommendation would have been made if ‘the change of guard’ had not happened.

While this was a major change point, many other decisions would require further Council approval during design and implementation. For example, introducing a permanent bus lane, reducing traffic speeds, and any significant budget or design changes would need agreement from Council’s project steering group. Approval for significant decisions would also need to be sought from the Council Strategy and Policy committee. In the case of District Plan changes, public consultation and appeals processes also needed to be factored in. Implementation in essence is embedded in decision-making processes that had the combined effect of continually revising the Framework’s intended plans.
New Zealand literature describes the uncertainty created by council internal and political processes, and the increase in risk that uncertainty brings to councils’ reputations, potentially wasting time, and increasing uncertainty for developers (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008). For instance, Council processes to widen the road in previous decades resulted in many property owners developing and/or redeveloping their properties in line with Council plans for road widening, only to find that plans would change time and again. Council spent significant time negotiating with some property owners who, when the road design changed, no longer needed to be consulted.

The three-year political term also added uncertainty, with some Councillors focusing on fulfilling election promises and advancing tangible, short-medium term projects within the political cycle, potentially supporting their re-election. The Framework, without its original Council champions pushing its longer-term agenda, always risked losing internal support, given its dependence on ongoing Council decision-making. The relatively close vote for Option Three, with six of the fifteen councillors voting against the project as a whole, shows how support dropped from a time when the project was considered Council’s number one priority.

**Persistent Traditions**

The ‘persistent traditions’ conceptualisation explores how networks and ideas build up into overarching cultural frameworks, which influence the future direction of ‘socio-technical ensembles’ such as Adelaide Road. This model of obduracy emphasises the broader cultural context and values in which change is sought, and gives less emphasis to local events, interactions and ideas. Hommels describes these as the “traditions from which no relevant social group can easily escape” (2005a, p. 182).

Persistent traditions in many ways can be seen as both resulting from, and contributing to the other frames of obduracy namely; dominant frames with its gradual entrenchment and interrelationship of viewpoints and embeddedness, with its continual influence of intertwining systems. This version of obduracy however, brings the various underlying and persistent cultural values and traditions to the fore, enabling separate analysis of their potential contribution to urban obduracy.
Under this lens, a wider cultural landscape has an important influence on the Framework’s implementation. Council interviews, literature on implementation challenges, and central government activities, give some clues to the influence of overarching values and traditions and their reflection in long-standing institutional arrangements. This section explores evidence for two persistent traditions, and their impact on implementation, namely: the cultural dominance of private vehicles, and a situation of constrained local government.

‘The Car is King’

While the Framework set out to create a more ‘liveable’ Adelaide Road with improved environments for walking and cycling and public transport, Council did not escape the priority given to private vehicles, as seen in changes to the design of the road.

Hommels suggests that actors can reduce the power of such a persistent tradition by suggesting “a radical break with the past” (2005a, p. 187). The Framework however, did not contest Adelaide Road’s primary role as a motorised traffic arterial for buses and private vehicles. Potential for future light rail and separate cycle lanes was mooted in the Framework; however there were no proposals for separate facilities for cyclists, even in the widened version of the road. The Framework did not suggest radical changes in service levels for private vehicles, though they marginally increased through the introduction of permanent parking on both sides of the street (in the original plan), and intersection improvements would have enhanced traffic flow and safety.

When the bus/cycle side-by-side arrangement was lost and footpaths were narrowed, partly in order to retain some permanent parking, some councillors and consultants attempted to push for a ‘radical break’ by suggesting the removal of all permanent parking on the road. However this was not successful with one interviewee stating: “…everyone...says they’re more than happy to lose parking but no one’s actually ready to bite the bullet and do that.” This was largely due to a feeling that such moves were politically untenable, and not in line with the prevalent assumption that parking would be routinely available.
Every element of Adelaide Road space, outside of private vehicle travelling space, was contested to one degree or another. While it was unthinkable not to have separate space for cars, it was considered reasonable to alter the available space for pedestrians, and buses and completely feasible to remove the potential dedicated space entirely from cyclists.

The NZTA transport funding criteria through which Council plans are assessed embody a tradition of favouring private vehicles. NZTA assessment primarily focuses on efficiencies for private vehicle flow, and safety improvements achieved through road changes, taking less account of more ‘place’ oriented benefits. Within this model, benefits to walking and cycling, and benefits for ‘non-peak’ travel are not as highly valued and have less well articulated links to productivity goals. The assessment criteria embedded in the NZTA are largely outside council control, and outside wider political contestability.

One interviewee compared the challenges of accessing funding for the road with the ease with which central government funded national road improvements, concluding that local government is “hamstrung” by “central government attitudes that the car is king”. The Transport Manager, in considering the squeeze on funding for local projects, alluded to Government’s view that highway projects had bigger national benefits and therefore greater priority. The implicit values expressed through the BCR assessment could be seen as counter to aspirations for ‘place’, focusing instead on efficient ‘throughput’ of vehicles. Interestingly, while the BCR fluctuated during various design iterations, the final BCR did not greatly improve from the original road widening version. Council identified that this was still due to mode improvements for pedestrians compromising benefits for vehicle travel.

Another view in the ‘car culture’ is that urban population growth (no matter how ‘smart’) will be accompanied by increased private vehicle travel, even when located in walkable, compact inner-city areas. The final Opus traffic report and funding application, predicted that motorised trips resulting from the growth area would increase by between 650 and 1000 vehicles in the peak hours despite the central location, public transport and walkable environment planned for Adelaide Road (2011, p. 5). New Zealand literature confirms the predominant influence of private vehicles in central and local planning decisions for growth (Lee, et al., 2009; Slepian & Stephenson, 2006; Ward, et al., 2007).
Central government highly values ‘inter-regional’ travel through the state highway network, as seen through the funding priority given to national road projects, work-related travel, and travel between key destinations. The aim of the first Government Policy Statement (GPS) introduced by the Labour government in August 2008 was to:

…reduce travel by single occupancy vehicles, increase the amount of freight moved by coastal shipping and rail, reduce fatalities and hospital admissions from road crashes, increase the use of public transport, and have more people travelling on foot or by cycle. (Ministry of Transport, 2008 August, p. 2).

The statement went on to outline a recommended approach as part of developing and evaluating integrated planning across land use, transport and urban design:

An integrated approach will encourage more sustainable urban and regional developments that are compact, have a mix of uses and are well-connected, with a clearly defined structure of centres and corridors...This encourages people to walk, cycle and use public transport rather than drive (p. 22).

However the National Government elected in 2008 soon replaced the GPS, introducing the priority of seven highways of national significance, and the importance of land transport investment prioritising national economic growth and productivity. (Ministry of Transport, 2009 May). The new GPS represented a move away from the previous policy direction and retrenchment toward policy positions favouring private vehicles.

The focus of the 2009 GPS centred on improvements in journey time reliability, reduction in congestion, more efficient freight supply, better use of existing transport infrastructure, and better access to markets, and employment effects. The Government outlined their belief that “moving too quickly toward modal shift will have a negative impact on environmental and economic efficiency” (p. 11). Under the new GPS, funding for state highways increased significantly, with related reductions in funding for local roads and public transport.

Government also outlined an adjustment to the NZTA’s evaluation processes to give higher priority to projects with high BCRs (greater than 4), and give low BCRs (under 2) greater scrutiny.26 Integrated planning was mentioned in the new GPS, but only in as much as it might support national economic growth and productivity (p. 16).

26 Interestingly Roads of National Significance projects pressed forward despite many having a low BCR.
While this significant and sizeable shift towards road funding occurred under the National government, it must be remembered that previous policy still leaned heavily towards funding local roads and state highway development, despite earlier emphasis on land-use and transport integration, and support for other modes. Public transport, walking and cycling have always received a comparatively small share of transport funding compared to roads, which primarily carry freight and private vehicles.

The speed at which Government implemented its roads of national significance (RoNS) agenda, compared to the lengthy processes to implement projects such as Adelaide Road speaks volumes as to the ability of central government to make things happen. This is particularly evident when plans fit the ‘car and road freight is king’ tradition, or for ‘between city travel’ where Government emphasises its contribution to national productivity.

Significant road changes at the Basin Reserve (part of the State Highway One Road of National Significance between Levin and Wellington airport) and adjacent to Adelaide Road, included plans for tunnel duplication, and the separation of strategic from local traffic through a flyover beside the Basin Reserve (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2011a). However, active transport facilities on the proposed bridge at the Basin were explored as optional “clip-ons”, but not necessarily as an integral part of the transport solution during consultation (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2012). In this light, walking and cycling could be seen as possibly not contributing sufficiently toward Government goals to warrant more than peripheral investment.

![Diagram of Bridge option for Basin Reserve showing possible pedestrian clip on](http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/6848694/Basin-flyover-will-create-crime-graffiti)

**Figure 11:** Bridge option for Basin Reserve showing possible pedestrian clip on

The NZTA was able to progress RoNS projects at far greater speed, with central funding support assured and without the significant compromises or lack of funding associated with the local Adelaide Road project. As one interviewee put it, there seems to be “no problem having world class motorways coming in and out of Wellington, but something as simple as a road realignment and improvements to public transport on a local road is really hard.”

**Constrained local government**

There are many approaches to enhancing urban sustainability through strategies including: urban containment; transit-oriented development or smart growth; increased urban design guidance and controls; and through entities such as land development agencies. Local authorities have championed most New Zealand attempts to encourage more sustainable urban development. Labour governments, in the late 1990s and 2000s, developed a range of supportive policy for more sustainable urban development.

The 2008 National Government continued policy development on more sustainable urban development with a number of key differences. National focused on councils needing to reduce debt, keep to core business, provide high quality infrastructure and ensure an adequate supply of land for development. The difference in titles between the governments’ urban development discussion documents speaks volumes. Under Labour, the title was ‘Building Sustainable Communities’, and under National, ‘Building Competitive Cities’. Amendments to the Local Government Act in 2010 included a strong emphasis on a return to core services, proposing that by acting outside of their main responsibilities, council debt had grown out of control.

The National Government questioned the breadth of local authority activity despite recent government documents, outlining the need for greater local tools and funding to implement urban change. Rhetoric calling for a return to core business suggested that councils were inappropriately involved in issues best left to the market and to central government. This viewpoint possibly served to further reduce incentives for councils to ‘go outside the box’ and become active players in land development. Instead a focus on traditional tasks, implementing infrastructure works in line with the government’s priorities, and regulatory roles were seen as more appropriate ‘core’ roles.
In Wellington, Council’s approach to land-use planning had been described by staff as fairly permissive; and while leading to increased development in the city, it had also increased the amount of low-quality development. Council’s response included the Urban Development Strategy growth spine concept, focusing growth at key nodes along the transport spine. To enable this, the Framework and background documents clearly encouraged an active council role in development. Taking such a role, however, would have taken Council beyond ‘traditional’ or ‘core’ roles, including assuming greater levels of financial and political risk.

The private development market with its focus on short to medium term profit, and national market culture of low-density, stand-alone dwellings and greenfield development, have all provided less incentive for ‘the market’ to move toward smarter growth approaches. Despite this issue, the idea that the market could provide the change desired for Adelaide Road, was implicit in Council’s inaction in more actively facilitating development.

The lack of existing tools and funding mechanisms available to Council to take up an active role illustrates that these activities sat outside the usual ‘traditions’ of Council. The New Zealand literature generally describes a lack of urban change levers, funding and development tools, and a lack of national policy guidance on urban design (CityScope Consultants Ltd, 2009 July; Department of Internal Affairs, 2008). Council identified the need for new funding mechanisms, but were unable to progress this. Council’s reliance on central transport funding, to support the development change illustrates a critical problem and power imbalance between central and local government. Funding for the place-making components of Adelaide Road were largely at the mercy of government transport funding processes that favoured traditional road priorities; and political views that promoted more traditional local government roles.

While councils have sometimes acted as primary land developers, generally this has capitalised on their existing assets, as demonstrated through various public waterfront developments. Outside of the management of their own land assets, a more active development role has occurred only in a small number of instances and has often attracted negative public and central government attention, for example Christchurch City Council’s purchase of five central city properties as part of protecting plans for urban intensification (Office of the Auditor General, 2009). Central government has also promoted opening up
more greenfields land for development, which is counter to previous containment policies (Urban Technical Advisory Group, 2010).

Wellington City Council’s purchase of land in Adelaide Road during the last century demonstrated that they were able to comprehensively change the nature of the area from slum housing to a light industrial area. While an active role through an urban development agency was mooted as part of current plans, this did not progress into implementation. Council were not prepared to play an active role, instead by default ceding power to the market, and responding to central government calls for local government debt reduction and a focus on core services.

Pockets of land acquisition to enable intersection improvements still required Council to engage in multiple sets of negotiations, delaying the project and adding significant uncertainty to other aspects of the road improvements. While the Framework suggested a bold and active role in facilitating development, Council generally took a conservative approach in line with their traditional roles. Council’s attempts to acquire land, and their reliance on influencing development through rules and regulations, highlighted their lack of power in creating significant urban change, and potentially contributed to increased development uncertainty.

The need for central government transport funding to enable the Adelaide Road development as originally planned, and Council’s unwillingness to carry increased financial risk meant that radical change to Adelaide Road was largely dependent on central government and market decisions, with Council in the less powerful role of enabler and encourager.

This situation created less radical redevelopment for Adelaide Road, and a likely slower change in the development face. The ‘sea-change’ envisioned through the Framework is dependent on the ability of the market to respond, while at the adjacent Basin Reserve, the centrally-led and funded development will undoubtedly result in a radical reworking of the road space, involving compulsory property purchases and unsurprisingly increases in the flow of traffic. Due to constraints in power and funding, local government was unable to have the same effect on Adelaide Road, outside of intersection improvements.
Conclusion

Utilising social theories of urban obduracy, alongside relevant New Zealand literature and government reform processes, this discussion has provided a useful lens in analysing why and how the Adelaide Road Framework was successively modified and largely transformed during the process of its implementation.

The discussion on dominant frames illustrated how differing Council viewpoints, characterised as ‘The Place’ and ‘The Road’, influenced decision making from planning to implementation, using examples such as: Council’s role in facilitating development, and improvements for pedestrian and cyclists. The section on embeddedness explored the relationship between attempts to change elements of Adelaide Road and other elements within the system. For example, Council relied on NZTA funding for road widening, but the funding criteria applied did not assess the wider urban benefits sought by the Framework. Widening the road to any level was embedded in the existing land-ownership patterns and made Council efforts to change the road lengthy and complex. Finally, the section on persistent traditions highlighted a culture of power imbalances between central and local government and the market in planning and funding our places, and underlying values that continue to prioritise the movement of private vehicles and parking, over walking and cycling in our cities.

While government policy encouraged land-use and transport integration, the systems of funding remained narrowly prescribed. Council reliance on funding wider urban improvements through a transport subsidy were not realistic and with limited alternative funding mechanisms, and a risk averse political and economic environment, Council was left with few options but to scale back plans for Adelaide Road.

The development of detailed designs for the road was influenced by dominant professional viewpoints during implementation, and by a multitude of networked elements impacting on land-use and transport. These included: funding and organisational processes, historic patterns of development, rules and regulations, and professional practices.

Opportunities to improve the environment for pedestrians and cyclists lessened as the road layout was negotiated. The approach to assigning space across modes did not strongly
challenge the status quo of private vehicles. Despite the notion of creating a live/work area, the gains envisioned for other modes were overly optimistic given that Adelaide Road’s function as a busy arterial was never really contested. The developing design reinforced the road as an arterial for general traffic and public transport. Opportunities for ‘place’ became less a focus than efficient ‘throughput’, despite the Framework’s intention to strengthen Adelaide Road as a ‘place’. While attempts to improve active and public transport persisted, these played second fiddle to ‘through’ movement, and pressure to retain permanent parking. Potential safety gains for cyclists were lost, with the reversal of the decision to have a wide bus/cycle lane, resulting in service levels similar to current.

For public transport, while it was clear that service levels would improve through bus priority mechanisms, the immediate introduction of 24-hour bus lanes and associated removal of non-peak parking was ruled out. Rather than a ‘build it and they will come’ philosophy, Council took a ‘demand-driven’ approach, which continued to entrench the dominant position of private vehicles and their parking, predestining active and public transport to gradual increases only.

Council’s unwillingness to more actively participate in property development, meant that the pace and nature of urban change (outside infrastructure improvements) would largely be outside Council control and largely determined by the market. While a less active role in development may have been safer and less costly in the short/medium term, the hidden cost could be greater as over time places need to be made and remade in response to significant local and global pressures. This results in opportunity costs for population health and the local environment, and highlights the political and financial constraints faced by local government.
Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Recommendations

The thesis has described how key elements of the original vision for Adelaide Road were remade during implementation. A range of unique and complex combinations of points of view, systems, and values resulted in a continual remaking of Adelaide Road plans. Despite the envisioning of a different future for the area, it largely continued on its trajectory as a strong expression of its dominant role as a major traffic arterial. The process of continual remaking during early implementation worked against efforts for more sustainable urban redevelopment, and served to keep the place much as it was, despite the Framework’s vision of a different future.

While changes within the direct realm of Council control were gradually negotiated, more significant change away from the status quo became less likely. Central government policy during this time served to further prioritise the role of private vehicles and focused on a narrowly defined view of economic productivity of cities and travel. This effectively reduced the local government role to regulator and enforcer rather than a broader ‘change maker’.

Urgent and radical action in urban areas is required to mitigate and adapt to climate change, to reduce the burden of physical inactivity, obesity and related diseases, and to enhance social cohesion required for productive, healthy and resilient communities. Addressing the wide range of factors that challenge and change urban redevelopment plans during implementation will enhance local government’s ability to create more sustainable places. It will also help in capitalising on a range of significant co-benefits for health and wellbeing and the local environment.

Important considerations to understanding potential resistance to urban change include: different points of views influencing planning and implementing; complex interactions between the human and non-human elements of city ‘systems’; and the influence of overarching societal values and traditions.
Debate, discussion and strategies to address urban change challenges need to go beyond material or purely physical issues, and consider the interrelationship with the social, cultural, political and economic networks in which urban areas are entwined (Hommels, 2005a). This may include encouraging debate and discussion on values implicit in existing transport funding systems and values underlying local government’s involvement in place making. Without such debate, attempts to change urban areas ignore important influences on place.

The challenges and complexity of implementing more sustainable urban redevelopment suggest that solutions are also likely to be complex. While there are few (if any) successfully implemented and evaluated examples of sustainable urban redevelopment in New Zealand, international case studies highlight various success factors. These include:

- addressing commercial and financial feasibility early in project planning;
- public sector and private sector joint ventures;
- leverage from public land ownership;
- central government financial assistance and whole-of-government strategic support;
- the use of value capture methods;
- prioritising of growth areas (CityScope Consultants Ltd, 2009 July).

Potential New Zealand strategies identified to support implementation include: public-private partnerships; early resolution of funding issues; clear organisation of governance, management and operations structures; and detailed implementation plans covering actions across organisational levels (p. 61).

**Recommendations for local government**

The following recommendations outline strategies to address New Zealand implementation challenges as informed by theoretical conceptualisations of urban obduracy. While acknowledging the various strategies to address challenges already explored in New Zealand and international research, the recommendations from this thesis directly address urban obduracy revealed through the analysis of dominant frames, embeddedness and persistent traditions. In this sense they aim to complement and extend strategies already identified in
the literature. Hommels’ “unbuilding strategies” to overcome obduracy are used to frame the following recommendations to councils (2005a, pp. 186-189).

The first set of recommendations responds to urban obduracy that may be explained by the interaction of different social and professional viewpoints. The unbuilding strategy aims to increase transparency of views across groups and increase the flexibility of dominant views.

(1) **Actors acknowledge the importance of specific social groups involved in a redesign process and the possibility that their specific, potentially opposite ways of thinking may result in obduracy; they tend to apply a combined strategy in which redesign and the attempt to influence the rigidity of the dominant frames involved go hand in hand (Hommels, 2005a, p. 187).**

a. There is a need for increased joint negotiation and management of planning and implementation phases for place-based plans. Instigate equal co-leadership of urban redevelopment projects within Council planning and transport professions, spanning both planning and implementation phases. This will create a balance between aspirational vision and practical realism, and support enhanced integration between land-use and transport planning and implementation.

b. Prior to adoption of place-based plans, identify the critical differing views within Council on key issues impacting implementation. For example, provision of parking, assigning road space across modes, and a Council role in actively facilitating development.

c. Encourage transparent and informed debate across Council organisational levels, and with key stakeholders discussing short and longer-term urban sustainability risks of the different views (above).

d. Prior to implementation, identify joined-up strategies and potential compromise positions for key issues including:
   - Council’s role in actively facilitating development;
   - Prioritisation of pedestrians and cyclists.

e. Improve Council communication, clearly distinguishing between ‘possible visions’ for exploration, and definitive actions for implementation. This will reduce the development of unrealistic expectations both within and external to Council.
The second set of recommendations responds to urban obduracy that may be explained by the complex interactions between various elements of the urban landscape. This strategy encourages council to overtly consider and negotiate the obduracy associated with each embedded element early in the planning phase.

(2) **Actors accept that specific urban structures do not exist in isolation and that their obduracy is associated with their embeddedness in a greater network or ensemble; they come up with an approach in which the obduracy of various embedded elements is considered and negotiated** (p. 187).

f. Increase Council policy planners’ understanding of current funding systems and processes, and land ownership roadblocks for urban renewal projects.

g. During early planning, transport, land-use and planning professionals should collectively explore and identify integrated funding solutions and potential partners, and involve political, governance and managerial levels. Significant funding issues should be discussed and addressed during planning and captured within a detailed implementation plan.

h. Enhance communication between Council planning and transport professions, and the NZTA. This communication (during early planning) should clarify potential funding sources and identify possible hurdles (as well as strategies to overcome them) associated with a project’s wider urban development activities.

i. Follow up Council staff communication with the NZTA, with governance and/or political communication, especially where NZTA funding processes might scupper significant integrated initiatives.

j. Council advocacy is needed at the NZTA and at overarching government levels to challenge the existing weighting of funding criteria toward vehicle flow efficiency, for integrated projects with broader urban development aims. Advocacy should promote the longer-term sustainable economic, environmental, social, health and cultural benefits of improving the liveability of urban places.

k. Discuss and communicate the broader consequences of significant funding challenges on the achievement of place-based planning objectives, including opportunity costs associated with reductions in the scope of improvements.

l. Consider at an early stage the ramifications and practicalities of assigning road space differently, for example increasing physical space for active modes. This should involve
explicit organisational agreement and a rationale for priorities across travel modes, areas for compromise or no compromise, and principles that guide development and implementation of detailed designs.

m. Resolve design issues that go against mandated priorities (such as improving the road for all modes) during design, or overtly renegotiate priorities across Council layers.

n. A detailed implementation plan should include supportive activities within Council organisational layers. For example: organisational processes for integrated decision making; integration between planning and implementation phases; flow-through mechanisms to Council asset plans and budgets; identification of overarching champion roles; and activities to maintain political support across political cycles.

The third set of recommendations responds to urban obduracy that may be explained by overarching societal traditions and cultural values, which transcend the local context. The unbuilding strategy suggests reducing the power of these persistent traditions by overtly recognising their presence and suggesting more transformative change. While the Adelaide Road Framework suggested radical change, this did not carry through effectively into implementation.

(3) Actors recognise the importance of persistent traditions in the constitution of obduracy; they try to reduce the importance of that tradition by proposing a radical break with the past (Hommels, 2005a, p. 187).

o. Devote time in planning to explore underlying cultural assumptions, values and traditions such as the dominance of private vehicles, and constraints on local government, which might impact various stages of the project implementation.

p. Be transparent about underlying traditions, discuss their impact on urban change, and identify possible ways to ‘break with tradition’ with a wider audience, including communities, other local bodies, wider stakeholders, and central government.

q. Test ‘breaks with tradition’ by incorporating a range of small but radical changes into place-based plans. Innovative place-based ‘experiments’ will gradually build evidence and confidence in encouraging a different paradigm. For example, trial the removal of parking entirely in a small but contested area, promote and/or trial ‘active and public transport only’ days, and create events that include novel use of the road space such as an evening street sporting event or weekend markets.
Commit to small-scale demonstration projects on Adelaide Road with local businesses, for example purchase and develop property to enhance east-west connections, or increase green infrastructure. Possible properties for consideration could include those unlikely to ever meet earthquake safety standards due to financial feasibility.

The fourth set of recommendations supports the concept that physical changes to the landscape (while not solely important) can assist in meeting wider objectives for urban areas. It encourages decision makers to take a more ‘build it and they will come’ approach to creating urban change.

(4) Actors assume that material properties are the most important cause of urban technology’s obduracy; they tend to concentrate their redesign efforts on material aspects, but this may lead to physical determinism: the conviction that “social” problems will automatically be resolved by “technical” interventions in embedded urban structures (Hommels, 2005a, p. 187).

To physically prioritise modal shift, fast track the introduction of permanent 24-hour bus lanes on both sides of Adelaide Road, providing more space to cyclists off-peak and highlighting public transport priority. Work through the related off-peak parking issues as they arise but not as the priority issue.

To physically signal the importance of pedestrians and residents in the area, prioritise the implementation of high quality pedestrian facilities and green infrastructure along the street, including pocket parks, and high-quality urban design features.
Recommendations for further research

The implementation of other Adelaide Road Framework activities could be explored in the future, for example, implementation of enhanced green space and social connections, or how plan changes may have enabled increased residential density and mixing of uses. In the longer term it would be interesting to compare Adelaide Road prior to the Framework’s adoption to Adelaide Road in twenty or thirty years time, assessing how it may (or may not) have influenced a wide variety of relevant outcomes.

Research utilising a similar theoretical framework could explore implementation challenges from the perspective of other players such as: central government policy makers; developers; local communities including businesses; and interest groups. Such research could explore the values and assumptions influencing decisions for our urban areas from other perspectives. There would also be value in the development of a suite of case studies, which explore the implementation phase of urban redevelopment plans, to examine how representative the issues found in the Adelaide Road case are, and in what instances they have been overcome.

Finally, there are significant opportunities for research within the public health sector, to make explicit the impacts of urban change on health. Traditionally Health Impact Assessment (HIA) on urban change proposals in New Zealand has focused on policy level HIA. Increased consideration should be given to how plans may or may not be remade during project implementation, due to the potential positive and negative consequences of implementation trade-offs on health. Public health research could also support the economic case for quality urban places by attempting to quantify the longer-term benefits of key urban improvements on health and wellbeing.

To ensure public health input is relevant beyond the level of policy rhetoric; we need to roll up our sleeves and engage with local authorities and other urban change makers as they develop and implement urban change proposals. Taking this approach will contribute to the implementation of sustainable urban redevelopment and to important public health outcomes for communities.
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Appendix
ETHICAL APPROVAL AT DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL OF A
PROPOSAL INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS (CATEGORY B)

PLEASE read the important notes appended to this form before completing the sections below

NAME OF DEPARTMENT: Public Health

TITLE OF PROJECT: Masters Thesis:
A case study of urban redevelopment plans and implementation experience – considerations for sustainability and public health

PROJECTED START DATE OF PROJECT: October 2009

STAFF MEMBER RESPONSIBLE FOR PROJECT: Geoff Fougere (Principal Supervisor)

NAMES OF OTHER INVESTIGATORS OR INSTRUCTORS: Helen Topham (Master of Public Health candidate, and scholarship recipient for the NZ Centre of Sustainable Cities)

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE AIMS:

Utilising a local case study of current urban redevelopment plans, the research aims to identify the challenges local government face in implementing policy aspirations for more sustainable urban redevelopment, the extent to which these challenges will impact on the implementation of the redevelopment and its contribution to health and sustainability outcomes. The research will focus on implementation of key physical environment features that support more ‘liveable’ and ‘sustainable’ urban redevelopment. These factors include: increased population density, mixed used development, and enhancements to the movement network, particularly for public transport, pedestrians and cyclists. The research intends to:

- identify the aspirations of the case focusing on; increased population density, mixed used development, and enhancements to the movement network, and the local and national context for these aspirations;

- explore how the aspirations might contribute to public health and sustainability outcomes;

- distinguish the actions within the case study that will contribute to these aspirations;

- explore the experience of local government in early implementation of these actions;

- explore how implementation alters the project and the potential impact on the public health and sustainability outcomes;

- Identify conflicting priorities (e.g., timeliness, cost) that may impede good public health outcomes in urban redevelopment and their role in the case study.
The research will support agencies involved in policy development and implementation, particularly local and central government, and other groups, to better understand challenges faced by the local government sector in realising goals for more sustainable urban redevelopment. In addition, it will help in identifying possible entry-points for addressing implementation challenges at a local, regional and national level.

The research will support interested sectors, including health, in considering the potential impacts of redevelopment on health. It will raise awareness as to the complexity of implementation challenges versus planning aspirations, and will highlight the risks for public health and social wellbeing, especially when the health and social benefits or indeed, adverse effects hinge upon the need for comprehensive and high quality implementation.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE METHOD:

A single case study will be selected of a local government plans for urban redevelopment. The case study will involve an exploration of the implementation experience of an urban redevelopment project. The case will have sought to: increase population density, increase mix of uses and improve the movement network particularly for pedestrians, public transport and cyclists. The case study will be selected in discussion with local government, and with researchers working in the field of health and urban development.

Multiple sources and types of data will be used to inform the thesis e.g. Key informant interviews, council documents, design guides, surveys, consultant reports, photos, background publications, evaluations etc. Primarily this is a qualitative investigation but some data collection includes quantitative research such as travel surveys and population demographic information. The series of key informant interviews will be held with key Council staff using a partially structured interview style. It is likely that these interviews will be up to 2 hours in length and that more than one interview may be required with some participants. The agency will also be asked to provide relevant information related to the development (e.g. draft strategies, communication plans, Council minutes, etc)

Participants are likely to include:

- Relevant staff from Council for example: planners, urban designers, project managers, transport staff, management, Councillors)

Initial informal discussions have been held with Wellington City Council which is keen to support the development of a research topic in this area.

Meetings to discuss the formal research design will be held with Council to gain feedback. These meetings will provide an important check to ensure that the research is appropriately designed to meet the needs of working with the agency. Potential interview participants, and further key sources of information will be identified through these discussions and an information sheet will be developed ( see draft attached) to inform participants of the research, and how their potential input will be used, and for the purpose of gaining their informed consent.

DETAILS OF ETHICAL ISSUES INVOLVED:

The research will be supported by the development of an MOU between Wellington City Council and the NZ Centre for Sustainable Cities. Urban redevelopment can take upwards of ten years to complete. This thesis will focus mainly on aspects of early implementation, and as such does not intend to tell the full story of urban redevelopment cases.

The student will work with relevant policy agencies at an early stage to gain buy in to the research and to identify expectations of involved agencies, their contribution to the research and agreement as to any shared aims. Agencies will support the student to gain access to agency information and staff, and understanding will be reached between the agencies and the student on the research methodology, analysis, and utilisation of research findings.
Most written documentation used in analysis will be from government agencies, or freely available online, and as such is public information.

The student also works for Regional Public Health, which has a separate relationship with the Wellington City Council. Through Regional Public Health the student may have other dealings with the policy agencies. The student will declare this interest and any potential conflict as necessary and will make clear what her role is when contacting participants.

Consent
The agencies involved will identify interview participants. The main areas to be covered through key informant interviews will be the experiences, perceptions and opinions of planners and policy makers in implementing an urban redevelopment project. The informed consent of interview participants will be supported through use of an information sheet detailing the types of questions to be asked, issues around anonymity, and outlining the ‘checking back’ methods that the researcher will utilise to ensure the accuracy of the raw data and interpretations that the researcher may make. The researcher will also make clear the ‘non-threatening’ and exploratory nature of the questions.

Anonymity
Issues around anonymity will be discussed and approaches to conserve anonymity where possible will be agreed with participants. Even so, it will be made clear that it may not be completely possible to preserve anonymity due to the small number of participants, and the fact that they represent a small working group within the council.

Data Storage and Security
The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only the student researcher and her advisors will be able to gain access to it. At the end of the project any personal information will be destroyed immediately except that, as required by the University's research policy, any raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for five years, after which it will be destroyed.
Notes concerning Category B Reporting Sheets

This form should **only be used** for proposals which are **Category B** as defined in the policy document "Policy on ethical practices in research and teaching involving human participants", and which may therefore be properly considered and approved at departmental level;

2. A proposal can only be classified as Category B if **NONE** of the following is involved:
   - Personal information - any information about an individual who may be identifiable from the data once it has been recorded in some lasting and usable format, or from any completed research;
   - The taking or handling of any form of tissue or fluid sample from humans or cadavers;
   - Any form of physical or psychological stress;
   - Situations which might place the safety of participants or researchers at any risk;
   - The administration or restriction of food, fluid or a drug to a participant;
   - A potential conflict between the applicant’s activities as a researcher, clinician or teacher and their interests as a professional or private individual;
   - The participation of minors or other vulnerable individuals;
   - Any form of deception which might threaten an individual's emotional or psychological well-being;
   - The research is being undertaken overseas by students.

   If any of the above is involved, then the proposal is Category A, and must be submitted in full to the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee using the standard Category A application form, and before the teaching or research commences;

3. A separate form should be completed for each teaching or research proposal which involves human participants and for which ethical approval has been considered or given at Departmental level;

4. The completed form, **together with copies of any Information Sheet or Consent Form**, should be returned to the Manager Academic Committees or the Academic Committees Assistant, Registry, **as soon as the proposal has been considered at departmental level**;

5. The Information Sheet and Consent Form should **NOT** include the statement “This proposal has been reviewed and approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee” as this is inappropriate for Category B proposals. A statement such as statement “This proposal has been reviewed and approved by the Department of ......, University of Otago” may however be used;

6. Please ensure the Consent Form and the Information Sheet have been carefully proofread; the institution as a whole is likely to be judged by them;

7. A Category B proposal may commence as soon as departmental approval has been obtained. No correspondence will be received back from the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee concerning this Reporting Sheet **unless the Committee has concerns**;

8. This form is available electronically at the following web address:  
   [http://telperion.otago.ac.nz/acadcomm/categoryb.html](http://telperion.otago.ac.nz/acadcomm/categoryb.html)
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate we thank you. If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you of any kind and we thank you for considering our request.

What is the Aim of the Project?

The aim of the project is to support a better understanding of the challenges involved in implementing urban redevelopment plans that aim to enhance the sustainability and health of New Zealand cities. This project is being undertaken as thesis research for a Master in Public Health.

Research Question

How do local government implement policy aspirations for more sustainable, healthy urban redevelopment: what challenges do they encounter and what are the potential consequences for the realization of sustainability and health goals?

The major aims of the project include:

1. To explore how planners seek to create more sustainable and healthy urban form through local place-based plans for urban redevelopment.
2. To explore the challenges that emerge during implementation and how these may reshape development, and any potential implications for population health, wellbeing and sustainability.

Who is the Researcher?

The researcher is Helen Topham. Helen is a student at the University of Otago, Wellington School of Medicine, and aims to fulfill the requirements of a Master of Public Health by this thesis. Helen is receiving a scholarship through the New Zealand Centre for Sustainable Cities and works as Senior Public Health Advisor for the Wellington Regional Public Health service.

What Type of Participants are being sought?

The participants are local government staff who have had a role in urban redevelopment projects, as part of Wellington City Council’s place-based planning, either at the planning and/or the implementation phases.

What will Participants be Asked to Do?

Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to take part in a 1-2 hour interview.

Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project?

You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind.
What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it?

The main areas to be covered through key informant interviews will be the experiences, perceptions and opinions of planners and policy makers in implementing an urban redevelopment project.

A range of data will be collected including: council reports, meeting minutes, planning documents, consultant reports, and data from interviews and meetings.

This project will involve an open-questioning technique where the precise nature of the questions which will be asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops. Consequently, although ethics approval has been given on the basis of knowledge of the general areas to be explored in the interview, it has not been possible to review the precise questions to be used.

In the event that the line of questioning does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant or uncomfortable you are reminded of your right to decline to answer any particular question(s) and also that you may withdraw from the project at any stage without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind. It should be noted that the interview questions aim to be non-threatening and explorative in design.

The data is being collected for the sole purpose of answering the above research aims. The final thesis will be available to Councils involved in the research and to the New Zealand Centre for Sustainable Cities, who are providing a scholarship to the student for the Masters study.

The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity.

You are most welcome to request a copy of the results of the project should you wish.

The data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only the student researcher and her advisors will be able to gain access to it. At the end of the project any personal information will be destroyed immediately except that, as required by the University's research policy, any raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for five years, after which it will be destroyed.

Reasonable precautions will be taken to protect and destroy data gathered by email. However, the security of electronically transmitted information cannot be guaranteed. Caution is advised in the electronic transmission of sensitive material.

What if Participants have any Questions?

If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact:

Geoff Fougere

Department of Public Health

University Telephone Number: - 918 6046
CONSENT FORM FOR
PARTICIPANTS

Project Title: A case study of urban redevelopment plans and implementation experience – considerations for public health and sustainability

I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about. All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request further information at any stage.

I know that:

1. my participation in the project is entirely voluntary;
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage;
3. The data will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for five years, after which it will be destroyed;
4. The interview involves an open ended questions where the precise nature of the questions which will be asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops and that in the event that the line of questioning develops in such a way that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable I may decline to answer any particular question(s) and/or may withdraw from the project without any disadvantage of any kind.
5. The results of the project may be published and available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity.

I agree to take part in this project.

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(Signature of participant)...........................................

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(Date)