How is the concept of hybridity useful in thinking about third party humanitarian interventions? Case Studies: Bougainville and Solomon Islands

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Abstract

How one should carry out state-building humanitarian interventions responsibly and with positive outcomes has been called one of the primary problems of international relations today (Fry and Kabutaulaka 2008, 2-3). In the Pacific region, this is further complicated by recent colonial history, extreme power differences between states and increasing regionalism. The aim of my study is to assess two peace-building interventions, one in Bougainville and one in the Solomon Islands, in terms of their ability to build stable governance and lasting peace. To do this, I will be looking through the lens of hybridity - a term recently popularised in peace studies literature (Clements et al 2007; Mac Ginty 2011; Richmond 2009 & 2010). Using 'hybrid-sensitivity' as a way of assessing interventions could be a way forward in terms of assessing how foreign interventions can deal with the problems associated with national sovereignty, post- and/or neo-colonialism and our responsibility to protect others elsewhere - and to secure security within the region.
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# Table of Contents

## Chapters:

1. Literature Review........................................................................................................5

2. Modalities/ Processes of Engagement .........................................................................27
   a. Central Legitimacy Challenges to Third-Party Intervention
   b. An Extremely Brief History of Humanitarian Intervention
   c. Classifications and Trends of Peace Operations
   d. Military Humanitarian Intervention: Some Ethical Challenges

3. Defining Hybridity and Hybrid-Sensitive....................................................................50
   a. Philosophical Underpinnings of the 'Liberal Peace Project'
   b. Indigenous/ Traditional Approach
   c. Defining Hybridity
   d. Moving from Hybridity to Hybrid-Sensitivity

4. Case Study 1: Bougainville.........................................................................................72
   a. Historical Background
   b. Violent Conflict Begins
   c. Results of the Conflict
   d. The Peace Process: Third Parties, Methods
   e. Results of the Peace Process

5. Case Study 2: Solomon Islands..................................................................................86
   a. Historical Background
   b. Violent Conflict Begins
   c. Results of the Conflict
   d. The Peace Process: Third Parties, Methods
   e. Results of the Peace Process

6. Comparison and Consequential Analysis....................................................................96
   a. Criteria for Hybrid-Sensitivity and Application to Case Studies
   b. The Twin Pitfalls of Hybridity
   c. Concluding Statement
Chapter One: Literature Review

What are the various roles of third parties in peace making operations?

The question of the role of third parties in peace making operations is discussed in general in several classic peace and conflict studies texts; they address questions relating to the necessity of a third party and what would constitute ‘best practice’ in terms of motivation and engagement of a third party (Betts 1994, Stedman 1997, Wehr & Lederach 1991, Wallensteen 1997, Bellamy & Williams 2007). There is extensive literature available on this topic, much more than I have listed here; there are a series of debates surrounding the desirability of a third party, whether such a party should be neutral and what role the party should have, depending on context. What the literature surrounding hybridity goes into – in more detail than general academic literature on third parties – is the relationship between the third party and the ‘locals’, and what would be ‘best practice’ in terms of the playing out of this relationship, particularly in light of historic oppression and power imbalances.

What are the options a third party has for processes of engagement with peace making?

Once a third party decides to engage in peace making, there are a number of ways in which such an operation can be carried out. Within the field of international relations, there is a lot of emphasis on the differences between peace building, peace keeping and peace enforcement for example – depending on factors like the stage of the conflict, the role of the ‘host’ state and their consent or lack thereof for the peace operation. These various processes of engagement are more than just pragmatic solutions, but instead rest heavily on respective ideologies, for example the sanctity of borders versus the responsibility to protect. Peace enforcement is obviously especially contentious, as it can involve the use of force and be carried out without the consent of the ‘local’ state. There is disagreement in the literature about the precise meanings of these terms and the limits of any one category, so I will use Gareth Evan's

With regard to regional peace making, as opposed to international operations, Bellamy et al discuss a variety of types of non-UN peace operations, defined based on who the actors are: individual states, coalitions of the willing or regional arrangements (Bellamy et al 2005). Using this terminology to assess my case studies would be useful, and to look at the pitfalls associated with these kinds of interventions.

What is meant by ‘liberal peace’ and ‘hybrid peaces’?

Despite attempting to encompass a range of options for peace making engagement, most of the methods listed above could still fall under the general banner of ‘liberal peace making’ (Mac Ginty 2011) and the discussions regarding which of these types of intervention to use often rest on the assumption that ‘liberal peace’ is desirable and universally appropriate. For example, the Australian-led coalition of the willing into the Solomon Islands is deemed to have achieved its mandate, and, even more optimistically, to have “hinted at the creation of a new era of cooperation between Pacific states” (Bellamy et al 2005, p. 188). Forgetting for a moment that there is a long history of cooperation between Pacific states - until 1987 “it was a commonplace that the Pacific was indeed pacific” (Ware 2005, p. 435) - this rose-tinted analysis of the RAMSI intervention appears to assess it from a purely state-centred (and indeed, Australian) perspective; a perspective partially arrived at from the definition of the form of peace making and the assumed goals.

Mac Ginty analyses how thinkers have granted the liberal peace too much coherency and power (Mac Ginty 2011). Mac Ginty argues that there is not one liberal peace project, but multiples, often differing in very significant ways; the liberal peace is not designed in a ‘laboratory of peace’, but rather exists and interacts with the context it is supposed to be instilled and with the people there (Mac Ginty 2011).
Despite these multitudes of liberal peaces, there are some general statements we can make about what the words ‘liberal peace’ mean in this context and what ‘liberal peace making’ generally looks like. First of all, liberal ideals are grounded in the ideal of a bureaucratic State, which appears ‘natural’ and objective (Bourdieu 1994, p. 4). For example, the State’s supposed objectivity is exemplified in the Western justice system whereby the jury must be entirely impartial and unrelated to the people in the case or in our welfare systems which (at least in theory) do not make distinctions based on power or character, but treat each person as a random citizen worthy of certain entitlements based on universal criteria. This anonymity has the problems of being impersonal and dehumanising, but it has the benefits of treating every person the same and supposedly getting around prejudice and social hierarchy.

The western State is “the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital” (Bourdieu 1994, p. 5), namely the capital of physical force (monopoly of violence), economic capital (national market, tax), informational capital (linguistic and judicial codes) and symbolic capital. Symbolic capital is “any property … when it is perceived by social agents endowed with categories of perception which cause them to know it and to recognize it, to give it value” (Bourdieu 1994, p. 8) and the state is “the site par excellence of the concentration and exercise of symbolic power” (Bourdieu 1994, p. 9). To think of a state in these terms perhaps exemplifies the ‘job’ powerful nations have when they take up post-colonial state-building; creating this centre of capital and symbolic power and convincing the newly-minted ‘citizens’ to believe in these institutions.

Mac Ginty outlines the problem of defining the liberal peace, when “clearly the coercive liberal peacemaking in Afghanistan is very different from the more persuasive forms of liberal peacebuilding found in Northern Ireland” (2011, p. 6), but does conclude that the term remains analytically useful as there are enough similarities to make it a clear category; “the familiar cast list of states and institutions that promote liberal peacebuilding, the familiar script of liberal rhetoric, and the familiar policy prescriptions” (2011, p. 6). He then devotes a
chapter to debunking the myth of the unified liberal peace project, while showing what factors do constitute liberal peacemaking and why those priorities have been challenged in recent years. There is plenty of literature in the ‘post-liberal’ vein, of which Mac Ginty and Richmond are perhaps two of the most applicable for my purposes – especially as they specifically attempt to tackle the problems of liberalism with a notion of hybrid peaces (Mac Ginty 2011, Mac Ginty & Richmond 2009, Richmond 2009 & 2010).

While both Richmond and Mac Ginty provide interesting counter-points to thinking of processes as homogenous or one-directional, such an outwardly ‘equal’ seeming and intermixed ‘map’ of power is seen by some as excessively optimistic. Ahmad argues that proponents of hybridity present an unrealistically fair version of the world where interactions are not tarnished by power imbalance or historical oppression; “intercultural hybridity is presented as a transaction of displaced equals which somehow transcends the profound inequalities engendered by colonialism itself” (Ahmad 1995, p. 17).

Aside from historical colonialism, Ahmad argues that supporting transnational cultural hybridity without reservations “amounts ... to endorsing the cultural claims of transnational capital itself” (Ahmad 1995, p. 13). The global economic system which has allowed this supposed ‘hybridity’ to take place is built on a history of colonialism and continued exploitation (or neo colonialism), and to uncritically celebrate the ‘globalisation’ or hybridity created by it is to ignore its foundations and the hegemonic ideologies propping it up. These criticisms of hybridity theories need to be unpacked and applied to the case study, to see how they sit when ‘hybridity’ or ‘hybrid-sensitivity’ is being applied to a humanitarian intervention.

Ahmad’s critique is comparable to an argument by Slavoj Zizek, who argues that charity within the capitalist economic system is like giving with one hand what one smashed with the other (Ahmad 1995, Zizek 2009) – giving aid or providing peace making efforts is essentially a way to keep the global system operating to one’s own benefit, even if that is not one’s intended outcome. Hybridity could be framed as an illusory ‘way out’ for neo-colonialist powers – as
a way to put a positive PR spin on what amounts of neo-colonial bureaucratic control at worst, and paternalistic development projects at best. Of course, ‘Liberal’ peace building could be accused of this even more readily than hybrid-sensitive peace building, as it operates directly within the state-centred, empire-driven and neo-liberal economic model; essentially the status quo. Liberal peace and the liberal peace project aiming at said peace might be ‘humanitarian’ to a point, but only insofar as the ‘centres’ of power maintain their position and influence.

The ‘liberal peace’ espoused by people like George W. Bush and the ‘freedom’ associated with it has been dragged through the proverbial mud and is now greeted with a deserved level of suspicion. We are facing a crisis of legitimacy in terms of interventions and the role of the third party (Fry & Kabutaulaka 2008), if ‘we’ were not always in that crisis-state to begin with. However, doing nothing has also been tried, famously in Rwanda, and shown to have the potential for devastating consequences.

What is ‘hybridity’ and what is its relevance to peace making?

While the biological use of the term ‘hybridity’ goes back to the breeding of different species (Kapchan & Strong 1999), the notion of ‘cultural hybridity’ was popularised by cultural theorists and geographers. Gayatri Spivak writes about the interactions between domination and resistance and how this impacts upon the idea of ‘home’ and the spread of the English language – and her relationship to it (Chakrvorty et al 2006). Famously, Homi Bhabha wrote about how ‘mimicry’ by the colonised can be a kind of resistance and an example of cultural hybridity (1984) and how colonialism impacted upon and changed the colonizers, as well as the colonized (2001).

There is some debate over the qualitative value of hybridity, with some thinkers accusing hybridity-proponents of white-washing over the realities of oppression and inequality (Ahmad 1995). The counter-argument is that hybridity is not a qualitatively aligned process and that acknowledging hybridisation does not
deny the existence of power imbalances, and, indeed, can help to illuminate them (Kraidy 2006).

In fact, hybridity is a way to attempt to think about the relationships between the ‘local’ and various international forces without giving either particular qualitative worth. Doreen Massey writes about how places are processes and how we can understand that a place is a “distinct mixture” (2001, p. 177) of the historical relations which impact upon it; “The question is how to hold on to that notion of geographical difference, of uniqueness, even of rootedness if people want that, without it being reactionary” (2001, p. 172).

Here Massey points at the risk of romanticising the ‘local’, or creating a myth of nationalism/ local cohesion in order to pander to peoples’ need to be grounded in a place – and states very eloquently that one of the primary dilemmas facing us in modernity is how to achieve that sense of ‘home’ without doing so in a way which (potentially violently) excludes others.

This also connects with thinkers like Bhabha and Richmond who talk respectively about “the performance of identity as iteration” (Bhabha 2001, p. 165) and an “every day” notion of peace (Richmond 2009). This kind of thinking could be seen as somewhat neo-Aristotelian, in a similar way to Alasdair MacIntyre, emphasizing ethos instead of ethics and thus attacking the very core of modernity, and the concurrent universalism which drives liberal peace making. Ethos, by it’s very nature, is not universal; Charles Turner describes it thus “the ultimate reference point for ethical reasoning is not a formal freedom detached from determinate practice, but a conception of the good life for human beings, a good life embedded in those practices themselves” (1992, p. 29). An ethos of peace could be one grounded in “the everyday nature of any sustainable peace – perhaps focused on a culturally appropriate form of individual or community life and care” (Richmond 2009, p. 558). Relating to this, Epeli Hau’Ofa argues that far ‘below’ the circles of academics and politicians who define the ‘problems’ of Oceania, “ordinary people … are busily and independently redefining their world in accordance with their perceptions of their own interests” (1993, p. 14-15).

Charles T. Call et al argues against a ‘cookie cutter’ approach to peace building (2008) and Richmond takes it the step further to argue against a cookie

*Hybridity in other fields:*

Also, aside from people writing directly about peace making, there are useful definitions and guidelines about hybridity to be taken from other disciplines, like education, literary criticism, and cultural and communication studies.

An article written about hybridity in education argues that diversity means more than just diversity of the participants backgrounds, but also “diversity in the meditational tools, roles and the activity systems themselves” (Gutiérrez at al 1999, p. 287). This is clearly relevant for peace making, and transplanted to this field would mean that merely including a diverse range of participants is not alone a hybrid-sensitive approach – such an approach would need to be diverse also in terms of how it is carried out. A hybrid-sensitive approach to peace making means a careful consideration and openness about the *entire process*, not just a tokenistic meeting with a women’s group or the inclusion of local civil society representatives in a larger process they have no control over.

In the realm of organization studies, Lain L. Mangham applies Alasdair MacIntyre’s ideas about ‘characters’ to the way we run businesses and why such an approach is problematic (1995). He focuses especially on the ‘character’ of the ‘Manager’ whose job it is to further the interests of the company – and who suspends his personal ethics while in this role. McIntyre argues that we suspend our own ethical questioning and *our creativity* when we are placed in defined roles; we aim purely for efficiency and effectiveness towards an *end* (Mangham 1995).

These arguments are all highly relevant to peace making and how such a process could become more ‘hybrid-sensitive’; they get to the heart of some of the problems with an overly modernist or ‘liberal’ approach and explain how the *roles* these approaches place us in colour the way the operations play out – they also highlight the need to question the *end*, not just means to the end; i.e. what kind of ‘peace’ are we working for? Further more, Mangham begins to touch on
issues of how we can incorporate creativity, and maybe even emotion, into morality and how to cope with the uncertainty this seems to go hand-in-hand with; he finishes with writing that the philosopher Zygmunt Bauman argues: “Ambiguity, ambivalence, confusion, moral dilemmas and uncertainty are the human condition and we must learn to live with them” (1995, p. 202).

How does a hybrid-sensitive approach impact and shape humanitarian intervention – and why is it useful?

A hybrid-sensitive peace making process would be a re-imagining and enacting of the relationship between the third-party/s and the local actors. Central to what would make such a relationship ‘hybrid-sensitive’ is what I will call reciprocal learning – quoted by Mangham, Alan Wolfe argues that morality is a practice “negotiated between learning agents capable of growth on the one hand and a culture capable of change on the other” (Mangham 1995, p. 202). For reciprocal learning to take place, all parties involved need to be open to knowledge from the others – knowledge which may challenge existing paradigms and understandings. It does not entail a wholesale acceptance of this knowledge, but does mean a re-negotiation and a genuine willingness to accept change – and thus deal with the uncertainty outlined by Bauman above. Reciprocity implies that which is respective, changeable and complementary and does not aim at homogeneity or ideological domination.

This idea of partnership runs against the grain of modernist thought (where finding the universal answer is an – often unspoken – goal) and certainly against many manifestations of the liberal peace building project – “the prospect of the de-regulation of human conduct, of gambling on ‘human moral intuition and ability to negotiate the art and usages of living together’ may induce fear and anxiety” (Bauman, 1993: 3, in: Mangham 1995, p. 203). This fear is based on the unpredictable nature of others and strikes at the heart of the modernist myth; that the previously inviolable Fortuna “is now subject to the human control of the Machiavellian Politian or the scientist whose goal is general laws” (Turner 1992, p. 24). Charles Turner hints at the need for a more hybrid approach to the dilemmas we face, when he writes that reason’s potential “remains unfulfilled
because it cannot accept its own finitude, and at the same time cannot ignore what is thought to lie beyond its limits” (1992, p. 14); the moral problems we face are as pressing as ever, and reason *alone* is not sufficient for addressing them.

Another central problem with much of liberal peace building is the same as the problem with bureaucratic processes in general, namely: “The process is valued rather than people” and how McIntyre’s characters dehumanize us (Holmes 1992, p. 428). Human behaviour is unpredictable and does not fit neatly into prescribed ‘roles’ – contrary to education literature surrounding the jargon-mask ‘empowerment’ which argues you can *give* people (usually subordinates) a “sense of ownership”(Holmes 1992, p. 423). While Holmes is writing about education, the understanding of ‘empowerment’ he offers is very useful for thinking about peace making, whereby the traditional liberal peace making model attempts to ‘empower’ locals and ‘give’ them rights – thus treating locals as both subordinate and predictable. In MacIntyre’s terms, this places the third party in the role of either the manager (administrator, bureaucrat) or therapist, where the goal is to ‘help’ the locals conform to the dominant societal model (Turner 1992, p. 23), thus robbing not only the locals of perceived agency, but also placing the third party within a prescribed role where they are not giving the option of questioning the *end*, but only the means for arriving there (Langham 1995).

Most thinkers on the topic of hybridity come from a communication or cultural criticism background and therefore do not apply the concept directly to peace making (Ahmad 1995, Bhabha 1994, González 2005, Kraidy 2002 & Massey 2001). However, this does not mean their ideas surrounding hybridity and how it impacts upon cross-cultural relationships are irrelevant to peace making. Additionally, there are some political scientists and peace and conflict studies professors writing specifically on the implications of hybridity for peace and attempting to come up with useful definitions and parameters around such a fluid term (Clements et al 2007, MacGinty & Richmond 2009, Mitchell 2010, Richmond 2009 & Richmond 2010). Mac Ginty provides a visual diagram of hybrid peace and the four contesting influences (2011), which he updates in his new paper where he adds the need to modify the model so that the notion of
international actors moves beyond proponents of the liberal peace (Mac Ginty June 2011).

A hybrid approach to peace making would attempt to find a way to engage in peace making in a way which is more flexible, open and dynamic – engaging with people; people who are unknowable Others (Levinas 2005) and thus surprising, unpredictable, resistant and creative. People who will not easily submit to a ‘process’ of peace making that has been designed towards a singular conception of peace. Kabutaulaka writes about how the RAMSI intervention in the Solomon Islands was state-centred and carried out to further Australian interests, and that intervention needs to “cultivate a capacity for positive change within the country”; “The role of the intervening force must be one of facilitating positive development rather than dictating it” (2005, p. 303).

Hybrid-sensitive peace making attempts to deal with the huge problems surrounding the role of the third party in liberal peace making models – where the third party is the ‘bringer’ of knowledge, ideology and ‘rights’ to a presumably passive and pliable population – without throwing the baby out with the bath water. In a similar way as some have argued against international development in its entirety (Escobar 1992), some might argue there is no role for third parties in other peoples’ conflicts. While such a position might be philosophically seductive in its simplicity, it is propped up by various questionable assumptions.

Audra Mitchell provides a fascinating critique of a ‘process driven’ approach to peace making in general, which could be applied to how we think about third parties, whereby the ‘process’ (or the acting out of ideology) takes precedence over the actual people and events in the context which is being engaged with (Mitchell 2010). Oliver P. Richmond also talks about how liberal peace making privileges elites and institutions (and the processes that build them) over societies and everyday life (2009, p. 568). The role of international aid donors in relation to local NGOs is explored by Jonathan Makuwira and he writes about the meaning of an authentic partnership, as contrary to the problems plaguing the current system, including unrealistic timeframes, convoluted accountability measures and superfluous bureaucracy (2006).
Aside from philosophical justifications for a third party, there is the question of whether international peace building actually improves the prospects for peace – and while such a claim is difficult to assess, there is evidence that international peace building, and UN operations specifically, do markedly reduce the chances of large-scale violence (Call et al 2008, p. 8). Virginia Page Fortna also found that the presence of peacekeepers drastically reduces the chance of the recurrence of violent conflict and that consent-based, small, militarily-weak peacekeeping operations are often just as effective as larger, militarily-strong missions (2004).

Epeli Hau’Ofa argues “views held by those in dominant positions about their subordinates could have significant consequences on people’s self-image, and on the ways that they cope with their situations” (1993, p. 3). Without applying tags of ‘dominant’ or ‘subordinate’ in a haphazard fashion, it is fair to say that there are relationships with elements of domination and that the perceptions we have of each other help to shape our own identities – or indeed, are the only way identities are shaped.¹ Levinas famously argues that our primary responsibility is to the other, as it is they who bring us into existence – and that we should strive for a mutually beneficially “I-Thou” relationship (2005). Sudesh Mishra writes: “I suggest celebratory resistance, an awareness of the raison d’être behind foreign interests in this region, and an active desire to alter this relationship in our favour. We must articulate our position in the constituencies of the First World; the ordinary peoples of the First World are capable of listening sincerely and, in the end, it is they, not their governments, we have to convince” (1993, p. 22). The role now for the policy makers of New Zealand and Australia in the Pacific is to learn how to ‘listen sincerely’ and thus work towards creating mutually beneficial relationships – so the ongoing renegotiation of all identities involved is collaborative, rather than being based on models of universalism and domination.

¹ Jean-Marie Tjibaou writes: “To exist fully, Kanak culture, like the whole of the Kanak world, fundamentally needs this recognition by the world around it. It is vital. Denigration by indifference and the absence of cultural dialogue can lead only to suicide or revolt” (1996, p. 5).
As a European New Zealander writing about intervention in Melanesia – a part of the world I have not even been to let alone have intimate knowledge of – I am all too aware of the awkward nature of cross-cultural communication and learning, within existing power contexts. Jean-Marie Tjibaou writes that many European people are not comfortable talking about Melanesians or their relationship with them, “because everything that touches on the things which have been inherited from the colonial era is more or less taboo, and it is considered somehow unseemly to talk about them” (1996, p. 22). This tactic of avoidance might be easier and feel more ethically simple, but in fact it reinforces negative processes and stereotypes, for example the idea that Europeans are inherently dominant and Melanesians are the colonized and any relationship or dialogue between us will fall within that power dynamic. Avoidance also means we never properly air the ongoing issues of colonialism/ neo-colonialism and that we will put blocks in the way of an open and honest dialogue about what our roles should be, and how we can transform this shameful history to genuine partnerships; essentially avoidance means that when colonialism ‘ended’ so did the discussion about our relationships, miring us within that paradigm.

Risks of Hybrid-Sensitive Peace Making:

The twin dangers of hybrid-sensitive peace making are cultural appropriation on the one hand and a romanticisation of the local on the other (Clements et al 2007). Eric Waddell writes how in Hawaii indigenous people hold the ‘keys to the treasures’ of their knowledge and that by giving those keys away they would become vulnerable to being robbed and becoming ‘poor’; “what we know, and they don’t, is the only thing we have left” (1993, p. 29). While more subtle understandings of hybridity do take hegemony and dominance into account, it is still difficult to conceive of ‘hybrid-sensitive’ peace making in a ‘post’ colonial (or neo colonial) atmosphere of control and deserved mistrust; it cannot be assumed just because people are finally ready to learn that everyone will want to share
their knowledge, their treasures, with each other – least of all when examples of appropriation are so ubiquitous.2

The other risk is romanticizing and often concurrently homogenizing the ‘local’; Lal Brij writes about how “greater attention has been paid to the degree to which ethnographers of Melanesia have ignored change, instead presenting those cultures as timeless and little affected by the outside world” (2004, p. 125). Hybridity is not a new phenomenon and indeed, is perhaps more taken for granted in the ‘colonized’ world; “the sense of dislocation which some might feel at seeing a once well-known street now lined with a succession of cultural imports – the pizzeria, the kebab house, the branch of the middle-eastern bank – must have been felt for centuries, though from a very different point of view, by colonized peoples all over the world” (Massey 2001, p. 167). Hybridity essentially recognises the fact that culture is a constantly changing process of identity-creation, and that meetings between different cultures is a crucial part of this process – not only a space for domination and cultural loss.

Discourses which romanticize the ‘local’ often rest on assuming traditional culture is fragile, homogenous and needing to be preserved; this washes over many ethical issues and often ends up being patronizing to just those ‘locals’ this discourse is purporting to ‘protect’. Jean-Marie Tjibaou declares: “we want to tell the world we are not refugees from prehistory, any more than we are archaeological remnants, but men of flesh and blood” (1996, p. 20). Secondly, within these multitudes of locals there will be those who are dominating others - there are hierarchies within the local which can determine whose version of ‘the local’ a third party learns about, and thus which direction international assistance takes; “at times appeals to tradition and custom provide a convenient rationale for the protection of vested interests” (Henningham 1995, p. 6). Paradoxically, this can be particularly worrisome when the international assistance is aiming at doing things ‘the local way’ – but determining what that is based on the information they have, often from people high in the local hierarchy, or even just from those who are easily accessible by road (Chambers 1983).

2 The World Bank acronym “IK” standing for “Indigenous Knowledge” is suggested here as a particularly onomatopoeic example.
Assessing Hybrid-Sensitivity:

There is a gap in the literature in terms of the practical application of hybridity and how to ‘assess’ how hybrid-sensitive an intervention was. I will not be coming up with a definitive method for doing so, and I have my doubts as to whether there is a method for testing hybrid-sensitivity which transcends context, but I will be looking at two interventions and comparing them in terms of the definitions of hybrid-sensitive peace making and liberal peace making I have to work with – bearing in mind these are not opposites, but different and sometimes overlapping or complementary processes.

This gap is particularly strong in the Pacific region, where academic attention to peace making at all is thin on the ground. Clements et al draw attention to this gap, in their case relating to hybridity, and call for further examination of case studies (Clements et al 2007).

Case studies: The NZ-led intervention in Bougainville and the Australian-led intervention in the Solomon Islands

While both of these interventions were done with the full consent (and, indeed, invitation) of the host countries, both New Zealand and Australia have historically complex and fraught roles within the broader Pacific region, and now have quite different roles from each other with regard to development aid and peace making.

Australia is widely regarded as the ‘deputy’ of the United States (Kabutaulaka 2005, p. 289) and naturally this affects its role as a peacemaker and how any Australian-led interventions are likely to be perceived. Much of the literature argues that the Australian motivations for getting involved in the Solomon Islands were instrumentalist; Australia was hoping to keep it’s alliance with the U.S. strong but did not want to commit troops to the domestically unpopular peace building mission in Iraq (Kabutaulaka 2005). The rhetoric proclaiming the Solomons as a ‘failed state’ (Wainwright 2003) was thus used to show how it
could be a breeding ground for terrorism and other illegal international activities, meaning Australia would have to intervene for the purposes of regional and international security (Flitton 2003). Australia also has more interest in economic relationships with Southeast Asia, whereas New Zealand has historically been more active in the Pacific region (Flitton 2003).

A turning point in the Australian attitude to the Solomons, which had previously ruled out the chance of intervention, was an ASPI publication explaining how having a ‘failed state’ in the South Pacific could endanger neighbouring nations (Kabutaulaka 2005; Wainwright 2003). In terms of the role of the third party, Australia’s role here is defined in terms of the risk the Solomon Islands poses to Australia – and ostensibly to the region as a whole. With this as the motivation for engagement, the emphasis tilts naturally toward ‘security’ and perhaps a negative conception of peace – peace in terms of lack of overt violence, and a strong state that has a monopoly on violence. This connection is likely, but not definite, as one could intervene for reasons of regional security and still aim at positive peace, as one could believe that addressing root causes and social injustice is likely to result in greater regional security over a long-term time frame. However, it seems more likely that intervening for instrumentalist reasons might mean the intervener wants to keep time and resource commitment low and provide what they see as the basics of security – enough that the problem will not ‘spill over’ into neighbouring areas. Furthermore, they could argue that the issues surrounding a building of ‘positive peace’ need to be dealt with internally, and that the third party has no place dealing with inequality or intergroup grievances. However, it is worth noting that the role of the third party can change over time, and Australia has perhaps moved from being a short-term security-centred third party to realizing a long-term commitment is necessary to achieve their broader aims in the region (Allen 2011).

I have found surprisingly little literature discussing what New Zealand’s motivations for intervening in Bougainville might have been, and, as is always the case with politics, there would be fair amount of guesswork involved in terms of how analysts see New Zealand as benefitting from the peace operation.
In any case, the way New Zealand carried out their intervention (looked into later) is an interesting example of a third-party as facilitator, without seeming to have an especially obvious political agenda or desired direction for the government to take. As there is a void of literature on the motivations of New Zealand for getting involved, I can only glean what kind of ‘third-party’ it was based on the operation itself – all one can do in any case.

The history of the third party and its relationships in the region are also relevant and can have negative or positive effects in terms of trust and outcome. For example, the New Zealand-run peace talks in Burnham gained legitimacy with Bougainvilleans partly as a result of a Maori pōwhiri (welcome) and further involvement by local iwi (Hoadley 2005). In Australia the relationship between Europeans and indigenous Australians is still extremely unequal (Pilger 1992) and involving indigenous Australians in political meetings would shed (perhaps unwanted) light on glaring internal issues; this is not to say New Zealand is a postcolonial paradise, only that there is more public discussion on colonialism – as opposed to in Australia, where, for example, the long-overdue ‘sorry’ from the government did not materialise until 2008. It cannot be ignored that Both Bougainville and the Solomon Islands were colonized and New Zealand and Australia are colonies, where the majority culture is that of people descended from the colonizers.3 Bougainville, for example, already had a history of hostility towards Australia as a colonizer and at one time would have preferred to be administered by the United States than Australia (Ogan 1965).

How did NZ/ Australia conduct their respective peace operations in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands and what were the outcomes?

There is some literature examining the peace making efforts by New Zealand and Australia in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands respectively, and even a few articles that directly compare the two interventions (Hegarty 2003; Hoadley 2005). The Bougainville mission is generally seen as a success (Ghai & Regan

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3 I am using the word ‘majority’ here to mean that which has cultural power or hegemonic control, but it is also true in terms of numerical majority.
2006; Howley 2003; Knollmayer 2004; Regan 1999 & 2010; Saovana-Spriggs 2003), whereas the intervention in the Solomon Islands has mixed reviews, depending on the year the analysis was carried out and the political perspective of the writer (Allen 2011; Bellamy & Williams 2005; Dinnen 2002; Flitton 2003; Fry & Kabutaulaka 2008; Fry 2008; Kabutaulaka 2005).

Many analysts look at the Pacific in general in terms of conflict and regional peace building. For example, Benjamin Reilly writes about state functioning and failure in the South Pacific and states that Melanesia is more ethnically diverse than Polynesia; in fact, “Melanesia is one of the world’s most fragmented regions, containing roughly a quarter of all the world’s known languages” - and has related development problems, from schooling attainment to high levels of corruption (2004, p. 480). It is interesting to note that most of this article is written from a very state-centred perspective, whereby Reilly starts by writing about the problem of ethnic fragmentation and the ‘advantage’ of natural resource endowments in Melanesia. Later in the article, he adds that from a conflict-sensitive perspective those two factors could be qualitatively reversed; fragmentation can be a good thing, and reliance on primary resources is a key cause of war (Collier & Hoeffler 2005). He also argues that: “the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and democracy is essentially bell-shaped: both highly homogenous and highly fragmented social structures bolster the likelihood of democracy” (Reilly 2004, p. 483).

Reilly refers to Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands as “post-colonial creations” where people are mostly loyal to their clan, not to the ‘nation state’ as a whole (2004, p. 482). This problem is particularly relevant to Melanesia, as the other comparatively peaceful (and ethnically homogenous) countries in Polynesia were largely pre-colonial entities, in the sense that they had a shared language and culture before being made into a ‘nation state’ and thus could have presumably found the transition easier – as compared to vast ‘countries’ like the Solomon Islands, or the inclusion of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea – a landmass most people felt they had little to do with. Reilly refers to the “pervasive problem of representative government and democracy in highly
diverse societies” and thus begins to hint at the kinds of issues peace makers are going to have to wrestle with if they want to work out ‘hybrid-sensitive’ ways forward (2004, p. 483); what kind of state could/ should be established in a clan-based society such as those found in Melanesia?

Australia in the Solomon Islands:

The Solomon Islands has 450,000 people and 87 different indigenous languages and tension between groups has been a constant problem; “this process was intricately intertwined with the introduction of new administrative units by the colonial state, which precipitated divisions between various parts of the Solomons” (Reilly 2004, p. 488). The history of inappropriate centralised state building and the way it had contributed to conflict should have been a consideration for any peace making operation in the area; local history shows how state-centred or ‘liberal’ peace making operations did not take hold in the way proponents may have hoped. Furthermore, if a centralised nation state built in post-colonial Solomon Islands by its own people had not over-taken local clans in most peoples’ hierarchy of loyalty, the chances for a state imposed by a third party seem even more slim; “Deep-rooted patterns of identity and culture are likely to be considerably more resilient than anything Australian policymakers can come up with” (Reilly 2004, p. 491).

Sinclair Dinnen provides historical detail surrounding the ceasefire agreement in 2000, later peace agreements and post-conflict issues (2002), while others write about the problematic ethnic/ national representation chosen for these peace talks (Fry 2000) and of the local involvement in the peace monitoring troops on the ground (Knollmayer 2004, Dinnen 2002). Various thinkers have speculated on the motivations for Australia’s involvement in the Solomon Islands (Anderson 2008, Batra 2007, Flitton 2003, Kabutaulaka 2005), positing that Australia was more interested in furthering it’s geopolitical reach than in providing humanitarian assistance to the Solomon Islands.

In terms of Australian aid to the Solomon Islands, there is also controversy in terms of the impact. Tim Anderson emphasizes the negative and inequal impacts
of aid and the potential for ‘aid trauma’ (2008), while others reiterate how much of the Solomon Islands basic infrastructure is propped up by Australia’s ‘heavy lifting’ in the region, particularly financial (Allen 2011, Hoadley 2005).

**New Zealand in Bougainville:**

Ruth Saovana-Spriggs argues that the peace process in Bougainville was largely successful due to the usage of locally relevant conflict resolution methods (2003). While describing the peace process she argues that a central challenge was “integrating traditional methods with those of the modern western legal system” and uses the example of juries to illustrate her point; in Bougainville a jury should be *as impartial as possible* – clearly the opposite to the western bureaucratic model (Saovana-Spriggs 2003, p. 198-199). She describes the challenges facing peace makers who want to do so in a hybrid-sensitive fashion and argues that the process in Bougainville succeeded at just that, due in no small part to the role of local women.

The civilian/military peace monitoring groups in Bougainville following the agreement were also largely successful, for a large number of reasons: pre-deployment training, communal living, clear role identification and a strong relationship between superiors to name a few (Knollmayer 2004). Stefan Knollmayer discusses this success, and briefly contrasts it with the less successful peace monitoring team in the Solomon Islands, in terms of how well integrated the civilians and military staff were (2004). Although he does not use the language surrounding ‘hybrid peace’ or ‘everyday day peace’ (Richmond 2009), he uses similar concepts and argues the importance of relationships, participation and communal living.

Anthony Regan’s submission on Bougainville outlines the historical details involved in the peace process and what role various parties played; he particularly emphasizes the role of local people and groups who want peace (1999). Furthermore, he outlines the hybrid past of Bougainville itself, stating “Ethnic identities everywhere are constructed mainly through processes of
interaction between groups” (Regan 1999, p. 5), and the hybrid-sensitive peace making process: so while stating that ‘outsiders’ were necessary, he adds “the role of outsiders has been to encourage and support Bougainvillean leaders and others in proceeding in the direction they had already committed themselves to” (Regan 1999, p. 21). Finally, as ethnic identities are constructed through processes of interaction (Regan 1999), the anti-Papua New Guinea feeling in Bougainville and the emphasis on the allegedly “more peaceful temperament and relative cultural advancement of Bougainvilleans” was “a process that became crucial to the creation of a Bougainville ethnic identity” (Reilly 2004, p. 488

The peace making process in Bougainville was remarkable and thoughtful in a number of ways, but – as Anthony Regan points out – “all of this progress has been contributed to by the almost universal support of Bougainvilleans for peace” (1999, p. 1). This view is supported by others (Saovana-Spriggs 2003) who argue that Bougainvilleans were unusually driven towards peace, had strong local communities and had a powerful force in the form of local women – who hold considerable sway in Bougainvillean culture. This is precisely the point of hybrid-sensitive peace making – i.e. to facilitate the already existing local peace process and to avoid the errors of other models of peace building which can hurt or provide an obstacle for local agents of peace. This was done by providing basic security, resources and visibility for locals who want peace to work towards what form of peace will work best in their context – not by imposing an outsider’s idea of peace on an unwilling population.

What are the uses and limitations of established ways of measuring the ‘success’ of a peace making operation?

As I stated before, the Bougainville mission is generally seen as a success, whereas the intervention in the Solomon Islands has met with mixed reviews. What is interesting when looking at these judgements is what the political perspective of the writer is, and therefore how they deem a peace making operation successful or unsuccessful. Two classic approaches to assessing the success of a peace operation are: (Bellamy at al 2005)
• Stable peace – measured in terms of whether a stable peace was achieved. This is difficult to measure, as what constitutes a ‘stable peace’ is contested (ranging from negative peace to positive peace for example).

• Fulfilment of mandates – measured in terms of whether the mandate was achieved; did they achieve what they set out to do? The problems with this approach are also numerous, most notably: mandates often include vague or difficult to assess goals (like healing trauma) and the mandates themselves might not be well thought-out or appropriate for the context, so ‘achieving’ the goals of the mandate might not equal achieving the broader aims of peace making (Bellamy et al 2005, p. 175).

Taking a step back, Charles T. Gall et al put forward three broad approaches in terms of how demanding our expectations for ‘success’ in peace building should be (Gall et al 2008), but also states that “there is not yet a generally accepted criterion for “success.”” (Gall et al 2008, p. 4).

• “A Maximilist Standard: Root Causes” (Gall et al 2008, p. 6): the most ambitious approach, whereby ‘success’ is only granted when the root causes of conflict have been dealt with effectively and broader ‘positive peace’ has been achieved.

• “A Minimalist Standard: No Renewed Warfare” (Gall et al 2008, p. 7): Easiest to measure, it simply entails an ending of direct violence related to the conflict, otherwise known as the ‘negative peace’.

• “Moderate Standard: No Renewed Warfare Plus Decent Governance” (Gall et al 2008, p. 7): The middle ground, where ‘success’ is granted by the achievement of negative peace and a reasonable level of governance (something quite hard to judge, but clear when it is lacking).

Applying these standards to the peace operations in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands is very useful and clearly differentiates the difference between the two in terms of ‘success’ measured in these ways. Tentatively, I would say they both fail by maximilist standards – indeed, Roland Paris argues only two of
the major UN peacebuilding operations since 1989 are ‘successful’ in these terms (Gall et al 2008, p. 6) – and both, at various times at least, succeeded at the minimalist standard. Where they diverge would be at the moderate standard, where more analysis is needed to judge what constitutes ‘reasonable’ government and whether the government of the Solomon Islands and the semiautonomous region of Bougainville fulfil these standards.

Adding to this, the approach above could be argued to be fairly state-centric and perhaps aiming for the much-contested ‘liberal peace’ – as opposed to highlighting a hybrid peace. However, it is important to bear in mind that the liberal peace and the hybrid peace are not opposites and approaches which may have elements of the ‘liberal’ are not necessarily useless in terms of thinking about hybrid-sensitive peace making; a hybrid-sensitive approach does not mean that the state or the ‘negative peace’ become irrelevant or useless; it is not synonymous with being an anarchic or anti-State approach. Hybrid-sensitive peace making attempts to hold onto useful philosophies and approaches from multiple sources, and while elements of ‘liberal peace making’ have been shown to be highly problematic and undesirable, that does not mean that everything associated with ‘liberal peaces’ needs to be systemically rejected.

“Deep-rooted patterns of identity and culture are likely to be considerably more resilient than anything Australian policymakers can come up with” (Reilly 2004, p. 491). Peace making can only work on the host’s terms, not by instilling foreign values and contextually irrelevant institutions – finding the right balance between the demand for a stable nation state and the lived context of local communities is what hybrid-sensitive peace making aims for.
Chapter 2 - ON INTERVENTION: Modalities/ processes of engagement

"The truth is, sir, that men do what their power permits them to do [...] the difference is only that when we kill people we feel compelled to pretend that it is for some higher cause. It is this pretense of virtue, I promise you, that will never be forgiven by history."

• the character of Captain Chillingworth speaking about the British empire's colonialism, in 'The Sea of Poppies' by Amitav Ghosh.

An Extremely Brief History of Humanitarian Intervention:

Colonialism:

The colonial period is now generally accepted as a dark and shameful period in history and the antithesis of what would be called ‘humanitarian’ – to even suggest it could be conceived in those terms is ideologically very dangerous. However, Crawford argues that late nineteenth and early twentieth century colonialism could be called “aggressive humanitarianism” to reflect the ‘two faces’ of the engagement - aggressive and reformist (2002, p. 201). This starts our thinking about ‘humanitarian intervention’ in a very complex way, as it immediately problematizes the word ‘humanitarian’ and how/whether such a qualitative term can be useful when categorizing military engagement.

In fact, colonial engagement relied very much on ‘humanitarian’ norms as motives for expansion; the trend in the late nineteenth century was to speak of ‘principled expansion’ as part of what Crawford calls the transition from "naked aggression" to "aggressive humanitarianism" (2002, pp. 202-203). The underlying norms of the growing anti-slavery movement became fodder for both an increase in colonial activities and later the eventual demise of the practice. Initially, colonialists ironically used anti-slavery rhetoric to justify intervening in states where slavery was practiced or where African leaders refused to trade on European terms (Crawford 2002, p. 215). While they could have simply engaged in "outright land-grabbing" (as they had in the past to varying degrees), it was politically important to frame these activities in a humanitarian light; "Nearly all
involved in the conquest and colonization said they were motivated by humanitarian concerns” (Crawford 2002, p. 247).

Colonialism can certainly be seen as the first wave of state-building intervention, ‘humanitarian’ or not, and “the creation of new overarching forms of political community was a major determinant of the political dynamics of the post-colonial states” (Fry & Kabutaulaka 2008, p. 14). These created states, like the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, are major contributors to the root causes of later conflicts. This colonial state-building activity casts a long shadow on any state-building engagements undertaken now, as it is difficult not to draw parallels between the behavior of imperialists during the colonial era and international or regional hegemons now – especially when they take to re-arranging the domestic affairs of a politically weaker state.

This illustrates both the importance of norms in terms of how they inform actual political behavior and the concurrent relevance of the legitimacy challenge for intervention; how a nation state can legitimize intervening in another sovereign state. Quite aside from the fact that many (if not most) of the colonizers were cynically using humanitarian ideologies to justify their interventions, there would have also been colonizers who genuinely believed that what they were doing was humanitarian; for instance, being engaged in the centuries old “civilizing mission” whereby the ‘superior’ races would bring civilization (and, often, Christianity) to the ‘lower’ races (Crawford 2002, p. 213). The fact we would now perceive those colonizers as hopelessly deluded and patronizing is a timely reminder of the importance of assessing our own ‘humanitarian’ motives, and to remember that just because something comes from a humanitarian impulse does not mean it is actually in the best interests of those one is purporting to ‘help.’

De-colonisation:

De-colonisation in the Pacific from the mid-1960s to the 1980s did not alter the geographic boundaries of the colonial states, but “Liberal democracy and racial equality replaced autocracy and racial hierarchy as the criteria for legitimate
statehood” (Fry & Kabutaulaka 2008, p. 14). This new notion of universal human rights was a logical extension of the anti-slavery movement, in which the circle of concern was widened to include people other than white Christians (Finnemore 1996), even though one could argue that the values espoused were based very much on Judeo-Christian ethics and methods. It is important to note that just because these new norms were ‘Liberal’, does not mean that the way they were administered was felt to be compassionate or ‘liberal’ in the sense of being open or valuing the freedom of others to be different; anti-slavery rhetoric had been used in the past to legitimate colonialist interventions, as human rights doctrine could feasibly be used to legitimate military interventions now.

In the post-colonial environment many of the nations were effectively ‘new’ and had to learn to operate in a completely new manner and with new, created boundaries – all under an imposed value system. Hoffman argues that many of the states left behind by colonialism could be considered “pseudo-states” in that they “had been established by nationalists but were in fact not nations” (Hoffman 2003, p. 22). This is very important in our thinking about Bougainville and the Solomon Islands especially, as the geographical boundaries and states imposed upon the people there were not necessarily widely accepted – and ended up playing a significant role in the conflicts, most markedly in Bougainville conflict, and even larger than this – the notion of thinking of oneself as a citizen of a nation-state, operating in a Westphalian fashion, was also new.

New interventionism:

In the ‘post-colonial’ period overt, presumed political control was no longer an acceptable option and powerful states had to find new ways to exert influence, such as aid conditionality, diplomacy and regional organizations; “As in other parts of the developing world the Pacific states were subject to a new level of surveillance by aid donors and international agencies around the issues of ‘good governance’ and financial management” (Fry & Kabutaulaka 2008, p. 14).
During the 1990s the international community was faced with several prominent humanitarian crises which demanded some kind of reaction, most famously the civil conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda and the Balkans. Particularly in response to the impotence of the international community when faced with the Rwandan genocide and of the UN with providing appropriate and timely relief in the Balkans, the issue of when and how countries should transgress borders for humanitarian purposes became a prominent conversation – leading to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and the subsequent publication of the *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P) report in 2001 (Evans 2006). This report aimed to change the language from rights to carry out ‘humanitarian intervention’ to the more pressing *responsibility* (obligation) to provide help to people facing emergencies (Thakur 2003). Aside from providing a stronger moral impetus for would-be interveners, this new language is seen as putting the core emphasis on assistance and protection, as opposed to political interference; Thakur argues that while it would be morally defensible to overthrow a tyrannical state *if that was the only option* to protect the civilians of that state “the primary motivation behind intervention – the cause rather than the necessary condition – must not be defeating an enemy state” (2003: 163).

All the same, powerful states can use the failure to meet these new liberal international norms or R2P rhetoric as a reason to intervene for 'humanitarian' purposes, marking this type of intervention as supposedly different from the colonialism of the past. Indeed, one of the primary stumbling blocks for the R2P doctrine has been it’s misuse by so-called “false friends” (Evans 2006: 717) and “over-stretching of the norm” by the USA and the UK (Bellamy 2005: 31-32); “The biggest inhibitor of all to the ready acceptance of R2P as an operating principle has been the misuse of that principle in the context of the war on Iraq” (Evans 2006: 717).

**Classifications and Trends of Humanitarian Peace Operations:**

What is termed a ‘peace operation’ and how to categorize these operations seems to be as ideologically muddled as many of the other key themes around intervention. Furthermore, there is often a discrepancy between the legal
meaning of the word and the understanding of it in political theory. For those reasons, I will briefly outline what definitions I will be working with – and those will usually fall into the ‘broader political intervention’ camp, as opposed to the strict legal definition.

The categories of intervention are often framed in terms of a continuum, or at least in terms of fluid categories which can move into each other; for example, Pugh argues that there is generally “acceptance that the three types of operation: peace-keeping, peace enforcement and war can overlap with possibility of escalatory movement between them” (Pugh 1998, p. 344). Further illustrating the idea of a continuum, Hoffman puts forward four escalating ‘options’ to a potential intervener: firstly, non-intervention and being limited to humanitarian aid, secondly, ‘traditional peace keeping,’ whereby the force has to be politically neutral and can only use force in self-defense, thirdly, what Hoffman calls ‘mild coercion’ meaning the use of diplomatic or economic force and finally ‘strong coercion’, also called peace making (2003, p. 22). It is also possible to think of peace keeping as “peace after war” and peace making, or peace enforcement, as “war for peace” (Hoffman 2003, p. 25).

Though it was written in 1993, Gareth Evan’s book on international peace operations still provides very useful definitions which aim to collate “the definitions given in the UN Secretary-General’s An Agenda for Peace, but also those around which some measure of consensus seems to be emerging in the literature and international practice” (Evans 1993, p. 9). He breaks the possible international responses to conflict into four broad categories, defined largely in terms of timing (how far has the conflict escalated?) and level of militarisation. The first category is those strategies employed to prevent disputes arising and takes place when there is no conflict as yet, but, as always, the potential for one; he labels these as ‘peace building strategies’ and includes under this heading ‘international regimes’ (international norms and laws aimed to provide impetus or pressure to remain peaceful and deal with any disputes that may arise in a diplomatic way) and ‘in-country peace building’ (institution building, good governance initiatives and other strategies we may often think of as being part of ‘international development’ in general) (Evans 1993, p. 9). The second
category is strategies employed when there are emerging threats to peace in a region and the aim is to address these potentialities for violent conflict in a timely fashion, thus avoiding war; these actions are called ‘peace maintenance strategies’ and included therein is ‘preventative diplomacy’ and ‘preventative deployment’ (military or police put in place with an aim to protect and keep the peace) (Evans 1993, 10). These first two categories both occur before a conflict has become violent and are both aimed at avoiding the outbreak of war by resolving disputes peacefully and providing physical security or pressure from the international community; these are still humanitarian interventions, but they tend not to be highly militarised and when there is a military presence it is meant as a safe-guarding (or threatening) presence, and is not actively engaged in combat.

However, sometimes these methods do not succeed or the potential for conflict was not realised or reacted to at an earlier time, and violent conflict breaks out. The reactions of the international community once this happens are more controversial and legally and ideologically muddled, but the basic definitions Evans provides are useful for providing a framework to work within. ‘Peace restoration’ methods are those used with the consent of the governments involved (or other predominant actors) and are thus based on the ideal of ending the violence in a co-operative effort involving both third parties and local parties (Evans 1993, p. 11). The two ‘peace restoration’ strategies are not mutually exclusive and, indeed, often work in cohorts with each other; Evans calls the first ‘peace making’ (diplomatic tactics employed after conflict has become violent) and the second ‘peace keeping’ (military or police presence aimed at assisting peace agreements, disarmament, etc who can only use force in self-defence) (1993, p. 11). The term ‘peace keeping’ is particularly problematic, as it’s general use in political writing can stray quite wildly from the traditional understanding of the term – namely, “an unarmed or lightly armed military contingents being engaged in the monitoring, supervision and verification of ceasefire, withdrawal, buffer zone and related agreements” (Evans 1993, p. 11). Evans makes the distinction between this ‘traditional’ method and what he calls ‘expanded’ peace keeping, by defining the latter as involving other activities relating to good
governance, state building, human rights protection and the more long-term transition into a peaceful state (potentially newly independent or democratic) (1993, p. 12). Using these definitions, it initially seems as though both my case studies fall into the category of ‘expanded peace keeping’, as they were started after the outbreak of violent conflict, were done with the consent of the host parties and included more facets than ‘traditional’ peace keeping.

When local party consent is lacking to an intervention, the strategies are called ‘peace enforcement’ and include sanctions and peace enforcement operations where there is the use or threat of military force, against the wishes of the host parties (Evans 1993, p. 12). This is the most ethically fraught type of humanitarian intervention and perhaps the category people often think of when they are against interventions in general. In both my case studies and the counter-example there was officially on-going local party co-operation and consent and I will be looking specifically at the role of a third-party in a consensual humanitarian intervention. This type of intervention is problematic enough without complicating it with peace enforcement operations. This is not to say there is no place for ‘peace enforcement’ methods or that a government’s consent is necessarily a harbinger of a more ethically executed humanitarian intervention. However, peace enforcement comes with a unique set of abstract ethical problems and, related to this, logistical complexities in terms of carrying out an intervention against the wishes of powerful local parties – even the ‘simple’ delivery of humanitarian aid is difficult in such a setting.

Interestingly, in terms of international trends, “United Nations military personnel in peace-keeping operations are now outnumbered by forces engaged in coercive actions” (Pugh 1998, p. 354) and the New Zealand-led operation in Bougainville is listed as an example of this trend. It is argued that: “Some of these operations bear only the most tenuous relationship to consensual peace keeping” and that “internationally legitimised interventions are therefore much more diverse than what can be defined by the classic peace-keeping concept” (Pugh 1998, p. 345). The crux of all of this is that the current peace keeping reality is more complex than our ability to simply categorize it – or to create watertight legal or ideological barriers around these types of engagement.
**State-building:** or the “whole-of-government approach” (O’Keefe 2005).

Both of my examples could be called ‘extended peace keeping’, due to their extensive mandates with heavy emphasis on governance, but another useful term for thinking this kind of intervention is state-building (sometimes referred to as ‘peace making’) (Coady 2005). State-building is a long-term approach at peace building, meaning it comes with a new set of ethical problems, but also holds the solution to some of the ethical problems inherent to short-term peace keeping - which can be seen as nothing more than a band-aid to underlying problems (Coady 2005).

Whereas traditional peace keeping can be accused of being merely a short-term, superficial solution, state-building could be seen as overly interfering in the affairs of other nation states. Hoffman asks pointedly, without quite answering the question: “Can outsiders really engage in “nation-building”?" (2003, p. 28) Certainly, the role of the third party becomes deeply problematic when their role is to assist, or even lead, the building of a nation state and the institutions it is made of. This is particularly worrisome when the historical relationship between the intervener and intervened involves colonialism or other histories of control and oppression. However, merely stopping the immediate violence and doing nothing to assist in ensuring long-term stability does not seem like an adequate answer either.

In any case, state building only makes sense when there is a lack of acceptable state to begin with; this condition has been called the failed or failing state and is defined as a state “characterized by political, economic and social crises spiraling out of control” (O’Keefe 2005, p. 89). The existence of a failed or failing state is increasingly put forward as a justification for intervention, and was certainly the driving force behind the Australian intervention in the Solomon Islands (Kabutaulaka 2005; Wainwright 2003). The problem, of course, with the ‘failed state’ doctrine is when precisely to define a state as failed – if one applied the loosest definition almost all states in the Pacific region would be deemed ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ (O’Keefe 2005, p. 92), when in reality the states
continue to function to a generally acceptable level and intervening in all of them would be absurdly imperialistic – not to mention pragmatically impossible.

Both of my examples will be shown to have state-building mandates; the Australians even came up with a ‘new’ form of intervention to counter the legitimacy challenges. Australia put forward a ‘new’ maxim of what Alexander Downer called “co-operative intervention” – supposedly based in partnership with the intervened. On closer inspection, “co-operative intervention” could be accused of being something more akin to co-optive intervention, as it relies heavily on assumed ideals of ‘good governance’ and neo-liberal economic reforms (Fry & Kabutaulaka 2008, p. 3). The ideal of ‘co-operative intervention’ is based on consent, if not invitation, from the host country, working alongside and for the sovereign government and treaties clearly describing terms of engagement, but most centrally these are state-building missions; “This is based on the premise that state-building is the necessary first step for peace-building providing the basis for creating security and economic welfare” (Fry & Kabutaulaka 2008, p. 12).

The central problem with nation-building intervention is that it is mostly “unfeasible and dangerous” and can be neo-colonial in mission, but the alternative has its own issues; short-term interventions merely stop the immediate violence and then depart, making no lasting contribution to peace (Coady 2005, p. 26). Once a state has decided to intervene, whether to do so on a short-term peace keeping basis or as part of a long-term peace making operation is a very difficult decision – and one often based on practical possibility, as well as ideals.

Regionalisation trend:

Another way states engage with the ideological and pragmatic challenges to staging an intervention is by enlisting a ‘coalition of the willing’, often made up of states from the region. O’Keefe defines regionalism as meaning that: “the proximate region is simultaneously a source of threat and a recipient of humanitarian and development assistance” (2005, p. 81). Pugh writes about
geographic decentralization of international intervention and how “in some cases the United Nations has endorsed and legitimized post facto the initiatives of ‘coalitions of the willing and able’” (1998, p. 345). This kind of ‘regional solutions’ approach to conflict has ideological problems in terms of strengthening local powers; “states with regional ambitions can follow hegemonic policies with a covering of legitimacy, thus politicizing the whole operation” (Pugh 1998, p. 346).

Australia’s activities in the Solomon Islands are put forward by O’Keefe as an example of a regional hegemon using regional organizations and ‘coalitions of the willing’ as a way to assert dominance (2005). He states that Australia chose regional multilateral diplomacy precisely so it could keep international powers out, and that “despite a façade of multilateralism ... respective Australian governments chose a mechanism over which they could exercise a good deal of control” (O’Keefe 2005, p. 87).

These categories of humanitarian intervention are ways of dealing with both pragmatic realities and the legitimacy challenge. How to intervene in an effective, appropriate manner is an ongoing international debate; “the question of how the international community can engage in state-building intervention in a manner that maximizes the possibility of gaining legitimacy for the intervening mission and its state building project has become one of the most pressing issues in international relations” (Fry & Kabutaulaka 2008, pp. 2-3). These issues are already pressing and contentious before we introduce the military aspect of intervention and the attempts to argue for humanitarian military intervention – as opposed to humanitarian relief, or neutral, largely unarmed peacekeepers.

Central Legitimacy challenges to Third-party Intervention:

Legitimacy challenges exist both to the notion of third-party intervention in general and to the kinds of states that those third parties may be attempting to build; “the political legitimacy of the post-colonial state has been at the centre of the crises in governance experienced by Pacific states” (Fry & Kabutaulaka 2008, p. 1). Various kinds of intervention face their own specific brands of legitimacy
challenges and thus attempt to gain legitimacy (from various sources) through any variety of methods – ranging from the consent of the intervened host state to referral to international norms of human rights or war crimes. When the peace keeping or enforcement mission takes on a state building component, as both of my example interventions have, the legitimacy of the type of state being built in that context also needs questioning and defending; as mentioned above, this is particularly relevant in the post-colonial states where state boundaries and systems were imposed by the colonial forces, often without much support of the local civilians.

The Challenge of Sovereignty:

Respect for sovereignty is frequently thought of as the primary legitimacy challenge or stumbling block in the way of intervention; Abiew refers to this as the ‘clash’ between sovereignty norms and the ideal of universal human rights (1999, p. 23). The norm of state sovereignty is often said to have originated from the ‘Peace of Westphalia’ treaty in 1648 and the system of territorial sovereignty is thus called the ‘Westphalian system’. This system is mistakenly seen as the antithesis of an intervention-friendly system and as the primary ethical and legal challenge to the role of external agents in the internal affairs of states. However, Abiew argues that intervention has, in fact, always been accepted (with reservations) and as a practice evolved along side sovereignty – not against it, as is commonly assumed; he states: “External interference in the relationship between ruler and the ruled has been an enduring and pervasive characteristic of the Westphalian system since its inception” (1999, p. 21).

Of course, the ideal of sovereignty was not spontaneously invented in Westphalia in 1648, but had a long history prior to that era-defining moment; Abiew traces the ideal of sovereignty right through from Aristotle's Politics to it’s extreme incarnation in the form of Hobbes ‘sovereign’ leader (1999, pp. 25-28). What is notable about this history is that sovereignty has almost always been constrained by outside influences, for example Bodin, who is thought of as an advocate of sovereignty, believed the sovereign to be constrained by “natural law, divine law and the law of nations” (Abiew 1999, p. 27). Since this time the
international community has generally moved towards a more secular attempt at defining constraints on the actions of a ‘sovereign.’

Thus, when society shifted from being primarily religiously defined to being scientific, secular and rational, we lost that particular ethical ‘constraint’ on the sovereign and have, in the twentieth century, attempted to conceive of ethical boundaries which do not rest on religious beliefs - perhaps resulting in the ‘secular’ ideal of universal human rights. Turner argues this is why we need to conceive of the modernist epoch as one where something has been lost (instead of thinking about it purely in terms of uphill progress) and part of that loss has been a relationship with what Machiavelli called ‘fortuna’; the goddess of fortune (1992). For my purposes, fortuna represents mystical beliefs/ unscientific instincts and the reason Machiavelli was so keen to dispense with her was that she was/ is a primary constraint on the powers of the sovereign and the ‘rational’ approach. Fortuna, or fate/ aspects outside humanity’s understanding or control, is essentially a way of externalising luck and ethics – in much the same way the hindu religion worships kali, who wears a necklace of men’s heads, these unknowable women meant society as a whole had precise actions they could take to try to appease the gods (thus: avoid painful destruction and chaos) and also a larger narrative as to why sometimes these same gods are not successfully appeased. Machiavelli wanted a force like this brutally controlled by the sovereign, because it is inherently more powerful than any human leader – and thus able to inspire more devotion and obedience, undermining what should be the total control of the sovereign and of the ideology of the rational state.

Whether fortuna was successfully put under the sovereign’s control (as Machiavelli recommends leaders to do) is an argument outside the scope of my thesis, but in any case it is no longer acceptable to refer to those kinds of constraints on sovereignty or scientific rationality. Hobbes and Machiavelli are perhaps two of the most famous theorists who marked this turn of events, with Hobbes making the sovereign the mouthpiece of ‘divine law’ and Machiavelli admonishing the Prince to keep fortuna in line with a strong, violent hand. Abiew points out that the original meaning of the word ‘sovereignty’ relates to the
notion of superiority (from Latin ‘supra’) and that: “In the Westphalian international system the ultimate power holder is the state ... to be sovereign is to be subject to no higher power” (1999, p. 25). In a sense, the Machiavellians may have bitten off more than they can chew – with recall to religion or instinct no longer generally acceptable, the post-modern world is left floundering with attempts to come up with universal, rationally-argued ethical norms with which to justify their actions.

As the main challenge to sovereignty used to be religious power, it is perhaps unsurprising that the main motivation for humanitarian intervention by European states used to be the advancement and protection of the Christian faith and Christian leaders. Finnemore writes that a key normative shift in the last few centuries has been the inclusion of non-white, non-Christian people as worthy of concern and worthy of intervention on their behalf (1996). The ideals of universal human rights gained prominence with the anti-slavery movement and were seen as urgently necessary after the Second World War atrocities, to name two catalysts from many possible examples, and may constitute the new constraint on absolute sovereignty.

The development of humanitarian intervention has been concurrent with the development of an international system built on state sovereignty; “The theory of humanitarian intervention is based on the assumption that States in their relation with their own nationals have the international obligation to guarantee them basic or fundamental rights” (Abiew 1999, p. 30). This assumption was already present to some degree in the nineteenth century, albeit only applicable to Christian nationals (Finnemore 1996), but has been widened to include all people (at least in theory). There is increasing emphasis on the notion of state responsibility to its people and even to people elsewhere, articulated in documents like the Responsibility to Protect norm (which did not just refer to interventions, but also to the responsibility to prevent conflict, for example); “Sovereignty implies responsibilities as well as rights: to be sovereign means both to be responsible to one’s own citizens and to the wider international community” (Evans 2006: 709). This was “revolutionary in terms of its crystallization of the claim that sovereignty is not sacrosanct but instead is
conditional on how states treat their people, and evolutionary because it was a logical outcome of decades of statements regarding a right to relief” (Barnett 2011, p. 192). Kofi Annan marked this turning point when he gave a speech in 1999 referring to the ‘two sovereignties’ – one of states, one of people (Annan 1999): “calling for the United Nations to debate how it should respond when states violated the sovereignty of their people” (Barnett 2011, p. 191).

The difficulty, of course, is what rights we consider ‘fundamental’ enough to intervene to protect; i.e. where to draw the line in terms of what level of ‘violation’ is too much and warrants outside intervention. All states breach the rights of their citizens to some degree (especially if we think of states in terms of social contract thinkers like Hobbes and Locke) and there are many existing states which cheerfully breach accepted basic human rights norms without threat of intervention. However tempting as it may be, it would be ethically and pragmatically impossible to articulate a law or a set of concrete ground-rules surrounding use of intervention and what ‘fundamental rights’ a sovereign must provide their citizens. Harcourt reminds us that: “Intervention is a question rather of policy than of law. It is above and beyond the domain of law, and when wisely and equitably handled ... may be the highest policy of justice and humanity” (in: Abiew 1999, p.p. 38-39).

Kofi Annan argues that the international community needs to reach a consensus on “ways of deciding what action is necessary, and when, and by whom” (1999, p. 2). However, Brown argues that the inconsistency of when we agree to transgress another state’s sovereignty is a necessary effect of the process working as it should; it is necessarily context-specific, taking into account a range of deeply complex ethical and pragmatic concerns (2003). This means, of course, that there had been a widespread ‘failure’ to provide definite criteria for what a state needs to provide in order to ‘deserve’ sovereignty over it’s territory and for the related right to humanitarian intervention (Abiew 1999, p. 42). However, taking context into strong consideration is not mutually exclusive to working with a set of flexible criteria; the international community can use rules, laws and criteria as guidelines and markers to help guide them in every individual case; the R2P criteria for intervention attempts to do that, by
providing a list of considerations ranging from the ethical (reasonable grounds to intervene) to the pragmatic (reasonable hopes of improving the situation by intervening) (Evans 2006: 710). In any case, in this thesis there will be no attempt to come up with a universal understanding for when to intervene – only a set of ideas for how to think about or assess interventions.

The issue of Consent:

The lack of consent regarding military intervention raises important ethical and categorical questions. Coady states explicitly that ‘military intervention’ defines that which occurs “without the express consent or invitation of the state invaded” (2005, p. 15), while in the very same book O’Keefe states that “by its very nature, humanitarian intervention needs to be legitimated by the consent of the ‘intervened’” (2005, p. 76). What then of military humanitarian intervention, which seems to sit halfway between these two points? First of all, one could argue that Coady was referring to the consent of the state, whereas O’Keefe was referring to the consent of the ‘intervened’ – which could refer to those citizens on whose behalf the intervention is being staged, even in opposition to the state. However, even so, the two military humanitarian interventions I am looking out were both carried out with the consent, and invitation, of the host states – and while there could be debate as to whether the interventions should be classed as ‘humanitarian’, they were certainly ‘military’ in character.

Fry and Kabutaulaka argue that under international law ‘intervention’ denotes lack of consent, so according to this the Australian intervention in the Solomon Islands was not legally an intervention – as it was invited by the government: “However, the intervention label is apt in this context if employed in the broader political, rather than strictly legal, sense of the term” (2008, p. 10). In this way humanitarian intervention is sometimes defined as necessarily lacking consent – as if there was consent then it would not be an intervention per se. However, for my purposes I will be defining intervention as encompassing the more broad range of engagements listed previously, including peace keeping for example – which legally requires consent from the host country/ies.
**Military Humanitarian Intervention: Some Ethical Challenges**

**Humanitarianism: What is it and does it have a place in International Relations?**

One of the main factors which defines peoples’ differences in political theory is whether or not they believe that states can have humanitarian motives – and whether morality belongs in the field of international relations at all. Realists famously argue that morality has no place in the power struggle of international relations and that “morality of international relations ... is different in kind from that of ‘ordinary’ or ‘private’ morality” (Coady 2005, p. 17). There is something compelling to this argument, as it makes sense that private morality when applied to institutions can become ‘swallowed’ up; corporations, for example, run on the assumption that the ’bottom line comes first’ and the people working for the corporation will work for that goal, not for their private moral conscience. Strangely, realists may find some common ground with the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre here, as he argues that we lose our private morality when we take on ‘roles’ (Mangham 1995) – and there is no reason to think that the role of ‘state’ (or representative of that state) is any different.

However, states are still essentially collections of people and there are known instances of states acting in largely humanitarian ways, including intervening in cases where there is little other motive or reward for the state intervening. Coady argues that the motive to protect people from severe violation of basic human rights “has to be primary for an intervention to count as humanitarian, though it may coexist with other motives” (2005, p. 16). Of course, in any instance you can find some way the action benefitted the ‘humanitarian’ in question, if one applies the egoist theory that all human actions are selfish, but Coady convincingly argues that this theory “amounts to the very unexciting truism that people act from desires or reasons that are theirs” and thus becomes a “boring tautology” (2005, p. 19). The egoist theory is a smaller-scale version of the realist theory, which argues that states only ever act in accordance with ‘national interest’, not for humanitarian reasons, even if sometimes it is in their interest to carry out humanitarian activities (Coady 2005).
Coady goes on to argue that while realists warn of the negative impact of morality in international relations, it is actually moralism, not morality, which should give us cause for concern (2005). Moralism is defined as a kind of dogmatic morality, untempered by pragmatism, prudence or a respect for subjectivity in moral affairs (Coady 2005, pp. 20-21). As a contrast, what Coady calls “genuine morality” should actually protect against moralism and is concerned with both ideals and prudence (2005, pp. 22-23). This is particularly interesting when considering interventions, as the difference between engaging in a humanitarian intervention based on a foundation of moralism or of morality could be said to be one of the defining factors of the ‘success’ of outside intervention. A moralist approach could easily be paternalistic, badly executed and ill-timed – as it would be operating based on outrage and lofty ideals alone, without considering what the locals want, whether the intervention can actually improve the situation and whether that moment in time is the right one for engagement of that kind. An approach based on morality, on the other hand, would be looking for dialogue and practical guidance, being based in pragmatic compassion.

Aside from the debate as to whether morality belongs in international relations, even if we accept that it does we have to contend with the term ‘humanitarian’ and how it should be defined. Hoffman states that the criterion for ‘humanitarianism’ is “both elusive and unsatisfactory” (2003, p. 24) and Brown refers to the “vexed question of how to exactly define humanitarian” (2003, p. 31). I would argue that this debate will never see an end, as the philosophical debate about “the good”, famously championed by Plato over two thousand years ago, has not seen an end either; the term ‘humanitarian’ is qualitative and subjective, carrying within it the ethics of those who use it to define their activities. This does not make the term meaningless, as many words which hold great value in our society are similarly defined – words like freedom, democracy and dignity, but it does mean that the word is prone to being ‘misused’ or used in ways which others do not deem to fit with their definition of humanitarian. The only solution to that problem is the same for all qualitative
terms – to engage in debate about what it means to be ‘free’, for example, or which interventions are legitimately ‘humanitarian’ in character.

**Is it possible for the military to be engaged for humanitarian purposes?**

To begin with, it is important to make clear that *military* humanitarian intervention is not the only kind of humanitarian intervention option available to third parties; for example, peace keeping and reconstruction are interventions (Annan 1999) and even foreign aid and economic sanctions can be framed as *interventions* of sorts and have been used as political tools. These ‘soft’ measures can also be very powerful – and can have devastating effects on the people they were designed to protect; an effect usually associated with military intervention and the ‘collateral damage’ euphemism. Brown refers to the UN sanctions in Iraq as an example of this and states: “it should not be thought that armed interventions are necessarily more serious in their consequences than so-called peaceful methods” (2003, p. 33).

The rise of *military* humanitarian intervention as an international norm and as a subsequent political engagement is well documented (Abiew 1999, Barnett 2011, Crawford 2002, Finnemore 1996, Foley 2008, Hodge 2011, Pugh 1998 and Tsagourias 2007), and not necessarily welcomed as a development. Some have accepted humanitarian intervention as a necessary possibility for dealing with gross human rights violations, while for others the idea of a humanitarian *war* remains an oxymoron and the adjective ‘humanitarian’ should never be applied to war, whether the war was necessary or not (Barnett 2011, p. 171).

Barnett takes examples of humanitarian crises over the 1990s to illustrate the various failures of both interventions and inaction, and the relationship between humanitarian *aid* and the move to humanitarian military engagement (2011). The UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia provides a disturbing example in defense of military intervention, as it placed a huge emphasis on humanitarian *relief*, rather than the protection of the physical security of civilians and thus the mission was deemed a ‘success’ in relief terms, while people were being
massacred; Barnett argues that in this case humanitarianism “had become an alibi for the West's inaction in Bosnia” (2011, p. 180).

This lack of military action was a product of the prevalent norms at the time, for example the United Nation’s ideal of impartiality - “even when confronted with genocide” Kofi Annan lamented in his famous apology speech (in: Barnett 2011, p. 177). What the United Nation’s experience in Bosnia and Rwanda showed was that the existing norms of impartiality and a reliance on ‘soft’ relief based approaches4 were not adequate for dealing with the kinds of human rights abuses the international community was dealing with; these conflicts emphasized the need for security based approaches, to protect the basic physical security of the civilians before it would even be possible to carry out humanitarian relief. Barnett puts it succinctly when he concludes: “perhaps humanitarianism needed to give war a chance” (2011, p. 180).

The role of security can also be important in terms of the relationship of the third party to the local people who want peace – a relationship I will go into in far more detail later on, in the section on hybrid-sensitivity in intervention. Regarding the UNAMIR operation in Rwanda, General Romeo Dallaire said that it needed ‘muscle’ in order to back-up its mandate and to provide political moderates with the ability to compromise (Barnett 2011, p. 181); this supports a hybrid-sensitive view of peace building, where the role of the third-party provides the basic security necessary for locals to build their own peace. If local groups working for peace do not even have the basic security in which to operate, providing food and medicine seems like an inadequate and short-term solution indeed. The hopelessness of attempting to take-on large-scale violent conflict with only humanitarian relief is perhaps best articulated in a Doctors Without Borders advertisement at the time, satirizing the impossibility of what was being asked of them; it simply stated: “you don’t treat genocide with doctors; you don’t respond to a humanitarian crisis with a stethoscope” (in: Barnett 2011, p. 182).

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4 In Rwanda, even ‘soft’ approaches soon became impossible during the genocide of 1994.
This is certainly not to say that military intervention is always – or even normally – an appropriate form of engagement or that it is ethically uncomplicated in its own right. First of all, the ‘blurring’ of the boundaries between humanitarian relief and military intervention has been an increasing issue for third parties, perhaps especially for non-military relief organizations who have valid security-related and ideological reasons to be anxious about being mistaken for being part of a larger military project and resented (Pugh 1998, p. 341); this was seen as a possible reason for the extremely high death-toll of humanitarian relief workers in Afghanistan in 2010 (Nordland 2010). More recently, the fatally reckless decision of the United States’ government to have their military agents pose as part of a hepatitis B immunisation campaign during the hunt for Osama bin Laden has arguably led to the targetting and killing of polio vaccinators and other aid workers (Al Jazeera, 2012).

Aside from security and ethical concerns, another problem is the fact that military establishments often do not have the expertise to effectively deliver humanitarian aid; this became clear during NATO’s self-proclaimed “humanitarian war” in Kosovo in 1999, where NATO took full control of the operation, including humanitarian aspects of it, and made harmful mistakes due to a lack of relevant knowledge (Barnett 2011, p. 190). While military and humanitarian organizations do have some overlapping skills and can certainly learn from each other, they are still different organizations – often with very different priorities, methods and aims (Pugh 1998).

To illustrate the point above: there are many international aid organizations who focus on emergency relief, like Doctors Without Borders and the International Committee of the Red Cross, who are explicitly neutral and apolitical – meaning it is crucial that they are separate from any military intervention going on and can continue their relief work without being subject to political power struggles. Also, the stated aim of an emergency relief organization is necessarily dealing with immediate suffering and, as such, is not directly engaged in regime change or long-term political reform – the domain of some military humanitarian interventions. Military forces might wish to be neutral or impartial, but they are fundamentally agents of government policy and
thus participate in “political humanitarianism” (Pugh 1998, p. 341). To have just one over-arching operation, like NATO attempted to in Kosovo, is logistically a bad idea, regardless of how skilled the interveners are, as there need to be apolitical emergency relief personnel as well as, and separate from, agents working for long-term political change.

Furthermore, a cynic might ask (with good reason) how we are supposed to differentiate between a ‘genuine’ humanitarian military intervention and an unhumanitarian war, which uses humanitarian rhetoric to sell the war to the people who can grant or deny legitimacy to the operation. Barnett writes of Tony Blair espousing his “doctrine for the international community” as a move toward the ideal of humanitarian intervention (2011, p. 187) and concludes with the wry comment that for the United States “humanitarianism was now part of military strategy” (Barnett 2011, pp. 192-193). Interventions which have been carried out by the United States in recent years, notably in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the full support of Tony Blair’s government, are often understood as examples of deeply harmful interventions – resulting in huge civilian casualties, anarchies controlled by warlords and weak puppet governments. The motives for international engagement were originally sold as security related, but it did not take long for intervention supporting governments to push the humanitarian benefits of carrying out these wars.

Infact, military humanitarianism is not an oxymoron; the military has often defended humanitarian values and a ‘just war’ can be the lesser evil (Pugh 1998, p. 342), when compared to the inaction seen in response to genocides like that in Rwanda. The harm caused by inaction, or by relying on humanitarian relief in a situation which demands a security-centered solution, is easier to ignore than the harm caused by a military intervention, as the deaths are not directly connected to the third party; it is easier to explain away people killed in a civil ethnic cleansing conflict, than to excuse ‘collateral damage’ civilian deaths caused by our incompetent soldiers. But ethical simplicity is not a good enough argument when wrestling with notions of sovereignty, rights and what to do as an international community when the worst does happen. Brown refers here to the “dirty hands” problem, i.e. whether one can justify “morally dubious actions”
carried out for a greater good, which involve getting ‘dirty hands’ (i.e. direct involvement), and facetiously argues: “it is not possible to govern innocently, and Chomsky is probably right that the only way in which national leaders can preserve entirely clean hands is by abstaining from action” (2003, p. 38).

One of the most convincing arguments against military humanitarian interventions is that there are many other kinds of international engagement which would cost much less and potentially help many more people; an estimated 35,000 children die daily from poverty and preventable disease and Coady argues that “the funds devoted to the humanitarian relief of the ‘loud’ crises created by wars could be ten to twenty times more effective against the ‘silent’ emergencies created by poverty” (2005, p. 30). While this is an important point, especially relating to the exorbitant costs of military interventions, human suffering is not so easily quantified; if people in Rwanda are being killed in a genocide, it will not be much comfort to them to note that there are people elsewhere dying of hunger. The people most qualified to help in certain instances may be the military, and while they are indeed expensive, there is also no humanitarian alternative when the security situation is such that relief efforts cannot operate. The military have many applicable skills for humanitarian purposes, from building roads to mine clearance, and while humanitarian and military cultures do differ in significant ways, they are not polar extremes and also have important similarities (Pugh 1998, p. 342).

Despite any of this, military humanitarian activities should remain a last resort, due to their potential cost and harm (especially to civilians), the likelihood of subsequent diplomatic breakdown and the favoring of war as a means to solve problems – feeding into a pro-war doctrine. For example, in Somalia the humanitarian mission was militarized with horrendous results – torture by peace keepers, brutal killing of peace keepers and rapid withdrawal leading to the world’s prime example of a continuing failed state (Foley 2008). Foley argues that the famous failures of inaction (Rwanda and the Balkans) “needs to be set in context of what had happened in Somalia, and, in some ways, the failure of this intervention was more significant” (2008, p. 63). In Rwanda 800,000 people were killed in a genocide, which General Roméo Dallaire
estimated could have been stopped by 4,000 well-equipped soldiers (Foley 2008, pp. 60-61). While there were significant civilian deaths in the interventions carried out in the 1990s, Brown lists several of them and then states: “more human lives were lost in Rwanda in 1994 than in all the conflicts above taken together” (2003, p. 32). So the ‘action’ in Somalia was not more significant than the ‘inaction’ in Rwanda in terms of harm done or even perhaps in terms of complicity in that harm. The reason Foley argues we need to learn from Somalia is that it is an example of a time that a military humanitarian intervention was authorized by the UN and had a robust mandate, but ended in dramatic failure (2008, p. 63). Furthermore, the representative to the UN, Mohamed Sahnoun, had suggested grassroots, non-violent methods for dealing with the growing conflict, which many political commentators saw as the best way forward, and he was ignored and eventually forced out of office (Foley 2008, p. 66).

The above shows us why advocating for military solutions, even with strong reservations, is ideologically difficult in an environment which already defaults to militarism in some instances – and often, if not usually, without good reason to do so and without adequately attempting peaceful methods first. I am by no means advocating for a blanket acceptance of military humanitarian interventions, but neither am I arguing for a blanket ban on them. While “the easiest rule to formulate is a rule of abstention” (Brown 2003, p. 41), the ethical dilemmas facing nation states are more complicated than a simple ethical rule book would be able to cover. In fact, when dealing with a problem of this nature it is inappropriaite to refer to or attempt to put together a universal ‘rule book’, except as a general guide of issues to consider; “what is required is a form of judgment that constitutes a creative interaction between the standard criteria and the full specifics of the particular case” (Brown 2003, p. 45).
Chapter 3: Defining Hybridity/ Hybrid-sensitive

Philosophical underpinnings of the 'liberal peace project':

Before explaining what is meant by the ‘liberal peace project’, it is important to understand the broader philosophical foundations of such a project. On a macro-level, the liberal peace is built on the modernist and enlightenment ideals of universalism; on the ability to use rationality to deduce universal rules which apply to all people, regardless of culture, circumstance or other varying factors. The ‘project’ (if we want to call it that) is built on the idea that there are universal values that apply across the board, and that it is the duty of capable agents to spread the values and rights enshrined in such an understanding. For these reasons, among others, Mac Ginty (2011) argues that liberalism is essentially an interventionist and expansionist project – the drive to ‘spread’ liberalism is part of the core philosophy of such a set of values. The doctrine of universal human rights is a pertinent example of this kind of thinking. This is an observation about liberalism, but not necessarily a pure criticism; Richmond (2009) reminds us that sometimes even ‘bad’ (or co-optive) peacekeeping is better than the violent alternative, so sometimes having an ‘interventionist’ philosophy can turn out to be very ‘humanitarian’ and directly save lives. As a further example, while the international declaration of human rights can be accused of being culturally-biased and steam-rolling over heterogeneity, it has also been used as a document to support numerous indigenous efforts by grassroots movements around the world; to prop up claims to inherent and universal rights, superseding local authorities who use ‘culture’ as an excuse for violence and oppression.

However, none of this is to wash over the very real philosophical and practical problems with expansionist liberal ideals, and with modernist ways of thinking in general. Heathershaw accuses peace studies as a discipline of being too grounded in ‘rationalist’ or ‘problem-solving’ ways of thinking, leading to what he calls “the race to prescribe” (2008: 604). This links to larger pitfalls of modernism in general, for instance how the construction of a universal policy is seen as the ‘end’ itself, rather than the people caught-up in the policy (Holmes
Modernist paradigms also have problems accepting that which cannot be ‘rationally’ understood and explained. They are not open to the spontaneous, the irrational, the mystical, the element of luck, et cetera. This is particularly well illustrated by Charles Turner, when he argues that Machiavelli essentially ‘began’ enlightenment in a number of ways, but particularly by arguing that fortuna, the goddess of luck, is a woman who needs to be beaten and subdued by the Prince; that luck and the unexplained needs to be pushed out of public discourse (1992: 18) and perhaps, on a deeper level, luck has to be subdued – meaning we are aiming, a society, to use rationalist thinking to exercise full control over outcomes. The impact of this modernist framework on the way we frame and carry out interventions is deeply problematic; interveners use universalist ‘rational’ models to try to control luck and outcomes, while excluding all the particularist and context-driven aspects of life deemed unnecessary by modernist ideology.

This privileging of the general over the specific is important to keep in mind as we think about hybridity, as theories around hybridity are often put forward as an alternative to blunt liberal thinking – hopefully without slipping into extreme cultural relativism (which is dogmatic in a surprisingly similar way). Both Audra Mitchell and Oliver Richmond put forward ideas countering classical liberal thought – Mitchell (2010) argues we need to focus less on the ‘peace process’ and more on the people involved, and Richmond (2009) argues we need a ‘post-Liberal’ notion of peace where we look at the peace acts in the everyday lives of people.

*Liberal democratic peace thesis:*

Working forward from the general philosophy above, the project is furthermore built on the idea that free market democracies are best suited to ensuring the aforementioned universal human rights and security for all; indeed that democracies of the type described never go to war with one another, so if all countries operated in this way we could conceivably eradicate war. This central premise has increasingly come under scrutiny; John M. Owen argues that the
proposition is vulnerable in three notable ways – the proposition contains qualitative, ambiguous terms, wars are so rare that random chance could explain the lack of wars between democracies and there is a lack of a theoretical foundation – i.e. no one is sure why democracies would be less likely to fight each other than non-liberal states (1994, 87-88). Adding to the first proposition, Spiro (1994) shows how statistics can be deceptive – for example, just because no one in his family has ever won lotto, that does not mean there is a reason and that people should be researching what it is about his family that restrains them from winning lotto.

However, statistically flawed or not, the democratic peace thesis is very influential, in terms of how much politicians use arguments referring to it to justify wars against illiberal states – the idea that states should be ‘freed’ or ‘given democracy’ to help ensure international peace and security is a very familiar one.

*The Liberal Peace ‘Project’*

The liberal peace project is a term used to describe international pressure by powerful, liberal states or political actors (for example NGOs and UN bodies) to ‘convert’ or change illiberal states into democratic liberal free market states, via interventions and other coercive or incentivizing methods. Mac Ginty reminds us that liberal states are not necessarily interventionist in the military sense, but usually employ other means: “It would be wrong to characterize liberal states as trigger-happy: only a few use direct violence. More generally, liberal states resort to a range of coercive mechanisms, most of which mediate coercion through international institutions and use indirect violence through sanctions or financial pressures” (2011: 29). For example, within the South Pacific region there is little need for powerful states to use coercive means, as aid flows and budget support enable the donors (Australia and New Zealand) to dictate the terms they like.

Mac Ginty adds that there is not one liberal peace project, but multiple projects, often differing in very significant ways and that the liberal peace is not designed in a ‘laboratory of peace’; it exists and interacts with the context it is supposed to be instilled and with the people there (Mac Ginty 2011). This means
that the liberal peace project is not actually a unified body with one goal, and that we should instead conceive of plural liberal peace, which are changed and subverted by their respective contexts (this is the beginning of thinking about hybridity, the next section of this chapter).

Despite there being many kinds of liberal peace, there are some general statements we can make about what the words ‘liberal peace’ mean in this context and what ‘liberal peace making’ generally looks like. First of all, liberal ideals are grounded in the ideal of a bureaucratic state, which appears ‘natural’ and objective (Bourdieu 1994, p. 4) – for example, the State’s supposed objectivity is exemplified in the Western justice system whereby the jury must be entirely impartial and unrelated to the people in the case or in our welfare systems which (at least in theory) do not make distinctions based on power or character, but treat each person as a number worthy of certain entitlements based on universal criteria. This anonymity has the problems of being impersonal and dehumanising, but it has the benefits of treating every person the same and supposedly getting around prejudice and social hierarchy. The State can be defined as “the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital” (Bourdieu 1994, p. 5), namely the capital of physical force (monopoly of violence), economic capital (national market, tax), informational capital (linguistic and judicial codes) and symbolic capital. Symbolic capital is “any property … when it is perceived by social agents endowed with categories of perception which cause them to know it and to recognize it, to give it value” (Bourdieu 1994, p. 8) and the state is “the site par excellence of the concentration and exercise of symbolic power” (Bourdieu 1994, p. 9). In this way the liberal peace project elevates elites and institutions over societies and ‘everyday’ life (Richmond 2009: 568) – linking back to problems with excessive macro-focus and universalist ethics.

Despite supposedly universal ethics and philosophical homogeneity, Mac Ginty outlines the problem of defining the liberal peace, when “clearly the coercive liberal peacemaking in Afghanistan is very different from the more persuasive forms of liberal peacebuilding found in Northern Ireland” (2011, p. 6). Nevertheless, he does conclude that the term remains analytically useful as there are enough similarities to make it a clear category; “the familiar cast list of
states and institutions that promote liberal peacebuilding, the familiar script of liberal rhetoric, and the familiar policy prescriptions” (2011, p. 6). There is plenty of literature in the ‘post-liberal’ vein, of which Mac Ginty and Richmond are perhaps two of the most useful for my purposes – especially as they attempt to tackle the problems of liberalism alongside notions of hybrid peace (Mac Ginty 2011, Mac Ginty & Richmond 2009, Richmond 2009 & 2010). Mac Ginty argues the two major manifestations of liberal peace interventions are the internationalising aspect and the modern state as the principle unit of political organisation (2011, 39). The modern state is already covered in detail above, but the internalisation aspect is particularly relevant to our thinking about intervention; “Liberal peace building involves the introduction of resources, personnel and modes of practice from outside the country” meaning that the relationship between those international actors and their indigenous counterparts takes centre-stage, both in Mac Ginty’s book and in our thinking about the meaning of ‘hybridity’ in this context.

While liberal peace building can be tied to positive and negative developments, Mac Ginty highlights some of the problems of what Williams (2006:2, in: Mac Ginty 2011:28) calls the ‘new liberal militancy’; Three dimensions of this version of liberalism are worth highlighting: its tendency towards militarized or coercive interventions, its neo-liberal interpretation of economics, and its ethnocentrism.” (Mac Ginty 2011:28). This is tied to an ideological hegemony where liberalism is seen as “magic dust” capable of solving all kinds of social ills in any context and, perhaps even more worrying, as the only option when it comes to international engagement (Mac Ginty 2011: 28). Examples of paternalistic, (neo)liberal militarized interventions are easy to think of – Afghanistan and Iraq being the most currently relevant – and these kinds of interventions are those which provide fodder for arguments discounting the idea of third-party intervention altogether. Richmond (2009) argues that liberal-peace ideologies are grounded in humanism, even when they go astray, where I would be a bit more cynical and argue that there are plenty of proponents of the liberal peace who have mostly instrumentalist motivations – how we determine these motivations and what would constitute a ‘really’ humanitarian liberal intervention would be a matter of semantics and subjective values far outside
the scope of this masters. Crucially though, despite his defence of liberal peace proponents, Richmond falls into the 'post-Liberal' camp; in that he sees liberalism as an essentially failed ideology when it comes to thinking about international engagement and wants to work at creating new paradigms. Of the three reactions to liberal peace thinking that Mac Ginty (2011) outlines (to support, adjust or move beyond) this is entirely the most radical – and one where most thinkers on hybridity find themselves.

Indigenous/ traditional approach:

As is presents us with a prominent alternative to the liberal peace project, it is important to think about indigenous and/or traditional local approaches to peace building. Mac Ginty presents very useful definitions of these terms, along with the pertinent reminder that they are not the same thing: ‘Traditional’ refers to norms and practices that draw on long-standing modes of operation – historical pedigree. Indigenous norms and practices draw on local resources – “indigenous practices need not be traditional. Indigenous peoples are capable of adopting new techniques” (2011: 49). In peace studies parlance, indigenous/traditional approaches are also often referred to as 'bottom-up', as they come from the grassroots or local level 'up' to the macro-level.

In the past indigenous or traditional methods were often seen as being comparatively powerless when faced with international liberal peace agents, and language around these groups was often framed in dichotomies like oppressed (locals) and oppressor (international forces) – often relating to colonial history. Conversely, in recent years there has been what Mac Ginty calls the ‘romanticisation’ of the indigenous/ traditional, whereby the local has been associated unquestionably with the ‘good’ or ‘natural’ way of doing things (2011: 51); “Such a simplistic binary easily overlooks the fact that there are traditional and indigenous ways of warfare, torture, exclusion and degradation.” (Mac Ginty 2011:51).

Aside from the questionable romanticisation of the supposed ‘traditional’, there are additional issues relating to authenticity and the relevance of using historical methods for dealing with new problems. First of all, Mac Ginty uses the
Gacaca trials of Rwanda as an example of when supposedly ‘traditional’ conflict resolution methods were used, and calls the authenticity of the ‘traditions’ into question (2011). What he does not mention is the additional, and more troubling, fact that the Gacaca trials resulted in re-traumatizing some of the people involved, and that there are real questions as to whether this method of very public ‘truth telling’ is applicable in the event of a genocide, especially one featuring widespread rape (Brounéus 2008). In most cases events like the Rwandan genocide of 1994 are thankfully unprecedented in terms of the level of violence and horror a society has experienced – so ‘traditional’ ways of dealing with conflict, which may have dealt with small violent outbreaks in the past, may not be equipped to cope with such a new phenomenon.

Another issue Mac Ginty does discuss is that of authenticity; stating that the Gacaca method was actually a ‘hybrid’ of traditional conflict resolution methods and the influence of the international community (2011). Because the process was perceived as being ‘traditional’, it was subject to less scrutiny than it might have been otherwise, while actually furthering interests of various international actors and powerful local groups. Furthermore, even if one was to ask only indigenous people and attempt to create a ‘purely’ indigenous/traditional conflict resolution method, there are still issues of authenticity and representation. Hale writes about how locals in Chimaltenango criticise prominent intellectual Estuardo Zapeta because he only started identifying as Indian after moving to the United States; “the Maya movement is full of intellectuals and leaders like Zapeta, who recently ‘discovered’ their Indian roots and reinvented their culture, riding the wave of the international community’s enthusiasm for things Indian.” (1999: 301). This connects to issues of local bias and power structures within indigenous communities; how powerful members within indigenous communities can create problematic representations of that community as a whole and how engaging with these representatives as if they fairly represent everyone’s wishes can lead to reinforcing harmful hierarchies (Chambers 1983).

Hybridity encourages us to investigate, and hopefully transcend, these binaries and the concurrent way of thinking about relationships between cultures: "Cultural exchange is a dynamic process that occurs on multiple levels
and should not be conceived of in terms of one-way traffic, or the assimilation of the colonized by the colonizer” (Mac Ginty 2011: 51). Hofmann (2009) criticizes the trend of using ‘hybrid’ to explain political situations, saying that hybrid-states, for instance, amount to nothing more than a combination of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches and are therefore not intellectually innovative or interesting. I would say that if we interrogate the term ‘hybridity’ more thoroughly there are, in fact, subtle and important differences and ramifications for how we think about peace building, and perhaps state building. Regarding the quote above, I go perhaps a step further than Mac Ginty and argue that a hybrid approach is beyond being either a one-way or a two-way street – it is about complex and changing relations between and within groups, and recognises that the ‘top’ international community is not homogenous, and neither is the ‘bottom’ local community. Hybridity recognizes the varied and complex relational forces at work within and between all of these groups, rather than conceiving of influence in terms of being one-directional or between two clearly defined groups and resulting in ‘compromise’ between two positions. In his 2010 article, Roger Mac Ginty calls hybrid peace “the interaction between top-down and bottom-up peace” (my italics). This is key as it illustrates that the hybrid peace is based on the dynamic interaction/ process between different groups, rather than being the end result of those groups combining. This focus on the dynamic process, rather than the result, also has the benefit of avoiding reification of ‘either’ side.

In metaphorical terms, the combination of top-down and bottom up strikes me as a gentler version of the game tug of war – admitting that both sides have influence, and hoping to work out where in the ‘middle’ the two can meet. Top-down (often liberal) approaches had the internationals in charge and the locals seen as beneficiaries/ victims – the ‘combination’ of top-down/ bottom-up is actually a similar mindset, except conceived of in terms of ‘meeting in the middle.’ A hybrid-sensitive approach is the attempt to move beyond this goal-oriented struggle for power into a space where we can practice reciprocal learning with various people involved, within and between ‘groups.’ This connects to theories by Anzaldúa, who argues that in order to deal with problems between races and between males and females, we need “a massive
uprooting of dualistic thinking in the individual and collective consciousness” (Anzaldúa 1987: 102). So, to say that a hybridity-focussed approach to understanding cultures or states is nothing more than combining top-down and bottom-up entirely misses the point – as such an approach is at least attempting to be beyond thinking about groups in those kinds of simplistic binaries.

Defining hybridity:

Now that we have covered the existing approaches in their dichotomized form – from ‘the liberal peace project’ to indigenous and/or traditional approaches, the real work of defining what hybridity is begins. Before beginning this task, I felt I had an ‘instinctive’ understanding of what it meant, but quickly found myself wading through murky definitions, non-definitions and many statements like the following: “Because of its ambiguity, the term hybridity is bothersome” (Kapchan & Strong 1999: 240). Bothersome indeed. Kapchan and Strong go on to show how the term is connected to other, equally difficult, terms like syncretism, bricolage and creolization (1999). In the end, the definition I found most applicable and useful for peace building purposes was the one put forward by Mac Ginty: “Hybridisation is regarded as a dynamic and complex process in which prior-hybridised entities coalesce, conflict, and re-coalesce with other prior-hybridised entities to produce a context of constant mixing and interchange” (2011: 51).

One of the most important points in thinking about hybridity comes through clearly in this definition, namely that it is not the grafting together of two distinct entities to produce a third (this + that = those). Nor is it, as Hofmann would have us believe, a half-way point or compromise between two distinct entities. Richmond makes this clear when he writes that hybridity is “a coexistence of difference, rather than assimilation and internationalism” (2010: 687). The ‘compromise’ model where everyone ‘meets’ or ‘combines’ to form a new entity could also be called the infamous ‘melting pot’ ideal, to which Anzaldúa replies, regarding her chicano background: “They’d like to think I have melted in the pot. But I haven’t, we haven’t” (1987: 108). Hybridity recognises that “no actor is able to unilaterally impose its will” (Mac Ginty 2011: 70) and concurrently that
'oppressed' cultures are not 'melted' in with the dominant cultures, or without agency and means of resistance.

Going back to Mac Ginty's definition, he stresses the fact that all actors change during hybridization – not just the ‘less powerful’ (2011: 71). Furthermore, the three factors he highlights are worth briefly repeating here, namely: the fact that ‘both’ groups are already hybrid (2011: 72), secondly: hybridization is not an exotic process of alien groups to each other, but rather it is often a “gradualist, everyday process” (2011: 72), and finally, we need to get beyond the paralysing relativism that can cripple discussions on hybridity and hybrization (2011: 73). There are degrees of hybridization, and power relations inherent in thinking about interplay between cultures and actors, so thinking about hybridity does not mean that we need to take it to an extreme where we argue that because ‘everything is hybridized all the time’ that power relations are redundant or that cultural domination is not an issue (Mac Ginty 2011: 73). This is perhaps one of the most difficult points about hybridity and one which I will go into further detail about later.

Mac Ginty also provides a four-part model on the way liberal peace interventions become hybrid interventions – what is important here, for my purposes, is to conceive of differences between spontaneous and intentional hybridity. Mac Ginty's model would be relevant to even the most domineering and oppressive intervention, as there is always resistance, subversion and change. Anzaldúa writes about being chicano in a hostile world by saying: “stubborn, persevering, impenetrable as stone, yet possessing a malleability that renders us unbreakable, we, the mestizas and mestizos, will remain” (1987: 86). This is important to keep in mind, as it reminds us that resilience and flexibility are not, as is sometimes perceived, mutually exclusive, but are actually part of the same package – the very ‘malleability’ of a culture is what makes it impossible to entirely stamp-out. However, this does not mean that a domineering, culturally inappropriate intervention is ‘hybrid-sensitive’, just because it contains the spontaneous hybridity which is always present; because the people always manage to resist.

*History and context of the usage of 'hybridity':*
Hybridity was originally a biological term typically associated with the breeding of different species, which led to it being used to describe a person who is the product of blended cultures (Kapchan & Strong 1999: 240). The botanical origins of the term link to it being conceived of as having negative connotations to do with contamination (Kraidy 2006: 319) and superior-inferior relationships between colonizer and colonized; the fear the 'superior' might degrade to 'lower level evolution' (Mac Ginty 2011: 70). Basically, boundaries and binaries form the basis of various social systems, and the idea of the hybrid “suggested that boundaries were porous and therefore questioned the basis of the separation and the superior-inferior relationship that formed many of the foundation stones of social and political order” (Mac Ginty 2011: 71). On a cultural level, an example of a hybrid form is Rai music in Algeria; music that was deemed so dangerous it was banned. Kapchan and Strong argue this is an example of the permeability of generic boundaries, and shows that hybrid forms are “more nuanced than insider/ outsider polarities” (1999: 244). This example speaks to the overlapping and constantly shifting relationship between groups we may refer to as ‘local’ and ‘international’, and inherently problematizes terms like ‘traditional’ and the dichotomous thinking associated with it.

Apart from Mac Ginty’s wonderfully clear and applicable definition of hybridity, the other definition I particularly connected to is Anzaldúa’s more esoteric description of the mestiza consciousness, because it so clearly connects with this idea of moving past boundaries, within the emotionally-laden realm of cultural identity.

“This assembly is not one where severed or separated pieces merely come together. Nor is it a balancing of opposing powers. In attempting to work out a synthesis, the self has added a third element which is greater than the sum of its severed parts. That third element is a new consciousness – a mestiza consciousness – and though it is a source of intense pain, its energy comes from continual creative motion that keeps breaking down the unitary aspect of each new paradigm” (1987: 101-102).

5 Folk music blended with music from all over the world, including Western electric styles. It typically appeals to young people and contains social messages.
This quote also reminds us that hybridity is not a 'half-way' point between asymmetrically-opposed groups, nor is it a combination of them, and it also raises the salient point that something useful (even beautiful) can come from painful sources. This is an important point to hold onto while we think about hybridity, as it connects strongly with a lot of the 'post-colonial' literature on the topic – for example, Derek Walcott’s poem *A Far Cry From Africa* where he writes:

“I who have cursed
The drunken officer of British rule,
how choose Between this Africa and the English tongue I love?
Betray them both, or give back what they give?
How can I face such slaughter and be cool?
How can I turn from Africa and live?”

I began my attempt to understand 'hybridity' by reading cultural theorists and geographers. Gayatri Spivak talks about how “the idea of home is infinitely expandable” and how there is a complex interplay between domination and resistance; talking to Chinese students about learning English (which she now teaches), she says she learned it because she had the British ‘boot’ on her neck, but: “I love English because I love my mother tongue. And I will tell you, you do not learn English because the United States is asking you to, you do not learn English because you are entering the World Trade Organization. The only reason to learn a language is to be able to read its poetry” (Chakravorty et al 2006, p. 22-30). Spivak’s point about poetry is so pertinent for two main reasons: 1. It shows the complex relationship people can have with forces which dominate them and how we exercise our agency to make something our own, and 2. Since poetry is itself a very clear example of spontaneous hybridity and of ways melding dichotomies (like past and present, traditional and modern).

These multiple identities people live with in the ‘post-colonial’ world are the subject of much of the writing on hybridity and how actions like ‘mimicry’ by the colonised can, in fact, be an act of resistance or subversion (Bhabha 1984). Bhabha refers primarily to historical mimicry, but interestingly Paul Theroux
writes of the modern mimicry happening in call centres in India; the employees are taught specific regional accents and manners, so that the customers are not aware (and thus, outraged) that jobs in their area are being lost and outsourced to India (2008). A simplistic dominator/ dominated view of such a situation would be that the Indians are bowing to the demands of the all-powerful ‘West’, but a more nuanced approach could see the ways in which India has subverted the ‘rules of the game’ and managed to find it’s own benefits in an unfair economic situation.

The relationship between colonized/colonizer is central to our understanding of hybridity and certainly extremely applicable to the two interventions I will be contrasting; Bhabha reminds us of the persistent neo-colonial relations within the ‘new’ world order and states that “the Western metropole must confront its postcolonial history, told by the influx of post-war migrants and refugees, as an indigenous or native narrative internal to its national identity” (Bhabha 2001, p. 162). While it is common to consider the ways in which colonialism affected the colonised, it is important also to consider the ways in which, for example, India profoundly influenced the British Raj. The question then, for my purposes, is how we confront that reality – not just in terms of an ‘influx’, but also as an outpouring of peace making operations/interventions globally. This takes on additional complexity when colonial history and imposed Western-drawn borders play a pivotal role in the conflicts in question, as it does in both Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. The quote above is also useful in reminding us that ‘hybridity’ moves in all directions and that colonialism impacts upon the identity of the colonizer, as much as vice versa – before we are finally reminded, by the words of people like Spivak and Walcott, that even the most ardently anti-colonialist person can find beauty in something so intricately connected with global hegemony – the English language.

*Hybridity should not be a ‘way out’ for neo-colonialists, a way of maintaining the status quo, or a rationale for the maintenance of oppressive and corrupt relationships on the part of local elites.*

While hybridity provides an alternative to thinking about cultures in oppressor-
oppressed binaries, perhaps the greatest risk of this theory is forgetting cultural domination altogether and making the mistake Ahmad accuses hybridity-proponents of: “intercultural hybridity is presented as a transaction of displaced equals which somehow transcends the profound inequalities engendered by colonialism itself” (1995, p. 17). Aside from historical colonialism, Ahmad argues that supporting transnational cultural hybridity without reservations “amounts ... to endorsing the cultural claims of transnational capital itself” (Ahmad 1995, p. 13). The global economic system which has allowed this supposed ‘hybridity’ to take place is built on a history of colonialism and continued exploitation (or neo colonialism), and to uncritically celebrate the ‘globalisation’ or hybridity created by it is to ignore its foundations and the hegemonic ideologies propping it up. This means not forgetting the role of power, in all its forms; “an intercontextual understanding shows us that hybridity is a map of the complex and varied workings of power – it is not a posthegemonic state” (Kraidy 2006, 334).

This also relates to an argument by Slavoj Zizek, who argues that charity within the capitalist economic system is like giving with one hand what one smashed with the other (2009) – giving aid or providing peace making efforts is essentially a way to keep the global system operating to one’s own benefit, even if that is not one’s intended outcome. Either hybridity (as a theory) or liberalism could be accused in this way. Hybridity could be framed as an illusory ‘way out’ for neo-colonialist powers – as way to put a positive public relations spin on what amounts to neo-colonial bureaucratic activities at worst, and paternalistic development projects at best. Liberal peace building is even easier to accuse, as it operates directly within the state-centred, empire-driven and now neo-liberal economic model; essentially the status quo. Liberal peace and the liberal peace building which aims at it might be ‘humanitarian’ to a point, but only insofar as the ‘centres’ of power maintain their position and influence. Peace studies as a discipline has been accused of relying on these narratives too heavily itself and working at maintaining the status quo of power relations to ensure ‘peace’, at the cost of potentially disruptive, but transformative social change (Heathershaw 2008).

Mac Ginty argues that while the liberal peace may facilitate some
improvements at the local level, we need to keep the meta-process in mind, where “the liberal peace might be regarded as a system that facilitates the continuation of an essentially conservative international political system in which the same political and economic interests perpetuate their own domination” (2011, 44). Historically, many ‘interventions’ (or: invasions) have been carried out under a ‘liberal’ guise, with (badly) hidden economic and geopolitical agendas, for example, the coup in Chile in 1973 endorsed by the United States. The ‘liberal peace’ espoused by people like George W. Bush and the ‘freedom’ associated with it has been dragged through the proverbial mud and is now greeted with a deserved level of suspicion. Because of this, we are facing a crisis of legitimacy in terms of interventions and the role of the third party (Fry & Kabutaulaka 2008) - if ‘we’ were not always in that crisis-state to begin with. However, as covered in the previous chapter, doing nothing is more ethically dubious than it may first appear and can have results as devastating, if not more, than intervening – and can perpetuate historical wrongs on the part of the international community. The literature and praxis around hybridity and intervention is attempting to find a way of thinking about the relationship between the ‘international community’ and the ‘local community’ in a way which addresses the problems of the liberal peace project, without losing the potentially useful aspects of it and without throwing the whole idea of third-party intervention out entirely.

Moving from Hybridity to Hybrid-sensitivity:

The liberal peace is defined as the result of when the liberal peace agents and the local agents interact - everything outside this interaction are spheres which are irrelevant or invisible to the ‘other’ party in the intervention (the liberal peace aspects which the local dismisses, the local aspects which operate outside or contrary to the liberal peace). Therefore, the peace that comes out of an intervention is, in fact, a hybrid peace - as opposed to a ‘pure’ liberal peace, created in a lab and perfectly put into place (Mac Ginty 2011). This means that the result of any intervention, thoughtfully executed or not, is a hybrid of what the interveners intend and how the locals react to and subvert this intention, and
push for intentions of their own. The important point to take away from this is that a hybrid result alone does not speak to the good intentions of the interveners, and rather provides evidence of the ever-present agency of locals.

This being the case, what would it mean to be hybrid-sensitive? Mac Ginty talks about ‘liberal peace-max’ and ‘liberal-peace lite’ (quoting Richmond, 2011: 85) and says that sometimes “liberal peace agents have shown a greater willingness to engage in cooperative ventures with local actors” (2011: 86). This willingness to engage is not, in and of itself, hybrid sensitive (necessarily), but it is on the right path - and could lead to an intervention being considered hybrid sensitive. A hybrid-sensitive intervention would be one which recognises that the locals have their own plans and ideas for the peace building mission, and that a coming together of minds (both external and internal to the conflict) is the best way forward to creatively building an appropriate solution, so it would necessarily entail a willingness to engage, but also a lot more - namely, a desire to create the peace building plan with leadership from local peace workers/civil society, a discussion about what kind of peace is desired, ideas and resources which are shared in a flexible and reciprocal way.

Hybrid-sensitivity is also be framed as intentional hybridity, as opposed to ‘spontaneous hybridity’ which is always present. However, this is a problematic way of framing things, as the notion of ‘intention’ denotes control and a potentially artificial process subject to elite manipulation; as if the diversity of reactions and subversions are something that can be written into a ‘plan.’ This is why I have chosen the words ‘hybrid-sensitivity’ to express the approach of these third-parties; i.e. they are sensitive to and aware of the role hybridity has to play in the intervention, and choose to work with that (unavoidable) process, instead of attempting to dominate or push against it.

Essentially a hybrid-sensitive intervention is one which inherently recognises the agency of the people in the ‘host’ country and realises that they are likely to have far more relevant and context-specific ideas about peace building in their own land, while still recognising the important role the third-party plays in peace building - in terms of resources, fresh ideas, facilitators and security. Being hybrid-sensitive as a third-party means having an awareness of the process of hybridization and engaging with it as a useful and necessary
process - it underlines the importance of being humble and open to reciprocal learning. On a grander scale, Richmond argues “such positions are also often consistent with attempts to oppose meta-narratives which essentialise the everyday, politics and identity” (2010: 676). This cuts to the root of the major problems with the liberal approach and the universalism associated with it, and quietly opposes it in a “militantly particularist” (Williams 1989, in: Hale 1999: 302), contextual, micro level way. Instead of putting all the emphasis on grand narratives like state building (and the institutions therein), a hybrid-sensitive approach also (not instead of!) puts the daily narrative of individuals and communities in the centre – and what their priorities and visions for peace might be.

This way of addressing peace building is necessarily more spontaneous and has to be more flexible to cope with a range of responses and desires, while still working towards a larger goal which involves entire communities and nations (from peace in the everyday to peace in the state). Intellectually and pragmatically speaking, this process could be seen as more work intensive than the classic ‘liberal’ model it aims to move away from; the ‘interveners’ need to listen to more people, they need to be prepared to accept ideals different from their own, they need to be open to facilitate (instead of dictate). Indeed, working in politics at all (let alone internationally) is bound to be an intellectually demanding job, as McSwain explains perfectly when she quips:

“If the public official who encounters this argument is dismayed by what appears to be the tremendous ambiguity and personal responsibility it seems to place on him or her, first I must say that indeed service in the public sector does entail awesome responsibility and the struggle with sometimes overwhelming ambiguity” (1987: 54-55)

Another useful way of thinking of the comparison between the ‘liberal’ peace-building process and hybrid-sensitive peace-building, is by associating the former with ethics and the latter with ethos. The ‘liberal’ peace is built on the ideal of universal ethics; a set of rules designed to apply to all equally, and thus, the process of building this peace is the process of attempting to build (or impose) this set of regulations. Aristotle addresses the problems with an ‘ethics’
led system – namely, humans do not all have the same vision of what ethics are and the ‘rules’ may need to change based on context. Instead, he puts forward the ‘harmonious road’ of life - an ethos of living in a way to maximise your own and others’ harmony. This idea is deeply rooted in the ideal of praxis, as opposed to theory; one cannot ‘have’ ethics (they are not a possession), one must live them out in practice. This is fundamental to our thinking about humanitarian interventions and the role of the third-party.

It is important to note that ethos is not the same as “culture” and does not rely on consciously agreed-upon values in the way that culture can be seen to; instead, an organizational ethos relies “on continuing interpersonal interactions across individually held life worlds, through which tentative and fluid accommodations about meaning emerge” (McSwain 1987: 37). Moving from this definition, Aristotle also argues that human character (and the virtues within that) are only formed within interaction; “This constitutes a radical departure from our liberalism-inspired contemporary appreciation of ethics as privately held values, and ethos as an agreed upon pattern of such values” (McSwain 1987: 39). This also connects with thinking whereby the ‘other’ is prioritised for the very reason that ‘they’ are necessary to us; we cannot pursue the ‘good’ without them, or grow our characters into that which we would desire.

Furthermore, as no one can own ethics, no one can gift them someone else. In the context of a third-party humanitarian intervention, this means that the third-party needs to let go of any notion they have of being the ‘bringer’ of ethics. This kind of philosophy is often explored when relating to education – in the old ‘reading, writing and arithmetic’ model of education the teacher was seen as a vessel full of knowledge, and the students as ‘blank slates’ (empty of knowledge). This model has been largely thrown out, in favour of new ideals around education where the teacher is the facilitator – the students are not lesser than the teacher, the students have their own knowledge and skills already and the teacher is a person helping them learn whichever specific topic is at play, using their previous skills and knowledge. This is not a perfect metaphor for intervention, but it is a helpful way of thinking; people are not empty vessels and one cannot ‘bring’ a particular set of ethics to another person. People already have their own ethics (and ethos), so as an intervener one is not
engaging with ‘blank slates’, but rather complex and largely functioning societies who, for whatever reason, have requested outside help to return to a peaceful way of life. They have not requested to be ‘taught’ or ‘given’ ethics.

Adding to this, an emphasis on ethos also puts the method of engagement of the third-party in the centre of things, rather than merely the end goal. If we were focusing mostly on ethics, we would think mostly about what we would want to build and what systems such a state should have. This is largely how the ‘liberal peace’ operates – through making lists and criteria for how a nation state should be (the universal declaration of human rights, for example), and perhaps part of the reason many interventions run in this fashion tend to ‘fail’ by their own criteria. An example of such an intervention is the US-led ‘intervention’ in Iraq, where the ‘goal’ of toppling Saddam Hussein was centralised, rather than the way in which the US would engage with Iraq and Iraqis. When intervening from an ‘ethos’ (or ‘everyday’ as Richmond would put it) led perspective, it is necessary and obvious that the every day way in which the third-party behaves and relates to the locals is of primary concern, and that the ‘goals’ (whatever they may be) will only come out of a well-thought out and harmonious ethos.

Finally, ethos intrinsically places emphasis on both context and character, two elements seen as irrelevant by many more modernist approaches. While ethics implies an idealistic uniformity, ethos is about a dynamic living-out of values, in ‘every day’ life. Ethos is also the practice of ‘acting out’ virtues until they become habit and, thus, part of one’s character. The role of character in humanitarian intervention is crucial, yet strangely ignored. Many people in Bougainville spoke of the personal respect and friendship they felt for Roger Mortlock and how specifically him being the person in charge was a large factor in determining the success of the intervention; a phenomenon Joseph Kabui called the “Roger Mortlock factor” (Adams, ed. 2001: 39). Placing this emphasis on the personality and attributes of which people we choose (beyond a list of CV-ready experiences) flies in the face of modernist thinking and, indeed, it is even seen as ‘unfair’ for a company to hire someone based on personality preference, as opposed to the ‘hard facts’ of their CV. Aristotle had no such qualms and was perfectly happy to exclaim that personality plays a central role in ethos and, also, has a feedback loop relationship with it; namely, your character influences your
ethos, and ethos is the practice of forming a good character. Rory Stewart talks about how intervention is an art, not a science, and that planning a good intervention is like planning a mountain rescue mission (2011). This being the case, the factors to consider are thus: one needs detailed knowledge of the terrain (context), preparation to a degree (but awareness that there is a lot you cannot prepare for), and most importantly, one should take the advice of the English Mountain Rescue and “Be prepared to turn back if conditions turn against you” (2011). Stewart says the kinds of people we look should look for are “intelligent risk takers”, leading us back to the centrality of character and personal virtues (2011). If one was planning a dangerous mountain ascent, the technical skills of the members of the team would be very important of course, but you would also want people who were likely to be reliable, good in a crisis, able to swallow their pride and admit defeat and any number of other personality traits relevant to the group in question.

Chapter conclusion:

Hale makes the witty point that “no one in Chimaltenango – at least no one whom I have met – walks around with Homi Bhabha’s latest essay under her or his arm” (1999: 302), but goes on to say that people in this area do pick up international cultural theories and subvert them for their own purposes. In a similar way, Hau’Ofa writes about how Pacific Islanders go about their lives successfully, flying in the face of the meta-narratives drawn-up by academics and policy-analysts who consign the Pacific to a future of hopelessness (1993).

Being hybrid-sensitive in a world where our identities are so rigidly drawn-up, studied and reinforced is an extremely difficult task to take on – it is the question of how to build reciprocal relationships of learning and compassion against a historical backdrop (and current reality) of oppression, abuse and large gaps in wealth and global influence. It means letting go of some meta-narratives which might feel so obvious they seem like ‘common sense’ and opening our minds to radically different world views, while still valuing particularism, including our own, and not aiming to ‘melt’ our identities in the proverbial pot.

In a practical sense, this means being creative and context-driven, but not
necessarily throwing away everything associated with liberal peace building; there will be elements of this model and way of thinking which are helpful and even crucial to building peace in various contexts, it should simply not be assumed a priori that this will be the case (Richmond 2009: 567). Hybrid-sensitive peace building means assessing each context individually and making difficult specific judgments on what is applicable based on an often spontaneous and intuitive dialogue; Richmond argues that the ethics of peace reside in “unscripted conversations” (2009: 574).

If we cannot find our ‘rules’ and limitations within a traditional ‘liberal’ human rights model, what other alternatives exist? McSwain writes that one of the questions often posed, in society in general, but also in response to shirking traditional ethics, is “where do we look for moral guidance?” (1987: 40). Her answer to this is that relationships themselves provide structures and checks, and furthermore that “Human feeling and intuition do have rational and regulative aspects and they too, through relationships, can protect us against the fact that men indeed are not angels” (McSwain 1987: 54). Through human relationships the negative aspects of our natures are illuminated, punished (socially, if not in other ways) and kept in check. Similarly, Yack argues that, contrary to common belief, Aristotle was not blind to the potential for conflict in his ‘polis’ (political community), and actually considered argument to not only be a natural part of such communities, but a fundamental part: “The existence of these conflicts bespeaks the presence, not the absence, of political community” (1985: 92).

This links back to one of my central arguments in the first chapter, namely: that intervention is a question of policy, as opposed to law (Harcourt in: Abiew 1999, p.p. 38-39). In much the same way that deciding when a nation state should intervene in another cannot be based purely on a set of criteria, so too the ‘ethics of peace’ (and peace building) need to be re-imagined in every particular case. This is a nerve-wracking ‘method’, as people cannot rely on formulas or ‘accepted wisdom’, but it is tied to the way morals (and thus peace or well-functioning societies) are constructed to begin with; Richmond quotes Bauman as writing: “the moral is what resists codification, formalisation, socialisation, and universalisation” (2009: 574). Despite modernist thinkers best intentions
and efforts, we have yet to arrive at an objective, rational set of universal morals and thus idea of how an ideal, harmonious society should look, so whenever the fabric of a society is torn apart by violent conflict the crucial question of *how to live* is thrown into the centre-stage - and the only reasonable way to approach such a wildly subjective and culturally-driven query is with extended and open dialogue, and many imaginative, experimental minds.
Chapter 4 - Case study: Bougainville

Basic facts and historical background:

Bougainville is a region of Papua New Guinea (PNG) with a population of 175,160 (2000 census); less than 4% of the population of PNG (Regan 1999: 2). Although it politically belongs to PNG, it is geographically and ecologically part of the Solomon Islands chain and was previously known as North Solomons. The region is comprised of Bougainville Island, the island of Buka and various outlying islands. The first settlement occurred approximately 28,000 years ago and the first European contact with Bougainville was with the French in 1768 – from which time Bougainville has changed hands from being controlled by France, to Germany in 1899, to Australia during World War I, briefly belonging to Japan during World War II and back to Australia in 1946. PNG gained independence from Australia in 1975 and Bougainville became a region of PNG, before finally acceding to ‘autonomous region’ status and having their first regional elections in 2005.

Anthony Regan posits “pre-colonial social structures in Bougainville were based on small, localized landholding clan lineages that could link in various ways and for various purposes, but normally on a temporary basis” (2007: 91). This means that prior to colonial administration, the entity of ‘Bougainville’ as a whole, and certainly as a part of a larger nation state, was not the space most people would occupy in their minds – they lived in and associated themselves with their local community. An island which is already so internally diverse then being included as part of the Papua New Guinea nation state, with whom Bougainvilleans had very little to do with, is an example of the often arbitrary nature of colonial nation building; “Colonial borders often included groups with emerging identities, and the problems of fostering national cohesion within borders encompassing such diversity has sometimes been especially intense” (Ghai & Regan 2006: 589). This has not just been the case in Bougainville, but in Papua New Guinea as a whole – where disparate groups have often had little contact or relationship with each other and certainly with the centralized
government machinery, and relied instead on their small, local communities and pre-colonial social structures (Ghai & Regan 2006). Given historically exploitative treatment by various colonial administrators and the unreliability and corruption of the modern government body, it is perhaps unsurprising that people feel more connected to their local societies and consequently more beholden to them. In saying this, peoples’ relationship to the state varied depending on circumstances; proximity to the ‘centre’ of the colonial administration provided various benefits. Because of this, communities who live geographically closer to the hubs of power have a different relationship with the colonizer/ modern state; for example, groups in Buka had greater access to education, employment and other opportunities and this kind of ‘access’ to colonial goods was seen as a key divider between groups (Ghai & Regan 2006).

There are nineteen main language groups in Bougainville and no one group has ever been large enough to dominate the others; Regan describes these communities as “‘fragile’, grouping and re-grouping as leadership changes or conflict occurs” (1999: 3), but one could also see these groups as flexible/ fluid and thus creating a changing community which is remarkably resilient to shocks. Furthermore, there was historically “little evidence of the extreme ‘demonizing’ of opponents’ as there often is in ethnic conflicts” (Regan 1999: 21) and “well-established mechanisms for resolving conflict” (Regan 1999: 21). This reminds us that while there was conflict in Bougainville during pre-colonial times, people also lived largely in peace and had ways of dealing with conflict when it arose; conflict resolution is not a process special to western cultures and locally-based methods have historical/ contextual relevance and may be seen as more legitimate by citizens and be more successful. In saying this, it is important not to fall into the trap of simply equating the local with ‘the good’, as local methods may also have problematic aspects (reinforcing existing and damaging hierarchies within those communities for example) and may also not have a precedent for dealing with the type and scope of crimes committed; i.e. a local conflict resolution method which was appropriate and effective when someone’s life stock was stolen can not be applied to cases of violent civil conflict without some forethought and probably reinvention.
Anthony Regan introduces the theme of ethnicity in Bougainville by reminding us: “Ethnic identities everywhere are constructed mainly through processes of interaction between groups. They are not inherent qualities of groups of communities (1999: 5). In the context of Bougainville this means thinking of ethnic identity as something formed within interactions between the various local groups and later by the interactions with the outside world – in the form of colonial forces and the modern ‘international community.’ Islands seem to represent “quintessential platforms for nation state” (Baldacchino in: Ghai & Regan 2006: 590), because of being finite geographical regions surrounded by a natural ‘border’ (the sea). However, during the pre-colonial period, it was likely that there was very little ‘Bougainvillean’ identity overall and that people mostly knew of their own community and those nearby; for instance, even inter-group conflict mainly occurred between groups within the same language group (Regan 1999: 5). Furthermore, communities were often defined in terms of what ecological space they lived in – people from the coast were seen as more open and flexible than the hardy people from the mountains. The dramatic ecological differences between regions within Bougainville is perhaps one reason that people did not generally identify as part of the whole island until colonizers/other outsiders shifted the lens. Also, and perhaps surprisingly, most islands do not seek nation state status (Ghai & Regan 2006: 590), so the ‘identity’ of Bougainvillean and subsequent secessionist movement is an anomaly.

Once colonial administration made Bougainvillean aware of their place in larger Papua New Guinea and Melanesia, the idea of the ‘Bougainvillean’ began to take hold. Colonialists helped propagate the narrative of Bougainvillean being ‘superior’ to other Papua New Guineans; they “were regarded as a superior type of labor, well equipped for supervisory roles” and were often employed as colonial police and plantation supervisors in other areas of Papua New Guinea (Regan 1999: 7). Some people see this as sowing the seeds for a secessionist movement, but as I will go into later, others believe that the ‘ethnic’ aspect of the conflict only became central as a reaction to the brutality of the Papua New Guinean forces (Regan 1999). In terms of local rivalry between ethnic groups, no linguistic group is strong enough to entirely dominate the others; after the elections in 1965 Eugene Ogan noted that general reputation was more
important to voters than whether the person running was from their ‘ethnicity’ (1965: 465). This is in stark contrast to some other areas in Melanesia where ethnicity can play a much more central role – the ‘wantokism’ (allegiance to people who speak the same language as you/ come from the same community) of the Papua New Guineans coming to Bougainville for mining jobs was seen as a cause of resentment, for example, and in the Solomon Islands elections are seen to be heavily influenced by wantok loyalty.

Most groups in Bougainville were matrilineal, however Regan emphasizes the point that “matriliny is not the same as matriarchy” and that “in general, women did not exercise public power” (1999: 3). Nonetheless, women in Bougainville are certainly seen as having more power than most in the region, at least in terms of control of land and perhaps in some other respects too; Eugene Ogan writes “the lack of gender hierarchy made older women, once they got used to me, some of my best sources of information” (Ogan 2004: 122). Ruth Saovana-Spriggs writes about women's role in the peace process and reminds us of the crucial role women played in traditional societies; their power was mostly ‘in the land’, as male relatives had rights of ownership, but only with females ‘tok orait’ (permission) and women have the right of veto (2003: 204). However, one way these traditional sources of power for women have been eroded by colonialism was through the introduction of the plantation economy, introduced in 1905 by the German administration; it led to “the undermining of the previously preeminent economic roles of women (through men taking control of the new forms of wealth emerging from the cash economy), and also of the authority of traditional leaders” (Regan 2007: 93). Eugene Ogan argues that more than in other parts of New Guinea, commercial interests dominated the colonial situation in Bougainville – he adds that, at the time of writing, plantations that had been established under German administration were still being run by descendants of the original owners (2004: 123). This means the traditions surrounding land ownership and control, where women found most of their power, were completely changed and replaced by new rules, governed by market forces and external plantation owners.

Tied into this issue is the changing value of land/ traditional currency, both crucial aspects of traditional restorative justice. While land and traditional
currency were historically the main forms of compensation in disputes, this system is untenable in modern Bougainville due to the scarcity and price of land and the fact that traditional currency has been replaced by modern currency in terms of usefulness and value in many young peoples’ minds (Saovana-Spriggs 2003). Ruth Saovana-Spriggs writes about how this touches at the core problem of restorative justice which honours tradition but functions in modern Bougainville; “The dilemma requires creative thinking and wisdom in the search for alternative options that would continue to maintain fundamental principles while adjusting and responding to new needs and circumstances” (2003: 200). Thus, how to arrive at a hybrid-sensitive approach to conflict resolution in a region like Bougainville – one which was locally-based and relevant, but took changing circumstances and priorities into consideration.

*Historical roots of the conflict:*

The civil conflict in Bougainville is very controversial in terms of the roots of the conflict and what should be considered the main ‘cause’ of the uprising. Anthony Regan explores this debate by positing two main arguments – the classic ‘Greed’ versus ‘Grievance’ debate where one side argue that the conflict was caused by the mine/relative deprivation caused by the mine and the other argue the conflict was caused by ongoing issues with post-colonialism and the long-standing desire of Bougainvilleans to be self-determining (and not controlled by PNG) (2007). The economist Paul Collier argues that civil conflicts are usually caused by greed or grievance, the terms respectively referring to either violent conflict in the hopes of financial gain (such as control over valuable resources) or in an attempt to gain ‘justice’ or revenge (often connected to a perceived injustice against a certain religious, ethnic or political group) (Collier & Hoeffler 2004). He argues that while popular opinion seems to assume grievance is the main motivator behind violent conflict, in actuality ‘greed’ (or: financial feasibility) plays a much bigger role, and, indeed, some of the determinants of grievance have a neutral or even negative affect on the likelihood of violent conflict (Collier & Hoeffler 2004).
Regan correctly argues that in the case of Bougainville neither explanation works alone (2007), while seen through the eyes of Collier one could argue that while the potential for ‘grievance’ related violence had been present in Bougainville for a long time, it was only the economic feasibility and potential gain which finally motivated the rebels into violent rebellion. However, I would also add that ‘relative deprivation’ in light of the mine is a good example of the overlap between notions of greed and grievance; inequality and alienation from land could be framed as grievance, but the way the combatants might want to remedy this grievance could fall under the ‘greed’ heading. I explore this issue in more detail below.

**Panguna mine:**

Panguna mine began operating through Bougainville Copper Limited in 1972 amid protests from various quarters (Regan 2007: 94). Initially many of the Bougainvillians were against the mine being built at all, especially landowners who had to relocate their villages, but once they realized the mine would go ahead with or without their consent the main issue of contention became the low rates of compensation (Regan 2007: 95). By 1987, 60% of the revenues from the mine had gone to the national PNG government, 35% to foreign shareholders, 5% to the provincial government of Bougainville and 0.2% to local landowners – add this to the compensation/ rents and landowners received a grand total of about 1.4% of the income generated by the mine (Regan 2007: 95). It is ironic that when national governments or global corporations behave in this manner it is ‘business as usual’, but when local landowners demand more than their 1.4% they are called ‘greedy’ – this is where I see the boundary between Collier and Hoeffler’s notions of ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ (2004) getting very blurry, as the inequality, relative deprivation and alienation from land the mine created, with very little compensation for locals, could just as easily be framed as an issue of justice and grievance.

**Secessionist demands:**
While some argue the mine was the central cause of the conflict, others argue that the Bougainville conflict dates back to before the 1970s, but intensified during this period due to the mine and during mid-1970s during PNG’s transition to independence when Bougainville only reluctantly agreed to become a region in this larger state (Hegarty 2003). Eugene Ogan refers “the colonial triad” of administration, mission and commercial interests in his personal essay on his experiences in Bougainville (2004: 123) and David Hegarty refers to the “colonial Australian administration” running the mining operations (2003: 3). Indeed, looking at the ideologies of various rebel leaders and groups, opposing colonial rule/ the central state of PNG often went hand-in-hand with opposing the mine and was increasingly seen as the larger issue from which the problems with the mine, and the exported profit, flowed. For example, Damien Dameng built his Me’ekamui Pontoko Onoring movement from around 1959 up to around 10,000 supporters around “an ideology based on restoring traditional customary ways and authority, and opposing the mission, the colonial administration, and (from the mid-1960s) the Panguna mine” (Regan 2007: 99). While Dameng’s movement began from an anti-colonial stance and moved to include anti-mine discourses, Francis Ona was originally the leader of young landowners and mine employees whose supporters “persuaded him to expand his agenda to make Bougainville’s secession his primary goal” in 1989 (Regan 2007: 100). At any rate, secessionist demands became increasingly interwoven with anti-mine rhetoric and the mine – and the unequal distribution of the wealth from it - came to be a symbol of the larger issue of self-determination.

The conflict years:

By late 1988 unrest had escalated to a point where landowners around Panguna conducted violent actions against the mine and resisted efforts by the PNG police force to stop them (Hegarty 2003). Partly due to excessive use of force by the PNG police and defence force (Regan 1999), support for landowners grew and the conflict took on an “ethnic and separatist character” (Regan in: Hegarty 2003: 4). Amid the chaos, the Panguna mine closed in May 1989 and was never re-opened. Security forces pulled out of Bougainville and from March 1990 anarchy
developed, during which many non-Bougainvilleans were driven out of the province in “what was in some ways a form of ethnic cleansing” (Regan 2007: 101).

In March 1990 Francis Ona made Bougainville’s second unilateral declaration of independence, but as in 1975 the move did not gain international recognition. Marilyn Taleo Havini recounts that by this stage the PNG government had realized that most people just wanted to resume a normal life, so came onto the idea of a blockade which would make this impossible; a withdrawal of security forces and a closure of every kind of commercial and civil government service (Sirivi and Havini, eds. 2004: 3). From late 1990 to the mid-1990s this blockade was enforced by PNG forces, resulting in hardship and lack of access to medical supplies and health services (Regan 2007: 101). The main issue which caused death was lack of access to medical supplies or care in the event of medical emergencies, and some people who had medical emergencies were so desperate they made the dangerous journey to the Solomon Islands where they became refugees (Sirivi and Havini, eds. 2004: 4).

Several writers have written on the period of the blockade, and what is interesting is that not all recollections of that period are negative – because of lack of imported groceries, for example, people had to return to subsistence farming and actually experienced an increase in general health; “there is some evidence that deaths from untreated illness or injury may well have been offset to a significant degree – or even outweighed – by the improved general health of the population in areas under blockade” (Regan 1999: 17). It is important to note that these times of great suffering were also times of innovation and a resurgence/ transformation of tradition. Josephine Tankunani recalls local ingenuity during the blockade period, such as building homes from natural materials and finding ways of hiding the evidence of shelters, and notes: “traditional gardening knowledge was rediscovered by people who had abandoned several practices because of town living and access to supermarkets ... The barter system came back into existence because there was no money in circulation” (Sirivi and Havini, eds. 2004: 38).
**Results of the conflict:**

In the ten years that followed the declaration of independence by the BRA in 1990 anywhere from 8000 (Wilson-Roberts 2001:27) to an estimated 12,000 to 20,000 people died (Regan 1999:18); “at no time has any effort been made to detail the methodology upon which estimates of the numbers of death were made” (Regan 1999: 18). Remembering that Bougainville has a small population, this means that approximately 5% of the population was killed from either violence or disease, while a further 50,000 people were displaced (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 27).

Aside from the human cost, the conflict resulted in severely damaged infrastructure, loss of all revenue from the mine, economic collapse and the destruction of “what had been the most effective government of any kind in the Pacific Islands region” (Hegarty 2003: 4). Anthony Regan has a more unorthodox view of the results of the conflict, where he argues “it is seldom that any complex development – even conflict – has entirely negative consequences” (1999: 14). While he lists the many traumatizing and debilitating impacts of the war, he also notes that there were some ‘complex’ impacts with potentially positive offshoots, for example the destruction of various economic activity (often outside controlled, like Panguna mine), which could be seen to have led to a re-emergence of ‘Melanesian communalism’, redistribution of wealth and political power and increased self-reliance (Regan 1999: 15). Finally, Regan argues that there has been a strengthening of traditional culture and the status of women leaders in the community (1999: 16).

**The peace process:**

New Zealand was chosen to be the key third party for a number of reasons, one of the major ones being the perceived neutrality of New Zealand when compared to Australia, who were seen as being in cahoots with Indonesia (Wilson-Roberts 2001) and also as having a negative colonial history in the region; following an election in 1965, Eugene Ogan writes that "voting for any Australian would have been in conflict with their oft-expressed, deep-seated antagonism" (1965: 404).
New Zealand took on a ‘light’ coordinating role: “it would provide the venue but not attempt to facilitate an agreement. That would be left to the factions themselves. Despite policy positions that suggested a bias, New Zealand’s neutrality was once again accepted (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 30).

In 1994 the PNG state was attempting to rush a peace process through to end the civil conflict in Bougainville, Joseph Kabui wrote later that he felt “we would be more comfortable joining a peace process that is a genuine, considered and collective contribution that can come about in the right mood and through the right approach” (2001: 34). Kabui adds that the Cairns Communiqué (the result of the meeting) “didn’t last five minutes” (2001: 35) as the agreement was between top UN, Commonwealth and PNG officials and had no bearing on the situation on the ground, between local people.

Ruth Saovana-Spriggs has a different interpretation of the meeting in 1994, claiming: “various journalists reported the meeting as a failure due to the lack of attendance of BRA’s leadership. Despite this perception, however the women initiated a phase of unity – the coming together of all Bougainville people” (2003: 208). Saovana-Spriggs argues that the women present at the meeting were the crucial agents of peace as they drew on their roles in the personal lives of the men involved in conflict to remind them of the costs of the war (2003). They also pleaded with the BRA leadership to come down from the mountains and when this failed they offered to go up into the mountains themselves and speak to them in person; “In retrospect, the women’s plea and demands may have appeared unsuccessful. I think otherwise. The women’s plea registered with the men and haunted them as the years went by. These initial efforts established the momentum for peace that eventually led to the 1998 Lincoln Agreement” (Saovana-Spriggs 2003: 209).

1997 Burnham talks and the Lincoln Agreement:

In July 1997 the first Burnham talks were held at the military camp near Christchurch. The aim was to hold these talks in a ‘Melanesian way’, meaning that there were a large number of participants and no fixed timetable (Wilson-
Supporters of Francis Ona remained outside the process, as they believed his statement in May 1990 had already achieved independence; the Me’ekamui group continue to remain outside the process, despite Ona’s death in 2005 (Regan 2007: 103). The role of New Zealand was to be a neutral party and to provide the venue; central issues relating to the conflict were put aside during the peace talks (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 31). Rather than seeking to address the longer-term problems underlying the conflict, before the peace talks “a declaration was issued, seeking ‘unity and reconciliation’” (Wilson-Roberts 2001:30). This helped to steer the talks towards dealing with the immediate issue of living together in peace, to actually create the space and possibility for dialogue on the larger issues later down the line; “Until June 1999, the primary focus was on building a process within which parties could feel secure. Negotiations on divisive political issues then began, and continued for over two years, concluding with the signing of a peace agreement in August 2001” (Regan 2007: 102).

“Security was a concern and it was a bold move by New Zealand to hold talks so far from the scene” (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 30); this point is also crucial because it refers to the trust that New Zealand, as a third party, had put into the peace talk participants from Bougainville. Joseph Kabui writes about an incident which ensured him of New Zealand’s commitment to Bougainville; he writes that a helicopter full of New Zealand personnel was shot at right before the peace process was to begin, but that the New Zealand officials downplayed the event and did not cancel the peace talks because of it, as he had feared they would – “I said, ‘Thank God.’ ... I knew that New Zealand was definitely committed to the whole peace process, and I knew right then that New Zealand’s commitment was right from the heart. New Zealand could have said, ‘Stuff Bougainville; we’re not going to risk getting New Zealand citizens killed if Bougainvilleans cannot get their act together and are not ready for peace” (Kabui 2001: 39). This story illustrates the roles of both risk and trust in effective third-party led peace building – the New Zealanders had to be open to a certain level of risk in engaging with the parties of the conflict, and that level of risk – especially to transport these participants onto New Zealand soil – was only made bearable through a high level of trust that people would work for peace.
Women from Bougainville were actively involved in the Burnham peace talks and the creation of the Lincoln Agreement; a small group of women attended each meeting at Burnham and a larger group of about fifty women attended the Lincoln meeting (Saovana-Spriggs 2003: 210). In a press statement after these meetings, the group of women from Bougainville stated that “to survive, we looked within our culture, our traditional society and ourselves” (Saovana-Spriggs 2003: 210). Including women in the peace talks, who were not ‘active’ participants in the conflict, but rather civilians and peace makers, could be seen as one of the key reasons for the success of these talks; it meant the participants who had been involved in the conflict had to discuss the costs of the conflict with ‘normal’ civilians, rather than only with adversaries and third-parties. Furthermore, the inclusion of women was seen by the women as a re-invigoration of women’s role in traditional Bougainville society; a role that had been weakened by colonial forces (Saovana-Spriggs 2003). In the same press statement referred to earlier, the women wrote that as a result of the peace talks “our menfolk have rediscovered the value of women sharing in the decision making process and we attest here today to the liberating effect this has had upon our fellow women delegates” (Saovana-Spriggs 2003: 211).

Results and continuation of the peace process:

The result of the Burnham peace talks was that the various groups came together and committed themselves to peace and reconciliation and agreed to the emplacement of a regional truce monitoring team (TMG) led by New Zealand (Hegarty 2003); it consisted of 250-300 unarmed military and civilian personnel from Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Islands.

By late 1998 there were three main factions in Bougainville regarding the peace process and what result they wanted to see. The first was led by Joseph Kabui and advocated for secession, the second was led by John Momis and advocated for stronger autonomy within Papua New Guinea and the third was led by the rebel leader Francis Ona – this group had not been part of the peace process and refused to join, as they believed independence had already been achieved in 1990 when Francis Ona declared it (Ghai & Regan 2006: 597). The
third group had limited support and most Bougainvilleans supported the first and second factions.

Negotiations with the central Papua New Guinean government regarding the status of Bougainville began in June 1999 and during these negotiations Bougainville had an advantage; the rebels still had their weapons and thus ability to cause harm, the fighting had ended with the secessionists being the stronger side and the cost of nine years of conflict had been very high for the Papua New Guinean government, along with international pressure to stop the atrocities (Ghai & Regan 2006: 597-598). Under these conditions, in the 2001 agreement Bougainville was able to negotiate for regional autonomy and a guaranteed referendum to determine whether or not to become a fully independent state; “Both referendum and autonomy would be constitutionally guaranteed, provided arms held by the Bougainville factions were disposed of” (Ghai & Regan 2006: 598). This is another example of the importance of the role of a third-party or the awareness of the international community – putting down arms and trusting the Papua New Guinean government to honour their promise of a referendum would be a large gamble on the part of the Bougainvilleans, if they did not have the added reassurance of an aware and politically powerful ally in New Zealand.

The first elections for an autonomous Bougainville were held in 2005; Ghai and Regan quip that: “with the 2001 agreement Bougainville gains the prize that eluded it in 1976 [autonomy]. Will it turn out to be a pyrrhic victory?” (2006: 600) They argue that the ‘asymmetrical relations’ of de-centralised governance might prove to “further loosen the structures of the state, making it harder for the centre … to manage centre-provincial relations” (Yash & Regan 2006: 601). This brings up a key anxiety surrounding the notions of the devolution/ decentralization of power, namely that less control means less ability to predict – and greater uncertainty.

As mentioned previously, under ‘Results of the Conflict’, Anthony Regan puts forward some ‘complex’ impacts of the years of conflict on society in Bougainville, particularly relating to increased self-reliance (with the blockade) and increased status and visibility for women leaders (1999:15-17). While it would be hyperbolic and inappropriate to credit these impacts to the peace process itself, it is important to note that the peace process did not actively
undermine these positive, locally-led processes; women were included in a more than tokenistic way, local leaders were in charge of the peace-making process and traditional conflict resolution means were drawn upon throughout.
Chapter 5 - Case Study 2: The Solomon Islands

Basic facts and historical background:

The Solomon Islands is a Melanesian nation consisting of over 900 islands, with a population of more than 500,000 people who speak an estimated 70 languages. The state consists of ten administrative areas, most of which are defined by island boundaries. The autonomous region of Bougainville is part of the Solomon Islands chain geographically, but is part of Papua New Guinea politically. Aside from that exception, the Solomon islands chain and the political entity of the nation state are the same.

Much like Bougainville and the rest of Melanesia, the Solomon Islands is extremely internally diverse (Fraenkel 2004, Moore 2007). Across the Solomons there are matrilineal, patrilineal and ambilinial descent principles depending on the community (Fraenkel 2004: 20). In terms of justice systems and conflict resolution methods, the Solomons also provides a wide array; “there existed no unitary point of cultural reference from any one region that could be deployed to settle disputes. Custom was inevitably re-moulded, redefined and selectively styled to meet these new and unfamiliar circumstances” (Fraenkel 2004: 11). The process of hybridisation is certainly not new to this region; there was hybridity between wantoks, but also in terms of the historical relationship to the outside world.

The historical relationship between the Solomon Islands and the wider Pacific community (particularly Australia) has been historically fraught and complex. On the one hand, much of what is today called ‘Solomon culture’ has been created in reaction and relationship with colonial powers, and Christianity is now definitively the dominant religion in the region; “much of today’s kastom has been arrived at over the past century ... Christianity, a dominant element in modern Solomon Island society, has altered the relationship between the people, the spirit world, and land” (Moore 2007: 190). However, these facts do not dull the horrors inflicted onto the Solomons by outsiders; most pertinently that of the Pacific slave trade, also called ‘black birding.’ Between 1870 and 1910 about 30,000 Solomon Islanders enlisted for work on overseas plantations; “most of
those recruited (or kidnapped) were young men from the island of Malaita, or from the also remote and resource-poor Weather Coast of Guadalcanal” (Fraenkel 2004: 23).

**Historical roots of the conflict:**

Perhaps even more so than the conflict in Bougainville, the civil conflict in the Solomon Islands is difficult to pin to any particular cause; “causes of the conflict are multiple and interlinked, including the cultural differences between different ethnic populations, and increasing competition for limited resources around the centralised capital” (Moser 2007: 232). Some of the main factors put forward are the ethnic dimension of the conflict, relative deprivation and other economic grievances and the failure of the state in maintaining cohesion and order. Obviously, these factors are not mutually exclusive and can, indeed, be causes for each other (for example, the ethnic conflict was exacerbated by relative deprivation).

**Ethnic conflict:**

From the late 1940s onwards internal migration saw many wage labourers, and often families, moving to the island of Guadalcanal (Moore 2007). Over time, the capital Honiara and its surrounds became dominated by Malaitan islanders, who had moved there under a ‘forced migration’ of sorts (in terms of economic circumstance) (Moore 2007). The growing presence and increasing wealth of the Malaitans was the cause of resentment from Guadalcanal islanders, some of whom saw the Malaitans as ‘immigrants’ and as people who had taken their land.

However, it would be overly simplistic to paint the relations between Guadalcanal islanders and Malaitan islanders as exclusively (or even mostly) hostile; there was also a history of close relationships between the peoples of the two islands (Moore 2007). Furthermore, this conflict had many interlinking causes, of which tension between ethnic groups was only one; “while cultural differences were one aspect of the problem, its causes were much more complex than simple cultural or ethnic tensions” (Moore 2007: 171). Moore argues that
the core issue was in fact control over land, and that the ethnic tension was fuelled by the larger problem, namely: relative deprivation, in relation to income from mining and palm oil plantations (2007: 172).

**Land ownership/ conflict of economic interests:**

Land ownership is an issue of crucial importance all over the South Pacific region; as islands tend to be small and land ownership is often hereditary, access to land ownership is sparse and coveted. To add complexity to this, various traditional understandings of land place it as ‘above’ or outside the notion of ownership; Moore quotes the paramount chief of ‘Are’are district on Malaita as saying “‘Are’are people do not own the land. The land owns ‘Are’are people. The land owns men and women: they are there to take care of the land” (2007: 189).

Land related grievances had some history in Guadalcanal before the violent conflict erupted; land and justice grievances had been stated in Guadalcanal petitions of 1988 and 1998 – the 1988 claim stressed a number of issues and was ignored and the same issues arose again in the 1998 claim which led to the tension (Anderson 2008: 64).

**‘Failed’ state:**

In June 2003 Alexander Downer launched an ASPI paper, written by Elsina Wainwright (2003), which described the Solomon Islands as failed and dangerous to the region at large and, especially, to Australia; “the ASPI report contained five references to possible terrorism and twelve references to a ‘failed state’” (Anderson 2008: 66). Previously Australia had been extremely reluctant to get involved in what was seen as an internal problem for the Solomon Islands, but the new war on terror had re-framed the perceived relevance (or: threat) of the civil conflict next door. Fundamentally, the argument put forward by Wainwright (and reiterated by Alexander Downer) was more comprehensive than simply stating the current tensions, but that it was at failed as a state on a more pervasive level; “The ASPI argument is not that the Solomon Islands state failed as a result of the 5 June 2000 coup or due to the policies pursued under the
post-coup governments. It is that the imported, super-imposed and colonial-bequeathed state had been ‘failing’ ever since independence” (Fraenkel 2004: 9). Essentially, the state in the Solomon Islands was not functioning as a western, bureaucratic state - “A shadow state has emerged in the Sis – a patronage system centred on the ruling cabal’s control over resources” (Moore 2007: 169). This connects with notions of hybrid-states, particularly in the Pacific region; states which contain elements of local and traditional custom and elements of the Westminster type nation state (Clements et al 2007).

The ‘failed state’ narrative which propelled Australia into action has received copious criticism (Clements et al 2007, Hameiri 2007, Kabutaulaka 2005), not least of which was the fact the ASPI report, and subsequent commentary, framed the hybrid nature of the Solomon Islands state as a weakness and a threat, rather than as a strength; “This advice was influential, but misleading ... Melanesian states have never been strong. Most Melanesian countries, including the Solomon Islands, have strong communities but weak states, and are still in the process of nation building and state building” (Anderson 2008: 66, emphasis mine). Clements et al provide a critique of “failed, weak, fragile state” literature in general and argue instead that most states, especially in the Pacific region, are hybrid political orders where most people identify more with their immediate community than as citizens of their state (2007: 47). Not recognizing this as a strength and source of resilience was perhaps the first misstep by the Australian peacemakers.

*The conflict years:*

In 1998 the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA)\(^6\) began terrorizing Malaitan communities living on Guadalcanal; shops were ransacked, migrant workers were chased away and there were several attacks and murders (Anderson 2008). During 1998 and 1999 there were forced evictions of mostly Malaitan islanders, with over 35,000 people internally displaced by November 1999 (Anderson 2008: 64).

\(^6\) Later the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM)
In retaliation Malaitans formed the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) by late 1999 (Anderson 2008: 64-65), which included high numbers of Solomon Island police officers and had access to their weapons. In June 2000 the MEF kidnapped Prime Minister Ulufa’alu and forced him to resign (Anderson 2008: 65). The MEF declared war on the GRA/ IFM and revenge killings increased the death toll to over 100 people by the end of the year 2000 (Anderson 2008: 65).

What Clive Moore has called the “second phase” of the conflict began after the Townsville peace agreement of October 2000 and the handing in of many weapons (2007: 174). The two-sided war between IFM and MEF then abated, but was replaced by violent anarchy and the formation of gangs, who used what weapons were left to terrorize “the government, bureaucracy, public, and even their own families and wantoks” (Moore 2007: 174).

Results of the conflict:

During the violent conflict there were 150-200 estimated deaths, 450 gun-related injuries and more than 35,000 people internally displaced (Moser 2007: 232). While these numbers are certainly horrifying, Clive Moore stresses that it is wrong to compare the civil conflict in the Solomons to those in Africa, as Benjamin Reilly does with his ‘Africanisation of the Pacific’ argument (2000), because “the total death roll from the undeniably violent occurrences, mainly on Guadalcanal, was probably no more than 150” (2007: 169).

In terms of post-conflict reparations, after the June 2000 coup the Sogavare government emphasized it’s commitment to Melanesian values and to ‘justice before peace’ in terms of dealing with the violence of the tensions, however, in practice, most of the compensation wound up with the militia leaders and politicians, rather than the civilians who had been displaced or otherwise affected by the war (Fraenkel 2004: 11). In terms of justice for the families and communities of victims of homicide, Solomon Islanders wanted national redress, as they considered the crimes to be communal or inter-island (Fraenkel 2004: 45) – i.e. not just between individuals and thus not sufficiently dealt with by a western style court.
These two examples highlight the kinds of ethical problems a hybrid-sensitive approach would attempt to resolve; in the first case, the issue is how compensation can be arranged with reference to and relevance for *kastom* but not favour the most powerful people within that community, namely the people with access to the means of violence. In the second case the issue is how to address serious, grievous crimes in a communal fashion, rather than the individualistic systems in place in a western courtroom. These examples cut to the core of the ‘twin dangers’ of either overly romanticising the local approach (and perhaps aiding harmful types of nepotism) or applying inappropriate western methods (the anonymous, individualistic court) to a local trauma (Clements et al 2007).

*The peace process:*

Initial Ceasefire Agreement talks were held in August 2000, followed by the Townsville Peace Agreement in October 2000. Only the two fighting groups were present at the Ceasefire Agreement talks in August 2000 and civil society continued to be excluded at the October 2000 Townsville Peace Agreement (Dinnen 2002, pp. 289-291). These two militant groups, from the islands of Malaita and Guadalcanal respectively, were formed from ethnically diverse islands “to dominate Solomon Islands national politics, as if they were the only two ethnic groups in the country” (Fry 2000, p. 303) and Australian peace makers played into this new, conflict-driven narrative by only engaging with them and treating them as representations of those diverse islands. These early peace talks are generally seen as a failure, with Anderson noting that they “led to agreements that were not respected or enforced” (2008: 65).

In January 2003 the foreign minister of Australia, Alexander Downer, famously stated that sending Australian troops to the Solomon Islands would be “folly in the extreme ... for how many years would such an occupation have to continue? And what would be the exit strategy?” (Anderson 2008: 65). When the Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, Sir Allan Kemakeza, asked Australia to intervene in he was initially rebuffed, but the narrative changed when ASPI launched the report describing the Solomons as a ‘failed state’ (detailed above).
This re-positioned the internal Solomon Islands ‘tension’ as a threat to regional security, because it could provide a haven for terrorists or other dangerous groups (Wainwright 2003). Once Alexander Downer did concede there would be an Australian led intervention, he foreshadowed that it would be a “co-operative intervention” (Anderson 2008: 76); a term which would gain much usage and criticism in the coming years.

**RAMSI:**

In response to a plea from Prime Minister Kemakeza, Australia and NZ funded a Pacific-wide response to the conflict in the Solomon Islands; it is called the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, or RAMSI. The RAMSI forces arrived in Honiara on the 24th of July 2003 “to no resistance and general welcome, and began a process of retrieving weapons and making arrests” (Anderson 2008: 67). RAMSI made 3000 arrests within the first few months and confiscated almost 4000 firearms (RAMSI 2010: 5).

There were more than 2000 people involved in RAMSI: “the majority from Australia, but with token representation from other Pacific island Forum countries. They arrived with little more than a blueprint on how to handle the situation” (Moore 2007: 175). While the RAMSI website emphasizes the Pacific-wide nature of the mission (RAMSI 2010), in reality Australians were very statistically dominant; “between 2004 and 2007 the Australian Federal Police contingent made up 69% to 76% of total numbers” (Anderson 2008: 67).

The RAMSI mandate was “broad and vague” (Anderson 2008: 68) and lead to some local disappointment in terms of what was not achieved (Anderson 2008: 67). Clive Moore argues that many Solomon Islanders wanted a more radical departure from their current political arrangement than RAMSI was intended to deliver; “Many Solomon Islanders feel uneasy about the Westminster system that they inherited from the British, and by what they see as the imposition of first-world values on their Pacific state” (2007: 178). These, perhaps unrealistic, expectations combined with ignorance on the part of the third party (in terms of what the locals were expecting) were a cause for disappointment. The Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT), “probably the
largest and best established domestic NGO in the Solomons” (2008: 69) carried out several surveys and found that while people saw RAMSI as succeeding in security terms, it was not as useful in welfare terms (2008: 69). Anderson goes on to say that the ‘welfare’ component was “arguably outside the mandate”, but with such an unclear mandate it is not surprising that some locals believed that it was (2008: 69). Despite any of this, it is important to note that overall RAMSI has enjoyed broad support and has had some important positive effects (Anderson 2008), like the ending of the violent anarchy terrorizing the people.

Results and continuation of the peace process:

In 2006 RAMSI, and the Australian-led peace process, faced perhaps it's biggest hurdle with violent election riots in Chinatown, including arson and attacks on RAMSI vehicles (Anderson 2008: 70). RAMSI faced a lot of criticism for failing to foresee or halt the riots and there was a subsequent breakdown in diplomatic relations between Australia and the Solomon Islands, culminating in a visa ban on Solomon Island ministers wanting to visit Australia and Sogavare's reaction of threatening to withdraw support for RAMSI unless the ban was dropped (Anderson 2008: 71). Later that year at a PIF meeting Sogavare pushed for greater PIF control over the intervention, and less Australian (Anderson 2008: 71).

In terms of political change, in 2004 there was a draft constitution that would turn the Solomon Islands into a federal republic – thus decentralising government and aiming to reach greater numbers of the population in a more meaningful way (Moore 2007). This move had been done partially in response to increasing claims for autonomy from several provinces after the coup in June 2000 (Moore 2007). Clive Moore also makes the crucial point that the Solomon Islands proved to be remarkably resilient in the face of violent conflict, in no small part due to the decentralized nature of the state and the self-reliance of communities; “there was no famine or large-scale human catastrophe when central and provincial governments broke down. The delivery of health, education, and communication services was affected, but as many of these
services have always been maintained by Christian denominations, the effect was never as severe as often depicted” (2007: 184).

In 2008 the Pacific Island Forum commissioned a social impact assessment of the peace process, including the RAMSI presence in the Solomon Islands, and interviewed over 100 people. The surveys found that RAMSI “has undoubtedly created a conducive climate within which to restore basic services”, noted high expectations of RAMSI, but added that few people knew “what RAMSI’s long-term plans are” (Anderson 2008: 69-70). In terms of social change, there was a small, but noticeable general improvement and progress in terms of gender equality in the Solomon Islands, perhaps due to shifting roles in emergencies like war; “members of one community commented that a positive impact of peace had been ‘gender equality gained through women’s involvement in reconciliation’” (Moser 2007: 235). It is important not to paint an overly rosy picture of this reality, as domestic abuse was also reported as a result of the conflict (Moser 2007) and many cultural barriers remain in place in terms of women seeking political power (Whittington 2008).

One of the related impacts of the intervention has been what Anderson terms “aid trauma”; “the harmful side-effects of a long term, conspicuously wealthy foreign occupation” (2004: 62). The ‘aid caravan’ arrived in the Solomon Islands in 2003, along with the intervention, and had numerous negative impacts, along with the more obvious – and intended - positive outcomes, namely “an inflationary ‘enclave bubble economy’, failures in human and institutional capacity building and relative deprivation” (Anderson 2008: 74). This is particularly important to note, as relative deprivation is cited as one of the main causes of the conflict to begin with. The inequality of wealth between foreign aid workers and locals is one cause for resentment, but even within the Solomon Islands there are vast differences in terms of the reach of RAMSI and the ‘aid caravan’; “for the 84% of people living in villages, RAMSI had made little difference, as the aid was mainly a ‘bubble’ in the capital city” (Anderson 2008: 74). This is what Robert Chambers refers to as the ‘road bias’ – i.e. the ‘aid
caravan’ only reaches the most accessible, and therefore the already most developed, regions of a country (1983).

In Australia’s defence, it is important to remember, as we are reminded by an ASPI publication in March 2011, that (largely Australian) donor assistance accounts for expenditures of more than 30% of education, 50% of health and around 90% of the development budget (Allen 2011). Hoadley refers to this as Australia doing the “heavy lifting” in the region and refers to Australia’s take over of the expensive and longer-term burden in Bougainville from New Zealand (2005). While Australia’s generosity should not be forgotten, and the pivotal role that foreign aid plays in the lives of people in the region, it also does not cancel out the need for criticism or analysis of their motivations; aid is, in itself, a political tool and can be used to achieve political goals. Finally, it is crucial to remember that the intervention in the Solomon Islands is carried out with full consent, which is allowed to be withdrawn at any point (Allen 2011), so the ‘role’ as a third party is not entirely without merit in any case – they are also donor, provider of security, they are in it for the long-term, and they operate with the full consent of the ‘host’ government.
Chapter 6: Consequentialist Analysis and Conclusion

‘Criteria’ and application of Hybrid-sensitivity:

I have put the word criteria above in quotation marks, as the whole notion of a ‘tick list’ is contrary to being hybrid-sensitive, and this list of possible ways to be hybrid-sensitive is really nothing more than a loose framework, or themes to illuminate some of the ways to move towards a more context-driven, relationship-based approach.

One key point, before I begin, is that the onus of being hybrid-sensitive rests on the third-party, not the intervened. This is for a number of reasons, not least of which that there is an inherent power imbalance in the case of outside intervention – in cases where the intervened have requested outside help they are clearly already in the vulnerable position of needing assistance, meaning their ‘hybrid-sensitivity’ towards the third-party is not as central as the reverse. Furthermore, one of the main defenses of using a third party at all is that they are not involved in the conflict at hand and not suffering from the same levels of trauma relating to it; therefore, it is much more reasonable to expect them to be able to engage with the issues surrounding the conflict (and the ending of it) without the same historic pain and potentially emotive responses.

Finally, in the case studies I am including, and in many cases in general, nation states that have the power and resources to intervene are historically more influential than the states where the interventions take place. Jenny Petersen emphasizes the need to ensure that by using ‘hybridity’ as a theoretical tool we do not sideline the role of power and oppression (2012), whereas Marwan Kraidy argues that hybridity, properly understood, is not the ignoring of power dynamics, but, rather, a map of them (2002). Acknowledging that these power imbalances do exist, and that ‘sub-altern’ groups usually have to be hybrid-sensitive, whether they want to or not, means that the responsibility to make a conscious effort in that direction lies with the group for whom such an ideological step could be seen as constituting a ‘compromise’ of their hegemonic power.
1. **High levels of mutual trust**

In Bougainville the role of mutual trust came into play with the implementation of the TMG – the TMG members lived unarmed in communities which had been engaged in violent conflicts a few months prior; Phil Goff explains the relationship between the TMG and the locals by writing that “while Bougainvilleans drew a sense of protection from the TMG’s presence, in truth security was a reciprocal affair” (2001: 7). This trust is often connected to a lack of military (often perceived as necessary for ‘security’) and faith in the community to lay down their weapons; RAMSI, in contrast to the unarmed peace monitoring groups in Bougainville, “became an Australian-led, police dominated body with military and bureaucratic backing that included representatives from several Pacific Island Forum members” (Anderson 2008: 67). While trust has to be prudent and informed – one should be an ‘intelligent risk taker’ (Stewart 2011) – seemingly risky overtures of faith can be fundamental turning points in a conflict, as mentioned previously when Kabui was moved by the trust the NZ-led peace makers had put in Bougainville (2001).

More than simply relating to physical security, trust also includes the belief that people know best what will work for them and that they do not need a paternal brand of ‘assistance.’ In the Solomon Islands, RAMSI lost popularity partly by the favouring of international ‘experts’ over well-qualified locals (Moore 2007: 178) – not giving locals those jobs is an example of not providing a respectful level of trust in the capacities, and also does not acknowledge or build self-reliance. Trust is also important on a broader scale for re-building social and business relations to normalcy. The peace process should honour, aid and build trust as a means for re-building a functioning society and as a means of healing; “even during the most direly violent situations, ‘social assets’ – the mutual trust and cooperation between families, kin and neighbours – are a crucial resource for survival and offer opportunities for building peace into the future” (Goodhand & Hulme 1999: 21).
2. **Non-prescriptive approach/ specific to the local context**

There is a need for an even more “fine-grained’ analysis of war” than previously, as conflicts have become more varied and locally specific and warfare itself has been decentralized and lacks the semblance of order it used to have (deWaal in: Goodhand & Hulme 1999: 17). War is no longer carried out in a clearly defined way, so the way we engage with it cannot be either; third parties need to aim to know the minute specifics of every case.

Aside from the commitment to peace and reconciliation and the deployment of the TMG, the Burnham peace talks did not dictate a particular direction for Bougainville to go in; “we have no prescription for Bougainville – that is for the people of Bougainville and Papua New Guinea to determine. Our role, of which the monitoring group has been a key part, is to assist in maintaining an environment conducive to an acceptable outcome for both” (Goff 2001: 8).

Rebecca Adams further emphasizes this point about the Burnham talks and the TMG when she writes that it did not adhere to “existing ‘peace keeping’ templates. It was a product conceived for (and often on) Bougainville, and derived its strength from being able to identify on the ground what Bougainvilleans as well as other Papua New Guineans needed, and equally from a gut feeling about what would work” (Adams 2001: 10). This shows that this peace process was deeply context-driven, open-ended and was not dismissive about the role of intuition (or ‘gut feeling’), as opposed to the way in which liberal peace interventions would classically be framed – as overly prescriptive, rigid and hyper-modernist in terms of their philosophical foundation (explored in chapter two).

In the Solomon Islands Ruth Liloqula lamented that “local governance has been abandoned in the rush to ‘nation build’” (2000, p. 42) and that there has been insufficient questioning of whose interests the state which is being built will
serve – especially in the face of the majority of Solomon Islanders who “see it [the nation] as a threat to their resources, their cultural identity and culture, their environment and the basis of their sustained community living” (2000, p. 43). This analysis of post-colonial Solomon Islands contradicts the dominant ideology of liberal peace building, which assumes that state-centred development is, or should be, universally applicable and desirable. Three years before the RAMSI intervention even began, Liloqula wrote that pushing such a model of development in the Solomon Islands context can do worse than nothing, it can cause harm by undermining local governance and community resilience (2000). When asked to assess RAMSI in 2007 90% of respondents in the Solomon Islands gave their overall support, but “on justice, 41% would prefer to use customary law to modern law and 47% said it would depend on the circumstances” (Anderon 2008: 72).

Clive Moore notes the discrepancy between the notion of the ‘failed state’ and the reality on the ground for most Solomon Islanders: “what had failed was the introduced modern centralized processes of government and its services, the export-led economy, and the infrastructure of urban life, not the lives of the 84 percent of Solomon Islanders who still live in villages and remain dependent on subsistence agriculture and fishing” (2007: 170). Being non-prescriptive and locally specific also means recognizing the strengths of a “society which is largely stateless” (Clements et al 2007: 49) and working within that context, rather than trying to super-impose a model which has been rejected by the people who live there and has been shown to ‘fail’ in that context.

3. **Focus on the process (as opposed to the goal)**

Non-prescriptive means not trying to ‘solve’ a problem or provide a specific end-goal, but in addition to this, any ‘goal’ shouldn’t be the primary driving force behind the intervention, but rather an engagement with the process of building peace itself. For example, the intervention in Iraq was such a failure in part (along with copious other reasons) because the ‘goal’ of toppling Saddam Hussein was seen as over-riding any concerns about the means of achieving such a goal (the intervention process). The process was not considered to be as
important, and as worthy of thought and critique, as the moral force of getting rid of Saddam Hussein.

Goodhand and Hulme complain that a number of contemporary models for thinking about war “view conflict as an event with a start and finish, not a process” and that such an approach is “inappropriate” for the wars happening in the world today (1999: 18). Fundamentally, they emphasize that even after violence has ended, the peace building process itself is inherently going to bring up more conflicts within a community (not necessarily violent) regarding the future direction of their community/ nation (Goodhand & Hulme 1999: 18). Engaging with the process, rather than an ‘end goal’, helps to ensure that third parties facilitate the peaceful resolution of these ideological conflicts, rather than rush towards any possible ‘peace’ that can be arrived at.

A further benefit of a process-led peace intervention, where the mandate is arrived at later – and by locals, is that there is less scope for disappointment on the part of the locals. In the Solomon Islanders there was confusion over what the mandate was aiming to achieve and then disappointment when it did not meet broader welfare-related expectations, and even hopes for radical changes in political systems (Moore 2007: 178). If the intereners had simply worked as facilitators, leaving the ‘driving’ of the process and the formation of the mandate up to the people of the Solomon Islands, the mandate would likely be more locally relevant and realistic, and the people who made the mandate would be the same people trying to institute it and hoping to benefit from it in the long-term.

In Bougainville, the peace process aimed fundamentally at securing the peace necessary for conversations about the direction of the region to begin – and Phil Goff emphasized that they did not have a mandate for Bougainville and that, indeed, having one would be inappropriate (2001). The Burnham peace talks explicitly sought to find a way of ‘living together peacefully’ and put this possibility, and thus the possibility of an ongoing peace process, before the need to address the particular grievances and crimes of the conflict.

4. **Flexibility and resources**
Flexibility refers to the allowance for spontaneity, unusual methods and unanticipated developments, possibly taking more/different resources than a classic liberal peace making process (especially that most precious resource of all: time). However, it is important to remember that ‘traditional’ peace building interventions are also extremely time and resource intensive, and certainly more so if they fail at building lasting peace.

Stefan Knollmayer explores the reasons behind the success and acceptance of the truce and peace monitoring groups on Bougainville and looks at the ways the reciprocal nature of security was practiced in the pre-deployment training of the groups (2004). The pre-deployment training aimed at integrating the civilian and military members of the group and did this by embracing the “military culture of communal living and working, or as one civilian monitor described it, ‘a share house magnified’” (Knollmayer 2004: 226). In this way the orchestrators of the training used tradition (the military tradition and the Pacific tradition of living together) to bring people together in a useful way, rather than seeing tradition solely as a cause for division and cultural clashes; this method emphasized the positive and co-operative elements of the civilian’s and the military members group cultures. While the military approach was used in some ways (living together, sharing chores), there was considerable tweaking of the usual approach to suit the particularities of this case – for example, there was an unusually flexible and open operational structure and a “blurring of civilian and military tasks in a single joint operation” (Knollmayer 2004: 222) to better be able to respond to a changing and unfamiliar context.

Behind both the peace process and the resulting peace monitoring group was the philosophy that living together for extended periods of time would help to bring people together and open dialogue; this is a very ‘Pacific’ approach to conflict and, indeed, “restorative justice is sometimes said to be rooted in the traditions of small-scale indigenous societies, such as the Pacific Islands” (Saovana-Spriggs 2003: 195). Stephen Henningham also wrote about traditional peace making in the Pacific, saying: “indigenous traditions … favouring the consensus resolution of disputes have encouraged this emphasis on co-
operation. Island leaders have referred to a ‘Pacific Way’, whereby issues are talked through in an unhurried fashion in informal meetings, in pursuit of a consensus acceptable to all involved” (1995, p. 15). Although that was written in 1995 and thus does not refer to it, the peace making process which was to follow – particularly the long, informal ‘meeting’ at Burnham – followed this model and arrived at a peaceful resolution.

5. The Right People

Here I am referring to the oft-ignored role of character, personal virtues and relationships (between individuals, communities and countries). Cynthia McSwain writes about the centrality of relationships in creating ethics and how relationships place checks and limits on undesirable human behaviour, in a more intimate and immediate way than law does (1987).

*Relationships between third-party and locals:*

In contrast to the integrated civilian/military monitoring groups in Bougainville (Knollmayer 2004), the IPMT in the Solomon Islands was made up entirely of Australians and New Zealanders with no local members (Dinnen 2002, p. 292). Also, as mentioned above, many jobs which could have been given to well-qualified locals were given to international ‘experts’ (Moore 2007: 178), thus limiting contact and potential for working relationships between local and international experts. Furthermore, when it came to assessing the impact of RAMSI the survey to do so was written by an entirely Australian staff, while the people who took the survey were mostly Solomon Islanders (Anderson 2008: 72). This is a perfect example of tokenistic inclusion, without allowing real involvement in terms of the process and the questions asked.

In Bougainville the Chief Negotiator for the civilians and the Force Commander for the military staff lived in the same house and “ate cornflakes together in the morning” thus providing a relaxed space to air internal disagreements (Knollmayer 2004, p. 228). Knollmayer concludes that the
‘intense operational co-operation’ seen in Bougainville may be the way of the future and that it was part of a larger “fluid peace process” (2004, p. 229).

_Local's who want peace:_

Here I am referring to the importance of thinking of _which_ people are involved in the process (not just ‘included’ on the signing document, but actually part of building the process and the resulting agreements) – especially of note is the unusual involvement of women and non-combatants - or locals who want to build peace. This might seem obvious, but this crucial group of people is often left out of both conflict analysis (Stedman 1997) and of peace talks, such as the Townsville peace talks held with the aim of securing peace in the Solomon Islands (Fry 2000).

Goodhand and Hulme argue that third parties should aim to identify and understand the roles of grassroots social organisations “with a view to providing external support to these more effectively in the future” (1999: 21). This connects back to trust/local ownership, and comes from the recognition that there _are_ locals who want peace (most of them, in fact) and that those people have much better contextual knowledge when it comes to addressing the conflict at hand.

_Gender:_

“The recognition that gender relations contribute an essential element of analysis has come late to the study of conflict as compared with the study of development” (Goodhand & Hulme 1999: 20). Ruth Saovana-Spriggs argued that the peace process in Bougainville was such a success partly because “men and women, warring factions, leaders of traditional and modern institutions, have taken responsibility for the civil war and its consequences” (2003: 212). This did not simply happen as a matter of course, but was the result of an unusually inclusive and time intensive peace process, and the matrilineal nature of
Bougainville society; “it is very important to appreciate the power women hold in traditional Bougainville societies” (Saovana-Spriggs 2003: 204).

It is important to note that the inclusion of women in peace processes is not desirable because of some innate, biological ‘peacefulness’ women are supposed to have, but because women make up approximately half of the population and their voices have previously been ignored. To ignore any significant group of a population is not only oppressive, but also limiting in terms of one’s ability to understand a conflict and provide appropriate assistance; “a gendered analysis of conflict offers increased insights into possible entry points for the ‘smart relief’ that might make the likelihood of peace less distant” (Goodhand & Hulme 1999: 21).

Third party:

According to Daniel Flitton, Australia intervened in the Solomon Islands in order to maintain it’s strong relationship with the United States and provide an excuse for getting out of Iraq; “conveniently for Canberra, the troops are needed back home” (2003, p. 7). Flitton argues that Australia’s motivations were purely self-interested and without a real knowledge of the area, and even goes so far as to say: “If Australia’s interests were truly focused on achieving the best outcome for the Solomon Islands, then New Zealand is far better placed in regional terms to lead the operation into the long term” (Flitton 2003, p. 8). He argued this because New Zealand has better relationships in the Pacific region, meaning that feelings between actors and knowledge bases are important for a successful peace process – similar arguments as those put forward by proponents of hybrid-sensitive peace building.

The character of individuals:

Furthermore, it is important to properly select and train the individuals who will be acting as representatives for the mission at large; RAMSI was seen as overly “brusque” and the RAMSI personnel caused offence (not to mention potential
social harm) by engaging with prostitutes in the Solomon Islands (Moore 2007: 178). In contrast, various representatives involved with the peace mission in New Zealand are spoken of in extremely fond terms by locals; Kabui referred to his great respect for Roger Mortlock and states that he was “the right man at the right time and Bougainvilleans remember him fondly” (Kabui 2001: 40) and Don McKinnon, former Secretary General and one of the key figures behind the peace process, named the late Joseph Kabui as the godfather to his son – showing that the relationships formed during the peace process were not merely for instrumental purposes.

_The Twin Pitfalls of Hybridity:_

One of the ‘pitfalls’ of hybridity is the romantisization of the local and the subsequent blind faith in ‘local’ methods or leaders, missing the complexity of the situation and the potential for power imbalances _within_ the local (Clements et al 2007). Lisa Calvano writes about how multinational corporations engage with local communities and how that can cause conflict (2008). While Australia is not a corporation, some phenomena and analysis she uses is useful here, for example: she describes the ‘trinkets and beads’ phenomenon whereby the corporation offers low value ‘trinkets’ in exchange for a resource (logging rights for example) and thus divides locals against each other; those who want the trinkets and those who think it is a bad deal (Calvano 2008, p. 796). Applying this terminology to peace making, the Australian peace making mission in the Solomon Islands was closely tied-up with Australian foreign aid and the Solomon Islands government was using what money it had in extremely corrupt and nepotistic ways – contributing to what has been called “the ‘chequebook’ approach to peace negotiations” (Dinnen 2002, p. 289) – thus exacerbating anger within the nation and essentially rewarding those who had engaged in violence.

Furthermore, the compensation demands in the Solomon Islands were constantly growing and demands were increasing (Dinnen 2002, p. 290), meaning that perhaps some of the actors involved were what Stedman calls ‘greedy spoilers’ and continuing to hand out compensation was only increasing
their demands and also, very likely, the resentment of peaceful civilians who were getting no such pay-outs for choosing peace; “inducements alone will serve only to whet the appetite of the greedy spoiler, the legitimacy and illegitimacy of its demands must be clearly distinguished” (Stedman 1997, p. 15). Thus the ‘trinkets’ of aid/compensation were administered in such a way that they may have worsened the conflict between locals, and increased the perceived reward of engaging in conflict.

Appropriation is perhaps more difficult to identify and address, as it requires determining when motivations are true and whether the stated aims of cultural awareness, for example, were met. For example, while it is possible that Alexander Downer was indeed sincere in his attempts to build a ‘co-operative intervention’, from the many points made above it seems like this was done in a haphazard and intellectually lazy fashion, utilising the word “co-operative” to grant legitimacy to the mission in the eyes of the Australian public and Solomon Islanders. The RAMSI website also refers to the involvement and support of the wider Pacific in an exaggerated way, in comparison with how much input, involvement and control other Pacific nations really had in what is generally seen an Australian dominated mission.

**Conclusion:**

Conflict resolution and peace making is always context-specific and it is problematic to apply ‘lessons’ from one conflict onto another (Hegarty 2003). The conflicts I have compared may have some similarities, but they also have central differences and took place in different cultural, geographical and economic contexts – to name a few of the many factors playing into both. For example, it is important to keep in mind that Bougainville had an unusually rich history of security to draw on (Hegarty 2003), whereas the Solomon Islands have a history of internal conflict. Therefore the ‘good example’ of peace building in Bougainville may not be applicable elsewhere, in regions without such a solid foundation.
All the same, the notions of hybridity and of hybrid-sensitivity help to frame ideas around cross-cultural relationships in general and in particular those relating to interventions, done with the sincere aim of assisting. My set of ‘criteria’ is not complete, concrete or applicable to every case, but merely uses the idea of hybridity to re-think the way interventions are carried out and assessed – and how interventions can be ‘locally led’ without falling into mundane dichotomies, romantic associations with all traditional methods or co-opted and appropriated ‘culture’ for the purposes of a public relations boon. All a hybrid-sensitive approach really asks is that humans treat each other as fallible equals whom they have an ability to learn from, rather than dictate to, and to remember that the categories we use to simplify each other perhaps actually complicate the relationships between us and exaggerate our differences.

“In all people I see myself, none more and not one a barley-corn less, And the good or bad I say of myself I say of them.”

- Walt Whitman, Section 20, Song of Myself.
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