

**Tracing the Discursive Origins of the
War on Terror: President Clinton and
the Construction of New Terrorism in
the Post-Cold War Era**

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Abstract

Since September 11th, 2001, there has been considerable growth in the literature on the American-led war on terror, and work continues to focus on President George W. Bush's 'war on terror' discourse. However, while there is a large literature on President Bush's war on terror, there is a much smaller literature on President Clinton's and President Reagan's approaches to counterterrorism. The research gap raises several important questions. For example, did the Bush-led war on terror represent a discontinuity in U.S. foreign policy? Was terrorism not considered a serious threat for the United States before the 2001 World Trade Center bombings? What was Clinton's interpretation of terrorism? What were the Clinton administration's main counterterrorism initiatives? These questions demonstrate the need for an in-depth analysis of President Clinton's counterterrorism initiatives in order to fully understand the current American-led war on terror. Adopting the methodology of critical discourse analysis (CDA), this research examines and analyses more than 200 official texts written and spoken by key figures in the Clinton administration, and illustrates how a counterterrorism 'regime of truth' was constructed and maintained through discursive practice during the Clinton presidency. This research shows that based on President Reagan's first 'war on terrorism' discourse which focused on the threat of international terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism, President Clinton contributed to the discursive construction of 'new terrorism,' or 'catastrophic terrorism,' which is characterised by an emphasis on borderless threats, home-grown terrorism, cyberterrorism, terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, and so-called 'rogue states.' In addition, in contrast to President Reagan's and President George W. Bush's 'war' rhetoric, President Clinton employed both a 'crime frame' and a 'war metaphor' to conceptualise terrorist attacks. The particular interpretation of terrorism and terrorists shaped the administration's material practices of counterterrorism, which shifted from a law enforcement and legislation-based counterterrorism policy to a coercive military-based approach. Importantly, this research demonstrates that prior to September 11th, 2001, the Clinton administration had already established the discursive and institutional basis for the George W. Bush administration to respond to the 2001 World Trade Center bombings.

Accordingly, there is indeed a clear continuity of the American-led war on terror from President Reagan, to President Clinton, and through to President George W. Bush.

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Introduction

Since the 2001 World Trade Center bombings, there has been a considerable amount of literature published on President George W. Bush's 'war on terror' discourse and post-9/11 U.S. foreign and security policies (Jackson, 2005, 2006, 2014; Croft, 2006; Jarvis, 2008, 2009; Hodges, 2011; McCrisken, 2011, 2012). However, with very few exceptions (Deutch, 1997; Winkler, 2006; Dumbrell, 2009), there is a notable lack of discussion regarding President Bill Clinton's counterterrorism efforts. In order to fill this gap in the existing literature and challenge the frequent assumption that there was a revolutionary counterterrorism policy shift after September 11, 2001, this thesis analyses the discursive dimension of terrorism, counterterrorism, and the American-led war on terror. In particular, it focuses on the Clinton administration's terrorism-related discourse and material practices of counterterrorism. Additionally, in order to demonstrate the continuity (and lack of change) of U.S. counterterrorism policy, President Reagan's and President George W. Bush's discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism are also examined. The research presented in this thesis demonstrates a real continuity in the United State's counterterrorism policy across different administrations and suggests that the origins of the global 'war on terror' actually lies in earlier periods, particularly the Reagan and Clinton administrations.¹ In other words, the Bush administration's post-9/11 counterterrorism initiatives were actually not a revolutionary foreign policy change as some scholars insist (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003; Leffler, 2003; Mann, 2004). President Bush's 'war on terror' was largely built upon the foundations of his predecessors' counterterrorism efforts, and continued its logic, particularly President Clinton's discursive construction of so-called 'new terrorism'

¹ It should be noted that prior to the Clinton administration, the United States was governed by the George H. W. Bush administration. That this research does not focus on President George H. W. Bush's political discourse on terrorism is due, in part, to the relatively short term of his presidency (from 1989 to 1992). It is also because his administration largely concentrated its foreign and security policies on the articulation of the 'new world order' (Lazar & Lazar, 2007) and on tackling threats posed by Saddam Hussein. However, some scholars (Litwak, 2000; Miles, 2012) argue that the George H. W. Bush administration contributed to the conceptualisation of so-called 'rogue state' threats which was later articulated in the Clinton administration's terrorism discourse (Chapter 5). It also rhetorically described Iraq's military occupation of Kuwait in 1990 as terrorist acts (Winkler, 2006).

which brought together notions of home-grown terrorism, cyber-terrorism, terrorism involving the utilisation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and so-called rogue states.

This research adopts a constructivist approach to U.S. counterterrorism policy, and the main methodology employed is critical discourse analysis (CDA). More than 200 official texts (see Appendix 1) written or spoken by key figures of the Clinton administration are examined and analysed. The texts examined include most of President Clinton's and his Secretaries of State's speeches, remarks, radio addresses, and interviews on terrorism and counterterrorism. Although different types of CDA has been employed in scholarship, several key theoretical commitments are shared by all CDA analysts, including the following: Discourse(s), word(s), and language are not neutral; discourse(s), word(s), and language can never be used objectively; discourse not only constructs, but also constitutes, the social world; and discourse is socially, culturally, and historically contingent (see Chapter 2). Given that language is never neutral and cannot be used objectively, it is not possible to achieve absolute (or objective) truth, or so-called universal knowledge.

Employing CDA, this research illustrates how a counterterrorism 'regime of truth' was constructed and maintained through discursive practice during the Clinton administration. It can be argued that threat, danger, and risk do not exist independently; instead, they are defined, interpreted, and analysed by policy-making or 'world-making' elites (Bourdieu, 1987). Accordingly, terrorism, which is constantly argued by the U.S. elite as being a severe threat to the United States and Western societies, is actually a product of social construction. More specifically, the threat of terrorism is discursively constructed, and through the way that discourse is constructed and comprehended, terrorism is perceived as a sociopolitical 'reality' in the U.S. political arena and is understood via a particular 'grid of intelligibility' (Milliken, 1999) by policymakers.

This research contributes to current understandings of the U.S.-led war on terror—the George W. Bush administration's counterterrorism policy revolution—by providing an in-depth analysis of President Clinton's counterterrorism practices and a genealogical study of the administration's terrorism discourse. It argues and suggests that prior to the tragedy of September 11th, 2001, the Clinton administration had already established a discursive and policy framework, both rhetorically and materially, for the Bush administration to respond to the event; and, therefore, there is a clear

continuity rather than a radical change in U.S. counterterrorism policy from Reagan to Clinton and through to George W. Bush. In the past decades, U.S. administrations have tended to adopt a very similar rhetorical strategy to interpret terrorism and terrorists, and have employed a military-based approach to counterterrorism. In addition, with the aid of CDA and a method of genealogy, the discursive origins of the ‘war on terror,’ as well as the deep cultural and social meanings of the specific language used by the U.S. elite, are discussed and analysed. The main findings show that the elite’s discourse on terrorism is composed of a unique and identifiable set of words, assumptions, narratives, metaphors, myths, and American cultural grammar. As Richard Jackson (2005: 28) argues, language is extremely important for political understanding; words really do matter. Furthermore, this research, to date, is the first systematic empirical and theoretical study of President Clinton’s political discourse on terrorism, counterterrorism, and other key security issues addressed by his administration, such as rogue states, the proliferation of WMD, and Middle East peace.

Overview of the Thesis

Chapter One examines the existing literature on the U.S.-led war on terror, particularly President George W. Bush’s so-called foreign policy ‘revolution’ after the 2001 terrorist attacks, the ‘war on terror’ discourse, and the Clinton administration’s counterterrorism initiatives. This chapter problematises the current literature and challenges the assumption shared by most scholars and pundits that the ‘war’ and its discourse originated with the George W. Bush administration. It argues instead that the ‘war’ can actually be traced to earlier periods. Prior to September 11, 2001, U.S. administrations had already adopted similar rhetorical strategies to interpret terrorist threats and had implemented a series of counterterrorism policies aimed at eliminating terrorism and terrorists and containing ‘rogue states.’ Thus, this research suggests a continuity (and lack of change) of U.S. counterterrorism policy across different administrations.

Chapter Two introduces the theory and methodology employed in this thesis. A constructivist approach to international relations (IR) is adopted to explain and elucidate President Clinton’s counterterrorism initiatives. In addition, several key concepts employed by constructivist scholars, such as the intersubjective understanding of IR, relations between agents and structures, and the social

construction of foreign policy and national interests, are particularly focused on. Moreover, a specific methodology, namely, CDA, which is broadly used by constructivists in the field of IR, is explained and illustrated. Norman Fairclough's approach to CDA and his three-dimensional model of discourse analysis has been chosen as the main methodological tool to analyse U.S. presidential discourse due to his specific definition and account of discourse(s).

Chapter Three is an examination of President Clinton's discursive construction of 'new terrorism,' or 'catastrophic terrorism.' It argues that based on President Reagan's first 'war on terrorism' discourse, which was characterised by state-sponsored terrorism and international terrorism, President Clinton framed and constructed 'catastrophic terrorism', which was characterised by borderless threats and the acquisition of WMD that could have been used by terrorists and rogue states in the post-Cold War world. President Clinton's discourse on terrorism later provided an established rhetorical framework for President George W. Bush to discursively respond to the 2001 World Trade Center bombings. The chapter also illustrates how a sociopolitical 'reality' of terrorist threat was constructed and constituted through U.S. official documents and a series of policy practices, and how a counterterrorism 'regime of truth' became a 'grid of intelligibility' shared by policy-making elites and a 'common understanding' by the American majority.

Chapter Four examines and analyses President Clinton's speeches, radio addresses, and interviews regarding terrorist attacks targeted at the United States and its citizens in the 1990s. Through an examination of President Clinton's political rhetoric, it can be seen that the Clinton administration adopted both a 'crime frame' and the 'war metaphor' to structure its discourse on counterterrorism and to rhetorically conceptualise the act of terrorism. The chapter argues that the way that the U.S. elite described terrorist attacks not only reflected their understanding and knowledge about terrorism and terrorists, but also affected the real practices of U.S. counterterrorism. Specifically, if terrorism is defined as a crime, counterterrorism policy based on law enforcement and legislation is adopted. In contrast, if terrorism is interpreted as acts of war, a military counterterrorism policy is suggested and justified.

Chapter Five discusses the discursive construction of 'rogue states' in the U.S. political arena. During the 1990s, the Clinton administration successfully related terrorism to issues associated with rogue states, the proliferation of WMD, and Middle

East peace. Based on President Reagan's first 'war on terrorism' discourse and Anthony Lake's statement regarding 'backlash states' given at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University in 1993, the Clinton administration framed and articulated the dangers posed by the 'rogues' in the post-Cold War world. To deal with the 'rogues,' particularly Iraq and Iran, Martin Indyk's dual-containment approach was adopted and employed by the Clinton administration. Because these regimes were deemed to be *unpredictable* and *irrational*, they had to be monitored and contained, either through an 'aggressive containment' or an 'active containment.' The discursive construction of 'rogue states' not only created a 'common understanding' of the rogues, it also rationalised and justified U.S. policies towards these countries. Consequently, a regime change in Iraq and multilateral sanctions targeted at Iran were seen as necessary, while alternative options were considered nonsensical.

Chapter Six argues that there are at least four different types of narratives embedded in U.S. counterterrorism discourse: the narrative of good and evil, the narrative of civilisation and barbarism, the narrative of American exceptionalism, and the narrative of heroes and cowards. By adopting these perspectives, the narrators framed and structured the discourse(s) related to terrorism and counterterrorism and, importantly, helped to discursively construct American identity. The language utilised by the U.S. elite indeed fulfilled certain political purposes that not only depoliticised the motivations of terrorism, but also dehumanised the terrorists. Through the way that the discourse was created and understood, terrorism was socially embedded as a 'negative ideograph' and a social taboo in U.S. and Western societies. Most importantly, the discursive construction of terrorism and terrorists created clear discursive boundaries around these subjects and constrained the way that they could be meaningfully discussed and understood. That is, terrorism and terrorists were inherently evil; they had to be controlled, contained, or eliminated.

Chapter Seven illustrates the shifts in U.S. terrorism discourse and provides theoretical reflections on this research. The usage of the terms *terrorism* and *terrorist* in the U.S. political arena can be traced primarily to the 1960s. However, the political meaning of these terms changed several times over the past few decades. In the 1990s, based on President Reagan's first 'war on terrorism' discourse, President Clinton contributed the expressions 'new terrorism' and 'catastrophic terrorism' to the

discursive construction process. Further, President Clinton's discourse on terrorism provided a useful discursive framework for President George W. Bush to frame the 'war on terror' discourse and to prompt the 'war' in Afghanistan and Iraq. The chapter argues that a radical foreign policy change in the coming future is highly unlikely because the 'war on terror' discourse has been sedimented and institutionalised across American society. To change the discourse, a determined 'change agent,' a particular social and political context, and the promotion of critical linguistic awareness (CLA) and emancipatory language practice in education are indispensable.

Finally, in the conclusion, an overview of the major findings and arguments of the thesis—such as the continuity of the U.S.-led war of terror—are provided. That is, the 'war' and its discourse can be traced to earlier periods, and there is a discursive continuity from Reagan, to Clinton, and through to George W. Bush. In fact, the 'war' is still continuing under the Obama administration. Many of President George W. Bush's counterterrorism policies have been adopted and continued by President Obama. At the end of the thesis, the limits, gaps, and weaknesses of this research are indicated and illustrated. It is suggested that in order to fully understand the discursive construction of counterterrorism and the shifts in the U.S. discourse on terrorism, the rhetoric of other presidents, particularly Barack Obama's 'counter-extremism' discourse, and the role of the media, should also be examined.

Chapter 1

Literature Review and Research Questions

Introduction

Since the tragedy of September 11, 2001, there has been considerable growth in the literature discussing the U.S.-led war on terror, and a body of work continues to develop on President George W. Bush's discursive construction of the 'war on terror.' Among the existing literature, scholars and academics (Collins & Glover, 2002; Silberstein, 2002; Murphy, 2004; Krebs & Lobasz, 2007) tend to assume or at least imply that the war and its discourse originated with the George W. Bush administration. Besides this assumption, one of the frequent arguments is that the 2001 terrorist attacks significantly changed the worldviews of Washington's elites and profoundly affected the U.S. administration's subsequent foreign and security policies (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003; Leffler, 2003, 2004; Mann, 2004). However, in contrast to such an orthodox understanding, this thesis, through tracing the discursive origins of the 'war on terror,' attempts to demonstrate a distinct continuity of U.S. counterterrorism policy from President Reagan, to President Clinton, and, later, through to President George W. Bush. It argues that, based on President Reagan's first 'war on terrorism,' President Clinton rhetorically framed and created so-called 'new terrorism,' or 'catastrophic terrorism,' which is defined not only by its borderless character, but also by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) utilised by terrorists and rogue states. As a consequence, President Clinton's discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism provided a useful and readily available discursive framework for President George W. Bush to respond to the 2001 terrorist attacks. Importantly, the language and discourse used by these U.S. administrations not only constructed, but also constrained, the way in which the subjects of 'terrorism' and 'terrorists' could meaningfully be comprehended and discussed and how they might be addressed.

To problematise the existing literature and find a research gap, this chapter firstly examines the current discussion of President George W. Bush's foreign policy revolution, particularly focusing on neoconservative worldviews and the Bush Doctrine. It argues that President Bush's foreign policy largely followed that of his predecessors, and, therefore, reveals a continuation rather than a revolutionary shift of

U.S. counterterrorism policy after September 11, 2001. Following this argument, a review regarding the discursive dimension of the ‘war on terror’ and a study of the Clinton administration’s counterterrorism initiatives are examined and discussed in greater depth. This literature review shows a persistent lack of research on President Clinton’s terrorism discourse and his counterterrorism initiatives, thereby meriting further research. Lastly, several research questions that this thesis seeks to answer are briefly introduced and outlined.

The Myth of President George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy Revolution: Neoconservative Worldviews and the Bush Doctrine

Since the 2001 World Trade Centre bombings, issues regarding terrorism and counterterrorism have been widely discussed in the scholarship of international relations (IR). There is also a considerable literature elaborating on President George W. Bush’s global war on terror and the transformation of U.S. foreign and security policies. The frequent argument in the existing literature is that the war and its discourse originated with the George W. Bush administration and that a distinct foreign policy revolution occurred in the U.S. political arena after September 11, 2001. For example, Mann (2004: xii) indicates:

The administration’s distinctive approach to the world became considerably more pronounced after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Over the following year the Vulcans put forth a remarkable series of new doctrines and ideas, ones that represented a dramatic break with the foreign policies and strategies of the past.

Similarly, Leffler (2003: 1046) argues that ‘the Bush doctrine departs radically from the ways in which American administrations of the twentieth century have conceptualized and articulated appropriate responses to acute dangers.’ Daalder and Lindsay (2003: 2) also emphasise that President George W. Bush’s foreign policy revolution ‘was not a revolution in America’s goals abroad, but rather in how to achieve them.’ Scholars (see Daalder & Lindsay, 2003; Leffler, 2003; Mann, 2004;

Parmar, 2005; Miller, 2010) claim that the tragedy on U.S. soil not only prompted Washington's elites to rethink America's global role in the post-9/11 era, but also provided an opportunity for the Bush administration to formulate a new U.S. national security strategy to tackle the threats posed by terrorism, terrorists, and so-called 'rogue states.'

Moreover, to understand the Bush-led war on terror fully, some scholars (see Mann, 2004; Mearsheimer, 2005; Schmidt & Williams, 2008) indicate that a neoconservative account of world order and U.S. foreign policy is indispensable. Mann (2004) and Singh (2009), for example, have argued that President George W. Bush's global war on terror—in particular, regime change in Iraq and democracy promotion in the Middle East—is based on the specific political ideal of 'U.S. primacy' shared by neoconservatives, most of whom were, at the time, serving as opinion-shaping leaders and policy-making elites under the George W. Bush administration. The neoconservative worldview, which is also known as the Bush Doctrine, is characterised by its unambiguous commitment to America's international leadership: that is, the U.S. is the sole superpower in the post-Cold War world and seeks to preserve its hegemonic position for the indefinite future (Schmidt & Williams, 2008: 193). Other commitments embraced by neoconservative pundits, such as the preemptive use of military force, the maintenance of a unipolar international system dominated by the United States, and the promotion of democracy, were also defined as central elements of the neoconservative Bush Doctrine. In short, for neoconservatives,² as William Kristol and Robert Kagan (1996: 23) emphasise, 'American hegemony is the only reliable defence against a breakdown of peace and international order.' Moreover a world dominated by the United States would support U.S. national interests.

² In 2001, approximately twenty neo-conservatives served in the George W. Bush administration (Singh, 2009: 37). Most of them were junior members of the Bush administration. Perhaps, the highest ranking official was Paul Wolfowitz, President Bush's first-term Deputy Defense Secretary (Ibid.). Similar to other politically active Americans in Washington, neo-conservatives have interconnections, favoured think tanks and journalistic homes, reliable fundraising sources, and discrete agendas (Ibid.). Parmar (2005: 8) argues that in foreign policy, the neo-conservatives were, and are, fiercely patriotic and loyal to the United States. Therefore, they view the United States as a 'good' country and a 'benevolent nation' in world affairs. In addition, neo-conservatives believe that the United States has a powerful military which enables the country to shape and dominate the world in accordance with its interests (see Mearsheimer, 2005).

The Bush Doctrine was explicitly articulated in the public discourse of U.S. elites and official documents. For example, in 2004, while accepting an interview on CNN's Larry King Live, President Bush expressed his 'deep desire to spread liberty around the world as a way to help secure [the U.S.] in the long-run' (quoted in Monten, 2005: 112). He continued that 'democracy and reform will make [Middle Eastern states] stronger and more stable, and make the world more secure by undermining terrorism at its source' (quoted in Ibid.). President Bush's statement shows that after the 2001 terrorist attacks, exporting democracy and transforming the Middle East into a zone of democracies were seen as a key preoccupation of the Bush administration's foreign policy, one firmly supported by neoconservative elites as a possible solution to terrorism.³

Additionally, the neoconservative worldview, characterised by the political ideal of U.S. primacy and the promotion of democracy, was deeply embedded in the George W. Bush administration's 2002 *National Security Strategy (NSS)*:

The United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world. (2002 *NSS*).

The *NSS* provides an overview of the George W. Bush administration's post-9/11 security strategy. It outlines the major security concerns of the United States—terrorism, terrorists, and rogue states—and illustrates the ways in which the United States would address the identified threats. To tackle them, the United States had to act decisively and immediately, as the *NSS* suggests that 'we [the U.S.] cannot let our enemies strike first' and that 'to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively' (2002: 15). Clearly, the assertion of preemptive use of military force was confirmed and justified by the

³ The promotion of democracy has a long history in U.S. foreign policy, such as, President Jefferson's vision of an empire of liberty, President Wilson's missive that 'the world must be made safe for democracy,' and President Clinton's democratic enlargement and engagement (Leffler, 2004: 22-3; Brinkley, 1997; Dumbrell, 2002, 2009). Yet, it became a particular concern in relation to terrorism after 9/11 (Leffler, 2003; Monten, 2005).

George W. Bush administration in order to deal with the potential threats and enemies that might challenge the United States, in particular, al Qaeda and Iraq's Saddam Hussein regime. The Bush Doctrine, distinguished by its declaration of a preemptive use of force, was thus perceived as an obvious U.S. foreign policy shift.

In fact, President George W. Bush—in sharp contrast to his predecessor, President Bill Clinton—along with Bush's national security advisors, stressed the importance of a foreign policy based on the preponderance of U.S. military power (Mann, 2004: xii; Mearsheimer, 2005: 1-2). Specifically, America's superior military capacity, as the neoconservatives averred, provided a robust instrument for the U.S. administration to transform the world into one that fits U.S. national interests and to spread its core values, such as freedom, democracy, and human dignity, to the rest of the world. In 2002, while giving a speech to the graduates at West Point, President Bush (2002) noted that 'America has and intends to keep military strengths beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.' Notably, while making a comment on the Bush Doctrine, John Mearsheimer (2005: 1) also argued that the Bush Doctrine 'has an idealist strand and a power strand: Wilsonianism provides the idealism, an emphasis on military power provides the teeth.'

Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Bush Doctrine is actually not a revolutionary shift of U.S. foreign and security policies, because sustaining democratic peace and spreading America's core values—the central core of the Bush Doctrine—fits within traditional themes in U.S. history. As Leffler (2004: 22) highlights,

The goals of George W. Bush's foreign policy 'rekindle Thomas Jefferson's vision of an empire of liberty. They were integral to Woodrow Wilson's missive that "the world must be made safe for democracy." They flow from Franklin Roosevelt's four freedoms. They echo the notable rhetoric of John F. Kennedy's inaugural address, to "oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty."

In addition, since the days of the Founding Fathers, the United States has acknowledged that, if necessary, the United States would act unilaterally in the

international arena. For example, at independence, the United States explicitly distinguished itself from the ‘Old World.’ Even in the Cold War period, although U.S. administrations publicly affirmed a commitment to collective security and multilateralism, privately, however, they never renounced the ambition to act unilaterally (Ibid.: 22-3). In terms of the assertion of preemptive war, critics have argued that the unilateral use of military force was not seen as the only tool for the George W. Bush administration in order to tackle potential threats, and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was actually a war of choice (Ibid.: 23). In contrast to the Iraq war, while addressing the threats from Iran and North Korea, the Bush administration did not act unilaterally and preventively as it asserted in the 2002 *NSS*, due to political calculation and pressure from the international arena.

Other research (Freedman, 2009; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007) also shows that prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks, the neoconservatives argued for the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime; they also contributed to the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act aimed at toppling Saddam’s regime and establishing a Western democracy in Iraq (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007: 244). Additionally, during the 1990s, the preemptive use of force was adopted by the Clinton administration in order to combat terrorism and was articulated in *Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39* regarding counterterrorism (Leffler, 2004: 24). And, to respond to the bombings of the United States’ African embassies in 1998, the Clinton administration authorised a series of attacks against Sudan and Afghanistan. Thus, as Leffler (2004: 24) indicates, before George W. Bush took office, the preemptive and unilateral use of military force was already widely accepted by Washington’s elites. The distinct difference between the Clinton and the Bush administrations is that the former viewed preemptive war as a possible option, while the latter translated it into a national doctrine (Ibid.).

Additionally worth of note is the development of the war plan initiated by the George W. Bush administration, and the history of the so-called ‘Vulcans’—the key figures of Bush’s national security team.⁴ By studying the professional and ideological development of the Vulcans, Mann (2004) indicated in *Rise of The Vulcans: The*

⁴ The term ‘Vulcan,’ according to Mann (2004: ix-x), can be traced to the 2000 U.S. presidential campaign. During the campaign, Candidate George W. Bush’s foreign policy advisors called themselves the ‘Vulcans,’ in order to honor the Roman god of fire. The word ‘Vulcan’ was initially used as a joke; yet, it caught on, and Bush’s team started to use it in public.

History of Bush's War Cabinet, that Vulcan philosophy is basically constituted by three major political ideals, namely, the embrace of preemptive action, the notion of an unchallengeable American superpower, and the systematic export of America's democratic values. In addition, similar foreign policy experiences—most of the Vulcans previously served in other Republican administrations and had close connections with the Department of Defence⁵—prompted the Vulcans to define U.S. power in terms of military capability and to prioritise security rather than economic issues as the preoccupation of the George W. Bush administration. Most importantly, as Mann (2004: 363) argues, the war in Iraq demonstrated the Vulcans' commitment to a neoconservative foreign policy drafted by Paul Wolfowitz—one of the influential neoconservative pundits in U.S. politics—at the end of the Cold War, and later rewritten by Scooter Libby (Wolfowitz's aide) under Dick Cheney's name. The draft suggested the necessity of preventing the emergence of any power that might threaten the United States in the post-Cold War world and the need to 'shape the future security environment' (Ibid.). Given that terrorism had emerged as the United States' primary security concern and that it arose primarily in the Middle East, a preemptive war targeted at Iraq was presented as necessary and inevitable, because it was a crucial step to transform the entire politics and social fabric of the Middle East (Ibid.).

A literature review on the Bush-led war on terror, focusing particularly on the neoconservative perspective of foreign policy and the Bush Doctrine, reveals that the war on terror can actually be traced to earlier periods. Prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks, the neoconservative pundits promoted a series of plans regarding world transformation, such as regime change in Iraq and the promotion of democracy in the Middle East. The findings also suggest a continuity of U.S. foreign and security policies, in terms of the preemptive use of military force targeted at terrorism, terrorists, and threats from Saddam Hussein's regime. During the 1990s, the preemptive use of force was not only discussed and practiced by the Clinton administration but also articulated in some official documents, for example, *PDD 39*. Thus, it is plausible that President George W.

⁵ For example, Donald Rumsfeld was President Ford's Secretary of Defense. Besides this, prior to joining the George W. Bush administration, Dick Cheney (President Bush's Vice President) and Colin Powell (President Bush's Secretary of State) served together in the defense department during the George H. W. Bush administration. Even Condoleezza Rice, Bush's first term national security advisor, started her career in Washington with a stint at the Pentagon, working for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see Mann, 2004).

Bush's foreign policy was not actually a revolutionary shift in U.S. politics. After all, most of President George W. Bush's policies were drafted and considered by U.S. elites before September 11, 2001.

Discourse Analysis of the American-Led War on Terror

In addition to an orthodox explanation of the American-led war on terror focused on the discussion and debate of U.S. foreign and security policies, a discourse/text analysis of public rhetoric on terrorism and counterterrorism also contributes to a more in-depth understanding of President George W. Bush's global war on terror. Through an interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse and language, scholars (see, among others, Jackson, 2005, 2006; Croft, 2006; Winkler, 2006; Hodges, 2011) have not only illustrated how a social and political reality of a 'terrorist threat' was framed and constructed after the terrorist attacks in 2001, but also elaborated on how the subject of terrorism was interpreted and understood as a 'negative ideograph,' or a 'social taboo,' in Western societies.

Soon after the 9/11 tragedy, John Collins and Ross Glover (2002) edited a collection of essays entitled *Collateral Language*. This edited volume can be seen as one of the first post-9/11 pioneering studies on U.S. terrorism discourses. In it, the two discussed how discourse and language were used and misused by policy-making elites in order to rationalise and justify the global war on terror. Through a critical analysis of officials' public rhetoric on terrorism, the authors argued that words have histories and that specific terms—for example, *evil*, *cowardice*, *justice*, *freedom*, *targets*, *civilisation*, and *barbarism*—utilised by politicians, fulfilled certain political purposes. In other words, the language that elites used not only functioned to conceptualise individuals' understanding of terrorism and terrorists, but also suggested a particular way in which these subjects should be dealt with. That is, terrorism and terrorists had to be suppressed and eliminated because they were 'evil' and severely threatened 'the American way of life' and Western 'civilisation.' Given that terrorism and terrorists were inherently 'evil,' negotiating with them was seen as nonsensical, and a military approach aimed at eliminating the 'targets' (i.e., terrorism and terrorists) was, therefore, justified. However, despite the insightful account of the officials' interpretation regarding the war and terrorism, *Collateral Language* lacks a theoretical and methodological approach for researchers to study discourse and language

systematically.

Published around the same time, Sandra Silberstein's (2002) *War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11* provided a more meticulous analysis of President George W. Bush's 'war on terror' discourse. The central idea of *War of Words* is that language can be utilised to frame and construct realities. As Silberstein (2002: 1) indicated, 'language has consequences—that through the use of language, we create and recreate particular worlds of understanding.' Through analysing President George W. Bush's major speeches delivered subsequent to the national tragedy, Silberstein illustrated how the specific events of September 11, 2001 came to merit the full-scale war on terror suggested by the U.S. administration and the creation of an unprecedented coalition of allies. Moreover, Bush, by positioning himself as a kind of national chaplain on the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance, through his words, united political, religious, and cultural stances in support of his presidency and the policies he would undertake (Ibid.: 43). Aside from that, it is noteworthy that Silberstein stressed the indispensable role of the media, in particular, television, in constructing the event itself, and post-9/11 identities, and, importantly, educating the American public on Islam and the Arab region—a religion and specific area that were largely unfamiliar to most Americans prior to the attacks. The national tragedy's larger relevance for Americans, according to Silberstein, was, indeed, profoundly constructed by reporters and the visual frames of the news media (Ibid.: 61). However, Silberstein's work contained some weaknesses. For example, it lacked an in-depth discussion on who or what controls transformational power over public discourse, such as political elites, eyewitnesses, and opinion-shaping leaders, among others. Lastly, it omitted an analytical tool or framework for researchers to critically examine discourse and language.

Similar to Silberstein, Croft (2006) emphasised the crucial role of media in the discursive construction of the 'war on terror.' In *Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror*, Croft argued that in addition to political elites, cultural products (such as television, films, music, novels, comedies, and tattoos) contributed to the 'war on terror' discourse. For Croft, the 'war on terror' is not merely a political project promoted by the U.S. administration. Rather, it is produced, reproduced, and constructed by government agencies and, importantly, American popular culture. To further understand the 'war on terror,' Croft (2006: 10) argued that the events of

September 11 should be analysed and discussed in the context of theoretical work on crises. A crisis, according to Croft (2006: 5), is framed in and through social interaction. Specifically, through ‘decisive intervention,’ a crisis is given meaning, and a route for potential policy options is simultaneously provided. With the specific mechanism of crisis, Croft (2006: 5) indicated that ‘there are no objective ontological criteria that a crisis must fulfil to be a crisis,’ and that ‘a crisis is one when it permeates discourse, and creates new understandings and, thereby, new policy programmes.’ Shortly after the tragedy, the ‘war on terror’ not only was accepted by and resonated with the American majority, but also was deeply embedded in a wide range of U.S. social institutions. Consequently, other alternative discourses, such as, for example, ‘no war for oil,’ were eventually marginalised and suppressed by the dominant discourse. In short, in the past decade, the ‘war on terror’ was successfully institutionalised and sedimented in wider American society. Given that it has now become a kind of ‘taken-for-granted’ knowledge, the dominance of the ‘war on terror’ means that it will be hard to change in the future.

In addition, Carol Winkler’s (2006) *In the Name of Terrorism* has provided a systematic overview and analysis of U.S. presidential rhetoric on terrorism and counterterrorism. Winkler (2006: 17) argued that the Vietnam War was the first main conflict in the post-World War II era that prompted more than one hundred presidential speeches in which the term ‘terrorism’ was used in relation to the war. The frequent usage of the terms *terrorism* and *terrorists* in the U.S. political arena, according to Winkler, can be traced to the Kennedy administration. During the Vietnam War, President Kennedy and his successors, namely, President Johnson and President Nixon, adopted a similar rhetorical strategy which rhetorically lined the political ideology of Communism and terrorism to portray their Viet Cong enemies. However, for the U.S. administrations, the term *terrorists* referred not only to the Vietnamese enemies, but also to American students who opposed U.S. military intervention in Vietnam. In addition, Winkler illustrated and detailed how U.S. administrations discursively responded to the major significant crises in the past few decades: for example, the Carter administration to the Iranian hostage crisis, the Reagan administration to the increase of international terrorism, the George H. W. Bush administration to the first Gulf War (1990–1991), the Clinton administration to so-called ‘postmodern terrorism,’ and the George W. Bush administration to the tragedy on September 11, 2001. Based

on the texts analysed, Winkler argued that in the past few decades, terrorism has become a ‘negative ideograph’⁶ in wider American society. As she highlighted, terrorism ‘is a cultural-bound, abstract term of ordinary political discourse that warrants the use of power in ways the public has normally considered unacceptable’ (Winkler, 2006: 15). Simultaneously, her research shows that Democratic administrations tended to define terrorism as a ‘crime,’ while Republican administrations, by contrast, preferred to employ ‘war’ narratives to interpret terrorist attacks targeted at the United States and its citizens (Ibid.: 11, 200).

However, in contrast to the abovementioned literature, Jackson’s (2005) *Writing the War on Terrorism* provided a specific approach to the study of President George W. Bush’s ‘war on terror’ discourse. Employing critical discourse analysis (CDA), Jackson (2005: 2) declared that the language of the ‘war on terror’ is actually not an objective or neutral interpretation of reality; instead, ‘it is a deliberately and meticulously composed set of words, assumptions, metaphors, grammatical forms, myths and forms of knowledge.’ Through an examination of the George W. Bush administration’s terrorism discourse, including officials’ speeches, interviews, radio addresses, and reports to Congress, Jackson illustrated how a single event—the 2001 terrorist attacks—was discursively framed by opinion-shaping leaders and policy-making elites. Further, the ‘war on terror’ discourse, according to Jackson, served a purposeful political agenda while simultaneously establishing clear parameters around how this event could meaningfully be discussed and understood.

Additionally, Jackson (2005) emphasised that the essence of counterterrorism policy, as with foreign and security policies, was the articulation of threat, danger, and identity. It is clear that officials’ public discourse emphasised the extreme threats of ‘super-terrorism,’ or ‘catastrophic terrorism,’ notable for its borderless characteristic and destructive capacity. Further, in order for such policy to gain coherence and support from wider American society, terrorism and terrorists were portrayed as severe threats to the American way of life and Western society. Importantly, in the process,

⁶ According to McGee (1980: 15; see also Winkler, 2006: 11-6), an *ideograph* should fulfill at least four requirements: (1) It must be a term widely utilised in the political arena; (2) it must be an abstract collective commitment to a specific normative goal; (3) it must give the authorities the ability to implement necessity measures for some reason or excuse, and these measures must be accepted and seen as reasonable by the majority; and (4) its meaning must be culture-bound; that is, it can be defined and illustrated within different social and cultural backgrounds.

the evil of 'otherness' and goodness of 'Americans' were also rhetorically constructed. To defend the United States, officials claimed that the United States had to lead the fight against terrorism, because transforming and leading the world has been the historical burden and the international responsibility of the United States. As President George W. Bush claimed, 'we will go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world' (Bush, 2001), and 'we stand together to win the war against terrorism' (Ibid.). Overall, the central argument of Jackson's research was that there are important and unambiguous connections between language, discourse, and counterterrorism practices (or the exercise of power). As he argued, language is indispensable for political understanding; words, indeed, do matter (2005: 27-8).

Jackson's research has also been one of the few exceptions (see also Leeman, 1991; Wills, 2003; Winkler, 2007; Toaldo, 2012) in elaborating on the genealogical origins of the 'war on terror' discourse and President Reagan's first 'war on terrorism.' His article entitled, 'Genealogy, Identity and Counterterrorism' (2006) compared the discursive dimensions of counterterrorism between different American administrations. By examining more than 150 major speeches, interviews, and public addresses given by the key members of the Reagan and the George W. Bush administrations, Jackson contended that the Reagan administration's counterterrorism approach provided a discursive foundation for the George W. Bush administration to formulate its counterterrorism policy and respond to the 2001 terrorist attacks. Both administrations adopted a similar rhetorical strategy to interpret the terrorist threat and to structure their terrorism discourse. Through the production and reproduction of discourses, 'terrorism' was conceptualised in a specific way. That is, terrorism is an 'evil scourge' (Jackson, 2006: 174) of the world and an imminent threat to the U.S. and the American 'way of life.' With the particular threat of terrorism, both the Reagan and the George W. Bush administrations frequently referred to 'the evil scourge of terrorism'; they both claimed that terrorism had to be controlled and suppressed because it was an extraordinary threat and because, being highly dangerous, 'it might spread like cancer' (Ibid.: 176). The language used by elites was therefore not neutral or objective; instead, it fulfilled certain political purposes, which dehumanised so-called terrorists and depoliticised the motivations of these U.S. administrations. Importantly, in so doing, they could rationalise and justify their counterterrorism initiatives to the public.

Despite the discussion of the 'war on terror' discourse and its genealogical

discursive origins, Jackson (2011a, 2014) and McCrisken (2011, 2012) recently studied and examined President Obama's public discourse on the global campaign of counterterrorism. Their research shows a distinct continuity (and lack of change) of U.S. counterterrorism policies between the George W. Bush and the Obama administrations, although, at the onset of the Obama presidency, the U.S. government sought to modify several policies, such as ending the use of torture, withdrawing from Iraq, and reorienting the 'war' to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Jackson and McCrisken argue that many of the Bush administration's counterterrorism initiatives were accepted and continued by the Obama administration, for example, drone strikes. Notably, Jackson (2014) has further explained that over the past decade, the 'war on terror' has been sedimented in wider American society, and it now exists as a powerful and durable social structure. Once a set of ideas has become institutionalised in a society and broadly understood as a hegemonic discourse, or a 'regime of truth,' it is difficult for any policy maker—even the President of the United States—to challenge the assumptions and beliefs underlining the discourse and shift the present policy in a radically new direction. Given this, it can be argued that a radical change in U.S. counterterrorism policy is unlikely. A policy change, Jackson (Ibid.) has emphasised, needs some necessary conditions, namely, a powerful and motivated change agent and a specific moment of rupture or crisis. Given that neither condition currently exists in U.S. society, the 'war on terror' will continue into the foreseeable future.

Adam Hodges and Chad Nilep (2007) have also contributed to the critical study of the language of the 'war on terror.' In *Discourse, War and Terrorism*, scholars—most of them from the fields of sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology, among others—provide a critical perspective on war and terrorism. While the contributors share the same critical focus, it is worth noting that their specific theoretical frameworks and methodologies vary considerably, due in part to the diversity of CDA, and in part because CDA scholars concentrate their research on various issues and social phenomena. However, through the lens of CDA, in this edited volume, these scholars established an interdisciplinary approach to language and power, which the editors argued as leading to more meaningful interpretations of social processes, such as the discursive construction of identities and ideologies in the aftermath of events like 9/11. For example, Hodge (2007) elaborated on how the George W. Bush administration legitimised its pre-9/11 regime change plan in Iraq by

rhetorically connecting Saddam Hussein's regime to bin Laden's al Qaeda and the 2001 terrorist attacks, and how a sociopolitical 'reality' of an enemy alliance against the United States was discursively constructed and constituted through the production and reproduction of discourses.

Annita Lazar and Michelle Lazar (2007) also indicate that the 'New World Order' discourse is actually socially and historically contingent, conceptualising and producing knowledge of post-Cold War international relations and America's role within a particular timeframe. Notably, the essence of this specific discourse, according to Lazar and Lazar, has been America's justification for policing and defending the New World Order. Given that the violence perpetrated by the enemy has been interpreted and negativised as immoral and unjustified, America's violence has been positively presented and justified as a moral and just cause in the pursuit of a just peace (see Lazar & Lazar, 2003, 2007).

Lastly, Patrick Dunmire (2007) examined and analysed the George W. Bush administration's NSS and President Bush's two major speeches regarding the 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq. Dunmire argued that the Bush administration's preemption doctrine was established on the articulation of an unpredictable future characterised by 'emerging threats' and the 'coming dangers' of Saddam Hussein. The specific vision of a 'potential' future actually paved the way for a 'preemptive war' and made the war inevitable.

It is worth noting that the discursive dimensions of 9/11 and the American-led war on terror have also been widely discussed in many academic journals. For example, following the 2001 terrorist attacks, *Discourse and Society* (Chouliaraki, 2005), and *Journal of Language and Politics* (Martin & Edwards, 2004) both released a special issue regarding the tragedy of September 11 and the Iraq war discourse. *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* (Cloud, 2003) likewise collected a set of papers given at the National Communication Association in November 2002, where academics and pundits organised a specific panel elaborating on how the rhetorical trope of 'evil' was produced, deployed, used, and misused in public discourse. Robert Hariman (2003), in this edited volume, argued that the term 'evil' has different layers of meanings in terms of its usage in the political arena, in American popular culture, in the expression of world pain, and in the analysis of so-called 'structural evil' caused by the violence committed by the operation of a political and economic system. Moreover, due to the

dissatisfaction with public responses to the 1966 Tower shootings at the University of Texas and the 1999 shootings at Columbine High School, Rosa Eberly (2003) argued that claims about evil ‘can be warranted only through the existence of a noumenal realm that is outside human affairs in time’ (Eberly, 2003: 552); yet, it does little for individuals to rethink the deliberative questions raised by such tragedies and escape these tragedies from happening again. Overall, in this specific essay collection, the rhetorical trope of ‘evil’ was discussed in great depth; what scholars debated was whether this kind of language should be employed and used in political rhetoric, given its consequences.

Other researchers, such as, John Murthy (2004), Christian Spielvogel (2005), David Noon (2004), and Robert Ivie (2007), have also contributed to studies of U.S. discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism, in particular, how the George W. Bush administration politically and morally justified the war against terrorism and Saddam Hussein and how U.S. historical memory, moral values, and national myths were adopted by policy-making elites to dominate public interpretation of the September 11 events and the appropriate response to the terrorist attacks.

Overall, an examination of the literature reveals an ambiguous gap in the scholarship mainly focused on President George W. Bush’s ‘war on terror’ discourse. A smaller, but nonetheless significant, number of studies on President Reagan’s first ‘war on terrorism’ rhetoric now also exists (see Gold-Biss, 1994; Zulaika & Douglass, 1996; Jackson, 2005, 2006; Winkler, 2006, 2007). However, with very few exceptions (Winkler, 2006), there is a notable lack of research on the Clinton administration’s discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism. During the 1990s, the United States and its allies suffered several significant terrorist attacks. These attacks—including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Tokyo sarin gas attack, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombings, and the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Africa—prompted the Clinton administration to take note of so-called ‘catastrophic terrorism’ characterised by borderlessness and terrorist acquisition of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. As later Chapters will show, the Clinton administration also contributed to the conceptualisation of ‘rogue states,’ or ‘backlash states,’ that were later dubbed as an ‘axis of evil’ by the George W. Bush administration. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration’s counterterrorism initiatives have been, to date, rarely studied systematically.

President Clinton's Counterterrorism Initiatives

An examination of the literature on the American-led war on terror reveals a notable lack of discussion on the Clinton administration's counterterrorism initiatives, in particular, the discursive construction of so-called 'new terrorism,' or 'catastrophic terrorism,' and the real-world policy practices of counterterrorism. Most of the research regarding President Clinton's foreign and security policies largely concentrates on the debate surrounding U.S. post-Cold War grand strategy (see Ikenberry, 2002; Dueck, 2004; 2006: 114-46; Layne, 2006: 38, 118-33, 134-58), and the administration's specific policies towards some critical regions, such as the dual-containment strategy in the Middle East and the promotion of democratic enlargement in Europe (see Brinkley, 1997; Dumbrell, 2002, 2009; Freedman, 2009; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). However, with very few exceptions (see Winkler, 2006: 127-54), there is less discussion of the discursive dimension of the Clinton administration's counterterrorism efforts. It can be argued that the war on terror led by the George W. Bush administration actually originated in earlier periods and that the idea of a U.S. counterterrorism policy revolution after September 11, 2001 is largely mythical. To demonstrate the continuities of U.S. counterterrorism policy and fill the existing research gap, this thesis provides research on President Clinton's construction and enactment of counterterrorism. In this respect, it contributes to a fuller comprehension of the different 'wars on terror' led by U.S. administrations, from President Reagan through to President George W. Bush.

As mentioned, during the Clinton presidency, the United States and its allies suffered a number of significant terrorist attacks. These attacks prompted policy-making elites to address the pressing threats posed by terrorism and terrorists. Further, they contributed to the discursive construction of 'catastrophic terrorism' which was constantly stressed by U.S. elites in their public rhetoric during the course of the Clinton administration. President Clinton's discourse on 'catastrophic terrorism,' distinguished by terrorists' acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, arguably provided a useful rhetorical foundation for President George W. Bush to respond to the 2001 terrorist attacks. Among others, this illustrates the distinct continuity within U.S. counterterrorism policies, from Reagan's first 'war on terrorism' to the present, in terms of the language that elites used and the policies implemented by the

administrations.

However, the debate regarding U.S. post-Cold War grand strategy and specific policies towards the Middle East and Europe are the main focus of the existing literature. Scholars (see Brinkley, 1997; Dumbrell, 2002) have argued that as the first U.S. president whose presidency governed exclusively in the post-Cold War world, Clinton and his national security team tried to formulate a grand strategy that could encapsulate foreign and defence policies and distinguish itself from those of his predecessors, such as Eisenhower-Dulles's 'New Look,' and Bush-Baker's multinational 'New World Order.' In 1992, while Bill Clinton was still a presidential candidate, he outlined three foreign policy priorities with which the next president particularly should be concerned: updating and restructuring American military and security capabilities, elevating the role of economics in international affairs, and promoting democracy abroad (Brinkley, 1997: 111-2). Clinton's statement was later clearly articulated in his administration's *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS)*.

However, despite the fact that threats from terrorism and 'rogue states,' as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), were noted as security concerns by government agencies and articulated in the Clinton administration's *NSS*, most researchers and political commentators focus on Clinton's promotion of a democratic enlargement plan, characterised by the emphases on geoeconomics and the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), rather than his counterterrorism initiatives. This emphasis was due to counterterrorism at the onset of the Clinton presidency not actually being a preoccupation of the U.S. administration, in part, because economic issues were prioritised by the President and key figures in his administration. Thus, the promotion of free trade—the efforts to lower trade and investment barriers, such as signing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), concluding the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and supporting the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)—was of particularly interest to scholars and pundits, and is frequently presented as the major political achievement of the Clinton administration, not security issues such as terrorism and counterterrorism.

In addition to the Clinton administration's national security strategy, which largely focused on economic issues and a democratic enlargement plan, Martin Indyk's

dual-containment approach to Middle East peace was broadly discussed in IR scholarship in order to explain President Clinton's policies towards Middle Eastern countries. In September 1993, Anthony Lake— Clinton's first-term National Security Advisor—introduced and stressed the threats from so-called 'backlash states,' which were later widely known as 'rogue states,' in his remarks at SAIS at Johns Hopkins University. Following his speech at SAIS, Lake (1994) further elaborated on the Clinton administration's 'rogue states' policy in his *Foreign Affairs* article entitled 'Confronting Backlash States.' As a key figure in Clinton's national security team, Lake's discussion of a dual-containment strategy illustrated that so-called 'backlash states' were real concerns of the Clinton administration, especially the threats posed by Iraq and Iran in the Gulf region. The articulation of 'backlash states' reveals something of a U.S. foreign policy shift. It is obvious that in the U.S. security narrative, 'backlash states' had replaced the Soviet Union as the major threats to the United States in the post-Cold War world due to the radical ideologies that these 'outlaw states' shared and the military might—seeking acquisition of WMD and missile delivery systems—they possessed. Notably, in this article, Lake argued how indispensable the dual-containment strategy was for the U.S. administration to address the threats from Baghdad and Tehran.

Apart from the articulation of 'backlash states,' Harvey Sicherman (1997), Gary Sick (1998), F. Gregory Gause III (1994), Robert Litwak (2000), and Lawrence Freedman (2009) have provided historical and theoretical accounts of the Clinton administration's dual-containment strategy and its policies towards the Middle East. Making arguments from a realist perspective on world politics, and in particular the strategic concern of geopolitics and the theory of balance-of-power, these scholars illustrated the shift of U.S. foreign policy from George Kennan's 'containment' in the Cold War period, to Martin Indyk's 'dual containment' in the post-Cold War world. In addition, questions pertaining to how international context—the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War—affected the worldview of Washington's elites were discussed in great depth. Additionally, other literature on U.S. overseas operations and military strikes which targeted the Saddam Hussein regime and terrorist facilities, such as Operation Desert Strike in September 1996, Operation Infinite Reach in August 1998, and Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, are worth noting. The relevant research explained how a military approach of counter-rogue states and

counterterrorism was employed by the Clinton administration to tackle threats from Iraq and al Qaeda, in addition to how policy-making elites legitimated and justified the use of force as necessary to its Republican opponents, as well as the American public (Byman, 2000; Hendrickson, 2002).

However, in contrast to the orthodox realist explanation of the Clinton administration's dual-containment strategy which is mainly based on the strategic concerns of geopolitics and balance-of-power theory, Paul Hoyt (2000a, 2000b), K. P. O'Reilly (2007), Elizabeth Saunders (2006), and Alexandra Homolar (2010) have contributed to an alternative understanding of U.S. rogue-state policy in the 1990s. For example, conducting sophisticated research combining both quantitative and qualitative methods, Hoyt (2000a) and O'Reilly (2013) have argued that in the 1990s the Clinton administration created and framed the 'rogue state' image, and the term 'rogue states' was constantly mentioned in the elite's rhetoric while referring to states like Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea. In the process, some specific policies aimed at transforming the behaviours of these 'outlaw regimes' and enhancing U.S. national defence—for example, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, vigorous U.S. support of U.N. sanctions against Iraq, and the promotion of national missile defence—were justified and rationalised. Homolar (2010) also explained the evolution of the 'rogue state' narrative in U.S. security policy, particularly concentrating on two crises taking place in the post-Cold War era, namely, the first Gulf War (1990–1991) and the North Korean nuclear crisis (1993–1994). The findings demonstrate that prior to President George W. Bush's declaration of the global war on terror, the 'rogue state' narrative had already been discursively constructed and utilised by Washington's policy-making elites in the 1990s.

With regard to the literature on the Clinton administration's counterterrorism initiatives, few scholars concentrate their research on U.S. post-Cold War counterterrorism policy. This lack exists, in part, because at the onset of the Clinton presidency, counterterrorism was not identified as a priority by key figures in the administration, and in part, because many of the counterterrorism actions authorised by the Clinton administration were conducted covertly. These actions have been mentioned in recent memoirs of key members of President Clinton's national security team. For example, Richard Clarke (2004), the former chief counterterrorism advisor on the National Security Council (NSC), has provided an insightful account of U.S.

counterterrorism efforts during the Clinton administration, and in particular, the debates within the NSC on issues associated with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programme and Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda. Louis Freeh (2005), the former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), also provided a sharp critical review of the American-led investigation into the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing that targeted U.S. marines in Saudi Arabia, and how the Clinton administration's policy towards Iran affected the FBI-led investigation. Moreover, Anthony Lake (2000), President Clinton's first-term National Security Advisor, indicated that chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, as well as cyberterrorism, could become imminent threats to the United States and its allies in the post-Cold War world, thereby arguing that the current U.S. administration should note and address these threats carefully. Lastly, President Clinton's (2004) and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's (2003) memoirs also illustrated that so-called 'rogue states' and the potential terrorist attacks organised by al Qaeda were identified as severe threats by the Clinton administration; additionally, the internal discussion on counterterrorism and counter-rogue regimes and the processes of decision making are simultaneously detailed in their memoirs.

Furthermore, the security concerns of terrorism and the counterterrorism measures suggested by government agencies can be found in officials' articles published in *Foreign Affairs*. For example, John Deutch (1997), the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), introduced the graphic concept of 'catastrophic terrorism,' which he argued severely challenged the United States and its allies in the post-Cold War world. Deutch (1997: 10) averred that 'terrorism, like the plague in the Middle Ages, frightens both leaders and citizens. It is a disease that is spreading, its cure is unknown.' Similarly, William Perry and Ashton Carter (Carter & Perry, 1999), the former Secretary of Defence and the former Assistant Secretary of Defence, stressed that 'catastrophic terrorism,' which might involve chemical and biological weapons and a broad range of cyber attacks, had become one of the major threats to the United States. To tackle the new threat, distinguished by its destructive and borderless character, officials argued that effective counterterrorism actions must be defensive and offensive, and new mechanisms of cooperation—both nationally and internationally—between intelligence and law enforcement agencies were required. In addition, a reform within the U.S. administration and an integrated counterterrorism strategy characterised by the emphases of intelligence and warning, prevention and

deterrence, crisis and consequent management, and coordinated acquisition of equipment and technology, was argued as indispensable (Carter, Deutch, & Zelikow, 1998).

In addition these high-ranking officials, Secretary Albright (1998: 59) also argued and reiterated that antiterrorism was one of the new tests of international will and American leadership. As she highlighted, ‘terrorists today are more wealthy, mobile, sophisticated, and deadly than ever before’ (Ibid.). Thus, in order to fight against terrorism, all nations must unite in the struggle against terror, and there is no acceptable middle ground (Ibid.). Importantly, Secretary Albright suggested that a military approach to counterterrorism should never be excluded by policy makers. Specifically, despite judicial, diplomatic, and economic measures, the use of force was officially identified as an extraordinary measure of counterterrorism. In February 1998, while justifying the necessary use of force, Albright (1998c) firmly stated, ‘if we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than any other countries in the future.’ Clearly, for Washington’s elites, America’s military preponderance was presented as a robust instrument for the U.S. administration to contain and repel the threats identified. In the name of counterterrorism and counter-rogue regimes, during the tenure of Clinton’s presidency, the U.S. administration, indeed, authorised and approved several military operations targeted at al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.

Clearly, an examination of the existing literature reveals an obvious research gap in the IR scholarship. As previously mentioned, the frequent assumption of the American-led war on terror is that the war and its discourse originated with the George W. Bush administration and represented something of a foreign policy revolution. To challenge this limited perspective and to fill the gap identified above, this research, through a systematic examination of the Clinton administration’s public discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism, attempts to demonstrate a distinct continuity of U.S. counterterrorism policy between different presidencies, from Ronald Reagan, to Bill Clinton, and, later, through to George W. Bush. The research presented here suggests that, based on President Reagan’s ‘war on terrorism’ approach, President Clinton articulated the notion of ‘new terrorism,’ or ‘catastrophic terrorism,’ which became a formative conception for the United States and its allies in the post-Cold War era. President Clinton’s counterterrorism discourse then provided an important rhetorical

foundation for President Bush to respond to the 2001 terrorist attacks. In other words, far from being a radical break, President Bush's global war on terror actually represents a continuation of U.S. counterterrorism practice.

Research Questions

Based on the above literature review, it is clear that several questions need further examination. Therefore, this thesis is based on the following research questions:

Central Research Question

- To what extent is there a counterterrorism 'regime of truth,'⁷ and how did it come to be constructed and sustained through the process of discursive practice⁸ during the Clinton administration?

Sub-Questions

- What kind of assumptions, beliefs, and values underline the U.S. terrorism and counterterrorism discourses in this period?
- What are the histories and embedded meanings of the important words in U.S. terrorism-related discourse?
- How is the language reinforced and affected by discursive actions?
- What knowledge or practices are normalized by language?
- What are the political functions of the discursive construction?
- How does language create, reinforce, or challenge power relations in society?

⁷ According to Foucault (2002: 131), each society has its *regime of truth*. Foucault (Ibid.) elaborates by stating that the concept of 'regime of truth' can be understood as a type of discourse which is perceived and functions as true; the specific mechanisms or some instances that enable individuals to distinguish true and false interpretations; the means by which is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; and the status of those who have the authority to affect public opinions and decide what is true.

⁸ In this research, the concept of *discursive practice* means the way that discourse is created and understood. It functions to bridge the gap between texts and social practices. Jorgensen & Phillips (2002: 69) argue that through the process of discursive practice, texts can frame and are framed by social practice.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed and summarised the main research on the American-led war on terror and the foreign policy of the Clinton administration. It finds a real gap in the current scholarship, and subsequently identifies the core questions that this thesis seeks to answer. It suggests that if we are to fully comprehend the global campaign of terrorism promoted by successive U.S. administrations, it is necessary to trace the discursive origins of the ‘war on terror’ initiated by the George W. Bush administration, to understand how the discursive construction of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ framed and constrained the common understanding of terrorist threat, and, importantly, to rethink how discourse function to support the interests of policy-making elites. Additionally, as mentioned, prior to September 11, 2001, various U.S. administrations had launched a war against their terrorist enemies, namely, via President Reagan’s war on terrorism, which focused on international terrorism and state terrorism, and via President Clinton’s counterterrorism efforts against al Qaeda and so-called ‘rogue states.’ Thus, a clear continuity of U.S. counterterrorism policy exists between different presidencies.

This thesis, explicitly illustrating the discursive construction of so-called ‘catastrophic terrorism’ and the real practices of counterterrorism conducted by the Clinton administration, is the first in-depth and systematic analysis of President Clinton’s terrorism and counterterrorism discourses. To critically analyse the language and discourse used by U.S. elites, this thesis employs a constructivist approach and a methodology of critical discourse analysis (CDA) in order to explore the research questions stated above. The next chapter briefly explains the constructivist interpretation of IR and Fairclough’s specific approach to CDA. Through the lens of CDA, this thesis argues that the language and discourses utilised by elites are not neutral; instead, they are subjective and, therefore, socially and culturally contingent. It argues that threat, danger, and risk do not exist independently; they are actually subjectively defined, interpreted, and analysed by powerful elites. Further, through the way in which discourse is created and understood, the social and political ‘reality’ of threats like ‘terrorism’ and ‘rogue states’ are discursively constructed and constituted. The discursive construction of threats and dangers not only affects the way in which these threats are meaningfully understood and discussed, but also the way with which they should be dealt with in practice.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations, and Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis

Introduction

The previous chapter problematised the existing literature on the Clinton presidency, and challenged the frequent argument that the American-led war on terror and its discourse originated with the George W. Bush administration. An examination of the literature on President Bush's 'war on terror' finds a real gap, which suggests the need for an in-depth analysis of President Clinton's counterterrorism initiatives. To effectively answer the research questions outlined in the previous chapter, this thesis adopts a constructivist approach to international relations (IR), and the methodology of critical discourse analysis (CDA).

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, the main arguments of constructivism, including the key concepts of inter-subjective understanding of international relations, and the social construction of national interest and foreign policy, are discussed and elaborated. The second section concentrates on the explanation of CDA, including the origins of CDA, the tenets and common features of CDA, and the theoretical commitments shared by CDA scholars. In addition, Fairclough's specific approach to CDA, and his three-dimensional model of discourse, are introduced and explained. In addition, a critical approach to U.S. terrorism discourse and counterterrorism policies based on Fairclough's methodology of CDA is illustrated.

A Constructivist Approach to IR and U.S. Foreign and Security Policies

Since the 1990s, constructivism has come to be seen as an alternative approach to both neo-realism and neo-liberalism, the two most influential approaches in the scholarship of IR. The 'constructivist turn' in IR was given further impetus by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War (Checkel, 1998; Barnett, 2005). With the aim of challenging the traditional interpretation of international politics mainly elucidated by positivists and rationalists, constructivists argue that both Waltz's theory

of neo-realism—characterised by its main arguments that states are the main actors of IR, the international system is fundamentally anarchic, anarchy is the main determinant of national interests and state behaviour, and states are self-interested rational actors (Waltz, 1993, 2000)—and neo-liberalism—featured by its explanation of interstate cooperation, institutions, norms, regimes, and political economy (Baldwin, 1993)—failed to predict and explain the reasons why the Soviet Union would collapse without significant changes in the distribution of capabilities in the international system. Considering the theoretical omissions of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, constructivists argue and provide an alternative approach for researchers to question and rethink the orthodox interpretation of international politics, including the meaning of anarchy and balance of power, the relationship between state identity and interests, the elaboration of power, and the prospects for change in world politics (see Adler, 1997; Wendt, 1987, 1992, 1995, 1999). Although many (Checkel, 1998: 325; Jackson & McDonald, 2009b: 19) argue that constructivism is a broad social theory or method rather than a substantive theory of IR, constructivism is accepted and widely employed in IR scholarship. Constructivist approaches are also widely utilised to discuss and analyse a range of subjects in the field of IR, such as national security and the use of force (Katzenstein, 1996; Williams, 1998), the social construction of national interests and security threats (Campbell, 1998; Weldes, 1999), military doctrine and strategy (Johnston, 1996, 1998; Kier, 1996), the culture of national security (Barnett, 1996, 1999; Berger, 1996), and recently U.S. foreign policy and the ‘war on terror’ (Jackson & McDonald, 2009b; Schonberg, 2009).

In contrast to neo-realist and neo-liberalist understandings of IR, constructivists are particularly concerned with the way agents and structures co-constitute each other; the social construction of identities and interests; and the importance of ideational, normative, and discursive factors in the framing of international political reality (Jackson, 2009a: 172; also see Wendt, 1987, 1992; Doty, 1993, 1997; Suganami, 1999; Barnett, 2005). Though there are a number of different variants of constructivism in the discipline of IR—such as, for example, conventional constructivism, critical constructivism, modernist constructivism, post-modernist constructivism, and feminist constructivism—most constructivists share the same theoretical commitments namely: that the nature of reality is socially constructed; that agents and structures are inter-dependent and co-constitutive; that ideas, language, symbols and other discursive

processes are embedded in national identities, interests, beliefs and perceptions, which in turn constitute powerful normative structures; and that the importance of normative structures lies in the way they construct categories of meaning, constitute identities and interests and define standards of appropriate behaviour (see Hopf, 1998; Barnett: 2005; Reus-Smit, 2009). On these assumptions, constructivists argue that identities and interests are socially and culturally constructed, rather than existing outside or prior to society, as neo-realists usually assume. Constructivists also claim that the agent-structure relationship should be perceived as a dynamic, continuous and contingent process. That is, agents constitute structures through their beliefs, actions and interactions, while structures simultaneously produce agents by helping shape their identities and interests. Constructivist conceptions of the agent-structure relationship challenges the orthodoxy of international politics because it brings human agency back into the analysis of international politics, a contrasting point to realists' structural determinism (Barnett, 2005: 259). Given that the world is socially constructed between different agents, it is only through representation that human beings are able to give meaning to material 'reality' and to events like acts of political violence (Jackson & McDonald, 2009b: 20-1).

It is also worth noting that constructivist explanations of the inter-subjective understanding of identities and interests has an important implication for the way in which individuals conceive of states before their first encounter with each other. For constructivists, we cannot know 'what we want' unless we know 'who we are.' Identity, therefore, plays a pivotal role in the social construction of national interests and the framing of foreign policy. Such a perspective stands in opposition to orthodox IR theories which treat 'national interest' as an objective fact which can be observed, and the national interest as determined by the systemic character of anarchy. As Hopf mentions, 'Identities categorise people according to common features, making the other's actions intelligible and an individual's own actions vis-a-vis them intelligible to himself' (quote in Schonberg, 2009: 16). Identities are created to be utilised, and are applied within an inter-subjective social system. The kinds of identities embraced by a state will not only affect the way it views the world, but also influence the way it interacts with other actors and the international society. For instance, during the Cold War period, the United States and its allies categorised themselves as peace-loving and democracy-loving countries; consequently, the world was politically divided into two

blocs led respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union. However, it should be noted that before policymakers act for the state, they have to engage in a process of interpretation. Through the process of interpretation, the situations—either crises or wars—that the state faces are subjectively defined (Weldes, 1996: 276-7; 1999). The situations defined will further affect the subsequent foreign policies adopted and implemented by the state. Usually, the process of interpretation presupposes a shared language, i.e., the national interest, which justifies and legitimates the state's action and behaviour. Hence, the national interest is produced in, or emerges from, a process of representation through which state officials make sense of their international context (Weldes, 1996: 277). To summarise, the 'national interest' of a state is constructed and created as a meaningful object out of shared meanings between state leaders and policy-making elites, through which the world, particularly the international system, is understood.

As well as the interpretation of identities and national interests, the concept of inter-subjective understanding, another focal point of constructivism, also provides an insightful conceptual tool for researchers to rethink the interaction between agent (state) and structure (the international society) (see Hopf, 1998; Wendt, 1987, 1992, 1995). Through sharing common knowledge, beliefs, and expectations, the relationships between different actors are constituted, whether cooperatively or conflictually. A security community, for instance, in which states trust each other to resolve disputes without war, is shaped and constituted by shared knowledge and expectations. A security dilemma, on the other hand, is a social structure composed of inter-subjective understandings in which states are suspicious of others' intention and military might (Wendt, 1995: 73). In order to define and secure their interests, states tend to adopt self-help measures, such as enhancing their military capabilities or even implementing coercive military exercises. However, from a constructivist perspective, both the security community and the security dilemma demonstrate that the agency-structure relationship is dynamic and mutually interacting and is constructed through the collective understanding of imagined security, rather than the brute distribution of material capabilities as neo-realists claim.

With regards to the study of U.S. foreign and security policies, constructivist approaches to IR—especially their explanation associated with norms, identity, and narrative—provide a useful framework for analysing the American-led war on terror

(see Jackson & McDonald, 2009b; Schonberg, 2009). Constructivists argue that the concept of ‘norms’ can be defined as shared expectations regarding appropriate or legitimate behaviour by actors with a specific identity, which can constitute the interests and constrain the actions and behaviours of state actors in the international society (Jackson & McDonald, 2009b: 21-2). On this basis, the United States is perceived as a ‘norm revisionist’ in the war on terror led by the administration of George W. Bush (Ibid.: 22). Specifically, constructivists would suggest that the so-called Bush Doctrine, i.e., the necessity to ‘tackle the threats before they become an imminent threat,’ not only challenged the antiquated notions of ‘imminence’ as the standard of legitimacy for states to use military force but also promoted a new concept of pre-emptive self-defence (Ibid.). It has been shown that George W. Bush’s war on terror indeed affected the interaction of international society. For example, following Bush’s war declaration, Australia and Japan—America’s two key allies in the Asia Pacific region—both subsequently shifted their security policies and elucidated their definitions of preventive war in the context of concerns about the threats of future terrorist attacks and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Ibid.). The shift of Australian and Japanese security policies indicates that the constructivist account of norms has real explanatory power, and therefore, can be usefully employed to analyse the U.S.-led war on terror, as well as its political and ethical consequences.

In terms of the function of identity and narrative, constructivists argue that we cannot know ‘what we want’ unless we know ‘who we are.’ *Narrative*, a key concept of constructivism that is understood as particular stories about who we are, is linked to a particular policy action through a framing process (Barnett, 1999: 12-6). For constructivists, cultural factors such as national myths, historical parallels, symbols, and ideas, can be utilised as a kind of ‘symbolic technology’ to enable action and the actors who undertake them (see Laffey & Weldes, 1997; Jackson & McDonald, 2009b: 24). This theoretical tool is very useful for analysing U.S. counterterrorism discourse. In the official interpretation of the war on terror, terrorism is usually portrayed as an extreme threat to American citizens and the core values of the United States, namely, freedom, democracy, and human dignity. And, since the Reagan administration, the U.S. government has tended to utilise the same rhetorical strategy to describe the threat of terrorism (see Winkler, 2006, 2007). For example, President Reagan claimed that terrorism is ‘a growing threat to our way of life’ (quote in Jackson, 2006: 168), and ‘a

severe challenge to America's foreign policy' (Ibid.). Similarly, President Clinton and President George W. Bush also frequently described terrorism as a 'threat to our way of life' (Clinton, 1995f; Jackson, 2006: 169) in their speeches. In order to protect the American way of life, the U.S. government claimed that the United States was obliged to lead the world in the fight against terrorism. Clinton (1996s) stated: 'America remains the indispensable nation. There are times when America and only America can make the difference between war and peace, between freedom and repression, between hope and fear.' Such an interpretation can be viewed as a powerful narrative of American national identity which directly links to the notion of the United States as the 'Chosen Nation' and the 'Millennial Nation' (see Hughes, 2003). The power of these stories of identity and history then orients the United States to a particular type of political response to the terrorist threats. As Madeleine Albright (1998c) claimed, 'if we have to use of force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future.' Undeniably, then, identity and narrative—through the production of discourse and the process of interpretation—affects the framing of U.S. foreign policy and subsequent practices of counterterrorism; identity, therefore, is central to national interests and to the dynamics of world politics. Recognising the role of identity gives us a richer understanding of U.S. foreign and security policies.

Adopting a constructivist perspective on IR, this research employed CDA, which is broadly employed by constructivist scholars as the main methodology to study and analyse U.S. terrorism discourse and its counterterrorism policies. With the aim of challenging the orthodox depiction of terrorism⁹, this research argues that U.S. terrorism and counterterrorism discourses function to construct a kind of 'common sense,' or common 'grid of intelligibility' (Milliken, 1999) about terrorism, constitute

⁹ A number of scholars (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, & Smyth, 2011: 31) argue that there are key differences between orthodox and critical approaches to terrorism. Ontologically, critical approaches tend to view terrorism as a social construct which evolves and shifts over time and place (and therefore, is socially and culturally contingent), whereas orthodox approaches tend to treat it as a fixed, objective and scientifically identifiable phenomenon (Ibid.). Epistemologically, critical approaches are more interested in issues such as knowledge and power, the political function of labelling, and the consequences of academic research on individuals and communities (Ibid.). Accordingly, critical approaches tend to prioritise human security and societal security, while orthodox approaches tend to concentrate on national security and the maintenance of the status quo (Ibid.).

the political ‘reality’ of the American-led war on terror, and justify and legitimise the administration’s counterterrorism initiatives. It is argued that the production of the terrorism discourse and the discursive construction of ‘new terrorism’ are intended to maintain a specific counterterrorism ‘regime of truth.’¹⁰ Additionally, it is argued that the terrorist threat is not an objective, free-standing fact; instead, it is subjectively categorised through a process of interpretation (Campbell, 1998; Jackson, 2005, 2007; Mueller, 2006). That is to say, our understanding of terrorism or the terrorist threat is often defined and given meaning by powerful political elites, or the ‘worldmaking power’ (Bourdieu, 1987)—the most significant resources of news media and other social processes. By labelling and uttering terrorism as a severe challenge to the United States, it eventually becomes an extraordinary threat to U.S. citizens and the American way of life. In the name of counterterrorism, the U.S. elite can justify and legitimise their counterterrorism initiatives, in spite of their negative consequences. Constructing national interests and foreign policies through specific identities, i.e., ‘good Americans’ and the ‘city upon the hill’ (American exceptionalism), U.S. terrorism discourse successfully links counterterrorism policies to the history of the United States; it also functions to convince American citizens to support officials’ political and military decisions. Finally, the findings presented in this thesis simultaneously demonstrate the strong continuity and lack of change of the American-led war on terror, from Reagan, to Clinton, and through to George W. Bush.

Critical Discourse Analysis and the Social Construction of Reality

In recent decades, discourse analysis has become widely recognised as a useful approach for the critical study of IR (see Doty, 1993; Adler, 1997; Milliken, 1999). With the development of discourse analysis in IR, more and more scholars are focusing their research on the function of language, and discussing how words, language, and

¹⁰ The concept of ‘regime of truth’ can be understood as the type of discourse that is perceived and functions as true in a given society; the specific mechanisms or some instances that enable individuals to distinguish true and false interpretation; the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; and the status of those who have the authority to affect public opinion and decide what is true (Foucault, 2001: 131-3).

discourse¹¹ are utilised in the political arena. For instance, Collins and Glover (2002), Croft (2006), Hodge (2011), Jackson (2005), Jarvis (2009), Murphy (2004), Silberstein (2002), and Winkler (2006) all contribute to the study of language and political discourse, and in particular the discourse of the American-led war on terror. With the help of language theory, the concept of ‘securitisation’ and its explanation of ‘speech acts’ also enriches the field of security studies in IR (Taureck, 2006; Waever, 2011: 95). Although discourse theorising occurs within different epistemological paradigms, such as post-structuralist, postmodernist, feminist, and social constructivist, it is predicated upon a common set of theoretical commitments. First, discourse is a system of signification which constructs social realities and gives meaning to social practices, events and objects (Milliken, 1999: 229). Second, discourses define subjects, such as national security experts, defence intellectuals, and foreign policy-makers, who are authorised to speak and act (Ibid.). It legitimates forms of knowledge and political practice, and common ‘grids of intelligibility,’ within particular social groups and historical settings (Ibid.). Furthermore, discourse functions to maintain a ‘regime of truth’ and exclude other alternative suggestions and measures (Ibid.: 229; also see Foucault, 1980, 2002). Third, discourse theorists argue that discourse is historically and culturally contingent and open-ended, thus requiring continuous production and reproduction, and is, therefore, open to resistance and destabilisation (Milliken, 1999: 230; Jackson, 2009c: 68).

Besides this, it is also noteworthy that several other premises are broadly shared by most discourse analysts, especially social constructionists¹². First, a critical approach to taken-for-granted knowledge is indispensable in discourse analysis studies. For social constructionists, our knowledge of the world should not be perceived as objective truth, because reality is only accessible to us through the process of

¹¹ In the contemporary human sciences, the term *discourse* is used to express any organised body or a number of statements and utterances governed by rules and conventions of which the user is largely unconscious (Macey 2000: 100). The French linguist Benveniste further defines the term *discourse* as any utterance that involves a speaker and a listener, and an intention, on the part of the speaker, of influencing the listener. According to Benveniste, both a trivial conversation and a formal speech can be seen as examples of discourse (Macey 2000: 100). However, in this research, discourse is defined as *a particular way of talking about and comprehending the world* (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002).

¹² The term ‘social constructionism’ (also known as ‘social constructivism’) is broadly discussed in the field of sociology and linguistics.

categories and interpretations (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 5). As Barnett (2005: 259) argues, reality does not exist out there waiting to be discovered; instead, historically-produced and culturally bound knowledge enables human beings to create and give meaning to reality. Given that discourse, words, and language are not neutral and cannot be used objectively, there is therefore, no possibility of achieving absolute/objective truth or so-called universal knowledge. Consequently, so-called ‘truth’ should not be viewed as universal and fixed; truth(s) can always be doubted and questioned. More specifically, our knowledge and representations of the world are not neutral reflections of an objective reality which exists independently of human beings; instead, they are products of our ways of categorising and understanding the world.

Second, human beings are fundamentally historical and cultural beings; therefore, our worldview and our understanding of the world are the products of historically situated interchanges among people (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 5). Given that the ways in which we understand and interpret the world are historically and culturally specific and contingent, our worldviews and identities could have been different. As Barnett (2005: 267) indicates: identities are social and thus are always constructed in relationship to others, and because identities are social and are created through interactions, they can change. From this vantage point, constructionists believe that individuals’ worldviews and identities are also not fixed; they may also change over time, and depend on the situations that people have experienced. Similarly, Jorgensen and Phillip (2002: 5) indicate that this kind of understanding—of knowledge as being contingent—should be perceived as an anti-foundationalist position which clearly stands in opposition to the foundationalist argument that ‘knowledge can be grounded on a solid, metatheoretical base that transcends contingent human actions.’¹³ Thus, for constructionists, the social world, including knowledge, identities and social relations, is constituted socially and discursively.

Given that the world people live in is socially and discursively constructed, it is

¹³ The main difference between foundationalists and anti-foundationalists is their position towards the nature of the world. Anti-foundationalists argue and believe that there is not a ‘real’ world which exists independently and can be discovered by observers/researchers. Thus, for anti-foundationalists, it is impossible for researchers to observe the world (or illustrate a specific subject) ‘objectively.’ Related to this is the specific concept of *double hermeneutic* shared by anti-foundationalists which notes that the world is interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic level) and their interpretation is interpreted by the researchers (a second hermeneutic level) (Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 18-9).

plausible to say that discourse—a *particular way of illustrating and understanding of the world*—plays as an essential role in maintaining specific social patterns, and therefore the character of the social world is not pre-given or determined by external conditions. Finally, knowledge, social processes, and social action should not be understood and discussed separately; instead, they should be further elucidated and discussed in a specific social context (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 5-6). From a constructionist perspective, knowledge can only be created through the process of social interaction in which the ‘common truths,’ or ‘the regime of truth’ defined by Foucault (see Foucault, 1980, 2002), is created and perceived. The ‘common truths’ not only enable people to distinguish true and false interpretations, but also to categorise which action is accepted by the majority. In other words, within a particular worldview, some forms of action are perceived as natural, while others are treated as unthinkable.

In short, generally, social constructionists tend to embrace a sceptical approach to, and question, the taken-for-granted knowledge and ‘common sense’ interpretation of subjects; their understanding of the world, both ontologically and epistemologically, affects the way they view the world and the methods by which they study the world. Moreover, for constructionists, different social understandings of the world may lead to different social actions, and the social construction of knowledge and truth indeed has some social consequences.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

As a variant of discourse analysis, CDA builds its central arguments on the premises of social constructionism outlined above. However, it also distinguishes itself as a specific type of discourse-analytical research aimed at studying the way social-power abuse, dominance, and inequality, are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by spoken and written language in a social and political context (van Dijk, 1994: 435, 2001: 352; 2008: 85). In contrast to other approaches of discourse analysis, CDA sheds light on the asymmetry of power relationships. CDA claims that this kind of power relationship is detrimental to social development, and leads to numerous social and political problems, such as social inequality, social injustice, and the provocation of racism.

With the aim of supporting political or ethnic minorities (that is, the suppressed groups in society), CDA scholars stand in clear opposition to the dominant social

groups. Through critically analysing dominant discourses, they seek to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality. In addition, CDA tries to demonstrate the role of *discursive practice*—the way in which discourse is produced, circulated and consumed—in the maintenance of the social world, including those social relations which involve unequal relations of power (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 63). For this reason, CDA is particularly distinctive in its emphasis on the relationship between language and society, and the relationship between analysis and the practices analysed (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 258).

Discourse as a form of *social practice* which shapes and constitutes the social world is central to CDA. The explanation of discourse as a form of social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discourse event and the situations, institutions and social structures which frame discourse (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 258). The dialectical relationship could be further explained as a dual relationship between discourse and the social world: on the one hand, the discourse event is shaped by situations, institutions, and social structures; on the other hand, the discourse event also simultaneously shapes situations, institutions and social structures (Ibid.). This explanation also refers to the crucial argument of CDA that discourse is socially constitutive and socially framed, and that discourse constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, social identities, social relations and social classes (Ibid.). From the perspective of critical discourse analysts, discourse not only helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, it also helps to transform it. Since discourse is so socially influential, discursive practices thereby function to constitute and generate certain social effects, such as producing and reproducing unequal power relations between social classes, men and women, white and black, domestic citizens and immigrants, and cultural or ethnic majorities and minorities, through the ways in which they illustrate the world and thus position people (Ibid.).

As a consequence, CDA distinguishes itself as an engaged and committed social science, rather than a dispassionate and objective academic discipline (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 258). In fact, most CDA scholars are politically active against social power abuse, dominance and power inequality. They also concentrate their research on a wide range of social and political phenomena: for instance, Kress's focus on the political economy of representational media (see Wodak, 2002 : 6); Fairclough's discussion of discourse and social change, and his explanation of discourse, ideology

and power (Fairclough, 2001, 2010); and van Dijk's research into discourse and racism, and his work on communication and media discourse (van Dijk, 1993, 1997, 2008). To sum up, what is distinctive about CDA is its research focus on power inequality—the dominated groups and the oppressed groups—and its explicit declaration to emancipate interests that are usually less discussed in the existing literature on discourse analysis (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 258-9).

The Theoretical Origins of CDA

Since the early 1990s, CDA has been seen as focused on a network of scholars, following a symposium in Amsterdam in January 1991. During the symposium, many key figures, namely, Teun A. van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo Van Leeuwen, and Ruth Wodak, had the opportunity to discuss theories and methods of discourse analysis, and CDA specifically. The symposium was a landmark event, contributed to the theoretical development of CDA. In the group meeting, the main differences and similarities of each discourse approach were exposed, and these still describe the different approaches today (Wodak, 2001: 4). Since this first meeting in Amsterdam, annual symposia have been held and have accompanied the emergence of CDA. With the emergence of the network of CDA, many approaches, usually less discussed by English-speaking scholars, such as Utz Maas's and Siegfried Jäger's approaches to discourse in the German-speaking world, have been noted and studied (Ibid.: 4).

However, although the network of CDA derives from the early 1990s, some of the tenets of CDA can be found in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School before the Second World War.¹⁴ Besides this, its current focus on language and discourse is

¹⁴ The Frankfurt School concentrates its research on Marx's thought and seeks to reexamine the philosophical heritage from which it arose. Scholars of the Frankfurt School argue that cultural products should not be viewed as epiphenomena of economy; rather, they should be understood as relatively autonomous expressions of contradictions within the social whole. In addition to that, Frankfurt School philosophers are noted for the emphasis on the subjective conditions for revolutionary transformation (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 261). Based on the philosophical foundations mentioned, Jürgen Habermas indicates that a critical science has to be self-reflective (reflecting on the interests that underlie it), and it must consider the historical context in which linguistic and social interactions take place (Ibid.). Habermas further develops the concept of the *ideal speech situation* which is understood as the utopian vision of interaction taking place without power relations intruding into it. It

broadly understood to be established by ‘critical linguistics’ which emerged mostly in the United Kingdom and Australia, and began at the end of the 1970s (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 260-2; van Dijk, 2001: 352). The 1970s is therefore seen as a pivotal period for the emergence of a form of discourse and text analysis that recognised the function of language to maintain and reproduce power relations in society (Wodak, 2001: 5). As a new research approach, CDA actually has many counterparts in the ‘critical’ developments in sociolinguistics, psychology, and the social sciences, some dating back to the early 1970s. In addition to these neighbouring disciplines, CDA can also be seen as a reaction against the dominant formal paradigms, that is, the asocial or uncritical linguistic paradigms of the 1960s and 1970s (van Dijk, 2001: 352).

With regard to the theoretical foundations of CDA, there is a commitment broadly shared by scholars that ‘Western Marxism’ profoundly affected the development of CDA. Western Marxism, which gives more emphasis than other variants of Marxism to the cultural dimension of societies, stresses that capitalist social relations are established and maintained in large part in culture, and especially highlights the role of ideology and discourse, not just the economic base (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 260; van Dijk 2008: 33-7).

Many key figures and movements of Western Marxism, namely, Antonio Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, Jurgen Habermas, and Louis Althusser, are all seen as contributors to the theoretical and methodological development of CDA (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 260). For instance, Gramsci argues that the continuing power of the capitalist class depends upon a combination of political society and civil society. Althusser is also well-known for the theory of ideology which maintains that ideologies are not part of a nebulous realm of ‘ideas,’ but are tied to material practices rooted in social institutions, and that ideologies position individuals in particular ways as social subjects (Ibid.: 260-1). Gramsci and Althusser’s works influenced the development of CDA, such as Stuart Hall’s work of critical analysis and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, Habermas’s concept of the ‘ideal speech situation,’ and his broader research approach, also enlightened German sociolinguistics, pragmatics, and some studies in the field of CDA (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 259-61). Although critical discourse analysts often

is argued that Habermas’ account of discourse and the ideal speech situation profoundly affected German sociolinguistics, pragmatics, and some studies in CDA (Ibid.).

do not explicitly categorise themselves within this legacy, these political thinkers and philosophers and their thoughts nevertheless frame their work. Their arguments provide a solid foundation for CDA analysts to study discourse and explore social and political phenomena.

The Tenets and Common Features of CDA

As previously discussed, CDA is just one variant of discourse analysis, and there exists many different approaches within the wider field of CDA. Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 271-80) outline the main tenets of CDA as follows:

- CDA addresses social problems;
- Power relations are discursive;
- Discourse constitutes society and culture;
- Discourse does ideological work;
- Discourse is historical;
- The link between text and society is mediated;
- Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory;
- Discourse is a form of social action.

Jorgensen and Phillips (2002: 60-4) further summarise Fairclough and Wodak's explanation and conclude that there are at least five common features among different variants of CDA: (1) the character of social and cultural processes and structures is partly linguistic-discursive; (2) discourse is constitutive and constituted; (3) language use should be empirically examined within its social context; (4) discourse functions ideologically; and (5) CDA identifies itself as critical research. In this section, the central arguments of each feature are outlined and briefly discussed.

(1) The character of social and cultural process and structure is partly linguistic-discursive

CDA analysts believe that discursive practice is a form of social practice. Through the process of discursive practices—that is, the way in which texts are created, circulated, distributed, and consumed—the social world, including social relations and social identities, is constituted (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 61; also see Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000: 448-9). In addition, it is partly through the process of discourse

production and consumption that social and cultural reproduction and change take place. This conception also suggests that most CDA analysts do not deny that some societal phenomena are not of a linguistic-discursive character (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 61). However, the aim of CDA is to concentrate on the linguistic-discursive dimensions of social and cultural phenomena and processes of change in late modernity, such as organisational analysis, pedagogy, media and racism, nationalism and identity, and democracy and politics (Ibid.).

(2) *Discourse is constitutive and constituted*

CDA analysts establish their arguments on the premise broadly shared by social constructionists that discourse is a form of social practice that plays a part in producing the social world. In the study of CDA, discourse is understood as a form of social practice which both constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social practices. This viewpoint suggests a crucial concept of CDA, namely, that there is a dialectical relationship between discourse and other social dimensions. Discourse not only functions to frame and reframe social structures; it simultaneously reflects social structures (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 61).

In his research, Fairclough cites children-parents-family as an example through which to examine the conception of a dialectical relationship. According to Fairclough, the relationship between parents and children is partly discursively constituted; he also indicates, however, at the same time, the family is perceived as an institution with concrete practices, pre-existing relationships and identities. These practices were initially discursively constituted, but have become sedimented in institutions and non-discursive practices (Fairclough, 1992a: 66).

The conception of a dialectical relationship can be utilised to interpret the relations within social interactions and social structures, such as the relationship between students, professors and educational institutions, and the relationship between patients, doctors and medical centres. Through the process of discursive practices and social practices, the social world, including knowledge, social classes and structures, and social interactions, is constituted. In short, in the analysis of CDA, social structures not only determine discourse, they are also a product of discourse (Fairclough, 2001: 31).

(3) *Language should be empirically examined within its social context*

CDA directly engages in concrete, linguistic textual analysis of language use in social interaction. This characteristic, in fact, exhibits a notable difference between CDA and other types of discourse analysis, such as Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, and discursive psychology. The former, Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, is more concerned with general patterns and aims at a more abstract discourse in society at a particular moment or within a specific social domain. It also concentrates on discussing how discourses limit human possibilities for action (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 20-1, 63). The latter, discursive psychology, is particularly interested in everyday discursive practices and therefore in shedding light on the necessity of systematic empirical analyses of people's talk and written language in some specific contexts, such as, the mass media, research interviews, and so on (Ibid.).

(4) *Discourse functions ideologically*

CDA stresses that discursive practices make a contribution to the creation and reproduction of asymmetrical power relations between different social groups and social classes. These consequences are examined as ideological effects by CDA analysts. Fairclough and Wodak (1997) indicate that 'ideologies are particular ways of representing and constructing society which reproduce unequal relations of power, relations of domination and exploitation.' Although the theory of ideology was initially developed as a part of the Marxist explanation of class relations, it is now widely extended to encompass relations of domination based upon gender and ethnicity (Ibid.: 275). Classical Marxism suggests that the dominant ideology is usually the ideology of the ruling class, and there are indeed certain dominated groups or classes in human society (van Dijk, 2008: 34). These dominated groups may develop biased conceptions of their socioeconomic position, which in turn may lead these dominated groups to act against their own basic interests (Ibid.). The dominated classes tend to conceal their ideology but seek to ensure that the ideology embraced by them is accepted as a general or natural system of values, norms, and goals (Ibid.). Considering the power relations of social structures and classes, ideological reproduction assumes the nature of consensus formation and the power derived from it takes on a hegemonic form (Ibid.).

However, despite the variety of approaches to the concept of ideology, it is

generally assumed that the term ‘ideology’ refers to the group or class ‘consciousness’ which underlies the socioeconomic, political and cultural practices of group members in such a way that their interests are realised (van Dijk, 2008: 34). Van Dijk further introduces a systematic sociocognitive analytical framework of ideology. An ideology, according to van Dijk’s definition, ‘is a complex cognitive framework that controls the formation, transformation and application of other social cognitions, such as knowledge, opinions and attitudes, and social representations, including social prejudices’ (Ibid.). Ideological social cognitions are not systems of individual beliefs or opinions; instead, they are produced from members of social formations or institutions. However, it should be noted that the acquisition of an ideology is not merely directed by the dominated groups, or by the ‘objective interests’ of some specific groups and classes (Ibid.: 35). Therefore, discourse and communication are suggested to play an essential role in the formation and transformation of ideology (Ibid.). For this reason, it is crucial for analysts to examine who, utilising what processes, controls the means or institutions of ideological reproduction, and to demonstrate that discourse, in particular, discourse of powerful institutions and groups, is the pivotal social practice that mediates and manages the wider social beliefs (Ibid.).

(5) Critical research

In opposition to objectivist social science, CDA does not identify itself as politically neutral; instead, it tends to identify itself as a critical approach that is politically committed to social change (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 64). Besides this, in order to expose and object to social inequality, scholars of CDA clearly identify their position in support of oppressed social groups and minorities. Specifically, uncovering the role of discursive practice in the continuation of asymmetrical power relations, and struggling for radical social change, are the normative aims of CDA (Ibid.: 64).

Fairclough’s Three-Dimensional Model: A Critical Approach to U.S. Terrorism Discourse and Counterterrorism Policies

As previously discussed, CDA is a discursive research approach that is enlightened by the philosophical thinking of Western Marxism; within the discipline of CDA,

different variants and approaches exist, such as French Discourse Analysis, Critical Linguistics, Social Semiotics, Sociocultural Change and Change in Discourse, Socio-cognitive Studies, the Discourse–Historical Method, and the Duisburg School (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 262-8). However, in this research, Fairclough’s Three–Dimensional Model (see Fairclough, 1992a, 2001) is employed as the main methodology to analyse U.S. terrorism discourse and the counterterrorism initiatives implemented by the Clinton administration, due to his specific definition and account of discourse(s). Other social and culture theories are also utilised to illustrate how discourses are produced and consumed, and how they contribute to the maintenance of the counterterrorism ‘regime of truth’ in order to enhance and modify Fairclough’s Three–Dimensional Model, particularly its explanation of discursive practice and social practice.

Similar to social constructionists, Fairclough’s approach to CDA is characterised by its definitions of discourse, namely, that ‘discourse refers to language use as social practice,’ that it ‘is comprehended as the kind of language used in some specific fields,’ and that it ‘is utilised as a count noun,¹⁵ referring to a way of speaking and thinking which gives things meaning from a particular perspective’ (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 66-7). For Fairclough, discourse should not be seen only as constitutive, but also as constituted; discourse per se should be understood as an important form of social practice that shapes the world. Fairclough’s particularly highlights the difference between the discursive and the non-discursive dimensions of social practices, a point in opposition to those of other discourse analysts; for example, Laclau and Mouffe tend to treat all social practices as discourse, and thus discourse itself is fully constitutive of the social world (Ibid.: 19). The specific perception of discourse as constitutive and constituted refers to Fairclough’s other definitions of discourse. A number of different discourses are suggested to be used by human beings, such as feminist discourse, post-structuralist discourse, neoliberal discourse, Marxist discourse, environmentalist discourse, and so on. These discourses are usually produced and given particular meanings by a powerful group of people, such as scientists, academics, political elites

¹⁵ In contrast to other scholars, such as Laclau and Mouffe, who identify all social practice as discourse, Fairclough indicates and confines the term *discourse* to semiotic systems, such as language and images; therefore, there are various discourses. Besides this, each type of discourse represents a specific way of thinking and a particular way of understanding (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 66-7).

and policy practitioners. Through discursive practices, these discourses are consumed in everyday life and thereby constitute the social world. As various types of discourse exist, the term ‘discourse’ is actually considered a count noun—a discourse, the discourse, the discourses, discourses—which can be distinguished from other types of discourse (Ibid.: 66).

Aside from providing the definitions of discourse, Fairclough indicates that discourse contributes to social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and meaning (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 67). Thus, discourse has at least three functions for the social world: the identity function, the relational function, and the ideational function (Ibid.). Furthermore, every instance of language use can be viewed as a *communicative event*¹⁶ that encompasses three dimensions: a *text*, including spoken and written language, a visual image or a combination of these; a *discursive practice* that involves the production and the consumption of discourse; and a *social practice* that involves both discursive and non-discursive elements (Ibid.: 68-9). In the real practice of discourse analysis, these three dimensions should always be examined by the analysts. Specifically, a detailed discourse analysis should concentrate on the linguistic features of the text (text), the process associated with the production and the consumption of the text (discursive practice), and the wider social practice to which the communicative event belongs (social practice) (Ibid. 68).

However, notably, the analysis of the linguistic features of the text will simultaneously involve the analysis of discursive practice and vice versa (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 68-9). Nevertheless, text analysis and discursive analysis should be discussed separately because in Fairclough’s model of discourse analysis, two different dimensions are represented. The former, text analysis, focuses on linguistic features, such as vocabulary, grammar, syntax and sentence coherence, from which discourses and genres¹⁷ are realised linguistically (Ibid.: 69) The latter, discursive practice, concentrates on how the authors of texts draw on already existing discourses and genres to create a text, and how the receivers of texts also apply available discourses

¹⁶ The term *communicative event* is defined by Fairclough as an instance of language use, such as, for example, a newspaper article, a film, a video, an interview or a given political speech (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 70).

¹⁷ A *genre*¹⁷ is a particular usage of language which takes part in, and thereby constitutes part of, a particular social practice, such as an interview genre, a news genre or an advertising genre (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 67).

and genres in the consumption and the interpretation of the texts (Ibid.). Discursive practice also functions to bridge the gap between texts and social practices. Hence, only through discursive practice can texts frame, and are framed by, social practice (Ibid. 69).

Fairclough's approach to CDA provides a useful framework for analysing U.S. terrorism discourse and American-led counterterrorism initiatives. In his Three-Dimensional Model, Fairclough distinguishes among discursive practice, text and social practice as three levels that can be analytically separated. Therefore, when analysing U.S. terrorism discourse, the analyst firstly concentrates on the text(s) itself. Inspired by Foucault's methodology of genealogy (Dean, 2009: 52-74; Foucault, 2001), the research in this thesis attempts to trace the discursive origins of the American-led war on terror. Genealogy, according to Foucault (Gutting 2005: 50), is a 'history of the present,' and its primary intent is not to understand the past in its own terms or for its own sake, but to know and evaluate the present. Through text analysis, specific words, language and phrases frequently utilised in U.S. terrorism and counterterrorism discourse are carefully examined. The aim of the text analysis is to understand and answer several crucial questions, such as: What kind of assumptions, beliefs and values underline the U.S. terrorism and counterterrorism discourse? What are the histories and embedded meanings of the important words in U.S. terrorism discourse?

Critically analysing the texts collected, this research demonstrates that terrorism was given meanings and understood as a severe political and social phenomenon in the United States in the 1970s (see Collins & Glover, 2002; Winkler, 2006). Furthermore, since the Reagan administration, the U.S. government has tended to use the same rhetorical strategies to interpret the threat of terrorism. Terrorism was officially defined as an extreme threat to the American way of life as it challenges U.S. foreign policy and national security. In addition, the vocabulary employed by powerful political elites, such as *evil*, *coward*, *innocence*, *freedom* and *justice*, indeed has particular cultural meanings for U.S. citizens and therefore functions for political purposes. For instance, when terrorism and terrorists are subjectively defined as 'evil' by powerful political elites in the United States, a Christian country¹⁸, this interpretation also suggests a way

¹⁸ Samuel Huntington (2004: 369) indicates that Americans are overwhelmingly Christian, and religiosity distinguishes the United States from most other Western countries. Besides, in comparison

to address the terrorist threat. That is, they have to be eliminated; negotiating with evil is unacceptable. Additionally, the language used not only portrayed the features of terrorism and terrorists, but also shaped the national identity of the United States (see Chapter 6).

In terms of discursive practice, according to Fairclough, the analysis of discursive practice focuses on how discourse is produced and consumed in specific social contexts. Moreover, the analysis of discursive practice draws on the function of the existing text(s). That is to say, the analysts would face and discuss issues of *intertextuality* in the analysis of discursive practice. In Fairclough's research, the concept of intertextuality refers to a condition in which all communicative events draw on an earlier event (Fairclough, 1992a: 232-4; Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 73). Thus, dealing with the issue of intertextuality means answering the question about how the authors of the text(s) use the existing text(s) to create new text(s).

In this research, the analysis not only concentrates on Clinton's terrorism discourse but also examines Ronald Reagan's and George W. Bush's discourses associated with the terrorist threats. The Reagan administration is argued to have provided a clear rhetorical foundation for the Clinton administration to formulate its terrorism discourse. During the Clinton presidency, the United States suffered a number of significant terrorist attacks, including the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, the 1998 African Embassy Bombings and the 2000 *U.S.S. Cole* Bombing. These incidents prompted the U.S. administration to respond to the threat of domestic terrorism and international terrorism. For the Clinton administration, no clear boundary existed between international and domestic terrorism. Terrorist attacks could occur everywhere, and everyone could be the next target of the terrorists. As an 'open and free society' (Clinton, 1995k), the United States was not immune from terrorists from 'within and beyond' (Clinton, 1995m) its borders.

Apart from these, the 1995 Tokyo Sarin Gas Attack and cyberterrorism, a new type of terrorism, also contribute to Clinton's terrorism discourse associated with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and with Internet security. Terrorist attacks that were accompanied with the use of WMD were interpreted and constructed as 'catastrophic terrorism' during the Clinton years. After the September 11, 2001 tragedy,

to people from other countries, Americans tend to view the world in terms of good and evil due to their religiosity.

Clinton's interpretation of catastrophic terrorism as boundless was accepted and adopted by the George W. Bush administration. Through the process of discursive constructions and interpretation, the discourse on terrorism and its suggestions on anti-terrorism measures function to maintain a counterterrorism 'regime of truth.' They are still consumed by most American citizens and are seen as the taken-for-granted knowledge up to the present day (see Jackson 2011a, 2014).

Finally, the analysis of social practice is the last and the most complicated part of Fairclough's CDA. In the examination of social practice, the analyst will discuss two main concepts introduced in Fairclough's theory: the *social matrix of discourse* and the *orders of discourse*. Discussing the social matrix of discourse and the orders of discourse will help the analyst to specify the social and hegemonic relations and structures that constitute the matrix of social and discursive practice (Fairclough, 1992a: 237-8). In this thesis, our knowledge of terrorism is argued to be constituted through the production and the consumption of terrorism discourse. Furthermore, symbolic power or so-called 'worldmaking power,' in Bourdieu's (1987) terms, plays the essential role of discourse producer. These elites, particularly powerful political elites, have privileged access to public discourse; they dominate the production of discourse, decide on what kind of information should be interpreted as *truth* and the ways that selected information should be interpreted. Through the production of discourse, social structures are constituted and sustained. The analysis of social practice also helps answer other crucial questions of this research, such as: What knowledge or practices are normalised by the language? What are the political and social consequences of discursive practice? How does language create, reinforce, or challenge power relations in the society?

As Fairclough points out, discourse analysis is not sufficient in itself for an analysis of wider social practices. Other social and cultural theories are necessary in addition to discourse analysis. Therefore, constructivists' interpretation of the inter-subjective understanding of identities and national interests, and their perspective about identities, narratives and foreign policies are also employed in this research to strengthen Fairclough's approach to CDA. A constructivist perspective helps us to better understand the social construction of the American-led war on terror and to explain how and why the U.S. terrorism discourse resonated so strongly among U.S. citizens. Finally, aside from constructivism, Foucault's (2002) perspective about *truth*

and power, and *subjugated knowledge* (Jackson, 2012) also contributes to the critical study of U.S. terrorism discourse and the conclusions drawn from the present study (see Chapter 7). Simultaneously, *critical linguistic awareness* (CLA) and *emancipatory language practice* (see Fairclough, 1992b, 1999, 2010) are argued as indispensable for discursive change and the future study of discourse (see Chapter 7).

Date Collection and Analysis

In terms of the data analysed, this study focuses on the speeches, interviews and radio addresses given by senior members of the Clinton administration, particularly President Clinton, his Secretaries of State, and key figures in the National Security Council (NSC). As discussed earlier, the President of the United States and his senior national security advisors are seen as powerful political elites, or a ‘worldmaking power’ (Bourdieu, 1987), who have privileged access to public discourse. These elites dominate the production of discourse and control the ways that discourses are created, circulated, and received. Thus, their interpretation of terrorism is particularly worth examining and analysing further. In this research, more than 200 official texts were carefully analysed, including all of Clinton’s terrorism and counterterrorism discourses, which are compiled and published by the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* and *the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*. The political rhetoric of the Secretaries of State has been released and can be found in the online archives of the Department of State. In addition, other significant official documents and reports, such as *The U.S. National Security Strategy*, *The Presidential Decision Directive*, and *Patterns of Global Terrorism* were also analysed. This primary analysis of administration texts was then supplemented by broad secondary analysis, including academic work influenced by relevant social and cultural theories.

It is worth noting that in addition to Fairclough’s approach to CDA, a specific analytical technique—that is, first order critique, and second order critique—introduced by scholars like Milliken (1999) and Jackson (2007, 2009c) also guided the analysis of administration texts and documents. A first order critique, or immanent critique, focuses on the internal contradictions, mistakes, misconceptions, and omissions of discourse(s); it tries to find and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse omits to acknowledge and deal with (Jackson, 2007: 379). The aim

of the first order critique is not to establish the ‘real truth’ of the subject; instead, it seeks to destabilise dominant interpretations and demonstrate the inherently contested and political nature of discourse (Jackson, 2009c: 68). A second order critique entails reflecting on the wider political and ethical consequences of the representations in the texts (Ibid.). Specifically, it explores the ways in which the discourse functions as a ‘symbolic technology’ (Laffey & Weldes, 1997) employed by policy-making elites and government agencies to construct and maintain a hegemonic ‘regime of truth,’ exclude alternative interpretations of knowledge and practice, and justify and legitimate proposed policies towards particular actors and events (Jackson, 2009c: 68-9). Overall, the exposure and destabilisation of the current terrorism discourse, as this thesis attempts to do, contributes to further debate on the current ‘taken-for-granted’ knowledge of terrorism and counterterrorism; and, importantly, it encourages the articulation of potentially emancipatory forms of knowledge and practice (Jackson, 2007: 397).

Conclusion

This Chapter has introduced the constructivist approach to IR, the history and theoretical origins of CDA, and Fairclough’s Three-Dimensional Model which is characterised by the analyses of *text*, *discursive practice*, and *social practice*. By employing Fairclough’s approach to CDA, President Clinton’s discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism were examined, analysed, and discussed. In the next chapter, the discursive construction of ‘new terrorism’ or ‘catastrophic terrorism’ will be discussed and further illustrated. The research presented here argues that based on President Reagan’s first ‘war on terrorism’ discourse, President Clinton framed and constructed the ‘new terrorism’ discourse. The essential elements of Clinton’s ‘new terrorism’ discourse are the emphases on home-grown terrorism, cyberterrorism, rogue states, and the extreme threats of weapons of mass destruction. It can be argued that President Reagan’s and President Clinton’s discourse on terrorism actually provided an existing rhetorical foundation for President George W. Bush to respond to the 2001 terrorist attacks. These findings suggest a clear continuity in the American-led war on terror from Reagan, to Clinton, and then to George W. Bush, in terms of the fact that their administrations used similar rhetorical strategies to interpret terrorism and terrorists,

and a coercive approach to counterterrorism was adopted by each administration.

Chapter 3

Framing the Threat of Catastrophic Terrorism: Genealogy, Discourse, and President Clinton's Counterterrorism Initiatives

Introduction

As argued in a previous chapter, a frequent assumption in the literature on the American-led War on Terror is the notion that the war and its public discourse originated with the George W. Bush administration. To challenge this perspective, this chapter seeks to explore the political discourse of terrorism and counterterrorism practices during the Clinton administration. An examination of administration discourses on terrorism that emerged during the administrations of Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in fact, demonstrates deep continuities in U.S. counterterrorism approaches. This research suggests that based on Reagan's initial 'war on terrorism' discourse, Clinton articulated the notion of *catastrophic terrorism* or *new terrorism*, which became a formative conception for the United States and its allies in the post-Cold War era. Clinton's counterterrorism discourse then provided an important rhetorical foundation for President Bush to respond to the 2001 terrorist attacks. In other words, far from being a radical break, Bush's global war on terror represents a continuation of U.S. counterterrorist practices.

The central core of terrorism and counterterrorism discourse is the interpretation of threat, danger and uncertainty. Political elites emphasise, and frequently claim, that terrorist violence is sudden, dramatic, and threatening and therefore, requiring urgent action. However, some would question whether the threat posed by terrorism really is as dangerous as officials assert. It is argued that the danger and threat stressed by politicians is not actually an objective condition; instead, it is defined, articulated and socially constructed by authorised actors (Campbell, 1998: 1–2). Specifically, danger and threat do not exist independently; rather, they become *reality* by the way in which people analyse them and consider them to be urgent and imminent. In other words, our perception of threats and crises is introduced through a series of interpretations, and as a result, is largely a product of social construction. In Foucault's (1980, 2002) terms, the interpretation of the terrorist threat constitutes the knowledge of terrorism and

sustains a counterterrorism ‘regime of truth’ that defines what can be meaningfully said and discussed about the subject. With regard to the political functions of threat and danger, some scholars (Freedman, 2004; Robin, 2004; Altheide, 2006a; Jackson, 2007, 2008a) have argued that the political interpretation of threat, danger and war serves a number of political purposes, in particular, *selling* specific foreign or domestic policies to public audiences. In efforts to prepare public opinion for extraordinary exertions and potential sacrifices, a political and social ‘reality’ of threat and danger is necessary. As Senator Arthur Vandenberg suggested of President Harry Truman, if the President wanted to persuade U.S. citizens to take on international Communism and shift U.S. foreign policy to re-engage with a war-prone Europe, he had to ‘scare the hell’ out of them (Freedman, 2004: 7). Since then, Washington elites have accepted that a high-risk or potentially costly foreign policy requires *selling* the threat to the U.S. public.

The concept of threat and danger is established on the basis of the human emotion of fear (Booth and Wheeler, 2009: 62). Charles Darwin, the father of evolutionary science, clearly identified that fear is one of six basic emotions of human beings. According to Darwin, fear is not only primordial but also facially legible, along with other emotions, namely, happiness, sadness, anger, disgust and surprise (Ibid.: 62). Robin (2004: 1) also claims that ‘fear is the first emotion experienced by a character in the Bible.’¹⁹ Undoubtedly, emotions inform our attitudes and strategies, and tell us how to react and face the situation we are experiencing. The emotional reaction we experience as fear is caused by a sense of danger. That danger, through discursive interpretation, threatens to harm things we value, such as freedom from pain or freedom from a loss of some sort. Importantly, the fear produced by threat and danger not only affects individuals’ responses to the surroundings they face, but it also guides the actions and behaviours of actors in the political arena. For example, during the Cold War, U.S. foreign and security policies were based on the scenario of nuclear devastation, and the world order was perceived to be established on the so-called

¹⁹ Robin (2004: 1) argues that it is *fear* (not desire, not shame) that is the first emotion experienced by a character in the Bible. When Adam and Eve eat the forbidden fruit, they start experiencing, perhaps, the most electric of emotions of fear. Prior to being afraid, Adam and Eve exist and act without any palpable experience of fear. For Eve, fear might come from the pain of childbirth; for Adam, fear could come from the duress of work. And, for both, the dread knowledge of death is the source of fear (Ibid.).

‘balance of terror.’ Similarly, in the post-Cold War period, the threat and danger posed by terrorism has become a dominant framework for foreign and security policies. Through a series of discursive processes of interpretation, so-called ‘catastrophic terrorism’ (Carter & Perry, 1999: 149–50) or ‘super-terrorism’ (see Sprinzak, 1998) has become a ‘reality’ that threatens the values of U.S. society.

This chapter argues that counterterrorism policy was not initially the primary preoccupation of the Clinton administration; yet, through the discursive construction of the notion of ‘new terrorism,’ terrorism came to be viewed as one of the most pressing challenges to U.S. national security. With the occurrence of several major terrorist attacks on the United States and its allies, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 1995 Tokyo sarin gas attack, terrorism came to be seen as a serious threat to the United States, and counterterrorism was defined as one of the main tasks of U.S. military forces in the post-Cold War period. By articulating the extraordinary threat of *catastrophic terrorism*, the ‘reality’ of *new terrorism*²⁰ was accepted and shared by the key figures of Clinton’s administration and by most U.S. citizens.²¹

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the historical meaning of the word *terrorism*, and the invention of *terrorism* in the U.S. political arena. Through the method of genealogy, the chapter examines how the understanding of *terrorism* and *terrorist* has shifted historically and culturally. It is argued that the usage of *terrorism* can be traced to the period of the French Revolution, while the political utterances of terrorism in the United States actually originated from the Kennedy administration (Winkler, 2006). The second section focuses on Clinton’s

²⁰ Duyvesteyn (2004: 443) has argued that the so-called ‘new terrorism’ is characterized by four features. First, the perpetrators of terrorism act transnationally, and operate in loosely organised networks. Second, religion is the key motivator for terrorists and terrorist organisations. Terrorists act for religious causes, and are therefore seen as religious fanatics. Third, terrorists seek weapons of mass destruction in order to kill as many people as possible. Fourth, terrorists do not differentiate between military combatants and civilians.

²¹ According to time-series data compiled by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and German Marshall Fund of the United States, the percentage of Americans who believed terrorism was a critical threat to the United States increased from 69 per cent in 1994 to 84 per cent in 1998 (Western, 2005: 112). Terrorism and the illicit proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were seen as the most critical threats to the U.S. security during the tenure of the Clinton presidency (Ibid.).

discursive construction of terrorism. An analysis of the *intertextuality*²² of Clinton's 'new terrorism' discourse demonstrates that the Reagan administration provided the initial framework for the Clinton administration to construct its new terrorism discourse. Through various discursive practices, so-called catastrophic terrorism involving inherent features of boundlessness, weapons of mass destruction and rogue states became a political 'reality' widely known by U.S. citizens. Finally, some of the broader social effects and political consequences of Clinton's terrorism discourse, such as antiterrorism initiatives, and a military approach to address the threat of terrorism are discussed in the third section. The conclusion discusses the main continuities in U.S. counterterrorism from Reagan to Clinton and Bush, and explores some of the implications of the main findings.

Genealogy and the Invention of U.S. Terrorism Discourse

Many academics and counterterrorism practitioners argue that terrorism is a special type of political violence, and the term *terrorism* has a unique meaning in human history. According to Wilkinson (2012: 13), the modern words *terror*, *terrorise*, *terrible* and *terrorism* are all derived from the same Latin word—*terrere*—which means to tremble or to cause to tremble, and *detertere*, to frighten from. Etymologists also indicate that the terms *terrorism*, *terrorist* and *terrorise* actually were not widely accepted and utilised in the English world until the equivalent French words had taken on a special significance during the French Revolution (Ibid.). That the term 'terrorism' can be traced to the French Revolution is now widely accepted in the field of terrorism studies (see Collins, 2002; Jenkins, 2003; Townshend, 2011; Wilkinson, 2012).

Tracing the discursive origins of the word *terrorism*, it is clear that its original meaning actually differs from the popular perception of today. In the 1790s, the word *terrorism* was initially employed to describe the attempts by French leaders to eliminate their political opponents. Although the specific suppression that followed the French Revolution was not particularly extreme compared to the fatalities caused by the twentieth century dictatorships, the *reign of terror* did cause great horror and sufferings because it claimed several thousands of lives (Jenkins, 2003: 27). In addition,

²² According to Fairclough (1992), the purpose of *intertextuality* is to shed light on the function of the existing text(s), especially focusing on how the writer utilises the existing text(s) to construct the new text(s).

unlike during warfare, during the period of *terror*, killings were carried out against non-combatants, and often these non-combatants were members of particular social classes or belonged to groups who held particular opinions (Ibid.).

However, in Russia during the nineteenth century, the cultural and historical meaning of terrorism changed. The term *terrorist* was used by the ruling party to label Russian revolutionaries who adopted violent methods to pursue their political aims and realise their political ideals (see Collins, 2002; Jenkins, 2003; Wilkinson, 2012). However, as the term *terrorism* spread quickly throughout Europe beyond Russia, and even into India, the conception of terrorism shifted again (Wilkinson, 2012: 13). At the end of the nineteenth century, when left-wing and radical rebels were launching violent attacks, such as bombings and political assassinations targeted at European countries, in particular, France and Russia, the concept of terrorism came to be perceived as the actions carried out by anarchists rather than governments, in contrast to the initial eighteenth century France definition (Jenkins, 2003: 27; Wilkinson, 2012: 13).

After the end of the Second World War, the meaning of terrorism once again changed due to post-war political movements and the provocation of anti-colonialism. In the 1940s and 1950s, according to Booth and Dunne (2012: 18), terrorism was more frequently used to describe the political violence provoked by nationalists or anti-colonists in specific areas, namely, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. However, since the end of decolonisation, the term *terrorism* refers more broadly to the actions of dissatisfied national and ethnic groups within Western countries, such as the United Kingdom (by the IRA, the Irish Republican Army), Spain (by ETA, the front for the Freedom of the Basque Homeland), Canada (by the FLQ, Front de Liberation du Quebec), and the Red Army Factions in Germany and Italy (Ibid.; also see Townshend, 2011).

It has been argued that as late as 1965, the word *terrorism* had not yet entered into general usage in the U.S. political arena (Collins, 2002: 158). Yet, a decade later, the term had acquired a particular set of meanings, the American public was familiar with the meaning of the term, and there were political elites who regularly invoked *terrorism* as a threat to the United States (Ibid.). It has also been argued that the usage of the word *terrorism* by Washington leaders is closely related to U.S. foreign policy and social movements of the 1960s. Winkler (2006) demonstrates that since the Kennedy administration, the U.S. government has regularly employed terms such as

terrorism and *terrorist* to label its adversaries abroad, as well as its internal political dissidents, in particular the students who adopted confrontational tactics to protest U.S. intervention in South Vietnam. For example, President Kennedy used the phrase ‘Communist terror,’ which combined the political ideologies of Communism and terrorism, in his letter to President Diem of South Vietnam (Ibid.: 18). Dean Rusk, President Kennedy’s Secretary of State, also mentioned that ‘During 1960 alone, Communist armed units and terrorists assassinated or kidnapped over 3,000 local officials, military personnel, and civilians’ (quoted in Ibid.). In addition, when reminiscing about the Second World War, Kennedy created another phrase—‘Nazi terrorists’—to describe Nazi Germany (Ibid.). By merging terrorism and Communism into a companion phrase, the Kennedy administration rhetorically amalgamated the tactics of terrorism with the ideological objectives of Communist powers, and in doing so helped to justify U.S. military intervention in South Vietnam.

When Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency, key figures in the Johnson administration adopted the same rhetorical strategy—the strategy that amalgamates terrorism and Communism—to label U.S. enemies in the Vietnam War (Winkler, 2006). Henry Lodge, the U.S. ambassador to Vietnam, called terrorism a ‘time tested traditional Viet Cong weapon’ (quoted in Ibid.: 18). He added that terrorism was ‘the heart of the matter in the war in Viet-Nam’ (quoted in Ibid.). When President Johnson described U.S. foreign policy in the Vietnam War, he stated: ‘It will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Viet-Nam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control’ (quoted in Ibid.: 19). For the Johnson administration, terrorism was not only a tactic adopted by the enemies of the United States on the battlefield and one which could decisively determine the outcome of the war, but it was also a potential threat that might profoundly affect the willingness of Vietnamese civilians to fight the Viet Cong (Ibid.: 18).

The Nixon administration continued his predecessors’ rhetorical strategy, although, in contrast to the Johnson administration, it tried to adopt a more conciliatory approach to address the conundrum that the United States faced in South Vietnam (Winkler, 2006: 20). For Nixon, *terrorism* implied both an external and an internal threat to the United States; that is, terrorism could refer to Communist enemies in Vietnam and to students protesting United States-Vietnam foreign policy (Ibid.: 21).

Rhetorically, Nixon (1969) used the term ‘reign of terror’—a special phrase which invokes historical meanings from the French Revolution and from Nazi Germany, as well as from Stalin’s Great Terror (Townshend, 2011)—to describe the political situation in Vietnam. On the other hand, when answering press inquiries, Nixon (1970) claimed ‘[...] when students on university campuses burn buildings, when they engage in violence, when they break up furniture, when they terrorize their fellow students and terrorize the faculty, then I think “bums” is perhaps too kind a word to apply to that kind of person.’ In short, for the Nixon administration, the term *terrorism* encompassed a broad range of meanings. Terrorists, by the definition of Nixon, could be the communist opponents in the Vietnam War or the American citizens opposing the policies implemented by the Nixon administration.

Similar interpretations of terrorism were employed by the Carter administration when the United States attempted to tackle the Iranian Hostage Crisis. Carter used Nixon’s definitions of terrorism and terrorist, while additionally defining the Crisis as an ‘act of terrorism’ and portraying the captors—most of whom were students—as ‘terrorists.’ In his speech for the American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO), President Carter clearly defined the incident as an ‘act of terrorism’ which was ‘totally outside the bound of international law and diplomatic tradition’ (Carter, 1979). In an interview with NBC News, Carter similarly asserted:

Iran is at this moment involved in a criminal act, a terrorist act. And it’s not a matter of negotiating on a diplomatic basis between two nations. This is a matter of condemning Iran for international terrorism and kidnapping. (Carter, 1980a).

Carter’s interpretation of the Hostage Crisis featured a crime frame, and this labelling of the captors as ‘criminals,’ ‘kidnappers’ and ‘terrorists’ shifted the dominant political discourse of terrorism. Specifically, Carter’s administration decided to adopt a crime frame to define acts of terrorism, rather than simply linking the Hostage Crisis with the Vietnam-era notion of terrorism (see Winkler, 2006). In addition, it can be argued that the shift of U.S. terrorism discourse demonstrated that the United States was, at that time, deeply concerned with its foreign relations with its allies in the Middle East, and

did not want to imply that the Muslim world was a Cold War enemy, especially while the United States was providing assistance to the Mujahideen fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan (see *Ibid.*).

However, with the growing confrontation between the United States and the Soviets, the U.S. terrorism discourse changed significantly, particularly during the Reagan presidency. Throughout the 1980s, the Reagan administration broadly employed a ‘war metaphor’ to construct its terrorism discourse, particularly focusing on the threat of international terrorism and so-called state-sponsored terrorism (see Winkler, 2006, 2007). In public statements, Reagan stated that terrorism is a ‘new kind of warfare’ (Reagan, 1984a), and that ‘international terrorism is indeed a new form of international warfare’ (Reagan, 1985a). He further argued:

the war which terrorists are waging is not only directed against the United States, it is a war against all of civilized society. This is a war in which innocent civilians are targets. This is a war in which innocent civilians are intentional victims, and our servicemen have become specific targets. (Reagan, 1985b).

Reagan’s terrorism discourse illustrates a specific rhetorical strategy which links the broader Cold War narrative to the state sponsorship of terrorism. For example, Reagan argued that the rise of state-sponsored terrorism could be traced back to ‘increased Soviet support for terrorism, insurgency, and aggression coupled with the perception of weakening U.S. power and resolve’ (Reagan, 1984b: 480). For Reagan, ‘terrorism is the antithesis of democracy’ (Reagan, 1985c) and an act of war which was supported by the Soviet Union as well as some terrorist states. Jackson (2005, 2006) argues that Reagan’s terrorism discourse actually provided the primary rhetorical foundation for the George W. Bush administration to respond to the 2001 World Trade Center bombings with a ‘war on terrorism.’

Writing the Threat of New Terrorism/Catastrophic Terrorism: The Discursive Transformation of Contemporary Terrorism

As previously discussed, terrorism is not a modern social and political phenomenon.

Since the French Revolution, terrorism has been discussed by a great many people. In the United States, the terms *terrorism* and *terrorist* have also been frequently mentioned and repeated in political discourse. During the Vietnam War, the word *terrorism* was utilised to describe the Viet Cong. During the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the term *terrorism* was adopted by political elites to define a ‘criminal act’ in Iran. In sharp contrast to other presidents, Reagan employed a ‘war’ metaphor to construct his terrorism discourse, and to interpret the threat of international terrorism, as well as state-sponsored terrorism. It has been argued that Reagan’s terrorism discourse provided a very useful framework for his successors to frame their political discourses about terrorism (see Jackson, 2005, 2006). Using *intertextuality* and *interdiscursivity*,²³ in this section, I examine and analyse Clinton’s ‘new terrorism’ discourse. My research demonstrates that the Clinton administration indeed established a solid rhetorical foundation that allowed the George W. Bush administration to formulate its terrorism discourse and this illustrates the continuity in the American-led war on terror.

During the Clinton era, the United States and its allies suffered a number of significant terrorist attacks. Key incidents included: the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo Gas Attack in the Tokyo subway system; the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing; the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing; the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing; the 1998 US Embassy Bombings in Africa; and the 2000 *USS Cole* Bombing. These incidents were the primary focus of the Clinton administration’s terrorism and counterterrorism discourses, and were constantly mentioned in administration rhetoric. In sharp contrast to Reagan’s terrorism discourse and its focus on state-sponsored terrorism, encapsulated in Reagan’s Cold War expression that terrorism is the *antithesis of democracy* (Winkler, 2006), the Clinton administration formulated and constructed its terrorism discourse by stressing the characteristics of a *new terrorism*²⁴, characteristics which were based on the terrorists’ targets, the

²³ The aim of *interdiscursivity*, according to Fairclough (1992a), is to specify what and how discourse types are drawn upon in the discourse under analysis; the object of *intertextuality* is to analyse how the writer utilise the existing text(s) to construct the new text(s).

²⁴ In terrorism scholarship, there is a debate on the concept of *new terrorism*. Discussions about new terrorism were originally prompted by several significant terrorist attacks in the 1990s, such as the 1995 sarin subway attack in Tokyo, and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (Jackson & Sinclair, 2012b: 30-2). Since the 1990s, the new terrorism argument, which is characterised by the stress of potential terrorist attacks and the weapons that terrorists might use, has been particularly noted by Washington’s

methods they adopted, and the weapons they utilised. According to the Clinton administration, boundlessness, or borderless, stood out as the most significant feature of the ‘new terrorism,’ where terrorists come from ‘within or beyond our borders’ (Clinton, 1995m), and terrorist acts have ‘become an equal opportunity destroyer, with no respect for borders’ (Clinton, 1996s). In other words, there was no longer a clear boundary between external and internal terrorism. Terrorist attacks could strike a foreign ally or even a target on U.S. soil.

Besides this, John Deutch, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), echoed Clinton’s construction of boundlessness when he wrote, ‘terrorism, like the plague in the Middle Ages, frightens both leaders and citizens. It is a disease that is spreading; its cure is unknown’ (Deutch, 1997: 10). Portraying terrorism as ‘diseases’ was actually not a new type of rhetorical expression in the U.S. political arena. In order to intensify the terrorist threat, President Reagan and his administration had adopted the same theme, depicting terrorism as ‘a **cancer**.’²⁵ According to the Reagan administration, the ‘**plague** of terrorism’ would ‘spread like a **cancer**, eating away at civilized societies and sowing fear and chaos everywhere’ (quoted in Leeman, 1991: 130). This would occur ‘if we permit terrorism to succeed anywhere’ (quoted in Ibid.: 130-1). By employing a medical metaphor, terrorism was thus interpreted as a disease that can strike anyone, anywhere, and because there is no cure for this threat, it is very frightening.

The concept of the *new terrorism* (or *catastrophic terrorism*) later became a prominent conception in the George W. Bush administration’s discourse. Bush and his top officials adopted the same rhetorical strategy established by the Clinton administration to construct their terrorism discourse in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Colin Powell, for example, referred to ‘the **scourge** of terrorism’ (quoted in Jackson, 2005: 73) while justifying the U.S.-led global war on terror. Donald Rumsfeld also claimed that ‘terrorism is a **cancer** on the human condition and we intend to oppose it’ (quoted in Ibid.). This rhetoric graphically

political elites (Ibid.: 35-7). However, notably, a number of terrorism scholars (Copeland, 2001; Tucker, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004; Spencer, 2006) reject the notion of ‘new terrorism,’ arguing that the characteristics of terrorism which are purportedly ‘new’ have many historical precedents.

²⁵ In order to emphasis key analytical points in the original text, I have used bold in the direct quotations, and all subsequent bolding of texts are added by the author. This particular approach is employed by Silberstein (2001) and Jackson (2005) in their analysis of terrorism discourse.

described the characteristics of terrorism and suggested that the terrorist threat required aggressive countermeasures.

Clinton's discursive construction of terrorism and counterterrorism can be traced to late in the first term of his presidency, specifically after two significant terrorist attacks occurred in Japan and on U.S. territory: the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo gas attack on the Tokyo subway system and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Before these incidents, most of Clinton's rhetoric regarding terrorism was given as a response or a comment on a specific terrorist incident, such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1993 Iraqi attempt to assassinate the former President George H. W. Bush (Clinton 1993d; 1993e; 1993g). The 1995 nerve gas attack in Japan played a key role in the construction of Clinton's terrorist narratives and was mentioned in many presidential speeches, as well as in many official documents and reports. For instance, when stressing the threat of weapons of mass destruction, Clinton mentioned that 'no one is immune to their danger ... the sarin gas attack in the subway injured thousands of commuters' (Clinton, 1996h); and, 'as we have seen this year in Japan, chemical weapons can threaten our security and that of our allies, whether as an instrument of war or of terrorism' (Clinton, 1995n). Although this was an attack on a foreign ally rather than directly against the United States, the U.S. government took various lessons from it.

To many terrorism experts and academics, this incident showed that weapons of mass destruction were now available to a great many terrorists. It was suggested that more and more terrorists would likely utilise chemical and biological weapons to attack mass-civilian targets because these weapons were easy to acquire and possess (see Laqueur, 1996; Deutch 1997). This incident was also thought to mark a turning point in the history of terrorism, because for the first time a non-state terrorist group had used chemical and biological weapons to attack civilian non-combatants (see RAND, 1999). In addition, it was seen as a defining incident for all discussions of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism (Ibid.: 40). Before this tragedy, terrorist attacks which involved the use of weapons of mass destruction were merely part of a theoretical scenario discussed by terrorism experts and national security practitioners. However, the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack came to symbolise how the threat of weapons of mass destruction was no longer a theoretical possibility, but had become a reality.

In 1996, following the gas attack in Japan, a Hollywood movie, *The Rock*, was released, which showed an incident involving hostage crisis and CBRN terrorism. Chemical and biological agents, such as, VX and sarin, were utilised to threaten the authorities. Anthony Lake (2000: 14-5), Clinton's first-term National Security Advisor, indicates that this film truly reflected the security concerns of U.S. counterterrorism practitioners; and the movie in part demonstrated that the discursive construction of new terrorism was gradually entering into American popular culture. According to polling data provided by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and German Marshall Fund of the United States, the percentage of Americans who believed international terrorism was a critical threat to the United States increased from 69 per cent in 1994 to 84 percent in 1998 (*U.S. General Population Topline Report*, 2002: 92). Besides this, in 1998, 76 per cent of U.S. citizens worried about the threat of chemical and biological weapons (*Ibid.*: 93). The polling data illustrated that through the process of discursive practice—in which discourse is created and consumed—the new terrorism reality has been constituted and accepted by many in Clinton's era.

The discursive construction of Clinton's terrorism and counterterrorism discourse was also heavily influenced by the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, particularly in terms of its contribution to Clinton's interpretation of 'home-grown' terrorism. Clinton expanded Reagan's notion of international terrorism to construct the new threat of 'home-grown' terrorism. In contrast to other terrorist attacks in the 1990s, the Oklahoma City bombing stands out as an instance of white extremist terrorism which originated on U.S. soil. Even more alarming for the administration, the two main suspects, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, were American nationals. The terrorists were not motivated by discontent with U.S. foreign policy, nor were they under the influence of a religious cult. Instead, they merely disagreed with the authorities' gun control policies and strongly supported the militia movement (see Linenthal, 2001; Michael & Herbeck, 2001). Following the Oklahoma City bombing, the Clinton administration amended its antiterrorism legislation, which had initially concentrated on fighting international terrorism, in order to address the threat of 'home-grown' terrorism (see Clinton, 1995h; 1996g). It has also been argued that in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, 'terrorism' became a dominant frame through which American politics had to be interpreted (Zulaika, 2009: 5). Subsequent to the terrorist attack in Oklahoma City, terrorism (in particular, the notion of

'home-grown' terrorism) was more frequently emphasised by policy-making elites when referring to the identified threats to the United States in the post-Cold War world.

The Oklahoma City bombing and the Tokyo sarin gas attack both appeared to display characteristics of modern terrorism: its boundless nature and the novel means adopted by the terrorists. In his public rhetoric, the president emphasised how, with this transformation of terrorism, no one was immune from the terrorist threat. This was also a feature of the Bush administration's discourse after the 2001 bombing of the World Trade Center. With this 'new terrorism,' Clinton asserted:

we become vulnerable to two kinds of terrorism: first of all, what you might call home-grown terrorism, what you experienced in the Japanese subway, what we experienced at Oklahoma City; secondly, terrorism that is generated or at least involves, interests from beyond your borders, such as what we experienced at the World Trade Center in New York [...].
(Clinton, 1996f).

Clinton's construction of the new terrorism would eventually provide a key rhetorical foundation for the Bush administration's responses to the terrorist attacks of September 11th. For example, when discussing the threat of terrorism, Cofer Black, Bush's Spokesman Coordinator for Counterterrorism, claimed that 'the threat of international terrorism knows no boundaries' (quoted in Jackson, 2005: 100). Similarly, President Bush himself stressed that the government had to 'give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home' (quoted in *Ibid.*: 112). This rhetoric employs nearly identical discursive strategies as the Clinton administration's attempts to portray the threat of terrorism as boundless.

As well as the discursive construct of boundlessness, another feature of Clinton's terrorism discourse was his interpretation of the targets terrorists selected and the tactics they adopted. A close reading of Clinton's terrorism discourse reveals that during the Clinton years, terrorism was specifically defined as being an act of killing, in contrast to the orthodox definition widely accepted at the time—that is, an act of violence or intimidation to achieve specific political goals (Winkler, 2006: 131). In an interview with the Arab news media, Clinton pointed out that 'there are clear

definitions of terrorism, and one of them is the willful killing of innocent civilians who themselves are not in any way involved in military combat' (Clinton, 1993i). Influenced by the Oklahoma City bombing, the president claimed: 'Terror is when someone, allegedly for some philosophical or political reason, believes they have the right to take innocent lives [...]' (Clinton, 1996d). According to Clinton, terrorists were 'killing at random,' (Clinton, 1996r) and their aim was to 'demoralize us as a people and to spread fear into everyday life' (Ibid.). Clearly, the presidential rhetoric specifically highlighted the violent nature of terrorism and how brutal the terrorists were. In addition, Clinton also quoted Osama bin Laden's own religious fatwa to further support his construction of modern terrorist attacks: 'We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians. They are all targets' (Clinton, 1998g). Importantly, Clinton's particular construction functioned to depoliticise the motivations of terrorists. According to the religious fatwa, bin Laden made an appeal to all Muslims to kill Americans and their allies until the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and the Haram Mosque in Mecca were freed from U.S. control, and until U.S. troops departed from all the lands of Islam (Lewis, 1998: 14-5). Recent research has demonstrated that terrorists like bin Laden and members of al Qaeda fight for strong political reasons and are not simply motivated by murder or religious extremism (see Eland, 1998; Pape & Feldman, 2010; Gunning & Jackson, 2011). However, the dominant terrorism discourse, on the other hand, silenced counter discourses which focused on the political motivations of terrorists.

In August 1998, following the release of bin Laden's fatwa, the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed. Approximately 220 people died and more than 4,000 were injured in these two incidents (*The 9/11 Commission Report*, 2003: 70). In October 2000, the *USS Cole* was also bombed by terrorists in the port of Aden, Yemen, resulting in 17 deaths and 39 injuries on board the vessel. The United States claimed that bin Laden and his al Qaeda accomplices were responsible for these incidents. The series of attacks targeted at Americans appeared to support the president's definition of the nature of modern terrorism as an act of killing. The purpose of the president's terrorism discourse was not simply to provide an official definition of terrorism; it simultaneously created a cultural and political climate of fear and released a clear

message to all citizens that Americans were now the tempting targets of terrorists.²⁶ In his speech, Clinton claimed:

America is and will remain a target of terrorism precisely because we are leaders; because we act to advance peace, democracy, and basic human values; because we're the most open society on Earth; and because, as we have shown yet again, we take an uncompromising stand against terrorism (Clinton, 1998g).

Similarly, President George W. Bush also discursively attributed the 2001 terrorist attacks to the violent nature of terrorists—that is, they attacked the United States because they are hate-filled persons, and because the United States is a powerful symbol of freedom and democracy. On the day of the terrorist attacks, President Bush (2001b) stated: 'America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.' He also mentioned that the terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center all hated American freedoms. As President Bush indicated:

They hate what we see right here in this chamber—a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. (Bush, 2001d).

It can be argued that the language used by politicians was not neutral; instead, it fulfilled certain political purposes which not only functioned to deflect attention from the political grievances of the terrorists, but also denied or suppressed any alternative

²⁶ Furedi (2002: vii) indicates that Western societies are increasingly dominated by a *culture of fear* which is characterised by the belief that humanity is confronted by powerful destructive forces that threaten our everyday existence. Besides, according to Furedi (Ibid.), people living in Western societies have less familiarity with pain, suffering, debilitating disease and death. And, despite an unprecedented level of personal security, fear has become an ever-expanding part of individuals' life. Similarly, Mythen and Walklate (2006: 126) argue that the *culture of fear* is deeply rooted in Western cultures; it is prompted by state institutions, and exacerbated by professionals who work within media and security industries.

understanding of the events (Jackson, 2005: 54-7).

It is also worth noting that *cyberterrorism*, a new tactic purportedly used by modern terrorists, was articulated in Clinton's terrorism discourse, and also by the Bush administration after the tragedy of September 11th, 2001. Clinton's cyberterrorism narrative closely echoed his interpretation of the new terrorism as boundless. Due to the convenience of modern technology and the opportunities provided by the Internet, terrorists found it easier to breach the traditional boundaries of nation states and attack private and governmental facilities to achieve widespread social disruption. As the Report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection noted:

For an adversary willing to take greater risks, cyber attacks could be combined with physical attacks, against facilities or against human targets, in an effort to paralyze or panic large segments of society, damage our capability to respond to incidents (by disabling the 911 system of emergency communication, for example), hamper our ability to deploy conventional military forces, and other wise limit the freedom of action of our national leadership. (*Critical Foundations: Protecting American's Infrastructures* 1997: 18).

Data from experts also showed that there was a dramatic increase in the number of people worldwide who possessed the skills to carry out cyber-attacks, climbing from a few thousand in the early 1980s to 17 million in 1996; it was projected that the number would reach 19 million by 2001 (*Critical Foundations: Protecting American's Infrastructures*, 1997). Clinton responded to this by announcing:

Hackers break into government and business computers. They can raid banks, run up credit card charges, extort money by threats to unleash computer viruses. If we fail to take strong action, the terrorists, criminals and hostile regimes could invade and paralyze this vital system, disrupting commerce, threatening health, [and] weaken our capacity to function in a crisis [...]. (Clinton, 1998a).

For the Clinton administration, cyberterrorism was not merely a possible scenario; it was now a fact of everyday life. For instance, in April of 1998, a group of hackers called the Masters of Downloading/2016216 successfully broke into the Defense Department's communication network and stole a substantial amount of sensitive data (Lake, 2000: 43-5). In addition to this, the Justice Department admitted that from 1999 to 2000 numerous institutions and facilities were attacked by terrorists, including the U.S. Postal Service, the State of Texas, the Canadian Department of Defense, AT&T, the U.S. Army, the White House, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, USIA, NATO, and an FAA control tower (Winkler, 2006: 133). In addition to other conventional tactics employed by terrorists, cyberterrorism was of great concern to the Clinton administration, and the Justice Department added 'cybercrime,' 'cyberpiracy,' 'cyberstalking,' 'cyberterrorism' and 'cybersecurity' to the national lexicon (Ibid.).

Apart from the focus on cyberterrorism, the Clinton administration also highlighted the presence of external threats from so-called *backlash states*, or *rogue states* (see Chapter 5).²⁷ Reagan's terrorism discourse had previously stressed that in terms of the sponsorship of terrorism the Soviet Union was not the only participating government. Reagan asserted that:

Most of the terrorists who are kidnapping and murdering American citizens and attacking American installations are being trained, financed and directly or indirectly controlled by a core group of radical and totalitarian governments – a new, international version of Murder, Incorporated. (Reagan, 1985c).

According to Reagan, 'all of these states are united by one simple criminal phenomenon – their fanatical hatred of the United States, our people, our way of life, our international stature' (Reagan, 1985c).

²⁷ The term *backlash states* is also widely known as *rogue states*, which is more frequently used by U.S. politicians. On September 13th, 1993, Anthony Lake first introduced the concept of *backlash states* in his remark at Johns Hopkins University. In 1994, Lake further published an article named "Confronting Backlash States" in *Foreign Affairs* to further explain Clinton's policies toward the states identified (Lake 1994).

Clinton adopted the same language and added such expressions to his terrorism discourse. During the Clinton era, the United States successfully associated the terrorism issue with rogue states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Clinton administration claimed that these countries attempted to harbour terrorists and destroy peace in the Middle East, and that they had established close relationships with various groups designated as terrorist organisations by the U.S. Department of State. In official language, these countries were thus explicitly labelled as allies of terrorists who hated the United States. President Clinton stated:

nations like Iran and Iraq and Libya [...] aim to destabilize the region. They harbor terrorists within their borders. They establish and support terrorist base camps in other lands; they hunger for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. (Clinton, 1995g).

In addition, these countries were usually portrayed as having tyrannical regimes that were ‘enemies of peace’ (Clinton, 1995a), and that distanced themselves from the international community. For instance, the Clinton administration accused the Saddam Hussein regime of adopting state terrorism to suppress and kill innocent civilians, such as the Kurdish people, the Shia Muslims, foreign journalists, and U.N. officials (Clinton, 1994a; 1994c). The administration also claimed that Iran provided financial support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in order to destroy the Middle East peace process (see Indyk, 2009). To tackle the threat posed by rogue states, President Clinton declared that U.S. policy towards these countries was simple: ‘they must be contained’ (Clinton, 1995g).

Beyond this, the Clinton administration claimed that the United States also had an obligation to help these states transform themselves into constructive members of the international community (Lake, 1994: 46). Similar to Clinton, after the 2001 World Trade Center bombing, Bush directly associated terrorism with the threat of rogue states and weapons of mass destruction. In his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush mentioned that ‘states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger’ (Bush, 2002a). In other words, based on the rhetorical foundations established by Clinton, Bush used similar rhetoric to label

and construct U.S. enemies and highlight the threat of catastrophic terrorism.

A close study of Clinton's terrorism discourse reveals that at the beginning of his first term, counterterrorism policy was not a central preoccupation of his administration. However, the Tokyo sarin gas attack and the Oklahoma City bombing prompted the Clinton administration to reassess the priority of U.S. national security policy and formulate a robust counterterrorism strategy. Following this reassessment, the terrorism issue was then frequently mentioned in presidential rhetoric and stressed by many U.S. officials. The Clinton administration also declared on many occasions that terrorism was one of the most dangerous threats to the United States during the post-Cold War period. For example, in his remarks at the United States Air Force Academy, Clinton argued that 'fighting terrorism is a big part of our national security today, and it will be well into the 21st century' (Clinton, 1995). Similarly, Warren Christopher (1996), the Secretary of State, echoed the president's language when he stated that 'none of the challenges we now face is more pressing than the fight against terrorism. Terrorism destroys innocent lives. It undermines a society's sense of security.' During the Clinton presidency, such statements were ubiquitous in administration rhetoric.

The U.S. government also directed its citizens' attention to the threat of terrorism by referring to the fascism of the Second World War and the communism of the Cold War to construct and emphasise the threat of terrorism. Specifically, terrorism was identified and perceived as being at the core of U.S. national security policy, and it was defined as a threat which replaced fascism and communism as one of the most severe challenges for Americans in the post-Cold War period. Giving a radio address in 1996, Clinton explained that 'while the international perils of the 20th century, fascism and communism, have been defeated, new dangers are rising to take their place as we enter the 21st' (Clinton, 1996m). Until the end of Clinton's presidency, fighting terrorism was officially articulated in the administration's various documents and reports such as the *National Security Strategy* (NSS), *the Patterns of Global Terrorism*, *the Presidential Decision Directive 39*, and various *Executive Orders* which explicitly outlined the essential points of U.S. counterterrorism policies and America's firm statement against terrorism and terrorists.

Overall, during the eight years of his presidency, Clinton articulated a particular interpretation of terrorism, detailing the features of new terrorism and the scenarios of

potential terrorist attacks. Based on the foundation of the ‘war on terrorism’ constructed by the Reagan administration, Clinton expanded Reagan’s interpretation of international terrorism by adding the threat posed by ‘home-grown’ terrorists. Clinton also stressed the danger of catastrophic terrorism which involved rogue states, weapons of mass destruction, and cyberterrorism. In so doing, Clinton’s discourse provided a rhetorical context and foundation for the Bush administration to respond to the tragedy of September 11th, 2001. It maintained a continuity of U.S. counterterrorism policies from Reagan to Clinton and Bush.

The Social Practices of U.S. Terrorism Discourse: Political Consequences and Social Effects

As previously discussed, a central theme of Clinton’s terrorism discourse was writing the *new* terrorist threat, and then ‘selling’ the subsequent counterterrorist policies to the public. Denton and Woodward note that:

the presidency is an office, a role, a persona, constructing a position of power, myth, legend, and persuasion. Everything a president does or says has implications and communicates “something”. Every act, word, or phrase becomes a calculated and measured for a response. (quoted in Edwards, 2008: 2).

Through the production of discourse and the use of language, the presidential administration demonstrates their leadership, shapes public perceptions about various issues, and the audiences often learn about a large number of issues, public affairs and situations. Most American citizens have little to no knowledge of the issues and threats that the United States faces (Edwards, 2008: 2). Most of the time, they rely on the president to offer a semblance of order to the world around them, and it is only through the utilisation of language that presidents can convey that sense of order (Ibid.).

Besides, Altheide (2006a: 417) also argues that government and policy-making elites—the key news sources—play significant roles in the distribution of public information, in particular, the necessity of extraordinary measures to combat fear (such as, crime and terrorism). Specifically, through the production of a discourse of fear

(Campbell, 1998; Jackson, 2005; Winkler, 2006), the government authorities can define problems and further set political agendas. In other words, it is through the production of discourse that presidents and administrations inform the populace of what goes on in the international arena; and it is through the interpretation of threats that people understand how *severe* a threat is, and how *dangerous* the situation that the United States is facing and experiencing may be. Accordingly, political discourse becomes a primary instrument for presidential foreign and security policies. During Clinton's tenure, the administration undertook counterterrorism initiatives, including, among others, antiterrorism legislation, international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, the enhancement of aviation safety and security and shifts in military strategy.

It is argued that the most significant antiterrorism achievement of the Clinton administration was the promotion of the *Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996* (AEDPA). Following the two tragedies that occurred in 1995, namely, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the sarin gas attack in Japan, the Clinton administration was stunned by the increased threat of so-called catastrophic terrorism featuring characteristics of home-grown terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In response to these attacks, law enforcement agencies were commanded to enhance and sharpen their counterterrorism capabilities.

Responding to requests from law enforcement officers, in May 1995, the Clinton administration transmitted the Antiterrorism Amendment Act of 1995 to Congress. This legislation called for an increase in the powers of law enforcement agencies to combat domestic terrorism (Clinton, 1995h). In order to persuade Congress and American citizens to accept the new antiterrorism legislation, Clinton powerfully demonstrated the urgency and necessity of the law. He reminded American citizens of the tragedy they had experienced, and reiterated the severe danger modern terrorism posed. The main theme of Clinton's counterterrorism discourse was simple and clear: America was now vulnerable to the threat of terrorism, and terrorism was severely challenging U.S. national security and its way of life. Clinton stated that terrorism and terrorists 'threaten our common peace, our freedom, our way of life' (Clinton, 1995e; 1995f). For these reasons, new antiterrorism legislation was considered to be indispensable. In the president's words:

we mustn't let our country fight the war against terrorism ill-armed or ill-prepared. I want us to be armed with 1,000 more FBI agents. I want the ability to monitor high-tech communications among far-flung terrorists. I want to be able to have our people learn their plans before they strike. (Clinton, 1995k).

Along with AEPDA 1996, during his presidency, Clinton signed several Executive Orders (EOs) regarding antiterrorism efforts, including EO 12938: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, EO 12947, EO 13099: Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process, and EO 13129: Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with the Taliban. Through the discursive construction of terrorism as a major, boundless threat challenging both the American way of life and the traditional values Americans believe in, Clinton's 'new' terrorism discourse eventually became a reality explicitly articulated in numerous official documents, and was accepted as a common 'grid of intelligibility' (see Milliken, 1999) shared by counterterrorism practitioners as well as the American public. The new legislation represented the concrete practical contribution made to U.S. counterterrorism initiatives.

As well as the new antiterrorism legislation, the shifts of U.S. national security strategy and military doctrine are also discursive achievements of Clinton's presidency. In February 1995, the Clinton administration released its *National Security Strategy* (NSS). In the NSS, terrorism was clearly articulated as a threat to the United States in a 'new' security environment, and combating terrorism was identified as one of the key tasks of U.S. military forces in the post-Cold War era. As explicitly articulated in the NSS:

as long as terrorist groups continue to target American citizens and interests, the United States will need to have specialized units available to defeat such groups. From time to time, we might also find it necessary to strike terrorists at their bases abroad or to attack assets valued by the governments that support them. (NSS, 1995: 10).

To fight the terrorist threat, the U.S. counterterrorism policy was

to make no concessions to terrorists, continue to pressure state sponsors of terrorism, fully exploit all available legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists and help other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism. (*NSS*, 1995: 10).

The *NSS* was understood as a guideline which helped to frame Clinton's foreign and security policies; it also laid out elements of the worldview and political ideals of the Clinton presidency.

At the same time, William Perry, Clinton's Secretary of Defense, introduced and described a new concept of US military strategy, *preventive defence*, during the second term of Clinton's presidency. The new military strategy was based on three essential priorities: to prevent threats from emerging, to deter threats that do emerge, and to defeat threats using military force, if prevention and deterrence fail (Perry, 1996: 65). The articulation of *NSS* and the shift of U.S. military strategy illustrated that Clinton's presidential rhetoric about the new terrorism had eventually become a kind of policy-based 'common sense' broadly shared by the key figures of the Clinton administration, and it functioned to sustain the existing counterterrorism 'regime of truth.' The imminent threat of terrorism, through its interpretation by powerful elites, had become a central political reality of American society.

In addition to some of the concrete discursive achievements mentioned, it is also worth noting the broader social effects of Clinton's terrorism and counterterrorism discourses. The most influential effect of social practice of the terrorism discourse is the construction of the subject. The construction of the subject not only shaped knowledge of terrorism but also affected subsequent practices of antiterrorism. For example, when terrorism was depicted as a 'disease,' a 'plague,' or a 'cancer,' this kind of interpretation—the utilisation of a medical metaphor—suggested a particular approach to the problem; that is, it should be 'eliminated,' as that is the only way to wipe out the disease. Fairclough (2001: 100) argues that 'different metaphors have different ideological attachments,' and 'different metaphors imply different ways of dealing with things' (also see Chapter 4). Thus, by interpreting terrorism as a disease, specific tactics of counterterrorism, such as surgical military strikes and targeted killings, are therefore justified and rationalised. As previously discussed, in the past

decades, the three administrations all employed the medical metaphors to express the threat of terrorism, and they all adopted a military approach to fight against the threat.

During the Clinton presidency, the United States launched several military operations aimed at ‘eliminating’ the terrorist threat, such as its responses to Iraq’s attempt to assassinate the former President George H. W. Bush in 1993, and to the 1998 African embassy bombings. According to public opinion polls, 61 per cent of Americans supported the president’s decision to bomb Iraq, and more than 70 per cent of U.S. citizens supported U.S. raids on terrorist installations in Sudan and Afghanistan (Hendrickson, 2002a: 112, 144). In addition, approximately 77 per cent of American opinion leaders supported the U.S. government’s decision to launch air strikes against terrorist training camps and other facilities (*U.S. Leaders Topline Report*, 2002: 51). The result of the public opinion polls demonstrates the degree to which the administration’s terrorism discourse resonated with the public, thus enabling officials to carry out the desired military operations.

Another social effect of the terrorism discourse is that the construction of subject created a specific cultural understanding of terrorism. For example, the nature of terrorism was constructed as mere brutality and violence; terrorists were inherently ‘evil,’ and were ‘psychos,’ ‘fanatics’ and members of ‘religious cults.’ The interpretation of terrorists as ‘fanatics’ and ‘killers’ functions to depoliticise the purposes of terrorists by attributing their violence to religious, other-worldly or psychopathic causes. However, in recent research, the causal link between religion and violence has been challenged and questioned by many academics (see Jackson, 2007; Gunning and Jackson, 2011). Research suggests that there is insufficient evidence that religion is the central cause of political violence. Similarly, Pape (2010) strongly argued that foreign military occupation and the U.S.’s pro-Israeli foreign policies, rather than Islamic fundamentalism, are the major concerns of so-called Islamist terrorists.²⁸

It has also been argued that the ‘new terrorism’ discourse framed by the creation of apocalyptic scenarios actually creates unnecessary fear, anxiety, and panic among

²⁸ According to the finding of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST), among the 2,200 suicide attacks across the world from 1980 to the present day, more than 95 per cent of all suicide attacks are actually in response to foreign occupation, rather than religious causes, in sharp contrast to the orthodox understanding (Pape & Feldman, 2010).

civilians (Mythen & Walklate, 2006; also see Altheide 2006a; 2006b). Given the low occurrence of real terrorist acts in the United States (notwithstanding the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the tragedy of September 11th, 2001), some question whether terrorism really poses an imminent threat (Jackson, 2011b). Statistics also show that the global annual figure for deaths caused by international terrorism outside of warzones from 1968 to the present is approximately 300-700, while the approximate number of annual fatalities from adverse reaction to prescription drugs in the United States is roughly 32,000 and the number of suicides annually in the United States is around 30,000 (Ibid.: 132). Besides this, an individual's estimated probability of death from international terrorism in the United States is 1:80,000, whereas the estimated probability of death from falling down is 1:236, and the probability of death from a gunshot wound is 1:325 (Ibid.: 133). This highlights the fact that that numerous issues ought to be of greater concern than terrorism, and more funds and resources should be allocated to improving current problems, such as drug abuse, suicide, poverty and unemployment, influenza, HIV/AIDS, climate change, and so on.

The conclusion of recent research suggests that the counterterrorism 'regime of truth' is constructed and sustained through the production and reproduction of discourse. When the terrorism discourse is consumed and accepted as 'truth' and as 'taken-for-granted' knowledge, other approaches and discourses are silenced and marginalised. In terms of WMD terrorism, for example, scholars have recently argued that there is no need to exaggerate this threat because the possibility of an attack is very low and it is very difficult for terrorists to possess and deliver chemical or biological agents (Carpintero-Santamaria and Mueller, 2012: 85-7). Despite the existence of thousands of terrorist groups throughout history and tens of thousands of terrorist attacks over the past 40 years, there have been very few attacks using WMD (Jackson, 2011: 138). In recent decades, the most serious incidents are the 1995 Tokyo sarin gas attack and the anthrax letters sent in the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 attacks (Bolanos *et al*, 2012: 40). As Brian Jenkins, a long-standing RAND specialist has argued, 'deliberate attempts to kill as many people as possible in one violent action are rare' (Jenkins, 1995: 44), and 'terrorists want many witnesses, not many dead' (Ibid.).

With regard to the threat of state-sponsored terrorism, the Gilmore Commission, a

Clinton-appointed advisory panel formed to assess response capabilities to WMD-related terrorist incidents in the United States, concluded in its final report that rogue states would hesitate to entrust such weapons to terrorists because their actions are unpredictable and there is a possibility that terrorists might also utilise these weapons against their state-sponsors (see RAND, 2003). Besides this, the subsequent consequences that rogue states would face (for instance, their international obligations) are likely to prevent these states from utilising weapons of mass destruction. In other words, the apocalyptic scenarios described in presidential rhetoric, and by key figures of their administrations, are of questionable validity and utility. Therefore, we need to try and understand them in terms of their political functions, i.e., the way they serve to maintain power and social hierarchies or words to that effect. As critical discourse analysts argue and assert (Jorgensen & Phillip, 2010: 65), discourse is constitutive and constituted; it not only reproduces, but also changes knowledge, identities and social relations, including power relations.

Conclusion

Clinton's terrorism and counterterrorism discourse reveals real continuity in U.S. counterterrorism policy, which may indicate a limited capacity for change between administrations (Jackson, 2011a, 2014; McCrisken, 2011, 2012). According to the research presented here, there is evidence of an established tradition whereby Washington elites utilise a similar rhetorical strategy to construct their interpretation of terrorism, and this tradition has continued through the administrations of Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. They all adopted similar themes and narratives in their discursive constructions of terrorism and counterterrorism, particularly in terms of the interpretation of the terrorist threat and the requirement of counterterrorism measures. Officials repeatedly claimed that terrorism threatened the American way of life, challenged the core values of the nation and was intended to disrupt American society. These actions could not be tolerated, they further claimed, and the United States had to act decisively to protect the values Americans firmly believed in. Leading the world in this fight against terrorism was not only the international obligation of the United States, but also its historical burden. Language used by officials created a powerful framework for the authorities to normalise and justify their political decisions, as well as serving to maintain the counterterrorism

'regime of truth' which has been further expanded and institutionalised in Bush's war on terror and Obama's counterterrorism approaches (see Jackson, 2011a; 2014). Through its articulation and re-articulation, the threat of terrorism has come to form part of a common 'grid of intelligibility' (see Milliken, 1999) which is broadly shared by policy makers and the public. Most important of all, the dominant discourse has functioned to exclude other alternative discourses and measures, suppress dissent, silence other opinions, and undermine alternative future courses of counterterrorism action.

However, it is also important to note that although the different presidencies exhibited many similarities, slight variations still existed between them. International terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism were the great concerns of Reagan's administration. In his 1985 speech delivered before the American Bar Association, Reagan claimed that the Soviet Union was no longer the sole source of terrorism; instead, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua were emerging as the primary enemies of the United States (Reagan 1985c). Reagan's interpretation of terrorism stressed that it was the antithesis of democracy. He also suggested that acts of terrorism may be evidence of the strength of democracy in the Cold War world. Since the United States was the exemplar of an effective democracy, it became the natural target of terrorists (Winkler, 2006: 84-5).

Like his predecessor, Clinton adopted Reagan's expression of state-sponsored terrorism and depicted terrorists as 'enemies of peace.' Based on Reagan's first 'war on terrorism,' Clinton expanded Reagan's interpretation of international terrorism and broadly related terrorism to issues of rogue states, weapons of mass destruction and a threat to peace in the Middle East. For Clinton, these issues were interrelated, and could not be discussed separately. Clinton claimed that rogue states harboured terrorists, maintained close relationships with various terrorist organisations, sought to possess weapons of mass destruction and hated peace and democracy. In addition, he emphasised the threat of home-grown terrorism and the possibility of catastrophic terrorism aimed at the mass killing of civilians. The Clinton administration also focused its counterterrorism initiatives on non-state terrorism, such as that practiced by bin Laden and his al Qaeda accomplices, along with Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The definition and interpretation of terrorism and terrorists directly affected the framing of the Clinton administration's counterterrorism

policy, as well as its counterterrorism practices. During the Clinton presidency, the promotion of antiterrorism legislation, international cooperation with U.S. allies and the enhancement of aviation security were seen as the three pillars of U.S. counterterrorism strategy, and were explicitly articulated in the president's counterterrorism discourse.

Furthermore, it can be argued that the Clinton administration constructed the main rhetorical foundation for the Bush administration to construct its response to terrorism. After the tragedy of September 11th, 2001, Bush employed the same rhetorical strategy to formulate his public terrorism discourse, such as when he labelled enemies of the United States as the 'Axis of Evil,' and stressed the danger of terrorism as an unlimited, potentially catastrophic threat. The Bush administration also related terrorism to issues of rogue states and weapons of mass destruction, and these narratives became institutionalised in subsequent U.S. counterterrorism practices. The construction of catastrophic terrorism resonated with the American public and became a commonsense during Clinton's and Bush's presidencies. In 2002, according to polling data provided by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, more than 85 per cent of Americans worried about the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers, while 86 per cent of U.S. citizens thought that the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons would threaten U.S. national security (*U.S. General Population Topline Report*, 2002: 92-3).

Similar to his predecessors, Bush also adopted a military approach to respond to terrorist attacks, and clearly defined terrorism as an 'act of war.' Bush's interpretation of terrorism and his war rhetoric in turn directly led to U.S. overseas military operations, namely, *Operation Enduring Freedom* in 2001 and *Operation Iraqi Freedom* in 2003. In the name of counterterrorism, the Bush administration was able to defend its policy of war on terror, both domestic and international, using the rhetorical framework established by Clinton.

The global war on terror launched by Bush, it could therefore be said, was the next logical step along the course of rhetoric and practice established by Clinton, as the use of force to respond to terrorist attacks was already widely held as an 'extraordinary step' during the Clinton administration. Since the 1990s, the Clinton administration conducted several coercive operations aimed at killing bin Laden and other key members of al Qaeda, such as the bombings of Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998

(Hendrickson, 2002a, 2002b; Clark, 2004; Patman, 2010). Besides this, in order to address the problem of Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction, Clinton, in his second term, also considered the possibility of regime change in Iraq (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007; Freedman, 2008). In 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2000, the United States also launched various military operations targeted at Iraq and its facilities alleged to hold weapons of mass destruction (Hendrickson, 2002a, 2002b; Albright, 2003; Indyk, 2009). Taken in sum, the analysis of the discourse and practice of the Clinton administration demonstrates a strong continuity of U.S. counterterrorism policies between the Clinton and Bush presidencies, and illustrates that the discursive origins of the war on terror in fact lie in the earlier period.

As previously discussed, this chapter traces the discursive origins of the ‘war on terror’ and the political usage of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ in the U.S. political arena, in particular, President Clinton’s discursive construction of ‘new terrorism.’ However, it is worth noting that in addition to the framing of new terrorism, conceptualising the act of terrorism—either by defining terrorism as a crime or a war—is one of the discursive achievements of President Clinton’s counterterrorism practice. To understand discursive change in U.S. terrorism discourse, the next chapter examines and analyses speeches given by the administration regarding the significant terrorist attacks targeted at the United States and its citizens in the 1990s. I argue that the way that officials interpreted the events not only constructed the parameters within which these incidents could be comprehended but also suggested a specific way for government agencies to respond to the attacks. Specifically, during the Clinton presidency, U.S. counterterrorism policy shifted from a law enforcement-based approach to the assertion of military-based measures.

Chapter 4

Conceptualising Terrorist Attacks: Discourses, Metaphors, and President Clinton's Counterterrorism Initiatives

Introduction

As previously discussed, since the tragedy of September 11, 2001, much literature has been written about President George W. Bush's war on terror. However, with few exceptions, there has been a complete lack of discussion regarding President Ronald Reagan's discourse on this war (for example, see Wills, 2003; Winkler, 2006, 2007; Jackson, 2006; Toaldo, 2012) and President Bill Clinton's counterterrorism initiatives (Winkler, 2006). In the existing literature, scholars argue that the current war on terror and its discourses originated with the Bush administration. However, my research challenges this limited understanding and demonstrates that the American-led war on terror can actually be traced to the earlier administrations, as President Reagan and President Clinton had already established a rhetorical framework that enabled President Bush to respond in the way he did to the World Trade Center bombing.

Winker (2006, 2007) has studied the various U.S. presidents' political discourses and indicates in her research that Democratic presidents tended to use narratives that feature crime as a main theme to interpret terrorism and terrorist attacks, while Republican presidents preferred to utilise the narratives of war to structure their discourse on counterterrorism. In contrast to Winkler's definition and observation, the research in this thesis illustrates that as the first Democratic post-Cold War president, Bill Clinton adopted both the *crime frame* and the *war metaphor* to construct his political discourse on terrorism.²⁹ Clinton's specific interpretation of terrorism and terrorists further affected the counterterrorism initiatives implemented by his administration.

By examining Clinton's terrorism and counterterrorism discourse, this research

²⁹ In contrast to Winkler's (2006: 11, 200; 2007) research on discourse and narrative, this chapter particularly discusses the political function of *metaphors* and *frames*. My research illustrates that how policy-making elites employed the *crime frame* and the *war metaphor* to conceptualise acts of terrorism, and how the language affected U.S. counterterrorism practices during the Clinton presidency.

demonstrates that during the tenure of Clinton's presidency, the U.S. government established a solid rhetorical foundation that encouraged the majority of the American public to conceptualise terrorist violence in a very specific way. In addition to this, in order to explicitly elaborate the political functions of discourse, metaphor, and terminology, this chapter first introduces the theoretical framework of metaphor and explains how metaphorical thoughts and words are used to construct and constitute the social world; the political usage of metaphorical phrases and expressions in recent decades will also be examined. In the second section, the most significant terrorist attacks that occurred in the 1990s and the related political rhetoric of Washington's elites will be analysed. The texts examined include all of President Clinton's speeches associated with his responses to the terrorist attacks that took place during his years in office. In addition, the major political achievements of Clinton's counterterrorism initiatives will be discussed. In conclusion, my findings demonstrate that there is a strong continuity in the government's approach to the American-led war on terror from Reagan to Clinton and Bush.

Metaphor, Frame, and the Social Practice of Counterterrorism

The concept of metaphor has been traditionally understood and used as a poetic device and as a rhetorical flourish by scholars of literature and language (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003: 3). While it is often used in other disciplines, this use is rarely acknowledged or analysed; there is a particular lack of discussion regarding the political use of metaphors in international relations scholarship. Scholars (Lakoff, 1991; Chilton & Ilyin, 1993; Shimko, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003; Schaeffner, 2004, 2008) argue that in addition to discourse, metaphors are indeed a crucial part of our everyday life. Specifically, discourse, narrative, and metaphor not only help human beings to frame and comprehend the situations that they face, but they also co-constitute the social world.

However, most individuals are unaware of how prevalent metaphors are; that is, metaphors are used automatically and unconsciously. Shimko (1994: 658) claims that 'certain metaphors are so taken for granted that they usually slip into our thoughts and actions undetected and unrecognised.' Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 3) also indicate that 'metaphor is pervasive in everyday life ... our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.'

A brief survey of everyday expressions can demonstrate the popularity of metaphors and the broader usage of metaphorical thoughts. A remarkable example is that in everyday conversations, 'time' is described as 'money' which can be 'spent,' 'wasted,' and 'saved.' Besides this, 'ideas' are often interpreted as 'food' for thought that can be 'chewed on' and 'digested.' Moreover, people often say that 'we "play" the game of life' and use the term 'hot' to describe physically attractive individuals. These everyday practices all illustrate that metaphors are pervasive in our daily lives and that the use of metaphors is more than just language enhancement.

Chilton and Ilyin (1993) studied the political functions of metaphor in their research; they indicate that metaphor is characterised by its 'heuristic' and 'interactional' roles. The former means that a metaphor enables an individual to understand a complex and remote situation in a simple and easy way (Chilton and Ilyin, 1993: 10); the latter refers to its specific rhetorical skill, which is a means of avoiding direct reference, of creating common ground, and of maintaining contextual continuity and cohesion (Ibid.).

Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 5) introduce the concept that *argument is war* and further argue that 'the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another' and that 'metaphorical thought structures what we do and how we understand what we are doing when we argue' (Ibid.). Indeed, in our everyday language, we are not merely talking about arguments in terms of war. Instead, by utilising metaphorical thoughts, we 'win' or 'lose' our arguments. We also plan a 'strategy' to 'defend' against 'attacks' from 'opponents' (Ibid.: 4-5). Although there is no physical war, there is a verbal war. The *argument is war* concept elaborates that metaphorical thoughts are actually a part of our everyday practices. Scholars' interpretations of metaphorical thoughts illustrate that metaphors are not merely linguistic devices, but are integral to the way that people experience and conceptualise the social world (Hodges, 2011: 21). To sum up, if discourse is a way of thinking and a way of understanding the world (as discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), then metaphors and narratives (as discussed in Chapter 6) are essential for structuring discourse; together they function efficiently to help individuals conceptualise their world.

With regard to the political function of metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 159) claim that metaphors 'play a central role in the construction of social and political

reality.’ Although sometimes the usage of a metaphor is detrimental to the quality of decision-making, metaphorical thought in itself is still simply ‘commonplace and inescapable’ (Lakoff, 1991: 25, 32). This research (Lakoff, 1991; Chilton & Ilyin, 1993; Shimko, 1994; Stenvall, 2009; Hodges, 2011) has demonstrated that in the political arena, metaphors are frequently used to explain a particular political situation. For example, after World War II, President Dwight Eisenhower employed the ‘domino’ metaphor, which is also known as the domino theory, to stress the increasing communist threat in Southeast Asia. In 1954, Eisenhower explicitly stated that, ‘You have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the “falling domino” principle. You have a row of dominos set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly’ (Shimko, 1994: 656). In addition, other metaphors such as the ‘iron curtain,’ ‘containment,’ ‘communism is a disease,’ and ‘rational choice and zero sum games’ were constantly used in U.S. elite Cold War discourse, which graphically shaped public understandings of the Cold War and the threat of communism. The specific interpretations of the communist threat illustrated the imminent risk posed by the Soviet Union, captured public attention on the issue of anticommunism, and directed subsequent U.S. foreign and security policies for several decades.

It is also worth noting that Latin America is traditionally discursively identified as the ‘backyard’ of the United States. The metaphorical thought of Latin America as the ‘backyard’ of the United States implies the strategic importance of this area, particularly its geopolitical significance for U.S. national interests (Shimko, 1994). The American-led first Gulf War in the 1990s can also be understood as a panorama of metaphor (Lakoff, 1991). During this war period, the George H. W. Bush administration employed numerous metaphors to stress the severe threat of Saddam Hussein and to justify its political decision to conduct a military intervention. In official language, President Bush defined Saddam Hussein as having a ‘stranglehold’ on the U.S. economy. James Baker, Bush’s Secretary of State, also claimed that the Iraqi leader was ‘sitting on our economic lifeline.’ Similarly, General Norman Schwarzkopf described Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait as a ‘rape’ (Ibid.). The language used by the key figures of the George H. W. Bush administration demonstrates how often metaphors are used and illustrates how foreign policy crises and wars have been constructed in terms of discourse, language, and terminology. Undoubtedly, in the past

few decades, Washington's elites have skilfully utilised metaphors to structure their discourses on foreign and security policies and to justify their political decisions.

Chilton and Ilyin (1993) argue that the skilful use of metaphors can lead to the manipulation of an emerging political discourse, providing new conceptual premises for the development and justification of particular policies. For example, in October 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, the former Russian leader, used the metaphor of the *common European house* to introduce the *new thinking* of the Soviet Union (Chilton & Ilyin, 1993). By utilising this specific metaphor, Gorbachev avoided directly mentioning the sensitive political divisions between the Soviet Union and other European countries, and simultaneously explored the concept of *new thinking* (Ibid.: 9). The political usage of metaphor illustrates that a new metaphor, or the new use of a metaphor, can break up the rigid conceptual frames of an existing political order, introduce new options, and importantly stimulate political thought and imagination (Ibid.: 10). Besides, it is worth noting that metaphor can be viewed as an important diplomatic device broadly utilised by political elites in the discursive formulation of new foreign policy (Ibid.: 9). As Chilton and Ilyin (1993: 9-10) argue, metaphor leaves room for further negotiation of specific meanings and references. Subsequent to Gorbachev's introduction of the *common European house*, European elites discussed, reiterated and engaged with the Russian leader's new political thinking, and therefore new policies were suggested and prompted.

Related to the concept of *metaphors, frames*—which have been mostly discussed in the fields of anthropology, sociology, linguistics, psychology, and artificial intelligence (Tannen & Wallat, 1987: 206; Tannen, 1993: 15-6)—are also frequently utilised in our everyday practices of language. Fillmore (1985: 223) indicates that 'a frame represents the particular organisation of knowledge which stands as a prerequisite to our ability to understand the meanings of the associated word.' Similarly, Tannen (1993: 16) argues that the term *frame* (and related terms, such as *script, schema, prototype, speech activity, template, and module*) reflects the notion of *structure of expectation*. *Structure of expectation*, according to Rose (1975; also see Tannen, 1993: 16), is that 'on the basis of one's experience of the world in a given culture (or combination of cultures), one organises knowledge about the world and uses this knowledge to predict interpretations and relationships regarding new information, events, and experiences.' Specifically, through a frame, we not only

understand the particular meaning of a word but the meaning(s) of a set of words, and therefore, the knowledge of a specific subject is constructed. For example, we cannot randomly understand the meaning of each weekday (such as, *Wednesday*, *Thursday*, and *Sunday*); nor would we expect to find *father*, *mother*, *son*, *daughter*, *brother* and *sister* separated from each other. Instead, we learn these sets of words in groups. And, in so doing, we can fully comprehend the meaning of each word and how these terms conceptualise our understanding about the larger calendric cycle of seven days (or the practice in our culture of assigning different portions of the weekly cycle to work and non-work), as well as the meaning of *family* (see Fillmore, 1985: 223-4). In short, ‘to understand the meaning of a word was to understand the structure within which the word played its role, and that this structure had its being precisely because of the existence of the other words’ (cited in *Ibid.*: 227).

In addition to foreign and security policies, the American-led war on terror and its discourses have featured the use of metaphorical concepts and frames. The present research argues that the *war metaphor* and the *crime frame* were both broadly adopted by the United States’ government to describe the terrorist attacks that were targeted at the United States and its citizens, and to frame the subsequent counterterrorism policies. These political leaders’ interpretations of terrorism not only conceptualised the ‘common understanding’ of terrorism—either as a criminal act or an act of war—but also provided a framework to meaningfully discuss the subject of terrorism. Furthermore, the metaphor and frame suggested specific approaches to tackle the threat posed by terrorism and terrorists. As Fairclough (2001: 100) argues, ‘different metaphors have different ideological attachments’ and ‘different metaphors imply different ways of dealing with things.’ In the political arena, terrorism is constantly interpreted by U.S. administrations as a *scourge* and *cancer*; and, as a result, it (terrorism) has to be eliminated and cut out (see Chapter 3). The interpretation of terrorism as a disease—by using a medical metaphor—actually suggests a coercive approach to counterterrorism, such as ‘surgical strikes’ and targeted killings. Through an examination of U.S. counterterrorism discourse, this chapter illustrates that the *crime frame* motivated the development of a counterterrorism policy concentrating on the promotion of anti-terrorism legislation and multilateral cooperation among nations, and that the *war metaphor* led to military-based counterterrorism actions and measures.

Terrorism as a Crime: Clinton's First-Term Counterterrorism Initiatives

During Clinton's first term, the United States experienced a number of significant terrorist attacks on home soil and overseas, namely, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, and the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta, Georgia. Based on the texts examined, the present research argues that in the first term of Clinton's presidency, the United States tended for the most part to adopt a '*crime*' *frame* to portray terrorism and terrorists, and to interpret the terrorist attacks. The discursive construction of terrorism as a crime rather than an act of war influenced the formation of Clinton's first-term counterterrorism policy, which was characterised by the promotion of new anti-terrorism legislation, particularly *Presidential Decision Directive 39* (PDD 39), the *Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996* (AEPDA), and multilateral counterterrorism cooperation among nations.

Scholars of discourse analysis (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002; Lakoff & Johanson, 2003) argue that social and political 'realities' do not exist independently; instead, they are constructed and constituted by discourse, language, and words. Lakoff and Frisch (2006) also indicate that 'language matters, because it can determine how we think and act.'

Utilising the epistemology and ontology shared by most discourse analysts, this research argues that the language used by the key figures of U.S. administrations not only revealed the way that Washington's policy makers comprehended the subject of terrorism and terrorists, but simultaneously influenced the formulation of national security policy and the concrete practices of counterterrorism. Specifically, if terrorist attacks are perceived as crimes, then the subsequent counterterrorism initiatives executed by the authorities would therefore involve measures associated with crime-fighting techniques, such as checking bank accounts, wiretapping, promoting anti-terrorism legislation, sharing intelligence with other allies, and recruiting spies, informants, and counterterrorism practitioners (Lakoff & Frisch, 2006).

On the other hand, if terrorist attacks are discursively defined as 'acts of war,' then unilateral military operations aimed at 'eliminating' and 'killing' so-called 'evil terrorists' are soon seen as indispensable. The '*war*' *metaphor* also excludes other non-violent alternatives that might have been adopted to address the threat posed by

terrorism.

The First World Trade Center Bombing

The first World Trade Center bombing occurred on February 26, 1993; it led to 6 deaths and 1,000 injuries (*Pattern of Global Terrorism, 1993*). Soon after this terrorist attack in New York City, the Clinton administration used the ‘crime’ frame to structure its discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism and to frame its subsequent counterterrorism initiatives. In official language regarding the massive explosion, President Bill Clinton mentioned little about enemy aggression and nothing about blaming anyone; instead, he concentrated on hardship and American suffering (Feste, 2011: 166). However, an important feature of Clinton’s discourses on this specific terrorist attack is that the President explicitly suggested a law-based approach—emphasising the importance of law enforcement and new anti-terrorism legislation—to deal with the threat of terrorism. On the day following the first World Trade Center bombing, President Clinton stated:

Following the explosion I spoke with New York’s Governor Mario Cuomo and New York City Mayor David Dinkins to assure them that **the full measure of Federal law enforcement resources** will be brought to bear on this **investigation**. Just this morning I spoke with FBI Director Sessions, who assured me that the FBI and the Treasury Department are working closely with the New York City police and fire departments. Working together we’ll find out who was involved and why this happened. (Clinton, 1993a).

In addition, at an adult learning centre in New Jersey, President Clinton clearly announced:

I can tell you this: that we have put the full, full resources, **the Federal law enforcement agencies, all kinds of agencies**, all kind of access to information at the service of those who are working to **figure out** who did this and why and what the facts are. (Clinton, 1993b).

Again, while answering the press regarding the bombing that occurred in Manhattan, New York, the President mentioned:

My feeling now is one of real gratitude to **the law enforcement officials** at every level who worked together and moved quickly to try to **resolve** this matter and who did **make an arrest**. (Clinton, 1993c).

Within the context of President Clinton's speeches, it is obvious that the 'crime' frame was adopted as the main theme to define and interpret the first terrorist attacks that the Clinton administration was confronted with. The crime frame, according to Lakoff and Frisch (2006), entails law, courts, lawyers, trials, sentencing, appeals, victims, and so on. Clearly, the language used constituted the meaning of the crimes and functioned to shape the audience's understanding of the terrorist attacks. As Fillmor (1985: 223) indicates, a 'frame' refers to a 'specific unified framework of knowledge or coherent schematization of experience.' Hodges (2011: 21) also argues that a 'frame' comprises the background knowledge that provides a context for a word's usage and meaning in a given situation. The interpretation of the World Trade Center bombing indeed shaped the U.S. citizen's understanding about the incident and provided a specific framework to meaningfully discuss and comprehend the incident. Chilton and Lakoff (1999: 37) stress that metaphors are not mere words or fanciful notions; instead, they embody the modes of thought and structure the discourse of foreign policy in the deepest sense.

In his presidential speeches, Bill Clinton actually sought to avoid using the words 'terrorism' and 'terrorists' to describe the incident and the culprits. He also mentioned several times that any measure based on law enforcement and cooperation among agencies was indispensable. As the President clearly stated, Federal law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Treasury Department, and the New York City Police were in charge of the '**investigation**' (Clinton, 1993a); these authorities would use every possible means to '**figure out**' and '**resolve**' the matter (Clinton, 1993d), and, undoubtedly, the responsible parties would eventually be '**arrested**' and brought to justice (Ibid.). The rhetorical definition of 'terrorism as crime' directed the formulation of Clinton's counterterrorism initiatives during the first year of his presidency. When answering the press regarding a new Federal law for the

death penalty for terrorists, Bill Clinton claimed that the promotion of anti-terrorism legislation was emergent and necessary for the United States. The President stated:

I support **the crime bill**. I supported the **crime bill** last year which expanded the death penalty in many different areas. And as you know, I have a longstanding support for capital punishment. (Clinton, 1993e).

As the first post-Cold War presidency, issues associated with terrorism and counterterrorism were initially not the focus of the Clinton administration (Clarke, 2004: 73). The administration's response to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing illustrates that President Clinton and his administration tended to treat terrorism as an 'ordinary' crime and sought to address the terrorist threat through the enhancement of counterterrorism law enforcement. On public occasions, Clinton rarely mentioned terrorist threats to the United States and its citizens.

The 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing

The crime frame was also employed by the Clinton administration to respond to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing—an American-originated home-grown terrorist attack (Michel & Herbeck, 2001).³⁰ On the day of the tragedy, President Clinton immediately announced that his administration had 'deployed a crisis management team under the leadership of the FBI, working with the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, military and local authorities' (Clinton, 1995c), and 'the world's finest **investigators**' were sent to '**solve these murders**' (Ibid.). Besides this, the President asserted in the same speech:

We will find the people who did this. When we do, justice will be swift, certain, and severe. These people are **killers**, and they must be treated like **killers**. (Clinton, 1995c).

Two days after the incident, Bill Clinton gave another statement to the press

³⁰ Similar to the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing was initially assumed by Arab or Islamic groups; yet, subsequently it was attributed to domestic militia sympathizers. (Jenkins, 2003, 44-5).

regarding the tragedy. In this specific speech, the President once again defined this incident as a crime and detailed the counterterrorism measures implemented by his administration. President Clinton firstly expressed his appreciation to the law enforcement officials. He said that ‘their continued vigilance makes me sure that we will **solve** this **crime** in its entirety and that justice will prevail’ (Clinton, 1995d). He further indicated that U.S. counterterrorism initiatives would be based on a wide range of law enforcement and closer cooperation among federal agencies (Ibid.). President Clinton explicitly stated:

I’d like to say a personal thanks ... to the Oklahoma **lawman** whose vigilance led to the initial **arrest** of the **suspect** ... justice for these **killers** will be certain, swift, and severe. We will **find** them. We will **convict** them. And we will seek **the death penalty** for them. (Clinton, 1995d).

Similar to the reaction of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the crime frame was adopted as the main theme to identify and interpret the explosion in Oklahoma City. The terms utilised in Clinton’s discourse on terrorism, such as ‘investigators,’ ‘murders,’ ‘killers,’ ‘suspect,’ ‘arrest,’ and the ‘death penalty,’ all fit under the crime frame heading. In addition, the Clinton administration also suggested a law-based approach to ‘solve’ the problem, as President Clinton clearly indicated that the responsible party would be ‘found,’ ‘arrested,’ and ‘convicted’ by law enforcement officials. Official rhetoric about the Oklahoma City bombing and subsequent counterterrorism initiatives illustrate that an anti-terrorism ‘reality’—law-originated crisis management—was actually constructed by and comprised by the political usage of metaphors.

As Fillmore (1985: 224, 227) argues, frames represent a particular organisation of knowledge which stand as a common ground to the figure representable by any of the individual words. And, the most efficient way to understand the specific meaning of a word is to understand the structure within which the word played its role. The categorising of terrorism as a ‘crime’ rather than an act of ‘war’ led to different political outcomes. Crimes are expected to be ‘solved,’ while wars are either ‘won’ or ‘lost.’ Wars involve ‘attacks’ by a specific ‘enemy’ and ‘battles’ (Hodges, 2011: 25); however, crimes entail ‘suspects’ and ‘investigations.’ Accordingly, it can be argued

that the interpretation of terrorism as a crime not only conceptualised the act of terrorism but also suggested a particular way—a law-based approach to counterterrorism—in which government agencies should respond to the attacks.

The 1996 Saudi Arabia Khobar Towers Bombing

The Khobar Towers bombing occurred on June 25, 1996, in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and led to 372 injuries and the death of 19 U.S. soldiers. In sharp contrast to the other incidents, the Clinton administration adopted both the ‘crime’ frame and the ‘war’ metaphor to structure its discourse about this attack. On the day of the terrorist attack, President Clinton clearly stated that the explosion was plotted by ‘coward terrorists.’ As he said, ‘the explosion appears to be the work of **terrorists** ... the **cowards** who committed **this murderous act** must not go **unpunished**’ (Clinton, 1996i). In the same speech, Clinton also mentioned and stressed that an FBI-led team had been sent to Saudi Arabia to assist with the ‘**investigation**’ (Ibid.). By cooperating with the Saudi authorities, the United States would make sure ‘those **responsible** are **brought to justice**’ (Ibid.) and demonstrate that ‘those who did it must not go **unpunished**’ (Ibid.).

It is obvious that a law-based ‘crime’ frame was initially employed by the Clinton administration to construct its discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism, as can be seen in its response to the previous terrorist attacks, namely, the first World Trade Center bombing and the Oklahoma City bombing. However, in the days following the terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia, the Clinton administration shifted its discourse and adopted a harsher approach to the subject of terrorism. Giving a statement to the press regarding the terrorist attack in Dhahran, President Clinton clearly defined the incident as an ‘**outrageous attack on Americans**’ (Clinton, 1996j); he also asked U.S. citizens to rededicate themselves to the ‘**fight against terrorism**’ (Ibid.).

In the foreign policy arena, Bill Clinton strongly appealed to the G-7 leaders in Lyons, France, to build closer international cooperation aimed at fighting terrorism, because the threat of terrorism was so severe and no one was completely immune from its threat. Bill Clinton indicated at the G-7 summit that terrorism was the ‘**common enemy**’ (Clinton, 1996j) of each member, and that terrorism had to be ‘**eliminated**’ (Ibid.). When meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France, President Clinton explicitly expressed the threat posed by the terrorism and terrorists:

We understand that **an attack on one of us is an attack on all of us** and that **none of us is invulnerable. Attacks of terror can occur anywhere**, whether in a Paris metro station or in Manchester or the subway in Tokyo or the World Trade Center or the Oklahoma City Federal Building ... As we become more open, as our borders became freer to cross ... we all become more vulnerable to **terrorists**, to **the organized forces of destruction**, to those **who live to kill for ethnic or racial or religious reasons**, especially. (Clinton, 1996l).

Given that the terms such as ‘attack,’ ‘enemy,’ ‘eliminate,’ and ‘fight’ were broadly used to describe the political violence and the suspects involved in the terrorist attack targeted U.S. soldiers, it is plausible to suggest that later in Clinton’s first-term presidency, the discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism shifted from law enforcement–based counterterrorism interpretation (the crime frame), to a harsher approach (a combination of both the crime frame and the war metaphor). Terrorism was also officially identified as one of the most severe threats to the United States in the post-Cold War period. Nevertheless, according to some former officials, the threat of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda was still underestimated by the White House and the U.S. intelligence agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the FBI (Clarke, 2004).

It is also worth noting that in addition to the crime frame and the war metaphor, the World War II narrative and the Cold War narrative were also employed by the Clinton administration to construct its terrorism-related discourses and to remind U.S. allies of the pressing threats they faced; as President Clinton stated:

I am pleased that our summit partners here agreed with me to direct our agenda to the work we can do together to **fight terrorism and international crime** ... While **the international perils of the 20th century, fascism and communism**, have been defeated, **new dangers** are rising up to take their place as we enter the 21st ... Unlike the previous great struggle of this century, we must confront these **threats** along a moving front ... Working with our partners around the world, we will take on the forces of

terror. As a result of United States leadership, here in Lyons we have adopted specific recommendations to **combat crime** and **terrorism**. (Clinton, 1996m).

My fellow Americans, during the long struggles of **World War II** and the **cold war**, America stood fast for freedom. In our time, terrorism is the enemy of peace and freedom. America must not and America will not be driven from **the fight against terrorism**. (Clinton, 1996o; also see Clinton, 1996p).

In this speech, Clinton used a sophisticated rhetorical strategy to merge these narratives, and adopted both a crime frame and the war metaphor to structure his terrorism and counterterrorism discourses. Clearly, terrorism was interpreted as one of the main ‘threats’ to the American-led Western countries in the 21st century and was perceived as a ‘common enemy’ of all human beings, similar to fascism in World War II and communism during the Cold War. The specific linking of terrorism with fascism and communism fulfilled certain functions for political purposes, such as discursively aligning the United States with its allies and causing them to note the rising threat of terrorism and to unite together to ‘combat’ the new enemy—terrorism and terrorists—in the post-Cold War period. As President Clinton claimed: ‘no enemy could drive us from the fight to meet our challenges and protect our values during World War II and the cold war, we will not be driven from the frontiers of our fight against terrorism today’ (Clinton, 1996m). The American-led counterterrorism alliance was encouraged to take the responsibility of fighting and winning the war against terrorism in the 21st century.

The Formulation of the First Term Counterterrorism Strategy: 1993–1996

As previously discussed, at the outset of Clinton’s presidency, counterterrorism policy was not a priority for the U.S. administration. Instead, President Clinton and his top political aides concentrated their attention on enhancing U.S. economic interests, particularly the promotion of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the new Uruguay Round Accord under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Haass, 1997). The Clinton administration also stressed its foreign and security policy agenda

on multilateralist ‘enlargement’ and democracy promotion (Brinkley, 1997; Dumbrell, 2002).

However, the series of terrorist attacks that occurred in the mid-1990s, such as the Tokyo Sarin gas attacks, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the Khobar Towers bombing, led the Clinton administration to reprioritise its national security policies. Consequently, toward the end of Clinton’s first term, counterterrorism came to be seen as an important issue of U.S. national security, a viewpoint shared by key figures of Clinton’s national security team, although they were later strongly criticised for underestimating the potential threat posed by bin Laden and al Qaeda after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Clarke, 2004: 101).

Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Clinton administration indeed achieved several counterterrorism initiatives during its first term, including PDD 39, the AEPDA of 1996, and the enhancement of aviation security.

On June 21, 1995, President Clinton signed PDD 39—U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, which reiterated the U.S. government’s ‘no concessions’ policy towards terrorists (Clarke, 2004: 92). This policy had been violated by the Reagan administration in the 1980s with its arms trade with Iran in an attempt to solve the hostage crisis (Ibid.). In this document, the Clinton administration claimed that the United States would act decisively and adopt both defensive and offensive actions to ‘reduce the capabilities and support available to terrorists’ and to ‘reduce vulnerabilities at home and abroad’ (*Presidential Directive Decision 39*). The new guidance of counterterrorism measures illustrated that the Tokyo Sarin gas attacks and the Oklahoma City bombings indeed profoundly affected elites’ political thinking about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the new threat of terrorism, especially so-called home-grown terrorism (see Chapter 3).

To address these threats, PDD 39 particularly stressed the significance of enhancing the counterterrorism capabilities of the United States to ‘detect,’ ‘prevent,’ ‘defeat,’ and ‘manage’ the consequences of chemical, biological, and nuclear materials and weapons utilised by terrorists (*Presidential Directive Decision 39*). The Clinton administration asserted and argued that there was no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists (Ibid.).

On April 24, 1996, the U.S. Congress approved the AEPDA of 1996, which was formulated by the Clinton administration in order to tackle the terrorist threat at home

and abroad and to deal with potential terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, such as those experienced by the United States and its allies in New York, Oklahoma City, and Tokyo, Japan. The AEPDA of 1996 emphasised an increase in the capability of law enforcement agencies to combat the 'new' terrorism (see Chapter 3), which was characterised by its borderless nature and unexpected mass casualties. Specifically, it provided broad new Federal jurisdiction to prosecute those who committed terrorist attacks, banned fundraising in the United States that would support particular terrorist groups, required plastic explosives to contain chemical markers so that the authorities could easily track down and prosecute the criminals who utilised them for violence, and enabled the government to issue regulations requiring that chemical taggants be added to other type of explosives as well so that law enforcement agencies could easily trace bombs back to their makers (Clinton, 1996g). The AEPDA of 1996, according to Warren Christopher (1998), Clinton's first-term Secretary of State, was seen as an important step forward in the Federal government's continuing efforts to combat terrorism and improve and sharpen the counterterrorism capabilities of U.S. law enforcement agencies.

In addition, the Clinton administration's counterterrorism efforts on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism was noted by its achievement of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, which is widely known as the Numm-Lugar-Domenici Act (NLD Act), and the successful ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The NLD Act was derived from the warning of potential terrorist attacks that involved CBRN weapons on U.S. soil and the necessity to decrease the risk of nuclear material theft and diversion from the former Soviet Union's haemorrhaging stockpiles (RAND, 1999: 2). The purpose of the NLD Act was to enhance state and local emergency response capabilities to counter CBRN terrorism (Ibid.). For this reason, the new legislation indicated that the Department of Defense would take the responsibility to provide civilian personnel of Federal, state, and local agencies with appropriate training and expert advice associated with emergency response to use or threatened use of CBRN weapons. It also allocated funds for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for the establishment of metropolitan emergency medical response teams (Ibid.). More detailed, in 1996, only 7 million U.S. dollars was allocated to the DHHS for its bioterrorism initiatives; however, in 2000, 230 million U.S. dollars has been requested for the DHHS programmes (Ibid.).

Similarly, the Department of Justice received an increased budget to support state and local domestic preparedness programmes of counterterrorism. The budgetary allocation increased from 21 million U.S. dollars in 1998 to 120 million U.S. dollars in 1999 and to 162 million U.S. dollars in 2000. In sum, the administration's fiscal year budget on counterterrorism increased from 5.7 billion U.S. dollars in 1996 to 10 billion U.S. dollars in 2000 (Ibid.).

With regards to international cooperation on issue of weapons of mass destruction, during the first term of Clinton's presidency, the United States completed the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and the ratification of the CWC in 1996 (Walt, 2000: 72; Dumbrell, 2009: 144). Building upon President George H. W. Bush's policy, President Clinton submitted the treaty for Senate ratification in November 1993, and it was finally approved by Congress in the early part of his second-term presidency (Walt, 2000: 72). The CWC prohibited the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. With the approval of the CWC, as Clinton stated, the United States was 'committed to protecting its (our) troops, to fighting terror, to stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to setting and enforcing standards for international behaviour, and to leading the world' (Clinton, 1997a).

Another significant U.S. counterterrorism initiative was the effort to enhance aviation safety and security. Clinton's efforts involved a number of approaches, such as the articulation of new legalisation and strategies, the creation of new institutions and agencies, and the allocation of special budgets and human resources.³¹ The promotion of the aviation security plan could be attributed to introspection after the tragedy of Trans World Airlines Flight (TWA) 800, which took place on July 17, 1996, and caused 230 deaths. Although this tragedy was not caused by terrorists, it was

³¹ According to the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, after the incident of TWA 800, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ordered at least 54 advanced explosive detection systems to enhance airport security; it also worked closely with industry to develop agreements and award research grants, and hired 300 new special agents to test airport security. Other achievements completed by the Clinton administration include: the Customs Service deployed 140 inspectors and investigators to critical airports; the FBI added 644 agents and 620 support personnel for counterterrorism courses; the State Department and the FAA sponsored domestic and foreign courses for anti-terrorism assistance training; and the FAA received additional funding for Bomb-Sniffing Dog Teams (see *Final Report to President Clinton: White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security 1997*: 48).

interpreted through the lens of concerns about potential airline terrorism (Clarke, 2004). Following this tragedy, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13015 and established a special commission led by the Vice President, Al Gore, aimed at developing a comprehensive strategy to improve aviation safety and security. On September 9, 1996, the commission presented its initial report and proposed 20 recommendations to the administration (*Final Report to President Clinton: White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security 1997*). The essential points of the recommendations included the establishment of a consortia of 450 commercial airports in the United States, the requirement of criminal background checks, and FBI fingerprint checks of all airport workers (Ibid.: 31-47; Clinton, 1996u). Most of the recommendations proposed by the commission were adopted by the administration.

Congress also quickly responded and approved many budget requests to allow authorities to enhance their counterterrorism capabilities and improve their equipment for aviation security. For example, Congress approved approximately 160 million U.S. dollars in federal funds for the improvement of aviation security, as suggested by the commission. In addition, the commission recommended that the federal government should devote significant resources, approximately 100 million U.S. dollars annually, to meet capital requirements identified by the airport consortia and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (*Final Report to President Clinton: White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security 1997: 27*). On October 9, 1996, Clinton signed the Federal Aviation Reauthorisation Act of 1996. The articulation of aviation security and the creation of new structures within government institutionalised Clinton's counterterrorism discourse, practices and broader strategy. Clinton claimed that the authorisation bill would 'improve the security of air travel' (Clinton, 1996v) and simultaneously 'carry forward our fight against terrorism' (Ibid.).

It also worth noting that the TWA 800 tragedy prompted the administration to rethink the role of the Federal government in caring for, and working with, the victims of terrorism. In the past, when transportation disasters occurred abroad or resulted from criminal activity, the Department of State and the Department of Justice were the main authorities that dealt with the needs of the families of passengers. However, no particular unit or branch of the Federal government had clear responsibility, authority, and capacity to assist the families of victims involved in domestic disasters (Clinton, 1996v). With the approval of the Federal Aviation Reauthorisation Act of 1996, the

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was specifically identified as the primary unit of the Federal government that was responsible for heading up the investigation of disasters and providing assistance to the families of victims. Richard Clarke, one of Clinton's senior counterterrorism advisors, indicated that the new legislation of aviation security fully reflected the unique personality of the Clinton administration (Clarke, 2004: 92). From now on, The NTSB would be the sole authoritative agency providing information and necessary aid for the families of victims when they lost their loved ones (Clinton, 1996x).

In summary, during the first term of Clinton's presidency, U.S. counterterrorism initiatives were mainly concentrated on three fronts: (1) at home, by giving law enforcement officials the most powerful counterterrorism tools available, such as the new anti-terrorism legislation of AEPDA 1996; (2) abroad, through closer cooperation with allies of the United States, such as economic sanctions toward Iran and multilateral cooperation on the issue of money laundering; and (3) by improving security at American airports and on American planes. Besides this, when political and diplomatic tools were limited, the use of force was accepted as an option to 'reduce terrorist capabilities' and to 'reduce vulnerability at home and abroad,' as was clearly articulated in PDD 39. However, although the coercive counterterrorism measures were never excluded by the Clinton administration and it did launch military strikes targeted at Iraqi's intelligence headquarters in 1993 in response to the plot to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush (see Chapter 5), it can be argued that in the first term of Clinton's presidency, the law enforcement-based counterterrorism approach was still the primary framework for Washington's elites, and that the crime frame was broadly employed to structure their discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism.

The Metaphor of War: Clinton's Second-Term Counterterrorism Policies

When Bill Clinton was re-elected as President of the United States in 1997, U.S. counterterrorism policy went through a significant revision during his second term; that is, from a law enforcement-focused approach to a coercive counterterrorism approach, particularly the assertion of the use of force in Sudan and Afghanistan. President Clinton asserted and mentioned several times that terrorism was one of the most severe threats to the United States and its citizens in the 21st century; he also

discursively constructed the political reality of the new ‘nexus of threats’ which was constituted by terrorists, international criminals, rogue states, and drug traffickers (see Chapter 5). At the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, he pointed out that ‘our security is challenged increasingly by nontraditional threats, from adversaries both old and new, not only hostile regimes but also terrorists and international criminals, who cannot defeat us in traditional theaters of battle but search instead for new ways to attack’ (Clinton, 1998a). In a speech at the 1999 Third Way Summit in Florence, Italy, Clinton also indicated that ‘the biggest problems to our security in the 21st century and to this whole form of governance will probably come not from rogue states or from ... government, but from the enemies of nation-states, from terrorists and drug runners’ (Clinton, 1999).

If terrorism was not seen as the preoccupation of Clinton’s administration in its first 4 years, it is undeniable that the war against terrorism was definitely one of the top national security issues for the second term of Clinton’s presidency, particularly tackling the threats from bin Laden and al Qaeda (see Clarke, 2004). Sandy Berger, Clinton’s second-term National Security Advisor, mentioned that by the mid-1990s, bin Laden ‘was on the radar screen; in 1998 he was the radar screen’ (Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008: 263). George Tenet, the Director of CIA, explicitly expressed in his 1998 memo that ‘We are at war’ (Ibid.: 267; Dumbrell, 2009: 138). In this section, the major counterterrorism initiatives of the second term of Clinton’s presidency and the interpretation of the significant terrorist attacks, namely, the 1998 African Embassy bombings, and the 2000 U.S.S. *Cole* bombing, are discussed and examined.

The 1998 African Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania

On August 7, 1998, the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were struck almost simultaneously. In Nairobi, Kenya, the explosion resulted in over 200 deaths and more than 4,000 injuries. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the bombings caused 11 deaths and 85 injuries. These attacks, which were directly targeted at the United States, took place 6 months after bin Laden’s religious fatwa that declared a global war on the United States and its citizens. Soon after the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, President Clinton stated:

I hope you will understand why I feel the need to comment on the fact that

early this morning bombs exploded outside two of our American Embassies in Africa ... Both explosions caused large-scale damage to our Embassies and to surrounding buildings ... These **acts of terrorist violence** are abhorrent; they are inhuman. We will use all the means at our disposal to bring those responsible to **justice**, no matter what or how long it takes ... To the families and loved ones of the American and African victims of these cowardly attacks, you are in our thoughts and prayers ... We are determined to get answers and justice. (Clinton, 1998b).

The day after the terrorist attacks, President Clinton also explicitly mentioned in a radio address:

I want to talk to you about the terrorist bombings yesterday that took the lives of Americans and Africans at our Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania ... to tell you what we're doing and how we are **combating** the larger problem of terrorism that targets Americans. Most of you have seen the horrible pictures of destruction on television ... in both places, many Africans were killed or wounded, and devastating damage was done to our Embassies and surrounding buildings ... we will continue to take **the fight to terrorists**. Over the past several years, I have intensified our effort on all fronts in **this battle** ... The most powerful weapon in our **counter-terrorism arsenal** is our determination to never give up. (Clinton, 1998c).

Throughout President Clinton's statements, the 'war' metaphor was employed as the main discursive theme to structure the President's political discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism. Clinton indicated that the United States would 'bring those responsible to justice' (which implied a law enforcement-based approach), and a team including medical personnel, disaster relief experts, criminal investigators, and counterterrorism specialists from the Department of Defense and the State Department was dispatched to the affected regions to start the investigation (Clinton, 1998b). However, in printed statements and speeches, the President spent a lot of time stressing the brutality of terrorism and terrorists. It is obvious that in the war frame, the

enemies—terrorism and terrorists—were ‘abhorrent’ and ‘inhuman,’ the ‘attacks’ launched by the enemies led to ‘a large scale of damage’ resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries, and the scenery of the battlefield was ‘horrible.’ To ‘fight’ against terrorism, the United States would never retreat because that would ‘give terrorism a **victory** it must not and will not have’ (Clinton, 1998c).

More importantly, around two weeks after the terrorist attacks, the Clinton administration decided to respond by launching 79 tomahawk missiles on alleged bin Laden outposts in Sudan and Afghanistan. According to intelligence from the CIA, on August 20, 1998, bin Laden and al Qaeda high-ranking staff would be at a meeting in their Afghanistan training camps to review the results of their attacks and to plan their next steps (see Hendrickson, 2002a, 2002b; Clark, 2004; Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008; Patman, 2010). Other information also showed that a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan was associated with al Qaeda’s network and was accused of being involved in the production of materials for chemical weapons (Ibid.). Although the proposed military retaliations led to strong criticisms regarding the President’s motivation,³² President Clinton and his national security advisors insisted on the necessity of these military retaliations. When giving remarks on the military action against terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, President Clinton claimed:

Today I ordered our **Armed Forces** to **strike** at terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the threat they present to our national security. I have said many times that terrorism is one of the greatest dangers we face in this new global era ... Today we have **struck** back ... The United States launched **an attack** this morning on one of the most active terrorist bases in the world ... Our objective was to damage their capacity to **strike** at Americans and other innocent people. (Clinton, 1998f).

³² During that time, President Clinton was involved in a political scandal regarding his relationship with the White House intern—Monica Lewinsky. The scandal and the resulting investigation eventually led to the impeachment of President Clinton in August 1998 by Congress. Some critics argue that the Clinton administration used the military retaliations to divert public attention away from his political scandal. In line with this prediction, after the military operations, President Clinton was blamed for the ‘Wag the Dog’ strategy addressing the threat from bin Laden and al Qaeda (Hendrickson, 2002b: 315-6; Clark, 2004).

In addition, when President Clinton addressed the nation regarding the retaliation, he stated:

Our **target** was terror; our **mission** was clear: to **strike** at the network of radical groups affiliated with and funded by Usama bin Ladin ... The groups associated with him come from diverse places but share a hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence, and a horrible distortion of their religion to justify the murder of innocents. They have made the United States their adversary precisely because of what we stand for and what we stand against. (Clinton, 1998g).

America has **battled** terrorism for many years ... But there have been and will be **times when law enforcement and diplomatic tools are simply not enough**, when we must take extraordinary steps to protect the safety of our citizens. With compelling evidence that the bin Ladin network of terrorist groups was planning to mount further attacks against Americans and other freedom-loving people, I decided America must act. (Clinton, 1998g).

It is obvious that a ‘war’ metaphor underscored President Clinton’s discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism. As Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, Bill Clinton discursively defined the mission that the United States wanted to achieve and the targets—bin Laden and al Qaeda—that the military strikes were aimed at. In addition, Clinton provided essentially four justifications for the military actions conducted by the United States. He specifically noted that bin Laden and al Qaeda masterminded the terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, that they had been involved in other major terrorist attacks aimed at the United States and its citizens in the 1990s, that compelling information suggested that bin Laden and al Qaeda were plotting further terrorist attacks on the United States, and that they sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction (Clinton, 1998f; Hendrickson, 2002a: 105). Thus, in order to prevent and deter additional attacks by the clearly identified terrorist threat, the United States must ‘act’ and ‘strike back.’

Clinton's military decisions gained strong support from the broader American public, even at a time when the President's public trust was in question. Approximately 40 per cent of U.S. citizens believed that the military strikes approved by the Clinton administration were affected by the President's domestic problems with Monica Lewinsky (Hendrickson, 2002b: 316). Nevertheless, nearly all members of Congress supported Clinton's decision regarding military retaliation (Hendrickson, 2002a: 107). Moreover, polling data provided by *Newsweek* and *CBS—New York Times* illustrated that the Afghan and Sudan bombings won popular approval. According to the *Newsweek* poll, 73 per cent of U.S. citizens approved of the strikes, while a *CBS—New York Times* poll showed that 70 per cent of Americans supported President Clinton's decisions (Hendrickson, 2002a: 112).

The 2000 U.S.S. Cole Bombing

In 2000, while the U.S.S. *Cole* was docked and refuelling in Aden, Yemen, a small craft approached the port side of the Navy Destroyer and an explosion occurred, resulting in 17 deaths and 39 injuries on board the vessel. Soon after the terrorist attack, President Clinton claimed that this incident was an '**act of terrorism**' (Clinton, 2000a) and that it was a '**despicable and cowardly act**' (Ibid.). Besides this, in official language, the suspects were rhetorically defined as '**hate-filled cowards**' (Clinton, 2000b) and '**hate-filled terrorists**' (Clinton, 2000c). In order to respond to the terrorist attack targeted at U.S. soldiers serving in the Middle East, the Clinton administration quickly directed a team organised by the Department of Defense, the FBI, and the State Department to begin the relevant '**investigation**' in Yemen (Clinton, 2000a). President Clinton also asserted that through intensive cooperation with the Yemeni government, the United States '[would] find out who was responsible and hold them accountable' (Ibid.); the responsible parties would eventually be brought to justice, and 'justice will prevail' (Clinton, 2000c).

Madeleine Albright, Clinton's second-term Secretary of State, also echoed the President's interpretation about the incident. Secretary Albright claimed that the attack was a '**criminal act of terrorism**' (Albright, 2000d); she also discursively portrayed the suspects as '**cowards**' (Albright, 2000c). When answering questions about the terrorist attack and the measures implemented by the administration, Albright clearly said:

We are in **the process of investigating** the facts on what happened to the *COLE*. I had a conversation about an hour ago with the president of Yemen, and they are being very cooperative in **the investigative process**. (Albright, 2000b).

In addition, when giving a statement on the investigation of the U.S.S. *Cole* bombings, the Secretary announced:

Yemeni and U.S. **investigators** have now completed several phrase of the initial **investigation** into the attack on the USS Cole ... the next critical phase will require Yemeni and U.S. personal to work as partners in the **collection of information** and participants in the **interview process of witnesses** to this **criminal act of terrorism**. We count on President Saleh's commitment of full cooperation as we move to the most critical aspects of this **investigation** and seek to **solve this act of terrorism**. (Albright, 2000d).

Based on the analysis of Washington elites' discourse on the U.S.S. *Cole* bombing, it is plausible to conclude that the Clinton administration actually adopted a crime frame (rather than a war metaphor) to interpret and respond to the attack, although on some occasions, the key figures of the administration tended to use a harsher language, such as 'hate-filled cowards,' 'hate-filled terrorists,' and 'despicable and cowardly act' to define the incident and the suspects involved in the attack. This illustrates how a specific interpretation of terrorism as a crime gave impetus to a law-based counterterrorism approach to 'solve' the threat posed by terrorism. As Secretary Albright claimed, 'we must—and will—do all we can to **find and hold accountable** the cowards responsible for their **murders**. And we must continue working with allies and friends so that terrorists have nowhere to turn, nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, nowhere to operate and no money to finance their crime' (Albright, 2000b).

In contrast to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton administration opted for a diplomatic response to the bombing of the U.S.S.

Cole rather than a military retaliation targeted at the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, although there was a heated debate about the use of force in Clinton's national security team (Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008: 271-2; Patman, 2010: 116). According to intelligence provided by the FBI and the CIA, the terrorist attack in Yemen was apparently an al Qaeda-led operation.

However, President Clinton still decided that without definitive proof, his administration would not consider more sustained attacks (Clarke, 2004: 223-4; Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008: 271-2). It is argued that the reason why the Clinton administration did not retaliate against al Qaeda after the U.S.S. *Cole* bombing is due to the limited timeframe; that is, the terrorist attack took place shortly before the 2000 U.S. presidential election, and Bill Clinton was a 'lame duck' president by this time, meaning that he had very little actual power during the last few months of his term (Feste, 2011: 175). Nevertheless, in order to prevent additional attacks targeted at U.S. soldiers, President Clinton ordered all U.S. Navy ships in the Persian Gulf to pull out and head toward the safe open seas (Clinton, 2000a; Feste, 2011: 175). In addition, the U.S. Navy spent more than 250 million dollars to repair the ship and decided to temporarily stop using the Suez Canal for the fear of potential attacks (Feste, 2011: 175).

The Second-Term Counterterrorism Policy: Bin Laden, al Qaeda, and the Use of Force

In contrast to his first-term counterterrorism policy, Clinton's second-term policy toward terrorism was overall more aggressive and military-based in terms of the language used by the key figures of the administration and the real practices of counterterrorism implemented by the administration. Following bin Laden's religious fatwa and his declaration of war in February 1998, which called on Muslims to kill all Americans anywhere they could, whether innocent civilians or not (*The 9/11 Commission Report: 47*),³³ President Clinton issued two new *Presidential Decision*

³³ On February, 1998, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri issued a religious fatwa called the 'World Islamic Front.' In this specific statement, bin Laden and Zawahiri claimed that America had declared war against God and his messenger and they called for the murder of all Americans around the world. Three months later, when accepting an interview arranged by ABC-TV, bin Laden further indicated that 'We believe that the worst thieves in the world today and the worst terrorists are the

Directives (PDD) on counterterrorism: PDD 62 (Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas) and PDD 63 (Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection). PDD 62 contributed to the establishment of the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism; Richard Clarke was simultaneously nominated as its first director (see *Presidential Directive Decision 62*).

However, despite the administration's counterterrorist efforts, in August 1998, bin Laden and his al Qaeda accomplices bombed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The U.S. government believed that al Qaeda was involved in many other significant terrorist attacks that took place in the 1990s after the embassy bombings, such as the murder of U.N. peacekeepers in Somalia, including the U.S. rangers in Mogadishu; the assassination plots against the President of Egypt and the Pope; and an attempt to bomb six United States 747s over the Pacific. Al Qaeda also struck the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan and gunned down German tourists in Egypt (Clinton, 1998g).

Bin Laden's declaration of war and the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa prompted the Clinton administration to actively address the threats posed by bin Laden and al Qaeda, through both diplomatic and coercive means. As Sandy Berger and Richard Clarke claim, since the mid-1990s, the United States has been dedicated to monitoring, tracing, and assassinating bin Laden and the top levels of al Qaeda (Clarke, 2004; Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008: 263). An example of this is the U.S. cruise missile strikes on Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, although they failed. In short, Clinton's policy toward bin Laden was very simple, as he clearly told the 9/11 investigators: 'I wanted to see him dead' (Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008: 267; Dumbrell, 2009: 138). To achieve this goal, the use of force was necessary. When justifying his military decision to the U.S. public, Clinton claimed:

The United States does not take this action lightly. Afghanistan and Sudan have been warned for years to stop harboring and supporting these terrorists groups. But countries that persistently host terrorists have no right to be safe havens. (Clinton, 1998g).

Americans. Nothing could stop you except perhaps retaliation in kind. We do not differentiate between military or civilian. As for as we are concerned, they are all targets' (*The 9/11 Commission Report*: 47).

This pre-emptive strike doctrine was later accepted and followed by President George W. Bush to respond to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and to rationalise his global war on terror (Dumbrell, 2009: 138; also see Chapter 1). The George W. Bush administration also accused the Afghan Taliban regime and the Saddam Hussein regime of harbouring terrorists. Interpreting the severe and imminent threat of terrorist attacks, in the same way as the Clinton administration, George W. Bush and his aides insisted that the war on terror was indispensable.

Critics (see Clarke, 2004; Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008; Patman, 2010) state that Clinton's national security team internally identified that the United States was at war against terrorism; as George Tenet explicitly described in a memo in December 1998, 'We are at war' (Dumbrell, 2009: 138). They argue that despite this, and despite concerns that U.S. citizens were vulnerable to the terrorist threat in the late 1990s, the Clinton administration failed to formulate a comprehensive strategy commensurate with the language it was using. In 1999, Paul Bremer, a senior officer on counterterrorism from the Reagan administration, and later the George W. Bush administration, wrote to the *Washington Post* and urged the Clinton administration to act aggressively to eliminate al Qaeda (Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008: 269-70). He urged the administration to:

dispel the impression of recent years that attacks on Americans—whether in Somalia, Saudi Arabia, or Pakistan—remain unanswered. And they come as a welcome application of unilateral American force after years of dependence on desultory multilateralism. (Cited in Chollet & Goldgeier: 270).

In his article, Bremer—the U.S. counterterrorism elite—emphasised that the United States needed to find a strategy that could 'keep bin Laden off balance' and use its resources to assassinate him (Ibid.).

In addition, Clinton's counterterrorism policy was strongly criticised for its lack of actionable intelligence on bin Laden and al Qaeda; that is, the White House could not effectively integrate counterterrorism intelligence due to bureaucratic politics and the confrontation between different departments. Since 1996, Louis Freeh, former

Director of the FBI, had refused to work with the National Security Council (NSC). Freeh also strongly doubted and criticised Clinton's determination regarding the Khobar Towers bombing investigation (Freeh, 2005: 1-35). An FBI investigation report showed that the Iranian government was the mastermind of this bombing. However, the White House decided not to take any effective action to retaliate due to political sensitivities related to the U.S.-Iranian relationship (see Chapter 5). Clearly, at that time, improving U.S.-Iranian relations was perceived as a greater priority by Clinton's national security team than the investigation (Freeh, 2005: 1-35). It is argued that in May 1999, the United States had its most actionable intelligence on bin Laden's whereabouts; yet, Clinton and his NSC colleagues were concentrated on American-led missions in Kosovo and the debate over using ground force. As a result, the United States lost the opportunity to kill bin Laden (Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008: 269). When Clinton left office in January 2001, bin Laden and his al Qaeda accomplices were still at liberty to pursue their global jihad against the United States. Officials' response to the terrorist attacks (for example, the Khobar Towers bombing, and the U.S.S. *Cole* bombing), on the other hand, illustrates a dialectical relationship in which discourses, structures, and interests interact. Specifically, discourse does not necessarily determine concrete policies; other factors, such as material circumstances, and the consideration of U.S. foreign relations, also contribute to the discursive formulation of counterterrorism, as well as the subsequent policies.

To conclude, although the Clinton administration had noticed the threat posed by bin Laden and al Qaeda in its second term and it did demonstrate a strong intention to solve the problem, Clinton and his national security team still neglected to formulate an effective approach to address the threats posed by bin Laden and al Qaeda. This, according to critics, in part, is because the President and his administration faced severe challenges in his second term, both internally and internationally (such as impeachment by Congress, the confrontation between different bureaucracies within the administration, the new political situation in Iran, and the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo). In part, it was also because the established discourse on terrorism constrained and simultaneously excluded alternative options of counterterrorism, such as U.S. withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, and ending support for Israel, which might have been more effective. While commenting on the Clinton administration's counterterrorism initiatives, Chollet and Goldgeier argue (2008: 272), 'the government bureaucracy

proved too resistant and the public's attention was too fleeting.' Apart from that, it is worth noting that Clinton's personal foibles hindered his capabilities at precisely the moment he needed the American public to take the warning about bin Laden and al Qaeda seriously (Ibid.). Richard Clarke (2004: 225) indicates:

because Clinton was criticized as a Vietnam War opponent without a military record, he was limited in his ability to direct the military to engage in anti-terrorist commando operations they did not want to conduct. He had tried that in Somalia, and the military had made mistakes and blamed him. In the absence of a bigger provocation from al Qaeda to silence his critics, Clinton thought he could do no more. (Clark, 2004: 225).

Besides, Clinton's scandal with Monica Lewinsky was seen as diverting public attention away from the terrorist threat. For example, when the President urged the world to combat terrorism and asked that 'all nations must put the fight against terrorism at the top of our agenda' at the United Nations in September 1998, the spotlight was focused on his political scandal and impeachment. As Clinton mentioned in his memoirs, 'while I was speaking to the U.N. about terrorism, all the television networks were showing the videotape of my grand jury testimony' (Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008: 266).

Conclusion

During the tenure of Clinton's presidency (from 1993 to 2000), the United States formulated its terrorism and counterterrorism discourses and explicitly identified terrorism as one of the most severe threats to the United States and its citizens in the 21st century. In these specific political discourses, the U.S. government structured and conceptualised the political violence of terrorism. Through the process of discursive practice—the way that discourse is created and consumed—a 'common understanding' of terrorism and terrorists was shaped and accepted by the majority of the American public. Based on President Reagan's 'war on terrorism' discourse, President Clinton framed two different variants of interpretation regarding acts of terrorism; that is, terrorism as a criminal act and terrorism as an act of war. The official definition of terrorism and terrorist attacks further influenced the way that the subject of terrorism

and terrorists was meaningfully discussed and comprehended; it simultaneously suggested different approaches to either 'deal with' or 'combat' terrorism.

As argued in this chapter, in the first term of Clinton's presidency, terrorism was initially not the preoccupation of the Clinton administration, and it acted less aggressively in responding to the terrorist attacks, such as the first World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the Khobar Towers bombing. Toward the end of Clinton's first term, however, terrorism came to be perceived and reprioritised as a crucial national security issue. The shift of U.S. security policy illustrates that the real-world terrorist attacks led to new discourses which then created new counterterrorism practices. And, the comprehension of terrorism as a 'crime' rather than a 'war' also affected the subsequent counterterrorism initiatives implemented by the authorities.

Toward the end of his first term, Clinton claimed that his counterterrorism policy was based on three pillars: (1) at home, by enhancing law enforcement tools for the various counterterrorism agents; (2) abroad, by closely cooperating with U.S. allies; and (3) by improving aviation safety and security. In addition, when terrorist attacks took place, the Clinton administration tended to conduct crisis management led by the FBI to 'investigate' the incidents and rhetorically made a vow to 'bring those responsible to justice.' It is obvious that during the first 4 years of the Clinton presidency, a law enforcement-based counterterrorism approach was embraced by the key figures of the Clinton administration, although the President utilised harsher language to talk about the Khobar Towers bombing and approved the military retaliation targeted at Iraqi's intelligence headquarters in 1993 (see Chapter 5).

However, in the second term of Clinton's presidency, the United States shifted its counterterrorism policy and acted aggressively to engage with bin Laden and al Qaeda. The most remarkable example is its military bombings of Sudan and Afghanistan in the summer of 1998 and the internal debate on the use of force following the 2000 U.S.S. *Cole* bombing. Although in the case of the U.S.S. *Cole*, the White House decided not to launch military retaliations, the use of force was never excluded by the NSC staff. President Clinton and Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State, asserted several times in their speeches that when political and diplomatic tools were constrained, 'extraordinary steps' were indispensable. To tackle the threat of the 'new terrorism,' the United States must act and would act decisively to protect the safety of

its citizens.

As I have suggested, Clinton's counterterrorism discourse provided a foundational framework for the George W. Bush administration to respond to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Following Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton's approach, the 'war' metaphor was employed by the George W. Bush administration to construct and legitimate its 'Global War on Terror.' President Bush's interpretation of the war in turn led to subsequent military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. As Chilton and Lakoff indicate, 'Metaphors are not just words; they are concepts that can be and often are acted upon' (1999: 56). By interpreting terrorism as an act of war, a counterterrorism 'reality' was therefore constructed and constituted which formed the basis, justification, and execution of counterterrorism initiatives.

In addition, this chapter has illustrated that the U.S. government tended to use the 'crime' metaphor to structure its terrorism and counterterrorism discourses, particularly regarding incidents in which civilians were murdered, such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. In contrast, when the attacks involved the killing of U.S. service women and men, the administration tended to adopt the 'war' metaphor to conceptualise the terrorist attacks, and responded with military retaliation, such as its responses to Iraq's attempt to assassinate the former President George H. W. Bush in 1993, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the consideration of use of force for the retaliation of the 2000 U.S.S. *Cole* bombing. Although in some cases the U.S. government eventually decided to not adopt coercive measures, the military approach was seriously considered by members of the NSC—that is, it remained a part of U.S. policy-making elites' discursive frame.

To summarise, this chapter discussed the political function of discourse, metaphor, and frame. It argued that metaphors and frames are not merely language or poetic devices. Rather, they discursively conceptualise individuals' understanding about the act of terrorism (either as a crime or as an act of war) and influence the real practices of counterterrorism implemented by U.S. administrations. Next chapter focuses on U.S. administrations' discursive construction of *rogue states*—one of the essential elements of Clinton's 'new terrorism' discourse. In the following chapter, I argue that during the 1990s, a sociopolitical reality of *rogue threat* and a *nexus of new threats* constituted by

terrorists, international criminals, rogue states, and drug traffickers, was discursively shaped and constituted through the production of discourse and policy practices.

Chapter 5

Framing the Threat of Rogue States: Iraq, Iran and President Clinton's Dual-Containment Approach to Middle East Peace

Introduction

An examination of President Clinton's discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism reveals that in addition to the discursive construction of so-called catastrophic terrorism (as discussed in chapter 3) and the conceptualisation of terrorist attacks (as elaborated in chapter 4), framing the threat of *rogue states* and *enemies of peace* was also one of the significant features of Clinton's terrorism-related discourse. When Bill Clinton assumed office in January 1993, the promotion of peace in the Middle East was seen as a crucial foreign policy task of the administration. In the U.S. security narrative, 'rogue states,' particularly Iraq and Iran, were identified as severe threats to the United States and its Arab allies. These states, according to the U.S. government, sought to possess weapons of mass destruction, financed and supported terrorism, and were involved in domestic human-rights abuses. Moreover, regimes in these countries were hostile to peace and democracy, and, as a result, were enemies of peace.

To promote peace in the Middle East, President Clinton and his national security team formulated a dual-containment approach aimed at tackling Iraq and Iran—the region's most dangerous actors, as defined by Secretary of State Warren Christopher (1995: 21). Based on the narrative of 'rogue states' and the scenario of uncertainty and instability caused by the rogues, the United States asserted the indispensability of its global leadership and justified its policies regarding rogue states and global nonproliferation initiatives. Officials argued that the efficiency of its dual containment and nonproliferation policy could reduce the possibility of future terrorist attacks and contribute to Arab-Israeli reconciliation.

This chapter argues that through the process of discursive practice, or, the way in which discourse is framed and understood, the political reality of the rogues was eventually constructed and constituted in the 1990s as a major policy narrative. The discursive construction of rogue states by the Clinton administration not only conceptualised the common understanding about the rogues, but also suggested a

specific way—Martin Indyk’s dual-containment approach—to deal with them. That is, rogue states were constructed as *irredeemable* and *unpredictable*. Hence, they should be monitored and contained. President Clinton’s discourse on rogue states also provided a foundational rhetorical framework for President George W. Bush to shape his ‘war on terror’ discourse and rationalise the American-led global war on terror after the 2001 World Trade Center Bombings. In his state of the union address, President George W. Bush explicitly indicated that Iran, Iraq and North Korea constituted an ‘axis of evil’ arming to threaten the peace of the world (Bush, 2002a). In the tenure of Bush’s presidency, the concept of ‘axis of evil’ was constantly utilised by U.S. elites to emphasise and argue the imminent threats posed by the so-called ‘rogue states.’

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, a methodology of genealogy is adopted to trace the discursive origins of ‘rogue states’ and the political usage of the term in the U.S. political arena. It is argued that, based on President Reagan’s first ‘war on terrorism’ discourse which was characterised by state-sponsored terrorism and the interpretation of ‘outlaw states,’ President Clinton and his political aides completed a discursive achievement of so-called ‘rogue states’—one of the key elements of President Clinton’s discourse on catastrophic terrorism. For the Clinton administration, rogue states, together with their evil accomplices, namely, terrorists, international criminals, and drug traffickers, constituted the ‘nexus of new threats’ that threatened the United States and international society in the twenty-first century. Accordingly, these threats should be carefully examined and addressed immediately. Clinton’s interpretation of rogue states also provided a useful rhetorical framework and criteria to describe and assess the threats posed by the rogues.

In the second section, the Clinton administration’s dual-containment strategy is discussed and elaborated. This section argues that the shift of the international system due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War provided a specific context for the U.S. elite to shape, interpret, and reassess the new threats of rogue states and frame the subsequent dual-containment strategy. The specific perception of the rogue threats profoundly affected the formulation and practices of U.S. foreign policies towards Iraq and Iran in the 1990s. The former stressed the importance of containment plus regime change; the latter concentrated on containment and the gradual development of engagement. It is noteworthy that the aim of the present research, which focuses on Iraq and Iran, is not to assess the efficiency of the

dual-containment approach; instead, it aims to analyse the discursive dimension of President Clinton's rogue-states policy. The findings also contribute to the further understanding of President Bush's global war on terror after September 11, 2001.

The Discursive Construction of Rogue States: The Genealogy and Political Reality of the Rogues

As discussed in chapter 3, rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction are featured significantly in President Clinton's terrorism-related discourses. To shape the public understanding of so-called catastrophic terrorism, the Reagan administration's 'war on terrorism' discourse, which highlighted the danger of international terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism, was employed as a rhetorical foundation by the Clinton administration. During the Clinton presidency, the United States successfully related terrorism to issues of rogues states and weapons of mass destruction, and peace in the Middle East. For the Clinton administration, rogue states, such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya, harboured terrorists within their borders, established and supported terrorist base camps in other countries, and hungered for weapons of mass destruction (Clinton, 1995g). Their hostility towards peace and democracy led to political instability in the Middle East, and caused great suffering. In official language, rogue states were interpreted and identified as an extreme threat to the United States and its Arab allies; they were *enemies of peace* (Christopher, 1995: 21). Because they were deemed irrational and unpredictable, they had to be controlled and contained.

It can be argued that through the production and reproduction of discourses, the political reality of rogue states was eventually constructed and constituted as an accepted term in U.S. politics. In the 1990s, the emerging threat of rogue states was a major concern of the U.S. government and broadly discussed by the Washington's elite and many academics (Hoty, 2000b; Saunders, 2006; O'Reilly, 2007; Homolar, 2010; Miles, 2012). One of the notable political consequences of this discourse was the creation of clear boundaries surrounding the discussion and plan for comprehending and addressing these states. The discursive construction of rogue states also provided a useful framework for the Clinton administration to rationalise and justify its Gulf policy in the Middle East, in particular, the American-led missions in Iraq and multilateral sanctions targeted at Iran.

The common assumption of the political usage of the term *rogue states* is that it originated with the Clinton administration (Hoyt, 2000a, 2000b; Saunders, 2006; O'Reilly, 2007; Homolar, 2010). During the 1990s, President Clinton, Secretaries of State Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright, National Security Advisors Anthony Lake and Sandy Berger, and Secretaries of Defense, constantly utilised the term *rogue states* to label the enemies of the United States. According to Hoyt (2000a: 301), the first reference to so-called rogue states in the U.S. political arena can be traced to January 1994; however, the currency of the term was not widespread until early 1996. By conducting quantitative research and reviewing data that covered the period from 1993 to 1998, Hoyt indicates that the term was mentioned 243 times in American political rhetoric.³⁴ Besides this, four specific states, namely, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, were most frequently designated 'rogues' by the U.S. elite. Among the texts that Hoyt examined, Iran was referred to 71 times in all mentions, while Iraq, Libya, and North Korea were mentioned 69, 47, and 30 times, respectively. Other states, such as Cuba, Sudan and Syria, although they were mentioned considerably less, were also categorised as 'rogues.' Similar to Hoyt, Saunders (2006: 26) investigates data from 1985 to 2001, and argues that before the end of the Cold War, the term *rogue* was indeed rarely mentioned by Washington's elite—perhaps the only exception is Representative Pete Stark's description of Iran as a *rogue* in 1987. In addition, Klare (1995) illustrates an evolution in which concerns about terrorism during the 1980s transformed into an apprehension of a third-world country armed with weapons of mass destruction. Klare claims that since the first Gulf War, the political idea of rogue states had been used by the George H. W. Bush administration to stress the rising threats posed by certain states. The specific interpretation simultaneously provided a strong justification for the George H. W. Bush administration to defend its post-Cold War policies, such as the debate on issues of ballistic missile defence and military expenditures (see also Miles, 2012).

However, in contrast to the explanation mentioned, Litwak (2000: 53) locates the

³⁴ Hoyt (2000a, 298-99) collected 511 U.S. official documents associated with rogue states (124 from the Department of State, 102 from the White House, 26 from the CIA, and 259 from the Department of Defense) and analysed over 278 relevant documents. Most of the documents were transcripts of speeches and press conferences given by President Clinton and the key figures of his national security team.

political idea of rogue states in the Reagan administration and argues that the rhetorical strategy of labelling foreign adversaries as *rogue*, *pariah*, or *outlaw* states can actually be traced to the late 1970s when the Department of State inaugurated its list of terrorist countries under the Export Administration Act of 1979. Since that time, the term *outlaw* has frequently appeared in the U.S. official lexicon when politicians refer to states associated with terrorism. For example, President Reagan and his aides tended to utilise the term to describe countries associated with terrorism. When giving remarks at the American Bar Association in July 1985, President Reagan explicitly identified Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua as ‘outlaw governments’ and ‘outlaw states’ (Reagan, 1985c). Reagan declared:

the growth in terrorism in recent years results from the increasing involvement of **these states in terrorism** in every region of the world. This is terrorism that is part of a pattern, the work of **a confederation of terrorist states**. Most of the terrorists who are kidnaping and murdering American citizens and attacking American installations are being trained, financed, and directly or indirectly controlled by a core group of radical and totalitarian governments—a new, international version of Murder, Incorporated. And all of these states are united by one simple criminal phenomenon—their fanatical hatred of the United States, our people, our way of life, our international stature. (Reagan, 1985c).

George Shultz, Reagan’s secretary of state, also mentioned that ‘states that support and sponsor terrorist actions have managed to co-opt and manipulate the terrorist phenomenon in pursuit of their own strategic goals. It is not a coincidence that most acts of terrorism occur in areas of importance to the West’ (cited in Litwak, 2000: 53). These examples illustrate that Reagan’s ‘war on terrorism’ discourse indeed provided a rhetorical foundation for his successors to frame and formulate their discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism, such as President Clinton’s interpretation of *rogue states* and *states of concern* and President Bush’s *axis of evil* rhetoric. In his State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush indicated:

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an **axis of evil**, arming

to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic. (Bush, 2002a).

Interestingly, it can be argued that the political usage of the term *outlaw* was rooted in a national myth of American culture, namely, the Wild West and the New Frontier (Slotkin, 1998; West & Carey, 2006; Juyan, 2007). In past decades, the New Frontier theme has been utilised by several presidents to structure their political discourse and energise their proposed policies. For example, on July 16, 1960, when accepting the Democratic Party's nomination as a presidential candidate, John F. Kennedy announced:

I stand tonight facing **west** on what was once **the last frontier**. From the lands that stretch three thousand miles behind me, the pioneers of old gave up their safety, their comfort and sometimes their lives to build a new world here in the **West** ... They were determined to make that new world strong and free, to overcome its hazards and its hardships, to conquer the enemies that threatened from without and within ... For the problems are not all solved and the battles are not all won—and we stand today on the edge of a **New Frontier**—the **frontier** of the 1960's—a **frontier** of unknown opportunities and perils—a frontier of unfulfilled hopes and threats. (Kennedy, 1960).

According to Slotkin (1998), the concept of the American frontier was first articulated by Frederick Jackson Turner, an American historian in the early twentieth century. In his address titled, 'The Significance of the Frontier in American History,' Turner indicated that the contemporary crisis of American development is the closing of the old frontier and the delay in finding a new one (Ibid.: 3). Turner's explanation of the American frontier is argued as an essential reading to comprehend the ideologies of both Republican progressives and Democratic liberals (Ibid.).

The *New Frontier* trope was adopted by, in addition to President Kennedy,

President Theodore Roosevelt (Dorsey, 1995), President Ronald Reagan (West & Carey, 2006), and President George W. Bush (Jackson, 2005; West & Carey, 2006) to stress the national values and spirit of the United States—progress and prosperity—and the leadership of the United States in the international arena. Also, in the frontier narrative, there must be a *frontier hero* and an *outlaw enemy*, such as Reagan (the United States) and Communism (the Soviet Union) in the Cold War, and George W. Bush (the United States) and Osama bin Laden (terrorism/terrorists) in the post-9/11 world. Given that the frontier myth is based on the real experiences of American people, it has certain in-built political functions which discursively construct the national identity of the United States and prescribe its behaviour in response to threats defined by elites (Dorsey, 1995: 1). The specific interpretation of the American frontier is actually an inter-subjective understanding or American meta narrative regarding who Americans are and where Americans come from which is widely shared by the American majority; it also discursively stresses the remarkable difference between the United States and the outlaw countries. Thus, when the U.S. President referred to the frontier spirit and connected it to U.S. foreign policy issues, it resonated with U.S. citizens and gained currency within society at large.

When Bill Clinton took office in 1993, one of the more difficult tasks of his administration was to formulate a new U.S. foreign policy to deal with the new challenges. Clinton's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake (1994: 45), pointed out in a *Foreign Affairs* article that without the major threat from the Soviet Union, the United States and the international society still faced many challenges from some 'recalcitrant,' 'outlaw' and 'backlash' states, in particular, Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. These states, according to Lake (Ibid.: 46), featured notorious regimes controlling power by coercion and intimidation, infamous records of human rights, and ambitious military programmes in weapons of mass destruction and missile-delivery systems. Lake's article, it can be argued, has an important place in the construction of the political reality of rogue states, because it elevated the emerging threats of the 'rogues' into official policy and profoundly affected the formulation of President Clinton's 1995 *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Homolar, 2010: 717). Specifically, the concepts of 'counter-proliferation' and the 'dual containment strategy' aimed at tackling the threats posed by the 'rogues' were argued as the integral parts of Clinton's *National Security Strategy* (Ibid.; also see the

National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement). The political concern of so-called backlash states actually reconfirmed Lake's previous remarks at SAIS in Johns Hopkins University in September 1993, which were seen as a brief outline of Clinton's first-term foreign policy. In his speech at SAIS, Lake claimed:

Backlash states are more likely to sponsor **terrorism** and traffic in **weapons of mass destruction** and ballistic missile technologies. They are more likely to suppress their own people, foment ethnic rivalries and threaten their neighbors. (Lake, 1993).

To tackle the threats posed by backlash states, a policy based on multilateral internationalism, was introduced. As Lake said:

Our policy toward such states, so long as they act as they do, must seek to isolate them diplomatically, militarily, economically, and technologically. It must stress intelligence, counterterrorism, and multilateral export controls. It also must apply global norms regarding weapons of mass destruction and ensure their enforcement. (Lake, 1993).

However, despite cooperation with U.S. allies and international norms, Lake (1993) indicated that a military-deterrence approach was indispensable because the source of such threats was *diverse* and *unpredictable*. He asserted:

when the actions of such states directly threaten our people, our forces, or our vital interests, we clearly must be prepared to strike back decisively and unilaterally ... We must always maintain the military power necessary to deter, or if necessary defeat, aggression by these regimes. (Lake, 1993).

Lake's statement about backlash states provided a useful rhetorical foundation for President Clinton to frame the narrative of rogue states and stressed the imminent threat of so-called catastrophic terrorism armed with weapons of mass destruction. Following Lake's 'From Containment to Engagement' speech at SAIS, the term *backlash states* was somehow replaced by *rogue states*, which was more popular and

widespread in the U.S. political arena. During the eight years of his presidency, President Clinton mentioned the term *backlash states* only once, in April 1994. When giving a speech to U.S. citizens regarding the new challenges in the post-Cold War era, Clinton (1994b) claimed that ‘there are other threats today also demand our active engagement, from North Korea’s nuclear program to the efforts of Iran and other **backlash states** to sponsor terrorism. We’re meeting those threats with steadiness and resolve.’ By contrast, Clinton mentioned *rogue states* on many occasions. According to O’Reilly (2007: 304), over the course of his administration (from 1993 to 2000), President Clinton mentioned the term 69 times in his public statements, while Secretaries of State Christopher and Albright used the terminology 19 and 43 times, respectively. With regard to specific threats posed by the rogues, President Clinton stressed:

The 21st century will not be free of peril. Aggressive **rogue states**, global crime networks and drug traffickers, **weapons proliferation**, and **terrorism**, all these will continue to menace our security. (Clinton, 1996z).

There is a **nexus of new threats: terrorists, rogue states**, international criminals, drug traffickers. They, too, menace our security, and they will do more of it in the new century. They will be all the more lethal if they gain access to **weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical, or biological**. (Clinton, 1996y).

Now we find ourselves at a turning point in history, when the blocs and barriers that long defined the world are giving way to an age of remarkable possibility ... But this is also an age of new threats: threats from **terrorists**, from **rogue states** that support them; threats from ethnic, religious, racial, and tribal hatreds; threats from international criminals and drug traffickers, all of whom will be more dangerous if they gain access to **weapons of mass destruction**. (Clinton, 1996w).

As the cold war gives way to the global village, we have new opportunities and new security threats. We know what those security threats are. We see

them every day, the ethnic and religious hatred, the reckless aggression of **rogue states**, the **terrorism**, the drug trafficking, the **weapons of mass destruction** that are increasingly threatening us all. (Clinton, 1995o).

It is clear that in the U.S. post-Cold War security narrative, the concept of rogue states was discursively linked to other issues, such as terrorism, international criminals, and drug traffickers. The narrators claimed that rogue states intended to support terrorism and sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Similar to President Clinton, the discursive construction of an Iraq/Al Qaeda alliance was the central element of President George W. Bush's 'war on terror' discourse (Jackson, 2005; Hodge, 2011). Additionally, most of the designated regimes were criticised for their involvement in human right abuses.

Since the 1990s, the alleged ambitions mentioned were utilised by academics and by the elite to assess a 'rogue,' and were accepted as a common 'grid of intelligibility' (see Milliken 1999) that was widely shared by policy makers (Henriksen, 2001, 2012; Miles, 2012). For example, Henriksen (2001: 357) indicated in his research on U.S. rogue-state policy: 'rogue rulers rejected international norms, sponsored terrorism, pursued the acquisition of megadeath weapons and threatened the peace.' Madeleine Albright also claimed that 'the risk that the leaders of **rogue states** will use **nuclear, chemical or biological weapons** against us or our allies is the greatest security we face' (Henriksen, 2012: 3). Furthermore, through the process of discursive practice—the way that discourse is created and understood—a political reality of 'rogue states' and a 'nexus of new threats' was eventually constructed and constituted through official documents and policy practices. Importantly, this specific interpretation established the parameters around how the subject of rogue states could meaningfully be discussed and comprehended. That is, they financed and supported terrorism, hungered for weapons of mass destruction, and violated the universal value of human rights.

Apart from that, it is noteworthy that, despite the discursive connection between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, President Clinton's rogue-states narrative highlighted the idea of borderless threats due to the side-effect of globalisation. On the other hand, the utilisation of the meta narrative (see Baker, 2006)—globalization—also illustrated how the nature of international structures, as well as social and political contexts, influenced the production and reproduction of discourses. When giving

speeches associated with the borderless threats, President Clinton indicated:

problems that start beyond our border can become problems within our border. No one is immune to the threats posed by **rogue states**, by the spread of **weapons of mass destruction**, by **terrorism**, crime, and drug trafficking, by environmental decay and economic dislocation. (Clinton, 1996f).

While the international perils of the 20th century, fascism and communism, have been defeated, new dangers are rising up to take their place as we enter the 21st. New technologies and the rapid movement of information, money, and people across borders bring us closer together and enrich our lives. But they also make us all more vulnerable to **rogue states**, crime, drugs, and **terrorism**. (Clinton, 1996m).

But for all the promise of our time, we are not free from peril. Fascism and communism may be dead or discredited, but the forces of destruction live on ... We see them in the reckless acts of **rogue states**. We see them especially in the dangerous webs of new threats of **terrorism**, international crime and drug trafficking, and the continuing threat that **weapons of mass destruction** might spread across the globe. These forces of destruction find opportunity in the very openness, freedom, and progress we cherish. (Clinton, 1996s).

These discourses illustrated that the particular international context (due to the end of the Cold War) and the tendency of globalisation prompted policy-making elites to reinterpret the new international order, and re-define and reassess the new threats to the United States in the post-Cold War world. In U.S. foreign policy discourse, new threats, such as rogue states and terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction, replaced the Cold War enemies—Communism and the Soviet Union—as the new enemies. In addition, the forces of global integration and interdependence made each country more vulnerable to the *nexus of new threats*. As President Clinton said, ‘we’re all vulnerable to the reckless acts of **rogue states** and to an **unholy axis of terrorists, drug**

traffickers, and international criminals' (Clinton, 1997b). Given that the United States is the sole superpower, as officials constantly claimed, it had a special responsibility to develop 'a strategy to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressure, perhaps eventually transform' (Lake, 1994: 46) the so-called rogue states into the international community. Similarly, after the 2001 terrorist attacks, the 'axis of evil,' featuring the characters of rogue states and their linkage with terrorism and terrorists, was explicitly articulated in President George. W. Bush's 'war on terror' discourse (see Bush, 2002a). Clearly, both of the Presidents adopted the same cultural and historical trope of Nazi Germany in the Second World War to frame and structure their discourse on so-called 'rogues.'

In addition to the discursive construction of rogue states, it is noteworthy that over the past decades, the concept and definition of rogue states had undergone a significant change, which shifted from condemning the domestic policies of some particular regimes to describing states that posed severe threats to the United States and international society. Prior to the 1980s, the terms *rogue*, *pariah*, and *outlaw* were initially utilised to depict the oppressive regimes that brutally repressed their citizens and political dissidents, such as Pol Pot in Cambodia and Idi Amin in Uganda (Litwak, 2000: 50). In the 1970s, however, some political analysts, namely, Richard Betts (1977) and Robert Harkavy (1981), particularly used the term *pariah state* to characterise a set of diplomatically isolated states who intended to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons, such as Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, and South Korea. These states, according to Harkavy (1981: 136), shared similarities: They were small, weak countries that were isolated from big-power benefactor(s), such as the Western powers, the Soviet Union, and the Third World blocs; they were countries whose national origins or present constitutional statuses were widely questioned; they were countries that face a severe security dilemma, and whose adversaries were supported by at least one superpower; and they were countries whose national defence largely relied on conventional weapons and who suffered a lack of military capability to defend themselves. In short, the term *pariah state* referred to 'a small power with only marginal and tenuous control over its own fate, whose security dilemma cannot easily be solved by neutrality, nonalignment, or appeasement, and lacking dependable big-power support' (Harkavy, 1981: 136). Thus, in order for survival, these states necessarily have strong motivations to develop and acquire nuclear weapons.

In the 1980s, the definition of rogue states changed from internal to external behavioural criteria, in particular, highlighting the link between the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. The criteria of a state's external behaviour was notably utilised by the Reagan administration to interpret the 'outlaw' and 'terrorist states' (Reagan 1985c).³⁵ In the 1990s, the definition shifted again due to the emphasis on human-rights values in the international arena. As a result, a state's human-rights record was perceived as another significant criterion for assessing the rogues. Nincic (2005) argued that rogue states were usually condemned for the pursuit of a broader set of policies which were seen as implicitly threatening to the international community, in particular, massive internal repression, and over-aggression against other states.

Similarly, O'Reilly (2007: 307) has indicated that in U.S. political discourse, rogue states were usually portrayed as 'having repressive governing regimes oppressing their populace, committing torture, and eliminating political opposition.' For example, the violation of the human-rights value was explicitly stressed in President Clinton's discourse on rogue states. Through the process of discursive practice, the criteria—supporting terrorism, pursuing weapons of mass destruction, adopting a specific foreign policy that threatened U.S. interests in key regions, and violating the human-rights values—was adopted by elite and academic pundits to categorise and interpret the 'rogues' (Morton, 2004: 171-2; Saunders, 2006: 26; O'Reilly, 2007: 297, 307-8). Importantly, the discursive construction of 'rogue states' created a clear set of parameters around how these particular countries should be meaningfully discussed, understood, and dealt with.

To summarise, the political usage of the term *rogue states* can be traced to other relevant terminology, such as *pariah states*, *outlaw states*, and *backlash states*. Initially, the concept of categorising specific countries in this way was introduced and mainly used by academics when talking about the issue of nonproliferation, in particular, in relation to nuclear weapons programmes. Subsequently, in the 1980s, it was used to refer to state-sponsored terrorism and terrorist states, such as in President Reagan's

³⁵ In his remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association, President Reagan officially defined regimes in Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua, as 'outlaw governments,' as the 'core group of radical and totalitarian governments,' and as the 'confederation of terrorist states' (Reagan, 1985c; also see Homolar, 2010: 711).

‘war on terrorism’ discourse. In the 1990s, due to President Clinton’s discursive construction, the concept was understood to indicate states that supported terrorism, possessed or pursued weapons of mass destruction, and violated universal values of human rights. It is worth noting that in the last year of the Clinton presidency, the term *rogue states* was replaced by *states of concern* when the United States sought to improve its foreign relations with Iran (which will be discussed later). When George W. Bush assumed office in 2001, both the terms *rogue states* and *axis of evil* were constantly mentioned by the key figures of his administration. According to data from *The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, during the tenure of his presidency, President Bush mentioned the terms *rogue states* and *axis of evil* 13 and 28 times, respectively.

Containing the Rogues: Iraq, Iran and the Interpretation of Dual Containment

Historical Background of the Dual-Containment Approach

As previously discussed, the dramatic shift of international context due to the end of the Cold War prompted U.S. policymakers to rethink the United States’ role in international society and reformulate U.S. foreign policy. On May 18, 1993, Martin Indyk, the special assistant to President Clinton for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), introduced the *dual-containment strategy* in a symposium at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. As the designer of the dual-containment strategy, Indyk (1993) indicated that, without the threat from the Soviet Union, the United States was undoubtedly the ‘unchallenged dominant power’ in the Middle East, and ‘all sides now look to Washington to exert its influence.’ Indyk (1993) further argued that from now on the United States would no longer continue the traditional containment strategy presented by George Kennan in the 1950s, and manipulate the balance-of-power in the Middle East; instead, a new strategy of dual containment was indispensable for the United States to deal with its post-Cold War enemies, namely, Iraq and Iran. Indyk’s interpretation of dual containment was subsequently adopted by the Clinton administration as a guideline to formulate its Middle East policy and profoundly affected U.S. foreign relations with its allies and

so-called rogue states in the 1990s (Gause III, 1994: 57-8; Dumbrell, 2009: 152).³⁶

The essence of dual containment, according to Indyk (2009: 36-41), was to tackle the threats posed by Iraqi Saddam's regime through 'aggressive containment'³⁷ and to modify Iran's behaviour by 'active containment.' During the Cold War period, U.S. Middle East policy was established on the orthodox realist understanding of international politics characterised by geostrategic calculations and George Kennan's interpretation of containment. Washington's elite argued and insisted that, in order to protect America's national interests in the region, in particular, the free flow of oil from oil-rich states, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Qatar, realist balance-of-power diplomacy was indispensable. In the U.S. security narrative, states in the Gulf, mostly Sunni Arab dominant countries, were U.S. allies and governed by pro-Western regimes; one of the similarities these states shared was that they all faced severe threats from regional powers—Iraq and Iran—in terms of their military superiority and political ambitions towards the Gulf region. To deal with the rising powers and maintain U.S. hegemony in the Gulf, U.S. administrations argued that a balance-of-power diplomacy relied on one balancing the other, which was believed to be a feasible approach to sustaining the stability in the area and in accordance with America's national interests.

Scholars (Gause III, 1994: 59; Katzman et al., 2001: 82-3) argue that America's political and military involvement in the Gulf can be traced to the 1980s (or earlier),³⁸

³⁶ The Clinton administration's Middle East policy, according to John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2007; also see Dumbrell, 2009: 150), was profoundly affected by officials with close connections to Israel or prominent pro-Israel organisations, such as the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The former was noted as a pro-Israel lobbying organisation in the United States; the latter was a well-known pro-Israel think tank. Besides, Martin Indyk was the former deputy research director at AIPAC and the first Jewish U.S. Ambassador to Israel.

³⁷ To effectively deal with the threats posed by Iraq, the Clinton administration decided to adopt a covert coup effort aimed at overthrowing Saddam's regime, and an overt policy of 'aggressive containment.' Specifically, in its public posture, the U.S. administration would clothe its policy in international legitimacy by demanding Iraq's full compliance with all U.N. Security Council resolutions that were made in the early 1990s. From the perspective of NSC principles, the combination of sanctions and a series of covert operations would eventually lead to the collapse of Saddam's regime (Indyk, 2009: 38-9).

³⁸ Jacobs (2011: 26-7) argues that Alfred Thayer Mahan was one of the first Americans who noted the political and strategic importance of the Middle East. In his 1902 *National Review* article titled 'The

when President Carter declared the Carter Doctrine and asserted that the United States should prevent any hostile power—in particular, the Soviet Union— from dominating the region.³⁹ Three significant events occurred between 1979 and 1981: the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the doubling of world oil prices. These events prompted the Carter administration to alter its foreign policy and decide to actively engage in Middle East affairs (Ibid.). President Carter’s policy was continued by President Reagan and President George H. W. Bush. Both Reagan and George H. W. Bush adopted a balance-of-power approach to tackle the threats posed by Iraq and Iran. The most notable practice was the U.S. role in the Iran-Iraq war. Before the 1979 Revolution in Iran, the United States firmly supported the Iranian shah and encouraged Iran to assume the role of regional policeman (Ibid.). However, when Iranians succeeded in repulsing Saddam’s invasion and laid siege to Basra, the second largest city in Iraq, the Reagan administration decided to bolster Saddam’s regime as a counterweight to the Islamic Republic, because a balance-of-power approach required the United States to support the losing side and ensure that neither country could become the dominant power in the region (Indyk, 2009: 34). Apart from that, despite the fact that Iraq was a Soviet ally at the time, President Reagan also removed Iraq from the State Department’s terrorism list in order to provide Saddam Hussein with critical intelligence data (Ibid.). Even after the war, the United States retained the balance-of-power policy and treated Iraq, essentially, as a check on Iranian power. The shift of U.S. foreign policy illustrated how the U.S. policy-making elites comprehended the new security environment and, critically, how they sought to formulate new foreign policy discourse in accordance with perceived interests.

When George H. W. Bush assumed the presidency, the concern with geopolitics and balance of power continued to guide U.S. Middle East policy. After the first Gulf

Persian Gulf in International Politics,’ Mahan indicated that the Persian Gulf emerged as ‘one terminus of a prospective interoceanic railroad’ that would become ‘one link ... in a chain of communication between East and West, alternative to the all-water route by Suez Canal and the Red Sea.’ Mahan also suggested that the United States should be concerned by its increasing interests in that area due to its expanding economy and its increasing international power.

³⁹ The Carter Doctrine was a policy proclaimed by President Jimmy Carter aimed at deterring the Soviet Union. President Carter (1980b) explicitly stated in his State of the Union Address in 1980: ‘An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.’

War, the George H. W. Bush administration decided to leave the Iraqi Saddam regime in place, expecting it could constrain Iran's political influence in the Gulf. The assumption of the Bush Sr administration's policy was that the American-led war had destroyed much of Saddam's army; accordingly, the Iraqi people could overthrow Saddam's regime without any foreign assistance (Indyk, 2009: 35). However, the miscalculation of the Bush Sr administration led to great suffering in Iraq. That is, Saddam Hussein and his loyalists were allowed to suppress their domestic dissidents, including the Shiites in Southern Iraq and the Kurds in the North (Ibid.). According to Indyk, approximately 60,000 Iraqi Shiites and 20,000 Iraqi Kurds were slaughtered after the George H. W. Bush administration had called on the Iraqi people to rise up against the dictator. In addition, around 2 million Kurdish refugees fled to the Turkish border (Ibid.). Saddam Hussein's violation of human rights was subsequently condemned by international society; since that time, Iraq has been constructed as a threat to the United States and subsequently designated as a rogue state by the Clinton administration.

Iraq

As the first U.S. president whose presidency governed exclusively in the post-Cold War world, Bill Clinton reformulated U.S. Gulf policy towards Iraq and Iran and connected the dual-containment approach to his Arab-Israeli peace reconciliation plan. For President Clinton's national security team, because the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War had weakened both Iran's and Iraq's military capabilities and the United States had become the dominating power in the Gulf area, the United States no longer needed to implement a balance-of-power strategy as it had in past decades. Clinton's policy towards Iraq was instead based on an aggressive-containment approach aimed at demanding Saddam's full compliance with all U.N. Security Council resolutions which were made during and after the first Gulf War, particularly Iraq's military programme regarding weapons of mass destruction and the repression of the Iraqi people. The theoretical assumption of aggressive containment was that a combination of sanctions endorsed by the international community and covert operations led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would ultimately contribute to regime change in Iraq. Moreover, in order to maintain Iraq's stability after Saddam's collapse, Clinton's

national security team⁴⁰ decided to support the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an opposition group led by Ahmed Chalabi. They anticipated that the pro-Western INC could establish a democracy in post-Saddam Iraq. To achieve this goal, in 1995 the CIA asked Congress to provide 15 million dollars per year for covert actions so that the U.S. agencies could destabilise Saddam's regime and finance Iraqi opposition groups (Sick, 1998: 7).

On the other hand, in the international arena, the United States closely cooperated with its allies, namely, France and the United Kingdom, to conduct U.N.-authorised missions—military overflights of the no-fly zones—in northern and southern Iraq. The main purpose of these actions was to protect the Kurdish people from Saddam's repression and constrain Iraq's further invasion plans. Consequently, during the course of Clinton's presidency, the United States launched several strikes to deter Iraq's outlaw behaviours, such as the military operations in 1994, 1996, and 1998 (which will be discussed later). In its public posture, Clinton's Iraq policy was to make every effort to contain Saddam's leverage in the Gulf; yet, covertly, it aimed to overthrow the regime through any means (Indyk, 2009: 38).

The first test of Clinton's dual containment approach was the Iraqi assassination plot against former President George H. W. Bush in April 1993. Prior to Bush's visit for the anniversary of Kuwait's liberation, the Kuwaiti government arrested sixteen people, including two Iraqi nationals, who had crossed the border with an SUV loaded with bombs and detonators (Clarke, 2004: 81). The evidence provided by the CIA and FBI revealed that the Iraq government was deeply involved in the plot, and that Saddam Hussein was the mastermind (Ibid.). In order to respond to the assassination plan targeted at the former U.S. President, the Clinton administration decided to launch a military retaliation targeted at the Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad. The operation had special meaning because it was the first time in his presidency that President Clinton ordered the use of force and it demonstrated U.S. policy towards terrorism: that is, 'make no concessions or deals with terrorism and terrorists.' In his speech regarding the military strike, President Clinton said:

⁴⁰ Clinton's first-term national security team, also known as the NSC principles, was mainly organised by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Leon Fuerth, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell, and the Director of the CIA, Robert Woolsey.

We should not be surprised by such deeds, coming as they do from a regime like Saddam Hussein's, which is ruled by atrocity, slaughtered its own people, invaded two neighbors, attacked others, and engaged in chemical and environmental warfare. Saddam has repeatedly violated the will and conscience of the international community. But this attempt at revenge by a tyrant against the leader of the world coalition that defeated him in war is particularly loathsome and cowardly. (Clinton, 1993g).

In the same speech, Clinton also stressed:

The Iraqi **attack** against President Bush was an **attack** against our country and against all Americans. We could not and have not let such action against our Nation go unanswered ... A firm and commensurate response was essential to protect our sovereignty, to send a message to those who engage in **state-sponsored terrorism**, to deter further violence against our people, and to affirm the expectation of **civilized** behaviour among nations. (Clinton, 1993g).

Saddam Hussein has demonstrated repeatedly that he will resort to **terrorism** or aggression if left unchecked. Our intent was to target Iraq's capacity to support violence against the United States and other nations and to deter Saddam Hussein from supporting such **outlaw behavior** in the future. Therefore, we directed our action against the facility associated with **Iraq's support of terrorism**, while making every effort to minimize the loss of innocent life. (Clinton, 1993a).

It can be argued that this specific interpretation was structured by a set of narratives (as discussed in chapter 4) which explicitly distinguished the difference between the United States and the Saddam regime. In the narratives, Saddam's regime apparently isolated itself from the international community and the civilised world (the narrative of civilization and barbarism), because its governance was based on the implementation of coercion and intimidation, and it severely violated international law

and human-rights norms. Given the fact of Iraq's invasions of its two neighbours—Iran and Kuwait—and the brutal repression of Iraqi citizens, Saddam's regime was no longer to be tolerated by civilised society. The principles of international law and the human-rights values were widely shared by the members of international society, and Iraq's perceived outlaw behaviour illustrated that it did not qualify as a civilised country.

Additionally, in presidential rhetoric, Saddam's regime was linked to terrorism and terrorists because it resorted to terrorism and supported terrorists. Although the assassination was eventually uncovered, it was still an attack and an act of terrorism. Terrorism, as defined by the U.S. government, was an *act of loathsomeness* and a *cowardly act*. The United States could not accept these outlaw behaviours, and, therefore, should respond decisively (the narrative of cowards and heroes). To justify military retaliation, President Clinton utilised a specific language, which referred to the history of the United States and the deep cultural identity narratives of Americans, to structure its political discourse. He claimed that 'from the first day of our Revolution, America's security has depended on the clarity of this message: Don't tread on us' (Clinton, 1993g), and that 'the limited and proportionate action taken by the United States Government will frustrate and help deter and preempt future **unlawful** actions on the part of the Government of Iraq' (Clinton, 1993h).

Clinton's military retaliation was seen as a successful practice of dual containment. In his first decision to use military force, President Clinton demonstrated that his administration's Gulf policy would emphasise containment rather than aggressive operations. More specifically, it sent a clear message: during the Clinton presidency, military force would be utilised to deter Saddam Hussein rather than to overthrow his regime through targeted killing (Indyk, 2009: 150). Clinton's decision was supported by the U.S. Congress. No one in either the Senate or the House objected to the President's actions (Hendrickson, 2002a: 144). In addition, polling data provided by the *New York Times* illustrated that the military strike was strongly supported by an American majority. Three days after the strike, 61 per cent of U.S. citizens approved of the action, and the President himself received an 11-point increase in public approval (Ibid.). It is also worth noting that, until the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, there was no clear evidence to prove that Iraqi intelligence services were involved in any terrorist or assassination attacks aimed at killing American citizens or Western targets

(Clarke, 2004: 84). This helps to explain why the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities were so doubtful about President George W. Bush's interpretation of the link between Saddam Hussein, Usama bin Laden, and the 2001 World Trade Center Bombings (Ibid.).

Subsequent to the 1993 military retaliation, Indyk's dual-containment approach, along with the limited use of force, continued to direct the Clinton administration's Iraq policy. Before President Clinton left office, the United States conducted another three significant military operations aimed at containing Saddam's regime. In October 1994, when the U.N. Security Council considered lifting sanctions as an incentive for Iraq's cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), Saddam Hussein dispatched his elite troops—Hammurabi and al-Nida Republican Guard divisions—to the Kuwaiti border and sought to pressure the Security Council to lift the sanctions (Indyk, 2009: 152-3). To deter Saddam Hussein, the Clinton administration conducted *Operation Vigilant Warrior* and swiftly redeployed U.S. combat troops in Kuwait, including the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division and a few hundred extra high-tech aircraft (Freedman, 2009: 288). Under coercion from the United States, Saddam Hussein quickly withdrew his troops, and the crisis was eventually averted.

In September 1996, Saddam's regime once again mobilised military forces in northern Iraq when the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) accepted military support from Iran and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) asked Saddam Hussein to intervene (Hendrickson, 2002a: 147). Saddam Hussein decided to wage a fierce battle in Irbil, and brutally suppressed the opposition. According to the CIA and the INC, 96 Kurdish dissidents were killed in the conflict, and more than 2,000 individuals were captured by the Iraqi Army; most of them were later tortured and killed by Iraqi forces (Freedman, 2009: 293). The Clinton administration responded by launching 44 cruise missiles targeted at Iraqi military outposts in southern Iraq. In justifying the military operation, President Clinton claimed that the operation was based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 688, which authorised member states to use all necessary means to protect the Kurds; the U.S. leader also sent a clear message to Saddam Hussein that 'when you abuse your own people or threaten your neighbors, you must pay a price' (Clinton, 1996t). Soon after the strikes, public opinion once again demonstrated that the American majority supported President Clinton's decision and that 58 per cent of Americans approved of the military operation, and only 31 per cent disapproved

(Hendrickson, 2002a: 148). Moreover, in the U.S. Congress, although there was some hesitance, the Senate passed a resolution ‘commending the U.S. armed forces for their successful attack’ by a 96-1 vote (Ibid.).

The diplomatic clashes between the United States and Iraq continued in the second term of Clinton’s presidency. In 1998, when Iraq gradually distanced itself from its past promise—allowing the UNCOM to access its military facilities and investigate its weapons of mass destruction programme without any pre-conditions—the Clinton administration decided to initiate a series of strikes and threatened to use military force. On November 15, a date prior to the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, the United States, along with the United Kingdom, conducted *Operation Desert Fox*, a series of military strikes lasting four days (Hendrickson, 2002b: 321; Freedman, 2009: 296-8). When justifying the military operation and interpreting the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, President Clinton claimed:

The international community had good reason to set this requirement. Other countries possess weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With Saddam, there’s one big difference: He has used them, not once but repeatedly, unleashing chemical weapons against Iranian troops during a decade-long war, not only against soldiers but against civilians ... not only against his own people, gassing Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq ... that left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will use there terrible weapons again. (Clinton, 1998k).

Similarly, while giving an address to Arab nations regarding the missile attacks on December 19, 1998, Clinton stated:

Saddam has ruled through a **reign of terror** against his own people and disregard for the peace of the region. His war against Iran cost at least half a million lives over 10 years. He gassed Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq ... He massacred thousands of his own people in an uprising in 1991 ... Saddam simply must not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas, or biological weapons. (Clinton, 1998l).

It is clear that in this presidential rhetoric, the narrative of rogue states was utilised to describe Saddam's regime. In addition, the term *reign of terror*—a special phrase which invokes historical meaning from the French Revolution and from Nazi Germany, as well as from Stalin's *Great Terror* (as discussed in chapter 3) was adopted to interpret Iraq's political situation. Because the Iraqi government was deemed irredeemable and unpredictable, it had to be carefully monitored and controlled.⁴¹ The Iraqi leader had to know, as President Clinton said, that 'if you act recklessly, you will pay a heavy price' (Clinton, 1998k). Clinton also asserted that, as well as the military strikes, a plan for regime change was necessary. He explicitly stated:

The fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world. The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi Government, a Government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a Government that respects the right of its people. (Clinton, 1998k).

Through the process of discursive practice, the political reality of a rogue state was constructed and constituted through official documents and policy practices, which then shaped the common understanding of Saddam's regime and rationalised the U.S.-led missions in Iraq. A Gallop poll showed that 74 per cent of U.S. citizens approved the U.S.-led *Operation Desert Fox* (Hendrickson, 2002a: 156). In addition, 70 per cent of the American public thought that if military force had to be used, it should be utilised to overthrow Saddam Hussein rather than merely support UNSCOM missions (Freedman, 2009: 297). The House also passed the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 by a vote of 360-38 in October 1998 (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007: 244). Public opinion showed, at the end of 1998, that both U.S. citizens and the U.S. Congress all expected a regime change in Iraq (for more details about regime change in Iraq, see

⁴¹ According to Indyk (2009: 81), in January 1993, President Clinton first used the word *irredeemable* to describe Saddam Hussein when he accepted an interview with Thomas Friedman. In the interview, *irredeemable* was deliberately deployed to end speculation that the president, despite subsequent denials, had signaled his real intentions toward Saddam.

chapter 6.)

After the 2001 World Trade Center Bombings, the George W. Bush administration discursively linked Iraq to al Qaeda and thereby justified the American-led war in Iraq. In his October 2002 speech in Cincinnati, President Bush explicitly indicated the ‘grave threat’ from Iraq. He said:

Tonight I want to take a few minutes to discuss a **grave threat** to peace and America’s determination to lead the world in confronting that threat. The threat comes from Iraq. It arises directly from the Iraqi regime’s own actions—its history of aggression and its drive toward **an arsenal of terror** ... It possesses and produces **chemical and biological weapons**. It is seeking **nuclear weapons**. It has given shelter and support to **terrorism** and practices **terror** against its own people. The entire world has witnessed Iraq’s 11-year history of defiance, deception, and bad faith. (Bush, 2002d).

Bush’s 2002 speech in Cincinnati was seen as an important statement which launched the push for war in Iraq (Hodges, 2011: 72; 2007: 68). However, it can be argued that prior to President Bush’s war declaration, President Clinton conducted a series of operations aimed at destabilising Saddam’s regime, both overtly and covertly. President Clinton’s discursive construction of rogue states and so-called catastrophic terrorism also provided a foundational framework for President Bush to structure his ‘war on terror’ discourse and justified the global war on terror. Importantly, the particular discourse on Iraq and Saddam Hussein constrained the policy options for subsequent administrations to deal with the perceived threats from the ‘rogue,’ and made the war virtually inevitable.

Iran

Another challenge to Clinton’s dual-containment approach was Iran’s hostility towards the United States. Since the Iranian Revolution, Iran has been portrayed and identified as a state that firmly supported international terrorism and financed many terrorist groups, in particular, Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Moreover, in U.S. foreign policy discourse, the Iranian regime rejected any efforts associated with Arab-Israeli reconciliation and sought to subvert pro-American governments in the

Arab world. It is conceivable that containing Iran would be more difficult than deterring Iraq, in part because of U.S. sanctions against Iraq after the first Gulf War which were supported by the international community and the United Nations, partly because most U.S. allies, especially European countries and Japan, expected to develop closer commercial and trade relations with Iran during that time. Thus, in sharp contrast to the Iraq policy, the U.S. Iran policy was not focused on the promotion of regime change; instead, it was based on active containment aimed at transforming Iran's behaviour through multilateral sanctions and a direct, official dialogue with the Iranian regime.

As previously mentioned, since the 1979 Revolution and Hostage Crisis, Iran has been perceived as a great threat to the United States and to Western countries. In previous decades, Iran was accused of supporting international terrorism, a number of worldwide assassination plans—including a plan to assassinate Salman Rushdie, the author of *The Satanic Verses*—and its great ambition of becoming a regional hegemon. In order to maintain political equilibrium in the Middle East during the Cold War period, U.S. administrations traditionally followed the Carter Doctrine aimed at preventing any outside power from dominating the region. In addition, a balance-of-power approach was adopted by President Ronald Reagan and President George H. W. Bush to frame their Middle East policies. In the 1990s, however, the balance-of-power approach was modified by the Clinton administration due to the new security condition identified by policy-making elites, namely the vacancy of a great power in the Middle East and rising threats from several regional powers. The realist interpretation of power politics and U.S. foreign relations was continued and employed by the Clinton administration to draft its post-Cold War foreign policy towards the Middle East. Consequently, Kennan's containment strategy was replaced by Indyk's dual containment approach, which particularly concentrated on regional threats, namely, Iraq, and Iran, rather than on an external threat from the Soviet Union.

While introducing the new U.S. Middle East policy, Martin Indyk (1993) explicitly indicated that Iran posed a five-part challenge to the whole world: its support of international terrorism; its support of Hamas and Hezbollah and attempted sabotage of the Arab-Israeli peace talks; its subversion through supporting Islamic movements in Sudan and elsewhere; its acquisition of offensive weapons that would allow Iran to become a dominant power in the Gulf; and its prospective acquisition of weapons of

mass destruction and the technology of delivering those weapons. Warren Christopher (1995: 21), Clinton's first-term Secretary of State, also claimed that Iran and Iraq were the *most dangerous actors* in the Middle East and were the *enemies of peace*. In his 1995 *Foreign Policy* article, Christopher wrote:

Iran is **the world's most significant state sponsor of terrorism**, and **the most ardent opponent of the Middle East peace process**. It supports those who commit atrocities from Tel Aviv to Buenos Aires, and throughout the Arab world. The international community has been far too tolerant of Iran's **outlaw behavior**. Others have sold arms and given Iran preferential economic treatment, making it easier for Iran to divert resources to **terrorism** and to building **weapons of mass destruction**. That must end. The evidence is overwhelming: Iran is still intent on projecting **terror** and **extremism** across the Middle East and beyond. Only a concerted international effort can stop it. (Christopher, 1995: 22).

Indyk's statement and Christopher's interpretation demonstrate that Iran was perceived and identified as a great threat by the Clinton administration, which challenged the United States and the international community. Also, Iran's outlaw behaviours apparently fit into the discursive criteria of so-called rogue states, and it was indeed a member of the 'rogues,' as the key figures of the Clinton administration frequently argued. As well as his political aides, President Clinton also repeatedly dubbed Iran *a rogue state* in his public speeches. For example, upon departure for the G-7 summit and regarding the 1996 Khobar Towers Bombing in Saudi Arabia, the President claimed:

Our struggle at the end of the cold war is to deal with these **new perils**: the **rogue states like Iran and Iraq**; the smugglers who would poison our children with drugs; those who deal in sophisticated weapons or **weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological and nuclear**; **terrorists** who strike not just in Saudi Arabia but in the subways of Tokyo, in the streets of London, in the Holy Land, and in America's heartland; usually people in the paralyzing grip of religious, ethnic, and racial hatred. (Clinton, 1996k).

In response to the particular threat of Iran and international terrorism, Clinton also said:

Iran has presented a particular problem to the **peace process** of the peoples of the Middle East ... we have moved to counter **Iran's support of international terrorism** and in particular **its backing for violent opponents of peace in the Middle East** ... we have tried to stop its request to acquire **weapons of mass destruction**, which would make it a threat not only to its neighbors but to the entire region and the world. (Clinton, 1995g).

In short, in the discourse, Iran was identified as a rogue state and a member of the new nexus of threats. Its military, political, and religious ambitions threatened the Arab-Israeli peace process, its Muslim neighbours (most of them pro-American), and the international community. Most importantly, the specific interpretation suggested a particular way—through strict multilateral sanctions—to contain Iran and isolated it from international society. To achieve this goal, closer international cooperation was indispensable. As Indyk (2009) indicated, the efficiency of active containment depended on multilateral sanctions rather than on the unilateral sanctions executed by the United States.

As previously discussed, the interpretation of Iran's outlaw behaviours and the justification of U.S. leadership can be argued and traced to the cultural myths of the Old West and New Frontier, which were widely utilised by the U.S. elite to structure its political discourse and to stress U.S. global leadership. It is argued that the associations with frontier 'outlaws' were actually rooted in the American cultural psyche; that is, the cattle rustlers and gunslingers of the Wild West (West & Carey, 2006: 387). Although the term *outlaw* in these contexts might not be intended to directly reference the cowboy's nemesis, it suggests someone outside the rules of society, and, importantly, constructs Iran's 'subject position' (Doty, 1993).⁴² Subject

⁴² Doty (1993: 306) argued that the production of subjects and objects is always vis-à-vis other subjects and objects. She further explained that what defines a particular 'subject' is, in large part, the relationships that this subject is positioned in relative to other 'subjects.'

positioning together with other textual mechanisms, namely, presupposition and predication, functions to construct and constitute specific kinds of subjects and objects, and the relations among them (see *Ibid.*: 306). In other words, the discursive construction of rogue states creates particular background knowledge and meanings of the ‘rogues’ (i.e., presupposition and predication), and establishes a clear parameter around how these ‘subjects’ should meaningfully be discussed and dealt with. Clearly, Iran was the cattleman excluded by the international community, and the United States was the guardian gunslinger making efforts to transform Iran’s outlaw behaviours. An examination of American political rhetoric, clearly shows that the cattleman and outlaw references were constantly utilised in the elite’s rhetoric, such as President Reagan’s Cold War discourse and President George W. Bush’s ‘war on terror’ discourse. In U.S. presidential rhetoric, frontier heroes had clear enemies: they were communists in the Cold War, rogue states and evil terrorists in the 1990s, and recently, bin Laden and al Qaeda in the post-9/11 world (Slotkin, 1998; West & Carey, 2006; Juyan, 2007). These enemies, according to U.S. administrations, should be punished, and justice should be swift, certain, and complete.

To tackle the threats from Iran, the NSC initially outlined three options: positive incentives, sanctions and isolation, and military action (Indyk, 2009). The first suggestion was immediately excluded due to Iran’s animosity towards the United States, as it was explicitly articulated in U.S. political discourse. With regards to military action, the NSC elites feared that a military-based operation might irritate the Iranian regime and lead to retaliation; Iran could disrupt the flow of oil from the Gulf and use its leverage with Hezbollah and PIJ to launch a series of terrorist attacks targeted at U.S. citizens. Accordingly, sanctions and isolation was seen as the most reliable and feasible option. The discussion within the NSC illustrates how discourse affects and constrains policy practices—that is, it makes some options seem nonsensical and others seem logical and legitimate (Jackson, 2005; Winkler, 2007; Hodge, 2011). Given that Iran’s regime embraced a deep animosity towards the United States, a policy based on negotiation, dialogue, and offering positive incentives, was comprehended as infeasible and subjectively excluded by the elite.

However, the efficiency of active containment was based on the assumption that other countries—in particular, key European allies and Japan—could cooperate with the United States so that international sanctions could be enforced. Officials argued

that unilateral sanctions implemented by the United States could not simply constrain Iran's outlaw behaviour, and other countries' foreign investment in Iran would certainly contribute to Iran's promotion of international terrorism and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. By considering this, the Clinton administration's Iran policy concentrated on persuading international society to comprehensively isolate Iran through strict sanctions. The most remarkable political achievement was the legislation of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) and the rapprochement between the United States and Iran after Khatami's election in 1997, though the rapprochement was temporary.

In 1995, the Clinton administration suffered great pressure from its Republican colleagues. The Republican-controlled Congress asked the Clinton administration to modify its Iran policy, and a full sanctions proposal was subsequently suggested. Indeed, the United States was criticised by its European allies for its double standards regarding the multilateral sanctions; by 1995, the United States was, in fact, Iran's third-largest trading partner and largest oil purchaser (Freedman, 2009: 302). Most European countries doubted the credibility of international sanctions and expected to establish closer foreign relations with Iran. Given that Iran had potential markets, vast oil resources, and an advantageous geopolitical location, the Europeans argued that the country should not be isolated from international society, and an alternative approach, namely, *critical dialogue*, was argued as more pragmatic (Indyk, 2009: 167-8).⁴³ To convince EU allies, in March 1995 the Clinton administration first vetoed Iran's new oil production contract with Conoco, an American oil company, which was assumed to offer advantages to a French oil company named Total (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007: 288). With the veto, Christopher pointed out that the contract was inconsistent with containment. However, more information showed that Edgar Bronfman, Sr., the former head of the World Jewish Congress, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) played key roles that affected the Clinton administration's decision (Ibid.).

Following the veto, in May 1995 President Clinton signed two further executive orders (EOs), namely, EO 12957 - Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources (Clinton, 1995b) and EO 12959 -

⁴³ The basic assumption of the so-called *critical-dialogue approach* was that European countries could trade with Iran as long as the Iranian regime listened to complaints about terrorism and its death threats against Salman Rushdie, the author of *The Satanic Verses*.

Prohibiting Certain Transaction With Respect to Iran (Clinton, 1995j). With the legislation and the presidential executive orders, all trade, trade financing, loans, and financial services to Iran were banned. From that time on, American companies could no longer purchase oil or invest in any commercial project in Iran.

On June 19, 1996, the U.S.-led international sanctions against Iran reached a peak when the House approved the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) by a vote of 415-0. One month later, the Senate passed the act by unanimous consent. On August 5, President Clinton signed the ILSA into law, and Senator Edward Kennedy added Libya—another rogue state identified by the Clinton administration—for good measure because of its involvement in the 1988 Lockerbie air disaster (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007: 289; Indyk, 2009: 169). The ILSA 1996, for the first time, authorised the U.S. president to impose secondary sanctions on any non-American company investing over 40 million dollars in Iran. As anticipated, the legislation of ILSA 1996 caused strong resistance from European countries. The European Union (EU) argued that imposing U.S. law on other countries was prohibited under the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and, therefore, organised a series of actions as countermeasures, including action against the United States in the WTO (Freedman, 2009: 305). In 1998, in order to break the stalemate, the Clinton administration eventually agreed to grant waivers for European companies from ILSA. However, in return, the EU agreed to support a U.S.-proposed hard-line approach targeted at Iran, especially on the issues of nonproliferation and counterterrorism (Ibid.: 306).

With regard to the rapprochement between the United States and Iran, after the Iranian presidential campaign in 1997, the newly-elected President, Mohammad Khatami, considered altering Iran's U.S. policy if the United States would agree to lift sanctions against Iran. On January 7, 1998, when giving an interview on Cable News Network (CNN) to Christiane Amanpour, the new Iranian leader explicitly expressed his attitude towards the key issues that deeply concerned the U.S. government and citizens. While taking questions regarding terrorism, Khatami said:

Terrorism should be condemned in all its forms and manifestations; assassins must be condemned. Terrorism is useless anyway and we condemn it categorically ... Supporting people who fight for the liberation of their land is not, in my opinion; supporting terrorism. It is, in fact,

supporting those who are engaged in combating state terrorism ... Any form of killing of innocent men and women who are not involved in confrontation is terrorism. It must be condemned, and we, in our turn, condemn every form of it in the world. (Khatami, 1998).

Although Khatami's statement was seen as controversial in the U.S. political arena because the information provided by the U.S. intelligence community showed that Iran was deeply involved in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing (Freeh, 2005), President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright, believing that the new Iranian leader could contribute to the rapprochement which broke down following the 1979 Revolution, still decided to support the Khatami regime. Clinton and Albright's decision eventually led to a confrontation between different agencies within the administration. During his time of civil service, Louis Freeh, the director of the FBI, strongly doubted President Clinton's determination and his promise to the American public regarding the investigation of the terrorist attacks targeted at U.S. Marines in Saudi Arabia (as elaborated in Chapter 6). Freeh himself also claimed that former President George H. W. Bush's assistance and his personal relationship with Saudi's Royal family actually made great contributions to the FBI-led investigation in Dhahran, rather than the Clinton-led administration (Freeh, 2005: 26-8).

In terms of Arab-Israeli conciliation and Iran's nuclear programme, Khatami (1998) mentioned that 'we have declared our opposition to the Middle East peace process because we believe it will not succeed,' and that 'we have clearly said that we don't intend to impose our views on others or to stand in their way ... Palestinians have the right to express their views about their land ... they too have a right to self-determination.' Khatami also stressed that in opposition to a nuclear Israel who still refused to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran was a member of the NPT, and had accepted several inspections organised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the past. Iran, he argued, was not a nuclear power and it did not intend to become one (Ibid.). At the end of the interview, the new Iranian leader further proposed an exchange of the two countries' professors, writers, scholars, artists, journalists, and tourists (Ibid.). On June 17, 1998, in response to Khatami's *dialogue of civilisations*, Secretary Albright said:

We have supported cultural and academic exchange, and facilitated travel to the United States by many Iranians ... As the wall of mistrust comes down, we can develop with the Islamic Republic, when it is ready, a road map leading to normal relations. Obviously, two decades of mistrust cannot be erased overnight. The gap between us remains wide. But it is time to test the possibilities for bridging this gap. (Albright, 1998d).

As well as Albright's positive responses, in April 1999 President Clinton announced that the United States would lift sanctions that prevented Iran from importing food and medicines from the United States (Indyk, 2009: 224). Even Martin Indyk, the designer of dual containment, claimed: 'the United States has made it clear repeatedly that we have nothing against an Islamic government in Iran ... We are ready for a dialogue' (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007: 291). Clinton's efforts of improving U.S. Iran relations were supported by his Republican colleagues, in particular, senators from the farm-belt states, because the shift in foreign policy enabled the United States to export foodstuffs to Iran (Ibid.). Furthermore, in February 2000, after Iran's Majlis elections, which Iranian reformers swept in the campaign, Albright even made a forthright apology for the U.S. role in the 1953 Mossadegh coup, and offered Iran a dialogue with the United States with no preconditions (Freedman, 2009: 307). However, these unilateral efforts still could not create the rapprochement and engagement that the Clinton administration expected to achieve because the prior hostile discourse was too deeply sedimented for real change. As President Khatami mentioned during his first visit to the United States in 2007, 'the misunderstandings and mistrust between the two sides was so deep' and 'the pressure that existed on both sides' was so great (Indyk, 2009: 229). President Khatami and Iranian reformers, though supported by the broader public, could not challenge the powerful supreme leader, Khamenei, and the hard-line clerics. Facing strong resistance from the conservatives, the newly-elected president still needed to make a compromise on highly contentious issues, such as the normalisation of relations with the United States (except on the civilisational level), the relaxation of pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and a reduction in support for international terrorism, so that he could effectively maintain his political leverage.

It is also worth noting that the political conditions in Iran—Khatami's triumph in

the elections—and the reassessment of U.S. Iran policy, considering the shift of policy from containment to engagement, led to the shift in the U.S. political discourse. In the last year of Clinton’s presidency, the Department of State decided to stop using the old epithets of *rogue*, *outlaw*, and *terrorist state* when referring to Iran. Simultaneously, the term *rogue states* was replaced with *states of concern* in the U.S. official lexicon (Katzman et al., 2001: 81). On June 19, 2000, when accepting an interview on The Diane Rehm Show, Secretary Albright clearly stated that ‘we are now calling these states “states of concern” because we are concerned about their support for terrorist activity, their development of missiles, and their desire to disrupt the international system’ (Albright, 2000a). The political shift in interpretation from *rogue states* to *states of concern*, according to Litwak (see Katzman et al., 2001: 81), was a utilitarian response to changed circumstances; it shifted in focus from a unilateral American perspective to a focus on violations of agreed international norms. Moreover, the political usage of *states of concern* also functioned to promote U.S.-suggested multilateral cooperation on the ‘problem’ of Iran (Ibid.). However, it can be argued that the discursive change of U.S. Iran policy only reflected minor adjustments rather than major changes in discourse. Iran, as Albright (2000a) indicated, was still identified and considered as one of the critical threats to the United States, and therefore, a continuous monitoring is necessary.

In short, the transformation of U.S. post-Cold War Gulf policy illustrated how the nature of the international system (the specific social and political context) and the worldview that elites embraced affect the discursive construction of threats, dangers, and risks. Through the process of discursive practice and the reproduction of discourses, the common threat of the rogues was eventually shaped and constituted. These discourses also served to conceptualise the so-called rogue regimes, maintain the counter-rogues regime of truth, and affected the real practices of foreign policy. Further, what we can learn from the Clinton administration’s rogue-states policy is that discourse per se might not necessarily determine concrete policies; rather, they were determined in a dialectical relationship in which discourse, structure, and material interests interact. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration discursively linked terrorism to its broader Middle East policy, such as weapons proliferation, rogue states, and the Middle East peace. For the Clinton administration, these issues should not be discussed separately; instead, they should be noted, carefully concerned, and dealt with.

Conclusion

An examination of President Clinton's terrorism-related discourses demonstrates a clear continuity of the American-led war on terror, from the administrations of Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton through to George W. Bush. President Reagan's first 'war on terrorism' discourse and the articulation of 'terrorist states' or state-sponsored terrorism provided a useful discursive structure for President Clinton to frame the so-called 'catastrophic terrorism' discourse and stress the rising threat of rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction. In the U.S. post-Cold War security narrative, a political reality of 'rogue states' and a 'nexus of new threats' were framed and constantly reiterated by key figures in the Clinton administration. Officials argued that rogue regimes, together with terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, severely challenged the United States and international society. Their outlaw behaviours, such as their support for terrorist attacks and other forms of radical violence, their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and their violations of human-rights all illustrated that they were politically and ethically immoral. These regimes isolated and excluded themselves from the civilised world that was symbolised by freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, and the trend of globalisation—issues that were the focal points of President Clinton's foreign policy—and, therefore, they were on the wrong side of history. Given that the threats posed by the 'rogues' were urgent and unquestionable, as officials frequently argued, it was clear that the United States should act decisively and help these countries constructively transform.

It can be argued that the political usage of the term *rogues* was not neutral; instead, it fulfilled certain political functions. The connotation was that the rogues had to be controlled and contained, either through aggressive containment or active containment, because they were crazy, irrational, and unpredictable. And, because they were thought to be irredeemable, a policy of regime change was argued as an alternative option for tackling the undeterrable regimes. As I have shown, in the 1990s, there was a strong demand for regime change in Iraq, supported mainly by neoconservatives (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 4), and the Clinton administration, indeed, conducted a series of covert and overt actions targeting the Iraqi Saddam regime, such as the U.N.-authorised missions in 1994, 1996, and 1998, and the legislation of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. Although the Clinton administration tended to contain rather

than overthrow Saddam's regime through the use of military force, the promotion of regime change was broadly discussed in the U.S. political arena, especially during President Clinton's second term. The U.S. Congress and the American public also strongly supported the policy of regime change in Iraq, even if military means had to be employed.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush administration discursively linked Saddam Hussein to Osama bin Laden and the World Trade Center bombings. In the name of counterterrorism, the Bush administration launched a global war on terror and overthrew Saddam's regime (see Rogers, 2004, 2005, 2008). After a decade's efforts and debate, the United States eventually established a Western democracy in Iraq and expected the new Iraq to be a model state in the Middle East. However, it is conceivable that the Bush-led war on terror was actually not a revolution of U.S. foreign policy: Presidents Reagan and Clinton had already provided an established discursive framework embedded in official documents, institutions and practices for President Bush to formulate the 'war on terror' discourse, and many of their policies were continued by the Bush administration, such as the plan for regime change in Iraq, containment and sanctions against Iran, and the promotion of democracy in the Middle East.

Finally, the present research demonstrates that discourses, material interests, and ideology actually reinforced each other and co-constituted the social world that people live in. The discursive construction of 'rogue states' and the shift of U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s partly explains how the U.S. policy-making elites understood the new international order of the post-Cold War world, and sought to establish America's role in accordance with the interests identified. More specifically, through the process of discursive practice and social practice, the American perspective on world order—stability in the Middle East, U.S. primacy and hegemony in the Gulf, and global liberal capitalism—was constituted and sustained. In the 1990s, the so-called 'rogues threat' was stressed and frequently mentioned by key figures in the Clinton administration, and was broadly accepted as part of a common 'grid of intelligibility' by U.S. policy makers. Official interpretation of the rogues also conceptualised the subject of *rogue states*, which then created clear boundaries around discussions and plans for dealing with rogues.

Additionally, the transformation of social and political contexts forced the

political elite to reconsider and reformulate a new discourse—the catastrophic terrorism discourse—featuring the *nexus of new threats*, and provided a dual-containment approach to tackle threats from Iraq and Iran. Clearly, the essence of the dual-containment approach was to prevent Iraq or Iran from becoming the dominant power in the Gulf, so that the United States could maintain its political leverage in the region, continue providing its security commitments to both Israel and pro-American Arab governments, and secure the flow of oil and commerce. Although the Clinton administration suffered harsh resistance, both domestically and internationally, when it tried to promote its rogue states policy, it eventually acquired the necessary support from Congress and the American public, and successfully convinced key European allies to adopt a harsher line on issues of counterterrorism and nonproliferation. Examination of Clinton’s dual-containment approach also illustrated that U.S. domestic politics—particularly the resistance from the Republican Party—and interest groups in Congress, such as the oil lobby and the Israel lobby in the case of containing Iran, played essential roles in the discursive construction of rogue states, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.

As previously discussed, this chapter has illustrated the Clinton administration’s rogue states policy towards Iraq and Iran, and explained how the already established discourse framed and constrained the policy options for dealing with the perceived threats posed by the ‘outlaw’ countries. As Jackson (2014) argues, once a set of ideas, beliefs, and practices has become embedded in a society and functions as a ‘truth regime,’ it is hardly to expect a distinct policy change (see also McCrisken, 2011). In the next chapter, the discursive construction of American national identity—another essential part of U.S. counterterrorism discourse—will be further elaborated. The following chapter will argue that through the way that the discourse was created and understood, terrorism was eventually perceived as a *negative ideograph* and a *social taboo* in the United States and Western societies more broadly.

Chapter 6

Writing American National Identity: Discourses, Narratives and the Social Construction of Terrorism as a Negative Ideograph

Introduction

In addition to the discursive construction of new terrorism, an essential element of U.S. counterterrorism discourse involves the articulation of American national identity. In the wider international relations (IR) literature, the concept of identity has long been the subject of analysis, particularly from constructivists who argue that foreign policies and national interests are not determined by the anarchy of the international system or by power distribution; rather, they are shaped by cultural factors, such as ideas, norms, and identities. Constructivists claim that we cannot know ‘what we want’ unless we know ‘who we are.’ To fully comprehend the essence and subsequent implementation of foreign and security policies, it is therefore necessary to examine how these policies are framed and interpreted by political leaders, and how identity plays an enabling and legitimatising role in the formulation of foreign and security policies.

From a constructivist perspective, threats and crises do not exist independently; they become reality through the ways in which people analyse them and consider them to be urgent and imminent. Campbell (1998) and Weldes (1999) argue in their research on U.S. foreign policy that the interpretation of threats and crises is part of the literal articulation of national identity. Identity, according to Campbell (1998: 9), is a dimension of being that is both inescapable and indispensable for the existence of any nation and is constituted in relation to difference. The constitution of identity is achieved through the articulation of boundaries which demarcate an inside from an outside, a self from another, and a domestic sphere from a foreign sphere (Ibid.). In other words, national identity is constructed and constituted through categorising, and this process affects the framing of foreign and security policies, as well as subsequent social practices.

This chapter argues that at the centre of the U.S. discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism is an articulation of its national identity. By carefully examining President Clinton’s political discourse, along with a comparative study of other

presidents' terrorism-related discourses, this research finds that there are at least four different types of narratives embedded in America's perspective of terrorism, namely, the narrative of good and evil, the narrative of civilisation and barbarism, the narrative of American exceptionalism, and the narrative of heroes and cowards (see also Jackson, 2005). These narratives have their own unique meanings within America's popular culture, history, and civil religion.⁴⁴ They explicitly articulate the core values, national spirit, and the myths that Americans live by (Hughes, 2003). By utilising a culturally specific form of language, the terrorism discourse created by the different administrations not only resonated with American citizens but also co-constituted the common understanding of terrorism and terrorist, thus enabling these leaders to justify their anti-terrorism initiatives. In other words, terrorism was eventually established as a *negative ideograph* in U.S. society (McGee, 1980; Winkler 2006; Jackson, 2011).

The Discursive Construction of National Identity

The Narrative of Good and Evil

Current American political discourse is permeated by the notion of good Americans versus evil terrorists; in fact, the deliberate narration of this concept by U.S. leaders has come to form one of the main themes of the country's national identity (Jackson, 2005, 2006; Rediehs, 2006; Ivie, 2007). When critically analysed, it can be seen that there are many different layers of meaning to this narration. On one level, after a series of terrorist attacks and their detrimental impact on the confidence of Americans in their country's core values and the American way of life, this narrative has helped to reassure American citizens in the face of additional terrorist threats. On another level, it has helped political leaders gain support from, and unite, the general population. It has also provided them with a powerful framework to justify and legitimise

⁴⁴ In *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville indicates: 'In the United States, religion ... is mingled with all the habits of the nation and all the feelings of patriotism, whence it derives a peculiar force' (quoted in Huntington 2004: 103). The consolidation of religion and patriotism, according to Samuel Huntington (Ibid: 103-4.), is evident in America's civil religion which 'enables Americans to bring together their secular politics and their religious society, to marry God and country, so as to give religious sanctity to their patriotism and nationalist legitimacy to their religious beliefs, and thus to merge what could be conflicting loyalties into loyalty to a religiously endowed country' (also see Tocqueville, 2000).

counterterrorism initiatives, including a series of military operations to seek revenge for the initial terrorist attacks.

The identity that America has claimed for itself has traditionally encompassed many positive attributes, such as tolerance, generosity, kindness, bravery, and sacrifice, and its citizens have been described as peace-loving and law-abiding people. Officials have claimed that although the United States has culturally been a heterogeneous society—a melting pot of different backgrounds and histories—each American has believed in the nation itself and has embraced the traditional values of the country, namely, freedom, democracy, and human dignity. These positive qualities of the American people have been frequently mentioned and repeated in the political rhetoric, particularly in reference to the heroic victims of terrorist attacks. When commenting on the 1998 African Embassy bombings, for example, President Bill Clinton made the following statements:

Our hearts are heavy with the news that now 12 Americans, **brave people** who were **working to build a better world and represent all of us abroad**, have lost their lives. (Clinton, 1998d).

These 12 Americans came from diverse backgrounds ... but as different as they were, each of them had an **adventurous spirit**, a **generous soul**. Each relished the chance to see the world and to make it better. (Clinton, 1998e).

Furthermore, when giving speeches associated with the casualties of the 2000 *USS Cole* bombings, President Clinton stated the following:

[...] the world sees our Nation's greatest strength: people in uniform rooted in **every race, creed, and region** on the face of the Earth, yet bound together by a common **commitment to freedom** and a common **pride in being American**. (Clinton, 2000c).

These discourses expressed Americans' good qualities, emphasised the values they firmly believed in, and framed and reaffirmed the national identity of the country. American citizens were seen as perishing in the terrorist attacks because they had

devoted their lives to benefiting humankind, promoting peace and democracy, and bringing hope and peace to conflicted regions. These Americans were the targets of terrorism because they ‘act[ed] to **advance peace and democracy**’ and because they ‘[stood] **united** against terrorism’ (Clinton, 1998c). Unity is a key feature of the discourse, and one that President George. W. Bush also highlighted in his ‘war on terror’ discourse (Jackson, 2005: 85-8).

Through this emphasis on ‘good’ Americans, the narrative also implied and emphasised the great difference between the American citizens and the evil terrorists. According to the official viewpoint, it was simply a fact that terrorists and their allies were the ‘enemies of peace’ or even the ‘enemies of everything.’ As Clinton said: ‘terrorists are enemies of everything we believe in and fight for: peace and democracy, tolerance and security’ (Clinton, 1998c). Terrorism not only threatened Americans’ everyday lives, asserts the rhetoric, but it also challenged the core values of the country. Moreover, through the continued re-emphasis on and proclamation of this narrative, terrorism came to be seen as a clear opposite to the true nature of ‘good America.’

In addition to the ‘good America’ viewpoint, the narrative of evil terrorists also contributed to the formulation of U.S. terrorism and counterterrorism discourses and to the construction of national identity (Jackson, 2005, 2006; Rediehs, 2006; Ivie, 2007). The concept of ‘evil terrorists’ has different layers of meaning. First, the narrative used terms with strong negative associations to depict the nature of terrorism and terrorists. Second, it created a powerful discursive framework that allowed the authorities to justify significant anti-terrorism measures. Third, the narrative demonised terrorists and depoliticised their motives. Words such as ‘evil,’ ‘hatred,’ ‘perverse,’ ‘twisted,’ ‘madness,’ ‘senseless,’ ‘fanatical,’ ‘loathsome,’ ‘bloodshed,’ and ‘brutal’ were broadly utilised by administration officials to describe terrorism and terrorists. For example, when describing terrorists and their actions, President Clinton made the following statements:

The bombing in Oklahoma City was an attack on innocent children and defenseless citizens. It was an act of cowardice, and it was **evil** ... I will not allow the people of this country to be intimidated by **evil cowards**. (Clinton, 1995c).

These people are **killers**, they must be treated like **killers**. (Clinton, 1995c).

That is what you saw in the terrible incident with the **religious fanatic** taking a little vial of poison gas in the subway in Japan. (Clinton, 1995g).

These **brutal acts of terror**, which once again have taken the lives of innocent Israelis and at least one American citizen. (Clinton, 1996a).

These **fanatical acts** are aimed not just at killing innocent people but at killing the growing hope for peace in the Middle East. (Clinton, 1996b).

It was this **madness** that somebody for some **perverted** political purpose could take everyone else's life away from them [...]. (Clinton, 1996d).

Those we mourn today, must surely confound the minds of the **hate-filled terrorists** who killed them. (Clinton, 2000c).

In response to the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, Clinton also claimed that terrorism originated in a 'twisted mentality' (Clinton, 1998f); the suspects belonged to terrorist groups characterised by their 'fanatical glorification of violence' and a 'horrible distortion of their religion;' and their mission was 'murder' and their history was 'bloody' (Clinton, 1998g). It is clear that in the context of this narrative of 'evil terrorists,' the character of the enemies was set in sharp opposition to the 'good Americans.'⁴⁵ The result was that a common understanding of terrorism and terrorists

⁴⁵ The dichotomy of good and evil provides an example to explain the binary structure of language. According to Llorente (2002: 39), in English, almost every noun, adjective, adverb, and verb has its opposite; usually this opposition implies a devaluation of one term and a favoring of the other. Specifically, words have opposition terms and occupy a hierarchy in which one term is positive, while the other is negative. As Derrida argues, binaries do not have a 'peaceful coexistence,' but rather exist as a 'violent hierarchy' in which 'one term governs the other ... or has the upper hand' (Coe, K., Domke, D., Graham, E., John, S., & Pickard, V., 2004: 235). Carr and Zanetti also indicate that binaries imply 'a struggle for predominance' that powerfully suggests that 'if one position is right, then

was articulated to the general public; terrorists were cold-blooded murderers, psychopaths, religious zealots and irrational killers. Further, this specific interpretation of evil terrorists, in Foucault's terms (Foucault, 1980, 2002), actually placed boundaries around what can be meaningfully discussed about the subject of terrorism. The counterterrorism 'regime of truth' was simultaneously constituted and sustained.

It can be argued that since terrorists were defined as evil, it was unacceptable to negotiate with them through a rational political dialogue. Rather, they had to be suppressed and eliminated. After the 1998 African embassy bombings, President Clinton justified the subsequent bombings of Sudan and Afghanistan as being a righteous decision, and claimed that the military actions were aimed at 'fanatics' and 'killers' (Clinton, 1998g). President Clinton's statement emphasised that unlike terrorists, Americans valued human life; that is, they sought to minimise rather than maximise the loss of innocent life. Demonising political rivals as 'fanatics' and 'killers' was a rhetorical strategy aimed at distancing the United States from terrorists, even though they arguably both adopted the same tactic—that is, the pursuit of violence, to achieve their goals.

Steel (1995: 93) argues that 'if one's enemy is perceived as absolutely evil, then any means implemented against him becomes moral.' Davis and Lynn-Jones (1987: 35) further suggest that 'if Americans regard themselves as morally superior to the rest of the world, they can regard any criticisms only as unfounded and malicious.' These observations explain in part why the Clinton administration could win popular approval for its actions, despite the absence of reliable information proving that a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant had been producing VX nerve gas at the time of the U.S. attacks (Henderson, 2000: 243; Hendrickeson, 2002: 112). According to a poll by *Newsweek*, 73 percent of the public approved of the strikes, while a *CBS-New York Times* poll similarly found that 70 percent of Americans supported these actions (Hendrickson, 2002: 112).

Utilising a good-versus-evil narrative to interpret foreign and security policies is a rhetorical tradition in U.S. politics. One of the most notable examples is President Ronald Reagan's use of the term 'evil empire' to refer to the Soviet Union and communism in the Cold War period. In presidential speeches regarding terrorism, he

the other must be wrong' (Ibid.). Scholars have argued that binary conceptions of reality indeed have consequences; binaries inherently engender and strengthen unequal relations among objects (Ibid.).

also frequently referred to the ‘**evil** scourge of terrorism’ and rhetorically labelled his foreign enemies as ‘**evil** men’ (Jackson, 2006: 174). For example, President Reagan said that ‘terrorism is the preferred weapon of weak and **evil** men such as the **evil** man Colonel Qadhafi’ (as cited in *Ibid.*).

Similar to Reagan, after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, President George Bush adopted the Manichean metaphor of good and evil to formulate his ‘war on terror’ discourse. On the night of the national tragedy, President Bush clearly stated that ‘today, our nation saw **evil**, the very worst of human nature’ (Bush, 2001b). He also said that ‘we are in a conflict between good and **evil**, and America will call **evil** by its name’ (as cited in Ivie, 2007: 221). Condoleeza Rice, President Bush’s National Security Advisor, echoed the president’s speeches and defined the war on terror as ‘a war against **evil** people’ and ‘a war against the **evil** of terrorism’ (as cited in Jackson, 2005: 67). During President Bush’s tenure, these terms were constantly repeated in the U.S. political arena when referring to terrorists and terrorism, and they functioned to justify and constitute President Bush’s global war on terror.

Recent research (Hariman, 2003; Domke, 2004, Murphy, 2004; Jackson, 2005, 2006; Ivie, 2007; Northcott, 2007) has argued that the construction of the good-versus-evil narrative was fed by America’s popular culture and grew into a civil religion of sorts. In his research on the U.S. ‘war on terror’ discourse, Jackson (2005: 66) states that the reason why political elites adopted the good-versus-evil narrative was because the language of evil more easily taps into and reflects American popular culture and its steady diet of Hollywood-style depictions of evil.

Every year, the American film industry produces a large number of films in the horror genre, such as action movies about terrorists, serial killers, and psychopaths, as well as slasher films. In addition, television dramas, graphic novels, games, and fiction in the horror genre are all growing in popularity with younger generations of Americans. Thus, ‘when the president says that something or someone is evil, he places it within a well-known drama, one that not only provides convenient characterisations for all concerned, but also channels powerful emotions that have already been experienced virtually’ (Hariman, 2003: 513). Adopting this language in political rhetoric permits the speaker to evoke powerful emotions that do not normally emerge from democratic political language (Jackson, 2005: 66).

America is also a deeply religious society, and most American citizens consider

themselves to be Christians; therefore, the language of evil, per se, has a particular cultural-religious meaning for U.S. politicians and citizens. Along with President Reagan and President George W. Bush, President Clinton also reinforced U.S. civil religion by utilizing this divine theme to frame his terrorism and counterterrorism discourse and to classify counterterrorism attacks as moral acts. As a result, fighting against terrorism was firmly placed in the context of a struggle between good and evil.

For example, when commenting on the Oklahoma City bombing, President Clinton condemned the terrorist attacks as a terrible 'sin' that took the lives of American families (Clinton, 1995f). He added that 'one thing we owe those who have sacrificed is the duty to purge ourselves of the **dark forces** which gave rise to this **evil**. They are forces that threaten our common peace, our freedom, our way of life' (Ibid.). At the end of his speech, Clinton cited St Paul's words: 'Let us not be overcome by evil but overcome evil with good' (Ibid.). Apparently, in the context of President Clinton's speech, the term 'evil' meant a force or principle that resides in human beings. Since evil is inherent in people, the best way to overcome it is to 'find the people responsible for bringing forth the evil, and either kill them or restrain them from bring forth further evil' (quoted in Rediehs, 2002: 66-7).

In essence, the language of evil performed several distinct functions for administration officials. Not only did it normalise and rationalise counterterrorism initiatives, but it simultaneously dehumanised the terrorists and depoliticised their motivations. Defining terrorism as an evil act of killing, rather than an ongoing act of extortion to achieve political goals, did away with the need to consider the motivations behind terrorist acts.

The Narrative of Civilisation and Barbarism

Another narrative which forms part of American national identity is the meta-narrative of civilisation. A meta-narrative, according to Somers and Gibson, is a specific kind of narrative 'in which we are embedded as contemporary actors in history ... Progress, Decadence, Industrialization, Enlightenment, etc.' (quoted in Calhoun, 1994: 63). Besides this, meta-narratives can be also understood as the 'epic drama of our time,' such as Capitalism vs. Communism, the Individual vs. Society and Barbarism/Nature vs. Civility' (Ibid.: 63). It is argued that the meta-narrative of civilization embedded in U.S. terrorism and counterterrorism discourse reinforced binary identities and placed

parameters around what could be meaningfully discussed and understood about the subject of terrorism (see Llorente, 2002; Jackson, 2006, 2005; Salter, 2007). In the narrative of ‘good Americans’ versus ‘evil terrorists,’ the Western countries, led by the United States, were depicted as the representatives of universal civilisation, while terrorists and rogue states were referred to as uncivilised barbarians.

The word ‘civilisation’ can be traced to France in the eighteenth century, where the term *civilite* was associated with the status norms of the *noblesse de robe* in the court of the monarchy (Cox, 2000: 217). In Germany, during the same time period, the corresponding term was *kultur* (Ibid.: 218). Both *civilite* and *kultur* implied a process of increasing civility and the antithesis of barbarity; this has been argued to be closely related to the emergence of the middle class as a strong social force in both France and Germany (Cox, 2001: 107).⁴⁶ However, with the European expansion of imperialism in the nineteenth century, the process of civilisation spread from Europe to the rest of the world. European civilisation was eventually perceived as a dynamic and active agent inspired by the doctrine of progress, and non-European civilisations were seen as passive and fixed (Ibid.).

In sharp contrast to the concept of civilisation is the concept of barbarism. Todorov (2010: 14) argues that the term ‘barbarian’ has its origins in Ancient Greece when it was part of the common language, especially after the Persian War. It was used to distinguish between the Greeks and everyone else (the ‘others’ or the foreigners) (Ibid.). As these ‘barbarians’ or ‘slaves by nature,’ as defined by Aristotle, could not participate in Greek speech which was seen as the foundation of logic, philosophy, and politics, they were excluded from the Greek community (Salter, 2007: 82). Hence, the concept of barbarian led to identity being based on community, language, and political participation rather than on nation, race or lineage (Ibid.).

With regard to the use of the term in modern society, Said mentions that it encompasses those lacking in manners, language and morals, but not organisation; barbarians symbolise a violent threat to the ‘civilised’ community (Salter, 2007: 82). Kristeve also argues that ‘the word no longer refers to a foreign nationality, but

⁴⁶ The process of civilisation, according to Robert Cox (2001: 107), has typically been viewed as a universal phenomenon that grew during the European Enlightenment period in the eighteenth century; it included the application of universal reason and natural laws to the physical sciences, economic, law and morality. In addition, the finality of the process was a single, unified civilisation.

exclusively to evil, cruelty, and savageness ... the barbarian was to be identified as the enemy of democracy' (quoted in Ibid.: 82). When examining official U.S. discourse on terrorism, it can be seen that the idea of civilisation is deeply embedded within the language and rhetoric. This serves to reify the threats posed by terrorism and remind U.S. citizens of the danger, brutality and difference of the terrorists.

Recent research argues that since the 1980s, the United States has utilised the meta-narrative of civilisation to frame its wars on terrorism, and has strongly appealed to its allies to fight against the terrorist threat because it threatens civilisation (see Llorente, 2002; Jackson, 2005, 2006). President Reagan, for example, declared that terrorism constituted 'a declaration of war on **civilized** society,' and that the United States would joint 'with **civilized** countries in condemnation of terrorist outrages' (Jackson, 2006: 173). In addition, in order to effectively tackle the terrorist threat, the United States urged its Arab allies to act immediately and eliminate the 'scourge of **civilization**' (Ibid.). George Shultz, Reagan's Secretary of State, adopted the same theme to portray the threat from terrorists as barbarism. When speaking of terrorism and the modern world, Shultz explicitly indicated that terrorists commit 'acts of brutality' upon '**civilized** society,' that they 'are depraved opponents of **civilization** itself,' and that 'terrorism represents a return to **barbarism** in the modern age' (Ibid.). For the Reagan administration, the savage nature of the terrorists was self-evident and was visible in 'their cruelty,' the 'viciousness of their tactics,' and their 'bestial nature' (Ibid.).

When critically analysing the language used by the key figures of the Regan administration, the portrayal of terrorism as barbarism not only dehumanised the terrorists, but also depoliticised their reasons for pursuing violent actions. On the other hand, the use of the concept of civilisation and barbarism also suggests that a coercive approach is required to address terrorism. That is, it is impossible to negotiate with terrorists because they are barbarians; savages should be controlled and suppressed. Accordingly, when politicians defined terrorism as barbarism, they effectively eliminated the option for rational political dialogue to peacefully resolve the problem.

In the 1990s, the meta-narrative of civilisation was also utilised by the Clinton administration in its counterterrorism discourses. In the presidential rhetoric, terrorism was officially interpreted as a severe threat to modern 'civilisation' and to all 'civilised people.' When emphasising the catastrophic terrorism of the post-Cold War period,

President Clinton stated:

Obviously, every **civilized society** is at risk of this sort of thing. (Clinton, 1995d).

They resort to murderous attacks that are an affront to the **civilized world**. (Clinton, 1996c).

These kinds of attacks present a genuine threat not only to the lives of the innocent civilians [...] but to the whole idea of an **open, civilized society** in a global economy. (Clinton, 1996f).

It's not the cold war, it's not World War II, but it's an important part of our struggle to make this a **civilized and sane world**. (Clinton, 1996n).

There is no nation which can hide from terrorism unless we all recognize that the rules of **civilized people** do not permit it to be practiced. (Clinton, 1996r).

It may be the most significant security challenge of the 21st century to the people of the United States and to **civilized people** everywhere. (Clinton, 1996r).

The meta-narrative of civilisation was also used by the Clinton administration to shape and promote its counterterrorism policies, such as international sanctions targeted at state-sponsored terrorism. When he urged U.S. allies and other countries to support the American-led counterterrorism initiatives, President Clinton declared:

Free society must mobilize their resources, their ingenuity, and their will to wipe out this evil from our midst. (Clinton, 1996q).

All responsible nations and **freedom-loving people** everywhere ... have to work closely together to stop the spread of terrorism. (Clinton, 1996r).

To succeed in this battle we need to wage it together, as one America leading **the community of civilized nations**. (Clinton, 1996s).

But every **advanced country** is going to have to make up its mind ... That's a decision that every country's going to have to make. (Clinton, 1996s).

In the context of the civilisation narrative, fighting against terrorism was articulated as the duty of every 'free society' and all 'freedom-loving people.' This viewpoint also suggested that the United States, as the leader of the free world, would lead 'the community of civilization nations' to combat terrorism. To effectively tackle the threat posed by the terrorists, President Clinton connected the civilisation narrative to his new terrorism discourse characterised by the feature of boundlessness; he particularly stressed the importance of international cooperation, as he mentioned that 'an attack on one of us is an attack on all of us,' that 'none of us is invulnerable,' and that a 'terrorist attack could occur anywhere' (Clinton, 1996l). Through the use of this discourse, a counterterrorism alliance led by the United States was discursively constructed; the terrorists and rogue states were excluded from civilised society because they 'hated' the universal values of civilisation and were therefore the enemies of peace and democracy.

Within this narrative of civilisation, American society was usually portrayed as being the most 'open society' in the world, distinguished by the 'free and rapid movement of people, technology, and information' (Clinton, 1995i). Openness and free movement were also described as the driving forces behind America's continued progress and leadership of the world. However, in the shadow of terrorism, openness and free movement made American society and its citizens particularly vulnerable to the threat of terrorism. This discursive construction of American society was a direct contrast to the societies to which the terrorists belonged, and which were isolated from civilised society. Terrorists were portrayed as rejecting the pursuit of a better life characterised by peace and prosperity. As President Clinton argued, 'their dark vision is of the past, not the present; of violence, not hope for a better future' (Clinton, 1996a). He also stated 'The future they darken is their own. Instead of a life of security and

prosperity, all they have to offer is violence, poverty, and despair' (Clinton, 1996b).

This interpretation of American society created a civilisation-barbarism dichotomy. Terrorists were separated from the values of civilisation, such as openness and free movement, which produce prosperity and liberty; instead, they were portrayed as choosing to adopt isolation, envy and resentment, which produce poverty and stagnation (Llorente, 2002: 43).

Similar to his predecessors, after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, President Bush employed the same civilisation-barbarism strategy to formulate his 'war on terror' discourse. During the tenure of his presidency, Bush repeatedly referred to the terrorists as 'barbarians' and the U.S.-led coalition as the 'civilised world.' When addressing a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Bush articulated the 'war on terror' as a clash between 'civilization and barbarism' (Bush, 2001d). On other occasions, President Bush made the following statements:

The terror that targeted New York and Washington could next strike any center of **civilization**. Against such an enemy, there is no immunity, and there can be no neutrality. (Bush, 2002b).

These people were **barbaric**. It's hard for the American mind to comprehend how **backwards** and **barbaric** these people were. (Bush, 2004c).

In his description of the 'axis of evil,' President Bush referred to Afghanistan as a regime organised by 'barbarians.' He described it as a 'county ... run by the **barbarians** called the Taliban' (as cited in Salter, 2002: 88). When addressing U.S. troops at Osan Air Base in South Korea, Bush declared:

The United States makes no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who support and harbor the terrorists, because they're equally guilty of murder. Any government that chooses to be an ally of terror has also chosen to be **an enemy of civilization**, and the **civilized world** will hold those regimes to account. (Bush, 2005).

In sum, in the past few decades, the civilisation-barbarism narrative has been frequently employed by key figures in several administrations to shape U.S. counterterrorism discourses. Importantly, the civilization-barbarism dichotomy contains the connotations and genealogy of the term. On the one hand, it elicits images of menacing nomadic armies attempting to conquer Christian Europe, such as Attila the Hun and the Mongol leader Genghis Khan (Llorente, 2002: 41; Jackson, 2005: 48). On the other hand, especially for many Americans, the narrative of civilisation and barbarism evokes collective memories relating to conflicts with Native Americans, when White Christian civilisation was opposed by a savage racial enemy (Jackson, 2005: 48; also see Slotkin, 1998). Thus, by employing the civilisation-barbarism narrative, the national identity of the United States was discursively constructed and re-affirmed as representing modern civilisation, while the terrorists and rogue states, or the ‘axis of evil,’ came to represent barbarism—the antithesis of the modern civilisation.

The Narrative of American Exceptionalism

Another characteristic of U.S. terrorism discourse is the narrative of exceptionalism, particularly the notion of the ‘indispensible country.’ The narrative of exceptionalism is rooted in the Puritan version of America expressed by John Winthrop, the first governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony (Monten, 2005; Friedman, 2012;). Speaking onboard the *Arabella* in 1630, bound for a New World, John Winthrop urged his fellow settlers to create a new society wholly obedient to God’s will and its infinite possibilities:

For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us. So that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world. (Cited in Vlahos, 2012: 67).

According to Hoover (2012: 2), Winthrop’s remarkable 1630 address, which is also known as the address of ‘A Model of Christian Charity’ quoted the biblical metaphor of a ‘city upon a hill’ when calling for a Puritan vision of the world to be established in

the Massachusetts Colony. This specific interpretation, where the United States is depicted as a ‘city set upon a hill,’ is understood as the discursive origins of American exceptionalism broadly cited by academics and political elites in the U.S. political arena.⁴⁷

As well as Winthrop, Alexis de Tocqueville, a French aristocrat, also made a contribution to the discursive construction of the so-called ‘exceptional nation.’ In 1831, Tocqueville visited the United States and attempted to understand the U.S. political system via a comparative perspective, in particular, why democracy was so successful in America but struggling in France. During his years in the United States, Tocqueville was very impressed by the American way of life, especially the American political system, and the system of religious liberty and the profusion of sects; his observations were subsequently published as the two-volume *Democracy in America* (1835, 1840). Tocqueville’s observations of the American way of life enriched the meaning of exceptionalism and reified the political idea of an ‘exceptionalist America.’ He explicitly noted: ‘the position of the Americans is therefore quite exceptional, and it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be placed in a similar one’ (as cited in Hoover, 2012: 1).⁴⁸ Winthrop’s rhetoric of exceptionalist America and Tocqueville’s observations of American politics helped to discursively construct the public narrative of exceptionalism that has been told and retold in American society ever since. Over the last two centuries, prominent Americans have tended to describe the United States as a ‘shining city on a hill,’ an ‘empire of liberty,’ the ‘last best hope of Earth,’ the ‘leader of the free world,’ and the ‘indispensable nation’ (Walt, 2011: 72).

With regard to the use of the exceptionalist narrative in the U.S. political arena, historians have recently noted that references to Winthrop’s 1630 address could be traced to George Washington, the First President of the United States. Yet, its specific

⁴⁷ In 1630, Winthrop was 42 years old when he joined the first large contingent of Puritans who left England to pursue a new social order where, as defined by the Christian scriptures, fellowship with God and God’s people would be the controlling norm. Until his death, Winthrop was seen as a key Massachusetts figure who transformed that vision—a godly commonwealth in the new world—into reality (see Noll, 2012: 5-11; Vlahos, 2012: 67-76).

⁴⁸ Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* is still perceived and argued as the best known of all the ‘foreign traveler’ works about the United States; this book is also recognized as the most important source text for studies of American exceptionalism (Hoover, 2012: 1).

and extended use seems to have begun with President John Kennedy (Noll, 2012: 5). On January 9, 1961, he addressed the Massachusetts state legislature. In the speech, he claimed that:

I have been guided by the standard John Winthrop set before his shipmates on the flagship *Arabella* three hundred and thirty-one years ago ... “We must always consider,” he said, “that we shall be as a city upon a hill—the eyes of all people are upon us.” Today the eyes of all people are truly upon us—and our governments ... must be as a city upon a hill. (Cited in Noll, 2012: 5-6).

Similarly, President Ronald Reagan widely utilised the exceptionalist rhetoric to emphasise U.S. global leadership and to justify U.S. foreign policy. Seiple (2012: 14) argues that Reagan’s first reference to the ‘city upon a hill’ was on January 25, 1974, when he gave a speech at the first annual Conservative Political Action Conference. Following that, in his November 13, 1979, statement regarding his presidential candidature, President Reagan created a new phrase—that is, ‘a shining city upon a hill’—rather than adopting the orthodox interpretation for his speech (Seiple, 2012: 14). However, perhaps most famously, the President referenced Winthrop’s 1630 address when he envisioned an America of ‘harmony’ and ‘peace’ (Ibid.). Noll (2012: 6) indicates that the frequent references by Ronald Reagan to the United States as ‘a city on a hill’ or ‘a shining city on a hill’ sounded the exceptionalist note more explicitly, and that the Winthrop reference has become a staple in the rhetoric of politically conservative Christians ever since. Given that the United States is a deeply religious society (a high proportion of Americans believe that religion plays an important role in their lives),⁴⁹ the rhetoric of an exceptionalist American was extremely powerful and

⁴⁹ According to Huntington (2004: 83-92, 98-103), overwhelming majorities of Americans affirm religious beliefs, and large proportions of Americans appear to be active in the practice of their religion. For example, in 1999, 86 per cent of Americans believed in God, 8 per cent in a universal spirit, and only 5 per cent in neither. Besides, in a series of 2002-2003 polls, 57 per cent to 65 per cent of Americans thought religious was very important in their life while 23 to 27 per cent said fairly important; only 12 to 18 per cent indicated religion was not important. In addition, 64 per cent to 66 per cent of U.S. citizens claimed membership in a church or synagogue, and 58 per cent to 60 per cent of them said they prayed one or more times a day.

resonated with the large conservative Christian audience.

Examining U.S. terrorism discourse, it can be found that the narrative of exceptionalism was adopted by the Reagan administration to construct its Cold War discourse and its interpretation of counterterrorism. For example, the Reagan administration labeled the Soviet Union as the ‘evil empire’ and identified the confrontation between the United States and its Soviet rival as a struggle between good and evil. President Reagan claimed that ‘There is sin and evil in the world, and we’re enjoined by Scripture and the Lord Jesus to oppose it with all our might’ (cited in Winkler, 2006: 82). This kind of interpretation, according to Winkler, actually elevated the mission of the United States into a religious calling (Ibid.). Placing foreign policy within the context of the divine, Reagan urged U.S. citizens to accept on faith their exceptional responsibility in the world—that is, spreading peace, freedom and democracy. The Reagan administration also charged the former Soviet Union with so-called ‘state-sponsored terrorism.’ For Reagan, terrorism was the ‘antithesis of democracy,’ and the United States, as the exemplar of an effective democracy, became the natural target of terrorists. At a speech at the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association, Reagan stated:

we must understand that the greatest hope the terrorists and their supporters harbor, the very reason for their cruelty and viciousness of their tactics is to disorient the American people, to cause disunity, to disrupt or alter our foreign policy [...] to distract us from our very real hope that someday the nightmare of totalitarian rule will end and self-government and personal freedom will become the birthright of every people on Earth. (Reagan, 1985c).

By interpreting the Soviet Union as the ‘evil empire’ and portraying terrorism as the ‘antithesis of democracy,’ the Reagan administration justified its Cold War policy and its counterterrorism initiatives. Therefore, Reagan’s ‘war on terrorism’ can be understood as one of the crucial parts of his Cold War foreign policy. For example, in the 1980s, the U.S. administration firmly supported the Nicaraguan ‘Contras’ to overthrow the left-wing government (Jenkins, 2003: 26). In official language, the U.S. administration defined the Sandinista government as a ‘Marxist-Leninist clique’

(Reagan, 1985a) that broke the hearts of the freedom-loving people by imposing a brutal dictatorship and were deeply involved in terrorism, while the Nicaraguan ‘Contras’ were described as ‘freedom fighters’ (Reagan, 1985c), even though the counter-revolutionary forces carried out many acts of brutal violence against civilian targets. Overall, during the tenure of Reagan’s presidency, terrorism was discursively constructed as the opposite of democracy. The United States, as the ‘exemplar of democracy’ and the ‘shining city on the hill,’ had the responsibility and the international obligation to promote peace and democracy.

Vlahos argues that during the past decade, the exceptionalist rhetoric of America has been frequently utilised by Washington’s elites to legitimise and institutionalise American militarism (Vlahos, 2012: 68). Similarly, through examining Clinton’s discourse on terrorism, this research demonstrates that in the early post-Cold War era, the narrative of exceptionalism was frequently used by key figures of the Clinton administration to frame U.S. foreign and security policies and to rationalise its counterterrorism initiatives. In presidential speeches, Clinton repeatedly claimed that the United States was an ‘indispensible nation’ with a special role in human history. Given that the United States is unique, leading the world to fight against terrorism and promote peace, freedom and democracy were considered an ‘international obligation’ and the ‘historical burden’ of the United States. When justifying America’s global leadership President Clinton announced:

The fact is America remains the **indispensible nation**. There are times when America and **only America** can make a difference between war and peace, between freedom and repression, between hope and fear [...] where our interests and values demand it and where we can make a difference. **America must act and lead.** (Clinton, 1996s).

He further stated:

we should embrace this **responsibility** because at this point in time **no one can do** what we can do to advance peace and freedom and democracy [...] let us resolve to work for a world that looks more like that in the 21st century, to stand strong against the moments of terror that would destroy

our spirit, to stand for the **values** that have brought us so many blessings, values that have made us at this pivotal moment the **indispensible nation**. (Clinton, 1996s).

Besides this, Clinton also discursively attributed the series of terrorist attacks targeted at U.S. citizens to the ‘unique’ and ‘exceptional’ role of the United States. In official language, the reason why the United States and its citizens were targets was simply because the United States is the ‘leader of the free world,’ the ‘bright hope of the world,’ and ‘the most open society on Earth.’ For example, discussing the African Embassy bombings in 1998, Clinton stated:

Americans are targets of terrorism, in part, because we have **unique leadership responsibilities** in the world, because **we act to advance peace and democracy**, and because **we stand united against terrorism**. (Clinton, 1998c).

[...] for terrorists target America because **we act and stand for peace and democracy**, because **the spirit of our country is the very spirit of freedom**. It is **the burden of our history and the bright hope of the world’s future**. (Clinton, 1998e).

America is and will remain a target of terrorists precisely because **we are leaders**; because **we act to advance peace, democracy, and basic human values**; because **we’re the most open society on Earth**; and because...we take an uncompromising stand against terrorism. (Clinton, 1998g).

Madeleine Albright, Clinton’s Secretary of State, also employed the exceptional rhetoric and justified the United States’s role in world politics, describing the United States as ‘the greatest country’ (Albright, 1998b), ‘the only superpower’ (Albright, 1998c), and ‘the indispensable power’ (Albright, 1998c) of the world. Furthermore, to effectively tackle the threats that the United States faced in the post-Cold War era, including terrorism, both Clinton and Albright insisted that the United States would take ‘extraordinary steps’ and decisively use military force to protect U.S. national

interests, even when coercive operations were not supported by its allies. When talking about U.S. post-Cold War foreign and security strategies, Albright made her well-known comment that, ‘if we have to use force, **it is because we are America**; we are **the indispensable nation**. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future’ (Albright, 1998c). Following the 1998 African embassy bombings, the Clinton administration launched military strikes on Sudan and Afghanistan, and justified the right to use force by reminding U.S. citizens that the United States is an ‘indispensible country.’ According to public polls, more than 70 percent of U.S. citizens supported the military operations (Hendrickson, 2002a: 112, 144), even though these operations caused great suffering and were later criticised as a mistake (Henderson, 2000). The statements of the ‘indispensible nation’ and the coercive measures implemented by the U.S. illustrated how this exceptional world view directly influenced U.S. foreign and security policies.

Similar to Clinton, after the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the same presumption of America’s international responsibility and its unique role in world history was employed in Bush’s counterterrorism discourse. On the night of the national tragedy, Bush said the United States was targeted for attack because the United States is the ‘**brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world**’ (Bush, 2001b). On other occasions, the president stated: ‘This is a **great country**. It’s a **great country** because we share the same **values** of respect and **dignity** and **human worth**’ (Bush, 2001c); and ‘Ours is a **great land**, and we’ll always **value freedom**. We’re an **open society**’ (Bush, 2001f). When justifying the proposed counterterrorism policy and stressing the leadership of the United States, President Bush claimed that the United States is a ‘**great nation, a freedom-loving nation, a compassionate nation**, a nation that understand the value of life, and rout terrorism out where it exists’ (Bush, 2001f). Based on Reagan’s rhetoric of the ‘shining city upon the hill’ and Clinton’s ‘indispensible county,’ Bush formulated his ‘war on terror’ discourse by discursively constructing the nation’s role of leading the global struggle against terrorism.

Notably, the narrative of exceptionalism explicitly reflected the world view of the United States, on the one hand, whilst simultaneously functioning to construct its national identity, on the other hand. Moreover, it rationalised and justified the actions and behaviours of the United States and its subsequent foreign and security policies. Dougal (2001) argues that when politicians identify the United States as an

indispensable country and stress its leading role in world politics, they actually put forward the suggestion that the United States should reform the world, either as an exemplar or a crusader. Hughes (2003: 91) similarly argues that Americans' self-consciousness about their country can be attributed to the national myth of the Millennial Nation, which claims that the United States will eventually illuminate the globe with truth, justice, goodness, and democratic self-government. As embodied on the Great Seal of the United States, '*annuit cœptis*' or 'he (God) has favoured our undertakings' and '*novus ordo seclorum*' or 'a new order of the ages,' Americans believe that their country is not an ordinary nation; instead, it is a nation with a unique obligation, an 'undertaking,' which will bless all the nations of the world (Ibid.: 100-1).

American exceptionalism, a story about the ancient history of the United States and a story about the American way of life, embedded in U.S. counterterrorism discourses, can be also understood as a kind of shared or collective narrative which reminds U.S. citizens 'who Americans are' and 'where Americans come from.' It functions to discursively construct the national identity of the United States and make sense of Americans' lives. Furthermore, it directs the way that the United States interacts with international society and frames its foreign and security policies, such as the promotion of democracy, foreign military interventions and counterterrorism initiatives. As Guth (2012: 77) argues, although the ideology of American exceptionalism is complicated, one core element has always been foreign policy exceptionalism. Walt (2011: 72) similarly notes that the United States has a divinely ordained mission to lead the rest of the world, and that is the tradition of U.S. politics. From the perspective of constructivism, national interests and foreign policies are actually not self-evident and determined by the nature of anarchy, as neo-realists usually claim; instead, they are socially constructed. Constructivists also suggest that we cannot know 'how to act' until we know 'who we are.' Thus, exceptionalism, a unique world view of the United States and a story of the American way of life, is fundamental to the construction of U.S. national identity and foreign and its security policies.

The Narrative of Heroes and Cowards

Another prominent feature of U.S. counterterrorism discourse has been the 'hero' and

‘coward’ narrative. Importantly, using cowardice as a descriptor for terrorist attacks also serves to construct a gendered discourse which emphasises masculinity—or the lack thereof—as being a way to understand the attacks plotted by the terrorists and as justification for the counterterrorism measures conducted by the authorities (Egan 2002: 54). However, in studying the narrative of cowardice, it should be noted that the narrative does not argue that the acts of counterterrorism implemented by the authorities were in any way justified; instead, similar to other narratives invoked in U.S. counterterrorism discourse, the narrative of cowardice functioned in part to construct national identity and made the counterterrorism initiatives, in particular, the launch of a military-based approach to anti-terrorism, appear normal.

According to *The Oxford English Dictionary*, the term ‘coward’ and ‘cowardly’ are derived from the old French word *coart*. Etymologists have suggested that *coart* was originally utilised to describe an animal, in particular, the hare ‘turning tail’ in flight, or the habit of frightened animals drawing their tail between their hind legs. However, in modern English, the meaning and the usage of these terms changed and differed from the original definitions in old French. In a study of U.S. political discourse, Egan (2002: 54) argues that the word ‘coward’ was traditionally utilised to depict a person who was not qualified to be a real man; one who refused to fight when he was engaged in a battle. It further implied that the coward was not brave enough to face his adversaries and that he chose to hide behind his rivals. In essence, the coward was the antithesis of the mainstream ideology of masculinity in a patriarchal culture (Ibid.).

Masculinity, according to the orthodox explanation, is usually described with words like strong, brave, aggressive, and rational, whereas femininity is expressed as being weak, cowardly, passive, and irrational (Egan, 2002: 54). The coward, failing to meet the traditional description of masculinity, is, therefore, associated with the characteristic of femininity. Egan indicates that the narrative of cowardice constructed by the United States and used in its counterterrorism discourse actually created a binary where the coward is on one side, and the hero is on the other, and the hero must do something to teach the coward a lesson (Ibid.). Hence, when the U.S. claimed that terrorist attacks were ‘cowardly acts,’ it was actually asking the cowards—that is, the terrorists—to fight like real men. Undoubtedly the United States would eventually play

the hero who must punish the cowards and teach them the lesson they deserved.⁵⁰

After the tragedy of September 11th, 2001, the Bush administration adopted the narrative of cowards and heroes to construct its ‘war on terror’ discourse and to frame its counterterrorism policies. In presidential rhetoric, Bush repeatedly claimed that the so-called terrorists were ‘cowards,’ and the actions they conducted were ‘cowardly acts;’ he also announced that the United States would respond to the ‘cowardly acts’ without hesitation. On the night of September 11th, 2001, President Bush explicitly declared: ‘Make no mistake: The United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these **cowardly acts** [...] The resolve of our great Nation is being tested. But make no mistake: We will show the world that we will pass this test. God Bless’ (Bush, 2001a). By invoking the term ‘coward,’ a clearly emasculating term, the Bush administration justified its ‘global war on terror’ mission and made bombing Afghanistan a veritable certainty. However, it would be asked whether cowardice is the right term and whether a suicide attack like the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 are really cowardly acts. Another question is what options are immediately excluded when the authorities invoke the terms ‘coward’ and ‘cowardly’ to interpret the terrorist attacks.

According to Egan (2002: 60), suicide is often constructed and understood in two different ways: brave, ‘as in giving one’s life for one’s country’ and cowardly, ‘as taking the easy way out and not really dealing with the difficulties of life.’ It is obvious that the terrorist attacks targeted at the United States were framed and categorised as ‘acts of cowardliness’ in U.S. counterterrorism discourses. Durkheim, a French sociologist, argues that suicide cannot not be understood simply as a binary between bravery and cowardice; instead, it is a phenomenon closely associated with the particular social and cultural context in which people live, and, therefore, it should be studied and explained as an act determined by dynamic social forces (Ibid.: 61).

⁵⁰ Perhaps the emasculating interpretation and the possible resolution, i.e., the punishment, are related to the so-called ‘cowardly conduct’ specifically mentioned within Military law and noted by military professions. According to the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice, acts of cowardice, such as desertion in the face of the enemy and surrendering to the enemy against orders, are strictly prohibited. These cowardly actions have long been condemned and punished in the military; the punishment is typically severe, ranging from corporal punishment to the death sentence (for more details regarding the ‘cowardly conduct,’ see ‘Uniform Code of Military Justice,’ *US Military About.com*, <http://usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/ucmj/blart-99.htm>).

Durkheim further theorises four variants of suicide, namely, egoistic, anomic, fatalistic and altruistic.⁵¹ Based on Durkheim's theories of suicide, the emasculating interpretation of terrorists as cowards and cowardly is literally not an appropriate expression, given that the tragedy on September 11th, 2001, and many other terrorist attacks, fit into one or more of the categories of suicide. Nevertheless, the narrative of the coward was still used by Washington's decision makers to frame, legitimise and sustain their counterterrorism 'regime of truth' and to shape the common understanding of the subject of terrorism.

Tracing the discursive origins of the American-led war on terror, it can be demonstrated that prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the United States had employed the narrative of cowardice to construct its terrorism discourse and to frame its counterterrorism initiatives. During the Clinton years, the cowardice discourse was frequently mentioned in official references of terrorism. For example, when making comments on Iraq's attempt to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush, Clinton declared that 'this attempt at revenge by a tyrant against the leader of the world coalition that defeated him in war is particularly **loathsome** and **cowardly**' (Clinton, 1993g). In the same speech, he justifies the U.S. military strike in Iraq that followed by stating: 'A firm and commensurate response was essential to protect our sovereignty... to deter further violence against our people, and to affirm the expectation of civilised behaviour among nations.' Clinton argues 'Saddam Hussein has demonstrated repeatedly that he will resort to terrorism or aggression if left unchecked' (Ibid.). When responding to the Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, Madeleine Albright, Clinton's Secretary of State, referred to these attacks as '**cowardly** acts of terrorism.' She went on to echo Clinton's speech (Clinton, 1998i), asserting that 'we will spare no effort and use all the means at our disposal to track down and punish the perpetrators of these outrageous acts' (Albright, 1998e). Again, following the USS *Cole* bombing, Clinton announced that the suspects are 'hate-filled

⁵¹ Egoistic suicide, according to Durkheim, is a specific result of a society promoting extreme individualism. Anomic suicide occurs when a society shifts rapidly and its belief system, such as norms and values, is forced to change. Fatalistic suicide is attributed to an oppressive situation in which there is little to no hope of alleviating the oppressive conditions. Finally, altruistic suicide usually occurs in an extremely integrated society wherein the rules and values directing the society are strong. As a result, individuals living in this type of society are happy to sacrifice their lives for the society and the belief system that they adhere to (see Egan, 2002: 61).

cowards' (Clinton, 2000b).

Similar statements were frequently mentioned in the official language associated with other major terrorist attacks, namely, the Oklahoma City bombing (1995), the Khobar Towers bombing (1996), and the Centennial Olympic Park bombing (1996). President Clinton, for example, asserted:

It was an act of **cowardice** and it was **evil**. The United States will not tolerate it. And I will not allow the people of this country to be intimidated by **evil cowards**. (Clinton, 1995c).

The **cowards** who committed this murderous act must not go unpunished [...] make sure those responsible are brought to justice [...] Those who did it must not go unpunished. (Clinton, 1996i).

The **cowardly**, brutal attack on American military personal in Saudi Arabia is on everyone's mind. (Clinton, 1996m).

Today, we have an enemy it is difficult to face because the enemy is so often **hidden**, killing at random, surfacing only to perform **cowardly acts**. (Clinton, 1998: 1210).

The examples outlined all illustrate that the narrative of cowardice indeed fulfills certain functions. At one level, it condemned the terrorist attacks and emphasised the cowardly nature of the terrorists. At another level, as it always did, it provided a discursive framework for U.S. administrations to justify and legitimise its counterterrorism measures, such as its military strikes targeted at Iraq in 1993, its bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, and later, Bush's global 'war on terror.' In statements regarding terrorism, U.S. leaders affirmed that cowardly acts require a decisive response. As Clinton declared: 'there are no expendable American targets; there will be no sanctuary for terrorists' (Clinton, 1998g).

As mentioned, the coward narrative is usually combined with, or implicitly invokes the hero narrative. Together, these narratives constitute a binary opposition, discursively constructing the national identity of the United States and justifying the

subsequent counterterrorism initiatives. Specifically, when the United States claimed that terrorists were cowards and their behaviour was indicative of ‘cowardly acts,’ it simultaneously and implicitly identified itself as being the hero, with both the obligation and the right to take measures to respond. Jackson (2005: 79-80) argues that America’s hero narrative is closely associated with its popular culture and its national mythology of military heroism, noting that, perhaps, the most famous example of the hero narrative can be seen in American films. In common with many Hollywood movies, U.S. administrations constructed their counterterrorism discourse employing similar hero versus villain scripts. For example, when George Shultz, Reagan’s Secretary of State, addressed the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, he explicitly asserted: ‘I would like to salute the unsung **heroes** of the struggle against terrorism. These **heroes** are the intelligence analysts’ (quoted in Jackson, 2006: 178). The Clinton administration similarly employed the ubiquitous hero narrative of American popular culture in its counterterrorism discourse. When remarking on the Oklahoma City bombing, Clinton defined the victims as ‘the brave Americans’ and ‘patriots’ providing services for U.S. citizens (although these victims were not fighting a war). A similar rhetorical strategy was also adopted to describe the casualties of the African Embassy bombings in 1998, and the USS *Cole* bombing in 2000. When responding to these terrorist attacks, President Clinton stated:

your loved ones gave their lives to the highest calling, serving our country, protecting our freedom, and seeking its blessings for others. (Clinton, 1998bc).

They worked to create opportunity and hope, to fight poverty and disease, to bring divides between peoples and nations, to promote tolerance and peace. They expressed both their patriotism and their humanity. (Clinton, 1998j).

Our sailors aboard the U.S.S. *Cole* were simply doing their duty, but a dangerous duty, standing guard for peace. (Clinton, 2000b).

In the context of the president’s discourse, the grammar suggests that the victims were

‘patriots’ and ‘guardians of freedom,’ that they had good characters and that they were all-American heroes.

In common with his predecessors, George W. Bush also utilised the hero narrative to formulate the administration’s counterterrorism discourse. Through the production and reproduction of the ‘war on terror’ discourse, the narrative of heroes resonated with U.S. citizens. The hero narrative, as previously mentioned, is modelled on American popular entertainment scripts, and every tale in American popular culture has a cast of heroes and villains (Jackson, 2005: 79). Accordingly, the victims, rescue workers, firefighters, police officers and U.S. military personnel were all recast as American heroes in Bush’s ‘war on terror’ narrative (Ibid.). In this specific narrative, every EMS worker is Bruce Willis in *Die Hard*, every military professional is Tom Hanks in *Saving Private Ryan* and every citizen is Mel Gibson in *The Patriot* (Ibid.). The scripting employed by the administration evoked popular entertainment images of American heroes who devoted themselves to the United States, and who sacrificed their lives to protect the traditional values of the United States, namely, freedom, democracy and human dignity.

The particular myth of military heroism is related to the broader narrative of heroes. In American society, heroic figures are usually linked to the military and law enforcement professions. This reflects, in part, the U.S. position as the most militarily powerful country in the world, its robust military industrial complex, its highly militarised society, and its high levels of annual military expenditure (Bacevich, 2013; Goodman, 2013). To honor American soldiers and veterans, numerous national ceremonies are held in the United States every year. Besides this, many memorials associated with the war experiences, such as the National World War II Memorial, the Korean War Veterans Memorial and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, are located in Washington, the capital city. The national services and the establishment of memorials show that the United States is extremely proud of its military heroism, and, therefore, heroism is an important element in the construction of U.S. national identity.

Scholars have argued that national identity is at stake in the public memory of war (see Zelizer, 1995; Wahnich, Lasticova, & Findor, 2008; Finney, 2011). The collective remembering of war and narratives of heroism, mingled with stories of victimhood and martyrdom, are fundamental to national recovery, as well as the framing of national identity (Finney, 2011: 14). The explanation of collective memory and the social

construction of national identity provide a very useful perspective in examining U.S. counterterrorism discourse. By adopting the narrative of heroism and the collective memory of war, the national identity of the United States has been discursively constructed and reaffirmed. In the memorial service for crew members of the *USS Cole*, President Clinton stated:

I am quite sure history will record in great detail our triumphs in battle, but I regret that no one will ever be able to write a full account of the wars we never fought, the losses we never suffered, the tears we never shed because men and women like those who were on the U.S.S. *Cole* were standing guard for peace. We should never, ever forget that. (Clinton, 2000c).

They have given us their deaths. Let us give them their meaning: their meaning of peace and freedom, of reconciliation and love, of service, endurance, and hope. After all they have given us, we must give them their meaning. (Clinton, 2000c).

Similar to Clinton, in a memorial service for the Pentagon victims, Donald Rumsfeld, Bush's Secretary of Defense, also personalised the hero-victims:

We remember them as **heroes**. [...] 'He was a **hero** long before the eleventh of September,' said a friend of one of those we have lost – 'a **hero** every single day, a **hero** to his family, to his friends and to his professional peers.' [...] about him and those who served with him, his wife said: 'It's not just when a plane hits their building. They are **heroes** every day.' 'Heroes every day.' We are here to affirm that. (quoted in Jackson, 2006: 179).

On the one hand, the hero narrative could be perceived as a way of redeeming the tragedy of terrorist attacks (Jackson, 2005: 82). Few would be able to accept that their loved ones died needlessly or meaninglessly; therefore, narratives of survival and redemption are instrumental for exorcising the mantle of victimisation and vulnerability. From this perspective, these narratives serve as a normal part of the

collective ritual of mourning (Ibid.). However, they are also a powerful means of writing identity and demonising the enemy (Ibid.).

Conclusion

As argued in this chapter, the narratives embedded in U.S. counterterrorism discourses have played a crucial role in constructing national identity. In the past few decades, a common understanding of terrorism or a counterterrorism ‘regime of truth’ came to encompass key figures of the government administrations and the general populace of the United States. Through the social practices of counterterrorism, a clear boundary around what could be meaningfully discussed about terrorism and terrorists was built, and, as a result, the counterterrorism ‘regime of truth’ was constructed and maintained.

In addition, it has been argued that the way we discursively construct the subject of terrorism influences the way that we address this threat. For example, by interpreting terrorists as ‘evil,’ ‘barbarians,’ and ‘cowards,’ a military-oriented counterterrorism response was always highly likely. Americans have come to believe that since terrorists are ‘hatred-filled,’ ‘twisted,’ ‘mad,’ ‘brutal,’ and ‘irrational’ cowards, it is impossible to negotiate with them because they should be controlled, suppressed or killed. However, recent research (Bergen, 2001; Pape & Feldman, 2010; Gunning & Jackson, 2011) has illustrated that it is fallacious to attribute terrorist attacks to the inherent evil of the terrorists or to the cult of religion; instead, most terrorists are inspired by strong political motives, particularly the resistance to foreign military occupation and dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policies (Eland, 1998; Jackson, 2007). Hence, many scholars argue that perhaps a diplomatic and political resolution would be more appropriate to deal with the terrorist threat rather than coercive counterterrorism measures.

In addition to framing the national identity of the United States, the social construction of terrorism as a *negative ideograph* is another remarkable discursive achievement of U.S. counterterrorism practices (Winkler, 2006; Jackson, 2011). An ‘ideograph,’ according to McGee (1980: 15), should fulfill at least four requirements: (1) It must be a term broadly used in the political arena; (2) it must be an abstract collective commitment to a specific normative goal; (3) it must give the authorities the ability to implement necessity measures for some reason or excuse, and these measures must be accepted and seen as reasonable by the majority; and (4) its meaning must be

culture-bound; that is, it can be defined and explained within different social and cultural backgrounds.

It is obvious that terrorism fits the four categories listed. First, it is a term broadly utilised in the U.S. political arena. Second, the meaning of 'terrorism' has shifted at several different historical points. In the 1790s in France, the term was initially used to describe the attempts by French leaders to eliminate their political opponents (Townshend, 2011). In contemporary U.S. politics, 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' have been used to describe both an external or internal threat, such as Islamic terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, home-grown terrorism or even the American students who promoted the anti-Vietnam War movement in the 1960s (Winkler, 2006). In the name of counterterrorism, U.S. administrations have often justified and rationalised their counterterrorism initiatives, such as President Clinton's bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan and President Bush's global war on terror; these military strikes were all strongly supported by U.S. citizens, as indicated in national polls. In the end, through the discursive formulation and a numbers of broad social practices, terrorism increasingly functions as a *negative ideograph* and a *cultural taboo* within U.S. society. Taboos, according to Zuliaka (1996: 153), are rooted in the fundamental requirement to control dangerous behaviour. Steiner also indicates that a taboo has at least two social functions: the classification and identification of transgressions; and the institutional situating of danger, both by the segregation of it and by protecting society from it (Ibid.). 'Terrorism,' as argued and interpreted as the most intractable politico-military danger in many national and international scenarios, thus fulfills the requirements of a modern *taboo*.

To summarise, this chapter has analysed President Clinton's counterterrorism discourse, and illustrated how American national identity was rhetorically constructed by a set of narratives, namely, the narrative of good and evil, the narrative of civilisation and barbarism, the narrative of American exceptionalism, and the narrative of heroes and cowards. In the next chapter, an overview of the empirical findings of Clinton's terrorism discourse is provided, and some of the theoretical implications of the research are discussed. It is argued that over the past decades, the 'war on terror' discourse has become sedimented and institutionalised in the wider American society, and can be understood as a truth regime. To change the discourse, a determined change agent, a specific social and political context, and the promotion of a critical approach

to language—that is, critical language awareness (CLA)—are all necessary.

Chapter 7

Rethinking the Discursive Construction of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: What Discourse Revealed, Explained, and Hid

Introduction

The aim of the present research is to analyse and explain how the counterterrorism ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 2002) in America was constructed and constituted through the process of discursive practice. The conception of ‘regime of truth,’ according to Foucault (2002: 131), can be understood as a type of discourse which is perceived as, and functions as, truth, a specific mechanism or instance that enables human beings to distinguish between true and false interpretations, and the status of those who have the authority to affect public opinion and decide what is true. It can be argued that through the way that discourse is framed and comprehended—that is, discursive practice—the common understanding, or the common ‘grid of intelligibility’ (see Milliken, 1999), of terrorism is shaped and constituted. Specifically, through the production and reproduction of discourse, ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ are discursively constructed in a specific way, namely, as imminent threats to the United States, its citizens and Western civilisation. As President Reagan claimed, the ‘plague of terrorism’ (quoted in Leeman, 1991: 130) threatens to ‘spread like a cancer, eating away at civilised societies and sowing fear and chaos everywhere’ (Ibid.). That there is no cure for the terrorist threat makes it especially frightening, and thus it must be carefully monitored and controlled.

In addition, one of the key consequences of the discursive construction of terrorism is that it comes to function as a ‘negative ideograph’ (see McGee, 1980) and a ‘social taboo’ (see Jackson, 2011b) in American and broader Western society. Moreover, the social construction of the terrorist threat and the language utilised by powerful elites, or the ‘regime of truth’ in Foucault’s (2002) terms, suggests particular ways to address terrorism, either through a law enforcement-based approach or a military approach. Terrorism must be condemned and eliminated, while terrorists must be brought to justice and punished. The terrorism truth regime also implies that any compromise or negotiation is unacceptable because terrorists are inherently evil. This uncompromising rule is clearly articulated in U.S. official documents, such as the

annual report on *Patterns of Global Terrorism* and the *National Security Strategy*, and adhered to by counterterrorism practitioners. The everyday practice of discourse illustrates that discourse not only produces knowledge of terrorism and terrorists, but also shapes and constrains policy options. That is, it sets clear parameters for how the subject of terrorism should be discussed and understood, and rules out alternative and potentially more effective ways of responding to terrorism such as dialogue and political negotiation.

However, a number of questions remain: does discourse always reflect the truth? Further, what can we learn and what can we not learn from discourse? What kinds of ideology and power relations are embedded in discourse? Why is the dominant discourse or ‘regime of truth’ seen as credible and uncritically accepted by the popular majority? Can discourse be changed? How/why can discourse be (or not be) changed? Why do we sometimes need to change discourses? These questions are asked by critical discourse analysts and students. In order to answer these questions, this chapter firstly provides an overview of U.S. terrorism and counterterrorism discourse based on the empirical research presented thus far. In addition, through the method of genealogy, the discursive construction of terrorism and terrorists in the U.S. political arena is explored and examined. The research uncovers a clear continuity in the American-led war on terror, from Ronald Reagan, to Bill Clinton, and through to George W. Bush, in terms of the language used by U.S. presidents and the counterterrorism policies implemented by their administrations.

Following a chronological analysis of U.S. discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism, some wider theoretical reflection is provided. It is suggested that Foucault’s (2002) concepts of ‘truth and power’ and ‘subjugated knowledge’ (see also Jackson, 2012) provides a useful framework through which to critically question the dominant discourse and unveil the asymmetric power relations between powerful groups and less powerful minorities. Lastly, this research argues that critical language awareness (CLA) and ‘emancipatory’ language practice, as introduced by Fairclough (1992a, 1999, 2010) and other critical linguists (Janks & Ivanic, 1992), are necessary for the future study of discourse. In the conclusion to the chapter, I suggest that

although discursive change⁵² is extremely difficult to achieve and needs specific conditions to support it, such as a change agent and a particular social and political context (Jackson, 2014), it is still worthwhile for individuals, through the study and practice of language and discourse, to work for ‘change’ and to ‘change’ the world for the better.

Reviewing the American-Led War on Terror: A Genealogical Study of U.S. Terrorism and Counterterrorism Discourses

In one of his speeches, Michael Foucault said that genealogy is a ‘history of the present’ (Gutting, 2005: 50). That is to say, the primary intent of genealogy is not to understand the past in its own terms or for its own sake, but to comprehend and evaluate the present (Ibid.). By conducting a genealogical study, this research has traced the discursive origins of the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ in U.S. presidential rhetoric. It demonstrates a distinct continuity in the discourse of the American-led war on terror from Ronald Reagan, to Bill Clinton, and later, to George W. Bush. This finding challenges a dominant theme in the existing literature which suggests that the war and its discourse largely originated with the George W. Bush administration (Collins & Glover, 2002; Silberstein, 2002; Murphy, 2004), and the dramatic foreign-policy revolution following the 2001 World Trade Center bombings (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003; Leffler, 2004; Mann, 2004).

As discussed previously, the political usage of the term *terrorism* can be traced to the 1790s in France (Townshend, 2002; Jenkins, 2003). During the French Revolution, the term ‘terrorism’ was initially utilised to describe the attempts by French

⁵² As defined in this research, *discourse* means a specific way of thinking of and speaking of the world. Thus, *discursive change* does not merely refer to the substitution of one word for another, such as the Clinton administration’s replacement of ‘backlash states’ to ‘rogue states,’ and, later, to ‘states of concern,’ or the George W. Bush administration’s labelling of Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil’ and ‘rogue states.’ Instead, *discursive change* means a new thinking and a new approach to understanding a specific subject and the world we live in. It should be noted that real discursive changes require larger changes to the entire order of discourse; and, this is not something we have seen so far, in part because the discourse has been embedded and materialised in institutions and practices. Scholars (Fairclough, 1992a; and Jackson, 2014) also argue that a *discursive change* is very hard to achieve and it needs particular conditions, such as a determined change agent, a specific social and political context, and a problematization of social conventions.

revolutionary leaders to eliminate their political opponents. In Russia during the nineteenth century, the ruling party also used the word ‘terrorist’ to describe Russian revolutionaries who pursued their aims through violent methods (Wilkinson, 2012). However, at the end of the nineteenth century, when left-wing and radical rebels were launching violent attacks in European countries, the concept of terrorism came to be perceived as actions mainly carried out by sub-state anarchists, rather than by governments, an idea that was in contrast to the initial eighteenth-century French definition (Ibid.). In the 1940s and 1950s, the term terrorism was more frequently employed to describe the political violence employed by nationalists and anti-colonists in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Booth & Dunne, 2012). Until relatively recently, the concept of terrorism was used primarily to refer to the actions of nationalist and ideologically-motivated groups within Western countries, such as the IRA in the United Kingdom, ETA in Spain, the FLQ in Canada (Ibid.), and the Red Army Factions in Germany and Italy.

The usage of the term ‘terrorism’ in the U.S. political arena can be traced to the late 1960s, when the Kennedy administration defined its Vietnamese enemies and their actions as ‘terrorists’ and ‘terrorism’ (Winkler, 2006). A similar rhetorical strategy which merged the tactic of terrorism with the ideological objectives of Communism was adopted by both the Johnson and Nixon administrations to portray the Communist and Viet Cong threats. During the Vietnam War, the conceptual definition of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ used by U.S. administrations not only referred to the external threats posed by the Soviet Union and the Viet Cong, but also to American citizens who strongly opposed the U.S.-Vietnamese policy. In the late 1970s, during the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the Carter administration employed the same terrorism rhetoric to depict the event and condemned the actions of the so-called terrorists. President Carter defined the hostage crisis as an ‘act of terrorism’ (Carter, 1979) and rhetorically linked the event to ‘international terrorism’ (Carter, 1980-1981). Carter’s discourse on terrorism featured a ‘crime’ frame (see previous chapter), in sharp contrast to his successor, Ronald Reagan, who broadly employed a ‘war’ metaphor to structure his ‘war on terrorism’ discourse (see Jackson, 2006; Winkler, 2007).

In the 1980s, with the growing confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the U.S. terrorism discourse changed significantly, particularly during the Reagan presidency. President Reagan combined the Cold War narrative and the

'war' metaphor to frame his 'war on terrorism' discourse. For the Reagan administration, terrorism was the 'antithesis of democracy' (Reagan, 1985), and a 'new kind of warfare' (Reagan, 1984). Under the Reagan presidency, the United States launched military strikes on Libya in response to the 1986 La-Belle nightclub bombing in West Berlin, a terrorist attack for which Libya was denounced as the mastermind (Winkler, 2007; Toaldo, 2012). In Reagan's 'war on terrorism' discourse, Qadhafi was depicted as 'the mad dog of the Middle East,' a 'barbarian,' and 'the outlaw Libyan regime' (Winkler, 2007: 309). Given that Reagan explicitly defined terrorism as an 'act of war' and the administration broadly utilised a 'war' rhetoric to interpret terrorism, President Reagan's 'war on terrorism' can be argued as the first period of the American-led war on terror (Wills, 2003).

However, it is worth noting that, with very few exceptions, such as Winkler's (2006) explanation of President George H. W. Bush's discourse on the first Gulf War,⁵³ and Lazar and Lazar's (2007) research on the 'new world order' discourse, there are few studies which examine President George H. W. Bush's terrorism discourse. This was due, in part, to the relatively short term of his presidency (from 1989 to 1992). Moreover, the administration, under George H. W. Bush's tenure, largely concentrated its foreign and security policies on the framing of the new world order and on addressing threats posed by Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, in particular, the 1991 invasion of Kuwait and the U.N.-authorised Desert Storm mission. Nevertheless, as this research has shown (see Chapter 5), President George H. W. Bush contributed to the discursive construction of so-called 'rogue states' which was later expanded and further explained by his successors, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush (Litwak, 2000; Miles, 2012).

Scholars (Litwak, 2000; Miles, 2012) argue that the spectre of 'rogue states' was of serious concern to the George H. W. Bush administration, and the perceived threats from the 'rogues' affected the formulation of U.S. post-Cold War military strategy. For example, suggestions for tackling 'rogue states' and the assertion of a 'two-theatre'

⁵³ Winkler (2006: 104) argues in her research that at the beginning of the first Gulf War, the George H. W. Bush administration tended not to relate Iraqi's military invasion to terrorism; however, it eventually decided to adopt the terrorism theme to structure its political discourse (Winkler, 2006). For example, in official language, Saddam Hussein was described as an 'international terrorist' and Iraq's occupation of Kuwait was described as 'a systematic campaign of terror on the people of Kuwait.'

approach were explicitly articulated by Richard Cheney, President Bush's (Sr) Secretary of Defense, in his *Regional Defense Strategy*, which was released in January 1993, and the Department of Defense's 'bottom-up review' of U.S. military strategy (Miles, 2012: 22–3). The rogue states approach promoted by the George H. W. Bush administration was later continued by the Clinton administration. Les Aspin, Clinton's first-term Secretary of Defense, stated that the United States needed to 'contain rogue leaders set on regional domination,' and 'defeat potentially hostile regional powers such as North Korea and Iraq' who were 'pursuing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capabilities' (Ibid.: 23).

It can be argued that President Reagan's discourse on state-sponsored terrorism and President George H. W. Bush's rhetoric of the pressing threat of Saddam Hussein provided a discursive foundation for President Clinton to frame his terrorism-related discourse, particularly in terms of threats from the 'rogues.' During the Clinton years, the sociopolitical reality of 'rogue states' was created and constituted through the articulation of political discourse, official documents, and policy practices. In the official lexicon, the term *rogue states* was constantly mentioned by U.S. elites, and the frequency of its use reached a peak in 1999 (although, to improve the U.S.-Iranian relationship, the Clinton administration subsequently changed the designation from 'rogue states' to 'states of concern' in June 2000). The Clinton administration also discursively connected 'rogue states' to terrorism and counterterrorism, a practice which was later followed by the George W. Bush administration's response to the so-called 'axis of evil' used to justify the American-led war on terror. The discursive construction of the Iraq/al Qaeda alliance was also a notable element of President George W. Bush's 'war on terror' discourse.

An examination of President Clinton's terrorism discourse shows that during the first-term of his presidency, counterterrorism was not a major preoccupation of the administration's foreign and security policies. However, following the Tokyo sarin gas attack, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the Khobar Towers bombing, counterterrorism came to be seen as an important national security issue by key members of the administration. Outlining the specific threat of 'new terrorism,' or 'catastrophic terrorism' (see Chapter 3) President Clinton claimed: 'fighting terrorism is a big part of our national security today, and it will be well into the 21st century' (Clinton, 1995). Warren Christopher (1996), Clinton's Secretary of State, similarly

asserted that ‘none of the challenges we now face is more pressing than the fight against terrorism. Terrorism destroys innocent lives. It undermines a society’s sense of security.’

As discussed in the previous chapters, it is worth noting that the Khobar Towers bombing in particular, marked a turning point in Clinton’s discursive construction of counterterrorism, because for the first time, the Clinton administration adopted both a ‘crime frame’ and a ‘war metaphor’ to interpret terrorist attacks. Prior to this incident, the Clinton administration tended to describe terrorism as a crime, and its counterterrorism policy was largely based on a law enforcement-oriented approach. However, after the terrorist attack that targeted U.S. soldiers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, the Clinton administration shifted its counterterrorism policy and employed harsher language—a ‘war’ metaphor—to portray terrorism and terrorists. The President said that terrorism was one of the real ‘threats’ to Western societies (Clinton, 1996m), and terrorists were a ‘common enemy’ of all human beings. To address the threat, the President urged U.S. citizens to rededicate themselves to the ‘fight against terrorism’ in order to ‘eliminate’ terrorism (Clinton, 1996j). Consequently, in 1998, following the change in language, the Clinton administration bombed Sudan and Afghanistan in retaliation for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

In contrast to President Reagan’s ‘war on terrorism’ discourse which focused on the threats of international terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism, President Clinton’s discourse on ‘catastrophic terrorism’ emphasises the ‘nexus of new threats’ (Clinton, 1996y) and its borderless characteristics. The ‘nexus of new threats,’ according to the Clinton administration, constituted the dangerous webs of terrorism, rogue states, international crime, drug trafficking, and weapons of mass destruction (Clinton, 1996s). Clearly, in addition to the state-sponsored terrorism stressed by President Reagan, non-state actors and their potential arming with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons—so-called weapons of mass destruction—formed the essence of President Clinton’s discourse on ‘catastrophic terrorism.’ Apart from that, cyberterrorism, a new type of terrorism arising from developments in technology and information, was simultaneously emphasised by the Clinton administration, soon becoming prevalent in the U.S. official lexicon. Given that President Clinton had articulated the threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, cyberterrorism, and rogue states in the 1990s prior to the 2001 World Trade Center bombings, it can be argued that President

George W. Bush's 'war on terror' discourse was actually established on the rhetorical foundation provided by Clinton's 'new terrorism' discourse.

Clinton's discourse on new terrorism, or catastrophic terrorism, also illustrated how U.S. political actors comprehended the new post-Cold War security environment, and sought to establish their roles within that environment in accordance with perceived U.S. interests. Specifically, in official language, the 'nexus of new threats' replaced the 'evil empire' as the preeminent threat to the United States, its citizens, and the American way of life in the post-Cold War era. With the 'new nexus of threats' and the side effects of globalisation, President Clinton claimed that 'these forces of destruction find opportunity in the very openness, freedom, and progress we cherish' (Clinton, 1996s), and have made the United States and its citizens more vulnerable. Besides this, two significant terrorist attacks occurred in 1995, namely, the Tokyo gas attack and the Oklahoma City bombing, prompting the Clinton administration to note the threats of WMD-terrorism and 'home-grown' terrorism, and to further modify its counterterrorism policy by concentrating on both internal and external threats. President Clinton claimed that terrorists came from 'within or beyond our borders' (Clinton, 1995m), and that terrorist acts have 'become an equal opportunity destroyer, with no respect for borders' (Clinton, 1996s). The emphasis of borderless threats was later employed by President George W. Bush and his political aides to frame the 'war on terror' discourse, and to stress the danger of terror/enemies within the United States. For example, President Bush claimed that the United States needed to track down 'terror here at home' (cited in Jackson, 2005: 112), and John Ashcroft, the U.S. Attorney General, said that terrorists were 'living within our borders' and that the United States had to fight against 'enemies, foreign and domestic' (Ibid.).

Overall, building on Reagan's 'war on terrorism' discourse, Clinton's discourse detailed the characteristics of 'new terrorism,' the tactics that terrorists would utilise, and the targets they chose. Through the functioning of discourse, and the way that discourse is created and understood, the 'common understanding' or 'grid of intelligibility' (Milliken, 1999) of terrorism was constructed, constituted, and widely shared by decision makers and the public. Importantly, the discourse also constrained the possibility of alternative policy options based on non-coercive approaches such as political dialogue and negotiation, and suggested a very specific way to tackle terrorism and terrorists. That is, they had to be 'controlled,' 'arrested,' 'killed,' and

‘eliminated,’ as officials constantly asserted that U.S. counterterrorism policy was to ‘make no concessions to terrorism and terrorists.’ The political assertion of counterterrorism was explicitly articulated in various official documents, such as the *National Security Strategy* and the *Global Patterns of Terrorism*, and influenced the real practices of counterterrorism: for example, Reagan’s decision to bomb Libya in 1986, Clinton’s military retaliation targeted at al Qaeda leaders and facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, and, after 2001, George W. Bush’s global war on terror leading to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Finally, although there were many similarities between the three administrations, such as the rhetorical strategies utilised to portray the threat of terrorism and terrorists, the construction of the national identity of the United States, and narratives of good and evil, civilisation and barbarism, American exceptionalism and heroes and cowards, there were also some slight differences between them. In general, for President Reagan and President Clinton, counterterrorism was just one of their foreign policies. However, for President George W. Bush, counterterrorism and the global war on terror arguably comprised the central focus of his foreign policy. In addition, Reagan’s ‘war on terrorism’ discourse was structured by the Cold War narrative and the notion of state-sponsored terrorism. In contrast, Clinton’s ‘new terrorism’ discourse and George W. Bush’s ‘war on terror’ discourse were well known for their emphases on WMD-terrorism, home-grown terrorism, cyber-terrorism, and the threat from so-called ‘rogue states.’

What Discourse Revealed, Explained, and Hid: Theoretical Implications and the Future Study of Discourse

What Discourses Hide: Truth Telling, Subjugated Knowledge and the Production of Knowledge

As discussed in this research, one of the significant features of President Clinton’s ‘catastrophic terrorism’ discourse was its emphasis on so-called ‘rogue states’ armed with weapons of mass destruction and their connection with international terrorism. Similarly, the discursive connection of Saddam’s regime with al Qaeda, weapons of mass destruction and the 2001 terrorist attacks, formed a central theme of President

George W. Bush's 'war on terror' discourse. It can be argued that the administration's discursive construction of terrorism and counterterrorism was a kind of *truth telling*⁵⁴ which functioned to shape public understandings about the threats that the United States faced and more importantly, to sustain the counterterrorism 'regime of truth.' The discursive construction of 'truth' and the sociopolitical 'reality' of threats, such as catastrophic terrorism, the utilisation of weapons of mass destruction, and rogue states, fulfilled certain political purposes. Through the functioning of discourse, U.S. administrations were able to shape policy options and justify specific foreign and security policies, such as the Clinton administration's dual-containment approach to Middle East peace, and the George W. Bush administration's global war on terror.

Subsequent to the 2001 World Trade Center bombings, key individuals in the George W. Bush administration claimed that there was a real link between Saddam Hussein's regime, al Qaeda, and the terrorist attacks of September 11th. President Bush, for example, indicated in his October 2002 speech in Cincinnati:

We know that Iraq and the Al Qaida terrorist network share a common enemy—the United States of America. We know that Iraq and Al Qaida have had high-level contacts that go back a decade ... We've learned that Iraq has trained Al Qaida members in bombing and poisons and deadly gases. And we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America. Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints. (Bush, 2002d).

In addition, President Bush explained why a WMD-armed Iraqi regime was so dangerous to the United States and to the entire world. Bush stated:

⁵⁴ The term 'truth' here does not refer to *objective truth* or *absolute truth*. Instead, it signifies a *conditional truth* that is discursively constructed by powerful social actors and is therefore contingent. Given that language is never neutral and cannot be used objectively (as most social constructivists and critical discourse analysts assert), there is no possibility of achieving *absolute/objective truth* or so-called *universal knowledge*.

Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used chemical weapons to kill thousands of people. This same tyrant has tried to dominate the Middle East, has invaded and brutally occupied a small neighbor, stuck other nations without warning, and holds an unrelenting hostility toward the United States. (Bush, 2002d).

In the name of counterterrorism, the George W. Bush administration argued that a war against Iraq was necessary and an important part of the war on terror. It frequently claimed that 'Iraq is now the central front in the war on terror' (Bush, 2004a, 2004b). Importantly, polling data demonstrated the degree to which the administration's terrorism discourse resonated with the broader American society. For example, a 2002 Pew Research Center poll revealed that two-thirds of U.S. citizens believed that Saddam Hussein was involved in the 2001 terrorist attacks. Later, a 2004 study conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland illustrated that 57 per cent of Americans believed that Iraq had provided 'substantial support to al Qaeda' (Hodges, 2011: 64). Moreover, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations indicated in its 2002 report that issues such as the possibility of unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers, international terrorism, and biological and chemical weapons were deep concerns of the American majority (*U.S. General Population Topline Report*, 2002: 92-3). According to the report, 91 per cent of U.S. citizens worried about international terrorism (the percentage was 69 per cent in 1994 and 84 per cent in 1998), while 86 per cent of them thought that a WMD-armed Iraq, as well as biological and chemical weapons, were critical threats to the United States (Ibid.). The polling data not only illustrated that the administration's discourse on terrorism resonated with the public and likely helped to shape public opinion, but it also demonstrated that the discursive construction of threats and dangers indeed created a specific cultural understanding of so-called catastrophic terrorism and rogue states.

However, following the Iraq War, more and more information showed that the so-called *truth* articulated by officials was of questionable validity. For example, governmental documents—such as the final report of the 9/11 Commission and a 2006 Senate Intelligence Committee report—demonstrated that there was actually no hard

evidence to prove a collaborative operational relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, as the Bush administration had constantly claimed (Hodges, 2011: 64–5). Osama bin Laden, the al Qaeda leader, had explicitly indicated a salient difference between his brand of Islamic fundamentalism and Saddam Hussein’s secular dictatorship. On February 11, 2003, bin Laden argued in a tape: ‘the jurisdiction of the socialists and those rulers has fallen a long time ago. Socialists are infidels wherever they are, whether they are in Baghdad or Aden’ (bin Laden, 2003). Besides this, prior to the U.S. military invasion of Iraq, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zabaydah, the two key figures of al Qaeda, had told U.S. investigators that although bin Laden had once thought to align with Saddam Hussein, the plan was eventually excluded by bin Laden himself (Mearsheimer, 2011). This evidence illustrated that the ‘war on terror’ narrative framed by the George W. Bush administration was full of contradictions, misinformation, and propaganda. It produced a doubtful narrative. In order to ‘sell’ the proposed foreign policy—regime change in Iraq—the Bush administration chose to conceal significant information, because ‘telling the truth’ would undermine its claims about the Iraq/al Qaeda alliance.⁵⁵

Related to this, the George W. Bush administration justified the war in Iraq by citing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programme and its record of violating international non-proliferation norms. The specific interpretation of a WMD-armed Iraq functioned to help the administration to gain support from the broader society. Later, it came to be perceived as ‘taken-for-granted’ knowledge about the so-called ‘irredeemable regime.’ However, a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace pointed out that prior to the U.S.-led War in Iraq the broader consensus shared by U.S. intelligence agencies was that most of Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear, and long-range missile capabilities were destroyed as a result of the 1991 Gulf War and the U.N.-authorised inspections of the 1990s (Cirincione, Mathews, Perkovich, & Orton, 2004: 16). Apart from that, the Gilmore Commission, a Clinton-appointed advisory panel in the 1990s, argued in its final report that so-called

⁵⁵ It has been shown that prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a regime change plan for Iraq had been broadly discussed in the U.S. political arena. During the 1990s, many neo-conservative pundits, such as Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, and John Bolton, urged the Clinton administration to promote a regime change plan in Iraq; most of them later served as key members of Bush’s foreign and security policy team (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007).

rogue states would hesitate to entrust weapons of mass destruction to terrorists because their actions were unpredictable and there was always a possibility that terrorists might use the weapons of mass destruction against their state-sponsors (RAND, 2003). It is also worth noting that the subsequent consequences—the international response—would likely prevent these states from utilising weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, Condoleezza Rice, President George W. Bush's National Security Advisor and second-term Secretary of State, said that there was no need to worry about rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction. Rice clearly stated, 'if they do acquire WMD – their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration' (cited in Jackson, 2012a: 13). Overall, an examination of President Clinton's 'catastrophic terrorism' discourse and President Bush's 'war on terror' discourse illustrates the internal contradictions within discourse. Further, it can be argued that every discourse has contradictions and instabilities, even while the central building blocks of the discourse remain stable and in fact, become embedded in institutions and practices.

In terms of the cause of terrorist attacks targeted at the United States, the U.S. government most often attributed terrorist attacks to religious, other-worldly, or psychopathic causes. For example, in official language, terrorists were usually portrayed as 'religious fanatics,' 'barbarians,' and 'psychos,' and terrorism was interpreted as emerging out of a 'twisted mentality.' Yet, there was no mention in the discourse regarding what the United States had done in past decades that may have served as a reason for the political violence, in particular, the U.S. military presence in the Middle East and its pro-Israeli foreign policy. Scholars (Eland, 1998; Pape & Feldman, 2010) have recently argued that America's global interventionism was actually the major concern of so-called Islamic terrorists, rather than pathological hatred or radical Islamic fundamentalism. Ivan Eland (1998; see also Aksan & Bailes, 2013: 122) of the CATO Institute, for example, suggests that a strong correlation exists between interventionist U.S. foreign policy and terrorist attacks against the United States, and, therefore, a military-restraint foreign policy was suggested in order to reduce the number of potential terrorist attacks. Robert Pape and James Feldman (2010) also claim that foreign military occupation and the U.S.'s pro-Israeli policies contribute to terrorist attacks targeted at the United States (see also Bergen, 2001). However, despite the admonitions of scholars, U.S. foreign policy has been based on

the ideal of pursuing global dominance supported by U.S. military preponderance and the assertion of global leadership. The research mentioned above suggests that dominant discourses hide or obscure alternative interpretations; sometimes they *hide* important evidence or facts, and in doing so, a counterterrorism ‘regime of truth’ is simultaneously constructed and sustained.

During an interview regarding truth and power, Foucault (2002: 132) argued that ‘truth is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements.’ He went on to argue that ‘truth is linked in a circular relation with systems of power that produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it—a “regime” of truth.’ The truth, from Foucault’s (Ibid.) perspective, does not refer to the ‘ensemble of truths to be discovered and accepted,’ but, rather to ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true.’ Foucault’s conception of truth and power provides a useful tool to illustrate the ways in which the U.S. administrations’ public discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism came to be uncritically accepted and treated as ‘taken-for-granted’ knowledge. It also helps to uncover an asymmetric social structure constituted by the dominated groups and powerless minorities. Clearly, in the discursive construction of the war on terror (which began with Ronald Reagan, and then continued with Bill Clinton and George W. Bush), U.S. administrations actually played the role of *truth tellers*, and the *truth* (i.e., the common understanding of terrorism, counterterrorism, and rogue states) was defined, articulated, and affirmed by the powerful social actors—the presidents of the United States and their political aides. Given that they were the ‘symbolic power’ or the ‘worldmaking power,’ in Bourdieu’s (1987) terms, they had the authority to impose a ‘legitimate vision of the social world and of its divisions’ and further shape the public narratives. For this reason, their discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism were not merely rhetorical responses to a single terrorist attack, but the construction of a sociopolitical ‘reality’ of terrorist threat and U.S. security practices. Other discourses produced by less powerful actors—such as the ‘no war for oil’ discourse (Croft, 2006) and the discussion of state terrorism (Jackson, 2012a)—were kept in the margins and were very rarely accepted as ‘mainstream.’

In addition to the notion of ‘truth and power,’ Foucault’s argument regarding

‘subjugated knowledge’ also elaborates on the reason why some counter-discourses, or subjugated discourses, are seen as worthless, naïve, and disqualified, and therefore, are excluded and silenced by the central (or dominant) discourse. Jackson (2012a) argues that Foucault’s ‘subjugated knowledge’ actually implies two levels of meanings for the academic study of terrorism. First, it refers to what might be called ‘endogenous knowledge,’ which is present within the functional and systemic ensemble of terrorism studies itself. Yet, for various reasons, it is masked and buried by more dominant forms of knowledge (Jackson, 2012a: 13). Second, it refers to specific forms of knowledge, which are outside of, or exogenous to, the field of terrorism studies (Ibid.: 15). As Foucault indicated, subjugated knowledge also refers to ‘a whole series of knowledges that have been disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity’ (cited in Jackson, 2012a: 13).

The concept of ‘subjugated knowledge’ provides a useful framework for understanding why several counter-discourses, such as state terrorism (Chomsky, 2002; Stohl, 2006; Jackson, 2008b), nonviolent responses to terrorism (Hastings, 2004; Goerzig, 2010; Toros, 2012), and the political causes of terrorism (Eland, 1998; Pape & Feldman, 2010), are ‘subjugated’ by the dominant discourse and ‘regime of truth’ (Jackson, 2012a: 13–4). Further, it explains why certain types of research, which are usually identified as nonscientific or as lacking theoretical support, are ignored and seen as less important in the orthodox terrorism studies discourse (Ibid.: 15–6).

To sum up, political discourses not only produce knowledge, but also constrain knowledge. As discussed and elaborated in this thesis, the counterterrorism ‘regime of truth’ was constructed and maintained through the process of discursive practice. The ‘regime of truth’ not only framed the ‘common understanding,’ or the ‘grid of intelligibility’ (Milliken, 1999) of terrorism and terrorists, but also shaped the policy options which subsequently affected the real practices of counterterrorism. Furthermore, it set the parameters of debate and ruled out alternative ways of dealing with the ‘terrorist threat.’ Eland’s (1998) research and policy advice, for example, did not figure in official discussions, as it was excluded by the dominant discourse. However, the critical element of discourse analysis would argue that the sociopolitical ‘reality’ of threat, danger, and risk is actually contingent: it depends on who interprets

it, analyses it, and defines it. Given that ‘reality’ is given its meaning by agents and practices, and meanings are contingent and therefore changeable, discursive change is highly possible, although the fixities of meaning are usually very stable and difficult to change.

Can Discourse Be Changed? Why/How Can Discourse Be (or Not Be) Changed?

In the study of discourses, key questions are asked by researchers and discourse analysts, including: Can discourses be changed? Why/how can discourse be (or not be) changed? Why should we change the U.S. terrorism discourse? Through a genealogical study of U.S. terrorism-related discourses, the research presented here shows a clear continuity in U.S. counterterrorism from Ronald Reagan, and continuing with Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, in terms of the language that the U.S. presidents and their administrations used, and the practices of counterterrorism they conducted. In addition, recent research (Jackson, 2011a, 2014; McCrisken, 2011) on President Barack Obama’s counterterrorism rhetoric and practice argues that ‘continuity’ from previous administrations will likely be maintained. It is very hard to anticipate a significant counterterrorism policy ‘change’ due to the fact that over the past decade the ‘war on terror’ has become cemented in Americans’ society and everyday practices. As Jackson (2014) argues, once a set of ideas, beliefs, and practices has become embedded in a society and functions as a ‘truth regime,’ it is extremely difficult to make any change, even for a symbolically powerful actor like the president of the United States.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that this does not deny the possibility of any discursive change. There is indeed a discernible shift regarding the meanings and the usage of the terms *terrorism* and *terrorists* over human history. As previously mentioned, in France, during the period of the Reign of Terror, ‘terrorism’ was used to describe elites’ attempts to suppress their political opponents; however, after the Second World War and particularly with the rise of the decolonisation movement, it referred to the actions of national and ethnic groups within states, such as the IRA in the United Kingdom and ETA in Spain. In addition, as this thesis has shown, in past decades, there has been a reformulation of counterterrorism discourse in the U.S. political arena. For example, in the late 1990s, the Clinton administration decided to replace the phrase ‘rogue states’ with ‘states of concern’ in order to promote a policy

of engagement with Iran. With regard to the particular policy change, Madeleine Albright (2000a), Clinton's second-term Secretary of State, said, 'we are now calling these states "states of concern" because we are concerned about their support for terrorist activity, their development of missiles, and their desire to disrupt the international system.' Similarly, during the Iran-Iraq War (from 1980 to 1988), in order to bolster the Iraqi Saddam regime, the Reagan administration removed Iraq from the State Department's terrorism list and provided Saddam Hussein with critical intelligence data to fight against its Iranian adversary.

However, U.S.-Iraqi foreign policy changed, both discursively and politically, in the 1990s. In official language, Iraq was rhetorically labelled as a member of the 'rogue states' (as the Clinton administration argued) and the 'axis of evil' (as the George W. Bush administration emphasised). Recently, the Obama administration also decided to stop using the phrase 'war on terror.' As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explained, 'the administration has stopped using the phrase and I think that speaks for itself' (cited in McCrisken, 2011: 782).

Notably, although U.S. administrations like the Clinton administration and the present Obama administration sought to avoid utilising specific terms for certain political purposes, the essence and the central discursive building blocks of the terrorism discourse remained the same. That is, in every administration, terrorism and terrorists remained *inherently evil*, *irrational* and *religious fanatics*. Terrorists, together with rogue states, international criminals, and drug traffickers, constituted the 'nexus of new threats' and, importantly, as emphasised by U.S. administrations, they severely threatened the national security of the United States and the American way of life. Thus, to effectively tackle the threats, extraordinary measures were required, such as the use of military force, rendition programmes, and, more recently, targeted killing drone strikes adopted by both President George W. Bush and President Obama. In short, an examination of U.S. terrorism-related discourse shows a chain of equivalences. That is, although U.S. administrations sought to modify and change the usage of some specific terms, such as 'outlaw states,' 'rogue states,' 'states of concern,' and the 'war on terror,' due to specific proposed policies, an American perspective of world order based on the idea of U.S. primacy, the calculation of military and political interests, geo-political dominance, liberal ideology, and capitalism still constituted the core element of U.S. political discourse, which was not critically challenged or

replaced by other counter-discourses. One of the political consequences is that the ‘war’ is now continuing, and the United States is still struggling to fight against so-called ‘extremism.’

In terms of the question regarding how/why discourse can(not) be changed, Jackson (2014) concludes that a powerful change agent, and a moment of rupture or crisis, creates the necessary conditions for discursive change. Fairclough (1992a: 96) similarly states, ‘the immediate origins and motivations of change in the discursive event lie in the problematization of conventions for producers and interpreters, which can happen in a variety of ways.’ According to Fairclough (Ibid.), when problematisations arise, individuals are faced with severe ‘dilemmas’ which prompt them to think and act innovatively and creatively, and this specific social condition induces people to resolve the ‘dilemmas’ by adapting existing conventions in new ways. Therefore, in addition to the change agents, for Fairclough, the ‘problematizations’ of conventions and individuals’ awareness of ‘dilemmas’ are driving forces for discursive change.

This approach can be utilised to elaborate on several significant social and political ‘changes’ in contemporary history, such as President Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ discourse, Mikhail Gorbachev’s political and economic reorganisation in the former Soviet Union,⁵⁶ and Margaret Thatcher’s social and political reform (‘Thatcherism’) in the United Kingdom. It can be argued that Roosevelt, Gorbachev, and Thatcher all played the key roles of ‘powerful change agents,’ in Jackson’s (2014) terms, in the shaping and transformation of new discourses. Apart from that, the specific social and political conditions that these countries faced, such as the Great Depression in the United States and the economic recessions of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom during the 1980s, also provided a specific context for the agent actors to create new discourses, to introduce new thinking, and to promote particular social and political reforms.

Given that the two requisites—a powerful and motivated agent and a specific social and political context—do not exist in the current U.S. political arena, it is very hard to anticipate a radical counterterrorism policy ‘change’ in the coming years. In 2009, when President Obama assumed office, many expected that the newly elected

⁵⁶ Gorbachev’s political and economic reform was well known by the introduction and promotion of *glasnost* (openness), *perestroika* (restructuring), and *demokratizatsiya* (democratisation).

president would abandon his predecessor's foreign policy characterised by the global war on terror. Indeed, during the presidential campaign, candidate Barack Obama promised to return the United States to a moral, benign, and cooperative foreign policy based on the foundational values of the United States (McCriskin, 2011: 781–2). He declared, 'we must adhere to our values as diligently as we protect our safety with no exceptions' (cited in McCrisken: 782).

However, an examination of President Obama's first-term foreign policy reveals a clear 'continuity' (and lack of change) of U.S. counterterrorism policy, although at the onset of Obama's presidency, the administration sought to modify several policies, such as ending the use of torture, withdrawing from Iraq, and reorienting the 'war' to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Jackson (2011a, 2014) and McCrisken (2011) claim that over the past decade, the 'war on terror' has become sedimented and institutionalised as a common sense or 'regime of truth' within American society. Croft (2006: 263–4) also argues that through the production and reproduction of discourse, the 'war on terror' has penetrated everyday American practices, in particular, American popular culture, including books, novels, poems, films, TV programmes, music, and news media. Accordingly, it now exists as a powerful and durable social structure within American society, which not only shapes but also constrains public opinions and possible policy options. For this reason, even if the president wanted to 'change' direction, he and his administration would have to face the 'reality' of the truth regime, and resistance from the wider society.

Finally, despite the fact that U.S. counterterrorism policy 'change' will be extremely difficult to achieve in the coming years, there is no reason to give up all hope of discursive change. As this research has argued and presented, the current terrorism and counterterrorism discourses indeed fulfill certain contradictions and fallacies. However, through the ways of discursive practice and social practice, terrorism has been perceived and understood as a 'negative ideograph' (McGee, 1980; Winkler, 2006) and a 'social taboo' (Zulaika & Douglass, 1996; Jackson, 2011b) to the United States and Western societies. It has also been argued that the continuing fear of terrorism literally produces several social and political effects which benefit to policy-making elites and government agencies (Jackson, 2014). For example, it makes people more willing to exchange civil liberty for security, and more willing to allocate government resources on counterterrorism initiatives (Ibid.; see also Ridout, Gross &

Appleton, 2008: 575). Further, it activates authoritarian tendencies, deference to leaders, intolerance for dissent, and provoked patriotism (Jackson, 2014; see also Pyszczynski, 2004; Woods, 2011). In the name of counterterrorism, the administrations can therefore rationalise and justify their proposed policies, such as torture, targeted killing drone strikes, and military occupations. Considering the political and ethical consequences mentioned, a discursive change of terrorism and counterterrorism is necessary.

Change can start with ourselves (i.e., the producers and consumers of language and discourse) and with the everyday practices of critical linguistic awareness (CLA), as introduced by Fairclough and other critical linguists (Fairclough 1992b, 1999, 2010). As long as we can keep practising the skills of critical thinking, rather than uncritically accept the information given by the so-called ‘regime of truth,’ alternative counter-discourses can continue to be heard by the popular majority. In so doing, a wider debate and dialogue on public affairs becomes possible. The next section will focus on critical linguistic awareness and emancipatory language practice.

Critical Linguistic Awareness and Emancipatory Language Practice

The research presented in this thesis reconfirms the necessity of critical linguistic awareness (CLA) in education, as argued by Fairclough and other critical linguists (Fairclough, 1992b, 1999, 2010). Given that dominant discourses hide or obscure alternative interpretations, and that sometimes the ‘truth regime’ hides important evidence or facts, it is necessary to practise critical and oppositional reading, listening, and viewing of discourses, and engage in ‘emancipatory’ language practice. Fairclough elaborates on the importance of CLA in the following terms:

CLA aims to draw upon learners’ own language and discourse experience, to help them become more conscious of the practice they are involved in as producers and consumers of texts: of the social forces and interests that shape it; the power relations and ideologies that invest it; its effects upon social identities, social relations, knowledge, and beliefs; and the role of discourse in processes of cultural and social change. (Fairclough, 1992b: 239–40)

According to Fairclough (1992b: 240), CLA aims to encourage individuals to rethink and ‘become more aware of constraints upon their own practice, and of the possibilities, risks, and costs of individually or collectively challenging those constraints to engage in an “emancipatory” language practice.’ Janks and Ivanic (1992: 315) also argue that through CLA, language users can comprehend why and how a variety of English has become standardised, and, therefore, further question the view that such a standardised variety is inherently superior to other alternative interpretations. It is important to note that through CLA, individuals can become aware of the way in which certain groups tend to control and influence interactions, and of the way in which language tends to impose the speaker’s (or writers’) view of the world on us (Ibid.: 315–6).

In the study of U.S. terrorism discourse, for example, the counterterrorism ‘regime of truth’ or ‘worldmaking power’ played a significant role in shaping public narratives. Through the functioning of discourses, that is, through discursive practice, U.S. administrations rationalised and legitimised their counterterrorism initiatives, and in so doing, the ‘truth regime’ was maintained and constituted. Simultaneously, through the process of discursive practice and social practice, an American perspective on counterterrorism and world order, such as the United States’ role in global antiterrorism efforts and Middle East peace, was discursively constructed and constituted. In official language, U.S. elites claimed that terrorists and rogue states such as Iran and Iraq were ‘enemies of peace.’ Therefore, as the leader of Western civilisation, the United States had a duty to lead the world in the fight against terrorism, and perhaps, transform so-called ‘rogue states’ into international society. Leading the world to a better future was the international responsibility and historical burden of the United States. Officials’ statements regarding the security concerns of the United States not only show how they view the world, but also illustrate the anticipated response to a particular situation in accordance with perceived interests.

In addition, the discursive construction of terrorism and terrorists established clear parameters within which these subjects could be meaningfully understood and discussed. It also constrained the possibility of alternative policy options to address the threats that terrorism and terrorists posed. That is, terrorism and terrorists were *inherently evil*; they therefore had to be controlled, eliminated, or killed. As such, other suggestions aimed at peacefully dealing with the terrorism threat (see Hastings, 2004; Goerzig, 2010; Toros, 2012), such as political dialogue and negotiation, were excluded

and seen as somehow nonsensical. Similarly, rogue states, as U.S. political elites argued, were *irredeemable* and *unpredictable* (Indyk, 2009); they had to be monitored and contained, either through ‘aggressive containment’ or through ‘active containment’ (Freedman, 2009; Indyk, 2009). Critically analysing the statements of U.S. elites, it can be argued that officials’ interpretations about the ‘rogue threats’ actually suggested certain specific policies, such as the regime change plan in Iraq and international sanctions targeted at Iran. Consequently, other alternative policies were precluded. These examples illustrate that discourse is both constitutive and constituted, and discourse per se encompasses particular power relations and ideologies. On the one hand, it reflects the worldview of U.S. policy makers; on the other hand, it frames, suggests, and constitutes a particular world order shaped by the ‘worldmaking power’ of discourse.

In terms of CLA and ‘emancipatory’ language practice, it is argued that as long as individuals continue to question taken-for-granted knowledge and read dominant discourses in a critical way, the social structure and asymmetric power relations embedded in discourses can eventually be deconstructed. In so doing, a wider public debate and dialogue among different groups on specific issues, such as terrorism, counterterrorism, social inequality, and social injustice, can be prompted and noted by the popular majority, and perhaps contribute to the construction of new discourses and social change.

For many CDA scholars, power relations, such as the doctor-patient relationship and the teacher-student relationship, exist in the everyday practice of discourse. With the production and reproduction of discourses—such as medical discourses and educational discourses—these power relations are maintained and constituted. However, through the practice of CLA, the asymmetric power relations embedded in discourse can be emancipated from the taken-for-granted reality. For example, CLA would argue that in an orthodox medical discourse, doctors are usually perceived as professionals and intellectuals (they are assumed to know everything about diseases and prescriptions), while patients are seen as helpless. Patients should follow doctors’ instructions; their self-consciousness of their health condition is not really of concern in a hierarchical doctor-patient relationship. A similar asymmetric power relation exists in the teacher-student relationship. Through the functioning of discourse, the teacher-student relationship is discursively constructed. Students should follow

teachers' guidance and instruction; they have to be taught and educated. This specific understanding of the teacher-student relationship tells us how an appropriate relationship between teachers and students should be, and, importantly, the way that educational institutions function. Furthermore, the power relation embedded in discourse explains how an individual's identity (either as a doctor/teacher or as a patient/student) is discursively conceptualised and constructed, and how social structure is rhetorically framed and constituted.

In addition, it is worth noting how the power relations embedded in discourse explain why certain counter-discourses or subjugated discourses are excluded and silenced by the central (hegemonic) discourse. As previously demonstrated, the U.S. terrorism and counterterrorism discourse constructed a 'regime of truth' through the 'worldmaking power' of elite discourse, in Bourdieu's (1987) terms. As argued, a 'regime of truth' represents an asymmetric power relation within society characterised by dominant groups and powerless minorities. The status and resources of 'truth regimes' allows it to impose a legitimate version of terrorism and counterterrorism. Because it has 'symbolic power' and 'worldmaking power,' the interpretation/information provided is seen as convincing, and most of the time, is uncritically accepted by the public. Once the powerful interpretation is treated as commonsense and taken-for-granted knowledge, other counter-discourses are excluded and silenced. However, CLA would argue and suggest that through deconstructing powerful discourses, the alternative non-violent responses to terrorism (see Hastings, 2004; Goerzig, 2010; Toros, 2012), which the literature shows are more effective anyway, can be heard. In addition, peace studies has been studying violent for a long time and has a great deal to say, but until to dominant discourse is challenged and deconstructed, it is difficult for this other 'subjugated knowledge' to be noted.

Lastly, it should be noted and clarified that CLA does not argue that power relations are detrimental, or claim that the dominant discourse is absolutely false. Instead, it simply argues for a denaturalisation of taken-for-granted reality. Given that representations of the world are socially and culturally contingent—they could have been different—the entities which are seen as objective and natural could always have been articulated differently. Most important of all, what individuals can learn from CLA is how to respect differences, including different opinions, different voices, different languages, and different discourses. Differences should not be suppressed or

silenced. Instead, they should be negotiated through a series of dialogues and discussions. As Fairclough (1999: 98) indicates: ‘discourses are partial and positioned, and social difference is manifest in the diversity of discourses within particular social practices.’ Accordingly, learning how to work across differences in work, politics, cultural activities and everyday life is the main task for each CLA practitioner. In short, CLA can not only contribute to an education reform, by introducing a critical approach to language and discourse, but also contribute to a social change, by deconstructing powerful discourses and uncovering the asymmetric power relations embedded in discourses.

Conclusion

As mentioned, over the past decade the ‘war on terror’ has been sedimented and institutionalised in the wider American society, and now exists as a powerful social-political structure (Jackson, 2014). These social structures not only shape but also constrain policy options. That is, they set clear boundaries around how terrorism and terrorists can meaningfully be discussed and comprehended, and they rule out alternative options of dealing with them. At the beginning of Barack Obama’s first-term, the U.S. administration declared that the phrase ‘war on terror’ would be abandoned in the official lexicon. However, following an examination of current U.S. counterterrorism policy, it can be argued that the George W. Bush legacy—that is, the ‘war on terror’ and its discourse—is followed and continued by Obama, his successor. Despite the slight change of political rhetoric and the reorientation of the ‘war’ in Pakistan and Afghanistan, many of President George W. Bush’s counterterrorism initiatives have been adopted by the Obama administration. There is a clear ‘continuity’ (and lack of change) within the counterterrorism policies of President George W. Bush and President Obama.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the ‘war on terror’ did not actually originate with the George W. Bush administration as is frequently argued. Instead, the ‘war’ and its discourse can be traced to the Reagan administration or even earlier periods. This research illustrates that prior to President George W. Bush, other presidents made solid contributions to the discursive construction of terrorism, such as President Reagan’s ‘war on terrorism’ discourse, and President Clinton’s ‘catastrophic terrorism.’ Based on the rhetorical foundation framed and provided by his predecessors, President

George W. Bush formulated his discourse, and rationalised and legitimated the global ‘war on terror.’ Given that these four U.S. presidents all employed similar rhetorical strategies to interpret the terrorist threat and adopted similar tactics—military approaches—to tackle the threat, it can be argued that in the coming years the ‘war on terror’ will be continued with little significant counterterrorism policy ‘change.’

Although discursive change is extremely difficult to achieve due to the strict necessary conditions—namely, a powerful agent actor and a particular social and political context (Jackson, 2014)—it is still worthwhile for each individual to work for ‘change’ and to ‘change’ the world for better. Change is possible. Through critical language awareness (CLA) and ‘emancipatory’ language practice, individuals can become aware of the language used in everyday life, and of the power relations and ideologies embedded in discourse. As long as individuals keep practicing CLA rather than uncritically accepting the dominant discourse or ‘regime of truth,’ other subjugated discourses can be heard. Further, discursive change then becomes possible in the future. Most importantly, individuals can learn how to both respect differences and learn from them. As critical discourse analysts suggest, differences should not be silenced or suppressed; rather, differences have to be negotiated.

Lastly, as a researcher of critical terrorism studies and a student of international relations, a key normative question remains. How can a scholar or an education professional (or anyone else) contribute to discursive change and work for a better future? To conclude this research, the author would like to share a humble opinion regarding the responsibility of academics. In 1983, while visiting the University of California, Berkeley, Foucault (2001) introduced the concepts of *parrhesia* and *parrhesiastes*.⁵⁷ The former means ‘free speech’, and the latter refers to the person who speaks the truth (Peters, 2003: 212). For Foucault, the term *parrhesia* actually encompasses five major characteristics, namely, frankness, truth, danger, criticism and duty. In his speech, Foucault summarised that: ‘*parrhesia* is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself)’ (quoted in Peters, 2003: 213). That is to say, a *parrhesiastes* not only speaks the truth

⁵⁷ In *Fearless Speech*, Foucault indicated that the term *parrhesia* appears for the first time in Euripides (c. 484-407 BC) and then is utilised in the ancient Greek from the end of the 5th century BC (Foucault, 2001; Peters, 2003: 212).

but also speaks what he firmly believes in. Importantly, a *parrhesiastes* would risk his life to question or challenge the interlocutor⁵⁸ or the ‘truth regime,’ because he understands that telling the truth is his responsibility. Although the social and political context within today’s society is extremely different from the time that *parrhesiastes* lived, anyone can play the role of *parrhesiastes* in modern society, through their research and the everyday practice of discourse and language, working for alternative truths and a better future.

⁵⁸ According to Foucault, *parrhesia* is a form of criticism, directed either towards oneself or another, where the speaker is always in a less powerful position than the interlocutor (Peters, 2003: 213).

Conclusion

This research demonstrates a distinct continuity (and lack of change) of the American-led war on terror, from President Reagan, to President Clinton, and through to President George W. Bush. In contrast to the contemporary literature on the war on terror which suggests that 9/11 was the catalyst to making terrorism central to foreign and domestic policy-making, this study shows that terrorism was already becoming increasingly important in a great many areas of U.S. policy under Clinton. 9/11 only accelerated processes which had begun under Clinton.

In the past few decades, U.S. administrations have utilised similar rhetorical strategies to interpret terrorism and terrorists and have adopted a coercive counterterrorism policy that has highlighted the importance of using military forces to tackle the perceived threats. President Reagan's first 'war on terrorism' discourse shows that the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union largely affected the discursive construction and practices of U.S. counterterrorism policy. For the Reagan administration, counterterrorism was a part of its Cold War policies; thus, international terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism were the focus of its terrorism discourse. The Reagan administration argued that terrorism was the 'antithesis of democracy' (see Chapters 3 and 7) and explicitly articulated a 'confederation of terrorist states' that was comprised of Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua (see Chapter 5). In official language, these states were identified as 'outlaw governments' and 'outlaw states,' and, according to Reagan, the acts of these countries represented a 'new, international version of Murder, Incorporated' (see Chapter 5). By articulating the threat and danger posed by the Soviet Union and the 'confederation of terrorist states,' the U.S. administration rationalised its counterterrorism initiatives and justified America's 'exceptional' role in the fight against the 'evil empire,' as well as its 'war on terrorism.'

However, with the radical change of political context in the international arena in the late 1980s—that is, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union—the U.S. terrorism discourse shifted due to the new security condition perceived by policy-making elites and the new threats identified by the administration. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration discursively constructed 'new terrorism' or 'catastrophic terrorism,' which was characterised by borderless threats and the

acquisition of WMD that might be utilised by terrorists and ‘rogue states.’ Clearly, the emphases of home-grown terrorism, WMD terrorism, and cyberterrorism were the essence of President Clinton’s ‘new terrorism’ discourse. Established on the discursive framework created by the Reagan administration, the Clinton administration particularly stressed the ‘nexus of new threats’ constituted by terrorists, rogue states, international criminals, and drug traffickers. In addition, the tendency of globalisation (which weakened the traditional boundary of national states) was encapsulated in Clinton’s terrorism discourse, as President Clinton clearly stated: Terrorists come from ‘within or beyond our borders’ and terrorist acts have ‘become an equal opportunity destroyer, with no respect for borders’ (see Chapter 3).

Another significant finding is that during the second term of Clinton’s presidency, the U.S. administration employed harsher language to structure its counterterrorism discourse; that is, it employed a combination of a ‘war metaphor’ and a ‘crime frame’ to conceptualise the act of terrorism. In addition, the frequent use of a ‘war metaphor’ can be traced to officials’ responses to the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing (see Chapter 4). Prior to this specific incident in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the Clinton administration sought to define terrorism as a ‘crime’ (rather than a ‘war’) and adopted a law enforcement–based approach to counterterrorism. The major political achievements of President Clinton’s counterterrorism were the legislation of the *Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996* (AEDPA), the *Presidential Decision Directive 39* (PDD39), and increased aviation security prompted by the tragedy of TWA 800. Further, in 1998, after Osama bin Laden’s religious fatwa and the subsequent U.S. African embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton administration approved a series of military strikes targeted at terrorist facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan and launched *Operation of Desert Fox* aimed at Iraqi political and military targets.

The finding also shows that the Clinton administration tended to use a ‘crime frame’ to interpret terrorist acts when the attacks were targeted at U.S. civilians; in contrast, when the attacks were directed at U.S. officials and military professionals, a ‘war metaphor’ (or a combination of the ‘crime frame’ and a ‘war metaphor’) was employed to conceptualise the violence. In the last year of Clinton’s presidency, the U.S. government stopped labelling Iran as a ‘rogue state’; instead, the ‘states of concern’ concept was introduced by the Department of State (see Chapters 5 and 7).

This shift in U.S. foreign policy discourse illustrates how the U.S. elite discursively conceptualised the threats that were based on the subjective perception of IR and, critically, constructed the discourse in accordance with the national interests defined.

It can be argued that President George W. Bush's 'war on terror' discourse was established on the existing discursive framework created by President Reagan and President Clinton. In official language, President Clinton and President George W. Bush both stressed the severe threats from bin Laden, al Qaeda, and the 'rogue states.' Similar to his predecessors, namely, Reagan and Clinton, George W. Bush employed the term 'axis of evil' while referring to Iran, Iraq, and Libya. These countries, according to the George W. Bush administration, sought to acquire WMD, supported terrorism, and threatened world peace. President George W. Bush also rhetorically connected Iraq to al Qaeda and the 2001 World Trade Centre bombings. In so doing, a 'war' aimed at overthrowing Saddam Hussein was therefore justified and actively prompted.

However, as analysed in this research (see Chapters 1, 4, and 5), prior to September 11, 2001, regime change in Iraq had been widely discussed in the U.S. political arena and strongly supported by neoconservative pundits (some of whom were key figures of the Reagan and the George W. Bush administrations). In 1998, the Clinton administration approved the Iraq Liberation Act; it also claimed that an 'extraordinary step'—that is, the use of force—was indispensable to fight against terrorism. The military guidance on counterterrorism was explicitly articulated in the Clinton administration's *National Security Strategy* and PDD39. Critics have argued that the assertion of the unilateral use of force was central to the Bush Doctrine, which was characterised by preemptive strikes and U.S. military preponderance. Given that various U.S. administrations in the past few decades used similar rhetorical strategies to interpret the terrorist threat and implemented a coercive counterterrorism approach, it is plausible that there is indeed a distinct continuity of U.S. counterterrorism and that origins of the American-led global war on terror actually lies in earlier periods.

To date, the American-led war on terror still continues in the international sphere. Most of the counterterrorism policies implemented by the George W. Bush administration have remained under the Obama administration, such as the military occupation of Afghanistan; drone strikes; the use of torture, kidnapping, and profiling overseas; and the abuses at Guantanamo. Although at the onset of his first term,

President Obama was expected to be a ‘change agent,’ he was reluctant to formulate a new discourse, because in the past decade the ‘war on terror’ had been sedimented and institutionalised in the wider American society and this established discourse had been understood as a ‘truth regime’ by the American majority (see Chapter 7; Jackson, 2014). Similar to President Clinton, President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton strategically altered the political terms regarding counterterrorism by using the word *extremism* (rather than *terrorism*) and relocating the ‘war’ to two specific countries, namely, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nevertheless, the essence of the U.S. terrorism discourse remains: terrorism and terrorists are inherently evil, are extremely dangerous, and severely threaten the United States. By interpreting terrorists as a threat and a danger, it is impossible to negotiate with them. At the same time, any solutions based on dialogue and mutual understanding are seen as nonsensical.

To alter the discourse, this thesis argues that a determined change actor and a specific social and political context are necessary (see Chapter 7; Jackson, 2014). Most importantly, CLA and emancipatory language practice in education are indispensable. This thesis argues that change is possible; it can start from each individual—the producer and consumer of language and discourse—and from our everyday practices of discourse. Change can start immediately; each individual can make a contribution to the wider social and political reform by practicing CLA and by being a ‘change actor.’

Lastly, as a Ph.D. project, this research does have limits and weaknesses due to time limitations. As previously mentioned, this research is, to date, the first thorough analysis of President Clinton’s terrorism discourse and his counterterrorism practices. The research fills a gap in the existing literature on the ‘war on terror’ discourse and contributes to knowledge of the American-led war on terror by examining the three main U.S. administrations’ discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism. Nevertheless, it does not provide an in-depth analysis of President George H. W. Bush’s and President Obama’s terrorism discourse. This is, in part, because President George H. W. Bush’s presidency was shorter than the other presidencies and because his foreign and security policies largely concentrated on the ‘new world order’ and the UN-authorized missions in Iraq (see Chapter 5). However, it is undeniable that the George H. W. Bush administration contributed to the conceptualisation of ‘rogue threats;’ in fact, it rhetorically related Iraq’s military invasion in Kuwait in 1991 to previous acts of terrorism (see Chapter 5; Winkler, 2006).

In addition to President George H. W. Bush's political rhetoric, President Obama's 'counter-extremism' discourse is worth further study, particularly to chronologically understand the 'continuity' of U.S. counterterrorism policy across the different administrations. In contrast to President Clinton, whose terrorism discourse was not profoundly affected by the institutionalisation of the 'war on terror,' President Obama's discourse could illustrate how the sedimented discourse has constrained the production and reproduction of discourse and the real practices of counterterrorism. More specifically, once a particular discourse has become a 'truth regime' and is deeply embedded in the wider social and political context, even a powerful leader like the President of the United States is hardly able to promote real 'change.'

Finally, the function of the news media is also worth noting while discussing the discursive construction of terrorism and explaining how a particular discourse—such as the 'war on terror', for example—has permeated our everyday lives and has shaped our understanding about a specific subject. As Stuart Croft (2006: 226-33) among others, argues, the 'war on terror' has been powerfully reproduced in the mainstream news media, and the news media has itself made a contribution to the discursive construction of an Iraq–al Qaeda alliance and the promotion of an American-led war in Iraq (see also Silberstein, 2002; Hodge, 2011). When taking this into consideration, it can be argued that news media not only plays an important role in political communication and information distribution, but also in the co-production of meaning through which a specific event is understood and interpreted in a particular way through a particular discourse. And, importantly, in so doing, the pre-eminence of the policy programme can therefore be reasserted and actively prompted. Thus, to fully comprehend the production and reproduction of discourse and how the media has contributed to the framing of a 'truth regime,' understanding the role of news media is indispensable. Furthermore, other areas of research are warranted, for example: the alternative bottom-up discourses of resistance, rather than concentrating on the elite-level, top-down discourse of terrorism; and the role of popular culture in consolidating, mediating or resisting Clinton's counterterrorism discourse.

Appendix 1: Official Texts Analysed

President William J. Clinton

First Inaugural, January 20, 1993

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg1.pdf>

Remarks on Signing the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Amendment of 1993 and Exchange With Reporters, March 4, 1993

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg239.pdf>

Remarks on Mayoral Support for the Economic Program and an Exchange With Reporters, March 5, 1993

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg241.pdf>

Radio Address to the Armed Forces, March 12, 1993

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg283.pdf>

The President's News Conference with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, April 6, 1993

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg406.pdf>

Remarks to the National Association of Police Organizations and an Exchange With Reporters, June 24, 1993

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg926.pdf>

Remarks on the Appointment of Kristine M. Gebbie as AIDS Policy Coordinator and an Exchange with Reporters, June 25, 1993

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg932.pdf>

The President's Radio Address, June 26, 1993

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg936-2.pdf>

Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters, June 26, 1993
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg938.pdf>

Letters to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraq Intelligence Headquarters, June 28, 1993
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg940.pdf>

The President's News Conference With President Carlos Saul Menem of Argentina, June 29, 1993
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg954.pdf>

Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for Detection, June 29, 1993
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg958.pdf>

Interview With Foreign Journalists, July 2, 1993
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg976.pdf>

Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at Waseda University in Tokyo, July 7, 1993
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg1019.pdf>

The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Kim Campbell of Canada in Tokyo, July 9, 1993
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg1035.pdf>

Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons, August 19, 1993
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book2/pdf/PPP-1993-book2-doc-pg1397.pdf>

The President's Radio Address, August 21, 1993
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book2/pdf/PPP-1993-book2-doc-pg1398.pdf>

State of the Union Address, January 25, 1994

<http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3437>

Statement on the Church Bombing in Lebanon, February 27, 1994

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book1/pdf/PPP-1994-book1-doc-pg326.pdf>

Statement on the Attacks on Israeli Civilians, April 7, 1994

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book1/pdf/PPP-1994-book1-doc-pg635.pdf>

Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With United Nations Security Council Resolutions April 7, 1994

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book1/pdf/PPP-1994-book1-doc-pg636.pdf>

Remarks at a Memorial Service Honoring Victims of the Iraq Helicopter Tragedy at Fort Myer, Virginia, April 25, 1994

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book1/pdf/PPP-1994-book1-doc-pg770-2.pdf>

Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With United Nations Security Council Resolutions June 6, 1994

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book1/pdf/PPP-1994-book1-doc-pg1046.pdf>

Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With United Nations Security Council Resolutions, August 5, 1994

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book2/pdf/PPP-1994-book2-doc-pg1437.pdf>

Statement on the Death of Corporal Nahshon Waxman, October 14, 1994

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book2/pdf/PPP-1994-book2-doc-pg1768.pdf>

Remarks on Departure for the Middle East, October 25, 1994

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book2/pdf/PPP-1994-book2-doc-pg1868.pdf>

The President's News Conference With President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Cairo,

October 26, 1994

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book2/pdf/PPP-1994-book2-doc-pg1874.pdf>

Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With United Nations Security Council Resolutions, October 27, 1994

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book2/pdf/PPP-1994-book2-doc-pg1886.pdf>

Remarks to the Knesset in Jerusalem, Israel, October 27, 1994

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book2/pdf/PPP-1994-book2-doc-pg1890.pdf>

The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel in Jerusalem, October 27, 1994

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book2/pdf/PPP-1994-book2-doc-pg1893.pdf>

Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and an Exchange With Reporters, November 21, 1994

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book2/pdf/PPP-1994-book2-doc-pg2108.pdf>

Statement on the Terrorist Bombing in Israel, January 22, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg72.pdf>

Message to the Congress on Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process, January 23, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg74.pdf>

Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 24, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg75.pdf>

Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation To Combat Terrorism, February 9, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg190.pdf>

Message to the Congress Reporting on the Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons, February 16, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg216.pdf>

Message to the Congress Reporting on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, February 16, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg217.pdf>

Remark on the Bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, April 19, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg552.pdf>

Letter to Governor Frank Keating on Disaster Assistance to Oklahoma City, April 19, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg552-2.pdf>

Remarks and an Exchange With Reports on the Oklahoma City Bombing, April 21, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg562.pdf>

Remarks by the President and Hillary Clinton to Children on the Oklahoma City Bombing, April 22, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg569-2.pdf>

Remarks at a Memorial Service for the Bombing Victims in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, April 23, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg573.pdf>

Interview on CBS' "60 Minutes," April 23, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg574.pdf>

Remarks on Counterterrorism Initiatives and an Exchange With Reporters, April 26, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg605-3.pdf>

Remarks on Presenting the President's Service Awards, April 27, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg606.pdf>

Remarks on Presenting the Teacher of the Year Award, April 28, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg607-2.pdf>

The President's Radio Address, April 29, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg610-2.pdf>

Remarks at the World Jewish Congress Dinner in New York City, April 30, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg614.pdf>

Remarks at the Women Voters Projects Kickoff Luncheon, May 1, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg618.pdf>

Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation To Combat Terrorism, May 3, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg633.pdf>

Interview with Laurie Montgomery of the Detroit Free Press and Angie Cannon of Knight-Ridder Newspapers, May 4, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg634.pdf>

Remarks to the American Jewish Committee, May 4, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg640.pdf>

Remarks at the Michigan State University Commencement Ceremony in East Lansing, Michigan, May 5, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg641.pdf>

Remarks on Antiterrorism Legislation, May 8, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg657.pdf>

Remarks at the Peace Officers Memorial Service, May 15, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg687-2.pdf>

The President's Radio Address, May 20, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg720.pdf>

Remarks at the White House Conference on Character Building for a Civil and Democratic Society, May 20, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg721.pdf>

The President's Radio Address, May 27, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg757.pdf>

Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony in Colorado Springs, Colorado, May 31, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg765.pdf>

Interview With the United States Air Force News in Colorado Springs, May 31, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg770.pdf>

Remarks on the National Homeownership Strategy, June 5, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg805.pdf>

Interview With Larry King, June 5, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg808.pdf>

Remarks at a Swearing-In Ceremony for Officers Hired Under Community Oriented Policing Grants, June 8, 1995

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1995-book1/pdf/PPP-1995-book1-doc-pg831.pdf>

Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 23, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg79.pdf>

Letter to Congressional Leaders on Continuation of the Emergency With Respect to Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process, January 18, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg70.pdf>

Message to the Congress Reporting on Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process, February 9, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg201.pdf>

Message to the Congress Reporting on the National Emergency With Respect to Iraq, February 9, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg202.pdf>

Remarks on the Terrorist Attack in London, United Kingdom, February 10, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg206-2.pdf>

Statement on the Terrorist Attack in London, United Kingdom, February 19, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg301.pdf>

Statement on the Terrorist Attacks in Israel, February 25, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg336.pdf>

Remarks on the Terrorist Attack in Israel and an Exchange With Reporters, March 3, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg353.pdf>

Statement on the Terrorist Attack in Israel, March 3, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg353-2.pdf>

Remarks on the Terrorist Attack in Israel and an Exchange With Reporters in Taylor, March 4, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg359.pdf>

Address to the People of Israel, March 5, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg373.pdf>

Remarks at a Memorial Service for Victims of Terrorism, March 5, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg374.pdf>

Address to the People of the Middle East, March 8, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg395-2.pdf>

Remarks at the Opening of the Summit of the Peacemakers in Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt, March 13, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg436.pdf>

The President's News Conference With President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Sharm al-Sheikh, March 13, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg438.pdf>

Remarks on Arrival in Tel Aviv, Israel, March 13, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg443.pdf>

Remarks Following Discussions With President Ezer Weizman of Israel and an Exchange With Reporters in Jerusalem, Israel, March 13, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg444.pdf>

Exchange With Reporters Prior to Discussions With Likud Party Leader Binyamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem, March 14, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg451.pdf>

Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Students in Tel Aviv, March 14, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg451-2.pdf>

The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel in Jerusalem, March 14, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg444-2.pdf>

Remarks to the United Jewish Appeal Young Leadership Conference, March 17, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg465.pdf>

Remarks at the University of Central Oklahoma in Edmond, Oklahoma, April 5, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg549.pdf>

The President's Radio Address, April 6, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg553-2.pdf>

The President's Radio Address, April 13, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg579-2.pdf>

The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan in Tokyo, April 17, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg585.pdf>

The President's Radio Address, April 20, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg602-2.pdf>

Remarks on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, April 24, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg630.pdf>

Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, April 24, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg630.pdf>

Remarks on the Terrorist Attack in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, June 25, 1996

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1-doc-pg979-2.pdf>

Remarks on the Terrorist Attack in Saudi Arabia and an Exchange With Reporters, June 26, 1996

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Appendix 2: Full Texts of President Clinton's Crucial Speeches Regarding Terrorism and Terrorist Attacks

Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters June 26, 1993

My fellow Americans, this evening I want to speak with you about an attack by the Government of Iraq against the United States and the actions we have just taken to respond.

This past April, the Kuwaiti Government uncovered what they suspected was a car bombing plot to assassinate former President George Bush while he was visiting Kuwait City. The Kuwaiti authorities arrested 16 suspects, including 2 Iraqi nationals. Following those arrests, I ordered our own intelligence and law enforcement agencies to conduct a thorough and independent investigation. Over the past several weeks, officials from those agencies reviewed a range of intelligence information, traveled to Kuwait and elsewhere, extensively interviewed the suspects, and thoroughly examined the forensic evidence.

This Thursday, Attorney General Reno and Director of Central Intelligence Woolsey gave me their findings. Based on their investigation there is compelling evidence that there was, in fact, a plot to assassinate former President Bush and that this plot, which included the use of a powerful bomb made in Iraq, was directed and pursued by the Iraqi intelligence service.

We should not be surprised by such deeds, coming as they do from a regime like Saddam Hussein's, which is ruled by atrocity, slaughtered its own people, invaded two neighbors, attacked others, and engaged in chemical and environmental warfare. Saddam has repeatedly violated the will and conscience of the international community. But this attempt at revenge by a tyrant against the leader of the world coalition that defeated him in war is particularly loathsome and cowardly. We thank God it was unsuccessful. The authorities who foiled it have the appreciation of all Americans.

It is clear that this was no impulsive or random act. It was an elaborate plan devised by the Iraqi Government and directed against a former President of the United

States because of actions he took as President. As such, the Iraqi attack against President Bush was an attack against our country and against all Americans. We could not and have not let such action against our Nation go unanswered.

From the first days of our Revolution, America's security has depended on the clarity of this message: Don't tread on us. A firm and commensurate response was essential to protect our sovereignty, to send a message to those who engage in state-sponsored terrorism, to deter further violence against our people, and to affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations.

Therefore, on Friday I ordered our forces to launch a cruise missile attack on the Iraqi intelligence service's principal command-and-control facility in Baghdad. Those missiles were launched this afternoon at 4:22 eastern daylight time. They landed approximately an hour ago. I have discussed this action with the congressional leadership and with our allies and friends in the region. And I have called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to expose Iraq's crime.

These actions were directed against the Iraqi Government, which was responsible for the assassination plot. Saddam Hussein has demonstrated repeatedly that he will resort to terrorism or aggression if left unchecked. Our intent was to target Iraq's capacity to support violence against the United States and other nations and to deter Saddam Hussein from supporting such outlaw behavior in the future. Therefore, we directed our action against the facility associated with Iraq's support of terrorism, while making every effort to minimize the loss of innocent life.

There should be no mistake about the message we intend these actions to convey to Saddam Hussein, to the rest of the Iraqi leadership, and to any nation, group, or person who would harm our leaders or our citizens. We will combat terrorism. We will deter aggression. We will protect our people.

The world has repeatedly made clear what Iraq must do to return to the community of nations. And Iraq has repeatedly refused. If Saddam and his regime contemplate further illegal provocative actions, they can be certain of our response.

Let me say to the men and women in our Armed Forces and in our intelligence and law enforcement agencies who carried out the investigation and our military response: You have my gratitude and the gratitude of all Americans. You have performed a difficult mission with courage and professionalism.

Finally, I want to say this to all the American people: While the cold war has ended, the world is not free of danger. And I am determined to take the steps necessary to keep our Nation secure. We will keep our forces ready to fight. We will work to head off emerging threats, and we will take action when action is required. That is precisely what we have done today.

Thank you, and God bless America.

Note: The President spoke at 7:40 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House.

**Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters
June 28, 1993**

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

Commencing at approximately 4:22 p.m. (EST) on June 26, 1993, at my direction, U.S. naval forces launched a Tomahawk cruise missile strike on the Iraqi Intelligence Service's (IIS) principal command and control complex in Baghdad. This facility is the headquarters for the IIS, which planned the failed attempt to assassinate former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April of this year. This U.S. military action was completed upon impact of the missiles on target at approximately 6 p.m. (EST).

Operating under the United States Central Command, two U.S. Navy surface ships launched a total of 23 precision-guided Tomahawk missiles in this coordinated strike upon the key facilities in the IIS compound. The USS PETERSON (DD 969) launched 14 missiles from its position in the Red Sea, while the USS CHANCELLORSVILLE (CG 62) in the Arabian Gulf launched nine missiles. The timing of this operation, with missiles striking at approximately 2:00 a.m. local Iraqi time, was chosen carefully so as to minimize risks to innocent civilians. Initial reports indicate that heavy damage was inflicted on the complex. Regrettably, there were some collateral civilian casualties.

I ordered this military response only after I considered the results of a thorough and independent investigation by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The reports by Attorney General Reno and Director of Central Intelligence Woolsey provided compelling evidence that the operation that threatened the life of President Bush in Kuwait City in April was directed and pursued by the Iraqi Intelligence Service and that the Government of Iraq bore direct responsibility for this effort.

The Government of Iraq acted unlawfully in attempting to carry out Saddam Hussein's threats against former President Bush because of actions he took as President. The evidence of the Government of Iraq's violence and terrorism demonstrates that Iraq poses a continuing threat to United States nationals and shows utter disregard for the will of the international community as expressed in Security Council Resolutions and the United Nations Charter. Based on the Government of Iraq's pattern of

disregard for international law, I concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that new diplomatic initiatives or economic measures could influence the current Government of Iraq to cease planning future attacks against the United States.

Consequently, in the exercise of our inherent right of self-defense as recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and pursuant to my constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander in Chief, I ordered a military strike that directly targeted a facility Iraqi intelligence implicated in the plot against the former Chief Executive. In accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, this action was reported immediately to the Security Council on June 26. On June 27, Ambassador Albright provided evidence of Iraq's assassination attempts to the United Nations Security Council, which had been convened in emergency session at our request.

I am certain that you share my sincere hope that the limited and proportionate action taken by the United States Government will frustrate and help deter and preempt future unlawful actions on the part of the Government of Iraq. Nonetheless, in the event that Iraqi violence, aggression, or state-sponsored terrorism against the United States continues, I will direct such additional measures in our exercise of the right of self-defense as may be necessary and appropriate to protect United States citizens.

I remain committed to ensuring that the Congress is kept fully informed regarding significant employments of the U.S. Armed Forces. Accordingly, I am providing this report on the U.S. military actions of June 26, consistent with the War Powers Resolution. I appreciate your thoughts and continued support as we address these important concerns.

Sincerely,

William J. Clinton

Note: Identical letters were sent to Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Robert C. Byrd, President pro tempore of the Senate.

**Remarks at a Memorial Service for the Bombing Victims in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma April 23, 1995**

Thank you very much. Governor Keating and Mrs. Keating, Reverend Graham, to the families of those who have been lost and wounded, to the people of Oklahoma City who have endured so much, and the people of this wonderful State, to all of you who are here as our fellow Americans: I am honored to be here today to represent the American people. But I have to tell you that Hillary and I also come as parents, as husband and wife, as people who were your neighbors for some of the best years of our lives.

Today our Nation joins with you in grief. We mourn with you. We share your hope against hope that some may still survive. We thank all those who have worked so heroically to save lives and to solve this crime, those here in Oklahoma and those who are all across this great land and many who left their own lives to come here to work hand in hand with you. We pledge to do all we can to help you heal the injured, to rebuild this city, and to bring to justice those who did this evil.

This terrible sin took the lives of our American family: innocent children, in that building only because their parents were trying to be good parents as well as good workers; citizens in the building going about their daily business; and many there who served the rest of us, who worked to help the elderly and the disabled, who worked to support our farmers and our veterans, who worked to enforce our laws and to protect us. Let us say clearly, they served us well, and we are grateful. But for so many of you they were also neighbors and friends. You saw them at church or the PTA meetings, at the civic clubs, at the ball park. You know them in ways that all the rest of America could not.

And to all the members of the families here present who have suffered loss, though we share your grief, your pain is unimaginable, and we know that. We cannot undo it. That is God's work.

Our words seem small beside the loss you have endured. But I found a few I wanted to share today. I've received a lot of letters in these last terrible days. One stood out because it came from a young widow and a mother of three whose own husband was murdered with over 200 other Americans when Pan Am 103 was shot down. Here is what that woman said I should say to you today: "The anger you feel is valid, but you must not allow yourselves to be consumed by it. The hurt you feel must not be

allowed to turn into hate but instead into the search for justice. The loss you feel must not paralyze your own lives. Instead, you must try to pay tribute to your loved ones by continuing to do all the things they left undone, thus ensuring they did not die in vain.” Wise words from one who also knows.

You have lost too much, but you have not lost everything. And you have certainly not lost America, for we will stand with you for as many tomorrows as it takes.

If ever we needed evidence of that, I could only recall the words of Governor and Mrs. Keating. If anybody thinks that Americans are mostly mean and selfish, they ought to come to Oklahoma. If anybody thinks Americans have lost the capacity for love and caring and courage, they ought to come to Oklahoma.

To all my fellow Americans beyond this hall, I say, one thing we owe those who have sacrificed is the duty to purge ourselves of the dark forces which gave rise to this evil. They are forces that threaten our common peace, our freedom, our way of life.

Let us teach our children that the God of comfort is also the God of righteousness. Those who trouble their own house will inherit the wind. Justice will prevail.

Let us let our own children know that we will stand against the forces of fear. When there is talk of hatred, let us stand up and talk against it. When there is talk of violence, let us stand up and talk against it. In the face of death, let us honor life. As St. Paul admonished us, let us not be overcome by evil but overcome evil with good.

Yesterday Hillary and I had the privilege of speaking with some children of other Federal employees, children like those who were lost here. And one little girl said something we will never forget. She said we should all plant a tree in memory of the children. So this morning before we got on the plane to come here, at the White House, we planted that tree in honor of the children of Oklahoma. It was a dogwood with its wonderful spring flower and its deep, enduring roots. It embodies the lesson of the Psalms that the life of a good person is like a tree whose leaf does not wither.

My fellow Americans, a tree takes a long time to grow, and wounds take a long time to heal. But we must begin. Those who are lost now belong to God. Some day we will be with them. But until that happens, their legacy must be our lives.

Thank you all, and God bless you.

Note: The President spoke at 3:32 p.m. at the Oklahoma State Fair Arena. In his remarks, he referred to Gov. Frank Keating and his wife, Cathy, and evangelist Billy Graham.

Remarks at the World Jewish Congress Dinner in New York City April 30, 1995

Thank you very much. Thank you, Edgar. Foreign Minister Peres, thank you for being here, for your visionary leadership, your wise words. To all of the friends of Edgar Bronfman who are here from Canada and from around the world, I am profoundly honored to be with you this evening and to receive this wonderful Nahum Goldmann Award.

I know he was the president of the World Jewish Congress, the World Zionist Organization, the Jewish Agency, Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations. Every group I can think of associated with Edgar Bronfman, except the Seagram's Group--[laughter]--we would all like to be president of that, thanks to the work he has done. I would remind you, Edgar, that I'm a relatively young man without a great deal of job security. I hope you will keep me in mind in the future. [Laughter] We gather--I wish you wouldn't laugh quite so much at that. [Laughter]

We gather tonight to celebrate the accomplishments of an extraordinary man. For all of you, your presence here is testimony to your shared values, your shared goals, and to the countless lives that Edgar Bronfman has touched. In these years of great change and opportunity and of great anxiety and even fear, in years of too much cynicism, the Jewish community has found in Edgar Bronfman the rarest of combinations, a leader armed with passion for his people's cause and endowed with the strength to act on that passion. As president of the World Jewish Congress and a citizen of the world, Edgar Bronfman has given life to Emerson's observation that an institution is the length and shadow of one man.

In the long years when the Soviet Union imprisoned Jews within its borders, many raised their voices in anger, but Edgar journeyed to Moscow to win their release. When millions in Russia and all across Eastern Europe won their freedom from tyranny's grip, many rejoiced, but Edgar took the lead in helping Jewish communities reclaim their proud spiritual and physical heritage that many feared had been lost forever. And as a new era of peace dawns in the Middle East, many celebrate, but Edgar works every day to reconcile the people of Israel and the Palestinians and to bring new life to ancient lands. Wherever Jews dream of a better life and wherever those dreams are threatened, Edgar Bronfman is sure to be found.

A week ago today, Hillary and I went to Oklahoma City to mourn with and pay our respects to the victims and families of the terrible bombing there. Last summer, Edgar undertook a similar journey of his own when he flew to Argentina just hours after hearing of the bombing of the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. There in the midst of the rubble and the ruins, he called on leaders, visited the injured, spoke to the children, told them to stand firm against those who traffic in fear, to hope and not hate, but to work every day to turn that hope into reality. In these times, that is a lesson every citizen of every continent should learn and take to heart. It echoes loudest in the ears of those who have known so much terror and so much sorrow.

As was said earlier today by my friend Benjamin Meed, we mark the time when half a century ago the most terrible chapter in the history of the Jewish people was brought to a close. Unfortunately, 50 years later, merchants of hate still live among us here at home and around the world. Of course, we cannot compare their actions or their capabilities to the horrors that were visited upon the Jewish people, but they do practice and they do preach violence against those who are of a different color, a different background, or who worship a different God. They do feed on fear and uncertainty. They do promote paranoia. In the name of freedom of speech, they have abandoned the responsibility that democratic freedoms impose on all of us.

In this freest of nations, it must strike all of you as ironic that many of these people attack our Government and the citizens who work for it, who actually guarantee the freedoms that they abuse. In the name of building a better future, they would relive the most destructive chapters of evil. So while we cannot compare what they are saying and doing to what the Jewish people suffered decades ago, we dare not underestimate the dangers they pose. They can certainly snuff out innocent lives and sow fear in our hearts. They are indifferent to the slaughter of children. They threaten our freedoms and our way of life, and we must stop them.

Our early patriot Samuel Adams once said, "If we suffer tamely a lawless attack upon our liberty, we encourage it and involve others in our doom." Here in America it is not only our right, it is our duty to stop the terror, to bring to justice the guilty, and to stand against the hatred, and to help others in other lands to do the same.

Since the beginning of our administration we have taken broad and swift measures to fight terrorism here and abroad. We have brought to trial the alleged bombers of the World Trade Center, who struck at the heart of this city. We have

actively pursued those who crossed the line into illegal and violent activity. We have taken strong actions against nations who harbor terrorists or support their bloody trade. We have worked to prevent acts of terror, sometimes with remarkable success. And in a world where open borders and new technologies make our job harder, we have worked closer and closer with other nations to unravel the networks of terror and hunt down those who threaten our people.

But the tragedy of Oklahoma City and its aftermath have made it clear that we must take stronger steps. This week I asked Congress to approve my antiterrorism initiatives: the power to hire 1,000 new Federal officials in law enforcement and support to create a new counterterrorism center under the direction of the FBI; to authorize the military to use its special capabilities in incidents involving chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of terror in our country. Our proposals would also allow us to tag materials used to make bombs so that suspects could be more easily traced.

Although no one can guarantee freedom from terror, at least these common sense steps will help to make our people safer. So tonight I appeal again to Congress to pass these measures without delay.

While we take these actions at home, we must also continue and strengthen our fight against terror around the world. Tonight I want to speak to you about terrorism in the Middle East, about rogue nations who sponsor death in order to kill peace and what we can do further to contain them.

From the beginning of my Presidency, our policy in the Middle East has run on two tracks. Support for the peace process that reconciles Israel and her neighbors: I have been honored to work with Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres and their government and the people of Israel in that regard. And the policy of the United States has been the correct one, that we would never seek to impose a peace on Israel and her neighbors, but if Israel takes risks for peace we will be there to minimize those risks and maximize the chances of success. And we are ahead of where we were 2 years ago, and by God's grace, we will continue to make progress in the years ahead. I am especially proud of this work that we have all been able to do and particularly proud of the work of Secretary Christopher in this regard.

But the second part of our policy in the Middle East is also important: opposition to all those who would derail the peace process, promote terrorism, or

develop weapons of mass destruction. The dangers remain great. The closer we come to achieving peace and normalcy in the region, the more desperate become the enemies of peace. On buses and along busy streets, terrorist attacks have claimed innocent lives, and we grieve with the families of the victims.

We have strengthened our efforts to act against groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, and we are encouraging Chairman Arafat in his efforts to crack down on arrests and prosecute those extremists who resort to violence. But individuals and extremist groups are not the only threat. Israel shares the lands of the Middle East with nations who still seek to destroy the peace, nations like Iran and Iraq and Libya. They aim to destabilize the region. They harbor terrorists within their borders. They establish and support terrorist base camps in other lands. They hunger for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Every day, they put innocent civilians in danger and stir up discord among nations. Our policy toward these rogue states is simple: They must be contained.

Iran has presented a particular problem to the peace process of the peoples of the Middle East. From the beginning of our administration, we have moved to counter Iran's support of international terrorism and in particular its backing for violent opponents of peace in the Middle East.

At the same time, we have tried to stop its quest to acquire weapons of mass destruction, which would make it a threat not only to its neighbors but to the entire region and the world. Our policy has helped to make Iran pay a price for its actions. The nation has effectively been cut off from receiving credit from international financial institutions.

The United States and our allies in the G-7 have stopped Iranian purchases of weapons from our nations. We have refused to cooperate with Iran on sensitive matters such as nuclear energy and have tightened trade restrictions on items that might be used to build weapons.

We have not always been successful, as all of you know. The most recent reports of Russia's agreement to sell gas centrifuge equipment to the Iranians and to train nuclear technicians from Tehran are disturbing to me. Because Iran has more than enough oil to supply its energy needs, we must assume that it seeks this technology in order to develop its capacity to build nuclear weapons.

The United States has an overwhelming interest in fighting the spread of these weapons. And Russia, as a neighbor of Iran, has a particular interest in the same goal. If Russia goes forward with the sale of nuclear reactors, it will only undermine that objective. We have strenuously urged the Russians to reverse these decisions, and I will make that case directly to President Yeltsin when I visit Moscow in just a few days.

My fellow Americans, I speak especially to you when I say that many people have argued passionately that the best route to change Iranian behavior is by engaging the country. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to support that argument. Indeed, the evidence of the last 2 years suggest exactly the reverse. Iran's appetite for acquiring and developing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them has only grown larger. Even as prospects for the peace in the Middle East have grown, Iran has broadened its role as an inspiration and paymaster to terrorists. And there is nothing to suggest that further engagement will alter that course.

That is why last month, after the Conoco Company announced a \$1 billion contract to help Iran develop its oil reserves, I was prepared to stop the project by signing an Executive order banning any United States firms from financing, supervising, or managing Iranian oil reserves. But Conoco ultimately decided to abandon the deal. And let me add that one of the most effective opponents of that was Edgar Bronfman. As a major shareholder in Conoco, he would have gained financially from that. But he put the public interest above his self-interest, as he has so often throughout his life.

I did not reach my decision in that case lightly. One of the major hallmarks of our administration's foreign policy has been opening new markets abroad and aggressively helping our firms to compete, to create jobs for Americans here at home. But there are times when important economic interests must give way to even more important security interests. And this is one of those times.

So tonight, in this great dinner in honor of this champion of freedom, I am formally announcing my intention to cut off all trade and investment with Iran and to suspend nearly all other economic activity between our nations. This is not a step I take lightly, but I am convinced that instituting a trade embargo with Iran is the most effective way our Nation can help to curb that nation's drive to acquire devastating weapons and its continued support for terrorism.

The Executive order I plan to sign next week will cover not only the energy sector but all United States exports to Iran and all investments by American firms and the branches they own or control. We estimate that the embargo will have a limited effect on our companies and our workers. But after reviewing all the options, I have determined that if we are to succeed in getting other nations to make sacrifices in order to change Iran's conduct, we, too, must be willing to sacrifice and lead the way. In my discussions with President Yeltsin and with the G-7 leaders in Halifax in June, I will urge other countries to take similar or parallel actions.

I do want you to know that I do oppose the suggestion some have made that we impose a secondary boycott and prohibit foreign firms doing business with Iran from doing business with the United States. I don't agree with that. I think that decision would cause unnecessary strain with our allies at a time when we need our friends' cooperations. My decision to impose this embargo should make clear to Iran and to the whole world the unrelenting determination of the United States to do all we can to arrest the behavior and ambitions of that nation. It would be wrong to do nothing.

It would be wrong to do nothing as Iran continues its pursuit of nuclear weapons. It would be wrong to stand pat in the face of overwhelming evidence of Tehran's support for terrorists that would threaten the dawn of peace.

Securing a lasting and comprehensive peace must be our urgent priority. The heart of our efforts, of course, is the continuing strong relationship between the United States and Israel. But we must make it work by standing against those who would wreck the peace and destroy the future even if peace is made.

Let me say to you tonight, the strategy we have pursued is working. Never before have Arabs and Israelis met so frequently, traveled so freely, understood so well that their common destiny in peace and prosperity is urgent for all. When they are ready to turn a page on the path, the United States will work with them to shape a future of hope. And we will not stop working until the circle of peace is complete.

Six months ago, when I had the great honor to visit Jerusalem after we signed the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, I said to the members of the Knesset that the enemies of peace will not succeed because they are the past, not the future. We must work to make that statement true.

Foreign Minister Peres said that he felt sorry for me because we had lost our enemy. And we all laughed a little bit uncomfortably because we knew there was a

grain of truth in what he said. Oh, we knew so clearly when we had the Soviet Union, the cold war, and the massive nuclear threat. Today, no Soviet Union, no cold war, and for the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, no Russian missiles are pointed at the children of the United States. That is a cause for celebration, and we should be happy about it.

But I will tell you what I think the threat to the 21st century will be, and you can see its outlines all over the world today. The threat to the 21st century is simply this: These children who are here tonight should grow up in the most exciting, most prosperous, most diverse world in the entire history of humanity, but all the forces that are lifting us up and bringing us together contain a dark underside of possibility for evil, so that the forces of integration that are lifting the world up and bringing the world together carry within them the seeds of disintegration. And the great challenge for the 21st century will be how to see the opportunities presented by technology, by free movement of people, by the openness of society, by the shrinking of the borders between nations without being absolutely consumed by the dangers and threats that those same forces present.

That is the challenge of the 21st century because evil has not been uprooted from human nature, and the more open and the more flexible we are, the more vulnerable we are to the forces of organized evil. That is what you saw in Oklahoma City. That is what you saw in the terrible incident with the religious fanatic taking a little vial of poison gas in the subway in Japan. That is what I see when I go to Russia and what they really want from me now is an FBI office because organized crime is taking over their banks. Or when I went to the Baltics, and in Riga what they really want is some law enforcement help because now that the totalitarian regime has been stripped away from the Baltics, they are worried that their port will become a conduit for drugs and other instruments of destruction.

And that is what you see in the Middle East. Why do the terrorists seek to blow up innocent people in Israel? Because the only way to make the peace work between the Israelis and the Palestinians is to have free movement between the two. And if free movement between the two means that innocent people are killed, then the Government of Israel, because the people demand it, must erect barriers. And then when the barriers are erected, the income goes down in the Palestinian area, making

the peace a failure. The openness makes the peace possible to succeed and provides the threat to its undoing. That is a microcosm of the challenge of the 21st century.

If you go home tonight and think about it, nearly every modern problem can be explained in those terms. The forces of progress and opportunity and integration all carry within them the seeds of abuse by organized evil. And we must stand up against it.

In Proverbs, the Scriptures say that there will someday come a time when the wicked are overthrown and there are no more, but the house of righteousness will stand. Now in my Baptist upbringing, all the preachers used to tell us that that would only happen when the end of human time had come and we were all lifted to the hereafter. No one knows that, but I will say this: Edgar Bronfman has worked to hasten the day when the house of righteousness will stand, and so must we.

This can be a great time for human history, and our children and grandchildren can have a great future because of the lives of people like Edgar Bronfman. But the challenge is clear: Can we make the forces of terror the past? Yes, we can, but we have to work at it.

Thank you, and God bless you all.

Note: The President spoke at 9:34 p.m. in the Grand Ballroom at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. The Executive order of May 6 prohibiting certain transactions with respect to Iran is listed in Appendix D at the end of this volume.

Remarks at the Michigan State University Commencement Ceremony in East Lansing, Michigan May 5, 1995

President McPherson, Governor Engler, Ambassador Blanchard, distinguished Members of Congress and State officials, members of the board of trustees, distinguished faculty, honored guests, family members, and most importantly, members of the class of 1995, I'm honored to be your speaker today and to be back on this wonderful campus, the site of one of the great Presidential debates in 1992.

I have fond memories of Michigan State. And I was sitting there thinking of all the uses to which I might put my honorary degree. Maybe I will get more respect in Washington now. [Laughter] Regardless, now I know who I'm supposed to root for in the Big 10.

Speaking of sports, I want to take a moment of personal privilege to offer my very best wishes on his retirement to your distinguished basketball coach, Judd Heathcote.

And as a person who never, ever, would have had an opportunity to be here today doing what I am doing, I want to thank President McPherson, the present and past Governors of Michigan, and all others who have supported the remarkable set of educational opportunities for young people in Michigan, especially in higher education. The tuition guarantee program to keep tuition increases here to the rate of inflation for 5 years is a standard I wish other universities all across America would follow.

I also hope that other States will follow the example of the Michigan Education Trust and of Michigan State in entering into the direct loan program, which will lower the cost of college loans for young people and improve their repayment options so more people can afford to go to college and stay there until they get their degrees.

I also want to say that I am deeply honored to be joined today by another Michigan State alumnus who spoke from this platform last year, my friend and fellow Arkansan Ernest Green. He was one of the Little Rock Nine, a brave group of Americans who staked their lives for the cause of school integration and equal opportunity in education in my State almost 40 years ago. He made the right choice at the right moment in his life. He is a good model for you, and I hope you will do the same.

As I was reminded by your president and others when we gathered just a few moments ago, the last sitting President to address this assembly was Theodore Roosevelt in 1907. There were fewer than 100 graduates in the senior class then. But it was a time not unlike this time. We are on the edge of a new century; they had just begun a new century. We are on the edge of a new era; they had just begun the dawn of the industrial age. Like us now, they had many, many opportunities but profound problems. And people were full of hope mixed with fear.

But President Roosevelt and his generation of Americans were optimistic, aggressive in facing the challenges of the day, and determined to solve the problems before them. They launched the Progressive Era, using the power of Government to free the market forces of our country from the heavy hand of monopoly, beginning to protect our environment for future generations, to keep our children out of sweatshops, to stand strong for America's role in the world.

Theodore Roosevelt and the Americans of his generation made the right choices at the right moment. They met the challenges of the present, paved the way for a better future, and redeemed the promise of America.

Our journey as a nation has never been an automatic march to freedom and opportunity. In every generation there has come a point of challenge in change when critical decisions are made by our people to go forward or turn back, to reach out or turn inward, to unify or divide, to believe or doubt.

Today, we stand at the end of the cold war and the industrial age, at the onset of the global economy and the information age. Throughout all 219 years of our Republic, times of great change like this have unleashed forces of promise and threat, forces that uplift us and unsettle us.

This time is not different. You are walking into a future of unlimited possibilities. But more than half your fellow citizens are working harder, spending less time with their children, and earning about the same they did 15 years ago. You can look forward to bringing your children into an exciting world, freer of the dangers of war and nuclear annihilation, but the dangers here at home are still profound. Too many of our children are not born into stable families. Our streets are still too violent. And new forces threaten the order and security which free people everywhere cherish.

And so, my fellow Americans, it falls to your generation to make your historic choices for America. This is a very new and different time. But the basic

question before us is as old as our country: Will we face up to the problems and seize our opportunities with confidence and courage? It is our responsibility to make that choice again.

Because you have a fine education, with all its power and potential, when you leave this stadium your responsibility to your families, your community, and your country will be greater than ever before. With your lives fully before you, you too must once again redeem the promise of America.

On the homefront, there is reason for optimism. Though income stagnation and economic uncertainty plague too many of our people, unemployment is down, inflation is low, our deficit is declining, trade is up, and most importantly of all, educational opportunities are increasing. Though crime and violence, drug abuse and welfare dependency, and out-of-wedlock pregnancies are still too high and threaten our social fabric, we are making a serious assault on all of them, and we can make progress on all of them. Though Government is still too cumbersome and outdated, it is growing smaller, more flexible, less wasteful, and more effective. In all these endeavors, you must demand higher standards and more personal responsibility. But you must know that progress is possible.

Beyond our borders there is also reason for hope. Since the end of the cold war, the bonds among nations and the forces of commerce have grown stronger. There is now a greater understanding of our world's environmental challenges and a willingness to do something about them. Freedom, democracy, and free enterprise are on the march. Large countries are much less likely to go to war with one another. I am very proud to say that for the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, no Russian missiles are pointed at the people of the United States. And I am equally proud to say that next week I will become the first American President in nearly 40 years to visit Russia when no American missiles are pointed at the people of Russia.

Therefore, you who graduate today will have the chance to live in the most exciting, the most prosperous, the most diverse and interesting world in the entire history of humanity. Still, you must face the fact that no time is free of problems, and we have new and grave security challenges.

In this, the 20th century, millions of lives were lost in wars between nations and in efforts by totalitarian dictatorships to stamp out the light of liberty among their subjects. In the 21st century, bloody wars of ethnic and tribal hatred will be fought still

in some parts of the world. But with freedom and democracy advancing, the real threat to our security will be rooted in the fact that all the forces that are lifting us up and opening unparalleled opportunity for us contain a dark underside. For open societies are characterized by free and rapid movements of people and technology and information, and that very wonder makes them very, very vulnerable to the forces of organized destruction and evil. So the great security challenge for your future in the 21st century will be to determine how to beat back the dangers while keeping the benefits of this new time.

The dark possibilities of our age are visible now in the smoke, the horror, and the heartbreak of Oklahoma City. As the long and painful search and rescue effort comes to an end with 165 dead, 467 injured, and 2 still unaccounted for, our prayers are with those who lost their loved ones and with the brave and good people of Oklahoma City, who have moved with such strength and character to deal with this tragedy.

But that threat is not isolated. And you must not believe it is. We see that threat again in the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, in the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway, in the terrorist assault on innocent civilians in the Middle East, in the organized crime plaguing the former Soviet Union now that the heavy hand of communism has been lifted. We see it even on the Internet, where people exchange information about bombs and terrorism, even as children learn from sources all around the world.

My fellow Americans, we must respond to this threat in ways that preserve both our security and our freedoms. Appeasement of organized evil is not an option for the next century any more than it was in this century. Like the vigilant generations that brought us victory in World War II and the cold war, we must stand our ground. In this high-tech world, we must make sure that we have the high-tech tools to confront the high-tech forces of destruction and evil.

That is why I have insisted that Congress pass strong antiterrorism legislation immediately, to provide for more than 1,000 new law enforcement personnel solely to fight terrorism, to create a domestic antiterrorism center, to make available the most up-to-date technology to trace the source of any bomb that goes off, and to provide tough new punishment for carrying stolen explosives, selling those explosives for use

in a violent crime, and for attacking members of the Uniformed Services or Federal workers.

To their credit, the leaders of Congress have promised to put a bill on my desk by Memorial Day. I applaud them for that. This is not and must never be a partisan issue. This is about America's future. It is about your future.

We can do this without undermining our constitutional rights. In fact, the failure to act will undermine those rights. For no one is free in America where parents have to worry when they drop off their children for day care or when you are the target of assassination simply because you work for our Government. No one is free in America when large numbers of our fellow citizens must always be looking over their shoulders.

It is with this in mind that I would like to say something to the paramilitary groups and to others who believe the greatest threat to America comes not from terrorists from within our country or beyond our borders but from our own Government.

I want to say this to the militias and to others who believe this, to those nearby and those far away: I am well aware that most of you have never violated the law of the land. I welcome the comments that some of you have made recently condemning the bombing in Oklahoma City. I believe you have every right, indeed you have the responsibility, to question our Government when you disagree with its policies. And I will do everything in my power to protect your right to do so.

But I also know there have been lawbreakers among those who espouse your philosophy. I know from painful personal experience as a Governor of a State who lived through the coldblooded killing of a young sheriff and a young African-American State trooper who were friends of mine by people who espoused the view that the Government was the biggest problem in America and that people had a right to take violence into their own hands.

So I ask you to hear me now. It is one thing to believe that the Federal Government has too much power and to work within the law to reduce it. It is quite another to break the law of the land and threaten to shoot officers of the law if all they do is their duty to uphold it. It is one thing to believe we are taxed too much and work to reduce the tax burden. It is quite another to refuse to pay your taxes, though your neighbor pays his. It is one thing to believe we are over-regulated and to work to lessen

the burden of regulation. It is quite another to slander our dedicated public servants, our brave police officers, even our rescue workers, who have been called a hostile army of occupation.

This is a very free country. Those of you in the militia movements have broader rights here than you would in any other country in the entire world.

Do people who work for the Government sometimes make mistakes? Of course they do. They are human. Almost every American has some experience with this, a rude tax collector, an arbitrary regulator, an insensitive social worker, an abusive law officer. As long as human beings make up our Government, there will be mistakes. But our Constitution was established by Americans determined to limit those abuses. And think of the limits: the Bill of Rights, the separation of powers, access to the courts, the right to take your case to the country through the media, and the right to vote people in or out of office on a regular basis.

But there is no right to resort to violence when you don't get your way. There is no right to kill people. There is no right to kill people who are doing their duty or minding their own business or children who are innocent in every way. Those are the people who perished in Oklahoma City. And those who claim such rights are wrong and un-American.

Whenever in our history people have believed that violence is a legitimate extension of politics, they have been wrong. In the 1960's, as your distinguished alumni said, many good things happened, and there was much turmoil. But the Weathermen of the radical left who resorted to violence in the 1960's were wrong. Today, the gang members who use life on the mean streets of America, as terrible as it is, to justify taking the law into their own hands and taking innocent life are wrong. The people who came to the United States to bomb the World Trade Center were wrong.

Freedom of political speech will never justify violence--never. Our Founding Fathers created a system of laws in which reason could prevail over fear. Without respect for this law, there is no freedom.

So I say this to the militias and all others who believe that the greatest threat to freedom comes from the Government instead of from those who would take away our freedom: If you say violence is an acceptable way to make change, you are wrong. If you say that Government is in a conspiracy to take your freedom away, you are just

plain wrong. If you treat law enforcement officers who put their lives on the line for your safety every day like some kind of enemy army to be suspected, derided, and if they should enforce the law against you, to be shot, you are wrong. If you appropriate our sacred symbols for paranoid purposes and compare yourselves to colonial militias who fought for the democracy you now rail against, you are wrong. How dare you suggest that we in the freest nation on Earth live in tyranny! How dare you call yourselves patriots and heroes!

I say to you, all of you, the members of the Class of 1995, there is nothing patriotic about hating your country or pretending that you can love your country but despise your Government. There is nothing heroic about turning your back on America or ignoring your own responsibilities. If you want to preserve your own freedom, you must stand up for the freedom of others with whom you disagree. But you also must stand up for the rule of law. You cannot have one without the other.

The real American heroes today are the citizens who get up every morning and have the courage to work hard and play by the rules: the mother who stays up the extra half hour after a long day's work to read her child a story; the rescue worker who digs with his hands in the rubble as the building crumbles about him; the neighbor who lives side-by-side with people different from himself; the Government worker who quietly and efficiently labors to see to it that the programs we depend on are honestly and properly carried out; most of all, the parent who works long years for modest pay and sacrifices so that his or her children can have the education that you have had and the chances you are going to have. I ask you never to forget that.

And I would like to say one word to the people of the United States. I know you have heard a lot of publicity in recent days about Michigan and militias. But what you have seen and heard is not the real Michigan. This is the real Michigan. This is the real Michigan in this stadium today. The real Michigan is Michigan State. It's the astonishing revival of the automobile industry, with the remarkable partnership between the autoworkers and the management. Real Michigan is Kellogg's Corn Flakes and the best cherries in the world. The real Michigan is the Great Lakes and the UP. And most of all, the real Michigan was presented to me when I got off the plane and one of your local officials told me that here in mid-Michigan in only 5 days, the people of this area raised \$70,000 to pay for the help that people need in Oklahoma City. And that money is now on its way to Oklahoma City in a 27-car caravan, led by

members of 27 different law enforcement agencies from this part of your wonderful State. That is what I want America to know about the real Michigan.

So, my fellow Americans and members of the class of 1995, let me close by reminding you once again that you live in a very great country. When we are united by our humanity and our civic virtue, nothing can stop us. Let me remind you once again that our best days as a nation still lie before us. But we must not give in to fear or use the frustrations of the moment as an excuse to walk away from the obligations of citizenship.

Remember what our Founding Fathers built. Remember the victories won for us in the cold war and in World War II, 50 years ago next week. Remember the blood and sweat and triumph that enabled us to come to this, the greatest moment of possibility in our history.

Go out and make the most of the potential God has given you. Make the most of the opportunities and freedoms America has given to you. Be optimistic; be strong. Make the choices that Theodore Roosevelt made, that Ernest Green made. Seize your moment. Build a better future. And redeem once again the promise of America.

Thank you, and God bless you all.

Note: The President spoke at 1:30 p.m. in Spartan Stadium. In his remarks, he referred to Peter McPherson, president, Michigan State University; Gov. John Engler of Michigan; and James J. Blanchard, U.S. Ambassador to Canada.

Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony in Colorado Springs, Colorado May 31, 1995

The President. Thank you very much, General Stein.

Audience member. Soo-o-ey! [Laughter]

The President. That's my home State cheer, for those of you unused to foreign languages being spoken here in Falcon Stadium. [Laughter] Thank you very much.

General Stein, thank you. Secretary Widnall, General Fogleman, Governor Romer, Congressman Ramstad; to the distinguished faculty and staff; to the proud parents, family, and friends; to the members of the Cadet Wing: We gather here to celebrate this very important moment in your life and in the life of our Nation. Gentlemen and genteladies of this class, the pride of '95, this is your day. And you are only one speech, one pretty short speech--[laughter]--away from being second lieutenants.

I am honored to share this day with some exceptionally accomplished alumni of the Air Force Academy: General Fogleman, the first of your graduates to be the Air Force Chief of Staff; General Hopper, the first African-American graduate of the Academy to serve as the Commandant of Cadets; and a member of my staff, Robert Bell, who is the first graduate of the Air Force Academy to be the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control at the National Security Council. As I look out at all of you, I imagine it won't be too long before there's a graduate of the Air Force Academy in the Oval Office. If it's all the same to you, I'd like to delay it for just a few years. [Laughter]

I also want to congratulate the Air Force Academy on extending its lock on the Commander in Chief's trophy here that--I'm in your stadium, I think I ought to mention that your winning squad came to see me in the White House not very long ago, and I said that before I became President I didn't understand that when I heard that the Commander in Chief's trophy was a traveling trophy, that meant it was supposed to go back and forth between Washington and Colorado Springs every year.

I want to do my part in another longstanding tradition. By the power vested in me as Commander in Chief, I hereby grant amnesty to cadets who are marching tours or serving restrictions or confinements for minor misconduct. Now, General

Stein, I have to leave it to you to define which offenses are minor, but on this day, even in this conservative age, I trust you will be fairly liberal in your interpretation of the term. [Laughter]

Members of the class of 1995, you are about to become officers in the United States Air Force. You should be very proud of what you have already accomplished. But you should be sobered by the important responsibilities you are about to assume. From this day forward, every day you must defend our Nation, protect the lives of the men and women under your command, and represent the best of America.

I want to say here as an aside, I have seen something of the debate in the last few days on the question of whether, in this time of necessity to cut budgets, we ought to close one of the service academies. And I just want to say I think that's one of the worst ideas I ever heard of.

It was General Eisenhower who as President, along with the Congress, so long ago now recognized that national defense required a national commitment to education. But our commitment through the service academies to the education and preparation of the finest military officers in the world must never wane. And I hope your commitment to the cause of education as an important element in what makes our country great and strong and safe will never wane.

As President, my first responsibility is to protect and enhance the safety of the American people and to strengthen our country. It is a responsibility that you now have chosen to share. So today, I thought what we ought to do is talk about the steps that we will have to take together to make the world safer for America in the 21st century.

Our security objectives over the last 50 years have been dictated by straightforward events often beyond our control. But at least they were straightforward and clear. In World War II, the objective was simple: Win the war. In the cold war, the objective was clear: Contain communism and prevent nuclear war. In the post-cold-war world, the objectives are often more complex, and it is clear that American security in the 21st century will be determined by forces that are operating both beyond and within our own borders.

While the world you will face is far from free of danger, you must know that you are entering active service in a moment of enormous hope. We are dramatically

reducing the nuclear threat. For the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, there are no Russian missiles pointed at the people of the United States.

From the Middle East to South Africa to Northern Ireland, Americans are helping former adversaries turn from conflict to cooperation. We are supporting democracies and market economies, like Haiti and Mexico in our own region and others throughout the world. We are expanding trade. We are working for a Europe allied with the United States, but unified economically and politically for the first time since nation-states appeared on the European Continent. Just yesterday, Russia's decision to actively participate in NATO's Partnership For Peace helped to lay the groundwork for yet another important step in establishing a secure, stable, and unified European Continent for the next century.

Clearly there are powerful historical forces pulling us together: a worldwide thirst for freedom and democracy; a growing commitment to market economics; a technological revolution that moves information, ideas, money, and people around the globe at record speed. All these things are bringing us together and helping to make our future more secure.

But these same forces have a dark underside which can also lead to more insecurity. We understand now that the openness and freedom of society make us even more vulnerable to the organized forces of destruction, the forces of terror and organized crime and drug trafficking. The technological revolution that is bringing our world closer together can also bring more and more problems to our shores. The end of communism has opened the door to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and lifted the lid on age-old conflicts rooted in ethnic, racial, and religious hatreds. These forces can be all the more destructive today because they have access to modern technology.

Nowhere are the forces of disintegration more obvious today than in Bosnia. For the past 2.5 years, the United States has sought to contain and end the conflict, to help to preserve the Bosnian nation as a multistate entity, multiethnic entity, to keep faith with our NATO allies, and to relieve human suffering.

To these ends, we have led the NATO military responses to calls by the United Nations for assistance in the protection of its forces and safe areas for the people of Bosnia, led efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement, deployed peacekeeping troops to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to contain the

conflict within the present borders of Bosnia, and conducted the longest humanitarian airlift to the people there in history.

Two weeks ago, the Bosnian Serbs unleashed 1,400 shells on the civilians of Sarajevo. The United Nations called this attack a return to medieval barbarism. They asked for a NATO air response, which we supported. Now we have joined our allies to develop a coordinated response to the Serbs' continued refusal to make peace and their illegal capturing of United Nations personnel as hostages.

We believe still that a strengthened United Nations operation is the best insurance against an even worse humanitarian disaster should they leave. We have a longstanding commitment to help our NATO allies, some of whom have troops in the U.N. operation in Bosnia, to take part in a NATO operation to assist them in a withdrawal if that should ever become necessary. And so, if necessary, and after consultation with Congress, I believe we should be prepared to assist NATO if it decides to meet a request from the United Nations troops for help in a withdrawal or a reconfiguration and a strengthening of its forces.

We have received no such request for any such assistance, and we have made no such decision. But in any event, we must know that we must continue to work for peace there. And I still believe that we have made the right decision in not committing our own troops to become embroiled in this conflict in Europe nor to join the United Nations operations.

I want to say to you, we have obligations to our NATO allies, and I do not believe we can leave them in the lurch. So I must carefully review any requests for an operation involving a temporary use of our ground forces. But we have made the right decision in what we have done and what we have not done in Bosnia.

I believe we must look at all of these problems and all these opportunities in new and different ways. For example, we see today that the clear boundaries between threats to our Nation's security from beyond our borders and the challenges to our security from within our borders are being blurred. One once was clearly the province of the armed services, the other clearly the province of local law enforcement. Today, we see people from overseas coming to our country for terrorist purposes, blurring what is our national security. We must see the threats for what they are and fashion our response based on their true nature, not just where they occur.

In these new and different times, we must pursue three priorities to enhance our security. First, we have to combat those who would destroy democratic societies, including ours, through terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking. Secondly, we have to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction, whether they're nuclear, chemical, or biological. Third, we have to provide our military, you and people like you, with the resources, training, and strategic direction necessary to protect the American people and our interests around the world.

The struggle against the forces of terror, organized crime, and drug trafficking is now uppermost on our minds because of what we have endured as a nation, the World Trade Center bombing, the terrible incident in Oklahoma City, and what we have seen elsewhere, the nerve gas attack in Tokyo, the slaughter of innocent civilians by those who would destroy the peace in the Middle East, the organized crime now plaguing the former Soviet Union--so much that one of the first requests we get in every one of those countries is ``Send in the FBI; we need help"--the drug cartels in Latin America and Asia that threaten the open societies and the fragile democracies there. All these things we know can emerge from without our borders and from within our borders. Free and open societies are inherently more vulnerable to these kinds of forces. Therefore, we must remain vigilant, reduce our vulnerability, and constantly renew our efforts to defeat them.

We work closely with foreign governments. We share intelligence. We provide military support. We initiate anticorruption and money- laundering programs to stop drug trafficking at its source. We've opened an FBI office in Moscow, a training center in Hungary to help combat international organized crime. Over the past 2 years, we've waged a tough counterterrorism campaign, strengthening our laws, increasing manpower and training for the CIA and the FBI, imposing sanctions on states that sponsor terrorism.

Many of these efforts have paid off. We were able to arrest and quickly convict those responsible for the World Trade Center bombing, to stop another terrible planned attack in New York as well as a plan to blow up American civilian airliners over the Pacific, and help to bring to justice terrorists around the world.

In the aftermath of Oklahoma City, our top law enforcement officers told us they needed new tools to fight terrorism, and I proposed legislation to provide those tools: more than 1,000 new law enforcement personnel solely working on terrorism; a

domestic antiterrorism center; tough new punishment for trafficking in stolen explosives, for attacking members of the Uniformed Services or Federal workers; the enabling of law enforcement officials to mark explosive materials so they can be more easily traced; the empowering of law enforcement officials with authority to move legal, and I emphasize legal, wiretaps when terrorists quickly move their bases of operation without having to go back for a new court order; and finally, in a very limited way, the authority to use the unique capacity of our military where chemical or biological weapons are involved here at home, just as we now can call on those capabilities to fight nuclear threats.

I'm sure every graduate of this Academy knows of the *posse comitatus* rule, the clear line that says members of the uniformed military will not be involved in domestic law enforcement. That is a good rule. We should honor that rule. The only narrow exception for it that I know of today is the ability of law enforcement in America to call upon the unique expertise of the military when there is a potential threat of a nuclear weapon in the hands of the wrong people. All we are asking for in the aftermath of the terrible incident in the Tokyo subway is the same access to the same expertise should chemical and biological weapons be involved.

The congressional leadership pledged its best efforts to put this bill on my desk by Memorial Day. But Memorial Day has come and gone, and only the Senate has taken the bill up. And even there, in my judgment, there are too many amendments that threaten too much delay.

Congress has a full agenda of important issues, including passing a responsible budget. But all this will take time. When it comes to terrorism, time is a luxury we don't have. Some are even now saying we should just go slow on this legislation. Well, Congress has a right to review this legislation to make sure the civil liberties of American citizens are not infringed, and I encourage them to do that. But they should not go slow. Terrorists do not go slow, my fellow Americans. Their agenda is death and destruction on their own timetable. And we need to make sure that we can do everything possible to stop them from succeeding.

Six weeks after Oklahoma City, months after the first antiterrorism legislation was sent by the White House to Congress, there is no further excuse for delay. Fighting terrorism is a big part of our national security today, and it will be well into the 21st century. And I ask Congress to act and act now.

Our obligations to fight these forces of terror is closely related to our efforts to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction. All of us, I'm sure, ached and wept with the people of Japan when we saw what a small vial of chemical gas could do when unleashed in the subway station. And we breathed a sigh of relief when the alert officers there prevented the two chemicals from uniting and forming poison which could have killed hundreds and hundreds of people just a few days after that. The breakup of the Soviet Union left nuclear material scattered throughout the Newly Independent States and increased the potential for the theft of those materials and for organized criminals to enter the nuclear smuggling business. As horrible as the tragedies in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center were, imagine the destruction that could have resulted had there been a small-scale nuclear device exploded there.

The United States will retain as long as necessary an arsenal of nuclear forces to deter any future hostile action by any regime that has nuclear weapons. But I will also continue to pursue the most ambitious agenda to dismantle and fight the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction since the dawn of the nuclear age.

This effort is succeeding, and we should support it. No Russian missiles are pointed at America. No American missiles are aimed at Russia. Because we put the START I treaty into force, Russia is helping us and joining us in dismantling thousands of nuclear weapons. Our patient, determined diplomacy convinced Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to give up their weapons when the Soviet Union fell apart. We are cooperating with these nations and others to safeguard nuclear materials and stop their spread.

And just last month, we got the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which will benefit not only this generation of Americans but future generations as well by preventing scores of countries from developing and acquiring nuclear weapons. More than 170 nations have signed on to this treaty. They vow they will either never acquire nuclear weapons or, if they have them, that they won't help others obtain them, and they will pursue arms control and disarmament.

We have to now go even further. There is no excuse for the Senate to go slow on approving two other vital measures, the START II treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. START II will enable us to reduce by two-thirds the number of strategic warheads deployed at the height of the cold war. The Chemical Weapons

Convention requires the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles around the world and provides severe penalties for those who sell materials to build these weapons to terrorists or to criminals. It would make a chemical terror, like the tragic attack in the Tokyo subway, much, much more difficult. Both START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention will make every American safer, and we need them now.

There is more to do. We are working to complete negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, to implement the agreement we reached with North Korea to freeze and dismantle that country's nuclear program, to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. It is an ambitious agenda, but it is worthy of this moment, and it will make your future as officers in the United States Air Force, American citizens, and when you're parents and grandparents more secure.

Finally, let me say that none of this will work unless we also are faithful to our obligation to support a strong and adaptable military for the 21st century. The men and women of our Armed Forces remain the foundation, the fundamental foundation of our security. You put the steel into our diplomacy. You get the job done when all means short of force have been tried and failed.

We saw your strength on display in Haiti, where a brutal military regime agreed to step down peacefully only, and I emphasize only, when it learned that more than 60 C-130's and C-140's loaded with paratroopers were in the air and on the way. Now the Haitian people have a second chance to rebuild their nation.

We then saw your speed in the Persian Gulf, when Iraq massed its troops on the Kuwaiti border and threatened regional instability. I ordered our planes, ships, and troops into the Gulf. You got there in such a hurry that Iraq got out of the way in a hurry.

We saw your compassion in Rwanda, where you flew tons of supplies, medicines, and foods into a nation torn apart by violence and saved countless lives.

All over the world, you have met your responsibilities with skill and professionalism, keeping peace, making peace, saving lives, protecting American interests. In turn, your country has a responsibility to make sure you have the resources, the flexibility, the tools you need to do the job. We have sought to make good on that obligation by crafting a defense strategy for our time.

And I'd like to say here today that one of the principal architects of that strategy was our recently deceased former Defense Secretary, Les Aspin. During his

many years in the Congress as head of the Armed Services Committee, as Secretary of Defense, and as head of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, he devoted a lifetime to this country's defense. And we will miss him terribly. And we are very grateful for the legacy he left: a blueprint for reshaping our military to the demands of the 21st century, a blueprint that calls on us to make sure that any force reductions we began at the end of the cold war do not jeopardize our strength over the long run, that calls on us to provide you with the resources you need to meet the challenges of a world plagued by ancient conflicts and new instabilities.

All of you know here that after World War II a major drawdown left us at a major disadvantage when war broke out in Korea. And just 5 years after the post-Vietnam drawdown, in 1980, the Army Chief of Staff declared that we had a hollow Army, a view shared by most experts. We have been determined not to repeat those mistakes.

Even as we draw down troops, we know we have to be prepared to engage and prevail in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. Some argued that this scenario was unrealistic and excessively demanding. Recent events have proved that they were wrong and shown that we are pursuing the right strategy and the right force levels for these times.

Last summer, just before the North Koreans finally agreed to dismantle their nuclear program, we were poised to send substantial air, naval, and ground reinforcements to defend South Korea. Just a few months later, we deployed tens of thousands of troops to the Gulf and placed thousands more on alert. And in between those crises, I gave the go-ahead to the 25,000 troops engaged in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti.

In Haiti, the operation was especially historic because it was the most fully integrated military plan ever carried out in our history. The four services worked together, drawing on each other's special abilities more than ever before. And for the first time, we were ready to launch Army infantry and an air assault from a Navy aircraft carrier. When we decided to send our troops in peacefully, we did it in hours, not days. That kind of innovation and the ability to do that is what your country owes you as you walk out of this stadium today as officers in the United States Air Force.

This then will be our common security mission, yours and mine and all Americans': to take on terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking; to reduce the

nuclear threat and the threat of biological and chemical weapons; to keep our military flexible and strong. These must be the cornerstones of our program to build a safer America at a time when threats to our security have no respect for boundaries and when the boundaries between those threats are disappearing.

Abroad, as at home, we must measure the success of our efforts by one simple standard: Have we made the lives of the American people safer? Have we made the future for our children more secure?

Let me say to this class, I know that the rewards of serving on the front lines of our foreign policy may seem distant and uncertain at times. Thirty-four years ago, President Kennedy said, "When there is a visible enemy to fight, the tide of patriotism runs high. But when there is a long, slow struggle with no immediate visible foe, your choice will seem hard indeed." Your choice, your choice, ladies and gentlemen, to take on the problems and possibilities of this time, to engage the world, not to run from it, is the right choice.

As you have learned here at the Academy, it demands sacrifice. In the years ahead, you will be asked to travel a long way from home, to be away from your loved ones for long stretches of time, to face dangers we perhaps cannot yet even imagine. These are the burdens you have willingly agreed to bear for your country, its safety, and its long-term security.

Go forth, knowing that the American people support you, that they admire your dedication. They are grateful for your service. They are counting on you, the class of '95, to lead us into the 21st century, and they believe you truly do represent the best of America.

Good luck, and Godspeed.

Note: The President spoke at 11:13 a.m. at Falcon Stadium. In his remarks, he referred to Lt. Gen. Paul Stein, USAF, Superintendent, and Brig. Gen. John D. Hopper, Jr., USAF, Commandant of Cadets, U.S. Air Force Academy; Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, Air Force Chief of Staff; and Gov. Roy Romer of Colorado.

**Remarks to the Families of the Victims of the 1995 Bombing in Oklahoma City
April 5, 1996**

Thank you very much. Thank you so much, Reverend Alexander. Governor Keating, Mrs. Keating, Mr. Mayor, Senator Nickles, Lieutenant Governor Fallin, Congressman Brewster, Congressman Istook; most of all to the families here of those who lost their lives and those who survived the bombing almost a year ago.

I come here today as much as anything else to thank you. On this very difficult and painful day for me, when I have lost a great and good friend and a lot of gifted employees of the Federal Government, some of them very young, and some wonderful members of our Armed Forces and some of our Nation's most able business leaders, the power of your example is very much with me, and I thank you for that.

A year ago we were here to join in mourning your loss and praying for your healing. Today I ask that we not only remember your loss but celebrate the rebuilding you have already done and the work you will still do.

I have relived the moments of last year many times in my mind since I was here with you. I have wondered how you were doing and prayed for your strength. I was honored to have two of your citizens at the State of the Union Address and to recognize their unique contributions to our country through their service to you.

Just a few moments ago I was honored to lay a wreath, along with the First Lady and some children who survived and their parents, and then to dedicate the child care center that will be built near the site of the bombing, thanks to the remarkable efforts of your public officials and private citizens together. You have shown how strong you are, and you have given us all an example of the power of faith and community, the power of both God's grace and human courage.

On this Good Friday, what you have done has demonstrated to a watching and often weary and cynical world that good can overcome evil, that love can outlast hate, that the light of human life can shine on through the most terrible darkness. And so I thank you for that. And I know that you could not have done it without your faith.

On this Friday I can't help noting that there is a wonderful verse in the Book of Matthew which says that a person who follows the word of God will be likened unto a wise man who built his house on a rock. "And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat upon the house, and it fell not, for it was founded

upon a rock.” Well, your building was blown down, and many lives were shattered. But today I saw again that the spirit of Oklahoma City fell not, for it is founded upon a rock. And I thank you for showing that to America.

From the early rescue efforts that so many engaged in to the scholarship funds for the children who lost their parents, to the current outpouring of support that will enable families to travel to Denver for the trial, to the dedication ceremony I just attended, I see over and over and over again that you have redeemed the promise of essential human nature and human possibility that we celebrate so profoundly in this season. And what I want you to know is that, in doing that, you have renewed the faith of America. You have drawn our national family closer together.

A year ago I was able to come here and say to you that “You have lost too much, but you have not lost everything. You have not lost America.” In the year since, America has stood with you and prayed with you and worked with you as you rebuild. But today I come to you to say you have given America something precious, a greater sense of our shared humanity, our common values, our obligations to one another. You've taken some of the meanness out of our national life and put a little more love and respect into it, in ways that you probably cannot even imagine. And I thank you for that.

I will call on all Americans to express their solidarity with you when you celebrate the first anniversary of your tragedy. Earlier today I signed a proclamation calling for a moment of silence across our land on April the 19th at 9:02 a.m., Central Daylight Time, to ask the American people to gather in silent prayer and quiet reflection with their friends and neighbors, wherever they live, from Maine to Alaska, to southern California, to Florida.

And let me say to all of you again, we will be there with you. But because of what you have felt and what you have endured, let me ask you now if you will bow your heads in silent prayer to remember all that this year has meant to you and to pray for those who lost their loved ones on that plane in Bosnia. Only you can know how they feel.

May we pray.

[At this point, a moment of silence was observed.]

Amen.

I would like to say a special word now to some of the people who were involved here a year ago: To the Federal workers who survived the blast and are back on the job, we're glad, and we support you. To those who are not yet back on the job, we will stand with you until the day you are able to work again. To those who lost their lives in the service of their country, trying to help America get through every day in the best possible way, we thank you, your families, beyond measure.

Before Hillary and I left the White House this morning, we planted a new dogwood tree on the South Lawn to honor the memory of those who died in the crash in Bosnia. It is very near the one we planted a year ago, before we came to be with you for the first time, in honor of the loved ones that you lost. A year ago I noted that the dogwood tree embodies the lesson of the Psalms that the life of a good person is like a tree whose leaf does not wither; that just as a tree takes a long time to grow, sometimes wounds take a long time to heal. Well, your tree has taken root on the South Lawn of the White House. In a few weeks it will flower. The healing power of our faith has also taken root and must bloom again here.

You know, this Easter Sunday all over the world the over 1.5 billion people who are Christians will be able to bear witness to our faith that the miracles of Jesus and the miracles of the human spirit in Oklahoma City only reflect the larger miracle of human nature that there is something eternal within each of us, that we all have to die, and that no bomb can blow away, even from the littlest child, that eternity which is within each of us.

I know a lot of you are still hurting, but I hope as Sunday comes you'll be able to find some comfort in that. Your healing has to go on. A lot of you probably still have your doubts about all of this. I'm sure there's some lingering anger and even some rage and dark and lonely nights for many of the family members. I can only say to you that the older I get the more I know that we have to try harder to make the most of each day and accept the fact that things will happen we can never understand or justify.

We flew over my home State, you know, coming here, and it made me think of the words of an old gospel song that were actually written in Arkansas. And I thought I would leave you with these words, and our love and respect, as we move toward Easter.

The hymn goes:

Further along we'll know all about it.

Further along we'll understand why. Rise up, my brothers, and walk in the sunshine.

Further along we'll understand why.

God bless you, and God bless America.

Note: The President spoke at 1:20 p.m. in the Myriad Convention Center. In his remarks, he referred to Rev. Don Alexander, pastor, First Christian Church; and Cathy Keating, wife of Gov. Frank Keating of Oklahoma. The proclamation is listed in Appendix D at the end of this volume.

Remarks at the University of Central Oklahoma in Edmond, Oklahoma April 5, 1996

Thank you very much. Governor Nigh, Mrs. Nigh, Congressman Istook, Mr. Mayor, Mr. Speaker, the other distinguished guests on the platform, and to the students and the other members of the University of Central Oklahoma community and family, Governor David Walters and Mrs. Walters, and to all the people who are here with me today because of the mission we are on.

Let me say it's good to be back here. I heard the students laughing when Governor Nigh announced that I was here 8 years ago, and I was thinking, most of the students were in grade school the last time I was here. [Laughter] Later this year I'll be eligible for my AARP card-- [laughter]--but I'm still glad to be here.

As all of you know, and as the Governor said, I came here today to Oklahoma to pay my respects nearly a year after the tragedy of the bombing, to attend a memorial service for the families of those who were victims, for the survivors and their families, and others who were Federal employees who worked there, and to help your State officials to dedicate the beginning of the child care center which will be rebuilt, which is a remarkable accomplishment, and to meet with this scholarship committee, which informed me of the results which were just announced to you by Governor Nigh.

And it is coming at an especially sad but ironically appropriate time, just a couple of days after we suffered the loss of our Secretary of Commerce and a number of fine Federal employees--some of them very young, barely older than some of the students here--a number of fine U.S. military personnel, and some of our country's most outstanding business leaders in that plane crash in Bosnia.

I would like to make just two points briefly. I know it's cold and you've been waiting a long time, but I ask you to reflect on two things. That plane went down in Bosnia full of people who have worked very hard to help the American people fulfill their potential. Ron Brown was immensely proud of the fact that more than any other Commerce Secretary and Commerce Department in our history, they had been instrumental in opening new avenues for people to buy American products and American services and create jobs for Americans, so that when young people get out of college they can get jobs, good jobs, jobs that pay better than average, jobs with a good future.

But these people went to Bosnia with only the most modest expectation of any personal gain for themselves. They went there to try to use the power of the American economy to help bring opportunity to the Bosnians so that peace wouldn't fall apart and instead would take hold.

But the main thing I want to say is that my friend Ron Brown, who grew up in Harlem, never forgot where he came from and spent his lifetime trying to help other people realize their dreams. When our hearts were breaking over what happened in Oklahoma City--it was this madness that somebody for some perverted political purpose could take everyone else's life away from them who weren't even standing in the way, they just happened to show up in the wrong time in the wrong place. And so I would like to say two things to you today.

First of all, all of us need to ask ourselves a year later, what are our responsibilities not only to help the children who were tragically robbed of their parents in Oklahoma City to fulfill their dreams but to provide that opportunity for all people? I've worked very hard to expand the quality and availability of college loans and the college scholarships for children of modest incomes. I'm still hoping we'll pass a balanced budget amendment in our legislation in this Congress that will include a tax cut that gives families a deduction for the cost of college tuition, because I think it's the best possible tax break we could give America, to do that.

But this is not a political issue. Every American has an interest in seeing every other American be able to live out their dreams. And we have certain positive responsibilities, just like Ron Brown believed that we did, to try to do that, and access to higher education is, perhaps, the most important one.

The second thing I want to ask you about, especially the young people, is to think about where do we go from here. And as horrible and personal as the bombing of the Federal building was to you, I want you to try to step back a minute and put it in a larger context. It was, first and foremost, an act of terror. What is terror? Terror is when someone, allegedly for some philosophical or political reason, believes they have the right to take innocent lives, not people who are fighting them in war, not people who are wearing uniforms, not people who are staring at them across a battle line but just to take an action that will take the lives of people who just happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.

And we are seeing that all over the world, and you see it in two ways. First, you see homegrown terror, people in your own country that are so profoundly alienated they think they have a right to do this. You've been reading about the Unabomber in recent days. That's an example of that. You remember when the religious fanatics in Japan broke open poison gas in the Japanese subway and killed a lot of people and a few days later could have killed hundreds more, but miraculously, the second attempt was thwarted. That's an example of that.

And then you have imported terrorism, where people come in from other countries and they try to wreck your life to pursue their political ambitions. An example of that is the World Trade Center bombing. And it's really tough when they're coming from right next door, which is what is tearing the heart out of the people in the Middle East now. And you remember how recently we saw the people there--innocent--not only innocent Israelis, innocent Palestinians, innocent Moroccans, little children just blown away because some crackpot believes that it is a legitimate way to pursue your political philosophy to kill innocent civilians.

Now what I want to tell you today is--and I want you to think about this, especially the young people--the world you're living in and the world we're moving toward is going to offer you more opportunities to succeed, if you have a good education, than any generation of Americans has ever known. But the same forces that offer you those opportunities to succeed offer people opportunities to commit terrorist acts. And therefore, we must be more vigilant, more active, more determined than ever before.

Why is that? Well, just think about it. What's the world like now? Computer technology can now interface people all over the world. I'm trying to get every classroom and every library and every school in America connected to the Internet by the end of the decade. I know right now there are public schools in America where young junior high school students can get on the Internet and do research out of libraries in Asia and Australia, all over the world. Well, that also means that terrorist networks can get information about how to build bombs and how to wreak mischief if you just know how to find the right home page.

We've got to have open borders in order to move products and services around the world, in order for people to travel around the world. We have to be able to get around in a hurry. The more open the borders are, the more open the information is,

the more vulnerable we are to things like money laundering and terrorists moving out of countries.

Now, that should not frighten you. The good news is we are reducing the traditional threats to your security and your future. Communism has failed. The cold war is over. We have agreed to treaties that will reduce by two-thirds the number of nuclear weapons that existed when the cold war was at its height. And for the first time in the history of nuclear weapons, for the last 2 years there's not a single nuclear weapon pointed at any American citizen.

That is the good news. That's the good news. But in an open world of easy information, quick technology, and rapid movements, we are all more vulnerable than we used to be to terrorism and its interconnected allies, organized crime, drug running, and the spread of weapons of destruction. And so I spend a lot of my time as your President trying to think about what we can do to minimize those dangers. We've done a lot to try to fight terrorism.

We've done a lot to try to fight drug trafficking. We've done a lot to try to fight the money laundering that goes along with all this, to try to help other countries stand up to organized crime, because nobody is immune from this. You see it in all of the places I cited. You see it when those terrible bombs go off in London. I saw it in Latin America where we have honest law enforcement officials in Colombia trying to help us crack the Colombian drug cartels. And the good news is we arrested seven top leaders in the last couple of years. The bad news is, 500 Colombians laid their lives down trying to break their country of the grip of drug cartels.

So what we have to do is to ask ourselves, our generation--the generation that preceded us won World War II and then won the cold war. What we have to do now is to fight back these organized forces of destruction so all the opportunities that await you young people will be there and so you can pursue them without fear; so that if you're willing to work hard and obey the law and make the most of your own lives, you will be able to live out your dreams. That is what this is all about.

The lessons we have to take out of what happened to us at the World Trade Center, what happened to us in Oklahoma City, what we were able to avoid when we stopped terrorist attacks in the last 2 years on our own soil and against our airplanes as they were flying over the oceans, those are the things we have to learn.

Now, what I want to say to you is that, first, you've got to realize all these things work together. On the 19th of this month, when you all are observing the one-year anniversary, the reason I won't be here is I have to go to Russia to a nuclear summit. And part of it is about continuing to reduce nuclear weapons. But part of it is making sure that every place in the world that has the residue of the nuclear age, this nuclear material, make sure it is secure and safe and cannot be stolen, because we don't want our homegrown terrorists or our foreign terrorists to get their hands on nuclear material that, with just the size of a wafer, you could make a bomb 10 times more powerful than the one that destroyed your Federal building in Oklahoma City. So I have to go there. The United States has to be a part of that. And that's an important thing, but we also have to recognize that there are things that we have to do here at home.

Last year I asked people in the other parts of the world to stand with the United States because we took a tough stand against the countries that support terrorism, against Iran and Iraq and Sudan and Libya. And I get frustrated when they don't help. But when those bombs blew up in Israel, it sobered a lot of countries up, and in 3 days the President of Egypt and I were able to persuade 29 countries to send high-level leaders, including heads of state, to Egypt to meet to stand up against terrorism. We had Arab countries condemning terrorism in Israel for the first time.

So we've got--we're getting in a position now where the people are willing to say we can't let terrorism pay. We can't let terrorism pay. We've got to make sure that terrorists pay for what they're doing. We have to make sure that's true here and around the world.

When I was in Israel--and I suppose they have about as much experience with terrorism as anybody--I talked to leaders of both political parties. And they hardly agree on anything over there; they fight just like we do. [Laughter] But you know what? They were both agreed on one thing. They said, "You have got to continue to take the lead in the fight against terrorism, and you need to pass that legislation that you're trying to pass to crack down on the forces of terrorism in the United States and enable us to stand against them when they invade our country."

It's been almost a year since I was pledged that terrorism bill, and it's still not in the shape it needs to be. But let me just tell you three things that I think ought to be in it, and there's a big debate about it.

We know what kind of bomb blew up the Federal building. We propose that we be able to have markers that go into explosives when people buy them. Contractors don't have a thing in the world to fear. People need to buy explosives; you can't do a lot of work without them. But if explosives are used to kill innocent civilians, we ought to be able to find out where they came from and who bought them. That's what I believe, and I hope you do, too.

We ought to have explicit authority that permits the Attorney General of the United States to stop terrorist groups like Hamas from raising money in America. And if we catch people doing it, we ought to be able to throw them out of the country immediately--immediately, not after some long, drawn-out process.

We ought to have the best technology available to our law enforcement officials to keep up with these terrorists that move around in a hurry, and they're very sophisticated and very hard to catch. And we can do that without violating the civil liberties of the American people, without undermining the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. But I'm telling you, folks, these people are smart. They understand computers. They understand information. They understand how to hide. They understand how to doctor bank records. They understand how to launder money.

And when it all comes down to it, just think of what would happen if Oklahoma City had happened five or six or seven times within a month or two. Think what it would have done to the American people. Think what would have happened if 3,000 people had been killed at Oklahoma City and every American had felt like those people were within 50 miles of them. That's what happened in Israel just a few weeks ago. It can paralyze a country. It can take its heart out. It can take its confidence away. It can make young people believe they have no future.

Now, I am very optimistic about America's future, and I am proud of the work that our law enforcement officials have done in catching these people. And I am proud of the fact that we have caught and deported more terrorists in the last 3 years than at any time in our history put together. I am proud of that.

I am not saying these things to frighten any Americans. I am just telling you I have been around the world representing you; I've talked to people all over the world. I do not believe--if we can do our job and if we had just a little bit of luck--I do not believe that you will have to worry about a nuclear weapon wiping out a whole American community or killing lots of Americans in the way that our parents worried

about us when I was growing up. But I do not believe you can fulfill your dreams and be totally free until we have taken the strongest possible stand against terrorism, organized crime, drug running, and weapon sales. And they are all related.

So I ask you, I ask you because you will have more weight than most people--this State has suffered, this State has felt it, this State understands the human dimension of people killing innocent people for perverted, allegedly political reasons--to say in simple, clear terms, this is not a political issue; this is not a partisan issue; this is not an ideological issue. This is a matter of America getting ready for the future and guaranteeing our young people the opportunities that they deserve to live out their God- given dreams and destiny.

Thank you, and God bless you all.

Note: The President spoke at 4:40 p.m. in the courtyard at the School of Education. In his remarks, he referred to George Nigh, president, University of Central Oklahoma, and his wife, Donna; Mayor Bob Rudkin of Edmond; Glen Johnson, speaker, Oklahoma State House of Representatives; and David Walters, former Oklahoma Governor, and his wife, Rhonda.

Remarks With President Jacques Chirac of France on the G-7 Response to Terrorism and an Exchange With Reporters in Lyons June 27, 1996

President Chirac. Ladies and gentlemen, this press point is, in fact, to explain to you that we changed our agenda at the G-7. We all together were united in condemning the dreadful bombing that has taken place and the fact that the United States and Saudi Arabia have fallen victim to this appalling event. We expressed our deepest sympathy to the President of the United States and the people of the United States as well. And we decided to place terrorism on our agenda as the very first point for discussion and to prepare a communique in order to fight this scourge. This is a communique which you will be receiving at the close of this pre-press conference, so that you can see the top priority that we assign to fighting terrorism.

We've also agreed to convene a ministerial conference in about 3 weeks time which will be attended by the ministers of foreign affairs and ministers responsible for security at the level of the eight countries meeting here. And this is all designed to identify the steps which will bolster our fight against terrorism.

President Clinton. I want to thank President Chirac and my other G-7 colleagues for their very powerful statements and their expression of sympathy to the victims and their families.

We have once again stood united against terrorism. We understand that an attack on one of us is an attack on all of us and that none of us is invulnerable. Attacks of terror can occur anywhere, whether in a Paris metro station or in Manchester or the subway in Tokyo or the World Trade Center or the Oklahoma City Federal Building. This latest act of outrage reminds us of one of the great burdens of the modern world.

As we become more open, as our borders become freer to cross, as we can move information and money and people and material across national boundaries more quickly, we all become more vulnerable to terrorists, to the organized forces of destruction, to those who live to kill for ethnic or racial or religious reasons, especially. And I want to emphasize that I am convinced that the G-7 leaders are every bit as determined as I am to take stronger action.

In the next day or two we will be discussing, as I said earlier, 40 specific actions we can take to try to protect our borders, to try to stop the illegal weapons trade, to try to stop the money laundering and illegal currency transactions, to try to protect

the witnesses and others who support our efforts to crack terrorists and their operations. And then President Chirac, in suggesting this ministerial, has given us the chance to try to come up with even more specific steps that will involve, we hope, even more people rallying to our cause.

This is a very sad day for the United States. I have been very moved by the deep and genuine expressions of condolence by the President of France and the other leaders here. But I have been even more moved by the determination that they have shared with me in common to take stronger stands against terrorism, to prevail and not to give in. That is the message we want to go out to the world tonight.

Thank you.

Terrorist Attack in Saudi Arabia

Q. Mr. President, is there anything tonight that you discussed that might have an effect on the type of bombing that took place in Saudi Arabia, any difference in approach that that bombing—

President Clinton. Well, among the things we are looking at, for our next statement on this and for the ministerial meeting, is the question of whether we can do more to help each other protect our people against larger and more powerful explosives, and perhaps even more important, whether we can do more to detect them.

If you will recall, when we had the terrible bomb explosions in Israel several weeks before the election, one of the things that I did was to send to the people of Israel the latest detection equipment that we had to try to aid them in finding people who had explosives on their persons or in their cars. And we believe that made a contribution to their endeavors.

So one of the things that we are going to do is to try to figure out how much more we can do in the area of prevention and how much more we can do in the area of detection of explosives, which are becoming the weapon of choice for terrorists all around the world.

Extraterritorial Impact of Sanctions

Q. President Clinton and President Chirac, in your discussions this evening did Helms-Burton and the pending legislation involving Libya and Iran come up, and if so, did you detect any change of views on the subjects?

President Clinton. We did not discuss that at all. Thank you.

Note: The President spoke at approximately 10:50 p.m. at the Prefecture. President Chirac spoke in French, and his remarks were translated by an interpreter. A portion of this exchange could not be verified because the tape was incomplete.

Remarks on International Security Issues at George Washington University August 5, 1996

Thank you very much. President Trachtenberg, I was in the neighborhood so I thought I'd drop by. [Laughter] Dean Harding, members of the George Washington University community, Congressman Cardin, Congressman King, Congressman Matsui. Senator McGovern, thank you for coming, sir. Delighted to see you. And by the way, thank you for writing your brave book about your daughter and for going around the country and talking about her. Thank you so much. I want to thank the family members of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103 who are here with me today, as well as two of those who were held hostage in Iran back in 1980 who are here today--and '79. Thank you for coming.

I'm pleased to be back here at George Washington, especially as you celebrate your 175th anniversary. President James Monroe signed the congressional charter establishing GW. I can only applaud his wisdom and hope that 175 years from now our administration will be associated with a similarly proud legacy. I think he would be very proud if he could see what GW has become.

Last night the centennial Olympics came to an end. It was a great Olympics for America not only because of the triumphs of our athletes but also because of the magnificent job done by the city of Atlanta and all the other hosts. But in a larger sense, it was a great event not just for Americans but for people everywhere who believe in peace and freedom, who believe in individual achievement and common effort.

I believe we love the Olympics because they work the way we think the world ought to work. They are possible because all different kinds of people come together in mutual respect and mutual acceptance of the rules of the games. No one wins by breaking their opponent's legs or by bad-mouthing their opponents in a public forum. Instead, victory comes from doing well in a good way. And all who strive are honored, as we saw when our volunteers cleared the track for the brave, injured marathon runner who was the very last finisher in the race. Most individuals and teams from the 197 competing nations did not win any medal, but they all had their chance, did their best, and were better for their efforts. That is what we want for our country and the world at the edge of a new century and a new millennium.

In the world of the 21st century, the Olympic way will become possible in the lives of more people than ever before. More people than ever before will have the chance to live their dreams. The explosion of knowledge, communication, travel, and trade will bring us all closer together in the global village. But as we saw in that terrible moment of terror in Centennial Park, this new openness also makes us more vulnerable to the forces of destruction that know no national boundaries. The pipe bomb reminded us, as did the murder of 19 fine American servicemen in Saudi Arabia and the still unresolved crash of TWA 800, that if we want the benefits of this new world we must defeat the forces who would destroy it by killing the innocent to strike fear and burn hatred into the hearts of the rest of us. This is a lesson and a responsibility every American must accept. As the mayor of Montoursville, a town of just 5,000 people in Pennsylvania that lost 21 of its brightest hopes for the future on TWA Flight 800, said, no matter how secluded and how innocent we are, once we leave our community we're subject to the troubles of the outside world.

America faces three great challenges as we enter the 21st century: keeping the American dream alive for all who are willing to work for it; bringing our own country together, not dividing it; and making sure America remains the strongest force in the world for peace and freedom, security and prosperity. I come to this place of learning and reason, a place so focused on the future, to explain why we cannot meet our own challenges of opportunity and responsibility and community unless we also maintain our indispensable role of leadership for peace and freedom in the world.

The worldwide changes in how people work, live, and relate to each other are the fastest and perhaps the most profound in history. Most of these changes are good: The cold war is over; our country is at peace; our economy is strong; democracy and free markets are taking root on every continent. The blocs, the barriers, the borders that defined the world for our parents and grandparents are giving way, with the help of a new generation of extraordinary technology. Every day millions of people use laptops, modems, CD-ROM's, and satellites to send ideas and products and money all across the planet in seconds. The opportunities to build a safer world and a more prosperous future are enormous.

But for all the promise of our time, we are not free from peril. Fascism and communism may be dead or discredited, but the forces of destruction live on. We see them in the sudden explosions of ethnic, racial, religious, and tribal hatred. We see

them in the reckless acts of rogue states. We see them especially in the dangerous webs of new threats of terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking, and the continuing threat that weapons of mass destruction might spread across the globe. These forces of destruction find opportunity in the very openness, freedom, and progress we cherish.

We must recognize that modern technologies by themselves will not make for us a new world of peace and freedom. Technology can be used for good or evil. American leadership is necessary to assure that the consequences are good. That is why we have worked so hard to seize the opportunities created by change and to move swiftly and strongly against the new threats that change has produced. To seize the opportunities, we are strengthening our alliances, dramatically reducing the danger of weapons of mass destruction, leading the march for peace and democracy throughout the world, and creating much greater prosperity at home by opening markets to American products abroad.

Our alliances are the bedrock of American leadership. As we saw in the Gulf war, in Haiti, and now in Bosnia, many other nations who share our goals will also share our burdens. In Europe, we have supported the forces of democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union, the removal of Russian troops from the Baltics, and led the way to opening NATO's doors to Europe's new democracies through the Partnership For Peace, as Europe, the main battleground for the bloodiest century in history, is finally coming together peacefully. In Asia, we have revitalized our security alliance with Japan, joined with South Korea to promote lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, and worked steadily to encourage the emergence of a strong, stable, open China.

The end of the cold war has also allowed us to lift the dark cloud of nuclear fear that had hung over our heads for 50 years. Today not a single Russian missile is pointed at our citizens or cities. We are cutting Russian and American arsenals by two-thirds from their cold war height. We helped Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan to give up their nuclear weapons which were left on their land when the Soviet Union dissolved. We are working with Japan and Korea, and we have persuaded North Korea to freeze the dangerous nuclear program it had been developing for over a decade.

We have advanced the struggle for peace and freedom. When people live free and at peace, we are more secure because they are less likely to resort to violence or to abuse human rights, and more likely to be better trading partners and partners in our

common struggle against terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking, environmental degradation.

Because America is taking those risks for peace and democracy, the dictators are gone from Haiti. Democracy is back and the flow of desperate refugees has stopped. In Bosnia the snipers' killing fields have become children's playing fields once again. In Northern Ireland and the Middle East, though difficulties remain, conflicts that once seemed unsolvable are moving closer to resolution. None of these struggles is easy. There is no guarantee of success. But we will continue to work for success, and we will make a difference.

Finally, we have seized the opportunity to better our people's lives at home by opening markets abroad. The true measure of our security includes not only physical safety but economic well-being as well. Decades from now people will look back on this period and see the most far-reaching changes in the world trading system in generations, changes that are good for the American people, changes that include 200 new trade agreements, including GATT and NAFTA; the Summit of the Americas; the Asian-Pacific leaders' commitment to bring down trade barriers. Because of these changes America is the world's number one exporter again, and we have a million new high-paid jobs as a result.

Now, none of these achievements just happened. They came about because we worked with others to share the risk and cost of engagement, because we used the power of our example and, where necessary, the example of our power. They happened because we were willing to make tough choices today knowing they would pay off for you tomorrow. Above all, they happened because we refused to listen to those who said that with the cold war over America could choose escapism over engagement. Had we done so we would have weakened the world's reach for freedom and tolerance and prosperity and undermined our own security and prosperity.

The fact is America remains the indispensable nation. There are times when America and only America can make a difference between war and peace, between freedom and repression, between hope and fear. Of course, we can't take on all the world's burden. We cannot become its policemen. But where our interests and values demand it and where we can make a difference, America must act and lead.

Nowhere is that responsibility more clear or more urgent than in the struggle against terrorism. No one is immune, whether you're riding a subway in Tokyo or a bus

in Tel Aviv, whether you're window shopping in London or walking the streets in Moscow, whether you're doing your duty in Saudi Arabia or going to work in Oklahoma City. Terrorism has become an equal opportunity destroyer, with no respect for borders. Whether we like it or not, in ways both good and bad we are living in an interdependent world. That's why we must break down the walls in our mind between foreign and domestic policy. And I might say, Mr. President, on this 175th anniversary, that is one of the intellectual objectives that I hope our great universities will commit themselves to.

The reality is our personal, community, and national prosperity depend upon our policies on economics in trade at home and abroad. Our personal, community, and national well-being depends upon our policies on the environment at home and abroad. Most dramatically, our personal, community, and national security depend upon our policies on terrorism at home and abroad. We cannot advance the common good at home without also advancing the common good around the world. We cannot reduce the threats to our people without reducing threats to the world beyond our borders. That's why the fight against terrorism must be both a national priority and a national security priority.

We have pursued a concerted national and international strategy against terrorism on three fronts: First, beyond our borders, by working more closely than ever with our friends and allies; second, here at home, by giving law enforcement the most powerful counterterrorism tools available; and third, in our airports and airplanes by increasing aviation security.

This will be a long, hard struggle. There will be setbacks along the way. But just as no enemy could drive us from the fight to meet our challenges and protect our values in World War II and the cold war, we will not be driven from the tough fight against terrorism today. Terrorism is the enemy of our generation, and we must prevail.

First, on the international front, stopping the spread of terrorism clearly requires common action. The United States has a special responsibility to lead in this effort. Over the past 4 years, our intelligence services have been sharing more information than ever with other nations. We've opened up a law enforcement academy in Budapest which is training people from 23 nations, an FBI office in Moscow, and just last Friday, Congress gave us the funding for FBI offices in Cairo, Islamabad, Tel Aviv, and Beijing.

We've requested more money for intelligence in 1997. This focus is making a difference. As the Senate intelligence committee concluded in its 1996 report on the intelligence authorization bill, the work of U.S. intelligence agencies against terrorism has been an example of effective coordination and information sharing.

I've also worked to rally other nations to the fight against terrorism: last year at the U.N. General Assembly; this spring at the historic Summit of Peacemakers at Sharm al-Sheikh, where 29 nations, including 13 Arab nations, for the first time condemned terrorism in Israel and anywhere else it occurs in the Middle East and throughout the world; at the G-7 summit in Lyons and the recently held follow-on conference we called for in Paris, where we were represented ably by the Attorney General.

Now, the point of all these efforts with other countries is not to talk but to act. More countries are acting with us. More countries are taking the "no sanctuary" pledge and living up to their extradition laws so that terrorists have no place to run or hide. More countries are helping us to shut down the gray markets that outfit terrorists with weapons and false documents.

Last week in Paris, the G-7 nations and Russia agreed to pursue a sweeping set of measures to prevent terrorists from acting and to catch them if they do. And we set timetables with specific dates by which progress must be made. We're also working with Saudi Arabia to improve the security of our forces stationed there, so that we can continue to deter aggression by rogue states and stand against terrorism in the Middle East.

After Khobar Towers, I immediately ordered investigations by the FBI and a commission headed by General Wayne Downing, which is to report to me later this month. While it's too early to reach conclusions, these investigations are moving aggressively in cooperation with our host. And we are working with the Saudi Government to move almost all our troops to other bases to better protect them from terrorist attacks.

Even though we're working more closely with our allies than ever and there is more agreement on what needs to be done than ever, we do not always agree. Where we don't agree, the United States cannot and will not refuse to do what we believe is right. That's why we have maintained or strengthened sanctions against states that sponsor terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan. You cannot do business with countries

that practice commerce with you by day while funding or protecting the terrorists who kill you and your innocent civilians by night. That is wrong. I hope and expect that before long our allies will come around to accepting this fundamental truth.

This morning I signed into law the Iran-Libya sanctions act. It builds on what we've already done to isolate those regimes by imposing tough penalties on foreign companies that go forward with new investments in key sectors. The act will help to deny them the money they need to finance international terrorism or to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It will increase the pressure on Libya to extradite the suspects in the bombing of Pan Am 103.

With us today, as I said before, are some of those families and the loved ones of other victims of terrorism sponsored by Iran and Libya. Let me repeat the pledge I made to them earlier. We will not rest in our efforts to track down, prosecute, and punish terrorists and to keep the heat on those who support them. And we must not rest in that effort.

The second part of our strategy is to give American law enforcement officials the most powerful tools available to fight terrorism without undermining our civil liberties. In the wake of Oklahoma City, I strengthened the terrorism bill I had previously sent to Congress but which had not then been passed. Despite the vow of Congress to act quickly, it took a year before that bill came to my desk to be signed.

The bill had some very good points. It made terrorism a Federal offense, expanded the role of the FBI, imposed the death penalty for terrorism. As strong as it was, however, it did not give our law enforcement officials other tools they needed and that they had asked for, including increased wiretap authority for terrorists to parallel that which we have for people involved in organized crime now, and chemical markers for the most common explosives so that we can more easily track down bombmakers.

After the bombing in Atlanta, Congress said it would reconsider these and other measures. I immediately called the congressional leadership to the White House and urged them to put together a package and vote it into law before they left for the August recess last Friday. I am disappointed, and more importantly, the America people are disappointed that that job was not done. These additional measures would save lives. They would make us all more secure. When the Congress returns from the August recess, we will take them up again, and we must get the job done.

There is more I will ask Congress to do. Next month I will submit to Congress the "International Crime Control Act" that our Justice, State, and Treasury Departments drafted at my request, because more and more, terrorism, international organized crime, and drug trafficking are going hand in hand. This bill expands our fight against money laundering, so criminals and terrorists will have a tougher time financing their activities. It strengthens our extradition powers and border controls to keep more criminals and terrorists out of America. It increases the ability of American law enforcement to prosecute those who commit violent crimes against Americans abroad. Congress should pass it.

And once again, I urge the Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, so that we can eliminate chemical weapons stockpiles and give our law enforcement new powers to investigate and prosecute people planning attacks with such weapons. We have seen the terrible, destructive impact of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway. Within a month of that attack, Japan's Diet ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, but we still have not done so. If the Chemical Weapons Convention were in force today, it would be much more difficult for terrorists to acquire chemical weapons. They are not waiting, and we shouldn't either.

Finally, the third front of our struggle against terrorism is the airports and airplanes that bring us all closer together. Air travel remains the safest form of transportation. And our airlines have the best safety record and security record in the business. But that's a small consolation when a single attack can take so many lives. Last year we began field testing new high-tech explosive detection machines in Atlanta and San Francisco. We significantly increased security at our airports, and the FAA created a new Government and industry panel to review airline security.

After the TWA crash, I ordered new measures to increase the security of air travel. As any of you who have flown in recent days will have noticed, we're doing more hand searches and machine screening of luggage. We're requiring preflight inspections for every plane flying to or from the United States--every plane, every cabin, every cargo hold, every time. The Vice President is leading a commission on aviation security that is to report back to me within 45 days with an action plan to deploy machines that can detect the most sophisticated explosives and other needed changes.

Now, I know all this has led to some extra inconvenience for air travelers, and it may lead eventually to a modest increase in the cost of air travel. But the increased safety and peace of mind will be worth it.

So, greater international cooperation, stronger American law enforcement, safer air travel, these are the fronts of our concerted strategy against terrorism. Much of this work by law enforcement, intelligence, and military professionals goes unheralded, but we are getting results. For example, we prevented attacks on the United Nations and the Holland Tunnel in New York. We thwarted an attempt to bomb American passenger planes from the skies over the Pacific. We convicted those responsible for the World Trade Center bombing and arrested suspects in the Oklahoma City and Unabomber cases. We've tracked down terrorists around the world and extradited more terrorists in 4 years than in the previous 12.

But I want to make it clear to the American people that while we can defeat terrorists, it will be a long time before we defeat terrorism. America will remain a target because we are uniquely present in the world, because we act to advance peace and democracy, because we have taken a tougher stand against terrorism, and because we are the most open society on Earth. But to change any of that, to pull our troops back from the world's trouble spots, to turn our backs on those taking risks for peace, to weaken our opposition against terrorism, to curtail the freedom that is our birthright would be to give terrorism a victory it must not and will not have.

In this fight, as in so many other challenges around the world, American leadership is indispensable. In assuming our leadership in the struggle against terrorism we must be neither reluctant nor arrogant but realistic, determined, and confident. And we must understand that in this battle we must deploy more than police and military resources. Every one of you counts; every American counts.

Our greatest strength is our confidence. And that is the target of the terrorists. Make no mistake about it: The bombs that kill and maim innocent people are not really aimed at them but at the spirit of our whole country and the spirit of freedom. Therefore, the struggle against terrorism involves more than the new security measures I have ordered and the others I am seeking. Ultimately, it requires the confident will of the American people to retain our convictions for freedom and peace and to remain the indispensable force in creating a better world at the dawn of a new century.

Everywhere I travel on behalf of our country I encounter people who look up to us because of what we stand for and what we're willing to stand against. I have said this before, but when Hillary and I visited the Olympic Village, I was so moved by the athletes who came up to me and talked about what America had meant to their country: a young Croatian athlete who thanked me for our efforts there, not long after Secretary Brown's plane crashed and Secretary Kantor had finished the mission; an Irish athlete who thanked me for our efforts to bring peace in Northern Ireland; a Palestinian athlete who said that he came from a very old people, but they never had an Olympic team until they made peace with Israel, and that many people wanted to keep that peace.

This responsibility is great, and I know it weighs heavily on many Americans. But we should embrace this responsibility because at this point in time no one else can do what we can do to advance peace and freedom and democracy and because it is necessary at this point in time for our own peace and freedom and prosperity.

As we remember the centennial Olympics, the weeks of courage and triumph, the wonder of the world's youth bound together by the rules of the game in genuine mutual respect, let us resolve to work for a world that looks more like that in the 21st century, to stand strong against the moments of terror that would destroy our spirit, to stand for the values that have brought us so many blessings, values that have made us at this pivotal moment the indispensable nation. Thank you very much.

Note: The President spoke at 10:26 a.m. in the Lisner Auditorium. In his remarks, he referred to Stephen J. Trachtenberg, president, and Harry Harding, dean, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University; former Senator George S. McGovern of South Dakota; and Mayor John Dorin of Montoursville, PA.

Remarks in Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan August 20, 1998

Good afternoon. Today I ordered our Armed Forces to strike at terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the threat they present to our national security.

I have said many times that terrorism is one of the greatest dangers we face in this new global era. We saw its twisted mentality at work last week in the Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, which took the lives of innocent Americans and Africans and injured thousands more. Today we have struck back.

The United States launched an attack this morning on one of the most active terrorist bases in the world. It is located in Afghanistan and operated by groups affiliated with Usama bin Ladin, a network not sponsored by any state but as dangerous as any we face. We also struck a chemical weapons-related facility in Sudan. Our target was the terrorists' base of operation and infrastructure. Our objective was to damage their capacity to strike at Americans and other innocent people.

I ordered this action for four reasons: first, because we have convincing evidence these groups played the key role in the Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania; second, because these groups have executed terrorist attacks against Americans in the past; third, because we have compelling information that they were planning additional terrorist attacks against our citizens and others with the inevitable collateral casualties we saw so tragically in Africa; and fourth, because they are seeking to acquire chemical weapons and other dangerous weapons.

Terrorists must have no doubt that, in the face of their threats, America will protect its citizens and will continue to lead the world's fight for peace, freedom, and security.

Now I am returning to Washington to be briefed by my national security team on the latest information. I will provide you with a more detailed statement later this afternoon from the White House.

Thank you very much.

Note: The President spoke at 1:55 p.m. in the gymnasium at Edgartown Elementary School, prior to his departure for Washington, DC.

Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan August 20, 1998

Good afternoon. Today I ordered our Armed Forces to strike at terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the imminent threat they presented to our national security.

I want to speak with you about the objective of this action and why it was necessary. Our target was terror; our mission was clear: to strike at the network of radical groups affiliated with and funded by Usama bin Ladin, perhaps the preeminent organizer and financier of international terrorism in the world today.

The groups associated with him come from diverse places but share a hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence, and a horrible distortion of their religion to justify the murder of innocents. They have made the United States their adversary precisely because of what we stand for and what we stand against.

A few months ago, and again this week, bin Ladin publicly vowed to wage a terrorist war against America, saying, and I quote, "We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians. They're all targets."

Their mission is murder and their history is bloody. In recent years, they killed American, Belgian, and Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia. They plotted to assassinate the President of Egypt and the Pope. They planned to bomb six United States 747's over the Pacific. They bombed the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan. They gunned down German tourists in Egypt.

The most recent terrorist events are fresh in our memory. Two weeks ago, 12 Americans and nearly 300 Kenyans and Tanzanians lost their lives, and another 5,000 were wounded, when our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were bombed. There is convincing information from our intelligence community that the bin Ladin terrorist network was responsible for these bombings. Based on this information, we have high confidence that these bombings were planned, financed, and carried out by the organization bin Ladin leads.

America has battled terrorism for many years. Where possible, we've used law enforcement and diplomatic tools to wage the fight. The long arm of American law has reached out around the world and brought to trial those guilty of attacks in New York and Virginia and in the Pacific. We have quietly disrupted terrorist groups and

foiled their plots. We have isolated countries that practice terrorism. We've worked to build an international coalition against terror. But there have been and will be times when law enforcement and diplomatic tools are simply not enough, when our very national security is challenged, and when we must take extraordinary steps to protect the safety of our citizens.

With compelling evidence that the bin Ladin network of terrorist groups was planning to mount further attacks against Americans and other freedom-loving people, I decided America must act. And so this morning, based on the unanimous recommendation of my national security team, I ordered our Armed Forces to take action to counter an immediate threat from the bin Ladin network.

Earlier today the United States carried out simultaneous strikes against terrorist facilities and infrastructure in Afghanistan. Our forces targeted one of the most active terrorist bases in the world. It contained key elements of the bin Ladin network's infrastructure and has served as a training camp for literally thousands of terrorists from around the globe. We have reason to believe that a gathering of key terrorist leaders was to take place there today, thus underscoring the urgency of our actions.

Our forces also attacked a factory in Sudan associated with the bin Ladin network. The factory was involved in the production of materials for chemical weapons.

The United States does not take this action lightly. Afghanistan and Sudan have been warned for years to stop harboring and supporting these terrorist groups. But countries that persistently host terrorists have no right to be safe havens.

Let me express my gratitude to our intelligence and law enforcement agencies for their hard, good work. And let me express my pride in our Armed Forces who carried out this mission while making every possible effort to minimize the loss of innocent life.

I want you to understand, I want the world to understand that our actions today were not aimed against Islam, the faith of hundreds of millions of good, peace-loving people all around the world, including the United States. No religion condones the murder of innocent men, women, and children. But our actions were aimed at fanatics and killers who wrap murder in the cloak of righteousness and in so doing profane the great religion in whose name they claim to act.

My fellow Americans, our battle against terrorism did not begin with the bombing of our Embassies in Africa, nor will it end with today's strike. It will require strength, courage, and endurance. We will not yield to this threat; we will meet it, no matter how long it may take. This will be a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism, between the rule of law and terrorism. We must be prepared to do all that we can for as long as we must.

America is and will remain a target of terrorists precisely because we are leaders; because we act to advance peace, democracy, and basic human values; because we're the most open society on Earth; and because, as we have shown yet again, we take an uncompromising stand against terrorism.

But of this I am also sure: The risks from inaction, to America and the world, would be far greater than action, for that would embolden our enemies, leaving their ability and their willingness to strike us intact. In this case, we knew before our attack that these groups already had planned further actions against us and others.

I want to reiterate: The United States wants peace, not conflict. We want to lift lives around the world, not take them. We have worked for peace in Bosnia, in Northern Ireland, in Haiti, in the Middle East, and elsewhere. But in this day, no campaign for peace can succeed without a determination to fight terrorism.

Let our actions today send this message loud and clear: There are no expendable American targets; there will be no sanctuary for terrorists; we will defend our people, our interests, and our values; we will help people of all faiths, in all parts of the world, who want to live free of fear and violence. We will persist, and we will prevail.

Thank you. God bless you, and may God bless our country.

Note: The President spoke at 5:32 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House.

Remarks at the Memorial Service for Crewmembers of the U.S.S. Cole in Norfolk, Virginia October 18, 2000

The President. Secretary Cohen; General Reno; Secretary Danzig; General Shelton; distinguished Members of the Senate and House; Governor; Admiral Clark; Admiral Natter; Chaplain Black; Master Chief Herdt; Master Chief Hefty; the sailors of the U.S.S. Cole; the family members and friends; the Norfolk naval community; my fellow Americans. Today we honor our finest young people, fallen soldiers who rose to freedom's challenge. We mourn their loss, celebrate their lives, offer the love and prayers of a grateful nation to their families.

For those of us who have to speak here, we are all mindful of the limits of our poor words to lift your spirits or warm your hearts. We know that God has given us the gift of reaching our middle years. And we now have to pray for your children, your husbands, your wives, your brothers, your sisters who were taken so young. We know we will never know them as you did or remember them as you will, the first time you saw them in uniform or the last time you said goodbye.

They all had their own stories and their own dreams. We Americans have learned something about each and every one of them over these last difficult days as their profiles, their lives, their loves, their service have been given to us. For me, I learned a little more when I met with all the families this morning.

Some follow the family tradition of Navy service; others hoped to use their service to earn a college degree. One of them had even worked for me in the White House: Richard Costelow was a technology wizard who helped to update the White House communications system for this new century.

All these very different Americans, all with their different stories, their lifelines and love ties, answered the same call of service and found themselves on the U.S.S. Cole, headed for the Persian Gulf, where our forces are working to keep peace and stability in a region that could explode and disrupt the entire world.

Their tragic loss reminds us that even when America is not at war, the men and women of our military still risk their lives for peace. I am quite sure history will record in great detail our triumphs in battle, but I regret that no one will ever be able to write a full account of the wars we never fought, the losses we never suffered, the tears

we never shed because men and women like those who were on the U.S.S. Cole were standing guard for peace. We should never, ever forget that.

Today I ask all Americans just to take a moment to thank the men and women of our Armed Forces for a debt we can never repay, whose character and courage, more than even modern weapons, makes our military the strongest in the world. And in particular, I ask us to thank God today for the lives, the character, and courage of the crew of the U.S.S. Cole, including the wounded and especially those we lost or are missing: Hull Maintenance Technician Third Class Kenneth Eugene Clodfelter; Electronics Technician Chief Petty Officer First Class Richard Costelow; Mess Management Specialist Seaman Lakeina Monique Francis; Information Systems Technician Seaman Timothy Lee Gauna; Signalman Seaman Apprentice Cherone Louis Gunn; Seaman James Rodrick McDaniels; Engineman Second Class Mark Ian Nieto; Electronics Warfare Technician Third Class Ronald Scott Owens; Seaman Apprentice Lakiba Nicole Palmer; Engine Fireman Joshua Langdon Parlett; Fireman Apprentice Patrick Howard Roy; Electronics Warfare Technician Second Class Kevin Shawn Rux; Mess Management Specialist Third Class Ronchester Manangan Santiago; Operations Specialist Second Class Timothy Lamont Saunders; Fireman Gary Graham Swenchonis, Jr; Ensign Andrew Triplett; Seaman Apprentice Craig Bryan Wibberley.

In the names and faces of those we lost and mourn, the world sees our Nation's greatest strength: people in uniform rooted in every race, creed, and region on the face of the Earth, yet bound together by a common commitment to freedom and a common pride in being American. That same spirit is living today as the crew of the U.S.S. Cole pulls together in a determined struggle to keep the determined warrior afloat.

The idea of common humanity and unity amidst diversity, so purely embodied by those we mourn today, must surely confound the minds of the hate-filled terrorists who killed them. They envy our strength without understanding the values that give us strength. For, for them, it is their way or no way--their interpretation, twisted though it may be, of a beautiful religious tradition; their political views; their racial and ethnic views--their way or no way.

Such people can take innocent life. They have caused your tears and anguish, but they can never heal or build harmony or bring people together. That is work only free, law-abiding people can do, people like the sailors of the U.S.S. Cole.

To those who attacked them, we say: You will not find a safe harbor. We will find you, and justice will prevail. America will not stop standing guard for peace or freedom or stability in the Middle East and around the world.

But some way, someday, people must learn the lesson of the lives of those we mourn today, of how they worked together, of how they lived together, of how they reached across all the lines that divided them and embraced their common humanity and the common values of freedom and service.

Not far from here, there is a quiet place that honors those who gave their lives in service to our country. Adorning its entrance are words from a poem by Archibald MacLeish, not only a tribute to the young we lost but a summons to those of us left behind. Listen to them.

The young no longer speak, but:

They have a silence that speaks for them at night.

They say: We were young. Remember us.

They say: We have done what we could, but until it is finished, it is not done.

They say: Our deaths are not ours; they are yours; they will mean what you make them.

They say: Whether our lives and our deaths were for peace and a new hope, we cannot say; it is you who must say this.

They say: We leave you our deaths. Give them their meaning.

The lives of the men and women we lost on the U.S.S. Cole meant so much to those who loved them, to all Americans, to the cause of freedom. They have given us their deaths. Let us give them their meaning: their meaning of peace and freedom, of reconciliation and love, of service, endurance, and hope. After all they have given us, we must give them their meaning.

I ask now that you join me in a moment of silence and prayer for the lost, the missing, and their grieving families. [At this point, those gathered observed a moment of silence.]

The President. Amen.

Thank you, and may God bless you all.

Note: The President spoke at 11:38 a.m. on Pier 12. In his remarks, he referred to Gov. James S. Gilmore III of Virginia; Adm. Barry C. Black, USN, Chief of Chaplains, U.S.

Navy, who gave the invocation; Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy James L. Herdt, USN; Master Chief Thomas B. Hefty, USN, U.S. Atlantic Fleet Master Chief. The transcript released by the Office of the Press Secretary also included the remarks of Adm. Robert J. Natter, USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; Adm. Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations; Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig; Gen. Henry H. Shelton, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Secretary of Defense William Cohen. The related proclamations of October 12 and October 16 are listed in Appendix D at the end of this volume.

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