Reintegrating with Hostile Minds? An Examination of the Role of Social Psychology in Ex-Combatant Management in Rwanda and Burundi

Daniel Ohs

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ABSTRACT

How can ex-combatants, so normalised to violence, be successfully reintegrated into civilian life? Previous research on ex-combatant reintegration has focused on issues of economics, physical security, political involvement, and narrow community networking, leaving social issues underexplored. Indeed, no study has previously looked at the social psychological aspects of ex-combatant reintegration. In order to explore the presence of social psychological issues within ex-combatant management, a theoretical framework was developed in this thesis covering issues of intergroup division, authoritarianism, discrimination, and negative intergroup contact. Using programme documents and existing academic data, the framework was applied to two case studies of post-conflict ex-combatant management – in Rwanda and Burundi – analysing to what extent these social psychological issues have been addressed in ex-combatant reintegration. In each case study, the two main ex-combatant groups were analysed, and all major official reintegration initiatives were examined. The findings of the comparative analysis are disconcerting. Despite the presence of all social psychological issues from the framework in ex-combatant communities, the recognition of these issues within ex-combatant oriented programmes has been poor. In Burundi, the main reintegration programme has addressed social psychological issues in an inadvertent and fleeting manner, if addressed at all. The majority of the Rwandan programme has taken a similarly indifferent approach. However, a major point of difference is found in the ingando sub-programme in Rwanda which actively adopts social psychological principles for political motivations at the expense of ex-combatant reintegration, exacerbating negative intergroup issues. As such, the study finds a trend in these two contemporary ex-combatant management contexts in which social psychological issues are either not addressed, or misused to negatively impact on intergroup reconciliation. Consequently, the study highlights the importance of including a social psychological perspective in ex-combatant reintegration and peacebuilding initiatives in order to achieve sustainable peace.
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<th>FULL FORM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Armed Groups (Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNDF</td>
<td>Burundian National Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNK</td>
<td>Basic Needs Kit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>Burundian National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>National Council for the Defense of Democracy (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Forces for the Defense of Democracy (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Front for Democracy in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDDRS</td>
<td>Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDRP</td>
<td>Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRND</td>
<td>National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDRR</td>
<td>National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPDRR</td>
<td>National Program for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (Burundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NURC</td>
<td>National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Penal Reform International</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDF</td>
<td>Rwandan Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDRC</td>
<td>Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDRP</td>
<td>Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Program</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Social Identity Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIT</td>
<td>Social Identity Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDRP</td>
<td>Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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### LIST OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ingando</strong></td>
<td>Rwandan solidarity and educational camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interahamwe</strong></td>
<td>Genocidal Rwandan pro-Hutu paramilitary organisation associated with Government of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rwandité</strong></td>
<td>Meaning “Rwandan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ubuhake</strong></td>
<td>‘Social order’ in Kinyarwanda</td>
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INTRODUCTION
Research Background and Thesis Purpose

A major challenge to sustainable peace is the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life after conflict (United Nations, 2010). While the importance of managing ex-combatants stems from their societal vulnerability and capacity to reinitiate violence, much of the challenge is rooted in getting ex-combatants to leave their military lifestyles and attitudes behind (Themnér, 2011). Since the end of the Cold War, an increasing body of literature from academia and institutional actors such as the United Nations and World Bank has arisen on how to assimilate ex-combatants into society (Knight, 2008). While robust in its own right, the contemporary literature on ex-combatants has as so far failed to give adequate attention to issues outside of economics, physical security, political involvement, and narrow conceptualisations of community enhancement (Nilsson, 2005). This bias has been further exacerbated by disagreements over what contemporary peacebuilding measures for ex-combatants should constitute (Muggah, 2009a). Consequently, issues of social and intergroup psychology have remained underexplored within the field.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the presence of social psychological issues within contemporary ex-combatant management and reintegration. Specifically, issues of identity divisionism, authoritarianism, discrimination and negative intergroup contact will be explored, as identified by empirically established social psychological theory. To date, while little work has been done on the social psychological aspects of ex-combatant reintegration in general, even less attention has been given to analysing ex-combatant management and reintegration programmes. This gap concerns both traditional modes of reintegration, such as disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes, and less dominant approaches and sub-programmes, such as the ingando camps. To begin addressing this research gap, the present study will comparatively analyse two cases of contemporary ex-combatant management programmes after conflict in Rwanda and Burundi.

Research Questions

The current thesis contains two research questions (RQ). The first research question (RQ1) directs the research as a whole, while the second research question (RQ2) directs the case
study analysis to explore whether any social psychological issues have been addressed in the programmes, and if so, if this has been done purposefully or inadvertently. The research questions were formulated by drawing from the research gap on ex-combatant management and social psychology, and therefore aim to directly broach this gap.

**RQ1:** What social psychological issues surrounding social intergroup dynamics, present during conflict, are addressed in contemporary ex-combatant management strategies?

**RQ2:** In what manner are these issues addressed? Are they purposefully addressed, or inadvertently?

**Theoretical Framework and Case Study Research Design**

To answer the two aforementioned research questions, a social psychological theoretical framework was developed, informed by five established and empirically tested social psychological theories: Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987)\(^1\), Agentic State Theory (Bandura, 2001; Milgram, 1974), Dehumanisation Theory (Haslam, 2006), and Negative Contact Theory (Paolini, Harwood & Rubin, 2010). The framework aims to describe the major social psychological experiences of combatants during conflict, in order to build a foundation for understanding their potential needs and attitudes in the post-conflict period. The experiences described by the framework are: identity based intergroup division, structural authoritarianism, institutionalised discrimination, and negative intergroup contact.

This framework will then be applied to the two case studies of ex-combatant management in Rwanda and Burundi. In Rwanda, the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (RDRP) and *ingando* sub-programme will be analysed. In the Burundian case study the National Program for Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NPDRR) will be examined. In Rwanda, the *ingando* sub-programme has been included due to its centrality to the social reintegration of ex-combatants. No comparable sub-programme to *ingando* exists within Burundi.

\(^1\) SIT and SCT are together conceptualised as the Social Identity Approach (SIA).
The selection of cases was made on the basis of several factors. Both countries share similar pre-conflict histories with similar ethnic demographics, cultural norms, and economic pressures. Both countries also hold many shared narratives from their colonial past, including their later colonial history as the joint state of Ruanda-Urundi (Bhavnani & Backer, 2000). The close temporal proximity of conflict and reintegration programmes in each country was also a selection factor, as was the two countries’ geographical closeness in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. Furthermore, while being government run, both the RDRP and the NPDRR have been administered by the World Bank, thereby sharing some important structural similarities. Consequently, more robust implications and generalisations can be drawn from findings due to this shared network, as opposed to completely independent programmes.

Structure of Thesis

The present thesis contains six chapters. Each chapter can be summarised as follows:

**Chapter One** is a review of the body of literature surrounding ex-combatants and contemporary approaches to post-conflict reintegration. Both academic and institutional approaches will be covered. In reviewing the literature, the main research gap concerning the lack of exploration and adoption of social and social psychological issues in ex-combatant management is revealed.

**Chapter Two** provides a review of potential theoretical contributions from social psychology to the ex-combatant context. Six empirical theories concerned with intergroup contact and conflict are reviewed: Social Identity Theory, Self-Categorisation Theory, Agentic State Theory, Dehumanisation Theory, and Negative and Positive Contact Theory. Additionally, current intersections of ex-combatant literature and social psychology will be reviewed. Prior analogous use of social psychological theory to other conflict issues such as mass violence, reconciliation, and torture will also be covered.

**Chapter Three** details the research design and the theoretical framework of the thesis. The research design section covers the research problem, research questions, and

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2 These are described in more detail in Chapter Three.
case study design. Case study design is further broken down into case selection and outline, units of analysis, outcome variable, and material sources utilised.

    The theoretical framework section primarily outlines the framework itself. Derived from five of the social psychological theories outlined in Chapter Two, the framework describes major ex-combatant experiences during conflict in order to understand post-conflict needs and attitudes. It contains the three major blocks of *Intergroup Division*, *Military Living Environments*, and *The Perpetration of Violence*. The operationalization of the framework is also detailed, as is how the succeeding comparative analysis will be presented.

    **Chapter Four** is the first case study, examining the Rwandan ex-combatant management programme. A brief overview of Rwanda’s history and the civil war and genocide will be provided. The structure of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP) and *ingando* will also be detailed, before ex-combatant management is analysed utilising the theoretical framework of Chapter Three.

    **Chapter Five** is the second case study, examining the Burundian ex-combatant management programme. Akin to Chapter Four, an overview of Burundian history and the civil war will be presented. An analysis of the National Programme for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NPDRR) will follow.

    **Chapter Six** presents the comparative analysis and discussion of the two cases. Each case study will be analysed comparatively using the theoretical framework as a guide. Thereafter, major similarities and differences between the two case’s programmes will be outlined. Additionally, major thematic findings will be discussed. Limitations within the present study will also be presented. The chapter will finish with a conclusion of the thesis as a whole, and detail some potential policy implications and avenues for future research.
CHAPTER ONE

THE MANAGEMENT OF EX-COMBATANTS AFTER CONFLICT AND THE DDR PROBLEM: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The reintegration of ex-combatants has been recognised as one of the most difficult aspects of post-conflict recovery. Despite posing such an important challenge, the following review will demonstrate that the present body of literature suffers from an inconsistent approach to fundamental issues, and narrow investigative foci. The review will begin with brief coverage of the literature discussing the importance of ex-combatant management (Kingma, 1997a). Importantly, threats posed by ex-combatant communities will be discussed, exposing a lack of research towards understanding the motivational basis for violence by the community (Themnér, 2011). The review will then proceed to survey the critical literature surrounding the de facto mode of ex-combatant management; disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR). In addition to thematic divisions regarding scope and vague goals, the means of realising these are rarely agreed upon (Muggah, 2009a). Moreover, a distinct overreliance on economic, security, and politically driven measures has appeared in academia (Nilsson, 2005). Despite these academic criticisms, the current literature at large has lacked any strong movement towards developing alternative understandings to these dominant arguments, leaving social and community aspects to be inadequately explored (Özerdem, 2012). Furthermore, DDR mechanisms often remain discordant with other parallel peacebuilding measures (Sriram & Herman, 2009). Consequently, the present review aims to present an overview of the major themes and issues within contemporary ex-combatant and DDR literature. In doing so, it will also be illustrated that these approaches to ex-combatant reintegration are lacking in scope regarding understandings of behaviour and intergroup relations crucial to successful social healing and reconciliation often expected of DDR.

Definitions

Prior to beginning the review proper, the term ‘ex-combatant’ needs to be defined. For the purposes of this study, the term ‘ex-combatant’ will be defined as any former combatant member of a regular, or irregular military group – including rebels, militias and gangs – which initially formed with the intention of committing violent, combat related acts. This definition does not make distinction between adults and children, men and women, and able-bodied and disabled soldiers. This broad approach is representative of the scope of the

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3 I would like to recognise the existence of many broader definitions, and the contention surrounding the term, most notably the inclusion of female and child soldiers, slaves, and non-violent participants. Their present exclusion is based solely on the absence of violence within their roles.
present study, but it should be noted that each of the above mentioned groups does have their own very particular needs.

This definition is comparable to other general definitions within the literature, such as Themnér (2011), Nilsson (2005), and Berdal (1996). However, it excludes technical particulars surrounding step-by-step criteria to meet ex-combatant status, such as those presented by the United Nations (UN) (2010) in the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS). Within the IDDRS, ex-combatant status is based on meeting specific criteria of the relevant DDR programme, in relation to the scope of individuals being targeted for that programme. For example, many IDDRS based programmes require disarmament for an individual to be classified as an ex-combatant (UN, 2010). Consequently, this means that ex-combatant definitions change from programme to programme. Alternatively, the present definition has been chosen in order to be more inclusive of individuals and groups. Specifically, inclusion is based on prior participation as a combatant, provided the aforementioned definitional criteria are otherwise met. The major example of this, in line with Nilsson’s (2005) Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) report, is that ex-combatant status will not be dependent upon formal disarmament.

As previously mentioned, the thesis is looking to examine contemporary ‘ex-combatant management.’ In the present study, ‘ex-combatant management’ is used to refer to wider post-conflict strategies, initiatives, and activities with the aim of managing the reintegration, (re)assimilation, and settlement of ex-combatants into civilian life. In most aspects, the traditional term, ‘ex-combatant reintegration’ could be utilised. However, this has not been used as a leading term in the thesis in order to avoid confusion between ex-combatant reintegration as 1) the act of reintegrating ex-combatants – which is what the current study is concerned with – and 2) reintegration as the strict phase of DDR programmes. This is important, as reintegration activities can frequently fall outside of the actual reintegration phase. For instance, they may be included in demobilisation, or reinsertion phases. Alternatively, they may be contained in sub-programmes not directly linked to DDR, as in the case of Rwanda and ingando. Thus, the current terminology has been adopted in order to widen the scope of the study to the act of reintegration, rather than specific programme phases. However, at times, ‘reintegration’ or ‘ex-combatant reintegration’ may be also used. Unless explicitly specified, this also refers to the act of reintegration, rather than the DDR phase.
Inclusion criteria of sources for the present review are also important to outline. Specifically, traditional academic sources such as journal articles and book chapters, in addition to literature published by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), working groups, research centres and implementing institutions such as the UN will be drawn upon. The reason for analysing works outside of solely peer-reviewed publications is due to the scattered nature of ex-combatant research, in which a large proportion of cited critiques come from the institutional groups such as the World Bank, or consultancy organisations. A large amount of programme details and outcomes is disseminated through such means, whereas traditional academic sources have a tendency to focus on thematic issues.

The Importance of Focusing on Ex-Combatants

The management of ex-combatants is now widely accepted as one of the most challenging and important issues within post-conflict development (Berdal & Ucko, 2009; Kingma, 1997a). Within institutions, it was previously disregarded as a development issue; seen as a concern for post-war militaries, and as such left under the care of the relevant government’s defence authorities (Muggah, Berdal & Torjesen, 2009). This was until the late 1980s when international institutions such as the UN and the World Bank began to increasingly be requested to assist in the implementation of a rising number of DDR programmes\(^4\) in the wake of the increase in intrastate wars after the Cold War’s end, and programmes became relatively more development oriented (Muggah, 2009a; Stewart & Brown, 2007). New interest in DDR was also intrinsically linked to Boutros-Ghali’s, at that time, novel conceptualisation of peacebuilding as a preventative measure (Knight, 2008). This would be further expanded on by Annan (1998) during his tenure as Secretary-General. By the end of the 20\(^{th}\) century, DDR and ex-combatants were largely seen as projects too important to be left solely to host nations, with international management the norm, and cases where the UN has no direct managerial involvement extremely rare (Muggah, 2009a).

Further institutional import was placed on ex-combatants in the 21\(^{st}\) century. In 2006 the UN released the IDDRS, outlining their inter-departmental approach to reintegration with over fifteen UN agencies given DDR responsibilities (UN, 2006). The

\(^4\) DDR programmes and their contemporary issues will be discussed later in detail.
IDDRS was further revised in 2010 (UN, 2010). Other governments and institutions have also expressed interest in the management of ex-combatant interventions, such as Sweden’s Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (MFAS, 2005), and the German Technical Cooperation (Muggah, 2009a); the former of which was has been recognised as a large influence on subsequent UN initiatives (Nilsson, 2005). Such an increase in institutional interest and importance has also been shadowed by an analogous rise in academic attention over the last two decades (Berdal, 1996; Knight & Özerdem, 2004; Muggah, 2009b).

**The Role of Ex-Combatants in Post-Conflict Violence**

The importance of reintegrating ex-combatants within contemporary peacebuilding models largely stems from the threat of ex-combatants re-instigating violence. The academic literature has well documented cases of ex-combatants returning to violence not only within their own community or state, but also regionally (Gear, 2002; Kemp, 2007; Kingma, 1997a; Marriage, 2007). Simply, they are the most probable societal group to participate in renewed violence (Muggah, 2009a; Themnér, 2011). For instance, Nilsson (2005) and Özerdem (2002) note that many former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army chose to migrate to Macedonia after the war, and were later directly implicated in the perpetration of pro-Albanian violence. Similarly, Kingma (2004) has documented a number of cases where demobilised South African defence force soldiers have become guns-for-hire in Angola and Sierra Leone. In the Republic of Congo, many Zairian ex-combatant refugees were remobilised as Cobra militias (Themnér, 2011).

Ex-combatants become such important players in such resurgences of violence because they have the experience of realising violent acts. Unlike other societal groups after conflict, ex-combatants have spent the preceding years, if not decades, gaining combat and weapons experience. Additionally, in many cases they still possess weaponry (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004) and therefore do not have a direct barrier in realising violent aspirations (Ginifer, 2003; Muggah, 2009a).

The existence of former or parallel combatant networks has also been shown to increase the likelihood of violence. Specifically, the presence of networks has been noted to allow easy remobilisation, both from a personal ideological stance or via coercion by
spoilers (Nilsson, 2005). In particular, spoilers are seen by many as one of the biggest challenges to the sustainability of a peaceful ex-combatant community; groups or individuals that actively seek to disrupt the peace process for profit through extortion, violence, or trafficking (Muggah & Krause, 2009; Stedman, 1997). In such endeavours, ex-combatant groups are a clear boon to any spoiler. Due to the inevitable post-conflict economic downturn (Collier, 2008), spoilers are recognised to have a relatively easy time gaining new employees from the community, promising large, comparatively steady incomes (Mehlum, Moene & Torvik, 2002).

Regardless of the presence of spoilers the existence of ex-combatant networks also poses a threat to long-term peace. In essence, if ex-combatants are surrounded by those with whom they previously fought violently, they are more probable to jointly come to violent solutions for future challenges. For example, Spencer (1997) used the example of Nicaragua, where the Recontra and Recompa combatant groups were birthed from Contra and Compa ex-combatant networks respectively. Elsewhere in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ex-combatants have been known to re-engage in violence, and move easily between combatant groups due to tight networking even between groups when their ideological demands were unable to be met within their former group (Marriage, 2007). More recently, disgruntled ex-combatants taking up arms in the Central African Republic have been responsible for renewed instability (Zena, 2013).

Why Ex-Combatants Use Violence

Despite large amounts of literature on what types of violence ex-combatants commit after conflict, there is scarce research on why they do so. As Themnér (2011) argues, scholars have as so far made largely general assumptions about why ex-combatants resort to violence using structural explanations when designing programmes. Individual studies have identified various reasons for ex-combatant violence. For instance, Gear (2002) recognised distinct ideological modes of framing among South African ex-combatants. Similar arguments have been made at various levels of explanatory power by King (2007), Nilsson (2005) and Özerdem (2012) in analyses of ex-combatant contexts. More generally, unaddressed grievances, and poor economic and social outlooks are commonly identified as a motive for returning to violence (Berdal & Ucko, 2009; Collier, 1994, 2000, 2008; Hill, Taylor and Temin, 2008).
Studies directly asking ex-combatants about their opinions are perhaps the best in this regard, but rare. In the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, Themnér (2011) reported that ex-combatants who had chosen to re-engage with violence identified political marginalisation, alongside spoilers, as one of the primary reasons for returning to violence. Groups reported feeling as though they were being excluded from the dialogue and debate on the very political grievances they fought over. Comparatively, in their seminal survey Humphreys and Weinstein (2004) reported very mild political concerns amongst ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, despite examining the same combatant groups as Themnér (2011), although approximately three years apart.\(^5\) Instead, ex-combatants were principally concerned with meeting basic material needs. Similarly, in Liberia Pugel (2007) found a positive reaction to an emphasis on rectifying economic inequalities.

This illustrates that there is a poor understanding of ex-combatant motivations for violence within the literature. As Themnér (2011) states, explanations are either based on broad assumptions, or patchwork understandings of individual countries. Consequently, DDR programmes, which will be discussed next, with the aim of reducing violence and promoting peace, are being based on assumptions about the very problem they are trying to solve. Moreover, even the rare interview studies such as those by Themnér (2011), Pugel (2007) and Humphreys and Weinstein (2004) are limited by their initial theoretical assumptions, and thus the questions they pose to ex-combatants. As these assumptions guide the understandings of ex-combatant needs in DDR programmes, it raises some concerning issues about contemporary comprehensions of the causal mechanisms of violence amongst the community, and which mechanisms are initially examined (Themnér, 2011).

**Contemporary Thematic Issues in DDR**

DDR has quickly become the de facto mode of ex-combatant management within peacebuilding. In sum, DDR is the disarmament (D) of ex-combatants through small arms removal; demobilisation (D) through dismantling of military combatant networks and; and reintegration (R) of ex-combatants into civilian life (Muggah, 2009a). However, other than these basic foundations, little in DDR is agreed upon. In Africa alone, twenty-six modern

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\(^5\) Humphreys and Weinstein’s data was collected during 2003, while Themnér’s was collected through 2006.
DDR programmes have been implemented since 1990 (Zena, 2013), while numbers are similar in South America, and a growing occurrence in the Middle East, Asia and the South Pacific (Colletta & Muggah, 2009). However, despite the DDR phenomenon, its traditional mode of implementation has issues within the literature. On a fundamental level, there is a growing debate between the minimalist and maximalist interpretations of DDR (Muggah, 2009a). These thematic inconsistencies have led to vague goals, and frequently inadequate means of realisation, which creates poor understandings of DDR responsibilities within the larger peacebuilding framework (Jennings, 2008).

**Minimalist versus Maximalist Approach.** Competing thematic ideas of what DDR constitutes can be best summarised by the minimalist versus maximalist debate (Muggah, 2009a). In many ways, it reflects the lack of unified theory within DDR literature, and the mass heterogeneity of DDR actors (Nilsson, 2005). Minimalist approaches to DDR restrain themselves to addressing immediate security issues. In practise, this largely results in the main projects of DDR being weapons removal in the disarmament phase, cantonment in the demobilisation phase, and economic provisions for the few months succeeding reintegration (Muggah, 2009a). This denotes a largely pragmatic approach, where DDR is seen as an opportunity to reduce the threat of violence (LeMasle, 2010). Comparatively, the maximalist approach promotes a more holistic attitude toward the process, containing a community based transformative agenda for economic, social, and political spheres of life (Jennings, 2008; Munive & Jakobsen, 2012). Essentially, DDR is seen as an opportunity for development, and to address societal grievances and inequalities. Institutionally, the World Bank has been known to follow a relatively maximalist approach, while UN departments have traditionally seen DDR from a minimalist perspective (Muggah, 2009a). However, the UN, at least rhetorically is beginning to move to a maximalist approach, in line with Second Generation DDR goals (Colletta & Muggah, 2009; UN, 2010). It is also important to recognise that DDR programmes generally exist somewhere on a continuum between to the two poles (Munive & Jakobsen, 2012).

**Goals and Means of Implementation.** Such divisions have important ramifications for the conceptualisation of DDR goals and the means of implementation. Roughly, disarmament and demobilisation concepts largely remain consistent across the continuum – disarmament refers to the collection, management and destruction of arms while demobilisation consists of the official discharge/demilitarisation of combatant groups – the main thing which changes is the scope or means of such operations (Jennings, 2008).
However, there are nonetheless still issues surrounding many basic concepts of these phases. Fundamentally, Muggah (2009a) argues, concepts such as ‘security’ and ‘stability’ or even what constitutes the post-conflict period differ between institutional actors in spite of efforts such as the IDDRS. Such variance can not only result in vastly different expectations of disarmament and demobilisation, even before context is taken into account, but crucially also cause confusion between actors on a coordination level when it becomes time for implementation. As Colletta and Muggah (2009) state, a minimalist conception of ‘security’ may infer cantonment at demobilisation, and absolute disarmament in its respective phase, while a maximalist interpretation may assume a focus on community cooperation and temporary weapons removal respectively.

The implications of these divisions are more severe for reintegration (Torjesen, 2009). On a basic level, reintegration is purported, primarily by the UN and World Bank, to be a maximalist development oriented exercise. Academic discourse generally promotes a similar idea, proposing reintegration is best conceptualised as an effort to integrate ex-combatants into social, economic and political networks (Muggah, 2009a). For instance, the UN defines reintegration as the “process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.” Moreover, it is a “social and economic process […] primarily taking part in communities at a local level (UN, 2006, p. 5). In essence, the end-goal of reintegration is the complete assimilation of ex-combatants into society.

Many scholars argue that such conceptual clarity is rarely achieved (Colletta & Muggah, 2009; Jennings, 2007; Özerdem, 2012). Jennings (2007, 2008) has perhaps been the most critical of these scholars, arguing that reintegration is conceived of in two ways. The first is as an all-encompassing programme, which consequently allows for the inclusion of broad means, but results in poor direction towards particular goals. Or alternatively, reintegration is overly securitised to the point where reintegration is no longer the end goal, but rather a means to suppress any discordance in the ex-combatant community, and the original economic, social and community means are lost in favour of harsh security measures, and silencing of grievances. Furthermore, Torjesen (2009) has argued that reintegration programmes frequently switch between the two goals to the detriment of both organisers and ex-combatants. Social initiatives were recognised to be particularly poor in this regard. Özerdem (2012) has also criticised actors’ community centred focus as merely empty rhetoric. Specifically, he argues that although reintegration
is increasingly becoming positioned at a community level, it has little to no community involvement in the crucial planning and implementation stages, rendering it ineffective. Keen (2009) has been more scathing, proposing that many reintegration programmes purposefully deceive ex-combatants on what they will receive, promising wide support in full knowledge it cannot be realised.

**Relationship with Parallel Initiatives.** Scholars have also been critical of DDRs ability to complement other simultaneous peacebuilding measures. Torjesen (2009) argues that DDR and transitional justice mechanisms often operate in isolation from one another, resulting in contradictory outcomes. Specifically, she argues that DDR traditionally legitimises violence via preferential treatment and economic incentives post-conflict. Conversely, certain transitional justice measures often later, or simultaneously, punish ex-combatants perceptibly for the same acts for which they are being rewarded within DDR. This, Torjesen (2009) argues not only creates confusion, but also damages the social credibility of both DDR and transitional justice. Similar arguments are made by Sriram and Herman (2009) who state that such issues have arisen due to actors responsible for each programme being ignorant of the workings of one another. They argue that if DDR is to not incorporate transitional justice and reconciliation then they must be purposefully designed in cooperation.

Together this creates academic confusion over where DDR is positioned in the greater peacebuilding framework. If DDR and reintegration in particular must be restricted to a limited scope, then other initiatives must pick up what DDR cannot. Additionally, some degree of consistency between means and goals needs to be accepted if DDR is to be seen as a concept comparable across cases (Jennings, 2008). Certain actors see this flexibility of what to adopt as a strength of DDR (Muggah, 2009a), however it is arguably only a strength so long as there are external programmes to support external issues (Özerdem, 2012), and their restricted scope is appropriately communicated to ex-combatants, something which is currently not done (Torjesen, 2009). Furthermore, as will be discussed next, DDR must find solutions to critical problems within the dominant focuses of programme implementation, as identified within academia.
Dominant Focuses in DDR Literature – Strengths and Weaknesses

Across each stage of DDR there has arisen a distinct overreliance on certain factors. Specifically, economics, physical security, and political marginalisation have persistently dominated academic approaches to DDR despite mixed consensus on their ability to lead to successful reintegration (Özerdem, 2012). Simultaneously, initiatives focusing on female ex-combatants, and social and community factors have been both narrow and poorly realised (Muggah, 2009b; Nilsson, 2005).

Economics. Economic incentives have been the most prominent and consistent mode of ex-combatant involvement across DDR phases. In disarmament and demobilisation, economic incentives have served to entice individuals to participate in otherwise potentially non-beneficial processes. Comparatively, in reintegration economic stability promotion has been seen as a method in which to realise societal assimilation, and thus achieve the primary goal of DDR (Muggah, 2009a). Largely this emphasis has been made on the basis of structural assumptions of ex-combatant motivations (Nilsson, 2005). Specifically, some scholars have argued that ex-combatants primary incentive for violence in a civil war context is economic gain (Collier, 2000, 2008). Others have argued that other competing motivations may exist, but that these wane in the face of potential monetary profit (Berdal & Malone, 2000; Hazen, 2010).

Academic research has largely followed the institutional lead and focused on economic aspects of DDR. In certain instances, the literature has proved such an emphasis to be successful. In particular, economic stability promotion in reintegration has received support. Berdal (1996) and Özerdem (2002) have argued that a lack of economic security has been the best predictor of ex-combatants returning to violence. When interviewed by Hill, Taylor and Temin (2008), ex-combatants in Liberia stated that a lack of access to employment was the most likely reason they would consider disrupting the peace process violently. Also in Liberia, a focus on employment drives was noted as resulting in a stronger economic situation for ex-combatants who participated, than for those who opted out (Pugel, 2007). Elsewhere in Sierra Leone, Ginifer (2003) argued that economic provisions and job creation in reintegration programmes contributed positively to the peace process, and also to satisfaction within the ex-combatant community.

Other scholars have been less supportive of dominant economic efforts. Much of these recognise the importance of economic initiatives in poverty reduction and job
creation, but question their ability to achieve the broad goals which they promise. Jennings’ (2007) series of interviews with ex-combatants in Liberia noted high levels of dissatisfaction towards economic reintegration efforts. Specifically, groups were upset with the lack of attention being given to the differing economic predicaments between communities. Of interest is that Jennings’ interview population came from the same programme championed by Hill, Taylor and Temin (2008) and Pugel (2007). Similar problems arising from a lack of attention to local contexts were also noted by Peters (2007a) in his analysis of reintegration in Sierra Leone. Torjesen (2009) has also raised concerns around employment drives found in reintegration programmes, arguing that such initiatives often drive ex-combatants into unwanted job industries, a situation which may have contributed to individual’s motivations for initially joining the conflict.

Economic incentives have also been linked to creating mistrust about the reintegration process. For example, Willibald (2006) noted that high cash pay-outs may create unrealistic expectations of the rest of the DDR process. Similarly, Brethfeld (2010) in South Sudan, and Beeck (2009) in Indonesia found that ex-combatants were only committed tentatively, threatening violence if economic promises were not kept.

Criticisms towards an economic focus have been particularly strong within disarmament and demobilisation research. Academics have condemned various actors for falling back on economic incentives to motivate ex-combatant participation, despite institutional rhetoric to the contrary (UN, 2010; Willibald, 2006). In disarmament, criticisms have stemmed from the ineffectiveness of ‘guns for cash’ style programmes with scholars arguing that gun ownership is in many contexts a better guarantee of economic stability (Berdal, 1996), or that the fundamental logic of disarmament is simply often not understood (Arnold & Alden, 2007). Alternatively, Knight and Özerdem (2006) argue that in many cases cash incentives lead to ex-combatants purchasing new, better weapons. Regarding demobilisation, scholars have argued that economic provisions have in practise led to an oversimplification of the process, and been implemented over much needed, but complex training initiatives (Knight & Özerdem, 2006; Mashike, 2004)

**Physical Security.** Regardless of minimalist or maximalist interpretations, securitisation inherently makes up a large part of DDR. At its most fundamental core, DDR is concerned with the promotion of security, and subdual of violent uprising (Muggah, 2009a). Academic opinions on the degree of emphasis that should be placed on
security measures in DDR vary, from the near absolute (Verkoren, Willems, Kleingeld & Rouw, 2010), to moderates (Colletta & Muggah, 2009), to minimalists (Özerdem, 2012). Predominantly, the security dilemma exists on two main fronts; one of militarised security, and one of societal security.

First, militarised security refers to the quest for physical security within combatant frames. Principally, within DDR this is attempted in the disarmament phase. However, as previously mentioned there is little academic support for dominant disarmament methods. For instance, ex-combatants have been known to hold back large caches of weapons, putting into question their effectiveness (Brethfeld, 2010; Willibald, 2006). Karp (2010) has proposed that without total disarmament there are few tangible benefits to local or national security. Similarly, Muggah (2005) has noted that there exists no determinant of what constitutes a successful disarmament programme, with arbitrary statistics used instead which tend to serve political, rather than security goals. Consequently, many scholars have argued that disarmament and other weapons reduction aspects of DDR serve a largely symbolic purpose (Beeck, 2009; Sesay & Suma, 2009; Willibald, 2006).

Cantonment has also been used to promote militarised security. Specifically, cantonment refers to semi-permanent secure camps where ex-combatants are sent to undergo various demobilisation and reintegration related procedures such as medical screenings and reintegration orientations. This environment is intended to help alleviate short-term security measures, and also break military structures among the ex-combatant community, ideally leading to improvements in long-term security (MFAS, 2005). However, despite widespread use they have not been without problems (Muggah, 2009a). For instance, Knight and Özerdem (2004) have criticised their near-compulsory use within UN operations. Specifically, they cite the Angolan experience, wherein the demobilisation process took so long that many ex-combatants came to see the camps as their new homes, and were resistant to leaving. Kingma (1997a) has been more positive, arguing that lengthy and sometimes problematic cantonment is preferable to rushed transitions which create larger security issues.

Second, societal security refers to security issues directly affecting the wider community. In many instances, DDR is used positively as an opportunity to promote community security initiatives with ex-combatants in central roles (Verkoren, Willems, Kleingeld & Rouw, 2010), although certain scholars have argued that such efforts are not
the responsibility of DDR, but rather interim stabilisation and Security Sector Reform (Colletta & Muggah, 2009).

Research has also focused to a large extent on the negative effect that ex-combatants have on community in which they are reinserted. Intrinsically connected with the economic outlook of ex-combatants, it has been argued to not only disrupt the wellbeing of individual communities, but also wider reintegration efforts (Koth, 2005). Hazen (2010) argues that post-conflict conditions of insecurity create a myriad of opportunities for ex-combatants to commit violent crime. These opportunities are then made more desirable in instances where DDR has failed to provide economic security. For instance, Hazen (2010) states that in Sierra Leone, post-conflict politicians employed ex-combatants to intimidate voters. In Uganda, Collier (1994) found that economically disadvantaged ex-combatants committed a significant proportion of the nation’s crime rate.

Regardless of actual crime committed, perceptions of ex-combatants can add to social insecurity (Hazen, 2010). For example, Mashike (2004) found that members of South African communities that received demobilised ex-combatants were concerned about a rise in prejudiced violent crime. Not only were there anxieties that ex-combatants would commit criminal activities, but also that civilians would be aggressive towards ex-combatants in what was perceived as pre-emptive attacks. These anxieties existed despite any empirical evidence indicating such a notion.

*Political Marginalisation.* Political marginalisation has increasingly been recognised as a major concern throughout DDR. Many ex-combatants express feeling marginalised within reintegration programmes. In South Africa, Gear (2002) found that ex-combatants not only expressed sentiments of isolation within reintegration processes, but also betrayal from the government. Similarly, in Sierra Leone and the Republic of Congo, Themnér (2011) found that all ex-combatants he surveyed expressed feelings of marginalisation. There are however, cases where ex-combatants have been actively involved in the implementation of reintegration initiatives to much success. For example, in Nicaragua ex-combatants were involved in building and diplomacy projects to much success (Spencer, 1997).

During conflict combatants are often privy to higher levels of political influence than in peacetime (Nilsson, 2005). Consequently, it has been argued that if ex-combatants suddenly lose their political voice in the post-conflict environment, they may resort to
violence to remedy this perceived imbalance (Spencer, 1997; Torjesen, 2009). Political isolation was also found in Themnér’s (2011) analysis of ex-combatant communities in the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, with half of those interviewed noting feelings that they were being actively isolated from political activity. Similarly, the importance of ex-combatants having a political voice has been noted by Özerdem (2012) and Kingma (1997b) as it is indicative of ex-combatants new status as civilians, and represents their civic duties and responsibilities.

**Female Ex-Combatants.** DDR has traditionally struggled to incorporate the needs of female ex-combatants. Predominantly, this issue has stemmed from a lack of contextual sensitivity to the issues female ex-combatants face during conflicts, and therefore to their needs within DDR (Schwitalla & Dietrich, 2005). Specifically, female ex-combatants have generally been positioned within the normative male DDR system, or inadequate sub-groups within the normative system (Nilsson, 2005). Furthermore, they are often poorly targeted, and rarely actively sought to participate (Coulter, Persson & Utas, 2008). For instance, Mazurana and Carlson (2004) note that in Sierra Leone, only 6.5% of registered ex-combatants within DDR were women, despite estimates of women constituting up to 30% of the fighting force during the conflict. This marginalisation is in contrast to other minority groups such as child soldiers and the chronically physically or mentally ill, who have historically received separate – or at least extra - programmes for reintegration (Blattman & Annan, 2009; Johnson, Asher, Rosborough, Raja, Panjabi, Beadling & Lawry, 2008).

Consequently, Nilsson (2005) argues that normative DDR programmes are unable to adequately address the unique problems female ex-combatants faced during the conflict. These include issues such as increased sexual violence and psychological trauma, and also those faced post-conflict, such as community stigmatisation, spousal abuse, and marginalisation from male ex-combatants and the economic problems this entails. Moreover, even in instances where DDR may be beneficial to women, many avoid participation due to feelings of fear, stigmatisation, or abuse (Coulter, Persson & Utas, 2006). Officially, actors such as the UN have pledged to incorporate gendered programmes as part of second generation DDR (UN, 2006). However, no systematic review of this pledge has been undertaken, and its effect is difficult to evaluate.
Social and Community Issues. In recent years there has been increased recognition of the role of societal issues in instigating conflict (UNDPKO, 2010; Theidon, 2007). Consequently, the responsibility of reintegration to address societal rifts between ex-combatants and the wider community has received growing academic attention. However, the acceptance of ‘social issues’ has been largely relegated to that of community networking. Certain scholars such as Torjesen (2009) and Özerdem (2012) have suggested that contemporary social reintegration efforts are more attempts to ‘keep ex-combatants busy’ than actual transformative missions. Notably, the ability for communities to accept ex-combatants has been seen as a major obstacle for successful reintegration. Specifically, scholars have expressed strong concerns about hostility and fears between community members and ex-combatants erupting into violence (Muggah, 2009b). For instance, Humphries and Weinstein (2005) have argued that community acceptance is crucial for preventing ex-combatant instigated violence. In particular, they noted that in Sierra Leone, the biggest obstacle faced was the ability for communities to look past ex-combatants involvement in combatant groups known to have perpetrated high levels of violence. Similarly, Asiedu (2012) has noted the ability for resentment between the community and ex-combatants to fuel violence and reduce the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone. Conversely, when analysing particular communities in Sierra Leone, the author found that where a community’s activity facilitated contact and activities between groups, tension was significantly lower (Asiedu, 2012).

With such issues in mind, Özerdem (2012) has recently proposed that reintegration should be reconceptualised as a social community exercise. Promoting a reintegration framework based on prisoner-release models, the author argues that reintegration must conceptually be implemented with social cohesion as the complete end-point, rather than a theoretical goal. Moreover, communities must be seen as both the beneficiaries of reintegration, and co-planners, and therefore the healing of rifts between groups reaches paramount importance. Consequently, initiatives such as employment for ex-combatants must be seen as part of, and serve, social reintegration rather than have their own goals.

Social Behavioural Issues. Social behavioural issues have been less explored in the literature. While issues such as identity, ideology, group dynamics and prejudices have been increasingly recognised as a source of conflict, they are largely addressed as an aside, as opposed to systematically. For instance, it is relatively common for the role that ideology or identity plays in conflict to be mentioned in introductions or conclusions (e.g.
Alden, 2002; Özerdem, 2012; Peters, 2007b; Theidon, 2007; Themnér, 2011). However, as previously mentioned, the normative stance in DDR research is to view ex-combatant motivations, and thus reintegration goals, as an economic exercise (Özerdem, 2012). Consequently, few studies exist that provide a dedicated analytical exploration of social-behavioural topics such as identity, ideology, and group structure. This may potentially be due to the lack of research within psychological disciplines on DDR, which are typically concerned with such issues. Rare occurrences of psychological crossovers, in addition to other social psychological research will be discussed in-depth in Chapter Two.

Conclusion

The assimilation of ex-combatants into society has become one of the most critical aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding (Muggah, 2009a). Not only are ex-combatants the most likely group to participate in renewed violence, but they also possess the means and skills to do so through experience and existing networks (Themnér, 2011). Historically, attempts to address ex-combatant challenges have fallen under the auspices of DDR programmes. However, despite near uniform adoption since the 1990s, there have been strong criticisms of DDR programmes within academia. In particular, DDR has experienced thematic issues, surrounding what exactly it constitutes, its scope, target goals, and what means it should and can use to implement goals (Jennings, 2008; Muggah, 2009a). Consequently, the ability of normative modes of DDR to realise its fundamental goal of sustainable societal assimilation for ex-combatants has fallen short. Coordination with parallel peacebuilding measures, especially those of a social nature, has also been poor (Sriram and Herman, 2009). Furthermore, institutional actors and academia’s focus on DDR has largely centred on economic incentives which while successful in part (Collier, 2000), have been subject to many criticisms in regards to their ability to full realise goals (Jennings, 2007; Peters, 2007a; Torjesen, 2009). Physical security (Hazen, 2010; Nilsson, 2005) and political involvement (Themnér, 2011) have also been subject to academic attention, and similarly fallen short in their ability to comprehensively explain the issues facing the ex-combatant community. Conversely, social and behavioural facets of ex-combatant lives has been largely unexplored, save for narrow community networking issues (Özerdem, 2012).
CHAPTER TWO
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND INTERGROUP CONFLICT:
POTENTIAL THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO EX-
COMBATANT RESEARCH
Despite being overlooked in ex-combatant research, the field of social psychology contains a wealth of research on the creation and execution of intergroup violence. Consequently, it has strong implications for the post-conflict reintegration of ex-combatants. However, social and peace psychologists have largely ignored ex-combatant issues. Similarly, with few exceptions academics from traditional ex-combatant centred disciplines have left sociopsychological issues unexplored (Hoggett, 2009). In this review, major empirically supported theories relating to intergroup conflict have been roughly divided into two categories, and will be presented in order of conceptual complexity. First, major theories relating to the fundamental intergroup relations will be discussed. These are Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel, 1982), Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), and positive and negative Contact theory (Allport, 1954; Paolini, Harwood & Rubin, 2010). Second, theories exploring the legitimisation and sustainability of organised violence, specifically agentic state theory (Bandura, 2001), and Dehumanisation theory (Haslam, 2006), will be discussed. Prior analogous applications of social psychological theory to conflict related issues such as reconciliation (Kelman, 2008), mass violence (Bar-Tal, 2007; Staub, 2011) and torture (Zimbardo, 2007) will be also be covered, further legitimising the use of social psychological theory in the present context. Consequently, the applicability of social psychological research to ex-combatant related violence and thus reintegration will be illustrated.

**What is Social Psychology?**

Social psychology is subject to certain inherent assumptions and norms about human behaviour. These must be first briefly discussed before examining the theoretical literature, so as to adequately establish the ontological foundations on which they are based. In sum, psychology is concerned with the “nature […] of human behaviour and mental experience” (Colman, 2009, p. 619), whereas social psychology can be viewed as the study of “how thoughts, feelings, and behaviours of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of others” (Allport, 1958, p. 5). The present thesis will be based on the social psychological concept of group membership and intergroup relations as a guiding force in the creation, processing, and sustaining of individual actions and worldviews. Groups will be defined in the broad sense, being any collection of individuals who share goals, roles, social categorisation, norms and have a degree of interdependence between
each other. As per Brown (2000a), and Stangor (2004) among others, this definition includes larger scale social categories that do not necessarily have face-to-face interactions.

This perspective places a high emphasis on the role on ingroup norms and shared ideals. For instance, it proposes that while it is of course individuals that commit actions in the literal sense, their group membership, and the values which are inherent to said membership, influence their actions to a significant degree (Brown, 2010). As Brown (2010, p. 9) notes, it is the difference between “individuals acting as individuals, and individuals acting as group members.” One is, and can never be, exclusive of the other, but rather individual and group processes are best conceptualised on a continuum. Very rarely can one commit thoughts to action without outside influence, but nor is individual agency ever completely eroded by social context. Similarly, Bar-Tal and Staub (1997, p. 1) argue, “[h]umans are profoundly social beings […] [h]umans need others for the formation of their identity, their psychological being and self concept.” This is opposed to the personality approach to social psychology, which posits that individual differences are largely dictated by personality type, unaffected by social context (Brown, 2010).

**Dominant DDR literature and Social Psychology**

As previously mentioned, social psychology has received scant attention within ex-combatant literature. Yet, as will be discussed later, outside of DDR and ex-combatant research, these factors have been strongly implicated in driving conflicts, and in particular, individual combatant’s motivation to pick up arms (Staub, 2011).

Predominantly, the intersection of social psychology and reintegration has been addressed as an editorial aside. For instance, it is relatively common for the role that ideology or identity plays in conflict to be mentioned in introductions or conclusions of works but never systematically analysed or explored (e.g. Alden, 2002; Özerdem, 2012; Peters, 2007b; Theidon, 2007). However, the aforementioned normative stance in DDR research is to view ex-combatant motivations from a structural perspective (Nilsson, 2005). Consequently, few studies exist that provide a dedicated analytical exploration of

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6 A detailed critique and rebuttal of personality-type approaches to conflict is not possible within the scope of the study. However, for a detailed account of explanatory limitations, please see Chapter One of Brown (2010).
these topics. Furthermore, of the research that does broach these issues, much of it stems from outside of psychological disciplines. While this is by no means inherently a negative, it does largely result in sociopsychological theories being underutilised and decentred from the analysis. Even among the growing field of peace psychology, little attention has been given to ex-combatants. For example, since the journal *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* was founded in 1995, of the 73 issues that have been published, only seven articles have focused on DDR or reintegration.\(^7\)

Literature that does incorporate social psychological issues most commonly addresses the role of social identity. For instance, Themmér (2011) has argued that the proper management of ex-combatants group identities is one of the most important variables governing successful long-term reintegration. In Colombia, Theidon (2009) identified the role that identities such as masculinity, which are normally seen as relatively benign, can play in fuelling conflict under certain circumstances and have been used to recruit young men. She argues that worldwide, most reintegration programmes ignore contextual identity factors in conflict, seeing them as a secondary to economic or political concerns.

Elsewhere, post-hoc analyses of reintegration programmes have illuminated the role of social identity on ex-combatants lives. Gear (2002) identified the ability of conflicting war generated identities to be future catalysts for conflict. In particular she noted that many ex-combatants struggled to leave behind their military identities and lifestyles, describing them as a “mental uniform” (Gear, 2002, p. 119). This mental turmoil was argued to have led many ex-combatants leaving reintegration processes and returning to combatant groups in order to satisfy psychological needs. Humphreys and Weinstein (2009) noted similar sentiments in Sierra Leone, where they found that many ex-combatants still held on to their former combatant groups ideologies and mobilising philosophies years after reintegration.

The role destructive attitudes play in ex-combatants lives has been less explored. Kingma (1997a) argued that ex-combatants may struggle to adapt to civilian life which demands little blind obedience to authority, and places a high emphasis on personal free will. Comparatively, military and rebel institutions either attract highly authoritarian individuals, or force authoritarian compliance which in turn may lead to genuinely held

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\(^7\) Each issue contains approximately 11 articles, for an approximate total of 803 articles.
attitudes. Similarly, Heinemann-Grüder, Pietz and Duffy (2003) found a higher than average authoritarian mind-set among ex-combatants in Serbia. Söderström (2011) also found high levels of authoritarianism in the Liberian ex-combatant population. Specifically, they were noted to hold extremely monolithic worldviews in regards to politics, and expressed anger towards political dissent, in many ways seeing it as an affront to their actions during the conflict.

Extending briefly into social cognition, Humphreys and Weinstein (2009) have argued that the persistence of destructive attitudes hindering reintegration may stem from a fundamental cognitive shift in how individuals approach interpersonal relations. Similarly, drawing from a psychosocial analysis of DDR in Somalia and Central Africa, Hinkel (2013) has argued that sustained involvement in combat significantly changes ex-combatants’ mental functioning for the worse, affecting how they operate in day-to-day life.

Intergroup Relations Theories

For the purposes of this review, ‘intergroup relations theories’ refers to those theories which pertain to the fundamental conceptualisation of social groups. First the Social Identity Approach (SIA) will be covered. The Social Identity Approach is itself two theories conceptualised as a singular model; Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel, 1982) and Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Second, positive and negative Contact theory (Paolini, Harwood & Rubin, 2010) will be examined.

Social Identity Approach. The role of social identity has long been examined within psychology (Brown, 2010). However, it was not until the 1970s that it was first formalised into a unified theory by Henri Tajfel (1974, 1982), and SIT was born. SIT was developed further with his student and later colleague, John Turner (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Subsequently, while not without critiques, it has become one of the most enduring and popular sociopsychological theories for explaining intergroup behaviour (Brown, 2000b). Furthermore, the majority of later social psychological theories examining identity and social group behaviour use SIT as a fundamental basis (Hornsey, 2008). Self-

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8 For a highly detailed review of thematic problems, and critiques of past applications, see Brown (2002b).
categorisation theory, which describes cognitive categorisation and group identification processes, is intrinsically linked to SIT (Turner et al., 1987), which when examined together with SIT constitutes the Social Identity Approach (Brown, 2010).

At a fundamental level SIT proposes that a significant proportion of an individual’s identity is derived from perceived identification or membership in social groups (Tajfel, 1974). Specifically, identification can be with multiple groups, which then forms an identity. However, certain identifications will be more prevalent, and as such influence an individual’s identity on a larger scale (Tajfel, 1982). Moreover, identity within a group and a feeling of inclusion is seen as a necessary factor in psychological wellbeing (Brewer, 2001; Brown, 2010). As Hogg and Abrams (1988) note, SIT is concerned with “the group in the individual” (p. 3). That is, our internalised social identity is based on the groups to which we believe we belong, want to belong, or have to belong to, and are influenced by this membership in turn. Similarly, just as we categorise ourselves by identity, we also do so to others, placing them into identity based categories. This is done regardless of any conflictual or competitive basis for such an action, but more likely to simplify the world around us (White, 2001).

Subsequently, SIT is concerned with using social identity to explain intergroup behaviour (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Specifically, SIT holds that a driving factor of intergroup attitudes and behaviours is the maintenance of a positive social identity, as per group membership, relative to other groups within society (Brown, 2010). A logical extension of this is that as a consequence, groups are naturally drawn to compare themselves with one another. Furthermore, SIT argues that groups will attempt to emphasise similarities, and ignore differences within the ingroup and outgroup, pushing a homogenous representation (Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner, Reynolds & Eggin, 1996). Conversely, groups tend to maximise differences between the ingroup and outgroup, and downplay similarities (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Consequently, under the right conditions groups can develop prejudiced beliefs and violent actions towards other groups, in order to increase their distinctiveness and relative superiority over outgroups (Hogg, 2000).

Primarily, the intensity of ingroup identification is recognised as the key condition and measure of how extreme actions to improve intergroup distinctiveness will become (Brown, 2010). This largely holds true for both ingroups that are perceived as high in status, and those low in status. However, there are certain differences, with high status
groups more likely to engage in discriminatory acts. Comparatively, low status groups are more likely to initially attempt to remedy their status via devaluation of ingroup traits perceived as poor, or by leaving the group if possible. The latter choice is only possible in certain instances where abandoning the group is psychologically easy, and also possible from the perspective of broader society. If such actions are not possible, or do not adequately address psychological needs, attempts at social change tend to occur (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). This effect is exacerbated when groups are prompted, or required, to be in competition with one another. Consequently, intergroup comparison and devaluing becomes a more salient and important activity, further increasing hostility (Demmers, 2012).

Self-Categorisation Theory is intrinsically linked to SIT. It was formulated after Tajfel’s death by his collaborator Turner, to address criticisms of scope within SIT (Diehl, 1990; Vaughan & Hogg, 2008). Subsequently, it has also become a central element of SIT, describing the fundamental cognitive process in which categories, and thus group identities and norms are created and applied to the self, and others (Brown, 2010). In essence, Self-Categorisation Theory, as part of the Social Identity Approach is better conceptualised as an extended revision of SIT, rather than a separate theoretical understanding of identity and intergroup issues.

Self-Categorisation Theory is intended to describe internal intragroup processes of categorisation. In their early work on the theory, Turner et al. (1987) posited that most individuals construct their identity across three levels of category abstraction. However, there are potentially innumerable levels, with the following three being the most common. The first level is personal identity, the second is social identity (group membership), and the third is interspecies identity, our humanistic identity regardless of other social membership. Self-Categorisation Theory postulates that when group identity is elicited - for instance when an associated type of identity is called on such as national, ethnic, or religious identity in war – a type of self-stereotyping, or depersonalisation occurs, with the individual taking on the perceived norms of the group. Subsequently, perceived ingroup homogeneity increases, further increasing the effect of cognitive depersonalisation. Furthermore, Self-Categorisation Theory argues that the level of identity which is categorised in any given instance is context dependent, and is contingent on the presence of comparable outgroups (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994). For instance, in times of war, national or ethnic identity may be called upon due to conflict with a comparable national
or ethnic group. As such, identity and thus categorisation at the level of social identity becomes salient, and ingroup norms are adopted which in turn influence actions (Brown, 2000a).

The Social Identity Approach has received a large amount of support experimentally. Experiments concerned with SIT and SIA have largely fallen under two categories; those concerned with minimal groups, and those concerned with real groups. First, minimal groups refer to laboratory conditions wherein all possible contextual factors relating to the social world are stripped from the environment. Participants in minimal group experiments are then arbitrarily assigned to groups to delineate the minimum conditions needed for intergroup discrimination to occur, and exclude external explanations (Brown, Tajfel & Turner, 1980; Hornsey, 2008). Thus, while contextual circumstances in the real world mitigate such discrimination (as does the type of identification), it is a distinct theoretical possibility on mere group membership. Moreover, at the same time contextual circumstances may also increase the likelihood and intensity of discrimination rather than mitigate it (Diehl, 1990). In such experiments, known as minimal group paradigm studies, discrimination has been seen to occur based on assigned group membership (Brown, 2010). For instance, Billig & Tajfel (1973) were able to produce intergroup discrimination on the basis of aesthetic preferences for paintings by either Kandinsky or Klee, even when discrimination provided the ingroup with no tangible benefits. In a review of minimal group paradigm experimental literature, Diehl (1990) has noted significant experimental support for the tenets of SIT.

Second, studies focusing on existing social groups have been increasing in frequency. For example, Hunter et al. (2005) examined national groups of New Zealanders and Australians. In an experimental study, individuals in each group were given a time quota of white noise, which they had to allocate at any proportion to either their national ingroup or outgroup. Results indicated high levels of ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination, with significantly more white noise allocated to the outgroup. Examining cognitive understandings and representations of groups with USA and Australian nationals, Haslam et al. (1996) found that pre-existing stereotypes of both the outgroup and the ingroup increased as ingroup identification also did. In a more naturalistic setting,

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9 White noise can be perhaps best defined as an abrasive noise with a random frequency that is commonly presented at a high volume, and is commonly used as a proxy measure of pain infliction in psychology experiments (Colman, 2009). Static found on detuned televisions, or between radio stations is also white noise.
Brown, Maras, Masser, Vivian and Hewstone (2001) examined the attitudes of British travellers in France, when confronted with a port strike which stopped their ability to move around the coast. Individuals who identified more strongly with being British were noted to hold significantly more derogatory opinions of the French, than those with low British identification. In another study, Doosje, Branscombe, Spears and Manstead (1998) found a relationship between high Dutch identification, and lack of guilt over historic abuses in Indonesia by the colonial Dutch government, indicating an attempt at preservation of ingroup perceptions.

**Contact Theory.** Contact theory is one of the earliest and most long-lived theories of intergroup relations. Devised by Allport (1954), contact theory or as it was originally known, the contact hypothesis, argues that the most effective way to reduce intergroup prejudice and conflict is to bring the involved groups into direct contact. Allport (1954) proposed that most instances of intergroup discrimination and conflict are the result of misunderstandings and inaccurate stereotyping about the outgroup’s intentions due to a lack of direct contact. Subsequently, it is postulated that should sustained positive contact occur, groups will experience positive attitude changes as a result of humanisation of the other. However, Allport (1954) also identified that certain criteria must be met for such an effect to occur, and that mere contact alone was not enough to create attitude change.

Four main conditions for positive contact to occur have been identified. These were largely proposed by Allport (1954) in his original proposal of the hypothesis, and have been developed further by contact scholars such as Amir (1976, as cited in Brown, 2010) and Pettigrew (1998). The first condition is support. Essentially, this refers to institutional or social support from wider society or implementing body. The second condition is high acquaintance potential. Specifically, this means that groups and individuals that are brought into contact must have some type of shared interests in which to develop meaningful relationships. The third condition is the potential for equal or near equal social status. Allport (1954) and Amir (1976, as cited in Brown, 2010) argued that without relatively equal status, at least in the context of the contact treatment, no prejudice reduction can occur. With equal status, they posit that prejudiced beliefs become difficult to rationally sustain, and thus begin to break down. The fourth and final condition identified is the ability to hold shared goals. Allport (1954) identified shared goals as a key variable which can supersede past differences and other clashes of identity.
Recently, Paolini, Harwood and Rubin (2010) have begun to investigate the effects of negative contact, conceptualised as Negative Contact Theory. Specifically, they argue that just as positive contact under certain conditions may increase positive attitudes about relevant outgroups, negative contact may do the reverse. Largely, this argument is based upon extending the tenets of Self-Categorisation Theory to the outgroup, wherein negative experiences result in individuals attributing the encounter to the other’s outgroup, rather than the individual. This is important to our understanding of intergroup relations, as if individuals are predisposed to attributing negative experiences to the outgroup as a whole, this will in turn affect future interactions with the outgroup and increase prejudice. Furthermore, research suggests that negative contact may increase prejudice at a much higher rate than positive contact does to positive attitudes.

In their initial study, Paolini, Harwood and Rubin (2010) had a group of white Australians meet and converse with a Sri Lankan woman, an ethnic identity the authors identified as having negative stereotypes amongst the white community. In half of the meetings, the female confederate conversed in a warm, positive manner, while in the other half of meetings she acted tense and negatively towards participants. Afterwards, participants who were treated negatively were significantly more likely to make reference to the woman’s ethnicity, than those who were treated positively. This indicated that participants developed, or drew upon, a negative opinion of the woman’s group identity (ethnicity) as a result of their experiences with her, as evidenced by their perceived need to raise her ethnicity. In a further study, Barlow et al. (2012) found that negative experiences with individuals categorised as black Australians, asylum seekers and Muslims was a steady predictor of negative prejudices to the groups as a whole. This effect was also seen in a survey of white Americans; with negative contact with black Americans a significant and stronger predictor of negative attitudes towards other black Americans than positive experiences (Barlow et al., 2012). This effect may perhaps be seen as self-evident. However, it importantly creates an empirical basis for the proposition that people project negative experiences to outgroups, and use this as a basis for future interactions.

**The Theoretical Underpinnings of Perpetrating Violence**

Within the present review, theories referring to the underpinnings of perpetrating violence refer to those theories which pertain to the execution of violent acts as a group member.
Two theories will be examined: Agentic state theory (Bandura, 2001), and Dehumanisation theory (Haslam, 2006).

**Agentic State Theory.** Fundamental social and group attributions to the perpetration of violence have often been criticised for their lack of recognition of agency. Agentic state theory, first introduced by Milgram (1963, 1974), proposes that when individuals commit actions within hierarchical groups upon the orders of others, they cognitively disengage a proportion of their personal agency, and thus also responsibility. Specifically, individuals enter an agentic state wherein they do not explain, nor see, their actions as their own. Instead of being autonomously responsible for their own actions, a core feature of traditional agency (Bandura, 2001), they become agents of those hierarchically above them within the group (Milgram, 1974). In particular, it has been argued by Bandura (1999, 2001) that such disengagement of agency occurs during the perpetration of violence potentially outside of the individual’s code of morality.

Agentic state theory was a key conclusion of Milgram’s (1974) seminal obedience to authority experiment set. In the series of studies, also known sometimes as the ‘Shock Experiments,’ Milgram (1974) had participants take on the role of a ‘teacher’ who was to provide questions to a ‘learner’ in another room. Should the learner, actually a confederate, answer questions wrong (which they periodically did) the teacher was to administer an electric shock with progressive intensity. In actuality, the learner received no shocks, but the teacher was subject to a pre-recorded tape of screams and protests about their poor health. Milgram (1974) reported that with minimal, or at times null, prompting the participants were frequently prepared to administer what they believed to be lethal shocks to individuals. This effect held across environment types, from university laboratory settings to urban offices. In a meta-study of Milgram’s many variations, in addition to some subsequent studies by other authors, Blass (1999) found that approximately 62.5% of participants were prepared to ‘kill’ the learner across all studies. In some studies the proportion reached 80%.

Despite the fame of Milgram’s studies, it has received a great deal of criticism which must be addressed. Many criticisms have stemmed from ethical concerns (Baumrind, 1964; Burger, 2009). Specifically, concerns have been raised around extreme stress and emotional disturbance on participants, as many believed they had literally
caused the harm, or death, of another person. However, none of these criticisms have credibly devalued the findings of Milgram’s research (Burger, 2009).

More importantly, other criticisms have accused Milgram of utilising poor methodological rigor. As Zimbardo (2009) notes in his preface to the 2009 printing of Obedience to Authority, critics in academia and public media have attacked Milgram on only using young, male university students in his study, and therefore it lacks any significant generalizability. However, while Milgram’s first experiment certainly had these limitations; he conducted eighteen other experiments with different variables in each. In total, over one thousand participants took part, of ages up to 50, male and female, of varying socio-economic backgrounds, and in various different settings. Zimbardo (2009, p. xiv) personally argues that Milgram’s work is “the most representative and generalizable research in social psychology or social sciences.”

Theories of Dehumanisation. The concept of dehumanisation has been commonly drawn upon when attempting to understand acts of violence. The prevalence of dehumanising attitudes in conflicts is unequivocal, with Jahoda (1999) and Staub (2011) noting its use in fuelling mass violence. Despite this, psychology as a discipline is lacking in a dominant and unified account of its socio-cognitive processes (Haslam, 2006). Largely, theoretical approaches to dehumanisation have been represented by the concepts of infra-humanisation (Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez & Gaunt, 2000), and delegitimisation (Bar-Tal, 1998).

First, infra-humanisation is the proposal that groups have an inherent tendency to conceptualise themselves as more human than outgroups (Haslam, 2006). The most subtle form of dehumanisation, infra-humanisation is not a process in which groups perceive others as completely un-human. Instead, outgroups are viewed to contain less emotionally humanistic qualities than the ingroup. That is, they are infrahumans11 (Leyens et al., 2000). In particular, complex secondary emotions such as self-esteem, appreciation, and depression are not associated with outgroups (Leyens et al., 2000). Consequently, those outside of ones’ associated group are seen as more rudimentary and crude, but nonetheless human.

10 For instance, Milgram (1974) was concerned that only utilizing a university setting, and knowingly participating in a university experiment may create unnatural expectations on how to act. Therefore he used various settings and pretences, such as urban offices and private businesses.

11 “Infra” is the Latin for below, or under. Therefore, an infrahuman is below human (Colman, 2009).
Second, delegitimisation is the process by which groups attempt to exclude others by categorising them into profoundly negative social categories (Bar-Tal, 1998). First proposed formally by Bar-Tal (2000a), delegitimisation is noted to occur when groups are involved in tense conflict; in particular, conflicts perceived to be zero-sum. More extreme than infra-humanisation, by applying dehumanising traits to outgroups, and denying them of their humanity, it serves to delegitimise their protests. Moreover, it conversely also serves to legitimise the ingroup, as their opponent is now no longer legitimate in the humanistic sense. Additionally, delegitimisation is recognised to activate largely negative emotional responses to outgroups, and thus further perpetuates the legitimisation of violence acts towards them, as well as past acts previously committed (Haslam, 2006). As Bandura (2002) later noted, in the course of delegitimisation by dehumanisation, outgroups are pushed from the moral scope and concern of many individuals.

Prior Applications of Social Psychological Theory to Violent Conflict

Further evidence for the applicability of sociopsychological theories to ex-combatant concerns can be found within the psychological literature on broader conflict issues. Predominantly, this proposition rests on the assumption that sociopsychological theories have underpinned the foundations of the following prior academic research in the area of conflict and development. This is especially in relation to the perpetration of violence, and therefore an investigation to its relevance in the management of ex-combatants, themselves perpetrators of violence at multiple levels, is warranted. Largely, such applications have been in the fields of reconciliation (Kelman, 2008), mass violence (Staub, 2011), and torture (Zimbardo, 2007).

**Reconciliation.** A number of societal reconciliation initiatives have been based in part on sociopsychological theories of conflict (Kelman, 2008). As Kelman (2008) proposes, successful reconciliation is a deeply emotional and therefore psychological process. Rather than being pragmatic, reconciliation is the holistic “removal of the negation of the other as a central component of one’s own identity” (Kelman, 2008, p. 119). Essentially, he is positing that reconciliation requires a change in social identity and the fundamental intergroup relations which follow, as presented by SIT. Similar sentiments have been expressed by Bar-Tal (2000b). Specifically, Bar-Tal notes that successful reconciliation depends on mutual trust and cooperation, which in turn cannot operate in the
presence of intense prejudice. Moreover, national reconciliation programmes are often built upon the premise of healing grievances between perpetrator and victim groups at multiple levels – national, community, and individual (Brounéus, 2003). Consequently, as ex-combatants are essentially the perpetrator group, the question must be raised as to why ex-combatant reintegration is not, at least in part, addressed in a similar fashion to reconciliation initiatives.

In Rwanda, Staub and Pearlman (2006) ran a series of psychological reconciliation workshops between 1999 and 2004. These workshops involved bringing community members from previously conflicting groups together to perform exercises and discuss their experiences of the conflict. Overall, the goal was to create an environment of empathy and cathartic understanding between groups, and break down prejudiced dichotomies and destructive identities. Radio programmes broadcast across the Great Lakes region have been based on similar ideals (Staub, Pearlman, Weiss & van Hoek, 2007). An empirical evaluation of the program by Paluck (2009) produced mixed, but mostly positive results. Specifically, listeners were noted to develop more altruistic social norms to issues such as intermarriage, heightened empathy, and discussed issues with more intensity than the control group. However, beliefs on issues such as war, and peace initiatives were unchanged.

**Mass Violence.** Sociopsychological causes have also been implicated in the creation of mass conflict between groups. Jussim, Ashmore and Wilder (2001) note a direct extension of the fundamental tenets of SIT to conflict, namely homogenous support of the ingroup among groups in high positions, and despondence among low position groups. That is, they argue that in times of uncertainty the Social Identity Approach highlights the potential for increased support of the status quo among privileged or elite society members, and by extension crackdowns on any growing opposition. At the same time, it also fosters intragroup competition and calls for change among those in low status positions of society. Essentially, identity emphasises a need for high status groups to suppress upstart groups that threaten said status, and equally also encourages uprisings by low status groups in order to remedy the standing of their group in society.

Similarly, Eriksen (2001) examined the role that ascribed identities such as cultural or ethnic identity play in creating political conflict. Specifically, he argues that when these are transformed into coherent political identities with distinct ideologies, they can directly
contribute to the creation of conflict. In analysing three inherently different conflict case studies – the civil war in former Yugoslavia, the 1987 Fiji coup-d’état, and the Hindutva nationalist movement in India, Eriksen (2001) proposes a central role for political identity as a response to external pressures within society. Essentially, while identity may not trigger outright violence, it is what shapes it. As per what would be expected from SIT, internal differences within groups were ignored or suppressed, emphasising intragroup homogeneity. Correspondingly, ingroup-outgroup similarities were deemphasised, and differences exaggerated, creating crude dichotomies. Historical grievances were also used to bolster identity salience for the ingroup, and devalue the outgroup. For instance, Serbs in Yugoslavia evoked the harsh 14th century Ottoman rule of Kosovo to discredit Bosniaks.

Staub (1990, 2011) has argued that structural economic and social stresses do not motivate mass violence, as per dominant political and economic explanations of violence. Rather, they only serve to instigate conflict between groups, but not to turn it violent. Instead, he proposes that socio-cultural aspects of group identity such as authoritarianism, prejudices towards outgroups, grievances, and destructive ideologies lead groups to abandon non-violent conflict resolution and turn to violent means to realise goals. Moreover, once violence has been committed, individuals experience a shift in their cognitive outlook towards violence, finding it cognitively easier to commit.

Bar-Tal (2007) has proposed a similar argument in regards to intractable conflict. He argues that as conflicts progress over time, groups develop new rigid legitimising social identities and collective identities and memories as a response to conflict. However, they are also affected by previous historical discourses about conflict, and potentially the conflicting outgroup. As conflict intensifies, group membership and identity becomes more salient, and thus drives behaviour at a higher level. Doing so helps overcome basic psychological fears, and reduces personal stress, allowing groups to mentally adapt to life within a warzone. This worldview is also what impedes conflict resolution, as it not only serves to explain the conflict in the past, but also justifies their groups’ use of violence in the future. Thus, intractable conflict becomes self-perpetuating, a perspective which Bar-Tal (2007) argues only intensifies as conflict progresses.

**Torture and Cruelty.** Many academics have looked to social psychology to explain incidences of torture and cruelty. As previously mentioned, the first psychologist to systematically examine this was Stanley Milgram (1974). Specifically, Milgram wanted to
elucidate the conditions by which individuals were prepared to commit acts of cruelty and pain towards other humans, in order to explain the occurrence of war-time atrocities, such as the Nazi Holocaust, which inspired his research. As previously discussed, the conditions for such acts were relatively simple, only needing the presence of a perceived higher status group member to absolve them of personal responsibility. Consequently, Milgram (1974) concluded that extreme cruelty is not necessarily the result of personality traits, but rather the situational context in which ordinary individuals are placed.

Zimbardo (2007) came to similar conclusions regarding the Abu Ghraib torture and abuse incident. The Abu Ghraib incident refers to a series of cases of human rights abuses, torture, rape, and humiliation perpetrated by US soldiers against Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison, Baghdad (Amann, 2005). Initially, US officials attempted to lay the blame solely in the hands of perpetrators. However, in his role as an expert witness at the trial of the perpetrators, and documented in the 2007 book *The Lucifer Effect*, Zimbardo has argued for a predominantly situational explanation of the case, while not absolving individuals of personal responsibility. Specifically, he has proposed that the situational variables of enforced conformity, dehumanisation, poor supervision, and high stress, combined with simultaneous encouragement from other guards also under the same conditions contributed greatly to the incident, and mitigated otherwise peaceful attitudes. Essentially, he argues that torture on a large scale can only occur when the situational environment encourages perpetration; and that cruel violence is rather banal, committed by otherwise ordinary people (Zimbardo, 2007). Similar effects were also noted in Zimbardo’s own seminal experiment, the Stanford Prison study, in which participants, arbitrarily made guards, committed violent abuses against prisoner participants (Haney, Banks & Zimbardo, 1973).

**Conclusion**

Social psychological theory can be useful in understanding group relations and violent conflict (Brown, 2010). Despite this, social psychological theory has been under consulted in regards to ex-combatant and reintegration issues. Largely, present research within dominant ex-combatant related fields has ignored, or only addressed sociopsychological issues in passing (e.g. Alden, 2002; Özerdem, 2012; Peters, 2007b). Conversely, other research has identified the role of social identity and its influence on personal worldviews.
and intergroup relations (Theidon, 2009; Themnér, 2011). Pervasive and threatening authoritarian identities have also been found among certain ex-combatant communities (Söderström, 2011). Nonetheless, this research has never been implemented with psychological theory as the evaluative tool.

Meanwhile, much of social psychology is concerned with studying the conditions for group peace and conflict. Subsequently, there are many developed theories to draw upon. At a fundamental level, the Social Identity Approach (SIT and Self-Categorisation Theory) provides an account of the inherent need for group inclusion, identity, prejudice, and categorisation as a function of human social behaviour (Brown, 2000a; Tajfel, 1974). Positive and negative contact theory has also elucidated certain conditions in which groups change their attitudes in regards to outgroups (Allport, 1954; Paolini, Harwood & Rubin, 2010). Furthermore, agentic state theory (Milgram, 1974) and dehumanisation (Haslam, 2006) have been recognised to explain, in part, how many individuals and groups rationalise their use of violence. Importantly, the use of such theories is not without precedent. Specifically, they have been utilised in understanding reconciliation processes (Kelman, 2008), mass conflict (Eriksen, 2001; Staub, 2011) and torture (Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo, 2007); in many cases becoming the dominant academic understandings of human behaviour and cognition for such scenarios.

Consequently, the present study will utilise social psychological theory to address the gap in sociopsychological understandings of ex-combatant reintegration as identified in Chapter One. To achieve this, Chapter Three will develop an exploratory framework of the previously covered theories (excluding positive contact theory), as relevant to the special ex-combatant context. The Social Identity Approach will be utilised to address the gap in understandings of how strong intergroup division occurs, and motivations and early justifications for violent actions arise. Agentic state theory and Dehumanisation theory will then constitute the model for the fundamental underpinnings of combatant violence, and their place in military living environments. Negative contact theory then describes the social intergroup processes that occur as the result of perpetrating violence. Thereafter, analytical case studies will be conducted, using this framework, of the ex-combatant experience in the case studies of ex-combatant management in Rwanda and Burundi. These will comprise Chapters Four and Five.
CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter will outline the research design of the present study. In order to begin addressing the gaps in social psychological understandings of ex-combatant reintegration identified in Chapters One and Two, the study will utilise an exploratory comparative case study design. As such, no causal testing will be conducted, with the issue preliminarily investigated for more theory building in the future. This will be done by way of exploring two case studies of conflict – Rwanda and Burundi – and analysing their respective ex-combatant management strategies. In order to achieve this, a theoretical framework based on the theories outlined in Chapter Two will be developed. The theoretical framework can be broken down into three major inter-relational blocks addressing issues of: intergroup division based on identity needs, military group living environments, and the perpetration of intergroup violence. Together, they comprise a framework of actions, cognitive processes, and attitudes that encompasses most major parts of the sociopsychological ex-combatant experience during conflict, as per current theory. Consequently, it is proposed that these experiences have important, direct implications for post-conflict reintegration. The framework will be operationalized and applied to historical case studies to develop an understanding of conflict experiences, and DDR programmes to understand what processes ex-combatants underwent. The goal of applying the theoretical framework to these case studies, and then comparatively analyse them, is to study the extent to which social-psychological initiatives were conducted in the two case studies, and also explore its utility as a theoretical tool.

**Research Problem**

At a broad level, the present study is concerned with exploring contemporary approaches to ex-combatant reintegration. Specifically, it is focused on probing the large conceptual and theoretical gap within dominant DDR – in particular, reintegration – concerning social psychological issues. As outlined in Chapters One and Two, a lack of understanding and integration of basic sociopsychological concepts would predispose reintegration attempts to having a weakness when addressing areas of social interaction, intergroup relations, and attitudinal change. Such a basic failing is concerning as social integration, co-habitation and reconciliation are often seen as cornerstones of reintegration and DDR.
Research Questions

The present study will utilise the following research questions (RQ). RQ1 guides the study as a whole, and RQ2 directs the case study analysis to look at the nature of any addressing of social psychological issues in reintegration. The research questions are as follows:

**RQ1**: What social psychological issues surrounding social intergroup dynamics, present during conflict, are addressed in contemporary ex-combatant management strategies?

**RQ2**: In what manner are these issues addressed? Are they purposefully addressed, or inadvertently?

Case Study Design

The present study will consist of an exploratory comparative case study (Yin, 2009). As such, the primary goal of the study and the case study analysis will be investigative, exploring the role - or lack thereof - of sociopsychological issues in contemporary ex-combatant management, as evidenced by the two case studies. Consequently, the study is not testing any hypotheses, nor asserting any causal links to programme effectiveness. However, all of these are important potential avenues for future research. The use of a comparative case study design provides a number of benefits in this regard. Most notably, a comparative analysis assists in developing our broader understanding of ex-combatants in DDR within Central Africa. It also allows a stronger basis from which to further explore or test tenets of the framework than a single case study would allow. Additionally, in developing a theoretical framework of ex-combatant experiences, the present study takes an important step towards theory building. Specifically, the study expands existing, and applies new, theoretical perspectives on ex-combatant experiences, and reintegration in the post-conflict period.

**Cases**. Two case studies of conflict and post-conflict ex-combatant management will be examined. In order of presentation, the Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994), and the Burundian Civil War (1993-2005) will be analysed together with their respective reintegration programmes. The reasoning for extending the case studies to include both the conflict history, and the subsequent DDR measures, is to develop the inherent assumption
that war-time experiences of combatants will directly influence their needs and personal worldviews in the post-conflict period. Consequently, it is needed to look to the past, in order to develop strategies for the future. These will comprise chapters Four and Five.

The two case studies have been chosen for various reasons. Significantly, they both occurred in a relatively similar timeframe. As such, time related variables are somewhat mitigated. Additionally, each case study, while having government run DDR programmes, has had DDR overseen by the World Bank through the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP; 2002-2009) and later the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP; 2009-Present). Consequently, each case’s post-conflict management period shares some structural similarities due to this donor activity. Moreover, due to the World Bank’s involvement and their institutional norms regarding DDR and ex-combatants, another layer to the analysis is added. This is due to the cases analysed representing the approach the World Bank takes regarding ex-combatant management, therefore allowing some degree of generalisation. However, differences between cases and implementations of World Bank funding and administration should not be undermined. Nonetheless, any critique of these programmes has indirect implications for the World Bank’s wider DDR strategies within Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, both case studies exist within the same close geographic region within the Central African Great Lakes, and therefore share some comparable discussion worthy similarities. For instance, both Burundi and Rwanda share similar ethnic demographics, cultural norms, and economic pressures. Moreover, they share much of the same historical narratives from their time as the joint state of Ruanda-Urundi until 1962 (Bhavnani & Backer, 2000).

**Unit of Analysis.** The unit of analysis is the dominant combatant dyad\(^\text{12}\) during each conflict period. Additionally, explicitly dependent sub-groups which consider the combatant group identified in the dyad as their parent organisation will also be included when possible in the analysis.\(^\text{13}\) This unit is addressed in the first section of each case study, the focus being the conflict experiences of ex-combatants. Ideally, all dominant combatant groups which participated in post-conflict reintegration would be examined, however due to scope limitations within the present study this is not possible. Moreover, their exclusion is not seen to significantly jeopardise the validity of the study, as it is the

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\(^{12}\) Within the current study, a dyad refers to two opposing combatant groups.

\(^{13}\) For instance, certain *Interahamwe* factions in Rwanda were under the direct command of Government of Rwanda forces.
dominant combatant dyad which represents the majority of participants in the programmes analysed.\textsuperscript{14}

In Rwanda, the examined dyad is the Government of Rwanda – Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The Government of Rwanda is often referred to in other texts as the FAR (\textit{Forces Armées Rwandaises}) which specifically refers to the defence force. Similarly, the RPF is often represented by its French acronym, FPR (\textit{Front Patriotique Rwandaises}). However, within the present study, the denotations Government of Rwanda and Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) will be used throughout.\textsuperscript{15}

In Burundi, the examined dyad is the Government of Burundi – National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). Often, the CNDD-FDD has been referenced as the FDD, due to the Forces for the Defense of Democracy being the military wing of the group, while the CNDD was the political wing. However, as the CNDD-FDD is the full and official name, it is the designation and acronym that will be used presently.

\textbf{Outcome Variable.} The outcome variable\textsuperscript{16} of the present study is the DDR and related reintegration programmes of each case. This is addressed in the second section of the case study, the focus of which is the post-conflict management and reintegration of ex-combatants. Within this variable, only officially government run programmes will be analysed, with NGO or charity administered programmes for ex-combatants not considered. This is not to diminish the offerings that such groups provide in the post-conflict environment for ex-combatants. Simply, in the present study the role of civil society is not being analysed.

In Rwanda, the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (RDRP) phases one, two and three will be analysed as the primary DDR programme. Spanning from 1998 to the present, this project is run by the Government of Rwanda through the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), in conjunction with the

\textsuperscript{14} This is not an attempt to mitigate the importance of minor combatant groups within conflict.

\textsuperscript{15} It should be noted that the military wing of the RPF was technically called the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA). However, as Prunier (2002) notes, this was scarcely used in practise. As such, the denotation ‘RPF’ will be used throughout this study.

\textsuperscript{16} Outcome variable is often referred to in other literature as the dependent variable. In this instance, outcome variable has been chosen as no cause and effect is examined. Comparatively, dependent variable is frequently taken to infer testing for causality, and experimental interventions.
TDRP\textsuperscript{17}. In addition to the RDRP, the Rwandan government’s secondary reintegration project, the *ingando* camps will also be examined. While not directly linked to the RDRP, it focuses entirely on issues of social and cultural assimilation. Moreover, it is seen by the government as integral to reintegration, and attendance is compulsory for all ex-combatants (Purdeková, 2011).

In Burundi, the primary DDR programme is the National Program for Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NPDRR).\textsuperscript{18} Initially begun in 2004, and planned to consist of two stages running until 2008, it was extended with an emergency unofficial\textsuperscript{19} third stage until the end of 2013. Like the RDRP it has been administered under the MDRP-TDRP network, and run centrally in Burundi by the National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NCDRR).

Within the outcome variable, evidence for the addressing or not addressing of social psychological issues will be drawn from programme data. Specifically, to qualify as being addressed, an issue must be part of a purposefully planned initiative within ex-combatant management strategies. However, any given issue does not have to be the explicit focus of the initiative. The reason for including this caveat is that prior ignoring of social psychological issues within the academic and institutional literature would suggest that these issues are rarely used as the foundation for inquiry. Consequently, requiring social psychological issues to be the sole focus of an initiative would likely lead to absolutely no information. Conversely, to qualify as not being addressed within ex-combatant management, an issue must not be present, purposefully or inadvertently, in any planned initiative.

**Material Sources.** Information on the case studies has been drawn from multiple sources. Regarding pre-conflict histories, peer-reviewed academic books and journal articles have been the primary source of information. For information regarding the conflicts themselves and the relevant military structures, peer-reviewed academic works have again been the primary source. When relevant, post-conflict documentation either from interviews or DDR related screening from development institutions or NGOs has also been consulted in order to provide the most accurate representation possible. Regarding

\textsuperscript{17} It was also previously administered with assistance from the MDRP.

\textsuperscript{18} Some literature refers to the NPDRR by its French Acronym, PNDRR (*Programme National de Démobilisation, Réinsertion et Réintégration*).

\textsuperscript{19} ‘Unofficial’ in the sense it is not an explicitly defined third stage, but has been conceptualised as such for the present study. This will be expanded on further in Chapter Five.
types and levels of violence, the Uppsala Conflict Database Program’s (UCDP) Geo-Referenced Event Dataset has been used as a primary source as it provides individual battle statistics (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). Human Rights Watch documentation has also been used as a source of information regarding violence committed by groups.

Regarding DDR and ex-combatant initiatives, information has primarily been drawn from documentation from the World Bank through its role as MDRP/TDRP administrators. Individual Rwandan and Burundian government departments overseeing DDR and related programmes, and stakeholder or donor organisation’s documentation have also been consulted when possible. Additionally, peer-reviewed academic sources have been utilised to fill in descriptive information about programmes.

A number of sources have been directly contacted in order to gather reintegration related information. Most importantly, the World Bank and the TDRP working groups for Rwanda and Burundi have been contacted, and official requests for information sent. These requests have been somewhat successful, with a degree of support from the World Bank for this project. This was particularly notable in the case of Rwanda where detailed UN, World Bank, and Rwandan government documentation has been provided from 2001-2010. A lower, though satisfactory, level of documentation was also received for Burundi. The UN was also contacted in Burundi, however no response was received. Similarly, the Rwandan government was contacted and provided with an official request for information. Despite some initially promising communication, no information was provided. The Burundian government also did not assist with the project, despite being formally contacted. Certain local NGOs and community groups were also consulted in the initial planning of the project, however it was decided that sustained communication with various local groups would over-complicate the present study, and consume too much time in relation to any potential gain.

**Theoretical Framework Overview**

The purpose of the theoretical framework of the present study is to outline the major social and sociopsychological experiences of ex-combatants during conflict. Consequently, the supposition is made that such social experiences directly influence the wants and needs of
ex-combatants in the post-conflict environment, and therefore should have some bearing on the constitution and development of reintegration initiatives.

The framework is derived from the five theories presented in Chapter Two: Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorisation Theory (hereby referred to as a single entity, the Social Identity Approach [SIA]), agentic state theory, dehumanisation theory, and negative contact theory. Positive contact theory, while broached in Chapter Two will not be used within the framework, as it lacks applicability to the present context. However, as the direct reversal of negative contact theory, its assumptions do have connotations for post-conflict peacebuilding, and thus will be raised in the analysis of DDR. In addition, it should be noted that the framework is intended to complement, rather than replace traditional understandings of combatant experience. Consequently, it occasionally makes reference to broader structural assumptions based on external theories so as to achieve this synergy.

Finally, it is important to note that the following framework is not attempting to make sweeping generalisations about the population as a whole. Clearly, there are certain individuals who resist psychological urges to discriminate and perpetrate violence, regardless of circumstances. Instead, the theoretical framework attempts to explain what experiences and sociopsychological influences those who were compelled to take up arms lived under as combatants. Some of these influences refer to the desire to continue to use violence as a conflict resolution strategy while others refer to situational and behavioural occurrences that result from military living environments. Consequently, it is projected that these issues should then guide portions of reintegration initiatives.

The present framework consists of three interlinking blocks which are based on sociopsychological theory. ‘Blocks’ specifically refers to collections of related phenomena/experiences which can be conceptualised under one banner, which in turn are related to other blocks. For instance, the block ‘Intergroup Division,’ supported theoretically by SIA refers to intragroup identity needs, which intensify or create intergroup division and discrimination. In other literature, these kinds of blocks are sometimes referred to as ‘bins’ (George & Bennett, 2005).

The three blocks within the framework and the theories that inform them are: intergroup division (Social Identity Approach), military living environments (agentic state theory and dehumanisation theory) and the perpetration of violence (Negative contact
As previously mentioned, these are intended to describe combatant experiences once conflict has begun. Each block will be discussed in detail below, with the link between theory and application to ex-combatant experiences outlined. The implications of the adoption of such sociopsychological arguments would have for ex-combatant management is briefly outlined after each block. Specifically, the ways in which the positive aspects of these theoretical implications may be capitalised on will be explored, as will ways in which the negative aspects may be mitigated. A summary of the framework is presented below in Figure 1.

**Intergroup Division**

The block of Intergroup Division (Figure 1) is based upon the Social Identity Approach. Specifically, this block describes the social intra and intergroup processes undergone as a result of the societal discrepancies which result from living in a conflict situation. A core assumption on which it rests is that a significant decline in condition leads to intense psychological stress within individuals (Staub, 2011). In the present framework, this drop in condition is represented by the existence of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007). What the ‘condition’ constitutes is of little direct importance. Rather, the important factor is that the
decline in quality is deemed important to the individual in question. Thus, it can be a basic need in line with Maslow’s (1943) understanding of the concept, such as food, money, or social condition. Alternatively, it can be more abstract such as a perceived loss in standing in society through discrimination, a drop in collective self-esteem, or enforced separation from loved ones (Brown, 2010).

Resultantly, there is the need to increase intergroup distinctiveness, and also to elevate the ingroup in order to remedy any outstanding discrepancies in power or status. Under certain circumstances, this can result in either motivating individuals or groups to take up arms as combatants, or alternatively intensify intergroup division for those already within combatant groups. Consequently, due to the psychological pressure or stress, two main effects occur, and provide continued reasons for groups to divide upon identity lines. These are as follows.

First, psychological stress creates a heightened need for social identity. As per SIA, when identities come under threat due to competition, the natural response is to attempt to increase ones identity in order to ease psychological stress (Brewer, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Moreover, as Self-Categorisation Theory postulates, when group identity is elicited, a type of self-stereotyping, or depersonalisation occurs, with the individual taking on the perceived norms of the group. Consequently, ingroup homogeneity increases further, also increasing personal identification with the larger group, and intergroup differences are exaggerated, which in turn serves to threaten personal identity more, again increasing the need for identity salience (Turner et al., 1987). As a result, people begin to feel secure and connected because of group membership, and have a strengthened worldview.

The way in which these identities form is largely determined by context (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Specifically, it is important to recognise that what group an individual identifies with is heavily influenced by their contextual circumstances. Issues such as ideology, religion, ethnicity, geographic location, and political alignment can all dictate group membership (Brown, 2010). Moreover, identity can be either prescribed by society (such as ethnicity) or chosen (such as political ideology). However, there is still high potential for crossover between commonly ascribed identities, and those which are chosen.

Second, psychological stress results in intergroup division. Furthermore, the endeavour for positive group identity can exacerbate division. As noted in Chapter Two, one of the most effective ways in which to increase one’s social identity relative to the rest
of the society is to devalue outgroups. As a result, discrimination occurs, and groups become increasingly split from one another. This is particularly noted for groups who hold relatively higher positions within society (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). In the present context, these are most likely to be combatant groups connected with government militaries. Therefore discrimination is a way to further increase distinctiveness, to compensate for status lost by deprivation caused by external pressures. Moreover, it concurrently devalues the status of outgroups, further pushing them from psychological competition.

For groups of lower status, theoretically it is more likely that individuals will initially attempt to remedy their status via devaluation of ingroup traits perceived as poor, or by leaving the group if possible (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). However, when the generic conflict context is considered, this is often never possible. For one, it assumes that individuals can leave a group. But in many cases identities are ascribed by society at large, and disowning identity does very little. Furthermore, it presumes that by leaving one low status group, individuals can join another high status group. Clearly, that is not necessarily the case. Subsequently, one of the only avenues salient is to discriminate, and reposition your currently low identity at a high position. In the present context, rebel groups can be conceptualised as low status groups, as they are situated in a relatively weaker military and social status than government forces.

Additionally, this phenomenon can also shape divisions between combatant groups and the civilian population. Specifically, should violence be sustained over long periods, divisions centred on identity may occur between combatant groups and the wider civilian population, or sub-groups within each. In such a scenario of largely one-sided violence, any combatant group (whether government or rebel) would be considered the high status group, with the civilian population generally on the extreme end of the low status spectrum, dependant on their capacity for resistance.

Consequently, the present block can be summed up as creating or maintaining the fundamental intergroup split. This can be between combatant groups, or between combatants and the civilian community. Ingroup identities are enhanced to an abnormal degree, and outgroups are further distorted in perception, and actively discriminated against. However, this does not sufficiently explain how groups perpetrate violence at an organised level over a sustained period, and with any rigor or organisation; and herein lays the role of military living environments, the next block to be discussed.
Implications for Ex-Combatant Management. The issues raised by the Social Identity Approach have important implications for ex-combatant management. Most notably, it illustrates the potential for a wide social split based on identity between combatant groups. As identity is recognised as a fundamental psychological facet of existence, this becomes an important issue to address.

As a result, ex-combatant management initiatives need to explicitly address these identity-based issues. Specifically, significant identity-based divisions within their participant pool can damage ex-combatant relationships within DDR programmes, where ex-combatants of various factions are generally managed in the same environment and expected to work together. This becomes especially important in the case of long-term cantonment, or close living arrangements while participating in programmes. If not properly addressed, this could conceivably lead to violent interaction as a worst result. Alternatively, it could also lead to poor communication and cooperation within programmes, and exacerbate animosities, resulting in weakened outcomes. Lastly, if not explicitly addressed within social reintegration initiatives, there is the strong potential for these identity based issues to remain in the ex-combatant population post-reintegration. No data on the Social Identity Approach suggests that identity based concepts reliably leave individuals over time by themselves. Therefore, if such negative attitudes of outgroups are continued to be held by reintegrated ex-combatants, they may continue to negatively shape future interactions, which in turn may help develop future conflict. Consequently, programmes need to directly promote peaceful intergroup cooperation.

There are also ways in which the Social Identity Approach may be used to assist ex-combatant management. Specifically, it fundamentally proposes high ingroup cohesion with groups, and therefore this could be capitalised upon by ex-combatant programmes. Provided this is tempered with efforts to educate ex-combatants on the ingroup-outgroup issue, and ways in which to conceptualise intergroup relations non-violently and positively, this could strongly assist group participation in DDR and related activities.

Military Living Environments

Military Living Environments (Figure 1) describes the two major sociopsychological processes concerned with the active participation in organised military groups.
The first is based on agentic state theory, and concerns the structural authoritarianism within military hierarchies (Bandura, 2001). While respecting variance, the framework makes the basic assumption that hierarchical authoritarianism will exist in all groups to a noteworthy degree. Specifically, it is proposed that combatants undergo significant cognitive and sociopsychological changes as a result of partaking in such hierarchical environments (Bandura, 2001; Milgram, 1974). It is then argued that when a combatant commits violence within a military group upon the orders of others, they cognitively disengage a proportion of their personal agency, and thus also personal responsibility. Instead, it is diffused to the group leadership, and the group-at-large. Individuals enter an agentic state wherein they do not explain, nor see, their actions as their own. Rather, they see themselves as agents of those hierarchically above them within the group. In essence, when violence is perpetrated, individuals become cognitively adjusted to spreading the psychological burden onto others, and therefore attitudes towards violence fundamentally change.

Second, institutionalised discrimination against the opposing combatant group(s) is also undergone in organised military group violence. As presented in Chapter Two, the present framework adopts the theory of dehumanisation as presented by Haslam (2006), which in itself proposes two main types of dehumanisation; infrahumanisation, and delegitimisation. The former is a more subtle form of discrimination, wherein outgroups are viewed to hold less emotionally humanistic qualities than the ingroup (Leyens et al., 2000). The latter is what is typically considered dehumanisation, where outgroups are presented as inhuman in an attempt to elicit negative emotions, delegitimise any defence from the outgroup, and mitigate any pity or empathy from perpetrators of violence (Bar-Tal, 1998). Regardless of type, these prejudices serve to promote conflict with external combatants as a partial solution to the goals of the ingroup.

The present framework makes no assumptions as to what form of dehumanisation may occur within cases. Which will occur is largely dependent on contextual factors, and the intensity of violence being perpetrated. For instance, perceived ‘intractable’ aspects of individuals such as ethnicity are more open to extreme delegitimisation, whereas apparently temporal aspects such as political alignment are more typically seen as a target for infrahumanisation. In the latter, there is the possibility for recourse, while the former is a permanent aspect of one’s self. However, some degree of either type of dehumanisation
should constitute part of any group’s doctrine at an institutional level, as an attempt to ease the psychological burden of combatants as perpetrators of mass violence (Bandura, 2002).

The present block can be summed up as the means by which violence is sustained and legitimised within military groups. Authoritarian style hierarchies sustain structures of violence, wherein combatants diffuse their agency throughout the group system. Furthermore, these serve not only distort perceptions of the perpetration of violence, but also broader social life. Institutionalised discrimination through dehumanisation then functions to both sustain and legitimise acts of violence. This is done by removing humanistic features from the opposing combatant group, thus removing cause for compassion and personal inhibitions towards acting violently are reduced.

**Implications for Ex-Combatant Management.** The fact that ex-combatants have spent a large amount of time within a military living environment should not be ignored within ex-combatant management. First, in regards to the structural authoritarianism within the military hierarchy, direct efforts need to be made to break down a dependence on these structures. As noted in the ‘Intergroup Division’ section, a degree of ingroup cohesion and camaraderie can be useful. However, a high level dependence should not be encouraged. For one, it can encourage poor social situations, but it can also open up ex-combatants to manipulation by spoilers should they still adhere to norms of institutional obedience. Furthermore, ex-combatants may find themselves ill at ease with a post-demobilisation environment that presumes, and often requires, near complete freedom of movement, association, and agency.

Second, in regards to institutionalised discrimination, ex-combatants should receive education of re-humanising fashion. Specifically, reintegration programmes should educate, and illustrate the inaccuracy of any dehumanising beliefs held against outgroups. Importantly, if these are left unaddressed, they could negatively influence post-reintegration relationships with other groups, helping develop future conflict within society.

**Perpetration of Violence**

The fundamental proposition of the Perpetration of Violence block (Figure 1) is that committing military intergroup violence should be conceptualised as an instance of
negative intergroup contact. Consequently, as per negative contact theory, this means that upon acting violently towards a combatant group, negative attitudes towards said group will increase. Not only is the experience in this context defined by the negative practise of killing someone, the target group is also attempting to do the same to the individual in question. Therefore, the negative traits associated with individual occurrences of violence are attributed to the broader opposing group, further devaluing them. Importantly, this in turn increases intergroup division by lowering the perceived identity status of the outgroup in question, and increasing prejudice.

**Implications for Ex-Combatant Management.** As a result, negative contact theory proposes that ex-combatant management initiatives need to address issues of intergroup contact. Largely, this can be addressed through the direct reinforcement of positive contact experiences, in a gradually intense environment. This will assist to mitigate and break down negative traits applied to outgroups based on negative experiences. Furthermore, as with issues of identity, the addressing of this issue is all the more important as leaving it unchecked may damage the effectiveness of any DDR or related programme, due to mistrust and prejudice within ex-combatants who are participating.

**Theoretical Framework Summary**

In sum, the present theoretical framework can be understood as an overview of major social psychological experiences of combatants during violent conflict. It is then projected that these experiences are instrumental in understanding the needs of ex-combatants in the post-conflict period. The framework makes no proposals as to how conflict arises in society. However, it does rest on the basic assumption that the existence of conflict creates a decline in condition, and raises psychological stress creating undue pressure upon groups and individuals.

First, this decline intensifies intergroup division within combatant groups, based on identity needs. Moreover, this combination of psychological stress, downturn, and identity salience leads to the re-legitimisation of individual’s positions within combatant groups. Second, during military service, an individual both lives under a system which encourages diffusion of agency, and the perpetration of discriminatory attitudes against outgroups; both of which serve to further sustain and legitimise intergroup violence. Third, acts of
violence are best conceptualised as an instance of negative intergroup contact, which further intensifies intergroup division. From here, the cycle continues with intergroup violence legitimising past identity division, and creating the potential for new divisions (refer to Figure 1 for a visualisation of these relationships).

These experiences also have important theoretically based implications for ex-combatant management programmes. In sum, issues of ‘Intergroup Division’ and the ‘Perpetration of Violence’ propose that ex-combatants are in need of social and identity based interventions that promote peaceful intergroup relations, and breakdown the rigid dichotomies presented by external life pressures and military systems. Intense exposure to negative interactions with outgroups also proposes that ex-combatants need direct and controlled positive contact with the same groups, in order to challenge negative perceptions. Furthermore, ‘Military Living Environments’ which promote structural authoritarianism and institutionalised discrimination also need to be addressed. Specifically, worldviews of hierarchical obedience need to be broken down. Additionally, direct efforts to re-humanise those who ex-combatants believe to be inferior or deserving on an un-peaceful existence need to be made during the reintegration process. If these issues are not addressed, it is conceivable that true social reintegration, and thus peace will not be achieved. The connection between sociopsychological combatant experiences, and potential ex-combatant management implications is illustrated below in Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Experiences</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Post-Conflict</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity Based Intergroup Division</td>
<td>Promotion of Positive Intergroup Relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Network Expansion &amp; Critical Thinking</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalised Discrimination</td>
<td>Re-Humanisation and Education</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative Contact via Violence</td>
<td>Instances of Positive Contact</td>
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*Figure 2. Framework of Combatant Experiences in Relation to Post-Conflict Initiatives.*
Operationalization of Framework

In order to conduct an appropriately controlled comparative analysis, the framework needs to have its operational parameters defined for each case study. More specifically, the data to be drawn from the case studies to indicate the manifestations of the framework’s abstract theoretical points needs to be outlined. These indicators have been conceptualised as a set of questions for each block. As per Themnér’s (2011) similar research design, efforts have been made to pose general enough questions so as to allow comparison across cases, but not so broad that they fail to pick up case-specific details. In most cases, the operationalized questions regarding post-conflict ex-combatant management are direct reversals of combat experience questions.

The operationalization of combat experiences (see Figure 1) and ex-combatant management in the post-conflict environment (see Figure 2) will be presented together. The purpose of analysing combatant experiences during conflict is to explore if, how, and to what level ex-combatants experienced these sociopsychological issues. While it is theoretically proposed that they will have had these experiences, it is important to probe this issue within the case studies, rather than assume their presence. Subsequently, the main exploration of ex-combatant management in the post-conflict environment is directly connected to these conflict experiences. Focusing on reintegration initiatives, the purpose of examining these is to develop an understanding of whether sociopsychological issues are being addressed in the post-conflict period, and if so, to what level. Whether these issues have been addressed directly or inadvertently will also be explored. Thus, questions relating to conflict experiences have been denoted as ‘Conflict Questions’ and those concerning ex-combatant management and reintegration have been designated ‘Reintegration Questions.’

*Intergroup Division.* Indicators of intergroup division will be measured primarily using historical data, in addition to post-conflict interviews and documentation. In reintegration programmes, it will be examined whether these issues have been attempted to be mitigated or reserved. This data will be drawn primarily from programme documentation.

*Conflict Question:* Were combatant groups actively divided upon identity based lines? If so, what type?
Reintegration Question: If yes, have any efforts been made within DDR and related activities to promote positive intergroup relationships, and break down any perceived necessity for high intergroup division?

Structural Authoritarianism (Military Living Environments). Reports and histories on the wartime administration and running of combatant groups will be analysed, in order to develop an understanding of hierarchical authoritarianism within each group. As with other blocks, it will be explored within each country’s ex-combatant management programme documentation as to whether this issue is recognised and challenged.

Conflict Question: Was the larger combatant community subject to authoritarian hierarchies that promoted or required non-pluralism and obedience to authority? If so, were such structures utilised in the day-to-day operation of each combatant group?

Reintegration Question: Within ex-combatant management, have these structures been challenged with an emphasis on the expansion of pluralistic networks, and adoption of critical thinking?

Institutionalised Discrimination (Military Living Environments). Officially sanctioned discrimination and dehumanising representations of outgroups will be explored using historical data. Again, within ex-combatant management programmes it will be explored whether these issues have been broached and challenged for reintegration purposes.

Conflict Question: Were combatants encouraged, and officially sanctioned to discriminate against, and dehumanise outgroups? Either opposing combatant groups, civilians, or both.

Reintegration Question: If yes, have ex-combatants been attempted to be re-educated on these issues? Specifically, have ex-combatants had their potentially discriminatory and un-peaceful perceptions of outgroups challenged.

Intergroup Violence and Negative Intergroup Contact. The ‘Perpetration of Violence’ block will be predominantly measured by use of the UCDP Geo-Referenced Event Dataset in addition to historical documentation. UCDP data provides information on each verified battle each combatant group took part in, with whom, and how many persons were killed as a result in each group. A distinction will also be made between combatant-
combatant violence, and combatant-to-civilian violence. As instances of high negative contact, it will be explored within ex-combatant management programmes whether these negative perceptions have been challenged by instances of positive contact.

*Conflict Question A:* What groups did combatants violently interact with on a regular basis?

*Conflict Question B:* Were these interactions based on identity grounds?

*Reintegration Question:* Have ex-combatants had these strong occurrences of negative contact challenged with controlled instances of positive contact with members of those groups which violent interaction previously took place?

**Case Study Presentation**

The preceding order of the framework operationalization will also largely constitute the manner in which the case studies will be presented in Chapters Four and Five. Specifically, a framework block will be presented and any evidence for its proposals being present in combatant experiences outlined, and then whether the relevant ex-combatant management programmes have addressed the raised issues. This will continue for each framework block. No empirical propositions will be made regarding the success or effectiveness of any programme. For each case study, the analysis of the framework will be preceded by a brief history of the lead up period to each conflict, in order to position the conflict within its contextual bounds. A short overview of the conflict itself will also be given, as well as the relevant ex-combatant management programmes.

Following the individual case studies Chapter Six will comprise of a comparative analysis. Between case similarities, differences and general thematic concerns, as identified by the theoretical framework will be outlined, and their implications discussed. Specifically, the comparative analysis will focus on the identified experiences of each ex-combatant using each framework block as a guide. From these comparisons, whether the sociopsychological issues raised by the framework need to be addressed, and are addressed within current ex-combatant management strategies will be examined. Subsequently, the discussion will proceed to develop observations and recommendations regarding future research on ex-combatant management.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE RWANDA DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME, AND INGANDO: EX-COMBATANT MANAGEMENT IN RWANDA AFTER CIVIL WAR AND GENOCIDE
This chapter will present the case study of ex-combatant management in Rwanda after the Rwandan Civil War and genocide. First, a brief overview of Rwanda’s history will be given prior to conflict; in particular the cultural and ethnic divisions within society will be covered. As the Tutsi-Hutu divide came to dominate much of Rwandan politics, it is vital background to understanding the conflict and its social context (Lemarchand, 2009). Second, a summary of the Rwandan Civil War and genocide will be presented. Third, this will be followed by an outline of the Rwandan Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (RDRP) and ingando. These summaries are presented in order to illustrate the context which informs the specific sections of the succeeding analysis. Fourth, the analysis will outline whether the issues presented in the social psychological framework existed in the conflict, and whether they have been addressed in Rwandan ex-combatant management, and if so, in what manner. As outlined in Chapter Three, each block is operationalized as a series of questions for both combatant groups – Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Government of Rwanda - and reintegration programmes.

**The Background to Conflict**

The area which is now known as Rwanda is no stranger to conflict and strife. Going back to the 15th century Kingdom of Rwanda, society contained three distinct social groups - Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa (Prunier, 2002). These divisions, especially Tutsi and Hutu, would continue to dominate the social, political, and cultural landscape of Rwanda for centuries to come. In short, the social order (or ubuhake) between each group positioned Tutsi at the top as a group of the hierarchy who held most positions of power in Rwanda (Hintjens, 1999). Below Tutsi were the Hutu, which comprised the majority of the Rwandan population and continue to do so up until the present day. Finally, the pygmy Batwa were seen as an outcaste class, living mostly as hunter-gatherers (Pottier, 2002). It should be noted that these divisions were originally not impermeable, with movement between classes possible. Prunier (2002) notes, it was possible to be “de-hutuised” (p. 14) and rise to being Tutsi, and vice versa. Indeed, what these divisions originally were is unclear; commonly referred to as ethnic divisions, they may have originally been based on class, or family lineage (Reyntjens, 2004).

However, any ambiguity ended upon colonisation in 1884. Initially ruled as part of German East Africa, the end of the Second World War saw Belgium take over Rwanda
which was subsequently ruled as the joint state of Ruanda-Urundi, with modern day Burundi (Lemarchand, 2009). To colonists these societal divisions provided an excellent tool in keeping society divided and manageable with Tutsi firmly planted as the ruling class (Lemarchand, 2009). Furthermore, differences in appearance were capitalised upon, with a 1902 French report describing the Tutsi as distinctly ‘un-negro’ and therefore attractive and superior (Le Roy, 1902, as cited in Prunier, 2002). Many pseudo-scientific analyses reinforced this concept (Prunier, 2002).

Regardless, as Prunier (2002) notes, the specifics of each origin story do not matter greatly. Rather, what is crucial to the understanding of relations within Rwanda is that these narratives re-enforced massive power, status, and self-esteem discrepancies within societal identities. Tutsi were elevated on the back of these stories to positions of great power while Hutu were relegated to the lower echelons of society, deemed unintelligent, and unattractive. Tutsi were seen as a superior form of African, and therefore legitimate rulers over Hutu (Pottier, 2002). Though, as Hintjens (1999) points out, it is crucial not to overstate the importance of these ‘ethnic’ groups as solid concepts, but rather cultural manifestations of structural violence.

Tutsi domination did not last forever. In 1954 **ubuhake** was officially outlawed, giving Hutu greater access to resources (Pottier, 2002). In 1959 the transition to independence began in earnest, and Tutsi domination of Rwanda began to fail. Known as the ‘Hutu Republic,’ Hutu groups began to successfully vie for political power, resulting in violent skirmishes around the country (Prunier, 2002). Furthermore, divisions worsened after the full transition to independence (Lemarchand, 2009). Between December 1963 and January 1964 an estimated 10 000 Tutsi elites were executed; and from 1961 to 1967 approximately 150 000 Tutsi fled Rwanda, mostly into the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda (Prunier, 2002). Until the outbreak of civil war in 1990, Rwanda remained in a period of relative negative peace with only occasional Tutsi insurgent strikes into Rwanda.²⁰

Nonetheless, the economic and social situation of Rwanda began to decline in the lead up to 1990. In the late 1980s, the Rwandan Government experienced strong economic downturn (Lemarchand, 2009). Coffee, Rwanda’s primary export comprising 75% of all

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²⁰ However, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, in 1972 the first Burundian genocide of Hutu by the Burundian Army took place, which greatly affected those in Rwanda (Lemarchand, 2009).
trade saw prices drop to an all-time low in 1986. Tin mining experienced a similar fate (Prunier, 2002). Agriculture had also dropped in its economic importance, accounting for 48% of the national product in 1986 despite employing 90% of the population (Prunier, 2002).

Furthermore, the government was suffering from a period of intense political and social instability (Prunier, 2002). President Habyarimana’s power-circle was rife with infighting (Hintjens, 1999). This was perhaps best illustrated by the murders of political upstart Stanislas Mayuya in 1988, and Member of Parliament Félecule Nyiramutarambirwa in 1989. In an attempt to recover the regime launched shock campaigns to garner moral support. For instance, what it deemed ‘loose women’ were rounded up and sent to camps, and slums were destroyed under the guise of catching criminals (Prunier, 2002). Those who spoke out against these witch-hunts were frequently arrested (Dorn & Matloff, 2000).

Interestingly, the RPF based along the Ugandan border experienced mostly similar types of stresses. Under a series of Ugandan governments, RPF members as a refugee group were economically disadvantaged, ethnically marginalised and politically targeted, frequently to the point of mass violence (Kuperman, 2004). In addition, the Tutsi-Hutu divide back home in Rwanda was highly salient within the RPF, with most of its membership comprising of Tutsi refugees from the 1960s purges, or their children (Lemarchand, 2009).

**The Rwandan Civil War & Genocide (1990-1994)**

On the 1st of October 1990, the RPF invaded Rwanda from neighbouring Uganda. This was, as RPF General Paul Kagame (1990, as cited in Prunier, 2002, pg. 96) noted “the beginning of a protracted popular war.” Indeed, overlooking some tactical withdrawals in the RPFs initial 1990 invasion period, the civil war would continue until the 3rd of August 1993 when the Arusha Accords were signed in the capital Kigali, signalling the end of the first stage of the Rwandan Civil War (Pottier, 2002). The Accords contained seven peace agreements, which among other points were to establish a transitional government, merge Government of Rwanda and RPF armies through DDR, and repatriate refugees, in addition to instituting a ceasefire (Arusha Accords, 1993).
However, due to the assassination of Rwandan President Habyarimana and Burundian President Ntaryamira on April 6 1994 the fragile ceasefire was broken. Spurred on, or perhaps freed, by Habyarimana’s death, Government of Rwanda military forces began implementing a series of planned attacks on the Tutsi population, and sympathising Hutus across the country, creating what is now known as the Rwandan genocide (Hintjens, 1999). In addition to perpetration by the Rwandan Government’s military forces, satellite groups such as Agathe Habayimana’s Akazu and the paramilitary Interahamwe were further brought into the fold of the military (Lemarchand, 2009). The resurgence of violence led the Arusha ceasefire to be broken, and the Civil War reignited.

The genocide and civil war ended with the RPFs defeat of the Government forces and control of Kigali on July 17 1994 (Lemarchand, 2009). The RPF subsequently began its transition to power, initially with RPF member Pasteur Bizimungu as President and Paul Kagame, who led the RPF for most of the conflict, as Vice President. In 2000 Bizimungu resigned, and Kagame gained the Presidency (Waugh, 2004).

**Rwandan Ex-Combatant Management – An Overview**

Ex-combatant management in Rwanda consists of two primary modes of implementation. First, the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (RDRP) is the main reintegration effort covering social, economic, and health issues (Republic of Rwanda, 2010). Started in 1997, the RDRP is still currently operating in its third official stage. It is administered by the government’s Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), with assistance from the World Bank. Second, *ingando* is a supplementary programme not exclusive to ex-combatants. However, ex-combatants are required to participate in *ingando*, and take part in special *ingando* camps for ex-combatants, with other ex-combatants (rather than the broader population). The primary focus of *ingando* is reconciliation, education (Edmonds, Mills & McNamee, 2009), and social reintegration (Buckley-Zistal, 2009). *Ingando* is administered by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), and collaborates with the RDRC to provide services to ex-combatants.
The Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme. The RDRP consists of three stages. All stages have been open to RPF\textsuperscript{21} and Government of Rwanda ex-combatants.\textsuperscript{22} Prior to beginning, approximately 15,000 defeated former Government of Rwanda ex-combatants were integrated into the permanent RPF military wing in accordance with the Arusha Accords (Rusagara, 2009). Stage One began in September 1997 and ran until May 2001. Funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the stage was largely considered a failure by the UNDP, the Rwandan Government, and donors (World Bank, 2002). Disarmament has not been handled by the programme, but rather by the UN (Consia, 2008).

Due to this failure, Stages Two and Three saw a change in direction. For a start, the UNDP gave way to primary backing by the World Bank through the International Development Agency (IDA) (Republic of Rwanda, 2010). These stages are largely seen as more successful with expanded means and targets in economic, social, and health spheres (Consia, 2008; Republic of Rwanda, 2010). Additionally, members of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) based in the Democratic Republic of Congo began to be reintegrated under the programme category of Armed Groups (AG) (World Bank, 2002). A summary of each stage’s descriptive components can be found below in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Stage I</th>
<th>Stage II</th>
<th>Stage III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative body</td>
<td>UNDP, Government of Rwanda</td>
<td>World Bank, Government of Rwanda</td>
<td>World Bank, Government of Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Timeframe</td>
<td>1997-2001</td>
<td>2001-2008</td>
<td>2009-Present (open end-date)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Ex-Combatant</td>
<td>18,692 RPF ex-combatants and</td>
<td>20,000 RPF, 5000 Armed Group,</td>
<td>4,000 RDF,\textsuperscript{23} 10,000 Armed Group, and any late-demobilised Stage II ex-combatants, plus dependents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities</td>
<td>dependents</td>
<td>13,000 ex-Government of Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ex-combatants, plus</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\footnote{21}{After the Civil War the military side of the RPF became known as the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), and later it became the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) (Consia, 2008). However, for clarity the present study will continue to use the RPF denotation.}

\footnote{22}{In official RDRC/RDRP documentation, referred to as the Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR) (Republic of Rwanda, 2010).}

\footnote{23}{Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) refers to RPF and Government of Rwanda who made up the post-genocide military as part of an army merger outlined in peace agreements (Mgbako, 2005).}
Eligibility Criteria
- Self-identification as combatant, Rwandan national
- Self-identification as combatant, Rwandan nationality, combatant affiliation, weapons knowledge
- Self-identification as combatant, Rwandan nationality, combatant affiliation, weapons knowledge

Stated Objectives
- The demobilisation, and reintegration of RPF ex-combatants in order to downsize the military
- Demobilisation of ex-combatants; social and economic reintegration; facilitate reallocation of government funds to social and economic initiatives
- Demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants, provide socio-economic support, provide focused support to women, children, and disabled

Sources: Consia, 2008; Republic of Rwanda, 2010; World Bank, 2002, 2009a

The main programme components of the RDRP’s design have remained relatively steady over the three stages. Across all stages ex-combatants have been provided with demobilisation support and reinsertion assistance (World Bank, 2009a). From Stage Two onwards, ex-combatants have also been given medical and vulnerability screenings at demobilisation. Upon reinsertion, ex-combatants were provided with a Basic Needs Kit (BNK) of household items and food. RPF/Government of Rwanda ex-combatants were also eligible for financial allowances, ranging from US$330-1100 relative to military rank (World Bank, 2002; 2009a) and pre-war pension funds (Republic of Rwanda, 2010).

Economic components appear to have been the primary focus of RDRP reintegration. During Stage One, economic reintegration looks to be the near-sole focus, manifesting in cash stipends to ex-combatants (World Bank, 2002), and the creation of a vocational training school (Waldorf, 2009). In Stage Two and Three, economic components were expanded upon. They comprised of a six month reintegration grant of $US170 (Republic of Rwanda, 2010); a $US333 Vulnerability Support Window for ex-combatants who remained economically vulnerable; and government run construction projects to provide paid work (Consia, 2008). Social reintegration in Stage Two has consisted of pre-demobilisation sensitisation seminars to host communities; and the establishment of associations and co-operatives to encourage dialogue between ex-

As taken from World Bank programme documentation.
combatants and civilians (RDRC, 2005a). Participation in country wide reconciliation initiatives was also encouraged. Ex-combatants recognised as mentally unwell have received assistance from the RDRP, or the Rwandan Ministry of Health (RDRC, 2005b).

**Ingando.** Modelled off pre-colonial Rwandan traditions, ingando is a form of locally owned social integration or reintegration through live-in educational camps (Rusagara, 2009). Attendance is required for all ex-combatants, generally before reinsertion, although it sometimes takes place in the early stages of the reintegration phase. In some sectors it has been received negatively, with certain scholars describe it as social engineering (Purdeková, 2011) or brainwashing (Mgbako, 2005). The officially stated purpose of ingando is to facilitate re-education and cultural awareness on issues surrounding the civil war, genocide, ethnicity and national identity (Edmonds, Mills, & McNamee, 2009; Verwimp & Verpootren, 2004), in addition to civic responsibilities and gender sensitivity (Rubagumya & Jorgensen, 2008). RPF and Government of Rwanda ex-combatants attend ingando for two weeks full-time (Penal Reform International (PRI), 2004). Ex-combatants who have been implicated in genocidal acts regardless of affiliation spend up to three months (PRI, 2004). It has been described by Purdeková (2011) as a total institution, encompassing the entirety of participant’s lives while they attend.

The content of ingando can be divided into two themes – lectures and cultural awareness. Information is relatively scarce about the program. Nonetheless, there are a select number of in depth studies available, which describe the lectures as primarily centring on Rwandan history, the civil war and genocide, and RPF political ideology (Thomson, 2011; Purdeková, 2011). Moreover, it is highly concerned with combating the cultural-ethnic Tusti-Hutu divide which characterised much of the conflict (PRI, 2004). Overall, these lectures have the stated aim of ensuring social reconciliation, healing and unity under the new Rwandan (or Rwandité) identity and ending divisionism (NURC, as cited in Buckley-Zistal, 2009). Cultural awareness consists of singing traditional and new reconciliatory songs, and other activities to promote unity (Purdeková, 2011).

**Applying the Theoretical Framework**

The following section will operationalize the theoretical framework as outlined in Chapter Three. This will be done through a series of questions in order to create a degree of
tangibility to the abstract concepts which each framework block represents. Each question is denoted as either a Conflict Question pertaining to conflict experiences, or Reintegration Question concerning how the conflict issues have been handled the post-conflict ex-combatant management.

**Intergroup Division.** In short, this block represents the intergroup and intragroup processes which create and legitimise societal discrepancies. As per the Social Identity Approach, this has been represented through identity.

*Conflict Question: Were combatant groups actively divided upon identity based lines? If so, what type?*

Officially, the RPF was a pluralistic organisation open to all (De Forges, 1999). This notion is supported by much of the official rhetoric of the organisation before, and during the conflict. For instance, RPF songs often championed the *Rwandité* identity over Tutsi or Hutu (Chrétien, 1995, as cited in Des Forges, 1999). Moreover, Hutu were actively recruited into the RPF once they established bases inside Rwanda. Des Forges (1999) states that during 1993 and 1994, RPF recruits were schooled in the importance of Rwandan identity in orientation training, and told that the war was one of ideals and unity rather than ethnicity (Des Forges, 1999; Reed, 1996). This public emphasis on a pluralistic Rwandan identity has also been supported by histories of the RPF (Kuperman, 2004; Waugh, 2004).

However, in actuality the RPF appears to have been an organisation divided upon identity lines. Specifically, the RPF was massively dominated by Tutsi (Kuperman, 2004; Prunier, 2009; Waldorf, 2009). As Reyntjens (1996) notes, the RPF was perceived in Rwanda as being an entirely Tutsi group, while Kuperman (2004) frequently treats the RPF and Tutsi as synonymous. Consequently, whether intentional or not, the RPF rhetoric of being Rwandan rather than Tutsi or Hutu falls somewhat flat due to its homogenous makeup. Due to their dominant reason for invading Rwanda being tied to identity – in particular the returning of approximately 700 000 Tutsi refugees to Rwanda (Prunier, 2009), it would be rash to not to prescribe identity some importance. Additionally, Des Forges (1999) notes that many of the Hutu who were actively recruited into the RPF were suspected to have done so under coercion.
Furthermore, upon the war’s end the RPF leadership sometimes advocated anti-Hutu ideals (Lemarchand, 2009). As will be discussed later, a proportion of the official reconciliation message demonises Hutu (Thomson, 2011). For example, Turshen (2001) quotes instances where the RPF asked Tutsi women married to Hutu to divorce their husbands, as such unions “must have been the consequence of rape and not love matches” (p. 63). Additionally, Reyntjens (2004) notes that the present Rwandan political elite who are derived from the RPF are nearly entirely Tutsi, an RPF power consolidation he argues that is hidden behind a veil of meritocracy.

In addition to the Tutsi-Hutu division, the RPF contained a strongly anti-Government of Rwanda identity (Prunier, 2009). Specifically, the RPF was opposed to the Habyarimana’s ruling party, the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) (Lemarchand, 2009). This is perhaps an obvious assumption; any combatant group will be ideologically and thus identity-wise incompatible to their opposition. However, it is important not to ignore the significance that such an identity division will always have on individuals and groups.

The presence of identity divisions within the Government of Rwanda forces is more straightforward. The Rwandan military - and indeed their political leadership - was massively dominated by Hutu (Dorn & Matloff, 2000; Orth, 2001; Sommers, 2006; Stedman, 1997). As Hintjens (1999) notes, this ran through all military levels. This is not to propose that there were no Tutsi within the military. However, such occurrences were extremely rare, even ignoring ideological issues, as Tutsi were severely restricted in their ability to participate in the public service (Hintjens, 1999). This was, as Prunier (2002) suggests, in order to keep power within Habyarimana’s Hutu circle of power.

Furthermore, the conflict saw a rise in anti-Tutsi rhetoric from the Government of Rwanda. The Government frequently phrased the RPF invasion as a ‘Tutsi invasion’ of Hutu Rwanda (Lemarchand, 2009; Prunier, 2002). As the war went on, the government increased this divisionist framing, frequently referring to all Tutsi within Rwanda as accomplices to the RPF (Melvern, 2006). After Habyarimana’s assassination, this intensified, with the Rwandan Government’s military forces mobilising groups and individuals on anti-Tutsi lines (Lemarchand, 2009). Government controlled radio and media propelled much of this message (Kellow & Steeves, 1998).
Consequently, both groups with the combatant dyad Government of Rwanda – Rwandan Patriotic Front are considered identity salient organisations. While recognising contrary official rhetoric, the RPF is seen as a combatant group divided upon identity lines. This manifests through a Tutsi identity, a strongly Tutsi aligned set of ideals, an anti-Government of Rwanda stance, or a combination of the three. Furthermore, the Government of Rwanda is found to be a highly identity based combatant group, centred on Hutu ideology.

**Reintegration Question: If yes, have any efforts been made within DDR and related activities to promote positive intergroup relationships, and break down any perceived necessity for high intergroup division based on identity?**

Handling of identity based divisions is mixed. Officially, within Stage Two and Three of the RDRP, social reintegration has been regarded as satisfactory by the World Bank (Disch, Bezerra, Mobekk & Essoungou, 2010) and the Rwandan government (Republic of Rwanda, 2010). However, there appears to be almost no direct recognition of identity between combatant groups within the social reintegration initiatives, as outlined in World Bank and Rwandan Government documentation (e.g. RDRC, 2005a; Republic of Rwanda, 2010; Stavrou, Jorgensen & O’Riordan, 2007; World Bank, 2002, 2009a). Indeed, identity based reintegration is only given fleeting recognition within the programme literature, such as recognising the possibility that many ex-combatants may struggle to leave their military identity in the past (Stavrou, Jorgensen & O’Riordan, 2007; Rubagumya & Jorgensen, 2008). Most notably, a 2005 report produced for the RDRC specifically on environmental and social reintegration, fails to mention identity at all within its 40 pages (RDRC, 2005a).

Additionally, despite frequently referring to social reconciliation between groups as an important goal of the RDRP, this is rarely expanded upon. In actuality, many purportedly reconciliatory activities often refer to socio-economic initiatives. For instance, ex-combatant associations which are intended to further reconciliation, focus entirely on training economic business skills (Consia, 2008). Furthermore, the RDRP cannot officially discuss issues surrounding the Tutsi-Hutu divide, as these terms are banned in favour of ‘Rwandan’ identity (Tiemessen, 2004). Consequently, initiatives except for *ingando* have to avoid utilising this term, stifling any productive discussion around the ethnically homogenous ex-combatant communities.
Despite this lack of formal and direct recognition, Stavrou, Jorgensen & O’Riordan (2007) note some promising statistics regarding intergroup relations. Specifically, of the 500 ex-combatants surveyed, 41.8% of RPF ex-combatants, and 52.6% of Government of Rwanda ex-combatants stated that they had friendships with at least one ex-combatant originally from an opposing group.25

Initiatives within ingando are more negative regarding intergroup division. As Mgbako (2005) and Thomson (2011) note, the lectures surrounding the civil war and genocide are highly divisionist, placing the ‘blame’ for the conflict solely on Hutu, and by association ex-combatants formerly aligned with the Government of Rwanda. For instance, while sitting in on an ingando session for ex-combatants implicated in genocide acts, Thomson (2011) was told that the genocide was due to “deep seated and seething ethnic hatred that Hutu have for Tutsi” (p. 337). Teachings like this have important implications around healing divisionist framings, and also serve to further cement divisions between groups. Ex-combatants are not taught about these issues inclusively, nor does ingando appear to be centred on discussing these issues for the sake of moving forward. Instead, Hutu groups are actively singled out as the problem, while RPF ex-combatants are denoted as saviours (Tiemessen, 2004). Moreover, they arguably do not break down any perceived need for high intergroup division. If they achieve anything, it is to further reinforce the legitimacy of divisions between ex-combatants alignments.

Consequently, Rwanda’s management of identity based division can only be seen as mixed. Worryingly, the RDRP makes little direct recognition of the importance of identity in fuelling divisions between groups. Moreover, while reconciliation between groups is commonly stated as a programme objective, how this is to be achieved is rarely outlined. However, much of this may be undone by the divisionist teachings of ingando, which single out Hutu as a social group, and by association certain ex-combatants. As such, Rwandan ex-combatant management does not appear to be overtly promoting the breakdown of intergroup identities within the RDRP or ingando. Furthermore, much of ingando’s teachings appear to be doing the opposite by reinforcing an essentialist divide between ex-combatants.

**Structural Authoritarianism (Military Living Environments).** This section refers to the day-to-day hierarchies that ex-combatants lived under.

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25 This included Armed Group (AG) ex-combatants.
Conflict Question: Was the larger combatant community subject to authoritarian hierarchies that promoted or required non-pluralism and obedience to authority? If so, were such structures utilised in the day-to-day operation of each combatant group?

In the RPF’s early history it was a relatively pluralistic organisation. Prunier (2002) notes that prior to the invasion of Rwanda, the RPF was known to consult widely among its mid-ranks before making large decisions. However, in the lead-up to the war, this sense of pluralism began to fade. Strong intergroup cohesion was mandatory and coercion to take part in violence was present (Des Forges, 1999). Both Kuperman (2004) and Prunier (2002) describe the RPF as a highly cohesive and disciplined organisation, akin to any government military, and one that valued intragroup unity highly. This is perhaps best evidenced by the murder of RPF members in Uganda who favoured a diplomatic resolution rather than war (Kuperman, 2004). Discourse or communication with the enemy was, as typical in combat, never a possibility (Des Forges, 1999). Furthermore, they were supported by members of the Ugandan army, and thus had members with first-hand experience regarding the organisation of an active military unit (Orth, 2001).

The Government of Rwanda’s forces were also noted to be authoritarian in their constitution. However, there is considerably less information in this regard. Nonetheless, Prunier (2002) states that the forces were typical for a military organisation, with distinct hierarchies and rules of order. The Government forces were also supported through training sessions with the French military, further developing their capacity (Lemarchand, 2009). Exemplifying their systematic organisation and obedience to authority, Des Forges (1999) argues that it was the strict hierarchies within the Government forces which sustained the genocide towards the conflict’s conclusion. Specifically, she states that many non-military perpetrators of genocidal acts frequently refer to the authoritarian manner in which the Rwandan Government military not only organised themselves, but also outsiders. However, within the same report, Des Forges (1999) also notes that parts of the army were considerably less organised than the RPF, at least as manifested through their combat ability, describing them as “cannon fodder” (p. 703). 26

Overall, both the RPF and the Government of Rwanda are recognised as highly authoritarian organisations which demanded obedience from their members. Specifically,

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26 This may perhaps have been due to the Government of Rwanda’s relatively rapid expansion late into the war, recruiting civilians in order to compete with the RPF.
each organisation has recorded histories of hierarchical systems, and the application of these systems on a daily basis, in line with traditional military structures.

**Reintegration Question: Within ex-combatant management, have these structures been challenged with an emphasis on the expansion of pluralistic networks, and adoption of critical thinking?**

Recognition of the importance of breaking authoritarianism within reintegration processes through network expansion and critical thinking has been mixed. Within RDRP literature, ex-combatant networks have been recorded, with 85.4% of ex-combatants in 2005 stating that they regularly associated socially with other ex-combatants (RDRC, 2005a). However, whether this has been the work of the RDRP is unclear, as the only formal associations mentioned within programme documentation refer to skill training workshops (see Consia, 2008, p. 23). Additionally, the majority of demobilisation and reintegration programmes include all ex-combatant affiliations, and ex-combatants may be reinserted into multi-faction communities (Republic of Rwanda, 2010). While these may inadvertently promote reconciliation and pluralistic relationships, they are by no means centred on them. Additionally, as previously noted many ex-combatants (41.8% of RPF and 52.6% of Government of Rwanda) primarily associate with members of their own former affiliation (Stavrou, Jorgensen & O’Riordan, 2007). Consequently, the potential for ex-combatants to associate primarily or solely within their own identity group becomes high.

*Ingando* is troubling for the issue of authoritarianism. This problem manifests through lectures which focus on the politics and ideology of the RPF (PRI, 2004). From a certain perspective, this provides a unifying force, as former Government of Rwanda ex-combatants, and RPF ex-combatants are brought under one inclusive banner (Mgbako, 2005; PRI, 2004). However, when the previously divisionist teachings of other *ingando* components are considered, such as result appears unlikely (Thomson, 2011). Furthermore, there is another possibility that *ingando* itself instils a new type of authoritarianism within ex-combatants, in that much of the lectures seem to promote an uncritical championing of the RPF and at the same time ignoring many of the failings and war crimes committed during the conflict while ignoring its failures and crimes (Thomson, 2011). Additionally, it is important to note within *ingando* lectures, ex-combatants are not
permitted to engage in critical discussion with their teachers on these issues, and dissent is not tolerated (Thomson, 2011).

This approach may indeed unite all Rwandan ex-combatants under one ideological banner. However, because it is not done so critically or voluntarily, such unity may only be a façade, with non-supporters of the RPF forced into towing the party line. As such, any pluralistic relationships forged under this situation may be tenuous at best, and false at worst. Moreover, these teachings may serve to enhance authoritarian ideologies within RPF ex-combatants.

Consequently, Rwandan ex-combatant management cannot be seen to actively challenge authoritarian hierarchies. Specifically, while there are some promising signs of intergroup communication, these appear to be occurring despite any direct recognition of the issue within the RDRP. Furthermore, teachings to ex-combatants within ingando handle the issue of obedience to authority poorly. At best it is simply clumsy, while at worst it is manipulative, with the potential to create and enforce new authoritarian ideals surrounding RPF supremacy.

**Institutionalised Discrimination (Military Living Environments).** This block refers to discrimination against outgroups undergone in organised military group violence.

*Conflict Question: Were combatants encouraged, and officially sanctioned to discriminate against, and dehumanise outgroups through avenues such as propaganda? Either opposing combatant groups, civilians, or both.*

The RPF appears to have participated in mild discrimination towards the Government of Rwanda and civilian groups. As an opposition to the Rwandan government, the RPF frequently promoted anti-establishment messages, and discriminated against Government of Rwanda combatants as being corrupt and racist (Lemarchand, 2009; Mamdani, 2001). Des Forges (1999) also argues that certain RPF members expressed belief in the Hamitic hypothesis, and used it as a discriminatory platform. The Hamitic hypothesis refers to the now disproven notion that Tutsi originated in Northern African, and therefore were genetically superior and fit for rule (Buckley-Zistal, 2009). However it is unclear as to what level this type of discourse was officially sanctioned by the RPF leadership.
Interestingly, this vacuum of documented highly discriminatory rhetoric exists alongside large scale targeted violence by the RPF towards non-combatants. As will be discussed later in the chapter, the majority of the RPFs discriminatory targeting reveals itself through systematic violence perpetrated by the organisation. Consequently, while being cautious of placing too high of a value on inference rather than direct evidence, one has to consider whether the history of RPF discrimination is simply not known, rather than non-existent. This proposal is further supported by the existence of highly discriminatory policies and rhetoric by the RPF post-war once in power (Lemarchand, 2009). For example, Reyntjens (2004) quotes an RPF ideologue as stating that because Hutu elites all prescribe to ethnic ideologies, they must be excluded from power. Furthermore, the RPFs aforementioned reintegration programmes are frequently discriminatory, unfairly targeting Hutu as a mass group responsible for the genocide (Thomson, 2011).

Comparatively, the Government of Rwanda was documented as highly discriminatory towards both the RPF and Tutsi civilians. They also frequently resorted to dehumanising propaganda. In the early stages of the conflict, Lemarchand (2009) notes that the Government and its supporters promoted an anti-Tutsi stance, arguing that an RPF victory would see the return of colonial style repression for Hutu. The memory of the 1972 genocide of Hutu in neighbouring Burundi by Tutsi (Hintjens, 1999) was also capitalised upon, and used as an example of Tutsi cruelty (Lemarchand, 2009). Furthermore, it was seen to promote an inevitability of conflict between Tutsi and Hutu, and therefore a need for defence and victory rather than compromise (Lemarchand, 2009).

Tutsi women were also singled out in propaganda. Specifically, they were displayed as seductresses, morally evil, and later quite literally ‘in bed’ with the French military contingent in Rwanda, and therefore perverting the course of the conflict using sex (Green, 2002).

After the assassination of Habyarimana these discriminatory messages intensified. In what would arguably come to epitomise the conflict, Government forces calling for the genocide referred to the Tutsi and the RPF as cockroaches or inyenzi (Pottier, 2002). As such, Tutsi were dehumanised, and therefore not only seen as a threat to Rwandan society, but also not worthy of moral concern. Much of this propaganda was relayed by the

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27 In this case, portraying Tutsi and the RPF as synonymous.
government controlled Radio Rwanda, and the government supported Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (Li, 2004).

Consequently, there is unevenness in the discriminatory attitudes espoused by each combatant group. During the conflict, the RPF appears to have only promoted mildly discriminatory messages, and not utilised dehumanisation. Moreover, much of this has been directed at the Government of Rwanda, as would be expected of an active and violent opposition group. Comparatively, the Government of Rwanda has engaged in highly discriminatory and dehumanising acts within all levels of the organisation. Specifically, they have portrayed both the RPF and the entire Rwandan Tutsi population in a discriminatory and dehumanising manner during the course of the conflict.

**Reintegration Question: If yes, have ex-combatants been attempted to be re-educated on these issues? Specifically, have ex-combatants had their potentially discriminatory and un-peaceful perceptions of outgroups challenged?**

There has been little direct recognition of these issues within the RDRP. Furthermore, when recognition is made it is solely in regards to destructive anti-Tutsi messages. Indeed, much of the RDRP documentation (e.g. Consia, 2008; Republic of Rwanda, 2010) recognises the prevalence of these discriminatory ideologies within Rwandan society, and ex-combatants. However, it does not seem to propose that these are issues for the RDRP to solve. Rather, the role of the RDRP in combating these discriminatory narratives appears to be through supporting ex-combatants economically. In turn, this will encourage them to participate in wider societal reconciliation initiatives which do tackle these issues such as gacaca (Consia, 2008).

Conversely, *ingando* addresses anti-Tutsi ideologies strongly. Covered throughout the lecture topics of Rwandan history and the civil war and genocide, it was intended to promote reconciliation within the ex-combatant communities (PRI, 2004). Unfortunately, the literature finds that they have been addressed in an unhealthy manner, even encouraging new discriminatory ideologies. Framed as the “Rwandan disease,” the Tutsi-Hutu divide is sometimes blamed solely on colonial influence, while at other times innate Hutu characteristics and prejudices are blamed, or conversely both are implicated (PRI, 2004). Regardless, none of these propositions is supported by the existing literature on Rwandan history, which notes deeply rooted historical divides (Vansina, 2003). Penal Reform International (2004), a donor to the programme, has criticised *ingando* for
omitting crucial historical facts. Notably, the history of Tutsi political hegemony and abuses is rarely covered. When Tutsi oppression has been raised, it is referred to as being done under coercion by colonists, and unlike Hutu abuses not due to individual or group characteristics. Similarly, RPF abuses during the war are ignored. Indeed, the RPF’s official stance appears to be that no institutionally backed discrimination or crimes were ever committed (Kuperman, 2004). In addition, the range of economic, social, and political pressures which have been attributed to fuelling the war and genocide from the former Government of Rwanda’s perspective (Staub, 2011) is absent from teachings.

Furthermore, ex-combatants within ingando have no ability to engage with lecturers on these topics. Thomson (2011) and Mgbako (2005) both note that ingando becomes a case where ex-combatants are simply told they are wrong, rather than engaging deeply in why they are wrong. Thomson (2011) argues this is creating a new environment in which Hutu ex-combatants feel discriminated against. One ingando participant asked her “to alert the outside world about how being Hutu is a crime in the new Rwanda” (p. 338).

Consequently, ex-combatants are given a simplified, poor, and erroneous account of discrimination within Rwanda from ingando. In comparison, the RDRP across all stages does not appear to directly approach this issue in any programme initiative, leaving it the responsibility of broader reconciliation measures. Additionally, teachings within ingando encourage a new type of discrimination from RPF ex-combatants towards Hutu aligned ex-combatants.

**Intergroup Violence and Negative Intergroup Contact.** This section proposes that committing military type violence against members of another group should be conceptualised as an instance of negative group contact. Therefore, as per negative contact theory, negative attitudes towards said group will increase.

*Conflict Question A: What groups did combatants violently interact with on a regular basis?*

The RPF and the Government of Rwanda had frequent violent interactions. In total, the UCDP has recorded 115 separate battles between the two combatant groups during the war and genocide. A best estimate of battle deaths resulting from these battles is 7217 persons (Sundberg & Melander, 2013).
Both groups also interacted violently with the civilian population. According to the UCDP, the RPF has been recorded engaging in violence with civilians 49 times during the conflict. Similarly, the Government of Rwanda’s forces are stated to have fought civilians in 137 separate instances (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). There is disagreement regarding the death toll resulting from RPF attacks towards civilians. Human Rights Watch estimates that the RPF killed 25 000 to 30 000 civilians during the war (Des Forges, 1999), while the UCDP puts the number much lower, at 1323 dead. The Government of Rwanda is estimated to have killed 500 000 civilians, primarily as part of the genocide (Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

*Conflict Question: Were these interactions based on identity grounds?*

Generally, these instances of violence appear to be based on identity. Clearly, for RPF-Government of Rwanda interactions, the grounds for violence are based on combatant group identity. Furthermore, prior to the genocide, Des Forges (1999) and Prunier (2002) note sporadic instances of sanctioned violence towards Tutsi civilians from the Government of Rwanda. After the genocide had begun, the Government of Rwanda began targeting civilians en masse based on Tutsi identity, or supporting Tutsi individuals (Lemarchand, 2009; Prunier, 2002, 2009). As such, moderate Hutus, Hutu supporting the RPF, or other movements against the government were frequently targeted.

Due to a lack of official admission, it becomes less clear as to whether the violence towards civilians perpetrated by the RPF was based on identity grounds. Nonetheless, Des Forges (1999) argues that the fact that the RPF so frequently attacked civilians, and at such large numbers, reveals that they were explicitly targeting civilians on a systematic level. For instance, the RPF would commonly call civilians to attend town meetings, and then throw grenades into the gathered crowd and open fire with small arms (Des Forges, 1999; Lemarchand, 2009). This became so common that many civilians around Rwanda darkly joked that “kwitaba inama, ‘to die’ in Kinyarwanda, was the same as kwitaba inama, ‘to attend a meeting’” (Lemarchand, 2009, p. 90). Furthermore, civilian groups posing no threat and attacked by the RPF were often identified as entirely Hutu, belonging to the Government’s ruling party, or regional elites. For instance, Des Forges (1999) notes multiple instances wherein the RPF has killed civilians in newly claimed towns on the

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28 For a highly detailed itemised account of RPF violence towards civilians, see Chapter “The Rwandan Patriotic Front” in Des Forges (1999).
basis of ethnicity, or political alignment. Similarly, families of Government soldiers were executed, as were local leaders and known donors to the government. The RPF commonly engaged in summary executions, often based on poor evidence. For example, RPF Officer Gasore stated in regards to the killing of the entire town of Ndere, “we supposed that those still alive were alive because they had collaborated [with the Government] and we killed them all” (Des Forges, 1999, p. 716). As such, it is highly plausible that the RPF was targeting groups based on their identity.

**Reintegration Question: Have ex-combatants had these strong occurrences of negative contact challenged with controlled instances of positive contact with members of those groups which violent interaction previously took place?**

These occurrences of negative contact have only been challenged mildly and inadvertently. First, negative contact between ex-combatant affiliations has not been directly challenged within either the RDRP or ingando. For instance, within the RDRP documentation (e.g. Republic of Rwanda, 2010) there is no record of initiatives wherein ex-combatants are explicitly required to engage in controlled interaction with others based on affiliation. Similarly, while ingando involves both combatant groups, discussion is severely limited, creating a barrier to sustained positive contact. Combined with the often confrontational nature of ingando, any long-term positive contact is unlikely (Thomson, 2011). However, ex-combatants do participate in these programmes alongside ex-combatants of other affiliations. As such, there is a possibility that by doing so, ex-combatants may develop positive impressions of other groups. Nonetheless, this would be an inadvertent product of the programme. More positively, the RDRC does monitor intergroup ex-combatant perceptions (RDRC, 2005a).

Second, negative contact between ex-combatants and civilians is handled better. For instance, the RDRP contains pre-demobilisation sensitivity seminars with host communities, presentations on the importance of the RDRP, and regular problem solving workshops and ex-combatants are encouraged to engage in civic duties. A 2008 study by the RDRC found this to be relatively successful, with most ex-combatants stating they participated regularly in community activities (Rubagumya & Jorgensen, 2008). Interestingly, many ex-combatants also attributed their ability to communicate properly with civilians to ingando lessons on civic responsibilities, and the role of social and

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29 However, no available literature denotes what ‘regular’ means in this context.
political institutions (Rubagumya & Jorgensen, 2008). Positive social perceptions of ex-combatants by community members has been found in surveyed populations, although ex-combatants sometimes believed the opposite, reporting feeling untrusted by the community (RDRC, 2005a).

Therefore, the contesting of negative perceptions between groups is mixed. Specifically, the handling of intensely negative contact between ex-combatant factions is found to be relatively poor, with little to no direct addressing of the issue within the RDRP. Furthermore, ingando teachings on the civil war and genocide risk further reinforcing these perceptions. Comparatively, ex-combatant and civilian relationships have been handled in a superior fashion, with ex-combatants actively encouraged to engage with civilians.

**Conclusion**

In sum, the Rwandan civil war and genocide can be viewed as a conflict containing a high degree of sociopsychological issues. This is particularly noted within Government of Rwanda ex-combatants, though RPF members also experienced a high level of sociopsychological experiences. Despite this prevalence, Rwanda’s ex-combatant management measures – the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme, and ingando – have addressed these issues in an uneven manner.

In applying the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Three, a number of shortcomings are revealed. First, the RDRP makes scarce direct recognition of the importance of identity in fuelling intergroup division. Additionally, elements of ingando single out Hutu, and therefore Government of Rwanda ex-combatants, potentially exacerbating intergroup division. Second, regarding structural authoritarianism, the RDRP and ingando have mixed results. Specifically, while ex-combatant inter-affiliation networks are promoted, they rarely centre on developing social relationships. Moreover, ingando appears to instil new authoritarian attitudes, and misinformation. Third, combating discriminatory attitudes within reintegration is poor. Little specific attention has been given on repairing inter-affiliation ex-combatant relationships within the RDRP, and while ingando challenges anti-Tutsi ideologies, they risk instilling new anti-Hutu messages. Fourth, addressing negative perceptions of groups due to violence has only been
partially addressed. Specifically, the RDRP has successfully encouraged ex-combatants to engage in sustained contact with civilian populations they previously fought. However, no such initiative is promoted for inter-affiliation ex-combatant relationships.

As such, the addressing of sociopsychological issues in Rwandan ex-combatant management is rather poor. Frequently issues are not addressed, or only inadvertently addressed in part by initiatives centred on other themes, and thus treated in an indifferent manner. Conversely, at other times sociopsychological issues are addressed, but not in a positive, or reconciliatory manner. Consequently, from a social psychological perspective it is doubtful as to whether reintegration in Rwanda can truly achieve the total peaceful assimilation of ex-combatants into society.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR DEMOBILISATION, REINSERTION, AND REINTEGRATION: EX-COMBATANT MANAGEMENT IN BURUNDI AFTER THE CIVIL WAR
Following on from the Rwandan case, this chapter will present the case study of ex-combatant management in Burundi. First, a short summary of Burundi’s history will be outlined, with particular attention paid to the cultural divisions, grievances, and conflicts which informed the civil war. Second, a summary of the Burundian Civil War and the mass killings which preceded it will be given. Third, this will be followed by a historical outline of the National Programme for Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NPDRR). As in the previous case study, these summaries are presented to illustrate the broader context in which these ex-combatant management programmes exist. Fourth, the analysis will outline whether the issues presented in the social psychological framework were present in the conflict, and whether have been addressed in Burundi’s NPDRR, and if so, in what manner. Identical to the previous case study, the two main combatant groups in the conflict will be subject to this analysis. In the case of Burundi, these are the Government of Burundi and the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD).

The Background to Conflict

Burundi holds a similar history to its neighbour Rwanda. Founded as the medieval Kingdom of Burundi, it shared many of the characteristics of its Central African neighbours (Oliver & Atmore, 2001). This included the Tutsi-Hutu-Twa divisions, with only slight differences (Lemarchand, 2009). For instance, within the Tutsi were two sub-groups, the Tutsi-Banyaruguru, a high status minority; and the Tutsi-Hima, the lower status Tutsi majority. Additionally, residing above Tutsi in importance were Ganwa, a small aristocratic class comprising the royal court which has seen little recognition in recent decades since the abolition of Burundi’s monarchy (Scherrer, 2002). Otherwise, Burundi shared the same power discrepancies as in Rwanda, with Tutsi comprising the power elite outside of the royal court (Reyntjens, 2000). Demographically, Hutu dominated the population, comprising approximately 85-90% of the population, Tutsi 10-14%, and Twa the final 1% (Uvin, 1999).

In 1890 Burundi was incorporated into the colony of German East Africa (Boshoff, Vrey & Rautenbauch, 2010). After the Second World War, the colony was seized and Burundi and Rwanda were allocated to Belgium, ruled as Ruanda-Urundi (Lemarchand, 2009). This period saw a hardening of societal divisions, only differentiated to Rwanda by
the existence of the Ganwa. Nonetheless, Tutsi increasingly took hold of Burundian politics and gradually overshadowed the monarchy in any practical sense. By the 1950’s 31 of the 33 members of the Board of Governors were Tutsi, as were all 45 head chiefs, and 544 of the 559 sub-chiefs (Uvin, 1999).

Independence for Burundi in 1962 did not result in a long-term shift from Tutsi domination, although power did initially appear to be shifting to Hutu (Prunier, 2002). In 1959 there were multiple cases of mass anti-Tutsi violence. Between 1961 and 1964, Tutsi refugees who fled due to attacks and increasingly anti-Tutsi politics made attacks into Burundi which resulted in more retributive killings of Tutsi (Uvin, 1999). Over 12 000 Tutsi were killed in this period, with up to 70 percent of the Tutsi population fleeing to Rwanda (Lemarchand, 1970). During this transition, the Ganwa Prince Regent was also murdered, and his popular bi-ethnic party fell (Uvin, 1999).

This power challenge soon faltered. By 1966 Uvin (1999) finds that Tutsi-Hima had gained the power monopoly in Burundi. Not only did Tutsi dominate the government military, but the Tutsi political group UPRONA (French: Union pour le Progrés) took hold of political power and declared Burundi a republic, though effectively it would quickly become a dictatorship. Tutsi domination of politics would continue nearly unchallenged until 1993 (Lemarchand, 2009).

The 1972 genocide was perhaps the most important event in Burundi’s history prior to civil war in 1993. The genocide was a response to a small Hutu rebel incursion (which killed up to 3000 Tutsi), resulting in 200 000 to 300 000 civilian Hutu deaths by the Tutsi dominated army (Akwanga & Ewus, 2010; Lemarchand, 2009). An estimated 300 000 Hutu also fled Burundi in response to the attacks (Reyntjens, 2000). Furthermore, the fallout from the genocide solidified the military as a Tutsi mechanism, with nearly all Hutu removed (Lemarchand, 2009). As Reyntjens (2000) notes, the violence in 1972 reinforced fears of Tutsi extremism within the Hutu population, but the initial rebellion also developed an anxiety among Tutsi that the Hutu majority might try and eradicate Tutsi. Overall, Uvin (1999) argues the genocide “crystallized Hutu and Tutsi identities and created a climate of permanent mutual fear” (p. 258).

In the lead up to civil war Burundi experienced a number of societal shifts. Similar to Rwanda, Burundi relied on primary exports economically, and in particular coffee which saw a dramatic drop in international prices in the 1980s (Lemarchand, 1994).
However, the bulk of Burundi’s problems were largely social and political. For instance, the 1980s saw a strong decline in human rights, religious and political freedoms restricted, and torture increasingly utilised by the government. Government crackdowns and recurring attempted coups also contributed to an environment of fear (Reyntjens, 2000). Discrimination against Hutu by Tutsi regional leaders was also rife (Lemarchand, 1994).

In 1988 an army led coup d’état took control of Burundi. The new Tutsi President Pierre Buyoya, initially differed little from past leaders, however in 1990 he began the transition to democracy (Reyntjens, 2000). This led to a greater representation of Hutu in regional politics, and many political freedoms were regained. This culminated in the June 1993 election of Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu (Lemarchand, 2009).


On October 21st 1993 Ndadaye was assassinated by members of the Burundian Army signalling the beginning of the Burundian Civil War (United Nations Security Council, 1996). Immediately after Ndadaye’s murder, Hutu groups led by Ndadaye’s former Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) party erupted into mass violence against Tutsi (Reyntjens, 2000). Some classify this as genocide (United Nations Security Council, 1996), while others categorise it as mass killing (Lemarchand, 2009; Reyntjens, 2000). This resulted in between 30 000 and 100 000 killed. In addition to Hutu perpetrated violence, the Tutsi dominated army also responded in kind, targeting an equal number of Hutu regardless of their involvement (Lemarchand, 2009).

Following the mass killings, attempts at establishing a government were made. This resulted in the election of FRODEBU aligned Cyprien Ntaryamira in February 1994. However, his presidency was short lived; he was assassinated on April 6 alongside Rwandan President Habyarimana (Prunier, 2002). FRODEBU saw another member, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya gain the President’s position two days later, however the political situation continued to decline. In June, members of FRODEBU displeased with concessions made towards the Tutsi population split to create the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), which
quickly became the dominant rebel movement in Burundi (Reyntjens, 2000).\textsuperscript{30} The civil war would intensify from this point. In 1996 the Tutsi-dominated army overthrew the government, and re-established Buyoya as President (Lemarchand, 2009). In 2001 a transitional government was established, leading to a mix of Hutu and Tutsi within cabinet, although the President (Buyoya) and Vice-President (Domitien Ndayizézé) were both Tutsi.

In 2003 the CNDD-FDD signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement along with most other combatant groups (Wolpe, 2011). Prior to this, the civil war had developed at a steady pace, marked with multiple attempts at brokering peace. This led to the election of CNDD-FDD’s Pierre Nkurunziza as President in a Hutu dominated parliament in 2005 (Wolpe, 2011). In the present study, the establishment of an elected government is taken to signal the end to the conflict. However, it should be recognised that this is not a universal agreement, with many citing either the 2006 or 2008 Palipehutu-FNL\textsuperscript{31} peace agreements as signalling the end of the war (Wolpe, 2011).

**Burundian Ex-Combatant Management – The National Programme for Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration**

Ex-combatant management in Burundi is implemented through the National Programme for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NPDRR)\textsuperscript{32} (Scanteam, 2010; World Bank, 2004). Within Burundi, the programme is centrally administered by the government’s National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NCDRR) (Scanteam, 2010). Like Rwanda, it receives administrative and financial assistance from the World Bank via the Transitional Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (TDRP), and previously the Multi-Regional Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP). The UN has also provided ground assistance.

\textsuperscript{30} It should be noted that the CNDD-FDD is itself a joining of two organisations, with the CNDD representing the political body of the organisation, and the FDD the military wing (Reyntjens, 2000).

\textsuperscript{31} Palipehutu-FNL was the second largest combatant group after the CNDD-FDD.

\textsuperscript{32} However, certain documentation, primarily that sourced from the United Nations, combines the NPDRR with the UN’s disarmament program, thus referring to it as the National Program for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NPDDRR). For the purposes of the present study, the denotation NPDRR has been chosen due to its more prominent usage, and lack of focus on disarmament issues.
The NCDRR was founded in 2004 and is currently in its third stage. The first stage began in 2005 and ran for one year (Boshoff & Vrey, 2006). This stage was primarily concerned with reintegrating ex-combatants from the two main combatant groups. Stage Two was relatively more open ended, with a projected run time of two to four years. In actuality, it ran from approximately early 2006 until the end of 2008, closing on the 31st of December (World Bank, 2009b). Unlike Stage One, participants in Stage Two were entirely drawn from the new Burundian National Defence Force (BNDF) and Burundian National Police (BNP). These two groups were themselves comprised of both CNDD-FDD and Government of Burundi ex-combatants, integrated under Security Sector Reform initiatives (World Bank, 2009c). Originally intended to be the entirety of the programme, reintegration in Burundi was deemed incomplete at this point. Consequently, this led to a third stage being funded in 2009 by the World Bank. Although not officially considered a third stage of the NPDRR – its official status is unclear - for the purposes of the study it has been conceptualised as such (World Bank, 2009c, 2009d). As this stage has primarily focused on FNL ex-combatants it will be examined scarcely in the following analysis.

All stages of the NPDRR have covered reintegration on economic, social, communal, and health issues (World Bank, 2009d). In many ways, thematic foci have echoed those in Rwanda, most likely due to the presence of the World Bank through the TDRP and MDRP as a planning body. A summary of each stage’s descriptive components can be seen below in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Stage I</th>
<th>Stage II</th>
<th>Stage III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Ex-Combatant Communities</td>
<td>5 000 Government of Burundi ex-combatants, and 9 000 Armed Political</td>
<td>41 000 BNDF and BNP ex-combatants, plus dependents (including former)</td>
<td>6 000 FNL ex-combatants, and BNDF and BNP ex-combatants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Notes: These targets are pre-program estimates, and do not reflect actual numbers. World Bank (2009b) notes that Stages I and II have demobilised just over 26 000 ex-combatants. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties and Movements (APPM), primarily CNDD-FDD ex-combatants, plus dependents</th>
<th>Government and CNDD-FDD ex-combatants</th>
<th>vulnerable from Stage II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility Criteria</td>
<td>Disarmament, Burundian nationality, combatant affiliation, basic military knowledge</td>
<td>Disarmament, Burundian nationality, combatant affiliation, basic military knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stated Objectives</td>
<td>Socio-economic demobilisation, reintegration of ex-combatants, downsizing of military and establish new National Defence Force</td>
<td>Consolidate peace in region, support the demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants, promote socio-economic lives of ex-combatants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Boshoff & Vrey, 2006; Caramés, 2009; World Bank, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d.

Ex-combatants have been provided with demobilisation assistance and reinsertion support. Primarily, demobilisation assistance has manifested via medical screenings, socio-economic assessment, orientation for reinsertion, and medical counselling (World Bank, 2009c). This was conducted in cantoned demobilisation camps, which ex-combatants lived in for up to ten days within Stage One, and slightly longer in Two and Three (Boshoff & Vrey, 2006; World Bank, 2009c). Upon reinsertion, ex-combatants were given a reinsertion allowance equivalent to 18 months of wages, paid across intervals, and a transportation grant (Boshoff & Vrey, 2006). Wage levels were based on former rates for Government of Burundi forces ranging from $US371-1195.58 (World Bank, 2009b). Disarmament is also administered in demobilisation camps by the UN (Boshoff & Vrey, 2006).

In a similar fashion to Rwanda, economic components appear to have been the main focus of the NPDRR. However, unlike Rwanda, little reintegration support has manifested in cash payments. Instead, ex-combatants are asked to choose from one of the five following courses of economic support: income generating community based activities, vocational training and self-employment, continued formal education through
state schooling systems, business/entrepreneurship training, or the promotion of employment to specific employers who – subsidised by the programme – provide a job and training (Boshoff & Vrey, 2006). Micro-projects administered by the programme are also available. Additionally, ex-combatants are also supported in any attempts to purchase land via advocacy (World Bank, 2009b, 2009c).

Social reintegration was also present within the NPDRR. A 2004 World Bank report on Stage Two notes that “the need for reconciliation and community involvement in the DRRP is […] considered critical for successful reintegration” (World Bank, 2004, p. 7). Despite this statement, social reintegration is given little attention within NPDRR literature. Primarily, social reintegration is seen to be achieved through ex-combatant participation in associations, both mixed and solely constituted of ex-combatants (Boshoff & Vrey, 2006; World Bank, 2009b). In addition, community sensitization on ex-combatant issues has been provided, and counsellors have been trained to disseminate these teachings. Public awareness is also noted to be an aim of social reintegration (Boshoff & Vrey, 2006; World Bank, 2004). Psychosocial mental health support was also provided to ex-combatants suffering from combat related trauma from Stage Two onwards (World Bank, 2004, 2009c).

Applying the Theoretical Framework

The following section will operationalize the theoretical framework as outlined in Chapter Three. This has been carried out in the same manner as the Rwandan case study, with a series of questions representing each of the four blocks of the framework. Each question is denoted as either a Conflict Question or a Reintegration Question.

**Intergroup Division.** This first block represents the intergroup and intragroup processes which create and legitimise social discrepancies. As outlined in the theoretical framework, this has been represented by identity.

**Conflict Question:** Were combatant groups actively divided upon identity based lines? If so, what type?
The CNDD-FDD was strongly divided on identity lines (Lemarchand, 2009). Primarily, it was seen as a Hutu organisation. As outlined by Reyntjens (2000) and Uvin (1999), the CNDD-FDD was largely formed due to disagreements within FRODEBU around concessions to Tutsi powers, and lack of promotion of Hutu interests. Consequently, the CNDD-FDD came to be seen as an almost exclusively Hutu organisation (International Crisis Group, 2002), with membership not explicitly consigned to Hutu, but holding little pulling power for identifying Tutsi to join (Vandeginste, 2009). Scherrer (2002) identifies that the political wing (CNDD) was dominated by Hutu intellectuals, while the military wing (FDD) was formed from Hutu based militias. Dilworth (2006) also notes that rare Tutsi members of the CNDD-FDD rarely rose above being questioned due to their ethnicity. Certain CNDD-FDD elites, in particular Léonard Nyangoma also aligned themselves with the genocidal Interahamwe in Rwanda (Scherrer, 2002).

Perhaps most important to the CNDD-FDD and many of its members was the memory of the 1972 genocide against Hutu. Combatants within the organisation had these events salient in their collective identity, and as such were opposed to any further consolidation of Tutsi hegemony, for fear of repeat events (Uvin, 2007). For instance, Lemarchand (2009) notes that two leading members of the CNDD-FDD who actively promoted anti-Tutsi/pro-Hutu divisions, Pierre Nkurunziza and Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, suffered heavy losses of family within the genocide, as had many of their subordinates.

Additionally, there was a distinctly anti-Government identity within the CNDD-FDD. In an interview with Uvin (2007), a CNDD-FDD ex-combatant stated “[t]he communal administration persecuted people, and for that reason, I and many others joined the rebels” (p. 5). Others argued that the assassination of Ndadaye in 1993 illustrated that the Government of Burundi lacked any ability to maintain security in the country, and therefore it had to be established through rebellion, while others saw the anti-democratic processes of the armed forces to be symbolic of their desire to maintain Tutsi hegemony (Nindorera, 2012; Uvin, 2007).

34 Though there was some variance within the organisation, with FDD subordinates noted to be more radical than those aligned solely to the CNDD (Boshoff, Vrey & Rautenbach, 2010).
The Government of Burundi forces were also noted to be highly divided on identity lines. The Burundian armed forces and political elites were significantly dominated by Tutsi, and had been since the 1972 genocide (Uvin, 1999). Political domination reached a peak in 1996 with the military coup, and installation of Buyoya as president (Lemarchand, 2009). As Reyntjens stated in 2000, the army had become an “essential life insurance policy” for Tutsi in Burundi, thus almost becoming synonymous with their identity (p. 24). This was exacerbated in 1994 with the Rwandan genocide, which further strengthened Tutsi resolve to keep ethnic hold of the Burundian in fear of genocide by the Hutu majority. The mass domination of the Burundian armed forces and purposeful exclusion of Hutu has also been noted by many other scholars (Douma & Gasana, 2008; Nindorera, 2012; Ould-Abdallah, 2000; Rumin, 2012; Wolpe, 2011).

Consequently, both groups within the dyad Government of Burundi-CNDD-FDD are considered identity salient. Specifically, the CNDD-FDD is noted to be a group divided upon both ethnic Hutu lines, and strong opposition to the Government of Burundi regime. Similarly, the Government of Burundi is noted to hold strong Tutsi identity values, and actively excluded ethnic Hutu individuals.

**Reintegration Question:** If yes, have any efforts been made within DDR and related activities to promote positive intergroup relationships, and break down any perceived necessity for high intergroup division based on identity?

The recognition of identity divisions between ex-combatants within the NPDRR has been mixed. Like Rwanda, social reintegration is touted as important within literature on the programme (Boshoff & Vrey, 2006; World Bank, 2004, 2009b, 2009c), however it is given little detailed attention, and any initiatives are rarely expanded upon. Furthermore, there is scarce evaluation literature on the programme, hampering the ability to examine the perceived success or scope of these initiatives. Nonetheless, despite being classified as a mixed success, intergroup reconciliation looks to be stronger than in the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (RDRP).

Primarily, the promotion of positive intergroup relations within the NPDRR seems to have been the responsibility of community associations. Similar to Rwanda, these programmes have been centred on economic and sometimes social initiatives (Douma & Gasana, 2008). The associations were intended to bring ex-combatants of differing factions together, and also the civilian population, in order to encourage intergroup dialogue.
As of 2008 there were 132 associations, and between 6-12 percent of ex-combatants are believed to be members (Douma & Gasana, 2008). Additionally, campaigns based on providing “information and sensitization of ex-combatants, communities and society-at-large” have been referenced within NPDRR literature (World Bank, 2004, p. 7). These appear to have primarily focused on the civilian population, but also towards ex-combatants. However, no expansion is provided on what this constitutes. Furthermore, the 2009 World Bank review of Stage One and Two states these sensitization initiatives were executed poorly and at a much lower frequency than planned (World Bank, 2009b).

Furthermore, Uvin (2007) notes that ex-combatants tended to return to their hometowns. This is completely understandable, and perhaps an obvious statement. However, it exposes a disconcerting possibility in that ex-combatants, whether through daily life or community associations, may not be spending much time with ex-combatants of opposing affiliations. Consequently, social reintegation initiatives are only reinforcing intragroup, rather than intergroup, friendship and dialogue. Uvin (2007) also states that ex-combatants generally demobilised into mono-ethnic communities in Burundi. He argues that in many ways this can be beneficial, as community acceptance of their war-time actions will be higher. However, again this can lead to little inter-ethnic communication. Douma and Gasana (2008) note that this has stemmed from the Burundian government’s push for the programme to be centred on the growth of individual ex-combatants, arguing that “the communal approach is not deep-rooted in the Burundian way of life” (p. 18).

Consequently, the promotion of intergroup relations within the NPDRR can only be viewed as mixed. Strong plans of social reintegration have been attempted, and some implemented well such as community associations, but a lack of scope, and enforced importance has weakened these initiatives. Furthermore, an emphasis on individual growth rather than community integration has hindered the growth of positive intergroup relations.

**Structural Authoritarianism (Military Living Environments).** This second section refers to the day-to-day systematic hierarchies that ex-combatants lived under.

**Conflict Question:** Was the larger combatant community subject to authoritarian hierarchies that promoted or required non-pluralism and obedience to authority? If so, were such structures utilised in the day-to-day operation of each combatant group?
The CNDD-FDD was recorded to have been a moderately authoritarian organisation. For example, interviews conducted by Dilworth (2006) with former CNDD-FDD representatives make reference to a code of military discipline within the organisation, with a well-defined structure. For combatants who disobeyed or violated the movement’s code of conduct, court martials and summary executions were utilised. Boshoff and Vrey (2006) also recognise the high level of discipline which increasingly appeared in the group as the conflict progressed. Wolpe (2011) argues that the CNDD-FDD was, and remains, a highly authoritarian organisation. Furthermore, Dilworth (2006) also notes that the CNDD-FDD modelled the structure of the movement on the Burundian armed forces which, as will be discussed next, were hierarchical and authoritarian. However, Nindorera (2012) notes some variance within the CNDD-FDD on attitudes towards authoritarianism amongst group elites. Specifically, some wanted it to become an utterly authoritarian group which strict hierarchies, while others desired a less militaristic approach. Interviews with Uvin (2007) reveal the existence of forced membership.

Direct information on the nature of the Government of Burundi’s internal structures is less available. Nonetheless, the indications point towards a traditionally hierarchical organisation. To begin, the mono-ethnic makeup of the Government of Burundi, in particular the army has been suggested to indicate a closed non-pluralistic system (Nindorera, 2012). For instance, Lemarchand (2009) makes frequent reference to the highly ruthless nature of elites within the Government forces. In the lead up to civil war, the armed forces were known to forcibly purge unwanted elements from their ranks (Daley, 2006) and responded to uprisings with extreme violence (UN, 1995). The Burundian army has also been noted to frequently ignore democratic processes and was seen to be a dictatorial regime (Nindorera, 2012). Forced membership into Government forces was sometimes utilised (Uvin, 2007).

As such, both groups within the dyad Government of Burundi-CNDD-FDD are considered to have been moderately authoritarian. Specifically, each organisation has recorded historical accounts of being closed, non-pluralistic, and monolithic groups with notable levels of discipline applied to regular life.
Reintegration Question: Within ex-combatant management, have these structures been challenged with an emphasis on the expansion of pluralistic networks, and adoption of critical thinking?

The breakdown of authoritarian mind-sets in Burundi has been similarly mixed. As previously mentioned, network expansion has been limited. Community associations have existed in addition to sensitisation drives, however these have had sub-par results in regards to encouraging intergroup networks. Frequently, ex-combatants have been allowed, and even encouraged, to remain within mono-ethnic and mono-factional communities (Douma & Gasana, 2008). Expansion of networks into the civilian sector is more positive, with many civilians noting high generally ex-combatant involvement in the community, and positive perceptions between groups (Uvin, 2007; World Bank, 2009b).

Significantly, there have been no direct programmes focused on educating critical thinking, and the disavowing of hierarchical structures or monolithic ideologies (see ‘Social Reintegration’ sections in World Bank, 2004, p. 7 and World Bank, 2009b, p. 5-6). However, Douma and Gasana (2008) note that MDRP/TDRP officials have argued that the aforementioned ‘individual over community’ approach to reintegration was partially justified in order to reduce the possibility of remobilisation by former leaders. Consequently, despite no direct promotion of network expansion, this indicates that the programme at least recognises the nexus between individual agency and cognitive disengagement when in groups. Furthermore, Uvin (2007) notes some positive improvements in CNDD-FDD ex-combatants interviewed. Specifically, he states that CNDD-FDD ex-combatants spoke freely about political issues, and criticised government plans, feeling more at ease and more legitimate in using such discourse. Comparatively, Government of Burundi ex-combatants did not discuss politics, though this was likely not due to any remaining allegiance.

Overall, Burundian ex-combatant management is seen to handle issues of authoritarianism in a middling fashion. Promotion of network expansion is limited, with reinsertion practices leading to insular, mono-identity communities. Furthermore, authoritarian hierarchies within groups are only indirectly addressed, in no small part due to the very non-communal focused system which damages network expansion. However, this inadvertent breaking up of combatant clusters should be applauded, as it forces ex-
combatants to not rely upon, or be taken advantage of by former leaders in a broader environment that they still feel comfortable in.

**Institutionalised Discrimination (Military Living Environments).** This third block refers to discrimination perpetrated towards outgroups as part of organised military group violence.

*Conflict Question: Were combatants encouraged, and officially sanctioned to discriminate against, and dehumanise outgroups through avenues such as propaganda? Either opposing combatant groups, civilians, or both.*

In the first half of the war the CNDD-FDD was noted to engage in moderate discrimination. Notably the FDD wing was the most active discriminator, and also actively perpetrated violence towards these groups (Uvin, 1999). Much of the discrimination directed towards the Government of Burundi was based on their inability to provide an egalitarian and security society (Lemarchand, 2009). Consequently, they portrayed the government as corrupt, inept, and prejudiced (Dilworth, 2006; Uvin, 2007). As such, violence towards the Government forces, and to an extent the wider Tutsi population, was portrayed as a means of pre-empting the supposedly inevitable discrimination and violence towards Hutu (Lemarchand, 2009).

Additionally, elements within the CNDD-FDD also participated in anti-Tutsi propaganda. This was direct towards the Tutsi dominated Government forces, and the civilian population. For instance, Nindorera (2012) notes that hate propaganda was utilised in occupied territory. Moreover, as Lemarchand (2009) states, the birth of the CNDD-FDD as a radical, largely ethnic based, offshoot of FRODEBU should not be understated. Additionally, as much of the CNDD-FDD’s founding doctrine makes reference to the inevitability of Tutsi perpetrated violence, it consequently portrays them as inherently wicked. Nindorera (2012) also references interviewed CNDD-FDD ex-combatants as stating that many within the group fought on ethnic lines. Interestingly, multiple scholars record formal linkages between the CNDD-FDD and the overtly racist and anti-Tutsi Rwandan *Interahamwe* (Wolpe, 2011). A 2002 Human Rights Watch [HRW] report also implicates the FDD with accepting former genocide perpetrators from Rwanda into its ranks (HRW, 2002). The CNDD-FDD appears to have reduced their discriminatory rhetoric around 2001 in order to capitalise on a more populist agenda (Nindorera, 2012).
The Government of Burundi was similarly discriminatory during the course of the war. Lemarchand (2009) argues that the Government forces, in particular the armed forces, were frequently discriminatory towards Hutu. This was both internally, expelling unwanted individuals, and externally towards the populace (Uvin, 1999). In this sense, the CNDD-FDD was perceived as a ‘Hutu group.’ Furthermore, the Government had for decades discriminated against Hutu in the public arena. For instance, Hutu were frequently barred from public education systems (Lemarchand, 1996), and excluded from public service (Lemarchand, 2009).

In the context of conflict, Hutu rebels such as the CNDD-FDD were portrayed to be harbingers of instability. This was commonly evidenced by the extreme crackdowns that occurred after Hutu uprisings. Most notable is the army’s response to the 1993 uprising which resulted in mass killings of Hutu civilians. Much of the discrimination also stemmed from fears that a popular Hutu movement would threaten decades of Tutsi hegemony (Reyntjens, 2000). As Lemarchand (2009) commonly alludes to, the modern history of elites within Burundi essentially enshrines the low status of Hutu, with the “history of the country […] written in blood, mostly Hutu blood” (p. 119). Furthermore, Reyntjens (1999, as cited in Lemarchand, 2009) makes reference to inhumane Hutu internment camps, described by some as concentration camps, run by the Government army during 1997. These were instituted in order to minimise the number of Hutu joining the CNDD-FDD and the FNL.

Overall, both groups are seen to contain discriminatory rhetoric. Largely, this has manifested along ethnic lines, with the CNDD-FDD holding distinct anti-Tutsi rhetoric, in addition to anti-Government ideologies, although ethnically based discrimination appears to have waned in the later years of war. Conversely, the Government of Burundi contains a long established anti-Hutu ideology used to justify the Tutsi hegemony at most levels of the political and military system. However, neither group appears to have held as strongly discriminatory ideologies as those in Rwanda, nor has dehumanising rhetoric been utilised.

Reintegration Question: If yes, have ex-combatants been attempted to be re-educated on these issues? Specifically, have ex-combatants had their potentially discriminatory and un-peaceful perceptions of outgroups challenged?

The re-education of ex-combatants on discriminatory values has been poor. Specifically, outside of vague, rarely expanded upon and practically non-existent
sensitisation initiatives, the NPDRR has barely tackled issues of discrimination within ex-combatant management. This is despite a 2004 planning and funding document stating “social reintegration assistance would be to foster reconciliation among ex-combatants of different sides as well as between ex-combatants and civilians in communities” (World Bank, 2004, p. 7). Presumably, a large part of this reconciliation drive should involve challenging the discriminatory rhetoric and ideological frames which were present during the war, and directed at both opposing combatant groups and the civilian population. Instead, the NPDRR appears more focused on developing socio-economic capacity, so that ex-combatants can participate in Burundi’s wider reconciliation initiatives (Boshoff & Vrey, 2006; World Bank, 2009b).

Consequently, the promotion of non-discriminatory attitudes between groups in Burundi is inadequate. At best, existing initiatives may inadvertently challenge some ideals, however little to nil direct recognition can be found within programme descriptions.

**Intergroup Violence and Negative Intergroup Contact.** This final block proposes that committing military violence against members of outgroups should be conceptualised as an instance of negative intergroup contact. Therefore, as per negative contact theory, negative attitudes towards said group will increase.

**Conflict Question A: What groups did combatants violently interact with on a regular basis?**

The CNDD-FDD and the Government of Burundi had frequent violent interactions. Over the course of the conflict, the UCDP has recorded 396 battles between the two groups. This includes battles with the rebel group coded CNDD, and CNDD-FDD. A best estimate of combatant deaths from these battles is placed at 4581 persons (Sundberg & Melander, 2013).

Both groups within the dyad also frequently interacted violently with the civilian population. According to the UCDP, the CNDD/CNDD-FDD engaged with civilians violently 49 times. A best estimate places the number killed by these attacks at 245 dead. Comparatively, the Government of Burundi has been attributed to 162 occurrences of violence against civilians. This violence is estimated to have resulted in the death of 4218 civilians (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). This excludes the 1993 mass killings, in which the
Burundian army has been attributed with killing between 15 000 and 50 000 mostly Hutu civilians. Systematic rape was also utilised by both groups (HRW, 2002).

Conflict Question B: Were these interactions based on identity grounds?

Overall, most violence appears to have been based on identity grounds. Clearly, the violence between the Government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD is based on their respective identities as opposing combatant groups. Furthermore, as previously mentioned a noteworthy proportion of their respective opposition was based on ethnic grounds (Lemarchand, 2009; Uvin, 2007).

Regarding the CNDD-FDD, much of their violence appears to be based on identity. For instance, Human Rights Watch (1998, 2002) states that the CNDD-FDD has primarily targeted Tutsi civilians, or alternatively Hutu suspected of supporting the government. Further supporting the hypothesis of racial targeting, they also note that the CNDD-FDD seems to have largely avoided attacking Hutu so as not to isolate potential supporters. Widespread attacks on Tutsi civilians were also noted in the UN Security Council report in 1995 (UN, 1995). In other instances, the group has been noted to target government officials within occupied territory (HRW, 2003). These instances of violence have frequently employed summary executions in dealing with suspected government supporters (Dilworth, 2006).

The Government of Burundi’s forces similarly targeted civilians on an identity basis. As Human Rights Watch (2002) notes, they frequently targeted Hutu civilians, and those whom they believed to be supporting the CNDD-FDD. Additionally, wealthy Hutu who were seen to have the potential to support rebel groups were also targeted (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Reprisal killings were also utilised by the Government forces for groups believed to support the rebels (HRW, 2003; Lemarchand, 2009). As previously mentioned, they also employed internment camps, where forced labour and death via negligence and malnutrition was common (HRW, 1998; Lemarchand, 2009). Furthermore, the Government of Burundi forces were responsible for the deaths of up to 50 000 Hutu civilians in 1993, killed in what can only be described as a ‘mass reprisal killing’ in response to Hutu violence over Ndayaye’s assassination (Lemarchand, 2009).
Consequently, violence perpetrated by the CNDD-FDD and the Government of Burundi is considered to be identity based. This includes ethnic based identity, and political/combatant affiliation.

**Reintegration Question:** Have ex-combatants had these strong occurrences of negative contact challenged with controlled instances of positive contact with members of those groups which violent interaction previously took place?

Instances of negative contact have been challenged mildly. First, negative contact between CNDD-FDD and Government of Burundi ex-combatants has not been directly challenged within the NPDRR. In many ways, it is extremely similar to the manner in which controlled intergroup contact was handled in the Rwandan programme. As such, there are no explicit instances within any listed demobilisation or reintegration activity where ex-combatants are required to interact, in a controlled and positive manner, with those from an opposing affiliation (see Boshoff & Vrey, 2006; International Development Association, 2004; World Bank, 2004, 2009b, 2009c). Ex-combatants do however participate in demobilisation activities alongside other factions although interaction is neither controlled nor encouraged.\(^{35}\) Consequently, there is a possibility that ex-combatants may develop positive impressions of other groups by interacting with them in these activities. Nonetheless, this would be an inadvertent product of the programme. Somewhat positively, no ex-combatants interviewed by Douma and Gasana (2008) or Uvin (2007) mentioned intergroup violence based on former affiliation.

Positive contact with the civilian population is more positive. For instance, the previously mentioned community associations were partially designed in order to facilitate dialogue between ex-combatants and the broader population (World Bank, 2009b). Indications suggest this has worked relatively well, with Uvin (2007) noting that ex-combatant-civilian relations are generally positive. Furthermore, much of the dialogue between groups appears to have been centred on topics and activities raised by these associations, such as farming. Many are also noted to be actively involved, and welcomed into local body politics. However, Uvin (2007) also notes that ex-combatants still tend to cluster together outside of these activities. Specifically, he notes that by retaining being an ‘ex-combatant’ as their primary identity, reintegration may be hindered. Douma and Gasana (2008) also note occasional violent clashes between ex-combatants and civilians.

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\(^{35}\) This excludes FNL ex-combatants, who largely demobilised by themselves (World Bank, 2009c).
Primarily, these instances of violence are centred on perceptions that ex-combatants get special treatment, mostly based on monetary grants given at demobilisation and reintegration.

As such, the challenging of negative intergroup perceptions within the NPDRR is mixed. Specifically, no initiative has required or encouraged ex-combatants of formerly opposed factions to work together and engage in positive dialogue. Instead, ex-combatants are allowed to maintain closed, single identity communities. Consequently, interaction is inadvertent. Comparatively, ex-combatant and civilian relationships have been managed better, with interaction encouraged and moderately organised, though there are also still issues with ex-combatant-civilian relations.

**Conclusion**

Overall, the Burundian civil war can be viewed as a conflict containing a high level of social psychological issues. This has been noted in both the CNDD-FDD and Government of Burundi factions. Specifically, they possessed high levels intergroup division, structural authoritarianism, intergroup violence, and moderate levels of intergroup discrimination. Despite the noted presence of these issues, Burundi’s NPDRR has addressed social psychological matters in an inadvertent and sometimes notably poor fashion.

Applying the study’s theoretical framework revealed multiple gaps in the NPDRR’s handling of social psychological issues. First, the NPDRR has given little direct recognition to the importance of identity within its programme initiatives. For instance, commendable attempts at promoting interaction between ex-combatants have been made, however an intentional focus on individuals rather than communities has meant these scarcely involve getting ex-combatants of opposing factions together. Conversely, other programmes such as societal sensitisation have largely failed to materialise. Second, challenges to structural authoritarianism have only been inadvertent, while network expansion is severely limited. Promisingly the NPDRR has tried to discourage ex-combatants from reinserting together with former squad-mates, in order to disrupt attempts at violent remobilisation. Third, combating discriminatory ideologies has been poor, with nearly no recognition of their existence in the existing literature. Fourth, addressing negative perceptions of groups due to violence has been questionable. For instance, the
NPDRR has encouraged ex-combatants to engage in sustained contact with civilian populations they once opposed, however contact between ex-combatant affiliations is scarcely developed.

Consequently, the handling of social psychological issues in Burundian ex-combatant management is notably mixed. In many ways, it is comparable to the Rwandan RDRP with issues ignored, or only addressed inadvertently. The intentional thematic focus on the development of individual ex-combatants, rather than the wider Burundian community is especially concerning for social reintegration. However, positively it does not seem to suffer from the strong negative social and identity issues which plague Rwanda’s ingando. Nonetheless, from a social psychological perspective, the strength of the NPDRR’s ability to develop a healthy social living environment for ex-combatants is drawn into question.
CHAPTER SIX

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Moving on from individual case studies, this chapter will present the comparative analysis of ex-combatant management in Rwanda and Burundi. First, the study’s research questions will be briefly revisited, and their role in guiding the analysis outlined. This will also serve to define the parameters of the current analysis. Second, the comparative analysis will explore the two case studies and their respective ex-combatant management programmes. In Rwanda, this constitutes the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (RDRP) and ingando, while in Burundi ex-combatant management has been covered by the National Program for Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NPDRR). Using the study’s theoretical framework as a guide, a number of similarities and significant differences have been identified. The RDRP and NPDRR are notably similar in that they are consistently indifferent to social psychological issues. However, ingando in Rwanda actively incorporates social psychological issues, and utilises them in a manner not beneficial to peace in the ex-combatant community. Therefore, despite many similarities, the Rwandan and Burundian programmes can only be viewed as differing in their approach to social psychological concepts. Third, the implications these findings have for wider ex-combatant initiatives, such as those by the World Bank and United Nations, will be discussed. Fourth, limitations of the present study will be outlined. Finally, the study will end with some concluding remarks, and proposals for future research as identified by the present research.

Revisiting the Research Questions

The primary research question posed for the present study is: “What social psychological issues surrounding social intergroup dynamics, present during conflict, are addressed in contemporary ex-combatant management strategies?” In addition, a second research question has also been presented: “In what manner are these issues addressed? Are they purposefully addressed, or inadvertently?” Before delving into the comparative analysis, it is worth briefly revisiting what these questions mean to the following analysis.

Most importantly, these research questions are descriptive guides. As outlined in previous chapters, the focus of the present study is to explore the presence, and implementation of social psychological issues in official ex-combatant management, in particular, reintegration or reintegration-style initiatives. The latter caveat is made as acts of reintegrating ex-combatants are often implemented outside of the strictly defined
‘reintegration’ phase of DDR. For instance, in Burundi community counselling often fell under the reinsertion phase of the national programme (Boshoff & Vrey, 2006). In other instances, focused reintegration initiatives are sometimes implemented outside of the DDR system, such as ingando in Rwanda (Rubagumya & Jorgensen, 2008).

Consequently, the main thematic exploratory focus of the study can be summarised as follows. Essentially, it is looking to see whether ex-combatants have been assisted in their post-conflict journey to overcome un-peaceful social psychological attitudes and norms, and subsequently develop positive livelihoods. The research questions ask “what issues are there, and how have they been managed?” In sum, the emphasis of this study lies at analysing how ex-combatant management programmes are approaching their dependents with regard to social psychological issues, and what value programmes place on these social issues when doing so. As such, the present study provides an important contribution to the literature by beginning the exploration of the intersection between social psychology, and peace and conflict studies, in the context of ex-combatant management.

Applying the Theoretical Framework in a Comparative Analysis

In the following section, the Rwandan and Burundian case studies will be comparatively explored noting key similarities and differences. The three blocks of Intergroup Division, Military Living Environments, and the Perpetration of Violence from the study’s theoretical framework, as developed in Chapter Three will be used as a model for the analysis.

**Intergroup Division.** Concerning the first block of Intergroup Division, the Rwandan RDRP and the Burundian NPDRR follow a similar approach to intergroup division in ex-combatant communities. The main finding across the two cases is that *addressing identity based intergroup division has largely been side-lined in favour of traditional socio-economic initiatives.* Furthermore, as outlined in previous chapters, both case studies contained moderate-high levels of intergroup division within combatant groups, which was largely based on identity lines. Thus, there is arguably a significant level of identity salience across the ex-combatant populations. Most past research, as outlined in Chapters One and Two, has not explored identity issues through an explicitly
identity based approach and thus has failed to recognise the importance of addressing identity issues in order to assist post-conflict assimilation and reintegration. As outlined in Chapter Two, this is despite empirical theories such as the Social Identity Approach championing its importance, and prior analogous use of identity issues in other peacebuilding and conflict research.

In both cases of reintegration, the only clear intersection with promoting positive intergroup relations is within community association programmes, developed by the RDRP and NPDRR. However, when programme documentation is analysed, the focus of these programmes is called into question. In the case of Rwanda, intergroup reconciliation was not the intention of the programmes; the intended goal was rather to develop socio-economic related skills (Consia, 2008). Notably, Rwandan programme documentation frequently fails to recognise the importance of factional identities within its activity outlines (RDRC, 2005a). Burundi’s community associations on the other hand are slightly more positive, with intergroup dialogue between ex-combatant factions stated as a desired outcome of the associations (World Bank, 2004). Nevertheless, similar to Rwanda these associations in Burundi also serve other – primarily economic – goals, and are consequently not inherently centred on intergroup relations. When compared to the broader literature, this is not unsurprising, as economic initiatives have largely dominated academic and institutional discourse on ex-combatants (Muggah, 2009a; Özerdem, 2012).

Indeed, as can be seen in the case analyses in Chapters Four and Five, while the RDRP and NPDRR present socio-economic initiatives as social reintegration, they in fact lack any focus on actual social issues outside of job creation and economic sustainability.

Furthermore, within both programmes there is no obligation to ex-combatants to participate in these activities. For instance, in Burundi, only 6-12% of ex-combatants were estimated to be members of these associations (Douma & Gasana, 2008). In Rwanda numbers are harder to come by, but participation is noted to not be compulsory (Consia, 2008; Stavrou, Jorgensen & O’Riordan, 2007). Therefore, the level of importance that the RDRP and NPDRR are placing on identity based intergroup reconciliation is drawn into question.

Some distinct differences also exist between the two cases. Most importantly, Rwanda’s ingando provides an interesting counterpoint to the otherwise ambivalent approach to identity found in the RDRP and NPDRR. Ingando explicitly utilises identity
divisionism, though in a manner that serves political elites and select elements of the ex-combatant community, rather than the population as a whole. As ingando activities divide ex-combatants upon ethnic (Tutsi-Hutu) lines through lectures and political discourse, it reinforces identity divisions not only within the community, but also within the wider Rwandan population in which they are expected to assimilate. Essentially, it legitimises and encourages Tutsi ex-combatants to view Hutu ex-combatants as a lesser identity on the basis of their ethnicity and role, perceived or otherwise, in the conflict. Interestingly, this occurs within ingando despite official RPF policy prohibiting the use of pre-war identities, favouring the newly minted Rwandité identity (Hintjens, 2008).

Looking back to the Social Identity Approach (SIA), some key implications can be drawn (Brown, 2010). In regards to the similar propensity to treat identity division as unimportant, the main implication is that these divisions may remain in post-conflict society. For Rwanda, the concern stems from the fact that villages are predominantly multi-ethnic, with tightly inter-woven communities (Mazrui, 1995). As such, there is potential for identity to assist in developing interethnic animosity, and hinder broader national reconciliation goals, as identity salience with carry-over from the war and genocide. Specifically, RPF ex-combatants may capitalise on their newfound high identity status within society, and use it to gain social status. Comparatively, Government of Rwanda ex-combatants, as a now low status group36 will both suffer as a result of this new status, and also attempt to remedy this new inferiority. Both situations have the potential to disrupt peace.

Conversely, in Burundi the concern is that ex-combatants have largely returned to predominantly mono-ethnic communities (Uvin, 2007). Therefore, the danger is that ex-combatants may continue to have divisionist attitudes unchallenged post-reintegration, as interaction with different ethnicities and therefore by extension opposing combatant groups, is severely limited. This is aggravated by the programmes targeting the needs of individual ex-combatants, deeming a community approach to social reintegration inappropriate for Burundi (Douma & Gasana, 2008). Consequently, short-term violence is perhaps unlikely, with the situation instead exacerbating long-term prejudices among certain ex-combatants.

36 A position promoted by the general post-war climate as a defeated group, being genocide perpetrators, and ingando teachings which implicate Hutu ex-combatants in war-crimes as an entire social group.
As such, identity divisionism within Rwandan and Burundian ex-combatant management follows generally similar lines. The RDRP and NPDRR both address intergroup division in a rather inattentive and indirect manner. The RDRP completely ignores the importance of identity factors in promoting intergroup relations, instead favouring socio-economic training, as this is viewed as a proxy form of intergroup reconciliation. Comparatively, the NPDRR can be viewed slightly more favourably, recognising the importance of identity reconciliation, but never fully committing to the task of achieving it. Furthermore, the Rwandan programme comes under increased scrutiny when ingando is analysed. Notably, ingando actively encourages ex-combatants to remain divided upon identity lines in the post-conflict period. Consequently, while the Burundian programme may mostly ignore these issues, it does not seem to exacerbate them, an element which cannot be claimed by the Rwandan programme.

**Structural Authoritarianism (Military Living Environments).** The main finding regarding the issue of Structural Authoritarianism within the block Military Living Environments, across the two cases is that network expansion has been severely limited and institutionally unsupported, while the promotion of critical thinking has been largely ignored. Specifically, the approach taken to breaking authoritarian attitudes by encouraging network expansion and critical thinking is similar in the RDRP and NPDRR. This has occurred within both combatant dyads, which contained overtly authoritarian systems. In the case of Rwanda, the RPF and Government forces are noted to be highly authoritarian (Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 2002), while Burundi’s Government forces and the CNDD-FDD are considered moderately authoritarian (Nindorera, 2012; Wolpe, 2011).

Network expansion within the RDRP and NPDRR has been limited. Both programmes have failed to recognise the need for supported and controlled network expansion between ex-combatant communities. The Rwandan programme has provided no framework for this to occur, with contact limited to the aforementioned community associations which do not necessarily contain a wide spread of ex-combatants from different factions. The Burundian NPDRR has done likewise; considering the mono-ethnic makeup of Burundian communities this is perhaps even more concerning, as this further limits the possibility that ex-combatant networks may grow in Burundi (Uvin, 2007).

The promotion of critical thinking has also been poorly handled in both cases, though in a different manner in each case. Akin to network expansion, the RDRP and
NPDRR have been marked by a near complete lack of recognition of the issue. The NPDRR has also been somewhat contradictory in its efforts. While focusing on reintegrating individuals rather than communities, the NPDRR claims to have made positive gains in breaking down ideological dependence between ex-combatants and their former groups (Douma & Gasana, 2008). Consequently, while not directly educating ex-combatants on critical thinking, it is said to mitigate the need to do so. However, by this same logic, and when the mono-ethnic makeup of Burundi is considered, it is posited that ex-combatants are being reinserted into communities that have a higher likelihood of ideologically supporting them, and containing a high proportion of other ex-combatants from their own faction. As such, because the PNDRR has chosen to ignore group issues, the possibility that Burundian ex-combatants may retain their authoritarian networks, or modify existing ones, remains a valid concern.

Comparatively, Rwanda’s ambivalence towards critical thinking in the RDRP is countered by a direct manipulation of authoritarianism within ingando. Notably, the promotion of pro-Government/RPF agendas and the suppression of critical opposition illustrates not only a recognition of the power of authoritarianism and monolithic groups, but also a purposeful rejection of the opportunity to use network structures and education as a healing tool. Instead, it is used as an opportunity to create negative peace through the subdual of dissent.

When looking back to the dominant ex-combatant literature from Chapter One, this mixed approach is perhaps not overly surprising. While the disbandment of ex-combatant groups is an integral part of demobilisation, continued support for pluralistic expansion has been limited (Muggah, 2009a). Nonetheless, as Themnér’s (2011) research in Sierra Leone and the Republic of Congo exemplified, authoritarian obedience and dependence on networks is a significant issue, with remobilisers and social relationships stated as the main causal determinants of ex-combatants returning to violence. Comparable findings were also raised by Kingma (1997a) and Söderström (2011) who noted the obstructing role authoritarian attitudes played in the communal peace process.

Consequently, the contesting of authoritarian networks in both cases is largely the same. The main programmes in Rwanda and Burundi both address the issue in an unfocused manner, largely skirting around the issue except for some indirect, and in the case of Burundi often contradictory efforts as part of larger initiatives. At no point have
ex-combatants been assisted in developing critical thinking skills. Indeed, in Rwanda this has even been capitalised upon, and utilised to instil or reinforce authoritarian obedience towards the current government. As such, the concerns raised around the intersection of agency and group structures remain untouched within ex-combatant management.

**Institutionalised Discrimination (Military Living Environments).** Regarding Institutionalised Discrimination, within the Military Living Environments block, the main finding is that *institutionalised discrimination has been ignored by the main reintegration programmes, while ingando in Rwanda marks a stark difference wherein discrimination is actively capitalised on for unpeaceable goals.*

The recognition of discriminatory attitudes is notably absent within RDRP and NPDRR initiatives. Both programmes state the importance of fostering social reconciliation between ex-combatant factions, and in this sense recognise the existence of discriminatory rhetoric in each dyad, however neither actually sets out any plan for intergroup reconciliation (Republic of Rwanda, 2010; World Bank, 2004). Amongst the programme data there is no description of where or how ex-combatant officials will work with reconciliation authorities, nor have they developed any tailored ex-combatant activities to be undertaken within reconciliation initiatives. Interestingly, ex-combatant programmes are leaving these issues to be addressed by other peacebuilding initiatives. This unwillingness to engage in the nexus between reintegration and parallel social peacebuilding measures was also noted by Torjensen (2009) and Sriram and Herman (2009) in their analyses of DDR. The approach taken by the RDRP and NPDRR seems to be that these discriminatory attitudes will be solved in their entirety by reconciliation programmes with no direct involvement of ex-combatant organisations. Moreover, there appears to be the belief that socio-economic reintegration is adequate support in itself to foster intergroup reconciliation.

When the seriousness of discrimination, as outlined by Haslam (2006) and dehumanisation theories is taken into account, this seems somewhat misguided. The concern is that if these very unique discriminatory attitudes are not directly challenged, they will remain in the belief systems of ex-combatants. As Haslam (2006) and Bandura (2002) have noted, while discriminatory attitudes may originate as arbitrary legitimisers of violence, they often become internalised cognitively and thus develop into very real attitudes towards certain outgroups. Consequently, there is a serious need to treat ex-
combatants as an important sub-group in order to guarantee the addressing of specific attitudes.

Again, the major point of difference between Rwandan and Burundian management is *ingando* in Rwanda. Within *ingando* discrimination is not challenged in a manner conducive to sustainable peace. Instead, discrimination is utilised to legitimise one ex-combatant community – the RPF – and de-legitimise Government of Rwanda ex-combatants (Thomson, 2011). This is a notable counterpoint to the indifferent Burundian programme, and indeed much of the ex-combatant literature as a whole. For instance, none of the in-depth analyses of reintegration programmes reviewed in Chapter One (e.g. Humphreys & Weinstein, 2004; Marriage, 2007; Pugel, 2007; Themnér, 2011) have identified any point where ex-combatant management programmes have themselves utilised discrimination to achieve programme goals. The *ingando* programme has devalued the entire Government/Hutu ex-combatant community, labelling them as warmongers, and inherently prejudiced. Consequently, the theoretical implications of discriminatory policies are clear, with major consequences for individual and group identity, self-esteem and collective perceptions of self-worth which all have the potential to create or exacerbate intergroup violence, which in turn hinders the prospect of longitudinal peace. In speaking to Thomson (2011), a Government of Rwanda ex-combatant exemplified this when stating “being Hutu is a crime in the new Rwanda” (p. 338).

In sum, the approach taken to discriminatory attitudes follows a comparable pattern to previous issues. The Rwandan and Burundian programmes are essentially the same in their approach to the issue of institutionalised discrimination within their main reintegration initiatives. However, Rwanda’s *ingando* marks a point of difference wherein discriminatory attitudes are directly capitalised upon, and utilised by the programme itself, not to aid in healing, but to legitimise political rule and the outcome of the conflict.

**Intergroup Violence and Negative Intergroup Contact.** Within the Perpetration of Violence block, the issue of intergroup violence and negative intergroup contact was examined. It was found that both case studies featured high levels of identity based violence between combatant groups, and directed at the civilian population. Rwandan and Burundian ex-combatant management have addressed this issue in a mixed and again similar manner. The main finding is that *controlled positive intergroup contact has occurred between ex-combatants and civilian groups, but not between ex-combatant
factions. Both the RDRP and the NPDRR have made positive efforts in actively encouraging ex-combatants to associate with the civilian populations they once fought. However, no such attempt at sustained positive contact between ex-combatants of differing factions has occurred.

Essentially, the RDRP and NPDRR have created a situation closely echoing their approach to social identity wherein ex-combatants are left to facilitate intergroup contact on their own. Within the programmes there are no instances or activities which require ex-combatants to remain in sustained positive contact with one another, outside of regular demobilisation and reintegration proceedings. Furthermore, as previously noted there is no requirement for ex-combatants to engage with opposing ex-combatants during these proceedings, with ex-combatants often choosing to associate amongst others of the same faction. Interestingly, ingando does not appear to be providing a point of difference for this block. While the discriminatory rhetoric espoused by the programme is not constructive to positive contact, it does not explicitly hinder it in any unique manner. Perhaps not surprisingly, there is also no recognition of the importance of sustained positive contact in repairing negative intergroup perceptions, as promoted by positive and negative contact theory (Allport, 1958; Paolini, Harwood & Rubin, 2010).

However, despite the poor support for ex-combatant to ex-combatant interaction, initiatives focused on civilians are more positive. Ex-combatants are actively encouraged to engage in community activities, particularly in community associations, in order to facilitate sustained dialogue and interaction (Rubagumya & Jorgensen, 2008; Uvin, 2007; World Bank, 2009a). Therefore, while the RDRP and NPDRR are not designing activities with the purpose of positive contact, they are skilfully co-opting existing reintegration or communal activities. Interestingly, in Rwanda many ex-combatants noted that participating in ingando assisted them in developing skills to communicate with civilians, a notable counter to the otherwise negative evaluation of the initiative (Rubagumya & Jorgensen, 2008). Nonetheless, these efforts have not been fully successful, with intergroup tension noted in both Rwanda (RDRC, 2005a) and Burundi (Douma & Gasana, 2008). Most likely due to being a side-product of community associations, these programmes also do not meet the strict environmental conditions such as institutional support, shared goals, equal status
and acquaintance potential, generally considered necessary for positive contact to occur (Brown, 2010).37

As such, the efforts made within the Rwandan and Burundian management programmes current do not place high importance on sustained intergroup positive contact, relegating the issue to a sub-goal of initiatives. While the recognition of positive contact, in particular towards civilians, is a positive move, the lack of focus also means that environmental conditions for positive contact are generally not met. Furthermore, the lack of sustained contact between ex-combatant groups is a point of concern.

Comparative Analysis Summary: Disconcerting Similarities and Troubling Differences

When ex-combatant management in Rwanda and Burundi is analysed comparatively, a number of over-arching themes are revealed. Interestingly, when looking at social psychological issues, the main management programmes for both countries – the RDRP and the NPDRR - are strikingly similar in their constitution. This is perhaps due to both programmes involvement in the World Bank’s Transitional Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (TDRP). Essentially, both programmes and their governing bodies are marked by a distinct indifference towards social psychological issues. It is not that these programmes are openly opposed to the concept of social psychological issues within their recipient populations, but rather that they merely do not feature on the scope of their concerns. Consequently, a situation is created where sociopsychological issues are only addressed inadvertently, primarily due to shared norms with other initiatives. Any direct recognition of social psychological concepts, theory, or ideas is absent. A notable point of difference to this shared indifference is the presence of ingando within Rwanda which marks a direct recognition of theoretical concepts in order to reinforce government legitimacy.

Within the RDRP and NPDRR an environment of indifference towards social issues is seen in social reintegration initiatives. At many times the issues of identity, authoritarianism, discrimination, and negative contact are addressed as minor asides within larger social reintegration activities. For instance, social initiatives based on resolving

37 For a detailed account of these conditions, please refer back to Chapter Two, section ‘Contact Theory.’
issues around identity and intergroup relations are existent, but scarce. Moreover, when they are addressed, they are generally tacked on to other initiatives such as job creation rather than being the primary focus. Largely, it is assumed that as ex-combatants may come in to contact with other ex-combatants, this will provide an adequate foundation in which to develop intergroup reconciliation. Additionally, social psychological issues are sometimes not present in any discernible manner, intended or otherwise. For example, discrimination amongst ex-combatant communities is an issue which the main programmes seem reluctant to address in any manner. Similarly, sustained positive intergroup contact is rare. Contact is never explicitly engaged with either through dialogue or other means in regards to ex-combatant to ex-combatant contact, whereas sustained contact between ex-combatants and civilians is implemented more strongly. The latter is a welcome positive note for social issues within the otherwise socially bleak RDRP and NPDRR.

Social reintegration measures are also paid little attention in relation to other initiatives. For instance, in both programmes economic assistance appears to constitute the bulk of the programmes. In programme documentation it is not uncommon for social reintegration initiatives to receive one page or less of attention. For example, in Boshoff and Vrey’s (2006) Institute for Security Studies paper on the Burundian programme, less than 50 words are devoted to describing social reintegration (see pg. 23). Notably, for a ‘technical analysis,’ no technical aspects of social reintegration are outlined, nor are implementing bodies, or means of operationalization. This is despite social assimilation being cited frequently throughout the paper as a central goal of the programme. Comparatively, disarmament, demobilisation, other reintegration initiatives, and organisational partners are meticulously detailed, down to the types of small arms collected, in total comprising approximately two thirds of the 57 page document. A similar trend can be found within Rwanda’s programme documentation (e.g. World Bank, 2002, 2009a). For example, the 2010 ‘Project Implementation Manual’ for the RDRP does not outline what social reintegration constitutes in a practical sense, but refers to it only as “[i]nformation and sensitisation of ex-combatants and communities through outreach activities” (Republic of Rwanda, 2010, pg. 17).

As such, the social psychological factors sought in the present study are seen as poorly addressed. However, this is not occurring in favour of alternative social reintegration strategies. Indeed, when analysing programme data, social reintegration as a
whole appears to be somewhat of an afterthought. This is despite growing academic and institutional rhetoric, including that of the World Bank, calling for more social initiatives (e.g. Muggah, 2009a; RDRC, 2005a; World Bank, 2009d). Whether this absence of social initiatives is a real phenomenon, or rather simply a product of being underreported is unclear. However, the fact that the trend occurs across cases, and across multiple documents from different sources, implicates the former.

The major difference in the Rwandan and Burundian programmes is the presence of direct negative manipulation of these issues in Rwanda. While the main DDR programmes illustrate a level of indifference towards sociopsychological issues either positively or negatively, ingando in Rwanda demonstrates an explicit recognition, and understanding, of the power of these factors. Notably, ingando capitalises upon ideas of identity, and utilises authoritarianism and discrimination to legitimise government rule and make dissent socially unacceptable. Pro-government ideologies are promoted uncritically, creating an environment in which RPF ex-combatants have their superiority legitimised, creating a privileged elite. Comparatively, the former-government forces are expected to abandon old ideologies without any real, balanced discussion as to why they are wrong. As such, ex-combatants aligned with the defeated government either accept ingando and uncritically follow a monolithic system, or pretend to and suppress their own identities and beliefs. Neither outcome is conducive to sustainable peace. While critical dialogue is suppressed, this does not mean that dissenting attitudes will cease. Instead, the possibility arises that they will simply develop in private. Interestingly, no similar programme for ex-combatants has been conducted in Burundi, nor is any perceivably purposeful manipulation of these issues found in the NPDRR. As previously discussed, the RDRP avoids confronting these issues, almost in entirety.

Rwandan and Burundian ex-combatant management are best conceptualised as different approaches to reintegration, while sharing some notable similarities. Burundi’s NPDRR is summarised by indifference towards social psychological issues. It does not actively engage with social psychological theory, and core issues of identity, authoritarianism, discrimination, and intergroup contact are only fleetingly addressed as by-products of other initiatives with separate goals. Consequently, while Burundian ex-combatant management may not contribute towards developing a healthier social environment for ex-combatants, it at least does not exacerbate existing issues.
Comparatively, Rwanda’s RDRP shares the NPDRR’s indifference towards social psychological issues. However, much of this is undone by ingando within Rwanda. Notably, ingando engages with social psychological issues but in a manner unfavourable to sustainable peace, for ex-combatants. As such, the Rwandan approach to ex-combatant management can only be seen as utilising social psychological issues in a purposeful and negative manner.

Limitations

The present study was subject to a number of limitations. First, due to time and travel restrictions, it was not possible to gather data first hand. Ideally, original data on both the ex-combatant programmes, and communities themselves would have been gathered. Consequently, this study has relied on programme data, evaluations, and the existing body of academic literature. As such, there is a possibility that certain programme initiatives and activities have not been identified in the current research simply because they have not been documented. However, such negligence in reporting would presumably indicate that these initiatives, if existent, are not placed in high importance. Therefore, the trend of subjugating social initiatives, and in particular social psychological initiatives, would still hold true.

Second, accessing existing data has been fraught with difficulties. Most notably, collating ex-combatant programme data was difficult, with many programme donors and actors apparently reluctant to provide information. This was most felt in regards to the UN, the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), and the National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NCDRR) in Burundi, which all denied formal requests for information. With other organisations, information has been received while at other times months of back-and-forth communication has resulted in no data. In regards to the UN, this difficulty in gathering information has been noted previously. For instance, when studying ingando, Purdeková (2011) struggled to get information from the UNDP, a donor of the initiative, and after long-term lobbying only received a one page summary. Thus, similar to the first limitation, there is a concern that certain activities or aspects of initiatives have not been identified due to a gap in information regarding reintegration programmes. However, much of this limitation was mitigated by the assistance of the World Bank who provided their programme data,
evaluations, and proposals, in addition to independent consultancy evaluations (e.g. Consia, 2008; Uvin, 2007).

Collecting data on combatant groups was challenging. Most notably, gathering information on former government armies in both Rwanda and Burundi was problematic, and information on the CNDD-FDD was also scarce. Consequently, certain aspects – such as attitudes held, experiences, and behaviours – may not have been identified.

Third, the size of the study limited the number of case studies possible to examine. This is a limitation, as only two Central African countries could be analysed. Consequently, the generalizability of the current research to other DDR and reintegration programme is limited. However, the presence of World Bank best practises, and the cases inclusion in the TDRP network may somewhat mitigate this limitation. The present study should be viewed as a first step in bringing social psychological issues to light within the ex-combatant context, and as such provide the basis for more rigorous and extensive analyses.

**Beyond Rwanda and Burundi: Implications for Contemporary Ex-Combatant Management and Future Research**

The present study has found that social psychological issues are under developed within contemporary ex-combatant management strategies in Rwanda and Burundi. Specifically, the findings indicate that the social psychological issues of intergroup identity division, structural authoritarianism, institutionalised discrimination, and negative intergroup contact are not being positively utilised within programmes. The primary reintegration programmes – the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (RDRP) and Burundi’s National Programme for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NPDRR) – have taken a notably indifferent approach to these issues. At times issues are completely unaddressed, while in other instances they are only partially broached due to crossover with other programme aims. Institutionalised discrimination appears to be the most ignored issue, whereas identity divisionism is the most recognised, though still never deemed important enough to receive direct attention from any given initiative.

Comparatively, Rwanda’s secondary management programme of ingando marks a strong point of difference between the two cases. Drawing on identity divisions,
authoritarianism, and institutional discrimination, *ingando* utilises these issues in order to consolidate government power, rather than as a healing tool for ex-combatant communities. As such, this moves the Rwandan ex-combatant management programme from one that simply ignores social psychological issues, to one that actively utilises them in a destructive manner, regardless of the impact it may have on social healing.

Therefore, to frame these findings in regards to the study’s research questions:

**Research Question 1:** What social psychological issues surrounding social intergroup dynamics, present during conflict, are addressed in contemporary ex-combatant management strategies?

**Answer 1:** Within dominant and traditional DDR programmes the issues of identity, authoritarianism, discrimination, and negative intergroup contact are poorly addressed. Recognition is either non-existent, or minor. Within Rwanda’s *ingando* sub-programme, these issues are addressed directly, but to a negative effect.

**Research Question 2:** In what manner are these issues addressed? Are they purposefully addressed, or inadvertently?

**Answer 2:** Within the traditional DDR strategies in Rwanda and Burundi, they are addressed in an ambivalent and largely inadvertent manner. Within Rwanda’s *ingando* they are purposefully addressed, and in a negative manner not conducive to their healing.

When looking back to the existing body of literature in Chapter One, the largely indifferent approach to social psychology is not surprising. While conscious of oversimplifying a complex issue, the dominant approaches from institutional actors and academics has focused almost entirely on economic incentives, securitisation, and narrow social networking to curb violence, and reintegrate ex-combatants (Muggah, 2009a). This study does not wish to diminish the importance of such issues. However, in managing ex-combatants in this manner, reintegration programmes framework have nearly entirely ignored social and sociopsychological issues, despite their increased recognition as being integral to the creation and sustainability of violence.

The question must then be asked, what do these findings mean? Aside from some potential implications for peace and long-term stability in Rwanda and Burundi, suggestions can also be made in regards to broader approaches to ex-combatant
management. Primarily, these can be broken down into implications for the World Bank and other program donors and administrators, and avenues for future research.

In regards to donors and administrators, the findings suggest a need to take a stronger involvement in programme design and monitoring. This is imperative even for programmes which do not explicitly abuse social psychological principles. For instance, both the RDRP and NPDRR have been primarily funded and supported by the World Bank through the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP). Consequently, the World Bank bears a certain responsibility to administer programmes that assist ex-combatants in developing positive livelihoods. Furthermore, in their position as programme administrators and facilitators World Bank and TDRP officials are in a unique position to inform programme ‘best practices’. Therefore, they have the opportunity to assist in shaping programmes, and should utilise this opportunity in a constructive manner. The present study has identified that the social psychological issues, as outlined in the theoretical framework, are existent within combatant groups. Thus, logic extends that these issues are important to address in the post-conflict period due to their enduring presence in group narratives and attitudes (Staub, 2011), however this does not appear to be the case. Somewhat positively, what the current findings indicate is that World Bank supported programmes are not massively aggravating social psychological issues. However, nor are they utilising social psychological principles to assist ex-combatant reintegration and communal healing. These issues simply seem to be outside of the World Bank’s current concern and scope of what they conceptualise as necessary for reintegration. Similarly, local governments are equally accountable for this lack of recognition.

The suggestion to take more direct involvement in programmes is perhaps stronger for donors to programmes that negatively utilise social psychological principles. For instance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is a principal donor to ingando (Purdeková, 2011). The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) is also a major donor to ingando’s parent body, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) (Kearney, 2011). As Purdeková (2011) and Mgbako (2005) note, ingando appears relatively benign on the surface, however the growing body of literature supports the notion that it is not constructive to peace

38 While the reintegration programmes were separately administered and tailored to context, they were based off World Bank and UN best practises (Universalia Management Group, 2012).
(Thomson, 2011). Consequently, this illustrates that donors need not only to be aware of what issues their programmes may be ignoring, but also in what manner they are being destructive. Furthermore, there is a need to actively monitor what is actually being implemented within programmes, in addition to what is contained within programme proposals and official rhetoric. A notable example of doing so is Penal Reform International (PRI, 2004), also an *ingando* donor, which produced a report critical of programme activities taking place, in particular the discriminatory ideology being espoused by programme teachings.

Several recommendations for future research can be drawn from the present study. First, future research would benefit from field work with ex-combatants and programme administrators in order to accurately gauge the importance of social psychological issues to these communities, and if present, the severity of problems they are causing. Aside from rare studies such as those by Themnér (2011), Uvin (2007) and Humphries and Weinstein (2005), few studies directly engage and survey ex-combatant communities on a systematic level. As such, the ability to accurately assist ex-combatants in their assimilation into civilian life is brought into question if there is no significant understanding of what their needs and attitudes are in the post-conflict period.

Second, more research is needed on reintegration, DDR, and related programmes. As lack of access to DDR and related programme documentation was one of this study’s largest limitations, there is a need for better dissemination of information regarding these activities. As it currently stands, little information is readily available from institutional actors, and academic analyses frequently do not directly engage with programme data and design. Much of this onus falls on programme administrators to be more pro-active with distributing programme data to the academic community.

Third, future research may build upon the present study’s incorporation of social psychological principles with reintegration. This has highlighted the need for better communication amongst the peace psychology, social psychology, and peacebuilding communities. As identified previously within the thesis, the present body of literature has a growing yet underdeveloped understanding of the nexus between social psychology and peacebuilding. The findings also identify the continuing need for debate around what DDR, reintegration, and ex-combatant management should constitute. Specifically, research needs to explore what social reintegration should look like, and what role it
should have within these programmes. This is imperative as compared to other areas such as economic reintegration and convergent initiatives such as disarmament and demobilisation, social reintegration has not been thoroughly debated within the literature. Indeed, it has stagnated to a point wherein social reintegration has essentially been co-opted by socio-economic initiatives with little resemblance to traditional understandings of social intergroup relations, and intergroup friendship and reconciliation. The present study illustrates a need to expand traditional conceptualisations of what social reintegration means, and what issues are important to address in order to accomplish post-conflict reintegration. To achieve this, future research may benefit from examining the nexus between ex-combatant reintegration, and other peacebuilding measures such as reconciliation which do actively address social issues such as identity and discrimination. This may involve major re-conceptualisations of what ex-combatant management is, or it may involve a stronger linkage of reintegration with parallel peacebuilding measures.

The findings of the present study illustrate the importance of recognising social psychological issues within ex-combatant management. Currently, the two cases studies examined either ignore social psychological issues, as in the case of Burundi, or actively utilise them to further political consolidation, and not for social healing as in the case of Rwanda. These findings also suggest the need to explore these issues within other reintegration programmes around the world, many of which share similar characteristics to the two cases studied here. In essence, the socialness in the inherently social action of reintegration, and the reconciliatory acts this involves, seems to have been lost. This study argues that if reintegration is to live up to its goal of societal assimilation, it needs to explore the possibility of becoming much more centred as an intrinsically social exercise, rather than one solely of economics or security. Otherwise, from a social psychological perspective, it is doubtful whether contemporary ex-combatant management strategies can truly achieve lasting, peaceful reintegration of ex-combatants into society.
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