Tourism policy implementation in the Philippines, 1973-2009

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Abstract

This thesis examines the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation in the Philippines in the last 30 years or so (1972-2009). To meet this objective, the research undertook an ecotourism case study and pursued the following steps. First is a description and analysis of what policy implementation comprised in terms of policies and programmes. Second is an examination of how the implementation process has taken place through a focus on the interaction of key actors, their strategies and use of resources, as well as their perceptions and values. Third is an attempt at explaining why the implementation process has taken place the way it did by deducing key longer-term historical factors as well as contextual conditions from the analysis and exploring their inter-relationship.

Based on a review of the policy implementation literature, the thesis employed the advocacy coalition framework and policy networks approach in analysing the case of the Philippines. It allowed the researcher to use multiple levels of abstraction, identify key causal processes that might explain policy implementation, capture the dynamics of social interactions formed among policy actors and target participants, as well as take cognizance of the context within which tourism policies are implemented. In addition, the thesis utilized theories of the state such as clientelism to assist interpretation and explanation.

Field research was undertaken in the Philippines from January to July 2008 in two research sites: Manila and Pamilacan Island, Bohol Province. Data collected consisted of archival records, interviews, observations, and visual materials. Content analysis and network analysis were the principal methods of data analysis.

Analysis of findings suggests key roles for external and internal forces in explaining tourism policy implementation. External factors found salient were changing socio-economic conditions, social-cultural values, basic constitutional structure, and systemic governing coalitions and control of institutions. Internal forces found influential were ideas and policy learning, and policy networks.
Disaggregating these variables and analysing their dynamics lead to the central argument that subject to the constraints imposed by the wider environment and available resources, tourism policy implementation is determined ultimately by traditional power relationships, even if learning, as intermediated by policy networks and micro-implementation processes, drives the policy process forward. This applies most particularly at the local level where elite families dominate the political system and where patron-client relations are strongest.

In terms of contribution to knowledge, the thesis adds on three fronts. First, it increases the meagre supply of in-depth tourism policy studies. Second, by using the advocacy coalition framework and policy networks, it demonstrates the methodological utility of doing research that uses multiple levels of analysis and methods in order to better understand the policy process. Third, it illuminates some dark corners of policymaking. Within the Philippine context, it offers an integrated description, explanation and theory of the tourism policy process in the last 30 years or so. It highlights the political nature of implementation and the futility of assuming a Weberian model of public administration in a patrimonial state with a highly personalistic political system.

Broadly, the thesis identifies key categories that might be useful in studies of tourism policy implementation in other contexts, particularly democratizing island states. While proposing a transmission process through which these variables inter-relate, it calls for greater attention than currently conceived to policy-oriented learning as a driver of change, particularly if policy implementation efforts are more concerned with acceptance of uncertainty and collaboration than power plays among interest groups.

Finally, the thesis suggests ways to improve the use of policy process models in geographical contexts characterized by political instability. Focusing on the advocacy coalition framework, it calls for a re-assessment of some aspects that in the study were found to be at odds with the importance conveyed in the framework, a deeper consideration of the political system, and a relaxation of some rigid analytic dimensions.
Acknowledgment

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<td>ACF</td>
<td>Advocacy Coalition Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAHRR</td>
<td>Bohol Association of Hotels, Resorts and Restaurants</td>
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<tr>
<td>BANGON</td>
<td>Bohol Alliance of Non-Government Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BFAR</td>
<td>Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMT</td>
<td>Bohol Marine Triangle</td>
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<td>BOFETTO</td>
<td>Bohol Federation of Tour and Travel Operators</td>
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<td>BRUMM</td>
<td>Bohol Rescue Unit for Marine Mammal</td>
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<td>CI</td>
<td>Conservation International</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRM</td>
<td>Coastal Resource Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>DENR</td>
<td>Department of Environment and Natural Resources</td>
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<td>DILG</td>
<td>Department of Interior and Local Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Tourism</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>Environment Clearance Certificate</td>
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<td>EDSA</td>
<td>Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue</td>
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<td>ELAC</td>
<td>Environmental Legal Assistance Centre</td>
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<td>EIA</td>
<td>Environmental Impact Assessment</td>
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<td>EIS</td>
<td>Environmental Impact Statement</td>
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<td>EO</td>
<td>Executive Order</td>
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<td>ETWG</td>
<td>Ecotourism Technical Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Fisheries Administrative Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>International Union for Conservation of Nature</td>
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<tr>
<td>IATFMMC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Task Force on Marine Mammal Conservation</td>
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<tr>
<td>KKP</td>
<td>Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGC</td>
<td>Local Government Code</td>
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<td>LGU</td>
<td>Local Government Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Marine Protected Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOT</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOTT</td>
<td>Ministry of Trade and Tourism</td>
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NEDA National Economic Development Authority
NEDC National Ecotourism Development Council
NEP National Ecotourism Plan
NEPO National Ecotourism Programme Office
NES National Ecotourism Strategy
NESC National Ecotourism Steering Committee
NGO Non-Government Organization
NTO National Tourist Organization
NZAID New Zealand Agency for International Development
NZODA New Zealand Official Development Assistance
PAFIA Pamilacan Fishermen’s Association
PATA Pacific Asia Travel Association
PAWB Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau
PFEC Philippine Federation for Environmental Change
PIBOSA Pamilacan Island Tourism and Livelihood Multipurpose Cooperative
PIDWWO Pamilacan Island Dolphin and Whale Watching Organization
PITCO Pamilacan Island Tourism and Livelihood Multipurpose Cooperative
PO Peoples’ Organization
PTC Philippine Tourism Commission
PROCESS Participatory Research, Organization of Communities and Education towards Struggle for Self-Reliance – Bohol
REC Regional Ecotourism Council
SP Sangguniang Panlalawigan
TMP Tourism Master Plan
WTO World Tourism Organization
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WWF World Wildlife Fund
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background to the study

In the 1970s, tourism featured for the first time as a serious public policy concern in the Philippines, by appearing in the country’s development plans. The focus was decidedly to meet economic and political objectives, with innovative marketing programmes to lure foreign tourists and overseas Filipinos, investment in education, and infrastructure development. Policymaking was highly centralized in the hands of the President, with close assistance from the First Lady, technocrats and the military. The Ministry of Tourism (later renamed Department of Tourism) was institutionally very dominant relative to other actors in the tourism system, being able to, for example, control corporate decisions of the private sector such as opening new branches. Its influence extended to air transportation policy, and over local governments when it came to tourism facilities.

Today, tourism remains important but the substance of policy and institutional arrangements to implement it has changed drastically. Overtly political goals gave way to social and environmental considerations. The closed policy network is now more fragmented, and structurally open to non-government organizations, business, academe, and local governments. A much weaker Department of Tourism relies on these partners now, particularly local governments to implement its goals and plans, which have become integrated in approach. Similarly, the performance of local governments has been doubted, raising questions as to their capability to achieve the goals of tourism policy.

These broad developments raise fundamental questions in terms of public policy theory. For example, why do the orientation and the policy process change? What are the key drivers of change? What are the processes involved? These questions are not meant to be exhaustive but they indicate that the ‘black box’ of policymaking still needs illumination (Cairney, 2007; Kim & Roh, 2008). Tourism public policy is no exception, as its processes remain fuzzy (Hall & Jenkins, 1995).

There are compelling reasons why a study of tourism policy implementation is important, relevant and appropriate. First is to improve understanding of how society and
government function. Dye (1992) explains that public policy, in general, can be examined for scientific, professional and political reasons. The objective is to understand the factors that influence policy decisions as well as determine their effects, thereby providing insights into the workings of society. A more detailed knowledge of policy implementation can improve a government’s tourism policymaking process, as well as theoretical knowledge of the political dimensions of tourism development (Hall, 2008; Hall & Jenkins, 1995; Zhang, Chong, & Carson, 2002).

Secondly, there has been inadequate attention to in-depth tourism policy studies, particularly those that shed light on the ‘black box’ of decision-making (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007; Hall & Jenkins, 1995). As Pearce (2001) notes, commenting on local government tourism policy research, most are “essentially surveys of what is being done rather than in-depth analyses of how and why such policies have been developed and what effect they have had” (p. 335). Indeed, with just a few exceptional studies appearing since this assessment was made (e.g., Albrecht, 2008; Hall, 2008), this observation still remains valid. Moreover, extant tourism policy research focus on the process of making a tourism plan (Stevenson, Airey, & Miller, 2008), and the few who have written about implementation discuss mainly barriers to it (e.g., Berry & Ladkin, 1997; Dodds, 2007a, 2007b; Ioannides, 1995). Thus, Hall and Jenkins (1995) call for research that “does more than describe the inputs and outputs of tourism policymaking” (p. 94). This appeal gains urgency when it is considered that implementation failures and conundrums remain (O’Toole, 2000). For example, Jenkins (2006) reports that more than 80% of plans developed in the 1990s with the involvement of the World Tourism Organization have not been implemented. Dodds and Butler (2009), speaking of sustainable tourism development, also state that “there are more examples of unsustainable developments than sustainable ones” (p. 44). Thus, it is imperative that tourism policy studies of the kind advocated by Hall and Jenkins need to be undertaken with greater frequency not only to understand why implementation occurred the way it did, but to distil lessons for the future. As Hall (2001) stresses, "There is no perfect planning or policy process...Nevertheless, through an improved understanding of the policy processes and institutional arrangements...better integration of tourism development...without undue negative impacts may be achieved" (p. 610).
Thirdly, the change in the orientation of Philippine policy implementation and its processes deal with important theoretical issues that remain up in the air. To start with, it touches on the continuing debate regarding the role of the state vis-à-vis society in the policy process (Borras Jr, 2001; Ham & Hill, 1984; Migdal, Kohli, & Shue, 1994; Nordlinger, 1981). It delves into the interplay of key factors thought to influence the policy process: ideas (Hall, 1993; Oliver & Pemberton, 2004), networks (Dowding 1995; Marsh, 1998; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1988), institutions (Grindle, 1980; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975), rational choice (Bardach, 1977; Cho, Kelleher, Wright, & Yackee, 2005; Levin & Ferman, 1986), and broad societal processes such as democratization (Armijo & Kearney, 2008; Hsu, 2005). It also raises questions regarding the appropriate policy implementation approach, that is, whether it should be top-down or bottom-up, and the role of contextual conditions therein. Hence, a study that integrates all these issues and variables together with coherence should be able to offer an explanation about why tourism policy occurred the way it did.

Fourth is the persistence of narrow analytical frameworks in tourism policy analysis. Even though tourism policy has received more attention in recent years (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007), analytical models employed by researchers (e.g., Chambers & Airey, 2001; Dredge, 2006a, 2006b; Dodds, 2007a, 2007b; Pförr, 2005, 2006; Rodolfo, 2005; Sofield & Li, 2003; Zhang et al., 2002) do not capture the dynamic interactive relationship between the wider environment, the meso-level policy sub-system, and the micro-level organizations and individuals. This is because they focus mainly on a single plane of analysis, which is seen as providing only a partial account (Hall & Jenkins, 1995; Kim & Roh, 2008). Among recent publications, it appears that only a few (e.g., Bramwell & Meyer, 2007; Pförr, 2005, 2006) have used a multi-level approach. In other words, existing frameworks used in much of tourism policy research do not satisfactorily capture the complexity of the policymaking process. Thus, in relation to the third point above, a theoretical framework that discusses a wide variety of variables and presents them in multiple levels is needed. By articulating such an approach, the researcher is then able to offer an integrated description, explanation and theory of the tourism policy process.
1.2 Research aim and scope

This thesis aims to examine the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation in the last 30 years or so (1973-2009) in the Philippines by identifying the key variables and their relationships that influenced policy and changes to it. To meet this primary objective, three main tasks are involved. First, the research provides a description and analysis of what policy implementation comprised in terms of policies and programmes. Second is an examination of how the implementation process has taken place through a focus on the interaction of key actors, their strategies and use of resources, as well as their perceptions and values. Third is an attempt at explaining why the implementation process has taken place the way it did by deducing key longer-term historical factors as well as contextual conditions from the analysis and exploring their inter-relationship.

In light of the discussion in the preceding section, the thesis uses multiple levels of abstraction and an approach that integrates key causal processes that might explain the policy process. The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) developed (and revised many times) by Sabatier in 1986 is one such approach.

The intrinsic characteristics of the framework justify its employment in the tourism context. It incorporates the best features of both top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation (Sabatier, 1986). It neatly brings together the causal processes that political scientists deem salient in the policy process (John, 2003). Among others, these include policy-oriented learning and policy networks. A learning perspective stresses that policy implementers are not passive actors that respond only to environmental pressures but are active in knowledge acquisition and use (Fiorino, 2001). Furthermore, the implementation perspective is able to “illustrate the very real struggles that exist between actors, often at different levels, with respect to policy and planning as well as the potential policy and planning choices that are never taken” (Hall, 2008, p. 259).

The inclusion of policy networks within the framework, via advocacy coalitions, enables it to assess tourism. Tourism is considered to have multiple interdependencies that underlie interactions among tourist organizations starting from its long chain of distribution system to its fragmented supply chain (Selin & Beason, 1991; Tremblay,
1998). However, the advocacy coalition framework does not fully explain the features of policy networks (Kim & Roh 2008), so the thesis taps into network theory as well.

While this thesis is the first to have used the advocacy coalition framework in the tourism context, researchers employing the network approach have grown in recent years (e.g., Bramwell & Meyer, 2007; Dredge, 2006a, 2006b; Scott, Cooper, & Baggio, 2008; Shih, 2006; Timur & Getz, 2008). This is because policy network analysis captures the dynamics of relational ties, interdependence, communication and information flows formed among tourism participants (Timur & Getz, 2008), aside from taking cognizance of the social context within which tourism policies are formulated and made (Stevenson et al., 2008). In addition to the network approach, the thesis employs theories of the state such as clientelism to assist interpretation and explanation.

This multiple approach to tourism policy analysis can be seen as part of the growing body of tourism policy research that use diverse perspectives in order in better understand the policymaking process. For instance, Stevenson et al. (2008) employed stakeholder theory, policy networks and grounded theory to study how policy makers view tourism in relation to other policy issues. Bramwell and Meyer (2007) utilized the dialectical approach to policy networks, integrating a social constructionist analysis with a political economy approach. Pfotz (2005, 2006) combined social network analysis with stages heuristics to show how state and non-state actors influence policymaking processes and outputs. Tyler and Dinan (2001) used policy networks with chaos theory, institutional theory, and political theory to examine the role of interest groups in tourism policy development. At another level, the use of policy networks is an important step towards merging the rich policy networks literature, criticized for lacking a theoretical scaffold (Carlsson, 2000), into an established theory of the policy process (Weible, 2005).

Policy networks and advocacy coalition framework are applied to a case study of the Philippine experience in tourism policy implementation from the 1970s to the present decade. The choice of the Philippines is justified by the fact that there are certain features in its recent history and contemporary state of affairs to suggest that it is a critical case in policy process research in general, and in tourism policy implementation within the context of developing countries in particular. As Gerring (2004) emphasises, if conditions
for testing or challenging the theory are present in a case, then it is sufficient to evaluate the causal implications of the theory, and provide evidence for theoretical positions. The Philippines seems to meet such conditions. The country has had, since the 1970s, an active tourism programme whose orientation, substance and institutional arrangements have evolved through time. Institutionally, for example, there was a massive shift from being a centrally planned and implemented activity to one where state and non-state policy actors collaborate now. Following decentralization in 1991, tourism functions were devolved from the national government to local governments, thereby affecting power arrangements among policy actors. From having little regard to the environmental and social consequences of tourism, actors now carefully obtain local community support before embarking on huge projects. Nonetheless, in decision-making, traditional solidarities remain as a strong informal mechanism.

Looking at these changes through the theoretical lenses of the ACF and policy networks, a researcher could validate claims in the literature such as the role in the policy process ascribed to ideas, networks, socioeconomic process, institutions and choices (John, 2003; Real-Dato, 2009). Thus, an in-depth study of the Philippines, including an embedded case focused on Pamilacan Island, offers huge potential for theorization and practical lessons, particularly for similar countries whose socio-political system is moving towards greater democratization. Noting that “different countries seem to have different ‘implementation styles’” (Pulzl & Treib, 2007, p. 101), the case study further contributes to the production of ‘exemplary case studies’ (Flyvberg, 2006) in the sense that the details of the case help to better understand the black box of tourism policymaking, especially within the context of developing countries.

1.3 Overview of the research

The thesis argues that subject to the constraints imposed and opportunities presented by the wider environment and available resources, tourism policy implementation is determined ultimately by traditional power relationships, even if learning, as intermediated by policy networks and micro-implementation processes, drives the policy process forward. This applies most particularly at the local level where elite families - who place particularistic demand on policy implementers - dominate the political system
and where patron-client relations are strongest. To provide evidence of this argument and to meet the research objective, Chapter Two outlines a theoretical framework. It argues the applicability of the advocacy coalition framework and the complementarity of policy networks in studying the tourism policy process. Thus, the chapter reviews the literature on policy implementation, from which the advocacy coalition framework evolved, and policy networks, outlining the key debates and themes in the literature. A major theme discussed is the role of knowledge and its utilization in policy implementation. Concepts from the policy learning literature are integrated within the discussion, and the role of learning in the policy process is explicated. Another key feature is a discussion of key conditions that influence Philippine tourism policy implementation processes.

Chapter Three details the utility of the case study method in pursuing an in-depth study. It claims that the Philippines, as a result of its history and contemporary state of affairs, is imbued with features that makes it a critical case for policy process research in general, and in tourism policy implementation within the context of developing countries in particular. The methodological necessity of engaging in multiple levels of analysis is emphasised in order to discuss the complexity of the policy process. It also presents the key processes involved in generating the information required as well as methods employed in analysing the data. Finally, the chapter reflects on key ethical issues faced by the researcher undertaking research in a community with a conflicted contemporary history.

Chapter Four discusses the national tourism policy framework from a historical context. It demonstrates that the evolution of national tourism policy in the last 30 years had a strong learning component, particularly since the 1980s, culminating in a deepening of social learning in the present decade. It is shown that as tourism policy evolved towards greater sustainability, there was a general movement away from a top-down approach to a bottom-up perspective in implementation. Nonetheless, the chapter highlights the importance of financial and manpower resources, or the lack of them, in influencing the process. The discussion shows that lack of resources by the state had allowed civil society organizations to take up the slack, but not the private sector, thus increasing their own power in the process. Another factor emphasised is the role of power and politics, as
expressed in individual and institutional levels. It is shown that clientelistic relations remain durable and stymie rational policy implementation through abusive discretion.

Chapter Five emphasises the complexity of implementing policy particularly at the local level. This is shown by presenting an historical and analytical account of marine mammal conservation and ecotourism programme implementation in Pamilacan Island, Bohol Province. It demonstrates how network structure influences the policy process in a dialectical relationship with structural context, the actions of network actors, and policy outcomes. It clarifies the role of traditional power and political relationships as a key contextual factor, and shows how exploiting these variables can waylay the implementation process through the formation of opposing coalitions. It also shows the value of various rules of the game such as negotiations and accommodation in moving implementation forward.

Chapter Six carries over from the previous chapter but deals more explicitly with behavioural and policy outcomes. The chapter outlines the consequences of increased inter-organizational interactions, paying attention to the response of the community and the local government to the knowledge gained through feedback from the programmes introduced, increased linkages with travel industry and civil society, and changes in the socio-economic environment such as the emergence of competition. The chapter argues that a cohesive network structure that emerged has mediated policy learning and changes in community behaviour. Moreover, this role is shown to be underpinned by structural holes, key organizations with resources and individuals with skills such as experts, along with feedback effects from knowledge of policy impacts. The result presented demonstrates the important role that technical information plays in policy implementation. As well, the chapter reinforces the interactive relationship between policy learning and individual actions, network structure, and changes to the wider environment.

Chapter Seven returns the discussion to the macro-level aspect of policy implementation by discussing broad societal changes and key events in the last 30 years or so. This analysis logically flows from a description of policies and programmes undertaken in Chapter Four, and a detailed assessment in Chapters Five and Six of the network
structure, interaction of key actors at the local level, their strategies and use of resources, as well as their perception and values.

The examination of key external events and social changes in this chapter not only completes the set of variables proposed as influential in policymaking by policy process models including the ACF but also sheds light on the issue of policy sub-system membership, which in the case of civil society in Pamilacan Island, had seen them assuming key roles. It is argued that longer-term external forces such as democratization and environmentalism were critical factors that fundamentally shaped the alteration of the substance of tourism policy and formal institutional arrangements observed in the national level, as discussed in Chapter Four, and local levels, as examined in Chapters Five and Six. These influences are shown to have caused first, the installation of a systemic governing coalition committed to stemming the excesses of a politicized tourism programme and refocusing its concern towards sustainability; and second, the opening of democratic spaces for other policy actors particularly the NGO sector and local governments, thereby fostering plurality. Furthermore, the chapter argues that it is key external forces that start the chain in the process of policy change, as they lead to policy learning and a redistribution of resources - clearly discussed in Chapters Four to Six - which then both stimulate political action. Ultimately, this combination of processes determines whether a policy is implemented, terminated, or revised.

These points are further developed in Chapter Eight where key variables analyzed in previous chapters are integrated together in a proposed model. The discussion is structured along key questions dealt with in the research: what did implementation consist of in terms of policies and programmes, how did it go, and why did it occur the way it did by identifying the range of variables and their relationships. The chapter re-affirms the role of external events, institutions, ideas and policy learning, network structure, policy implementation processes, and situational variables in explaining the substance of tourism policy and arrangements to implement it. Yet it argues that policy learning must be accorded greater weight than currently conceived in the literature. An assessment of the theoretical framework, models of tourism development, and methods used in the study provide theoretical and methodological suggestions and implications for consideration in future research.
1.4 Contributions to knowledge

The thesis examines the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation in the Philippines by identifying the key variables and their relationships that influenced policy and changes to it. In meeting this objective, the thesis contributes to knowledge on three fronts. At the outset, it adds to the meagre supply of in-depth tourism policy studies, “most of which are essentially surveys of what is being done” (Pearce, 2001, p. 335), or focused on a narrow aspect of policy such as barriers to implementation. Within the Philippine context, the thesis contributes not just by adding to the limited supply of tourism policy studies but, by adopting an integrated case study approach that used multiple levels of analysis, departs from the usual practice of focusing only on a single level and dwelling mainly on management issues. Indeed, the thesis appears to be the first to have explicitly looked at tourism policy implementation in a democratizing developing country context using theories developed from the general policy implementation literature. Adding tourism policy implementation studies that have been undertaken in developed country contexts (e.g., Albrecht, 2008), the result is to widen the knowledge base from which future researchers can draw.

Second, the thesis demonstrates the methodological utility of doing research that uses multiple levels of analysis and multiple methods in order to better understand the policy process. This was accomplished by using policy networks and the advocacy coalition framework, the latter a theory that has not been applied to the tourism sector before in any geographic context. Based on this approach, the thesis reinforces views regarding the complexity of the policy process, and having a sense of its intricacies only through multiple levels of analysis (Kim & Roh, 2008). This research strategy might be useful in examinations of tourism policy in other contexts.

The third contribution to knowledge is the way it illuminates some dark corners of policymaking. This is achieved in a number of ways. First, it clarifies aspects of policymaking that should be focused on when looking at implementation in a developing country context. The thesis, particularly the part that deals with the embedded case, highlights the political nature of implementation and the futility of assuming a Weberian model of public administration in a patrimonial state with a highly personalistic political
system. Moreover, the case study demonstrates the need to consider the whole policy process including the formulation stage in studies of policy implementation, in view of the interdependency of the policy processes (Ellison, 1998; Sabatier, 1999).

Second, the thesis offers an integrated description, explanation and theory of the policy process as far as the Philippines in the last 30 years or so is concerned. This is definitely an improvement over current research on Philippine tourism policy where the preoccupation is to dissect management and operational issues based on a single level of analysis. The contention is that subject to the constraints imposed by the wider environment and available resources, tourism policy implementation was determined ultimately by traditional power relationships, even if learning, as intermediated by policy networks and micro-implementation processes, had driven the policy process forward.

This argument highlights a number of key variables. From the macro-level, it acknowledges the role of social forces, changing socio-economic conditions, constitutional structures, and governing coalitions. From the meso-level, it shows the key role of networks in modifying individual behaviour, in influencing policy outcomes, and changing the structural context; hence confirming notions that it is not just a metaphor but that they do matter (Howlett, 2002). From the micro-level, the thesis re-affirms the importance of personal qualities of implementers and the choices they make. In relation to these explanatory variables and the argument, the thesis calls for greater discussion of policy learning than currently conceived, in equal measure with power and conflict, in recognition of its key role in tourism policy implementation in the Philippines.

Beyond this, the argument points to a path through which these variables are inter-related. Specifically, the thesis proposes a transmission mechanism through which external events work with other variables and processes to influence policy change. This issue is not so clear in the literature (John 2003; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996, Nohrstedt, 2008; Sato, 1999). Thus, the suggestion provides an initial attempt. The proposed process explicity integrates and acknowledges the principality of learning in the policy process, instead of vesting it a marginal role. This is an improvement in the conceptualization of the ACF and amplifies beliefs in the literature that politics should not just be based solely on power and conflict but must involve “collective puzzlement” (Heclo, 1974, pp. 304-305).
It must be emphasised however that generalizing for specific policy issues based on this proposed process would require a more positivist approach (Lin, 1998).

Finally, the thesis suggests ways to improve the utilization of policy process models in geographic contexts characterized by political instability. In particular, the thesis calls for a re-assessment of some aspects of the advocacy coalition framework which in the study were found to be at odds with the importance conveyed in the theory, a deeper consideration of the political system, and a relaxation of some rigid analytic dimensions. Background information on these models is presented in the next chapter.
Chapter 2 : Review of the literature

2.1 Introduction

The introductory chapter stated that the thesis draws on policy implementation and policy network literatures. This chapter discusses these topics by devoting specific sections to the general literature and tourism-specific literature. The strategy of combining these broad strands in a single chapter is necessitated by the need to use the general literature to introduce or explain ideas in the tourism-specific literature that have not been investigated fully by tourism researchers. Moreover, such an approach strongly shows key contrasts in the way the tourism and non-tourism policy implementation literatures developed. As this chapter shows, whilst there have been robust advances made in general public implementation theory in the past 30 years, the tourism specific-literature has shown stunted intellectual development.

To convey this contrast, material presented in this chapter is clearly defined. It starts with a brief history of public policy implementation studies then examines key themes within the literature relevant to this work. This includes the major approaches to policy implementation, the so-called top-down and bottom-up approach, and efforts to synthesize them. Another theme discussed is the utilization of knowledge in policy implementation. Concepts from the policy learning literature are integrated within the discussion, and the role of learning in the policy process is explicated. Subsequently the discussion turns to the analysis of the policy networks literature. The various ways it is conceived and how network theory is utilized in the study of public policy implementation is examined. Following this, the sustainable tourism policy implementation literature is reviewed. The discussion is divided into three sections: perspectives on tourism policy implementation, the major factors that influence tourism policy implementation, and the use of networks as a mode to implement tourism policy. The discussion then moves on to key perspectives and conditions that influence policy implementation in the Philippines. The chapter closes by arguing the relevance and applicability of the advocacy coalition framework, a theory of the policy implementation process, and policy networks, in organizing the structure of the thesis.
2.2 Beginnings and conceptualization of public policy implementation studies

Policy implementation studies go back to the 1930s. J.C. Charlesworth and M. H. A Laatsch, both doctoral students of international relations and who passed their dissertations in 1933 and 1942, respectively, were the first to write about the subject matter (Saetren, 2005). Sporadic publications appeared in the 1940s and 1950s, with researchers writing about education issues and the law. At length, implementation studies became very fashionable in the 1970s. The explosion in interest was precipitated by questions on the effectiveness of Great Society social policies enacted by the 29th and 30th United States Congress in the mid- to late-60s and by the frustrations of the Vietnam War (Berman, 1978). Setting the pace was the study by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) who published their now classic book *Implementation*, an investigation into the execution of an employment project by the Economic Development Administration in Oakland, California. Other studies conducted in those days probed questions of how a law becomes a programme (Bardach, 1977), and why programme performance falls short of presidential/legislative promise (e.g., Derthick, 1972; Ingram & Mann, 1980; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983). By the end of the 1970s, the term public policy had come to mean policy formation or adoption (Goggin, Bowman, Lester, & O'Toole, 1990).

Implementation has been defined in a number of ways. For Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), it is pretty straightforward:

> Implementation, to us, means just what Webster and Roget say it does: to carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce, complete. But what is it that is being implemented? A policy, naturally. (p. xiii)

A policy, they state, is a "hypothesis containing initial conditions and predicted consequences. If X is done at time \( t_1 \), then Y will result at time \( t_2 \)" (p. xiv). Implementation therefore might be seen as a "process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions to achieving them" (p. xv). In other words, implementation means "the ability to forge subsequent links in causal chain to obtain the desired results" (p. xv). Grindle's (1980) views on implementation are similar. To her, the general process of implementation begins only when general goals and objectives have been specified, when
Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court decisions. Ideally, that decision identifies the problem(s) to be addressed, stipulates the objective(s) to be pursued, and, in a variety of ways, "structures" the implementation process. The process normally runs through a number of stages beginning with passage of the basic statute, followed by the policy outputs (decisions) of the implementing agencies, the compliance of target groups with those decisions, the actual impacts of agency decisions, and, finally, important revisions (or attempted revisions) in the basic statute. (pp. 20-21)

Without doubt, the foregoing definitions have all adopted the process view of implementation. This means that inputs in the form of programme elements such as financial and administrative structures, and permits from regulatory bodies, have been put in place to produce outcomes (Bardach, 1977). There are two approaches to this perspective. Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) distinguish between a compliance approach and a political approach. In the former, implementation is seen as a process that is immune from political pressures; it merely involves the mechanical execution by implementers of pre-ordained plans designed by political leaders, who see themselves as leading powers in society. The implementation problem (Bardach, 1977) in this regard is how to install an administrative control process to ensure that lower level officials follow orders from the top, so that there is no leakage of authority.

The political approach takes a more forceful stance. It locates implementation squarely within the complex policymaking arena, where approved policies are amended, pushed through, or waylaid in the process of executing them. Thus, there is a lot of political
action ranging from bargaining, manoeuvring, and coalition-building - a kind of pressure politics (Truman, 1951) that characterize governmental processes - as key players shift the battleground from policy adoption to implementation (Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983).

The political wheeling and dealing is at the heart of implementation as a system of games, as conceptualized by Bardach (1977). The metaphor implies the use of strategies and tactics by actors involved in the implementation process, as they try to get from others resources they do not control, whilst extracting favourable terms from other actors wanting to obtain from them. It also focuses attention to wider aspects of the process such as "the rules of play (which stipulate the conditions for winning), the rules of 'fair play' (which stipulate the boundaries beyond which lie fraud or illegitimacy), the nature of communications (or lack of them) among the players, and the degree of uncertainty surrounding the possible outcomes" (Bardach, 1977, p. 56).

That there is a multitude of actors involved in carrying out public policies is a common feature observed in definitions. These actors could be agencies at various levels of government, the business sector, members of civil society, and the target population. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) believe that it is important to achieve goal consensus among these participants if policy is to be carried out successfully. Bunker (1970) expresses the view that implementation is simply the massing of ‘assent’ of those actors involved. Bardach (1977, p. 41) explains that this involves a range of behaviour, that is, from quiet approval to active commitment:

Whether policies, plans, decisions or programmes are to be implemented, the essential question is: How are ideas translated into effective collective action? For benefits consistent with the concept or design to be realized, those charged with carrying out the policy, and those to be affected by it, must yield some degree of assent. The requirement varies from passive but tolerant acquiescence on the part of some to scrupulous, informed and intense commitment for others who take responsibility for the guidance and execution of the plan.

As public policies fall within the jurisdiction of government, many researchers have likewise thought of policy implementation as intergovernmental bargaining (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). In the United States, this pertains to the negotiations between federal and local governments about incentives they offer each
other to achieve their own objectives, even as they implement programmes jointly. Agranoff and McGuire (2001) argue that this bargaining and negotiating go beyond federal grants that have been extensively studied in literature (e.g. Cline, 2000; Elmore, 1985; Goggin et al., 1990) but extend to regulatory, contractual, audit and other transactions.

It is nonetheless possible for local governments, on their own accord, to devise and execute their programmes. This view is explicitly contained in Berman's (1978) conceptualization of policy implementation, where he states that implementation occurs in two levels: macro- and micro-implementation. In the macro-implementation level, central government personnel design a broad government programme to which those in the micro-implementation level react. The nature of the response depends a great deal on their interpretation of the macro-level plans, the resources made available to them, the leeway accorded, and the local environmental context. Thus, there is a great deal of mutual adaptation between the project to be implemented and the local setting. Berman suggests that, in effect, what happens is a “Russian doll of implementation-within-implementation” (p. 176).

2.3 Key themes in policy implementation studies

Since interests in policy implementation studies soared in the 1970s, several themes have emerged in the literature. Three of the most important themes are discussed here: (1) the approach to the study of policy implementation featuring debates between “top-down” and “bottom-up” advocates; (2) knowledge acquisition and learning; and (3) policy networks as mechanisms to implement policy.

2.3.1 Approaches to policy implementation

2.3.1.1 The top-down approach

Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973) conceptualization of implementation set the tone for a wave of rational (top-down) models. These models, according to Parsons (1995), are concerned with finding solutions to the question of perfect implementation. As such, in order to prescribe advice, they identify general patterns of behaviour across policy areas (Matland, 1995). The models have much in common with Weber's ideal type of
bureaucracy. Hence, they assume the presence of authoritative, centrally located personalities, whose issuances cascade down the hierarchy. To them, policies would see the light of day, as long as goals are clearly spelt out, control mechanisms are in place, and communication distortions between the principal and the agent are minimized (Sabatier, 1986).

In terms of specific research problems, Lester et al. (1987) point out that the "top-down" approach starts with a policy decision by the central government and asks the following questions: (1) to what extent were the actions of implementing officials and target groups consistent with (the objectives and procedures outlined in) that policy decision?; (2) to what extent were the objectives attained over time, i.e., to what extent were the impacts consistent with the objectives?; (3) what were the principal factors affecting policy outputs and impacts, both those relevant to the official policy as well as other politically significant ones?; (4) how was the policy reformulated over time on the basis of experience. (p. 202)

Donald Van Meter and Carl Van Horn (1975) were the first to develop a "top-down" model. To them, the type of policy to be effected, the attributes of key agencies involved, the disposition of the implementing official and the general environment are important variables in determining performance. If there is consensus among the key players and the amount of change required is minimal, policy implementation is likely to succeed. Edwards (1980) likewise proposed an equally prescriptive and deterministic model. It was, however, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) who developed the most comprehensive model. With 17 variables that condition the process, their framework tries to capture the full range of implementation activities.

In their model, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) propose three general categories of variables that influence intergovernmental policy implementation: (a) tractability of problem, (b) ability of statute to structure implementation, (c) non-statutory variables. These explanatory factors in turn are related to the various stages of the implementation process, which, they state, are: policy outputs of implementing agencies, compliance with policy outputs, actual impacts, perceived impacts, and major revision in statute. Tractability of problem pertains to the basic elements of the problem, and represents the
complexities of objectively assessing changes in the gravity of the situation. Statutory variables refer to those factors that influence the level at which the statute logically arranges the process. These include financial resources available to agencies to facilitate matters, rules that govern the interaction of implementing units, and ability of outsiders to bear on the process. Non-statutory variables are environmental factors, including support from leading political actors that may push or derail implementation.

Whilst top-down models proposed a number of policy prescriptions bundled in a long list of variables (over 300 in O'Toole's (1986) count) liable to manipulation and control by central authorities, they were criticized on a number of grounds. First, and with respect to the variables suggested, critics say top-down models fail to identify which are likely to be important in specific instances. It is argued that this is like assuming that all the variables can be used to improve policy implementation across policy areas (Lester et al., 1987). Second, the models assume that only those who designed the law are important, and that local service deliverers are low-life forms that need controlling. Sabatier (1986, p. 30) complains that this "leads the top downers to neglect strategic initiatives coming from the private sector, from street level bureaucrats or local implementing officials, and from other policy subsystems." Parsons (1995) adds that this disregard for front line workers is uncharacteristic of how real people behave. Third, top-down models miss watershed events in the policymaking process when they take the statutory language as their starting point (Matland, 1995). This leads to a break with history and figuratively entombs the policy makers who struggled amongst themselves to have a consensus that is stable enough to push for policy change (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980). A break with the past might also lead to confusion, as policy implementers have no way of knowing the real intent of the policy maker. Fourth, top-downers have been charged with overlooking the political angles by viewing implementation as an administrative process, thus belying the realities of political horse-trading. Matland (1995) suggests that the specification for clear, explicit, and consistent goals by top-downers is an example of this attitude.

2.3.1.2 The bottom-up approach

Because of dissatisfaction with the views of top-downers, alternative conceptualizations have been proposed. A diametrically opposed idea is to consider local officials...
responsible for policy implementation as the primary actors, rather than those at the top. It was argued that by beginning the analysis with these street level bureaucrats and analyzing their personal circumstances and the societal structure that govern their behaviour, a better understanding of policy implementation can be obtained (deLeon & deLeon, 2002). This so-called ‘bottom-up’ approach started with Weatherly and Lipsky (1978), who in their study of special education reform in the United States, showed the inadequacy of the rational choice (top-down) in theory and practice. Looking at a case in Massachusetts, they observed that the conditions set forth by the theory were in place: detailed policies, controls, resources. Yet, the education programme was not implemented the way policy-makers thought it should be. The workload of the participants just increased as the changes rolled out, and only by muddling through did the personnel cope. The implication is that it is extremely important to take into consideration the behaviour of implementers closest to the problem and define policy success in human or behavioural terms.

This concern for the policy implementer can be expanded to include local officials working with the implementer in delivering the service. Thus, from contacts by the implementer, a network of local, regional, and national actors involved in planning and implementing programmes are identified (Hanf, Hjern & Porter, 1978). The influence of those from the apex can be adduced by tracing them backwards. Grouping elements of them together leads to the formation of an implementation structure (Hjern & Porter, 1981).

To deal with the huge number of actors involved in implementation, bottom-uppers have devised their own strategies. In an approach he calls "backward mapping," Elmore (1982) suggests researchers start:

with a concrete statement of the behaviour that creates the occasion for a policy intervention, describe a set of organizational operations that can be expected to affect that behaviour, describe the expected effect of those operations, and then describe for each level of the implementation process what effect one would expect that level to have on the target behaviour and what resources are required for that effect to occur. (p. 28)
This chain necessitates, at the very least, an acknowledgement by higher level officials of the needs of lower-ranked personnel. This is because in backward mapping, community politics, the behaviours of individuals and groups within implementing organizations are seen as major determinants of policy outcomes (Browne & Wildavsky, 1983). Linder and Peters (1987) therefore emphasize that "programmes must be compatible with the wishes and desires, or at least the behavioural patterns of those lower echelon officials" (p. 463). Thus, the processes of negotiation and consensus building are important. Context is equally vital, that is, the general political environment within with the implementing organizations are situated, as well as the internal skills and culture the organizations possess (Parsons, 1995).

A recent re-interpretation of the literature is the argument that from the perspective of citizen participation in policymaking, a bottom-up approach is better, as it allows views of private citizens to be heard. de Leon and de Leon (2002) argue that by valuing consultations with affected parties, “a bottom-up policy implementation will tend to be more realistic and practical, in that it suggests that the vox populi have a great deal of say about where they are going and how they choose to arrive” (p. 478). Thus, in terms of upholding democratic principles, this approach is argued to be superior to a top-down approach.

2.3.1.3 Synthesis or intermediate models and contingency approaches

Like the "top-down" approach, "bottom-up" models also came under fire. In terms of implementation theory development, Linder and Peters (1987) criticize proponents of "bottom up" models for turning an essentially descriptive point, (i.e., the empirical finding that street level personnel determine policy implementation) into a normative stance. They argue that should this be the case, the ideas of policy control and legitimacy of authority are seriously undermined. Whilst they acknowledge findings that decentralization can be effective, which is implied by bottom-up models, Linder and Peters (1987) point out that "decentralization should be understood within the context of some centralized control" (p. 463). Likewise, ease of implementation becomes the overriding concern when evaluating what is good policy. Thus, the question "what should be done becomes defined by what can be done by existing organizations with minimal
disruption" (Linder & Peters, 1987, p. 464). They correctly aver that this is poor policy judgment that may unduly result to difficulties in defining appropriate goals as well as the means for accomplishing them. Furthermore, it was pointed out that policy formulators could not really be divorced from the process, as in the first place, it is their views and goals that determine the focus of implementation.

The response to these critiques has been to combine the best features of "top-down" and "bottom up" models to come up with synthetic models. One attempt is by Elmore (1985) who proposed to combine "backward mapping" with "forward mapping". The latter term refers to "top down" specifications such to policy instruments, clarity of goals, resources, etc. By laying out in advance the structure of the policy and tying them with the incentive structure of ultimate target groups a la backward mapping, Elmore (1985) believes that policy implementation is greatly improved.

Others equated their models with the various phases of the policy cycle. It was suggested that the "top down" approach is suitable in the planning stages but the "bottom up" perspective is more potent in later stages (Saetren, 1983). Berman (1978) identifies the policy context and parameters that describe it as the deciding factor. The dimensions include scope of change, validity of technology, goal conflict, institutional setting, and environmental stability. He argues that when the expected change is small and planned, macro- and micro-environments are steady, goal conflict is minimal, and there is close cooperation among institutions involved, then a "top-down" approach is most appropriate. Situations wherein the conditions described above do not prevail, however, calls for a bottom-up strategy.

Sabatier's (1986) views lie along similar lines. He states that when it is possible to design a clear policy structure so that there is no room for doubts and multiple interpretations, a "top-down" framework is useful. Otherwise, tenets of the "bottom up" strategy are more effective. This is the gist of Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework (ACF), which he envisioned as "primarily concerned with theory construction rather than with providing guidelines for practitioners or detailed portraits of particular situations" (p. 39). Full details of the framework are discussed later in the chapter.
Goggin et al. (1990) likewise came up with a synthesis. Calling their work ‘third generation’ research on policy implementation, they termed it the ‘Communications Model of Intergovernmental Relations.’ This model conceptualizes the implementation process at the state level, as opposed to the federal and local levels in the United States, with outputs and outcomes as resulting from choices made by the state. Three clusters of variables are mentioned as predictors of policy performance: inducements and constraints from the top, inducements and constraints from the bottom, and state decisional outcomes and capacity. Inducements include financial and technical aid, state and local incentives and constraints, state capacity to act expressed via personnel and financial resources, and ecological capacity that embraces economic, political and situational capacities of the state.

At about the same period when the Communication's Model came out, scholars had come to realize that policy implementation is much too complex to be captured by a one-size-fits-all model. Hence, researchers such as Helen Ingram (1990) and Richard Matland (1995) started proposing the use of contingency frameworks as a way to adapt. Essentially, contingency models aim to link structural characteristics with features of the organizational environment, implying that different conditions call for different implementation approaches.

In Matland's (1995) case, he suggests that it is better to come up with a model that explains the circumstance when the "top down" or "bottom up" approach is most suitable, rather than devote efforts towards uniting them. He states that this model must fully take into account the features of the policy. By focusing on the degree of ambiguity of policy goals and means, and the level of policy conflict that arises among actors, he skilfully organizes recommendations on policy implementations in the literature into a 2 x 2 matrix and develops four types of implementation processes. Refer to Figure 2-1 below.
Characterized by low levels of ambiguity and conflict, administrative implementation relies on sufficient resources to assure effective implementation. Following top-down approaches, administrative implementation adheres to the Weberian tradition of having centralized authority, hierarchy, and clarity of policy structure. Thus, policy is effected with the precision of a machine. This situation however assumes that implementers have a clear picture of the problem. In the case of political implementation, Matland (1995) suggests that the main determining variable that influences implementation is power held by one actor or a coalition of actors. From their control of policy resources, actors are able to bargain their way, or if it is political power they have such as support of constituents and political patrons, coerce other actors to heed their wishes. Implementation therefore is not automatic like that seen in administration implementation; rather it is the result of coercion and "remunerative mechanisms" (p. 164). In terms of "top down" or "bottom up" approaches, it is suggested that top down models, particularly those that incorporate political factors as important variables (e.g., Mazmanian and Sabatier’s (1983) model), are better able to describe political implementation. In experimental implementation, uncertainty is the norm, that is, either or both goals and strategies to achieve them are vague and open to different interpretations. Because policy ambiguity is high but the level of conflict is low, there is a lot of room for actors, particularly those with slack resources, in local sites, to influence
the process. Therefore, there is a lot of variation in the way public policy is implemented, as environmental variables interact more freely with the policy. In this setting, Matland (1995) states that the “bottom-up” approach is more apt, as the threshold for ambiguity is much higher in "bottom-up" than in "top-down" (p. 167). Symbolic implementation, as shown by policies that deal with redistributing power in society, is characterized by high levels of conflict and policy ambiguity. There is a lot of competition over strategies to effect an abstract goal, and actors coalesce in order to push their vision. At the local levels, those groups of actors that have access to resources emerge stronger and are able to direct the course of policy outcomes in their favour. The intensity of feelings of actors and strength of the coalitions can be expected to vary across sites. In this kind of scenario, Matland avers that it is difficult to say what between "top down" and "bottom up" is suitable. He explains that due to high policy ambiguity, central planners, the primary actors in "top down" models find it hard to control activities at the local level. They are not entirely powerless though, as they are still able to exert some influence by making resources available to local actors. The latter, primary actors in turn in "bottom up" models, dictate the flow of the implementation process, as the high level of conflict favours them over macro-implementers.

2.3.2 Knowledge and policy implementation

A theme that has emerged and has gained currency in implementation research is the role of knowledge and the processes of learning in policy implementation. Grin and Loeber (2007) assert that learning as a concept in public policymaking arose in reaction to models of policy stages or policy cycles such as systems theory propounded by Easton (1965). Whilst the system approach has led to a number of applications, including tourism policy studies (e.g., Hall & Jenkins, 1995; Pforr, 2001, 2005, 2006), the stages approach has been criticized because of its simplistic approach to a very complex process characterized by multiple sources of causation and feedback (Sabatier, 1999). Thus, quite a number of researchers have proposed learning theories as a palliative.

There are three broad strands in the literature on policy learning. According to Schofield (2001), the public administration perspective assumes that from a technical standpoint, policy proposals do not encounter any difficulties given a docile bureaucracy. The
organizational science perspective, seen in the works of Popper and Lipshitz (1998), George and Jones (2008) and others, assumes that organizational culture has an influence on learning both at the level of the individual and the collective. It is in political science where the literature is most fertile; however, Bennett and Howlett (1992) caution that learning has been conceived in various ways. Moreover, they should not be confused with policy learning concepts from related fields such as evolutionary economics (represented in works by Nelson & Winter, 2002; Fagerberg, 2003) or systems of innovation (Fischer & Frohlich, 2001; Johnson & Lundvall, 2003), both very near those in political science in conceptualization (Braun & Benninghoff, 2003). It is the latter body of knowledge that this study draws from.

2.3.2.1 Definitions of policy learning

Learning has traditionally assumed an instrumental role in public policy, albeit not discussed in-depth. This is evident in early references to the subject; for example, in Lindblom’s (1959) use of “ad hoc trial and error learning” when he conceptualized policy decision making as proceeding from successive limited comparisons or muddling through. Karl Deutsch (1966), who examined the role of feedback to enhance the government’s ‘learning capacity’ also mirrors this.

However, the debate on where policies come from, that is, whether they emanate from popular demands (pluralism), general forces external to the political system (structuralist theories), or people within the system (state-centric) (Hill, 1997), stimulated an interest in the role of learning. Walker (1974), reacting to the structuralist perspective, suggested that civil servants and policy specialists themselves, through their own cognition and utilization of knowledge, could influence and shape the thinking of policy makers (Bennett & Howlett, 1992). Taking off from this perspective, Heclo (1974) proposed a new way of approaching policymaking, one that focuses on knowledge. In the book Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden, Heclo (1974) questioned the traditional reliance on conflict and power, suggesting that it presents “a blinkered view of politics and particularly blinding when applied to social policy” (p. 305). He further argued that politics finds its sources not only in power but also in uncertainty - men collectively wondering what to do. Finding feasible courses of action includes,
but is more than, locating which way the vectors of political pressure are pushing. Governments not only ‘power’; they also puzzle. Policymaking is a form of collective puzzlement on society's behalf; it entails both deciding and knowing. (p 305)

In other words, social policy changes are not just the result of power. Rather, learning by society at large, and in particular “policy middlemen,” embraces the policy process. Heclo (1974) defined learning to mean

a relatively enduring alteration in behaviour that results from experience; usually this alteration is conceptualized as a change in response made in reaction to some perceived stimulus...Social learning is created only by individuals, but alone and in interaction these individuals acquire and produce changed patterns of collective action. (p. 306)

Thus, from a deterministic reaction to changes in the external environment, a wholesale change of the substance of policy and the ways by which it is executed is effected based on experience. From this position, it can be deduced that the central features of policy learning are that it is path dependent, that is, previous policies influence current policy thinking (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003) and that epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), whose members may come from within and without government, move the learning process forward.

The view that societal forces are involved in learning is consistent with the perspective of state-structuralists (Hall, 1993). Howlett and Ramesh (2003) called this type of learning exogenous learning, the kind where the subject of learning is the policy universe and where perceptions of the problem or the goals of policy are tested. This sort of “learning to educate our preferences,” Browne and Wildavsky (1983, p. 223) argued, necessitates foresight and flexibility. On the other hand, endogenous learning, following Hall (1993), is viewed as taking place within the government policy community and, utilizing normal policymaking, is primarily concerned with the necessary policy instruments or techniques in light of insights generated by past policies or new information.

A type of exogenous learning that has gained wide acceptance is social learning. Hall (1993) states that it can be broken down into three different types or orders. First order change concerns alterations of policy settings only, in response to policy legacy and new
ideas. Second order change happens when both policy settings and policy instruments are adjusted, including some institutional adjustments, but policy goals remain constant. Third order change is a radical modification in thinking, akin to a paradigm shift according to Hall, and means simultaneous changes in policy settings, instruments of policy, and policy goals. For the latter to be institutionalized, Oliver and Pemberton (2004) argue, an external shock of confidence-shattering proportions such as a monetary crisis or war between nations is required. Third order change has been cited as an example of the more fundamental double loop learning in organizational decision making, a behavioural strategy of which is to share power “with anyone who has competence, and with anyone who is relevant in deciding or implementing the action, in the definition of the task, or the control of the environment” (Argyris, 1976, p. 369).

It goes without saying that social learning focuses on interactions and communications among actors (Glasbergen, 1996). According to Fiorino (2001), social learning builds on the cognitive gains first established in the search for new policy instruments (technical learning), and on the evaluation of policy goals (conceptual learning). Thus, its governance structure is characterized by high levels of permeability whereby there is continuous interaction among policy actors (Kooiman, 1993). Glasbergen (1996) refers to this as structural openness. In addition, the emphasis on communication means that gaps in the understanding of a phenomenon and limitations to address them are accepted. This implies that the “social construction of policy problems” evolves and their political feasibility is carefully assessed (May, 1992, p. 334). Because of these, policy implementation becomes a shared responsibility between government and industry players (Fiorino, 2001).

Less concerned with system overhaul and more about practical suggestions regarding policy techniques is endogenous learning. Chiefly involved here are policy makers, who, if they follow Paul Sacks’ (1980) ‘politics as learning’ approach implies that they would “decide what to do without serious opposition from external actors” (p. 358). If they learnt, they should show increased intelligence and effectiveness of behaviour, the major points in “government learning” by Etheredge and Short (1983). This learning could be validated by (a) increased capacity for differentiation (recognition and articulation), (b) increased capacity for organization and hierarchical integration, (c) increased capacity for
reflective thought, perspective on the form and nature of the contents of thought, and on the choice of structuring principles (Etheredge & Short, 1983, p. 42). An example of endogenous learning is lesson drawing. Rose (1991) suggests that this occurs when policy makers who are confronted with problems proceed to analyze exemplar programmes from a different country and compare its features with existing unsatisfactory programmes with a view to improve public policy at home. Policy makers are seen as social engineers, concerned with fitting practical lessons from elsewhere into the home context (Rose, 2005). This is close to what Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) have called policy transfer, "a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in other time and/or place" (p. 343). Policy makers may also benefit from ‘spillover of ideas’ from one policy domain to the next (Kingdon, 1995) and by ‘systematically pinching ideas’ (Schneider & Ingram, 1988) during policy design.

Possibly the most applied definition of learning - or policy-oriented learning to be more precise - is contained in Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework. Following Heclo (1974), Sabatier (1993), referred to policy-oriented learning as the relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioural intentions that result from experience and are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy objectives. Policy oriented learning involves the internal loops...perceptions concerning external dynamics, and increased knowledge of problem parameters and the factors affecting them. (p 19)

Thus, policy-oriented learning, according to Sabatier (1987), involves “an ongoing process of search and adaptation motivated by the desire to realize core policy beliefs” (p. 151). These policy beliefs are structured hierarchically, where at the system’s centre is a deep core of basic normative and ontological principles, followed by a near (policy) core of policy strategies, and the third is a set of secondary aspects comprising policy instruments (Sabatier, 1993, pp. 31-32). Learning requires assimilating ideas in order to (1) improve one's understanding of the state of variables defined as important by one's belief system (or, secondarily, by competing belief systems), (2) refine one's understanding of logical and causal relationships internal to a belief system, (3) identify and respond to challenges to one's belief system (Sabatier, 1987, pp. 150-151).
Changes to these beliefs may be related to Glasbergen’s (1996) and Hall’s (1993) conception of learning. As changes in secondary beliefs involve revisions in the techniques and processes of policy, it may be referred to as technical learning. This could be both first- and second-order change in Hall’s terminology. Conceptual learning equates with changes to the policy core. Since third-order change happens only in extreme cases, this is the equivalent of alterations in deep core beliefs. Social learning is manifested through the process in which deep core beliefs are revised such as changes in governance structures and the promotion of communication (Lauber & Brown, 2006).

2.3.2.2 Role of learning in policy implementation process models

There are five major factors that form the core of theories of the policy process: institutions, socioeconomic process, choices, groups or networks, and ideas (John, 2003). What the three major theories of the policy process, namely, the multiple streams approach, punctuated equilibrium approach, and the advocacy coalition framework, do is to bring together research into these factors into coherent theories. Indeed, when they talk of ideas, they discuss learning; yet, the degree to which the subject is treated varies considerably. The multiple streams approach, which argues that policies change when three sets of independent variables - the streams of problems, policies, and politics - interact at policy windows through the linking or coupling efforts by policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1995), discuss learning as taking place within the policy community when they evaluate conflicting ideas. Nonetheless, the vector given prominence in explanation is environmental factors. Learning has no influence at the final policy change (Real-Dato, 2009). For the punctuated equilibrium approach, which views policymaking as long periods of stability interspersed by short but intense periods of policy change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993), the reference to learning comes via the random processes of iterative learning in order to adapt to change (John, 2003). In the examination of atypical, non-incremental change that represents a serious break from past practices, however, the idea of learning is cast aside and is not carried through to the end, as emphasis is placed on the strategic behaviour of the policy entrepreneurs (Real-Dato, 2009).
It is in the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), shown in Figure 2-2 below, where policy learning is integrated into the whole process. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, pp. 118-119) explain that its key premises can be broken down into four: (1) technical information has a role to play in explaining policy change, (2) understanding the policy process requires a time perspective of a decade or more, (3) a policy subsystem is the key unit of analysis; furthermore, this subsystem transcends traditional policy networks such as iron triangles but also include broader categories of actors from various levels of government and society, (4) following Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), ACF assumes that public policies have implicit theories that address objectives and therefore, they can be conceptualized as belief systems. Thus, particularly referring to the time element of a decade or more, ACF provides moments to study policy network dynamics in at least one cycle of policy formulation, implementation through to reformulation based on experience and other mechanisms of change (Sabatier, 1986). In other words, it effectively bridges the gap between formulation and implementation (Ellison, 1998). In addition, the framework fully incorporates the ideational approach to policymaking, providing “a grounded way of understanding the importance of discourse in the political process” (John, 2003, p. 490). Because of its breadth and depth, ACF has been used in over 100 publications on a variety of policy issues (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).
In ACF’s original formulation in 1986 and revisions made in 1993 and 1999, there are two main processes of policy change. These actions are explained in a set of falsifiable hypotheses that, in the 1999 version by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999), included six propositions regarding advocacy coalitions, two about policy change, and five concerning learning. These are briefly discussed in the following sections. The first process comes from external perturbations to the subsystem such as changes in the socio-economy, public opinion, system-wide governing coalition or election. These events are hypothesized to be necessary, but not sufficient, causes to create conditions that might replace existing governing coalitions or produce new policy initiatives (hypothesis 8). Absent these intervening events, and as long as the subsystem that emplaced the programme is in power, the key features of the programme remains intact, except when the subsystem is compelled to change the same by a hierarchically superior unit
(hypothesis 7). This is because in the first place, the composition of coalitions, particularly in mature subsystems with major controversies, are thought to be stable (hypothesis 1), have substantial consensus on issues in respect of the policy core (hypothesis 2), and would only negotiate the secondary aspects (policy instruments) of their beliefs (hypothesis 3). However, Sabatier (1993) emphasizes that it is still up to minority coalitions to exploit these ‘windows of opportunity’ (Kingdon, 1995). But with or without these prospects, it is proposed that actors with the same policy beliefs are more likely to coordinate on a short-term basis if they see their opponents as very powerful, and likely to inflict damages on them if triumphant (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). This coordination includes administrative agencies, which are seen to advocate moderation (hypothesis 4).

The second process of policy change is policy-oriented learning within the subsystem or the assimilation of new ideas, technical information or evidence, mediated by policy beliefs. Thus, like the views of some researchers (e.g., Deutsch, 1966; Lindblom, 1959; Linder & Peters, 1989), learning is seen as instrumental, as “members of various coalitions seek to better understand the world in order to further their policy objectives" (Sabatier, 1993, p. 19). It is suggested that learning across belief systems is most likely to occur if there was an “intermediate level of informed conflict” between the coalitions (hypothesis 9) and if there was a prestigious, professional forum to broker a deal (hypothesis 12). Nonetheless, even if evidence failed to convince an opposing group, the ACF hypothesises that the technical information would still educate the policy brokers and other policy makers; thus affecting policy (hypothesis 13). Between the two processes of external perturbations and policy-oriented learning, the latter is seen to play a minor role in policy change (Hsu, 2005; Hysing & Olsson, 2008; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996).

Modifications in 2007 by Sabatier and Weible introduced two more mechanisms of change: negotiated agreement and endogenous shocks in the policy system. Along with changes to the model in previous years, these improvements were a response to criticisms, alternative hypotheses and theoretical improvements recommended by others. For example, Schlager (1995) has proposed two rival propositions after her criticism of ACF’s collective action problems. Fenger and Klok (2001) suggested ideas on the

John Grin and Henk Van de Graaf (1996) have proposed an implementation model analogous to ACF, albeit “the focus is on learning between policy actors and target groups” (p. 305), and not learning between coalitions. They began by problematizing some implementation puzzles. In their examples, they asked why in the case of missile development in the U.S., it took a long time for an agency to implement an order by the Department of Defence, and why, in the case of packing fresh dairy food in the Netherlands, most supermarkets, except one, did not adopt an environmentally-sound solution despite all the economic and public relation advantages. The explanation they suggested is that the actors involved in the implementation processes have varying interpretations of the message, intent and actions needed to implement the policies. Following this lead, derived from Schon and Rein’s (1994) insight that artefacts and objectives have multiple meanings, that is, different actors working under other contexts may interpret them in entirely different ways than originally conceived, Grin and Van de Graaf (1996) argued that “policymakers must understand the patterns of behaviour of implementers and their target groups and how these can be influenced” (p. 298). This analysis is not entirely new as bottom-up implementation researchers have advocated the same approach before. However, what Grin and Van de Graaf emphasise is to view “implementation as learning” (1996, p. 298). One way to do this is for policy makers and implementers to go through a process of communicative action in order for them to arrive at a common understanding of an artefact with target groups. That is to say, during the implementation game (Bardach, 1977), policy actors will construct congruent meanings with them. Policy implementation, accordingly, becomes more effective.

The model rests on several key assumptions. First, the composition of policy actors is much broader than advocacy coalitions due to the addition of professional communities, identified as policymakers and policy implementers, who share a common paradigm. The latter group is treated as homogenous; hence, all members ultimately agree to a mutual frame of meaning. Second, learning between different communities is facilitated by interaction, and that learning between two actors is roughly equivalent to learning
between different communities. Following Schon and Rein (1994) and Yanow (1993), a critical assumption of the model is that policy actors have different policy belief systems than target groups.

Like ACF, the model is operationalized through a set of hypotheses (eight in all) that deal with the behaviour of target groups and conditions of learning. The key message of the propositions is that only with learning is a congruence of meanings achieved. This congruence is attained if artefacts to be developed are justified by or fall within an actor’s appreciative system or paradigm, or if it conforms to preferences. Self-reflection, both first and second-order as explained by Schon (1983) in *The Reflective Practitioner*, driven by governing paradigms, “surprises,” external events, and mutual learning are the key conditions of learning. Thus, an actor may broaden the meaning of a particular artefact or objective in congruence with others because of learning from his own reflection and/or inducement from external factors. Aside from outside stimulus, Grin and Van de Graaf (1996) stress the importance of unremitting dialogue across time and space between communities with divergent beliefs. This should lead to “joint construction which makes the meaning of the artefact as visible as possible” (pp. 314-315).

Recent theoretical and empirical works on policy learning and policy implementation have sought to fill perceived gaps in knowledge. Among these is the issue of individual learning and autonomy within a coalition (Dudley, 2007). This problem might be seen as the other side of criticism levelled against ACF, which is that it fails to sufficiently explain how actors in an advocacy coalition group together and engage in collective action (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Schlager, 1995; Schlager & Blomquist, 1995). On this, ACF hypothesizes those members of the coalition, because of the assumption that belief systems are hierarchical, would agree that contrarian beliefs are based on invalid understanding of the world (Sabatier, 1993). Dudley (2007) finds this shortsighted as it “overlooks the possibility that learning may involve individual processes of internal reinterpretation that can have the effect of carrying individuals and coalitions in diverse and unexpected directions” (p. 410). He argues that this reinterpretation may lead individuals to have new reflections amidst organizational change, and induce them to push for changes in issue and goal definition. Such an analysis is consistent with Hager’s (1995) views that policy beliefs are anchored on an individualist ontology. Thus, it is
argued that instead of having stable value systems, individuals possess “vague, contradictory and unstable value positions” (Hager, 1995, p. 71) malleable to new knowledge.

To address this lacuna, Dudley (2007) endorses the view of learning as development, as articulated by Laird (1999). According to Laird, a better alternative to viewing learning as instrumental is “one that distinguishes different kinds of cognitive changes” in individuals as they “can better enable us to discover the sorts of policy institutions or processes that have the best chance of getting partisans to engage in a re-assessment of their values” (1999, p. 3). Borrowing from cognitive development psychology as Heclo (1974), and Etheredge and Short (1983) did, Laird proposed two learning processes: (1) a gradual incremental process fed by outside stimulus, akin to a union of Heclo’s classic and instrumental conditioning, and (2) “development” or the progression of cognition through organizational dialogue. In order to solve the problem of reconciling individual and collective learning, Laird argued that it is individuals themselves who are instrumental in organizational knowledge transmission, codification and routinization (Dudley, 2007). This is apparently a difficult proposition, as Laird himself acknowledged that individual learning is much harder to detect than institutional learning. Learning in the latter is observable and can be reflected in revised procedures, guidelines and rules (Haas, 1992).

Also working on micro-level processes is Jill Schofield (2004), who sought to investigate learning by implementation actors as they translate policy into action. First, she criticized policy learning explanations particularly ACF as being “ideological and abstract” (pp. 288-289) instead of presenting them through operational details. She argues that this tendency assumes that implementers have a prior knowledge of how to execute a new policy. However, she pointed out that it is still an issue to be resolved, as implementation models have not fully explored mechanisms that explain the detailed processes by which learning occurs, and how they are routinized and maintained. Thus, beginning with the conceptualization of implementation as a policy-action continuum, an idea borrowed from Barrett and Fudge (1981), Schofield analyzed detailed processes involved in the implementation of capital investment projects in order to deploy new capital accounting procedures under the UK’s 1990 National Health Service and Community Care Act. The
ensuing model of ‘learned implementation’ shows implementation is conceived as a loop or circular series of phases beginning with identification of the policy problem through to informing the policy maker. No doubt, there is a great deal of endogenous learning involved. In-between, learning happens with experts that increases competence and capabilities of the implementer. The acquisition of knowledge leads to the development of a solution, and eventual routinization of the task. Then, an action is undertaken as job task, seen as the point of implementation. Critical in the whole process is ongoing knowledge development and sharing of this knowledge, and the facilitative role of the institution, particularly the amount of discretion it allows implementers to fill in details of the policy. Implementers’ “learning is at one and the same time bounded by bureaucracy, and enhanced by their roles as bureaucrats” Schofield (2004, p. 294) emphasises.

The model makes a number of theoretical statements, including the claim that implementation becomes possible because public policy managers are motivated by the desire to learn the technicalities of implementing policy. However, organizational features, problem complexity, resources, bureaucratic discretion, and individual attributes condition this motivation. According to Schofield (2004), there is likewise a time dimension to learned implementation with three phases involved: the initiation of implementation, the point wherein policy guidance or implementing rules and regulations are issued; the transitional stage wherein steps have been taken and are being maintained; and then the continuation stage wherein the steps have become part of day-to-day operation. Thus, time affords learning and for confidence to build up.

2.3.2.3 Mechanisms of policy learning

As previously noted, researchers have conceptualized learning as exogenous and endogenous. Heclo (1974) set the tone for this dualism when he drew from cognitive psychology to describe modalities of learning. He distinguished “classic conditioning” as the fruit of “conditioned reflex,” different from “instrumental conditioning” where learning is highly influenced by environmental variables. In the former, it is normal incrementalist policymaking that drives the process while in the latter, he argues that “…in both its self-instruction and self-delusions, the cobweb of socioeconomic
conditions, policy middlemen, and political institutions reverberates to the consequences of previous policy in a vast, unpremeditated design of social learning” (p. 316).

Over the years, researchers have either adapted Heclo’s abstraction or added to his ideas. Hall (1993), for example, explain that it is the normal politics of policymaking that lead to first- and second-order change, while shifts in “policy paradigms” or alterations in the dominant set of policy ideas induce third-order change. Many have emphasised external mechanisms of learning. To Rose (1991), mechanisms of lesson drawing include simple copying, emulation, hybridization, synthesis and inspiration. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) speak of voluntary transfer and coercive transfers, the latter arising from a country’s international obligations because of signing treaties or those driven by considerations such as interdependency, rivalry or emulation. Typical transfer agents here are thought to be international aid agencies and NGOs. A much larger constituency was in the mind of Pahl-Wostl et al. (2007) when they suggested that learning could be facilitated by promoting public participation. In this case, Tabara and Pahl-Wostl (2007) enumerate a number of factors deemed necessary to learning: how the problem is defined, the proper identification of members of the process, the type and rules of negotiation used, leadership, and availability of resources. Kroger (2005) opines that learning in such an inclusive environment is facilitated by acceptance of informal negotiations, and unfettered information exchange and coordination. Defining events can also induce learning. Busenberg (2001) called them “focusing events” or incidents that fixes public and political gaze on a policy issue. He stressed that these incidents, for example, a huge oil spill, coupled with the accumulation of policy experience over time and institutional structures that enable the conduct of research can be used to promote learning.

Other researchers have a strong endogenous learning bent such as Popper and Lipshitz (1998) who, drawing from organizational learning literature, emphasize organizational structures and procedures, and learning cultures (values and customs). Schofield (2004) highlights the importance of bureaucratic structures such as project teams, discretion, and use of experts as facilitators of learning. Time is an important element to allow for diffusion of learning.
Likewise, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) emphasized time in their conceptualization of ACF but they were more specific. They argued that policy implementation must be studied with a time perspective of a decade or more, citing the importance of the “enlightenment function” (p. 118) of policy research. Within this period, values by advocacy coalitions can change, enabling them to reinforce their positions or for individual members to alter their behaviours. For minority coalitions, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith discussed the significance of taking advantage of Kingdon’s (1995) ‘windows of opportunity’ for their own values to take root. Another mechanism from ACF is conflict, as it rouses members of the coalition into action towards learning, that is, acquiring knowledge and technical information to buttress their position. Grin and Van de Graaf (1996) suggested a less fiery method: self-reflection. They stressed that introspection, inducement by external factors, and interactions through debates, challenges, dialogues and similar forums between target groups and policy actors would facilitate the congruence of meanings between them; thus assisting policy implementation.

2.3.3 Policy networks as mechanism to study implementation of public policy

The use of advocacy coalitions highlights the role of networks in the transmission of knowledge in particular, and the implementation of public policy in general. Indeed, numerous studies have used networks as an approach to policy implementation research on a wide range of topics. Early references to its use are found in Hanf & Scharf’s (1978) book on inter-organizational policymaking, where, for example, Hanf et al. (1978) observe that “…interorganizational relations, or networks, reflect important links in the translation of policies into services” (p. 304). Examples of recent empirical research on policy networks include Nachmias and Arbel-Ganz (2006) on policy implementation in Israel, Anderson (2003) on social assistance reform in Czech Republic, Weible and Sabatier (2005) on marine protected areas, and Cho et al. (2005) on devolution and welfare reform implementation in the US. This section discusses aspects of policy networks relevant to the thesis.

Policy networks grew out of observations regarding the close relationships in policymaking between state and privileged interest groups in the United States. The
relationships were described using metaphors beginning with ‘whirlpool’ by Griffith in 1939. In the 1960s and 70s, these ‘sub-governments’ (Ripley & Franklin, 1984) composed of the executive branch, congressional committees, and interest groups enjoyed ever closer symbiotic relationships, thus, giving rise to the term ‘iron triangle’ (Lowi, 1972). A more expanded group of interested individuals and organizations coming together to rally around an issue or concern was called an ‘issue network’ (Heclo, 1978). The term ‘policy community’ was ascribed to very small but professional participants interacting on matters related to policy (Jordan & Schubert, 1992). In policy implementation research, Hjern & Porter (1981) suggested the use of the term ‘implementation structures’ to characterize subsets of organizations from the national and local levels that work together on specific government programmes. In 1986, Sabatier introduced ‘advocacy coalitions’ to denote an issue network while Haas (1992) designated ‘epistemic community’ to groups concerned with the application of scientific knowledge to achieve policy change. The American literature in turn influenced the development of policy networks literature in Europe (Marin & Mayntz, 1991; Marsh, 1998).

In contrast to these metaphoric but substantive meanings, there is another connotation attached to networks, one that is highly formal and pertains to any pattern of interaction or relationship among individuals, organizations, places, or other characteristics. Firmly established in sociology and social psychology, network analysis as it is called traces its history from the work by George Simmel (1908) and from French structuralism as represented by Claude Levi-Strauss (Kenis & Schneider, 1991). In the 1930s, Jacob Moreno developed sociometric models, the basis of most current social network analysis (SNA). The Manchester anthropologists Siegfried Nadel and Mitchell in the 1950s and 60s, followed by researchers such as Harrison White and Mark Granovetter from Harvard in late 60s to 1970s further developed the foundations of SNA (Berry et al., 2004). Using network analysis, these researchers highlight the importance of social interaction and contextual influences in shaping individual behaviour, ideas, and beliefs (Scott et al., 2008). Nodes, lines and graphs usually represent the structural relationships. Consequently, SNA has highly sophisticated measures or metrics, a topic discussed in the next section.
2.3.3.1 Analysing networks - the various dimensions

As policy researchers have learned over the past two decades, the utilization of policy networks provides a number of practical and theoretical advantages. On the practical level, research has illustrated that policy created and implemented through network structures encourages ownership and support from target communities (Prell, 2003). Interaction among members is seen to promote, inter alia, policy learning and cooperation (John & Cole, 2000; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). Christopoulos (2006) stresses that overall, networks can (1) facilitate coalition building; (2) ameliorate shocks from institutional transformation; (3) facilitate efficient sourcing and allocation of resources; (4) apply a filter to the information-reaching actors; and (5) ameliorate risks and therefore lead to impunity of higher risk-taking (p. 761). On the theoretical level, conceiving social relations as networks allows fine-grain analysis of its structure and content including rules that govern the exchanges, and examination of the patterns of relationship among actors involved (deLeon & Varda, 2009). In addition, it provides an efficient way to contextualize the behaviour of actors (Lazega, 1997).

Broadly, there are two vectors from which researchers draw to assess networks. The first comes from the policy network research tradition that emphasises cultural dimensions, which is qualitative, and full of thick descriptions. The second is from SNA that draws from the mathematics of graph theory (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). These dimensions are discussed below.

2.3.3.1.1 The descriptive or “metaphoric” dimensions

Analytically, the cultural aspects of policy networks serve as devices to distinguish one network from another (Dowding, 1995) and to understand them in action (Rhodes, 1988). Following Katzenstein (1978) who identified the autonomy of the state as important to the formation of policy networks, Atkinson and Coleman (1989) developed a classification system for policy networks based on two dimensions: (1) the state structure in terms of autonomy and concentration of power vis-à-vis interest groups, and (2) the capacity to mobilize business interests. Based on these, they were able to neatly classify known state-industry relations in the literature. Jordan and Schubert (1992) created a typology in which network was a common label that embraced all extant types of
relationship between the state and interest groups. They argued that the characteristics implied by existing policy networks are amplified by considering three main criteria: (1) the level of institutionalization, in particular stability, (2) the scope of the policymaking arrangement (whether it is restricted to a sectoral focus or whether it is trans-sectoral); and (3) the number of participants (whether the network is limited in membership or comparatively open). Based on these criteria, they labelled Heclo's (1978) issue network as the least stable - a sort of “shapeless and unpredictable ferment” (p. 14) - and identified “policy community” as the most stable. They likewise “mapped” the known policy networks based on the criteria and found that a majority were leaning towards sectoral descriptions, and that most of what could be read in the literature discussed stable relationships. They similarly discovered that it was difficult to differentiate the following networks: meso-corporatism, iron triangle, corporate pluralism, negotiated economy, policy community and clientelism. Concluding that “no where in the literature is a convincing contrast to be found” (p. 26) among these terms, they suggested studying types of networks in terms of their underlying characteristics instead of the aforementioned “loose labels.”

Rhodes (1988) did just this in his study of central and local government relations in the UK. Positioning policy networks at the meso-level or sub-central level of government and political organizations, he identified constellation of interests, membership, vertical and horizontal interdependence, and distribution of resources as key dimensions with which to analyze five types of networks that range from policy communities, issue networks, professionalized networks, intergovernmental networks through to producer networks. He likewise laid emphasis on the rules of the game, defining them along eleven lines including trust, consensus and accommodation, and the variety of strategies policy actors employ to achieve their goals.

Van Waarden (1992) proposed one the most comprehensive dimensions of policy networks. Improving upon the work of Atkinson and Coleman (1992), whose variables he criticized as being unclear as to whether they are conditions for or properties of networks, Van Waarden proposed seven dimensions, subdividing them into 37 categories: actors, function, structure, institutionalization, rules of conduct, power relations, and actor strategies. Although intended as tool to classify extant state-industry relations, Van
Waarden’s work have found application in empirical assessments of networks in different sectors (e.g., Collins, 1995, for agricultural policy; Dredge, 2006b, for tourism; Nachmias and Arbel-Ganz, 2006, to show government incapacity in safety regulations). The features of these dimensions are summarized in Table 2-1 below:

**Table 2.1: Van Waarden's dimensions of policy networks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Definition/Properties</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>Refer to the number of participants which determines the size of the network and type of actors involved; involve state agencies - whether political or administrative - and at least some organizations of civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Function</strong></td>
<td>Channeling access to decision-making processes, consultation or exchange of information, negotiation (exchange of resources and/or performance, or resource mobilization), coordination of otherwise independent action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>Pattern of relations between actors. Important variables include:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The size of the network, determined by the number of actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Boundaries, which may be open and fluent, or closed and monopolistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Type of membership: voluntary or compulsory participation. This determines whether the actors may perceive the network as a problem or opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pattern of linkages: chaotic or ordered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Intensity or strength of relation, that is the frequency and duration of interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Density or multiplexity. The extent to which the actors are linked in multiple relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Clustering or differentiation in sub-networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Linking pattern or type of coordination: hierarchic authority, horizontal consultation and bargaining, overlapping memberships, interlocking leaderships, frequent mobility of personnel from one organization to another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Centrality: none, pluri-centric (joint committees), or central unit, i.e., a focal organization as policy initiator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Degree of delegation of decision-making competencies to central units and measure of control by network participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Nature of the relations: conflictual, competitive or cooperative;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutionalization</strong></td>
<td>Refers to the formal character of the network structure and its stability; the degree of institutionalization will depend on the structural characteristics of the network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rules of conduct</strong></td>
<td>Refers to conventions of interaction or 'rules of the game' which govern the exchanges within the network. They stem from the role perceptions, attitudes, interests, social and intellectual-educational background of the participating actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power relations</strong></td>
<td>A function of the distribution of resources and needs among the actors; power in state-business relations is influenced by the size of the organizations, their degree of centralization or fragmentation, or a representational monopoly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors' strategies</strong></td>
<td>Plans to manage interdependencies with other actors while satisfying</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The typology developed by Marsh and Rhodes (1992), as discussed by Marsh (1998), is more parsimonious than Van Waarden’s and has also formed the basis of subsequent theoretical and current empirical works (e.g., Anderson, 2003; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Korentang & Larbi, 2008; Teichman, 2007). Originally, it was based on ideas by Rhodes (1988) discussed above. Thus, it likewise discussed networks based on their underlying characteristics and posited a continuum that distinguishes between policy communities and issue networks. However, the Marsh and Rhodes’ model proposes only four main dimensions with which to evaluate networks: membership, integration, resources, and power. Their approach has three main features, namely: (1) it is structural, that is, they view networks as “structures of resource dependency,” a la Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), (2) policy outcomes are affected by network structures, (3) exogenous factors could affect the policy network and the policy outcome (Marsh, 1998, pp. 11-12). Thus, Marsh and Rhodes too, see policy networks as a ‘meso-level’ concept of interest group intermediation that occurs at the sectoral and sub-sectoral levels, suggesting that to understand changes in any dimensions of the network, it has to be placed in the broader context.

All the previously mentioned network dimensions are the handiwork of scholars working in the political science field. Yet, network properties have also been developed within sociology and have found their way into public policy analysis (e.g., John & Cole, 1998; Raelin, 1982; Schneider, 1992; Schneider & Werle, 1991). These are discussed in the next section.

2.3.3.1.2 The sociological network analysis

Socio-metric analysis supplies a range of techniques that facilitates the examination of network properties and the significance of actors within systems of social relations. Through analysis of nodes, lines and similar visual maps that represent the actors and their inter-relationships, the degree of influence, direction of information flows and
resource exchanges are determined (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The method is particularly useful when comparing policy networks in different spaces and time (John & Cole, 1998).

Several aspects of network can be investigated. Haythornthwaite (1996, p. 330) identifies five aspects: (1) cohesion, (2) structural equivalence, (3) prominence, (4) range, and (5) brokerage. Specific metrics for some of these aspects include density and centrality. Density is a measure of the whole network, and technically measures the number of ties in the network that link actors or nodes together (Knoke & Yang, 2008). There are implications from having numerous linkages. Dense networks result to better and tighter communication flows among participants across space (Scott et al., 2008). It is also argued that by being abundantly connected, the structure facilitates the diffusion of norms (Rowley, 1997). The patterns of exchange among actors that results from interaction lead to learning. Thus, when interactions increase from having multiple ties, actors with varying value orientations or unequal appreciative systems come to share beliefs and arrive at a consensus as to standards of behaviour (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989). In addition, Rowley (1997) asserts that the existence of dense networks assists in coalition building, given that dense networks have plenty of participants that translate to multiple relationships. This view has been supported by research on advocacy coalitions (Zafonte & Sabatier, 2004).

Centrality in networks is equated with the power of actors. According to Knoke and Kuklinski (1982), a central position within the network shows power to control the exchange of information. Indeed, previous studies (e.g., Krackhardt, 1990; Melbeck, 1998) indicate a positive relationship between power and centrality. This correlation is not accidental but a function of a number of things including resources and a high degree of legitimacy (Christopoulos, 2006). Knowledge of who is central provides insights into the nature of the networks. Based on various typologies on policy networks (e.g., Howlett & Ramesh, 2003), it can be deduced whether the network is bureaucratic or statist if government dominated, or it can be corporatist or clientelistic if interest-groups were the central actors. Based on high centrality scores, key individuals or organizations are identified, thus, shedding light on who are responsible to the circulation of ideas and decision-making (John & Cole, 1998). This suggests that in a network, centrality can be
shared. Decentralization implies that actors are more willing to extend their support for the greater good (deLeon & Varda, 2009).

There are several types of centrality (refer to Knoke & Yang, 2008, for state of the art discussion) and two are considered here. First is closeness centrality that indicates an actor’s capability to contact others independently (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Closeness centrality is equated with efficiency, with Freeman (1979) suggesting that it “means fewer message transmissions, shorter times and lower costs” (p. 225) for actors with proximity. Between centrality is another type. It captures the ability of actors to control others in the sense of being an “intermediary,” that is, actors found to have it functions as gatekeepers of access by one actor to a third party particularly those in the periphery (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982).

Nevertheless, not being central confers advantages too. As Burt (1992) argues, centrality is not the only source of power in networks. He introduced the theory of ‘structural holes’ to discuss the significance of being in the middle of disorganized groups and of having weak ties, whose ‘strength’ was initially investigated by Granovetter (1973). Granovetter illustrated how actors who interact only with their own groups, but know other groups (thus creating weak ties between them), can be very instrumental in transmitting distinct information, norms and values across these other clusters. Burt suggested that this separation between non-redundant contacts is a hole, “like an insulator in an electric circuit” (1992, p. 65). However, because of the bridging mechanisms of structural holes that ties, rather weakly, these unconnected groups, network benefits accrue that are “additive rather than overlapping” (p. 65). In addition, Burt (1997) asserts that the holes spur entrepreneurial activities, so actors who are able to organize themselves around it can feed new information into networks in which they belong. There are however conditions for the theory to work. Galaskiewicz (2007, p. 7) notes that the essential ingredients are that (1) actors must be willing to exploit opportunities; (2) the content of the tie with alter is weak rather than strong, that is, social obligations are not very demanding; (3) actors are not subjected to stifling institutional rules and regulations.

Combining the metrics of density and centrality can yield insights on the behaviour of actors within the network. Rowley’s (1997) work is an important example as it sheds light
on actions that manifest in response to stakeholder pressures. He identified four roles that focal organizations assume. A compromiser role is taken under conditions of high density and high centrality. The goal of a compromiser is to negotiate a solution between stakeholders in conflict and create a predictable climate. When there is low density and high centrality, a commander role is adopted. Rowley states that “As a commander, the focal firm will use its powerful gatekeeper position to control network exchanges and the formation of shared norms” (pp. 902-903). A subordinate role is assumed when the network is characterized by high density and low centrality. This actor is expected to be a follower. Under conditions of low density and low centrality, the focal organization turns solitary. Oliver (1991) claims that an actor behaving this way pursues goals covertly (Rowley, 1997).

While the metaphoric dimensions and sociological network analysis appear very distinct, they are not mutually exclusive. Schneider (1992) emphasises that both perspectives can be integrated. He suggests that network analysis can be used to measure the structure of policy subsystems organized to formulate and implement policy. This is illustrated by his own work that compared chemical control and telecommunications policy domains in Germany (Schneider, 1992; Schneider & Werle, 1991). In these studies, he measured the actor and resource exchange network using network analysis but framed and informed the discussion by the substantive dimensions of policy networks. Similar studies that have demonstrated the utility of this approach have since regularly appeared (e.g., John & Cole, 1998; John & Cole, 2000; Christopoulos, 2006).

2.3.3.2 The network structure and policy outcome debate

A key issue within the policy networks literature, and one that has turned into a lively debate, is the influence of network structures on policy outcomes. There are three sub-components to this question, according to Berry et al. (2004, p. 546 ), namely: do communication networks influence the shape of policies that evolve; how network structures facilitate the emergence of policy entrepreneurs in various policy arenas; how the structures of networks influence policy participation, interpersonal relations, and the effectiveness of government institutions.
To address these questions, four approaches to the study of policy networks that all purport to use policy networks as an explanatory variable have been employed (Dowding 1995; Marsh, 1998). The first is “rational choice,” represented by the work of Kickert et al. (1997) which argues that outcomes are the result of bargaining between agents in the networks. The second is “personal interaction” that sees networks as based on personal relationships between individuals who share beliefs, preferences and a culture as espoused by Rhodes (2002), and Wilks and Wright (1987). The third is formal network analysis or social network analysis, while the fourth is the “structural approach” which emphasises the structural aspects of networks but downplays interpersonal relations (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992).

At issue in the debate is which vector is most useful in explaining policy outcomes. Taking the structural approach, Marsh and Rhodes (1992) argue that network properties, specifically network structure, affect policy outcomes. David Marsh, in the book *Comparing Policy Networks* he edited in 1998 specifically asked this question of his contributors, aside from inquiring whether the Marsh and Rhodes (1992) model was of any value as a framework for analysis. The response from the case studies was generally positive. Daugbjerg (1998, p. 78) found that “network structures make a difference” with network cohesion influencing policy preferences. He explained that in Denmark and Sweden, state resources alone could not account for environmental policy preferences but also by agricultural policy networks. In particular, he found that Danish farmers were more cohesive than their Swedish counterparts, thus enabling them to escape the costs of the Polluter Pays Principle. Daugbjerg and Marsh (1998, p. 54) emphasized that “policy outcomes are not just a function of what occurs in the network; they are also strongly influenced by the economic, political and ideological context within which the network operates.” They also argued that policy network is a meso-level concept that needed to be integrated with both micro-level and macro-level analysis, not only to be able to account for the membership of the network but also the outcomes from them. Looking at policing in Britain and New Zealand, McLeay (1998) found that the policy network that has developed in New Zealand was more reliant on interpersonal influence than on structural forces; however, she observed that “it is the structure of policing itself in relation to the
state…that is the predominant determining characteristic of policing policy in both countries” (p. 130).

Responding to issues raised in the book, Marsh and Smith (2000) sought a multi-dimensional and multi-causal approach to policy networks serving as explanatory variable. Contending that while existing approaches each have considerable explanatory power, “all fail to recognize that any attempt to use policy networks as an explanatory variable involves three dialectical relationships between them: structure and agency, network and context, network and outcome” (p. 5), they proposed a dialectical or iterative model to explain outcomes. It is emphasised that the model helps to identify the questions that should be asked in policy case studies and should lead to an assessment of the role of policy networks in affecting policy outcomes and change (Toke & Marsh, 2003). Diagrammatically, the model recognizes a number of points: (1) the wider context affects both the network structure and the resources of policy actors, (2) an actor’s skill is the product of innate skill by the actor, as well as learnings including feedback gained from implementing policy, (3) the combination of the actor’s resources, the actor’s skill, the network structure, and policy interaction influence network interaction, (4) the network structure is determined by the structural context, actor’s resources, network interaction, and policy outcomes, (5) policy outcome is the result of network structure and network interaction (pp. 9-10). Graphically, the model is shown below (Figure 2-3):

Figure 2.3: Policy networks and policy outcomes: A dialectical approach
This formulation by Marsh and Smith is complicated indeed. Yet, empirical testing of the model has given it support (e.g., Bramwell & Meyer, 2007; Gains, 2003; Toke & Marsh, 2003) and suggestions have been made to make it more theoretically appealing (e.g., Evans, 2001; Kisby, 2007). The basic idea remains however - that the metaphor policy network explains policy outcomes and policy change.

It is this idea of a metaphor explaining policy change that some researchers disagree with. In important reviews in 1995 and 2001, Dowding dismissed policy networks as lacking explanatory power. He explained that while the metaphors are useful heuristics, they could not account for policy change. He claims that

> All we learn from the study in network terms is that if a policy community breaks down an issue network evolves and other groups are able to enter the policy process more forcibly. But it does not explain community breakdown, nor issue network transcendence, nor the dynamics of the change. And it cannot do so, for part of what is to be explained is the creation and destruction of communities. The imagery is simply metaphorical heuristics, though no less serviceable for that. (1995, p. 139)

He does acknowledge that network analysis is an important tool with which to illustrate the structural effects of networks on policy formulation and implementation (Dowding 2001, pp. 89-90). However, he clarifies that it was sociological network analysis he is in favour of, not the use of features derived from analysis of individual actors that comprise the networks. He also proposes the use of bargaining models and game theory than introducing a meso-level theory, a concept he insists has no place “in social science more generally” (2001, p. 96). Dowding (1995) states that:

> attempts to provide a 'meso-level' theory, to connect networks with state autonomy approaches, or to drive network analysis by introducing 'ideas' in the form of 'epistemic communities' or 'advocacy coalitions' will all fail to produce fundamental theories of the policy process. They fail because the driving force of
explanation, the independent variables, are not network characteristics per se but rather characteristics of components within the networks. (pp. 136-137)

From this position, Dowding describes the original Rhodes’ (1988) model as insufficient, and the use of the Rhodes and Marsh (1992) typology as erroneous, since “the explanatory work is largely done at the micro-level in terms of properties of the actors and not in terms of the properties of the network” (1995, p. 141). Peter (1998) agrees with these points, stressing the importance of collective explanatory feature. Dowding likewise attacks the “dialectical approach” by Marsh and Smith (2000) as being “hopelessly vague” (2001, p. 102) and called for a stop to pointless theorizing on policy networks.

These are truly powerful criticisms that threatened the viability of policy networks. Richardson (1999) suggested that Dowding’s critique “might yet turn out to be a watershed finally marking the intellectual fatigue of policy community and network analysis” (pp. 198-199). Nonetheless, exploration of the issue remains a viable research programme (Berry et al., 2004). Some strands of current research on policy networks research continue to explore the connection between network structure and policy outcomes, first by testing the dialectical approach (e.g., Bramwell & Meyer, 2007; Gains, 2003; Toke & Marsh, 2003) or by developing new analytic frameworks (e.g., deLeon & Varda, 2009; Howlett, 2002). Some researchers even appear to take sides in their own investigations (e.g., Montpetit, 2005, in defence of Marsh; Christopoulos, 2005, siding with Dowding).

2.3.3.3 Criticisms of policy networks

That interest in policy networks lingers is testament that researchers continue to be excited by networks as the “new paradigm for the architecture of complexity” (Kenis & Schneider, 1991, p. 25). There are however important considerations for future research, the greatest being the charge that policy networks as a tool is inadequate for policy analysis for lacking “a theoretical scaffold” (Carlsson, 2000, p. 502). Why this is so is explored below.

First, there is the problem of explaining the motivation of actors and, related to this, how are conflicts within and between networks resolved. Peters (1998) suggests that what appears from the literature is that self-interest guide actor preference and strategies but it
is not clear whether information generated from interaction would be enough to predict outcomes. Definitely, this point closely mirrors Dowding’s (1995, 2001) position that it should not be behaviour of actors that explain outcomes but rather network-level characteristics. Second is the problem of defining policy networks. As Borzel (1998) notes, a Babylonian variety of policy networks exist. It is argued that the practice of developing typologies like Rhodes’s (1988) and others shows “degreeism,” a general analytic problem “in which continua are translated into categorical and definitional variables” (Peters, 1998, p. 24). Accordingly, the situation leads to ambiguities as to where exactly in the continuum do loose and open structures become networks. Peters (1998) extends the argument to include differentiating networks from other aggrupation of interest groups, noting that guidance from the literature is inadequate. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that identifying actors that comprise the networks, and hence assisting in its definition, is a long-standing issue in network analysis (Howlett & Maragma, 2006). The third problem is the purported neglect of the role of power and the consequent focus on co-operation and consensus as rules of the game. This is significant in light of arguments by Krackhardt (1994) that the ‘Iron Law of Oligarchy’ also prevails in networked settings (deLeon & Varda, 2009). Finally, the lack of clear evaluation criteria is highlighted. Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) stress that the network approach rejects the use of ex ante formulated goals as evaluation criteria. Peters criticizes this approach as “it is not clear if the implicit causal analysis contained within the network approach to policy can be falsified” (1998, p. 23). He suggests that reliance on ex post attribution of outcomes to the network does not assist theorizing on policy outcomes.

To address these issues, one proposal is to use sociological network analysis. It is argued that through mathematical algorithms, one can determine the extent to which members in a variety of relationships are connected, quantify the emergence of networks, and analyze their properties (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). More importantly for public policy analysis, it can demonstrate a clear connection between network structure and policymaking processes extant approaches “can only theorize about, or provide casual, descriptive or indicative evidence” (Dowding, 2001, pp. 89-90).

However, this approach too has been criticized on conceptual and methodological grounds. John and Cole (1998) provide a good summary, as follows. First, it is unclear
which, among relationships, (e.g., symbolic, ceremonial, operational, etc.) between actors are measured. Second, network boundaries are arbitrarily set. John and Cole (1998) note that researchers are in a difficult position because, on the one hand, socio-metrics require precision, but on the other hand, policy networks as currently conceived overlap with each other. Related to this is the third point against network analysis: membership. It is noted that policy analysis assumes that organizations constitute networks. However, because the basis of analysis is contacts between them, it is difficult to pinpoint which among the multitude of individuals that comprises the organization it should be. Fourth, the inter-relationship presented is cross-sectional and static, thus, failing to capture the dynamism of relationships particularly in a fast-changing environment. Finally, even when researchers surmount these challenges, the insights generated are unsurprising. Dowding (1995) calls this the paradox of formal analysis:

the paradox of formal analysis is that it must yield results which by and large fit with what we know by descriptive methods - otherwise we know something has gone wrong with our formal analysis. What we require to justify formalism is some surprising results, or paradoxical conclusions, which then justify closer qualitative analysis. (p. 156)

Thus, the conclusion is that network analysis is best suited for summarizing network features, a supplement for case study methods (Borzel, 1998; John & Cole, 1998). In this respect, it is par for the course for network analysis. It has earlier been described as a ‘handmaiden theory’ that is, it supports the elaboration of other theories but not its own (Rowley, 1997, p. 888).

2.4 Tourism policy implementation

In spite of over 30 years of policy implementation research, tourism researchers are just beginning to take notice of the analytical contributions that implementation theory can make for tourism. This is not surprising as public sector interest in tourism was a recent phenomenon compared to other policy domains (Hall & Jenkins, 1995). Like policy analysts who started to look into policy implementation in earnest in the 1960s and 70s when they noticed that government policies were falling short of expectations, so have tourism researchers begun looking only at tourism policies when problems in implementing tourism development plans came to light (Richter, 1989). Consequently,
literature on tourism policy is sparse (Hall & Jenkins, 1995), and studies of tourism policy implementation even less (Dodds, 2007b; Hall, 2008).

Frequently, policy implementation is examined not on its own but under or together with other topics. Thus, it is scattered in discussions of tourism planning (Gunn, 1988; Innskeep, 1991), tourism development (Alipour, 1996; Chambers & Airey, 2001), sustainable tourism (Berry & Ladkin, 1997; Briassoulis, 2000; Coles, 2009; Dodds, 2007a, 2007b; Dodds & Butler, 2009), collaborative processes in tourism (Kernel, 2005; Vernon, Essex, Pinder, & Curry, 2005), and strategic planning (Pechlaner & Sauerwein, 2002). This is not to say that policy implementation is emphasised. Rather, as Stevenson et al. (2009) have noted, approaches to these studies stress the process of making a tourism plan. A possible exception is Albrecht’s PhD thesis in 2008 that focussed squarely on tourism policy implementation and tourism planning. Nevertheless, some of these studies, for example those by Gunn (1988) and Innskeep (1991), are useful as they provide the earliest attempts to conceptualize tourism policy implementation. Overall, with a few exceptions, there is a little space accorded to how implementation of the policy, plan or programme proceeds, or what their effects are (Pearce, 2001). Consequently, theoretical development in tourism policy implementation has been extremely slow, conditioned largely by advances in the tourism topic it is paired with. This point becomes clearer when perspectives on tourism policy implementation are discussed later.

Most often, studies that touch on implementation do not discuss in-depth the processes of policy implementation but just report on some of its aspects. In particular, there seems to be a penchant for identifying barriers to policy implementation as evident in studies by Ioannides (1995), Berry & Ladkin (1997), Dodds (2007a; 2007b), and Dodds and Butler (2009), a subject that Gunn intensively discussed as early as 1978. Among these published works, there is hardly an acknowledgment of the wider policy implementation literature. Briassoulis (2000) seems to be the only exception when she used a policy implementation model by Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) to develop an \textit{ex ante} evaluation of sustainable tourism policy implementation.
One glaring result is that even recent works on tourism policy implementation appear weak and primitive, especially when set against current developments in the wider policy implementation literature (Albrecht, 2008). An example is a research in tourism policy implementation in China by Lai et al. (2006) where the authors averred, “Ideally, a plan should be implemented as planned” (p. 1171). As Albrecht correctly notes (2008, p. 58), such views are not in line with current thinking in policy implementation research. Nonetheless, these studies are useful as they identify key factors that influence the implementation of a policy or programme and provide ideas about how it is carried out.

2.4.1 Perspectives on tourism policy implementation

Early research on tourism policy implementation had it as part of a linear process of tourism planning with the tourism planner orchestrating everything at the centre. Baud-Bovy (1982, p. 32) had in fact suggested that the planner should “design facilities, tourist products, forms of tourism development which can easily be implemented.” Innskeep (1991) developed a comprehensive land-use planning model with very detailed steps beginning with study preparation, determination of objectives through to implementation and monitoring. In his model, implementation is the last phase but Innskeep (1991) stressed that it must be considered every step of the way. Evaluation is an important component as objectives are assessed from multiple perspectives. This is to ensure that plans and programmes are kept as realistic as possible and are implementable. This last point is very important as during this period, researchers (e.g., Choy, 1991) started to comment on delays in implementing long-terms plans.

As issues with tourism planning began to surface and sustainable tourism emerged as an alternative form of tourism, researchers raised the need for better policy and their implementation. For example, Alipour (1996) found that in Bodrum, Turkey, the implementation of plans is problematic as manifested in the “construction site syndrome” (p. 373) and consequent environmental stress, and the lack of procedures or instruments in place to address them. He blamed this squarely on the failure of the planning process that paid little regard to implementation. Thus, it has been argued that if sustainable tourism were to develop, it must be anchored on clear and sound formulation and implementation of policies through national plans (Harrison, 1994). Elliott (1997) made
it succinctly clear that implementation is paramount, and to not be the missing link it was thought to be. He declared that “Management documents are not worth the paper they are written on unless the policies and decisions are implemented” (p. 97). He also called attention to the political consequences of not implementing management decisions:

Non-implementation of policy means there has been wastage of resources, time and expertise spent in formulating policy, expectations have been raised and not realized, and the standing of managers as well as political leaders has been damaged. Members of the policy community and those affected can lose faith in the public sector, and the problems, which the policy was designed to solve, may become more acute. (p. 98)

When the notion of sustainability moved to the political agenda on a global scale (Bramwell-Lane, 1993; Dodds, 2007b), conceptual issues regarding tourism policy implementation began to be examined more closely. One issue discussed was the relation of implementation with policy formulation. Hall and Jenkins (1995) contended that it is pointless to try to distinguish the two processes. They argued, “Policy formulation and implementation are difficult to separate on a consistent basis because policy is often formulated as it is implemented and vice versa” (p. 11). Elliot (1997) agreed, observing that tourism is one sector “where actual experience and a deep knowledge of the industry and the sector are required” (p. 101). Thus, good policy formulation requires inputs from the street-level, leading to a blurring of lines between the management involved in formulation and implementation. Current research concurs with this conceptualization. Stevenson et al. (2008) asserted, “policymaking is a ‘soft’ intuitive human process rather than a rational scientific process” (p. 744). The result, they argued, is that policy is in a constant flux, unable to be fixed or clearly defined. Notably, this position contrasts with the linear process of tourism policy planning and implementation articulated by Gunn (1988) and Innskeep (1991) that still finds resonance in current research (e.g., Lai et al., 2006). Empirical studies have now reinforced Hall and Jenkins’s (1995) view. For instance, Pearce (2001), studying the re-establishment of the tramway line in Christchurch, NZ, noted the “fuzzy dividing line between policy formulation and implementation, the shaping of policy by council officers and the coming together of officers and councillors close to the workface” (p. 349).
Another issue addressed was the coherence of plans and coordination between levels of government to smoothen the implementation of policy. Ioannides (1995) asserted that sustainable policy options like ecotourism could not get off the ground without tourism itself becoming an integral part of a comprehensive national or regional planning framework. This is also the gist of Andriotis’ (2001) findings in Greece where he found that higher-level plans influence the implementation of smaller and lower-level plans. Dodds (2007b) argued for integration as well, noting that in the case of environmental sustainability, ecosystems transcend administrative boundaries. Indeed, it is contended that “successful tourism in any country requires good communication, cooperation and coordination between management at all levels of government and with the industry” (Elliott, 1997, p. 101).

How policy was executed at the firm level has also been investigated. Zhang et al. (2002) explained that knowledge of tourism policy implementation have practical and theoretical uses. It assists not only the policymaking process of government but likewise improves understanding of the political dimensions of tourism including the policymaking process, an area that, as pointed out earlier is under-researched.

One area where implementation frequently comes up is in tourism networks. Here, implementation is seen as part of the collaborative process (Jamal & Getz, 1995; Kernel, 2005; Vernon et al., 2005). As explained by Vernon et al., this process is divided into three phases, namely: ‘problem-setting’ where the nature of the problem is investigated and information about it sought, ‘direction-setting’ in which political consensus is achieved and solutions are identified, and finally, ‘structuring’ whereby the agreement is ratified and collective responsibility for implementation is decided. Kernel (2005) emphasised that at the end of the process, there has to be a perception among participants that decisions mutually agreed upon are implemented; else, future collaborative efforts might be jeopardized.

2.4.2 Factors that influence tourism policy implementation

“Why is implementation so difficult?” was the question Gunn asked himself in 1978 in an article with the same title. This was in recognition of observations that there is a wide variety of factors that can influence the achievement of goals, that implementation entails
the participation of multiple actors (Pal, 1992), and it involves far more than a mechanical translation of goals into routine procedures, as well as fundamental questions about conflict, decision making and ‘who gets what’ in society (Grindle, 1980). Pressman and Wildavsky (1979, p. xxi) lamented:

Our working definition of implementation will do as sketch of the earliest stages of the programme, but the passage of time wreaks havoc with efforts to maintain tidy distinctions...In the midst of action the distinction between the initial conditions and the subsequent chain of causality begins to erode...The longer the chain of causality, the more numerous the reciprocal relationships among the links and the more complex implementation becomes.

Since the time Gunn (1978) posed the question, the general direction of public policy implementation research has been to identify factors that explain the achievement of goals in the implementation process (Cline, 2000). The whole point of "top down" models, in fact, is to identify factors to ensure perfect implementation. And certainly, researchers did not disappoint: a review of implementation studies by O'Toole (1986) identified more than 300 critical variables!

Increasingly, tourism policy researchers are also noting that tourism policy implementation is constrained by a number of factors. For example, Elliot (1997) observed that the tourism sector produces a lot of glossy brochures and paper plans but managers from the public sector find it hard to implement them. In general, some of the factors cited are similar to those found to influence other policy sectors: lack of resources, unrealistic policies, too many organizations involved. The problems are particularly acute when local governments are involved (Dredge, 2001; Yuksel, Bramwell & Yuksel, 2005). However, tourism has unique characteristics that make tourism policymaking more challenging. Therefore, this section discusses some of these features and how they affect policy implementation. It also touches on factors that pertain to both description and explanation of policy.

2.4.2.1 Fragmented tourism industry

That the tourism industry is fragmented is one of the most common comments about tourism in the literature. Edgell (1990) and Tremblay (1998), for example, remark on the wide-ranging nature of tourism and how it is linked to diverse sectors of the economy.
The subject of defining the industry in fact is one of the longest running debates in the literature featuring on one hand, Stephen Smith, who prefers tourism to be an ‘industry,’ and Neil Leiper, on the other hand, who calls it a ‘collection of industries’ (see Leiper, 2008; Wilson, 1998, for discussion). Either way, private and public sector interests make up the industry and small businesses number far greater than big organizations (Smith, 2006). These have implications on the way tourism policy is implemented.

First, coordination of policy is much more difficult. Amoah and Baum (1997) argue that the amalgam of organizations from the public and private sectors frustrates the coordination of policy implementation, particularly when there is no umbrella body to orchestrate the execution of policy. Relatedly, the problem is heightened by the heterogeneity of the businesses involved. Dieke (1993) explains that this feature leads to a variety of interests, which can be competing sometimes. As Elliot (1997, p. 100) suggests “There can be opposition to the new policies, directly by vested interests who may lose some of their power or privileges, or by public organizations which are not committed or are under pressure to implement the policy.” In particular, the fragmented nature of the industry creates a fertile environment for power struggles over resources, more so at the community level (Jamal & Getz, 1995). Indeed, tourism policymaking case studies have been written that feature conflicts among actors that comprise the tourism system (e.g., Dodds, 2007a; Dredge, 2006a; Reed, 1997). The struggles become more heightened particularly if the policy to be implemented is vague, a topic discussed below.

2.4.2.2 Nature of tourism policy

In general, public policy implementation is said to be influenced by the content of the policy and context of implementation. In terms of content, Grindle (1980) states that the kind of policy being made will have considerable impact on the kind of political activity stimulated by the policymaking and implementation process. Much earlier, Lowi (1972) noted that programmes that provide collective benefits such as light and water in neighbourhood slums might be readily implemented because compliance will tend to be forthcoming with a minimal conflict. On the other hand, programmes with divisible benefits such as housing may exacerbate conflict and competition among those seeking to benefit from them and, thus, may be more difficult to execute as intended. Exacerbating
the situation is the ambiguity of the policy goal and the means by which it is to be implemented, as Matland (1995) shows. That is why, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) are careful to suggest that the theory behind the proposal should be adequate in addressing the problem, and that it be kept simple and direct. This also means that cause and effect relationships implied by the policy are direct and uncluttered, suggesting that specific activities are correctly sequenced (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984).

Following this, the nature of the tourism policy to be implemented itself is a major factor to the achievement of objectives. This can be explained by looking at some aspects of sustainable tourism policy. First, it has been argued that policy must be clear. As Pigram (1990, p. 5) states, “Policy must, first, be perceived by policy makers as conceptually robust, defensible and amenable to implementation.” However, accomplishing such a task for sustainable tourism policy is fraught with difficulties. Not only does tourism have a myriad of definitions, it could also be studied on a number of levels and from many perspectives (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007; Hall & Jenkins, 1995). Policy itself has a number of definitions (Hill, 1997). Add to this the complication of describing sustainability, which has been labelled as an unclear, contested concept (Butler, 1999; Mowforth & Munt, 1998), and it is no wonder that studies of sustainable tourism policy implementation have found policy to be vague. Briassoulis (2000), for instance, found that issues surrounding sustainable tourism development “are not easily tractable” (p. 267) due to difficulties in analyzing environmental problems, complexity of defining the economic dimensions of tourism, as well as problems in arriving at a systematic analysis of socio-cultural impacts. As a result, “policymakers formulate imprecise and abstract policies (goal statements) which do not concern directly the real problem being addressed at the actual level of implementation (absence of essential targets)” (Briassoulis, 2000, p. 267). While many governments have found the principles of sustainable tourism as adequate starting points for policy implementation, the guidelines that followed did not lead to enhanced knowledge of sustainability or lead to positive action (Berry & Ladkin, 1997). This vague nature of tourism appears symptomatic of the general lack of concern to tourism’s place in scheme of things particularly at the local government level. As Stevenson et al. (2008) found in Leeds, UK, there was lack of clarity in formulating and
executing tourism policy and how it fits with other priorities. This has a number of inter-related consequences.

First, a difference in perception what sustainable policy is arises among actors. Empirical studies from the UK bear this out. Vernon et al. (2005) found that in Cornwall, businesses have a narrow understanding of sustainable tourism, confining themselves to projects that directly influence their business such as tourist interpretation, improvement of facilities, and landscaping, instead of projects that have greater environmental benefits such as water conservation. They also observed that the businesses were heavily reliant on the public sector for support but shied away when impacts of their businesses on the environment are concerned. Stevenson et al. (2008) reported the lack of consensus around the development and delivery of policy in Leeds. Much earlier, Berry and Ladkin (1997) discovered that in Sussex, tourism businesses thought they were already sustainable because their small sizes purportedly do not damage the environment. In another setting, in Malta, Dodds (2007a) counted very few personnel directly overseeing the environment, but found more efforts being poured into marketing. She also discovered that while the public and the private sector actively participated in the development and adoption of sustainable tourism policy, politicians eventually expended more efforts to obtain votes for the next election than implementing the policy. Ioannides (1995) observed the same behaviour of politicians in Cyprus. Indeed, as Halme (2001) emphasised, differences in perception and knowledge base in sustainable tourism act as barriers to its effective implementation.

The second consequence of having vague policy is the lack of practical advice from government. Based on Berry and Ladkin’s (1997) analysis, businesses may interpret this absence as government looking only after its own interest, thereby creating an environment of suspicion and mistrust between them. In addition, even if there were useful guidelines from government, it is contended that they are difficult to implement. One reason is that implementers at the local level do not receive all the policy messages completely and accurately (Briassoulis, 2000), or because they are too specific, hence precluding adaptation. The latter is illustrated by policy implementation studies in China by Zhang et al. (2002). There, they found that some regulations are too strict with no
space to vary implementation based on actual situations. An excellent example was the hotel star rating system where rules even prescribe the layout of rooms.

With policy guidelines bordering on the extremes, a third consequence arises: discretion. According to Elliott (1997, p. 107), “managers often have discretion as to how they implement policy.” There seems to be two ways this is exercised: one is freedom to prescribe the rules as discussed by Briassoulis (2000); second is the liberty to be flexible in the application of the existing rules. Used imprudently, it might lead to contradictory policy implementation. This is demonstrated by tourism development in Vietnam, as seen through the implementation of licensing laws that govern traveller cafes. Lloyd (2003) noted that numerous procedures have been set in place, partly because the government has learned that some activities conducted in them have not been properly taxed. However, he also found that local authorities, looking after their own economic needs, would exercise their discretion in the implementation of regulations, in order to promote and protect the interests of businesses with whom they have developed a clientelistic relationship.

Inevitably, conflict erupts among policy actors due to unclear policy, particularly where resource use is concerned. Pigram (1990) emphasises that these conflicts eventually lead to large gaps between policy decisions and policy implementation. This is supported by numerous case study findings (e.g., Belsky, 1999; Cruz, Baltazar, Gomez, Lugo, 2005; Dodds, 2007a, 2007b; Majanen, 2007). In addition, Bramwell and Sharman (1999) aver that adversarial conflicts are wasteful as “stakeholders entrench their mutual suspicions, improve their adversarial skills and play out similar conflicts around each subsequent issue” (p. 392). However, there is also evidence that conflicts could be beneficial in obtaining a sustainable tourism outcome. This is demonstrated by Lovelock (2002) who discussed the role of conflict in implementing sustainable tourism in protected areas in Canada. He showed that an environmental NGO’s anti-development arguments and refusal to cooperate with the national parks agency and the tourism industry had an important role insofar as it opened a window for environmental issues to be debated publicly, leading to important policy changes in the way tourism is practiced in national parks. That the main source of problem for the ENGO studied by Lovelock is their difficulties reconciling the marketing efforts of Parks Canada with its preservation
mandate suggest another aspect of the nature of sustainable tourism policy relevant to this thesis - impacts from the application of policy and the stakeholders’ perception thereof - discussed below.

While the idea of sustainable tourism remains enigmatic (Coles, 2009), its main policy concern has largely revolved around three areas: the protection of the environment, fostering economic efficiency, and promoting the socio-cultural well-being of host communities (Briassoulis, 2000). Towards these ends, quite a number of perspectives and principles have been published to guide policy implementation. On the global scale, examples include the WTO Code of Ethics and the Local Agenda 21. Researchers have proposed several keys to unlock doors to sustainability, for instance, concern for livelihoods and improved living standards of host population in the short and long-run (Chambers & Conway, 1992), communities deriving benefits from the conservation of resources including wildlife on their own or neighbouring land (Burns, 2004) and keeping them local (Lepp, 2002), institution-building (de Kadt, 1992), role of policy (Pigram, 1990; Rodolfo, 2005) including improved understanding of the policymaking process (Hall, 2003). Approaches such as empowerment (Scheyvens, 2002) and ‘sustainable livelihoods’ (Cater & Cater, 2008) have been discussed. These are made in part to overcome the challenges of sustainable tourism including the mitigation of negative impacts, and clarification of the benefits tourism brings particularly how they are shared (Foucat, 2002).

In exchange, it is argued that policy makers and planners can earn the support of the host community and create a favourable attitude towards tourism policy implementation (Wang & Pfister, 2008). Relevant to this discussion of resident attitudes is their perception of the costs and benefits of implementing tourism within their community. According to John Ap (1992), who developed the social exchange theory of tourism development, when residents are confronted with a choice to develop tourism or not, they assess the costs and benefits they will receive. If the benefits outweighed the costs, the decision is to support tourism, while if the converse was true, tourism is not supported. Empirical investigations of residents’ perception of tourism (e.g., Jurowski, Uysal, & Williams, 1997; Kayat, 2002; McGehee & Andereck, 2004; Wang & Pfister, 2008) have largely found support to this theory. Likewise, it is argued that a difference in social
standing is no barrier to the exchange. Borrowing from Blau (1967) who proposed that a
junior partner tends to be more dependent and committed to the exchange relation than
the senior member who has greater opportunities, Kayat (2002) explained that a resident
“who is faced with poverty and the need to survive...may not be in favour but will still
commit himself/herself to an exchange with tourists and, in fact, expresses positive
attitudes toward tourism"(p. 175). Overall, this implies that community dependence on
tourism predict support for tourism policy implementation, consistent with the model by

2.4.2.3 Stakeholder participation

The above discussion points to the importance of having a strong participation by
stakeholders in the policymaking process. This has become a key tenet of sustainable
tourism development with case studies (e.g., the collection in the book edited by Fennell
& Dowling, 2003) emphasizing its importance. Hall (2008) defined stakeholders as
“individuals, groups and organizations with an interest in a planning problem, issue or
outcome that are directly influenced by or affected by the actions or non-actions taken by
others to resolve the problem or issue" (p. 121). To single them out in practice is a
difficult process, as according to Harrison (1994), calls for “local involvement,” is to
“assume the existence of an acceptable and indigenous local democracy,” (p. 718)
certainly not the case everywhere. Nonetheless, researchers have gone ahead identifying
who they are. For instance, Holtz and Edwards (2003) grouped stakeholders into six
primary groups: public sector (local, national, regional, and global governance), private
sector, multilateral and bilateral donors, NGOs, local communities and indigenous
peoples, and consumers. They likewise described their roles in implementing sustainable
tourism policy. The public sector, composed of a myriad of government agencies (Elliott,
1997; Hall, 2008; Pearce, 1992) are at the “centre of the divergent interests of tourism
development...by virtue of its dual responsibilities for protecting and regulating the use
of natural resources and promoting the economic development of its citizens" (p. 43-44).
Important players from this sector in implementing policies are local government officials
and local natural resource managers who deal with day-to-day problems of resource
allocation and capacity gaps, as well as national-level agencies who develop and
implement policy across levels of governance. The private sector was described as being
dominant in terms of financial resources but exercises little influence in environmental debates, although it is noted their activities could be very harmful (for example, see Bejder, 2005; Constantine, Brunton, & Dennis, 2004; Lusseau, 2005; Neumann, 2001, for impacts of private tour boats on marine wildlife). NGO, international aid agencies and local communities also impact on tourism policy but their influence was characterized as being difficult to define explicitly. Lastly, Holtz and Edwards discussed consumers as having influence in tourism policy via the private sector. Therefore, the consequence of the latter was seen as very limited.

Investigations to determine who the key players among stakeholders in tourism policymaking and development are have reinforced these notions. Tyler and Dinan (2001), for example, examined the role of the public sector, tourism trade associations, professional associations and umbrella groups in tourism policy development. They suggested that in England, an 'immature tri-axial network' exists composed of the following sub-networks: (a) the commercial tourism policy sub-network that includes the professionals (training), umbrella and trade groups, (b) public resource management sub-network that includes statutory and non-statutory groups, and professional (ethical) groups, (c) intra-government sub-network made up of the English Tourism Council, interested government departments and the ruling party. They further averred that within this issue network, the government is the strongest actor, with the intra-government network mainly responsible for formulating the national tourism strategy and churning out tourism relevant policies. However, members of other networks were noted to have a contribution by way of knowledge and expertise shared. Pforr (2006) also identified the government as the dominant player in Australia's tourism policy network. He arrived at this conclusion after examining the dynamics of policy formulation in Northern Territory (NT), specifically by looking at how the main actors composed of public, private and non-profit sectors interacted in making the Tourism Development Master Plan prepared in 1994. His findings reveal that political and economic actors heavily influenced the process of formulating the Masterplan. Environmental pressure groups, Aboriginal lobbies, local governments and other community-based structures were left out of the loop. He concluded that this mirrors the existing unbalanced institutional arrangement of the central government in NT, one that is characterized by close government-business
relations. Bramwell and Meyer (2007), however, found additional actors in former East Germany’s Rügen County. Aside from the government agency that managed Rügen’s protected areas and that was linked to different environmental groups, they identified the media (the local newspaper and the tourism developer who founded it), the county’s bank, and individuals associated with the former communist regime of East Germany as having been influential in regard to sustainable tourism issues.

Researchers have advanced a variety of reasons why stakeholders should collaborate with each other. Harrison (1994) believed that involving communities could prevent future conflicts between social classes from happening. He explained:

This suggestion is made not from some implicit ideological position on the nature of democracy and a preferred relationship of rulers and ruled, but rather because there is more chance of sustaining a viable tourism industry and viable communities if the communities it most affects are in sympathy with and benefit from tourism development. Indeed, perhaps the largest single cause of hostility to tourism is the perception that its benefits are restricted only to an elite. In such circumstances, unrest is a distinct possibility and there is ample evidence that tourism and socio-political unrest do not mix. (p. 717)

Healey (1998) agreed with this reasoning, arguing that collaboration prevents conflict from escalating and dragging contending parties into protracted and costly battles into the long-term. This is so because collaboration leads to a broad-based ownership of and support to policies that facilitates equity (Vernon et al., 2005). Collaboration is likewise said to provide access to innovative knowledge, markets and critical resources for participating organizations (March & Wilkinson, 2009; Novelli, Schmitz, & Spencer, 2006). Adopting collaborative practices such as networks ensures that there is some measure of local control over economic activities, and a judicious use of natural resources is observed, thus, the destructive impacts of tourism are mitigated (Saxena, 2005). There are also political benefits. Earlier, Benveniste (1989) stated that joint activities provide a mantle of legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders if the latter were involved in decision-making and implementation (Bramwell & Sharman, 1999).

However, getting stakeholders to participate in sustainable tourism policy implementation is easier said than done. First, there is the issue of differentiating the forms and levels of
participation, and within a local community context, identifying who should constitute the participants (Southgate, 2006). The sheer number of stakeholders that may arise from this analytical exercise is another complicating factor (Timur & Getz, 2008). In some cases, the chief reason is the marginality of tourism in policymaking. For example, in Leeds, Stevenson et al. (2008) found that tourism policy is discretionary on the part of local authorities. They also observed a lack of clarity in its position vis-à-vis other policy areas. As a result, there is lack of interest among the electorate and local politicians. For regions that show deep interests, some stakeholders, for instance NGOs, are purposely excluded in the process. Dodds and Butler (2009) explained that the main rationale for shutting the door on their participation is their tendency to put environmental and social concerns ahead of economic priorities. Thus, as Hall and Jenkins (1995) argued, a clash of values precludes meaningful collaboration in policymaking. In turn, this leads to a climate of distrust between government and other stakeholders that might mar policy implementation. This is shown in the study by Ioannides (1995) in Cyprus where he found deep resentment by local communities in Akamas over the reluctance of bureaucrats from the capital to include the visions and opinions of the residents. It was discovered that this was so in order to avoid intervention by interest groups. Importantly, this case illustrates the view (e.g., Tosun, 2000, 2006) that there are internal and external forces that limit the participation of stakeholders, particularly the community, in tourism development. Evidently, much of the explanation lies with the availability of resources and exercise of power and politics, topics discussed below.

2.4.2.4 Resources for sustainable tourism

Along with power, Elliot (1997) identified financial resources as critical to policy implementation. Dredge and Humphreys (2003) support this, emphasising that “policy is subject to a dynamic ebb and flow of commitment and resource availability” (p. 130). Allocating funds in their own budgets and staffing requirements is one way for organizations to demonstrate their dedication to a goal (Bramwell & Sharman, 1999). In addition, it is hypothesized that having resources provide sufficient basis for organizations to participate in collaborative arrangements, particularly when actions by others affect them (Jamal & Getz, 1995). More fundamentally, it is argued that possession of resources gives an organization the edge in defining how ideas are
implemented (Fadeeva, 2004). However, as commonly observed, resources seem to be always in short supply. For example, Briassoulis (2000) suggested that “implementing agencies usually lack the scientific and technical expertise and resources needed to apply new policy instruments and performance criteria (e.g., tourism green taxes, environmental accounting)” (p. 268). The problem is particularly acute in developing countries (e.g., Lai et al., 2006, for China; Thompson, O’Hare, & Evans, 1995, for Gambia). Jenkins (2006, p. 29) noted that:

Perhaps the biggest barrier to implementation is access to finance for the specified projects. This is often a major weakness of tourism plans where developments are often clearly specified but with only weak reference to where funds might be sourced.

Availability of resources is an on-going problem and for developing countries, one of the solutions is to tap international agencies. A popular choice is the World Tourism Organization, which has funded quite a number of tourism development plans (World Tourism Organization [WTO], 1994). Nevertheless, an evaluation in the mid-1990s revealed that more than 80 percent had never been implemented (Jenkins, 2006).

Yet, the issue of resources is not limited to developing countries, as developed countries encounter them as well. However, whereas the former might think about implementing sustainable development plans, in the latter the concern is more about executing collaborative arrangements between the public and the private sector (Bramwell & Sharman, 1999; Coles, 2009; Halme, 2001; Kernel, 2005). Here, a key issue is the extent to which members are willing to bear the costs of having sustainable tourism. For example, in Spain, Dodds (2007b) saw that communities are uneasy about making trade-offs. She explains:

The local population said they wanted a better quality of life but did not want to pay a water tax to limit water consumption. Businesses have not been very forthcoming in adopting renewable energy sources because they are costly to implement. (p. 313)

In the UK, interviews conducted by Berry and Ladkin (1997) revealed that business groups are concerned about who would pay for environmental initiatives. They reported that costs are increased by legislations that safeguard the environment to levels that
endanger the viability of small businesses, thus implementation of these acts by the private sector is lower. However, they found that if funds were available, the rate of diffusion would be higher. This seems to be confirmed by Vernon et al. (2005), where their findings show businesses participating in sustainable practices but reliant on the public sector for financial support and the setting up of infrastructure requirements. They also highlight attracting financial support to the implementation of the sustainable tourism strategy.

2.4.2.5 Power and politics

As is apparent in the discussion above, power plays a central role in policymaking and collaborative actions that implement policy. According to Hall (1994, p. 52), it “governs the interaction of individuals, organizations and agencies influencing, or trying to influence, the formulation of tourism policy and the manner in which it is implemented.” Hall and Jenkins (1995) explain that power is value-dependent, that is, actors struggle to impose their beliefs to control aspects of the policy process, particularly the way the agenda is set and rules that govern the debate are structured. Bramwell and Meyer (2007) discussed the characteristics of power in tourism development and suggested that power is emergent, that is, it arises out of social relationships, the tensions that the interaction between people creates, and the reaction that people make in prevailing situations. They also suggested that power is not merely “possessed” but is exercised. Thus, an actor may be perceived as powerful by being able to influence outcomes on the strength of his relations with other actors. Bramwell and Meyer likewise claimed that the sum of “the heterogeneous relations that involve power is much greater than that of the individual parts” (p. 769). This implies that the effects of employing power can be felt at many levels.

At the community or institutional level, power rests in the individual. As Reed (1997) explained, “At the local level, these [power] struggles may be rooted in the personalities and circumstances of individual parties” (p. 587). Their values, experience, ambitions, family ties, age, and other personal conditions all act to simultaneously influence their interpretation of reality and decision-making (Hall & Jenkins, 1995). The power of the individual is magnified in his capacity as a ‘fixer’ or ‘sovereign,’ a legislator or member
of the executive department who controls resources crucial to the policy and can intervene constantly to get things going (Bardach, 1977). His personal qualities could guide disorganized and disparate groups towards the implementation of policy (Cho et al., 2005; Levin & Ferman, 1986).

Power is also very much evident in higher levels of aggregation, including policy networks. Here, as tourism policy researchers are beginning to explore (e.g., Bramwell & Meyer, 2007; Dredge, 2006b; Pforr, 2006; Timur & Getz, 2008), the network structure within which the organization is embedded provides power. This is a function and a result of its structural position, that is, its centrality and interconnectivity within the network. Thus, stakeholders with higher centrality can manage the flow and direction of resources and information and be able to influence outcomes better than an ‘isolate,’ who may find themselves locked out of the process (Timur & Getz, 2008). Power through centrality can also be wielded through the knowledge and legitimacy that a member brings to the network (Fadeeva, 2004) and network ties (Dredge, 2006b), in addition to resources.

Clearly, power in tourism policy implementation can come from a variety of sources. Besides membership in a network, resources sustain power (Bramwell & Sharman, 1999). Legal authority and political legitimacy are important foundations. Elliott (1997) explained the broad powers of public sector managers in implementing policy, spanning formal and informal methods:

They can enforce or not enforce laws and regulations, financial measures, the granting or refusal of permissions, rights of consultation and participation...a more formal mechanism would be the use of bureaucratic methods to speed or slow the implementation process either to favour or penalize other parties in the process. Managers also have the power to interpret guidelines or wishes expressed by ministers. (p. 107)

That the public sector is able to do these activities, while other actors are not, point to another aspect of power: it is distributed unevenly. Consequently, it is argued that the influence of stakeholders varies that ultimately affects the nature of collaboration to achieve policy goals (Bramwell & Sharman, 1999; Reed, 1997). Fadeeva (2004), for instance, has argued that “Limited or excessive power of some actors can eliminate the diversity of ideas contributed by the diversity of membership” (p. 183) in a network.
Hence, in addition to contributing to a paucity of ideas to implement, power can be flexed to affect the manner in which the policy agenda is fixed and “rules of the game” is set (Hall & Jenkins, 1995, pp. 70-71). Case studies of sustainable tourism development across the globe show how this is manifested. In Malta, Dodds (2007a) found the government prioritizing economic over social and environmental considerations, thus creating a barrier to sustainable tourism policy implementation. The same order was similarly observed in Spain (Dodds, 2007b). Even within the government apparatus, there are power struggles over priorities. Bramwell and Meyer (2007) found that in the county of Rügen, formerly East Germany, the county council was unable to impose development limits over municipalities whose priorities were economic development through the attraction of new investments. The writers attributed the situation to the county’s relative lack of political and economic power vis-à-vis the smaller municipalities. The exercise of power is likewise visible in the behaviour of political parties. In Malta again, Dodds (2007a) noted that the Labour party proposed a tourism policy in 1996 but was unable to make it pass through parliament for lack of time. When the rival Nationalist party took over and passed exactly the same policy bill, the Labour party opposed it, just to spite the former. Another demonstration is non-decision by politicians to support policy implementation, as shown in Cyprus by Ioannides (1995). He found them hesitant to implement unpopular proposals that might affect their political careers come election time, the same tendency shown by politicians in Malta (Dodds, 2007a). These cases support the claim by Boehmer-Christiansen (2002) that politicians and their underlings in the bureaucracy act more on NIMTO (‘not in my term of office’) basis when it comes to adjudicating unpopular issues (Dodds & Butler, 2009).

Indulging in patron-client relations is another way in which the use of power is illustrated. It is typically ascribed to developing countries (Tosun, 2005), although developed countries are not necessarily immune to it (Pforr, 2001), and those described as having ‘weak states’ (Jordan, 1992; Van Waarden, 1992). Following Lande (1965), Gutierrez et al. (1992) define it as a specific form of power arrangement which involves the informal linkage between a political leader (patron) who is able to provide material goods and services for his political followers (clients) who, in return for the benefits received from the
former, reciprocate by rendering personal support and loyalty to their patrons. (p. 6)

In these states, the personal interests and official duties of policy makers merge (Hutchison, 2001). There is a high-degree of particularistic demand on these individuals when it comes to policymaking (Almonte, 1993). Thus, individuals engage in clientelistic relations motivated by benefits to persona and family and not by loyalty to institutions or abstract ideology (Manacsa, 1999).

Patron-client relations have been observed in some analyses of tourism development. Göymen (2000) noted its debilitating effects to governance of sustainable tourism in Turkey:

the lack of a strong political culture and developed mechanisms of participation result in an elite minority dominating the scene, creating a suitable atmosphere for clientelistic relations. Such relations between political/bureaucratic patrons and entrepreneur/developer clients may be contrary to overall national and local interests, creating a negative image of tourism activity. (p. 1042)

A similar observation was echoed by Southgate (2006) in the case of southern Kenya where he discovered that in the community of Kimana, clientelism was undermining local governance mechanisms based on the traditional age-set system, thus, preventing them from capitalizing on their environment’s ecotourism potential. The case differs from Turkey in the sense that the relations are not between bureaucrats and entrepreneurs but a vertically integrated patron-client hierarchy involving young leaders of group ranches as clients and national leaders as patrons dangling political promotion in exchange for land acquisition in the former’s community. Consequences on policy and actors, however, are the same: the relegation of the less powerful to minor positions and the erosion of trust in the ability of institutions to mediate between competing groups and enforce policies fairly.

2.4.3 Assessing modes to implement tourism policy

Notwithstanding imbalances in power among stakeholders, or arguably because of it, cooperative arrangements between organizations seem to be the trend. The arrangements have been called different names, for example, inter-agency relations (Dredge &
Humphrey, 2003), steering committees (Jenkins, 2006), partnerships and joint projects (Coles, 2009; Vernon et al., 2005), collaboration (Bramwell & Sharman, 1999; Jamal & Getz, 1995) and cooperation (Lovlock, 2003). The “project,” according to Coles (2009), is frequently used as “vehicles to deliver sustainable tourism” (p. 218). Consequently, approaches that deal with groups have been used to analyze these structures. These include inter-organizational relations theory that formed the basis of propositions by Jamal and Getz (1995) to implement collaborative projects. In turn, these conditions were utilized by Bramwell and Sharman (1999) to develop an analytic framework that evaluate collaborative policymaking focusing on the scope and intensity of collaboration, and degree of consensus of actors as key dimensions. Another approach that has gained ground in tourism research in recent years is network theory discussed below.

2.4.3.1 Tourism networks

Network analysis offers a number of advantages in evaluating tourism. First, its orientation towards policy actors allows the analysis of a wide range of organizations that comprise the tourism industry (Scott et al., 2008). Networks amply capture the dynamics of relational ties, interdependence, communication and information flows formed among tourism participants (Timur & Getz, 2008). In analysing tourism policymaking, Dredge (2006b, p. 271) asserted that the approach is enormously important as it distinguishes a number of points: (1) overlapping and simultaneous manner in which different issues within the one policy community can be addressed by different networks operating at different scales and over time, (2) distinctions between private and public domains is blurred by the push to implement the strategies of collective action and shared responsibility that are embedded in the notion of governance, (3) different levels of political support may exist for different policy issues within one policy network, (4) policy actors may have membership in different policy networks and their powers, roles, functions and level of support and interaction may vary within these structures. Tyler and Dinan (2001) emphasise that networks sit at the meso-level, “where tourism policy clearly resides” (p. 243).

Two main research streams can be distinguished in the way networks have been employed in tourism studies, both reflecting its wider application. The first, which draws
from organizational studies, deals with the issue of governance. Under this category, two sub-streams can be recognized. The first uses networks as a framework to understand destination planning and management (Dredge, 2006a; Hsin Yu Shih, 2006; March & Wilkinson, 2009; Pavlovich, 2003; Saxena, 2005; Scott et al., 2008; Tinsley & Lynch, 2001), while the second is concerned with the management of the firm and its business environment (Novelli et al., 2006; Tremblay, 1998). The second major stream was influenced by ideas from public policy analysis. Here, networks are seen as an important coordinating mechanism between state, business and civil society actors through which public policy are set and administered (Tyler & Dinan, 2001; Pforr, 2005, 2006). The distinction however is just analytical and artificial as there are studies that have used policy networks from public policy research to examine actor inter-relationships in destinations (e.g., Dredge, 2006b; Pforr, 2005, 2006).

On its own, network theory is applied to study tourism but it has also been used in combination with other frameworks. This is because, according to Tyler and Dinan (2001), a single theory or concept would not be able to explain in full the dynamism of the tourism industry nor the complexity of its policy structure. Thus, in their own work on England's tourism policy network, Tyler and Dinan applied networks to explain the dynamics of policymaking but they mixed this with concepts such as ‘core executive’ (Smith, 2000), ‘autonomous state’ (Smith, 1993), and the ideas of trust, bargaining, resource-based power arrangement and institutional arrangement, to come up with a more comprehensive explanation of network dynamics. Pforr (2006) took a different tack when he discussed tourism policy processes in the Northern Territories in Australia. To bring focus into the influence/reputation, cooperation and communication networks, he used social network analysis as a tool to plot the pattern of relationships among key actors. He integrated the discussion within the broader framework of political system developed by Easton (1965) and utilized the policy cycle model to analytically divide the policy process in several stages. Dredge (2006b) analyzed the functioning of a local tourism organization in Lake Macquarie, NSW through the lens of network theory but likewise covered cultural aspects such as actor strategies and power relations. Finally, Bramwell and Meyer (2007) adopted the same strategy when they looked at tourism policy relations in Germany. Following Marsh and Smith’s (2000) dialectical approach to policy networks,
they undertook multiple analyses that included an assessment whether developments within the network reflected the wider context, reputation analysis using the techniques of sociometry, and a determination of the relationship of policy networks and outcomes.

2.4.3.2 Network structure and tourism policy management processes - key variables

The relationship of networks with policy processes and outcomes, the subject of heated debates in the policy networks literature (see Dowding, 1995, 2001; Marsh & Smith, 2000, 2001), has been explored in tourism networks research. The debate focuses on the question of whether network structures influence policy outcomes. Marsh and his collaborators (see Marsh, 1998) believe that network properties such as network structure affect outcomes. Dowding (1995), on the other hand, vehemently opposes this view, arguing that networks are incapable of explaining policy change. In the tourism networks literature, there does not seem to be any fireworks, as all of those who have equated network structure with policy processes and outcomes obtained results supportive of Marsh’s claims (Bramwell & Meyer, 2007; Dredge, 2006b; Fadeeva, 2004; Pforr, 2005, 2006). These studies are briefly reviewed to highlight important dimensions of network structure found to have influenced tourism development and policymaking.

Bramwell and Meyer’s (2007) study of tourism development in former East Germany represent a direct assessment of the relationship between tourism networks and policy implementation outcomes. Focusing on Rügen Island, they looked at the dialectical relationships between network structure and agency, network structure and the context within which the network is embedded, and between network structure and policy outcomes. Their findings show that external changes reflected on tourism policy debates and developments in the island. This is demonstrated by increased autonomy for municipalities following reunification and the ‘invasion’ of business people from West Germany who quickly established themselves in the tourism and political fields. Because these businessmen have financial resources, they did not have to embed themselves deeply into local networks, relying only on the strength of weak ties and their wherewithal to secure influence. Bramwell and Meyer likewise showed evidence of network structure having an influence on the emergent shape of the networks, observed to be “path dependent and path-creating” (2007, p. 785).
Applying network analysis to analyze the development of Waitomo Caves in New Zealand, Pavlovich (2003, p. 203) showed how “limited relational ties within the destination contributed to limited resource and information flows.” She described how the government, as the central actor, constrained the growth of the destination for a long time, with ‘historical visual maps’ illustrating the almost complete absence of relational ties with other actors. It was only when adventure tourism was introduced in 1987 that a network-like structure involving new actors from the private sector began to emerge and grow. Accordingly, this increase in relational ties among them led to greater information exchange; thus, creating greater product diversity, multiple organizational nodal positions, and other network-based capabilities.

Dredge (2006b) applied network theory and the cultural aspects of policy networks to analyze public-private partnerships. In her examination of the social relation between the local government and tourism industry in Lake Macquarie, NSW, she found numerous initiatives to create a local tourism association/organization (LTO). The LTO would be set up, only to disband a few months later. This cycle would continue at least six times between 1972 and 2000. Dredge attributed this failure to sustain the partnership to parochialism and competition among key actors. In addition, no matter which side the initiative come from, the structure that emerged was problematic: no fulcrum or central figure to coordinate matters, muddled communication lines, unclear roles and responsibilities. This had the overall effect of raising dissatisfaction with the organization, and undermining legitimacy and ownership thereof, thus leading to its eventual retirement.

The aforementioned outcome raises the importance of clarifying the ‘rules of the game’ (Rhodes, 1988) including trust and bargaining. According to Wright (1988, p. 610), these rules set “approximate limits to the discretionary behaviour of the participants in the policy networks.” These are concerns taken up by Tyler and Dinan (2001) in the context of England's tourism policy network. They found that trust was an important element to get members of the network to collaborate. This was primarily because the groups channel their energies toward issues that directly affect their reasons for being. However, when there were issues that cut across their narrow interests, such as the travel insurance tax and the abolition of the English Tourist Board, they were prepared to bargain and
negotiate with each other to come up with common positions that would influence policy makers. Their success was gleaned from the translation of sustainability, a core public issue with the government, into ‘wise growth’ for the tourism industry.

Without doubt, the membership of the network affects the strength of ties among actors, and as shown in the above cases, the outcomes. It is also argued that the overall quality of membership plays a great deal. This issue is clarified in the case of Fadeeva's (2004) work on the role of tourism networks for sustainable development. Specifically, she looked at how a constellation of actors (eight different cross-sectoral networks from five European countries) select and implement sustainable tourism ideas. Her findings revealed that the composition of actors influences the execution of goals into actions. Homogenous actors, such as those with similar professional background found in Sälen, Sweden, were more efficient in idea implementation. Experience of members also counts, as it facilitates idea negotiation.

Halme (2001) also addressed the issue of network membership, particularly its role in learning among actors. From her study of tourism sustainability networks across Europe, she indicated that learning is facilitated by diversity of actors but, similar to Fadeeva (2004), some kind of domain similarity is required in order for the actors to act together. Learning in networks was found to be defined by external and internal processes. On the one hand, the networks responded to stimuli such as demands of customers and markets, threats, value changes (i.e., environmentalism). On the other hand, there was a focal or hub organization to push learning along by using the strategies of mimicry, improvisation, and positive reinforcement (e.g., recognition of achievements and small wins). This emphasises that inter-organizational learning is not easy, and as Halme suggested, timely reinforcement is needed to avoid sliding back to old patterns, as what happened in the Philippines with re-democratization, discussed below.

**2.5 Philippine tourism policy implementation**

**2.5.1 Perspectives and key conditions that influence policy implementation in the Philippines**

The Philippines is a unitary state comprised of the central or national government and the local government units. The national government is composed of three co-equal branches,
namely, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. A directly elected president presides over the 25-member Cabinet. The president is likewise commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the head of state. The legislative branch is composed of two chambers, the Senate or the upper house, and the House of Representatives or lower house. At the apex of the judicial branch is the Supreme Court, supported by a system of lower courts. The national government also includes a wide array of government corporations, quasi-government bodies, bureaus, and constitutional agencies.

On the other hand, local government can be divided into three levels according to hierarchy. At the top is the level of the province and cities, of which there are 80 and 137, respectively, at present. One rung below is the municipality, numbering 1,497. The lowest level of local government is the barangay. At 42,000, these units are the primary planning and implementing body of the government (Manasan, 1992).

Because of the huge number of actors in this complex system, studies of public policy are usually conscious of politics and the role of the socio-political environment in policymaking. According to Oorthuizen (2004), this means asking whether the policy in question has the support of politicians particularly at the local levels. Observing irrigation policy, he finds that national policies are not simply taken for granted or automatically implemented at the local level, but are subjected to political, if not violent activities. Thus, theoretical approaches used are those that have as key element the cognizance of the wider context. These include strategic management (Morton, 1996), and policy implementation models such as the ACF (Villamor, 2006) and an evolutionary variant (Santiago, 2003). By far, the most common approach is to utilize a political economy framework to study policy formulation (Araral, Jr., 2006; Gochoco-Bautista and Faustino, 1994; Oorthuizen, 2004; Teehankee, 1994). Tourism has also been subjected to this approach, through Linda Richter’s (1980, 1980a, 1982, 1989) seminal studies on the political uses of tourism, though it must be quickly added that such an approach to the analysis of Philippine tourism is more the exception rather than the rule.

Within these approaches, a major explanatory variable for the behaviour of policy actors is patron-client relations. In this perspective, the Filipino policy maker is seen as guided less by ideological considerations than by personal relationships to secure him and his
family. In addition, these relationships are viewed as more important than administrative structures to achieve goals (Oorthuizen, 2004).

Access to government is a frequent resource or mechanism used to dispense patronage. The Marcos administration, for example, used Timber License Agreements to reward friends and family for their support of the martial law administration in the 1970s and 80s. Through these Agreements, the state relaxed forest regulations that enabled the granting of vast forest concessions to private timber companies at give-away rates (Rico, 2006; Teehankee, 1994). The same is true of tourism during this period, where evidence is found in Richter’s (1980, 1980a, 1982) work. She points to the appointment of numerous casual and contractual employees within the Ministry of Tourism, bypassing rules of the civil service. In addition, Richter names members of the political elite that have economic interests in the tourism industry, who benefited from the government’s abandonment of its tourism plan to pursue luxury tourism. Not surprisingly, the list includes the Minister of Tourism himself, as well as the family of the First Lady (Wideman, 1977).

The concessions to these parties make obvious the power of elite families in policymaking, a point that is discussed in-depth later as an important factor in policy implementation. Now, what is highlighted is the observation that due to the dominance of these families, another approach to Philippine public policy analysis is to start from the view that the country is a democracy with many infirmities. Thus, it has been labelled a cacique democracy (Anderson, 1998) and an elitist democracy (de Dios, 1990; Hutchison, 2001). And because some members of the elite, particularly in the countryside, are prepared to use violence to maintain their grip on power, warlordism or petty sultanism (Sidel, 1989) have also been used to characterize the country.

From these terms, it is possible to deduce key conditions that determine the direction and pace of policymaking. A few are examined in the following sections beginning with society-level variables such as highly personalistic political system, the existence of many entry points for the lobbyists to use to influence policy, the enduring power of elite families, emerging power of civil society, through to management-level factors such as coordination and resource issues.
2.5.1.1 Political system based on personality and kinship

A common observation about the political environment of the country is its highly personalistic system. In other words, instead of relying on formal mechanisms, actors lean on personal connection to achieve goals (Manacsca, 1999). This can be illustrated by looking at the behaviour of politicians during elections. Whether it is a local or a national post, election depends on the personality of the candidate rather than the platform he/she espouses (Balisacan & Hill, 2003). Eaton (2001), citing the works of Stauffer (1975) and Wurfel (1988), observe that since candidates and incumbents can run under any party label they choose to adopt, national and sub-national party leaders control neither access to the ballot nor the subsequent behaviour of legislators in Congress. In the absence of such control, electoral success depends on establishing personal reputations and delivering particularistic benefits to local constituents. (pp. 114-115)

Hence, local politicians face some of the most particularistic incentives compared to any democratic country in the world (Carey & Shugart, 1995). To cope with the demands, these actors frequently tap into traditional solidarities and patron-client structures. Indeed, it is kinship that serves as the kernel around which politicians established alliances (Hodder, 2002). Through this clan network, leading figures can be political leaders, with power maintained by the patronage they dispense (Gutierrez et al., 1992, p. 6).

One of the benefits politicians bestow their supporters is appointment to government positions. Tourism researchers (Richter, 1980; Rieder, 1997), for example, mention nepotism and overstaffing in field offices and central agencies of the Ministry of Tourism during the Marcos period as causes of the bloated payroll. While these instances are observed in other countries too, a particular concern for the Philippines is that the issue infects the executive system so much particularly during regime changes. As Balisacan and Hill (2003) explain, "in the Philippines these changes affect the top layer of the civil service (at the level of the secretary), the next layer (undersecretary), quite often the third tier (assistant secretary), and sometimes even the fourth (at the director level)" (p. 19). This obliteration means that chances for policy consistency is very much reduced, as the change in leadership usually mean a change in direction. This is evident in the tourism sector. When a new secretary of tourism is installed, it is almost de rigueur to replace the
ongoing marketing programme with a new one, notwithstanding the huge costs involved. Thus, it was the Best of the Islands campaign under the Ramos administration in 1992-1998, Rediscovery Philippines under the Estrada administration from 1998 to 2001, and WOW Philippines under the Arroyo Administration.

2.5.1.2 Multiple windows to influence policy

That the civil service is not insulated from politics, as has been theorized and observed in the broader policy implementation literature (e.g., Dohler, 1991; Grindle, 1980; Ham & Hill, 1984), means that lobbyists do not have to rely mainly on their elected legislators to influence policy. In fact, there are quite a lot of entry points now that allow interaction between policymakers and the citizenry, ranging from formal structures of government to informal mechanisms such as public forums and task forces (UP, 1994; Wui & Lopez, 1997). The existence of these multiple windows is not unique to the country, as Grindle (1980) shows in her collection of policy implementation studies in other developing counties. What is pernicious is the sometimes bizarre nature of the mechanism used to intervene. Balisacan and Hill (2003), for example, cite the well-publicized example of former President Estrada (1998-2001), whose "midnight cabinet" of drinking friends led by Estrada himself could persuade the latter to change the decision of the "daytime cabinet." In the case of the ASEAN free trade area policy, Gochoco-Bautista and Faustino (1994) show that some business actors were able to derail the implementation of the signed policy by stopping its publication in newspapers, all of which happen to be privately-owned, thereby rendering the policy ineffective and in the meantime allowing businesses the opportunity to protect their particularistic interests.

These examples highlight the importance attached to informal structures as a policy window, not only because formal processes are slow (Brillantes, 1997). What this means, however, is that the rules of the game can be changed mid-stream and influence can be exerted until the end. Further, this implies that policy decisions can be renegotiated and reversed, depending on who wins the “war of redistribution” or the granting of concessions to monopolies and favoured status (Almonte, 1993, p. 109).
2.5.1.3 The constancy of the oligarchy

The influence of some members of the business sector brings the discussion back to the power of elite families in policy implementation. Almonte (1993) asserts that the county’s elite is one of Asia’s most powerful oligarchy, with land, wealth, and political power concentrated in the hands of relatively few families. What has made them so powerful? In the first place, the family in the Philippines is seen as much a political institution as a social one (Hodder, 2002, p. 54). Thus, the political system is argued to be based on families or clans (Gutierrez et al., 1992; McCoy, 2009). This applies particularly to the elite. With histories longer than the development of the Philippine state (refer to Coronel, 2004; McCoy, 2009; and Simbulan, 2005, for illuminating discussions on the history of these families), their interests are deeply entrenched.

Establishing themselves economically during the Spanish period and gaining political power during the American colonial era, the caciques reached the height of their power in 1954 to 1972, when they had full access to the state's financial instrumentalities, and were able to manipulate exchange rates, obtain monopolistic licenses and huge low-interest business loans (Anderson, 1988). Shortly sidelined during the presidency of Marcos (1965-1986), who promised to save the country from the old oligarchy -- but established cronies himself -- they regained political power during the Aquino regime (de Dios, 1990).

This power is expressed by demanding particularistic benefits for their businesses that skew policy outcomes in their favour. Hutchcroft (1998) has called this booty capitalism. This means that the elite, “be they traditional or new, sought to accumulate wealth in a manner which tended to be unproductive as it did not increase output and relied on rent-seeking via access to the state apparatus” (Gochoco-Baustista & Faustino, 1994, p. 23). Notwithstanding their particularistic interests, de Dios (1990, p. 140) suggests that there is common ground among them to call for policies that increase public expenditure; protect against imports of final goods; sustain a stable, if not overvalued currency, and resist moves to distribute wealth.

In the tourism sector at the national level, their influence was keenly felt during the martial law period. At that time, government promoted luxury tourism and to support
infrastructure development, massive resources were tied to hotel financing (Richter, 1980). The holdings of the First Lady’s family included top luxury hotels, some of which were constructed without going through the normal government planning process (Wideman, 1977). The Secretary of Tourism himself owned several seedy motels while close appointees to political, diplomatic, and academic posts possessed hotels and related establishments (Richter, 1989; Wideman, 1997).

The power of elite families to affect policymaking is not limited to the national scene, as it is equally strong in remote cities and the countryside. Away from the capital city spotlight, they lord it over through a complex network of patronage that combines socioeconomic benefits for the rural poor with the threat and/or actual use of violence (Borras, 2001). The result is not much different from the national situation: the non-implementation of public policy or its execution but based on the particularistic interests of those who can wield power. This is amply illustrated by the experiences of tourism destinations around the country. In Boracay, elected councillors were slow to design and implement enabling local legislations because some of them owned resorts that violate national environmental regulations such as height restrictions and setback rules (Achacoso-Sevilla, 2003). In Bohol, a local mayor ran a resort that was investigated for violating environmental standards (Chiu, 2006). In Cebu, only four out of fifty-four coastal resorts and hotels had completed the EIA and been granted the ECC, even if securing environmental clearance was required in environmentally critical areas such as coastal regions teeming with coral reefs (Huttche et al., 2002).

2.5.1.4 Emerging strength of civil society organizations

An actor responsible for exposing many of these anomalies is the NGO, often in partnership with the vibrant media. In recent years, their size, reach, capacity, and influence have grown to effect meaningful changes in the policymaking structure.

Their roots can be traced to liberalist ideas from Europe in the 1850’s that eventually led to the formation of charitable institutions and labour unions in Spanish Philippines (Buendia, 2005; Songco, 2003). However, it was only in the 1960s when a critical mass was formed. Magadia (1999) suggests that there are principally four factors responsible for this growth: changes in the Catholic Church from pressures inspired by liberation
theology, emergence of community organizing as a key strategy for demand making, the rise of student activism, and the formation of the Maoist brand of Marxism. These factors combined with the inherently weak political party system, and the low quality of government intervention in the economy (Clarke, 1994, p. 397). The fight in the 1970s and 80s to restore civil liberties and obtain a more equitable distribution of resources further fuelled the growth of civil society organizations (Silliman & Noble, 1998). More recently, civil society formation has been driven by a freer policy environment, increasing awareness for partnerships among policy actors, and a willingness to participate in political activities such as directly contesting electoral seats in Congress.

Records from the Securities and Exchange Commission provide an indication of the size of civil society organizations. From its archives, Silliman and Noble (1998), quoting Clarke (1994), found 58,000 NGOs as of June 1993. By 2008, an additional 50,000 have registered based on official statistics.

This group does not come in a single stripe. Rather, a high degree of heterogeneity and a wide range of strategic orientation characterize the sector. Brillantes (1998), for example, categorizes them into resource agencies and implementing institutions. Silliman and Noble (1998) cluster them into three levels, namely, POs or grassroots organizations, NGOs, and NGO networks or coalitions. Constantino-David (1998) ventures a typology that distinguishes membership-based organizations from institutions that provide funding; engage in development, justice and advocacy work; and those that make a mockery of the NGO concept by, for instance, being government-run and initiated or being business-oriented. In addition, she delineates the political orientation of each organization, a task that Buendia (2005) also does by conceptualizing a map of political alignments among POs.

The strategy of entering into political alliances among civil society organizations was of recent vintage, motivated mainly by the objective of deposing the Marcos dictatorship. This happened in the early ‘80s when a movement for democracy that galvanized organizations of various ideologies, sometimes conflicting, crystallized and engaged the dictatorship in daily protests (Magadia, 2003). It even co-opted a nascent environmental movement that was born in the late 1970s from increasing accounts of environmental
abuse perpetrated by those close to the powers that be, and from a greater concern for equity and rational distribution of resources (Magno, 1993; Ragarrio, 1993; Rood, 1998; Vitug, 1993). History proved them triumphant, with Marcos driven from office via a people power revolution in 1986, and installing Corazon Aquino as president.

Mindful of the huge role of civil society in her ascent to power, Aquino made people’s participation a central tenet of her administration (Brillantes, 1998). Not only did she incorporate the principle in the 1987 constitution but also put flesh into it by enacting relevant legislations, and appointing prominent civil society leaders to the Cabinet, including the tourism department. These practices were continued by her successor in 1992, Fidel Ramos, thus deepening the participation of civil society in governance (Clarke, 1998; Magadia, 1999).

The impacts to policymaking of these developments have been dramatic. First, the executive department and the elite-dominated policymaking bodies found themselves having to contend with a very active civil society in crafting laws, as demonstrated in case studies of legislations on generics drugs (Yadao-Guno, 1991), protected areas (Villamor, 2006), indigenous peoples’ rights (Rico, 2007), and in other policy sectors (UP, 1994; Wui & Lopez, 1997). In other words, policymaking was enlarged to include a hitherto ignored sector. Second, civil society organizations and their leaders in power provided a counterpoint, though not a counterweight, to the views of the old oligarchy that were resurrected with the restoration of democracy in 1986 (de Dios, 1990; UP, 1994). Thus, they were able to push for policies and programmes that addressed equity and resource issues. These include an overt response to pressing environmental concerns such as biodiversity conservation and wildlife protection (Balangue, 2005; Gozun, 2004; Ramos, 1998; Villamor, 2006) and laws that deepened further the democratization process (Wui & Lopez, 1997). In the tourism sector, this can be seen in the ecotourism programmes pioneered by NGOs that not only increased the diversity of tourism products but also provided an alternative to the luxury programme in place (Arcilla, 1999; Gatbonton, 1999; Pajaro, 1997; Yaptinchay, 1999). Their influence is also evident in the membership of these organizations to executive bodies such as in national ecotourism councils, committees, task forces, and presidential commissions (DOT et al., 2002; Gabor, 1998).
2.5.1.5 Weakness of the state in policymaking

The relative strength of civil society and its organized groups, as well as the tenacity of elite families, all reflect the weak capacity of the Philippine state to pursue public policy independent of pressure groups. The high level of political patronage and rent seeking discussed above shows how the personal interests and official duties of the decision makers converge. This contrasts with the observed strong institutional autonomy of developmental states where there is a clear distinction between the interests of state institutions and the private concerns of individuals (Hutchison, 2001). Almonte (1993) agrees, noting that “Everywhere else in the [Asian] region, traditional elites have been weakened...in relation to the state when the drive for development began. The Philippines is the only exception” (p. 112).

Indeed, at various levels, the state is subjected to the rent-seeking behaviour of opportunistic politicians and the oligarchy, yet, is unable to assert itself strongly. The result, it should be apparent from the above examples, is that the policymaking process is constantly hindered. Furthermore, it leads to a distressing view of public policy processes. The University of the Philippines (1994) summarizes the key ones, as follows: (1) the general use of policy merely as an instrument to respond to immediate or imminent problems, rather than as means to initiate long-running and wide-ranging reforms; (2) the difficulty of institutionalizing policy responses which renders them vulnerable to later interference and even reversal; and (3) the formulation and creation of ambivalent and often intractable policy directions and agencies, respectively, to address the policy issues (UP, 1994, pp. 1-2).

The origins of this weakness has been traced to as far back as the Spanish conversion and governance practices (Amoroso & Abinales, 2005), the elite nature of early democracy in the country, as well as the state’s historically minimal role in the economy (Anderson, 1988). Nevertheless, the state remains an important player because access to it remains a significant lever to amass wealth as far as elite families are concerned (Gochoco-Bautista & Faustino, 1994), and, as for civil society, a means through which more equitable policies and outcomes can be achieved.
It should be noted, however, that except for Richter’s (1980; 1980a; 1982; 1989) work on the political economy of tourism in the Philippines in the 1980s that discussed some of these structural patterns, particularly the personalistic nature of policymaking, the convergence of personal interests and official duties, and the influence of elite families, no other researcher has discussed these elements in studies of Philippine tourism policy. Rather, items that are commonly examined mirror those in the wider tourism literature. That is, the loci of analysis are not broad structural issues but ‘smaller’ management issues such as coordination and the question of resources (e.g., Cruz, 2005; Libosada, 1997; Rodolfo, 2005).

This could be attributed to a few reasons. First is that Philippine tourism policymaking, reflecting the wider tourism literature, has not been given the academic attention it deserves. Indeed, studies of Philippine tourism policy, let alone policy implementation, are so scant. And whenever aspects of tourism policy is discussed, it is in the context of examining other aspects of tourism such as tourism development and planning (Achacoso-Sevilla, 2003; Richter, 1982; Rieder, 1997; Trousdale, 1999), impacts (Arroyo & San Buenaventura, 1983; Navarrete, 1974; UP-AIT, 1981), or sustainability and the challenges it pose (Alampay, 2005; Cruz, 2005; Rodolfo, 2005), and not for the sake of investigating tourism policy formulation and implementation itself. In addition, the few studies that have touched on tourism policy are geared towards describing what has happened rather than examining the underlying forces that shaped those policies (e.g., Rieder, 1997; Rodolfo, 2005), akin to what has been observed elsewhere by Pearce (2001).

Moreover, the analytic frameworks used to look into the public policy issues of tourism are quite narrow, if not atheoretic. For example, Cruz (2005) basically used an institutional approach to compare the extent to which ASEAN NTOs have integrated sustainable tourism indicators in their operations. Rieder (1997), in evaluating the performance of the tourism sector during the post-Marcos period, used stylized tourism indicators, after tracing the historical development of the sector. Rodolfo (2005) adopted an eclectic approach when she compared the tourism policy frameworks of the Philippines with Thailand. She combined geographic concepts such as Defert index and product life cycle with governance concepts to suggest that public policy should be
employed to create a more favourable macro-environment for tourism to grow sustainably. An exception, as noted above, is Richter (1980a, 1982) who used a political economy approach, particularly centred on the internal and external policy, and internal and external economy, of the Ministry of Tourism. She likewise employed a multiple level of analysis, adroitly integrating the micro-level perspectives of key informants with her analysis of the macro-environment.

In short, most studies of tourism policy are largely confined to a single plane of analysis particularly limited to the macro-level. The result, obviously, is a failure to capture the complexity of the policymaking process and the exclusion of critical variables found in the meso- and micro-levels. These studies, nonetheless, are useful as they provide insights into operational and management issues that confront tourism policy implementation. These issues are illuminated in the discussion below.

2.5.1.6 Lack of resources for tourism development

There used to be a time in the development of Philippine tourism when access to resources was not a question. Back in the martial law days in the 1970s and 80s, tourism was a top government priority, and thus received a lot of support. There are multiple reasons for this, as explained fully in Chapter Four. Here, the most obvious is stated: the use of tourism for political purposes (Richter, 1980, 1980a, 1982, 1989). At that time, it was estimated that government’s financial exposure to the industry was 30 to 40 times its expenditure in public housing, with lots of the money poured into massive edifices such as luxury hotels, presidential guesthouses, meeting and cultural facilities (Richter, 1980, Wideman, 1977).

However, with the change in governing structure in 1986 when the dictator was deposed from power, the fortunes of the tourism sector changed. The powers of DOT were clipped particularly after the enactment of the Local Government Code in 1991 (Gabor, 1998). Now, contemporary observers (e.g., Achacoso-Sevilla, 2003; Palabyab, 2004; Rodolfo, 2005) lament the general benign neglect of the tourism sector.

The low priority can be observed at many levels. At the national level, the sector consistently loses out to other government departments in terms of funding. Rodolfo
(2005) states that “Tourism is not given priority status in the national agenda or in the allocation of budgets thereby leading to limited support from other government agencies related to infrastructure development, particularly road, airport, and seaport development” (p. 17). Gabor (1998) bewails that even internally generated funds such as duty free shop earnings, hotel room tax, and travel tax are diverted to other concerns such as education and health. That is why, she insists, DOT itself is not “really self-sufficient in fully funding its programmes and projects” (Gabor, 1998, p. 665). In addition, law enforcement agencies such as the national police and the Navy, which are supposed to assist with state policy implementation, are severely under-resourced (DocNGG1; “No firepower,” 2009, p.6).

At the local level, the shortage of resources can be seen in the lack of manpower and consequently the ineffectivity of the local government in carrying out its tourism duties. Rodolfo (2005), for example, finds that a number of local government units do not have tourism officers to look after basic tourism data collection. As a result, some establishments, even when required to do so, are unable to or do not submit reports that leads to up to five-months lag before official statistics about the performance of the sector come out. Libosada (1998), discussing ecotourism, points to a lack of local planners “‘who understand the characteristics of sound tourism planning based on environmental concerns’” (p. 50). It has been suggested that this state of affairs prevails because, in the first place, the resources made available to local governments after decentralization in 1991 was inadequate (Manasan, 2007).

2.5.1.7 Coordination issues

Compounding the lack of resources is the inadequacy of coordination among policy actors. Indeed, the problem is common, prevalent as it is in a range of policy areas, for example, in land administration (Habito, 2009), infrastructure development (Hill et al., 2007), management of historical site (Santiago, 2003), and tourism (Achacoso-Sevilla, 2003). Hill et al. (2007), explaining why infrastructure in general is not well-developed, mention that there is a lack of cohesion, coordination, and clear division of responsibilities among the 30 national agencies involved in infrastructure decision-making. That is why, they argue, there are many half-finished bridges in the countryside.
Even within the capital city where agencies are physically closer, lack of coordination is a problem. Santiago (2003), examining the implementation of plans to restore the historic Intramuros district, notes that mis-understanding and absence of cross-validation by officials resulted to buildings being constructed that conspicuously violated regulations. The only positive aspect, according to Santiago, is that it prompted authorities to heed calls for the establishment of an entity with sole jurisdiction and sweeping powers over the district.

Such a radical move has not happened to tourism, however. True, there have been moves in the past to improve coordination amongst government agencies, the private sector, and NGOs in promoting tourism development particularly during the time of President Ramos (Gabor, 1998). This is most evident in ecotourism where inter-organizational arrangements have been made clear (DOT et al., 2002; c.f., Libosada, 1998). Nevertheless, serious issues in general remain, particularly because government departments are organized along sectoral lines (Habito, 2009). It is even argued that a deficiency in inter-organizational coordination is more to blame, rather than lack of funds, for the perception that the government does not give priority to tourism (Achacoso-Sevilla, 2003).

The issue is highlighted by briefly discussing infrastructure support for tourism. Whilst tourism plans identify the construction of roads and airports set aside for tourism development, the caveat is that the primary responsibility for these projects does not lie with the tourism department but with other government agencies such as Department of Public Works and Highways, and the Department of Transportation and Communication, respectively, to whom tourism is just among many spending options. Thus, unless these two agencies, along with rest of the 30 infrastructure decision-making bodies (Hill et al., 2007), as well as the private sector, are influenced into supporting tourism through budget allocations and inter-agency approaches, then tourism development based on efficient infrastructure would always remain a pipe dream.

2.5.1.8 Low or poor understanding of tourism

At the bottom of the lack of inter-organizational coordination and resources devoted to tourism is a generally low knowledge or poor understanding by decision-makers of what
tourism is (Cruz, 2005; Buensuceso, 1999; Libosada, 1998). Owing perhaps to its short history, having been systematically developed in the country starting only in the 1970s, and its conceptually heterogeneous and complex nature (Tremblay, 1998), policy-makers particularly at the local level approach tourism haphazardly, sometimes with destructive consequences.

Early on, Viray (1995) asked if local governments were ready for tourism, much less the sustainable kind, given the numerous issues they have had to address to maximize benefits without suffering the negative consequences. Buensuceso (1999) was not so sanguine. Comparing the conceptual understanding of ecotourism of officials between local and national government, she noted that “Our people at the national level are way ahead...[however] when you go down to the regional level, its chaos” (p. 118). This knowledge gap in turn leads to questionable programmes, leaving national officials toting master plans with narrower development options for the locality. In an exchange with participants during a conference-workshop, she explained how this happens:

If it means development, they [local government] will simply allocate the meagre budgets that go to regional, provincial and even municipal levels to go and showcase an ecotour destination, put in a lowly-budgeted toilet right in the centre of protected area, allocating funds thereof and then call it a destination...These are simple things but a lot of local governments from barangays up, allocate money every year in the name of tourism and infrastructure development...By the time the people in the national level implement their master plan, which looks very good in the document, you're all mitigating because its all developed already. (Buensuceso, 1999, p.118)

Cruz (2005) validates these observations. Writing about sustainable tourism, he states that “Local authorities, by sheer ignorance of sustainable development principles, do not even enact ordinances or laws that will serve as framework for development and enforcement" (p. 107). The experience of Boracay Island also attests to this. Here, local authorities were found by Trousdale (1999) to be slow to translate national laws into local ordinances, though he attributed this attitude not just to lack of knowledge but also to the need to protect their personal interests. Clearly, these instances point to a delicate situation and one that if not addressed is bound to affect the tourism sector for a long time to come.
2.6 Summary of literature reviewed

Policy implementation has developed in stages. The so-called first generation of implementation research, as exemplified by studies conducted by Derthick (1972), Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), and Bardach (1977), focused on detailed accounts of how decisions were carried out and the measurement of policy implementation. They saw implementation success or failure as a function of flawed legislation and the inability of the bureaucracy to comply (Schofield, 2001). The second-generation was directed towards the identification of key variables that could be manipulated in order to influence the policy implementation process. Representative works of this generation include Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Lipsky and Wetherly (1978), Edwards (1980), and Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983). The third-generation, according to Goggin et al. (1990), aimed to be more scientific than previous generations. These works, embodied by Sabatier (1986), Goggin et al. (1990), Ingram (1990) and Matland (1995), were concerned with theory construction and therefore characterized by testable hypotheses.

Discussions in the literature have further divided this body of work into three distinct theoretical approaches to policy implementation. The first, the top down approach, is concerned with finding solutions to the problem of perfect implementation. It assumes that the presence of authoritative, centrally located personalities who specify in clear terms policy goals, then put control mechanism in place, are sufficient to ensure policy success (Parsons, 1995). The second, the bottom-up approach, argues the importance of street-level bureaucrats instead. Thus, the emphasis is on the behaviour of implementers closest to the problem (Linder & Peters, 1987). The third approach, which can be called hybrid theories, takes the best from the top-down and bottom-up approaches. They are seen as ways to adapt to the complexity of implementation contexts (Matland, 1995).

The emphasis of bottom-up researchers to street-level bureaucrats and personalities close to them in delivering services necessitated the use of network approaches in the study of policy implementation. In assessing public policy networks, researchers have relied on two vectors. The first is from the policy network tradition that emphasises cultural dimensions, which is qualitative, and full of thick descriptions (Atkinson & Coleman, 1989; Rhodes, 1988; Van Waarden, 1992). The second is from social network analysis.
that draws from the mathematics of graph theory (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). A key issue of recent debates is which vector is acceptable and most useful in explaining policy outcomes. On the one hand, there is a belief that policy networks are merely useful heuristics (Dowding, 1995, 2001) and lack theoretical scaffold (Carlsson, 2000). On the other hand, it is argued that the metaphor policy network explains policy outcomes (Marsh, 1998; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Marsh & Smith, 2000).

This belief in networks, in turn, has led to its conceptualization as an important component of policy learning mechanisms. The processes of policy learning and the role of knowledge have emerged as a key theme in policy implementation research (Schofield, 2004). As a concept in policymaking, learning or policy-oriented learning (Sabatier, 1993), arose as a reaction to models of policy stages or policy cycles (Grin & Loeber, 2007). The literature has developed along two analytical lines. The first is exogenous learning, such as social learning (Hall, 1993), where the subject of learning is the policy universe. The second is endogenous learning such as lesson-drawing (Rose, 1991). Here, learning is viewed as taking place within the government policy community, utilizing normal policymaking. Recent theoretical and empirical works on policy learning and implementation have sought to address the issue of individual learning and autonomy within networks (Dudley, 2007), and learning by implementers as they translate policy into action (Schofield, 2004).

Nonetheless, in spite of over 30 years of policy implementation research, the black box of policymaking remains fuzzy (Cairney, 2007; Kim & Roh, 2008). As Pulzl and Treib (2007, p. 103) note, “We know little about which of these factors [from theoretical models] are more or less important under which kind of background conditions.”

These observations of knowledge gaps are reflected most seriously in tourism policy implementation. Here the literature on tourism policy is sparse and studies of tourism policy implementation even less (Dodds, 2007b; Hall, 2008). Implementation is examined not on its own or together with other topics, and studies that have touched on it seem to have a penchant for identifying barriers to policy execution (Berry & Ladkin, 1997; Dodds, 2007a, 2007b; Dodds & Butler, 2009; Ioannides, 1995). Thus, there is an acute lack of in-depth studies on tourism policy in general and implementation in particular.
Indeed, the call by Hall and Jenkins made in 1995 still rings true today: there is a need for research that “does more than describe inputs and outputs of tourism policymaking” (p. 94).

The situation in the Philippines is no different from those observed in the tourism literature, that is, research on tourism policy is underdeveloped. Except for a few outstanding works on the political economy of tourism development in the 1980s (Richter, 1980; 1980a; 1982; 1989), research on tourism policy does not investigate the underlying forces that shaped those policies. Instead of discussing structural patterns, the focus has been the examination of management and operational issues (Achacoso-Sevilla, 2003; Cruz, 2005; Gabor, 1998; Libosada, 1998; Rodolfo, 2005). Proceeding from a single plane of analysis, this body of research suggests that the implementation of tourism policy is severely constrained by the lack of resources, inadequate coordination amongst policy actors, and the generally low or poor understanding by decision-makers of what tourism is. Thus, the literature fails to capture the complexity of the Philippine policymaking process and excludes critical variables found in the meso- and micro-levels of analysis.

The narrow discussion of the Philippine tourism policy literature on management issues, and the focus on barriers to implementation by the wider literature, seem to be the result of the analytical framework used in the research. Models frequently employed focus mainly on a single plane of analysis, seen to provide only a partial account (Kim & Roh, 2008). In addition, with very few exceptions, the tourism policy implementation literature does not acknowledge research in the wider policy implementation field, which have provided a huge variety of explanatory variables. In other words, existing frameworks utilized in much of tourism policy research do not satisfactorily capture the complexity of the policymaking process. Thus, a theoretical framework that discusses a wide variety of variables and presents them in multiple levels would contribute much to illuminate dark corners of the policy process. Such a framework is discussed below.

2.7 Theoretical framework of the thesis

There are specific criteria to be met in selecting a theoretical framework in order to study the policy process. Sabatier (1999) has discussed some of the considerations and
suggested that frameworks should meet the following: (1) they must have concepts and propositions that are relatively clear and internally consistent, be able to identify clear causal drivers, must give rise to falsifiable hypotheses, and must be fairly broad in scope in order to be applicable in different political systems; (2) the framework must be the subject of a fair amount of recent conceptual development and/or empirical testing. In other words, Sabatier explains that scholars view it as a viable approach to inform their own studies of the policy process; (3) the framework must be a positive theory seeking to explain much of the policy process; (4) the framework must address the broad set of factors that political scientists looking at different aspects of public policymaking have traditionally deemed important: conflicting values and interests, information flows, institutional arrangements, and variation in the socioeconomic environment (p. 8).

From these criteria, Sabatier (1999) identified seven frameworks that pass: stages heuristics, institutional rational choice, multiple-streams framework, punctuated-equilibrium, advocacy coalition framework (ACF), policy diffusion, funnel of causality and other frameworks in large-N comparative studies. Of these frameworks, Real-Dato (2009) suggests that three frameworks have dominated debate, namely ACF, punctuated equilibrium, and multiple streams. In particular, ACF is noted to have marked a ‘punctuation’ in thinking about public policy (John, 2003), attracting commentary and inviting the attention of scholars that has led to its application in more than 100 case studies in different contexts (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).

### 2.7.1 The applicability of the advocacy coalition framework

The objective of the thesis is to examine the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation in the Philippines from 1973 to 2009. To meet this objective, the following steps are pursued. First is a description and analysis of what policy implementation comprised in terms of policies and programmes. Second is an examination of how the implementation process has taken place through a focus on the interaction of key actors, their strategies and use of resources, as well as their perceptions and values. Third is an attempt at explaining why the implementation process has taken place the way it did by deducing key longer-term historical factors as well as contextual conditions from the analysis and exploring their inter-relationship.
It is argued that these activities are optimally met by the use of the advocacy coalition framework. The employment of ACF is justified by its intrinsic features and its suitability to the tourism context. Foremost is that it meets the criteria set by Sabatier (1999). As John (2003) emphasises, ACF as a positive theory neatly brings together the five causal processes deemed important by political scientists in any explanation of the policy process (institutions, networks, socioeconomic process, choices, and ideas). Its integration of learning in policy mechanisms not only is recognition of the cognitive factors in policymaking (Fenger & Klok, 2001) but likewise provides a basis to understand the dialectics of policymaking (John, 2003).

In this sense, ACF incorporates the best features of both top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation (Sabatier, 1986). For instance, there is clear recognition in ACF of top-down concerns such as having socio-economic factors and other macro-level variables as key explanations of policy change, and having a clear theory behind specific government programmes. Methodologically, this allows the researcher “to look at longer term factors that created the historical setting in which policy change could occur" (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996, p. 425). And because ACF begins with a policy problem or subsystem and not a specific legislative act, then, follows this up with a discussion of strategies employed by coalitions to improve their positions, it acknowledges a principal feature of bottom-up approaches, that is, the use of a networking strategy (Sabatier, 1986).

ACF takes an expansive view of policy subsystems. According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999), membership in advocacy coalitions is not limited to policy elites but must include actors, be they journalists, analysts, academics, private organizations, etc. from various levels of government and society who have roles to play in policy formulation and implementation. In addition, there are potential or latent actors (Balbus, 1971) who could join the coalitions if they had information (Sabatier, 1986). This feature fits well with the nature of tourism, as having an open system captures the diversity of public and private organizations involved in the sector (Edgell, 1990; Tremblay, 1998).

This liberal interpretation of policy subsystems extends to the time dimension to analyse the policy process. In ACF, a time perspective of a decade or more is deemed necessary.
Thus, a researcher is able to study subsystem dynamics through at least one formulation/implementation/reformulation cycle (Ellison, 1998). There is also a benchmark, policy change, through which the effects of external events, learning and other causal drivers can be understood through time. Hence, using ACF closes the gap between policy formulation and implementation (Sabatier, 1986).

2.7.2 Complementary role of policy networks

As suitable as ACF is in explaining the policy process, it has limitations in terms of explaining some group mechanisms (Schlager, 1995, 1999). Thus, the use of policy networks to supplement ACF is proposed. On its own, policy networks are applicable to a study of tourism policy and in fact has been used a number of times. As section 2.4.3.1 above explains, the approach enables the analysis of relational ties, interdependences, and information flows among organizations that comprise the tourism system. It likewise takes cognizance of the social context within which tourism policies are formulated and made (Stevenson et al., 2008). Hence, the network approach is an appropriate complement to ACF.

Researchers have noted the complementarity of the two approaches, particularly in shedding light on subsystem dimensions (Dolan, 2003; Elliott & Schlaepfer, 2001; Hsu, 2005; Kim & Roh, 2008; Smith, 2000). In the first place, ACF directly incorporates the concept of policy networks through the advocacy coalitions (Kim & Roh, 2008). Elliott and Schlaepfer (2001) suggest that policy network typologies such as those by Van Waarden (1992) support ACF because it allows *ex ante* analysis of actor behaviour. Fenger and Klokh (2001) believe that network theory might provide insights regarding the role of resources in ACF, while Bennett and Howlett (1992) suggest that power dependence can be elucidated. Theoretically, using both approaches is seen as an important step towards merging the rich policy networks literature, criticized for lacking a theoretical scaffold (Carlsson, 2000), into an established theory of the policy process (Weible, 2005). Works that have featured the two are emergent, with empirical investigations on their complementarily having been explored by Smith (2000) in a study on the implementation of industrial policy in the UK, Dolan (2003) on the workings of the US National Economic Council, Weible (2005) and Weible and Sabatier (2005) on
California’s marine protected area policy. Kim and Roh (2008) present theoretical work on the incorporation of policy networks within ACF. Figure 2-4 below, based on a re-interpretation of their analysis and of the literature, shows how ACF is inter-linked with policy networks.

**Figure 2.4: ACF and policy networks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of analysis</th>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>ACF elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macro</td>
<td>Institutional settings</td>
<td>Stable system parameters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State-civil society relations</td>
<td>Events external to the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meso</td>
<td>Policy networks</td>
<td>Advocacy coalitions or Policy sub-system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro</td>
<td>Policy actors</td>
<td>Policy learning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Kim & Roh (2008)

The figure shows that examining stable system parameters and events external to the system correspond to the macro-level of analysis. At this level, broad socio-economic changes, dynamics of state-civil society relations, and other society-level aggregates are discussed. An analysis at the meso-level of advocacy coalitions, whose members come from all levels (Sabatier, 1999) is seen as being enriched by the techniques of policy network analysis. Policy learning by individual actors and institutions is viewed to happen at the micro- and macro-levels, respectively. It is argued that policy networks mediate the process of learning.

Within the tourism context, the use of both ACF and policy networks as proposed in this study can be seen as part of the growing body of tourism policy research that employs multiple perspectives. For example, Stevenson et al. (2008) utilized network theory,
stakeholder theory, and grounded theory to analyse how policy makers view tourism in relation to other policy issues. Bramwell and Meyer (2007) used the dialectical approach to policy networks, integrating a social constructionist analysis with a political economy approach. Pforr (2006) combined the techniques of social network analysis with stages heuristics to show how state and non-state actors influence policymaking processes and outputs. Following these leads, the next chapter on research methods discusses how this thesis intends to integrate network analysis with the advocacy coalition framework together with other levels of analysis.
Chapter 3 : Methods

3.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the research strategies that the researcher has adopted in order to meet the research objective of explaining the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation in the Philippines from 1973 to 2009. It details the utility of the case study method in pursuing an in-depth study of the policy process. As such, it explains the conditions under which the approach is best used, and the advantages it affords the researcher particularly the specificity of information it is able to draw out to elucidate causal arguments. It claims that the Philippines, as a result of its history and contemporary state of affairs, is imbued with features that make it a critical case for policy process research in general, and in tourism policy implementation within the context of developing countries in particular. The chapter argues for the methodological necessity of engaging in multiple levels of analysis, hitherto undervalued in the literature, in order to capture the complexity of the policy process. Related to this is a discussion how these multiple levels are integrated by policy process theories and theories of the state. It also presents the key processes involved in generating the information required such as archival records, interviews and observation. Methods employed to analyse the data are explained, emphasising the simultaneity and iterative nature of the procedures. Finally, the chapter reflects on key ethical issues faced by the researcher undertaking research in a community with a conflicted contemporary history.

3.2 Case study
In order to investigate the process of change and its implications to implementation of tourism policy more deeply, a case study was undertaken. The case study is somewhat multi-faceted. Some researchers view it as comprehensive research strategy (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Yin, 1984), a methodological approach (Berg, 2001; Creswell, 2007), or a choice within a bounded system (Stake, 1995). Creswell (2007) defines it as an approach where the researcher “explores a bounded system or multiple bounded systems over time, through detailed in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information...and reports a case description and case-based themes” (p. 73). An important feature of the case study, according to Stake (1995), is that it explains aspects of a broader
phenomenon. To do this, it depends on co-variational evidence, that is “X must used be connected with Y in a plausible fashion” such as in non-case study research (Gerring, 2004, p. 348).

Case studies have long been employed as a research strategy (Creswell, 2007). Within the tourism research context, case studies on tourism development abound to the extent that there are complaints “a cumulative corpus of knowledge” is lacking (Dann, 2001, p. 14). However, case studies are very important. Hall and Jenkins (1995) suggest that the study of tourism public policy would be enriched if a case study approach were adopted. Indeed, recent works on tourism public policymaking (e.g., Dodds, 2007a, 2007b; Dredge, 2006; Pforr, 2005, 2006; Stevenson et al., 2008) have used the case study approach, in a testament to its advantages as a method and research strategy.

According to Yin (1984, p. 16), three conditions dictate whether a case study is appropriate as a research strategy: (1) type of question being asked, (2) the investigator's degree of control over actual behavioural events, (3) extent of focus on contemporary situations versus historical events. In terms of research question, Yin asserts that 'how' and 'why' questions, being more explanatory in nature and concerned with chain of events that happen over time, are best addressed using case studies, histories, and experiments. 'Who' and 'where' questions, which are more focused on prevalence and incidence can be dealt with more favourably by survey strategies or the analysis of archival records (refer to Table 3-1).
Table 3.1: Relevant situations for different research strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Form of research question</th>
<th>Requires control over behavioural events?</th>
<th>Focuses on contemporary events?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td>How, why</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Who, what,* where How many How much</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archival analysis</td>
<td>Who, what,* where How many How much</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes/ no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>How, why</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case study</td>
<td>How, why</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 'what ' questions, when asked as part of an exploratory study, pertain to all five strategies. From R.K.Yin, 1984, p. 17.

Despite its wide use, the case study approach has not escaped criticism. Flyvbjerg (2006) summarizes misconceptions about the research strategy, indicating that the issues pertain to the status of the case study as a method of scientific inquiry. Denscombe (2003) states that the method suffers from perceptions that it lacks rigour expected of good-quality research; and the limits or boundaries of the case can be nebulous, making it difficult to determine what data to gather. As the procedure frequently involves interviewing participants, Denscombe observes that success of a research project depend greatly on the access or permissions given the investigator. The corollary to this is the charge that the observer of the phenomenon may affect case study results, that is, the subjective decisions of the investigator during the research process may affect the overall objectivity of the results (Berg, 2001). The approach has also been derided for providing “little basis for scientific generalization” (Yin, 1984, p. 21), a charge that Yin (1984) takes pains to disprove. He explains that “case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes” (p. 21). Therefore, the case study may not represent a sample in the statistical sense but still allow the researcher to make analytic generalizations. Another complaint is that case studies, given their depth, take too long to produce, and often results in thick, 'unreadable documents.' To Flyvbjerg (2006), this is not a problem at all; rather, he asserts that thick narratives reflect that a “rich problematic” (p. 237) has been found. He is against summarizing case studies either,
just to meet criticism. As he argues, quoting Nietzsche (1974, pp. 335, 373), “one should not wish to divest existence of its rich ambiguity” (as cited in Flyvberg, 2006, p. 237). He goes on to suggest executing more case studies, emphasizing that a discipline without carefully laid case studies is a discipline without models or exemplars, thus, ineffective.

For indeed, the case study confers advantages to the researcher. In general, it is the depth of analysis, rich and detailed information gathered in a case study that makes it very useful (Berg, 2001). Depth may also refer to the degree of variance captured by an explanation (Gerring, 2004). This analysis within bounded system then produces context-dependent knowledge that, Flyvberg (2006) argues, allows beginners to become experts. Case studies are particularly strong when the objective of the research is to make descriptive inferences, that is, compare or contrast a unit under study with similar units (Gerring, 2004). Furthermore, case studies are practical tools to explain causal arguments. As Gerring argues, well-constructed case studies allow a researcher to look into a “box of causality to the intermediate causes lying between some cause and its purported effect” (p. 348). In particular, he suggests that causal mechanisms can be uncovered through case studies through its in-depth treatment of process tracing and investigation of actor motivation. Moreover, the approach is ideal in falsifying theoretical propositions. It is argued that if just one case study did not fit the causal proposition, that would be enough grounds to disprove it (Dion, 1998; Flyvbjerg, 2006).

In tourism policymaking studies, researchers highlight the scope and specificity of information that case studies are able to draw out. Stevenson et al. (2008) argue that case studies can deal with the “irrational and less tangible aspects of policymaking...and draw attention to the power inequalities that are embedded in society.” (p. 734). The approach, judging from the work of tourism policy researchers, allows the pinpointing of contextual factors and relationships that condition tourism policy processes. The approach stresses, among other things, the extent to which ideas work their way through networks of organizations (Fadeeva, 2004; Saxena, 2005), shows the relative power of individual actors and organizations (Bramwell & Meyer, 2007; Dredge, 2006b; Pforr, 2006), identifies barriers to effective policy implementation (Dodds, 2007a, 2007b) and the dialectical inter-relationship between sub-system groups and broader societal trends and variables (Bramwell & Meyer, 2007).
3.3 Selection of case for study

Having made a case for a case study, this section outlines the basis for selecting the study site: the Philippines. The suitability of a case study site is justified on theoretical and practical grounds. According to Yin (1984), single case studies are useful when they are considered as being a critical case, extreme or unique case, or a revelatory case. A critical case has strategic importance to a particular issue or problem. If conditions for testing or challenging the theory are present, the case study permits logical deduction of the sort “If this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 230). Thus, through a process called pattern matching, a single unit case study is sufficient to evaluate the causal implications of a theory, and provide evidence for theoretical positions (Gerring, 2004).

In the case of the Philippines, there are certain features in its recent history and contemporary state of affairs to suggest that it is a critical case in policy process research in general, and in tourism policy implementation within the context of developing countries in particular. As discussed at length in Chapters Four and Seven, the country has had, since the 1970s, an active tourism programme whose orientation, substance and institutional arrangements have evolved through time. Institutionally, for example, there was a massive shift from being a centrally planned and implemented activity to one where state and non-state policy actors collaborate now. From having little regard for environmental and social consequences of tourism, policy actors now carefully obtain local community support before embarking on huge projects.

How and why these changes happened offer huge potential for theorization and practical lessons. For example, the advocacy coalition framework predicts that policymaking is structured by the policy sub-system or network of participants (Sabatier & Weible, 2007), an issue that also occupies an important place in the policy networks literature (Dowding 1995; Marsh 1998). By looking at the case study of the Philippines, which has increasingly formulated and implemented public policy through collaborative efforts, this theoretical proposition could be disproved or supported. A related assumption of the advocacy coalition framework is that it is policy beliefs that hold coalitions together. As most of the studies that have used the advocacy coalition framework were undertaken in
pluralist societies, it would of theoretical interest to find out if such holds true in a clientelistic state such as the Philippines. Another example is the role in the policy process ascribed to ideas (such as equity), socioeconomic process, institutions and choices (John, 2003; Real-Dato, 2009). These factors and how they interact with the tourism system can be investigated thoroughly by looking at the Philippines since the domestic tourism policy system has been subjected to coercive internal and external stimuli that saw, among other things, changes to its constitution and led to the emergence of a potent civil society to challenge the dominance of state actors. These propositions, located at various levels of analysis, are just samples of the variety that can be found in the literature and is not meant to be exhaustive. But the point is clear: the country’s tourism experience has endowed it with features that allow for policy process theory testing and development within the context of developing countries.

The case study also can also provide international lessons for developing countries with tourism programmes and whose socio-political system is moving towards greater democratization, in this context, taken to mean the greater participation of the public in policymaking. The Philippines is part of a group of countries belonging to the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), the first in East Asia to have (re)gained democracy (Shin, 2006). According to the World Bank (2005, p. 26) it has the “strongest history of democratic decentralization” in the region (as cited in Hill, Balisacan, & Piza, 2007, p. 12). In the region, Indonesia is pinpointed as the country most relevant to learn from lessons in the Philippines as it has similarities with the country (Hill et al., 2007). These include being both archipelagic areas, having active tourism programmes, and having experienced democratization movements in recent history (Hall, 2000).

In addition, writers have called for more exemplary case studies (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Within the tourism context, Hall and Jenkins (1995) have stated a preference for detailed case studies in order to better understand the black box of tourism policymaking. Indeed, whilst there are numerous tourism case studies, the literature on tourism policymaking is scant, and on tourism policy implementation even less. A meaningful study about tourism policy implementation that proceeds from public policy theory is Julia Albrecht’s (2008) PhD thesis. However, her study is set in an industrialized country context (New Zealand), thereby potentially generating knowledge applicable only to those in similar
circumstances. As Pulzl and Treib (2007) note, after reviewing general implementation research in the EU, “different countries seem to have different ‘implementation styles’” (p. 101). Thus, production of a case study based on a developing country context should assist in elaborating mechanisms for tourism policy implementation. In particular, the case study addresses research gaps summarized by Hall and Jenkins (1995):

At the macro level there is widespread ignorance of institutional arrangements and, particularly, the role of the state in tourism public policy. At the meso level, there is little understanding of how and why decisions are made and actions are taken. At the micro level understanding of the relationship between individuals, their values and interests, and organizations and the state is lacking. (p. 96)

In terms of the general public policy literature, this case study contributes to the body of knowledge by clarifying the elements and processes of the advocacy coalition framework, principally as it applies to non-OECD country setting, its traditional ground (Beverwijk, Goedegebuure, & Huisman, 2008). It delves into the interplay of key factors thought to influence the policy process: ideas (Hall, 1993; Oliver & Pemberton, 2004), networks (Dowding 1995; Marsh, 1999; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes, 1988), institutions (Grindle, 1980; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975), rational choice (Bardach, 1977; Cho et al., 2005; Levin & Ferman, 1986), and broad societal processes such as democratization (Armijo & Kearney, 2008; Hsu, 2005). It also raises questions regarding the appropriate policy implementation approach in a developing country context, that is, whether it should be top-down or bottom-up, and the function of contextual conditions therein (Grindle, 1980; Morah, 1996). A by-product of the case study is the opportunity to suggest enhancements to the way models of tourism development are conceived.

3.3.1 Embedded case

In order to sharpen the case study, the research uses an embedded case study or within-case analysis. Gerring (2004) defines within unit cases as consisting of “all cases that lie at a lower level of analysis...If the primary unit of analysis is the nation state, then within-unit cases might be constructed from provinces, localities, groups, or individuals” (p. 344). The purpose is not to generalize beyond the case but to understand the complexity of the case (Creswell, 2007). This happens because the embedded case brings into the
discussion the specificity of place and 'local effect' (John & Cole, 2000). Thus, the output is an in-depth analysis that is rich in context in which the case relates itself to (Berg, 2001).

In the case study, this is operationalized by focusing on the island of Pamilacan in the province of Bohol. This choice was influenced by suggestions from key informants from the National Ecotourism Steering Committee. It turned out to be an optimal decision mainly for two reasons. First, the island has been the site of a number of conservation and tourism programmes in the last 20 years, which have been formulated and implemented by a host of state and non-state actors. Bohol province itself has been a centre of tourism development since the 1970s due to its significance in the historical and cultural development of the country, its rich flora and fauna, and unique landscapes. Secondly, the implementation of the programmes in Pamilacan involved political conflicts with clear coalitions. Thus, the island meets the theoretical conditions of the advocacy coalition framework, as the thesis’ organizing framework, in terms of temporal requirement (a decade or more) and having networks in a highly technical issue. In turn, this existence of networks provides the basis for using the policy network approach as an analytical tool with which to analyze in-depth the diachronic roles and relationships of local implementation actors, and the consequences of their interactions to the distribution of resources, power, knowledge, and values.

By assessing the network at the local level, the tourism policy domain is conceptualized by the researcher as a sector composed of differentiated policy networks, as graphically depicted in Figure 3-1. The ‘marble cake’ model of intergovernmental relations developed by Grodzins in 1966, and visualized by Cho et al., (2005), inspired it. However, as opposed to a three-layer domain as conceptualized for the United States by Cho et al., the figure shows the system to be divided into two planes of governance characteristic of the Philippines: the national and local levels. Yet, the functions of government are not in neat layers as conveyed by the diagram. Rather, as Grodzins emphasise, they are all mixed up: marbled like a rainbow cake. Thus, there is a joint sharing of functions even if formally the system of government is structured in two planes like a layer cake. This is seen in the implementation of tourism programmes and the tourism officers that run them, as represented by the cylindrical core. The local
government, under merit standards established by the national government, may appoint the tourism officer. Collaboration is seen in this system as the characteristic mode of action. Thus, the expertise of the national tourist organization is available to the local government to produce tourism plans, but the tourism officer relies on the weight of the local government to execute those plans. He/She could also count on the assistance of NGOs and POs to assist with grassroots organization of the local community. In turn, these NGOs may tap into their network that may extend up to the national level for technical or financial support. Thus, multiple actors such as government, NGOs, local tourism councils, and networks can be represented in the system. Each actor is seen to be present in both levels, so each plane must not be viewed as sharply bounded sub-systems, as membership may overlap with each other. The reciprocal arrows imply that interaction between actors can happen on an inter-plane and intra-plane basis, as tourism programmes are implemented.

Figure 3.1: Tourism planes of governance

By adopting this research strategy, the thesis follows a tradition in the policy networks literature - that of investigating embedded case studies that shed light on actual interaction and decision-making on policy issues (e.g., Kroger, 2005; Rhodes, 1988;
Schneider, 1992; Schneider & Werle, 1991). It is also consistent with views by Sabatier and Jenkins (1999) that policy subsystems can be nested.

3.4. Qualitative research design

Section 2.5 explains how the research objective of examining the substance and institutional arrangement of Philippine tourism policy from 1973 to 2009 is met theoretically by using the advocacy coalition framework and policy networks approach. Relatedly, this section discusses how the objective is achieved methodologically. Figure 3-2 below shows the relation of research aims with specific techniques to gather and generate information, as well as the means by which the information is processed. Among the data gathering methods used, there was a strong reliance on archival records when analyzing national level policies and programmes, and establishing the process of implementing tourism policies at the local level. This was supplemented by the simultaneous conduct of interviews, particularly at the local level to validate the documents, and to further identify documents for retrieval based on feedback from interviewees. Likewise, the figure relates the specific research tasks with the corresponding levels of analysis, with the diagram indicating that macro-level analysis refers to the examination of national level policies and long-term societal trends (tasks 1 and 3), whilst meso- and micro-levels of analyses pertain to sub-system and community level dynamics (task 2), respectively. As discussed in section 3.6.1, the division into various levels is merely analytical, as analysis at a particular level is actually supplemented or enriched by inputs from other levels. The ACF was principally used as the theoretical framework and integrating mechanism for the various levels. Methodologically, this means examining through content analysis, event analysis, and pattern matching, the influence of two broad sets of factors found at the macro-level, namely system parameters and events external to the system. As Figure 2-4 in Chapter Two shows, this also involves looking at the behaviour of policy actors across all levels, from the national down to the community that make up advocacy coalitions or networks, particularly as they pertain to policy learning. The techniques of policy network analysis were used mainly to analyze the advocacy coalitions in action at the meso- and micro-levels, although the dimensions of networks also came in handy when elucidating policy
arrangements at the macro-level. Full details of these are discussed in relevant subsections that follow.

**Figure 3.2: Research design**

The research design of this thesis is anchored on qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. This by no means suggests that qualitative methods that are the only means by which policy is studied. Indeed, as Rist (2003) points out, there is still to date no comprehensive methodology to study public policy. Instead, what the policy
implementation literature presents a diversity of approaches. Within the quantitative tradition, for example, a usual method is to use regression analysis. Here, researchers (e.g., Cho et al., 2005; Cline, 2003; Dodge, 1997) explore the relationship of goal achievement with resources available, the nature of policy, the wider environment, institutions, and individual characteristics of actors. For those who use the network approach to policy analysis, a common method is to employ structural analysis. These studies, both from the general literature (e.g., Christopoulos, 2006; John & Cole, 1998; Melbeck, 1998; Provan & Milward, 1995; Schneider & Werle, 1991), and the tourism literature (e.g., Hsin Yu Shih, 2006; March & Wilkinson, 2009; Pförr, 2006; Scott et al., 2008; Timur & Getz, 2008), employ quantitative socio-metric techniques particularly Euclidean distance measures to infer who among policy actors have the most influence within the network in shaping processes and outputs.

Notwithstanding the advantages of socio-metrics as explained in section 2.3.3.1.2, however, the approach has been criticized on conceptual and methodological grounds, as discussed in section 2.3.3.3. To recall, John and Cole (1998) suggest that it is unclear which among relationships (symbolic, ceremonial, operational, etc.) between actors are measured by statistics produced in network analysis. The sharpest critique has been that insights generated are unsurprising. As Dowding (1995) explains:

> the paradox of formal analysis is that it must yield results which by and large fit with what we know by descriptive methods - otherwise we know something has gone wrong with our formal analysis. What we require to justify formalism is some surprising results, or paradoxical conclusions, which then justify closer qualitative analysis. (p. 156)

Thus, this study did not attempt to compute quantitative measures of influence or reputation to determine institutional power. Rather, power and other network dimensions were assessed qualitatively. Qualitative methods are an established approach in policy research as shown in the case of policy networks as discussed in 2.3.3.1.1. One of the main reasons for this is the richness of information generated by qualitative methods whether one is explaining policy formulation, implementation, or accountability (Flyvberg, 2006). Discussing policy implementation, Rist (2003) explains that:
The focus...on the day-to-day realities of bringing a new program or policy into existence...is best done through qualitative research. The study of the rollout of an implementation effort is an area where qualitative work is at a clear advantage over other data collection strategies. (p. 630)

He adds that qualitative methods are best used when impacts of a policy or programme are to be investigated “When a program reaches a stage that it is appropriate to discuss and assess impacts, qualitative research provides a window on the program that is simply not available in any other way” (Rist, 2003, p. 632). In addition, the dynamic and longitudinal aspects of networks and advocacy coalitions have traditionally used qualitative data acquisition and analytical methods (Zafonte & Sabatier, 2004). Dohler (1991, pp. 280-281) explains that a qualitative comparison of the network structure at different points in time, focusing on the dimensions that have changed, provide an explanation for the performance of society-level initiatives. The method is further justified by the employment in the thesis of a dialectical approach to networks, as an integrative technique, which Marsh and Smith (2000) emphasise necessitates qualitative analysis. Thus, following practices in the general literature (e.g., Anderson, 2003; Korentang & Larbi, 2008; Marsh, 1998; Montpetit, 2005; Nachmias & Arbel-Ganz, 2006; Rhodes, 1988; Teichman, 2007), and in tourism research (e.g., Bramwell & Meyer, 2007; Dredge 2006a; Dredge 2006b; Fadeeva 2004; Novelli Schmitz & Spencer, 2006; Pavlovich, 2003a, 2003b; Saxena 2005; Tinsley & Lynch 2001; Tyler & Dinan, 2001), the thesis qualitatively assesses the cultural aspects of networks to understand them in action and account for the role of power relations, competition or cooperation as rules of the game, actor strategies, and other relevant network dimensions. Details of specific techniques employed in this thesis are discussed in succeeding sections.

3.5 Data collection

3.5.1 The research sites

Considering the complexity of policy analysis, the thesis would have to rely on multiple sources of information. This includes interviews, use of secondary documents, field observation, and structured and unstructured discussions. In implementation case studies, this reliance on more than one resource confers advantages. It shows a “certain degree of
consistency” and corroboration of findings, and this increased credibility should reinforce the interval validity of the results and its interpretation” (Yin, 1982, p. 50).

With this in mind, the researcher identified two areas in the Philippines as key research sites. The first is the national capital Manila, where offices of central government departments that oversee tourism or have anything to do with tourism is located (refer to Figure 3-3 below). Manila is also the home of key civil society groups that are involved in national tourism policymaking, particularly for one NGO deep into ecotourism across coastal regions in the Philippines. The second area is Bohol province (Figure 3-4).

Figure 3.3: Map of the Philippines

Source: DOT et al., 2002
Here, a site visited was the capital city of Tagbilaran, where key provincial offices such as the Bohol Tourism Office and the Bohol Environment Management Office are located. The next area was the town of Baclayon, where data collection concentrated on offices and individuals in the municipal hall. Pamilacan Island was the final site visited. The researcher spent a substantial amount of time in the island interviewing officials of people’s organizations involved in fishing and dolphin watching, barangay (village) officials, as well as mingling and conducting informal discussion with individuals during community events. Records of the barangay council were also examined. An indispensable trip was to the local libraries in order to gather background information about the research sites.

### 3.5.2 Source of information and forms of data generated

The thesis sought to obtain multiple information from a variety of sources. Field research to meet data requirements was conducted from January to July 2008, with two research trips made in Bohol province in the months of April and June. Following Cresswell (2007), the information can be grouped into four types: interviews, observations, documents, and audiovisual materials. This section explains the processes observed in generating that information.
3.5.2.1 Documents

The research originally set out to examine the political processes in ecotourism policymaking at the national level, and then subsequently focus on an embedded case, in order to meet the overall objective of describing and explaining the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation from 1973 to 2009. Thus, the investigator sought to identify specific documents that can shed light on the research problem. This activity is part of what is called unobtrusive measures in research (Berg, 2001), designed to “…provide access to aspects of social settings and their inhabitants that are simply unreachable through other means” (p. 189). In general, analysis of texts and documents follow the linguistic or sociological traditions, with the latter seeing text as a “window into human experience (Ryan & Bernard, 2003a, p. 259). Thus, access to these materials is crucial. As Yin (1982) explains, it allows the researcher to reconstruct, post-hoc, what transpired during the implementation process, and distinguish what are the factual and fictitious accounts. He adds that key aspects of the process (decisions, meetings, and many other public actions) can be gleaned from the documents, and can reveal turning points, person in-charge, who benefits, and a host of other important details.

For the thesis, these aspects were established by gathering and analyzing documents drawn from national government agencies, local governments, policy networks, and private individuals. A detailed list of the documents obtained is shown in Appendix 1, but an overview is shown in Table 3-2 below. Particularly useful in the analysis were minutes of meetings of national inter-agency bodies tasked to develop ecotourism: National Ecotourism Development Council (NEDC), National Ecotourism Steering Committee (NESC), and the Ecotourism Technical Working Group (ETWG). All were established in 1999 and, in the case of NESC, has met 45 times as at data collection time. This thesis being a study of ecotourism policy implementation, particularly focusing on wildlife ecotourism in the embedded case, a key source was the minutes of meetings of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Marine Mammal Conservation that operated from 1993 to 2001. National laws on tourism, fisheries, and conservation were obtained. Annual reports from NZAID-funded ecotourism projects were scrutinized. Past and present national developments including those for tourism were also analyzed.
Table 3.2: Summary of documents consulted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research site</th>
<th>Institutional source</th>
<th>Nature of unpublished documents obtained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>Department of Tourism</td>
<td>• Relevant internal memoranda&lt;br&gt;• Minutes of meetings of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Marine Mammal Conservation&lt;br&gt;• Reports submitted by <em>Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas</em> about programme in Pamilacan&lt;br&gt;• Tourism rules and regulations&lt;br&gt;• Bohol Area Tourism Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Ecotourism Program Office</td>
<td>• Pamilacan Island Dolphin Watching Organization business plans&lt;br&gt;• Documents related to preparation of National Ecotourism Strategy, and copy of strategy itself&lt;br&gt;• Minutes of meetings of NESC, NEDC, and ETWG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources</td>
<td>• Manta ray resource assessment research&lt;br&gt;• Statistics on commercial and municipal fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Library of the University of the Philippines-Diliman</td>
<td>• National development plans&lt;br&gt;• Newspaper articles on tourism and marine mammals&lt;br&gt;• Local research papers on tourism, democratization, decentralization, and sustainable development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohol Province</td>
<td>Barangay of Pamilacan</td>
<td>Barangay council resolutions and ordinances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Municipality of Baclayon</td>
<td>• Land use plan, draft tourism plan, and socio-economic profile&lt;br&gt;• Municipal council resolutions and ordinances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provincial Government</td>
<td>• Provincial Council committee reports published in Journal of Proceedings of the SP Session&lt;br&gt;• Visitor arrival statistics&lt;br&gt;• Fisheries statistics&lt;br&gt;• Records of the Bohol Tourism Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PIDWWWO</td>
<td>Visitor statistics and business plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PIBOSA</td>
<td>Visitors statistics and travel brochures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PROCESS-Bohol</td>
<td>Accomplishment reports on Bohol Marine Triangle project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bohol Alliance of Non-Government Organizations</td>
<td>Pamilacan Fishermen Association registration papers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similarly, in Bohol province, the researcher paid attention to the procurement of local government laws pertaining to tourism, fisheries and conservation. This went particularly to the municipal government and the barangay council of Pamilacan. As well, municipal plans and reports such as land use plans, socio-economic profile, tourism plan, and fisheries profile were obtained for analysis. A tip from a respondent (IntBo1) that issues in Pamilacan reached the provincial government led the researcher to scrutinize the provincial council’s *Journal of Proceedings of the SP Session* and subsequently minutes of meetings of the Bohol Tourism Council. Some of the proceedings were in *Boholano* dialect, a language foreign to the researcher, so arrangements for translation into English were made.

Private archives were another primary source of material. Interview respondents IntM7 and IntM11 turned over to the researcher their ecotourism files. The collection of the former pertains to personal copies of communications, reports, presentations, budgets and similar documents when the respondent was managing a conservation project in Pamilacan. The second gave all records obtained while an active member of the National Ecotourism Steering Committee.

Supplementing these primary documents were published research, reports, and newspaper articles on local tourism and marine conservation issues. This would include analysis of internet blogs particularly those referring to dolphin watching in the island. These secondary sources of data greatly aided in establishing background information and enriching the context of the analysis. A final source of document was thoughts written by the researcher in a journal as an observer of events particularly when he was in Pamilacan Island. Events observed include community meetings, training programmes held by NGOs and government agencies, and dolphin-watching tours run by the people’s organizations.

### 3.5.2.2 Interviews

Simultaneous with the gathering of primary and secondary documents was a determined search for organizations and individuals to be interviewed. To conduct interviews was paramount, as it allowed validation of data in the documents. In addition, feedback from participants enabled the researcher to identify further documents for retrieval and
examination, or persons to interview. Howlett and Maragma (2006) argue that the interview is a better technique in studies of policy networks rather than sampling techniques particularly if the aim is to provide a realist picture of network membership and composition. Thus, following a strategy called purposeful sampling (Creswell, 2007), the researcher identified organizations and individuals that can provide an understanding of the issues under study.

The starting point was the National Ecotourism Strategy launched in 2002. This document identifies the key actors, from the national down to the regional levels, who are responsible in some way for formulating and implementing a national ecotourism programme. Following Mandell (1984), two broad categories of interviewees were identified: (1) those elites who, based on their strategic position (management position) or the expertise they possess provide insights into events and relationships among policy actors; (2) those directly involved in the implementation of ecotourism programmes (at the national level and in Pamilacan) and through their own experience supply information on decision-making, provide the specific and the particular (Pinnegar & Daynes, 2006).

There are two categories here: the target participants in Pamilacan and the implementers themselves, normally from NGOs and government agencies based outside the area.

For the implementers in Pamilacan, the mutual relevance criterion was observed in order to define members of the network (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982). This criterion, which is based on the subjective perceptions of themselves in defining the boundary of the social system in which they belong (Wasserman & Faust, 1994), includes only those actors who are relevant to each other, and applying it yields four types. Knoke and Kuklinski (1982, p. 26) identify them as follows: (1) positional (i.e., formal organizations that have prima facie functions or interests in the domain), (2) decisional (organizations or groups that participate in decision-making processes), (3) reputational (groups and organization judged to be influential by a panel of experts), and (4) relational (groups and organizations named during interviews with representatives of organizations obtained by the first three criteria). From the list, the researcher employed the relational approach, as it provides the most comprehensive list of actors. Yet, Melbeck (1998) points out that one cannot interview an organization, only individuals or contacts that can provide information about the activities of the organization. Thus, these contacts - the most
common unit of analysis in social network analysis (John & Cole, 1998) - were conceived as agents of their organizations, following similar steps by network analysts.

This method was combined with the snowball technique (Miles & Huberman, 1994). At the end of each interview, the researcher would ask the participant any important person or organization they exchanged information with relating to the issue of ecotourism and marine mammal conservation, which are wedded together in the island. These names were then crosschecked with those listed in the primary documents. This blending of methods has basis in general policy studies (e.g., John & Cole, 1998, 2000; Melbeck, 1998) and in tourism policymaking research (e.g., Pforr, 2005, 2006). Overall, the result was interviews conducted with 36 credible individuals. The breakdown of participants in terms of organizational affiliation can be found in Appendix 4. In general, there were nine individuals from Pamilacan, eight from Baclayon, seven from Tagbilaran, and eleven from Manila. They came from national and local governments, POs, NGOs, business, and the local community. Nonetheless, following a pragmatic approach in interviewing (Plummer, 1983), the researcher did not miss opportunities to discuss with individuals on chance encounters such as during community events. These informal conversations provided the opportunity to learn more about the community.

The interview topics, shown in Appendix 2, were as varied as the background of the respondents. Depending on the background of the participant and feedback from other interviewees, the researcher asked the participant to address a part or all of three concerns. First was to verify the facts of the implementation process described in the documents. Second was to uncover the workings of the policy networks and the advocacy coalitions that have formed. To do this, topics revolved around theoretical constructs including network structure, institutionalization, power relations, decision-making processes, actor strategies, goals and resources. The third area of topics and questions probed into the perception of key informants in Pamilacan regarding the socioeconomic and environmental impacts of ecotourism in the island, as well as issues and challenges they faced in past and present programmes. All these were done in order to meet the research objective of examining the role of policy networks and policy learning, along with longer-term historical factors, as variables that explain the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation.
The interviews were conducted in a semi-standardized manner, that is, there was a set of questions but the investigator digressed in order to probe (Berg, 2001). Interviews were conducted face-to-face, with the researcher taking down notes during or immediately after the interviews. Typically, the formal interviews lasted between 45 minutes to two hours. Subsequently, off-site, telephone calls were made and emails exchanged with some individuals to clarify responses.

3.5.2.3 Direct observation and visual materials

Observing as a data collection method was employed during field research in Pamilacan in the months of April and June 2008. Herbert Gans (1968) discusses varying degrees of participation, noting that it is possible for one to be a participant-observer, to be publicly-acknowledged as a researcher. The emphasis then shifts from being a participant to that of an observer (Yanow, 2007). In the case of the researcher, the roles assumed were greatly influenced by his positionality and status (see section 3.7 for more discussion). In his role as an outside public researcher, observations were gathered that were not dependent on verbal behaviour and biases explicit in interviews or implicit in documents (Yin, 1982), as they were direct knowledge and comes from own judgement of the observer (Adler & Adler, 1994). Thus, the researcher was able to independently investigate the physical setting of the island, and note striking and perceptible environmental features and conditions. The type and quality of the island’s tourist facilities was likewise directly assessed, as was the level of participation of the residents to community events, particularly those geared towards self-improvement in order to provide better tourist services. Direct observations, facilitated by taking photographs and videos, was particularly useful during boat-based cetacean interaction tours, as it allowed the researcher to not only judge the quality of services offered but also reflect on the impact of the interaction on the biology of the marine mammals. To aid the observation, old photos of various aspects of island life was gathered including pictures of men catching, butchering whale sharks and drying manta ray meat. These photos validated for the researcher accounts in the literature regarding the extent of community involvement in the activity, and the methods they employed in their trade prior to the introduction of tourism.
3.5.2.4 Coding system for documents and interviewees

In order to distinguish the unpublished documents from published ones, and preserve the anonymity of interview respondents, the researcher developed a coding system. All interviewees were assigned five to six digit alphanumeric codes. The first three letters of the code were 'Int' to denote an interviewee, while the fourth (and fifth in one case) digit used the letters 'P', 'B', 'Bo', or 'M' to refer to the place of origin of the person. Respectively, the letters mean Pamilacan, Baclayon, Bohol, and Manila. The last digit is a number that refers to the nominal designation of the interviewee. Thus, a barangay official from Pamilacan who shared his views was called 'IntP1'in the thesis while an interviewee from the Department of Tourism in Manila was labelled 'IntM1.' A complete list of the codes can be seen in Appendix 4.

On the other hand, documents got the prefix 'Doc'. The next two to three digits in the code refers to the actor category and used the codes 'NG', 'NGO', 'LGU', 'TF', to denote national government agency, nongovernmental organization, local government unit, and an inter-agency task force. The last two digits refer to specific agencies within each category that issued the document and the nominal value assigned to the document itself. Thus, a resolution in 1997 by the Pamilacan barangay council expressing its support to whale watching was labelled 'DocLGUA15' while the minutes of a meeting on 5 November 1996 by the Inter-Agency Task Force on Marine Mammal Conservation was called 'DocTF1.' Appendix 1 shows the complete list of documents consulted with their corresponding codes employed in the thesis.

3.5.3 Data recording and storage

Creswell (2007) suggests the development of an interview protocol to capture data. The researcher followed this suggestion by designing a five-page interview form that contained the questions. For residents of the island and Bohol, two additional pages were added to include queries about their perception of socio-economic and environmental impacts of tourism and marine mammal conservation. Enough space was left in these forms so the researcher was able to note the responses. In the island, note-taking was the primary method of capturing data Direct recording to computers in MP3 format became an option in Manila, in some offices that did not mind the researcher connecting to their
electrical outlets (electricity rates in the country are the second most expensive in Asia, so automatic access was not assumed). However, the researcher still made use of the interview form for back up. Hard copies were then arranged in a folder.

Subsequently, some interviews were transcribed into a text file then imported into WEFT-QDA, a textual data analysis software free under a public domain license. To facilitate data integration, files containing preliminary analytic steps such as chronology of events and organization profiles were combined with interview transcripts in one large project file. Another software used was UCINET (version 6), a network analysis programme which was used to draw maps of the policy networks.

To reduce consumption of paper, documents such as minutes of meetings, proceedings of investigations, and similar sources were photographed using a digital camera. Then, they were stored in computer folders created for the purpose. Folders were named according to source for easy retrieval. To guard against data corruption, double copies in electronic format of all interview materials, documentary sources, and observations were made. Following university guidelines, all these materials are to be archived for five years in a space to be provided by the university.

3.6 Method of data analysis

To meet the objective of describing and explaining the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation from 1973 to 2009 at the national level and in the embedded case, the thesis principally employed the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) and policy network analysis. As shown in Figure 2-4 in Chapter Two, the use of the ACF means an examination of the influence of two broad sets of factors external to the policy subsystem responsible for policymaking, and an assessment of the role of policy learning. Policy network analysis implies viewing the institutions that comprise the network in action, examining their aggregate descriptive or metaphoric features and structural dimensions. Utilizing this approach meets suggestions by qualitative researchers regarding the use of analytic frameworks to analyze case studies (Berg, 2001; Creswell, 2007; Yin, 1984, 2003).
As shown in Figure 3-2, data analysis involved integrated steps. The first was to analyze the manifest contents of documents, interview transcripts and observation notes. These were undertaken after the researcher had transcribed the interviews personally. Therefore, there was no need for inter-coder reliability tests. The interview data was integrated with the chronology of events and organizational profiles in one WEFT-QDA project file to facilitate content analysis. The researcher adopted the strategy by Larsen et al. (2006) who, in their study of pharmacy policy, used only a few but broad categories at the start but increasingly refined the codes as the research progressed. This technique is called inductive coding, the objective of which is to generalize key themes in the raw data following a three-step process involving first, getting familiar with the texts, second, the creation of categories, and third, refinement (Thomas, 2006). This process in and of itself is not a novel approach as qualitative researchers have suggested it before (e.g., Miles & Huberman, 1994; Ryan & Bernard, 2003b). Thus, the coding process became more dynamic, as opposed to a static coding frame developed by Sabatier (1993).

Broadly, there were two types of codes used. The first pertains to codes developed to reconstruct the implementation process both at the national level and in Pamilacan Island. Examples of these are: policies, community profile, key issues, hunting, key events. The second group are a priori codes or abstract codes that refer to the analytic frameworks: power relations, actors and their roles and strategies, coalitions, learning, impacts and attitudes. These codes were developed manually and with WEFT-QDA. The software principally facilitated the retrieval, juxtapositioning, and grouping of the relevant texts.

Having sorted the data, the next step was to put together the facts of the implementation experience. According to Yin (1982), this strategy involves taking note of major events in the implementation of a policy such as organizational changes, crucial meetings, staff assignments, contract signing, and other activities. The facts were arranged topically and chronologically, from the 1970s through to the present. Yin (1984) emphasises the importance of arranging events into a chronology. He states that it “permits the investigator to determine causal events over time, because the basic sequence of a cause and its effect cannot be temporally inverted” (p. 113). Pearce (2001) adds that it provides an understanding how a policy is made and implemented, not just how policy should be (see also Hall & Jenkins, 1995). It also allows the examination of policy networks.
kaleidoscopically, that is, under constant political flux, and contextualizes changes in the networks within the longer historical-institutional structure (Grin & Loeber, 2007).

The networks and advocacy coalitions were created primarily from archival records and validated by contemporary accounts of interviewees. The structural frame of the analysis was based on network properties as proposed by Van Waarden (1992), as depicted in Table 2-1 in Chapter Two. Policy learning processes were elaborated principally through Glasbergen’s (1996) notion of technical, conceptual and social learning, but the unifying theoretical scaffold was the advocacy coalition framework. The presentation of data was aided by the development of relational maps. They show the evolution of the network since the 1980s through to the present and highlights changes in information exchange among policy actors.

The final step was the formulation of an explanation for the policy process. A strategy here was pattern matching. Gerring (2004) states that this necessitates comparing the findings with the causal implications of a theory. In the case of the thesis, this involved explaining the key features of the policy implementation process at the national and local levels, and determining the influence thereof of key elements of the ACF: the policy network structure, external perturbations, and policy learning. It also involved comparing the political processes with clientelism, a theory of the state. In addition, the elements of the dialectical approach to policy networks were assessed vis-à-vis findings.

This choice of possible combinations of causal conditions, as opposed to a nomothetic search, was in response to Capano’s (2009) analysis that policy researchers have not been very conscious of their epistemological and theoretical preferences. The results were then evaluated. Yin (1984) emphasises that “if the patterns coincide, the results can help a case study to strengthen its internal validity” (p. 103).

Ensuring validity brings triangulation, a type of validation (Creswell, 2007; see Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, for opposing views), to the discussion. Decrop (1999) suggests that triangulation “consists of confirming qualitative findings by showing that independent sources converge on them, or at least, do not oppose them” (p. 160). It is “a kind of replication within the same setting, rather than replication across settings,” according to Bloor (1997, p. 38). It also implies striving for balance in the use of methods, be it in data
collection, analysis and theories to substantiate findings (Axinn & Pearce, 2006; Cresswell, 2007). For an implementation study such as this thesis, Yin (1982, p. 63) suggests that this is met by ensuring that there is a factual account of the implementation experience, different points of view are recognized, and that participants are able to review findings by the researcher.

Following these, the researcher conducted triangulation in the following ways. First, information was gathered from multiple sources in order to establish and confirm the facts of implementation particularly at the local level and concerning the formation of networks. Second, the researcher relied upon secondary research and official documents to validate perception of residents particularly as they relate to policy learning and outcomes. Third, multiple methods and levels of analysis were employed to come up with a more robust examination of the implementation process. Fourth, the study relied on multiple theoretical frameworks and levels of analysis, principally combining the advocacy coalition framework and the policy networks approach. Another step was asking four interview respondents from Bohol and Manila to review findings by the researcher. A final step is to make the whole thesis accessible to respondents upon request.

3.6.1 Levels and unit of analysis

The preceding paragraph mentions the use of multiple levels of analysis in this study. This is because, as repeatedly stressed in the previous chapter, the policy process is very complex and a focus on a single level of analysis renders the investigation woefully inadequate and incomplete. This has led some researchers to suggest approaching policy analysis from multiple levels. They argue that examining the different levels clarify understanding of critical variables in the policy process such as the role of the state, decision-making, and the dynamics between individuals (Hall & Jenkins, 1995; Ham & Hill, 1984; Kim & Roh, 2008).

Researchers who believe in this argument seem to prefer three levels of analysis, although the combinations are different. For example, Ham and Hill (1984, pp. 17-18) propose three planes comprising of first, the micro level of decision-making within organisations; second, the middle range analysis of policy formulation [and implementation]; and third,
macro-analysis of political systems including examination of the role of the state (see also Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998; Hall & Jenkins, 1995; Nachmias & Arbel-Ganz, 2006; Rhodes, 1988, for similar views and analyses). Benson (1982) also deems appropriate the exploration of three levels in the structure of policy sectors beginning with (1) administrative structure (or the surface level of linkages and networks between agencies), (2) interest structure that provides the context for the administrative structure, and (3) rules of structure formation that set boundaries and cause action at other levels. In a comparative study of mental health systems, Provan and Milward (1995) similarly used three levels of analysis but of a slightly different nature: individual, agency, and network. In a recent formulation that marries the advocacy coalition framework and policy network analysis, Kim and Roh (2008) suggest three levels of analysis: macro-level that deals with the institutional and society-level setting, meso-level to deal with policy networks and coalitions, and micro-level to focus mainly on policy actors and their individual characteristics. Ostrom (1999) generically names these levels as constitutional-level, collective-choice, and operational-level, respectively. Dowding (1995, 2000) however does not believe in the existence of policy networks at the meso-level and therefore advocates only the macro- and micro-levels. From the social networks analysis side, Knoke and Kuklinski (1982) identify four levels starting with egocentric, dyad, triads, and through to complete networks, with the latter concerned with “patterning of ties amongst all actors...within the system” (pp. 16-17).

Clearly, the foregoing discussion shows that whilst the literature supports approaching the policy process from multiple levels of analysis, there is no agreement as to what exactly these levels pertain. This situation appears to reflect observations by Ham and Hill (1984) that the number of levels to actually examine depends on the purpose of the investigator. What is important, Kim and Roh (2008) stress, is to have a better understanding of the whole picture and complexity of the policy process by having multiple levels.

With the thesis’ objective of examining the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation in the Philippines in the last few decades, with the end view of deducing key longer-term historical factors and exploring their inter-relationship with contextual conditions, the thesis must really have multiple levels of analysis if this aim is to be met. Thus, as shown in Figure 2-4 in Chapter Two, the investigation covers three levels of
analysis namely micro-, meso-, and macro-levels. The following definitions from Daugbjerg and Marsh (1998, p.54) were adapted: micro-level pertains to a limited number of people and organizations at the local community; meso-level refers to structures and patterns of interaction of the policy networks and advocacy coalitions; and macro-level of analysis pertains to the relationships between the state and civil society, as well as the broader political structures and processes within which the policy network is located. Table 3-3 below lays out the key concepts used in each level of analysis while Figure 3-2 above shows the research tasks met at each level.

Table 3.3: Framework in data analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Unit of analysis</th>
<th>Key concepts or focal points</th>
<th>Relevant chapters in the thesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macro-level</td>
<td>State and civil society relations; policy structures such as national tourism organization</td>
<td>Configuration of policy arrangements, policy learning, social processes and key events, Clientelism</td>
<td>Chapters four and seven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meso-level</td>
<td>Policy networks and advocacy coalitions</td>
<td>Dimensions of policy networks, type of implementation process</td>
<td>Chapter five and six</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro-level</td>
<td>Individuals and organizations in the local community</td>
<td>Perception of outcomes, policy learning</td>
<td>Chapter six</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The division is merely analytical and not as strict as is presented by the above table. Rather, a particular level of analysis is supplemented and enriched by inputs from other levels when it is warranted by the discussion. In addition, informal units of analysis are
brought in. Gerring (2004) defines them as those units that are discussed in a peripheral way in order to assist the analysis.

Having identified the levels of analysis, the next issue is how to integrate them. Indeed, Ham and Hill (1984, p.18) note that it is the “interaction between levels which is particularly significant and problematic” (see also Ostrom, 1999). To address this concern, researchers propose the use of public policy frameworks such as the advocacy coalition framework (Weible, 2005) or the institutional analysis and development framework (Ostrom, 1999). For the thesis, the advocacy coalition framework is a logical choice, because from a theoretical point of view, “it links all three levels of abstraction, constantly connecting individual behaviour and structural elements” (Capano, 2009, pp. 23-24). Another mechanism employed in the thesis, and which has the same integrating features as the ACF can be found within the policy networks approach, that is, the dialectical approach. As Marsh and Smith (2000) explain, it offers a multi-dimensional and multi-causal approach that integrates micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of analysis. An important feature of the latter is an emphasis placed on grand theories of the state (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998; Marsh, 1998; Rhodes, 1988). Its use allows the formulation of an explanation in regard to overall tendencies in state-civil society relations and to elucidate reasons regarding the characteristics of networks (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998) not explained by the advocacy coalition framework.

In passing, it is noted that some researchers classify contemporary theories of the state under the following headings: pluralism, the new right, elite theory, Marxism and neo-pluralism (see Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987, for details). In the case of the Philippines, the relevant theory appears to be clientelism, a variant of elite theory. A number of researchers (e.g., de Dios, 1990; de Dios & Hutchcroft, 2003; Fox, 1994; Gutierrez, et al., 1992; Hutchcroft, 1998; McCoy, 2009) have taken advantage of this general theory to explain various aspects of Philippine politics. Of particular relevance to clientelism is the idea of patrimonialism, which in the Philippine context appears as closely associated with the former (Hutchison, 2001; Miranda, 1997). Thus, the thesis uses the same theories to help explain tourism policy implementation processes. Even as other frameworks such as elite democracy have been suggested (see Kerkvliet, 1995 for reviews), it is argued that those conditions that engendered clientelism as an influential theory of Philippine politics
more than 30 years ago are still relevant today. That is, problems of severe income inequality, physical and economic insecurity, importance of interpersonal relationships - particularly of the familial and patron-client variety - as part of efforts to have more security, persist. Moreover, given the magnitude to the situation, they appear far from being solved in the near term. Thus, the use of clientelism as a theory to explain help explain tourism policy is justified.

3.7 Reflexivity, positionality and ethical considerations

Qualitative research calls for explicit statements regarding the role of the investigator in the research process (Creswell, 2003, 2007). This is because from the onset of the research process, researchers begin with maps of consciousness (Mullings, 1999). Accordingly, the researcher becomes an integral part of the research milieu (Cloke, Cooke, Cursons, Milbourne, & Widdowfield, 2000), and conditions the output by virtue of “the personal biography of the gendered researcher, who speaks from a particular class, racial, cultural, and ethnic community perspective” (Denzin & Lincoln 1998, p. 23). Thus, there is a call to engage in reflexivity to reveal the historical, cultural and personal circumstance of researchers and examine their positionality vis-à-vis the ‘others’ (Ellis & Bochner, 2003; Haraway, 1999; Locke, 2001). This goes even for policy studies (Walt et al., 2008; Yanow, 2007).

Most definitely, the personal background of the researcher influenced choices in the research. The choice of topic to study (tourism policy) flows from the researcher’s interest in politics and training at the master’s level where he wrote about tourism and air transportation policy. The option to pick the Philippines as a case study site was influenced by his nationality, having been born and raised as a Filipino. There was however no personal connection with Pamilacan prior to its selection. The researcher’s decision was simply guided by practical suggestions from key informants and by theoretical considerations.

Once in the field, the other aspects of the researcher’s identity were at the foreground. Angrosino & Mays de Perez (2003), citing the work of Blackwood (1995), speak of how the identity of the researcher changes, depending on the way it is perceived by the other as dictated by the context. Cloke et al. (2000) suggest that the self has “shifting collection
of identities which refuse to be subjugated to the identity of researcher or researched.” (p. 143). Therefore it was, as the researcher was perceived in various ways, as discussed below.

The researcher’s professional status and affiliation with the national university is a strong part of his identity. This gave the researcher credibility, which opened opportunities. He was given access to official documents and interviews with government and civil society officials were easily arranged. This was particularly true in Bohol province where local government officials were very accommodating. In Pamilacan Island, the researcher was seen as sort of a tourism expert, and indeed, was asked in some instances of his opinions about tourism developments in the island. Nevertheless, other aspects of this identity helped as well. As a man, he was invited to drinking sessions that gave chances to increase rapport and gain trust as well as engage in informal discussion about the research topic. This was all in keeping with his public role of researcher as story-gatherer (Cloke et al., 2000), another dimension of his multiple identity.

These occasions for small talk were very important, as for the most part the researcher was identified as an outsider. While not a foreigner, he did not hail from Bohol Island. Neither did the researcher speak the dialect although there was no need for an interpreter because the locals can speak the national lingu franca, Filipino. However, he came to the island unaware of its recent conflicted history with research workers.

Initially, this positionality served as an entry barrier. While most informants were easy to approach, some informants were not, and were at first hesitant to answer questions. They recall that in the 1990s, researchers from outside came asking about their cetacean and manta ray hunting tradition and practices. They willingly shared their stories (Yaptinchay, 1999), but the subsequent publication of the research that highlighted the extent of the hunt and its effect on the whale population led to national laws being passed that curtailed their livelihood (Green, 2002), and turned their community upside down. Many years after, the odium against the researchers and idea of tourism as substitute could still be felt (DocNGOA2; IntBo7). Thus, locals are immediately suspicious of outsiders who ask questions about marine mammals and tourism, which unfortunately for the researcher was the very subject of his thesis. Only the researcher’s assurances regarding ethical conduct
and the intent of the research, which was to investigate the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation, lead them to relax.

Another vexed situation was feeling exposed to what Kvale (2006) calls counter-control by interviewees. This happens when interviewees try to mitigate the perceived imbalances in power between interviewer and interviewee. In a particular instance, a respondent asked the researcher what was new in the island. The researcher felt the question was a bit odd because in the first place, the respondent was from the province and was in the position to know the latest developments in the island, including gossip. After telling the interviewee what he already knew, the researcher felt that what ensued was a power game, or as Holstein and Gubrium (1995, p. 16) called it, the interview as “an interpersonal drama,” (as cited in Fontana & Frey, 2003).

This previous experience by the researched brings to the fore key ethical issues in their interaction with researchers as well as in writing. Hammersely and Atkinson (1995) suggest four issues needing resolution: (1) the need for informed consent, (2) upholding privacy, (3) avoiding harm, (4) disengaging in exploitative behaviour (see also Fontana & Frey, 2003). Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000) discuss reflexive methodology, suggesting among others, being self-aware of the problem of representation and authority in research. Being reflexive in writing is encouraged as well as being concerned with how the participants are represented (Angrosino & Mays de Perez, 2003). In relation to the latter, having multiple voices in the research is proposed in order “to remove the single voice of omniscience and to relativize it by including multiple voices within the research report” (Gergen & Gergen, 2000, p. 1028). Another strategy is to engage in respondent validation (Cole, 2005).

For the thesis, the researcher took steps to adhere to ethical behaviour. Participants were made fully aware of the objectives of the study. One instrument used was the research information sheet, which when possible, was sent ahead of the interviews along with the interview topics and questions. This information sheet had previously undergone review and given ‘Category A’ approval by an ethics committee of the University of Otago. In cases where it was impossible to provide the research information sheet, such as in informal discussions, the researcher made clear his intentions and assured participants he
meant no harm. The researcher also refrained from using personal information from these individuals. All interview transcriptions, reports, manuscripts, photocopies of official documents, and similar papers, were safely secured. The researcher likewise endeavoured to protect the rights and wishes of the participants, in part by not presenting them in bad light and to maintain their anonymity. Multiple voicing was undertaken by seeking participants who held different views and by letting them speak on their behalf. Finally, respondent validation was undertaken by sending drafts of thesis chapters to participants who wanted to read findings of the research. These include one from Manila and three from Bohol province.

3.8 Summary
This chapter has outlined the research methods used to address the objective of describing and explaining the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation from 1973 to 2009. It argued for a case study approach as appropriate to an in-depth description and analysis of tourism policy. To capture its complexity, the chapter discussed the importance of engaging in multiple levels of analysis, and the utility of the advocacy coalition framework and state theories as integrating mechanisms. The various techniques of data collection and methods of analysis were described, to explain how validation was achieved. The chapter quite lengthily discussed the issue of reflexivity, positionality and ethical considerations in view of the conflicted history of the local research site. In adopting these steps, the researcher asserts that he has implemented strategies that followed research design approaches advocated by Hall and Jenkins (1995) for more improved studies in tourism policy.
Chapter 4: Tourism policy framework

4.1 Introduction

Policy researchers have stressed that the policy process is very complex and that to gain a deep understanding of a phenomenon, policy analysis must be approached from multiple levels. Building on this, and in order to meet the research objective of examining the substance and mechanisms of Philippine tourism policy implementation from 1973 to 2009, the thesis investigates tourism policy from three levels: macro-, meso-, and micro-levels, as shown in Figure 2-4 and Table 3-3. This chapter, along with Chapter Seven focuses on the macro-level; as such, it deals with society-level aggregates that directly and indirectly impact on the processes of the lower levels. The particular concern of this chapter is the tourism policy framework and the discussion proceeds from a learning perspective, that is, policy implementation is viewed as a learning process. The examination is complemented by a policy network analysis particularly the aspects of power, resources, and interaction between actors.

The chapter is structured based on the argument that the development of tourism in the Philippines can be divided analytically into three phases of policy learning. Primarily, the division is based on how learning evolved, with phase one characterized as involving “reverse learning”, phase two by technical and conceptual learning, and phase three by the intensification of social learning. The transition from each phase is usually marked by key historical or policy developments. Phase one is the period from 1973 to 1986 when policy implementation was directed towards the employment of tourism as an economic and political tool. At this stage, administrators engaged in “reverse learning”, that is, sought to project a model tourism programme that other developing nations could learn. Nonetheless, in this phase, technical and conceptual learning particularly by the NGO sector and opposition groups began. Thus, phase two can be viewed as beginning just as the Marcos administration was waning, overlapping with phase one. More formally, for this thesis, phase two pertains to the period from 1986 to 1999 when the policy implementation process was opened to the participation of civil society. This occurred at various levels of governance, from the national, regional through to local levels. The period is characterized by intense technical and conceptual learning, even as social...
learning started to emerge. Under phase three, the period from 1999 up to the present, the gains of sustainability were consolidated, institutionalized, and recognized at the highest levels of government. Phase two is still continuing at this time, as conceptual and social learning have not stopped and have in fact deepened. However, the formalization of institutional arrangements and the subsequent formulation of a national ecotourism strategy necessitates that a new period, phase three, be analytically designated. In this period, social learning has intensified, reflected in the greater awareness of challenges that constrain sustainable tourism and increased knowledge across sectors of the link between the environment and tourism.

4.2 Brief overview of Philippine tourism

The Philippines is located in Southeast Asia, one of the most active tourist-receiving regions in the world. Because of a systematic and sustained tourism programme since the 1970s, foreign visitor arrivals to the country have increased enormously from just 166,000 in 1972 (NEDA, 1977) to 3.1 million tourists in 2008, according to official statistics kept by the Department of Tourism. A big chunk of these arrivals is accounted for by wealthier countries from Northeast Asia, notably South Korea that only recently has emerged as the number one generator of foreign tourists to the country, displacing the Japanese and American markets. Domestic tourism is also healthy. A previously neglected market segment, domestic tourists have surged to make 14 million trips in 2006 (National Statistics Office & Department of Tourism, 2006). On the back of billions of dollars in tourist expenditures (US$ 4.88 B in 2007), tourism is one of the country’s growth drivers, supporting 3.25 million employees directly or indirectly.

Tourism managers explain this level of activity to the diversity of attractions in the country. They have a point. Composed of 7,107 islands, the country is indeed dotted with numerous beaches, some of which have captured the world’s attention. Its biodiversity is bewildering, accounting for 5% of the world flora species, 6% of its birds, 4% of its animals (Gozun, 2004). Nonetheless, it is not only these assets that attract tourists. As would be explained later, the country has also been the recipient of abhorrent sex tourism traffic.
The natural and cultural attractions are supported by a vibrant service sector. Because of deregulation introduced in 1995, the domestic aviation sector is one of the most dynamic in the world, with at least five airlines competing to serve provincial and foreign destinations. There is also a variety of accommodation facilities, although concentration seems to be norm. From a national aggregate of just over 30,000 rooms (in 2006), almost half can be found in the national capital region. Of this, 67% belong to luxury and first class hotels. This is also reflected in related sectors. Despite the seeming atomism represented by numerous small players in the food service sector (Edralin & Castillo, 2001) and travel agency business, most of the businesses are located in Metro Manila.

This concentration was the legacy of the urban bias and centralized rule practiced by the government for quite a long time (Balascan & Hill, 2007). Within the tourism system, this centralized rule was epitomised by the Department of Tourism. Since it was institutionally organized in 1973, it has run the show for the sector. For a time, it even controlled air transportation policy and had a say in purely private corporate transactions of travel firms (Richter, 1982). Only with the enactment of a sweeping decentralization law in 1991 did it cede powers to other policy actors. Now, within the unitary system of government and under a democratized set-up, it has to contend with panoply of local governments (80 provinces, 137 cities, and 1,497 municipalities), civil society organizations, and other resource-oriented agencies keen to have their say on tourism matters. Other key policy developments from the 1970s onwards are presented in the table below. Details are discussed in succeeding sections of this chapter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Key tourism policy initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marcos (1965-1986)</td>
<td>Establishment of Ministry of Tourism; construction of hotels, convention, and tourism education facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquino (1986-1992)</td>
<td>Re-organization of Ministry of Tourism; formulation of Tourism Master Plan; involvement of private sector and civil society in plan and policy formulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramos (1992-1998)</td>
<td>Full implementation of Local Government Code devolves tourism regulatory powers to local governments; deeper involvement of civil society in policy formulation and implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the table, it is clear that the wide interest with tourism was a relatively recent phenomenon. For a long time, it was the domain of a select group of organizations, back when leaders in the highest echelon recognized its political contribution to martial rule. Analytically, this is phase one of tourism development in the country.

### 4.3 Tourism in the 1970s - 1986: Tourism as economic and political tool

In the Philippines, tourism got the boost it deserved when the leadership realized its immense political value. Prior to the 1970s, tourism was not on the official radar of the government. An evidence of this is its absence in Philippine development plans that have been a feature of economic planning in the country since the 1950s. However, when President Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, he saw the potential of tourism in confronting two political and economic issues faced by his administration. These issues were international, national, and individual in nature and essentially deal with questions
of political legitimacy while ensuring that the country was not economically dislocated (Richter, 1980a). Thus, like the dictator Franco of Spain (Ivars, 2004) and the authoritarian governments of Singapore, South Korea and Indonesia which all used tourism for political leverage (Richter, 1999), the Marcos administration poured resources into tourism development never before seen in the history of Philippine tourism in order to meet these objectives.

Officially, the role of tourism was to drive economic growth and efforts were expended to institutionally carry the programme. This is apparent in the national economic plans prepared by the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), and in actual events that happened in the 1970s and 80s. In the 1973-1977 Four-Year Development Plan, tourism appeared for the first time as an economic concern. The objective of the tourism programme was to enhance to the maximum the drawing power of the country, to be able to cash in on the growing Asian market. This was to be achieved by the two-pronged approach of promotional campaigns in both domestic and overseas markets, and infrastructure development, mainly the construction of road networks and airport improvements. To coordinate the effort was the newly-established Philippine Tourism Commission (PTC), operating under the Ministry of Trade and Tourism (MOTT). A few months later, PTC was abolished, the MOTT was split into two departments, and as result of the break-up, a new Ministry of Tourism was born in 1973. By late 1970s, tourism has been given its new role as a tool for national development (NEDA, 1977). In the 1977-1987 Ten-Year Development Plan, not only is it concerned with generating foreign exchange nationally but is likewise meant to spur regional development. Thus, eight provinces (Ilocos Sur, Benguet, La Union, Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Quezon, Zamboanga del Sur) and Metro Manila were to be the focus of investment and incentives. To complement infrastructure development, a programme to develop historical landmarks and Philippine arts was included in the plan. Tourism managers were to be supplied by the newly-established Asian Institute of Tourism within the University of the Philippines system (Bosangit & Mena, 2005).

Similar to developing countries that have poured resources into tourism development at that time (see Hawkins & Mann, 2007, for countries that have loaned significant amounts from the World Bank to develop tourism), the Philippine government was deeply
involved in tourism. Quoting various sources, Richter (1980) discloses that the government’s financial exposure to the industry was between 30 to 40 times its expenditure on public housing. She explains:

Depending on one's sources of information, between US$410-545 million of government money is now directly tied up in hotel financing. The relative size of this commitment can be compared from several angles: it is between one-seventh and one-fifth of the government's total proposed 1976 expenditures of $3.05 billion. It is more than the nation's total 1976 borrowing from the World Bank of $315 million. The Development Bank of the Philippines alone has lent a ‘staggering $229.29 million’ through July 1976 on tourism projects. (p. 238)

Among these projects was the development of massive edifices symbolic of the ‘construction site’ syndrome noted in other developing countries such as Turkey (Alipour, 1996). These include the building of accommodation establishments such as 14 luxury hotels in Metro Manila, some of which enjoyed 100% government financing (Wideman, 1977), and presidential guesthouses, resorts and similar facilities in other locations, sometimes remote, in the country (Ministry of Tourism, 1986). Others were meeting and cultural facilities such as the Philippine International Convention Center, the Folk Arts Theater, the Philippine Center for International Trade and Exhibitions, and the Cultural Center of the Philippines, all pet projects of the First Lady Imelda Marcos who wanted to create a “City of Man” (WTO, 1980, p. 29). None of these projects were officially sanctioned in the development plans (Richter, 1980). The key focusing event for the construction frenzy was the holding of the International Monetary Fund-World Bank conference in 1976 that waylaid plans for an orderly development (Richter, 1982; Wideman, 1977).

4.3.1 Centralized tourism policymaking

That the First Lady exercised enormous power in setting-up superstructures outside of official plans suggests that implementation power rested not with the tourism bureaucracy. In fact, policymaking power rested firmly with President Marcos. Thus, he served as the core of the policymaking network, the centre point through which all nodes revolve. Decision-making was “unitary instead of collegiate,” according to Simpas and Mariano (1976, p. 76), and “anyone who could gain access submits proposals directly to
the president” (p. 76) they added. Bacungan (1983) counts 1,941 presidential decrees, 1,331 letters of instruction, and 896 executive orders as having been issued by President Marcos directly under martial law (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). This staggering output was possible because there was no Congress to lead in policymaking, what with the Senate and House of Representatives abolished when martial law was declared in 1972. Pre-1972, the legislature was described as very effective in checking executive authority, aside from being independent and influential, compared to similar legislatures in developing nations (Emmert, 1983).

Assisting the president in the ‘conjugal dictatorship’ (Mijares, 1976) were favoured power groups such as technocrats (Anderson; 1988; de Dios, 1990), the armed forces (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005; Emmert, 1983), oligarchs and cronies (de Dios & Hutchcoft, 2003). As a rule, however, President Marcos defined the goals and only his approval was necessary for a proposal to be decreed, whereupon the concerned department would implement it together with the military (Mariano & Simpas, 1976).

Among executive departments, the National Economic Development Authority was the super-body, serving as the premier policymaking unit (Habito, 1998). Its internal processes were responsible for 90% of presidential decrees (Mariano & Simpas, 1976). Among these were proposals submitted by the Department of Tourism, which as Richter (1980) found out always had its way. “Tourism is a given” (p. 251) according to a NEDA official she quoted.

Indeed, DOT was very powerful institutionally relative to other actors in the tourism system. It controlled other policy sectors, defied prevailing norms, and had power over local governments over local tourism facilities. The DOT secretary sat as chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board; thus, it oversaw the country’s air transportation policy. Richter (1980) observes that DOT seemed to be exempt from regionalization and decentralization trends at that time, with its personnel growing by 300% from 1972 to 1977, when other departments had been steady or declining. It had jurisdiction over all tourism-related enterprises in the country, with the latter submitting to the authority of the DOT’s central office to inspect, license and approve their operation, as authorized by Batas Pambansa (National Law) No. 337. Control extended even to purely corporate decisions such as
opening new branches, transferring shares of stocks and licenses, to the more mundane issuance of IDs to tourism-affiliated personnel (MOT, 1986). This meant that local governments have little power over how standards on labour employment, health and safety, and others, are implemented (Richter, 1980a).

Aside from these groups and institutions, key individuals and families exerted influence in the tourism sector through their economic interests in tourism facilities. Certainly, Marcos himself nurtured key families, even as he promised to save the country from the old oligarchy that has usurped power for their own personal gain (de Dios & Hutchcroft, 2003). Prior to the declaration of martial law, oligarchs were potent forces in policymaking, reaching the zenith of their power just after WW II and before the declaration of martial law (Simbulan, 2005). In this period, they had full access to the state’s financial instrumentalities and were able to manipulate exchange rates, obtain monopolistic licenses and huge low-interest business loans (Anderson, 1988). Under martial law, only the Marcos and Romualdez families [the latter are relatives of the First Lady] had the privilege of combining both business and political influence (de Dios, 1990). These families and the cronies were assigned to specific economic sectors, allowing them the opportunity to usurp most of the country’s wealth (Almonte, 1993). Imelda Marcos’ holdings included top luxury hotels (Wideman, 1977). Tourism Secretary Aspiras himself owned several seedy motels while close appointees to political, diplomatic and academic posts possessed hotels and related establishments (Richter, 1989; Wideman, 1977).

With the administration firmly entrenched and its tourism programme supported by the elite, there was hardly opposition to tourism policy beliefs within the system. As Richter (1980a) argues, “Promotion of tourism per se displeases almost no one” (p. 5). Private-sector led organizations such as the Hotel and Restaurant Association of the Philippines had very close ties with administration, and functioned more as communication channels between government and the industry (Richter, 1980). However, there were independent groups that aired concerns about the way tourism was developing but they did not coordinate their activities as to be considered an advocacy coalition. The groups operated largely independent of each other. From within the government, some from DOT expressed disquiet about the frenetic pace of development and the opportunity cost of
concentrating funds into tourism (Richter, 1980). The religious sector showed disapproval over the negative impacts of tourism on the country’s women and children. At an international workshop on tourism in 1980, they declared that "tourism does more harm than good to people and to societies in the Third World" (Honey, 2008, p. 8). Their networking with like-minded entities in other developing nations receiving sex tourism traffic from developed countries culminated in the establishment of the Ecumenical Commission on Third World Tourism (Roekarts & Savat, 1989). Some domestic political and militant forces that wanted, *inter alia*, to terminate immediately and absolutely the Marcos dictatorship targeted tourism (Neher, 1981). The “Light-a-Fire Movement” and “April 6 Liberation Movement” for example, made it their business to burn hotels in Metro Manila. Their most infamous act was to bomb the conference of the American Society of Travel Agents which injured 20 delegates and deeply humiliated President Marcos who was seated 20 rows from where the bomb exploded (Neher, 1981; Caruncho, 2005). Nonetheless, by 1983, coalition politics had emerged with sectoral, leftist, socialist-democratic, and traditional political parties banding together to challenge the authority of the ruling power (Constantino-David, 1998; Magadia, 1999).

Clearly, tourism policy in phase one was run by a closed network of technocratic-militaristic coalition under the patronage of an autocratic president. By controlling political and economic power, backed up by the military, it was able to set an accelerated pace of tourism development geared towards the luxury market without much opposition. With the central government deeply committed, policy implementation was top-down, with directions flowing directly from the President. To some extent, there was ‘reverse learning’ instead of lesson-drawing, that is, government planners did not derive lessons from other countries how to run its tourism programme according to principles by Rose (1991) but sought instead to project a tourism programme where other developing nations could learn. For instance, there was an effort to promote “Martial Law-Filipino Style” (Richter, 1980a, p. 242). It helped that the international community responded positively to the ambitious employment of tourism as a development policy and to the innovative programmes created. For example, the “Reunion for Peace” programme geared towards U.S. veterans of the Pacific front of the Second World War and the Balikbayan (Return home) programme received wide praise (Richter, 1980a), with the United Nations
encouraging “the adoption of similar programmes elsewhere” (Richter, 1982, p. 151). The Asian Institute of Tourism within the University of the Philippines was likewise cited as a model educational unit for developing nations.

4.4 Tourism in 1986-1999 - Emergence of sustainable tourism

The recognition that the country received did not mask the negative impacts of tourism on the social fabric and on the natural environment. Nor was there a conscious effort to address them. Indeed, there was nothing in the 1977-1987 Ten-Year Development Plan to suggest the implementation of specific programmes or projects on conservation of natural resources for tourism purposes, except two innocuous lines (NEDA, 1977, p. 170) lumped with a paragraph on the development of cultural and historical assets. Moreover, the speed with which tourism superstructures was built suggests that the projects might have been granted exemptions from the environmental impact assessment system enacted just a few years ago. For example, the Folk Arts Theater which was constructed for the Miss Universe pageant in 1974 was built in 77 days of non-stop construction. Another demonstration of environmental abuse to achieve tourism objectives was the creation of an instant beach in Manila Bay, in time for the Manila International Film Festival in 1981 (Richter, 1982). Sex tourism grew rapidly, pushed by DOT’s no holds barred marketing in foreign overseas markets such as Japan (Yamashita, 2009). These include posters with pretty women with captions such as “There’s more from where she comes” (Tan et al, 1989, p. 187) and “A tanned peach on every beach” (Richter, 1999, p. 42). In Manila, it was estimated by the Ministry of Labor that up to 100,000 women were employed by the city’s hospitality industry (Richter, 1982). Provincial cities like Olangapo and Angeles that host military facilities of the U.S., also witnessed an explosion of sex tours (Jeffreys, 1999; McLellan, 2005). Some small towns were not spared either. In Pagsanjan, a tourist town in Laguna province south of Manila, paedophilia emerged as a major social problem at the height of the tourism boom in the municipality between 1981 and 1985 (Ueda et al., 2000). Learning particularly of these social impacts and how difficult “venue shift” can be (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) helped set the stage for the emergence of sustainable tourism in the 1980s, analytically phase two in the development of tourism in the country, characterized by technical and conceptual learning.
Internationally, discussion on the sustainable development of tourism has begun. A detailed history of the development of the literature is beyond the scope of this thesis (see Weaver, 2006, for a discussion) but a few triggers can be highlighted. These include analysis of tourism’s role in the degradation of the environment and cultural traditions by Krippendorf (1987). Krippendorf consequently called for “soft tourism” while Murphy (1985) called for “community-based tourism” which both espouse principles of sustainability, without explicitly using the latter term. The accretion of anomalies led the World Tourism Organization to declare at a Manila conference in 1980 that tourism resources "cannot be left uncontrolled without running the risk of their deterioration, or even destruction" (WTO, 1980, p.4). Thus, an orderly growth of tourism was called for. Subsequent to the issuance of the Brundtland Report in 1988, tourism academics and organizations (e.g., Lane, 1991; Pigram, 1990) started to employ the term ‘sustainable tourism’ to examine strategies that would lead to a more sustainable tourism sector.

These technical lessons from local tourism experiences and international discourse influenced the policy beliefs of those opposed to the Marcos administration. Thus, when Corazon Aquino from the opposition coalition took over as president in 1986, the orientation of DOT’s tourism programme changed to reflect conceptual learning. Fiorino (2001) indicates that the shift towards conceptual learning can be gleaned from a change in the scale of problem definition, the search for integrated strategies, use of consensus-based processes, and attention to new policy instruments. Successive events from this period suggest that the reforms pursued by the Aquino administration (1986-1992) and subsequently the Ramos government (1992-1998) do show a progression from technical learning to conceptual learning through to rudiments of social learning as tourism policy is implemented. Progress had been partial as government has shown a tendency to exhibit the behaviour characteristics of technical learning. Using Fiorino’s framework, details are discussed below.

4.4.1 Change in the scale of problem definition

Under the Aquino administration, the focus was amended to “correct the excesses of the Marcos years, to establish routine planning, and to assure that proper accounts were kept” (Richter, 1999, p. 42). The intention was to restore the image of tourism domestically and
overseas (Rieder, 1997), and to expand the use of tourism from primarily being a political and economic tool, to also be an instrument of social policy. A reflection of the new tourism orientation can be found in the 1987-1992 Medium Term Philippine Development Plan. Aside from the goal of maximizing the economic benefits from tourism, the Plan specifies the achievement of the following objectives: (1) a level of tourism development that is for and by the Filipino people which will improve their quality of life, promote conserve and preserve their heritage, and heighten their national identity and sense of unity (2) a level of tourism development that will optimize the utilization of indigenous resources and at the same time, protect the natural environment and preserve the country's ecological balance (3) a strong government organization that will direct, implement and coordinate the functions and resources to institutionalize the priority position of the tourism industry. Hence, for the first time, environmental considerations were integrated in tourism development. The Plan emphasizes that this would be achieved by giving importance to environmental and socio-cultural impact factors in the development of tourism areas. In addition, “consultations with local communities affected by tourism development” (NEDA, 1986, p.157) were to be held so that their welfare was given prime consideration.

These policy beliefs were further reinforced when the Aquino administration came out in 1991 with the Tourism Master Plan (TMP), a 20-year plan meant to guide the development of tourism in a more orderly, rational and sustained manner (Gabor, 1998). With the TMP noting the potential negative economic, social and environmental impacts of tourism, there was a strong emphasis towards equity and sustainability. An undersecretary of the DOT suggests that the “TMP is among the first, if not first among the pioneering government plans, that integrated and mainstreamed the sustainable development agenda” (Pantig, 1999, p. 2). Narzalina Lim, DOT secretary in 1992, summarizes the key elements of the TMP which reflected sustainability: (1) the TMP's projection for visitor arrivals had been deliberately understated based on the country's economic and population growth, as well as the foreseeable infrastructure capabilities in the country; (2) the cluster development strategy had been designed to promote regional equity by distributing tourism flows to the Visayas and Mindanao; (3) the TMP had acknowledged the limits to the future carrying capacity of the Philippine tourism industry
imposed by its economy, natural environment, and a social fabric “strained by overpopulation, extensive poverty, large regional income imbalances, and lack of livelihood opportunities outside the urban centres” (Alampay, 2005, p. 3). Clearly, there was a movement away from pure commercial pursuits of tourism towards a greater consideration of the social and environmental conditions.

4.4.2 Increased capacity for policy learning and attention to new policy instruments

Internationally, governments around this time have embraced ecotourism as a favoured form of sustainable tourism, and have programmes in the pipeline. Costa Rica and Bali, Indonesia had, respectively, the Monteverded Cloud Forest Preserve Project and the Bali Sustainable Development Project (Fennel, 2007) while Namibia went a step further by including an ‘ecotourism plank’ in its constitution when it gained independence in 1990 (Honey, 2008). Within the TMP framework of the Philippines, ecotourism also emerged as the de facto form of sustainable tourism favoured by the government and civil society. The flurry of activities on the subject following the publication of the TMP affirms this. The activities pertain mainly to increasing the capacity of government implementers to learn both technical and conceptual issues on ecotourism and consequently impose quality control mechanisms. With reference to the first, a key event was the formal introduction of the concept of ecotourism. This happened in 1992 during the second National Tourism Congress wherein Conservation International (CI) discussed ecotourism through a workshop (Buensuceso, 1999). Thus, participants were exposed to an early definition of ecotourism proffered by an NGO. At that time, CI viewed it as “a form of tourism inspired primarily by the natural history of an area, including its indigenous cultures” (Ziffer, 1989). The next year, the country played host to the 5th PATA Adventure and Ecotourism Conference and Mart. Seemingly armed with sufficient information, the DOT published in 1994 a Philippine Ecotourism Code of Ethics. According to Weaver (2006), these modes of quality control was characteristic of the early years of sustainable tourism. While not as comprehensive as those found overseas such as that developed by the Tourism Industry Association of Canada in 1995 (Fennel, 2007), they were consistent with findings by Genot (1995) that these guidelines address themselves to the three broad categories of tourists, host communities, and the tourism
industry. Thus, the Code discourages wasteful behaviour and asks the different sectors of the tourism industry to adhere to prevailing environmental standards and social acceptability requirements (“Code of ethics of RP ecotourism,” 1994). Subsequently, an Ecotourism Primer was published and Green Globe destinations were named (Gabor, 1998).

The move to name some provinces within the Green Globe network manifests another strategy within the range of quality control measures, that is, recognition (Weaver, 2006). In this period, the government institutionalized the scheme. Outstanding performers are recognized via the Kalakbay Awards, given every two years to industry players, tourism councils, and other stakeholders adjudged to provide excellent products and service. A related appreciation of excellence is the Galing-Pook Awards, administered by a private foundation, which recognizes outstanding local governance programmes. Among those that have been awarded are municipalities and provinces with programmes that have very strong ecotourism components, as either part of a coastal resource management programme (in the case of Bohol, Misamis Occidental, Batangas or Pangasinan provinces) or heritage conservation, in the case of Vigan City.

This is not to say that the state was consistent in its understanding of sustainable tourism. On the contrary, cases could be cited to show that the government displayed ambiguity of goals and development confusion. This is true particularly in the early 1990s when it was still accumulating technical and conceptual knowledge. Significantly, they are reflective of academic debates regarding the nature of sustainable tourism itself and what forms it should take. Contrasting examples illustrate this. First is the development of the Malasag Ecotourism Village in Cagayan de Oro City. Built in 1991, it was conceived as the Philippine counterpart to the world-famous gardens of Granada in Spain and Bouchart Gardens in Canada. Thus, amidst an 800-hectare forest setting, it has function rooms, an amphitheatre, swimming pool, cottages and dormitories, tribal houses, bird sanctuary. It is a massive resort and has been characterized as representative of larger-scale passive ecotourism that adhere closely to mainstream tourism (Alampay & Libosada, 2005; see also Laarman & Durst, 1987; Weaver & Lawton, 2002). Malasag’s sheer size contrasts with the smallness of ecotourism projects initiated in subsequent years such as community-based ecotourism projects across the country (e.g., Pamilacan Island in 1997.
and Ulugan Bay in 1998). Alampay and Libosada (2005) suggest that these projects are more in keeping with the niche conception of ecotourism that emerged in the literature later in the decade (see Brandon, 1996; Fennel, 2007).

Amidst growing interest in ecotourism projects by NGOs and local governments, the government returned to stricter forms of enforcement, that is, through regulation, characteristic of technical learning. DOT and the DENR issued in 1998 a joint memorandum circular to guide ecotourism development (DocNGE3). The circular outlines several criteria that emphasize small-scale infrastructure work, social acceptability, and monitoring and evaluation. Thus, in selecting sites for ecotourism projects, operators are asked to consider areas that not only provide enjoyment but also educational value and livelihood opportunities, it must be accessible, and the host community must be receptive and cooperative. In the case of protected areas, the circular mandates that the site must be located in recreational zones and other appropriate areas. In areas heavily visited by tourists such as Boracay Island, it implemented for the first time the Blue Flag system to monitor the quality of the beach made temporarily noxious by the *E. coli* bacteria in 1997. These were imposed on top of the traditional quality assurance systems created in the 1970s: the ECC and EIA systems of the DENR. The intent is to ensure the integrity of the environment through mitigation measures if necessary.

Briefly, in 1998, the DOT moved the discourse to a more conceptual level by defining the building blocks of sustainable tourism development in the Philippines using indigenous concepts. The framework identifies the Filipino value of ‘kapwa tao’ (fellow human being) as central to the tenets of equality and interdependence espoused by sustainable development. This concept allows the Filipino, the DOT explained, to accept responsibility and be accountable by giving glory to the creator (‘pagdakila’), according respect to others (‘paggalang’) and valuing human life and legacy (‘pagpapahalaga’). The DOT argued that these traits are enhanced by giving due course to ecology, character, and way of life. Together, these moral values underpin the development of tourism products.

"Thus, tourism is sustainable when it dignifies and makes people proud of it because people treat each other well (‘ikinararangal dahil may pakikipagkapwa’); it satisfies the customer because there is a lot of caring (‘ikinalulugod dahil may pagkalinga’); and it
promotes well-being because it brings out the best in every Filipino (‘may katiwasayan at kagalingan’) (Pantig, 1999, p. 5).

The depth and rapidity with which these actions came out seem to illustrate increased understanding of the viability of ecotourism for the country, an indication of instrumental learning (May, 1992), even as Fennel (2007) argues that ecotourism was possible long before the 1980s with work by Budowski (1976) and Miller (1978) on eco-development. At the same time, the quality control measures specific to tourism is recognition of the limitations of individual policy instruments to sustain it. This shows that technical learning on sustainable tourism within the Philippine context developed alongside conceptual learning, and is not necessarily a pre-cursor to it, as conceptualized in the literature (Fiorino, 2001; Glasbergen, 1996).

4.4.3 Search for integrated strategies

In contrast with disparate tourism plans used during the Marcos administration (Rieder, 1997), the Aquino government concerned itself with formulating an integrated approach to tourism development and streamlining the tourism bureaucracy made fat by patronage politics (MOT, 1986). These are in line with views in the literature that if sustainable tourism were to develop, it must be secured by sound policies embedded in national plans which themselves must be integrated with a comprehensive framework (Dodds, 2007b; Harrison, 1994; Ioannides, 1995). Thus, in the early years of its administration, it prepared rolling annual National Tourism Plans prepared with the private sector (Rieder, 1997). In 1988, it got the support of WTO and UNDP in preparing the 20-year Tourism Master Plan. In addition, when President Ramos took over in 1992 until 1998, regional tourism master plans were drafted for regions with high tourism potentials such as the Cordilleras (Dulnuan, 2005). Similar to the structure of tourism plans prepared in other countries (see WTO, 1994), these plans are comprehensive, containing detailed background analyses, a hierarchy of objectives, key strategies on marketing, human resources development, etc., as well as land-use and infrastructure plans.

When the Philippine Agenda 21 (PA 21) came out in 1995, specific references were made to ecotourism as one of the favoured strategies to manage coastal and marine ecosystems (Israel, 2003). PA 21 similarly calls for greater coordination of policies among national
government agencies such as DENR and DOT, and local governments concerning near-shore areas, beckoning them to prepare coastal zone management plans to delineate which areas are intended for mangrove, reclamation or ecotourism purposes. NGOs and local governments adopted these mechanisms in earnest, and a number of them initiated their own individual projects (Alampay & Libosada, 2005; Green, 2002; Pajaro, 1997). Thus, tourism development was integrated with the larger ecosystem to which it is highly dependent.

4.4.4 Expansion of policy subsystem and concomitant creation of new institutional arrangements

With broader policy goals to implement, the DOT and DENR finally saw it fit to collaborate, albeit on a ‘loose-coupling’ basis (Weick, 1976). An initial effort, though narrow in focus, was in 1993, through their joint membership in the Inter-Agency Task Force on Marine Mammal Conservation, along with those from the academe and civil society, to address issues regarding the protection of cetaceans. A joint memorandum circular issued in 1998 addressed gaps in the institutional management of ecotourism, a crevice deepened by the devolution of national government functions to local governments via the Local Government Code of 1991, and hitherto inadequately addressed by joint attendance to meetings on specific environmental matters (Libosada, 1998). The circular established a steering committee composed of senior officials of DOT and DENR as well as representatives from the private sector, to serve as the key policymaking body. A National Ecotourism Committee and Regional Ecotourism Committees were created as support organizations, while an Ecotourism Monitoring and Evaluation Team was tasked to evaluate and implement ecotourism projects (DocNGE3). However, many of the provisions are vague. For example, the circular did not clarify the relationship among the ecotourism bodies, delineate organizational boundaries, or provide operational definitions of the criteria to evaluate proposed sites. Evidently, more work needed to be done. Thus, DOT and DENR agreed that the circular was to be interpreted in the interim as an ‘initiating policy’ (UN-ESCAP, 1999) until a more detailed policy was devised. Such as policy was eventually enacted in 1999, via Executive Order No. 111, that named a lot more organizations into the policymaking body including representatives from the NGO sector, academe, and the business community.
Compared to having almost no role in formal policymaking during the initial phase, the private sector has been given prominence. Post 1986, the moribund tourism associations were revitalized and invited to help formulate and implement annual rolling tourism plans (Rieder, 1997). They were also involved in consultations regarding the preparation of tourism master plans and named in the boards of key government-owned and controlled corporations dedicated to tourism such as the Philippine Convention Visitors Corporation. They sat as members of countless organizing committees and various presidential commissions to develop tourism (Gabor, 1998), particularly during the incumbency of President Ramos who greatly emphasized teamwork and participatory processes (Habito, 1998).

A late addition to the subsystem but nonetheless making significant inroads is the NGO sector. The enlargement of the policy subsystem to accommodate them is recognition of their strength in implementing ecotourism programmes. From the NGO sector emerged pioneering ecotourism programmes. For example, the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, one of the biggest and oldest NGOs in the country, has developed its EcoDev Tour programme and has been running it in several provinces since 1995 (Gatbonton, 1999). WWF was a member of Inter-Agency Task Force on Marine Mammal Conservation that developed cetacean interaction tours in Pamilacan Island, Bohol in 1997, and whale shark tours in Donsol, Sorsogon in 1998, aside from conceptualizing tourism programmes in the Tubbataha Reef National Marine Park in Palawan. They frequently work with local governments, people’s organizations and donor agencies. This collaboration has resulted in the growth of ecotourism programmes all over the country. For instance, Alampay and Libosada (2005), in a classification of various ecotourism projects in the country using 1999 survey data, counted a total of 322 ventures in operation or in the pipeline around the country (see Table 4-1 below).
Table 4.2: Summary of ecotourism programmes in the Philippines by location and by type of tourism resource base

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tourism resource*</th>
<th>Luzon</th>
<th>Visayas</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine ecosystem</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freshwater</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural sites</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manmade</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alampay & Libosada, 2005, p.138

*Categories
Marine - marine-protected areas, coral reefs, islands, beaches, bays
Terrestrial - mountains, volcanoes, caves, trails, forest areas
Freshwater - lakes, rivers, hot and cold springs, waterfalls
Cultural - churches, historic sites, festivals
Manmade - urban parks, reforestation sites

The preceding discussion on the enhanced role of non-state actors in the policy process points to the government learning of its own shortcoming. However, instead of hierarchical integration predicted by Etheredge and Short (1983), policy makers manifested superior intelligence by increasing their capacity for social learning. This meant a more open horizontal exchange of communication with other policy actors (Kooiman, 1993). Thus, since 1986, DOT has increasingly allowed the private sector and the NGO sector to permeate its governance structure. In other words, by making some institutional adjustments, the DOT has implemented tourism policy jointly and severally with them. Kröger (2005) suggests that these institutional changes represent second-order policy learning or change.

Fiorino (2001) states that social learning involves an acceptance of capacity constraints. Hence, there is recognition of uncertainty, misunderstanding, gaps in knowledge and consequently how problems are to be solved (Glasbergen, 1996). Among local academics and practitioners in the 1990s, an awareness of this gap started to emerge. For example, Libosada (1998) noted major misconceptions on the nature of ecotourism by local governments. He recounted meeting officials proclaiming "we have ecotourism in our place. There are thousands of birds there and we can go hunting and killing hundreds of
them” (p. 50). In addition, Sinha (1997) identified knowledge gaps in ecotourism practice in the country, listing them according to priorities. The first was to conduct resource assessments and inventories of ecotourism areas, compile studies of ecotourism sites and to undertake institutional and policy studies on ecotourism; second was to carry out feasibility studies on ecotourism development; third was to determine the impacts of ecotourism. Viray (1995) questioned the applicability of ecotourism as an economic strategy by communities and local governments in light of knowledge gaps and potential negative externalities.

The accretion of anomalies in tourism practices during the Marcos regime, change in administration and subsequent shift in locus of power, and the re-orientation of the tourism programme from pure commercialism, and the way a new tourism policy is implemented all suggest a “paradigm shift” or third-order learning and change (Hall, 1993). In terms of descriptive policy network analysis, this learning shift brought enormous changes in the balance of resources and power within the tourism policy system. Resource endowments by individual policy actors were modified and accordingly the power they enjoy were enhanced or diminished. These are explored in the succeeding sections.

4.4.5 Loss of centralized resources and power

A big casualty in the change of governing structure was the DOT itself. As the successor Aquino administration moved to impose fiscal discipline and correct the excesses of the Marcos administration, it stripped the DOT of some its powers. For instance, under Executive Order 120 and 125-A, the Civil Aeronautics Board was removed from the administrative oversight of DOT, and its chairmanship transferred to the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, respectively. Consequently, DOT’s option to tie the fortunes of the domestic tourism industry to a liberal air transportation policy, so important in an archipelago like the Philippines, was lost. In addition, automatic appropriations from various revenue-generating units were reduced. DOT and its attached agencies, like other regular line agencies, have had to fight in Congress for its share of the national budget. Thus, even if it receives funds from duty free earnings, hotel
room tax, and travel tax, the department is not self-sufficient to meet its requirements (Gabor, 1998).

The final straw was the enactment of the Local Government Code in 1991. The Code devolved responsibility over tourism facilities and tourist attractions to cities and municipalities including powers to acquire equipment, regulate and supervise business concessions, and provide security services. Tourism development and marketing functions have been devolved as well. In effect, the Code transfers management control over tourism facilities to local governments, gives them freedom to make improvements on them or to build their own without prior blessing from the national government. This task was an important regulatory function of the DOT during the Marcos period. Importantly, the Code restores the power of local governments over local tourism businesses, including the licensing of tour guides and tourist transport. The only regulatory power left with DOT, if it can be called that, is the authority to endorse tourism development projects to other national agencies for investment incentives, issuance of environmental clearance certificate, land conversion, or availment of special investor’s visa (“Devolution,” 1993). Indeed, DOT was emasculated (Gabor, 1998), even though the ratio of its devolved budget to pre-devolution budget is comparatively low at 1.33% (Manasan, 2002). Mariano (1993), echoing concerns by the travel industry over possible deterioration in quality of products and services, suggests that decentralization appears a step backwards. This view is corroborated by former Tourism Secretary Gordon’s lament that the tourism development plans of the Aquino administration, as embodied by the TMP, “did not take off as these were overtaken by the Local Government Code” (Senate of the Philippines, 2005, p. 559). This is because the LGC allowed local governments to deviate from the TMP, particularly in the area of following environmental regulations (Achacoso-Sevilla, 2003).

A consequence of DOT’s weakened state is an increased reliance on coordination with empowered local governments and other national agencies to meet its goals. The result has been mixed. In places where local governments are sufficiently knowledgeable on the complexity of tourism and have the financial and manpower resources, partnerships seem to work. Conversely, where local governments are ignorant and/or, worse, elected officials display contempt for the law, the influence of DOT is hardly felt. Consequently,
policy implementation falters and observations that both Philippine central and local
governments constitute a weak or patrimonial state (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005;
Hutchison, 2001; Miranda, 1997) are reinforced. This is illustrated by the case of Boracay
Island where the local government was observed to have been slow to adopt ordinances to
implement guidelines on resort construction, zoning, and other environmental
requirements envisioned in the Boracay Island Master Development Plan developed by
DOT in 1990 (Trousdale, 1999). The result of this procrastination was the coliform scare
in 1997 that nearly brought the island to its knees. Worse, some resorts that violated
national environmental regulations such as setback rules and height restrictions were
found to have been owned by elected councillors who were supposed to craft the local
enabling legislation (Achacoso-Sevilla, 2003). In addition, the proposal by central
government to establish a Boracay Development Authority to manage the island has gone
awry due to insistence by local government officials to have it under their control. Thus,
it can be argued that when there is a convergence of public and private interest as happens
in clientelistic relations (de Dios, 1990; Lloyd, 2003; Sidel, 1989), or lack of
understanding at the local level, efforts by national government to achieve national policy
objectives can be thwarted.

4.4.6 Empowered but limping local governments

Clearly, the foregoing section shows that much of policy implementation now rests with
the knowledge and cooperation of local governments. However, they themselves are beset
by resource constraints that hinder their ability to fund services devolved to them and at
the level they prefer them to be. Manasan (2007) provides an excellent assessment of
LGU finances post-LGC. She finds that the share of LGU expenditure as a share of
government expenditure has doubled from 11% to 21.2%. Yet because of limited fiscal
autonomy given to LGUs, unpredictability in intergovernmental transfers, and low access
to private capital, the share of LGU own-source revenue in total general government
revenue rose by just two percentage points. Manasan avers that these figures point to a
misalignment between revenue powers and devolved expenditure responsibilities. The
situation is no different in areas co-managed by multiple stakeholders (including local
governments) such as protected areas. Entry fees to these areas are excessively low to
finance operations. Moreover, the fees are sometimes deposited with the central
government, and procedures to tap them too bureaucratic, making them inaccessible to improve local parks (Lockwood, 1999). Thus, LGUs in general have limited financial capacity to engage in tourism development.

This financial deficiency is exacerbated by the lack of skilled personnel. Rodolfo (2005) notes that notwithstanding the increased national enrolment in tourism courses and allied fields, the number of graduates capable of assuming managerial positions with strong orientation in research and product development is still scarce. Aside from the narrow graduate base, a further constraint is the lack of plantilla position for tourism officers, except for highly urbanized cities and municipalities. Nonetheless, local chief executives are given the prerogative to select one, but on a co-terminus basis with him (Philippine News Agency, 2008). Given that local elections are held every three years, this means that the tourism officer assigned changes with the political wind. Thus, only those with enough resources among local governments have dedicated permanent personnel to learn the ropes of tourism and have the time to apply them. This explains why local governments in general have been accused of ignorance particularly of general sustainable development principles (Cruz, 2005) and on ecotourism matters (Libosada, 1998).

4.4.7 A strong NGO sector funded by donor agencies

As noted above, NGOs have made a significant impact on tourism policy implementation through their partnerships with local communities and local governments. They have done a good job of quietly assimilating themselves into the tourism system via environmental programmes with active ecotourism components. Their legitimacy is derived from constitutionally-sanctioned membership in local policy planning bodies.

Quite often, international aid agencies and multinational corporations provide funding assistance. For instance, the United States Agency for International Development provided the capital to start the Olango Birds and Seascape Tour in Cebu, a component of the coastal resources management programme of the DENR (White & Rosales, 2003). The WWF initially implemented the whale watching project in Pamilacan in the 1990s funded by Citibank and DOT, before the New Zealand Agency for International Development took over. Earlier in the 1980s, WTO and UNDP formulated the Tourism
Master Plan. By themselves, these agencies are seen as constituting a new block of influence (University of the Philippines-Centre for Integrative and Development Studies, 1994). These developments are consistent with views by Tosun and Jenkins (1998) who observe that “Until a country reaches a certain stage of development, and depending on the importance of tourism in the economy, substantive tourism planning is usually donor-assistance driven” (p. 112).

Philippine NGOs have parlayed their political legitimacy and resource endowment to engage other actors in conceptual learning. This is done by serving as conduits for coercive and voluntary policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). Thus, just as NGOs have done in other countries, local NGOs have used ecotourism as a strategy to co-opt communities into giving up traditional environmentally destructive practices (see Foucat, 2002, for Mexico; Svoronou & Holden, 2005, for Greece). An excellent example on local shores is the whale-watching project in Pamilacan Island, Bohol Province. On the national level, it was CI that initially oriented local policy implementers of the utility of ecotourism as a conservation tool, suggesting that it can be used to finance protected areas, provide alternative livelihood for steward communities, and create economic value for intact ecosystems (Hillel, 1999).

4.5 Tourism in 1999 - present: Consolidation and institutionalization of sustainable tourism

The third phase of Philippine tourism policy implementation can be characterized as continuation of efforts at social learning. As discussed below, there was a crystallization of the gains achieved in the previous period, that is, further expansion of civil society participation in tourism policymaking and recognition of the challenges to sustainability of tourism. As most elements of conceptual learning apply to social learning (Fiorino, 2001), there was also a concern to strengthen policy implementation structures and to search for comprehensive approaches. All throughout, the search for improved policy means or instrumental learning has not been abandoned, particularly when there is dissatisfaction by a policy actor of a given situation.

With the proliferation of ecotourism programmes in the 1990s, the consequent destructive effects of misconceptions and lack of knowledge by local officials (Libosada, 1998;
Viray, 1995), and the creation of an initiating policy in 1999 to define ecotourism, it was felt that a more coherent and comprehensive approach had to be devised (Sinha, 1997). Thus, working on the belief that environmental considerations needed to be integrated in tourism and key challenges mentioned above have to be met (NEDA, 2001), social learning was intensified. A comprehensive approach to policymaking was adopted. The most significant output in this phase was the National Ecotourism Strategy (NES) and the National Ecotourism Plan (NEP). The processes involved in its formulation and implementation demonstrate social learning. These are examined in the following sections.

4.5.1 Collaborative approach in the formulation and implementation of the ecotourism strategy

In line with the new practice developed in the 1990s, government, business and civil society worked together to create a roadmap for the development of ecotourism in the country. A first activity was to agree to a common definition of what it is, as until then it was conceived in various manners by local groups depending on one’s emphasis (Libosada & Alampay, 2005; Pajaro, 1997). Thus, at a national workshop in Bohol province in October 1999, the 394 multi-sectoral delegates agreed to view ecotourism as a form of sustainable tourism within a natural and cultural heritage area where community participation, protection and management of natural resources, culture and indigenous knowledge and practices, environmental education and ethics as well as economic benefits are fostered and pursued for the enrichment of host communities and satisfaction of visitors. (DOT et al., 2002, p. 105)

This definition has a much broader scope over earlier definitions proffered by CI when it introduced ecotourism in the country back in 1992. For one, it includes benefits to host communities as a key dimension. It thus represents technical learning, reflective of theoretical developments in the ecotourism academic field. At around this time, conceptions of ecotourism have evolved from basic definitions in the 1980s, with some later ones incorporating host community benefits as a key dimension (Fennel, 2007; Donohoe & Needham, 2006). The discussion has also involved referencing the broader discourse on sustainable development in order to identify strategies to make the tourism sector sustainable (Weaver, 2006).
Consistent with this development, the local definition was subsequently used as the platform to articulate vision and mission statements in the strategy. It was employed to define strategic goals pertaining to ecotourism products, markets, community benefits and visitor experience (Buensuceso, 1999). Later, the New Zealand Official Development Assistance (NZODA, later renamed NZAID) was approached to provide funding assistance to craft a more detailed rendering of the strategy as well as design a programme to complement it. NZODA agreed to provide a grant of NZD300,000. Using a highly participative method of gathering inputs from local stakeholders characteristic of social learning, the Ecotourism Technical Working Group together with NZODA consultants conducted consultation workshops around the 15 regions of the country from February through to September 2001. Such a scale of consultation has never been done in the preparation of a national tourism plan before. The workshops sought to gather participants from local tourism associations, municipal and provincial governments, NGOs, indigenous groups, and other organizations involved in tourism and environmental programmes. Participants’ number varied from a low of 18 in Baguio City in northern Philippines to a high of 43 in Davao City, southern Philippines. Eventually, the enormous suggestions generated were condensed to a more manageable level during the National Ecotourism Planning Workshop in November 2001. With 120 delegates, the workshop discussed the common issues and concerns broached at the lower levels. Refined in subsequent meetings of the National Ecotourism Steering Committee, the NES and NEP were launched before 480 delegates to the Second Ecotourism Congress in 2002.

The key outlines of this collaborative output is an action plan that revolves around key ecotourism sites, product development, marketing and promotions, education and advocacy, support programme, national ecotourism fund, and monitoring and evaluation systems. It was designed to be implemented from 2002 through to 2012 in three time frames (short-, medium-, long-term). In the course of this period, 11 banner sites from 32 key sites are to be developed. The banner sites are those seen to serve as model projects and hence are priorities in development. A mixture of protected and non-protected areas, terrestrial and marine ecosystems, they are the Cordillera Rice Terraces, Mt Pinatubo, Tagaytay/Taal Volcano, El Nido archipelago, Puerto Princesa Underground River, Tubbataha Reefs National Marine Park, Mt. Kanlaon, the whole island of Bohol, Tanon
Strait, the whole island of Misamis Oriental, and Mt. Apo. Refer to Figure 4-1 below. Fifty-five (55) other sites are classified as emerging and potential sites. Twelve (12) itineraries are suggested, although questions can be raised on their viability.

**Figure 4.1: Banner ecotourism sites under the National Ecotourism Strategy**
The management methods of the strategy are reflective of social learning in that implementation was intended to be on the basis of cooperation and increased interaction among stakeholders. The first method is networking. Here, two types are conceived. First is the clustering of ecotourism sites based on similarity and complementarity; second is simply the establishment of a communication network involving individuals and organizations keen on ecotourism. The goal is to use the network as the backbone to facilitate communication exchange, particularly technical information, to and from various organizations located in different planes of governance. To be at the center of the network is the National Ecotourism Programme Office (NEPO). Emulation as form of lesson-drawing from overseas (Rose, 1991) is explicit in this arrangement, as the aim was to establish networks that work just as successfully as the Australian Ecotourism Association, Adventure Tourism Council in New Zealand, and Sustainable Tourism Network in Nepal (DOT et al., 2002). An example of a technical learning activity coordinated by NEPO is the formulation of a more rigorous form of quality control, that is, ecotourism standards that cover product offerings, services and accommodation, as well as certification and accreditation systems (Weaver, 2006). For this activity, a tourism accreditation consultant from Australia was tapped. Study tours of Malaysia and New Zealand were also arranged for members of the technical working groups and steering committees.

The second involves combining a top-down and bottom-up approach. However, these concepts are defined in ways that are different from those described by Elmore (1985), Sabatier (1986) and others who proposed synthetic policy implementation models. Instead, NES collaborators saw the “top-down” process to “focus on developing, managing and marketing the network of key ecotourism sites; and set standards to regulate and monitor ecotourism operation" (DOT et al., 2002, p. 50). This process is seen to channel resources downward from the central government to the regions. The “bottom-up” approach, meanwhile, aims to stimulate local communities and the private sector into joining by creating mechanisms for them to participate. It no doubt follows on from the experience of a highly-praised ecotourism programme in Ulugan Bay, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. Here, ecotourism plans were formed based on the initiatives of the five barangays and two ancestral domains in the area. The plans were later on
integrated into the city’s conservation and development programme (Alampay & Libosada, 2005; Cater & Cater, 2007).

This method is in line with current international arrangements where, as Vernon et al. (2005) observe, quoting Hall (2000), the public sector’s traditional “top-down” approach has been partially supplanted by decentralized governance structures where private businesses and local communities co-manage with government institutions. Lauber and Brown (2006) suggest that learning is an important part of these mechanisms. This is apparent in the management of protected areas and wildlife. In the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan 2004-2008, the programme thrust of the office in charge, the Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau (PAWB), is to focus and strengthen the protection of vulnerable and ecologically-fragile areas. Thus, it has committed to promote ecotourism in the 29 protected areas that are included in the National Ecotourism Plan. One strategy it has employed is to enter into memorandum of agreements with local government units and protected area management boards whose territorial boundaries fall within or straddle protected areas. Through this mode, it has managed to transfer the management and maintenance of Hundred Islands National Park to the city government of Alaminos, and establish Mt. Musuan Zoological Park and Botanical Garden in Central Mindanao in partnership with a local university. Similar cooperative arrangements have been forged in eight other national parks around the country. A constant feature is its collaborative arrangement in regard to species conservation and biodiversity conservation programmes. It has partnered with foundations and private businesses to protect species such as the Philippine eagle, marine turtles, tamaraw, crocodile, cloud rat, breeding-heart pegions, owl, cockatoo and raptors. These arrangements have been reiterated recently with the issuance by PAWB of Memorandum Circular No. 2006-01 in order to guide business planning and product development in protected areas. The memorandum exhorts park superintendents to work with the private sector and local communities at the planning stage to ensure the viability of tour programmes.

4.5.2 Institutional arrangements

Glasbergen (1996) suggests that social learning is distinguished by a high degree of structural openness, that is, relationships between regulator and target participants are
transparent and permeable. One way this was integrated into tourism policymaking systems in the country was to create structures that enable continuous dialogue between state and non-state actors. Such a formal structure was created by the ‘initiating policy’ or the memorandum circular jointly issued by the DENR and DOT in 1998. Learning that it was inadequate, the more detailed and authoritative Executive Order No. 111 (EO 111) was enacted in 1999.

EO 111 was both symbolic and definitive. According to former Tourism Undersecretary Pantig, its issuance by President Estrada suggests that finally ecotourism is being recognized “as a government agenda for sustainable tourism” (Pantig, 1999, p. 7). The order improves on the joint memorandum circular of the previous year in terms of institutional arrangement for ecotourism by including in the structure other departments deemed important in the formulation and implementation of ecotourism policy. A National Ecotourism Development Council (NEDC) composed of seven cabinet secretaries (Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources, Interior and Local Government, Trade and Industry, Finance, National Economic and Development Authority, and Education), NGO representatives and the private sector, was created to be the chief policymaking body; a National Ecotourism Steering Committee (NESC) comprised of two undersecretaries from DOT and DENR, five bureau directors, and private sector and NGO representatives, was designated to run day-to-day affairs. An Ecotourism Technical Working Group (ETWG) was attached to NESC to provide staff support. The Working Group is composed of personnel from various agencies of government. At the regional level, DOT and DENR regional directors were joined by civil society representatives and local government units in the Regional Ecotourism Council (REC). As a result, EO 111 at face value seems to have created a more systematic and integrated multi-level ‘implementation structure’ (Hjern & Porter, 1981) to coordinate and direct ecotourism development. Certainly, it moves ecotourism away from the exclusive domain of the DOT or the DENR towards a more cooperative structure. Thus, the ability of either agency to impose their own ideologies is countered by the influence of other organizations. The working relationship of these organizations is presented below (Figure 4-2). There are coordination and implementation issues, however, and these are discussed in relevant sections below.
It must be emphasized that the entire DOT or DENR administrative machinery is not involved in ecotourism. To the contrary, just a few of the 558 DOT personnel are relied upon, with all doing tasks in programmes other than ecotourism. The pattern is similar to those described by scholars of matrix organizations (Hjern & Porter, 1981). Thus, for the DOT, the planning and promotion sector is heavily engaged, but some offices such as the Administrative Service are excluded. The Directors of the Office of Tourism Development Planning, Office of Product Research and Development, and Office of Tourism Standards, along with the Undersecretary for Planning and Promotions, sit in the NESC. Here, they are joined by the DENR Undersecretary for Policy and Technical Services, the Director of the Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau (PAWB); and from DILG, the Director of the Bureau of Local Government Development. From the DENR side, it is mainly the Nature Recreation and Extension Division of PWAB that is involved.

The NES divides the work between DOT and DENR. Functions assigned follow traditional lines. It says DOT shall take on the responsibility of marketing the ecotourism products, product development, manpower training and awareness campaigns. Product
development is a bit of a misnomer here because succeeding pages reveal that this does not refer to infrastructure development or anything that connotes building of concrete structures, roads and other hardware. Instead, it pertains to the development of standards, regulation and accreditation system; adoption of internationally-recognized ecotourism icons; development and institutionalization of ecotourism ethics; classification of products and grading of activities; and creation of institutional guidelines and educational modules for ecotourism planning and development. This attention to “software” confirms observations that DOT now sees itself more as a coordinating and marketing body (Alampay, 2005), particularly after its licensing and regulatory functions over tourism establishments were devolved to LGUs by the Local Government Code of 1991. Thus, when it comes to infrastructure requirements important to tourism in general, DOT would just advocate, powerless, as it were, to implement. As former Tourism Secretary Gemma Cruz-Araneta laments, infrastructure and the modernization of airports, through critical to tourism, are "not really in our realm of authority" (Achacoso-Sevilla, 2003, p.87). A retired undersecretary affirms this, stating that “The only time we are able to engage in infrastructure work is when it is expressly mandated by Congress” (IntM6). As for DENR, it is made to focus on resource management, livelihood programmes for the community, extension services, training, monitoring and managing impact. These responsibilities were cemented when both agencies signed a Memorandum of Agreement on June 2004. In-between DOT and DENR are shared responsibilities to make the multi-sectoral EO 111 bodies work.

An odd feature of the institutional arrangement is the leadership structure. While EO 111 vests the chairmanship of NEDC to the DOT secretary, with DENR as the co-chair, it also orders that the positions be rotated between the two every three years. Thus, from 1999 through to January 2004, DOT served as chairman; from 2004 through to January 2007, it was the turn of DENR, until it was turned over again to DOT in February 2007. The National Ecotourism Programme Office (NEPO), the home base of NESC and ETWG, also has to change locations (i.e., set up office where the chairman is) as the leadership changes. The same system governs the leadership of NESC and RECs. The arrangement is certainly novel but it has brought a lot of logistical issues to the fore (IntM10; IntM11).
4.5.3 The long shadow of an old landscape

Lauber and Brown (2006) emphasize that the transition from technical through to social learning is not an easy process. This is because the process does not just involve the mere changing of beliefs by the coalition, but alterations in other mechanisms as well. According to Sabatier (1988), other processes involved in policy-oriented learning include individual learning, the spread of new beliefs and attitudes, change in the membership of the governing coalition, and changes in the rules of the game. These numerous processes suggest that complete social learning does not automatically follow advances in a given mechanism.

In the evolution of Philippine tourism policy implementation processes, such transition difficulties are obvious, as some traditional institutional practices characteristic of technical learning have persisted, even as interaction and communication among actors have deepened. This is shown in the division of major functions in ecotourism development between DOT and DENR along traditional lines, suggesting a minimal concern for cross-fertilization and hence, individual learning. Members of ETWG do however admit of having gained some understanding of how those in other departments worked, brought about by their increased interaction. “We were used to wildlife conservation…having been involved allowed us to know how tourism promotion is done” (IntM10; IntM11). But perhaps the most palpable demonstration of the transition difficulty is the continued presence of patrimonial or weak state features. In other words, despite writers (e.g., Abinales & Amoroso, 2005; David, 2008a, 2008b; de Dios & Hutchcroft, 2003) pointing out in academic books and popular media the detrimental effects of converging personal interests and official duties, the practice persists into the 21st century. A contemporary example is the case of the Mayor of Panglao Island, a tourist haven in Bohol province, who was charged by the DENR because the resort he owned had violated environmental standards which the municipality he headed was supposed to implement (Chiu, 2006). A more recent example is the case of the Korean resort found to have been constructed in 2007 along the crater of the Taal Volcano. Being a protected area and a permanent danger zone, the volcano and lake around it are off-limits to construction of any type; however, the resort was able to get off the ground even without the necessary national clearances and environmental certificates from the
volcanology institute and DENR; it merely relied on the Mayor’s permit who clearly overstepped his authority (Cruz, 2009; Burgonio, 2007). The Filipino sociologist Randy David (2008a; 2008b) argues that these difficulties are part of the complexities of a traditional society in the middle of a transition to a more modern state. They have endured because the conditions under which they arose such as great inequality and economic and personal insecurity have remained (Kerkvliet, 1995). It has been emphasized that unless these conditions are addressed, clientelistic practices in the everyday life of the nation will persist, and sustainable growth will be elusive (Hutchcroft, 1998).

4.5.4 Cooperative powers in a bed of scarcity

The development of the National Ecotourism Strategy, analytically the highlight of phase three in the development of Philippine tourism, underscores some tourism policy network dimensions. These dimensions include changing rules of the game, resource constraints, and power structures. Certainly, cooperation among stakeholders as a rule of the game has been institutionalized. DOT has codified its willingness to work with a number of government agencies particularly DENR and DA, to drive the sustainable development of the country’s natural tourism assets. Through mechanisms created by EO 111, there is also close collaboration with NGOs, the private sector and local communities.

Nonetheless, increased collaboration has made little dent on some challenges facing sustainable tourism policy implementation. Critical resources such as finance and human resources remain in short supply. A programme as huge as the NEP certainly needs funds. However, discussion on the subject is ominously thin and certainly no figures are mentioned. This contrasts sharply with the financial commitment of countries which have developed their own ecotourism plans. Australia, for example, announced $10 million to develop a national ecotourism strategy to be implemented over 10 years while Brazil announced a $200 million programme to develop its own (Honey, 2008). NEP assumes that new allocations are not forthcoming, believing naively that maximum results can still be squeezed from present sources “by focusing and coordinating the efforts of agencies that can support ecotourism” (DOT et al., 2002, p. 52). Hence, projects are to rely on existing budget allocations. Prophetically, there was no direct allocation for ecotourism programmes in the General Appropriations Act. The ecotourism fund envisioned in the
NES has failed to take off. Not even the recent appointment of the tourism secretary as senior cabinet member in 2002, implying that tourism would be accorded higher priority given the preponderance and moral ascendancy in policymaking the position creates (Palabyab, 2004), could increase DOT’s budget allocation to more than 0.23% of total government appropriations, the highest proportion of the budget it received way back in 1998. Likewise, even within DOT, the implementation of the strategy has not been directly prioritized financially. For example, even if the 2007 DOT budget increased by 148% over the 2003 level, the first year of NEP implementation, most of it went to marketing (64% of 2003 budget). The same absence is notable in the PAWB budget. Whatever support extended has been given in kind, for example, assignment of personnel and equipment, and indirectly through the general marketing efforts of DOT, and general environmental improvement and species conservation programme of PAWB and other agencies of DENR.

An exception is the Grassroots Entrepreneurship and Employment in Tourism (GREET) programme. In 2008, the DOT allocated 10,000,000 pesos to finance the programme. It aims to provide grants of up to 50,000 pesos to groups or individual entrepreneurs. Despite the minimal amount, it has attracted the attention of a variety of applicants: individuals, cooperatives, local governments, people’s organizations from around the country, having received more than 400 applications for projects that ranged from the production and selling of handicraft and souvenir items, food, native wine; provision of equipment for tour programmes such as kayaking; training programmes; to the development of marketing materials. It has effectively taken the place of the ecotourism fund. Its administration, however, is a curious case, because within the DOT family, its implementation has been assigned to the Philippine Convention and Visitors Corporations, its marketing arm whose expertise is to execute the country’s international tourism marketing campaigns. In addition, RECs do not seem to be involved in evaluating project proposals, that is, whether the projects conform to the overall vision of the ecotourism region, indicating the inutility of the regional body.

To augment the overall finance gaps, DOT has made it official policy to tap official development assistance (NEDA, 2001). Indeed, donors from overseas have taken up the slack for the government. Spain, through the Agencia Española de Cooperacion
Internationale, funded the preparation of the Vigan Master Development Plan. UNDP provided a modest USD5,000 that enabled many local governments to produce their own ecotourism brochures. NZAID has funded the formulation and implementation of the NEP through a sizable grant of NZ1,550,000. These projects come on the heels of ODA funding in the 1990s such as the sustainable development plan in Northern Palawan, and OECF and CIDA for Boracay’s environmental management programme (Gabor, 1998). Calimag (1997) details other financial and technical support provided by foreign-donors in protected area management that arguably have benefited ecotourism.

Compounding the resource deficiencies are shortages in manpower of key law enforcement agencies that stymie tourism policy implementation. The Philippine Navy, for example, is tasked to enforce the state’s coastal and maritime laws, including laws that regulate fishing by commercial fishers. Such vessels are sometimes known to negatively affect the behaviour and population of whales and dolphins which have become popular objects of ecotourism activities (refer to Chapter Six for detailed discussions). Yet, the Navy’s total manpower complement for 2006 is just around 25,000 (DocNGG1), for a very low ratio of approximately 3 Navy personnel to patrol each of the country’s more than 7,107 islands. This is indeed pathetic for a country with a coastline that is longer than the United States. In addition, the national police, the enforcer of fishery laws within municipal waters, have been reported to be seriously lacking in firearms. A newspaper reports that of 125,000 members, only 51, 242 have weapons (“No firepower,” 2009, p. 6) indicating a serious handicap to fight law violators, for instance, fishers who shoot dolphins with deadly weapons (Mallari, 2009; Papa, 2008).

Indeed, key players that directly affect tourism policy implementation seem hobbled by resource constraints or not aggressive enough to pursue sustainable tourism. That DOT has focused on the ‘software’ confirms its weak power relative to other agencies within the government system.

Nonetheless, within the tourism system, the government represented by DOT remains a strong actor, serving as the principal power in the network of tourism organizations involved in policy implementation. As the fulcrum, it has directed collaborative efforts to shape a way forward for sustainable tourism, though the NES and NEP. It has also
learned to live with the emergence of other government agencies whose official mandates impinge on tourism development particularly in developing new policy instruments, and to work with non-state actors in implementing programmes.

In the latter’s case, NGOs and local communities have truly stepped up. The challenge for NGOs is how to maximise the utilization of existing formal mechanisms and continue engaging the state (Wui & Lopez, 1997). Another is to keep the interest of these NGOs in tourism alive to get them continuously engaged. As Lovelock (2003) observes in his survey of Southeast Asian NGOs, tourism is perceived by them as pretty insignificant compared to other issues like deforestation and loss of endangered species.

It is the private sector that appears to be the ‘missing link’ in policy implementation (Ingram, 1990). While it has collaborated closely with DOT in policymaking, its own initiatives toward sustainable tourism have been minimal (Cruz, 2005). Shining examples can be counted by fingers, the most prominent of which appears to be the effort by El Nido Resorts in Palawan. Its projects involve providing small retail stores and stalls, as well as advanced farming methods to the community so they can supply good quality food to the resort (DOT et al., 2002). Only 25% of ecotourism tours are packaged by private tour operators, with the remaining 70% offered by DOT or local tourism offices (DOT et al., 2002). Even on voluntary ecotourism certification schemes where it might benefit over the long term, the uptake is low - only three hotels in the Philippines are listed in the Green Globe network, one of the lowest figures in Southeast Asia. Yet, this figure is consistent with the global lack of breadth and depth in the adoption of sustainable practices by the tourism sector (Weaver, 2009). Alampay (2005) observes that the national tourism trade associations seem to confine themselves only on marketing matters, destination identification, and awareness building. These activities are helpful but clearly, there is a need for the sector to increase the intensity of its participation and expand the range of its contribution if it is to make a significant impact.

This raises the issue of increasing the technical and conceptual learning capacity of key players in the industry. That is why, education was incorporated in the support programme component of the NEP. This aspect deals with capability building, community organizing, and the provision of health/rescue services, waste management
and disaster/emergency management services. A wide range of stakeholders are seen benefiting from training programmes on project management, product development, and interpretation. These include not only the LGUs and local communities, but also NESC/RECs whose members themselves are familiar only with their traditional functions (IntM10). A particularly important segment to train are tour guides, naturalist guides most all. There is a sore need for their services, as most people with knowledge on nature and culture interpretation are holed up in local universities, busy teaching (Libosada, 1998, p. 50).

4.6 Summary

This chapter has outlined the development of sustainable tourism policy implementation in the Philippines in the last 30 years. It argued that in the course of its evolution, acquisition of knowledge and policy learning played a significant role. This learning can be divided into three phases. The 1970s until the mid-1980s, phase one, was the period when tourism was employed as an economic and political tool. At this time, policy implementation was dominated by a techno-military coalition, sustained by a system of relations characterized by clientelism and patronage. Policy learning came in reverse, with efforts to export tourism experience under martial law instead of learning from outside. In the mid-80s to late 1990s, phase two, the tourism policy implementation process featured both technical and conceptual learning, and almost simultaneously, the seeds of social learning emerged. As the state sought to promote the idea of equity, address the negative impacts of unsustainable tourism practices, and respond to international discourse, the goal and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation were revised. Social aspects were emphasised, and explicit political uses were minimized. There was a massive shift in the balance of power and resources within the subsystem, tilting in favour of lower levels of government and non-state actors. The beginning of the 21st century, phase three, represents efforts to integrate social learning mechanisms deeper into the tourism policy processes. This means even greater participation by civil society in tourism policy implementation with both national and local governments.

From the perspective of approaches to policy implementation, this evolution shows a general movement away from a top-down approach to a bottom-up perspective. However,
this distinction appears to apply only in terms of actors involved in policy implementation, as other features seem to cross-appear. Consistent with the Weberian tradition observed in top-down models (Parsons, 1995), the 1970s and mid-80s was a period of very centralized rule, as tourism played a highly political role. Thus, those at the top were able to engage in wasteful and environmentally-destructive luxury tourism. Concerns of other stakeholders such as local communities did not enter into the picture, resulting in major problems such as paedophilia. Moreover, even if policies were clearly spelt in development plans, as they should be in top-down models, rational implementation was not assured. This is because those at the top also enjoyed a lot of discretion, particularly in advancing their initiatives to the prejudice of existing plans. Ironically, discretion is a hallmark of bottom-up approaches. However, as the administration was replaced and new ideas filtered in the mid-1980s, the set-up changed. The tourism policymaking structure was significantly enlarged with the addition of civil society and local governments. A more integrated approach to tourism development also ensured that views of other stakeholders were heard. This shift is consistent with the bottom-up approach.

Nonetheless, it was noted that the move towards institutionalizing sustainable tourism policy is fraught with difficulties and constraints. One of the key dimensions that recur is resources and its scarcity, a finding that is consistent with the literature. It was observed that from the top down to the bottom of the implementation structure, financial constraints and human resources are key concerns. This has enabled civil society and international agencies to engage the state and local communities. In the process, they have become important agents of policy learning.

Likewise, the chapter highlights the role of power and politics in policy implementation, as traditionally conceived in the literature (Bramwell & Meyer, 2007; Hall, 1994; Hall & Jenkins, 1995). In the case of the Philippines, this is expressed at the individual and institutional levels. The first is demonstrated by the discretion enjoyed by those in position during the Marcos regime to waylay tourism plans in favour of their own visions. Another illustration is the system of patron-client relations that prevailed and continued to influence the implementation of tourism policy. Institutionally, within the tourism system, power was found to initially reside almost exclusively with the national tourism
organization. However, this power was diluted and shifted to local governments, as the goals and mechanisms of tourism policy evolved.

How local governments used this newfound power in implementing tourism policy is further investigated by looking at the case of ecotourism programmes implemented in Pamilacan Island, Bohol province, the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 5: Policy implementation on the ground – the case of Pamilacan Island, Baclayon, Bohol Province

5.1 Introduction

While the previous chapter discussed the macro-level aspects of ecotourism policy implementation, this chapter focuses on the meso-level of ecotourism policy network. The chapter, together with the Chapter Six, emphasises the complexity of implementing policy particularly at the local level. This is shown by presenting an historical and analytical account of marine mammal conservation and ecotourism programme implementation in Pamilacan Island, Bohol Province. Thus, it contributes immensely towards meeting the research objective of examining the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation in the Philippines.

This is done by demonstrating how network structure influences the policy process and vice versa in a dialectical relationship with structural context, the actions of network actors, and policy outcomes. It clarifies the role of traditional power and political relationships as a key contextual factor, and shows how exploiting this power and ties can waylay the implementation process through the formation of opposing coalitions. It also shows the value of various rules of the game and strategies such as negotiations and accommodation in moving implementation forward.

The chapter is divided into three parts. First, it introduces Pamilacan Island, discussing its main features and its relationship with the rest of the province. Next is a presentation in chronological order of different initiatives in marine conservation and ecotourism under which Pamilacan has been involved in. In the third section, a detailed examination of coalitions that have been formed to support or oppose conservation and tourism is undertaken. It also discusses how implementation processes helped resolve the conflict and the role of the network structure in influencing behaviour.

5.2 The context of Pamilacan

Approximately 700km southeast of Manila and 70km of Cebu, Pamilacan lies in the middle of Bohol Sea, in the Central Visayas region at the centre of the Philippine archipelago (refer to Figure 3-3). It is 18 nautical miles from the town centre of Baclayon,
and is the only island barangay among Baclayon’s 17 barangays. The island has a land area of 141 hectares including 22 hectares of white sandy beach. There is a fringing coral reef, which extends to the sea south of the island (refer to Figure 5-1 below). Pamilacan is coralline in nature, and its soil, like many parts of the province, is faraon clay, which makes growing staple food like rice and corn difficult. It has very little freshwater, with only one reliable deep well serving the needs of the island when the rainwater runs out of stock. Nonetheless, these harsh conditions have not stopped people from living in the island.

Figure 5.1: Map of Pamilacan Island, Baclayon, Bohol

As at April 2008, there were 276 households in the island, equivalent to a population of 1,656 (IntP1). This figure comprises 12% of Baclayon’s population, which as at 2000 was
estimated by the National Statistics Coordination Board at 13,686. The Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas estimates that most of the island’s residents (82 to 95%) come from the mainland of Bohol. Only a minority, from five to 18% are from other provinces such as Leyte, Davao and other parts of Mindanao (DocNGOE9; DocNGOE8; DocNGOE3). Together they comprise only 14 clans. Politically and administratively, the head of the clans in the island is the barangay captain. Seven councillors (kagawad) and a youth council (sangguniang kabataan) assist him/her. Despite being a rich source of votes, the barangay itself appears politically unimportant, with politicians from the main island visiting only during the election season (IntP6). Mainly due to experiments that aimed to demonstrate the benefits of marine conservation, a topic discussed in full in succeeding sections, only in recent years did Pamilacan get the attention of local and national policymakers.

Almost all of the residents are engaged in fishing. Records from the Municipal Agricultural Office show that there are 1,250 registered fishers from the island, the biggest among 8 coastal barangays of Baclayon. WWF reports that only about 30% of the fishers have other sources of income such as fish trading, farming, rendering personal services (labour), or operating small variety stores. No one from Pamilacan engages in commercial fishing, as the majority of fishers (about 77%) use non-motorized boats to fish around the island or in nearby municipalities (DocNGOE9). They usually catch various reef fishes for subsistence and commercial exchange. With average fish yield ranging from 4.7 to 12.5 kg/trip during the peak months of April to June, and as low as 1.4 to 3.5 kg/trip during the rest of the year, annual net revenue per fisher is estimated to be no more than US$1355 (Samonte-Tan, White, Tercero, Diviva, Tabara, & Caballes, 2007).

There are, however, fishermen in the island who venture out to sea to catch bigger fishes such as manta rays. Hunting for manta ray, in fact, has been the tradition for islanders, so much, so that the name of the island itself is derived from pamilak, the term for the harpoon used in catching the ray. People from the main island expect manta ray, which they locally call sanga, to be served during the barangay’s fiesta every 15th of May, to be able to take home the meat when they go home, or to receive it as gifts (IntP3; IntP7).
Even people from places as far away as Metro Manila, particularly those who employ Pamilacan islanders expect it as gifts (IntP7).

Besides manta ray, another tradition is hunting for whales and dolphins. Until recently, Pamilacan was one of the seven villages around Central Visayas and Northern Mindanao found to have hunted these marine mammals (Alava, 1994). Pamilacan appears the most active, as shown by the origin of Bryde’s whalebones kept in the marine laboratory of a local university (IntM7). Dolar (1994) estimates that the tradition goes back three generations (75-100 years) and is said to have been derived from similar practices in Lila, another town of Bohol (Reeves, 2002). The catch is utilized in a number of ways. Dolphins are used as bait for sharks and chambered nautilus (Dolar, 1994) while dried whale meat is exchanged for rice or sweet potato in the markets of the provincial capital city Tagbilaran, or as Tan (1995) suggests substituted by restaurants to beef.

When hunting for whales and dolphins was banned in the 1990s, the islanders briefly but ferociously shifted to hunting whale sharks. Fuelled by rising export prices of shark meat in some Asian countries (IntBo1; Gallardo, 1999), fishermen would catch “just any whale shark in sight” (IntP1). By 1995, whale shark hunting had become a lucrative industry for the entire community with practically everyone involved (IntP1; IntP2; IntBo1). Those who did not have boats to run after the sharks were employed to slice, pack and transport the meat (IntP3; Balana, 1999). In a season, which ran from January to May, the community would catch from five to thirteen whale sharks (DocNGOE7; DocNGOE11). Profits were distributed according to a long-practised formula (Dolar, 1994).

That fishermen from the island are able to catch these huge creatures is testament to the rich marine life of Bohol Sea. Its deep waters provide migratory routes and habitats to 11 of 27 known species of marine mammals in the Philippines (Aragones, 2001). Leatherwood, Dolar, Wood, Aragones, & Hill (1992) identify them, as follows, (1) Risso’s dolphin (*Grampus griseus*), (2) Bottlenose dolphin (*Tursiops truncates*), (3) Pantropical spotted dolphin (*Stenella annennuata*), (4) Long-snouted spinner dolphin (*Stenella longirostris*), (5) Fraser’s dolphin (*Lagenodelphis hosei*), (6) Melon-headed whale (*Peponocephala electra*), (7) Short-finned pilot whale (*Globicephala macrorhynchus*), (8) Blainville’s beaked whale (*Mesoplodon densirostris*), (9) Sperm
whale (*Physeter catodon*), (10) Pgymy sperm whale (*Kogia breviceps*), and (11) Bryde’s whale (*Balaenoptera edeni*).

In addition, the area is home to, among others, three of the world’s eight species of sea turtles, rare shells such as *Conus gloriamaris, Cypraea guttata* and *Cypraea valentia*; 30 of 35 mangrove species in the Philippines; and nine of 16 species of sea grass in the country. There are 17 diving sites frequented by tourists, with four located around Pamilacan (Samonte-Tan et al., 2007). This bio-diversity has formed the resource base of a healthy tourism industry in the province centred in the islands of Panglao, Balicasag and Pamilacan, or the so-called Bohol Marine Triangle (refer to Figure 5-3). Cultural and historical sites, including the oldest stone church in the country located in Baclayon itself, terrestrial wildlife such as the oldest living primate genus known to exist on earth (the tarsier, *T. syrichta*) (Canete, 2003), and unique landscapes such as the Chocolate Hills, complement the marine biodiversity. All these have contributed to annual visitor arrivals of 531,800 (DocLGUC8), with tourism in the BMT estimated to provide annual net benefits of US$1.48 million (Samonte-Tan et al., 2007).

### 5.3 Initiation into conservation and tourism

The need to conserve the rich marine life on which fishing and tourism is highly dependent has led to the inclusion of Pamilacan in important conservation and ecotourism programmes. Nonetheless, this happened only starting in the 1980s. It was not on the radar of national policymakers in the 1970s when the government made an aggressive push for tourism development because, as discussed in section 4.2, that period focused on areas in and around Metro Manila, the capital city. With policy learning in the 1980s, however, Pamilacan began to be involved in at least five major coastal management and ecotourism programmes. The initiatives can be grouped into two periods. The first started in the 1980s with efforts to establish one of the first marine sanctuaries in the country. The second came in the late 1990s through to the present with a succession of programmes meant to address conservation and ecotourism concerns. A summary is provided in Table 5-1 while a more detailed account of events is shown in Appendix 3.
Table 5.1: Key programmes and events in Pamilacan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Initiation of Marine Conservation and Development Programme. Island’s coral reef is declared a marine reserve in 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1998</td>
<td>The Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources bans the catching, selling, purchasing and possessing, transporting and exporting of whale sharks and manta rays. The community seriously imperils the plan due to negative reaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1998 – June 1999</td>
<td>Intense political action by advocacy coalitions to have their way. Conflict eventually resolved through intercession by Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Provincial Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Commencement of Bohol Marine Triangle project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td>Start of the NZAID-funded ecotourism programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Dolphin watching tour sustainability issues begin to be discussed among stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>Ayala Foundation comes in Bohol and initiates a number of projects in Pamilacan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3.1 The Marine Conservation and Development Programme

The programme was a follow-up activity to the establishment in 1974 of Sumilon Island in neighbouring Cebu province as the country’s first marine park (White, 1987). At that time, the depletion of the country’s fish stocks and the inadequacy of the prevailing management systems had become apparent (Thomas, 1998; Trinidad, Pomeroy, Corpuz, & Aguero, 1993). Thus, efforts were devoted to design decentralized systems that involve a holistic approach, one that combines technological inputs as well as the direct participation of fishing communities in order to develop the community (White, 1996).
Emphasis was to be placed on adequate social preparation of the community to minimize resistance to extension activities (Flores & Silvestre, 1987).

With funding from the USAID coursed through the Asia Foundation, the Silliman University based in neighbouring Negros Island, in 1984, began marine conservation extension efforts in Balicasag and Pamilacan islands in Bohol and Apo Island in Negros Oriental (Green et al., 2004). Flores and Silvestre (1987, p. 488) identified the five components of the marine conservation and development programme, as follows: (1) institutional involvement of Silliman University; (2) prevention of destructive fishing activities and increasing long term yield by implementing a marine resource management programme; (3) community development programmes to establish alternative livelihood projects, improve fish marketing, educate the community, and promote reef monitoring; (4) outreach and replication component to extend programmes to other communities and establish linkages with interested individuals and agencies.

Initially, the project ran for three months. Implementation was anchored on technical and conceptual learning (Glasbergen, 1996) on the part of both the implementers and the target participants. According to White and Savina (1987), the organizers lived in the village and familiarized themselves with the problems of the community. They gathered baseline data, conducting socioeconomic and demographic surveys, and studies of the coral reef including substrate cover, fish diversity and other indicators (White, 1996). In cooperation with Ilaw International Centre, groups of 20 families were later formed into three “Ilaw ng Buhay” (Light of Life) chapters and were given lectures and training on sanitation, family planning, nutrition, marine conservation, child care, leadership, community organization, alternative livelihood, etc. (Flores & Silvestre, 1987). An unnamed community elder also recalls Silliman sponsoring trips to the university and providing school supplies to children, to convince the community of its conservation agenda. Its clear intentions and transparent strategies enabled the university to achieve “goal consensus” (Van Meter & Van Horn 1975), or “consensus of meanings” (Grin & Van de Graaf, 1996) and persuade community members to share their belief in conservation.
Part of the strategy was to establish marine sanctuaries to increase fish yield and attract foreign tourists. To this end, Silliman worked with the municipal government of Baclayon to have the entire coral reef area surrounding the island declared as a marine reserve. In 1985, the municipality did so via an ordinance (No. 8 - 1985). It designated 11.9 hectares of the reef located at the northwest corner of the island as fish sanctuary and breeding area. For the reserve, a number of destructive fishing methods were prohibited: dynamite fishing, fishing using electric power, cyanide, muro-ami (drive-in net) type of fishing, spear fishing using scuba, use of very small mesh gill nets. In the fish sanctuary, the ordinance banned fishing or collecting shells, the anchoring of boats permitted only in the traditional sandy beach areas, and the giant Tridacna clams and other marine organisms with potential economic value to local fishermen were protected from collection. The area outside the sanctuary but within the marine reserve was designated as traditional fishing area, and use of the following methods were allowed: hook and line, bamboo traps, gill nets, spearfishing without scuba and other underwater breathing device, other types of netting except destructive ones, and traditional gleaning. An amendment to the ordinance in 1986 vested management of the reserve in the Marine Resource Management Committee composed of barangay officials, and the island residents in general in conjunction with Sangguniang Bayan (municipal council) of Baclayon.

The introduction of the Marine Conservation and Development Programme to the island marked the beginning of its long engagement in conservation efforts, at least as far as coral reefs are concerned. It also signalled the peripheral involvement of the island with the nascent tourism industry of Bohol. Much earlier, in late 1978, the neighbouring island of Panglao had been declared as a tourism zone and marine reserve by the national government, thus paving the way for the construction of some dive resorts in the 1980s (Bersales, 2005). In 1989, the Philippine Tourism Authority opened its resort in Balicasag Island (refer to Figure 5-3). Visitors from these resorts would come visit any of the four dive sites around Pamilacan or spend a few hours on the beach. However, this did not lead to any remarkable tourism investment in tourist facilities save for a few cottages in the island. The only remarkable investment was made by a cooperative, first to be set up in the island. Called the Pamilacan Multi-Purpose Cooperative, it emerged to engage in rice trading and fishing from 1985 to early 1990s. It folded when members were unable to
pay debts (IntP2; IntP4; IntP7). Figure 5-2 below depicts the structural representation of the nodes and linkages of organizations involved in Pamilacan during this period.

**Figure 5.2: Relational structure of organizations within Pamilacan, 1984**

The nodes refer to organizations that operated in the island in the 1980s. Following Pavlovich’s (2003) strategy to create a sense of place, the biggest node refers to Pamilacan itself. The lineal connections show the governance links among the organizations as well as the informal social exchange relationships that prevailed. From the theoretical lens of the advocacy coalition framework, the emergence of an academic-bureaucratic coalition spearheading the implementation of the conservation strategy is seen. The glue that binds this coalition together undoubtedly is the need to wisely exploit marine resources and develop the community. Unusually for an academic institution in the Philippines, Silliman is one of the key units in this small-sized network. Its centrality is explained by its possession of scientific information to jump-start the formation and maintenance of the marine sanctuary. As Fadeeva (2004) explains, possession of such resources gives an organization an edge in how ideas are implemented. Researchers from the university as well as other academic institutions (e.g., Alava, 1994; Alcala &
Luchavez, 1993; Batoy, 1994; Leatherwood et al., 1992) would visit the marine sanctuary from time to time to conduct marine research and provide active and moral support to the community (White, 1996). They thus served as conservation policy learning-agents (May, 1992). In this way, the university was able to win over on its side those individual, unorganized fishermen who initially protested against the establishment of the marine sanctuary (IntP2). The barangay council understandably is a key player. Having constituted itself as the management council responsible for the marine reserve, and existing as the frontline agency of government in the far-flung barangay, it logically is the centre of field operations. The municipal government of Baclayon also occupies a central position, as in the hands of the local government rests some legislative and taxation powers that could influence the implementation of the programme (De Guzman & Reforma, 1993; Manasan, 1992). In addition, Mayors and similar political leaders have great latitude to intervene in the public system (Oorthuizen, 2004; Sidel, 1989). Its policy support suggests a cooperative relationship with Silliman and the barangay. The wider tourism industry, as represented by the Panglao and Balicasag nodes, was largely oblivious to the existence of the coalition, as tourism activity in the province at this time was embryonic (Bersales, 2005). Thus, following Fenger & Klok (2001), with the absence of significant policy issue in Pamilacan that might have concerned the industry, interaction was kept to its weakest level. In other words, apart from the occasional trip to the beaches and dive sites of Pamilacan by clients, the nearby resorts had nothing to do with the island. This explains why figure 5-2 shows there are no direct links between the industry and the local governments of Baclayon and Pamilacan. This low degree of integration by the tourist market meant the continuation of the island’s traditional hunting practices, because at this time, as discussed in the next chapter, efforts to save charismatic sea creatures have already started in the West. As Rhodes (1988) emphasises, a low degree of integration means the maintenance of the status quo, as there are few checks and balances. Consequently, despite conservation gaining a foothold in the island, it was not deep and broad enough to affect attitudes on hunting whales and manta rays. The result was increase in takes of whales (Dolar, 1994) even as the marine sanctuary improved fish stock around the island (White et al., 2003).
5.4 The growth of conservation and ecotourism

The Pamilacan coral reef conservation network was stable until wider developments in the 1990s, as discussed in the previous chapter and chapter seven, led to the expansion in its governance structure. At the tourism macro-level, technical, conceptual and social learning is taking root deeper into the system. Sustainable tourism is making its way into tourism plans and new institutional arrangements are being set up. In Bohol province, the new political leadership elected in 1995 has taken sustainability by the horn by incorporating ecotourism in its mission statement (Relampagos, 1998). All these have led to the intensification of conservation and ecotourism programmes in Pamilacan, as shown by the sequential and sometimes overlapping programmes and projects that targeted or included the island from 1997 until 2008. The following sections provide an overview of these.

5.4.1 Pamilacan Island Integrated Dolphin and Whale Watching Village Integrated Development Plan

Alarmed by newspaper reports and research from Silliman University of directed fishing of dolphins in Central Visayas and Northern Mindanao, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources issued in 1992 the Fisheries Administrative Order No. 185 that prohibited the catching, taking, selling, possessing and transporting dolphins (Barut, 1994). The following year, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources led by then marine biologist Secretary Angel Alcala - the former President of Silliman University - issued Special Order No. 1636 that created the Inter-Agency Task Force on Marine Mammal Conservation (IATFMMC). The Task Force was mandated to ensure the conservation of marine mammals through education programmes, habitat and resource management, research, and policy development. This all found expression in its major programme, the whale watching and ecotourism programme in Pamilacan.

Following the first whale watching expedition in 1993 that confirmed the existence of a large number of cetaceans in Bohol Sea but at a decreasing frequency (Dolar, 1994; DocNGOE1), the Task Force sought to establish a programme that specifically targeted Pamilacan. In May 1997, the programme officially started, fuelled by grants from Citibank, the Pacific Asia Travel Association, and the Department of Tourism. The Task
Force designated Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas (KKP), a non-government organization and local partner of WWF-USA, as implementer. It was tasked to develop the capacity of the local community to engage in ecotourism based on whale watching; provide support for the construction, maintenance and operation of a whale museum in the island; develop a whale watching tour to be run by a local cooperative and a concomitant marketing strategy to support its operation; and establish a marine mammal sanctuary in the waters around the island. The programme lasted for three years, from 1997 to 2000. Details of this important period, as well as more recent developments, are shown in Appendix 3. The main accomplishment of the programme was the establishment of the Pamilacan Island Dolphin and Whale Watching Organization (PIDWWO), envisioned to be the first people’s organization to organize whale watching tours in the country, if not the whole of Asia (DocNGOE7; DocNGOE11).

5.4.2 Bohol Marine Triangle

The Bohol Marine Triangle (BMT) project was implemented by the Foundation of Philippine Environment with funding from UNDP-Global Environment Facility beginning in 2000 in southern Bohol. With Integrated Coastal Zone Management planning process as a guide, it sought to conserve BMT’s resources by actively involving communities in planning, implementing and monitoring marine protected areas, establishing a sustainable harvest scheme, and in integrating tourism. Specific activities conducted in the towns of Dauis, Baclayon and Panglao (refer to Figure 5-3) over the life of the project, which lasted until 2005, included economic and marine environment baseline research, formulation of CRM plans, and setting up institutional and conceptual mechanisms for cooperation and patrols (DocNGOA2; DocNGOA3). Tourism was used to unite MPA management teams and resort owners over conflict in resource use (United Nations Development Programme, 2007).
Implementation of the project was cours ed through local NGOs, with each NGO assigned a specific component. In Pamilacan, PROCESS-Bohol primarily worked with the Pamilacan Fishermen’s Association (PAFIA) and PIDWWO, providing them with livelihood training and capability building programmes (DocNGOA2; DocNGOA3; IntBo7; IntP7). PROCESS also facilitated the granting of loans to PAFIA and PIDWWO by the Bohol Alliance of Non-Government Organizations (BANGON), the secretariat of the Livelihood Support Fund of the BMT (IntBo5).

5.4.3 The National Ecotourism Programme
In October 2002, the National Ecotourism Steering Committee (NESC) approved the inclusion of Pamilacan as one of the banner sites of the National Ecotourism Programme. The programme supports the National Ecotourism Strategy that was developed over a two-year period beginning in 2001. The strategy was formulated after detailed

Figure 5.3: Bohol Marine Triangle
consultation with government and civil society representatives around the 15 regions of
the country, a democratic process that has no equal in the history of local macro-tourism
development planning. The meetings resulted in a strategy document that contained a
detailed analysis of the country’s ecotourism policy environment, vision for the
development of ecotourism, the role of key agencies and institutional arrangements, and
the general approach to implement the strategy. It identified clustering as the principal
management method to link key ecotourism sites and networking to facilitate the
exchange of information particularly best practices (DOT et al., 2002).

Identification of the key ecotourism sites for immediate through to long-term
development is one of the components of the ecotourism programme. There are 31 key
sites selected, with 11 of them declared as banner sites (refer to Figure 4-1) or those that
are seen to “serve as models for developing ecotourism” (DOT et al., 2002, p.59). Fifty-
five (55) other sites are classified as emerging and potential sites. They are to be
improved through standards development, setting up an accreditation system, marketing
and promotions, education and advocacy, support programmes for community
stewardship and livelihood, and the creation of an ecotourism fund to be used to finance
development of key sites to be sourced from foreign donors, local agencies and user fees.

One of the principal donors to have responded is the New Zealand Agency for
International Development (NZAID). In 2001, it provided grants to fund a three-year
programme of assistance (phase one) that involved the development of the national
ecotourism strategy and the implementation of the ecotourism programme. NZAID in
2004 renewed the grant for another four years (phase two) ending 31 December 2008,
signing up for NZD1,255,000.00 in financial assistance (IntM10).

Pamilacan, along with Mt. Pinatubo and Banaue in central and northern Luzon,
respectively, received funding support mainly in phase one. Efforts by the Ecotourism
Working Group, NZAID consultants and other partners were focused on overhauling the
operations of PIDWWO, provision of equipment and training, coordination with the
private sector particularly on pricing, and providing marketing support.
5.4.4 Ayala Social Initiatives

The Ayala group of companies, one of the country’s biggest conglomerates, began its Bohol projects in 2007 under its corporate social responsibility brand and strategy. Called the Ayala Social Initiatives (ASI), activities fall under three development areas: education, environment and entrepreneurship. The flagship programmes are ASI-GILAS, solid waste management, and microfinance, respectively. Besides these, there are special projects including cultural preservation initiatives in Bohol and educational assistance to the Mangyan tribal group.

Working under the management of Ayala Foundation’s Centre for Social Development and collaborating with various government agencies and private institutions, Ayala has taken steps to assist Bohol’s food industries via support to the communities of Dauis, Jagna and Albuquerque towns. In Baclayon, the foundation has a decidedly tourism bent, with activities designed to facilitate the integration of the town with the wider tourism industry. Interviewee IntP9 outlines specific activities. First, the Foundation aided in converting about 67 ancestral homes into tourist lodging facilities and providing the homeowner’s association (the Baclayon Ancestral Homes Association or BAHANDI) with marketing support. Second, it conducted marine surveys in order to identify dive sites. This activity has managed to find four sites, with one site named Daquit-daquit having been declared a marine protected area. A strategy book meant to guide the sustainable development of the municipality is being prepared by partner organization Manila Observatory. In Pamilacan, it set-up a cooperative called the Pamilacan Island Tourism and Livelihood Multipurpose Cooperative, whose 89 household-members (almost 300 individuals) come from across the island. Its members have been provided training programmes on natural farming, massage and credit management. Researchers from the local Holy Name University mapped the built heritage of the island. However, the single most important contribution of the foundation is probably the granting of loans to islanders to enable them to refit their boats for planned diving and whale shark interaction tours. “The foundation was ready to provide up to 100,000 pesos [approximately US$2,250], with repayment dependent on the business that would arise from the tours, how generous is that” (IntP1; IntP2). The foundation has served as a
unifying factor for the island, as even warring individuals from rival people’s organizations have been attracted to join the cooperative (IntB4).

Because of these programmes, the governance structure in the island has significantly changed. Among others, there has been a redistribution of centrality, thus, a diffusion of power that flows from having financial resources, external linkages, authority or political kinship. These powers are wielded when core beliefs are threatened by external variables or when an actor tries to impose his belief over other players in the network. These issues, and the coalitions and that formed to address them and their characteristics are discussed in the remaining sections of this chapter. An assessment of other network features as they relate to policy learning is presented in the next chapter, sections 6.3 to 6.5.

5.5 The coalitions – their beliefs, strategies and powers

A policy network is said to be cohesive when its actors share similar preferences and beliefs (Montpetit, 2005). The initial configuration of social relations in Pamilacan shows that the network is not so solid. At least three coalitions can be identified from the network. The first can be called the marine mammal and ecotourism coalition, second is the manta ray coalition and the third is the anti-tourism coalition. These advocacy coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999) emerged in response to environmental conditions, and proffered ideas or beliefs to solve perceived problems. The first coalition, represented by IATFMMC and later on joined by PIDWWO in Baclayon, had its beginnings in marine mammal research that used ecotourism as a conservation strategy. Journalists and other public figures who share their views also qualify as members (Sabatier, 1993). These include the President of the Republic and some members of the Philippine Senate. The second coalition, an alliance between some members of the local community and their political kin in the municipal hall, appeared as a reaction to perceived injustice and betrayal of trust. The third coalition, an unlikely grouping of pro- and anti-tourism organizations, came about to lobby central government authorities to restore traditional hunting practices. These coalitions were identified based on similarities in policy beliefs and non-trivial degree of coordination (Weible, 2005).
Table 5.2: Coalitions in Pamilacan, 1997-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Marine Mammal and Ecotourism Coalition</th>
<th>Manta Ray Coalition</th>
<th>Anti-Tourism Coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>BFAR</td>
<td>KKP-WWF</td>
<td>LGU Baclayon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DOT</td>
<td></td>
<td>LGU Pamilacan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAWB</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PIDWWO</td>
<td>LGU Bohol</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Silliman University</td>
<td>Key individuals</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Univ. of the Philippines</td>
<td>from Bohol</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bookmark, Inc</td>
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Source: constructed from interviews and secondary data

5.5.1 Marine mammal and ecotourism coalition

The avowed goal of IATFMMC when it was created in 1993 was to conserve marine mammals known to inhabit the country. The task force was composed of representatives from the Department of Tourism (DOT), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), World Wildlife Fund-Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas (WWF-KKP), Marine Science Institute of the University of the Philippines, Silliman University Marine Laboratory, Bookmark, and Marine Turtle Foundation. A representative from the NGO sector summarizes the objective:

[It] is for conservation. Specifically we wanted to show how species conservation could benefit communities. We are concerned with linking biodiversity with human well-being...make people understand that biodiversity is essential in ecosystems services. This is difficult because people will say that biodiversity is far from the gut (IntM4)

IATFMMC was instrumental in raising awareness on creatures such as the *dugong*, dolphins and whales through its various activities. Among other projects, it conducted the country’s first marine mammal symposium-workshop in 1994 to devise an approach to marine mammal conservation. Its programme of action centred on survey and research, habitat and resource management, reviewing/drafting of policies for marine mammal conservation, and public education and information. In its meetings from 1994 to 2000, it took note of strandings/sightings of marine mammals around the country and the impact of industrial developments such as construction of a cement plant in Tanon Strait on
marine mammals. Its concern extends to conservation not just of wild animals but also those in captivity. Its active opposition to the building of a dolphin breeding centre in Subic in 1996 and in another attempt in 2001 shows the latter. It has also displayed concern on the exploitation of sharks and manta ray in the country, noting that sharks are being utilized for medicinal purposes and eaten as food (DocTF1; DocTF2). However, the most vexing problem the Task Force had to face was its whale watching and ecotourism programme in Pamilacan where it was deeply involved for three years, from 1997 to 2000 (DocTF3; DocTF4; DocNGA1).

In 1995, or two years before actual engagement with the community, the Task Force tried to convince the local government unit (LGU) of Baclayon to declare the area around Pamilacan as a marine mammal protected area (DocNGOE7). In exchange, the IATFMMC promised to convert a 200-year old Spanish fort in Pamilacan as a whale museum (DocTF1; DocTF2; DocNGOE3). In February 1996, the municipality issued resolution number 32 that usufructs 500 square metres of lot in the island, including the area where the Spanish fort lies, in favour of the Department of Tourism, so the latter, as member of the Task Force can build the whale museum using general appropriations fund and grants.

Secretary Mina Gabor of DOT, in February 1997, approved the allocation of 8.6 million pesos [about US$330,000 that time] to complement the US$8,000 donated by the Pacific Asia Travel Association. CITIBANK granted US$150,000.00 to WWF-USA, which the latter provided to local NGO Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas (KKP) to implement the whale-watching programme. The money was to be spent to implement the Pamilacan Island Dolphin and Whale Watching Village Integrated Development Plan (DocNGOE3; DocNGOE5; DocNGOE7).

The strategy of implementation was clearly top-down (Parsons, 1995), bearing the hallmarks of administrative implementation (Matland, 1995). Goals were carefully spelt for the programme and detailed actions plans prepared with corresponding budgets over the three year period. Expected outputs were listed such as a functioning cooperative, comprising of former whale hunters, that manages a model whale watching tour programme; a museum; a souvenir shop and other tourist amenities; an integrated marine
wildlife conservation programme underpinned by a marine mammal sanctuary; and a
vibrant whale and dolphin watching industry supported by the community, government
and industry. All these were finalized by KKP and DOT, with no input whatsoever from
the local community (IntM7).

Four key actors were identified as central to the implementation process: DOT, DENR,
WWF-KKP and LGU Baclayon. Thus, in December 1997, a memorandum of agreement
was signed that formalized individual responsibilities, as follows:

**Department of Tourism**: provide financial assistance, transfer the funds to KKP in three
tranches, monitor project implementation, and promote Pamilacan Island

**Department of Environment and Natural Resources**: provide scientific data,
administrative support, and technical expertise in project implementation and
conservation; ensure declaration of the protected area; formulate dolphin and whale
watching guidelines; monitor project; issue gratuitous permits for research

**Municipality of Baclayon**: allow use of Spanish fort for 10 years, issue permits and
clearances for the museum, support activities of the cooperative, create ordinances from
dolphin and whale watching guidelines, and support conservation initiatives including
enforcement

**Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas**: implement project, use the funds, deliver outputs, give
progress reports, and submit liquidation reports (DocNGOE5; DocNGOE7; DocNGOE11).

Within the DOT, it was the Office of Product Research and Development that was the
focal point, while for the DENR, it was the Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau
(DocNGA1; DocNGA4). For LGU Baclayon, the principal units were those from the
Mayor’s Office and the Sangguniang Bayan. The project manager was a veterinarian
from KKP, assisted by the Executive Director and community organizers hired purposely
for the programme (DocNGOE2; DocNGOE3). This group made up the implementation
Within this coalition, KKP was given the commander role (Rowley, 1997), and authorized to tap programme funds to implement the various components. Significantly, the more than eight million pesos [more than US$330,000 that time] in programme funds easily beat the 5.612 million pesos [about US$213,000] average annual income of LGU Baclayon (DocLGUB4). This must have motivated the LGU to attach a condition to its granting of the usufruct, which was that “all money releases” relating to the project must be channelled to them (DocLGUB9). However, IATFMMC, in a transmutation of the motto in host population/tourism power exchange relations “the guy who pays gives the orders!” (Kripperdorf, 1987, p. 49) paid no heed to this local assertion and proceeded with its process view of implementation (Bardach, 1977).

To keep the LGU onboard, and at the same time prevent leakage of authority (Bardach 1977), IATFMMC represented by KKP, engaged the municipality in weak coordination (Fenger & Klok, 2001). In June 1997, before 200 residents, municipal and barangay officials, IATFMMC presented its proposal to the suspicious community. Notably, only after Mayor Felix Uy’s explanation of the potential benefits of the programme did the community indicate their conditional support (DocLGUA15; DocNGOE2). After that, it was much easier for the KKP to pursue its strategy. The implementation itself is based on a learning approach. Over the next several months, it conducted seminars and workshops designed to increase the community’s technical and conceptual knowledge on tourism and the environment. These include modules on environment education, first aid and safety of life at sea, whale identification and approach, tourist needs and tour guiding (DocNGOE2; DocNGOE3; DocNGOE6; DocNGOE7; DocNGOE11). Thus, like Silliman University before it, KKP served as the principal agent of policy transfer to the target community (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). There were likewise conscious efforts to engage in other forms of learning such as lesson-drawing (Rose, 1991) from areas that have similar programmes. Cross-visits were made to another dolphin-watching site, Bais, were the city’s Office of Tourism runs a tour programme along Tanon Strait (Alcala et al., 2003). Recognition was given where they are due. ‘Thank you’ parties were organized for barangay health workers who assisted in profiling the community. Participation was opened to other stakeholders in the community. Adults conducted clean-up drives. Even children were involved, as there were poster-making contests
launched in the lone elementary school (DocNGOE2; DocNGOE7; DocNGOE11). Finally, in January 1998, the Pamilacan Island Dolphin and Whale Watching Organization (PIDWWO) was organized (DocNGOE6; DocNGOE7).

PIDWWO’s vision was to be the first community-based organization to manage a sustainable marine ecotourism destination in Asia (DocNGOE11). Due to the community’s bad experience with their first cooperative (IntB4; IntP4), they opted to form a non-stock organization that had clear environmental and socio-economic objectives, almost like paralleling the mandate of the barangay council. As seen through its Certificate of Incorporation (1999) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the objectives are: protect the abundance of the marine mammals around the island, provide alternative means of livelihood for islanders, maintain the cleanliness of the beaches and the surroundings in order to attract more tourists, maintain peace and order in the island, show indigenous culture to visitors, develop skills in managing an ecotourism project, and be role models to the community. Given these broad objectives, elected leaders of the organization were, not surprisingly, barangay officials and health workers, with the chosen Chairman of the Board the same person as the Barangay Captain, Crispo Valeroso (IntP2; IntP7). It had an initial membership of 37 individuals.

With the same person at the helm of potentially rival organizations, all seemed well at the island. The first whale watching tours were unofficially launched in February 1998, to be followed by a few more runs to train the villagers (DocNGOE6; DocNGOE11). At the same time, whale shark and manta ray hunters from the island continued with their trade (IntP1), unaware that events and policy decisions in another subsystem would change their fortune.

Roots of the conflict

In 23 March 1998, Reynaldo Jamoralin, a journalist from the Philippine Daily Inquirer reported in a front-page article that seven from a pod of whale sharks were slaughtered in the town of Donsol, Sorsogon province (refer to Figure 5-4). To increase the significance of the news, he quoted Scott Eckert from the Hubbs Sea World Research Institute, who said that a pod of 40-50 whale sharks, as found in Donsol, was a rare phenomenon, whale sharks being solitary creatures (Jamoralin, 2008, p.18).
In a case of journalistic sensationalism and in moves that made the blood of Pamilacan men boil in anger, the journalist published photos of Pamilacan islanders butchering whale sharks to accompany the two articles. No one had witnessed what happened in Donsol, but the manager of the KKP project in Pamilacan had pictures of the carnage that regularly takes place in the latter. He willingly provided the photos that hastened the demise of the trade (IntM7).

The publication of the hunt in the popular media served as the ‘focusing event’ (Birkland, 1997) to the broader policy issue of balancing community sustenance and environmental...
protection, a problem that is at the core of sustainable development. In a follow-up report by Donna Pazzibugan the following day, again appearing at the front page of the Inquirer, Noel Barut, research supervisor of the Bureau, was quoted as saying

we don’t have a ban against the trading of shark meat. There is no law against its export...We do not like its trading but if the survival of the local community who catch whale sharks for their food is at stake, we have to consider that. (Pazzibugan, 2008, p.1)

Essentially, what this meant was that BFAR was helpless in stopping the slaughter and trading of whale sharks. Politicians, however, did not share this inutile attitude. Senator Raul Roco, a presidential candidate in that election year, suggested calling on other agencies of the government for help. He said “If need be, both the DA and BFAR may call upon the Philippine Navy, the Philippine Coast Guard, PNP Maritime Command, the local government units and other government enforcement agencies to stop the indiscriminate harvesting of whale sharks” (Pazzibugan, 1998, p.1). The result of these media and political pressures is the eventual prohibition on hunting of whale sharks, and even manta rays.

There is some confusion as to who initiated the policy against the prohibition. On the one hand, a Task Force member stated that the President Ramos himself directed BFAR to do it (DocTF3). An NGO official explains the President’s possible motives:

The President is an avid diver and it must be appalling for him to see these creatures in newspapers dead. The pictures also hog the front pages, and as a politician in an election year, it should not be the picture of whales that are there but his (IntM4).

On the other hand, BFAR had been advocating for a ban on the hunting of whale sharks and manta rays, and have made clear its position in meetings of the IATFMMC. Only KKP’s reservations on the idea have prevented it from pursuing the goal (DocTF2).

At any rate, the discovery and publication of the slaughter served as a policy window (Kingdon, 1995). In 25 March 1998, just two days after the initial report of the slaughter came out and without prior consultation of any stakeholder (DocTF3; IntB4; IntP2), BFAR issued Fisheries Administrative Order (FAO) No. 193. Published on nationwide
newspapers two days later, it prohibited the catching, selling, purchasing and possessing, transporting and exporting of whale sharks and manta rays. Violators were to meet fines.

The way FAO 193 was formulated has some implications. Theoretically, its sudden appearance appears to be an urgent response to a focusing event within the marine conservation sector. Thus, Busenberg’s (2001) ‘learning from accidents’ is supported, as analogously, the event in Donsol is linked to an enhancement in the system of marine conservation laws. Likewise, it confirms the notion of ‘internal shocks’ by Sabatier and Weible (2007) as an alternative path to policy change, in addition to policy-oriented learning and the macro-level external perturbation. On the ground, the shock led to clashes in policy beliefs and to the emergence of two other advocacy coalitions: anti-tourism coalition and manta ray coalition.

5.5.2 Anti-tourism coalition

Significant to the community’s agreement to the programme was the condition that the IATFMMC would not pursue a ban on the fishery of manta ray and whale sharks. This was manifested on two occasions. First, during the initial presentation of the proposal in June 1997 (DocNGOE2) and subsequently in a barangay resolution in August that formally supported the programme (DocLGUA15). Aside from acknowledging that the plan was part of efforts to conserve marine mammals and reiterating its objectives, the barangay council carefully stated in the resolution that the programme

is focused mainly on the protection of dolphins and whales in the region and does not include a ban on the traditional hunting, landing and slaughtering of whale sharks and manta rays by the islanders (DocLGUA15).

In other words, the community fully understood that the plan would not undermine their traditional practice of hunting manta rays, and their lucrative livelihood based on whale shark hunting. IATFMMC, for their part, promised that this was so. Thus, when the ban came down, not to mention seeing their photos butchering whale sharks on the beach on the front page, the community’s reaction was swift. “Overnight, my friends instantly became enemies” (IntB4), according to a former NGO worker. The ban split the island into two factions: those opposed to the continuation of the project, led by the Pamilacan Island Fishermen’s Association (PAFIA), and the pro-tourism group represented in the
island by PIDWWO and KKP (DocLGUC2; DocLGUC4; DocNGOE6; IntC1; IntP1; IntP7). Interviewees say the split can be demarcated geographically. “Those who live north of the school, mostly PIDWWO members, favour tourism. Those on the south, the ‘fishing village’ where PAFIA members come from, dislike its continuation” (IntBo1; IntC1; IntP2; IntP3; IntP7).

In advocacy coalition framework terms, it could be argued that PAFIA was forced to articulate explicit beliefs, similar to when oil-related accidents in the US caused environmental groups to develop beliefs on the restriction and regulation of oil and gas sites (Fenger & Klok, 2001). At that time, its 100 household-members were content to meet the objectives of the organization that was to stop illegal fishing around the island, as well as provide search and rescue operation in the sea (IntP1). However, as ninety percent (90%) of its members were deep into fishing (DocNGB1), including manta ray and whale sharks, the ban was bound to affect their livelihood and tradition. In other words, the battle for them goes beyond secondary aspects such as compensation for the loss of livelihood, as the issue was simplistically reduced to later (DocLGUC4; DocLGUC6), but deeper than that. It was a question of what development path to take, that is, to leave hunting and go for tourism. PAFIA members were simply not prepared to leave a livelihood deeply rooted in their psyche (IntP1). As Leo Sumalpong says: “Whaling was a way of life for us. It was hard to change that” (Moral, 2003, p. d3). Thus, the ill-feeling not only hampered the work of organizing a dolphin-watching tour, but this also lingered a few years more, long after WWF had gone in 2000, and hunting had stopped when arrests were made. For example, a community organizer from PROCESS-Bohol, which continued where KKP left off, reported difficulty in dealing with the organization:

The quarter’s implementation was focused on Pamilacan. Significant accomplishments are the following: adoption of the barangay CBCRM plan, penetration at the controversial and persistent PO, the PAFIA. Finally, the officers, especially the president entrusted the POs constitution and by-laws to the CO. Before, the PO live in a world of secrets, they doesn’t want to reveal some PO information and don’t inform the CO on their meetings [sic] (DocNGOA2)
We do not speak of ecotourism as much as possible because they really got angry [sic] (IntBo7)

An initial activity of PAFIA was to file a protest with the barangay council. It did so on 13 April 1998, asking to have KKP ousted from the island. They argued that KKP betrayed the trust of the community. In a testimony to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Max Valero, PAFIA officer, stated that before *balilan* [whale] and *sanga* [manta ray] were banned they were the ones who catch the fish and brought it to Manila [sic]. That is why we know that they were the ones who requested for the ban of the fish (DocLGUC4).

They also used ‘analytical debate,’ an alternative mode by which coalitions advance their positions, according to the advocacy coalition framework. PAFIA asked the question “why ban the whale sharks when they are sharks [that kill] and they lay eggs like fish unlike other marine mammals which give birth like humans?” (IntP1). In other words, PAFIA wanted to continue with the hunt in spite of the national law. Moreover, according to one community organizer, PAFIA did not want KKP to report them to authorities (DocLGUC4; IntB4).

The rhetoric was serious, and potentially deadly. Jojo Baritua, community organizer from KKP, remembers, “One day the whalers knocked on my door armed with machetes and threatened to kill me” (Agence France Press, 2005, p. 6). To amplify the seriousness of their position, the group mobilized its members to an indignation rally in time for the visit of President Ramos in Baclayon for a cultural event (IntB1; IntP1). Later on, they issued an edict that proscribed direct business or social interactions between PAFIA and PIDWWO members and their children. Specifically, PAFIA denied PIDWWO members the following services: (1) buying manta ray meat, either fresh or dried, (2) buying in stores operated by a PAFIA member, (3) transporting them to the island on PAFIA-owned boats, (4) assistance when PIDWWO-owned boats break down at sea. PAFIA members were also barred from joining PIDWWO (DocNGOE6; IntP7). Animosity was high. “There was a lot of taunting, even in friendly games of cockfighting on Sundays, and the atmosphere was tense” (IntP7).
In response to the petition filed, the barangay council went into action. On 18 April 1998, it convened a barangay assembly where the motion was discussed. Results were overwhelmingly for the removal of KKP from the island. Of the 218 families that time, 120 favoured its ouster, 57 were for its continued stay, while 41 families abstained. Consequently, in Resolution Number 2 (1998) that was unanimously adopted, the barangay council endorsed PAFIA’s petition (DocLGUA12; DocNGOE6).

Significantly, the motion to oust KKP was seconded by a kagawad (village councillor) who doubles as chairperson of PAFIA. He is known to be one of the biggest traders of whale shark and manta ray meat in the island (IntB2; IntP1; IntP7). This situation illustrates the dynamic interconnection between political and economic activities to be found at the individual and household levels in the country (Hodder, 2002; Wolters, 1984), and reflects the nature of the Philippine state as weak or patrimonial (Hutchison, 2001). Such marriage ultimately affects environmental and ecotourism policy implementation, as amply demonstrated in other destinations in the country (e.g., Trousdale, 1999, and Achacoso-Sevilla, 2003, for Boracay; Chiu, 2006, for Bohol). In the case of Pamilacan, the integration was used to thwart marine mammal conservation and ecotourism policy implementation.

However, KKP did not budge. “KKP had no involvement whatsoever in this,” according to an NGO official (IntM4; DocTF3). Thus, project staff continued with the work of preparing PIDWWO and gathering data for research activities (DocNGOE6; DocNGOE7; DocNGOE11).

Following Marsh and Smith (2001), Bramwell and Meyer (2007) suggest that “the outcomes of debates and decisions have dialectical implications for the subsequent shape of that network. The outcomes then encourage…strategic learning among the actors involved, and they can lead to changes in membership or in the balance of resources in networks” (p. 770). This is shown in the dynamics in Baclayon. PAFIA, having failed to oust KKP showed political learning (May, 1992) by expanding arenas for their advocacy up to the municipal level, and eventually to the provincial level. In response, the municipal government of Baclayon decided to abandon the ecotourism project in favour of select constituents in Pamilacan and to actively campaign against KKP (DocLGUB11;
In July 1998, Felix Uy, by then a municipal councillor after local elections in May, and Provincial Board member on the strength of his election as president of the provincial councillor’s league, called a barangay assembly to say that it was KKP that instigated the issuance of FAO 193. He explained the potential negative effects of tourism to the island if the programme pushed through. A KKP internal report mentioned that Felix Uy talked about the “dislocation of the local communities, selling of lands to foreigners, limited access to beaches by the local people, AIDS disease, prostitution, destruction of the local culture, and many others” (DocNGOE6). It appears that the Mayor might have learned from the country’s bad experience with sex tourism in the 1980s, as discussed in Chapter Four, and was using the information to challenge the ecotourism programme. This further fuelled the distrust of the majority to KKP. The Mayor also asked important individuals, who occupy double positions in PIDWWO and the barangay council, to choose which side they want to represent (DocNGOE6). Felix Uy was likewise reported to have campaigned against the project even in Metro Manila where 1,000 people from Pamilacan reside (DocTF4), in a bid to tap latent actors who, according to Sabatier (1993) based on work by Balbus (1971), would act if they had appropriate information. Moreover, he got the support of Ernesto Herrera, the congressman then representing the first district of Bohol that includes Baclayon (DocTF4). The Director of KKP at that time also recalled having been given a rough time by the new Mayor. “The Mayor lambasted us in every forum he attended, labelling us ‘salot’ [plague] and encouraging other local governments not to let KKP in their municipalities” (IntM4).

What further inflamed passions in the municipality was a letter from the DOT in September 1998 that construction of the whale museum would be postponed, because the Asian financial crisis had depleted the funds of the department for development projects (DocNGA3). As a result, the municipality was left with the ugly spectre of not only having Pamilacan’s traditional livelihood wiped out by central government fiat, but also having an under-funded ecotourism programme as replacement.

Incensed, the local government formalized its new opposition to the programme and to DOT as well. In 12 October 1998, the local council issued Resolution Number 111 that withdrew the contract of usufruct given to DOT (DocLGUB11). The Mayor explained
that the resolution was a ‘batok’ [slap in the head] to DOT, in retaliation to the issuance of FAO 193 (IntB2). The resolution emphasized that “after a period of observation on the proposed project...the people of said island feel uncomfortably sad...because it causes them to loss the greatest traditional and most dependable means of livelihood” [sic] which was the catching of devil fish or manta ray (DocLGUB11). While the LGU acknowledged that the agreement it entered into with DOT was valid, it alleged that “the presence of the KKP in the island is a threat to the livelihood of the islanders since the Pamilacan people believed that the KKP was very instrumental in the banning of catching of manta rays...contrary to the fact that prior to the entry of the proposed project the KKP that catching of manta rays could not be banned” [sic] (DocLGUB11). The resolution likewise mentioned an instance wherein tourists released fishes caught in a trap locally known as ‘bobo’, an act which the LGU considered “detrimental and a threat to the livelihood of the islanders” (DocLGUB11).

Because of these political and economic pressures, the ranks of PIDWWO were decimated. Of the 37 original members, only 15 remained after 22 members resigned, including the chairperson and barangay captain, when the Mayor made his call (IntP2). When PAFIA made its threats not to sell manta ray meat to PIDWWO members, six families resigned (DocNGOE6).

The foregoing narrative reinforces a number of things. First, the importance of having enough financial resources in order to pursue the implementation of policy is strengthened. It becomes truly imperative when its non-availability would sink a community, destitute from an executive action oblivious of its immediate impact, deeper into penury. Second, it confirms a hypothesis in advocacy coalition framework that policy decisions in another subsystem can affect the implementation of policy. The enactment of FAO 193, an order meant to control the fishery of whale sharks and manta rays that are not the target species in Pamilacan’s ecotourism programme, totally broke the trust between the community and programme implementers, led to eruption of tension and threats to life, and turned the whole island upside-down. With reference to the policy process, the aggressive actions of the local government do not support the hypothesis by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) who said that within the coalition, administrative agencies would assume moderate positions. Fenger and Klok’s (2001) proposition that
government organizations are not expected to assume extreme forms of coordination are likewise not supported. Instead, they buttress findings that these administrative agencies are non-neutral, and play active roles as members of advocacy coalitions by taking sides (Sabatier & Zafonte, 1998). In this connection, what this manifests is social learning. May (1992) suggests that one way social learning is documented is through changes in alignments of interests and objectives. In the ecotourism programme originally, LGU Bohol is aligned with IATFMMC. However, when the controversies erupted, the municipal government switched sides and opposed IATFMMC.

However, these do not explain in full the extreme position taken by the municipal government. After all, some residents of the island, particularly PIDWWO members were bound to benefit from the ecotourism project. The explanation perhaps lies in patron-client politics, the most dominant theory of Filipino political behaviour (Manacsa, 1999; Nemenzo, 1989). PAFIA members as well as the barangay captain were known to be political lieutenants of the Mayor (IntP2; IntP4; IntP7; IntBo1). And with the Mayor running that year for election as Councillor, and his brother gunning as his replacement for town Mayor, it was important to be seen as a responsible patron to their constituents, lest the latter would transfer their allegiance and vote to rival clans (Sidel, 1989). This was very important, as their political opponents criticized them on the local radio for being powerless on the issue of the ban (DocNGOE6). In addition, the barangay captain and the PIDWWO leader were political enemies, having directly contested an election post on two previous occasions (IntP2; IntC1; IntBo1) and supporting different candidates for the Mayoralty post (IntB2; IntP2; IntP7). Thus, the Mayor indulged the wishes of the fishermen and threw his political weight against the programme when it suited his political objectives. This adds a layer of complexity to the advocacy coalition framework, as it hypothesises that the main glue to coalitions is shared belief (Sabatier, 1993). It seems that where Filipino politicians are involved, beliefs play just a part; political kinships, self-interest, or incentives exert a greater influence. The kinship led the Mayor to engage in strong coordination (Fenger & Klok, 2001) with PAFIA and the barangay council, given the interdependency of their clientelistic relations. Such relations have been observed in other local policy sectors such as irrigation (Oorthuizen, 2004), banking (Hutchcroft, 1998), air transportation (de Dios & Hutchcroft, 2003) and in day-to-day
community affairs (Kerkvliet, 1995). Therefore, the situation in the tourism sector is a reinforcement of what appears to be a systemic and historic condition. This by no means suggests that it is unique to the Philippines. In Taiwan’s nuclear policy, Hsu (2005) has found that playing politics seemed more important than upholding the administration’s beliefs in the rational use of nuclear power. Both contexts, thus, validate a claim by Lubell, Schneider, Scholz, and Mete (2002) that political incentives are one of the factors that influence collective action in coalitions. More specifically, it affirms a criticism by Schlager (1995) that coalition representatives also seek to secure core self-interest, in this case vote maximization and office seeking, by pursuing policy beliefs.

Some writers (e.g., Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Pemberton, 2003) have argued that in a network, less powerful actors may influence decision making through their veto power and adroit use of resources. This is confirmed in the case of PAFIA and PIDWWO, the two main protagonists in the island. PAFIA’s activities showed that it took advantage of its links with the municipal leadership to initiate activities detrimental to the project, thus delaying its implementation. In the case of PIDWWO, it benefited from the institutional support provided by IATFMMC and KKP in particular.

5.5.3 Manta ray coalition

At the core of the manta ray coalition’s argument is the restoration of the customary practice of hunting manta ray and whales in Pamilacan. This argument has cultural, economic and health dimensions. Cetaceans have long been known to exist in Philippine waters and the diversity of local terms for them attests to this (Tan, 1995). Indigenous hunting occurred, with some accounts tracing the practice for ritual purposes way back to the Early Metal Age (Fox, 1970), but was not widespread. For those in Pamilacan, indigenous whaling was believed to have been influenced by Yankee whalers who traipsed the Philippine waters for sperm whales in the 1800s (Townsend, 1935). Catching manta ray is part of this hunting tradition, so much so that the practice has been immortalized in local poetic literature (Nazareno, 1994), in much the same way that Moby Dick by Herman Melville (2003) put whaling in the literary firmament. Indeed, this tradition might explain the etymology of Pamilacan, as its name was derived from the word pamilak, the local term for the harpoon used to kill the animal. Pamilacan literally
means ‘a place to use the pamilak’ precisely because manta ray was abundant in Bohol Sea, a place where they literally leap out of the water (IntBo1; IntP3; IntP5; IntP6). Although there are differences in management approaches, the tradition is not different from other aboriginal subsistence hunting documented by Reeves (2002) in other parts of world. To outlaw the tradition by administrative order is to cut ties to this long history.

Economically, it is emphasised that revenue from hunting can be substantial. Manta ray was seen as expensive (Uy, Plaza, Montanez & Alingig, 1989). Depending on size, it could be sold for 10,000 to 20,000 pesos [US$370-740]. Before the boom, whales could fetch a price of 8,000 to 22,000 pesos [US$300-815] (Dolar, 1994), until in ballooned to as much as 150,000 pesos [US$5,600] (IntP1; IntP4). Under a scheme that divides the profit into five equal parts, Dolar explains that whale hunting contributes 30-40% to a family’s income. This provided funds for education and entertainment. It allowed families to send children to high school in the mainland, as the island only has an elementary school (IntP3). In addition, hunting provided jobs to almost everyone, as practically, the whole island was involved. Those who did not have boats to run after the whale sharks were employed to slice, pack, and transport the meat (Gallardo, 1999).

Definitely, these economic arrangements were seen to be better. The income alone is much higher than income earned from the non-consumptive dolphin watching, which in PIDWWO case reached only 43,500 pesos [around US$780] in 2004. Hence, ecotourism was seen as a poor alternative, unable to compensate for the loss and lift them out of the penury they were driven in (DocLGUC4). Evidently, there was massive failure on the part of organizers to address the financial side of the switch, a point that Burns (2004) stresses must be solved to the satisfaction of wildlife tourism hosts.

Finally, there are health issues involved. Pamilacan is quite far, located 18 nautical miles off the coast of the town centre. This vast distance, lack of regular transportation, declining fish catch, and inadequate water supply that constrains agricultural production, limits their protein source to what is available in the surrounding waters. Certainly, Bohol Sea does not disappoint and provides a diversity of marine choices. If tasty substitutes are available, such as dolphin and whale shark - described by a resident as like beef and pork, respectively (Agence France Press, 2005) - residents did not have to travel long distances
just to buy small quantities of “terrestrial meat” for consumption, and think about storing them until the next marketing day comes. In addition, dried whale meat is exchanged for rice or sweet potato in the markets of Tagbilaran. Thus, to stop hunting means putting their health at risk. As a local marine scientist remarks, “The fishermen are not barbarians. They are just trying to eke out a living in the harsh island environment” (Gallardo, 1999, p. 6). Evans (2005), who looked into indigenous whaling and tourism in Tonga, shares this conclusion. Much like those in Pamilacan, Tongans lost their whale meat when whale watching became popular and this loss was thought to contribute to food deficiency being observed among them.

Thus, all levels of government in Bohol petitioned BFAR for the removal of the ban on manta ray hunting (DocLGUA11; DocLGUB10; DocLGUC6). Quite unlikely, they were joined in this endeavour by KKP, even as KKP was accused of having been instrumental in the formulation of the administrative order in the first place. This cross-coalition interaction is explained below.

As early as 1996, when IATFMMC was still finalizing details of the Pamilacan ecotourism programme, the KKP had already recommended the exercise of caution when it came to the declaration of whale sharks and manta rays as endangered species. Its representative argued that in the country, “there are no comprehensive studies on the population status of whale sharks and manta rays and a considerable number of fishermen are engaged in the said fishery” (DocTF2). This is true, as studies (e.g., DocNGD1; Pine, Alava, & Yaptinchay, 2005; Trono, 1996; Quiros, 2005) began to appear only in succeeding years, based on observations in Pamilacan and a few other islands. “Our observations back then was that whale sharks and manta rays were overfished. Thus, our recommendation was for regulation and monitoring of the fishery. Banning was not an option at that time” (IntM7). Consequently, the IATFMMC and KKP committed to the islanders that a ban would not be imposed (DocNGOE2; DocLGUA15). In addition, when the presidential axe fell, KKP twice attempted to convince BFAR to lift the ban on the manta ray, to no avail (DocTF4).

Government units in Bohol all made a concerted effort to make representations with BFAR. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued a resolution calling for the exclusion of the
manta in the prohibition (DocLGUC6). In its role as policy fixer (Bardach, 1977) of the conflict, the SP emphasised as one of its guiding principles the support of efforts by all concerned to lift the ban (DocNGA1). On 5 October 1998, LGU Baclayon promulgated Resolution Number 109 requesting the Director of BFAR to lift the ban. The resolution noted that the ban had affected the economic well-being of the fishermen, “making them worry about the future of their families” (DocLGUB10). These positions were re-stated by the local government in a meeting with IATFMMC on 15 December 1998 to solve the issues plaguing the implementation of the programme. Aside from calling for termination, the delegation from Baclayon argued that while the community of Pamilacan understood the importance of the ecotourism programme, they strongly oppose the ban on manta ray, as it was not part of the programme and they have depended on it since time immemorial. In addition, they pointed out that manta rays are harvested for local consumption only and are not exported, unlike whale shark meat (DocTF3). The local government also made a request with the office of Senator Robert Jaworski, then Chairman of the Senate Committee on Environment and Natural Resources and whose Chief of Staff visited Baclayon to investigate, to intercede with BFAR on its behalf (DocTF4).

The Barangay council of Pamilacan took a slightly different tack to convince BFAR and the Office of the President. In a resolution (No. 04-2002) thanking the president for temporarily suspending the ban in 2002 and providing them the opportunity to “bring back lives to the general constituency” [sìc], they noted that “there are places or regions in the Philippine archipelago that are inhabited or frequented by manta rays, but the people do not catch nor eat them” (DocLGUA11). The Council suggested that these places be declared as national sanctuaries for breeding of manta rays, similar to the fish sanctuary they have in the island. The suggestion to declare other areas where manta rays roam as sanctuaries, but not Pamilacan, and to keep the suspension permanent, meant a strong desire to return to their old tradition.

That KKP joined the barangay council and other levels of government in Bohol in trying to change the policy, in a case of cross-coalition interaction (Weible, 2005), cannot be accounted for alone by functional interdependence (Weible & Sabatier, 2005) or resource dependence (Pfeiffer & Salancik, 1978), concepts normally used in the literature to clarify the nature of exchange. Resource dependence implies that accessing resources and power
from others facilitate interaction (Provan & Milward, 1995; Weible, 2005). Rather, this is explained by core beliefs (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999) and possibly proximity of policy interests (Kim & Roh, 2008). Because of KKP’s confidence in the lack of technical information about the population of manta ray, and perceived and actual dependence of some communities on the fishery for livelihood, it joined efforts by those from Bohol who have deep and intense feelings about the manta ray ban. Thus, it engaged in a “coalition of convenience” (Fenger & Klok, 2001) to push for policy change. Finally, the interaction by KKP with those in the opposing coalition suggests that the boundaries that separate them are porous. It appears that as far as secondary aspects and membership are concerned, there indeed are fuzzy edges in advocacy coalitions (Larsen, Vrangbæk & Traulsen, 2006).

5.6 Compromising policy beliefs
This is not to say that KKP, in supporting the Boholanos in its manta ray petition, has abandoned its core belief in conservation and ecotourism. Rather, what happened points to changes in the secondary aspects of its belief, adjustments to which are hypothesised to be necessary in order to protect policy core beliefs (Ellison, 1998). In the case of other organizations, the willingness to interact with KKP and subsequently to reach a compromise can be interpreted as policy learning processes, which was facilitated as the discussion moved towards addressing the technical question of how to compensate for the loss of the traditional livelihood. This parallels findings by Larsen, Vrangbæk and Traulsen (2006) in Denmark in terms of pharmacy policy. They noted that as discussions of pharmacy policy became more specific, that is, moved from ideological to technical matters, coalition members easily changed their minds. Similar instances of this happening are outlined below, when the opposing coalitions tried to solve their differences.

There were at least two attempts to do this. First was a meeting in December 1998 between IATFMMC and a delegation from Bohol composed of newly-elected Mayor Benicio Uy, his brother and former Mayor (and now Councillor) Felix Uy, and Barangay Captain Crispo Valeroso (DocTF3; DocTF4; IntB2). Here, they reiterated their opposition to the continued operation of the programme and the resulting ban on manta ray and their
concern about the potential negative impacts of tourism. They also expressed strong opinions against national government agencies, obviously referring to DOT and DENR, for executing projects and policies without providing substantial and sustainable means of livelihood to affected communities. IATFMMC however opposed the termination of the programme. The chair of the Task Force, Wilfrido Pollisco, deflected the LGU’s arguments and said that while the Task Force respected the view that the LGU cannot endorse a project that was not needed by the people, the presence of KKP in the island, in the first place, had the consent of the community (DocTF3). Ms Emily Bilet of DOT also said that since tourist flows to Pamilacan cannot be stopped, it is better for the community to be aware of the consequences tourism brings and prepare for them with the cooperation of the Task Force and the LGU, rather than stopping the project and leaving the community totally unprepared for tourism (DocTF3).

Their positions diametrically opposed, and with no one to mediate between them, the IATFMMC and LGU representatives failed to settle their main differences. What came out was a joint decision to hold a referendum at the end of January 1999 to determine the true feelings of the islanders. It was agreed that the next steps would be guided by the results (DocTF3; DocTF4).

When KKP relayed this to PIDWWO, the latter refused to participate, perhaps knowing that they were outnumbered by PAFIA (DocTF4; DocNGOE6). At that time, PIDWWO had been rebuilt by KKP, under new leadership, and had about 100 families as members. PIDWWO instead issued a resolution (No 1, s of 1999) urging the IATFMMC to abandon the referendum (DocNGOE6). In the resolution, they suggested that the only way for IATFMMC to help those affected by the ban was to “concentrate on providing the necessary livelihood assistance to the islanders who also wishes to continue and avail some alternative means of living rather than be persuade by the personal and vested interest of the few who wants to dominate and manipulate minds of the innocent people” [sic]. They reasoned that what was at stake was the “economic needs of the people...[as] everybody needs to be feed” [sic] rather than the political future of the island where support of the majority is important. Thus, PIDWWO did not find any compelling reason to participate in the exercise. The resolution also urged the municipal government of Baclayon, that if it was “really sincere in their quest to help the people of the island”, to
provide alternative livelihood and stop the intrusion of commercial fishermen in the area, rather than delaying the implementation of the project. It also warned that “should the municipality...support the continued harvesting of whale sharks and manta rays, they could do so” but it would not stop PIDWWO from continuing with the whale watching project (DocNGOE6). This disagreement by PIDWWO to the coalition’s decision reflects findings in the literature that even within a coalition, differences occur (Weible, 2005). However, as the advocacy coalition framework predicts, such disagreements disappear over time, as happened in PIDWWO’s case when it changed its mind over the referendum issue.

This happened during the second attempt to fix the execution of the programme, which had been transformed from an initial situation of low ambiguity/low conflict situation characteristic of ‘administrative implementation’ to the other extreme, high ambiguity/high conflict situation characteristic of ‘symbolic implementation’ (Matland, 1995). This time, it was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan that served as the ‘policy broker’ (Sabatier, 1993) in order to find a reasonable compromise in the conflict. In 16 April 1999, it issued Resolution Number 99-119 tasking SP’s Committee on Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, and Committee on Tourism, as well as two other members to conduct an inquiry in respect to the impact of FAO 193 and the existence of KKP in Pamilacan (DocLGUC2; DocLGUC2). In 23 April 1999, the first hearing was convened and invited to speak were representatives from the opposing coalitions. During the discussion, Crispo Valeroso intimated that should the project continue in the island, “blood might be shed” (DocLGUC4). This was so because a PIDWWO member “got stabbed that caused his hands to be injured. This happened because of the issue that they [PAFIA] want KKP to leave our place” [sic] (DocLGUC4). Hence, the PIDWWO chairperson declared that he would now agree to the referendum if only to have peace in the island. The PAFIA representative meanwhile related how life had become more difficult when their “livelihood was taken away” from them (DocLGUC4). Felix Uy stressed that in view of decentralization, the national government should not undertake projects without the consent of local officials.

Sympathetic to this position, the joint committee considered these views and let them become part of the guiding principles the committee adopted to evaluate options. The
guidelines were: (1) that in all options, the project must stay in Bohol, (2) that the social acceptability of the project is indispensable, (3) that alternative livelihood for the displaced sector must be considered at all times, (4) that the move for the lifting of the ban on manta rays must be supported (DocLGUC6; DocNGA1). From these principles, three courses of action were derived:

1. Have the KKP undertake “extensive social preparation” to reverse the negative feelings toward the programme and the implementer itself. Afterwards, an independent body would be asked to evaluate the social acceptability of the project and the NGO

2. Continue the programme but replace KKP with another NGO. The new implementer must provide “realistic livelihood projects”. The projects must be backed up by financial resources from the programme or from other government agencies and NGOs. Furthermore, everybody should work for the lifting of the manta ray ban

3. Carry on with the programme but the whale museum would be transferred to other sites (DocLGUC6; DocNGA1).

After consulting on 8 June 1999 with IATFMMC, the joint committee recommended adoption of option 3. However, it was also agreed that KKP’s office in the island would be moved to Tagbilaran, the provincial capital. The KKP office in the island would be turned over to PIDWWO, which would transform it into an exhibit centre of several skeletal remains of marine mammals, and function as an information centre on marine environment for tourists. Likewise, the proposed referendum would no longer push through (DocNGA1; DocNGOE6).

Seemingly, it was a good deal for each of the coalition. They appear to have given up only the secondary aspects of their beliefs without compromising their policy core beliefs, similar to findings by Ellison (1998) in the issue of water allocation and implementation of endangered species laws in the Animas-La Plata water project on the border of Colorado and New Mexico. IATFMMC and KKP got to continue their ecotourism and marine mammal conservation programme, only this time planting themselves in the main town and not in the island. PAFIA, the Barangay council and LGU Baclayon succeeded
in having KKP ousted physically from the island but had to accept that the programme had to go on in order for residents to have an alternative livelihood, through PIDWWO.

External events might also have forced the hands of the latter coalition into accepting the deal, instead of continued efforts to increase resources or to “outlearn” opponents (Sabatier, 1993, p. 34). In April, the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force in Cebu Province arrested leading PAFIA members for trying to smuggle whale shark meat (DocNGOE6; Gallardo, 1999). Only through the intercession of top municipal and provincial politicians, their patrons, were they able to get out of jail and escape charges (IntP1). In May, the Philippine Daily Inquirer newspaper reported the confiscation by BFAR of 230 kilos of whale shark meat and the apprehension of two persons caught selling manta rays in the markets of Baclayon (Balana, 1999). In other words, the coalition had to surrender to the higher power of the central government, fed by a vigilant national media, to enforce environmental laws.

Theoretically, the foregoing discussion implies a number of things. First, it highlights the importance of ‘venue shopping,’ that is, seeking a variety of influential audiences in order to ventilate concerns and resolve differences (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). Second, the status of policy brokerage in pushing through with implementation is raised here. To date, it is accorded minor status in the advocacy coalition framework, as strategies of coalitions appear more prominent. In this sense, the role played by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan follows that of the UK’s Department of Health insofar as resolving tobacco issues are concerned (Cairney, 2007). Moreover, the forum convened by the Sanggunian is more an arena for negotiation and compromise rather than a professional forum envisioned in the advocacy coalition framework. The public deliberation, as argued by Reich (1988), rightly encouraged civic discovery and explored policy choices. And because it paved the way for a “negotiated order” (Barrett & Hill, 1984), it proves that a public forum could be just as meaningful and effective as a rational technically-oriented one. Thus, the result contravenes the position by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) that the forum needed to be professional in character.

The introduction of social acceptability into the debate marks conceptual learning (Glasbergen, 1996) among parties concerned. Arguably, it was not much in the lexicon of
implementers as the early emphasis of the ecotourism programme was scientific research and conservation than community development (Green, 2002). Its entry marked a mid-stream shift in goal importance, one were the local community as a stakeholder is given primacy over the generation of scientific reports.

5.7 Summary and discussion

In order to investigate the impacts of networks to the policy process and its outcomes, this chapter has analysed the case of Pamilacan Island in Bohol Province. A review of the geographical, ecological and socio-cultural context noted the rich marine environment of the island, particularly the presence of cetaceans and elasmobranches. Initially, this resource base formed the basis of a livelihood based on consumption of wildlife. As the value of equity and conservation grew in importance at the national and local levels, a number of organizations and networks were attracted to the island, each bearing their own programmes. A dynamic network analysis of the linkages formed reveal interesting insights regarding their characteristics and concomitant influence on processes and outcomes. Analysis has shown the transition of the network from a sparse academic-bureaucratic network in the 1980s, to competing coalitions in the 1990s. As discussed in the next chapter, the network would transition to a dense ecotourism issue network in the 21st century.

Analysis shows that networks do influence the policy implementation process. As examined in the chapter, a low degree of integration among actors in the 1980s when marine conservation began meant less control and policing of environmentally-destructive behaviour. This allowed the continuation of marine mammal and manta ray hunting, with the possible demise of minke whale in Bohol Sea as consequence. In the 1990s, the entry of NGOs expanded the network to the extent that differences in beliefs led to an uncohesive network with diffused power structure. The struggle between coalitions to impose their own beliefs clearly slowed the policy implementation process. These outcomes, thus, clarify an issue fiercely debated in the literature (Dowding, 1995, 2001; Marsh, 1998; Marsh & Smith, 2000), and imply that networks do matter (Howlett, 2002).
Aside from the network structure itself, a number of variables were re-affirmed to be very important. Foremost are the resources and knowledge that policy actors bring into the process. Since conservation and tourism entered the island, those that have superior skills, ties, and resources have dominated, confirming the influence of institutional qualities in the process (Bardach, 1977; Cho et al., 2005; Levin & Ferman, 1986). This is most visible in the case of the policy fixer, with authority and ability to assume multiple roles, not the least of which is to be a compromiser and negotiator at the ground level when things go awry.

Their influence is mediated by contextual factors and implementation processes. Attempts at finding a solution to the issues in the island highlight the importance of negotiations (Browne & Wildavsky, 1983; Goggin et al., 1990; Parsons, 1995), in upholding trust, and reaching accommodation as rules of the game (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2001; Goggin et al., 1990; Rhodes, 1988). A key contextual factor is traditional power relations within the community. In particular, clientelistic relations, pervasive in everyday life across policy sectors, are observed to abet the close interconnection between political and economic activities of the elite. This marriage influences tourism policy implementation in two ways. First, those who wield it can thwart the policy particularly if political stakes are high. At bottom, this means that traditional power relations determine whether tourism could proceed or not and at what pace. This reinforces views by Richter (1982) that tourism development is essentially a political decision. The only constraint appears to be the availability of resources. Where it is available, the pace seems to be influenced by material benefits, politically and financially, accruing to the policy maker.

Second, it can energize the voice of the minority or small actors within the network who happen to receive the patronage. The latter seems to be the only redeeming value of clientelism, as in general its impacts are debilitating (Tosun, 2005). Seen in this light, there is merit in the argument that in implementing policy in a democratizing environment, ‘knowing who’ is as important as ‘knowing how’ (Schofield, 2004).

Overall, the effect is to add a layer of complexity to the advocacy coalition framework, inasmuch as it theorizes that the principal glue of coalitions is policy beliefs. The case shows that beliefs are found to bind just a coalition of convenience.
The analysis so far of the Pamilacan case has led to observations that some hypotheses of the advocacy coalition framework are not supported. These include those about the neutral nature of administrative agencies, the need for a professional forum, and the strict division among advocacy coalitions. Following assertions that it takes only a single case study to cast doubts on a theory (Flyvberg, 2006), the results do raise questions regarding the applicability of the theory, originally conceived in the pluralist society of the US, to a democratizing country. There might be a need to revisit some of the framework’s assumptions for it to work in a developing country. This issue is elaborated further in Chapter Eight when other aspects of the theory are considered to explain the policy process.

In addition, the chapter has shown that it is possible to characterize the processes of policy implementation dynamically and to emphasise different dimensions accordingly. That is to say, an implementation process initially seen as administrative in nature can turn to symbolic implementation (Matland, 1995), due to changes in the level of conflict as implementation goes along. Matland’s model however does not state which between top-down and bottom-up approaches is suitable in symbolic implementation. Findings suggest that if conditions approximate that of a patrimonial state, a bottom-up approach is appropriate. This is because in a patrimonial state like the Philippines where significant particularistic demands are made to political figures (de Dios & Hutchcroft, 2003; Randall, 1998) and clientelism is strong (Kerkvliet, 1995; Miranda, 1997; Sidel, 1989), there are many windows through which policy implementation can be influenced. Therefore, there is a lot of uncertainty whether the policy can be implemented particularly at local levels. The case of Pamilacan is instructive because when the conflict escalated, the local authorities appeared to bow to political priorities resulting to serious problems in implementation. Thus, it is argued that such contextual conditions are best described by a bottom-up approach than a top-down approach.

Finally, the chapter has revealed that there are multiple policy executions happening when a particular policy decision is tabled for implementation. In the present case, an executive decision to protect endangered species is implemented alongside state policy to promote sustainable tourism, as well as sustainable coastal resource management
practices. Therefore, the likely impacts to be generated by the policy can be multiple. What they are and how the local government responded is explored in the next chapter.
Chapter 6: Network structure and learning from policy outcomes in Pamilacan

6.1 Introduction
Analyses of the policy process presented in this chapter carries over from the previous chapter. Chronologically, the events and issues examined are those that occurred after the intense conflict in Pamilacan Island was resolved (i.e., from 2000 to 2009). As will be evident, changes have happened in the community and the local government since cetacean interaction tours began 10 years ago. The behavioural and policy outcomes of this experiment in policy implementation are discussed, noting that examinations of these aspects, particularly the role of feedback loops in informing policy changes, are essential parts of policy implementation models (deLeon & deLeon, 2002; Goggin et al., 1990; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Sabatier, 1993) including policy network approaches (Marsh & Smith, 2000).

The discussion proceeds from a network perspective, thus, still at the meso-level similar to Chapter Five. As shown in Figures 2-4 and 3-2, meso-level analysis is integrated here with micro-level analysis of the perception of individuals and people’s organizations in the community, supplemented by a review of relevant secondary literature.

The chapter outlines the consequences of having a dense network structure, paying attention to the response of the community and the local government to the knowledge gained from the programmes introduced, increased linkages with travel industry and civil society, and changes in the socio-economic environment such as the emergence of competition. The chapter argues that a cohesive network structure that emerged in the post-conflict period has mediated policy learning and changes in community behaviour. Moreover, this role is shown to be underpinned by structural holes, key organizations with resources and individuals with skills such as experts, along with feedback effects from knowledge of policy outcomes. The result presented demonstrates the important role that technical information and personal characteristics play in policy implementation. As with Chapters Four and Five, the role of resources is also highlighted. In addition, the
chapter reinforces the interactive relationship between policy learning and individual actions, network structure, and changes to the wider environment.

6.2 Setting the stage for tourism growth - the role of structural holes

Following the agreement forged by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as discussed in the last chapter, implementation of the ecotourism programme became less conflicted. Network actors seemed to agree on the need to move forward and collaborate. The stage had been set for tourism growth.

Taking the central podium is KKP, which derived its power from the internal structure of the Pamilacan network and its external linkages. Bridging weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) between the wider conservation network it operates in and the island, KKP prepared PIDWWO for the job of organizing itself around structural holes (Burt, 1992) that existed in the island. It was boosted by its high social rank (Benson, 1975), derived from its work as one of the organizations that pioneered in Asia the debt for nature swap in 1988. In the words of a former official “We had a strong presence because we were international” (IntM4). It got the commitment of private sector organizations such as the Bohol Federation of Tour and Travel Operators (BOFETTO) and the Bohol Association of Hotels, Resorts and Restaurants (BAHRR) to patronize the services of the organization (DocNGOD1; DocNGOE6). PIDWWO became a member of province-wide conservation networks such as the Bohol Rescue Unit for Marine Mammal (BRUMM), Bohol Coastal Resource Management Task Force, and Bantay-Dagat, the latter set-up to patrol the seas against commercial fishing operators intruding illegally within 15 km of the municipal waters (DocNGOE7; DocNGOE11). Services for the general population in the island were arranged with partner institutions including the distribution of goats to households, veterinary services for livestock and pets, as well as donation of books towards a barangay library (DocNGOC1; DocNGOE6; DocNGOE11). In this sense, it appears that in policy implementation “knowing who” is also just as important as “knowing how” (Schofield, 2004). This is hardly surprising, as at the heart of a network is the idea of ties with contacts.

Its financial resources also underpinned KKP’s power. It has been noted earlier that the programme funds it was able to arrange was more than the average annual revenue of the
local government of Baclayon, although eventually it was scaled down when DOT was not able to give its share in full. Nevertheless, KKP was still able to provide a host of services as discussed in the previous paragraph, as well as direct financial assistance such as grants to refit and register boats (DocNGOE4; DocNGOE11).

Eventually, the programme ended in August 2000 and KKP exited Pamilacan. However, it maintained interaction with island-based organizations, although not in a scale similar to its previous engagement (“When hunter”, June 2006). Briefly filling in the shoe of generous benefactor was the German Development Service. The focus was infrastructure development and key outputs were the construction of the island’s lone bakery and groins designed to arrest the erosion of sand in the beach (DocLGUA9; DocLGUA10; IntP3). In 2001, the Bohol Marine Triangle (BMT) project commenced. More than any other intervention, the BMT made the Pamilacan network so much denser. This was the direct result of links created when Bohol-based NGOs such as PROCESS-Bohol (Participatory Research, Organization of Communities and Education towards Struggle for Self-Reliance – Bohol), Environmental Legal Assistance Centre (ELAC), and the Bohol Alliance of Non-Government Organizations (BANGON), all BMT project implementers, made their way to the island to work with the barangay council, PAFIA and PIDWWO. PROCESS, a highly- respected NGO in the province which has been working on coastal resource management since 1985, wanted to continue where KKP left off (IntBo7). Aware of the politics that engulfed the island before, it adopted an inclusive approach, choosing to work with both PAFIA and PIDWWO. The focus however was on sharpening organization skills, or procedural learning (Schofield, 2004), and offering financial assistance. Thus, it provided seminars on organization self-assessment, and on financial and credit management (DocNGOA1; DocNGOA2; DocNGOA3). BANGON served as secretariat of the Livelihood Support Fund of the BMT. In this capacity, it extended loans to PIDWWO for 100,000 pesos [about US$1,820 at time of loan], so the latter can set up a booking and information office in the Baclayon town centre. PAFIA was also provided with a 123,000 pesos [around US$2,240 that time] loan to enable it to build a merchandising store in the island (IntBo1; IntBo5; IntP7). ELAC worked with the barangay council. As the council doubles as the management committee in-charge of the
fish sanctuary, ELAC gave it ropes and buoys to protect the reserve. With PIDWWO, ELAC gave funds for goat raising and construction of rainwater collectors (IntBo6).

Overlapping with BMT was the implementation of the NZAID-funded ecotourism project in Pamilacan. Formally starting in November 2002, it centred on overhauling the operation of PIDWWO. With a modest NZD28,000 programme funds, the ecotourism technical working group and the consultants sought to re-make the product as the best half-day marine tour in Bohol. This was to be accomplished by drastically reducing the number of people directly involved in tour operations (DocNGC2). It effectively did away with the long rotation scheme devised by KKP, which was judged ineffective due to the long slack periods (Ramos-Del Mundo, 2003), by having only nine persons to run the tours plus a project manager, secretary and treasurer. A series of training programmes were to be held, essentially similar to those undertaken during the KKP days, to improve quality of service. The itinerary was revised, just two boats were repaired, and safety equipment were purchased (DocNGC1; DocNGC2).

The NZAID implementing team played a critical role itself. Composed of experts in marine sciences, tourism planning and product development, and marketing from New Zealand and the Philippines, the team was equipped with knowledge to offer advice to PIDWWO from a more holistic standpoint. As merchants of meaning (Fadeeva, 2004), it served as a structural hole in bringing new perspectives into Pamilacan. Knowledge of international practices in wildlife marine ecotourism and coastal resource management has enabled the improvement of the product offering, streamlining of management operations, and protection of the resource base. It has also been instrumental in sharpening technical knowledge such as business planning skills (DocNGC1). Deep knowledge of the interconnection of the product and the market has led to the reinvigoration of relationships with the travel trade rendered moribund with the exit of KKP (Ramos-Del Mundo, 2003). Thus, the NZAID group was responsible in pushing PIDWWO to achieve greater heights and strengthen its relationship with other stakeholders.
6.3 Network structure and policy outcomes

Certainly, all these interactions have had serious implications on the network structure. One apparent result is the expansion in density as shown in Figure 6-1. Compared to the conservation network of the previous decade as seen in Figure 5-2, the inter-organizational network in the island is now denser. Some of the major players have remained by default, that is, the barangay and municipal governments are there by virtue of being primary agencies of policy implementation. The barangay council continues to function as the management council responsible for the marine reserve, with institutional and policing support from the municipal government. The emergence of new players is mainly responsible for the much denser network. For example, an additional actor from the public sector is the national government. Oblivious to the existence of the island at first, line agencies such as DOT, DA, DENR, and their bureaus have, on various occasions, trooped to the island to offer their assistance and services, in light of the problems the community suffered from the hunting ban. Reference is likewise made to the NGOs that have implemented conservation and tourism programmes in the island, often with funding from international aid agencies. A worthy addition are the local POs that were organized to interface with the NGOs and national government agencies, receive grants, and run the programmes that the NGOs have pioneered. As discussed in succeeding sections, these POs were instrumental in galvanizing support for conservation and tourism within the local community.

Another group of actors that has expanded its presence in the island is the tourism industry. Whereas it was just the nearby resorts of Panglao and Balicasag that were responsible for bringing in tourists to the island in the 1980s and early 1990s, a much more developed tourism industry of Bohol and Cebu have expanded their reach to far-flung areas. Thus, some resorts and travel agencies in these provinces would ferry their guests to Pamilacan after a countryside tour of Bohol. In other words, Pamilacan has become fully integrated into the tourism system of these provinces. While a large industry size is not a sufficient precursor in itself for a dense network, as Timur and Getz (2008) find in the case of San Francisco, developments in communications technology, particularly the ubiquity of cellular phones, mean that contacts are just a SMS away. In addition, some perceptive entrepreneurs like PIDWWT have maintained a web presence;
hence, ensuring that information about Pamilacan is available to anyone anywhere with internet connection. Aside from this, the island and its surrounds have been, for the past decade, the subject of more detailed marine research (e.g., Green, 2002; Rosales, 2003; Samonte, et al., 2007; White et al., 2003). Thus, interactions involving organizations in and outside the island, whether for humanitarian, business or scientific reasons, are much higher and more regular than years before.

Figure 6.1: Ecotourism network in Pamilacan

A consequence of a dense network is the formation of an efficient communication system (Scott, Cooper & Baggio, 2008). This has happened in Pamilacan, with island-based boat operators like PIDWWO, PIBOSA and independent suppliers actively exchanging information with resorts and travel agencies. In such networks, boundaries are fluid, loose coupling and extensive as industry players compete in the market (Mandell, 1984). On top of this, NGOs and government agencies from the local and national levels particularly those concerned with environment protection and livelihood development maintain close links with them as well as with key individuals such as the barangay captain. Thus, there is a lot of flexibility in the ‘comings and goings’ between partners, as suggested in these

Another consequence has been a redistribution of centrality. Whereas it was an academic institution and the local government of Baclayon that dominated the network a decade earlier, there are now many focal nodes in the restructured network. These include various NGOs having an ecotourism bent assuming the commander role (Rowley, 1997) depending on the issue at hand. This suggests the development of an ecotourism issue network. Power is more diffused in this network, with bases flowing from financial resources, external linkages, legitimacy, authority or political kinship. As discussed in sections 5.5.1 through to 5.5.3 above, these powers are wielded when core beliefs are threatened by external variables or when an actor tries to impose his belief over other players in the network.

As Oliver (1991) argues, growth in density opens new relational channels through which institutional norms are voluntarily diffused. Quite possibly, the network at this time could be construed as "communities of practice" (Schofield, 2004, p. 229) that facilitate learning. Consequences of increased interaction with the NGOs can be seen in the growth of the ethos of democracy and environmentalism in the island. The first is manifested in the increased popularity of people’s organizations and cooperatives as mechanisms for livelihood development and unity, and for participation in policymaking. The second is evident in a lot of ways, from increased familiarity with the fish sanctuary to policy initiatives. These are explained in the sub-sections below.

6.3.1 Deepening of democracy and environmentalism

6.3.1.1 Increased popularity of people’s organizations and cooperatives as mechanism for livelihood development and unity

For an island with less than 300 households, there are three tourism-oriented grassroots organizations in Pamilacan. This may seem surprising but the island’s history shows that in the past, no reason was too small to justify the formation of groups. The following quotes illustrate this:

When an NGO comes in, we immediately join…especially if food is free or there are no joining fees or meetings are just here in Pamilacan (IntP6)
When electricity was installed for the first time in the 1990s, the 60 residents who originally got connected to the system formed the Pamilacan Electric Consumers Association (IntP1).

Thus, when the need to push dolphin-watching arose, those who favoured leaned on this history and banded together to form PIDWWO. When success was becoming obvious, the non-consumptive use of cetaceans as basis of alternative livelihood became more acceptable. Accordingly, some members of PAFIA along with the independent operator PIDWWT, organized themselves into PIBOSA to compete with PIDWWO. With the entry of Ayala Foundation recently, a new cooperative called PITCO was formed to run diving operations. With contending parties coming together in PITCO, peace has reigned in the island, with the barangay captain proclaiming they are “80% united” (IntP1). Thus, it appears that social cohesion is indeed mediated by membership in organizations, an observation similarly shared by Cruz et al. (2005) from research undertaken in Mexico.

The formation of people’s organizations, assisted by NGOs, among the fisher folks reflects national and international trends on the growth of civil society (Clarke, 1998; Lee & So, 1999). As discussed in detail in Chapters Four and Seven, the number of individual POs, NGOs and NGO-networks that work for a variety of reasons has increased tremendously. The range of functions is wide, and this is clear in Pamilacan. Not only did the NGOs facilitate community organizing, they also did product development and marketing (IntBo5; IntBo7). In addition, they facilitated the participation of the community in local policymaking, as discussed below.

6.3.1.2 Sustained involvement in local tourism and conservation policymaking

The enabling policy environment of the 1990s that allowed civil society to penetrate state apparatus of policymaking, as explained in detail in Chapter Seven, has also permitted those in Pamilacan to have a say in their own affairs. In the case of ecotourism, the road was originally paved by the entry of KKP in the island. After it facilitated the organization of PIDWWO, it then positioned PIDWWO around structural holes (Burt, 1992) as explained in section 6.2. Thus, not only did PIDWWO manage to get the cooperation of the private sector in marketing the island, it was able to become a member of province-wide conservation networks (DocNGOE7; DocNGOE11). In these networks,
PIDWKO is able to take part in dialogues and activities that shape policy and programmes at a wider level. This opened the door to other people’s organizations such as PIBOSA. Both are members of the Bohol Rescue Unit for Marine Mammals, and participate in Bantay-Dagat. PIBOSA is also a member of Philippine Social Enterprise Network (IntB4). As well, all peoples’ organizations and independent boat operators actively discuss with the private sector and the local council management options to deal with threats posed by competition from Panglao and the intrusion of commercial fishers in municipal waters (IntB1; IntBo1; IntP7).

This experience by Pamilacan is by no means unique. In other parts of the country, communities that have emergent ecotourism industries have learnt how to access local policymaking structures as well. For instance, Galit and Reyes (1999) discuss how residents of Honda Bay, Palawan, participate in dialogues with local officials and NGOs through the Honda Bay Boatmen Association. Of the country’s more than 300 protected areas, there are 168 Protected Area Management Boards established, the membership of which includes people’s organizations and NGOs based on communities enclosed by the reserve (DocNGF1). All these are part of the ongoing democratization movement that gained momentum in the country in recent decades (De Guzman & Reforma, 1993; Silliman & Noble, 1998).

6.3.1.3 Environmentalism

Without doubt, there is now greater concern for the environment among islanders. This is not to say that nobody was environmentally aware before. On the contrary, the community has been praised because its excellent management of the fish sanctuary has given it the distinction of having achieved one of the highest ratings among marine protected sites in Central Visayas (Christie, White, & Deguit, 2002; White et al., 2003). What is suggested is that the definition of environmentalism has expanded to include aspects beyond the fish sanctuary and has permeated to a larger number of people. This is evident in many ways. First, and with respect to the fish sanctuary, every fisher in the island is familiar with it including the prohibitions and penalties that go with any violation. The diffusion of information is facilitated by the constancy of reminders to refrain from practicing illegal fishing and to respect the seas, the message delivered
through posters and billboards found around the island. Those with the means, particularly the barangay council that doubles as the sanctuary’s management committee, are assertive about protecting the resource by conducting patrols, providing 24-hr security, and imposing barriers physically through buoys (White et al., 2003). Second, large-scale hunting for cetaceans and elasmobranch has clearly stopped for 10 years running (IntP1; IntP2; IntP3; IntP4; IntP7). Villagers have turned to buying them from a nearby province (IntBo1). Third is the collection of environmental user fees from those who dock their boats, picnic in the beach, or dive in its waters (DocLGUA1; DocLGUA2; DocLGUA6; DocLGUA7; DocLGUA13). This was undertaken based on lessons derived from NGOs who have helped establish such mechanisms to recover environmental costs particularly in protected areas. It should be noted that levying user fees is a recent innovation and its use around the country is still limited (Rosales, 2003). Thus, Pamilacan residents can be considered as one of the pioneers in this regard. Fourth is the community’s effort to clean its surroundings and be more concerned with the island’s aesthetic beauty. Barangay officials, for example, have come up with Resolution No. 04-2002 requesting the Vice-Governor to donate funds to construct flower boxes along the 2.10 km long ‘barangay highway,’ “as visitors have been observed to take walking tours around the island” (DocLGUA3). Garbage bins can also be found along the path where tourists stroll near the beach and in the interior. Women’s organizations (BULAK and BLOSSOM) have been set up purposely to maintain cleanliness (DocLGUA4; IntP3; IntP7). Fifth is the attempt to address long-term threats to their marine mammal-based livelihood such as unsustainable touring practices by competitors and commercial fishing through policy initiatives by both the barangay and municipal governments. The latter is discussed in detail in sections 6.4 through to 6.5 below. The mimetic or learning process (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) is likewise evident in communicative actions with outside partners. For example, as soon as the NGO Environmental Legal Assistance Centre (ELAC) learned from the community that a newly built private resort constructed in Pamilacan has violated environmental laws, it sued the owners, to redress the situation (IntBo6). These actions seem to suggest ecological modernization (Hajer, 1995), the view that the economic objective of an ensured livelihood and the environmental goal of marine conservation are complementary.
There are two very practical reasons for this ecological modernization. First, and with reference to conserving marine mammals and the whale sharks, is that the villagers realized they could not fight the central government. Leo Sumalpong puts it succinctly “we’d be rebels if we do” (Moral, 2003, p. D3). He was speaking from the experience of community members who were jailed by the national police for trying to smuggle whale shark meat in 1999. Second is to protect the emergent tourism livelihood that relies heavily on the presence of the dolphins and whales. It has come to their attention that the unethical behaviour of fishers-turned-tour boat operators from Panglao, as well as the disturbance caused by commercial fishermen, negatively affects the welfare of dolphins, thus, compromising the long-term survival of the species and their livelihood. Hence, the need to be active in protecting them arose.

In relation to the tour itself, the design of the programme run by those from Pamilacan encourages a pro-conservation attitude. With a tour guide, participants walk around the island and discover life in the fishing village, after watching dolphins from the boat. There is opportunity to learn more of the marine environment through snorkeling in the fish sanctuary. Curtin (2003), based on the work by Oliver (1992), suggests that these activities are occasions for self-discovery and sensory involvement, elements that should develop deep feelings towards the environment. Repeated over the long term, and mediated by interpretation, it is suggested that these activities could change attitudes and behavior (Peake, 2007).

Overall, these findings lend support to assertions made by Kalland and Pearson (1998) that environmentalism in Asian countries is based on practical reasons. Lee and So (1998) further suggest that the attitude is geared towards livelihood issues. Given the experience of Pamilacan, this might well be true. Another Asian case validates this. Kontogeorgopoulos (2005) found that in southern Thailand, insecurities by tour guides in their future employment coupled with immediate monetary rewards serve a basic role in building environmental appreciation.

Based on Hall’s (1993) discussion of policy learning, Pamilacan’s turn-around is a sort of paradigm change, in terms of how policy problems are seen. That is, from a view that
natural resources must be exploited in order to improve economic plight to protection of the environment to protect their own existence.

In summary, the shift towards broader environmentalism by the community in Pamilacan demonstrates the usefulness of networks and learning in policy implementation. In this case, the networks assisted in developing such positive attitudes rather than outside of them (Fadeeva, 2004), and in subsequently spreading these mindsets and norms throughout the community (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989). Had NGOs not engaged with the community, the latter might have remained in their obstinate destructive ways and remained peripheral to the growing tourism industry in Bohol. This result provides support to the conjecture by Howlett and Ramesh (2002) that policy learning and policy change influence subsystem transformation. This last point finds further resonance when the role of negative feedback to grow networks is considered (Pemberton, 2003). The reaction of PAFIA and the rest of the anti-tourism coalition to the ecotourism policy have essentially brought in additional actors into Pamilacan, bringing to life new networks.

6.3.2 Routinization of behaviour

Moreover, the high degree of connectivity of the Pamilacan network serves as a better monitoring and coordinating pressure, and a constraint to organization and individual behaviour through third party influence (Rowley, 1997). The result is a steadying of norms towards the straight and narrow, and routinization of new behaviour. The best illustration of this is PAFIA’s involvement with whale shark hunting which has gradually decreased until it stopped altogether. This was attained through a combination of diligent law enforcement and undoubtedly political and community pressure. Another example is the way boat operators within the island have tried to match expectations set by the travel industry. Trying hard to conform to quality standards that are new to them, boat operators, crew, spotters and guides wake up at an unholy hour of 3:00am, so they can pick up guests in Panglao Island or Baclayon pier at the appointed time of 5:30am. “Men involved have also minimized drinking because there had been problems in the past of not being able to show up because of too much booze the night before” (IntC1; IntP7). They dress up in their uniforms and try their best to interpret the sights and sounds of the sea to the satisfaction of the guests, even if generally many are school dropouts or have only
finished elementary school (DocNGOB2). A number of training programmes have been implemented to see to it that they can communicate, can differentiate the different marine mammal species, and prepare meals acceptably (DocNGC1). These training programmes and interactions have in turn led to personal transformations among key individuals involved in the industry. This is illustrated by the following quotes:

Before, we were afraid of tourists because they might talk to us in English. Now we do not pay much attention...we know how to talk to them (IntP7)

you know that income is assured in tourism when you go out…unlike fishing wherein you might go home empty-handed (IntP2)

Even ways to resolve inter-personal conflicts have improved, with less contentious norms adopted. A respondent has this to say:

Now, we do not interrupt unnecessarily; if there is a complaint, we go straight to talking. Before, there would be fighting first (IntP7)

These quotes convey a very mature disposition and do not suggest that at the individual level, tourism as it has been experienced over the course of 10 years has affected the community negatively. Certainly, these are a far cry from the fears articulated by Mayor Felix Uy when he rejected tourism for Pamilacan more than 10 years ago (DocNGOE6; DocNGOE11). Quite the opposite, this development attests to the evolution of a welcoming attitude of the community to the idea of tourism as alternative to hunting. In other words, the confidence is another expression of the (80%) unity of the community behind tourism. This reinforces views by Dudley (2007) that policy learning involves “individual processes of internal reinterpretation that can have the effect of carrying individual and coalitions in diverse and unexpected directions” (p. 410). In the case of Pamilacan, the collective impact of new livelihoods, new values and confidence are evidence of what Halme (2001) calls the transformational outcomes of revolutionary learning.

The confidence of some residents might be traced to a number of reasons. First, dolphin watching has clearly shown that it can provide the community with new economic and political opportunities, as explained in section 6.3.1. Second, NGOs and travel industry partners were always on hand to provide assistance. Third, through ecotourism, they have
been able to take control of their lives by being able to participate in policy dialogues. That way, they can ventilate their concerns such as insecurities over the long-term prospects of dolphin watching. Together, what is suggested is that ecotourism, as they have experienced it after the conflict had died down, has proven to be a tool for personal learning, and economic and political development for the community.

6.4 Feedback effects of economic and political impacts of tourism

6.4.1 Changes in rules of the game and actor strategies

With changes in personal attitudes toward tourism, it was inevitable that the rules of the game and strategies would change. Whereas relations were highly mistrustful and conflictual before due to heated debates about the whale shark and manta ray fishery ban, personal learning had altered relations to one of competition, and later on by coordination. The value of being transparent is also raised. The process seems to have been hastened by feedback loops concerning the economic and political effects of tourism. As the literature suggests, feedback leads to actor’s learning (Deutsch, 1966; Marsh & Smith, 2000), increased sophistication in strategies (Sabatier, 1993), and ultimately to revision in the statute (Goggin et al., 1990; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Thus, to understand how the rules of the game and strategies evolved, it is necessary to discuss the economic outcomes of cetacean interaction tours in the island. It is shown that the positive perception of economic opportunities, along with the political developments, is associated with behavioural changes.

The organization of PIDWWO signalled the emergence of new economic opportunities for the community. With its formation, a new dimension was added to fishing and farming that exist synergistically in the island, similar to other coastal communities in the country (Eder, 2003; Nimmo, 2001). PIDWWO operated dolphin-watching tours, now called the Marine Life Tour, a half-day guided tour that features boat-based interaction with dolphins, snorkelling in the marine sanctuary, and lunch in the island. It has proved successful, so much so that it has spawned imitations across and beyond the island. For example, some PAFIA members and a former WWF community organizer banded themselves together to form the Pamilacan Island Boat Operators and Spotters Association (PIBOSA) to rival PIDWWO. The organization of PIBOSA and other
competitors is yet another demonstration of the effectiveness of the network structure in modifying behavioural outcomes towards acceptance of ecotourism and environmental conservation (Mandell, 2001; Provan & Milward, 1995; Rainey & Busson, 2001).

As a result, livelihood has expanded to include bed and breakfast, and tour boat operation. From previously one family in the late 1990s, five families now offer basic accommodation to tourists. They rent 12 cottages from 250 to 1,000 pesos [about US$5-21] per night and charge 200 pesos [US$4] per person per meal (IntP7; IntP8). Tour boat operation has also become popular. Eight organizations and individual entrepreneurs offer dolphin-watching tours. Together they use at least 31 tour boats. In addition, with the introduction in 2008 of diving trips by the Pamilacan Island Tourism and Livelihood Multipurpose Cooperative (PITCO), where 89 out of 276 families are involved, another 10 boats have been added to the stock (IntP2). While, overall, these figures are yet small compared to those that supported hunting before - where almost everyone was involved - these numbers provide the impetus for continued involvement in tourism, as clearly, tourism can sustain a coterie of new occupations, as discussed below.

New employment generated from the emergent tourism industry includes dolphin/whale spotters, tour guides, boat operator/captain, and cooks. In the case of PIDWWO now, this involves 60 individuals rotating for the jobs. Significantly, all hail from the island, so employment leakage is nil. Furthermore, there is no gender bias, compared to other cases of marine ecotourism elsewhere (e.g., Foucat, 2002; Petterson-Lofquist, 1995; c.f., Belsky, 1999; Galit & Reyes, 1999). Women, in particular, are employed as tour guides and cooks, in stark contrast to the lack of options before. Elsewhere in the country, researchers have observed that women in fishing communities get into the agricultural sector (Nimmo, 2001), or assist their fisher-husbands by taking care of fish trading and fish processing (Lachica, 1993; Pomeroy, 1987).

The achievements of Pamilacan have benefited the wider tourism industry of Bohol province in at least two important ways. First, with the introduction of dolphin and whale watching tours, the range of tourism products has expanded. Previously, a tour of Bohol would mainly revolve around a visit to its natural icon, the Chocolate Hills, and stops to historical and religious landmarks. All these could be accomplished in one day. With the
new activity in Pamilacan, along with a number of marine ecotourism products and other nature-based forms of tourism that have emerged in the last decade (Canete, 2003; DocNGA2; DocNGOA1), choices have widened. Thus, according to tour operators interviewed, a typical tour package now has an extended list of options for the visitor (IntB4; IntBo2). “There are more things to see, and with the development of infrastructure, the tourist has more reasons to stay” (IntBo2). In consequence, average time spent in Bohol has lengthened up to seven days (DocNGA2).

Secondly, the wider range of ecotourism products, the involvement of communities in some of them, and an enabling local policy environment has reinforced Bohol’s image as an emergent, top-notch ecotourism destination in the country. The image was cultivated in the 1980s with the development of resorts in Panglao island (Bersales, 2005), and received a boost in the 1990s when the tarsier (T. syrichta) was marketed by travel agencies to attract eco-tourists (Canete, 2003). Before long, the DOT was marketing Bohol as the eco-cultural paradise of the Philippines. This was picked up local politicians and in 1998, they articulated a vision of the province with ‘eco-cultural tourism’ at the forefront, and operationalized this with relevant policy actions including the establishment of the Bohol Tourism Office and the Bohol Environment and Management Office (Relampagos, 1998). As a result, the province was twice given the Galing Pook awards (in 2002 and 2004), a prestigious award on local governance. It was specifically recognized for its programmes on ecotourism development. No doubt, a contributory factor was the dolphin-watching programme in Pamilacan. In 2006, the British Airways named PIDWWO itself a finalist in the conservation category of the Tourism for Tomorrow Award. That year also witnessed the visit of Prime Minister Helen Clark of New Zealand in Pamilacan Island during a state visit to the Philippines. All these publicity pushed Bohol into the limelight that enhanced its visibility in the market.

Consequently, visitor arrivals into Bohol and Pamilacan have increased. From statistics kept by PIDWWO, PIBOSA and an individual operator, visitor numbers have leap-frogged from less than 300 in 1999 to more than 7,000 in 2006, a growth of more than 3200%, as shown in Table 6-1 below.
Table 6.1: Number of cetacean interaction participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Organization/Individual provider</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PIBOSA/ PIDWWT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4362</td>
<td>2460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4263</td>
<td>1782</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled from unpublished records of the tour operators

These visitor arrival statistics are conservative, as they do not include figures from smaller dolphin-watch organizations. The count excludes as well as those groups who travel to the island independently not to watch the dolphins per se but to frolic in the beach.

The numbers pale in comparison with more established cetacean interaction sites in other parts of the world. In Kaikoura, New Zealand, for example, whale-watching visitors have grown from 3,500 in 1989 to 60,000 in 1998 (Cater & Cater, 2007). In Hervey Island, Australia, the local economy benefits from 75,000 whale watchers (Bulbeck, 2005). However, figures in Pamilacan are consistent with the growth of tourism in the province of Bohol where 2007 visitor arrivals have increased 5.5 times since 2003 (DocLGUC8.).

Because of sustained market interest, gross revenues earned have increased over time. User fees and tour payments are the two main revenue streams. Learning that marine protected areas can charge user fees, the Pamilacan barangay council mandated the collection of user fees to visitors and their boats (DocLGUA1; DocLGUA2; DocLGUA6; DocLGUA7; DocLGUA13). This has given the barangay about 60,000 pesos [approximately US$1,170] in revenue in 2006 and, in 2008, approximately 90,000 pesos
[about US$2,023] (IntP3). Of these amounts, 70% go to the municipal government of Baclayon, while the remaining 30% are retained in the barangay (IntP6). Tellingly, the estimated amount could have been larger if officials were more diligent. The barangay treasurer admits that not every visitor is ticketed particularly if the group is small. “A waste of receipt,” she reasons, since the tickets - which the barangay buys for 175 pesos [US$3.7] a booklet from the Municipal Treasurer’s Office - could be used to charge diving boats that nets higher revenue for them (IntP5).

Tour payments are another source of revenue and here figures are much higher. Records from PIDWWO show that this has reached close to a million pesos in 2006 since tours unofficially began in 1998.

As mentioned above, the rules of the game evolved from conflictual to competitive because of learning the economic opportunities presented by the cetacean interaction tours. This is particularly true of the main service providers. First, PIBOSA enhanced its legitimacy by registering with the Securities and Exchange Commission and with the provincial government as a people’s organization (DocLGUC7; IntB4). Thus, its members became eligible to acquire new skills through training programmes sponsored by NGOs, similar to those received by PIDWWO (IntC1). Second, the organizations became more aggressive in attracting patrons, employing fair and sometimes foul means. An example was PIBOSA’s public accusation in 2004 of favouritism in PIDWWO and in 2006 of misrepresentation against the latter’s website. In turn, PIDWWO charged PIBOSA of uncooperative behaviour such as refusing to lend extra boats when needed (DocLGUC7; Ligalig, 2004; Obedencio, 2006). A sense of normalcy and civility in competition was achieved only when the Provincial Tourism Council and the local government both acting as ‘policy fixers’ (Bardach, 1977) stepped in (DocLGUC7).

6.4.2 Network stability

Network stability seemed to have been achieved only when the political landscape changed in 2007 (IntBo1). In that year’s election, representatives from PIDWWO, PAFIA (and PIBOSA by extension) won seats in the barangay council. A new barangay chairperson from PAFIA but who was open to tourism was also elected (IntP1; IntBo1; IntC1). In the municipal level, a new Mayor who was politically connected to PIDWWO

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was elected. Compared to the previous Mayor, he saw the huge potential of tourism (IntBo1; IntB3; IntB5). In terms of network analysis, this suggests that stability appears to be facilitated by having members with common beliefs, as Sabatier (1993) argues in the advocacy coalition framework, even if actors initially come from opposing coalitions.

Network stability was aided by the appearance of the politically neutral Ayala Foundation in 2007. Backed up by the resources of one of the country’s biggest conglomerates, Ayala Foundation is a structural hole in itself, similar to roles played by KKP and the NZAID team. Thus, it brought new expertise to the island and the municipality, this time relevant to running diving operations, finance operations in cooperatives, sustainable development, natural farming, heritage management, and personal development. Exploiting its strong ties with the companies of the Ayala conglomerate and its partners, it sends mentors to work with key individuals in the island (IntP9). These individuals, most of the time, represent committees of the cooperative that has been formed through the initiative of Ayala. What is remarkable is that the membership of the cooperative, formally registered with the Cooperative Development Authority as the Pamilacan Island Tourism and Livelihood Multipurpose Cooperative (PITCO) spans all people’s organizations (PAFIA, PIDWWO and PIBOSA) as well as independent tour operators in the island (IntP1; IntP2). Thus, with interlocking leaderships and overlapping memberships among groups in the island, an excellent opportunity for coordination existed again. It is asserted that amidst the competition for cetacean interaction business that exist among various people’s organizations and independent boat operators in the island, the activities of the Foundation have signalled a return to old cooperative ties and communal patterns of behaviour that existed before the growth of tourism in the island. Joint membership has forced PAFIA, PIBOSA and PIDWWO members to work together again, for example, supplying boats to the diving trips, similar to practices just a decade ago when almost all in the community were involved in the cetacean and elasmobranch trade in various capacities. Another expression of cooperation is their strong presence in discussions convened by the local government to formulate policies to regulate tourism activities and address sustainability issues (IntP4; IntP7; IntP8). Thus, along with the use of competitive strategies, actors have also showed a capacity to cooperate. Such interactive routines, Dohler (1991, p. 238) argues, leads to a kind of network stability that
“cannot be overturned straight away because they form the basis for cooperative relations between actors.” The concurrent barangay captain and vice-chairman of PAFIA, then, is justified in proclaiming that the island is “80% united” behind tourism (IntP1).

The interlocking membership of islanders in various people’s organizations and cooperatives, as well as their keen participation in discussions with other policy actors of sustainability issues that have resulted in stability implies other things for the policy process. Practically, this means that the three advocacy coalitions of the 1990s have now dissolved into a wider ecotourism issue network. It is, however, an empirical question whether they have turned into what Kim and Roh (2008) calls a “substantial coalition”, an aggrupation “loaded with social capital” (p. 679). Next, the situation seems to demonstrate the attainment of congruence in the meaning of conservation and tourism originally articulated between the IATFMMC and the local community. Yet this one mind was achieved only 10 years after it was introduced. This highlights a number of points. First is the importance of a temporal dimension in policy learning. The intervening years have allowed the participants in the network to engage in self-reflection and to receive mimetic pressure from other actors in the network. In addition, it has permitted them to learn first-hand the economic benefits of the programme as well as factors that may undermine success such as destructive behaviour by competitors. This interpretation of time as the period needed for new values to be imbibed is different from that traditionally conceptualized in the advocacy coalition framework. Sabatier (1993, 1999) sees time as relevant only in terms of showing a policy undergoing a cycle of formulation and reformulation. However, this interpretation is much closer to Schofield’s (2004) discussion of time in learned implementation, where she speaks of three temporal phases (initiation, transitional stage and continuation stage) that leads to learning. Second, it illustrates the value of having opportunities for “continuous, open exchange with communities with a different paradigm” (Grin & Van de Graaf, 1996, p.312), in this case, the succession of NGOs and international aid groups that followed IATFMMC, to introduce new values and achieve congruence in meaning. Third, the joint discussion of sustainability and the search for policy solution suggests a shift in the mindset of stakeholders regarding environmentalism itself. Their actions imply that they have begun to view the economic objective of an ensured livelihood and the environmental goal of
marine conservation as complementary. Hajer (1995) calls this the process of ecological modernization. It is nothing short of a ‘paradigm shift’ in Hall’s (1993) typology of policy change. This should increase the scope for policy learning beyond organizations and programmes, as Bennett & Howlett (1992) suggest.

6.5 The issue of environmental sustainability and policy learning

Mandell (1984) suggests that network stability is enhanced by activities that deal with changes in the complexity of the environment. In Pamilacan, the environment has clearly changed post-conflict, with the preceding section highlighting behavioural and network changes in response to multiple ties that emerged. An issue that has provided an impetus for cooperation among them is the sustainability of tourism. This concern seems to be the result of a range of issues that threaten the viability not only of cetacean interaction tours but also the subsistence of the community. Discussed below, they are environmental and commercial in nature, whose interplay are quite complex. Mainly, these revolve around the impact of tour boats and commercial fishing operations. Thus, after outlining the issues, the policy response of the local government is examined. The recognition itself of these issues by the community at large and the concerned local government is indicative of technical, conceptual and social learning, and point to the maintenance of stable network ties and cooperative relation in order to mitigate them. It again shows the role of technical information, via feedback loops, in policy change.

6.5.1 The impact of tour boats

The first issue is the ecological impact of increased cetacean interaction tours. First, some background on the way the present tour programme in Pamilacan runs. The tour can be divided roughly into three phases: meet and greet, dolphin interaction, and marine sanctuary phase. This present flow came to be when the NZAID-sponsored ecotourism consulting team revamped it in 2003. The first phase starts early in the morning, around 5:30-6:00am, when the crew of three meets with the dolphin watchers at the Baclayon pier. By the time the boat has left after a few minutes, the tour guide would have described marine life in the pier as well as land-based attractions visible from the sea such as the imposing Baclayon church. This is where the first phase ends.
The second phase begins some 20-30 minutes after departure, in the area where dolphins are to be seen. The dolphins generally can be found in three sites. The pump boat reduces speed and the spotter scans the area for signs of the cetaceans. However, special equipment like hydrophones are unavailable to facilitate the search but the crew maintains a cellular phone to learn from other tour boats that might have seen them in other locations. The tour guide describes the physical attributes of species normally seen such as Risso’s, bottlenose, and Fraser’s dolphins. Guests are encouraged to clap and whistle so that dolphins will come near and bow ride. Other cetacean interaction rules are discussed such as the boat not heading straight to or behind the dolphins but behind, and to keep level with them. Throughout this phase, other characteristics of dolphins like feeding habits, signature whistle and other noises, their predators, and group behaviour are explained. Other species that might potentially be viewed such as whale sharks and manta rays are described.

Eventually, when the spotter sees a group of dolphins, the boat approaches at reduced or neutral speed, and manoeuvres to the side. It maintains a distance of approximately 30 to 50 metres away of the pack. The guide claps and whistles to entice the dolphins to come. Some do bow-ride, play against each other, or leave. There is no telling what the dolphins would do in reaction to the presence of the boat. After about 10-15 minutes of interaction, the boat leaves to look for other groups. After about three encounters or one-hour and a half asea, the boat heads to the island, signalling the end of the second phase.

The third phase involves the marine sanctuary. Before guests get going with the snorkel, the tour guide first sketches the sanctuary, its history and function. A good part of the explanation is devoted to a description of various marine organisms found. This phase ends after about an hour, after which the guests are served an early lunch near the old Spanish fort. The remaining time before the 12 noon trip back to the mainland is spent on optional activities.

Fundamentally, the above schedule and conduct of activities is different from those run by competitors from Panglao. The latter employs only a single person, the boat captain, who brings guests around the waters to search for the dolphins. There are no tour guides to provide background information or interpretation. They would keep looking until they
found a pod, but there is no strict timetable observed. Hence, the tour, or boat rental to be more precise, can be as short as 30 minutes. Not having received expert training on cetacean interaction, they would sometimes head straight to the pod, thus scattering them or changing their direction. Lawrence Casiraya, an individual who posted his experience in a newspaper blog, had this to say about what he experienced:

We set out past 6AM and by the time we reached the area where the dolphins are, it was already swarming with many boats with the same idea. As one colleague puts it, it was more like “dolphin chasing”, rather than watching. Each time dolphins were seen rising out of the water; it was like off to the races. And it just seemed to scare these poor creatures. (Philippine Daily Inquirer Online, November 18, 2008)

If no creatures are seen or the guests decided to stop the search, the fishers head home to Panglao. Back in the island, they look for new customers in the beach. It is suggested that a Panglao fisher can do the tour up to three times a day (IntP7).

Combined, these two different practices could generate potentially negative impacts on the cetaceans. Previous researches have established that the mere presence of boats could lead to a lot of harmful behavioural and biological changes including abundance (Bejder et al., 2006), reproductive success (Lusseau, 2005; Lusseau & Bejder, 2007), behaviour (Constantine et al., 2004; Corkeron, 1995; Lusseau, 2003), vocal communication (Norris, 1994; Scarpaci et al., 2000), inter-animal distance (Blane & Jackson, 1995), and swimming speed and direction (Williams, Trites, & Bain, 2002). Some aspects of boat-based interactions as they are practiced in Pamilacan are considered here. Foremost of these is the behaviour of the tour operators while interacting with the dolphins. As mentioned above, those from Panglao violate cetacean interaction rules, the least of which is Joint Administrative Order No. 1, issued by the Department of Tourism and the Department of Agriculture, which expressly prohibits aggressive behaviour. Those from Pamilacan are violators themselves, as they do not maintain the suggested minimum distance of 100 meters. In this respect, they are not alone, as their international counterparts are culpable themselves (c.f., Lusseau, 2005). The effect of these violations is a magnification of the impact of boat interactions particularly on the female dolphins (Lusseau, 2005).
Aside from erratic boat movement, another point hurled against tour boats is the noise generated by engines. It is contended that the noise affects the animals’ hearing that in turn, alters patterns of communication and group cohesion (Higham & Lück, 2008). This highlights the issue of vessel types. In Pamilacan and Panglao, tour boats are fishing pump boats re-fitted with passenger facilities. Typically, they run on second-hand 4DR5 automobile engines attached to propellers (IntP4; IntP5; IntP7). On this, it has been observed that propeller-driven boats are much noisier than water-jet powered boats (Gordon et al., 1992; MacGibbon, 1991). This implies that cetaceans in Bohol Sea are more prone to noise disturbance particularly when many pumpboats are chasing after them.

The issue of number of tour boats is important for another reason: its effects on abundance of species. Originally, in Pamilacan in 1998, there were seven boats accredited to conduct the tours. Over the years, this has increased to 31 boats, as the number of independent operators grew. With Panglao fishers and some Panglao-based resorts joining the fray, there are now more boats than ever (IntBo1; InBo2). Compared internationally, the numbers are quite remarkable, as similar sites have less (c.f., Lusseau, 2005; Peake, 2007). While tour boats in Bohol might not run all at the same time, it was observed elsewhere that the deployment of additional boats affects the abundance of species (see Bejder et al., 2006). Thus, boat interaction tours in Bohol Sea could act as another source of pressure on the population size of cetaceans.

Already there is evidence of this pressure affecting abundance, anecdotally at least. Boat operators report seeing only four of the eleven species of marine mammals in Bohol in their regular trips: Risso’s dolphin, spinner dolphin, Fraser’s dolphin and bottlenose dolphin (IntP4). However, they claim that the rest, if not more, are out there if they look for them. This is evidently an empirical question. In addition, whales have been slow to come back. Boat operators report seeing six sperm whales in 2005, but none has returned. However, there were three sightings of Bryde’s whales in 2008 (IntP4; IntP7; InBo1). This could suggest disturbance. Of course, the impact of other vessels that traverse Bohol Sea has to be taken into account as well but this is discussed later.
Lastly, a factor that might intensify the potential impacts on the dolphins is the observation that they are resident around Pamilacan (IntBo1). This means that they are likely to be exposed to year-round, sometimes three times a day, dolphin-watching tours. Thus, the cumulative exposure to boats and their noises could be much higher than migratory animals such as great whales (Constantine & Bejder, 2007).

In summary, the increased number of boats that have offered interaction tours with cetaceans and the haphazard way it is practiced by some opportunistic individuals threaten the viability of the livelihood itself by generating negative impacts on the marine mammals. To maintain the sustainability of the trade, the issue is the subject of consultations among stakeholders in the community, precipitating local government policy changes, as discussed below in section 6.5.4. It provides the impetus in the ecotourism network to cooperate and maintain stable ties with each other in order to engage in collective action (Knoke, Pappi & Tsujinaka, 1996). Another significant issue that performs the same role is commercial fishing, discussed below.

**6.5.2 The influence of commercial fishing**

One issue that constantly crops up in Pamilacan is the communities’ aversion towards commercial fishing. In the context of ecotourism in the island, commercial fishing is accused of perpetrating three things: reducing species diversity and abundance, affecting cetacean behaviour, and threatening food security in the island. These complaints are part of the wider and long-running debate in the country that pit municipal fishers against commercial fishers (Eder, 2005; Lim, Matsuda & Shigemi, 1995). Thomas (1998) counts at least three major conflicts that have occurred between the two sectors historically, all revolving around the use of fishing gear by the commercial sector and how they deplete fish stock.

In the 1990s and the present decade, the issue evolved to include restrictions in fishing grounds. Specifically, commercial fishers are accused of intrusion into municipal fishing areas (Elazequi, de Guzman, & Foronda, 1999; Lopez, 2004). A brief review is in order. From 1976 until the enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, municipal water was defined in local statutes as the part that extends three nautical miles (about 7 km) from the shoreline out to sea. In this area, approximately 118,471 sq. km. out of the
country’s 2.2 million sq. km. total territorial water area, only municipal fishers are given fishery privileges. Under the LGC framework, the boundary was extended up to 15 km from the coast of the farthest island of a municipality. Given that the country is dotted with hundreds of offshore islands, some of which like Pamilacan are more than 15 km from their administrative centre in the mainland, the Code greatly increased the territory of many coastal municipalities, whilst reducing the area available for commercial fishing. As a concession, the Fisheries Code of 1998 authorized municipal governments to allow commercial fishers with boats up to 150 GT to operate within the 10.1 to 15 km area from the shoreline provided they keep themselves to waters with depth of more than seven fathoms (12.8 meters). It goes without saying that commercial fishers protested, maintaining that municipal fishing waters are their historic fishing grounds too (Green et al., 2004), and have in fact filed cases in court, particularly after local governments started apprehending commercial fishing vessels (Thomas, 1998).

The issue of intrusion is not simply a matter of boundary delineation, as it reflects other serious problems plaguing the fishing sector. First is the inability of the Philippine commercial fleet, with their decrepit equipment, to compete with modern fishing vessels of Japan, Taiwan, and the US in deep-sea fishing (BFAR, 1987; Fortes & Catedrilla, 1996). Thus, with a few exceptions, most are forced to stay close, on average just 112 km away from homeport (Trinidad et al., 1993). Second is that both sectors do compete for the exploitation of the same resource or species. Major species caught by commercial fishers are also the major species caught by marine municipal fishers (DocNGH2). Third is the traditional open water access policy that have allowed just anybody who meet licensing requirements to dip their fishing gear in the water (Trinidad, 2004), thus increasing tremendously the number of fishers that compete for marine resources.

However, who are these commercial fishers? The 1998 Fisheries Code define them as fishers who take fishery species by passive or active gear for trade, business or profit beyond subsistence or sports fishing. They are classified into three (small-scale, medium-scale, large-scale) depending on the size of the fishing vessels they use. Importantly, their vessels must be 3.1 GT or more, otherwise, they would be classified as municipal fishers. Nationally, there are 3,874 commercial fishing vessels registered with BFAR as at September 2007 (DocNGH1). From the Central Visayas region comes 485 fishing
vessels, of which 75 are from Bohol province. The three towns nearest to Pamilacan Island (Baclayon, Dauis and Tagbilaran) contribute 45 boats to this figure, but no one from Baclayon is a registered commercial fisher. Although commercial fishers generally use second-hand boats (Thomas, 1998), their vessels are equipped with modern technology that allows them to measure the distance, depth, volume and even the type of fish they wish to catch (Green et al., 2004). Hence, they are technologically and technically more efficient than municipal fishers (Trinidad et al., 1993). There are also reports that state they carry deadly firearms like pistols onboard (IntP6; IntBo1; Lopez, 2004). These characteristics allow them to “intrude” into municipal waters with ease, which in turn is alleged to cause harmful impacts on cetaceans, an issue discussed below.

6.5.2.1 Perceived impact 1: Reduction in species diversity and abundance through by-catch

Indeed, in Pamilacan, there is a gnawing belief that commercial fishers are the cause of a perceived loss of marine mammal diversity in recent years. A boat operator explains, “we have not hunted whales for 10 years now, so whales should have returned. But why haven’t they come back? I think it’s the commercial fishers to blame” (IntP4). Residents confirm that whales could be seen floating near the marine sanctuary before, but not anymore today (IntP3; IntP5).

The view that commercial fishers are at fault has historical basis. In fact, the identities of marine mammals in the country were only verified in the 1990s when researchers from Silliman University, IUCN/SSC Cetacean Specialist Group, Texas A & M University, and University of the Philippines, as part of the research method, boarded commercial fishing vessels in Central Visayas and Northern Mindanao (Dolar, 1994; Leatherwood, et al., 1992). Perrin et al., (2005) note that research in this period yielded an estimate of 2,000-3,000 dolphins killed by commercial fishers (c.f., Alava, Yaptinchay, Trono & Dolumbal, 1998, for manta ray).

The claim by Pamilacan boat operators is supported not just historically but also by contemporary accounts of injuries and mortality of marine mammals caused by fishing activities and systematic culling. Termed ‘operational’ or ‘ecological’ interactions (Silva, Feio, Prieto, Goncalves, & Santos, 2002), it is suggested that the interface between
marine mammals and fisheries is global in nature (Lopez, 2006; Read, 2008; Shaughnessy, Kirkwood, Cawthorn, Kemper, & Pemberton, 2003). Thus, instances have been documented in Bohol Sea (IntBo1), other areas within the Philippines (Dolar et al., 2003; Fuertes, 2000; Labro, 2009; Papa, 2008), and in many parts of the world (e.g., Dans, Alonso, Crespo, Pedraza, & Garcia, 2003; Shaughnessy et al., 2003). Indeed, killing can be intentional, particularly if the cetacean is seen in the act of removing or damaging fish captured in fishing gear resulting to the loss of, or diminution in the value of the catch (Read, 2008). In the end, while there is no direct evidence to implicate commercial fishers in the prolonged absence of great whales in Bohol Sea, there is enough from the literature to suggest that commercial fishers do indeed have a role to play.

6.5.2.2 Perceived impact 2: Effect on cetacean behaviour

Apart from perceived impact on cetacean diversity and abundance, boat operators have noticed some behavioural changes in cetaceans that they attribute to commercial fishers. A boat operator has this to say, “When there is commercial fishing the night before, I notice that dolphins aren’t playful. At the sound of approaching [tour] boat, they immediately dive, as if afraid to interact” (IntP4).

While the observed behaviour might be a reaction to the tour boat, the literature supports the claim that fishing activities affect cetaceans’ behaviour. Bearzi (2002) points out that modification in behaviour is just one of the general effects of fishing. Furthermore, it has been suggested that these changes force cetaceans to leave, disperse or have reduced reproductive rates (Lusseau, 2005; Lusseau & Bejder, 2007). Lavigne (2003) clarifies that the issue is the other side of the ecological conflict that has tended to discuss the impact on commercial fisheries of marine mammals.

From the literature, there appears to be two closely-inter-related factors that influence the way fishing affects the behaviour of cetaceans: first is the presence of fishing boats itself, and second is food availability from the fishing gear. Arguably, a fishing boat is no different from a tour boat in that its mere presence could generate negative impacts (Corkeron, 1995; Gordon et al., 1992; MacGibbon, 1991; Richter 2002), more so if the boat’s movement is erratic and the engine is noisy. Aggravating this are attempts to
interact with dolphins without knowing marine mammal interaction protocols (Lusseau, 2005). On the second factor, Bearzi (2002) hints of cetaceans modifying their behaviour depending on prey abundance or shifts in food prey availability. In the Philippines, commercial and municipal fishers deploy a variety of fishing gears supplemented by fish aggregating devices (Thomas, 1998). The effect of this must be to increase interaction between the fishery and marine mammals, and consequently, increased feeding, as have been observed by other researchers (e.g., Diaz-Lopez, 2006; Roche et al., 2007; Silva et al., 2002). This point brings to the fore the issue of food security in Bohol Sea, as discussed below.

### 6.5.2.3 Perceived impact 3: Threats on municipal food security

The expansion of the fishing sector, including municipal fishing, has impacted as well on the availability of food in Bohol Sea. Green et al. (2004) have analyzed the growth of fishing in the region. They found that since 1991, the capacity of commercial fishing boats has increased by about 250%, with some 20% of them carrying sonars. Even with accessible fishing grounds reduced to around 33% of the region’s waters, because of the expansion of municipal waters from the Local Government Code, commercial fishers accounted for about 60% of production volume. The researchers suggest that this volume could only be explained by the intrusion of commercial fishers into municipal waters. Lopez (2004) seems to validate this when he claimed that in neighbouring Cebu province, commercial fishers could steal as much as 15,000 kilos of fish from the payao of small fishers in one good night. Nevertheless, Green et al. (2004) note that overall fishing production volumes have fallen, and catch composition has deteriorated. The implication raised is that the whole region is experiencing economic and ecosystem overfishing, a situation that is repeated in other Philippine waters (Soriano, Claudio, & Fansler, 1995).

This could only have negative effects. Indeed, catch by smaller fishermen is now much less. A barangay official of Pamilacan states, “It is now [summer] the season for frigate tuna but there is no catch...not in a net, not in hook and line” (IntP2) while a former PIDWWO official notes, “If not for the marine sanctuary, we would have died already” (IntP6). Municipal fishery statistics mirror their sentiments, as figures show a steady decline in total fish catch from 300 MT in 2002 to 176 MT in 2006 (DocLGUB2). As
demand has risen over the years, the municipality is experiencing a deficit in food production, except for fruits and root crops (DocLGUB3; DocLGUB4). Because of the shortfall, the price of fish region-wide has skyrocketed by over 1,400% in the last 20 years (Green et al., 2004). In Bohol province, the price of frigate tuna, staple fish in Pamilacan, has jumped 259% from 1990 to 2007 according to figures from the National Statistics Office, thus putting enormous pressure on family finances.

6.5.3 Plight worsened by scarce resources

The predicament of Pamilacan fishers is exacerbated by their inability to fight the commercial fishers and/or to sustain themselves due to lack of resources. Green et al. (2004) compared the resources of the island-barangay with others in Central Visayas. They found Pamilacan fishers to have one of the poorest fishing characteristics in terms of equipment, i.e., lowest density of motorized boats/km of coastline, lowest density of all gears/km of coastline. With an annual income from fishing and gleaning of US$448-1,866 (Samonte-Tan et al., 2007), way below than the average annual family income of Php 147,000 [US$2,700] nationally, according to official statistics, there really is not much scope to improve fishing activities.

Nor is the municipal government endowed with great resources either. In comparison with other municipalities in Central Visayas, Green et al. (2004) found its resources wanting. It has one of the smallest budgets in coastal resource management among coastal towns in Bohol and its municipal waters have not been carefully delineated. Its financial inadequacy is captured by the quote below:

Baclayon Mayor Benny Uy, during a meeting of the Provincial Tourism Council, admitted that only one pump boat of the Baclayon LGU and another 16-horsepower pump boat donated by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) are patrolling in the area, but not regularly due to the shortfall on fuel budget and manpower. (“Patrol boats,” 2006, p. 1)

Nonetheless, this has not stopped the local government from taking action to address concerns. As Jamal and Getz (1995, p. 194) emphasise, a stakeholder affected by the actions of others has a right to take counter measures in order to mitigate whatever impacts are generated. In the case of the barangay and municipal governments, these
involved using policy instruments at their disposal, no matter how limited their impacts are. The measures, which can be seen as products of ‘puzzling’ about the external environment (Heclo, 1974), are discussed in the next section.

In summary, the above section reviewed the communities’ aversion against commercial fishing by discussing complaints that the latter not only threaten the sustainability of tourism, through their negative impacts on the cetaceans, and on the food security of the islanders as well. Certainly, the issues surrounding commercial fishing are complex and multi-dimensional. They are not something that the municipality of Baclayon and the community of Pamilacan could address on their own, as clearly some dimensions of the problem, for example weaknesses of the commercial fleet and open water access policy, are beyond their jurisdiction and capacity. Yet as explained below, the local government in cooperation with other stakeholders in the ecotourism issue network is coming up with policy solutions to moderate both the impact of cetacean interaction tours on the marine mammals and commercial fishing to the sustainability of tourism in the municipality. These developments again demonstrate the utility of networks in communicating ideas (Scott, Cooper & Baggio, 2008), particularly in transmitting options to enhance sustainability, as observed in the literature (Fadeeva, 2004; Halme, 2001).

6.5.4 Local government policy changes - From ambivalence to active participation

The politics that marred the implementation of ecotourism in Pamilacan in the late 1990s, as discussed in detail in Chapter Five, would seem to imply that the local government of Baclayon did not care about conservation and tourism, at least as far as marine mammals and manta rays are concerned. The frank declarations of the Mayor are very revealing:

The municipality did not care about banning the whale sharks because at that time, there was low awareness of conservation. Besides, the municipality did not earn anything from it [in terms of any fees paid] because in the first place there is no ordinance that penalizes the hunting of whale sharks. (IntB2)

These views are corroborated by an official from the Bohol Tourism Office who said that “Baclayon leaders were not so keen on environment before...they would even uproot the mangroves planted by students at the front of the [Baclayon] church” (IntBo3).
As far as tourism is concerned, the municipal government seems content at adopting a laissez-faire approach, with a former Mayor reasoning, “we did not benefit from it” (IntB2). What he means is that the municipality did not derive direct revenues from tourism that in the past were concentrated, as far as Baclayon is concerned, on stopover tours of the Baclayon Church and occasional trips to Pamilacan by tourists from Panglao and Balicasag (DocLGUB3; DocLGUB4). Thus, with tourists just passing through, there was no coherent plan to neither build tourism infrastructure nor cultivate relationships with the travel trade or the DOT.

However, its prior involvement with conservation issues in the 1980s and its initial agreement with IATFMMC to start dolphin-watching tours in the municipality in the 1990s suggest otherwise. What emerges therefore from these seemingly contradictory experiences is a municipality ambivalent of its values. As shall be shown, this attitude is largely the result of changes in the orientation and political learning of its leaders of the value of conservation and tourism to their ambitions and careers. This political learning, coupled with policy learning, have combined to enable the municipality to influence the course of ecotourism development.

As already discussed in the previous chapter, the municipality’s first involvement with systematic conservation efforts was in the 1980s. It came via its policy support to the Marine Conservation and Development Programme ran in Pamilacan Island by Silliman University. The programme was designed to establish a marine sanctuary, partly to attract foreign tourists. Thus, the seeds of tourism development with explicit local government involvement were planted based on exchange relations with academic and conservation groups.

Apart from a few small, unorganized fishermen in the island, the programme did not encounter any opposition from political leaders. One reason is that marine conservation did not impinge on their traditional economic interests nor did it affect their political relations with the electorate. Indeed, researchers have long noted that when the political and economic security of politicians or their families are at stake, they would take particular interests in policymaking (Goymen, 2000; Manacsa, 1999; Oorthuizen, 2004). These are the failings of a weak state, where particularistic demands put undue pressure
on policy makers, to bend over rules in order to accommodate (Hutchison, 2001). At that time, the main economic activity in the town was agricultural production (DocLGUB2). Likewise, the ruling political family was engaged in the construction business (IntB1), and no one in Baclayon was known as being engaged in commercial fishing activities (DocNGH1). Another reason is that technical information regarding the state of the nation’s marine resources are mostly lodged in central government agencies and universities. For lack of resources, and the nature of the prevailing centralized political system, local government were dependent on central governments (De Guzman & Reforma, 1993; Manasan, 1992). Thus, there was no impediment to reserving a few hectares in Pamilacan as a marine sanctuary.

The municipal policy support to marine conservation kept apace with national developments in fishing regulations and marine conservation by introducing local ordinances that implemented national laws. In network analysis terms, it was acting as a commander within its legal geographic jurisdiction, a node where enabling policies must emanate (Rowley, 1997), and where the concerns of local communities must pass through first before they are transmitted to higher levels of government, and vice-versa. For example, as the issue against commercial fishers heightened, it passed a series of ordinances in favour of its municipal fishers (e.g., DocLGUB12; DocLGUB13). The behaviour of the local government was also consistent with the growth in environmentalism among local leaders in Bohol province. As one official puts it, “Politicians have changed their minds about conservation. If they do not have conservation in their agenda, they’d out of touch with trends” (IntBo4). Thus, programmes and projects dealing with the environment emerged at this time in Bohol, including the setting up at the provincial level of institutional structures to deal with the environment such as the Bohol Environment and Management Office (Relampagos, 1998). In 1998, the provincial government enshrined the values of environmentalism in its mission statement.

However, when key political allies of the Mayor complained about the betrayal of trust reposed on implementers of an ecotourism programme in Pamilacan meant to address the loss of income from prohibitions to hunting cetaceans and elasmobranch, the environmental bent digressed. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Mayor
backtracked on his support to IATFMMC and allied himself with his political clients from Pamilacan. The main reason for this seems to be the need for the Mayor to maintain his clientelistic relations with the fishermen, in order to secure the latter’s support in the coming May 1998 elections. Thus, at that time, political interests took precedence over marine conservation.

After their re-election, the officials continued to side with PAFIA and the barangay council. However, their position weakened over time. The previous chapter discusses the factors that led to the collapse. Chief among these were efforts to compromise policy beliefs such as mediation in a public forum. This venue showed evidence of institutionalized power (for example, the technical superiority of national agencies over local governments) and demonstrated to the local government the difficulty of fighting a network of central government agencies and civil society groups. This process facilitated political learning (May, 1992). Realizing the political infeasibility of their proposals, the Mayor’s support for hunting and to PAFIA attenuated.

At the same time, the conflict and the forum became a venue for policy-oriented learning (Sabatier & Jenkins, 1999). As Lovelock has found (2002), conflict sometimes leads to public debates that help shape practices. From interactions with opposing national fishery and tourism officials who have the technical knowledge, municipal and barangay officials in Baclayon learnt, subsequently agreeing to a “negotiated settlement” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) and altering their hostile attitudes towards ecotourism. Principally, these are reflected through policy initiatives that emanated from the barangay council and the municipality after the conflict. Assuming the commander role, the barangay council in March 2000 issued Ordinance No. 01-2000 that aims to regulate the conduct of dolphin and whale watching tours and address the illegal intrusion of other vessels within municipal waters (DocLGUA14). It was prompted by officials’ observations that the tour had “slowly gained acceptance” among residents in the island, and the twin needs of protecting the cetaceans and imposing its authority over its territorial jurisdiction over the nearby waters (DocLGUA14). The rules however covered minimal grounds, focusing only on the registration of tour participants and boats used, and imposing user fees, suggesting that they just pertain to secondary aspects of policy beliefs (Sabatier, 1993). In
June 2000, the municipal council affirmed the barangay ordinance by issuing its own legislation. It declared that

the future of whales and dolphins runs parallel to the future of man. The future depends entirely on man’s will to care for their environment now and through sustained action, give rise to a healthier world for generations to come. (DocLGUB14)

Significantly, the municipality took the above quote (without referencing) from the book *Field Guide to Whales and Dolphins in the Philippines* written by Lorenzo Tan in 1995, a member of the IATFMMC, its former adversary. That the local government would do this shows two things about policy learning by the municipality. First, it reinforces the point that in complex policy subsystems such as ecotourism, policy actors get information from other actors particularly those with influential affiliations (Weible, 2005). Secondly, and more fundamentally, it supports May’s (1992) assertion that policy learning “entails learning across multiple advocacy coalitions” (p 340). Furthermore, the role of conflict and the forum in gaining new technical information that contributes to policy change is affirmed (Sabatier & Jenkins, 1999).

More practically, the ordinance recognized the need to monitor, regulate and limit dolphin watching, otherwise “the dolphins and whales staying, playing and nesting in the area will go away wild and afraid” (DocLGUB14). Similar to the barangay ordinance, however, it merely prescribed registration procedures but added the requirement to provide life saving gadgets. Safety guidelines were more strongly addressed in an ordinance issued in 2003 (DocLGUB15).

In 2005, the municipality set on firmer grounds its ecotourism and marine conservation policy. This was done by enacting an ordinance (No 8-05) that defines the use, maintenance and conservation of dive sites and other marine resources within its jurisdiction (DocLGUB16). It declared that it would be the policy of the local government to conserve its marine resources from damage or exploitation by illegal fishers and abusive tourists. In order to do this, the ordinance approved detailed rules and regulations on the conduct of tourists in dive sites, proposed capacity limits, as well as imposed user fees and charges. These are indications of technical learning (Fiorino, 2001) but there is
also evidence of second-order learning (Hall, 1993), as demonstrated by the provision that created a new administrative structure - the Baclayon Coastal Resources Management Board composed a multi-sectoral groups - to oversee the implementation of the ordinance. The CRM Board complements the work of the Municipal Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Management Council that was created earlier in compliance with the provisions of the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998.

Technical instruments to deal with illegal fishing have likewise been updated, in a case of first-order policy change (Hall, 1993). Between 2005 and 2007, the local council successively issued ordinances that banned the entry of commercial fishing vessels within municipal waters and controlled the use of fish aggregating devices (DocLGUB17; DocLGUB17).

Another way through which learning is reflected is the willingness by the municipality to work with other organizations and invest in inter-organizational relationships. Glasbergen (1996) refers to this as demonstrative of social learning or increased capacity for network management. Since 2000, the municipality has entered into a number of agreements with several organizations to undertake environmental programmes and projects. These include the construction of groins in the beaches of Pamilacan with the assistance of the German Development Service (IntP3), the Coastal Resources Management Programme funded by USAID (IntBo1), and the technical assistance entered into with the National Ecotourism Steering Committee in 2002 to redevelop the dolphin-watching programme. But perhaps the most palpable statement of its commitment to marine conservation is its support to the Bohol Marine Triangle Project. In partnership with other local governments and civil society groups, a range of activities was undertaken within the municipality ranging from research, formulation of CRM plans, through to the activation of fish wardens to guard against illegal fishing activities. When the project ended in 2005, Baclayon set up PADAYON together with the municipalities of Panglao and Dauis (hence the name) to continue the work, providing it with financial resources and personnel (IntB3). A recent partner is the Ayala Foundation, which has initiated a number of projects not just in Baclayon but in the whole province of Bohol as well. In these network activities, the local government is central in the sense of betweenness. As Wasserman and Faust (1994) explain, this means that the municipality serves as the
central node through which partner organizations from outside would go through before individual communities in the barangays are reached. This is particularly the rule if the proposed programme was to meet the criteria of social acceptability. Thus, NGOs, international aid agencies, and national government officials had to seek formal approval from the Mayor and the council before Pamilacan, for example, could be included as a pilot site of the National Ecotourism Programme in 2002, and in the IATFMMC project much earlier.

Another demonstration of social learning is its assumption of the compromiser role (Rowley, 1997). Under conditions of relatively higher density and higher centrality, it negotiated for a mutually satisfactory solution in the conflict between PIBOSA and PIDWWO to avoid destabilizing gains from the ecotourism programme in Pamilacan.

 Nonetheless, even if learning is argued to have happened within the network, interaction alone did not insure that only good quality advice came out. This is illustrated by the construction of groins in the beaches of Pamilacan. It was ostensibly constructed to arrest sand erosion in the island upon the advice of a German consultant, but whose expertise it was revealed later was in animal science (IntBo1). Thus, not only did it mar the scenery for some time, it served no purpose at all in the end, as the sand completely covered the groins. In addition, the groins could have done serious environmental damage on marine flora and fauna (see Huttche et al., 2002). What this reinforces is the view that policy outcomes are only as good as the quality of the individual actors or nodes that comprise the network (Fadeeva, 2004).

When a new leadership was installed after the 2007 local elections, a new dynamism characterized the ecotourism landscape of the municipality. In Rowley’s (1997) network analysis, the municipal government became a catalyst. Efforts are expended to enhance the capacity for policy learning, particularly the lesson-drawing type by Rose (1991). An example is to draw lessons from more mature destinations such as Donsol and Boracay (IntP1). According to David (2008), “learning from Boracay” (p. A9) is frequently heard. It means

the need to check [tourism] over-development which could lead to environmental problems...the urgency of getting all stakeholders...united behind a common goal
and a plan to achieve it; and finding the balance between meeting the people's needs for survival and ensuring sustainability of the environment. (David, 2008, p. A9)

Municipal employees and key community leaders are feeling the enthusiasm alike (IntB1; IntB4; IntP7). As a municipal staff quips “things are different now...there is more energy” (IntB5). It appears that a congruence of meaning in policy implementation (Grin & Van de Graaf, 1996) seems to have been achieved. A municipal official explains why “The big difference is that a lot of help is given to the municipality now and it so happens that the focus is tourism” (IntB1).

Nonetheless, a business-political angle cannot be missed in explaining the excitement of some officials. A top official has recently organized a travel business in the municipality, on top of a women’s organization that conducts environment clean up (IntB8; IntP3; IntP7). Thus, policy work that addresses tourism and sustainability issues in the municipality are bound to positively redound to the official’s material interest.

As a result, key areas relevant to the sustainability of ecotourism are being addressed. These include setting up administrative and physical structures to oversee tourism development. A municipal tourism officer from elected councillors was named to head the newly built Municipal Tourism Centre, for example. They have started the process of creating an integrated tourism plan (IntB3; IntB5). Landmark policies have been amended or are being reviewed (IntB1). Ordinance No 8-05 was superseded in January 2008 to include, among others, finer details on acceptable and prohibited practices within dive sites; reduce the number of accessible sites, thus protecting in particular the Pamilacan marine sanctuary that was included in the earlier ordinance; and provide more detailed capacity limits. In addition, the issue of competition in dolphin watching tours posed by fishermen from Panglao, and the intrusion of illegal fishers into municipal waters, are the subject of current consultations by the municipal council, with the view to designing a policy that should favour the municipality (IntB1; IntBo1).

Significantly, experts from the local travel industry and marine sciences are involved in these endeavours, to allay the fears of some Pamilacan boat operators that any suggested solution is not going to be supported by important stakeholders (DocLGUB21; IntBo1).
The use of experts indicates two points. First, the local government recognizes its limited understanding of the travel industry, where if policies were to be enacted that involve the sector, “actual experience and a deep knowledge of the industry and the sector are required” (Elliott, 1997, p. 101). This is evidence of social learning. Second, it reinforces the view by Schofield (2004) that government learning, for purposes of identifying and routinizing policy solutions, can be facilitated by experts, instead of government actively seeking information. Thus, it demonstrates that policy changes can be effected by interest groups without necessarily acquiring formal power or influence but through the flow the ideas (Hall, 2003, p. 290).

### 6.6 Summary and discussion

This chapter is an extension of Chapter Five. Chronologically, analyses dealt with here pertain to developments that occurred after the intense conflict in Pamilacan Island was resolved (i.e., from 2000 onwards). Events in this period suggest the importance of networks in influencing the policy process, as similarly asserted in the previous chapter. It is shown that the transition from competing coalitions in the 1990s to a denser ecotourism network in the 21st century had a number of consequences. These are revealed in three dialectical relationships that emerged. The first dialectical relationship is between network structure and the structural context. The growth of environmentalism and democratization in the national context, discussed in detail in the next chapter, has led to the expansion of the network in Pamilacan to include a succession of civil society organizations. The experience of some policy actors in this network in turn led to a more pro-active stance in marine mammal conservation in other parts of the country and the push to use policy instruments such as a code of ethics and environmental principles such as social acceptability in future projects elsewhere (IntBo3; IntM4; IntM7; Yaptinchay, 1999). Second is between network structure and actions of network actors. It was clear that the discourse generated from the experience of Pamilacan in the 1990s influenced the choice of policy actors in the subsequent decade to participate in tourism development in the island. Their entry reshaped the structure of the network through the opening of new relational channels, with the consequent heavier density influencing the flow of information and exertion of pressure that over time modified behaviour. These include ecological modernization and conformity by the community with tourism business
practices. The third dialectical relationship is between network structure and outcomes. Whilst the low degree of integration among actors in the 1980s meant less control and policing of environmentally-destructive behaviour, a much more cohesive network in the present decade has led to more positive results including ecological modernization.

Thus, these relationships support the contention that networks do matter (Howlett, 2002). Moreover, it buttresses the dialectical approach to policy networks (Marsh & Smith, 2000), though it was important to combine it with a dynamic network analysis. The foregoing likewise makes it clear that a dense network structure mediates policy learning. This role is underpinned by structural holes, key organizations with resources and individuals with skills such as experts, and feedback effects from knowledge of policy impacts. The latter factor demonstrates the important role that technical information plays in policy implementation, as hypothesized by the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999).

The influence of these factors is manifested in the response of the community and local government. It is noted that behavioural and policy changes are closely associated with policy learning and political learning by policy makers. It is shown that local policy makers have a capacity to engage in policy learning, drawing lessons from a variety of sources and mechanisms including conflicts, interactions in public forums, collaborations with technically knowledgeable entities, and from counterparts in other geographic regions. This demonstrates that the “politics as learning” approach do not simply imply that state agencies formulate policies without consideration of external forces (Sacks, 1980) but that elements from the bureaucracy, as exemplified by local government, at minimum, draw lessons from them (Rose, 1991) and/or open doors for these forces to help shape and implement policies.

Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that it took some time for learning to take place. This raises the importance of having ample time for behaviours to alter and be routinized, and hence for policy implementation to be seen as successful. As a distinct variable, its discussion has not been very explicit in public policy implementation studies, although it is integrated in the literature on learning processes (Busenberg 2001; Schofield, 2004) and the diffusion of innovation in a social system (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; Rogers,
Hence, it is argued that future research and tourism policy implementation activities explicitly consider this element (see Dodds, 2007b), particularly paying attention to how behavioural outcomes spread through a system through time. The Pamilacan case study points to some aspects that may be relevant: introspection and environmental scans, particularly taking cognizance of risk factors such as the potential impacts of tourism and competitive pressures.

Environmental scans in turn raise the importance of external events and broader processes in the policy process. Up to this point, the role of societal processes has not been dealt with explicitly, except brief references to how the broader democratization and environmentalism process, elements of the structural context, had a dialectical relationship with the network structure in Pamilacan. Their influence need further elaboration now in order to shed light on their influence in the policy process including the issue of policy sub-system membership that, in the case of civil society, had seen them assuming key roles in Pamilacan Island. In the first place, policy researchers assume that external events serve as the primary motors of policy change (Real-Dato, 2009; Sabatier, 1999; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Thus, following the practice by policy researchers of first discussing network characteristics and sub-system dynamics then examining external events next (e.g., Elliott & Schlaepfer, 2001; Ellison, 1998; Hsu, 2005; Larsen et al., 2006), the thesis, in the next chapter, looks at key external events and processes influential in the policy process in the past 30 years.
Chapter 7: Explaining tourism policy implementation processes and outcomes - The role of societal trends and key events

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapters have highlighted a number of key points in relation to the objective of the thesis which is to examine to substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation from the 1970s to the present decade. Inevitably, this objective leads to the identification of key variables that explain the substance and processes observed. Thus, from Chapter Four, the role of learning in the tourism policy process, particularly in informing the substance of policy, is highlighted. It is noted that the state, through a new systemic governing coalition that emerged in the 1980s, sought to promote the idea of equity and mitigate the negative impacts of tourism through the introduction of more sustainable forms of tourism. This was associated with a massive shift in the balance of power from the central government to other policy actors. From Chapters Five and Six, the influence of the network structure in spreading new knowledge and ethos to a wider population is stressed. Learning, both the policy and the political kind, also played a role in policy change. This is one thread that binds these chapters.

Nonetheless, Chapters Four to Six raise the importance of discussing external events and broader processes in the policy process by pointing to how the broader growth of the NGO sector had expanded the policy networks, hence altering the quality of decision-making, at the national level and in Pamilacan. Thus, this chapter examines the influence of two broad society-level forces, namely, democratization and environmentalism. It is argued that these forces and key external events are primarily responsible for this fundamental change in the policy process. The chapter also makes the argument that these forces helped precipitate policy learning.

The analysis presented here is in keeping with the literature on policy implementation and change, which insists that policy oriented learning plays only a secondary role to external events in explaining the policy process (Real-Dato, 2009; Sabatier, 1998; see also Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Hall, 1993). In addition, network research has emphasised the role of
macro-level forces in understanding policy networks, as well as changes to them. Moreover, the literature on tourism contains some explicit examples of external events influencing the course of tourism development (e.g., Beirman, 2003) including societal trends such as decentralization and democratization (Ivars, 2004; Yuksel et al., 2005).

Within the advocacy coalition framework, these variables are the “longer term factors that create the historical setting in which policy change could occur” (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996, p. 425). Thus, they shed light on three issues observed in previous chapters: (1) how and why have non-state actors expanded; (2) why both state and non-state actors, in close cooperation, are involved in formation and execution of tourism policy; (3) what forces and events pushed policy learning among policy actors. These issues gain significance when it is considered that just two decades ago, as explained in Chapter Four, policy implementation was highly centralized, tightly controlled by a technomilitary coalition, and there was enormous animosity between state actors and civil society groups. As well, the discussion would show how ideas (such as equity) were operationalized by those in the political opposition when they seized power.

Specifically, it is argued that the drive to regain democracy and the greater concern for the environment have restructured the tourism policy implementation process principally in two ways: first, by installing a new systemic governing coalition committed to stemming the excesses of a politicized tourism programme and refocusing its concern towards sustainability; second, opening democratic spaces for other policy actors particularly the NGO sector and local governments, thereby fostering plurality.

In terms of the objective of the thesis, the analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates the value of society-level forces and key focusing events not only in explaining the evolution of current policy but also in accounting for the structure and membership of policy-subsystems. Aspects of the analysis also point to the instrumental role of learning and how this process moved forward because of key events. Furthermore, it provides an indication of the mechanism in which these factors influence policy change in combination with other variables, an issue that hitherto the advocacy coalition framework is silent.
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first section discusses the democratization process, outlining the roots and growth of the civil society. The second section deals with the issue of environmentalism, explaining the economic origins of environmental exploitation, and the growth of the environmental movement. Where appropriate, the discussion proceeds from a historical perspective, to enable the analysis to be situated within the longer and broader context of the country’s development history.

7.2 Re-democratization: Civil society and its role in policy process

7.2.1 The third wave of democratization

In the 1970s through to 1990, at least 30 countries made the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Huntington (1991) called this the third wave of democratization, the “global democratic revolution” (p. 24) of the late 20th century. The third wave started in southern Europe and spread to other regions of the world, in sequence, reaching the shores of East Asia in mid-1980s (Shin, 2006). The Philippines was the first to re-democratize in 1986, followed by South Korea and Taiwan in 1987.

The democratization movement in the Philippines is multi-faceted. Many writers, among them Constantino-David (1998) and Clarke (1998), have argued that it was the growing inequity in political, economic and social structures that spurred the rapid development of a civil society movement that called for democratization when the country was under martial law. This view is consistent with the literature on democratization where a link between economic development and democratic government has been the subject of theoretical and empirical work (e.g., Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994; Huntington, 1991; Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). The dissatisfaction with the status quo coupled with the breakdown in elite solidarity during the Marcos dictatorship (Rocamora, 2004). These forces eventually led to the formation of a “people power” movement that toppled Marcos in 1986.

More than any other sector in society, civil society plays a significant role in furthering democratization. Shin (2006) emphasises that during the transition, it is the mass citizenry that can make or break progress. Hermoso and Luca (2006, p. 323) explain that
civil society assumes a distinct function in establishing direct democracy through
the formation of organizations, associations, coalitions and other entities that
embody people’s collective interests. These groups and networks serve as vehicles
for citizens to voice their interests and thus become parties in decision-making
processes.

Whilst civil society groups, on their own, have limited capacity to initiate or block policy
choices (Wui & Lopez, 1997), they nonetheless possess some independent political
resources that enable them to participate meaningfully in the policy process (Armijo &
Kearney, 2008). Thus, the development of a strong and non-violent civil society is highly
correlated with growth of liberal democracy (Shin, 2006).

7.2.2 Roots of democratization movement

Research on democratization in the Philippines is largely devoted to the analysis of the
growth of the civil society movement. Songco (2003) notes that its roots can be traced to
the introduction of liberalist ideas from Europe to Spanish Philippines in 1850s onwards.
This led to the establishment of charitable organizations, cooperatives and labour unions
in the country (Buendia, 2005). Nonetheless, it was only in the 1960s when a critical mass
of societal organizations were formed, enabling the identification of civil society as a
distinct organization (Magadia, 1999).

The main motivation for the formation of these organizations was to assist the urban poor
and the peasantry, as shown by the Zone One Tondo Organization in Manila and the
four factors that led to this growth: (1) the rise of student activism; (2) the emergence of
community organizing as a key strategy to mobilize communities for mutual defence and
demand making; (3) changes in the Catholic Church that was inspired by liberation
theology and the works of Saul Alinsky and Paulo Freire (Hermoso & Luca, 2006); (4)
organization of the Maoist brand of Marxism through the Communist Party of the
Philippines; the party used NGOs to achieve organizational strength, obtain foreign
funding, launch new efforts within the movement and create institutional power bases to
fight Marcos (Constantino-David, 1998). Likewise contributing to the growth was
increased development assistance, mainly from Europe, directly to NGOs by foreign
governments, and increased instances of elite philanthropy (Clarke, 1998).
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) propose that actors with the same beliefs are likely to coordinate if they see their opponents as very powerful. Backed up the military, the Marcos dictatorship was obviously very strong, and the centralized nature of the state meant that it was the more dominant actor compared to societal interests (Katzenstein, 1978). Even so, whilst Philippine civil society organizations have different ideologies and perform a variety of roles (Constantino-David, 1998), they saw it fit to engage in coalition formation to face the regime. The primary stimulus for this was the assassination in 1983 of Senator Benigno Aquino, President Marcos’s archenemy. For the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), this event is an ‘internal shock’ (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) whose impact is to redistribute political resources and validate beliefs of the opposition. In the case of civil society organizations in the country, the event precipitated the emergence for the first time of coalition politics. The assassination was the ‘window of opportunity’ that created the condition for the multitude of organizations comprising sectoral, leftist, socialist-democratic, and traditional political parties to band together to call for the ousting of the President (Silliman & Noble, 1998). Thus, their combined resources served to strengthen the opposition against the military might of the administration.

In terms of the ACF, this objective to fight Marcos in order to “demolish the existing structures of injustice and exploitation” (Neher, 1981, p. 264) served as the glue of their politics. Because of daily protests from 1983 to 1986 by the coalition, a distinct communitarian political subculture and sense of solidarity emerged, a feeling that is aroused from time to time when the need arises (Magadia, 1999, 2003).

This feeling of “spiritual unity” (Abinales & Amoroso 2005, p. 230) aside, the mobilizations by the minority at that time produced little by way of policy changes. To an extent, this is because of the tight rein maintained by the network of technocratic-militaristic governing coalition, with the President as the fulcrum, which managed the policy process during the dictatorship, as explained in section 4.3.1.

In such cases, what is necessary for major policy alterations to occur is a “powerful exogenous shock (or shocks) sufficient to undermine a well-entrenched paradigm” (Oliver & Pemberton, 2004, p. 416). Such an event happened when the daily protests for democracy culminated in the ‘people’s power’ EDSA revolution in 1986 that ousted
President Marcos. This event came as a defining and ‘focusing event’ (Birkland, 1997), as its success meant that the long struggle to end authoritarian rule had ended, and a new democratic era would be ushered.

7.2.3 Key changes in the re-democratized environment

7.2.3.1 Emergence of new systemic governing coalition

The ACF hypothesises that external perturbations, such as that of the EDSA revolution, are necessary but not sufficient causes to produce new policy initiatives. This is because the minority coalition has to exploit the ‘windows of opportunity’ (Kingdon, 1995) for policy change in order to have any effect. In the aftermath of the revolution, the minority coalition dethroned the dominant Marcos cronies and allies. Leading members of civil society made themselves available for appointment to the Cabinet and in other executive positions by President Aquino - a practice followed by succeeding presidents (Clarke, 1998; Songco, 2003). Their selection ensured that civil society would have unprecedented influence in governance, thus, made their presence felt in the policy stream. As Schlager (1999) notes, gaining control of policymaking structures is one way to make policy changes.

Indeed, the ACF suggests that one method to change policy is to replace the governing coalition with a new one. Sabatier (1993) emphasises that this coalition must include latent individuals that might have the same beliefs as the leadership, so that what is created, according to Oliver and Pemberton (2004), is a network that forms a widespread climate of opinion for policy adoption. In the Philippines post-EDSA revolution, there was a massive shift in the system personnel structure. Not only were members of civil society appointed to the Cabinet, the government was re-organized. It should be pointed out that when a regime changes, a President has the power to effect large changes in the civil service by having the discretion to appoint whomever he pleases at the top layer (secretary), second layer (undersecretary) through to the fourth layer (director level) (Balisacan & Hill, 2003). A recent report indicated that out of 6,000 managerial positions in the government, the President appoints 60% (Domingo, 2008). Thus, the transfer of power represents a massive shift in system personnel structure. It was particularly huge from Marcos to Aquino, as all local government officials, who were then serving at the
pleasure of Marcos as local elections had been suspended under him (Santiago, 2003), were replaced (David, 1996). Coupled with allies in the media and other social institutions such as the church that have fought against the dictatorship, the effect of this would be to create a widespread network capable of launching new policies or revert to old ones. The changes were seen at a variety of levels and are discussed at some detail in the next section, but a few aspects are presented below.

At the individual level, civilian rule over the military was returned, as citizens moved away from authoritarian practices characterized by military supremacy (Tillah, 2005). Individual rights, particularly freedom of speech, were regained after years of repression (Dayag, 2004). At the institutional level, formal democratic structures and processes of government that existed in the country prior to 1972 were restored (de Dios, 1990). This includes the re-establishment of the bicameral congress, or the House of Representatives and the Senate. The government was re-organized. A Commission of Government Organization was set-up to “de-Marcosify” the bureaucracy, reduce its size, decentralize services, privatize government assets, increase accountability, and economize operations (Tillah, 2005, p. 21). All these changes demonstrate that key external events have the potential to ‘punctuate’ institutional inertia and cause the reversal of policy (Nohrstedt, 2008).

Within the then Ministry of Tourism, changes instituted reflected the wider political development. Personnel and structural reforms were immediately carried out. A civil society activist was appointed undersecretary and later on secretary of tourism (Lim, 2009). In order to streamline operations made fat by patronage (Richter, 1980), the number of personnel was immediately reduced from more than 3,000 employees to around 2,500 within the first year of the new administration (MOT, 1986). With the enactment of the Attrition Law in 1992 that froze hiring and the filling up of positions that become vacant, this number has steadily decreased to its present level of just around 558 staff, according to official records. Ironically, this was supported by moves to increase the number of deputy ministers from three to four, an ominous sign of a top-heavy bureaucracy that would eventually characterize the Aquino administration (Tillah, 2005). In 1987, by virtue of Executive Order No. 120, a key agency attached to the ministry that enabled it to control air transportation policy, the Civil Aeronautics Board,
was transferred to the Department of Transportation and Communication. However, other agencies with tourism-related functions were attached to it and functional units replaced some bureau offices that were abolished.

Under this new management set-up, a new vision of tourism was articulated. Details of the role that tourism was to play are discussed in Chapter Four, particularly section 4.4. Essentially, the governing coalition wanted an expansion of the function of tourism, from merely a tool to achieve political ends but to be an instrument of economic and social development, while being protective of the environment and the social fabric. In addition, the Ministry supported the privatization policy of government by contracting and leasing the various resorts and tourist facilities owned by the Philippine Tourism Authority, and “disengaging itself from the construction and development of new tourist resorts and facilities” (MOT, 1986, p. 15). Furthermore, legal initiatives to combat sex tourism were made within the context of fighting trafficking and prostitution particularly that involving children (Hodgson, 1993, p. 528).

In keeping with the general trend towards democratization of governance, the department opened its doors to the private sector. National tourism associations were reinvigorated and asked to participate in preparing annual tourism plans (Rieder, 1997). Leading private sector members were named on the governing boards of government-owned corporations dedicated to the promotion of tourism. They were also invited as members of various organizing committees, task forces, and Presidential Commissions (Gabor, 1998).

In the late 1980s and 1990s, the NGO sector particularly those with environmental bent, was able to weave its way into the tourism system. The route was rather indirect, as its participation came because of its use of ecotourism as an environmental conservation or community development strategy (Arcilla, 1999; Gatbonton, 1999; Pajaro, 1997; Yaptinchay, 1999). For example, Conservation International was credited with introducing formally in 1992 the ecotourism concept to local shores (Buensuceso, 1999), while the Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas, a local affiliate of WWF pioneered ecotourism tours in the Tubbataha Reef National Marine Park, assisted DOT to preserve important heritage sites (Gabor, 1998) and opened cetacean interaction tours in Pamilacan and Donsol (Yaptinchay, 1999). Their success in articulating and implementing ecotourism
Programmes have earned for them space in policymaking activities. Indeed, civil society organizations have managed to ‘infiltrate’ various state mechanisms in policymaking, as shown in Table 7-1 below. Research by Buendia (2005, pp. 213-216) provide data on the gains in representation of people’s organizations in regional councils, and local special bodies. These developments explain the close collaboration of civil society and government in various policy sub-systems, like that observed in Pamilacan as noted in Chapters Five and Six.

Table 7.1: Venues for interaction between state and civil society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matrix of Formal and Informal Venues of Interaction</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Congress</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Individual senators/ representatives, including sectoral and party-list representatives; 2) political coalitions and alignments of senators/ representatives; 3) Committees; 4) Sessions and hearings; 5) Bicameral conference committee; 6) The President through the Certification and Veto powers; 7) The Legislative-Executive Development Advisory Council (LEDAC); 8) The Judiciary through Judicial Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Executive Branch</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) The chief Executive; 2) The Cabinet/ Cabinet clusters; 3) Departments, bureaus and offices [including line agencies, technical working groups within agencies and NGO desks]; 4) specialized administrative agencies and executive bodies; 5) the Commission on Appointments and the Concurrence power; 6) The Judiciary through Judicial Review; 7) The Congress through impeachment, legislative investigations, and power of the purse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The judiciary</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) The Supreme Court; 2) The Court of Appeals; 3) Regional Trial Courts; 4) Municipal Trial Courts and Circuit Trial Courts; 5) Other special courts; 6) Judicial and Bar Council; 7) The President through the appointment power; 8) Congress through impeachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local government units and autonomous regions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) local officials [local chief executive, the Sanggunian and other local officers]; 2) public hearings and consultations and other mandated activities; 3) local special councils and bodies; 4) Congress through the control power; 5) The Executive through the power of general supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informal venues</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1) media; 2) public forums, dialogues and symposia; 3) multisectoral consultations, dialogues, summits and task forces; 4) tripartite or multisectoral bodies and councils</td>
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</table>

In tourism, civil society was engaged in policymaking through its membership in executive bodies. In the Inter-Agency Task Force on Marine Mammal Conservation that existed from 1993 to 2000 and was active in Pamilacan, for example, KKP-WWF was deeply involved. In the present structures, NGOs have two seats each in the National Ecotourism Development Council and the National Ecotourism Steering Committee. They are to work with seven public sector representatives and one from business to implement the country’s ecotourism strategy and programme (DOT et al., 2002). In the related field of protected area management, at least four NGO representatives work with a minimum of five public sector representatives in running Protected Area Management Boards.

NGOs are particularly active in informal venues. During the incumbency of President Ramos, who emphasized teamwork and participatory processes, and constantly admonished his Cabinet that “everything is inter-agency now” (Habito 1998, p. 49), numerous multi-sectoral Presidential Commissions and task forces were created. In the tourism sector, these include the Presidential Commission on Taal and Tagaytay, Presidential Commission on Ifugao Terraces, Presidential Commission on Bicol Special Tourism Development Project, Presidential Task Force on Philippine Tourism Highway, and Presidential Commission on Vigan (Gabor, 1998). In addition, the president annually convened summits to discuss among other things strategic social and economic policies, poverty alleviation measures, pole-vaulting strategies, and social reform (Aguirre, 1998). These summits were participatory in nature and were well regarded for feedbacks generated (Wui & Lopez, 1997).

The same fervour for collaboration was observed in designing strategy documents. The formulation of the Philippine Agenda 21 was particularly well received given the depth and breadth of consultation conducted (Lagarde, 2006). In the tourism sector, the height of cooperative work was perhaps achieved during the formulation of the National Ecotourism Strategy, and the National Ecotourism Programme with close collaboration characterising the process in its production from 2001 to 2002.

The above discussion of changes in governing coalition does reinforce a key tenet of the ACF: that events external to the system of which changes to governing coalition is an
element is highly influential in determining the processes of policy implementation (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). The orientation of tourism policy was significantly modified in the 1980s only when the closed techno-military regime that promoted luxury and sex tourism, and principally used it to serve the political needs of the regime that needed legitimating (Richter, 1982), was replaced by a more open and inclusive policy network. This new network was imbued with a strong democratic ethos, and as discussed later in section 7.3.3, environmental values as well. Relatedly, the discussion also demonstrates the importance of institutions, and control thereof, in policy changes (Schlager, 1999). Only when the minority coalition of civil society organizations, opposition political parties and other sectoral groups managed to dethrone, through a peaceful revolution, the governing coalition from their control of policymaking structures did their beliefs found their way in policies and programmes of government. There was little room for ‘analytical debate’ in this particular instance, an alternative mechanism proposed by the ACF for minority coalitions to advance their positions (Nohrstedt, 2008), but simply the takeover of power through the forces of history.

Nonetheless, how civil society groups got from the streets to the boardroom was not merely the result of asserting themselves and being accepted by the government (Brillantes, 1997), a strategy NGOs have traditionally employed (Lovelock, 2003; Songco, 2003), but also because alterations in state policy have made their cooperation legitimate. This is discussed in the next section.

7.2.3.2 Constitutional revision and changes in governance

In the ACF, one core aspect of a government programme is the way it addresses the “overall seriousness of the problem” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 133). Under the martial law regime, public participation in policymaking was negligible, as democratic institutions had been abolished. There was a consistent pattern of inclusion and exclusion in the decision-making network that emerged, as Daughbjerg and Marsh (1998) hypothesise in an authoritarian regime. Those businessmen linked to the interests of the Marcos family, loyal politicians, the military who enforced martial rule, and the technocrats dominated this (Villamor, 2006). Civil society was hardly involved and was in fact opposed. Thus, the issue of democratic representation and access was a serious
concern. In the aftermath of the EDSA revolution, President Aquino made people’s participation a major feature of her government (Wui & Lopez, 1997) aside from restoring formal democratic forms, structures and processes that existed in the country prior to 1972 (de Dios, 1990). Rocamora (2004) explains that this was a concession to the civil society that played a decisive role in the battle against the dictator.

The concept was eventually institutionalized when the 1973 constitution was replaced by the 1987 freedom constitution as the basic law of the land. The pertinent provisions are shown below:

The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation [Article II, Section 23]

The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies composed of local government units, regional heads or departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region [Article X, Section 14].

The State shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means [Article XIII, Section 15]

The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanism [Article XIII., Section 16]

To be sure, the three previous constitutions (made in 1899, 1935, and 1973) all contained some provisions on people’s participation in government. However, as Buendia (2005) explains, these provisions mainly direct the state to not curtail the right of citizens to form associations or societies. This contrasts sharply with the above stipulations where the state is directed to encourage the formation of civil society organizations and ensure their participation in decision-making processes.

The Aquino and Ramos administrations further put flesh on these democratic principles with a series of laws that empowered the public. For example, under Aquino, Republic
Act No. 6735 (the Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989) allows citizens to directly propose, enact, or reject national or local legislative acts. In consequence, national government policies would henceforth no longer be imposed top-down. In the case of proposed legislations, they would have to be deliberated upon by the legislature and civil society. The effect was immediately felt as civil society groups worked to have their voices heard on key issues, as demonstrated in case studies of legislations on generic drugs (Yadao-Guno, 1991), protected areas (Villamor, 2006), urban poor housing (Rebullida, 2003), indigenous peoples’ rights (Rico, 2007), and others as compiled in a book by the University of the Philippines (1994) and in a volume by Wui and Lopez (1997). Civil society groups also featured highly in the preparation of development plans such as the medium term development plan, Philippine Agenda 21, and regional tourism master plans. In addition, just before her presidency ended, Corazon Aquino signed the Local Government Code that devolved functions of national governments to local governments.

As a result, local governance was democratized, and corresponding democratic space granted to NGOs in local policymaking bodies with the enactment of the Local Government Code in 1991. Its passage meant that the same inclusive process of consultation obtaining in the national level could be observed in the local level. Consequently, the population of civil society organizations has exploded (Silliman & Noble, 1998) so they can participate in deepening democracy. This is because the Code contains specific provisions that ask provincial and municipal governments to work with NGOs and people’s organizations, as follows:

Local government units shall promote the establishment and operation of people’s and non-governmental organizations to become active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy. [Section 34]

Local government units may enter into joint ventures and such other cooperative arrangements with people’s and non-governmental organizations to engage in the delivery of certain basic services, capability-building and livelihood projects, and to develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity and income, diversify agriculture, spur rural industrialization, promote ecological balance, and enhance the economic and social well-being of the people. [Section 35]
A local government unit may through its local chief executive and with the concurrence of the “sanggunian” concerned provide assistance, financial or otherwise, to such people’s and non-government organizations for economic, socially-oriented, environmental, or cultural projects to be implemented within its territorial jurisdiction. [Section 36]

The Code radically altered central-local government relations through devolution and decentralization. Researchers have noted that these twin concepts are necessary ingredients of democratization (Brillantes, 1998; Hermoso & Luca, 2006; Yuksel et al., 2005). As De Guzman and Reforma (1993) note, decentralization is “increasingly recognized as a mechanism that will foster democratization in the equitable distribution of power, resources, and services” (p. 3). In terms of the ACF, Sabatier (1993, pp. 21-22) notes that it is in decentralized political systems where policy learning is facilitated through the leeway granted for policy experimentation and evaluation of policy instruments.

Through the Code, the policymaking power of the executive and the legislative branches of the national government were curtailed because of some important provisions that enhanced local autonomy and increased local financial resources (Eaton, 2001). These include sections that mandated automatic revenue sharing procedures instead of the previous system of negotiated transfers, and the stipulation that 40% of tax revenues be shared with local government. In addition, specific functions of key line agencies such as agriculture, education, environment, health, public works, transportation, social work and tourism were devolved.

As far as tourism is concerned, municipalities were given responsibilities over tourism facilities and other tourist attractions including the acquisition of equipment, regulation and supervision of business concessions, and security services for such facilities. To provinces and cities were assigned the tasks of tourism development and implementing promotion programmes. To a department that once had enormous power even over transactions that are private in nature (see MOT, 1986), this was a huge reduction in policy responsibilities. Nonetheless, this transfer of tourism powers to local governments implies a new dynamism in the policy process, as Ivars (2004) has noted in Spain. As
shown in the case of Pamilacan Island, in Chapters Five and Six, it leads to local policy learning albeit in a painful and complicated way.

Democratization was further boosted during the presidency of Fidel Ramos. Adopting 5 D’s of governance identified as devolution, deregulation, decentralization, democratization, and sustainable development (Aguirre 1998), he spearheaded the enactment of laws that firmly entrenched people’s participation in the firmament. Most significant of these is Republic Act No. 7941 passed in 1995 that set up the party-list system and provided for proportional representation to the House of Representatives of marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties. The law states that up to 20% of all seats shall be composed of party-list representatives, enabling civil society groups to serve as countervailing forces not just in informal venues but in the elite-dominated formal structures like the legislature where actually policy is crafted. Another watershed law is the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (Republic Act No. 8371) of 1997 that recognized the claims of indigenous cultural communities over ancestral domains and provided for their mandatory representation in all policymaking bodies and in local legislative councils. It also vested in the community the right to self-determination, through the grant or withholding of free and informed consent of proposed policy, programme, project or plan within their domain.

The above-mentioned analysis of the people’s power revolution as a key event, and the constitutional and major policy changes that followed, have some implications for the advocacy coalition framework. First, it reinforces the presumption that the external environment influences the direction of policy. For the ACF, this change is mainly driven by dynamic events, whilst stable system parameters such as constitutional structures have benign roles, because changes in the latter are presumed to take place rarely (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). However, the experience of the Philippines (and other democratizing states such as Thailand) as outlined in this thesis suggests that the assumption may not apply. The constitution has been revised on two occasions in a space of 13 years (1973 and 1986), with initiatives to tinker with it never failing to appear since the 1990s. In addition, policy innovations that operationalize or clarify constitutional provisions such as those on public participation continue to appear. Thus, whilst basic provisions remain, they are re-interpreted constantly. In other words, constitutional structures could be seen
as just as dynamic as external events. Second, there appears to be a complex circular interaction between elements of the ACF analytically presumed to be stable, on the one hand, and dynamic on the other. The chain began with the intensification of the democratization movement, a change in socio-cultural values (stable component), which was followed by the EDSA revolution (dynamic event). This led to a change in systemic governing coalition (dynamic element) that worked for constitutional changes (stable component). This roundabout interaction and seeming dynamism of the stable parameters renders the analytical division between the two vectors untenable, as clearly, they change and feedback on each other more frequently than presumed. The result is to confound the ACF, raising issues as to its applicability in nation-states with very fluid political systems.

To summarise the impacts of democratization, a society-level force in terms of policy networks and external influence in regard to the ACF, in explaining changes in the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation, it is useful to relate development to the tenets of liberal democracy. Larry Diamond (1999) suggests that liberal democracies have two features. First is the presence of check and balance within the government structure, particularly mechanisms to restrain executive power. Second is the existence of structures through which citizens can participate meaningfully in decision making. With respect to the first element, it is noted that democratization has led to the reconstitution of formal structures and processes of democracy. The dominant executive branch, supported by the military and oligarchs under martial law, now no longer monopolized policymaking. It has to contend with a restored legislative body, cross swords with a revitalized media, and deal with an expanding civil society. Thus, major tourism policies undergo congressional processes in the twin chambers, whereas before only access to the President is needed. The outcome is a long-winded and more complex policy process. Two examples illustrate this point. The independent Ministry of Tourism was created in 1973 only a few months after it was originally organized as part of the Ministry of Trade and Tourism. The swift reorganization was accomplished because the decision rested solely with the President. This is in contrast with efforts to re-structure the same department. Bills to create a more responsive tourism department have been filed since the 1990s when Congress was re-constituted in 1987 (Cortes, 1991; see also website of House of Representatives at http://www.congress.gov.ph). However, the effort
succeeded only in 2009 with the passing of the National Tourism Policy Act, more than 20 years since the department was last re-organized in 1987 when the Aquino administration was still a revolutionary government. The delay could be attributed to many intervening variables, but there is no doubt that one factor is the greater number of policy actors that have to be consulted before such measures are approved.

With respect to the second element, it is clear from the evidence that channels now exist that allow citizens to participate in decision-making and policy implementation. From the national, regional, and down to the local level, structures have been erected that welcome civil society organizations. The creation of a democratic space was a product of the huge role assumed by civil society during the historic struggle against authoritarianism in the 70s and 80s. The constituency that formed peopled the new establishment, enabling the installation and maintenance of a systemic coalition averse to centralized rule. The focus was on promoting democratization at various planes of governance in order to distribute power and foster equity. In terms of tourism policy processes, the effect therefore was to create a larger and more inclusive policy subsystem, backed up by an enabling legal environment.

Yet, another force was simultaneously altering the policy process. This was the increasing public concern regarding the deteriorating state of the country’s natural environment. In the advocacy coalition framework, this attitude change represents a fundamental shift in socio-cultural values, a system parameter change to drive policy change (Sabatier, 1999). Thus, increased environmentalism reinforces not just the power of social forces in explaining policy change but also the strong role therein of policy-oriented learning, confirming views that policy learning is more conducive in natural systems (Sabatier, 1993). As is shown in succeeding sections, this increasing awareness led to the formation of an environmental movement that influenced tourism policy in at least two ways. First, the environmental movement helped crystallize the democratization movement by assisting the latter to equate the observed environmental abuse with issues of equity that strike at the heart of the democratization project. Second, the lexicon and tools of the environmental movement served as a foundation to tourism policy that emerged in the 1980s, and continue to inform present principles and practices. In particular, concepts such as social acceptability and the precautionary approach intermingled with the
knowledge of the negative environmental and social impacts of tourism that proliferated in the past to produce a much broader vision of tourism that integrated environmental and social concerns to tourism development.

The roots of these arguments are discussed in the sections below. The first section places in historical context the exploitation of the environment, pinpointing its origins to economic reasons. The second section traces the growth of the environmental movement, while the third and last section explores consequences in the tourism sector.

7.3 The role of increased environmentalism

7.3.1 Environmental plunder for economic growth

Historically, the focus of the state has been the exploitation of the environment for national economic development. This was accomplished through the promotion of extractive industries, infrastructure development, and conversion of forest and marine land for agricultural purposes, settlement, and industrial use (Reyes-Boquiren, 2002). Nonetheless, it was just the elite that largely benefited. Rico (2006, p. 231) forcefully argues that “from the Spanish period to the Marcos years, the country's environment had been plundered to serve the interests of the ruling class, the elite, and the cronies.”

The exploitation of the environment reached its peak during the Marcos dictatorship in the 1970s. The administration continued the promotion of exports of agricultural products and raw materials that started in the Spanish period (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005; Larkin, 1995), sustained through the American occupation (Anderson, 1988; de Dios & Hutchcroft, 2003), and intensified in the post-WW II period (Rico, 2006). Shielding domestic manufacturers through import-substitution industrialization (ISI), Marcos issued presidential decrees on fisheries and aquaculture, forestry and in mining that further opened virgin territories to economic activities. The Fisheries Decree of 1975 paved the way for the expansion of commercial fishing that soon equalled the municipal sector in production and led to the emergence of “fishpondification” or the conversion of mangrove forests to boost aquaculture (Sagun, 1996). This growth in commercial fishing is also blamed in the population decline of marine mammals in the country including Pamilacan (see Chapter Six specifically section 6.5.2). With wood processing as one of the focussed industries, the government allocated much of unclassified land as public
forestland eligible to be licensed for logging via timber license agreements (TLAs), many of these entered into with cronies that gave them a right to cut 100,000 hectares of forest for only Php 1.00 per hectare (Teehankee, 1993). It also implemented policies of low forest charges and export taxes (Villamor 2006). Kummer and Turner (1994) conclude that it was this complicity by the state, conspiring with the elite to strip the forest of its logs, more than population growth, which is to blame for increased deforestation in recent memory. Coxhead and Jayasuriya (2003, p. 413) affirm the indictment, arguing that a combination of inward-looking policies, state favours to the elite, and underinvestment in critical infrastructure perpetuated poverty and environmental degradation.

In ACF terms, as has been argued in earlier sections (see 7.2.2-7.2.3 and 4.3.1), leading the juggernaut was the governing coalition of the dictator and his allies and cronies in business, local government and military. They were able to do this because of the centralized nature of the authoritarian regime, with expectable democratic deficit (Ivars, 2004). Villamor (2006) states that this coalition shared a preference for export-oriented industrialization. This is clearly in action in the case of marine mammals. An initial attempt to conserve marine mammals in the country in 1982 did not prosper due to political interference (Reeves, n.d.). Instead, a commercial license to hunt whales was granted to an exporter (Barut, 1994). The result was the destruction of the forest and marine environments with serious ramifications to human lives, as discussed below. In turn, knowledge of environmental abuse and technical information about its consequences helped shape the views of the environmental movement.

7.3.2 Environmental stress and its costs

Indeed, deforestation was highest during the Marcos period. Rico (2006) reported that in that period, forest cover was being lost at the rate of 300,000 hectares per year. As a result, reduction in old growth rainforest further accelerated, declining from almost 92% of the country’s land area in 1575, 57% in 1934, to only 24% or roughly 7.168 million hectares as at 2002, according to official statistics.

Other ecosystems came to equally bad shapes. Aguilar (1993, p. 22) notes the severe destruction of coastal resources, citing research showing that only 5-6% of coral cover are in good condition. Zablan (1993) reports of river systems being biologically dead (40 of
This devastation has tremendous human and non-human consequences; three important points are discussed here.

First is the reduction of biodiversity, particularly for endemic species. Various statistics show the Philippines as one of the 17 mega-diverse countries in the world. But because of deforestation and destruction of coral reefs, much of this biodiversity is threatened, to the point that the country has been labelled as the “hottest of the hotspots” (Reyes-Boquiren, 2002, p. 92; Gozun, 2004, p. 435), a strong candidate for “extinction spasm” (Luna, 2001, p. 206).

Second is the sheer number of human lives lost due attributed to environmental catastrophes in the 1980s and 90s. The Ormoc flash flood in Leyte province in 1991 stands out among the most horrific, what with 4,922 killed, 3,000 people missing, and 14,000 houses destroyed (Meniano, 2007). These disasters were widely blamed on logging, mining, swidden farming, and other activities that deforested mountains meant to serve as natural barriers against strong typhoons.

Third are the economic and social impacts of environmental destruction. Greater fishing effort by commercial fishermen, including those by foreign fleets that intrude into national borders (Alvarez, 2006; Soriano et al., 1995), have reduced the catch of municipal fishermen from 1,500 kg in 1987 to about 1,100 kg in 1996 (Gozun, 2004). This reduction in turn has caused the price of fish in some regions to rise by 1,400% in the last 20 years (Green et al., 2004). In the forest, the social impacts were keenly felt. Here emerged the phenomenon of development refugees, or those compelled to leave their traditional grounds for development purposes (Partridge, 1989). Magno (1993), for example, tells of indigenous communities across the country being forced from their ancestral domains just so the state and the cronies awarded timber licences by the Marcos government can ravage the forest. This is shown by a plan by the National Power Corporation, with funding from the World Bank, to build four dams along Chico River nestled within the Cordillera mountain ranges in northern Philippines. The number of affected tribal people was estimated at 100,000 and only the “tenacious resistance of the Kalinga and Bontoc people to the Chico Dam Project...pressured the World Bank to abandon the project in the early 1980s” (Magno 1993, p. 9). This event and similar
accounts of environmental abuse, even during the Aquino administration (e.g., Rood, 1998; Vitug, 1993), helped crystallize the environmental movement, as discussed in section 7.3.3 below.

7.3.3 The growth of environmentalism

Some models of policy implementation including the ACF incorporate feedback loops in order to highlight the role of technical information in policy learning that in turn leads to increased sophistication in strategy and ultimately policy change (Goggin et al., 1990; Marsh & Smith, 2000; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). As Cairney (2007, p. 57) emphasises, alterations in behaviour are derived from reactions to external events and the assimilation of new evidence from efforts to learn more about the world. This is evident in the present case. The accomplishment of the Kalinga and Bontoc tribes to stop the dams proved useful in grabbing the attention of civil organizations, particularly religious ones, who were then active in other socio-political and economic issues (Rebullida, 1991), including the negative impacts of tourism on the country’s women and children (Tan et al., 1989). They swung into action. First, they provided organizing then technical support (Rood, 1998). Then, in a demonstration of conceptual learning from policy outcomes (Glasbergen, 1996), they began to see the connection between poverty and underdevelopment and how they form a vicious cycle, that “poverty causes environmental degradation (particularly in a setting characterized by a large population sharing limited resources), which in turn, reduces economic productivity, thus aggravating poverty” (Ragbrero, 1993, pp. 48-49). And because of onerous favours that Marcos had been giving his associates, and to some extent the Aquino administration, society groups started to equate environmentalism with the basic issue of equity and rational distribution of natural resources (UP, 1994). Green Forum, an environmental network, was emphatic in its declaration that

the critical point in the vicious cycle is 'lack of democratic access to and mismanagement of natural resources. When resources such as forests and fishing grounds are given to a few [who do not belong to the local community], the result is the degradation of such resources and the impoverishment of the local community, with the eventual effect of overburdening the remaining resources and contributing to their destruction. Poverty, therefore, is just the manifestation
of the problem, and environmental destruction is the tail-end of the process. (Ragrario, 1993, p. 50)

As a result, environmental groups, in a bid for the “recovery of the environment” (Magno, 1993, p. 7), rallied behind small communities. They assisted the latter in opposing state-sponsored projects deemed damaging to the environment such as the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant by incorporating environmental concerns in protests against the Marcos regime (Magno, 1993). Others developed a social conscience and engaged in scientific research and programme implementation. An example is Haribon Foundation that originated as a bird-watching group in 1972. It gradually evolved into a wildlife conservation group, and then expanded its operations to embrace scientific research and programme implementation (Soriano et al., 1995).

The foregoing discussion clearly demonstrates the instrumental role of policy-oriented learning, borne of technical information from policy feedback, and how it progresses through an incremental process fed by outside stimulus (Etheredge & Short, 1983; Heclo, 1974; Laird, 1999). No doubt, the re-orientation of the goals of environment groups towards more abstract social values such as equity was conditioned by knowledge of the environmental situation made worse by the excesses of the authoritarian regime.

A consequence of learning among organizations is the development of common strategy. ACF suggests that stakeholders would coordinate and implement strategy, and seek the formation of coalitions in order to better understand the world and achieve their policy objectives (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Knowing the strength of the governing coalition during the Marcos regime, environmental groups formed coalitions in order to increase their political stock, starting in 1979 with the creation of the Philippine Federation for Environmental Change (PFEC). Magno (1993) states that at its inception, PFEC “clearly exhibited a commitment to the politics of transformation and redistribution” (p.13). This coalition building continued well into the 80s and 90s as the concept of sustainable development gained foothold. An example is Green Forum that was organized in 1989. Highly political, it employed a range of strategies and exploited key ‘focusing events’ (Birkland, 1997) to achieve its objectives. For example, it came out with a Voter’s Guide to Sustainable Development during the 1992 general elections.
(Caruncho, 1991) and participated in UNCED in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 where it acted as co-chair of the parallel International NGO Forum (Ragrario, 1993).

The environment movement however had to wait until the authoritarian rule ended in 1986 before it could formally change official policy according to some of their beliefs. This is because of the tight control maintained by the technocratic-militaristic network, with the dictator Marcos at the centre that favoured export-oriented industrialization (Villamor, 2006). In such a regime, a closed network leads to policy continuity, even inertia, “because participants share a common ideology and, thus, policy preferences” aside from recognizing that “it is a positive-sum game” (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998, p. 54). Their ‘window of opportunity’ came after the EDSA revolution in 1986. In the aftermath, a massive government re-organization got underway as explained in section 7.2.3.1 that caused the replacement of the old network with a new governing coalition. Leading members of the environment movement, such as the PFEC Chairman, was appointed to the Cabinet by President Aquino (Magadia, 2003; Magno, 1993). This ensured that the clamour for policy change would be given more official attention now that a venue that oversees policy had been made accessible, a point Schlager (1999) suggests is one method to alter policy. Once in place, they called for laws and policies that gave emphasis to protected areas, biodiversity, conservation, wildlife protection, reforestation (Balangue, 2005; Gozun, 2004; Ramos, 1998; Villamor, 2006) along with the application of environmental principles in national, local and site development planning (Ramos, 1998). These were in recognition of the “seriousness of the [environmental] problem” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 133), as a core aspect of policy. These issues were managed under a new institution established in 1987 for the purpose, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The presence of members of the environmental movement in the Cabinet also provided a countervailing influence to the views of the old oligarchy that were resurrected with the restoration of democracy (de Dios, 1990; see also Teehankee, 1993; UP, 1994).

Even the judiciary, characterized as a passive policy maker (UP, 1994), became an environment activist. In a judicial decision hailed as significant in the drive towards sustainable development, the Supreme Court in Oposa v Factoran, affirmed that “the constitutional right to a healthy ecology and environment [in the 1987 Constitution] is
executory and needs no enabling statute for the latter to become the basis for a cause of action in a court suit” (UP, 1994, p.117). The case involves children from around the country, joined by their parents and the Philippine Environmental Network, Inc. challenging the Secretary of DENR to cancel all existing Timber Licence Agreements and to prevent him from renewing or processing new applications (Gaymaytan, 2003). The SC upheld the standing of the petitioners and went to declare that they may represent the unborn or the future generation. It therefore recognized the concept of intergenerational equity; thus, providing a clearer understanding of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and expanding the doctrine of standing (Manguiat & Yu, 2003).

The foregoing discussion implies a couple of things for the ACF. Mainly it pertains to the importance of dynamic system events, namely changes in systemic governing coalition, to explain policy changes. It was only after a new open and inclusive systemic governing coalition, with some from the environment groups themselves as members, replaced the tight policy network of the authoritarian regime were they able to pursue their environmental advocacies, enriched by technical information from policy feedback, in terms of government policies and programmes. This sequence is similar to that experienced by civil society groups that campaigned for the restoration of democracy, as explained in section 7.2.3. What this suggests for the ACF is a path through which changes in the wider environment, such as trends like democratization and environmentalism, cause alterations in policy, an aspect of the theory that remains a ‘black box’ (Kim & Roh, 2008). Essentially, it ascribes an interpretive role for governing coalitions and political action. The mechanisms of this path are explained in some detail in section 7.4 and in the next chapter.

7.3.4 **Consequences for the tourism sector**

For the tourism sector, the growth of environmentalism had enormous implications on the substance and institutional arrangements of tourism policy. First was the increased inter-organizational relationship with other policy actors, particularly the DENR and environment groups, in keeping with the democratization trend and the influence of the environment movement. In particular, the DOT and other actors such as local governments contemplating tourism development had to coordinate with resource-
oriented departments when it came to tourism policies and programmes that impact significantly on the environment. This is the essence of the EIS and ECC system instituted in the 1970s but reinvigorated in the 1990s and 2000s (DocNGE1, DocNGE2, DocNGE4). The reverse is observed when protected areas and natural parks under the jurisdiction of these departments contemplate tourism development (IntM10). In effect, with the change in governing coalition and increased environmentalism, tourism was somehow involved in natural resources management.

In addition, environmental and social NGOs had to be provided space in the policymaking structures, particularly when they started to employ ecotourism as development strategies in communities they work with. At the national level, as discussed above, NGOs became members of informal groups such as inter-agency task forces that formulated policies, plans and programmes for the tourism sector and the wider polity. Conservation NGOs such as KKP, for example, became members of the Philippine Council for Sustainable Development and Inter-Agency Task Force on Marine Mammal Conservation that had programmes in Pamilacan. Their involvement in ecotourism policymaking received the highest recognition when in 1999, President Estrada signed Executive Order 111 that formalized the creation of the Cabinet-level National Ecotourism Development Council and the National Ecotourism Steering Committee, in which NGOs have been named as members.

These arrangements were replicated at the local level. Local governments, for example, those in coastal areas, found themselves having to work with environmental NGOs when the latter sought the establishment of marine protected areas not only to conserve fast degrading marine resources but also to promote tourism (Galit & Reyes, 1999; Green, 2002; Oracion et al., 2005; Russ & Alcala, 1999; Thiele, Pollnac & Christie, 2005). By 2001, Indaba and Suarez-Aspilla (2004) report, based on surveys by Alcala (2001), that these areas have reached 500, one of the largest number of coastal resource management experiences in the world (Thiele et al., 2005), attesting to the close collaboration between civil society and local government.

Despite these collaborative efforts, fragmentation also marks the processes of tourism policy. This can be attributed to the huge number of civil society organizations coupled
with the decentralization of government, which means that there are more policy actors that participate than ever before. In such contexts, there exist many centres of authority that may potentially compete (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998). This is shown by the experience of Pamilacan analyzed in this thesis where national and local government agencies fought, and in other informal cases like Boracay (see Achacoso-Sevilla, 2003; Trousdale, 1999). This is in contrast to the experience of most developing countries where tourism policy is highly centralized (Yuksel et al., 2005). In the Philippines presently, policymaking takes place within a variety of policy networks, as Daugbjerg and Marsh (1998) argue in democratized settings. In this case, the problem is that of securing coordinated policy actions among separate but interdependent organizations (Rhodes, 1988).

Oliver and Pemberton (2004, p. 420) suggest that the triumph of a new idea depends on the ability of those proposing it to secure the endorsement of those in power to decide and on its subsequent adoption by institutions concerned. Evidence demonstrates that environmentalism was able to penetrate the corridors of power and cause changes in the substance of policy across a variety of areas. Certainly, this was the case of tourism policy, as its substance was significantly altered, the second implication of environmentalism. As discussed in detail in Chapter Four, there was a marked change in the orientation of national tourism policy; the use of new policy instruments, some of which were derived from environmentalism; and a much greater concern for integrated strategies. As argued in sections 4.4-4.5, all these indicate policy learning, specifically conceptual learning (Fiorino, 2001). From primarily being a political and economic tool during the Marcos period without much regard for environmental and social impacts, the policy was enhanced to also emphasize environmental and social concerns (Gabor, 1998). These are clearly seen in the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plans formulated post-1987 and the Tourism Master Plan. In addition, the plans are integrated strategies that incorporated environmental concerns for the first time. Subsequently, as sustainable development gained ground locally and internationally, ecological and social concepts permeated tourism policy and enriched its vocabulary. New tourism policy instruments such as an ecotourism code of ethics and similar quality control measures were formulated in cognizance of the inability of present mechanisms to deal with
environmental threats of tourism. Tourism impacts were to be mitigated with the application of environmental principles such as social acceptability and the precautionary principle (Balangue, 2005; DocNGE1). The principles were operationalized by a series of administrative orders in the 1990s that updated the EIS system formulated in the 1970s. In the revisions, the state gave premium to a process that allowed consultation with the wider community and “the provision of just and fair solutions to valid problems raised by the host communities” (Ramos, 1998, pp. 452-453). Thus, while most tourism activities such as camping, mountain trekking, and staying with indigenous communities are exempt, activities that physically carves the community such as the construction of a rest house in an area more than 5000 sqm, construction of above 18-hole golf course, and setting aside more than 300 hectares for agri-tourism needed to undergo the EIS process (PAWB, n.d.). Related to this, the social acceptability criterion of the process assesses the following elements: (a) ecological/environmental soundness of the proposed project, (b) effective implementation of the public implementation process, (c) resolution of conflicts, (d) promotion of social and intergenerational equity and poverty alleviation (e) effective environmental monitoring and evaluation, and (f) proposed mitigation and enhancement measures (DocNGE2). Public hearings would have to be conducted in cases where the project is of a scale as to affect a huge number of people, public opposition is rising, and a written request was made for such an activity. Clearly, the employment of these environmental principles seeks to correct the excesses committed during the Marcos period wherein voiceless local communities became development refugees in their own ancestral lands.

In terms of the ACF, the influence of the environment sector to the tourism policy-subsystem demonstrates yet again the influence of events external to the system. This time, the specific variable is “policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems” (Sabatier, 1993, p. 22). Not only are tourism projects, major and minor alike, now subjected to environmental processes at the time of inception, they would have to adhere to environment standards while in operation (Huttche et al., 2002). To not comply is to invite the attention of activist policy actors.
7.4 Summary and discussion

With the objective of identifying variables that explain the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation from the 1970s to the present decade, this chapter has examined the influence of two broad society-level forces, namely democratization and environmentalism. It was shown that the idea to regain democracy and to arrest environmental degradation simultaneously worked to ultimately affect the substance and processes of tourism policy. The worsening environmental condition, which was abetted by the excesses of the dictatorship, had led to the growth of the environmental movement. At the forefront were civil society organizations, later joined by pro-democracy activists calling for reforms, which equated poverty with the destruction of the environment. Together they formed a large potent constituency base and engaged with the state heavily, first by fighting it to remove the dictatorship, then permeating the new establishment with its ideas and people. The result was the installation of a new broad governing coalition, committed to the democratic ethos and sustainable development of the country’s natural resources. This coalition is open and plural, with spaces allotted to civil society groups that have allowed them to participate in tourism policymaking both at the national and local levels. Its ideas are reflected in the 1987 constitution and its provisions on people’s participation on governance, as well as in pro-environment laws and policies subsequently issued. This is the essence of substantive democracy, “where people can directly participate in decision making on matters that affect their interests” (Hermoso & Luca, 2006, p. 320). It is argued that the communitarian spirit that emerged from the struggle to change the system has persisted to this day (Magadia, 1999, 2003), and that the alliance between NGOs with certain state agencies is really going to be “the face of politics and policymaking in the years to come” (Abinales, 2004, p. 36).

It remains to be seen if the country will move towards the direction of a ‘hollow state,’ a term that describes a situation in modern societies where public policy entities have become interdependent in order to achieve goals (Cline, 2000). With an enabling legal environment, increasing number of NGOs and their active involvement in some key sectors, the country might well be on its way. Nonetheless, as explained in earlier chapters, traditional structures such as patron-client relations have remained durable,
implying that as the country moves towards having a modern society, it still has to yield to traditional norms (David, 2008a; 2008b).

In relation to the theoretical framework of this study, these developments highlight a number of points. First, it demonstrates the value of society-level forces and key events in explaining the structure and membership of policy sub-systems. Democratization set in motion a series of events that have led to the reconstitution of formal structures and processes of democracy, and the existence of structures across planes of governance through which citizens can participate meaningfully in decision-making and tourism policy implementation. Increased environmentalism helped crystallize the democratization movement by equating the observed environmental abuse with issues of equity that strikes at the heart of the democratization project. The lexicon and tools of the environmental movement also served as a foundation to a revised tourism policy in the 1980s, and continue to inform present principles and practices. In a large part, this relationship is a result of the assimilation of evidence of environmental degradation from industrial activities. Thus, the second point in terms of the ACF is the important role of ideas and policy learning

Third, the chapter provides an indication of the mechanism in which societal forces influence policy change, an issue hitherto unanswered in the advocacy coalition framework. The ACF accords system parameters (attributes of the public problem area, distribution of natural resources, fundamental socio-cultural values and social structure, constitutional structure) a benign role in explaining the policy process. In the words of Sabatier & Weible (2007), “The relatively stable parameters are stable over long periods of time, approximately 100 years or more” (p. 125). It is emphasised that these factors rarely stimulate efforts for policy changes. Thus, the model is silent regarding the causal processes that lead to policy change after a shock (John, 2003; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Nohrstedt, 2005; Sato, 1999), except to say that they “clearly affect behaviour” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 120) and are important in “establishing the resources and constraints within which subsystems must operate (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 193). In other words, from the point of view of the framework, the core mechanism of policy change is a veritable ‘black box’ (Kim & Roh, 2008, p. 675).
In the study, environmentalism and democratization were the principal drivers of change. These ideas represent changes in socio-cultural values, a stable parameter, according to the advocacy coalition framework. Their growth led to the installation of a new governing coalition, a dynamic element, which then expanded to a wider network with the alliance of the media and other social institutions. This broad base subsequently called for constitutional changes, presumed to be a stable factor in the ACF that codified people’s participation in policymaking and made the protection of the environment an important policy concern.

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the process through which changes in socio-cultural values cause policy change begins with the adoption of the new values or ideas by a coalition of institutions. This suggests an instrumental role for learning by members of the network. They would have to be convinced, through evidence, discourse, or experience of the necessity of change in order to take action. They would then have to gain control of the policymaking structures in order to make the policy changes, as Schlager (1999) emphasises.

The above discussion raises two implications for the advocacy coalition framework. First, the circular nature of the interaction among stable and dynamic parameters suggests a need to relax the analytical distinction between stable system parameters and external events. As evidence shows, in a dynamic political context such as democratizing states, the assumption of a stable system parameter may be hard to sustain. The factors could be as dynamic as external events. Second is that change in stable system parameters need a dynamic element, a network of organizations to be exact, in order to influence the policy process. The last chapter that follows proposes a scheme in which these factors interrelate with other variables to influence policy change.
Chapter 8: Analysis and conclusion

This chapter presents a summary and evaluation of the key findings from an analysis of policy implementation in the Philippines. The discussion is organized around the basic research objective of examining the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation in the last 30 years or so. The objective can be broken down into three main tasks. First is a description and analysis of what policy implementation comprised in terms of policies and programmes. Second is an examination of how the implementation process had taken place by focusing on the interaction of key actors, their strategies and use of resources, as well as their perceptions and values. Third is an attempt at explaining why the implementation process had taken place the way it did. This is done by exploring the role and interaction of knowledge, institutions, external events and forces, and contextual factors. An assessment of the theoretical framework, models of tourism development, and methods used in the study provide theoretical and methodological suggestions for consideration in future research.

8.1 Research questions revisited

8.1.1 What did policy implementation consist of?

Formal attention to tourism policy in the Philippines began in the 1970s with the establishment of national-level institutions such as the Ministry of Tourism to develop the country’s tourism industry. The primary motivation for this was the need to confront political and economic issues that followed the declaration of martial law by President Marcos in 1972 (Richter, 1983). Subsequently, tourism was featured for the first time as an economic concern in the country’s development plans, where, from then on, it would occupy a separate chapter. The focus was decidedly to meet economic and political objectives, with innovative marketing programmes to lure foreign tourists and overseas Filipinos, investment in education, and infrastructure development. The decade would stamp its mark in the country’s tourism history with the development of massive edifices symbolic of the construction site syndrome (Alipour, 1996).

The gains from these investments however did not hide the negative impacts of tourism on the social fabric of the nation, particularly the growth of sex tourism and paedophilia,
and on the natural environment. Opponents of the Marcos regime started to take notice and draw technical lessons from local tourism experiences and the emergent international discourse on sustainable development. Thus, when Corazon Aquino from the opposition coalition took over as President in 1986, the orientation of the country’s tourism programme changed. In general, there was a shift towards conceptual learning that continued well into the 1990s. Conceptual learning is characterized by a change in the scale of problem definition, the search for integrated strategies, use of consensus-based processes, and attention to new policy instruments (Fiorino, 2001). The state began to promote the idea of equity, and social and environmental aspects were emphasised in order to mitigate the negative impacts of tourism. A Tourism Master Plan that was to guide the development of tourism for 20 years was formulated in 1991 that integrated a sustainable tourism agenda. This was followed by activities that increased the capacity of government implementers to learn both technical and conceptual issues related to ecotourism, the de facto form of sustainable tourism favoured, and consequently impose quality control mechanisms. In addition, tourism was identified as a strategy with which to manage fragile ecosystems, as seen in the case of Pamilacan Island.

The late 1990s saw a widening and deepening of the country’s policy commitment to sustainability. This was expressed in the way social learning was intensified and in the mushrooming of ecotourism programmes. Resource-oriented departments such as the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and the Department of Agriculture both identified ecotourism as a viable strategy to assist livelihood needs of communities particularly in coastal regions. With devolution, civil society organizations and local governments were quick to join the fray. This is what happened in Pamilacan where a network of state and non-state actors successively implemented their own marine conservation programmes but with ecotourism components. In the process, academics and practitioners began to observe gaps in knowledge and capacity constraints.

Thus, at the turn of the 21st century, efforts were turned to creating a coherent and comprehensive approach to ecotourism as the preferred form of sustainable tourism. The process started with the signing of Executive Order 111 in 1999 that symbolically and definitively institutionalized ecotourism “as a government agenda for sustainable tourism” (Pantig, 1999, p. 7). Subsequently, the National Ecotourism Strategy (NES) and
the National Ecotourism Plan (NEP) were finalized in 2002, which serve as the blueprint for the development of ecotourism until 2012. These documents were produced in the spirit of collaboration between state and non-state actors, characteristic of the open structure of social learning that have underpinned the development of tourism since the 1990s. A summary of the development of these arrangements is presented below.

8.1.2 How did the implementation process go?

This section provides a summary of the interaction of policy actors in the process of implementing tourism policy since the 1970s. At the time the country started to systematically develop tourism in the 1970s, it was under martial law. Policymaking was centralized in the hands of the President, though the First Lady closely assisted him, as well as technocrats he named to the cabinet, and the military. With tourism playing a highly political role, the Ministry of Tourism was institutionally very dominant relative to other actors in the tourism system. Its control extended to areas outside its usual turf such as air transportation policy, local governments when it came to tourism facilities, and private tourism entities over some corporate decisions. With the support of the elite, the administration poured financial resources into wasteful and environmentally destructive luxury tourism development never before seen nor to be duplicated again in the country. Policy implementation was clearly top-down, and consultations with local communities did not enter into the picture. However, even if policies and programmes were clearly identified in development plans, implementation was not assured, as power and politics played a huge role in derailing rational implementation.

The tourism landscape radically altered when the reins of government changed in 1986. With democratic and environmental movements greatly responsible in installing the new government, changes were made to the way tourism policy is implemented. The total dominance of the national tourism organization was slowly eroded with the expansion of the policy sub-system, facilitated by new constitutional provisions that institutionalized the participation of civil society in decision-making. The subsequent devolution of central government functions to local governments in the 1990s further emasculated the Department of Tourism, as power and resources over tourism development were transferred to the latter. The private sector was given prominence, with moribund tourism
associations revitalised and invited to help formulate and implement tourism plans. The new emphasis on integrated approaches meant that the views of other stakeholders were heard. Thus, compared to the martial law period where it was top-down, policy implementation in this phase more closely resembled a bottom-up approach.

The 1990s and 2000s saw efforts to institutionalize collaboration within the expanded policy sub-system. Formal and informal mechanisms were set-up in order for resource-oriented departments, civil society, and travel industry players to design tourism strategy documents or assist in policy implementation. Arguably, the apex of this approach was achieved with the formation of ecotourism bodies at national and regional levels in order to create a multi-level implementation structure, although questions can be asked about their effectiveness.

Nonetheless, policy implementation is hobbled by resource constraints. Unlike in the 1970s when tourism enjoyed unprecedented support, the succeeding periods seemed characterized by interminable concerns about financial and human resources capacity. While the power to develop tourism had been devolved to local governments, they were generally found to be lacking the resources and authority needed to fund tourism expenditures or to appoint personnel to enforce the law. This gap has allowed NGOs and international donor agencies to take up the slack, in the process becoming important agents of policy learning. The private sector was the missing link, as it had not been very vigorous in making its own initiatives. This is because the sector, like its counterparts overseas, is under-resourced and fragmented.

In Pamilacan, implementation of tourism policy reflected the national situation, but with some differences. The approach has generally been collaborative with key players coming from civil society and local governments. The key actors who dominated were those with superior skills, ties, and financial resources. These were mostly representatives of national agencies and NGOs. Travel industry players did not figure at all, except when arrangements had already been set by the state and civil society actors.

Nonetheless, the Pamilacan case affirms that implementation can be a highly political process (Pulzl & Treib, 2007; Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983) particularly if there is a clash of values (Cline, 2000). Implementation actors are shown to have their own goals,
whether political, business or both, and pursuing them could split communities along ideological lines, enough to form advocacy coalitions.

8.1.3 Why did tourism policy implementation occur the way it did?
This section proposes an explanation of why the substance of tourism policy and institutional arrangements thereof evolved the way they did in the past 30 years by summarizing the key factors whose confluence and interactions are thought to have been influential. Broadly, the reasons can be categorized into internal and external forces.

8.1.3.1 The role of external forces
The emphasis on the role of external forces flows from a structuralist perspective of where policies emanate (Hill, 1997). That is to say, social pressures drive public policy (Bennett & Howlett, 1992). This view is reflected in the inclusion of the wider social political and economic environment in models of policy implementation and the policy process, including the ACF (e.g., Goggin, et al. 1990; Kim & Roh, 2008; Morah, 1996; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Sabatier, 1987; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975), as well as approaches to the analysis of tourism policy (e.g., Hall & Jenkins, 1995). In the advocacy coalition framework, the environment is represented by stable system parameters, and external events. As shown in Figure 2-4 and Table 3-3, these two broad factors include changes in socio-economic conditions, socio-cultural values, basic constitutional structure, and systemic governing coalitions. In the case study, they all appeared to be influential in tourism policy implementation. Their salience are re-examined in the succeeding sections.

8.1.3.1.1 Changing socio-economic conditions
At the national level, tourism policy implementation seemed to have been shaped by the international discourse on sustainable development and tourism, increasing demand for tourism, as well as manifestations of negative impacts of this growth, particularly its effects on women and children. These factors particularly affected those opposed to the tourism policy of the Marcos regime, so that when they were in power, they altered the orientation of the policy. As explained in section 4.3.1, a reflection of the new policy was the emphasis on environmental and socio-cultural factors in the development of tourism
areas, as well as initiation of consultations with communities affected by it. These were enshrined in the Tourism Master Plan of 1991, and in other strategy documents formulated in subsequent years.

In Pamilacan, it was also the increasing tourism activity and knowledge of their impacts on the ecology, particularly on the behaviour and biology of marine mammals that has been driving incremental policy change. In addition, the process is being pushed by rising competition and the growth of commercial fishing. Prevailing tour practices among competitors are not sustainable, while fishing vessels pose multiple risks to both humans and non-humans, leading members of the community to cooperate to identify solutions.

An important socio-economic dimension found to directly impact on the process is the lack of resources, just as emphasised in the literature (Bramwell & Sharman, 1999; Briassoulis, 2000; Elliott, 1997; Jenkins, 2006; Thompson et al., 1995). Over the years, direct financial support to the tourism sector has waned. Moreover, agencies deemed crucial in law enforcement are hobbled also by resource constraints. Devolution in the 1990s has made little difference as local governments themselves are, in general, underfunded and do not have personnel. NGOs and international aid agencies have taken up the slack but without the private sector stepping up, which are under-resourced and fragmented themselves, the local tourism industry cannot hope to be competitive.

8.1.3.1.2 Socio-cultural values and dimensions

Two major changes in socio-cultural values that started in the 1970s and continue to diffuse within society have altered both the orientation of policy and institutional arrangements. These are democratization and environmentalism. The idea to regain democracy and concern for the worsening environment, seen to be abetted by the dictatorship, led to the formation of a constituency base that actively engaged the state. Sequentially, the first step was to fight the dictatorial regime and secondly, to permeate the new governing structure with constructive ideas and people committed to the ethos of environmentalism and democracy. It is argued that the communitarian spirit that developed during the fight against the dictatorship has persisted to the present and is palpable in policymaking mechanisms that include both state and non-state actors.
Democratization is also seen in efforts to engage in bottom-up approaches to community tourism planning.

This arrangement was seen in Pamilacan, first with Silliman University and its partner institutions, and later on, other NGOs and their own collaborators. Consultations with the community were a key methodological element. Nonetheless, a broader meaning of environmentalism was slow to develop in Pamilacan, and this was because of the high-value the residents had placed on hunting, as stopping it had cultural, economic and health ramifications. The clash of values, which has been noted as one of the hindrances to policy implementation (Cline, 2000), took quite a few years to resolve. The eventual spread of environmentalism relied on having these conflicts resolved and depended on having denser network ties through which ideas and socio-economic pressures such as competition and growth of commercial fishing are communicated.

A socio-cultural dimension observed to have been durable, omnipresent, and extremely influential is patron-client relations. At the national level during the Marcos period, clientelistic relations allowed his cronies and family to exercise enormous discretion to the prejudice of rational planning and promote a tourism programme based on luxury tourism and sex tourism. At the local level, in Pamilacan and other informal cases cited in the thesis, this relation was observed to influence implementation by enabling those who enjoy such relations to thwart official policy particularly those that impinge on their self-interest. However, there is also evidence that clientelism provides a voice to small policy actors who would otherwise be peripheral to the process due to lack of power. This is perhaps its only redeeming value, as overall it would appear that patron-client relations have debilitating effects on policy implementation, just as it has been observed in the literature (Southgate, 2006; Tosun, 2005). This reinforces the salience of traditional power and politics in policy implementation (Bramwell & Meyer, 2007; Hall, 1994; Hall & Jenkins, 1995; Tosun, 2005), as being perhaps more important than beliefs as the ‘glue’ to politics.

8.1.3.1.3 Changes to constitutional structure

In 1987, an event occurred that has happened only the fourth time in the country’s history - a new constitution was ratified. This new basic law significantly altered the institutional
arrangements of many policy sectors including tourism because of its provisions that enshrined the participation of civil society groups in decision-making. With the objective of promoting equity, the Aquino and Ramos administrations put flesh into these democratic principles by approving laws that have allowed citizens to directly propose enact, or reject national or local legislative acts (Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989); be represented in national, regional and local legislative and development councils (Local Government Code of 1991; also Republic Act No. 7941 that set up the party-list system, and Republic Act No. 8371 or Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act). Thus, in numerous task forces, presidential commissions, legislative hearings, and other mechanisms of decision-making, state and non-state actors can be found together. In terms of tourism policy processes, the effect was to create a larger and more inclusive policy subsystem.

8.1.3.1.4 Changes in systemic governing coalition and control of institutions

The case study revealed important roles for institutions in policy implementation. Nonetheless, even if institutions have a long pedigree in political science as an object of research (John, 2003), the advocacy coalition framework does not discuss it in detail (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). This is unfortunate, as having control of institutions that direct policy is an important element to institute policy changes (Schlager, 1999). In the case study, the orientation of tourism policy was significantly modified in the 1980s only when the closed techno-military regime that promoted luxury and sex tourism was replaced by a more open and inclusive policy network with strong democratic and environmental ethos. The maintenance of this constituency base ensured that attention to sustainability would continue into the 1990s and the next century, and backsliding towards a closed network was checked. In Pamilacan Island, the change in barangay council structure in 2007, with the election of PIDWWO and PAFIA representatives, contributed in a huge way towards creating a more unified network structure in the island. The election of a new Mayor in 2007 in Baclayon - who was clearly focused on tourism development - likewise created opportunities for policy change at the local level. Prior to this, the municipality seemed to be ‘puzzling along,’ (Heclo, 1974) making incremental changes only after political calculations and policy-oriented learning from a conflictive relationship with central government agencies and NGOs. Interestingly, the conflict highlights the influence of institutionalized power, and its gradation in a hierarchy.
However, although superior administrative units are shown to have better access to information and resources, policy implementation is not immediately ensured if street-level bureaucrats and target participants both had values that contradict with those at the top. Thus, this result lends credence to a bottom-up orientation in policy implementation, as argued by ‘bottom-uppers’ and network analysts (Elmore, 1982; Hanf, Hjern & Porter, 1978; Hjern & Porter, 1981). It would take the intercession of policy brokers within these institutions and the emergence of threatening socio-economic changes before a congruence of meaning was achieved.

8.1.3.2 Internal forces

Besides external forces, an explanation of tourism policy implementation must take into account internal forces. In this section, the role of ideas and policy learning, and policy networks are summarized. In the ACF, as shown in Figure 2-4, these factors can be found mainly at the meso-level and are thought to play instrumental functions.

8.1.3.2.1 Ideas and policy learning

Although policy learning is conceived as having just a minor role in explaining policy implementation (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Hsu, 2005; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Sabatier, 1993), even for ACF that has explicit hypotheses about it, it seemed to have assumed an important function in tourism policy in the Philippines. Evidence was shown in Chapter Four that tourism policy implementation could be seen as having developed along three policy-learning phases. As the state sought to promote the idea of equity in the mid-80s to the 1990s, address the negative impacts of past policies, and respond to international discourse on sustainable tourism, the goal and mechanisms of local tourism policy was revised that was path-creating, reflective of the almost simultaneous occurrence of technical, conceptual and social learning. At the turn of the 21st century, efforts were geared towards integrating social learning mechanisms deeper into tourism policy processes. This means even greater participation by civil society, as policy transfer agents, in tourism policy implementation with both national and local governments.

The concurrence of technical, conceptual and social learning in policy implementation since the 1980s defies the sequence in which they are thought to occur (Fiorino, 2001; Glasbergen, 1996). This appears to be a product of the country’s history, where a
confluence of events in that decade made possible a re-ordering of the analytic process. For example, the change in the goal of tourism policy, reflective of conceptual learning is closely associated with efforts to include civil society in policymaking, a structural openness characteristic of social learning. Arguably, both these processes were reactions to the experience during the martial law period.

The significance of policy learning is supported by analysis of free trade policy (Gochoco-Bautista & Faustino, 1994) and policy reform (Araral Jr., 2006) in the country where respectively, government learning, and lesson drawing and Bayesian learning were found to be important explanations. It is also enhanced by observations that in instances where it is noted to be happening – when policy change is taking place (Bennett & Howlett, 1992) – conflict between groups is not always a prior activity, a condition for learning according to the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1997). In other words, policy-oriented learning occurred because of direct government efforts to increase their intelligence and effectiveness (Etheredge & Short, 1983). This was true in the 1990s in the national level when cooperative mechanisms were already in place – efforts were dedicated towards increasing the capacity of government implementers to learn both technical and conceptual issues about ecotourism and consequently impose quality control mechanisms. However, in Pamilacan, where the new issues would converge, conflict was a key factor for political and policy learning. The clash in values first led to the development of explicit views about conservation and tourism, then splitting of the community along ideological lines and the formation of advocacy coalitions, before local governments changed their attitudes. Subsequently policy change was characterized as in the nature of technical, conceptual and social learning, facilitated by the emergence of a much denser ecotourism network structure. All this took time, providing credence to the importance of a temporal dimension in policy implementation (Schofield, 2004) and diffusion of ideas (Rogers, 1995).

Consequently, in a setting where there is a general lack of resources and expertise, for example, tourism as practiced in developing nations, it makes sense to accord policy learning greater weight than currently conceived. Indeed, if efforts are concentrated not on being pre-occupied with power plays, but in reducing or accepting uncertainty and engaging in collaborative activities, or in Hecllo’s (1974) words, “men collectively
wondering what to do” (p. 305), policy implementation could be envisaged as learning. It is an acknowledgment that policymaking is an intellectual process as much as it is a political exercise. Researchers in a variety of policy sectors have gone ahead in this endeavour, for example, in economic policy (e.g., Hall, 1993; Oliver & Pemberton, 2004) or in environment policy (e.g., Fiorino, 2001; Lauber & Brown, 2006, Tabara & Pahl-Wostl, 2007). In the tourism field, a few have undertaken research from a learning perspective (e.g., Fadeeva, 2004; Halme, 2001; Saxena, 2005), tied it with network structures (e.g., Bramwell & Meyer, 2007; Dredge, 2006a), or explored potentials for lesson drawing between countries and territories (Harrison, 1994; Wong, Bauer, & Wong, 2004). Undertaking more research studies along these lines would surely enrich the tourism literature.

8.1.3.2.2 The network structure and policy implementation

Researchers doing research on policy learning must be prepared to link ideas with policy actors. As Oliver and Pemberton (2004) explain of ideas, quoting the work by Berman (1998) “[They] do not have any impact by themselves...[but] influence politics only by acting through or on a particular political actor” (p. 415). This shows the importance of the role of institutions and networks in the policy process, a topic that has been hotly debated in the literature (Christopoulos, 2005; Dowding, 1995, 2001; Marsh, 1998; Marsh & Smith, 2001; Montpetit, 2005; Raab & Kenis, 2007; Richardson, 1999; Toke & Marsh, 2003). Results of the analysis have largely supported the argument that a network structure has a dialectical relationship with context, outcomes, and policy actors that comprise the network. In Pamilacan, these three relationships were observed. First, regarding the interactive relationship between network structure and policy actors, it was seen that less powerful actors were able to influence decision making through their veto power and adroit use of resources (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Pemberton, 2003). The dense network also led to better monitoring and coordinating pressure, eventually modifying behavioural outcomes (Mandell, 2001; Provan & Milward, 1995; Rainey & Busson, 2001). The second dialectical relationship is between network structure and the structural context. The growth of democratization and environmentalism has led to the expansion of the network in the island. Knowledge gained by some actors from interaction within this network in turn guided the development of policy instruments and
the application of environmental principles in other programmes elsewhere. The third relationship is between network structure and outcomes. It was observed that variation in network structure is linked to a variation in network outcomes. The sparse bureaucratic-academic network in the 1980s did not prevent the escalation of marine mammal hunting but a dense network in later years is associated with the diffusion of environmental norms and the spread of ecological modernization that have stopped hunting. These results imply that a network is not just a metaphor as Dowding (1995) suggests, but reify management arrangements that could be considered as part of policy design considerations (Howlett, 2002). In addition, by providing a structure for small actors to voice their concerns, networks appear as one way to infuse democratic values in policy implementation, as contemplated by deLeon and deLeon (2002).

8.1.3.2.3. Policy implementation processes and situational factors

The Pamilacan case study, and the experience of the country during the Marcos period, highlights the political nature of implementation (Pulzl & Treib, 2007; Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983) and the futility of assuming a Weberian model of public administration in a patrimonial state with a highly personalistic political system. In other words, when implementation actors have their own political or business goals as they did in Pamilacan, it does not make sense to take it for granted that the actor would behave according to the prescription of political echelons. In such an environment, the better alternative is to take into consideration suggestions by bottom-umpers for programmes to be compatible with the behavioural pattern of lower-ranked officials (Linder & Peters, 1987). After all, as the study re-affirms, the personal qualities of actors are instrumental in moving implementation forward (Bardach, 1977; Cho et al., 2005; Levin & Ferman, 1986). Accordingly, the importance of keeping trust and negotiation as an implementation process (Browne & Wildavsky, 1983; Goggin et al., 1990; Parsons, 1995) and in learning (Kroger, 2005; Tabara & Pahl-Wostl, 2007) is raised. Above all, the case study demonstrates the need to focus on the whole policy process including the formulation stage in studies of policy implementation, and not just investigating What happens after a bill becomes a law (Bardach, 1977). As the study shows, the reaction of the community to tourism was conditioned by prior research activities that they did not anticipate would lead to disastrous effects for them after the policy came. Integrating earlier phases into the
analysis, for example by using the advocacy coalition framework, would be an acceptance of the interdependence of the policy processes (Ellison, 1998; Sabatier, 1999).

**8.1.4 The interrelationship of factors**

How do the factors interact to explain policy implementation processes? Is there a sequence to their effects? Theories of the policy process are not so clear on this (John, 2003; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Nohrstedt, 2008; Sato, 1999) and research is just beginning to explore the link between external events and the policy process (e.g., Nohrstedt, 2008, using the ACF). Besides, the huge number of factors involved constrains the ability of models to determine which are crucial and under what conditions they are relevant (Pulzl & Treib, 2007). Nonetheless, findings from this thesis may suggest a path through which these broad processes influence policy, although generalizing for specific policy issues based on this process would require a more positivist approach (Lin, 1998).

The case of the Philippines seems to show that broad changes in socio-economic conditions and cultural values affect policies when a coalition of organizations first deduces lessons from these changes. Then, political actions such as contesting elections that change systemic governing coalitions, or crises, open a window of opportunity for the coalition to make radical policy changes such as changing constitutions. Cognitive changes such as choice of policy instruments appear to depend more on political learning and policy-oriented learning. Depending on the nature of the coalition or network, its dialectical relationship with structural context, actions of individual actors, and policy legacy as time passes, these changes can create desirable outcomes such as behaviour modification and knowledge creation that in turn informs public policy. Graphically, the interrelationship is shown by the figure below.

**Figure 8.1: How external events and learning influence policy**
This figure is not an attempt to create a deterministic model of policy change. It merely suggests a transmission process through which external events and learning may be linked with policy outcomes, thus providing a causal process for policy change and outcomes. It is in line with the thrust of current research to identify details of theoretical and epistemological issues and processes behind policy change (Capano, 2009; Nohrstedt, 2008; Real-Dato, 2009).

In reference to the ACF, the above figure explicitly integrates and acknowledges the principality of learning in the policy process, instead of just vesting it a marginal role. This is an improvement in the conceptualization of the framework and amplifies beliefs in the literature that politics should not just be based solely on power and conflict that present a “blinkered view,” but must involve “collective puzzlement” (Heclo, 1974, pp. 304-305) as well. Finally, by highlighting political actions of organizations that have assimilated new information or learnings (for example, by contesting elections) and concomitant micro-implementation processes that come with the search for a solution, the figure sheds light on the question of why policy changes actually materialize.

8.2 An assessment of the advocacy coalition framework as organizing framework for the thesis

This thesis used the advocacy coalition framework from the policy implementation literature as the main organizing framework. With its eclecticism and linking of individual behaviour and structural elements (Capano, 2009), it was found to be an adequate framework to explain policy implementation in the Philippines. Chiefly, it has enabled the identification and examination of key causal processes deemed important in explaining the policy process.

In the course of the analysis, however, some aspects of the theory were not supported. These include the hypotheses on the neutrality of administrative agencies, and the need for a professional forum for policy-oriented learning to occur. In addition, the status of some elements of the theory, in practice, was at odds with their importance as represented within the framework. For example, institutions and policy brokerage are both relatively inconsequential, as strategies of coalitions appear more important. Yet, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was hugely instrumental in resolving the conflict that marred
implementation in Pamilacan. Another example is the marginal role accorded to policy learning compared to external events as motors of policy change. It was observed that since the 1980s, learning has played a significant role in the national tourism policy process, with both state and non-state actors engaged in technical, conceptual, and social learning in order to push for a sustainable tourism agenda. In light of this, perhaps a deeper examination of these aspects of ACF is in order.

Theoretically, the strong role of learning means that public policy is not merely driven by social pressures and interests but as argued by policy learning theorists, by learning processes as well. Nonetheless, as Real-Dato (2009) points out, ideas and interests are hard to isolate in reality. This was clear in Pamilacan where the idea of conserving the environment, thus engaging in cooperative activities to identify solutions, is intertwined with the material needs and interests of people to ensure their livelihood and food security. What this means is that maintaining a strict division between the endogenous process of policy learning and external pressures is difficult to sustain. However this issue might play out in the future - for instance, along an evolutionary path as John (2003) suggests - learning must be integrated and, if the situation warrants it, should be analyzed in equal measure with external events.

The analysis of Philippine tourism policy experience also points to other areas that the advocacy coalition framework might take into account. Foremost is the need to consider the political system. In its present formulation, the framework is best applied to societies where pluralism is the main policy style (Parsons, 1995; Sabatier, 1998). In such societies as the U.S., public policy is seen as the product of competition among interest groups (Ham & Hill, 1984). However, a country under authoritarian rule cannot be expected to have such robust interest groups in the open for fear of retribution. Under this situation, the framework becomes applicable only when democratization has set in, as shown by this thesis, and in results obtained by Hsu (2005) in his analysis of Taiwan’s nuclear policy. Furthermore, a closer analysis of the political system might reveal alternative mechanisms in the formation of advocacy coalitions. It could well be that traditional power relations are more important than beliefs as ‘glue’ to politics. This claim is not farfetched given that some ‘beliefs’ such as environmentalism, while ideological in developed countries (Sabatier & Zafonte, 1998), have more practical underpinnings in
Asian countries (Kalland & Pearson, 1998). In the case of ecotourism policy examined in this thesis and Taiwan’s nuclear policy as analysed by Hsu, beliefs played just a part; political kinships or incentives exert a greater influence. Moreover, a greater attention to the political system would allow for the possibility that advocacy coalitions do not have strict boundaries but have ‘fuzzy edges,’ as Larsen et al. (2006) contend, and as found in this thesis. The experience in Pamilacan shows that members of coalitions crossed-over to other coalitions after making political calculations, others engaged in coalitions of convenience with opposing camps, and as a congruence of meaning is achieved over time, difference are resolved that lead to competing coalitions disappearing altogether. The latter suggests that like some assertions in the literature (e.g., Hager, 1995; Hysing & Olsson, 2008), people might not really have stable beliefs on all issues to be able to create a strict hierarchy. Perhaps they only have secondary-level beliefs that made negotiations and learning less difficult, or as Hajer (1995, p. 14) argues, people have “vague, contradictory, and unstable ‘value positions.’” Thus, taking a closer look at a country’s socio-political context, particularly those characterized as non-pluralist, should clarify the provisions of the theory and test its applicability across space.

In addition, the case study argues for the applicability of a bottom-up approach in symbolic implementation (Matland, 1995). This is mainly because the nature of the country’s political system means that there is a lot of uncertainty whether a policy can be implemented at the local levels. The case of Pamilacan is instructive because when the conflict escalated, the local authorities appeared to bow to political priorities resulting to serious problems in implementation. Thus, it is argued that such contextual conditions are best described by a bottom-up approach than a top-down approach.

Finally, the interrelation of external events and stable system parameters raises two implications for the theory. The first is that changes in stable system parameters such as socio-cultural values need a dynamic element such as coalition of policy actors in order to influence the policy process. Figure 8-1 above proposes a transmission mechanism, and suggests that the actors would have to take control of policymaking institutions through political action, if they are the minority, in order to make policy changes. Second, the circular nature of the interaction among stable and dynamic parameters suggests a need to relax the analytical distinction between them. There is evidence to show in this thesis and
in the literature (e.g., Beverwijk et al., 2008; Hsu, 2005) that in political contexts such as in democratizing states, stable system parameters are not as constant as they are thought to be. For example, the Philippines had seen changes to its constitution in a space of 13 years (1973 and 1986), with initiatives to tinker with it never failing to appear since the 1990s. In Thailand, the constitution had been replaced 17 times since 1932, with the latest coming in 2007. In other words, the assumption of a stable system parameter may be hard to sustain in reality, for they could be as dynamic as external events.

8.3 Reflections on the role of policy actors in tourism development
The huge role of NGOs and people’s organizations in local community tourism development and in the policy process suggest that existing models of tourism production system and value chains might have to be re-assessed. Current discussions still uphold the view that only the state and the market are involved, with the state represented by tourism departments/bureaux that take care of tourism policy while the market is represented by the travel industry and tourists (Cornelissen, 2005; Lazzeretti & Capone, 2008; Tremblay, 1998). This is inadequate, as it is clear from the case study that civil society has been very dynamic not only in producing tourism products but also in pushing policy development. The importance of civil society is bolstered not just by their involvement in product development but also in building coalitions in support of environmental sustainability (Fadeeva, 2004; Halme, 2001; Halpenny, 2003), tasks which the travel industry are wont to do, if the lack of breadth and depth in their sustainability practices is an indication (Weaver, 2009). With the growing strength of civil society, it is imperative that it becomes integrated in discussions of tourism development.

8.4 Reflections on methods used
Whilst the advocacy coalition framework proved an adequate strategy to identify causal processes in policy implementation, it was the complementary role of policy networks that made the analysis richer. First, the analytical tools of policy networks allowed an examination of the properties of advocacy coalitions in terms of power, resources and strategies, which are underdeveloped in the advocacy coalition framework (Fenger & Klok, 2001; Green & Houlihan, 2004; Weible, 2005). Second, the techniques of network analysis allowed insights to be generated when linkages were too meagre and policy
beliefs were underdeveloped. Relatively, when conflict on development options had attenuated and fighting groups have dissolved into a comparatively dense network, policy network analysis proved useful in characterizing changes in the rules of the game, and the diffusion of norms across organizations and individuals.

Facilitating the process was approaching the analysis from three levels of abstraction, namely macro- meso- and micro-levels. As researchers have emphasised, the policy process is too complex to be investigated at a single level (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007; Hall & Jenkins, 1995; Ham & Hill, 1984; Kim & Roh, 2008). The strategy has allowed the consideration of a wide range of variables and the causal pathways they can take as they interrelate. In particular, the inclusion of the meso-level policy network, contrary to claims by Dowding (1995, 2000), served as a “corrective device” to “map the paths through which political subsystems develop…identify junctions at which…[to] focus analytically while preserving the maximum range of choice as to where to move to next” (Evans, 2001, p. 542). The result was a more comprehensive explanation that would not have happened had the analysis focused singularly on the macro- or micro-levels.

A discussion of macro-level factors likewise enabled the contextualization of the analysis within a longer time horizon. Sabatier (1993) emphasises its importance, noting that evaluations of policy programmes change when viewed from a longer historical perspective. Experience from this thesis reinforces this. Evaluation reports unearthed by the researcher after the three-year programme in Pamilacan by IATFMMC contain a lot of qualifying statements to its success because of the conflict (DocNGOE11). However, looking at how those events in the past structured the development of environmentalism within the community a few years after, it appears that the conflict was a necessary condition, thus, should not be viewed negatively. In addition, a longer-term horizon gave the opportunity to examine how behaviours changed over time, thus, providing insights into mechanisms of policy learning.

Key to this last process was the conduct of content analysis of archival records. More than any other data collection method, it was instrumental in discovering factual accounts of events, key aspects of the process such as meetings and public actions, the tension between opposing groups, and turning points. Hence, it played a huge role in establishing
the facts of implementation. The WEFT-QDA software was helpful in the content analysis but was prone to crashing when the electronic file became large. In addition, the archival records served as primary references in constructing the historical networks, although it proved ineffective in developing a contemporaneous picture, for which interviews were the better technique.

In turn, these interviews raised the importance of acting ethically in the field, in the sense of how communities are portrayed and how research outputs are communicated. This consciousness was not very strong with the researcher when he started the research process. But having learnt how research on the one hand, had led to policy developments that have helped save marine mammals, and on the other hand, having heard how the community had suffered in the process, the researcher was convinced that being ethical must be at the heart of the research process and its impacts. As Denzin (2003, p. 459) says, quoting Sherman Alexie (1993), “words are another kind of violence.” Thus, ethical considerations must not just be concerned with not inconveniencing participants or putting them in harm’s way until the research is completed. The researcher must likewise be concerned with how the research output might affect a community in the longer term. Although this is easier said than done, not the least because the researcher has no control over how his output is going to be used by others in the future, the researcher or university ethics committees must imagine these remote possibilities and try to put safeguards in place.

8.5 Limitations of the study

Although the research employed multiple methods in order to capture as much as possible the complex reality of the policy process, the thesis in the end was the product of a researcher’s interpretation. As discussed in section 3.7, this interpretation is influenced by the researcher’s personal biography. Another person with a different background looking at the events, documents, and artefacts used in the study might have a different reading from that provided in the research (Hodder, 2003). As Denzin and Lincoln (2003) emphasise, “there is no single interpretive truth” (p. 37-38). The researcher could only rely on the strength of the validating and triangulating procedures he set in place so the output could stand up to scrutiny.
This caveat is valid when it is considered that there are multiple influences in the policy process. As O’Toole’s review in 1986 found, there are more than 300 variables salient in policy implementation. This thesis could not and did not attempt to look into all these (to the researcher’s knowledge no one did) but only considered those deemed important and relevant to the research. A limiting and determining factor was the theoretical preference accorded to the advocacy coalition framework and policy networks. They have been adequate indeed in highlighting significant categories and pointing to causal mechanisms. Nonetheless, a researcher using different theoretical lenses might give more value to other processes and his chosen models at the expense of other frameworks (Cairney, 2007), thus, “see quite different things – at least initially” (Sabatier, 1999, p. 5). Examples of such processes could be liberalism and globalization. Hall and Jenkins (1995) argue that these processes have meaningfully influenced the way national governments deal with the tourism industry. They could very well have affected the different sectors of the Philippines (see Lopez-Wui & Encarnacion-Tadem, 2006; Soriano et al., 1995) and possibly the local tourism industry (Rodolfo, 2005), in tandem with other processes. However, except for brief remarks, they were not examined critically in this thesis.

Another limitation was the inaccessibility of some documents. For example, the minutes of meetings of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Marine Mammal Conservation unearthed by the researcher were incomplete. There were only six detailed records obtained, spanning the period 1996 to 2000. However, it was clear from the records that there had been meetings since the Task Force was organized in 1993. Unfortunately, for various reasons, nobody from its members could produce these early documents. Thus, the researcher was denied the opportunity to obtain a better picture via hard evidence of how this body arrived at some of its programme decisions including its choice of Pamilacan as programme pilot site. Related to this was the inability of some organizations in Bohol, particularly an inter-municipal body, to provide remote assistance. The contact did not give the information requested despite entreaties. Consequently, the researcher had limited ideas about the activities of other municipalities that share coastal borders with Baclayon. Although these limitations were remedied somewhat by interviews and analysis of other materials, some of the respondents (for example, those who were
members of the Task Force) were unable to impart details that might have produced more penetrating analysis.

A final limitation of the thesis is that the enactment of a major policy development in 2009 was purposely left out of the analysis. The Tourism Act of 2009 was signed into law middle of that year. Among other provisions, the law increases the budget of the DOT, restructures the office and agencies attached to it significantly, and creates a permanent position for a tourism officer in local governments where tourism is a significant economic activity. Thus, the law addresses quite a number of issues discussed in the thesis including resource constraints and coordination problems at the national and local levels. Nonetheless, this policy innovation was not included because it was passed just as the researcher had finished processing the data collected and had started writing the results. Even when a full first and second draft was completed, agencies concerned were still debating the implementing rules and regulations of the law. In other words, events related to the policy were yet unfolding for it to be considered in a thesis that was ready for examination. Therefore, even if the policy, on the face of it, modifies the mechanisms of tourism policy implementation meaningfully, the researcher decided to leave the Tourism Act out.

8.6 Concluding remarks

This thesis began in 2006 with the original aim of investigating the role of policy networks in the policy process. Over the next three years, this question has evolved to its present form: to examine the substance and mechanisms of tourism policy implementation in the Philippines from 1973 to 2009. Thus, the thesis moved from assessing the role of a single variable to deducing key longer-term historical factors, as well as contextual conditions, and exploring their inter-relationship. Policy networks have since been joined by a variety of variables that might potentially explain tourism policy implementation in the last 30 years. These include external forces such as changing socioeconomic and socio-cultural conditions, as well as changes in the systemic governing coalition and control of institutions responsible for policymaking. Equally important were the role of ideas and policy learning, micro-implementation policy processes, and the mediating function of policy networks. An analysis of the inter-
relationship of these factors lead to the central argument that subject to the constraints imposed by resource availability and opportunities presented by a changing environment, tourism policy implementation in the past 30 years was determined ultimately by traditional power and political relationships, even if learning, as intermediated by policy networks, had driven the policy process forward.

Methodologically, this thesis has demonstrated the usefulness of adopting a policy implementation approach, coupled with policy network analysis - a combination that has not been undertaken in the tourism context - in a critical case study. In so doing, it has identified a research strategy that might prove useful in examinations of tourism policy in other contexts, particularly island states in the developing world. It is important that analysis of the policy process be of multiple levels in order to deal with its complexity. However, researchers must strive to be ethical particularly when dealing with communities that have conflicted histories.

Based on perspectives that single critical case studies should be able to identify theoretical generalizations regarding causal mechanisms, this thesis identifies specific categories that might be useful in studies of tourism policy implementation. The advocacy coalition framework neatly captures most of these variables. Again, these are institutions, networks, socioeconomic process, choices, and ideas.

These broad categories, together with the results of the thesis, have some implications for future research on tourism policy. First, researchers intending to use the theory in their investigations of tourism policy particularly in the context of developing countries must take into account political systems into consideration. A closer look into the influence of socio-political context may help determine alternative mechanisms in the formation of networks and the permeability of coalition boundaries. Future research, for example, could focus on investigating the conditions under which traditional power relations are more important than beliefs as glue to politics. The role of civil society vis-à-vis the state and the travel industry in tourism policy and product development could be further examined. Such close attention to contextual conditions also implies that the researcher can judge whether a top-down or bottom-up perspective to policy implementation is
applicable, if he/she wishes to equate the analysis with the intensity of conflict involved if any.

Moreover, there is a need to conduct in-depth research in order to scrutinize the implications of inter-relating external events and stable system parameters. The ACF makes a strong analytical distinction between these two variables, but evidence from this thesis and elsewhere point to a dynamic instead of stable system parameters. In addition, the thesis suggests inter-penetrability between the two. Thus, future research could look into contextual conditions under which these factors could be analytically combined. As this thesis dealt with a democratic third-world island state, it should be interesting to see if the same patterns could be observed in a developed state.

A final area of study is the exploration of the relative role of policy-oriented learning, and other ‘minor’ elements of the framework, as a motor of policy change. Future research is needed to establish whether they deserve their current undervalued status or they need serious evaluation.
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Appendix 1: Documents consulted

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<td>Administrative Order No. 96-37: Revising DENR Administrative Order No. 21 series of 1992 to further strengthen the</td>
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<td>Joint DENR-DOT Memorandum Circular: Guidelines for ecotourism development in the Philippines</td>
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<td>Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau</td>
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<td>Development Academy of the Philippines</td>
<td>Integrity Development Review of the AFP-Philippine Navy 2007</td>
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<td>DocNGH1</td>
<td>Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources</td>
<td>Commercial fishing statistics as at August 2007</td>
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<td>Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources</td>
<td>Philippine Fisheries Profile 2007</td>
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<td>Barangay Ordinance No. 01 - 2004</td>
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<td>Resolution No 01-2007</td>
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<td>Barangay Ordinance No. 1 - 1997</td>
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<td>Ordinance to ban the entry and use of electricity to attract fish, April 1992</td>
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<td>New Mayor’s permit fee in fishing, October 1993</td>
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<td>Ordinance regulating dolphin and whale watching, June 2000</td>
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<td>Providing for safety measures in dolphin and whale watching, August 2003</td>
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<td>DocLGUB16</td>
<td>Municipality of Baclayon</td>
<td>Rules and regulations about the use of dive sites, April 2005</td>
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<td>DocLGUB17</td>
<td>Municipality of Baclayon</td>
<td>Banning entry of bigtime fishing boats, July 2005</td>
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<td>DocLGUB18</td>
<td>Municipality of Baclayon</td>
<td>Defining the use of electric shiners in fishing, October 2006</td>
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<td>Municipality of Baclayon</td>
<td>Fishery ordinance, April 2007</td>
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<td>New rules and regulations about the use of dive sites, January 2008</td>
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<td>Consultation meeting with stakeholders on dolphin watching issues, May 2009</td>
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<td>DocLGUC1</td>
<td>Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan</td>
<td>Report of the committee on tourism in a joint meeting with the provincial tourism council (report no 2006-05), March 29, 2006</td>
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<td>Minutes of the regular session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bohol, June 10, 1999</td>
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<td>Employment survey of Pamilacan</td>
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<td>Letter of UP Lady Veterinary Students Association, May 30, 1999</td>
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<td>BOFETTO letter to IATFMCC expressing support to PIDWWO, 23 April 1999</td>
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<td>Pamilacan Island whale watching project business plan</td>
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<td>Pamilacan Island Dolphin and Whale Watching Village Integrated Development Plan, Status Report, 22 May to 30</td>
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<td>Letter of KKP vice president to PIDWWO re grant to construct food service kiosk and boat refitting, Feb 1, 1999</td>
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<td>Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas</td>
<td>Memorandum of agreement between DENR, DOT, KKP and Municipality of Baclayon</td>
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<td>Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas</td>
<td>Pamilacan Island dolphin and whale watching village integrated development programme second progress report, June 1998-May 1999</td>
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<td>Pamilacan Island End of the Project Review and Evaluation, August 7, 2000</td>
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<td>DocNGOE8</td>
<td>Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas</td>
<td>Project proposal for ‘Enhancement of the Pamilacan Island Dolphin and Whale Watching Livelihood Enterprise’ by KKP/WWF Philippines</td>
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<td>DocNGOE9</td>
<td>Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas</td>
<td>A profile of the capture fisheries in Pamilacan Island, Bohol</td>
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<td>DocNGOE10</td>
<td>Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas</td>
<td>Contract of lease between Fortunato Pingkian and Kabang Kalikasan ng Pilipinas</td>
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</table>
Appendix 2: Interview topics

Personal/ Actor background

- Involvement by organization with ecotourism before Pamilacan
- From within the organization, who advocates for ecotourism (as a concept or in business such as tours) and is responsible for its development?
- View of ecotourism.

Actors

- who were your partners in implementing the project? What made you decide to work with them? Were there incentives involved (e.g., learning opportunities)
- Needs/interests served by your taking part in the project
- Who should have been included/excluded in the project? Played a greater role?

Function

- Role of organization in the scheme of things
- Issues discussed when meeting
- Particular issues consistently pushed by a member

Structure

- Nature of relation: conflictual, competitive or cooperative?
- Strength of relation of among organizations involved
- Outside of Pamilacan project, work done with any of the organizations involved
- Conflicts and their resolution
- Flow of information - is there a hierarchy?
- Flow of other resources e.g., budget
- Patterns or types of coordination that occur and/or forms/modes of interaction (e.g., exchange of personnel, committees)
- Characterization of decision making
  - Who/what (issue) dominates
  - How is a decision reached
  - Who makes sure that decisions are implemented, and how is monitoring undertaken
  - Is there transparency in the process

Institutionalization
• values/mandates/beliefs that bind the organizations together (is it shared by all?)
• other rules imposed on organizations

Power relations

• strong and weak actors (why?)
• Person organizations defer to for major decisions (why)
• Important outsiders

Actors’ strategies

• interest of organization, how pursued?
• How does the network facilitate or constrain the achievement of your organization's goal?

Resources (budget, personnel, office machines, etc.) available to the network

• Extent of contribution of resources of members
• Comment on the amount of funding received

Goals

• How was Pamilacan identified? Was there any specific site or project in Central Visayas you want included? Who pushed for Pamilacan?
• Was the project consistent with the needs of the community?
• Goals that have been added in the course of implementing strategy.
• Conflicts in the strategy

Leadership

• Capability of key administrators and staff to generate and mobilize support
• Capability to manage programme requirements
• Capability to motivate

effectiveness of group

• was the group in-charge of implementation successful?
• factors behind its effectiveness/ineffectiveness?

perception of policy impacts
• Do you feel that the ecotourism program has affected the economic opportunities for local people, particularly women, in anyway?
• Do you feel that benefits have accrued to the community? What are they?
  In terms of community investments, where have surplus funds, if any, been invested? What infrastructures have been set-up as a result of tourism?
• Do you feel that ecotourism has made a dent on the incidence of poverty in the island?
• Do you feel that community life is in any way affected by ecotourism? What are the positive and negative changes?
• Do you feel that any resentment or stress (e.g., communication, demands by tourists) exists between locals and tourists? Between locals who benefit and do not benefit?
• Do you feel, that as a result of the ecotourism project, development is more in the interest of visitors as opposed to locals?
• Do you feel that those from Pamilacan Island have a sense of control over tourism development in the island (eg can initiate joint action and other mgmt processes, ownership of facilities)?
• Has there been a code of behaviour with respect to the tour? Do you feel it is being followed?
• Do you feel that the environment has been affected by the tours?
• Do you feel that there has been a change in attitude towards marine life?
Appendix 3: Chronology of events in the development of ecotourism in Pamilacan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>Late 1970s</td>
<td>Pamilacan plays a peripheral role to Panglao Island tourism developments</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1985</td>
<td>Pamilacan Island’s coral reef is declared a marine reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Pamilacan Island is declared as marine mammal protected area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>LGU Baclayon usufructs 500sqm of lot in Pamilacan in favour of DOT, so latter can construct whale museum as part of ecotourism programme to be implemented in the island.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1997</td>
<td>Pamilacan Island Integrated Dolphin and Whale Watching Village Integrated Development Plan formally begins with grants from Citibank, DOT and PATA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1997</td>
<td>Community expresses support to project on condition that they will not be stopped from hunting manta rays and whale sharks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1997</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement among DOT, DENR, KKP and LGU Baclayon. It spells out key responsibilities of the agencies in the plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1998</td>
<td>PIDWWO is formed with 37 individual members headed by the Barangay Council and health workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 1998</td>
<td>Initial whale watching tours initiated by KKP in Pamilacan</td>
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<tr>
<td>23-24 March 1998</td>
<td>The Philippine Daily Inquirer newspaper comes out with frontpage stories on the slaughter of whale sharks in Sorsogon province, more than 500kms away from Pamilacan. Pictures used were from Pamilacan</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 March 1998</td>
<td>The Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources bans the catching, selling, purchasing and possessing, transporting and exporting of whale sharks and manta rays. Fisheries Administrative Order No 193 is published in newspapers 2 days later</td>
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<td>April 1998</td>
<td>A barangay assembly, majority of families in the island vote to oust KKP from the island, for violation of trust. KKP refuses and continues with work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1998</td>
<td>Majority of PIDWWO officials and members resign, upon prodding my Councillor Uy. Only 15 members remain</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 1998</td>
<td>KKP rebuilds PIDWWO with help of 80 families</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1998</td>
<td>LGU Baclayon withdraws usufruct given to DOT, citing the destabilizing presence of KKP in Pamilacan</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1998</td>
<td>IATFMMC meets with LGU Baclayon officials to settle differences. A referendum to determine the true feelings of the</td>
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<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1999</td>
<td>PIDWWO refuses to participate in referendum. IATFMMMC writes the Mayor to request indefinite postponement of referendum. The mayor refuses but referendum does not push through anyway</td>
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<tr>
<td>April-May 1999</td>
<td>Some Pamilacan residents are arrested for trying to smuggle whale shark meat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-June 1999</td>
<td>Provincial Council of Bohol investigates the issues in Pamilacan. After considering 3 options, it decides to continue with the project but transfer the museum site to another place (Balicasag, Panglao or Dauis), not to push through with the referendum, relocation of KKP office to Tagbilaran</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 2000</td>
<td>KKP phases out project in Pamilacan. It recommends a three-year extension to DOT. DOT supports in principle but is unable to provide funding.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 2002</td>
<td>NZAID-funded ecotourism programme that includes Pamilacan commences. Focus is trained on overhauling tour operations by PIDWWO</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 2003</td>
<td>PIDWWO’s whale watching tour is re-launched as Marine Life Tour</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td>PIBOSA complaints to DOT about monopoly of PIDWWO and Travel Village of tours</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>DOT-DA Joint administrative order on people’s interaction with cetaceans</td>
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<td>November 2005</td>
<td>Consultation reveals crowding in dolphin watching area due to proliferation of illegitimate (untrained personnel) tours by fishermen from neighbouring Panglao Island</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 2006</td>
<td>PIDWWO is selected as finalist in the BA Tourism for Tomorrow Awards (Conservation category)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2006</td>
<td>PIBOSA swaps accusations of misrepresentations and uncooperative behaviour with PIDWWO. Provincial Tourism Council comes in to settle differences</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>Ayala Foundation comes in to Baclayon and initiates a number of projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2008</td>
<td>Consultations are held to fashion out municipal ordinances to govern the conduct of dolphin watching tours in Baclayon, particularly in relation to competition from Panglao Island.</td>
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## Appendix 4: Persons consulted

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<tr>
<td>IntP1</td>
<td>Current barangay and PAFIA official</td>
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<td>IntP3</td>
<td>Former barangay official</td>
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<td>IntP4</td>
<td>Current PIDWWO official</td>
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<td>IntP5</td>
<td>Current barangay official and PIDWWO member</td>
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<td>IntP6</td>
<td>Former PIDWWO official</td>
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<tr>
<td>IntP7</td>
<td>Current PIDWWO and barangay official</td>
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<td>IntP8</td>
<td>Independent tour operator</td>
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<td>IntP9</td>
<td>Ayala Foundation representative</td>
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<td>Former municipal official</td>
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<td>Municipal official</td>
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<tr>
<td>IntM3</td>
<td>WWF official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IntM4</td>
<td>CI official and former WWF official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IntM5</td>
<td>Former NESC member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IntM6</td>
<td>Former NESC member and retired usec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IntM7  Former KKP official
            DOT official
IntM8  DOT employee
IntM9  Dept of Env. and Natural Resources official
IntM10 Dept of Env. and Natural Resources official
IntM11  From Baguio and Cebu
            Former NESC member and PO official
IntM11  Department of Tourism employee
IntC1