Third-Party Coordination in Conflict Resolution: Views from Third-Party Practitioners in the Maoist Armed Conflict of Nepal and the Moro Conflict of the Philippines

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Abstract

A growing field within mediation research explores issues of multiparty intervention and third-party coordination. The existing literature highlights third-party coordination as a problematic but extremely important conflict intervention strategy; however, it lacks an in-depth understanding of fundamental aspects of third-party coordination. In the light of this research gap, this study explores three fundamental themes related to third-party coordination in conflict resolution: conditions for third-party coordination; the influence of relationship dynamics and power status of third parties on coordination; and the effectiveness of third-party coordination. These themes are elaborated by means of an analysis of two case studies: the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and the Moro conflict of the Philippines. The research finds that third-party coordination is a contingent process, with varying needs and relevance in different phases and types of conflict. Context, policy and motive are three key factors influencing third parties’ readiness to coordinate. Power differences among third parties, their attitudes towards each other, differences in intervention strategies and priorities, the nature of conflicts, and the actions taken by the conflicting parties are five contextual factors that influence the dynamics of third-party relationships. Shared intervention goals and a convergence of interests among local and external third parties contribute to conflict resolution both during the conflict and in the political normalisation phase. Formalised intervention mechanisms mandated by the conflicting parties are found to be more strongly correlated with conflict resolution than informal and independent third-party interventions.
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AIN</td>
<td>Association of International NGOs in Nepal</td>
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<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Government Overseas Aid Program</td>
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<td>ARMM</td>
<td>Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao</td>
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<td>BOGs</td>
<td>Basic Operating Guidelines</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CCD</td>
<td>Centre for Constitution Dialogue</td>
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<td>CHD</td>
<td>Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAFAG</td>
<td>Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>Civilian Protection Component</td>
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<td>CZOP</td>
<td>Coalition for Children as a Zone of Peace</td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>Collective Conflict Management</td>
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<td>CPN (Maoist)</td>
<td>Communist Party of Nepal, Maoist</td>
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<td>CBSs</td>
<td>Community Based Organisations</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBCS</td>
<td>Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Constituent Assembly</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
<td>Daily Interpretive Analysis</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Assistance</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GPH</td>
<td>Government of the Philippines</td>
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<td>HRTMCC</td>
<td>Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Coordination Committee</td>
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<td>INSEC</td>
<td>Informal Sector Service Centre</td>
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<td>IID</td>
<td>Initiatives of International Dialogue</td>
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<td>IGOs</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organisations</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Contact Group</td>
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<td>IMT</td>
<td>International Monitoring Team</td>
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<td>INGOs</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPBS</td>
<td>Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies</td>
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<td>IRSMP</td>
<td>Inter-Religious Solidarity Movement for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICFM</td>
<td>Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>JCCCH</td>
<td>Joint Coordination Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities</td>
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<td>JSSR</td>
<td>Justice and Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>KILOS</td>
<td>Kilos Kapayapaan at Katarungan</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCG</td>
<td>Local Contact Group</td>
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<td>Local Monitoring Team</td>
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<td>LPC</td>
<td>Local Peace Committees</td>
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<td>MOA-AD</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain</td>
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<td>MinHRAC</td>
<td>Mindanao Human Rights Action Centre</td>
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<td>MPC</td>
<td>Mindanao People Caucus</td>
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<td>MPAC</td>
<td>Mindanao Peace Advocates Conference</td>
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<td>MPPM</td>
<td>Mindanao Peoples Peace Movement</td>
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<td>MWG</td>
<td>Mindanao Working Group</td>
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<td>MOPR</td>
<td>Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction</td>
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<td>Mindanao Peaceweavers</td>
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<td>MILF</td>
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<td>Moro National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>MTF</td>
<td>Multi-donor Trust Fund</td>
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<td>SNV</td>
<td>Netherlands Development Organisation</td>
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<td>NEA</td>
<td>Network of Effective Action</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of Islamic Conference</td>
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<td>PDS</td>
<td>Peace and Development Strategy</td>
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<td>RNA</td>
<td>Royal Nepal Army</td>
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<td>SSR Group</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform Group</td>
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<td>SPA</td>
<td>Seven Party Alliance</td>
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<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
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<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNMIN</td>
<td>United Nations Political Mission in Nepal</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United National Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-PBC</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<td>UNPFN</td>
<td>UN Peace Fund in Nepal</td>
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<td>UPF</td>
<td>United People’s Front</td>
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<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Third-Party Coordination in Nepal and the Philippines

1. Problem Statement
Non-coercive third-party intervention has become a common approach to solving internal and international armed conflicts around the world. A great deal of research illustrates that effective third-party intervention can put an end to complex, protracted, and even intractable intrastate conflicts (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2005, Wallensteen 2002). However, there are cases in which unsystematic and immature third-party intervention efforts have led countries towards either the recurrence of violent conflict within a few years of signing a peace agreement or the failure of the implementation of the peace agreement.

Empirical research shows that about half of all mediation efforts around the world, particularly since the mid-1990s, have included more than one third party (Beber 2010, Lindgren, Wallensteen, and Grusell 2010). This trend towards an increasing number of third parties suggests a growing interest in conflict resolution efforts across the globe (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009, Crocker 2011, Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001b, Crocker, Aall, and Hampson 1999b, Kriesberg 1996, Paris 2009, Svensson 2011). Mediation and facilitation have traditionally been the most common forms of non-coercive third-party intervention in armed conflicts. They are often single-party interventions performed by powerful nation states and the United Nations (UN) in high-level negotiation processes.

This trend, however, has changed over the past two decades. Third-party roles have expanded beyond mediation and the facilitation of high-level negotiation processes to include new roles, such as the monitoring of ceasefires and peace processes, providing support for post-negotiation initiatives, facilitating reconciliation and peacebuilding processes, and supporting conflict-affected countries through development and humanitarian assistance. New types of third-party interveners have emerged along with the UN and powerful nation states. Western nations that are politically less powerful in global governance structures but are resource rich, such as the Scandinavian countries,
local and international peacebuilding organisations, the European Union (EU), international financial institutions such as the World Bank, regional organisations such as the African Union, private mediators, faith-based organisations, and local business communities are all examples of newly emerging third-party entities. With an enlarged number of third-party interveners acting in various capacities, with myriad roles, and in different phases of conflict, the issue of coordination has garnered critical scrutiny. In other words, third-party coordination is emerging as an important area of inquiry in mediation research. However, it has not yet received sufficient scholarly attention.

A number of scholars, such as Crocker et al. (1999), Fisher (2006), Iji and Fuchinoue (2009), Jones (2001), Kriesberg (1996), Nan (2003), Ricigliano (2003), and Strimling (2006), have reflected on issues of multiparty intervention and third-party coordination in conflict resolution efforts. The existing literature highlights third-party coordination as one of the most problematic yet important aspects of conflict intervention. The literature also points out that coordination is not occurring on a regular basis, largely because of the distinct policy and strategic interests of third parties.

Although the existing conflict management literature captures many of the above-mentioned aspects of third-party coordination, there are two major gaps that need to be addressed. First, the existing literature does not provide an adequate understanding of the fundamental dimensions of third-party coordination. It explains very little regarding the conditions for third-party coordination and the impact of relationship dynamics and the power status of third parties in coordination processes. There is considerable discussion of strategies for making third-party interventions effective and contributory to conflict resolution. However, while these discussions often make the case that third parties should coordinate to make their intervention efforts effective, they rarely provide solid empirical justifications to back up these assertions. This thesis is an attempt to fill this gap, through an in-depth exploration of the fundamental components related to third-party coordination. To this end, I develop a set of propositions and test their efficacy in terms of filling the identified gap.

Second, a number of conclusions related to third-party coordination are drawn from the study of either one subset (e.g., diplomatic coordination and postwar coordination) or two contending groups of third-party interveners (e.g., official–unofficial coordination and local–external coordination), rather than from the study of the coordination behaviours of a broad spectrum of interveners engaged in various phases of conflict. To acquire an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of third-party coordination, there is a need to conduct a comprehensive assessment of actual field-based coordination practices. I do so by listening to the experiences of third-party practitioners and other relevant stakeholders who work in real-world conflicts, so as to determine what they see as the key issues in coordination. To date, no such comprehensive studies have been conducted to solicit the views of a diverse range of third-party practitioners and other stakeholders regarding these issues. Another key goal of this thesis is thus to address this methodological cum empirical gap while exploring the fundamental components of third-party coordination.

2. Focus of the Study
This study has been conducted with three major objectives in mind. First, it aims to explore some of the key factors that play an influential role in the occurrence of third-party coordination. An in-depth understanding of this issue is particularly salient because
it provides insights into some of the root causes of third-party coordination problems. A more comprehensive knowledge of the conditions for third-party coordination helps us to understand the underlying factors that motivate (or demotivate) coordination among third parties, and thereby to design the most effective third-party coordination strategies for particular conflict-affected countries. The current literature on this issue provides only general explanations, such as how the various institutional and policy interests of third parties sometimes impede coordination and how the convergence of such interests contributes to coordination (Crocker, Aall, and Hampson 1999a, Iji 2005). On its own, this approach does not help us to understand fully many of the contextual and policy factors, as well as the motives behind the occurrence of third-party coordination. This study aims to fill this lacuna.

**Research Question 1: Under what conditions do third parties coordinate their intervention efforts?**

Second, the relationship and power dynamics of third parties and their impact on coordination and conflict resolution processes is another key dimension that is not well articulated in the existing literature. I argue that relationship and power dynamics are crucial causal variables that play a central role in the occurrence and outcome of third-party coordination. For this reason, a broader and deeper understanding of this issue is crucial. Yet existing explanations of this dimension are limited. In the prevailing literature, the dynamics of the relationships between official and unofficial third parties in conflict resolution processes are often highlighted (See Böhmelt 2010, Chataway 1998, Chigas 1997, Fisher 2006). However, this is only one subset of third-party relationship dynamics. Other third-party relational dimensions, such as local-external third-party relationships, external-external third-party relationships, and local-local third-party relationships, are largely neglected in the literature.¹ This study therefore aims to identify key factors that are central to the relationship dynamics of local and external third parties, among external third parties, and among local third parties.

¹ Nation states, the UN, bilateral and multilateral organisations, international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, are considered external third parties. Civil society organisations, NGOs, and human rights groups are considered local third parties.
The existing literature is heavily focused on highlighting the importance of coordinated third-party relationships in conflict resolution processes. For example, Nan (2003) discusses the essence of a stronger relationship and interconnections between various actors in peacebuilding efforts; Jackson (2005) highlights the importance of ‘early and continuous consultation’ along with a ‘maintained’ relationship for an effective third-party coordination; and Aydin and Regan (2012) conclude that the intervening states that are in cooperative relationships have been more successful in terminating wars than those that compete with each other to increase their influence over the combatants. Although these authors highlight relationship dynamics as an important causal variable that affects coordination processes, they fail to clearly spell out the underlying conditions governing how and why these relationship dynamics impact third-party coordination. Acquiring a broader and deeper understanding of this issue therefore becomes a prominent research focus. This study aims to formulate a set of indicators that are dominant in influencing the relationship dynamics among third parties in their coordination processes.

The issue of the power status of third parties, and its impact on their coordination processes, is another important but under-addressed topic in the literature. There is a discussion in the literature about how power and leverage impact the outcome of mediation (Svensson 2007b). However, there is insufficient discussion of the role of power status in third parties and its impact on coordination. Although some scholars, such as Kriesberg (1996) and Ricigliano (2003), have mentioned the role of power in third-party coordination, they have been more focused on how internal power politics and the national interests of third parties contribute to coordination problems. These explanations do not consider the role of the power status of third parties in the third-party coordination process. Therefore, this study aims to explore whether or not power differences among third parties have a significant impact on their relationship-building and coordination outcomes, and if so, how power affects relationship dynamics.

Research Question 2: How do third-party relationship dynamics and power differentials influence their coordination behaviours?

Third, the notion of coordination effectiveness is another important dimension of third-party coordination, because the ultimate goal of coordination is to make the intervention
processes contributory to conflict resolution. The existing literature highlights some core strategies for making coordination efforts effective in conflict resolution; these include a proper understanding of the interests of interveners (Iji 2005), an understanding of the characteristics of the environment and the actors to be coordinated (Paris 2009), and burden sharing during mediation efforts (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001b). Other strategies include the inclusion of powerful third parties within the intervention coalition (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001b), and the selection of an appropriate third party or a group of third-party actors to perform certain intermediary roles in conflict resolution efforts (Kriesberg 1996). While the strategies mentioned in the literature focus on the fact that third parties should be coordinated to make them effective in intervention processes, they do not address how such coordination strategies have contributed to conflict resolution in actual practice. In this regard, another important focus of this research is to provide empirical justifications of coordination strategies from two perspectives: coordination success and coordination effectiveness. The coordination success component evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of certain third-party coordination processes in conflict resolution efforts. The coordination effectiveness component assesses the actual contribution to conflict resolution of different coordinated actions taken by third parties.

Research Question 3: To what extent does third-party coordination contribute substantially to conflict resolution?

In order to explore these dimensions of third-party coordination, I develop a theoretical framework by combining a number of relevant theories drawn from sociology, critical peace studies, and the international conflict management literature. Particularly, I consider Resource Mobilisation (RM) theory, drawn from sociology, as fundamental to my theoretical framework, which is also backed up by other theories, such as motives theory, ripeness theory, hybridity theory, mediators’ power and leverage theory, and mediation effectiveness theory.

3. Contributions and Significance of the Study
This research has the potential to make a contribution to both theory and policy in the area of third-party coordination. In a broader framework, this empirical study informs us
about the limits and scope of third-party coordination in conflict resolution processes, and further suggests a way to evaluate the extent to which it can be considered an effective conflict intervention approach.

Theoretical and policy contributions of this research are promising because the findings of this study are based on in-depth interviews and interactions with a diverse range of third-party practitioners and other relevant stakeholders working in real-world conflicts. These are people who have perhaps the best understanding of various dimensions of third-party coordination, because they confront coordination issues on a regular basis. Their stories related to coordination are well-grounded in reality. No previous research has been conducted on this particular theme by incorporating direct interaction with a wide range of interveners from two distinct conflict contexts.

The second potential contribution of this research concerns its articulation of a set of empirically identified Contextual, Policy, and Motives (CPM) factors that often contribute to the occurrence of third-party coordination. In the existing conflict management literature, there are no such indicator-based explanations regarding the occurrence of third-party coordination. I believe that the findings of this research on this particular theme are well-developed and better conceptualised than what has been discussed in the literature to date. Likewise, by examining two different cases this research authenticates that third-party coordination is a contextual process; the reasons for coordination in each armed conflict and peace process are not the same. Nonetheless, factors related to the occurrence of third-party coordination can be explained under the CPM framework.

The third potential theoretical contribution of this study is its examination of the dynamics of third-party relationships, not only in their official-unofficial dimension but also from multiple perspectives. This research segregates third-party relationships into different subsets, such as external-local, external-external, and local-local, and then seeks to explain the relationship dynamics of third parties in each of the subsets. It also identifies a set of indicators that has the potential to influence third-party relationship dynamics in conflict resolution processes. A benefit of this process is the highlighting of the voices of third-party practitioners on the ground and the presentation of their
perceptions and experiences regarding their relationships with other third parties. This research reveals that the construction of third-party relationships in different subsets is basically determined by their power differences and traditional rivalries, attitudes towards each other, differences in intervention strategies and priorities, and actions taken by third parties and the conflicting parties. The presentation of this third-party relationship dynamics framework is another innovative theoretical contribution in the area of third-party coordination.

The fourth potential theoretical contribution of this research is the demonstration of the nexus between the power status of third parties and its impact on their coordination in conflict resolution efforts. Debates on power in the existing conflict management literature tend to be focused on the impact of internal power dynamics of larger third parties in coordination processes, rather than the impact of the power status of third parties in broader third-party coordination processes. This study provides new insights into the influence of the power status of third parties on their coordination processes. It demonstrates why the power status of third parties functions as a contextual element in the occurrence of third-party coordination from one conflict context to another.

The fifth potential theoretical contribution of this research is related to its role in differentiating between third-party coordination success and coordination effectiveness, and identifying their co-relationships in conflict resolution. Coordination success describes the factors that contribute to strengthen the coordination processes, whereas coordination effectiveness explores how different coordination attempts substantively contribute to transitioning a country from a conflict situation to a degree of peace. This differentiation is important because it provides an insight into why some third-party coordination becomes highly effective in conflict resolution processes, whereas other coordination efforts do not. Such insights are valuable in the effort to better understand the limits and scope of third-party coordination.

Additionally, this research aims to make some policy contributions to the field of conflict resolution. With the rapid growth of third-party interveners in armed conflicts and peace processes, coordination has become an important topic of discussion among policymakers, in both national and the international arenas. However, because of a lack
of contextual research-based information about and analysis of key issues, policymakers often find themselves unable to address coordination problems. It is against this backdrop that the findings of this study will be useful for policymakers who desire to address third-party coordination problems.

The findings of this research will also be useful for third-party interveners themselves. Some key questions which might be answered include: In which phase of the conflict will their interventions be most effective in terms of producing certain outcomes? Is an isolated intervention or a coordinated intervention the most strategic choice? Which type of intervention (isolated or coordinated) will best contribute to fulfilling policy and strategic interests? How will the type of intervention utilised affect the satisfaction rate of conflicting parties? What type of intervention is easier? Such analysis could enable third parties to make their future intervention efforts more worthwhile in terms of fulfilling their interests, as well as the interests of a conflict-affected country. This research will also provide guidelines for third parties to assist them in making their relationships less confrontational and competitive.

Further, this research can help governments to gain insight into how to manage the diverse range of third-party interveners. For example, to manage pre-agreement third-party intervention processes they can learn from the Philippines case, where the government and rebel groups brought many local and external third parties together with the formation of intervention structures, such as the International Contact Group (ICG) and the International Monitoring Team (IMT). In order to manage the post-agreement intervention process they can learn lessons from Nepal, where the government, with the formation of the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF), took the initiative in bringing external third parties together.

A key focus of this research is to analyse third-party coordination trends in different phases of conflict, such as the conflict escalation, pre-agreement, and post-agreement phases. An understanding of phase-based third-party coordination practices can assist policy makers and third-party practitioners in identifying the spontaneities and constraints of third-party coordination and the reasons behind such fluctuations in different phases of
the conflict. This would be extremely valuable information for addressing third-party coordination problems in each phase of a conflict.

Finally, this research also has potential to contribute empirically in the area of third-party intervention research. The Maoist Armed Conflict of Nepal and the Moro Conflict of the Philippines are relatively under-studied conflicts from the perspective of third-party intervention, and not studied at all from the perspective of third-party coordination. These conflicts have also not been studied simultaneously with the use of a multiple case-study method. In this regard, the selected cases are empirically significant as a contribution to the existing literature.

4. The Cases
This thesis critically evaluates third-party coordination practices within the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and the Moro conflict of the Philippines. Due to the presence of a multiplicity of third-party interveners, the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and its current peace process is a highly relevant case to assess their coordination efforts in different phases of the conflict. A large number of third parties, including global and regional powers like the US, India, China, the UN, the EU, other nation states (mainly European and Scandinavian countries), donor agencies, international financial institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB), local and international peacebuilding and human rights Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and individual mediators have all been active third parties in Nepal in different capacities. Some were active within a particular phase of the conflict, whereas others were active throughout the whole conflict cycle. Despite all of this activity, questions about how they contributed to conflict resolution and how they complemented each other’s efforts have yet to be satisfactorily answered. This case study therefore aims to provide critical insights into the coordination dynamics of third-party intervention in Nepal.

The Moro conflict of the Philippines is another relevant case for this research. The Moro conflict comprises two conflicts concentrated in Mindanao, the southern part of the Philippines: conflict between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and conflict between the GPH and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The multiplicity of third-party interveners can be observed in
both of the Moro conflicts. In the GPH-MNLF conflict and peace process, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)\(^2\) and its member countries, particularly Indonesia, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Brunei, served as the third-party interveners.

Thus far in the GPH-MILF conflict and peace process, a significant number of local and external third parties have been involved in both formal and informal capacities. For example, Malaysia was involved as a facilitator of the high-level negotiation process, while four nation states, namely, Japan, the UK, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and four international organisations, namely, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD), The Asia Foundation, Conciliation Resources, and Muhamaddiyah are involved as members of the ICG in providing support to the high-level negotiations. There is an additional formal intervention structure, the IMT, which works mainly at the local level to monitor different aspects of the peace process, particularly civilian protection, human rights protection, socio-economic progress, rehabilitation and security. IMT members include Malaysia, Japan, Indonesia, Norway and the EU, as well as the Non-violent Peace Force, Mindanao People Caucus (MPC), and Mindanao Human Rights Action Centre (MinHRAC). In addition, significant numbers of civil society organisations and networks of NGOs are involved as local third-party actors. There is also involvement by bilateral donors such as Australia, and multilateral agencies such as the World Bank. This plethora of actors makes it a fascinating case study for examining the dynamics of third-party coordination, and this conflict has arguably not yet been studied in this regard.

5. Research Approach

I have adopted a multiple case-study method structured around the concurrent observation of two cases for understanding the dynamics of third-party coordination in the two different conflict settings. This study mainly adopts a theory building approach, which enables the construction of new perspectives on issues around third-party coordination. The study also partly adopts a theory testing approach to indicate the relevancy of descriptive explanations of third-party coordination in the conflict management literature. In other words, the study adopts both inductive and deductive approaches.

\(^2\) OIC has changed its name since 2005. Now it is known as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.
This research relies significantly on primary data collected from the field. Public documents such as articles, reports and news archives that highlight the dynamics of third-party coordination are not found in adequate numbers to be relevant. The research is thus based largely on the subjective and objective analysis of in-depth interviews with key informants in each case. Available and relevant secondary sources of information are also utilised.

Using a semi-structured questionnaire approach, primary data was collected during three months of field research in Kathmandu, Nepal, from December 2011 to February 2012, and two months of field research in Manila and Mindanao, Philippines, from July-August 2012. Altogether 83 face-to-face interviews were conducted in the field: 40 in Nepal and 43 in the Philippines. Interviewees were drawn from political party leaders, peace panel members, peace dialogue facilitators, representatives of diplomatic missions, UN officials, representatives of donor agencies, International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs), and NGOs who are serving or have served as third-party interveners. Not all relevant third parties have been interviewed due to their unavailability during the period of field research, or their unwillingness to share information. The study therefore only captures the voices of those who were available and accessible during the field research period.

6. Central Arguments

This research is based on the assumption that coordination is a necessary step to be taken by third parties, whether at their own initiative or that of the conflicting parties, in order to play a constructive role in conflict resolution efforts. I argue that coordination among third-party interveners can be instrumental for leveraging collective pressure on the conflicting parties to find a negotiated solution in a timely manner. Conversely, the lack of collective pressure may provide space for the conflicting parties to prolong the negotiation processes and to use that time to strengthen their military and political capacity. Third-party coordination can be instrumental in convincing the conflicting parties to minimise the intensity of conflict, thereby reducing the cost of collateral damage and encouraging the signing of a peace agreement.
I further argue that third-party coordination can provide a reliable political guarantee for the conflicting parties to produce a peace agreement and implement it without significant hurdles. Third-party coordination can also help to commit and combine resources from various actors so as to adequately implement the peace agreement. The accumulation of large amounts of collective resources in a basket fund can then be spent on the needs of the peace process, rather than on implementing projects in the donors’ narrow interest areas. Amalgamating resources also helps to speed up the post-agreement peace process, as conflicting parties know in advance how much they are going to receive, and how and where it is going to be spent. This can avoid the duplication of services and overlapping projects and programmes, and makes the monitoring of how resources have been spent easier.

Despite the many advantages of coordination in conflict resolution processes, third parties are often less than willing to coordinate. Conflicting interests, diverse intervention goals, differences in coordination behaviours, existing and past relationships, and power differentials among third parties are some of the factors that lead to the breakdown of coordination efforts. Coordination is a very complex and dynamic process, often requiring the convergence of interests among diverse third parties. Coordination is also dependent on timing. It is a very contextual process, as the conditions under which third parties coordinate, when their coordination becomes effective, and what makes their coordination effective in conflict resolution can differ from one context to another, and even from one phase of conflict to another.

7. Concepts and Definitions
In this study, I use broad terms such as peace process, conflict resolution, third-party interveners, third-party intervention, multiparty mediation/intervention, third-party coordination, third-party relationship, and the power status of third parties. This section summarises the basic concepts and definitions used, and presents them as operational definitions for the purpose of this research.
**Peace Process:**

There are many definitions of the term *peace process*. Saunders has defined it as “a political process in which conflicts are resolved by peaceful means” (Saunders 2001, p. 483). A peace process can include a variety of activities, such as confidence-building measures, risk-reduction strategies, good offices, fact-finding or observer missions, conciliation and mediation efforts, and the deployment of international forces, and all of these activities can be conducted in different stages and phases of a peace process (USIP 2014). For the purpose of this research, I have defined peace process as a long and critical pathway towards achieving a durable peace. In a peace process, the conflicting parties, either by themselves or through the support of third parties, take a number of steps to support and sustain peace. A peace process can be divided into pre-agreement and post-agreement phases. In the pre-agreement phase, it involves activities such as declaring a ceasefire, adopting confidence-building measures, being involved in formal and informal negotiations, allowing third parties to monitor human rights and the progress of the peace process, and moving toward the signing of a formal peace agreement. In the post-agreement phase, a peace process means the continuation of pre-agreement activities along with peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, and the implementation of the signed peace agreement.

**Conflict Resolution:**

Like the term peace process, there are many definitions of *conflict resolution*. Wallensteen defines conflict resolution “as a situation where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accepts each other’s continuous existence as parties and ceases all violent action against each other” (Wallensteen 2011, p. 8). On the basis of this definition, the term conflict resolution, for the purpose of this research, is understood in both broader and narrower perspectives. Viewed narrowly, conflict resolution refers to conflicting parties’ formal agreement to cease hostilities and continue negotiation until they have signed a peace agreement. In a broader framework, it includes all peace process-related activities that must be carried out from the pre-agreement to post-agreement phases.
**Third-party Interveners:**

A broad spectrum of individuals, states and agencies may perform the role of *third-party interveners* in armed conflicts and peace processes. They can be external as well as local actors. External third parties “may consist of nation-states or coalitions of states; transnational or subnational organizations; ad hoc commissions; individuals; or any other actor with international standing” (Dixon 1996, p. 653). Local third parties may consist of a “person with particular status who can transcend the conflict divides, such as individuals with religious roles, retired statesmen or even businessmen” (Wallensteen 2012, p. 289). Third parties have also been recognised based on special characteristics and roles in civil conflicts, such as official and non-official third parties, power and pure interveners, official diplomats, private facilitators, and track-one and track-two diplomats. Official third parties may consist of the UN, nation states, and an association of nation states (Babbitt 2006, Böhmelt 2010, Fisher 2006, Grozev and Boyadjiev 2005), whereas unofficial third parties may belong to NGOs, international institutions, think tanks, civil society organisations, community groups, business groups, citizens, media, independent research institutions, conflict resolution professionals, experts appointed by the track-one community, academic and religious groups, individuals with international stature, and former government officials (Babbitt 2006, Böhmelt 2010, Fisher 2006, Grozev and Boyadjiev 2005, Gurkaynak 2007).

For the purpose of this research, third-party interveners include nation states, regional and global powers, the UN and its specialised agencies, multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies, international peacebuilding organisations, and local civil society organisations who are engaged in various phases of conflicts and in various capacities, such as through a formalised intervention mechanism facilitated and mandated by the conflicting parties, or through informal involvement.

**Third-party Interventions:**

*Third-party interventions* fall into various types. For example, they may be categorised as coercive or non-coercive interventions. Military intervention belongs to the category of coercive intervention, whereas economic, political and humanitarian forms of
intervention belong to the non-coercive category. A third-party intervention can also be a hybrid type, where third parties combine both military and non-military approaches. Some scholars have focused more on the military and economic aspects of third-party intervention, whereas others have focused on the political and humanitarian forms of intervention. The definition presented below captures both coercive and non-coercive approaches to third-party intervention:

Third-party interventions into ongoing civil wars are complex attempts to manipulate the preferences of warring parties and, thus, conflict outcomes. These attempts to alter the course of a conflict can include providing material, intelligence, and money to change the structure of the relationship among combatants or, alternatively, providing information through mediation and other diplomatic initiatives to change the information that they hold about their adversary (Regan, Frank, and Aydin 2009, p. 137).

This research is focused on assessing the coordination dynamics of non-coercive third-party intervention, and refers to a variety of forms of intervention, such as mediation, facilitation, back channeling, political and diplomatic pressure, conflict and peace monitoring, advocacy, monitoring of arms and armies, and humanitarian and development interventions to provide support for addressing during-conflict humanitarian needs and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives.

*Multiparty Mediation/Intervention:*

Crocker et al. (2001 & 2002), Sisk (2002), Kydd (2006), and Beber (2010) are some of the scholars who have attempted to define or at least broaden the concept of *multiparty intervention*. Beber has defined multiparty mediation as the involvement of “more than one third party in either a primary or secondary role” in conflict resolution processes (Beber 2010, p. 17). Sisk has defined multiparty mediation as “simultaneous, sequential (the baton pass), and uncoordinated or composite mediation efforts” (Sisk 2002, p. 13). Crocker et al. have defined multiparty mediation as the engagement of several third parties over the cycle of the conflict, which could be either sequential or simultaneous in a conflict management effort. Such mediation could occur through a coalition of third parties or without a formal coordinating structure (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2002).
For the purpose of this research, I define a multiparty intervention as the involvement of either homogeneous or heterogeneous groups of third parties in conflict resolution processes with various roles, expertise, resources and interests. In a multiparty intervention, third parties can either be invited by the conflicting parties to provide support to the peace process, or they may be self-interested in intervening to advance their own institutional interests. Multiparty intervention can also be a form of intervention taken by third parties as a group with formal or informal association in different intervention structures; or it can be isolated action taken by many third parties within a particular conflict.

Third-party Coordination:

Although a number of scholars have attempted to define third-party coordination (See Crocker, Aall, and Hampson 1999b, Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001b, Iji 2005, Iji and Fuchinoue 2009, Kriesberg 1996, Nan 2003, Paris 2009, Strimling 2006), the definitions lack a common understanding. Combining ideas from various definitions, I have formulated an operational definition of third-party coordination for the purpose of this research. Here, coordination is understood as an environment and process in which a range of third parties – regardless of their origin, power status or role – make attempts to work together in different stages of the conflict. The aim of third-party coordination is to contribute to the reduction of violence in its initial stages, and ultimately to contribute to the settlement of a particular conflict through various activities. A more detailed description of the key concepts and definitions of coordination is presented in Chapter 2.

Third-party Relationship:

There is no concrete definition of third-party relationship in the existing literature. For the purpose of this research, I have devised a set of indicators to measure the strength of a relationship among third parties. In general, the frequency of collective involvement in various intervention events, the comprehensiveness of interactions and communication processes, perceptions and attitudes towards each other, and the previous history of coordination and collaboration are the four major indicators that measure the bases of third-party relationships in armed conflict and peace processes.
Power Status of Third Parties:

The power status of third parties can be assessed from various perspectives. For the purpose of this research, power status is assessed on the basis of the third parties’ economic and political leverage over the conflicting parties and the conflict-affected countries. Third parties have been divided into three different categories based on their power status. Regional and global powers belong to the first category, and I have defined them as powerful third parties. The UN, bilateral and multilateral agencies, and other individual nation states belong to the second category. I have defined them as moderately powerful third parties. Finally, international organisations and local civil society organisations belong to the third category. I have defined them as less powerful third parties.

Third-party Coordination Success and Coordination Effectiveness:

Coordination success evaluates the strength and depth of third-party coordination, and I measure this with a number of indicators, such as in-depth coordination versus superficial coordination, high coordination commitment versus low coordination commitment, and meeting and information sharing-focused coordination versus action-driven coordination. I examine how these variables function while third parties are engaged in a coordinated response to a conflict through various approaches, such as the formation of formal and informal coordination mechanisms, organising meetings, launching campaigns, exchanging information, joint mediation and facilitation of peace talks, ceasefire monitoring, investigating of human rights violations, and post-conflict reconstruction programs. Conversely, coordination effectiveness measures third parties’ direct and indirect contributions towards taking a country from a conflict situation to a certain level of peace through one or many different intervention actions.

8. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis consists of eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter provides a detailed review of the mediation literature from the perspective of third-party coordination, and identifies some of the major gaps in the existing conflict management literature. This chapter also provides a theoretical framework, followed by a
set of research propositions that are used in the study. Chapter 3 provides a detailed explanation of the methodology used in the thesis, and highlights the major research processes that have been followed in the course of the research. This chapter also lays out a rationale for selecting the two empirical cases. The fourth chapter provides contextual background information and a historical analysis of the contexts of the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and the Moro conflict of the Philippines. It begins with a brief description of the Maoist armed conflict and peace processes in Nepal and the third-party interveners and intervention practices within this conflict. The second part of the chapter provides an analysis of the Moro conflict and peace processes of the Philippines and the third-party interveners and intervention practices within this conflict. Finally, this chapter provides a comparative analysis of both cases.

Chapter 5 is the first empirical chapter. It provides insights into the conditions under which third parties have coordinated in the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and the Moro conflict of the Philippines. It devises a set of contextual, policy and motives factors that are key to determining the occurrence of third-party coordination. Chapter 6 is the second empirical chapter. It explores the influence of third-party relationships and power dynamics on the occurrence of coordination. It also examines the dynamics of third-party relationships in different subsets, such as the relationship between local and external third parties, among local third parties, and among external third parties. Finally, it identifies a set of indicators that play a dominant role in influencing the third-party relationship dynamics in armed conflicts and peace processes. Chapter 7 is the final empirical chapter. With reference to the various coordination practices observed within the two conflicts, this chapter provides insight into the extent to which coordination in conflict resolution processes in the respective countries resulted in ‘coordination success’ as well as ‘coordination effectiveness.’ The final chapter of the thesis highlights major findings and summarises the research, in addition to offering policy recommendations.
Chapter 2
Coordination in Multiparty Intervention: A Review of the Literature

1. Introduction
Why do third parties, despite their active intervention in various armed conflicts, often fail to reduce the intensity of armed violence and create sustained peace processes? The answer to this question lies in various factors, such as issues of conflict ripeness, uncooperative conflicting parties, third-party intervention failures, and the interveners’ limited understanding of the conflict context. An additional factor which can impede successful intervention is the multiplicity of third-party interveners and their uncoordinated intervention efforts in different phases of an armed conflict. Through a review of the broader conflict management literature, this chapter aims to provide an assessment of the dynamics of third-party coordination. I first provide an overview of the major dimensions of third-party coordination. Next, I provide a critical assessment of the existing literature and identify key research gaps. I then present the theoretical framework of this research, which consists of a set of theories drawn from sociology, critical peace studies, and international conflict management literature. In the final section, I generate a set of research propositions, based on the theoretical framework and aimed at addressing the research gaps related to this theme, and use them as the analytical framework of this research.

2. Third-Party Coordination: Concepts and Definitions
There is an emerging policy interest in both local and external third-party intervention in armed conflicts and peace processes (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009, Clements 2009, Crocker 2011, Crocker, Aall, and Hampson 1999b, Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001b, Kriesberg 1996, Paris 2009, Svensson 2011). Particularly in the post-Cold War era, the scope of intervention and the number of third-party interveners has increased significantly (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009, Paris 2009, Parry 2004, Regan and Abouharb 2002, Wallensteen 2011). These new intervention practices are defined as multiparty...
intervention, where interveners with different origins, strengths and resources peacefully intervene in different phases of armed conflicts.

Due to the complex and multifaceted nature of post-Cold War internal armed conflicts, no single third-party actor has the capacity to monopolise conflict intervention efforts. The emergence of a broader range of interveners reflects the need for specialised mediation efforts at different stages of a conflict, because conventional mediation activities such as assisting the conflicting parties to initiate dialogue and negotiation are not sufficient to address the needs of contemporary armed conflicts (Griffiths and Whitfield 2010). No single third party has sufficient political resources to address the multifaceted issues associated with conflict. For these reasons, coordination and complementarity among interveners are considered vitally important in contemporary conflict management processes (Parry 2004). A collective third-party intervention may produce the necessary ‘political will’ and ‘muscle’ to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiation table. It can open up new channels of communication that can lead parties to negotiate a settlement on their own (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001b).

There are additional studies which demonstrate the importance of third-party coordination. A study on post-1945 civil wars by Aydin and Regan reveals that intervening states which were in a cooperative relationship were more successful in terminating the war than those who competed with each other to increase their influence over the combatants. Such competitive relationships actually prolonged the wars (Aydin and Regan 2012). In line with this finding, Griffiths and Whitfield confirm that the lack of coordination among interveners may lead to an intervention failure, and that intervener coordination is therefore vital for the success of their intervention efforts (Griffiths and Whitfield 2010).

With the growth in the number of interveners and the negative consequences of this proliferation, third-party coordination is becoming an important theme of conflict

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4 In this chapter, I use the terms multiparty mediation and multiparty intervention interchangeably.

5 Various authors have used different words to denote the working-together culture of third parties. For example, Kriesberg (1996) and Strimling (2006) have used the term ‘cooperation.’ Crocker et al. (1999,
management research. A number of scholars have attempted to analyse this theme, but at present third-party coordination is not well defined or adequately spelled out in the literature. Most definitions capture either one or a few aspects of coordination. For example, Campbell and Hartnett define coordination as “an iterative process of gradually building trust, understanding and working relationships” (Campbell and Hartnett 2005, p. 7). According to Oberg et al, third-party coordination in the context of a preventive action means initiating activities such as telephone calls and conferences among the interveners (Öberg, Möller, and Wallensteen 2009). Kriesberg states that, in a coordination process, “the intermediaries [of a conflict] are working on the same issues with the same set of persons on each side of the struggle” (Kriesberg 1996, p. 349). Fisher suggests that “coordination is directed toward increasing complementarity, either simultaneously or sequentially” (Fisher 2006, p. 68). Crocker et al have defined coordination as the sequential or simultaneous involvement of many different interveners to assist peace negotiations in any given conflict; here coordination comprises activities such as “the careful crafting of a coherent political strategy, building support and finding resources for that coherent strategy, and diminishing the possibilities that other third parties – and interested outsiders – will undermine the peace process by pursuing their own agendas” (Crocker, Aall, and Hampson 1999b, pp. 57-58). Strimling uses the term ‘intermediary cooperation,’ and underscores the importance of interaction between official diplomats and private facilitators “to contribute, directly or indirectly, to the effectiveness of each other’s work or to the achievement of complementarity between efforts” (Strimling 2006, p. 93).

None of these definitions provide a sufficiently broad definition of coordination. One definition highlights trust-building among third parties as an important component of coordination, whereas other definitions pinpoint effective communication and dialogue as a prerequisite for coordination. Other components, such as the culture of working together among those addressing similar issues, complementing each other’s intervention efforts, and the avoidance of cross-purposes among interveners, have also been highlighted. Yet third-party coordination, being a dynamic practice, requires a broader

2001 &2002) and Nan (2003) have used the term ‘coordination.’ For the purpose of this study, I have generally used the term coordination to denote coordination, collaboration and cooperation.
definition in order to capture its myriad aspects and dimensions. For this reason, I define coordination in the context of third-party intervention as an environment wherein a broad range of third parties, regardless of their origin, power status and roles, make different attempts such as communication, consultation, and coalition and network formation, to work together in various stages of an armed conflict. The aim of third-party coordination is to contribute to the reduction of violence in its initial stages, and ultimately to contribute to the settlement of a particular conflict through various peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives. Such coordination can be between local and external third parties, among local third parties, and among external third parties. It can also be between official and unofficial third parties.

2.1 Third-Party Coordination Framework

A number of coordination frameworks outlined in the literature deepen our understanding of third-party coordination. In this section I provide an overview of the major scholarly works that have attempted to conceptualise third-party coordination.

Kriesberg was probably the first scholar to introduce the notion of third-party coordination into scholarly debate. He used the term ‘intermediary cooperation’ to elucidate the coordination of third-party interveners working within a particular conflict. He describes different magnitudes of coordination, which can be very close or very loose, and which can be effectively or ineffectively operationalised among third parties. Activities such as consultation among intermediaries, division of responsibilities in the intervention processes, and the selection of leading actors are key aspects of coordination (Kriesberg 1996). Although Kriesberg’s work on intermediary cooperation opened up further discussion on third-party coordination, the ideas he proposed are quite abstract and it is difficult to discern how they might work in practice.

According to Iji & Fuchinoue (2009), two components are particularly salient for understanding the dynamics of third-party coordination. First, it is essential to recognise factors such as the motives of third parties for intervening in a particular conflict, and their level of commitment to managing that conflict. Second, it is important to recognise the leading actor who is facilitating coordination and cooperation among third-party interveners. They further argue that while states, international organisations and NGOs
may have a common goal regarding intervention, such as humanitarian considerations, the interests, priorities, and commitments of each actor may be different while taking action in the field.

Despite their discrete policy interests, third parties may of course also have shared goals that drive them to coordinate with each other. For instance, different states can work together because of their shared political interest in a particular conflict. However, there is no authority or institution in the international arena that regulates how different third parties work together, notwithstanding the UN Peacebuilding Commission (see below). This means that coordination among diverse third parties is mostly a coincidence, typically when there happen to be commonalities in interests and commitments (Iji and Fuchinoue 2009). Iji and Fuchinoue have proposed that shared conflict intervention goals, along with a leadership role, are pertinent to an effective coordination. What they miss are the conditions that motivate third parties to come up with a shared conflict intervention goal, and the process for selecting a lead actor to coordinate different interventions.

Nan (2003) coined the term ‘intervention coordination’ to explain various dimensions of third-party coordination. Intervention coordination advocates for a stronger relationship and interconnections between governmental and non-governmental and local and international institutions involved in various forms of peacebuilding. Nan has defined intervention coordination in the following terms:

> Intervention coordination is any effort to conduct pieces of a peace process for maximum joint impact. When conflict resolution professionals engage in a peace process, they are intervening. There are many interventions by international and local governmental and non-governmental organizations in every peace process. When these professionals seek to inform their own and others’ interventions so that they build a stronger overall peace process together, that is intervention coordination. This admittedly broad definition allows for a range from the loosest to the closest forms of coordination and includes some activities that might be labeled cooperation or collaboration (Nan 2003).

Nan also discusses how interveners can coordinate their efforts. One of her suggestions is that if full coordination among interveners is not possible, then a minimal level of coordination, such as ‘information sharing’ and ‘joint analysis,’ is pertinent. In the case
of long-term work on the peace process, interveners should engage in information- and analysis-sharing, joint planning, resource sharing, and working in collaboration. Nan also argues that coordination should be avoided if it is going to be costly, time wasting, or comprised of independent actions. It should also be avoided if coordinated action leads toward compromise in confidentiality (Nan 2003). This notion of intervention coordination seems a comprehensive coordination framework. First, although the author does not clearly spell out the usefulness of intervention coordination in the different phases of armed conflict, this framework can still be applied in both conflict and post-conflict settings in order to promote coordination among all segments of third-party interveners. Second, intervention coordination is a simple framework, as components of coordination are straightforward and easy to ascertain.

Fisher (2006) comments on the coordination between track-one and track-two diplomacy, and the contribution of such efforts in the official negotiation process. Track-one and track-two coordination is particularly important in the pre-negotiation phase of a conflict, and contributes to the “opening up of communication, the improvement of attitudes, the analysis of conflict issues and dynamics, the development of frameworks, the creation of options directed toward resolution, and so on” (Fisher 2006, p. 65). Based on the analysis of four different cases, Fisher concludes that coordination between track-one and track-two interveners can be useful for sharing information, indirect sequencing of efforts, joint strategy planning, and collaboration in implementation. Track-one and track-two coordination also promotes mutual acceptance and respect (Ibid). However, the third-party coordination framework proposed by Fisher is limited to coordination between track-one and track-two actors in the pre-negotiation phase of conflict. It does not inform us about other important dimensions of third-party coordination, such as local versus external actors’ coordination, local actors’ coordination, and external actors’ coordination.

The work of Strimling (2006) is another useful framework for understanding cooperation among third-party interveners. However, her framework only focuses on cooperation between official and unofficial interveners and does not explain coordination and cooperation among role-based (political, social, security and humanitarian) interveners,
origin-based (internal and external) interveners, and interveners working at different levels (top, middle, and local) of the conflict structure. Strimling proposes four different activities – communication, coordination, collaboration and integration – associated with cooperation between official diplomats and private facilitators. Communication includes activities such as information and idea sharing; coordination is related to synchronising timing, sharing resources, and coordinating contacts; collaboration incorporates activities such as joint design and/or implementation of specific activities and active partnership on an ad hoc or sustained basis; and integration is related to the integration of personnel, resources, strategies, operations and identity (Strimling 2006).

2.2 Coordination in International Practice: Some Mechanisms and Frameworks

To some degree, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (UN-PBC) serves as a global mechanism for the coordination and management of post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives in countries emerging from conflicts. With its Resolutions 60/180 and 1645 (2005), the UN General Assembly and Security Council established the UN-PBC on 20 December 2005, and mandated it “to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities, and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery” (UN-PBC 2013a). UN-PBC has three major operational structures – the Organisational Committee, Country-Specific Configurations, and the Working Group on Lesson Learned – through which they “marshal resources at the disposal of the international community and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding in countries emerging from conflict” (UN-PBC 2013b). The Organisational Committee comprises 31 member states, sets the working agenda of the PBC, and is responsible for crafting Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies (IPBS). The Country-Specific Configurations oversee peacebuilding programs in the countries of strategic priority for the PBC and encourage the actors in those countries to get involved in formal and informal meetings, both at Headquarters and at the field mission level. The Working Group on Lesson Learned is responsible for assessing the success or failure of various post-conflict peacebuilding programs, and
designs impact driven actions and strategies for future interventions based on lessons from the past.

The UN-PBC can be regarded as an institutionalised coordination structure for the synchronization of post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives around the world. However, given its structure and mandates it is quite limited in scope, because it only focuses on the coordination of post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives and does not incorporate coordination needs that many conflict-affected countries require during the escalation and negotiation phases of armed conflict. Moreover, its provision of overseeing Country-Specific Configurations is limited to the few countries related to its strategic priorities and leaves out other countries which may also require post-conflict peacebuilding coordination.

Collective Conflict Management (CCM) is another framework that advocates for coordinated third-party intervention through the collective actions of civil society groups, individual states, international organisations, and regional/sub-regional organisations in inter-state as well as intra-state conflicts. CCM aims at addressing traditional and non-traditional security threats currently faced by the global community (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2011). Specifically, CCM aims

1. to control, diminish or end the violence associated with the conflict through combined peace operations and/or mediation, conflict prevention and avoidance;
2. to assist, where appropriate, with a negotiated settlement through peacebuilding, cross-border management and other cooperative efforts and measures;
3. to help address the political, economic and/or social issues that underlie the conflict; and/or to provide political, diplomatic and economic guarantees or other long-term measures to improve local security conditions (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2011, p. 51)

CCM incorporates a broad range of activities, both to address specific security challenges and to respond to immediate conflict management needs. Its structure can be informal, improvised, ad hoc and opportunistic; in some cases its functions can also be reflected in
the form of formal charters or alliances. Finally, CCM takes place under the auspices of a lead actor (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2011).

CCM can be a useful approach to addressing emerging traditional and non-traditional security threats, and to reducing the intensity of violence in countries suffering from internal armed conflicts. However, due to global power politics it can be difficult to ensure the collective engagement of global actors and regional bodies in conflict management initiatives. Many actors are not interested in managing conflicts until it affects their strategic interests. Similarly, finding a lead actor can be a major challenge among powerful global and regional actors, as they may not be ready to accept another as a lead agency for coordination. Moreover, regional actors who have influence in a particular conflict-affected country may be opposed to the presence of other external actors. In such cases, CCM may be unusable.

Strategic coordination is another available framework for third-party coordination. The notion of ‘strategic coordination’ emerged to address three main challenges which third-party interveners often face in armed conflicts and peace processes. These are related to “incoherence between the mediation and the implementation phases; conflicting approaches within a given phase; and fragmented, contradictory efforts to implement a given strategy” (Jones 2001, p. 2). Strategic coordination is an ad hoc approach which emphasises the role of a lead agency to coordinate and establish priorities and resolve disputes in a way that “is recognized by other key implementing agencies” (Ibid).

Successful cases of strategic coordination have often taken place in the form of Friends Groups, which tend to guarantee a high level of international commitment. With positive experiences in Bosnia and Sierra Leone, strategic coordination has been considered an alternative to UN coordination in countries where the role of the UN has been less effective. But the success of strategic coordination is determined by many different factors, including “the relative difficulty of the implementation environment; the degree of political and resource commitment of major and regional powers to a peace process; and the relative correspondence of interests and objectives among the major and regional powers involved” (Ibid). Strategic coordination can be considered a practical and useful framework for addressing post-agreement third-party coordination issues. However,
selecting a lead agency for facilitating coordination and collaboration can be a daunting challenge in the presence of a multiplicity of global and regional third-party interveners.

The Network of Effective Action (NEA) is another coordination framework that emphasises the integrated action of interveners to design and implement holistic peacebuilding programs. NEA is not a complete coordination structure; however, it provides some guidelines for peacebuilding actors regarding coordination and collaboration among their activities which, it is argued, could have a “greater impact on conflict situations at the programmatic and systemic levels” (Ricigliano 2003, p. 446). A number of operating principles are proposed as the core components of NEA. For example, based on the experience of Georgia, Ricigliano proposes two operating principles for NEA:

1. Promote information exchange between political, social, and structural actors working on a specific conflict, between official and unofficial actors, and between international actors and local partners. This information exchange will promote improved and integrated situation assessments and program design.

2. Promote organizations taking an iterative approach to peacebuilding, combining political, social and structural activity that addresses specific issues in the conflict, as opposed to promoting a ‘global’ settlement (Ricigliano 2003, pp. 451-452).

Multi-track diplomacy can also be considered a type of coordination framework. In general, multi-track diplomacy is an extended and improved version of track-two diplomacy that aims to incorporate all levels of diplomacy in building a real and sustainable peace (Grozhev and Boyadjiev 2005). Diamond and McDonald, who propounded the notion of multi-track diplomacy, have defined it as the combination of nine different tracks of diplomacy: peacemaking through diplomacy (government), peacemaking through conflict resolution (non-government/ professional), peacemaking through commerce (business), peacemaking through personal involvement (private citizens), peacemaking through learning (research, training and education), peacemaking through advocacy (activism), peacemaking through faith in action (religion), peacemaking through providing resources (funding), and peacemaking through information (communication and mediation) (Diamond and McDonald 1996). Multi-track
diplomacy also emphasises the interconnectedness between the tracks in order to address current international peacemaking challenges. The authors argue that

[t]he relationship between the tracks of components of the Multi-Track Diplomacy system lie at the heart of its functioning. The lines of relationship determine pathways of communication, sharing of resources, and opportunities for collaborative action and mutual enrichment. When the relationships are adversarial or underdeveloped, of combative or indifferent energies, the system is operating with unfulfilled or distorted potential (Diamond and McDonald 1996, p. 156).

This framework is applicable for addressing third-party coordination issues in all phases of conflict, as it advocates for coordination between a wide range of third-party interveners and intervention actions.

### 2.3 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Third-Party Coordination

The literature highlights a number of advantages and disadvantages of third-party coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes. From Kriesberg’s point of view, “[e]ffective coordination among intermediaries in large-scale conflicts often significantly contributes to resolving major conflicts, while poor coordination contributes to the deterioration of a conflict and its persistence” (Kriesberg 1996, p. 349). Nan and Strimling argue that third-party coordination is useful for the successful resolution of conflict because it helps to “minimize negative interactions, address gaps, increase efficiency and realize opportunities for synergy” (Nan and Strimling 2006, p.2). According to Strimling, because cooperation among third-party interveners can occur at different levels and in different forms, the potential benefits of such diverse levels of cooperation also differ:

Different levels of cooperation offer different potential benefits. At the low intensity end of the cooperation spectrum, intermediary communication can lead to expanded understanding of each other’s work, increased respect and trust, and the ability to identify and take advantage of opportunities for complementarity. Sharing ideas (including joint analysis, reflection on lessons learned, etc.) facilitates understanding of different goals, theories of change, strategies, and time horizons. It also can lead to useful analysis of the ways in which different processes affect one another. In addition, idea sharing presents valuable opportunities to reflect on, and challenge, one’s own assumptions and approaches in light of different ideas and experiences (Strimling 2006, p. 99)
One of the advantages of third-party coordination is the sharing of the fiscal burdens and political risks associated with mediation (Beber 2010). Frazier and Dixon have further described the benefit of a third-party coalition as providing legitimacy for the work of states involved in the intervention. Such a coalition is also beneficial for pooling resources, burden sharing and risk management, and ultimately reduces the cost of conflict management of individual states. At the same time, it can take a long time to form a coalition and confusion may arise regarding the division of responsibilities among coalition partners (Frazier and Dixon 2006).

A number of scholars have also described the negative consequences of multiparty intervention. Strimling argues that too much attention on coordination among mediators may undermine the potential role of conflicting parties for transforming conflict (Strimling 2006). Likewise, the presence of a large number of mediators negatively affects the negotiation effort “by diminishing the cohesion of a third-party effort” (Beber 2010, p. 2). A proliferation of interveners may mean that third parties intervene in a conflict with an uncoordinated approach and competing interests; this in turn may provide an opportunity for warring parties to plot against the third parties (Jackson 2005). A multiplicity of interveners can also create other problems, such as lack of uniformity among interveners in conveying messages to the conflicting parties, or prolonging the negotiation process. If conflicting parties have the option to choose one or a few mediators, a conflicting party which is not interested in a negotiated solution may use ‘forum shopping’ as an opportunity to delay the negotiation process. ‘Continuity and consistency’ problems, ‘misunderstanding and conflicting interpretations’ of issues, and ‘competition for scarce resources’ are some of the problems which can arise when large numbers of mediators are in operation for a longer time. Additionally, in difficult circumstances third parties may be tempted to pass responsibility on to others to protect themselves from possible failures (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2011).

This review of the existing literature shows that third-party coordination has both advantages and disadvantages. Coordination has the potential to directly contribute to conflict resolution; conversely, the lack of third-party coordination is detrimental to conflict resolution. However, coordination is not yet widely accepted as a priority by
third parties (Heldt 2013). There are clearly a number of challenges associated with the occurrence of third-party coordination. In the following sections, I explore some of the important factors related to the conditions for third-party coordination and some of the challenges associated with it.

### 2.4 The Conditions of Third-Party Coordination

There are debates in the literature regarding the conditions under which third parties do or do not coordinate. Iji and Funchinoue (2009) have argued that even in the absence of binding coordination mechanisms, structures and policies, third-party interveners such as coalitions of states, states, international organisations, and coalitions among official and non-official actors, desire to coordinate with each other mainly because of their mutual ‘policy interests’ or ‘a broad coincidence of interests and commitments’ within a particular conflict. A number of contextual factors also motivate third parties to coordinate with each other. Tajikistan’s experience demonstrates that interveners’ coordination was “prompted by a broad coincidence of interest and commitments” (Iji 2005, p. 201). Specifically, Russian-Iranian collaboration in pushing the settlement process forward, coherence in conflict resolution strategies among interveners, and unified international commitments to end the war through mediation efforts have been identified as some of the contextual factors that motivated third parties to coordinate in Tajikistan. Moreover, a convergence of institutional interests and a clear division of labor between official and unofficial intervention processes contributed to bringing a diverse array of interveners together (Iji 2005).

By contrast, a number of scholars have identified some of the impeding factors for coordination in multiparty intervention processes. Griffiths and Whitfield pinpoint coordination difficulties caused by a superficial understanding of the conflict context, lack of diplomatic unity, and inconsistent standards and strategies (Griffiths and Whitfield 2010). According to Kriesberg, activities involving larger agencies and powerful nation states are very difficult to coordinate, mostly because of their larger scale of operations and diverse range of engagements (Kriesberg 1996). Miall argues that the diverse nature and characteristics of mediators make coordination difficult: they can act at cross-purposes and even “wreck [each other’s] efforts” (Miall 2004, p. 15). Presenting
the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Svensson concludes that the lack of a coherent approach among interveners was one of the major obstacles to third-party coordination. His findings suggest that the lack of third-party coordination was seen particularly during the ‘intensive armed phase’ of the conflict. Coordination improved in the latter stage of the conflict with the formation of a tripartite leadership structure called the ‘troika’ (Svensson 2009).

Similarly, Crocker et al have highlighted particular obstacles associated with coalitions. Some of these have to do with difficulties in managing and connecting the interests and positions of different actors, and giving authority and delegating power to each mediator (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2002). From Strimling’s point of view, both official and non-official interveners work in the interests of their institution or government, or the alliance they represent. Private mediators often pursue the interests of their funders. As a consequence, paying less attention to the interests of the parties in conflict and working to fulfill the interests of those to whom they are accountable may have a negative impact on the overall intervention process (Strimling 2006).

Ricigliano (2003) has pointed to the ‘realpolitik’ attitude prevalent among governments, larger organisations and NGOs as one barrier to coordination among multiple interveners. Ricigliano explains that a government engaged in a conflict-affected country works based on its ‘national interests’ and is therefore often ambivalent about coordinating with other governments and NGOs. Larger organisations such as the UN, the EU, and larger governments like the US may have difficulties in coordinating and sharing information due to their own bureaucratic turf battles. Coordination among NGOs has been similarly impeded by competitive funding processes and shrinking resources (Ricigliano 2003).

Jones argues that no one institution, including the UN, has sufficient capacity to take the lead role in directing strategic coordination among external actors. This is due to “[t]he proliferation of third-party actors, the prevalence of political competition between major powers, and the weakened authority of the UN … to perform essential strategic coordination functions” (Jones 2001, p. 23). According to Nan, the three major types of challenges to coordination are financial, psychological and strategic. Financial difficulties
in organising face-to-face meetings with conflict resolution professionals scattered around the world, donors’ unwillingness to provide funding for coordination work, and limited sources and competitive funding processes particularly impede strategic coordination. The lack of shared conflict resolution goals, approaches and strategies makes coordination difficult. The psychological challenges of coordination include third parties competing to gain prestige, lack of transparency due to confidentiality concerns, and the lack of personal relationship building and trust among third parties (Nan 2003).

2.5 Challenges Related to Third-Party Coordination

Third-party interveners often face challenges in coordination due to their inconsistent and contradictory conflict management approaches and strategies (Jones 2001). Third-party coordination in itself is a highly contested issue, as many groups and individuals consider it an unnecessary bureaucratic layer (Donini, Dudley, and Ockwell 1996). Due to this lack of acceptability, third-party coordination is often not considered as necessary practice in peace processes. A number of other factors can impede third-party coordination, particularly the issue of power. Campbell and Hartnett argue that the “political imperatives and jockeying for power … greatly complicate coordination processes” (Campbell and Hartnett 2005, p. 5), making it difficult to compel third parties of various kinds to come up with a common intervention objective. Campbell and Hartnett have identified these further barriers to coordination:

- Agencies use very different languages and terminology. Agencies have different security classifications and communications systems. Agencies are governed by different cultures or institutional norms of behavior and interaction. All of these potential communication barriers between agencies set the stage for considerable misunderstanding and miscommunication (Campbell and Hartnett 2005, p. 6).

Experiences from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Sudan have revealed five main challenges to peacebuilding coordination efforts: a need for local ownership, capacity and cooperation with external actors; dedicated peacebuilding coordinating structures; inclusive coordination processes; coordination that accommodates various needs; and a need to be both reactive and proactive (Lotze, De Carvalho, and Kasumba 2008). In an assessment of the UN peacebuilding mission and other concurrent third-party intervention efforts in Kosovo, Choedon identified
interveners’ lack of a common understanding of the problems, or the absence of a shared vision, strategy and plan of action for adequately addressing those problems, as some of the key challenges associated with third-party coordination. There was also a challenge among third parties to find their appropriate roles and responsibilities within the broader framework of post-conflict intervention in Kosovo (Choedon 2010). Beber has pointed out three major problems associated with the multiplicity of interveners: conflicting interests and opinions on the settlement of a conflict; an unclear division of responsibility and lack of transparency over the allocation of decision-making power among the mediators; and a delay in decision-making processes due to the large number of mediators (Beber 2010).

Lederach highlights the interdependence gap in peacebuilding efforts as one of the key challenges to a coordinated relationship of respect and understanding between the higher levels of leadership and the community or grassroots levels of leadership. He highlights the need for both horizontal and vertical relationship-building and coordination among actors (Lederach 1999). He also suggests a number of ways to remove the interdependence gap, including: increasing the recognition that peacebuilding is an organic system requiring relationships and coordination of multiple activities and multiple roles, at multiple levels; and increasing the mutual understanding by each level of the particular approaches and activities required. The orientation is towards awareness of the unique contribution that each brings in order to build relationships of respect, provide greater points of coordination, and decrease the competitiveness of activities and control structures devised to protect turf, which ultimately limits the capacity for change and integration in the system. Finally, he suggests building relationships before, during and after formal accords between people who are not like-minded, like-focused, and like-situated within the structure of the society (Lederach 1999).

2.6 Approaches and Strategies for Third-Party Coordination
Despite the limited use of systematic or formal coordination as a conflict resolution approach by third parties, scholars have suggested a number of approaches and strategies. Kriesberg (1996) has advocated for consultation among intermediaries as an effective way to coordinate and build consensus on the roles that various actors can play in peace
processes. Crocker et al (2002), Kriesberg (1996), Rubin (1992), and Susskind & Babbit (1992) have suggested that coordination at multiple levels is a prerequisite for sustainable peace. Kriesberg maintains that coordination between intermediaries at only one level of conflict may fail to achieve sustainable peace, which requires coordination from the top to the local levels (Kriesberg 1996). Susskind and Babbit argue that it is important to recognise which type of mediator can be most effective when and where (Susskind and Babbitt 1992). According to Crocker et al (2002), different mediators may perform different roles at different stages of the conflict and peace process. For example, if there is a low level of violence, then a combination of track-one and track-two mediation assistance may be required. In the case of a medium level of violence, track-two agencies can support activities related to the pre- and post-negotiation processes, while great powers and coalitions of states can be involved in the formal negotiation processes. This assistance can be sequential, as track-two actors take responsibility for the pre- and post-negotiation processes, and track-one actors take responsibility for formal negotiation processes. In the case of high levels of violence, second-track actors can still be involved in the pre- and post-negotiation processes, and actors such as great powers and international and regional organisations can be involved in formal negotiations. This type of mediation will also be sequential (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2002).

Nan and Strimling argue that third parties can collaborate throughout the conflict cycle. However, the best collaboration occurs when they have established ‘shared goals’ to achieve clear outcomes (Nan and Strimling 2004). Heldt suggests the need for ‘ideal planning’ to address the coordination problems associated with diplomatic peacemaking. In his view, coordination problems can be resolved in a given conflict by limiting the number of interveners and by encouraging one third party, such as the UN or an Intergovernmental Organisation (IGO), to take overall responsibility. However, Heldt also points to the implementation difficulties of such provisions in some regions, such as Asia and Africa, mainly due to the “(sub-)regional rivalries and unresolved disputes, and because of vested interests in the conflicts among some countries” (Heldt 2013, p. 16).
The formation of formal and informal third-party coordination mechanisms is also regarded as crucial in the literature. By the mid-2000s more than 30 coordination mechanisms were in existence in several conflict-affected countries, with the participation of major third-party interveners. These mechanisms are often known as friend, contact and core groups. Whitfield classifies 30 different mechanisms in five broad categories: Contact Group, Group of Friends, Friends of a Country, Implementation and Monitoring Groups, and Coordination Mechanisms for Implementation Processes. These coordination mechanisms are not very different in terms of their core functions, as many of them are responsible for the collective implementation of peace agreements, conduct of peacebuilding initiatives, monitoring of the peace process, and so on (Whitfield 2008b). Although the formation of third-party coordination mechanisms is practiced in different conflict settings, previous research does not inform us whether such mechanisms were used widely as a core intervention strategy, or whether they merely took place along with other intervention approaches. There is also a lack of clarity about how many of these mechanisms were initiated by third parties, and how many were initiated by the conflicting parties.

### 2.7 Who Coordinates with Whom?

There is no clear, systematic or sufficient explanation in the literature regarding the nature and characteristics of third-party relationships in peace processes. The bulk of the literature is focused on the coordinated relationship between official and unofficial interveners (Böhmelt 2010, Chataway 1998, Chigas 1997, Fisher 2006, Grozhev and Boyadjiev 2005, Gurkaynak 2007, Kraft 2000, Kriesberg 1996). This section provides a discussion of the dynamics of official-unofficial third-party coordination, which may provide a basis for exploring other types of third-party coordination dynamics.

There is a common argument in the literature that track-two (non-official) initiatives complement the track-one (official) mediation process, and that their relationship is often informal and interactive in nature. Continuous interaction and communication between track-one and track-two actors means acting together in identifying effective peacemaking strategies (Gurkaynak 2007). Official diplomats, due to the bounded nature of their work, may face difficulties in establishing proper contacts on the ground and
even identifying the best problem-solving strategies. In such cases, track-two diplomacy can be a very useful resource for track-one diplomacy (Chataway 1998).

Scholars have also emphasised the interrelatedness of official and non-official actors in building a real and sustainable peace. Grozov and Boyadjieva argue that “a real and lasting peace will only be achieved when there is a genuine desire for peace amongst the government, civic and private sectors” (Grozov and Boyadjiev 2005, p. 65). Bohmelt’s findings suggest that due to resource strength and leverage over adversaries, actors involved in track-one diplomacy have been found to be more effective and influential than those involved in track-two diplomacy. An alternate view is that a combination of official and non-official track action can be more effective than independent track action (Böhmelt 2010). Gurkayanak agrees that “track one, while formulating or evaluating its policies, often benefits from the ideas generated at these unofficial meetings, because information garnered from multiple sources relevant to a conflict leads to better policies” (Gurkaynak 2007, p. 64). According to Chataway, unofficial diplomacy can be useful before and after the formal negotiation. Beforehand, unofficial actors may contribute to bringing the adversaries to the negotiation table, while afterwards they can serve as a watchdog to the implementation of the agreement (Chataway 1998). Fisher emphasises track-one and track-two collaboration mainly during the pre-negotiation phase, and suggests that such collaborative efforts can make an important contribution to the final outcome of the official negotiation process (Fisher 2006). Most scholars agree that unofficial initiatives can be helpful to the smooth functioning of official initiatives.

2.8 The Determinants of Coordination Effectiveness
What makes a third-party coordination process effective? Scholars have forwarded a number of proposals for enhancing the effectiveness of third-party coordination. Strimling argues that a ‘long-term, strategic, and highly collaborative’ effort is essential for coordination effectiveness (Strimling 2006). She also maintains that effective communication among mediators is vital for improved coordination. Interveners’ existing and past relationships also determine the effectiveness of coordination. According to Bohmelt, conflicting relationships between mediators in the past make their efforts less effective, whereas a friendly and cooperative relationship makes their intervention more
successful (Bohmelt 2010). Susskind and Babbit emphasise the importance of ‘right moment’ collaborative efforts among mediators (Susskind and Babbitt 1992). Commitment, leadership, and national and international consensus on peacemaking strategies are also crucial for making third-party coordination processes effective (Iji and Fuchinoue 2009). Nan and Strimling contend that coordination works well once there are defined roles, trust and respect among interveners (Nan and Strimling 2004).

Moreover, the use of appropriate third parties, with appropriate roles, in appropriate situations, is crucial to maximising the benefit of multiparty intervention. For example, official actors may be influential during the official negotiation process by using their leverage over the conflicting parties, whereas unofficial mediators such as NGOs and academics can be more influential during informal dialogue and interactive problem-solving processes (Fisher 2006). Proper attention to the selection of coalition partners is a prerequisite for an effective multiparty mediation (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001b).

Leadership, leading actors, and the existence of a coordinating institution are also argued to be vital for effective coordination among international actors (Iji and Fuchinoue 2009, Iji 2005, Pèlerin 2007). Emphasis is given to the leading actor’s coordination and collaboration with a diverse range of international actors, including neighboring states, major powers, international, regional and sub-regional organisations, ‘groups of friends,’ NGOs, and even diaspora populations. The leading actor’s coordination with such a diverse range of international actors can help to make them ‘engaged and informed’ about the intervention process. It may also help them to seek cooperation from other actors (Pèlerin 2007).

There is also an emphasis on the joint involvement of both local actors and international actors to obtain the best outcome of intervention efforts (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001b, Gizelis and Kosek 2005, Garb and Nan 2006, Pèlerin 2007). In this regard, the work of Wehr and Lederach is relevant, as they have emphasised the connection and coordination between insider-partial and outsider-neutral mediators. The insider-partial mediators who have emerged from within the conflict situation itself have solid knowledge of the conflict and the conflicting parties which outsider-neutral interveners
may lack, despite their high level of leverage over the parties. In this regard, collaboration between both types of interveners would assist in obtaining the best mediation outcome (Wehr and Lederach 1991).

Nan and Strimling have pointed out the following three components of effective cooperation among third parties:

- Clarify clearly defined separate complementary roles for official and unofficial interveners in order to develop shared visions of mutually reinforcing activities to reach shared goals of stronger peace processes.
- Develop personal and institutional relationships of trust and respect between official and unofficial interveners.
- Develop long-term initiatives and encourage field-based cooperation (decentralized planning) amongst staff representing official and unofficial efforts (Nan and Strimling 2004)

The need for local participation during the intervention process is another dimension which a number of scholars have emphasised. According to Crocker et al, local as well as national actors need to be engaged to support the broader peace process (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001b). Gizelis and Kosek argue that humanitarian intervention demands the joint involvement of local and external actors, as the extent of involvement and consultation with local third parties determines the effectiveness of external actors. Local actors’ involvement and consultation increases the credibility of international intervention and can prevent possible conflicts that might arise because of such intervention (Gizelis and Kosek 2005). Garb and Nan, referring to the Abkhaz-Georgian peace process, also emphasise the value of combining efforts of local and international peacebuilders to create ‘a vibrant citizen-based peace process’ (Garb and Nan 2006). Similarly, Pelerin argues that a combined effort of local/national and international mediators is useful for obtaining the best outcome of mediation efforts (Pèlerin 2007). There is a consensus that the involvement of local third parties in intervention processes is important for achieving a successful outcome.
Campbell and Hartnett, with their two decades of interactions with individuals from the development, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, humanitarian and conflict resolution communities, have drawn a number of conclusions regarding the importance of successful coordination in conflict resolution processes. They argue, first, that coordination contributes to managing potential tensions and increasing understanding of other perspectives. Second, instead of setting up a hierarchical and authoritarian coordination structure among different agencies, they suggest that multilateral organisations, bilateral initiatives, non-governmental organisations, and incentive-driven coordination processes function more effectively. Third, some degree of coordination between local and international actors contributes to the long-term effectiveness of coordinated efforts. Fourth, a decentralised decision-making processes, but with strong vertical linkages between the headquarters and the field, are important for effective coordination and to ensure accountability for actions taken on the ground. Moreover, integrated conflict analysis, scenario planning and gaming tools are important for building relationships and fostering understanding of the different agencies’ perspectives and approaches (Campbell and Hartnett 2005).

A coordination network is one mechanism for ensuring coordination among third parties. Drawing on the experience of the Georgian-Abkhaz peace process, some fundamental components that made the coordination network workable include: “inclusivity and transparency; in-person meetings; absence of a formal organizational structure; autonomy of each organization; focus on integrative agreements; and a culture of coordination” (Garb and Nan 2006).

In the context of post-war third-party coordination, Paris argues that “effective coordination requires striking a balance between competing imperatives, which are shaped by the characteristics of the environment and the actors to be coordinated” (Paris 2008, p. 53). From Crocker et al.’s point of view, mediators’ commitment to work under agreed common principles is vital for the effectiveness of the coalition of mediators. Even if mediators do not fully collaborate, they can at least share the burden of mediation efforts in various ways, such as providing resources or avoiding conflict or cementing a
peace agreement. Inclusion of powerful third parties within the coalition can contribute to the effectiveness of intervention efforts (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001b).

The presence of institutionalised mechanisms has been recommended as another strategy for effective third-party coordination, in order to “promote regular, sustained, and meaningful interaction between intermediaries” (Strimling 2006, p. 116). Similarly, selection of a lead actor for major mediatory efforts, especially for the implementation of a peace agreement, is pivotal for strategic coordination among third-party interveners. Strimling emphasises that the lead actor should have the freedom to set intervention priorities, while other third parties should follow the set priorities and strategies. If a problem arises between third parties in the course of the intervention process, then the lead actor should act as a dispute resolution body (Jones 2001).

With reference to conflict resolution efforts in Mozambique, Jackson suggests three policy proposals for effective third-party coordination:

First, international organizations and states concerned about intervening in an internal conflict need to have systems in place for identifying potential non-official mediators from among the local and international NGO community. This requirement obviously involves greater networking with the NGO community, and establishing forums for exchange and cooperation. Second, special care needs to be directed toward establishing trust and training the parties during the pre-negotiation phase. The temptation to move straight into public negotiations must be resisted. Third, much greater attention needs to be paid to the question of coordination. As early as possible, competing and multiple mediation strands need to be drawn into a single thread and the potential roles of third parties need to be carefully monitored (Jackson 2005)

Moreover, willingness and a mutual interest in coordinating with each other are important factors behind the effectiveness of multiparty intervention. If the mediators have this ‘willingness’ and ‘mutual interest,’ if there is an adequate ‘division of labor,’ and if ‘constructive interaction’ between official and unofficial interveners is practiced, then effective coordination is possible (Iji 2005).

It is clear that the existing literature has significantly elaborated a wide range of strategies that have the potential for third-party coordination effectiveness. Some of these
effectiveness strategies are generated through empirical observation of different conflicts. Many of them have been suggested as possible strategies.

3. Analysis of the Literature and Research Gap

A tentative consensus in the literature is that third-party coordination can be a useful approach for resolving conflicts and supporting a peace process systematically. Scholars have offered many proposals for how coordination should take place among third parties and how it can be more effective. The existing literature also describes a broad range of third-party coordination issues within the discussion of various forms of coordination, such as diplomatic coordination, official-unofficial coordination, and post-war third-party coordination. Some pertinent themes have also emerged in the literature related to the advantages and disadvantages of coordination, challenges to coordination, approaches and strategies for coordination, and the effectiveness of third-party coordination.

Despite capturing a number of aspects of third-party coordination, the existing literature is not sufficient to deepen our understanding of this particular issue. A key weakness in the literature is the failure to deliver a comprehensive concept of third-party coordination. I therefore argue that it is important to construct a broader definition and framework of third-party coordination which could be taken as a reference point for understanding and analysing all coordination practices that occur in armed conflicts and peace processes. One of the aims of this review has been to bring together different concepts and definitions, in the interest of arriving at a comprehensive definition of third-party coordination.

Our current state of knowledge surrounding third-party coordination is partial and fragmentary, based on the study of many small subsets related to third-party coordination, such as diplomatic coordination, official-unofficial coordination, and post-war coordination. In addition, much previous empirical research is based on the study of a single case study, mostly with the use of secondary source of information. This often prevents us from obtaining an actual picture of third-party coordination, as there is no inclusion of the perspectives of third-party practitioners and other relevant stakeholders who are dealing with coordination issues on a regular basis. Hence, another crucial aim of this study is to conduct a comprehensive study of third-party coordination by highlighting
the voices of third-party practitioners and other relevant stakeholders directly working in two different conflict contexts.

Some fundamental issues related to third-party coordination, particularly issues around conditions for third-party coordination and the impact of relationships and power dynamics on third-party coordination, have received very little attention in the existing literature. There is thus the lack of a solid theoretical/policy framework or any standard and identifiable sets of indicators that could assist us in recognising the occurrence of third-party coordination. I argue that the conditions under which third parties coordinate are important, as they are the most influential and primary elements in shaping the overall dynamics of third-party coordination. A better understanding of the real-world conditions of third-party coordination could also contribute to the design of better policies and strategies for third-party coordination, as it provides insights into the coordination practices and behaviours of third parties, such as the timing and context of coordination and the structure and composition of coordination.

Although the existing conflict management literature provides a clear indication that the occurrence of coordination requires a friendly relationship among third parties, it does not explicitly explain the reasons behind more or less harmonious third-party relationships. In addition, the existing literature is strongly focused on the relationship between official and unofficial third parties, and very little attention is given to other relational dimensions, such as between local and external third parties, among local third parties, and among external third parties. Regardless of the importance of a good relationship between official and non-official third parties, this conclusion alone does not provide a complete picture of third-party relationship dynamics, because this is just one subset of the dynamics of third-party relationships. To gain a more systematic and in-depth understanding of this dimension, it needs to be viewed from a broader perspective, including a comparative understanding of which types of third-party relationships are more important to conflict resolution than others.

Consequently, I argue that the power status (both economic and political) of third parties is one of the most important elements in the third-party coordination process. Third parties often make decisions regarding whether or not to coordinate with other third
parties based on their power and position within a particular conflict-affected country. Yet, despite the obvious significance of power status, the existing literature fails to explicitly address the role of the power status of third parties in the coordination process.

Against this backdrop, the two main objectives of this study concern the articulation of a contingency model for the better understanding of two crucial aspects of third-party coordination: a) conditions for third-party coordination; and b) the impact of relationships and power dynamics on third-party coordination. The study aims to construct a set of contextual, policy, and motive-based factors that may have both theoretical and policy significance in relation to the two themes mentioned above (see Chapter 1 for detailed information).

Finally, the existing literature is found to be quite explanatory for proposing a set of strategies for third-party coordination effectiveness. Some of these strategies are drawn from empirical observation, whereas a large number of strategies are simply proposed as possible strategies for coordination effectiveness. There is little systematic empirical evidence or concrete explanations that could inform us about the degree of usefulness of third-party coordination strategies in the different phases of armed conflict. In this research, I am particularly interested in examining the general applicability of these suggested strategies in the cases selected for this study.

### 4. Theoretical Framework

Based on the review of the third-party coordination literature and my own understanding of the subject, it is my hypothesis that the dynamics of third-party coordination are significantly influenced by the conflict context as well as the policy interests and motives of third parties in the particular conflict-affected country. The review of literature also provides a clear indication that three specific issues – namely, the conditions for third-party coordination, the impact of relationships and power dynamics on third-party coordination, and the effectiveness of third-party coordination – require further investigation in order to understand the deeper dynamics of these fundamental components of third-party coordination. On this basis, I suggest a theoretical framework that could provide a solid foundation for constructing a set of research propositions to be used as an analytical framework for further investigations.
In this section, I provide a brief overview of theories drawn from sociology, critical peace studies, and the international conflict management literature. This will help to establish a strong theoretical foundation for further discussions and explorations of the topic. Specifically, I present Resource Mobilisation (RM) theory, drawn from sociology, as a key theoretical model for this research. Along with RM theory, I also describe other supporting theories that are relevant for each area of investigation. For example, motives theory and ripeness theory, drawn from the international conflict management literature, are chosen to support the first area of investigation (the conditions for third-party coordination). Theories such as the notion of hybridity and power, and the leverage of mediators, have been selected to support the second area of investigation (the impact of relationships and power dynamics on third-party coordination). Finally, mediation success theory, drawn from the international mediation literature, has been selected to support the third area of investigation (effectiveness of third-party coordination).

The roadmap of this section is as follows: I firstly describe the basic features and characteristics of each theory; secondly, I provide an analysis of their relevancy for this research; and finally, I draw a set of research propositions for further investigation.

4.1 Resource Mobilisation Theory

Resource Mobilisation theory was propounded in the 1970s in relation to the study of the dynamics of social movements (Buechler 1993, Canel 1997, Edwards and Gillham 2006, Jenkins 1983, McCarthy and Zald 2001). This theory elaborates how a group or a social movement mobilizes and manages human, financial, and other external and internal resources for achieving goals through collective actions (Canel 1997, Jenkins 1983). One key objective of resource mobilization is to bring groups of common interest together, with a view that such efforts will help to “build solidarity, raise consciousness of common interests, and create opportunities for collective action” (Fireman and Gamson 1979, p. 2).

RM theory has a number of features, as it analyses conditions and contexts that motivate an individual or a group to take part in certain collective actions. RM theorists argue that individuals’ decisions to take part in such a movement are determined by a cost-benefit analysis of their perceived participation (Klandermans 1984, Fireman and Gamson 1979).
The realisation of shared interests by the people who share grievances, interests or beliefs is another factor behind participating in any collective action. Other motivations for becoming involved in collective actions are related to people’s desire to express solidarity with a group with which they are associated, and this comes with a sense of responsibility to defend the values of the group to which they belong (Fireman and Gamson 1979). RM theorists also argue that the realisation of a sense of urgency surrounding a collective action encourages people to get involved in collective action. Fireman and Gamson argue that “Whatever events lower the chances that constituents can realize their interests without collective action thereby raise the necessity for collective action. Whatever events raise the chances that collective action can successfully promote or protect constituents’ interests thereby raise the opportunity for collective action” (Fireman and Gamson 1979, p. 32).

Fireman and Gamson maintain that necessity, opportunity, and loyalty and responsibility are major factors that increase the chances of a collective action. They note that “the necessity of some collective action is increased by events which threaten the interests of its constituents, undermine their trust in authorities, and discredit rival possibilities of collective action” (Fireman and Gamson 1979, p. 35). Likewise, “the opportunity for collective action is increased by events that raise the credibility of the collective actor, throw its antagonists into disarray, and make available coalition partners and third party support” (Ibid, p. 38). The loyalty and responsibility come from “a group with which they experience solidarity, and the other acting through people's responsibility to personal principles which are at stake in collective action” (Ibid).

RM theory also addresses the role of leadership in collective action (Buechler 1993, Canel 1997). According to Canel, leaders are particularly important to “identify and define grievances, develop a group sense, devise strategies, and facilitate mobilization by reducing its costs and taking advantages of opportunities for collective action” (Canel 1997, p.4). Buechler contends that an effective collective action hinges on the movement organisers’ and leaders’ ability to “gain access to sufficient resources and motivating rational actors to become involved (Buechler 1993, p. 228).
An adequate understanding of the political environment by the movement organisers has been considered as another crucial factor behind the success or failure of a collective action (Pichardo 1988, Canel 1997). Pichardo suggests that an understanding of “the alignment of political groups and the susceptibility of the social structure to the efforts of social movements” (Pichardo 1988, p.102) is crucial for the occurrence and effectiveness of collective action. Canel (1997), on the other hand, highlights the consciousness of political opportunities for collective action:

The structure of political opportunities refers to the conditions in the political system which either facilitate or inhibit collective action. Political and cultural traditions, for example, will determine the range of legitimate forms of struggle in a given society. The degree to which civil liberties and individual rights are respected in a given society will also facilitate or inhibit collective action (Canel 1997, p. 5).

Canel further argues that it is crucial to recognise the opportunities for collective action and act accordingly:

[O]pportunities for collective action come and go. The challenge for social movements is to identify and seize opportunities for action. This implies a cost-benefit assessment of the likelihood of success, given their evaluation of the possible outcomes of their actions and the responses of their adversaries as well as those of their allies (Canel 1997, p. 5).

RM theory also emphasises the importance of sound relationships and interactions with different external and internal actors, where the external actors are referred to as the media, authorities, and other movement organisations, and the internal actors are referred to as members of a group who have a sense of common identity, shared fate, and a general commitment to defend the group (McCarthy and Zald 1977, Fireman and Gamson 1979). According to Fireman and Gamson, good relationships among different actors are crucial because “people who drift without solidarity in relations, without firm principles, anxious, atomized, anomie – such people are unlikely to mobilize for collective action” (Fireman and Gamson 1979, p. 28).

There is debate in the academic literature regarding the organisational structure of the social movement for collective action. Some scholars, such as McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Jenkins (1983), argue that the movement should operate on the basis of a more centralised approach, while others maintain that it should operate by means of a
decentralised structure. Jenkins (1983) claims that “centralized, formally structured movement organizations are more typical of modern social movements and more effective at mobilizing resources and mounting sustained challenges than decentralized, informal movement structures” (Jenkins 1983, p. 528). He does, however, admit that, despite some disadvantages of a decentralised organisational structure, it can also be “highly adaptive, encouraging tactical experimentation, competition among subgroups, and lessened vulnerability to suppression or cooptation by authorities” (Jenkins 1983, p. 539).

Based on the above description, it can be argued that RM is a relevant theoretical model for assessing a number of dimensions of third-party coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes. RM theory explains why and how the convergence of interests among people or groups motivates them to take part in collective action. This idea can be applied to assess the importance of shared conflict resolution goals and the convergence of interests in promoting third-party coordination. In addition, RM theory acknowledges that a better understanding of context and political environment contributes to the promotion of collective action. This notion can be directly applicable to an exploration of the extent to which contextual factors, such as the conflict context and the existing political environment, play a significant role in the occurrence of coordination. RM theory also addresses the importance of leadership for collective action, and this can be helpful in assessing whether the role of a lead agency has significance for the occurrence of third-party coordination. The relationship dimension discussed under RM theory is relevant as well for an examination of the factors that influence third-party relationship dynamics in armed conflict and peace processes. Finally, the organisational structure of social movement operations discussed in this theory can be contextualised for exploring the impact of formal and informal third-party intervention structures related to the occurrence and effective of coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes.

4.2 Motives Theory
The existing conflict management literature suggests that third-party involvement in civil conflicts is driven by numerous motives. Opportunism and threat response, security and strategic interests, ensuring solidity of the international system, and interests in the
outcome of the conflict have been pointed out as key motives behind major and regional powers’ intervention interests in armed conflicts (Iji 2001, Kathman 2010, Kleiboer 1995, Stedman 2001). Iji and Fuchinoue have classified the motives of states, international organisations, and NGOs involved in conflict intervention. They argue that states are primarily involved in a conflict for their national interests, whereas international organisations and NGOs are interested in demonstrating their usefulness (Iji and Fuchinoue 2009).

Some scholars maintain that a combination of humanitarian, security, and national interests motivate third parties to intervene in conflict. Touval and Zartman suggest that third-party motives can be a combination of humanitarian interest and self-interest aimed at extending influence over the conflicting parties, which may provide a long-term political benefit to the interveners by incorporating their interests in the outcome of a mediated conflict (Zartman and Touval 1985). Janus believes that a third party’s decision to intervene in a conflict may be because they have “direct economic or political stakes, sympathize with one of the parties to conflict, suffer spillovers, or be concerned with humanitarian issues” (Janus 2009, p. 191). Third parties’ desire to gain prestige, satisfaction, rewards, incentives, and a concern to make things different in conflict-affected countries or communities also motivate them to intervene in a conflict (Greig and Regan 2008, Höglund and Svensson 2009, Höglund and Svensson 2011, Maoz and Terris 2005, Smith 1985, Wall, Standifer, and Stark 2001, Young 1972, Zartman 2009).

In certain cases, human rights and humanitarian concerns have also attracted some third parties to intervene in armed conflicts. Other countries have also set ‘peace’ as a foreign policy goal (Whitfield 2008b).

The above explanations highlight the fact that third-party interveners are engaged in armed conflicts and peace processes with certain motives, primarily for fulfilling their own interests and only secondarily for the benefit of the countries affected by armed conflict. Motives theory thus provides a basis for exploring whether third-party motives have significance for the occurrence of coordination. I suggest that divergent motives are a crucial factor behind the lack of coordinated third-party relationships. Divergent motives often discourage third parties from coordinating with other third parties, unless
the coordination contributes to their individual intervention goals. I further argue that if the conflict resolution goal of a third party is based primarily on humanitarian grounds, they are more inclined to maintain friendly relationships with other third parties.

4.3 Ripeness Theory
Ripeness theory explains the contexts and conditions that motivate the conflicting parties to engage in the negotiation processes and ultimately find possible solutions to the conflict (Forde 2004, Greig and Regan 2008, Kleiboer 1994, 1995, O'kane 2006, Zartman 2000). Ripeness does not take place when the conflict is at a lower level, because one or another conflicting group may have expectations of achieving their goals through violent means (Kleiboer 1995). Ripeness only arises when the conflicting parties reach the stage of a mutually hurting stalemate due to the destructive and ambivalent nature of conflict (Zartman 2001, 2006). Ripeness arises when a sufficient number of people from both conflicting parties internalize the fact that negotiations are necessary to halt the destructiveness of the conflict (Marie Olson and Alethia 2011). Ripeness is also the product of a level of realization from the conflicting parties that achieving their goals is not possible through violent means and a preferable condition for initiating negotiations is necessary (Greig and Regan 2008).

However, ripeness in itself does not necessarily lead to a solution to the conflict; it must be recognised, either by the conflicting parties or third parties, so that the ripe moment can be utilised for initiating negotiation processes (Zartman 2001, 2006). Ripeness is a stage of maturation for conflict resolution and it does not come about repeatedly; rather, it comes and goes quickly (Kleiboer 1995). An analysis and understanding of ripeness is crucial for potential mediators and for the conflicting parties so that they can take timely action in conflict resolution efforts. In order to realise ripeness in a conflict, an understanding of the local political context is also salient, so that a potential mediator can make an effort to convince the influential leaders from both sides of the conflict that the time is ripe to explore the possibilities for a peaceful resolution (Kleiboer 1994). A ripe moment can only be identified after a “careful analysis of the dynamics of the conflict and how its evolution affects the capabilities, perceptions, and behaviors of the parties” (Kleiboer 1995, p. 4). Moreover, a ‘complete willingness’ of powerful leaders from both
sides of the conflict is a prerequisite for finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. Kleiboer (1994) argues that ripeness contributes to convincing these leaders to find an alternative rather than continue the fighting.

Ripeness theory is about recognising the right moment for negotiation. This notion of ripeness can equally be applicable in the context of third-party coordination. In particular, we could ask questions such as: Are there any ripe moments for third-party coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes? How do third parties identify such ripe moments for coordination?

4.4 Notion of Hybridity

The terms *hybrid* or *hybridity* have become buzz words in peace and conflict studies and have been used widely to describe the characteristics of various peacebuilding efforts, such as hybrid peacemaking missions, hybrid criminal tribunals, hybrid governance, and hybrid peace (Millar 2014). The notion of hybridity describes the composition, structure and characteristics of interactions and relationships of different peacebuilding actors and structures from the local to the international level (Mac Ginty 2010, Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012, Millar 2014, Millar, Lijn, and Verkoren 2013, Peterson 2012).

Jarstad and Belloni note that there is always some kind of confrontational relationship between local and external peacebuilding actors, and that this often motivates them to impose their own values, norms and practices upon each other. In the end, if they compromise, hybridity takes place in various peacebuilding practices (Jarstad and Belloni 2012).

A number of scholars have defined and further conceptualised this term. For Peterson (2012), hybridity refers to “the interactions of a wide array of actors involved in an even wider range of activities through which multiple hybridities are evidenced and created” (Peterson 2012, p. 10). Jarstad and Belloni (2012) define hybridity as “a condition where liberal and illiberal norms, institutions, and actors coexist, interact, and even clash” (Jarstad and Belloni 2012, p. 1). MacGinty and Sanghera (2012) characterise hybridity as the dynamics of interaction and relationships between top-down and bottom-up actors (Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012). They further describe hybridity in the following terms:
The picture that should emerge from considering hybridity is a messy, awkward one far removed from the neat silos one often finds in charts of the linkages between governments, donors and international NGOs. Instead, it is useful to conceptualize hybridity as a complex and constantly moving drama in which no actor is able to maintain a unilateral course. Actors are not necessarily consistent in their actions, and may be compliant and cooperative on one issue but offer resistance on another (Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012, p. 4).

The notion of ‘frictions’ is another dimension that broadens our understanding of hybridity by explaining the complex and multifaceted interactions between local and international actors. The frictions concept informs us about the reasons behind achieving different outcomes from diverse local and international interactions (Millar, Lijn, and Verkoren 2013). In this regard, Miller et al argue that “the outcomes of interaction processes between international and local agents will always be unexpected. Sometimes frictions may assist in stabilizing some form of peace, sometimes they will not. The results are sometimes hybrid and sometimes not, but whatever they are, they cannot simply be planned, funded and implemented” (Millar, Lijn, and Verkoren 2013, p. 142).

The above explanations indicate that the existence of hybridity can be taken for granted in various peacebuilding efforts. It describes the ability of local and external actors to develop the capability to work together and even to resist each other when that is needed. The notion of hybridity can provide a basis for exploring the dynamics of relationships between various third-party actors, such as those between local and external actors, among external actors, and among local actors. It can describe the relationships and levels of interaction among third parties who are engaged in intervention actions through both formal and informal structures.

4.5 Power and Leverage of Mediators
The existing mediation literature discusses the power and leverage of third parties and their impact on the occurrence and outcome of mediation, and concludes that powerful third parties are more active and influential actors than less powerful third parties. Svensson concludes that power mediators out-perform pure (weak) mediators in terms of convincing conflicting parties to sign a peace agreement (Svensson 2007b). Bercovitch and Schneider reveal the dominance of the international conflict management market by the US and other powerful permanent members of the UN Security Council (Bercovitch
For a number of reasons, the power status of third parties is important in armed conflicts and peace processes. For example, the power and leverage of third parties can help to reduce the cost of conflict (Beardsley 2009, Beardsley et al. 2006, Schrodt and Gerner 2004, Smith and Stam 2003, Zartman and Touval 1985); increase the benefits of cooperation (Beardsley 2009, Beardsley et al. 2006, Smith and Stam 2003, Zartman and Touval 1985); and support and shape the direction of post-agreement programmes (Beardsley et al. 2006, Svensson 2007b, Zartman and Touval 1985, Bercovitch 1997). In addition, powerful third parties have the capability to perform all conflict mediation activities, whereas the less powerful third parties cannot perform some of the roles of powerful third parties, such as utilising a ‘carrots and sticks’ approach (Beardsley 2009).

All of the above explanations clearly demonstrate that the power status of third parties plays an influential role in armed conflicts and peace processes. This conclusion leads me to articulate a research proposition which can assist in evaluating the extent to which the power status of third parties dominates third-party coordination processes, in the same way that it dominates broader intervention processes.

### 4.6 Mediation Effectiveness

According to Bercovitch, any kind of positive impact or effect created by third-party mediators to support a country moving in a non-violent direction can be defined as mediation success. If activities such as the signing of a peace agreement and accepting a ceasefire or settlement or other conflict resolution occur because of mediation, that is an indication of mediation success (Bercovitch 2007). Bercovitch also identifies the criteria for mediation success from the process and outcome points of view:

>[S]uccess may be achieved if the parties in conflict feel empowered, or feel that their concerns were addressed respectfully. There may be no successful outcome (in any sense of the word), but the parties still feel they have achieved success in the process. In the same way, there may be a process of mediation marred by many procedural disagreements and dissatisfaction, but it may lead to a cessation of violence and even a formal agreement (Bercovitch 2007, p. 291).
Significant discussions in the existing literature focus on explaining the factors contributing to mediation success and/or effectiveness (Bercovitch 1986, Bercovitch 2007, Kleiboer 1996, Regan 1996, Regan and Stam 2000, Siniver 2006, Svensson 2007b). However, scholars have adopted different approaches to defining mediation success. For example, Regan and Stam (2000) argue that timing plays a crucial role in making intervention efforts effective (Regan and Stam 2000). Svensson (2007) and Siniver (2006) have defined mediation success from the perspective of the power and leverage of third parties. Svensson concludes that a joint effort of power and pure mediator may “be the best way of enhancing the prospect of mediation success” (Svensson 2007b, p. 230), whereas Siniver maintains that third parties’ excessive leverage over the disputants has the best potential for mediation success (Siniver 2006). Regan (1996) concludes that intervention strategies adopted by third parties are more important than the characteristics of the conflict in achieving the desired intervention goals (Regan 1996).

There are also other broad categories for explaining the factors influencing the outcome of mediation. In Bercovitch’s view, the identity of the conflicting parties, the nature of the dispute, and the characteristics of the mediators are key to determining the outcome of mediation (Bercovitch 1986). Kleiboer (1996) has clustered four major factors – the characteristics of dispute, the parties engaged in mediation, the characteristics of mediator, and the international context – as key determinants for the outcome of mediation. She identifies a number of sub-themes within each of these factors. For example, within the ‘characteristics of dispute’ category, she identifies conflict ripeness, the level of conflict intensity, and the nature of the issues in conflict as key sub-factors influencing the mediation outcome. Within the ‘parties engaged in mediation’ factor, she specifies six different components for influencing mediation outcomes, namely, their identification, cohesiveness, type of regime, motivation to mediate, previous and ongoing relationships, and the distribution of power between them. Regarding the ‘characteristics of mediator’ category, (im)partiality, leverage and status have been identified as major components for influencing the mediation outcome. The ‘international context’ is associated with factors such as the impact of conflicts from other parts of the world, and
political and economic pressure imposed by powerful third parties to influence the outcome of conflicts (Kleiboer 1996).

A number of mediation effectiveness strategies suggested by this theory can be utilised to assess the effectiveness of third-party coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes. In particular, two determents of mediation outcome – the characteristics of the mediator, and intervention strategies – have been found to be useful as a reference point for assessing the effectiveness of third-party coordination.

5. Research Propositions

The theoretical framework presented above and the gaps identified in the literature provide a basis for developing a set of research propositions. Despite identifying a number of research gaps in the literature, it is not possible to address all of them within a single thesis, because of the time frame and the length and scope of the research project. Three important and highly interrelated sub-themes related to third-party coordination – conditions for third-party coordination, the degree of influence of third-party relationships and power status in the coordination process, and the effectiveness of third-party coordination – have therefore been chosen for further exploration. This examination leads to eight related research propositions, which I offer as points of departure for further interpretation and analysis of the core research themes.

5.1 Propositions for Identifying the Conditions for Third-party Coordination

Proposition 1: Contextual factors such as the existing political environment and the conflict context determine whether or not third parties coordinate.

Proposition 2: Shared conflict resolution goals and the convergence of interests promote third-party coordination. In contrast, conflicting policy interests prevent third-party coordination.

Proposition 3: The role of a lead agency contributes significantly to the occurrence of third-party coordination.
5.2 Propositions for Assessing the Degree of Influence of Third-party Relationships and Power Status on the Coordination Process

**Proposition 1:** Third-party coordination is easier among actors who share more or less similar values and ideologies and have similar origins. Conversely, it is more difficult for third parties who have dissimilar values and ideologies and different origins.

**Proposition 2:** The existence of formal intervention mechanisms endorsed by the conflicting parties makes third-party relationships and coordination processes stronger than independent intervention mechanisms.

**Proposition 3:** The power status of third parties is the most important factor influencing the third-party coordination process.

5.3 Propositions for Exploring the Effectiveness of Third-party Coordination

**Proposition 1:** The joint involvement of both local and external third parties in intervention efforts has a higher potential for effective conflict resolution than the involvement of only local third parties or only external third parties.

**Proposition 2:** The existence of formal intervention structures mandated by the conflicting parties makes third-party intervention efforts more effective for conflict resolution than settings that lack such structures.

6. Conclusion

In this chapter I have reviewed the existing conflict management literature from the perspective of third-party coordination, and provided an overview of major scholarly works which have discussed the notion of third-party coordination. As a result, I have revealed the main research gaps related to this topic. I have also presented a theoretical framework for this research which, in combination with the review of literature, has provided a basis for developing a set of research propositions to be examined in the three different empirical chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) of this thesis. In the following chapter, I will explain the research methodology employed in this research.
Chapter 3
Research Methodology

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter I reviewed the existing literature on the dynamics of third-party coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes, and identified a number of research gaps. I also presented a theoretical framework. More importantly, I developed a set of research propositions based on the theoretical framework and the gaps identified in the literature. This chapter provides an overview and explanation of the methodology used in this thesis, and highlights key methodological issues related to this research.

From the broadest perspective, this study aims to assess the dynamics of third-party coordination in conflict-affected countries and its impact on conflict resolution processes. Specifically, this research has three major objectives. First, it attempts to identify the conditions under which third parties coordinate in armed conflicts and peace processes. Second, it attempts to uncover the degree of influence of relationships and power dynamics on the coordination behaviors of third parties. Third, it examines the effectiveness of third-party coordination in successful conflict resolution efforts.

In order to achieve my research goals, I have adopted a broadly qualitative research approach in relation to the concurrent analysis of two cases – the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal, and the Moro conflict of the Philippines. Four specific reasons justify adopting a case study approach and the selection of these two cases for exploring the dynamics of third-party coordination. First, the case study method provides ample space for explaining this relatively new field of study in some detail and with the simultaneous observation of two separate cases. Focusing on only one case would not be as persuasive as two cases. Second, the multiple case study method provides a comparative understanding of the dynamics of third-party coordination, demonstrating the similarities and differences in third-party coordination patterns, practices and impacts in two distinct conflict contexts. In addition, the case selection process has been influenced by a number of factors, such as my personal in-depth understanding of the selected cases, the relevance of the selected conflicts, and the contemporary relevance of the conflicts and
peace processes for obtaining a fresh perspective on the research theme. Third, the case study method is also useful for providing a critical and comprehensive analysis of the research theme and for looking at the topic from multiple perspectives. Finally, a case study method assists in gaining an in-depth understanding of the research theme through a detailed exploration of the topic.

This is also a time-relevant empirical study, as there is to date no study on the third-party coordination theme which focuses on both the Moro conflict of the Philippines and the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal. There are thus very limited secondary sources of information on third-party coordination in relation to both of these cases.

Another crucial and innovative feature of this research project is the highlighting of the voices of third-party practitioners and other relevant stakeholders who often have to deal with coordination issues during their engagements in armed conflicts and peace processes in actual conflict situations. Third-party practitioners and other stakeholders, such as government officials and policymakers, are key actors who understand the coordination problem better than most; this means that they can provide more reliable information than other sources. No such research on third-party coordination has been conducted thus far which includes such a broad range of third-party interveners as research participants. In this regard, this research makes an original methodological as well as theoretical contribution in the field of third-party intervention research.

Third-party coordination is linked not only with policy perspectives but with behavioural aspects. It is related to third parties’ perceptions of themselves and others, and such dynamics are not explicitly stated in the public documents issued by third parties. The dynamics of third-party coordination can only be fully understood through direct human interaction, and interviews are an excellent way to engage in such interactions. These primary sources have of course been supplemented by secondary sources of information. In order to maintain the accuracy of the primary information, I have interviewed a broad and diverse range of third parties and other relevant experts and stakeholders. Such cross-party interview techniques have been useful in determining the accuracy of the information which is shared.
This research approach does have several limitations. First and foremost, it only addresses the coordination gap identified in the existing conflict management literature; it therefore does not cover the coordination gap that could be identifiable in other social sciences literature, such as political science, international relations and sociology. Second, this research has only assessed three fundamental dimensions of third-party coordination: the conditions for third-party coordination, the impact of relationships and power dynamics on third-party coordination, and the effectiveness of third-party coordination in terms of successful conflict resolution. This means that it does not present a complete picture of the dynamics of third-party coordination. Third, since this is a study of only two cases, it may be difficult to generalize the findings to other contexts. Fourth, as in-depth interviews are the major sources of information for this research, not all third parties have been included in the interview processes. Third parties who expressed interest in participating and who were approachable were included. Moreover, because the coordination gap is not a widely accepted notion by third-party interveners, there is a possibility that some respondents may have concealed some information, exaggerated, mis-remembered, or given information which they believed I wanted. Such practices may have impacted on the results of the research. Despite these limitations, this research nonetheless has the potential to contribute further to our understanding of the dynamics of third-party coordination.

2. Motivations for Carrying Out this Research

The factors that initially motivated me to conduct this research come from both the personal and theoretical levels. For the past ten tumultuous years in Nepal, I have been a frontline human rights and peace advocate, and have had an opportunity to work closely with a number of local and external third parties. I also had ample opportunity to witness the diverse engagements of third-party interveners and their impact on conflict resolution. This led me to question why these actors so often intervene in conflict and peace processes with a set agenda and thus only fulfil their own institutional policy interests. Although all of these local and external actors claimed that they were there to support the people of Nepal so as to bring the country out of the quagmire of violence and strife, they rarely coordinated their efforts during the actual intervention processes. I found similar claims and behaviours among local and external third parties in Mindanao, Philippines
during my six-month stay there as a participant in the Research Abroad programme of my university in the US. Witnessing all of these third-party intervention practices, it became clear to me that divergent motives and policy interests often impeded their coordination in intervention efforts. This aroused my curiosity to identify those conditions or commitments that might inspire them to coordinate.

These personal factors helped to shape my deep interest in identifying how third-party interveners with different roles, interests and motives have actually worked hand-in-hand in a particular conflict-affected country. I was further interested in obtaining a comparative understanding of third-party intervention processes and strategies in conflict settings that included my own country, Nepal. My theoretical ambition was to identify whether or not there are any relevant theories that explain the reasons behind the occurrence and effectiveness of third-party coordination and its impact on conflict resolution processes. I was also interested in familiarising myself with theoretical frameworks that suggest approaches and strategies for coordinated third-party intervention in conflict-affected countries. I was further interested in theory building, given the absence of theories in the areas of my research interest; and I was partially interested in theory testing, in the context of the lack of empirical analyses of the existing theories. These initial motivations pushed me to review the literature, which ultimately helped me to identify research problems and research gaps, and to finalise my research questions.

Several scholars underscore that a research problem determines the future direction of a research project, and that a research question generated through an understanding of the research problem drives and directs the entire study process. A foundational task of a researcher is thus to come up with a solid research question (Hoglund and Oberg 2011b). Having a clear and concise research question that directly addresses the research problem is a key factor in designing a results-driven research project (Berg and Lune 2004). My initial focus in the research design process was therefore to clearly spell out the research problems and come up with a research question that could direct me to address the specified research problems in a systematic way. A review of the literature and the identification of a research gap was a key activity in this regard. The review of the
literature also provided me with the clear idea to adopt a multiple case study-based qualitative inquiry as a key method for the research. In the following section, I discuss the qualitative research method and case study approach and the relevance of this approach for this study.

3. Qualitative Research Method and Methodology: An Overview

There is frequent use of the terms ‘method’ and ‘methodology’ in social science research. A method generally refers to the processes and strategies that have been applied in collecting the data, whereas a methodology provides the justification for adopting a certain research method (Jackson, Drummond, and Camara 2007, Tylor and Bogdan 1998). Qualitative and quantitative are two broad research methods, where the quantitative approach produces numerical data and the qualitative approach “produces descriptive data – people’s own written or spoken words and observable behavior” (Tylor and Bogdan 1998, p.7). In the social science model of research, the quantitative methodology has also been referred to as a ‘positivist’ approach, which adopts questionnaires, inventories and demography as the data collection method, with a view to producing data that is suitable for statistical analysis. Qualitative methodology has been referred to as a ‘phenomenologist’ approach, which may adopt participant observation and in-depth interviewing techniques for obtaining descriptive data (Tylor and Bogdan 1998). Since this is a qualitative study, this chapter focuses on qualitative methodology and the justification behind adopting this approach.

Qualitative research is driven by the need to understand human beings’ experiences in a humanistic and interpretive framework (Jackson, Drummond, and Camara 2007). The use of unstructured and semi-structured interviews have often been considered primary techniques in qualitative research methods (Burnard et al. 2008, Burnard 1991). According to Taylor and Bogdan (1998), qualitative research is about “understanding people from their own frames of reference and experiencing reality as they experience it” (Tylor and Bogdan 1998, p. 7). They define qualitative research as an inductive approach because “qualitative researchers develop concepts, insights, and understandings from patterns in the data rather than collecting data to assess preconceived models, hypothesis, or theories” (Ibid).
In qualitative research, researchers attempt to examine a topic from different perspectives. With the intensive study of a small group of subjects, qualitative research provides an in-depth understanding and firsthand knowledge of a particular topic. Such research can be conducted in various ways, such as through observing the daily lives of human beings, active listening, and looking at the various documents they produce (Tylor and Bogdan 1998). Jackson et al note that “the qualitative researcher relies on the participants to offer in-depth responses to questions about how they have constructed or understood their experience” (Jackson, Drummond, and Camara 2007, p. 23). Further, “the qualitative researcher will get much more information about a phenomenon, realizing that the major drawback will be that the results will not be generalizable to a population because very few participants participate in studies offering so much depth of detail” (Ibid).

According to Berg, the interest of a qualitative researcher is to look at how individuals situate themselves in a certain social settings and “how inhabitants of these settings make sense of their surroundings through symbols, rituals, social structures, social roles, and so forth” (Berg 2004, p. 7). Qualitative methods keep the researcher in close contact and connection with the subjects through a number of direct interaction approaches, such as in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. The qualitative method also helps to draw out the real-life experiences of people in their own words, instead of measuring them with pre-determined quantitative scales. Moreover, the qualitative method focuses on “hypotheses and theory generation rather than on hypothesis testing and theory verification, as is the case with most quantitative research” (Ponterotto 2002, p. 398).

My research embraces these notions and characteristics of qualitative research. It is focused on the analysis of perceptions, understandings and evidences shared by concerned individuals on the issues around third-party coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes. It is assumed that the explanation and analysis of experiences and perceptions shared by people who either have worked as third-party interveners or closely observed the intervention process can provide a deep-rooted knowledge of this issue from the perspective of the practitioner. Information related to coordination practices, behaviours, attitudes and the motives of each individual, agency and organisation has
rarely been publicised by the entities themselves, unless an element of reflective practice is built into the programme, or unless someone takes the initiative to expose these behaviors or ideas. The qualitative research method has become instrumental in this regard, because the presentation of real-life experiences of human beings is very difficult to measure through quantitative methods. It can also be problematic to interpret such results through a quantitative approach, unless a well-developed quantitative data set is available.

This research is not about identifying the frequency of third-party coordination; instead, it focuses on identifying a general prototype of third-party coordination by listening to the stories and experiences of relevant individuals. I have found the qualitative research method to be the most effective approach in this regard, as it provides independent space to analyse empirical cases in terms of key questions, such as: Why do third-parties coordinate with one another? Who coordinates with whom? When do they coordinate or not? What are the motives behind coordination? What has been the contribution of third-party coordination to successful peace processes?

Under the rubric of the qualitative method of inquiry, I have adopted a case study approach for further exploration of the research theme. In this study I concurrently observe two cases, embracing a multiple case study approach. In the following section, I provide a brief explanation of the reasons behind adopting a multiple case study approach and other relevant information regarding the case selection approach.

4. The Case Study as a Method of Research
This research follows a multiple case study method. There are several reasons behind choosing the case study method. The case study method has been considered an important and frequently used approach in qualitative research (Simons 1996, Stake 2000, Meyer 2001, Bennett and Elman 2006, Simons 2009, Yin 2009, Stake 1995, Gagnon 2010, Gerring 2007, Yin 1994). Several scholars have attempted to define and elaborate on the importance of this approach. Swanborn states that “a case study is the study of a phenomenon or a process as it develops within one case” (Swanborn 2010, p. 9). Johansson notes that a “case study is expected to capture the complexity of a single case” (Johansson 2003, p. 2). The case study method can be used as an ‘exploratory
methodology’ that either contributes to the generation of ‘scientific theories’ or tests a ‘scientific theory’ (Daniel 2007). According to Berg, “Case study methods involve systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how the subject operates or functions” (Berg 2004, p. 251). The case study method is used to gain a deep understanding of an issue with the study of one example from multiple perspectives, rather than having partial knowledge of the same issue with the study of many different examples (Simons 2009, Gerring 2007). In other words, a case study explores “the uniqueness of the single case” (Simons 2009, p. 3). There are certain distinctions between the case study and other qualitative methods, such as grounded theory or ethnographic research. For instance, “the case study is open to the use of theory or conceptual categories that guide the research and analysis of data. In contrast, grounded theory or ethnography presupposes that theoretical perspectives are grounded in and emerge from firsthand data” (Meyer 2001, p. 331).

There are various types of case studies. Yin suggests exploratory, descriptive and explanatory as three major types of case studies (Yin 2003). Due to the combination of multiple research strategies, case studies can also be regarded as a ‘meta-method’ (Johansson 2003). As far as this research is concerned, it is a meta-method, as I have combined the exploratory, descriptive and explanatory approaches. It is an exploratory case study because I have attempted to seek the answer to particular research questions. It is descriptive because I have provided an in-depth analysis of both cases regarding the dynamics of third-party coordination. It is also explanatory, because it makes use of a multiple case study model, which is intended to answer how third-party coordination works in different conflict contexts.

Hammersley and Gomm (2000) have emphasised a number of features of a case study. In their view, a case study is a study of either one or a relatively small number of cases, where one case is analysed from multiple perspectives. Here, qualitative data is privileged over quantitative data. Likewise, case studies are focused on a deep-rooted understanding of the case rather than on ‘theoretical inference’ or ‘empirical generalisation.’ At the same time, “the wider relevance of the findings may be
conceptualized in terms of the provision of vicarious experience, as a basis for ‘naturalistic generalisation’ or ‘transferability’” (Hammersley and Gomm 2000, p. 4). Case studies have become popular methods in qualitative research because they are ‘down-to-earth’ and ‘attention-holding,’ even though results obtained have often been considered not relevant for generalisation. However, Stake argues that case studies are “epistemologically in harmony with the reader’s experience and thus to that person [case studies can be] a natural basis for generalisation” (Stake 2000, p. 19).

Despite the many strengths of the case study method, it also has some weaknesses. Gagnon has specified three main weaknesses of the case study method: it is time-consuming for both the researcher and the subjects; the external validity of the results is problematic, for it is difficult for another researcher to reproduce a case study; and it has significant shortcomings when it comes to the generalizability of the results (Gagnon 2010). Despite these potential drawbacks, the case study is a very popular and frequently used qualitative research method. Given its usefulness, this research has utilised the case study method. All possible attempts were made to minimise the weaknesses of case study research while building on its strengths.

In addition, the use of multiple cases in this research is intended to provide comparative insight into how different factors such as the conflict context, policy considerations, and motives of the third parties affect coordination processes. Multiple case studies mean the inclusion of more than one case as a unit of analysis within a single study. This aims to show that they “replicate each other – either predicting similar results (literal replication) or contrasting results for predictable reasons (theoretical replication)” (Yin 2003, p. 5). In this instance, more or less similar cases have been selected for a comparative analysis through which the researcher aims to identify key differences between these cases. Stewart argues that in the course of a “typical multi-case study, a number of contrasting instances of a particular problem (or phenomenon) are brought together, in order to investigate, or to identify, key factors that seem to have some bearing on an outcome of interest” (Stewart 2012, p. 70).
There is not a big distinction between the single case and the cross-case study method. In both methods, the analysis of observations and modeling of causal relations between them remains the same. The only difference is the number of observations selected for the study (Gerring 2007). One of the major advantages of the multiple case study method is the greater validity of the results over a single case study. In multiple case studies, the results have been drawn from a set of cases, making the study more robust and compelling than a single case study (Gagnon 2010, Yin 1994). My intention behind selecting two cases for this study is similar. In particular, I have been concerned about making the results of this research stronger. Having two cases means increasing the authenticity of the results (as suggested in the literature).

4.1 Case Selection

The selection of the case(s) is one of the most important tasks in qualitative research. The literature suggests that a “researcher must devote considerable effort to finding cases that fully meet the criteria that have been established for forming the theoretical sample” (Gagnon 2010, p. 51). It has also been argued that “[c]ase selection has to be guided by the objective of the study…a random selection of cases is usually inappropriate” (Höglund 2011, p. 116). This process is what Höglund (2011) has referred to as unit homogeneity. The second condition is “to make comparisons between cases from dissimilar situations, such as different social, cultural and geographical contexts” (Ibid).

While selecting the cases for this study I have combined both of the approaches mentioned above. The Moro conflict of the Philippines and the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal are similar in terms of the diversified nature of third-party interveners. However, they are dissimilar in terms of the nature, characteristics and duration of armed conflict. They are also geographically different, as one conflict belongs to South Asia and the other conflict belongs to South East Asia. At the same time, they are similar in that both of them are internal armed conflicts in Asia. The following section will introduce the cases selected for this study, and provide a brief explanation as to why these cases are relevant.
4.2 Cases for the Study

In order to assess the coordination dynamics of third-party intervention in conflict-affected countries, the Moro conflict of the Philippines and the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal are two intriguing cases for study. There are some similarities and many differences between the two cases. The Moro conflict has been characterised as an identity-based armed conflict, whereas the Maoist conflict is an ideology-based conflict. The Moro conflict is a protracted conflict, stretching back for the past 40 years or so, whereas the Maoist conflict is a short-term conflict, having lasted only for about ten years. In terms of the scope of these conflicts, the Moro conflict has been focused largely on Mindanao in the southern part of the Philippines. By contrast, the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal has a nationwide scope.

Regarding third-party engagement, the Moro conflict has been negotiated by the formal and direct engagement of external third parties, whereas the Maoist armed conflict has been negotiated by the limited facilitation of local actors and with an indirect but active involvement of external third parties. Both of these conflicts can also be differentiated in terms of the UN’s involvement. In the Philippines there is some presence of UN specialised agencies in post-conflict management initiatives, whereas in Nepal there was official involvement of the UN in post-agreement peace initiatives, particularly for the management of arms and armies. The peace negotiation process (GPH-MILF) in the Philippines has been facilitated by Malaysia, observed and assisted by the International Contact Group (ICG) and monitored by the International Monitoring Team (IMT). All of these are formal structures of third-party involvement. In contrast, Nepal has no such formal third-party intervention structures in place, and many of the third-party efforts are either isolated interventions or exist through informal mechanisms.

One obvious similarity in both of these peace processes is the multiplicity of interveners, ranging from nation states to local NGOs. The role of neighbouring states in the conflict settlement process is also found in both peace processes. In Nepal, India played a crucial role in finding a negotiated solution to the conflict, whereas in the case of the Philippines Malaysia played such a role. However, while Malaysia has been involved in a defined role in the peace process in the Philippines, in contrast India’s role in Nepal’s peace
process is publicly invisible, but very active through back channels. The presence of the US in a more informal but attentive role was found in both peace processes. The US has been involved in the Mindanao peace process mainly through the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), for a limited period of time, whereas in Nepal its role is more direct and includes, in addition, a number of US-originated NGOs. The differences between these two cases provide an opportunity to distinguish the extent of differences in third-party coordination behaviours when the conflicts have both similar and different characteristics.

5. Data and Data Sources
Yin (1994) has suggested six different sources of evidence for case study research, including documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artifacts. In this research, I have used field-based interviews as the primary source of information, as issues such as the perceptions, reasoning and motivations of actors are often not well covered by the media and other sources of information. In such cases, data needs to be collected through primary sources (Hoglund and Oberg 2011a). Another important goal of this research is to highlight the voices of field-based third-party practitioners and other relevant stakeholders, and to identify their perspectives on third-party coordination. For this reason, empirical observation with the use of primary sources of evidence is the best approach. The lack of publicly available information regarding some of my research questions has also led me to rely heavily on primary sources of information.

In addition to in-depth interviews, other secondary sources of information such as scholarly articles, reports, working papers, press statements, speeches, and online news sources have also been consulted in this research. Secondary sources of information have been particularly useful in obtaining information regarding programmes, policies and strategies of various third parties, as well as for the conflict background and other historical facts associated with third-party intervention.

5.1 Data Collection Procedure
I completed the data collection process in four different phases. First, I undertook rigorous library research, consulting journal articles, reports, working papers, press
statements and speeches, and online news reports related to third-party intervention in the Maoist conflict of Nepal and the Moro conflict of the Philippines. I also examined other relevant data, such as policy documents of targeted organisations and institutions through their websites, and e-mail correspondence.

The second and most crucial phase of data collection was the field research period. A first round of field research was conducted in Nepal from December 2011 until February 2012; a second round of field research was conducted in the Philippines from July until the end of August 2012. In Nepal all interviews were conducted in Kathmandu, whereas in the Philippines interviews were conducted in Manila, Cotabato City, and Davao City. The majority of interviews in both Nepal and the Philippines were conducted face-to-face. A few participants were interviewed via Skype due to their unavailability during the field research.

The third phase of data collection involved approaching targeted individuals and organisations from both countries. These individuals were those who were either not accessible during the field research period or living outside the country of the case study. They were reached through Skype, telephone conversations, and e-mail correspondence. Contacting individuals continued until the completion of the research, depending on requirements for additional information.

The fourth phase of data collection related to reconnecting with individuals who had already participated in the research. This reconnection process remained important for reconfirming information they had shared during the interview process. In some cases they were asked for additional information. Not every individual who was interviewed in the field was contacted in this phase of data collection, only those who had expressed concern about how they might be quoted in the research. All of these processes were important in terms of increasing research validity.

5.2 Interview Questions
Semi-structured questionnaires were used to obtain information from the research participants. There were three different forms of questionnaires. One form was directed to all types of third-party interveners. The second form was directed to peace panel
members, political party leaders, scholars, and practitioners working in the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The third form was directed to government officials responsible for the management and coordination of peace process-related activities. The questionnaires were developed and finalised after consultation with my research supervisors. After conducting several initial research interviews in the field, the questionnaires were further revised. Questions were again refined after the completion of the first round of field research in Nepal, and improved versions of the questions were asked in another round of field research in the Philippines. The lists of questions are included in the Appendices section of this thesis.

6. Interview Process and Recruitment of Research Participants

Interviews are one of the most common and powerful data collection tools in social science research (Briggs 1986, Elliot 1986, Qu and Dumay 2011, Yin 1994). They have been used to explain, justify, cross-verify and interrelate research issues in a great many different projects (Briggs 1986). Yin (1994) argues that the interview method is the most important approach used in case study research for gathering necessary data. Some research efforts may require more interviews than others, and may require interviews with a heterogeneous group of people versus a homogeneous group of people. The ideal number of interviews for different research areas is influenced by a number of contextual factors, such as the needs and scope of the research and the resources available for conducting particular research (Guest, Bunce, and Johnson 2006).

Three types of interview processes are popular in social science research: the structured interview, the semi-structured interview, and the unstructured interview. Structured interviews, which generally incorporate closed-ended questions, have often been used in quantitative data gathering processes, whereas semi-structured and unstructured interviews, which allow the researcher to ask open-ended and flexible questions, have been often used in qualitative data gathering processes (Jackson, Drummond, and Camara 2007). In the semi-structured interview process, a researcher generally asks open-ended questions to the participants to gather certain facts, as well as opinions and insights surrounding a particular issue (Yin 1994).
Additionally, predetermined but open-ended and structured questions can also drive and direct the semi-structured interview process. Here, a researcher asks precise questions to the respondents in a consistent and systematic order. However, a researcher is also afforded the freedom to ask immediately generated sub-questions, if (s)he requires further information about a particular topic or theme (Berg and Lune 2004, Gagnon 2010). It also gives space for the interviewees “to provide responses in their own terms and in the way that they think and use language” (Qu and Dumay 2011, p. 246).

The in-depth interviewing approach aids in understanding the individual perspectives of different people. Compared to other methods, such as survey or secondary data, the in-depth interview is the best way to gain a firsthand answer to the proposed research questions. The researcher is also free to ask follow-up questions after each initial question, which depend on the direction of the interview and the researcher’s interest in understanding a particular aspect of the research. Open-ended questions give freedom to the research subjects to lengthen or shorten their answers (Brouneus 2011).

In-depth interviews can be useful for both inductive and deductive research. An inductive research approach aims at developing a new hypothesis or theory, which later can be tested through other case studies, comparative case studies, surveys, or large-N studies. A deductive approach can be adopted in order to test the application and relevance of existing theories (Brouneus 2011). I have adopted a combination of both inductive and deductive approaches. On the one hand, I attempt to illustrate the relevance of descriptive explanations in the existing literature; on the other hand, I also try to generate new theoretical explanations on issues around third-party coordination. However, the key focus of this study remains theory building, and only secondarily theory testing.

Several scholars have examined the advantages of the interview in qualitative data-gathering processes. Taylor and Bogdan describe the qualitative interview process as a flexible approach where a researcher has the freedom to change the numbers, types of respondents, and types of information (s)he wishes to collect. Although there needs to be a pre-determined general idea of the research, this allows a researcher to change the direction of the research when new information or perspectives arise (Tylor and Bogdan
1998). According to Berg and Lune, the “basic strategy of snowballing involves first identifying several people with relevant characteristics and interviewing them or having them answer a questionnaire. The subjects are then asked for the names of other people who possess the same attributes as they do” (Berg and Lune 2004, p. 36). I used this method in both Nepal and the Philippines to identify some of the research participants. However, most of the participants were identified through the purposive sampling approach.

The selection of the research participants was very purposive. There were three categories: The first included peace mediators and facilitators, bilateral donors, UN agencies, international political missions and peace monitoring teams, INGOs, and NGOs who worked as a third party in the country of each case study. The second category included former and present peace panel members from the government as well as rebel groups, political leaders, and government officials responsible for managing and coordinating the peace process. The third category included experts, scholars, and practitioners familiar with the dynamics of third-party intervention in each country. Altogether 83 participants were interviewed throughout the research period: 40 in Nepal and 43 from the Philippines. Tables presented below summarise the socio-demographic and institutional distribution of research participants in Nepal and the Philippines:

Table 3.1: Gender Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender Distribution</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Local-External Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local-External Representation of the Research Participants</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Third-Parties</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Third Parties</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local-External Third Parties</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicting Parties</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.3: Institutional Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Representation of the Respondents</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation States and Bilateral Agencies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFIs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicting Parties/peace panel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private mediator</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The inclusion of 83 participants from diverse groups was considered an appropriate sample for this research. As the research aims to carry out an evidence-based analysis that can help us to better understand the dynamics of third-party coordination, a detailed analysis of the 40 plus in-depth interviews for each case was considered a large enough number.

7. Data Storage and Security Procedures

The data obtained from the subjects was in the form of digital recording and notes taken during the interviews. Some of the information was received through e-mail and Skype conversations. All the data recorded on tape was transferred to the researcher’s computer and stored in password-protected files. Consent was obtained from each participant before the audio recording of his or her voice and an explanation was given as to why the researcher was using a tape recorder. If subjects did not wish to disclose their names in the final research, their names were omitted. Any personal information was destroyed at the conclusion of the project. However, as required by the university’s research policy, raw data on which the results of the project depend is retained in secure storage for five years, after which it will be destroyed.

8. Data Analysis

Data analysis is the most crucial as well as most challenging task of the qualitative research method (Williamson and Long 2005). Qualitative data encompasses words and
observations, including field notes, interview transcripts, documents, photographs, sketches, video, and tape recordings (Dey 1993). Taylor-Powell and Renner suggest that the data analysis process demands creativity, discipline, and a systematic approach. There is no single or best way to do this effectively (Taylor-Powell and Renner 2003). However, an “analysis that is meticulously done, based on clearly articulated theories, and responsive to research questions can be good analysis” (LeCompte 2000, p. 152).

There are different approaches to data analysis, and the choice of approach depends on the researcher and his/her research aims and objectives (Dey 1993). Yin (1994) has suggested two strategies for analysing case study evidence: relying on theoretical propositions, and developing a descriptive framework for organising the case study. In this research, Yin’s first suggestion has mostly been adopted. The results presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have thus attempted to assess the validity of theoretical propositions generated through the literature review.

The data analysis process used in this research employs Dey’s approach, which states that qualitative data analysis refers to “processes of describing phenomena, classifying it, and seeing how our concepts interconnect” (Dey 1993, p. 31). I have also followed the different phases suggested by Taylor-Powell and Renner (2003). Chronologically, these phases are as follows: get to know the data, focus on the analysis, categorise information, identify patterns and connections within and between categories, interpret, and bring them all together. In general, I have followed six different steps in this phase of the research. The first step was Daily Interpretive Analysis (DIA) in the field to capture the major points from each interview, keep the field notes up to date, and note my personal reflections on each interview. The second step was translation and transcription of field interviews. The third step was case-specific clustering of both primary and secondary sources of data based on different research themes. The fourth step involved cross-case data clustering based on different research themes. The fifth step entailed content analysis and the interpretation of the data based on the research propositions. The final step of data analysis was the identification and presentation of the key results.
9. Quality Assurance Measures

Quality assurance of the research results is one of the most important aspects in a qualitative research process. Even a researcher who is very skillful in qualitative research design needs to make sure that the results obtained have credibility, utility and validity (LeCompte 2000, p. 152). Gagnon (2010) has addressed the role of the researcher in the validity process, and argues that the actions and personal characteristics of the researcher play a vital role in determining the accuracy of the result. Here, a researcher needs to adopt three different approaches for enhancing the validity of his/her research: the holistic illusion, the elite bias, and over-assimilation. Holistic illusion means that the researcher includes data that are most relevant to the research; elite bias means only the inclusion of responses that are well-articulated; and over-assimilation means that the researcher “accepts the facts and perceptions conveyed by local informants whole cloth, surrendering his or her own vision and critical faculties” (Gagnon 2010, pp. 21-22).

Burnard et al suggest that a thorough analysis of the entire data collected for the study is necessary to ensure that the analysis process is systematic and rigorous. Researchers also need to engage in constant comparison while analysing the data, which can be done by “reading and re-reading data to search for and identify emerging themes in the constant search for understanding and the meaning of the data” (Burnard et al. 2008, p. 431). I have followed the advice of Gangon as well as Burnard et al.

Verification processes are also an effective strategy for ensuring quality in research. This means going “back and forth between design and implementation to ensure congruence among question formulation, literature, recruitment, data collection strategies, and analysis” (Morse et al. 2008, p. 17). Morse et al discuss five verification strategies for ensuring validity: methodological coherence, sampling sufficiency, developing a dynamic relationship between sampling, data collection and analysis, thinking theoretically, and theory development. Methodological coherence refers to “congruence between the research question and the components of the method” (Morse et al. 2008, p. 18), while sufficient sampling ensures that the selected sample adequately represents the targeted population. Developing a dynamic relationship between sampling, data collection and analysis means ensuring the validity of the results. Thinking theoretically means having a clear idea of how the newly collected data contributes to generating new ideas and
knowledge. Finally, the theory development process entails “moving with deliberation between a micro perspective of the data and a macro conceptual/theoretical understanding” (Morse et al. 2008, pp. 18-19).

I argue that obtaining good quality data, using an appropriate research methodology, employing a proper data analysis technique, and providing an adequate presentation of results ensures validity in the research process. I adopted a number of strategies to validate the data in this research. The first strategy was the collection of data from various resources such as policy documents, cross-sectional interviews and media reports, along with primary data sources. Personal insights gained from interviews were also used to validate the data. Presentation of results has been done based on the principle of neutrality and impartiality. Finally, evidence-based analysis of the context and dynamics was given priority, rather than the more general statements given by research participants.

10. Limitations of the Research
Although this research has met its objectives, I am aware of its limitations. As is common in qualitative research, there is space for constructive criticism of the research method, the validity of the data, and the analysis method of the research. Since third-party coordination is a new area of research, there are some limitations in terms of its method, analytic process, and findings. For instance, there are limitations in terms of its scope. It only assesses the third-party coordination dynamics of two different peace processes, which means that the results may not support generalisation. This research is an attempt to analyse general tendencies of third-party coordination, based on the perceptions shared by the research participants and other evidence found during the research processes. This does not result in a detailed pattern of third-party coordination; rather, it only highlights some broader aspects of third-party coordination in two contexts.

Due to the lack of other reliable sources of information on this topic, in-depth interviews have been used as the main source of information. In this regard, readers may raise questions regarding the authenticity of information collected through in-depth interviews, even if the interviews have been conducted following the principles of case study-based qualitative research. It should be noted that not all targeted third parties have been interviewed. This was due to their unavailability during the field research period, or their
unwillingness to share information. In particular, potential research participants who represent powerful nation states often hesitated to talk with the researcher, while those who were willing to speak often hesitated to allow me to digitally record the interview. Time constraints for field research, and other disruptions such as flooding, and an outbreak of war in the Philippines, also had an impact on reaching some of the participants. Similarly, it was difficult to reach third parties who were involved early on in the intervention processes but were later no longer active. Most of them had already left Nepal and the Philippines by the time the field research was carried out. In sum, this research only represents the voices of those who were available and accessible during the field research period in Nepal and the Philippines.

It is often expressed that the coordination gap is not a widely acknowledged issue by third parties involved in peace processes. In addition, some third parties may be reluctant to provide critical comments on the attitudes and behaviors of other third parties, which may then have some impact on collecting quality data from the field. In this context, the validation of collected data has remained a challenge because public documents such as articles, reports, and news archives that typically highlight attitudinal and behavioral aspects of third parties have not been found sufficient. In some cases, the information validation process has been negatively affected due to participants’ lack of interest in being a part of the research because their position does not allow them to speak openly on particular research themes.

Finally, due to time and resource constraints, this study only incorporates two cases in order to identify general patterns of third-party coordination. The findings of this research might be applicable to other conflict contexts, but it is not claimed that they are completely generalizable.

11. Conclusion
This chapter has provided a thorough description and explanation of the research method and methodology used in this research. In brief, this is a multiple case study-based qualitative research project, which incorporates primary sources of data collected from field research in Nepal and the Philippines. In the next chapter, I provide a detailed
description of the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and the Moro conflict of the Philippines, and the main third-party interventions within those conflicts.
Chapter 4
Armed Conflicts, Peace Processes, and Third-Party Interventions in Nepal and the Philippines

1. Introduction
In the previous chapter I provided a detailed description and justification of the methods and methodologies used in this research. This chapter provides an overview of the cases selected for the research: the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and the Moro conflict of the Philippines. The chapter begins with a brief background overview of the Maoist armed conflict, followed by a description of the peace process and the third-party interventions and interveners in this conflict. The second part of the chapter begins with a similar background overview of the Moro conflict, followed by a description of the peace process and third-party interventions and interveners within this conflict. The final section synthesises the first and second sections.

2. Armed Conflict in Nepal: Evolution, Causes, and Consequences
An armed conflict erupted in Nepal on 13 February 1996. The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN, Maoist)\(^6\) instigated an armed struggle by undertaking several violent attacks on police posts and government offices in some hilly districts of Mid-Western Nepal. The Maoists articulated three broad objectives of their armed resistance: to wipe out the ‘capitalist class and the state system’ that had traditionally existed; to abolish the Monarchy\(^7\) that protected and promoted feudalism; and to establish a democratic republic ruled by the people (Mahat 2005). Based on these three objectives, the Maoists were driven to radically transform Nepalese society economically, socially and politically. They therefore named their struggle a ‘People’s War,’\(^8\) through which they sought to establish a communist government. The Maoists defined “the principal aim of the armed

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\(^6\) Although they are now popularly known as UCPN (Maoist), I have here described them simply as Maoists.

\(^7\) There was an active Monarchy in Nepal until the 1990s. After the success of the People’s Movement in 1990, the then King was ready to share power with parliamentary political parties and remain as a constitutional Monarch. However, the King still held some powers, such as Chief of Command of the then Royal Nepal Army.

\(^8\) Maoists have officially defined their armed struggle as a People’s War; however, it is popularly known as the Maoist armed conflict.
struggle … [as] to capture political power for the people” (UCPN-Maoist 1995). They sought to control state power by “completing the new democratic revolution after the destruction of feudalism and imperialism, then immediately moving towards socialism and, by way of cultural revolutions based on the theory of continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, marching to communism” (Ibid). This conflict has also been called “a competition for control over the state,” with the simultaneous use of violence and non-violent political means (Kievelitz and Polzer 2002, p. 23).

2.1 The Rise of the Maoists

Before the eruption of armed conflict, the CPN (Maoist) was not a popular or highly influential political party in the Nepalese political landscape. However, it was somewhat influential in its base areas, the hilly districts of Mid-Western Nepal. Before the eruption of armed revolt, the Maoist’s ‘genealogy’ can be divided into various parts. One of its wings, the United People’s Front (UPF), had participated in the general election of 1991 and won nine seats in the parliament out of 205 (Rhoderick 2007). The UPF, after a few years of experience within the multiparty democratic system, realised that their desired change could not be obtained under the existing political and social system, which they had named as semi-feudal, semi-colonial and fascist. The UPF subsequently boycotted the second general election in 1995, claiming that the existing political system did not work in favour of the people. This conclusion was most likely drawn because of their intense groundwork for beginning an armed movement. Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, then Chairman of the UPF, submitted a 40-point list of demands to the government, expressing an intense dissatisfaction over the existing socio-economic and political practices adopted by the mainstream political parties (UPF 1996). The UPF wanted immediate action to be taken to address their concerns relating to socio-political change, nationality and foreign policy, which were specified in their 40-point memorandum submitted to the government (Suhrke 2009).

It was unlikely that the government would address all of their demands within a short time-span, especially given the unstable political environment of that time. The UPF did not expect their demands to be addressed immediately; rather, it appeared to be a strategy by the Maoists to legitimise their armed struggle as a pro-people political struggle. At the
same time, the government undervalued the UPF’s demands, anticipating that nothing serious was going to happen. Even if the government had taken initiatives to pay attention to their demands, the Maoists would not have stopped their armed movement because the demands were put forward as a warning to the government on the eve of the formal inception of the armed struggle.

The Maoist armed conflict eventuated and expanded nationwide due to the perceived failure of multiparty democracy from 1990 to 1995, built on the expectations of people who were historically poor, discriminated against and marginalised. There had initially been hope amongst these groups of people that their lives would significantly improve after the restoration of multiparty democracy in 1990. However, multiparty democracy up until this time had failed to fulfill the expectations of the Nepalese people due to the lack of people-centric economic and development policies, a high level of political corruption, the unheard voices of people from disfranchised groups, and exclusion and discrimination based on caste, gender, ethnicity, and place of residence (Crossette 2005, Kievelitz and Polzer 2002, Sharma 2009). The Maoists took advantage of the chaotic political atmosphere of the country, drew attention to the unheard groups, and convinced marginalised people to wage war against the state authorities with the ultimate aim of emancipating the people from the existing exploitative practices of Nepalese society.

The lack of a cordial and interdependent relationship between the state and society is another reason behind the eruption of the Maoist armed conflict, where marginalised groups had always been exploited for the benefit of state authority (Riaz and Basu 2007). The failure of the democratic government and political parties to fulfill the expectations of the people contributed to a sharp increase in public anger and frustration towards the government. Instead of working together to fulfill the demands of various groups, the government and the mainstream political parties were involved in corruption, inter- and intra-party rifts related to grabbing political power, and neglect of the people’s aspirations (Bhattarai 2005, Dahal 2005, Kievelitz and Polzer 2002, Suhrke 2009, Thapa and Sijapati 2004). The enjoyment of existing resources by only a small number of
citizens resulted in the sidelining of historically marginalised groups\textsuperscript{9} in Nepalese society. In this light, the Maoist armed struggle was due in large part to the accumulated grievances felt by underprivileged people against the Nepalese government (Dahal 2004, Gobyn 2009, Mahat 2005, Thapa and Sijapati 2004).

\subsection*{2.2 Three Phases of Armed Conflict}

In the beginning phase of armed conflict, from 1996-2000, the Maoists’ strategy was to strengthen their local political influence with direct military action against political party structures and local government institutions, while in the national political domain they were attacking the Monarchy politically. The Maoists were very successful in accomplishing their mission. Initially, they were involved in the struggle with limited military capability and very limited support from the public. For this reason, the armed struggle was not considered a serious issue in its initial stage. The government wanted to treat the armed movement as a problem of ‘law and order.’ However, the armed struggle grew like wildfire and became a nationwide movement. By that time government security forces, particularly the police force, had already lost their capacity to quell the rebel group through military means (Whitfield 2008a).

It was only around 2000-2001 that the armed police force, and later on the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), was mobilised against the Maoists. By the time the government paid serious attention to this problem, the Maoists had already developed a strong military capacity, with more than 15,000\textsuperscript{10} combatants and a force capable of challenging the state’s security forces. As a result, within five years of the armed struggle the Maoists were able to expand into an armed movement with a nationwide scope, strong military and political strength, and a strong support base among the historically marginalised groups of Nepalese society. The Maoist armed struggle of Nepal can be considered as one of the most strategically sound and successful (both militarily and politically)

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\textsuperscript{9} This group includes Dalits (the so-called lower-caste group), Janjati (an ethnic group), Aadibasi (an endogenous group), and the people from complex geographical locations, particularly from the hilly regions of the country.

\textsuperscript{10} The figure is ambiguous. Some say the Maoists only had 10,000 militants, whereas others say that they had 20,000. According to the UNMIN’s verification in 2007-2009, there were 19,602 qualified combatants living in the cantonments after the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement in November 2006 (UNMIN 2009).
communist armed revolts of the twenty-first century. Its success can be measured by its rapid expansion from a few hilly districts to the entirety of Nepal, and its positive as well as negative contribution to shaping the socio-political and economic dynamics of the country (Mishra 2004). A favorable political climate, social upheavals, topographic advantages, and strategically sound political and military actions are some of the broader factors that determined the dynamics and direction of the Maoist armed struggle.

The second phase of the Maoist armed struggle began after the rise of King Gyanendra following the royal massacre\textsuperscript{11} in mid-2001 and the King’s widely criticised undemocratic move in 2002 to dissolve the democratically elected government. In this phase the political conflict was triangular in nature, with the Maoists, the King, and the mainstream political parties in conflict with each other. None of these forces was powerful enough to rule over the other (Dahal 2004). The triangular nature of conflict remained until the King’s absolute takeover of power in February 2005.

The third phase of the conflict began in early 2005 and lasted until April 2006. Now there were only two parties involved in the conflict: the Maoists and the mainstream political parties were on one side, and the King was on the other side. The formal peace process began in November 2006 after the government and the Maoists signed a peace agreement.

2.3 The Impact of the Maoist Armed Conflict

The armed conflict had more negative impacts than positive. On a positive note, the armed conflict contributed to an increased awareness among the populace of various socio-economic and political issues (Lal 2001). The Maoist armed conflict also helped to amplify the regime change agenda among the public (i.e., the abolishment of the Monarchy and existing malpractices within the multi-party democratic system), and was ultimately successful in establishing this as a common national agenda for political transformation. Despite some of its positive aspects, however, the armed conflict was an unfortunate event in the human and economic development of Nepal because of the immense loss of human and capital resources and downward trends in the development

\textsuperscript{11} In the Royal massacre, 17 royal family members were killed in the palace, including King Birendra, his wife and son, daughter, and other close relatives (See Gregson 2002).
process of the country. The death toll within a decade was already more than 13,000, along with the disappearance of hundreds and the displacement of more than 200,000 people from conflict-affected areas (INSEC 2007).

Stagnated economic and human development processes, infrastructure damage of more than two billion US dollars, the proliferation of guns, and a serious threat to human security are some of the myriad consequences of the Maoist armed conflict. It also increased the vulnerability of rural populations, particularly the lives of the poor, women, youth, children, and elderly people. Public facilities such as educational institutions, health posts, and government offices were either closed or dysfunctional during the conflict. High unemployment, low economic growth, the shutdown of local business enterprises, and decline in agricultural production forced thousands of rural villagers to be displaced from their usual places of residence. The involuntary migration of a significant number of youth from rural areas to India or Gulf countries in search of livelihood opportunities has made many villages demographically imbalanced, as only elders and children are left behind. Such a demographic imbalance has contributed to the disintegration of many families (Dahal 2004, Dahal 2006, Dahal and Bhatta 2008). Nepal has to face the immediate and long-term impacts of this armed conflict and it may take several years to bring the economic and human development process back on track.

3. The Trajectory of Peace Negotiations and Peace Processes in Nepal

Nepal’s peace process has moved ahead, and not just because of successful negotiations between the conflicting parties. Other supplementary intervention efforts which accompanied the negotiations have also determined the trajectory of the peace process. For example, India played a vital role in devising the 12-point agreement between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA)\(^\text{12}\) and the Maoists in October 2005. The People’s Movement of April 2006 was another vital political event, which not only forced the King to step down from power and give it back to the people, but also created a conducive environment for the signing of a peace pact between the government and the Maoists.

\(^\text{12}\)The Seven Party Alliance was a coalition of seven Nepali political parties seeking to end autocratic rule in the country. This group comprised a number of political parties: Nepali Congress, Nepali Congress (Democratic), CPN (UML), Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, Nepal Sadbhawana Party (Anandidevi), United Left Front, and People’s Front.
The role of informal mediators was crucial in convening secret talks and back channeling between the Maoists, the palace, and the mainstream political parties. Moreover, the role of the UN during the period of conflict, particularly after the signing of the CPA, also remained crucial for monitoring the Constituent Assembly (CA) election and the management of arms and armies (Mehta, Pandey, and Rajan 2010).

In addition, the Maoists’ strategic shift from a violent struggle to a non-violent struggle, along with the mainstream parties’ decision to include the Maoists in their struggle against the King, was an important political event heralding the beginning of a more hopeful peace process. Considering the complex political environment of Nepal in 2002 and afterwards, the Maoists found those complexities unfavorable for accomplishing their ultimate goal of establishing a communist government. A significant number of Maoist leaders lobbied within their party for a peaceful solution in order to institutionalise their agenda for change with an alternative approach, rather than the violent approach. As a result, the Maoist plenum meeting in 2005, popularly known as the Chunwang plenum meeting, decided “to forge an alliance with the parliamentary political parties against the monarchy and push for the formation of the federal democratic republic” (Basnet 2011). This decision was a paradigm shift in the Maoists’ policy, redefining the course of their struggle. Gobyn has pointed out the key factors that compelled the Maoists to move towards finding a peaceful solution of the conflict:

[F]rom 2002 onward, they [Maoists] started to realize that there was no direct military solution of the conflict, that they lacked the internal support from the urban middle class, and that the international community was not going to accept an armed communist takeover in Nepal. To overcome these obstacles, the Maoist leadership started to develop a more pragmatic and pluralistic approach and engaged with domestic and international forces. The 2003 peace-talks with the government, the cease-fire at the end of 2005, and the agreement with the mainstream political parties were all concrete steps on that path (Gobyn 2009, p. 434)

There are additional explanations as to why the Maoists chose to compromise after 10 years of armed conflict. It is generally believed that the Maoists saw that the conflict had reached a stalemate that was not beneficial to them. It is also claimed that there was bottom-up pressure from Nepali citizens to end violence and reinstate democracy. The success of the nonviolent People’s Movement of April 2006 that toppled the monarchy
remained a crucial event in influencing the political parties involved in the compromise, including the Maoists. Most relevant to this study, it is believed that the efforts of external and internal third parties were a key factor in pressuring the conflicting parties to find a negotiated solution.

Nepal’s peace process is regarded as largely a homegrown peace process, because “the timing and direction of peace talks were chiefly determined by domestic political forces” (Suhrke 2009, p. 2). However, a number of local, regional and external third parties also showed interest in de-escalating the armed conflict through military as well as peaceful approaches (Farasat and Hayner 2009). For instance, military assistance to the RNA was provided by India, the US and the UK until early 2005, in support of suppressing the Maoist armed struggle. International donors, particularly from Europe and even India, the US, and the UK, provided support during the conflict, as well as post-agreement humanitarian and conflict management support. Deep interest shown by the international community on issues around security sector reform, human rights, transitional justice and federalism are some of the visible examples of active third-party intervention in Nepal’s peace process.

### 3.1 Peace Talks and the Failure of Peace Talks

Peace talks were crucial political events that influenced the dynamics and direction of the Maoist armed conflict. Peace talks at one point brought hope that the conflict was going to be resolved peacefully, with limited social, human and economic costs. The failure of these peace talks brought devastating results, with a massive escalation of violence from both conflicting parties.

Before the People’s movement of 2006, only two rounds of formal talks were undertaken between the government and the Maoists. The first round of peace talks was in 2001 and they were held in a series of three meetings, on August 30, September 13, and November 13. This round of peace talks began after a large-scale Maoist attack on government offices and security barracks in Dunai, in the Dolpa district of Midwestern Nepal (Sharma 2009). Although both parties had agreed to attend the peace talks, they were not moving smoothly, mainly due to the huge differences in ideologies which obstructed a negotiated solution. Both parties were also using the ceasefire period as an opportunity to
re-strengthen and re-organise their military capacities and assess each other’s weaknesses. At the same time, they used this time for improving their public image (particularly the Maoists’) by conveying a message that they wanted to find solutions to the conflict through peaceful means. No such policy decisions were made from the Maoists’ side regarding their approach to the struggle. The first round of peace talks broke down in late November 2001 after a massive attack from the Maoists on a military barrack in Dang district of mid-Western Nepal. This event forced the government to declare a state of emergency and return to war with the mobilisation of the RNA for the first time. Human rights violations greatly increased after late November 2001 due to the larger scale of insurgency and counter-insurgency actions (Dahal 2004, Dahal 2005, Sharma 2009).

The second round of peace talks began in April 2003. Once again, three series of peace talks were convened, on April 27, May 9, and August 17. This round of talks was considered more serious than the first round for two main reasons. First, the Maoists had sent Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, one of their top ranked leaders, as their chief negotiator, along with three other high profile leaders. One of them, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, had already become a chief negotiator in 2001, and another, Ram Bahadur Thapa (Badal), was the military strategist for the Maoists. In other words, negotiators from the Maoists’ side were comprised of high-profile leaders.

In addition, during the second round of peace talks, the newly crowned King Gyanendra was already active in the day-to-day state affairs of the country and had even nominated the Prime Minister of his choice. It was believed that this round of peace talks would take the country in a peaceful direction. However, the peace talks broke down again on 27 August 2003. The Doramba massacre, where government security forces killed 17 unarmed Maoists and two civilians, is considered as the key reason for the breakdown of the talks (Dahal 2004, Dahal 2005, Sharma 2009). Other reasons included growing mistrust between the two sides, the absence of ceasefire monitoring mechanisms, the absence of confidence building measures, single-track negotiation, a focus on differences rather than on commonalities, inflexibility in the adjustment of goals, the lack of defined
roles for facilitators, and a lack of support from the mainstream political parties for the negotiations (Dahal 2004, Sharma 2009).

Both of these rounds of talks were facilitated by local individuals without the use of formal international third-party involvement (Sharma 2009). Until 2004, external third-party interventions consisted of development aid, humanitarian assistance, military assistance to the RNA, and providing some good offices and back channel support. Informal active third-party interventions in all domains had begun only after the King’s takeover in February 2005.

4. Third-Party Interveners in Nepal
It is estimated that more than 600 NGOs in Nepal are directly engaged in the conflict and peace intervention process (Interviews 2011). Nearly 50 bilateral and multilateral donor agencies and more than 100 INGOs are active in Nepal and many of these have focused on supporting the peace process (IA 2006). The UN and its specialised agencies working in Nepal have made peacemaking a core program. The UN also provided good offices during and after the conflict for the negotiation process (Dahal 2005). Additionally, both official and unofficial external third parties, such as non-governmental peacemakers, the UN, India, China, the US, the EU, and other Western donors have been involved in the intervention process since 2000, encouraging dialogue between the conflicting parties, sharing experiences from other conflict settings, and giving support to the negotiation process (Whitfield 2008a). The multiplicity of interveners indicates their deep institutional interests in conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in Nepal.

It is obvious that international actors enter into a conflict system with various motives. The initial motivation of internal and external actors to get involved in conflict resolution efforts in Nepal was humanitarian, due to the increased number of conflict-related killings from one year to the next.\(^{13}\) Economic, social and psychological costs were also increasing with each passing year. But humanitarian tragedy was not the only motivation for third-party assistance. Strategic and policy interests of both internal and external

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\(^{13}\) According to the INSEC database, the total conflict-related killings were 81 deaths in 1996, 1,514 in 2005, and more than 4,600 deaths in 2002 alone. Data can also be obtained at: http://insec.org.np/pics/1247467500.pdf.
actors were equally important (Whitfield 2008a). Nepal’s geopolitical context, foreign aid dependency, and internal political dimensions are three broader reasons for the active third-party intervention in its conflict. Dahal has argued that the global war on terrorism, geo-strategic contests, and security considerations are major factors that have motivated third parties to get involved in “military cooperation, creative diplomacy, international law, trade, investment and humanitarian support to limit the harmful actions of the actors in conflict” (Dahal 2005, pp. 15-16).

Bhattarai similarly suggests that the increase in violent activities, a worsened security situation, and human rights concerns are three major factors that attracted Nepal’s immediate neighbors and other international actors to get involved. Neighboring countries, particularly India and China, feared the spillover effect of Nepal’s armed conflict. They were also concerned about preventing an active role for other external actors in the region. Other countries, particularly Western nations as global advocates of human rights, were deeply concerned about the deteriorating human rights situation and the deepening political crisis due to a dramatic increase in violent activities. The US was further interested in Nepal because it wanted to restrain communist influences and expand its anti-terrorist global alliance (Bhattarai 2005).

5. Phases of Conflict and Third-Party Intervention in Nepal

Nepal has had 15 years of third-party interventions in its armed conflict and peace processes. The interventions have mostly been informal but often very influential in changing the dynamics and directions of the conflict and peace process. With a view to analysing the dynamics of third-party intervention in Nepal, their engagements can be divided into three main phases: 1996 to 2001, 2002 to 2006, and from 2007 onwards. The first phase can be considered a less active third-party intervention phase, the second phase an active third-party intervention phase, and the final phase the most active third-party intervention phase.

In the first phase, there was no significant involvement from external third parties. This may be due to three key reasons: first, the international community did not deem it necessary to step in because the conflict was not serious enough in terms of human casualties and property damage; second, they miscalculated the trend of expansion of the
armed struggle; and third, they relied on the then government to find an adequate solution to the conflict. Similarly, local third parties’ efforts in the beginning phase were limited to the role of messenger between the conflicting parties (Interview 2012). Local third-party intervention in armed conflict began in 1998, just two years after the initiation of the Maoist armed conflict. Senior leaders from the Nepalese human rights community, who had close contact with the leaders from both conflicting parties, attempted to bring the parties together (Interview 2012). However, dialogue did not properly materialise due to the lack of sincerity from both parties. Thus, the first phase of third-party involvement was less active and did not produce any substantial outcomes.

Active forms of third-party intervention began after November 2001 when the violence escalated, following the failure of the first round of peace talks between the Maoists and the government. As a response to the Maoists’ attacks on military barracks and government offices in the Dang district of mid-Western Nepal, the government imposed a state of emergency that enabled it to mobilize the RNA against the Maoists. The post-November 2001 scenario attracted a number of external third parties to Nepal who were divided in their support of a military versus a non-military solution to the conflict. For example, India, the US and the UK were in favor of a military solution, which meant that they heavily supplied both lethal and non-lethal weapons to the RNA until the King’s takeover of power in February 2005. In contrast, the European nations, Nordic countries, the UN, and local and international NGOs were in favor of a negotiated solution to the conflict. The scenario changed after February 2005 with the King’s action against democracy. By then, almost all third parties more or less agreed that the correct response to the conflict was to help the parties to find a negotiated solution rather than prolonging the conflict.

The UN focused on Nepal’s conflict starting in September 2002 after Secretary-General Kofi Annan offered to use his good offices for the peaceful solution of the conflict. Tamart Samual, an official from the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), made his first visit to Nepal in mid-2003, during which he “developed good relations with a wide variety of political actors in Nepal, consulted regularly with Indian officials (in recognition of the enduring importance of India’s influence within Nepal) and other

representatives of the diplomatic community” (Whitfield 2010, p. 6). Officially, the UN was involved in Nepal’s conflict from May 2005 through the establishment of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to monitor the human rights situation and advise the government on the promotion and protection of human rights. After the signing of a peace agreement in November 2006, the United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was established in 2007 for the management of arms and armies and the monitoring of the CA election (Farasat and Hayner 2009).

In addition to the UN, both local and external third parties were involved in various conflict intervention initiatives at the local and national levels. Local third parties, particularly Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), human rights groups, and other professional groups were involved in conflict monitoring and peace advocacy work. At the same time, a block of external actors, particularly the Europeans, were putting diplomatic pressure on the government to find a negotiated solution to the conflict. They also condemned human rights violations committed by government security forces and Maoist combatants. A 12-point agreement was signed between the SPA and the Maoists in October 2005 under the indirect facilitation of India.

Another dimension of third-party intervention emerged after the signing of the CPA in November 2006, namely, post-agreement third-party intervention. There was not a single post-agreement issue which was addressed by the conflicting parties without third-party support. Some notable interventions include external support for the NPTF and the UN Peace Fund, monitoring the CA election and facilitating debates and discussion around it, managing arms and armies, the integration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants, and discharging disqualified combatants. Other activities included human rights monitoring and peace advocacy, implementation of peace building initiatives, and actions against landmines.

The formation of the Peace and Development Strategy (2010-2015) has remained another key intervention event in the post-agreement period. A large number of local and external third parties have been involved as third-party interveners in this phase. The UNMIN has been a major external intervener involved in supporting Nepal’s peace process since 2007. Specifically, UNMIN was involved in the management of arms and armies,
monitoring of the peace process, and the monitoring of the CA election. In addition to UNMIN, there was serious involvement by other third parties such as the US, India and China. Other external third parties have also been involved through NPTF and the UN Peace Fund. NPTF is a joint government-donor funding mechanism to support the post-agreement peace process through four core areas of intervention: Cantonment Management and Rehabilitation of Combatants, Conflict Affected Persons and Communities, Security and Transitional Justice, and Peace Building Initiatives at National and Local Levels. Eight major donors – Denmark, European Union, Finland, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, UK, and the United States – have contributed to this fund.

Parallel to the NPTF, donors have also provided support for the UN Peace Fund in Nepal (UNPFN). This fund came into existence in March 2007 “to mobilize resources to the UN system in Nepal in support of activities of clear, short-term relevance to the peace process” (UNPFN 2007). The UK, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland and Canada have provided the equivalent of US $26.9 million from 2007 until 2014. UNPFN has five core areas of support: Cantonments/Reintegration, Election/Governance/Mediation, Recovery/Quick Impact Projects, Security, and Rights and Reconciliation related activities (Ibid).

International financial institutions, particularly the World Bank and the ADB, were additional third-party interveners in post-agreement reconstruction and rehabilitation related initiatives. The ADB provides support for strengthening Local Peace Committees (LPC). Other UN agencies, such as the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Women’s Fund have focused on the implementation of UN Resolutions 1325, 1820, 1612 and the preparation of a National Plan of Action (NPA). INGOs and local NGOs were also functioning independently to support the peace process.

Additionally, a number of organised third-party intervention mechanisms have been formed at both the governmental and non-governmental levels. The peace support working group and landmine action working group are two well-known third-party mechanisms formed under the MOPR. There are also a number of collective third-party
intervention mechanisms formed by the initiatives of other organisations and agencies. Some of these include: Nepal Transition to Peace Process (NTTP), Peace Working Group of Association of International NGOs in Nepal (AIN), Collaborative Leadership of United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR) group, the Violence Prevention Committee, and the Security Sector Reform Group. More detailed analyses of these intervening events are presented in following chapters.

There are both domestic and external factors behind the extensive involvement of external third parties in the post-agreement intervention process. Both the conflicting parties and local third parties were willing to provide adequate space for external third parties because they hoped to obtain the necessary support for the transition from war to peace. They therefore welcomed both state and non-state third parties. External third parties had earned some credibility due to their decisive role in bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiation table. Consequently, the conflicting parties expected to gain similar levels of support in the post-agreement period. Access to resources was another domestic factor behind extensive third-party involvement in the post-agreement period. Nepal had to accumulate a large amount of resources for the reconstruction process, which would not be possible without attracting multiple interveners.

Nepal’s peace process has remained an issue of profound interest for many external third parties, with particular focus on state restructuring issues, such as the adoption of a federal state model, natural resource management, and security policy (which affects the bordering countries of India and China). The governance model of the state lines up with the interests of Western states who desire to see Nepal as a human rights and democracy-friendly state in the long run. Many international organisations want to see a reflection of their agendas in the post-agreement state building and constitution making processes. Many local third parties, particularly the CSOs and human rights organisations, desire to see Nepal as a justice-friendly state because they are interested in justifying the importance of their advocacy efforts.
6. Moro Conflict of the Philippines: Evolution, Causes, and Consequences


The Moro conflict\(^{14}\) in the Mindanao region of Southern Philippines is one of the oldest ongoing conflicts in the world (Buendia 2005, Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005). The conflict has its roots in the 15th century and the Spanish and American colonisation of the three main regions that now make up the Philippines: Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao (which the Moro/Muslim people call the Bangsamoro).\(^{15}\)

The outbreak of large-scale violence in Mindanao by Moro rebels is the product of a number of historical and contemporary factors. The physical areas of contestation are the Muslim-majority areas of Central and Southwestern Mindanao, areas that have traditionally been inhabited by a Muslim majority. The Manila government’s refusal to allow a self-governed Muslim Mindanao led them to take up arms against the government (Buendia 2005, Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005, Powell 2010). The identity crisis of Muslim minorities living in Mindanao increased greatly after the independence of the Philippines in 1946, when the Philippine-Christian settlers who had moved from other parts of the Philippines started to take control of land and other natural resources in Mindanao, leading to growing socio-economic and political domination by the Christian population (Quimpo 2001). Muslims in Mindanao have long claimed that the central

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\(^{14}\) The Moro conflict is also termed the Moro problem, the Mindanao conflict, and several other names. I have used the term Moro conflict to denote the armed conflict initiated by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and later carried on by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

\(^{15}\) The name “Philippines” came into being only in 1946 upon the country’s independence from the United States. Combining Luzon, Vishay, and Mindanao, the colonial government gave the country its current name.
government exploits their resources and occupies their land for its own benefit (Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005, Vellema and Lara 2011).

Although the struggle over resources is considered the root cause of violence in this case, the origin of the conflict is based on grievance rather than greed (Kaufman 2011). The Moros’ consistent political demand for a self-governed Muslim Mindanao is the crux of the conflict, rather than any interest in looting the available natural resources. Factors such as the huge changes in the demographic composition of Mindanao over the past 100 years due to the gradual ‘minoritisation’ of local inhabitants, and a ‘policy of neglect’ by the Manila government in its failure to deliver basic services to the people in Mindanao, contributed to the formation and strengthening of the MNLF (Mercado 2011).

An armed revolt by the secular-based MNLF, with the support of “a new generation of educated Muslim militant leaders” (Odaira 2009, p.36), erupted in late 1960 with the aim of reclaiming the Bangsamoro homeland from the Manila government. The Jabidah massacre of 1968, in which 28 Muslim recruits were killed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), gave birth to an armed insurgency under the leadership of Nur Misuari. In the 1970s, when President Marcos proclaimed Martial Law in the Philippines, including Bangsamoro, the hostilities intensified greatly. The conflict escalated in the 1970s, resulting in many battle-related deaths and large numbers of refugees (MacDonald and Viñals 2012). In 1976, under the auspices of mediation efforts by the OIC, particularly Libya, the MNLF and the government signed a peace deal, the Tripoli agreement, in which President Marcos agreed to provide autonomy for 13 of the 24 provinces in Mindanao. However, failure to implement the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement dragged the MNLF towards another phase of violent struggle, which terminated only in 1996 after the signing of a peace agreement (Villanueva and Aguilar 2008).

The 1996 peace pact (the Jakarta agreement) stipulated the implementation of the previous Tripoli agreement (Iribani 2006, Quimpo 2001, Mercado 2011). The 1996 GPH-MNLF peace agreement paved the way for the establishment of a regional autonomous

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16 OIC changed its name a few years ago and is now called the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.
government in Muslim and mixed Christian-Muslim areas of Mindanao. Both parties had an expectation that the autonomous government would receive overwhelming support from the majority of people living in that region (Quimpo 2001). The 1996 GRP-MNLF peace agreement was also considered by most stakeholders to be adequate in terms of its content, as it was based on a peace and development framework. It was also thought to be a foundational agreement for achieving peace because it provided “a solid and sound basis for resolving the conflict in the Southern Philippines” (Mercado 2011, p. 136).

However, the peace process has since run into problems, partly because of the mismanagement and corruption that prevailed within the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) administration, and partly because of additional factors such as the lack of support for ARMM from groups other than the MNLF, and the exclusion of the non-Muslim population from decision-making processes in the autonomous region. The peace agreement also failed to address the central issue of land rights, one of the most important aspects in guaranteeing inter-ethnic, inter-religious, and inter-communal peace in Mindanao. In short, the peace agreement did not meet the basic expectations of the Muslim population who grew up during the MNLF’s struggle against the government (Bertrand 2000, Boada 2009).

### 6.1 The Rise of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

One of the leading figures within the MNLF, Salamat Hasim, was banished from the MNLF in 1978. He subsequently formed the MILF in 1982 (Mercado 2011). The MILF justified its establishment by pointing to the failure of the MNLF to address historical injustices faced by the Muslim population in Mindanao. The MILF was particularly dissatisfied with the 1996 peace agreement and the moderate stance taken by the MNLF regarding the future of the Muslim population in Mindanao. The MILF felt that the provision for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was too limited, compared with their original demand to reclaim the Bangsamoro homeland. It subsequently entered into a separate but related armed resistance against the Manila government in early 1997. This armed struggle (with some breaks in fighting during this period) continued for almost 13 years. The last ceasefire was in November 2009 and has been the longest one yet, allowing for the production of a Framework Agreement in
October 2012 and eventually the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in March 2014.

There are four major differences between the MILF and the MNLF. First, the MILF defines itself as a “religious and political organisation made up of Islamists engaged in liberation struggle based in their traditional homeland embracing Mindanao, its adjacent islands, and the Sulu archipelago” (MILF 2011). In contrast, the MNLF defines itself as a nationalist political organisation and its struggle as being “against the Philippines Government to achieve Independence of the Bangsamoro Land” (MNLF 2011). In addition, the MILF has emphasised the religious dimension of the struggle to a greater extent than the more secular-based MNLF. Its initial goal was to create “a Separate and Independent Islamic State” in the Southern Philippines (Mercado 2011, p. 145). The MILF combines Bangsamoro nationalism with contemporary Islamic fundamentalism, but not extremism. Its ideology commits the movement “to make the words of Allah supreme” in the life of the Bangsamoro people (MILF 2011).

The MNLF, in contrast, has adopted ‘egalitarianism’ as its guiding ideology, stating that it “affirms, promotes, or characterizes a principled belief in the EQUALITY of ALL PEOPLE in the political, economic, social and civil rights aspects regardless of differences in religion, race, ethnic origin, age, and gender” (MNLF 2011). The MILF has further explained that its ultimate objective is to regain the right to self-determination and the right to govern their Bangsamoro homeland in accordance with their way of life (Interview P-30, 2012). From the very beginning of their struggle, the MILF “placed their emphasis on their Islamic roots and received a broad popular support from the rural communities who felt disenfranchised by the lack of economic development in the region” (Guerra 2010, pp. 4-5). Third, the MILF emerged when it saw that the political solution offered to the MNLF was not able to address what was perceived as the real aspirations of the Bangsamoro people (Interview P-30, 2012). Fourth, the ideological basis for the different rebel movements is somewhat different. The MNLF holds nationalism as its guiding ideology, while the MILF is both nationalism-oriented but also seeks to advance Islamic values as part of its ideology. These ideological differences fueled the split of the MILF from the MNLF (MacDonald and Viñals 2012).
6.2 Cost of Conflict

The Moro conflict has been socially and economically costly. At least 120,000 people have been killed over the past four decades, and a further two million people have been displaced in various phases of the conflict (AI 2008). The number of displaced persons was 700,000 when war erupted after the failure of MOA-AD (MacDonald and Viñals 2012). At least six billion US dollars have been spent on military expenditures. The conflict has also contributed to 17.5 billion US dollars lost in GDP (Oquist 2009). The number of killings related to the GPH-MNLF conflict alone was around 100,000, with 20 percent of these being civilian deaths. Conflict-related government spending within the 26 years of fighting is estimated to be 73 billion pesos (approximately 1.7 billion US Dollars) (Ebrahim 2010).

7. The Evolution of the Peace Processes

Off-and-on violence and a number of different agreements in each phase of the conflict are key features of both the GPH-MNLF and GPH-MILF peace processes. In the GPH-MNLF peace process, the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in 1976 and its failed implementation dragged the MNLF to another phase of armed struggle against the Manila government. With the mediation of the OIC and its member states, mainly Libya and Indonesia, the GPH-MNLF negotiation continued even in the midst of war, eventually contributing to the crafting of another peace agreement in 1996. This agreement was a reaffirmation of the 1976 peace agreement.

Similar to the GPH-MNLF process, the GPH-MILF peace process from the very beginning was undertaken amidst sporadic violence. In 1997, the MILF leadership, for the first time in its history, agreed to negotiate with the Philippines government (Interview P-30 & P-32, 2012). This process continued until 2000. During this period, there was no significant fighting between the government and the MILF, and local third parties were informally mediating. However, the conflict escalated to war again in April 2000, when then President Estrada declared an ‘all-out war’ against the backdrop of alleged atrocities committed by the MILF (Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005). In this round of fighting, the government was able to damage the military capacity of the MILF;
however, “it failed to crush the MILF, which chose to avoid direct confrontation by splintering into smaller groups and hiding in the remote areas of the region” (Ibid, p. 4).

A new phase of the peace process was initiated when Malaysia intervened as a facilitator. The talks resumed in mid-2001. After the departure of President Estrada, the new administration of President Arroyo introduced an ‘all-out peace’ policy and took an initiative to begin negotiations with the MILF, inviting the Malaysian government to act as a facilitator. This policy was terminated in February 2003 when the Philippines’ military forces began attacking MILF controlled areas with the ostensible aim of controlling “criminal elements” (Ibid). Also in 2003, the MILF and GPH agreed to sign a peace agreement popularly known as the Tripoli Agreement. This agreement emphasised three aspects of the peace process: the security aspect, the humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aspect, and the ancestral domain aspect (Ebrahim 2010). In this phase of peace negotiations, as per the spirit of the Tripoli Agreement, the government and MILF introduced new mechanisms to support the peace process. The formation of the IMT to support the peace process at the local level, the Joint Coordination Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (JCCCH), and the establishment of the Multi-donor Trust Fund (MTF) came into being (Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005).

With the support of the Malaysian facilitator, other intervention mechanisms such as the IMT and the JCCCH, and pressure from local third parties, the conflicting parties made a great deal of progress towards an agreement in 2008, when they agreed to a Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The proposed MOA-AD was drafted in the spirit of the Tripoli Agreement of 2003. This historic document “set forth provisions for much greater territory and autonomous control than was awarded to the MNLF in the 1996 Agreement” (Ampatuan et al. 2010, p. 10). However, the MOA-AD was not acceptable for some local politicians in Mindanao. They filed a case in the Supreme Court of the Philippines arguing that the proposed agreement was unconstitutional. This created a real obstacle to the peace process and the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a temporary restraining order on the eve of the signing of the MOA-AD. This caused the MILF great disappointment, resulting in a re-launch of the war against the government. Since then, both parties have put forward conditions for the
resumption of a new round of talks. The government demanded demobilisation of the rebel forces, while the MILF demanded an international guarantee to resume the talks (Hofmann 2011). Both parties finally decided to talk to each other after several rounds of back channeling from different third parties, which became a turning point leading to a resumption of formal peace talks in late 2009. This phase of talks eventually convinced the GPH and MILF to find a negotiated solution to the conflict. Consequently, they signed a Framework Agreement on 15 October 2012 and eventually a comprehensive peace agreement on 27 March 2014. This agreement is expected to pave the way for the conflicting parties to find a sustainable solution to the Moro conflict.

8. Third-party Intervention and Interveners in the Moro Conflict

Despite being one of the oldest conflicts in the world, the Moro conflict was for many years largely a ‘forgotten conflict’ by important international actors. This has changed significantly over the past decade as several major actors in the international community deemed the conflict to be strategically important. Consequently, they are now involved in the conflict in a variety of roles, such as facilitator, ceasefire monitor, and development interveners (MacDonald and Viñals 2012). The emergence of local third parties such as peace groups, faith-based organisations and human rights groups added another dimension to the Moro peace process.

The GPH and the Moro rebels have accepted external third parties as an integral part of previous and the current peace negotiation process. The OIC and its member countries, namely Libya, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, were the forefront third-party interveners for almost two decades during the peace negotiations between the GPH and the MNLF. Since then, Malaysia, the ICG, IMT, bilateral and multilateral agencies and local third parties have worked as important interveners in the GPH-MILF peace process. Both of these peace processes provide important insights into the dynamics of third-party intervention in conflict-affected countries.

The OIC has been one of the key peace brokers in the conflict between the GPH and MNLF. During the third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1972, the OIC expressed concern about the problem of the Southern Philippines and decided “to seek the good offices of the Government of the Philippines to
guarantee the safety and prosperity of the Muslims” living in Mindanao (Lingga 2006a, p. 5). A careful diplomatic effort that avoided the infringement of national and regional integrity was a key strategy of the OIC in its involvement in the GPH-MNLF negotiations. Despite the OIC’s proactive intermediary role and convincing both parties to sign an agreement, it nonetheless failed to come up with a comprehensive peace agreement that could be implemented (Ibid). Still, the OIC is widely recognised for its effective ‘political influence’ and diplomatic efforts in pressing the MNLF and the Manila government to seek a middle-way solution to the conflict (Cook and Collier 2006). The OIC, due to its continuous effort over more than two decades, was able to keep the negotiation process going and finally pushed the GPH and MNLF to sign an agreement (Santos 2001). This indicates the acceptability of OIC involvement in the peace process; however, the ultimate outcome of OIC involvement is questionable due to the failure to implement the 1996 peace agreement.

In addition to its mediation role, the OIC in 1997 also became involved in peacekeeping, providing a small group of individuals for ceasefire monitoring (Lingga 2006a). Sanctions were also applied by OIC-affiliated countries to put economic and political pressure on the Manila government. Most OIC member states were not financially or politically strong enough to impose effective sanctions over the Manila government, but the oil impediment policy of states like Iran and Saudi Arabia worked well in 1973, forcing the Manila government to accept OIC mediation (Santos 2001).

Malaysia has worked as the lead facilitator in the formal GPH-MILF peace process and has also undertaken secret talks on many other occasions when formal talks broke down. Malaysia also adopted a ‘back channel’ role when conflicting parties delayed the signing of some sub-agreements (Lingga 2006a, Santos 2003). Malaysia has been involved in the GPH-MILF peace process since 2001, when the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammad, along with the then Indonesian President, received an invitation from President Arroyo asking for their support “to convince the MILF to resume the stalled negotiations” (Lingga 2006a, p. 5). Since then Malaysia has remained one of the most credible facilitators and has gained acceptance by both sides, who have believed Malaysia could make a difference and help to remove some of the obstacles to the peace
Besides its role as a facilitator, Malaysia has also provided a venue for formal peace talks between the conflicting parties. It is also leading the IMT.

The International Monitoring Team (IMT) and International Contact Group (ICG) are two major structural frameworks designed specifically to coordinate external third parties in the GPH-MILF peace process. The IMT initially came into existence in September 2004 and has been functioning since then, except for a brief time when Malaysia pulled out from mid-2008 until late 2009. The key function of the IMT has been to support the peace process on the ground by monitoring the ceasefire and reporting back to the peace panel members about progress. The IMT is comprised of five countries – Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan and Norway – as well as the EU, and is assisted by a number of local and international organisations. The formation of the IMT reaffirms the utility of local and external third parties in supporting the parties in conflict at a critical juncture of the peace process. It also demonstrates that third parties can not only play mediation, facilitation and pre-negotiation roles, but can also act as effective agencies on the ground, monitoring ceasefires and the cessation of hostilities.

The ICG came into existence in September 2009 with the signing of a Framework of Agreement by the Chair of the GPH and the MILF peace panel in the presence of the then Malaysian government facilitator, Datuk Othman Bin Abdul. The ICG consists of four nation states, the UK, Japan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and four international organisations, namely The Asia Foundation, CHD, Conciliation Resources, and Muhammadiyah (GPH-MILF 2009). The ICG is unique because it includes both governments and non-governmental organisations. The Framework of Agreement for the establishment of the ICG recognises external third parties as a bridge between the conflicting parties by providing expertise and continuous advice whenever required (Ibid). There are a number of cases where the ICG has been very constructive in keeping the peace process alive. For example, disagreeing with the government’s proposal for solving the Bangsamoro issue, the MILF officially walked out of the talks after the meeting on 27-28 January 2010. During that time, the ICG and the Malaysian facilitator convinced the MILF to sit for the next round of exploratory talks with the government. Similarly, the government peace panel also “agreed to take the MILF proposal and
identify which parts could be done through executive action, which would require legislative amendments, and which would require constitutional changes” (Ampatuan et al. 2010, p. 10).

Domestic actors have also played an important role in the Moro peace process. Civil society has remained an important voice for peace in the Philippines. The Bishop-Ulama conference, for example, was directly involved in the 1996 negotiations in an observer capacity. A number of civil society organisations, representing Moros, Christians, Lumads, and other intercultural, interreligious and inter-sector groups, have also been actively involved in a diverse range of peace initiatives, from the local to the national levels. Some of their key peace initiatives include: grassroots support for development and poverty alleviation; confidence-building across and among the different communities; monitoring of human rights issues; implementation of the ceasefire; acting as informal facilitators of talks; and more generally acting as advocates of peace (MacDonald and Viñals 2012). Other civil society-led peace initiatives include activities such as consolidated mass campaigns during the outbreak of violence and calling for parties, especially the government, to continue the negotiation process rather than engaging in war. Both conflicting parties have recognised the important role of civil society groups. Teresita Quintos Deles, the Presidential Adviser on the peace process, argues that the role of civil society groups in the talks was instrumental because they “have consistently and relentlessly urged both sides not to leave the peace table until an understanding is reached” (OPAPP 2012).

Civil society has also contributed to minimising human rights violations through fact-finding and relief missions, and has been effective in reducing direct violence through extended local ceasefires, even if only in the short-term. The extension of multi-sector peace dialogue, the delivery of integrated programs to alleviate the impact of violence, assistance in societal reconstruction, and the empowerment of people to regain control over their lives through peace-building programs, such as ‘creating space for peace’ and housing and livelihood programs, are additional impacts which civil society initiatives have been able to achieve on the ground (Ferrer 2006, Rood 2005). The formation of the
Banty Ceasefire Group by civil society representatives and grassroots volunteers is a further example (Santos 2005).

Third-party involvement in the peace process has become acceptable because it comes with funding, resources, and other long-term possibilities that may be useful for various groups. The MILF finds that third parties, particularly external third parties, help them to internationalise the conflict and enhance their recognition in the international arena (Interview P-30, P-32 & P-36 2012). International actors have also been found to play an important role in guaranteeing the negotiation process. The MILF believes that they have achieved international legitimacy because of all the external actors involved, and consider this as one of their major achievements. This is important for ensuring that they are not seen to be a terrorist organisation. It also contributes to their financial and political viability and is important for legitimacy with their own people, the larger public, and of course the international community. The government is more circumspect on this issue. It does not like the idea of ambassadors coming to the MILF camp or acknowledging that the MILF represents an independent state (Interview P-1 & P-14 2012).

In summary, third-party involvement has increased the legitimacy of the peace process in the Philippines. Third parties have worked as bridge builders during times of increased hostilities and forced the conflicting parties towards the resumption of talks. It would have been more difficult for the talks to resume if international actors were not involved during the time of President Arroyo, because at this time both sides were not talking to each other. Likewise, the establishment of the ICG and the presence of Malaysia helped to facilitate the peace process. In an interview with the *Manila Bulletin*, Mohagher Iqubal, the MILF peace panel chair, said, “We lost our trust in the Arroyo government after it reneged on the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MoA-AD). So, in case the negotiation comes to life we will ask for an international guarantee so the Philippines government cannot renege on its commitment” (Usman 2008, p. 1). His statement indicates the importance of trust and the role that international actors can play in the peace process.
9. Discussion, Analysis, and Conclusion

There are a number of similarities and differences between the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and the Moro conflict of the Philippines. One similarity is the multiplicity of third-party interveners, ranging from local to international and with diverse roles and interests. Another similarity is that a neighboring country has played a crucial role in peace negotiation processes in both conflicts. In the Moro conflict, Malaysia has been officially recognised as a facilitator in the GPH-MILF peace process. In the Maoist armed conflict, India played this role in the pre-negotiation processes, but has not been officially acknowledged. In Nepal, local facilitators were appointed during the formal negotiation process with a very limited role.

At the same time, the nature of third-party engagement is different in each case. For the most part, third-party engagement in the Maoist conflict in Nepal has been very unstructured and informal. In the Moro conflict, third-party engagement has been quite structured due to the existence of a number of formal mechanisms, such as the ICG, IMT, and the involvement of countries under the umbrella of institutions such as the OIC.

There are also similarities and differences in the nature and characteristics of the conflicts. The Maoist conflict is a short-term conflict, lasting from 1996 to 2005, whereas the Moro conflict is a protracted conflict which has been in existence for more than four decades. Despite being short in duration, the Maoist armed conflict had a nationwide scope and impact. In contrast, the Moro conflict can be defined as a ‘sub-national conflict’ due to its influence and impact only in the Central and Southwestern areas of the Southern Philippines. Moreover, the Maoist armed conflict can be characterised as a class-based struggle that began with a call for the ending of poverty, discrimination and the marginalisation of people living in Nepal, whereas the Moro conflict is an identity-based armed struggle that emerged due to the discrimination and marginalisation of people based on their ethnic and geographical identity. Both conflicts have deep historical roots. The Maoist conflict dates back less than 250 years, while the Moro conflict includes at least 400 years of discrimination and marginalisation.

Regarding the negotiation process, the government of Nepal had to negotiate with only one rebel group, whereas in the case of the Moro conflict the Philippines government
negotiated with two different rebel groups (MNLF and MILF) for the same cause, but in different periods. The negotiation processes in these conflicts have been quite distinct. Three phases of peace negotiations (2001, 2003, and 2006) were sufficient for the parties to reach a decision to sign a comprehensive peace agreement between the Nepal government and the Maoist rebels. In the case of the Moro conflict, the negotiation was quite protracted in both the GPH-MNLF and the GPH-MILF peace processes. Over 20 years of sporadic negotiations, the GPH and the MNLF signed at least two major peace agreements, the Tripoli Peace Agreement and the Jakarta Agreement. In the 16 years of sporadic negotiations between the GPH and the MILF, they also signed at least three major peace agreements, namely the Tripoli Agreement of 2003, the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro Issue in 2012, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in March 2014.

Although this is not a comparative study, the two cases selected for this study prove to be quite relevant to enhancing our understanding of third-party coordination practices in different conflict settings. In particular, this study helps to identify the degree of similarities and differences in third-party coordination practices from one conflict context to another, and why such differences exist. It further helps to identify how a number of contextual and policy factors, as well as the motives of third parties, play a role in shaping the dynamics of third-party coordination.

The next chapter will be the first empirical chapter of the thesis, in which I will discuss the conditions for third-party coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes.
Chapter 5
Why Do Third Parties Coordinate in Armed Conflicts and Peace Processes? Exploring the Conditions for Third-Party Coordination in Nepal and the Philippines

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter I provided an overview of the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and the Moro conflict of the Philippines. I also outlined the main third-party interventions and interveners in both cases. In this chapter I explore the conditions that led to the occurrence of third-party coordination in both conflicts. Additionally, I provide a comparative perspective that helps us to better understand some of the broader conditions for third-party coordination.

As stated in Chapter 2, a key weakness of previous research is its disproportionate focus on the lack of coordination in multiparty intervention processes. It highlights the following contributory factors to the lack of third-party coordination: superficial understandings of the conflict context, lack of diplomatic unity, lack of coherent intervention approaches and strategies, overbearing intervention by larger agencies and powerful nation states, and realpolitik views prevalent among organisations (Crocker, Aall, and Hampson 1999a, Iji 2001, Iji and Fuchinoue 2009, Kriesberg 1996, Ricigliano 2003). Yet there is very little discussion in the literature on positive conditions for third-party coordination. A general argument is that coordination among third parties is largely coincidental in armed conflicts and peace processes, and has often taken place on the basis of the mutual policy interests of third parties or ‘a broad coincidence of interests and commitments’ (Iji and Fuchinoue 2009). This limited interpretation motivated me to further identify the conditions under which third parties coordinate in peace processes. In light of the two different cases, I aim to identify some of the common factors and key policy drivers of the occurrence of third-party coordination. I also explore some case-specific conditions for third-party coordination, examining in particular the applicability of three research propositions related to this dimension of third-party coordination. The three research propositions are:
Proposition 1: Contextual factors such as the existing political environment and the conflict context determine whether third parties coordinate or not.

Proposition 2: Shared conflict resolution goals and the convergence of interests promote third-party coordination. In contrast, conflicting policy interests prevent third-party coordination.

Proposition 3: The role of a lead agency contributes significantly to the occurrence of third-party coordination.

This chapter is structured as follows: In the next section I analyse third-party intervention practices within the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and test the relevance of the above-mentioned research propositions. In the third section, I analyse third-party intervention practices within the Moro conflict of the Philippines by adopting the same approach. In the fourth section I undertake a synchronised analysis of both cases to find similarities and differences in the occurrence of third-party coordination. In the final section I summarise the research findings and explain their significance.

2. The Conditions for Third-Party Coordination in Nepal

2.1. The Existing Political Environment and the Occurrence of Coordination

There is some evidence that the sharp escalation of violence contributed to third-party coordination in Nepal. There was no evident third-party coordination in the first five years of the conflict, between 1996 and early 2001. In this early phase, coordination was not prioritised by local or external third parties, as the low severity of the conflict during this period had little adverse impact on their routine developmental efforts and other usual activities. A lack of common understanding among interveners about possible solutions to the conflict further impeded their coordination. For example, some interveners were in favor of mainstreaming the Maoists through peaceful negotiations, whereas others were in favor of pursuing military victory (Kievelitz and Polzer 2002).

With the escalation of violence after November 2001, coordination among third parties began to increase. Between the periods of high escalation of violence and the signing of the peace accord in November 2006, there were only specific issues of concern for third parties, including the reduction of violence, stopping human rights abuses, pushing the
conflicting parties to sign a formal peace deal, or reinstating democracy (Interview N-5, N-9 & N-24 2012). In other words, third parties had a clear idea of the areas where they could or should intervene. They also had a similar analysis and understanding of the conflict context, as well as similar views on the possible resolution of the conflict. For example, a gradual consensus emerged that the international community would not support the violent takeover of state power by the Maoists, nor military victory over the Maoists by the government (Whitfield 2012).

Powerful third parties such as India, the US and the UK, who were providing military assistance to the government until early 2005, halted assistance after the absolute Royal takeover of power in February 2005. A research participant from the International Crisis Group noted that India and the US took a lead intervening role in the post-February 2005 political environment, and built a consensus that the takeover by the King was unacceptable. Likewise, local third parties, particularly NGOs, CSOs and human rights groups, were raising their voices for a peaceful solution to the conflict (Dahal 2005). There was already a group of Western European countries advocating for a peaceful solution. In short, the political environment of Nepal from early 2005 until early 2006 created a consensus among the interveners that Nepal required a negotiated and peaceful end to the conflict, rather than a military solution.

A strong coordination, particularly at the diplomatic level, was also seen in late 2005 and early 2006. During that time the King controlled the government, was not keen to initiate dialogue with the rebels and mainstream parties, and the country was in a deep crisis due to the higher levels of confrontation between the major political forces. To overcome this stalemate, the diplomatic community in Nepal, along with local CSOs, became increasingly vocal about finding a peaceful solution to the conflict and restoring democracy. There was also a sense of unity among local and external third parties in support of the People’s Movement against the King and the ongoing dialogue between the mainstream political parties and the Maoists. Many respondents, representing both external and local third parties, acknowledged that such coordination had not been seen before in Nepal among external third parties, with all major interveners and the local
CSOs more or less speaking in a unified voice for ending the political crisis and participating in frequent dialogues and interactions with each other.

Third-party coordination during the time of conflict can also be linked to interveners’ institutional interests. In Nepal, external interveners who were long-time supporters of development initiatives experienced a number of challenges at this time in implementing their development programmes. Pre-approval from the Maoist rebels before the implementation of any programmes, payments of donations or monthly levies by local and international NGO staff, and other kinds of support, either in cash or in kind, were prevalent during this period (Frieden 2012). It was in this context that third parties began coordinating.

One such endeavor was an agreement on Basic Operating Guidelines (BOGs) in October 2003 by a group of development interveners, with the exception of the US, India, and China. According to Frieden, the BOGs were intended “[t]o defend the development space against the pretentions of the insurgents and the interference of the security forces, which were trying to limit the free movement and open communication of development workers” (Frieden 2012, p. 103). The BOGs also “allowed development agencies to coordinate a common response to challenges and abuse by the parties in conflict” (Ibid). This finding can be linked with RM theorists Fireman and Gamson’s (1979) argument that a collective action takes place among actors who share grievances, interests and beliefs, concluding that such actions are important to defend their identity. Since development interveners in Nepal were experiencing common problems during the time of conflict, most had a shared interest in finding ways to protect their collective interests; BOGs facilitated this.

Cost-benefit analysis was another crucial factor in promoting third-party coordination during this time of intense political crisis. Incentives in the form of strategic successes and the promotion of core values became crucial for third-party coordination. Third parties have been clustered into five broad categories in order to analyse their interests and incentives in Nepal’s peace process.
Local third parties belong to the first category. Their incentive was to ensure a democratic and violence-free society. Democratic culture flourished in Nepal after the People’s Movement of 1990 and local third parties became accustomed to that environment. However, the prevalence of violence and the King’s control over the democratic government threatened this situation. Coordination among local third parties and with other third parties became essential to wage a peaceful and democratic movement to defend their newly emerging identity as members of a democratic society (Interview N-7, N-18 & N-20 2012).

India belongs to the second category of third parties. The incentive behind its engagement was related to its domestic security and strategic concerns. Because of its open border with Nepal, political instability and insecurity in Nepal posed a security threat. Extensive insecurity in Nepal could also give other regional and global powers, such as China and the US, an opportunity to interfere, weakening India’s political influence over Nepal. India was thus interested in blocking the interference of other interveners, including the UN, US, China and the European countries. The expansion of the Indian Maoist movement also posed an internal security threat to India. It was believed that there was a possible connection between the Maoist groups of Nepal and India. In this context, it was critical for India to disengage the Nepali Maoists from armed violence and involve them in mainstream politics (Interview N-11, N-20, N-31 & N-36 2012), as this action could have a flow-on effect in India.

EU members belong to the third category of third parties. They had no visible strategic interests in Nepal; their incentives seem to have been value-driven. Rocketing violence and the King’s takeover were gradually destroying the democratic culture, and human rights violations were increasing throughout Nepal. This situation was an affront to their core values, as EU members had been advocating and supporting human rights and democracy initiatives since 1990, the beginning of the era of multi-party democracy in Nepal. The success of the peace process would protect and promote these core values (Interviews 2012).

The US belongs to the fourth category of third parties. Its incentive for intervening in Nepal’s conflict was to mitigate the emergence of a communist movement. More
importantly, the Maoists were labeled a terrorist group by the US government, which meant that their intervention was linked to the War on Terror. Further, as a global advocate of democracy they were opposed to the King’s move to seize political power (Interview N-31 2012).

Other third parties, such as the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and the UK, belong to the final category. They are longtime supporters of Nepal’s development process and wanted to secure their presence in Nepal into the future. The prevalence of violence and autocracy would be viewed as a policy failure of their development and cooperation efforts. They also had human rights and democracy concerns (Interviews 2012).

In short, all third parties found that ending the conflict in Nepal would benefit them in one way or another. Although each had distinct policy interests behind their support for ending the conflict, coordination among them became an important and time-relevant priority for fulfilling their individual interests. This finding directly supports the argument made in resource mobilisation theory that cost-benefit analysis is one of the factors that motive people or groups to take part in certain collective actions (Fireman and Gamson 1979, Klandermans 1984).

2.2 Lack of Coordination in the Post-Agreement Period (Late 2006 and Onward)

Several respondents in Nepal (representing both local and external third parties) noted that there have been a number of coordination problems in the post-agreement period. An important reason for this is that many third parties have held distinct opinions regarding the political context, particularly regarding the rebels. This political atmosphere eventually reduced the possibility of third-party coordination. One of the respondents, who represent an international NGO, explained this as follows:

You know in 2005, I think it was very easy for all international actors to have the same analysis of what was happening in Nepal, that there needs to be restoration of democracy, the war needs to be stopped, and then of course the 12 point [plan] happened, which gave everyone a platform around which to rally... What happened in 2007 and after that... it became much harder to see things in black and white after 2006 April and after CPA [Comprehensive Peace Accord] particularly. You know what, in this sense, the international actors sort of patterns
Another respondent associated with a foreign diplomatic mission in Kathmandu stated that there was a genuine level of coordination among international third-party interveners at the height of the political crisis; however, that momentum decreased following the end of the crisis:

You know, in 2005/2006 there was very good coordination among the ambassadors living in Nepal, when the people were fighting for democracy and when the people’s movement was about to start... The 17 embassies they were together, meeting with different political parties and giving solidarity to the people. Once the political process somehow settled down... the coordination slowly dispersed... that I am looking a little from inside (Interview N-5 2012).

Differences in opinions regarding the modality of the peace process also prevented third parties from coordinating with each other, as some actors advocated a fast-track solution, whereas others favored a sustainable but slow-track solution. In this regard, an analyst associated with an international NGO expressed the following:

It seems to me that... you are lacking [in] common understanding. You get some actors who... say this [peace process] has gone on long enough... just finish it off now. You get other actors and say... well... it’s gone on quite long and the process is losing legitimacy but at the same time you don’t want to rush people because these decisions are complicated and take time. And you get a third group of international actors and say... well... it does not matter to us as long as our relationship remains the same (Interview N-11 2012).

These differences of opinion among interveners were the result of many different factors, including a lack of shared understanding of the conflict context and shifting priorities in a changing political environment. An example is differing responses to the welcoming of the UN Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and its later termination. In 2007 most third parties, including India, welcomed UNMIN’s presence in Nepal to support post-war peace initiatives, particularly the monitoring of the ceasefire, the CA election, and the management of arms and armies. However, by 2010-2011 no unified voice was heard among external third parties on extending UNMIN’s presence in Nepal. The “United Kingdom was in favor of a technical rollover by a month, while China argued on acting upon the request of Nepal. EU, led by the United Kingdom, wanted to send a strong signal to Nepal that the failure of the local actors couldn’t be passed on to the world body” (Saurabh 2010, p.2). Many respondents also expressed the belief that India was
against retaining UNMIN for an extended period and pressured the Nepalese government to terminate its mandate. India was reluctant to keep the UN mission in Nepal because it wanted to obtain maximum credit for its support for Nepal’s peace process, and was therefore not keen to share credit with the UN and other interveners.

The termination of UNMIN’s mandate without completing the integration and arms management process meant that it ultimately only had partial success in Nepal’s peace process. Consequently, there was a distinct lack of coordination among third parties regarding the implementation of several provisions of the peace agreement. The lack of a consolidated voice among third parties on the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the modality of the federal state, and uncoordinated support and advice during the constitution writing process are some examples of this.

There are a number of reasons for the lack of third-party coordination in the post-agreement period. First and foremost, the post-agreement environment was an opportunity for many third parties to analyse the political context from the viewpoint of their own interests, and to predict future scenarios in a broader perspective, whereas during the conflict they had to analyse the situation from a narrower perspective, focusing on how to deal with armed violence and how to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiation table (Interview N-11 2012). Second, the accessibility of third parties to both high-ranking political party leaders and rebel leaders also contributed significantly to their lack of coordination. Easy access to leaders of conflicting parties in the post-agreement period gave third parties the opportunity to express their concerns and interests directly to the key stakeholders in the peace process. This was not the case during the period of violent conflict.

Finally, the lack of coordination between headquarters and field-level staff is another factor behind the lack of coordination. Donors in Nepal provided millions of dollars from their headquarters to invest in post-agreement programmes, mainly to support the CA election and constitutional dialogue, strengthen democratic institutions, assist with reintegration and rehabilitation of combatants, and other post-conflict reconstruction initiatives. However, due to delays in the implementation of the peace agreement, donors could not spend their funds as expected, despite their headquarters’ direction. As a result,
they poured money carelessly into various programs. This situation was seen at several levels, including the INGO and NGO level, and it had a negative impact on post-agreement donor coordination (Interview N-3, N-11 & N-23 2012).

2.3 The Convergence of Interests and Third-Party Coordination

Nepal’s case demonstrates that some third-party coordination events were based on the third parties’ convergence of interests; often they were issue-based and observed in both the highly escalated and post-agreement phases of conflict. A number of respondents observed that the issue of human rights brought many third parties together. Whether it was to put pressure on both conflicting parties to stop human rights violations, or to lobby for establishing an OHCHR and UNMIN office in Nepal, most international actors, particularly the Western countries, the UN, and the human rights community of Nepal, raised a unified voice, as Rawski and Sharma also note:

During this period, rights defenders in Nepal became increasingly united in their public advocacy against both Maoist and army violence. When the army began to detain large number of people without producing them before the court and to deny or limit access to military detention by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the ICRC, human rights lawyers filed hundreds of habeas corpus petitions in the Supreme Court – at great potential risk (Rawski and Sharma 2012, p.179)

Local human rights groups who were engaged in human rights advocacy condemned human rights abuses committed by both the Maoists and government security forces. The efforts of these local third parties were supported by the Western diplomatic community. Likewise, Western countries lobbied at the UN Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva to nominate a special rapporteur to Nepal to investigate conflict-related human rights abuses. This eventually contributed to the establishment of the OHCHR office in Nepal in 2005 (Whitfield 2008a).

Following the signing of the peace accord, many third parties raised a collective voice for the formation of the TRC, the Disappearance Commission, and against amnesty for those who had committed war crimes (Interview N-4, N-5, N-17 & N-25 2012). The following statement by a European diplomat in Kathmandu describes third-party coordination on human rights issues in this post-agreement period:

*If you look at today’s picture, we have an example, just a case in point is... all the donors (Western) have gone together and are very coordinated on human*
rights issues, messaging to the Maoists and other parties on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) bill. There we are coordinated, we deliver the same message, and the ambassadors all go to the meetings because it is a bigger push (Interview N-4 2012).

The third parties mentioned above had set human rights protection as their primary agenda during the period of armed conflict, and it can be argued that their genuine humanitarian interest to safeguard the fundamental rights of the people was a crucial factor behind their coordinated human rights interventions.

Third-party coordination on issues surrounding a UN interagency integration and rehabilitation programme of more than 4,000 ex-combatants, who were discharged from the cantonments as disqualified combatants, is another relevant example of third-party coordination based on the convergence of interests in Nepal. This was a major, time-consuming but important element of the peace process. Numerous respondents acknowledged that although the third parties had different views on the modality and allocation of resources in support of this initiative, their active participation in the UN-convened meetings and discussions around this issue was one of the best examples of post-agreement coordination.

Virtually the entire international community came under one coordination mechanism chaired by UNDP resident coordinator Robert Piper (Interview N-2, N-23, N-24 & N-32 2012). Before the discharge process began, leading officials from different UN agencies, including UNMIN, came together to devise a solid plan to push the process along, and coordinated with the government and the Maoists to support the process. There was also an effective division of labor. UNMIN undertook political negotiations, the UN country team added pressure, and the donors allocated the funding required for the successful completion of the process. One of the respondents suggested that the occurrence of coordination in this case was also due to strong leadership and having a lead agency to coordinate the process. In addition, the convergence of interests of donors led to their allocating resources equitably and sufficiently, because they all wanted a share of the pie (Interview N-2 2011).
The homogeneity of some groups of third parties also contributed to promoting third-party coordination in both pre-agreement and post-agreement phases. One of the best examples of this is the coordination practices adopted by the EU countries. Coordination forums were utilised to share and verify information received from different sources, and to respond to particular issues in a unified manner. One of the European diplomats explained this homogeneity in the following way:

*There is an EU working group where [the] EU delegation, EU members and Norway and Switzerland are involved. They meet every three weeks ... Sometimes [they] also invite like-minded donors like Australians, occasionally Americans are coming along, but not as often as Australians... That is the coordination mechanism... to make sure that all the donors have one voice. It is a functional mechanism... for example, right now the integration and rehabilitation of combatants... as every country has been quite active... GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) has been doing a lot in the cantonment... we have been doing things... observation mission going out... you don’t know what everyone is doing, it can be difficult to get information and information sharing is very important. GIZ is always very useful to obtain information because they are working inside the cantonment... They have their presence in communities outside the cantonment, so they could come to the meeting and tell us this is what we see and then someone else says we received that... let’s put it together. In another case, for example, in coordination of response... you might have Swiss come out and say we have been approached with this... has anyone else been approached? Someone else will say... oh, we have been approached with a similar question. Let us make sure we give the same response... so that parties or different actors in the peace process cannot try to split the European countries. Generally, coordination is information sharing... a lot of information sharing. And often negotiation discussions about what the next step is going to be as we see through [the] conflict resolution and peace process (Interview N-26 2012).*

This notion of intervener homogeneity is congruent with Crocker et al’s concept of collective conflict management, which advocates for the collective involvement of third parties with similar characteristics (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2011).

The above examples demonstrate that urgent issues and/or issues of high interest can motivate third parties to come together and take coordinated action. In Nepal, third parties realised the urgency of the human rights issue, as well as the importance of the integration and rehabilitation of discharged combatants. There are no real discussions in the existing literature which describe urgent issues and issues of high interest as motivations for third parties to coordinate. I argue that certain issues in armed conflicts and peace processes are quite compelling for some third parties, both because they
advance their policy interests and also partly because of genuine humanitarian concerns. Third parties which share a similar conflict resolution objective, and a common political analysis of the context, desire to intervene collectively to address those particular issues. They find coordination to be an effective intervention strategy for producing a desirable outcome for their mutual benefit, as well as for the benefit of the conflict-affected country.

However, the urgency of an issue does not always encourage third parties to engage in coordinated action. An example of this is third-party engagement in the first phase of the constitution-building process, which began in early 2008 and continued until the collapse of the CA body in 2012. Constitution-building is one of the most important and pressing issues associated with Nepal’s peace process, because the demand for CA elections was a primary aim of the armed struggle and a key negotiating point between the government and the Maoists. Given its importance to the overall success of the peace process, almost all third parties, both external and internal, focused on this issue. However, as claimed by many respondents, the constitution-making process, particularly in the post-CA election period (April 2008 onwards), was an uncoordinated and disorganised third-party engagement. Few concrete actions were taken by the third parties to initiate a collective stance regarding the future of the Nepalese constitution. Discussions initiated by the UNDP Nepal office also collapsed in the middle of the process (Interview N-7, N-11, N-23 & N-27 2012).

A number of factors contributed to making the third parties’ efforts uncoordinated in the constitution-making process. First, the constitution-making process was a broad political effort, where elements to be included or excluded in the constitution depended on the negotiation and bargaining capacity of political actors. Third parties, in this regard, took the side of those political actors and interest groups who were closer to their own policy and ideological orientations. Second, third parties used the constitution-making process as an opportunity to advance their own policy, strategic and value-driven interests. Third, the third parties engaged in a turf battle over the resources required for the constitution-making process. They wanted to be seen as active supporters of Nepal’s most historic political event.
2.4 Policy Interests and Third-Party Coordination

The involvement of external and local third parties in Nepal has been heavily influenced by their strategic and policy interests. Consequently, third parties have often come up with divergent ideas for the resolution of the conflict and different standards of measurement of the success of their intervention actions (Interview N-7 & N-11 2012). A number of examples demonstrate how the lack of a convergence of interests has influenced third-party coordination in Nepal. Excluding India and China, most of the external donors and UN agencies active in Nepal contributed to the formulation of the Peace and Development Strategy 2010-2015, which emerged in order to build consensus among donors and to avoid the duplication of peace and reconstruction activities. The absence of China and India in the PDS formulation process indicated their unwillingness to coordinate their interventions. Instead, India and China provided support to Nepal based on their own development assistance framework, which allowed them to concentrate their support solely in areas of their own policy and strategic interests.

The second example relates to third parties’ desire to convene their own informal networks and coordination mechanisms, while operating with more or less similar objectives. The Nepal Transition to Peace Process, managed by The Asia Foundation and operating in collaboration with the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC); the UNDP-led Collaborative Leadership Project; and the International IDEA-led Political Party Dialogue Forum on constitution-building involve very different forums, established in different periods, and coordinated by three different agencies. Regardless of their different names and written objectives, they all work with similar political leaders and local mediators, and deal with similar issues around peace, democracy and constitution-making (Interview 2012). They do have a nominal level of communication and interaction, but their existence as discrete entities indicates that the organisations and agencies convening these forums have competing goals and diverse motives (Interview 2012). The problem is that having different forums for advancing more or less similar agendas may provide inconsistent messages to the conflicting parties.
A third example is the existence of two different peace funds in Nepal supported by the same donors. There is the NPTF, convened by the Government of Nepal with the support of seven donors, and the UN Peacebuilding Fund, managed by the UN. The Terms of Reference of the UN peace fund clearly indicate that it is “[d]esigned to complement the Nepal Peace Trust Fund and other existing mechanisms for peace process support by focusing only on tasks that cannot be funded or implemented through existing mechanisms” (UNPFN 2009, p. 1). However, having two institutions with similar objectives not only increases administrative and financial costs, it also creates confusion among the public (Interviews 2012). Those who supported the existence of both funds claim that the UN peace fund is necessary until the NPTF develops the capacity to manage and regulate the peace fund properly. They also insist that the UN peace fund can be an alternative means of support for ongoing peace initiatives when the NPTF is blocked due to political unrest or other reasons (Interviews 2012). By contrast, those who favour only one peace fund argue that having one mechanism would create greater focus, and could also accumulate resources that have been divided between two different peace funds (Interview N-9 2012).

The above examples support the argument made in motives theory that third parties often place a high priority on their institutional interests during their involvement in various intervention actions. This can discourage third-party coordination because their primary goal of intervention remains advancing their own policy interests, which often contradicts with others’ policy interests. However, as argued before, a cost-benefit analysis of incentives sometimes contributes to third-party coordination. In Nepal’s conflict it was seen particularly during the time of conflict in the form of one-off events, and in the post-agreement phase in the form of issue-based coordination.

2.5 Leadership Factors and the Occurrence of Third-Party Coordination

Nepal’s case demonstrates that the presence of a lead agency greatly contributes to the occurrence of third-party coordination in all phases of conflict. However, taking a lead role in the coordination process is contextual, as it largely depends on the issues, objectives and intentions of the coordination. In Nepal, different nation states, agencies, and even individuals have played a prominent leadership role in the facilitation of third-
party coordination (Interviews 2012). As pointed out by many respondents, it was India which took a lead role in having a 12-point agreement in place between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA)\(^{17}\) and the Maoists in October 2005. India provided a venue and other logistical support to facilitate dialogue between the SPA leaders and the Maoists. The 12-point agreement paved the way for the People’s Movement of 2006 against the King, and ultimately the signing of the peace agreement between the Government and the Maoists in November 2006.

The role of Ian Martin as Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Nepal and chief of UNMIN from 2005 until 2008 is another example of commendable leadership among external as well as local third-party intervener in the critical political transition phase. He remained in regular contact with a range of third parties and the conflicting parties and was able to gather support from them to make UNMIN’s work successful. Consequently, many other interveners accepted his leadership role (Interview N-2, N-3, N-23 & N-24 2012). One of the respondents who had worked with UNMIN and OHCHR in Nepal said, “Ian Martin was doing a great job in terms of coordination, all the way through” (Interview N-24 2012). Similarly, the leadership role of Robert Piper and the UN coordination office in Kathmandu on issues around the formulation of the Peace and Development Strategy Paper (2010-2015) and the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants is regarded as one of the best examples of third-party coordination (Interviews 2012). This example is supported by a respondent who worked as an external third-party intervener in Nepal:

> I think a good example is Robert Piper’s effort over the last year to come up with the development assistance framework and with the peace and development strategy and then the UN development assistance framework... He has really invested lots of resources in... both of those efforts. The idea is to keep the peace process alive, keep everyone on [the] same page but in a real sense, not in a bureaucratic sense, and that’s quite important (Interview N-24 2012).

It is not only nation states and UN-affiliated officials but a number of private mediators who have also taken a lead role to deal with specific issues. Padma Ratna Tuladhar and Daman Nath Dhungana, prominent local facilitators, lead a Track-Two (also called track

\(^{17}\) SPA is an alliance of seven mainstream political parties of Nepal formed in late 2004 to ignite a non-violent protest against the authoritarian government led by the King.
one-and-a-half) forum called the Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative (NTTP). This forum is an example of how local and external interveners can facilitate dialogue among conflicting parties by joining together in one forum. Given that the forum makes use of external mediators, such as John Paul Lederach and Martin Stuerzinger, there is collective leadership by external and internal interveners (Interview N-21 2012). This forum is an example of how joint leadership by mediators functions in the dialogue facilitation process in the post-agreement political environment.

The above examples demonstrate that strong leadership contributes to third-party coordination. However, different third parties take leading roles in different phases of conflict and for different tasks. For example, the leadership role of India is found in the pre-agreement phase. Being a powerful third-party intervener in Nepal, it is unlikely that any other third party could have been as effective as India in that critical phase of conflict. Likewise, the ad hoc leadership role of Ian Martin following the signing of the peace agreement demonstrates a change in leadership role to address the coordination needs of that particular phase, particularly for the management of arms and armies. The leadership role of Robert Piper was crucial in generating consensus among external interveners around critical issues of the peace process in the heightened post-agreement period. And the collective leadership role of the NTTP was also critical for keeping the conflicting parties engaged in dialogue throughout the post-agreement period. These examples confirm the need for a range of leaders for distinct intervention tasks in various phases of conflict, and support the argument made in RM theory that leadership is vital for collective action (Buechler 1993, Canel 1997).

Several participants also expressed the view that personal initiative, personal relationships and chemistry play a key role in third-party coordination. One of the respondents, who belongs to the UNDP, commented, “Especially when two agencies have similar personalities, then collaboration and coordination occurs, otherwise it does not occur. Interveners are not motivated to coordinate unless certain policies [and incentives] guide them to do it” (Interview N-2 2011). As this respondent notes,

_We are not mandated to coordinate with each different unit within the UNDP, forget agencies as such. It’s [based] largely on the personality that is there. If it is a collaborative personality, coordination is possible… Why would I go out and_
coordinate when I can just get it done?... It takes lots of time and there is no time, people are very busy... And there is no incentive for coordination... If life goes on, then why do you need to coordinate... if I coordinate what do I get? Nothing. If I do not coordinate, what do I get? Nothing. It really does not matter (Ibid).

The above statement demonstrates that relational dynamics are a factor in motivating or de-motivating people to coordinate. If there are effective, capable actors with resources they may be able to get things done without much coordination, but there are costs associated with unilateral action as well. One of the respondents from an international NGO, who wished to remain anonymous, shared the following experience regarding the importance of personal relationships in the coordination process:

> It comes to the issue of trust and chemistry and this kind of relationship you have or do not have. I have to say, honestly, with the current manager of UNDP, I work fine and good and everything goes easily. [With the] earlier one, I could not work. I tried but I could not. Chemistry of course is not the only thing... of course there is an organisation... not only people but I mean institutions matter, but people make the difference.

### 3. Discussion: Third-Party Coordination in Nepal

The above analysis of the Nepal case confirms my three research propositions. My first research proposition was that contextual factors, such as the political environment and the conflict context, impact on the occurrence of third-party coordination. In this case, coordination among third parties occurred mainly under the pressure of violence and political crisis. Coordination lessened in the post-conflict period. The point is that, before the signing of the peace agreement in November 2006, intervening roles were very clear for third parties, but roles blurred after the signing of the peace agreement because there were many more issues to consider. Third parties also had a different set of priorities due to differences in political analysis. Crocker et al’s (2002) observation that coordinated third-party assistance depends on the levels of violence partially supports this research finding. They argue that in cases of high levels of violence, second-track actors can be involved in the pre- and post-negotiation processes, while actors such as great powers and international and regional organisations can be involved in formal negotiations. They advocate this ‘sequential’ form of mediation (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2002). However, in Nepal a variety of actors were involved in violence reduction efforts, in a more or less collaborative effort. This happened not simply through mediation in formal
negotiations, but in the form of pressure groups and lobbying and advocacy-related activities.

Based on my analysis, it can also be seen that coordination patterns change from one phase of the conflict to another. Little coordination occurs among third parties in the beginning phase of the conflict; coordination gradually increases with the escalation of violence. It then decreases again in the post-agreement or political normalisation period. This finding is important, as it informs us about the phases where third-party coordination appears to take place more spontaneously, and those where greater efforts are needed to help third parties coordinate.

This research also provides general support for my second research proposition, that shared conflict resolution goals and the convergence of interests promote third-party coordination. It can be argued, for example, that a convergence of interests advanced third-party coordination during the periods of armed conflict and around issues of international concern, such as human rights. Particularly among the Western states, third-party coordination around human rights and democracy promotion can be explained in terms of their common goal of promoting liberal peacebuilding values. This finding supports the argument of Zaum, who contends that Western states have shared interests in intervening in a conflict because they “are motivated by liberal objectives such as responding to large-scale human rights violations or [are] conducted under an international responsibility to protect” (Zaum 2012, p.121).

But while third parties found a unity of purpose during the period of crisis, this solidarity was lost after the signing of the peace accord in 2006. This finding supports the arguments made by Iji (2005) and Iji and Funchinoue (2009). They claim that even in the absence of binding coordination mechanisms, structures and policies, third-party interveners are nonetheless willing to coordinate with each other based on their mutual ‘policy interests’ or ‘broad coincidence of interests and commitments’ within a particular conflict. The case of Nepal also confirms the argument made by Crocker et al (1999), Kriesberg (1996), Jones (2001), and Nan (2003) that divergent interests, competing goals, and the lack of shared conflict resolution goals, approaches and strategies hinder third-party coordination. This finding can be linked to Svensson’s assertion that the lack of a
coherent approach among interveners is a major obstacle to third-party coordination (Svensson 2009).

This research also confirms my third proposition that the role of leadership contributes to third-party coordination, a point made in the literature. Iji & Fuchinoue (2009) discuss the importance of having a leading actor to facilitate coordination and cooperation among third-party interveners. Jones (2001) makes a similar argument. It is important to note that in Nepal the lead agencies were not selected either by a group of third parties or the conflicting parties; rather, they evolved out of the intervention processes itself.

The existing literature does not explicitly discuss the importance of personality as an important factor in third-party coordination. This research, however, identifies relational dynamics as a very important component in third-party coordination. Some individuals truly desire to coordinate, whereas others do not do not wish to make the effort required, unless it is deemed necessary. Finally, it appears that interveners who represent powerful states or institutions are less likely to coordinate, as they have higher strategic interests in conflict-affected countries and higher leverage over the conflicting parties. By contrast, third-party interveners with low or no strategic interests are more willing to coordinate with other parties.

4. Conditions for Third-Party Coordination in the Philippines

4.1 The Existing Political Environment and the Occurrence of Third-Party Coordination

The Philippines case also demonstrates that political crisis or severe violence often encourages third parties to coordinate. The Moro conflict is one of the most protracted conflicts in the world, as is its peace process. Third-party coordination was not seriously pursued during the GPH-MNLF peace process, as only a few Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) member countries intervened in the top-level negotiation process, and all of them worked under the umbrella of the OIC. However, a diverse range of third parties emerged during the GPH-MILF peace process, including peace NGOs and civil society groups. International peacebuilding organisations also came to Mindanao, and bilateral donors such as Japan, Australia, the EU, the US, and the UN agencies, who had
historically supported development initiatives in Mindanao, began to provide support for various peace initiatives, including monitoring, advocacy, training and capacity-building. Some of the diplomatic missions in Manila also showed an interest in supporting peace initiatives (Interviews 2012).

The evidence suggests that third-party coordination was not a priority in the conflict interventions during the beginning phase (1997-2000) of the GPH-MILF conflict. This is partly because of the perceived lack of intensity and impact of the armed conflict. Another characteristic of this early phase of conflict was the absence of a diverse range of third-party interveners. Those involved at this stage were a small number of local third parties. Third parties began to come together only after a sharp escalation in the fighting between the government and the MILF. After the declaration of all-out war in 2000 by President Estrada, and a major clash between the GPH and MILF in 2003, civil society organisations from Mindanao as well as Manila came together to form a number of peace advocacy networks. The formation of the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS) and Mindanao Peaceweavers (MPW) between 2000 and 2003 is an example of such a network. One respondent in Mindanao, who belongs to a Mindanao-based NGO, and who wants to remain anonymous, explained civil society involvement in this way:

We were part of the formation of the MPW, because we saw the need to consolidate CSO efforts, to expand participation in the peace process. It was formed actually during the time there was fighting in Mindanao. The main goal was to increase the voice of the civil society in the peace process, but more importantly, strengthening the capacities and the constituencies of the different peace networks. Because there were already some peace networks at that time but they are not necessarily coordinating or even talking with each other (Interview 2012).

Similarly, the IMT was initially formed in 2005 after major violence in 2003-2004. It was established as a collective intervention mechanism for the monitoring of the ceasefire at ground level. The eruption of violence in late 2008 after the parties failed to sign the MOA-AD was another turning point for advancing third-party coordination, as it led to the establishment of the ICG in 2009, the CPC in 2010, and the return of the IMT in early 2010. The conflicting parties realised that structures like the ICG and the IMT could be helpful for minimising violence and obtaining support for the negotiation process. It can thus be argued that third-party coordination, whether in the form of formalised structures
like the ICG and the IMT, or other more informal structures like the networks formed by civil society groups, is generated as a product of intensified violence.

There are other examples of coordinated efforts of third parties during crises and intense levels of violence. Manila-based diplomatic missions issued joint press statements on several occasions expressing their concern about the fighting and the humanitarian crisis in Mindanao. Both local and international third parties worked together during the crisis. Joint third-party monitoring during the Basilan clashes in October 2010 and skirmishes in Maguindanao in August 2012 are notable examples. One respondent who represents an NGO in Mindanao, and who wishes to remain anonymous, made this comment:

For example, in 2003 there was an outbreak of war in Mindanao. Our intervention is we helped organise a network of organisations and we formed the Mindanao Peace Weavers. We had multiple interventions during that time. We had dialogue with internally displaced people (IDPs), with the Local Governments units (LGUs) and the rebels involved in the war of 2003. There is a team organised by the network to dialogue with national officials like the congressmen, senators, and the cabinet secretaries, the OPAAP. We have also a team organised to dialogue with different embassies... The call of the dialogue is to stop the war between the government and the MILF, because there are already so many IDPs, and return to negotiations. We also dialogue for the declaration of a ceasefire. We were able to influence the MILF to declare a unilateral ceasefire. But our government at that time also said that if MILF will declare a ceasefire, the government would do so as well. But when the MILF declared a ceasefire, the military did not. So we made a human chain with all the IDPs to call for the government to honor their promise for a ceasefire. We were successful on this account (Interview 2012).

Coordinated third-party intervention was also found during the negotiation stalemate phase of the GPH-MILF conflict. Organising conferences, public meetings, and lobbying to put pressure on both parties are some of the coordinated events in this phase of the conflict. In this regard, one of the respondents in Mindanao, who wished to be anonymous, explained the following:

Often times when there is an impasse to the negotiations, often times the civil society networks have the power to call the party. Meaning, in an informal process, they can organise activities where they bring in the two parties, in any way explore options, they break the impasse by creating spaces for dialogue rather than polarization between the parties (Interview 2012).

The evidence suggests that coordinated intervention through the ICG, IMT and CPC began in Mindanao after the failure of local and unilateral intervention efforts conducted
before 2003 (Interview P-14 2012). Between 1997 and 2001 local third parties were involved as informal facilitators of the peace process. However, such efforts were not successful in accelerating the negotiation process or minimising the intensity of armed violence. Local mediators were blamed for being biased towards the rebels, and their minimal leverage over the conflicting parties was another drawback. In 2001, the entry of Malaysia as an external third-party facilitator also failed to convince the parties to seek a negotiated solution. The involvement of Malaysia was misinterpreted by a large number of local third parties, who considered Malaysia to be biased towards the rebels. Malaysia’s alleged policy and strategic interests in the disputed island of Sabah provoked further criticism of its engagement in the GPH-MILF peace process (Interview P-2, P-4, P-13 & P-18 2012).

During this period the conflicting parties began to accept more local and international third parties in support of the peace process, and to form intervention structures such as the IMT, ICG and CPC. One respondent who represents a local NGO on the International Monitoring Team commented:

*The vehicle of coordination among international actors in pushing for the negotiation itself is the ICG and IMT. Back in 2006, when both sides had an impasse in their negotiations, we thought that local actors are not anymore enough to push the negotiations forward. We needed outside actors. It’s not necessarily because Malaysia is not an outside actor. However, being a mediator, its influence in pushing both parties towards negotiation is very limited because it has to worry about how it will proceed and the perception of being partial... We brainstormed about the idea of ICG in Manila together with concerned people and diplomats... But it took another crisis in 2008 that produced so many IDPs before this idea was adopted. In 2009, the ICG came about. The idea is twofold; the first is to have some sort of a pressure group... Why? Because you cannot depend on the local groups to push for the negotiations. Why? Because [the] earliest, the first ever negotiations since 1975, all has been monopolized by local actors. There was a signing of a peace agreement but after which things have been the same. There is something definitely wrong about leaving the peace process to purely local actors... Why? Because there is no guarantee (Interview P-37 2012).*

### 4.2 The Convergence of Interests and Third-Party Coordination

In the Philippines, and particularly in Mindanao, various NGOs and networks are working on a wide range of issues related to the peace process. However, human rights concerns have remained a key issue that has inspired both local and international third
parties to take coordinated action. Several respondents from both Manila and Mindanao, representing local as well as external third parties and conflicting parties, expressed this view:

*Local third-party: [Several of] these networks are already in existence... I know they have also their own interests but somehow these networks are united [in] the work on peacebuilding and human rights (Interview P-32 2012).*

*External third-party: The peace process issues are quite a common ground of agreement of almost everyone who is involved in one way or the other in the peace process. Human rights are another one (Interview P-10 2012).*

*One of the conflicting parties: These people [international third parties] are very concerned of human rights here as well as in Mindanao. Even if we don’t tell them, they know, because they investigate. The network of these powerful countries, they can gather all the information they want, this is another help for us... The standard operating procedures of these NGOs are to tie up with local NGOs (Interview P-30 2012).*

Although human rights concerns have brought a number of third parties together, other factors have had an adverse impact on third-party coordination in all phases of conflict, at least partially attributed to the lack of convergence of interests. According to several respondents, the lack of coordination is particularly seen among local third parties because of factors such as their alienation from one or the other of the conflicting parties, different notions of how to achieve peace in Mindanao,\(^\text{18}\) personality clashes, and competition for funding. Local third parties are also divided on the basis of their origins – Manila-based versus Mindanao-based – and the ethnic groups they represent – Moro versus non-Moro.

In addition, some influential local third parties (who are often blamed as spoilers of the peace process) – the business sector, senators, local politicians, the Armed Police Force, and the Supreme Court of the Philippines, who have the potential to support or derail the peace process – do not interact much with other third parties. Even religious leaders, despite being a very influential group in both the local and national political domains, were not well consulted by third parties (Interview P-18 2012). This indicates that while there was coordination among like-minded local third parties, such as NGOs, there was

\(^{18}\) For example, some local third parties were in favor of MOA-AD, whereas others were either neutral or against it.
less coordination between differing types of third parties. Many respondents expressed the view that this tendency was seen in all phases of the conflict.

A common obstacle to coordination was the differences in conflict intervention approaches and strategies among third parties. These differences were generated by different cultural and organisational backgrounds, personality clashes, and the contradictory policy interests of different interveners. Such differences have been present during the entire intervention process. At the same time, some intervention efforts have experienced more coordination problems than others. One respondent, who worked as an external third-party intervener in Mindanao and wished to be anonymous, expressed her experience of these differences in approaches and strategies:

> The security component of the IMT and my approach is very different. They come to the community with all the military gears and equipment, so the people run away. I go as a normal person so people are not scared and they talk to me freely. Really, we have a different approach... We do not as well try to get to know what others [fellow interveners] are doing, what are their [intervention] approaches and methodologies. We totally have different cultural and institutional backgrounds (Interview 2012).

Another respondent, who represents a local NGO in Mindanao, also explained how different viewpoints on the conflict affected coordination:

> In resolving the conflict, you have to identify the roots causes of the conflict. I think so many groups right now have their own versions of the root causes of the conflict that will suit their own political and economic agenda. This all makes a bit more complicated... Some organisations, like for example those from Manila, don't see the conflict from the lens of those people in Mindanao. This is the problem (Interview P-22 2012).

### 4.3 The Homogeneity of Interveners and Third-Party Coordination

As in Nepal, the homogeneity of the interveners has contributed to third-party coordination in the Philippines. One intriguing example of this is the mediation effort by the OIC and its members during the GPH-MNLF peace process from 1975 to 1996. Unlike the GPH-MILF peace process, the third-party interveners in the GPH-MNLF peace process were not very diverse. The OIC and its member countries, particularly Libya, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, monopolised the whole intervention process. These three countries performed sequential as well as simultaneous interventions in different stages of the peace process. For instance, Libya was crucial in the beginning phase of the
peace process because it provided a venue for negotiations, which resulted in the signing of the Tripoli agreement in 1975. The role of Libya in later years was more focused on back channeling and other carrot-and-stick approaches to exert leverage on the conflicting parties, especially the Philippines government.

Saudi Arabia played the role of power mediator by putting pressure on the Philippines government through an oil embargo in 1983. This event occurred when the negotiation process stalled, and helped the parties to resume negotiations. Indonesia took the lead role during the final phase of the negotiation process, while other OIC members played a supplementary role. Indonesia remained significant in crafting the 1996 peace agreement between the GPH and the MNLF, and became the host country for the pre-1996 negotiation process (Lingga 2006b). There was a good level of coordination among the OIC members, who built on previous developments in the peace process. This coordination was facilitated in part because of shared Islamic values, including OIC members’ intense desire to support their Muslim brothers and sisters (Santos 2001). Intervention in the GPH-MNLF peace process was also undertaken by a limited number of third parties, which contributed to smooth coordination amongst them.

The structure and function of the ICG was also facilitated by the homogeneity of the interveners. Due to its inclusion of both state and non-state actors, the ICG is generally considered to be a hybrid intervention mechanism. At the same time, it can also be interpreted as a homogeneous structure because the majority of its members are from Western countries and share similar social, political and cultural values.  

The ICG is comprised of four nation states – the UK, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Japan – and four non-governmental organisations – The Asia Foundation, the CHD, Conciliation Resources, and Muhammadiya. Five of the eight ICG members represent the Western world.

There are four major explanations for the occurrence of coordination among ICG members. First, individuals interviewed in the field believed that everybody within the ICG valued the diversity of the ICG (despite its perceived homogeneity) and considered

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19 Several participants interviewed in the field suggested that the ICG is dominated by Western governments and organisations. This contributes to its being a homogeneous intervention structure.
diversity to be a major strength in support of the peace process (Interview P-16 2012). There was also respect for the different roles that actors played within the ICG, while at the same time they valued their interdependence. An appreciation of each other’s strengths seems to have prevented them from competing with each other. For instance, Japan is more focused on infrastructure; the UK has more of a political role; while NGOs gather information from the grassroots and report to other ICG members and peace panels (Skype Interview P-17 2012).

Second, the ICG has functioned well because of a clear division of labour among its members, which helps everyone to focus on their roles (Interview P-15 & P-17 2012). For example, Conciliation Resources is focused on the documentation and dissemination of the peace process, while the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue acts as the ad-hoc coordinator. The Asia Foundation gathers information on the ground and shares it with other ICG members. Diplomats have leverage over the parties which non-governmental organisations do not. One of the ICG respondents noted this complementary among ICG members:

Reconciliation Resources had done a lot of peace work. TAF has been doing a lot of work for years; decades. In terms of dividing the work, we never competed anyways in terms of how we work operationally on the ground as NGOs. There is healthy competition, but we are not duplicating. There is a lot of communication among us. We have the effort to support NGO communities down there, to try to build up their capacity, to play a bigger role in this peace process. We communicate regularly with each other on the ICG. I think each one brings something special to the table. Japan, for example, because of its work in the IMT and JICA being down there, brings a special understanding of the situation and it plays a special role that we don’t have, and Britain doesn’t have. Saudi Arabia has its special role. It’s hosting the OIC, for example (Interview P-15 2012).

Third, members of the ICG agreed that they were in no rush to produce results until and unless the conflicting parties were ready to do so. In other words, they agreed not to put pressure on the conflicting parties to come up with a peace agreement. Rather, they preferred to extend their support for the negotiation process and prevent it from failing (Interview P-15, P-16 & P-17 2012).

Fourth, everyone accepted the ICG’s diversity as a strength, and shared ideas and a central vision in support of the negotiation process (Ibid). ICG members met prior to
every formal negotiation to make their positions clear. After every session they met with
the MILF panel members in order to clarify their reactions to the talks. On some
occasions the ICG convinced the rebel group not to withdraw from the negotiations. The
ICG has also been useful in conveying the interests and positions of the rebel group to the
government (Ibid).

Despite smooth coordination between ICG members, they have also experienced a few
problems as well. The lack of a unified voice is sometimes pointed out as a problem. One
of the respondents, who belongs to the ICG, explained the problem this way:

> You always want to make sure you always have the same message and that is
> the biggest challenge. This, because there are no opportunities that much that
> you will be speaking every time at the same time. So you want to speak with the
> same tune as much as possible (Interview P-15 2012).

### 4.4 Mandate-Based Intervention and Third-Party Coordination

This research finds that mandate-based intervention efforts were crucial to the occurrence
of third-party coordination in the GPH-MILF peace process. Intervention structures such
as the IMT and ICG perform their roles as per the Terms of Reference set forth by the
conflicting parties and agreed upon by Malaysia, the lead facilitator of the peace process.
As a consequence, third parties which were part of such mechanisms had limited
opportunity to be involved in the intervention processes in isolation. Competency-based
third-party recruitment, as part of these mechanisms, was another significant factor
behind making the mandate-based interventions more coordinated. The conflicting parties
initially called for expressions of interest among third parties who wanted to be part of
the various intervention structures. Only those who demonstrated a high level of
commitment were included. Consequently, the mandates bound third parties to coordinate
with other third parties in intervening events. One of the respondents, who works as a
conflict expert in the Philippines, stated: “Structure prevents … [third parties] to take
isolated intervention in the peace process. When there was no mediation structure, third
parties were not interested to coordinate” (Skype Interview P-13 2012).

The IMT is a unique example of a mandated intervention. Its members are forced to
coordinate with each other, as they are mandated to achieve their common goals of
minimising human rights violations, protecting civilians, and conducting rehabilitation
and socio-economic development programs. Three main factors have contributed to effective coordination among IMT members. First, every member was provided with a clear mandate and a clear division of labour was established. They also had clarity regarding the roles and functions of various sub-structures within the IMT (Interviews 2012). These consisted of four different components: a) security, b) socio-economic assistance, c) civilian protection, and d) humanitarian aid, development and rehabilitation.

The IMT is led by Malaysia, which heads the security component as well. Other actors have led or coordinated each of the other sub-structures. For instance, Japan led the socio-economic assistance component, while the EU led the humanitarian, development and rehabilitation component. The Nonviolent Peace Force led the civilian protection component. In other words, every intervener performed his or her roles under the umbrella of the IMT, but every actor did specific things without interfering in each other’s mandates. Second, there was a clear command control within the IMT structure whereby Malaysia served as the lead agency. Third, there was a convergence of interests among IMT members, despite their different responsibilities and working modalities. Every intervener focused on winning the hearts and minds of people on the ground, but they did so without undermining the roles of their fellow interveners (Interviews 2012).

Despite generally effective coordination within the IMT, it also experienced a few coordination problems, such as the lack of uniformity in approaches and strategies to monitor ceasefire violations and provide support to people affected by the armed conflict. Some respondents stated that members of the IMT often operated without considering the local relevance of their intervention approaches and strategies. Differences in cultural and institutional orientations also created occasional tensions among IMT members (Interviews 2012). Changes in the head of the IMT every six months also produced coordination problems, particularly in terms of maintaining a consistent team spirit. Coordination between individuals from military and non-military backgrounds created further challenges. However, according to some respondents, these challenges were overcome by regular dialogue, respecting each other’s working approaches and strategies and being strict about mandates (Interviews 2012).
4.5 The Conflicting Parties’ Efforts and Third-Party Coordination

In the Moro conflict, the conflicting parties’ efforts and interests have often been key to bringing a diverse array of third parties together, although civil society initiatives are an exception in this regard. In the GPH-MNLF peace process, it was the GPH who invited the OIC to mediate. In the GPH-MILF peace process there are a few commendable examples of hybrid coordination mechanisms or other notable collaborative efforts. Whether it is the Mindanao Working Group and Multi-Donor Trust Fund type of mechanism, or the ICG and IMT type of political and security focused intervention mechanisms, they all have been formed through the facilitation of the conflicting parties.

There are two prominent factors behind the conflicting parties’ interests in forming such structured intervention mechanisms. First, the growing intensity of the conflict after the failure of negotiations in 2005 and later in 2008 compelled the government to establish different intervention structures, in order to create an environment for resuming talks with the MILF. The MILF demanded more international guarantees in order to resume talks with the government. Second, the failure of previous single-party intervention efforts inspired both conflicting parties to agree on multiparty intervention structures, where local as well as international third parties could support the development of the peace process. The following statements by one local and one external third party support this interpretation:

External third-party: [The creation of a multiparty intervention structure] is a shared interest in continuing the process that led them [conflicting parties] to these interventions after every failure. The failure of the local monitoring team led to the creation of the international monitoring team. The failure of the Malaysian-facilitated peace talk led to the ICG. The failure of the IMT after 2008 led to the CPC (Interview P-14 2012).

Local Third-Party: The increasing number of international interventions... in Mindanao is not due to deliberate strategies by the parties. ICG and CPC were created because of the debacle of the MOA-AD. The MOA–AD led to increased armed conflict and violence... Because of this, the parties could not come back to the renegotiating table. The MILF required so many demands at that time before they can go back to re-negotiating table, two of which were (a) the protection of civilians and (b) some form of guarantee, and the guarantee became the International Contact Group (Interview P-2 2012).

A related point is that some government provisions in the Philippines restrict how international organisations implement their projects and programs, requiring them to have
local partners. This has forced international peacebuilding organisations to have local counterparts before getting involved in any peace intervention initiatives. In this regard, one respondent who belongs to a Manila-based NGO said, “The problem with INGOs is you cannot go to direct interventions. You have to work with partners” (Interview P-20 2012).

As in other political struggles around the world, rebel groups in the Philippines have utilised the multiplicity of interveners as a strategic advantage in the peace process. The government has cynically accepted third parties’ presence as a face-saving strategy. The introduction of new intervention structures has been interpreted by both parties as a ‘need.’ Coordinated third-party interventions have been found mainly in the later stages of the GPH-MILF peace process and have become more structured and coordinated after each escalation of armed violence. Structures like the ICG and the IMT are, in other words, the product of increased complexity and intensity of the conflict.

5. Discussion: Third-Party Coordination in the Philippines

Like the Nepal case, the Philippines case confirms my first proposition. However, it only partially confirms the second proposition and it does not confirm the third proposition.

This research has found that third-party coordination in the Philippines case is highly influenced by the existing political environment and conflict context. Little third-party coordination took place during periods of low intensity of violence, particularly during the initial and the political normalisation phases of conflict. Instead, coordination tended to occur after the violence escalated. Interestingly, this contradicts Svensson’s findings about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where he found that lack of coordination was particularly evident during the ‘intensive armed phase’ of the conflict (Svensson 2009). In the Moro conflict, in contrast, and similar to the conflict in Nepal, the escalation of violence and political crisis was a key policy driver of third-party coordination.

The views of various respondents pinpoint two prominent contributory factors in this regard. First, despite some differences in third-party agendas and approaches to conflict resolution, there were no real differences in opinions among local and external third parties that violence should be stopped immediately and conflicting parties should resume
negotiation without preconditions. Second, the harmonious working relationships between third parties were a growing trend soon after the escalation of violent conflict in Mindanao from 2001 onwards. It was therefore easier for third parties to come up with a coordinated voice in this phase of the conflict.

Another interesting aspect with regard to coordination is that the number of third parties and intervention structures increased following each major outbreak of violence. The outbreak of war in 2000-2003 gave birth to a number of civil society networks; the 2003-2004 war gave birth to the IMT in 2005 and the further strengthening of other civil society networks; and the eruption of war in August 2008 gave birth to the ICG and CPC and the rebirth of the IMT. Interveners did not coordinate with the same enthusiasm when there was no or low intensity of violence. One of the respondents who belongs to a local NGO in Mindanao said, “During the crisis, everyone is doing well. After the crisis, people will no longer converge and also resort to blaming, instead of talking and reflecting” (Interview P-29 2012).

This analysis partially confirms my second proposition, namely, that the convergence of interests contributes to third-party coordination. A common concern with human rights and the homogeneity of interveners fused third parties’ interests in this respect. However, other issues such as differences in intervention approaches and strategies, personality clashes, different cultural and institutional backgrounds of interveners, and a desire for the visibility of their intervention actions contributed negatively to the occurrence of third-party coordination. There has been relatively better coordination and a sense of unity among local and external third parties on issues of international concern, particularly human rights.

Generally speaking, comprehensive coordination between diverse third-party interveners is missing in the context of the Moro conflict. This particular finding runs counter to Kriesberg’s (1996) argument for the necessity of coordination from the top level to the local level. Third-party coordination in the Moro conflict is mostly small-scale, notwithstanding the ICG, and often limited to like-minded actors. One of the reasons for this is the conflicting parties’ interests in clustering external third parties into various small groups and seeking specific assistance from each of those groups for the specific
needs of the peace process. In the case of local third parties’ coordination, this is related to topographical challenges, as they are dispersed in different locations, such as in Manila and Mindanao, and in many different cities even within Mindanao.

The Philippines case demonstrates some important and interesting aspects of third-party coordination. Here, homogeneity has promoted third-party coordination. The role of conflicting parties is also found to be quite crucial for facilitating third-party coordination through the establishment of various mandate-based intervention structures. In the next section, I will provide a more detailed analysis regarding the influence of these factors for third-party coordination.

6. Discussion and Analysis
This section summarises key points drawn from this research and provides an analysis of these findings. It further provides a comparative summary of the relevance of research propositions in the cases selected for this study.

Table 5.1: Research Propositions and Their Relevancy in the Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Propositions</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upheld</td>
<td>Partially Upheld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 1: Contextual factors such as the existing political environment and the conflict context determines whether third parties coordinate or not</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 2: Shared conflict resolution goals and the convergence of interests promote third-party coordination. In contrast, conflicting policy interests prevent third-party coordination</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 3: Role of a lead agency contributes significantly to the occurrence of third-party coordination</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in the table above, all three propositions are upheld in the case of Nepal, whereas the first proposition is upheld, the second proposition is upheld only partially and the last proposition is not upheld in the case of the Philippines. This demonstrates that the occurrence of third-party coordination is contextual. Factors that contribute to the occurrence of coordination in one conflict context may not have the same impact in
another context. This research has also revealed a number of other findings related to the occurrence of coordination. Some are directly related to the research propositions, whereas others are very different from what was expected.

As mentioned previously, the existing literature posits that third parties coordinate with each other mainly because of their mutual policy interests and a broader coincidence of interests and commitments in the peace process (Iji 2005). My research confirms that a broader coincidence of interests and commitments is crucial to the occurrence of third-party coordination, but further reveals that the readiness of third parties is the first and foremost condition for their coordination. Context, Policy, and Motive (CPM) are three major factors which make third parties ready to coordinate.

6.1 CPM Factors and Third-Party Coordination

This research demonstrates that third-party coordination is a contextually contingent process, and factors that influence the coordination process in one context do not necessarily have the same impact in another context. For example, third-party coordination in Nepal was primarily ad hoc, informal and improvised, largely lacking institutionalisation and centralisation. In contrast, third-party intervention practices in the Philippines were quite diverse in different phases of conflict. For instance, informal third-party coordination was found among local third parties, and occurred particularly after the outbreak of major war in 2001. Institutionalised third-party coordination occurred mainly in the later phase of the GPH-MILF conflict (2009 onwards), and domestic and unitary third-party interventions failed to stop war or to keep the parties engaged in negotiations. There was no formal local-external third-party coordination until the reestablishment of IMT in 2010, after the resumption of peace talks. Finally, third-party coordination in the Philippines was an impulsive and sporadic event, rather than a planned process; it became somewhat more planned and institutionalised during the peace negotiations phase from 2009 onwards.

Policy interests are often foundational criteria for third-party coordination. The influence of policy factors in third-party coordination processes can be understood in two ways: a) the policy interests of conflicting parties in bringing third parties together (mostly observed in the Philippines); and b) the convergence of policy interests of third parties
(primarily observed in Nepal, and somewhat in the Philippines). Once the conflicting parties are interested in accepting the intervention of third parties in the conflict, they initiate mandate-based formalised intervention structures, where a group of homogeneous or even heterogeneous third parties can work together to fulfill their mandates. When a group of third parties realise that they have similar intervention goals, they often prepare to coordinate. The motives factor is another important aspect of third-party coordination, which is often determined by the personalities and personal relationships of interveners and a cost-benefit analysis of incentives for coordination.

Although third-party coordination is a highly contextual process, there are also some common factors that affect the coordination process in each conflict context. Table 5.2 summarises some of the common as well as case-specific factors that contributed to the occurrence of third-party coordination.

Table 5.2: The Occurrence of Third-Party Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Elements for the Occurrence of Third-Party Coordination in Nepal and the Philippines</th>
<th>Nepal Case Specific Conditions for Third-Party Coordination</th>
<th>Philippines Case Specific Conditions for Third-Party Coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Escalation of violence</td>
<td>- Complex and contentious issues in the peace process</td>
<td>- Lengthy duration and repeated failure of negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Complex political environment</td>
<td>- Role of lead agency</td>
<td>- Mandate-based formalised intervention structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Issues of international concern such as human rights</td>
<td>- Convergence interests and common intervention goals of third parties</td>
<td>- Conflicting parties’ interests and initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Clarity on intervention issues</td>
<td>- Personality and personal relationship among interveners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Homogeneity of interveners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2 Indicators for Identifying the Occurrence of Third-Party Coordination

How do we explain the different factors leading to the occurrence of third-party coordination, as well as different practices of coordination? Based on my research findings among third-party practitioners and other relevant stakeholders, I suggest that there are a number of factors that significantly shape the dynamics of third-party
coordination in all phases of the conflict. Table 5.3 summarises the role of such factors in the occurrence of third-party coordination.

Table 5.3: Factors Contributing to the Occurrence (or not) of Third-Party Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Significant Third-Party Coordination</th>
<th>Little Third-Party Coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power and position of governments and rebel groups</td>
<td>- Strong government and strong rebel group (the Philippines)</td>
<td>Weak government and opportunist rebel group (Nepal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of conflict/ negotiation</td>
<td>- Protracted conflict and protracted negotiations (the Philippines)</td>
<td>- Short-term conflict and short-term negotiation (Nepal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity of the conflict</td>
<td>- During the time of crisis and under the pressure of violence (both cases)</td>
<td>- When the situation is relatively stable (both cases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics and composition of third parties</td>
<td>- Limited involvement of global and regional powers (the Philippines)</td>
<td>- Multiplicity of major global and regional powers (Nepal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Homogeneity of interveners (both cases)</td>
<td>- Competing goals and interests (both cases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Convergence of third-party interests (both cases)</td>
<td>- Divergent of third-party interests (both cases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues of intervention</td>
<td>- Issues that are the product of conflict such as the reduction of violence and human rights abuses (both cases)</td>
<td>- Issues that are the source of conflict such as MOA-AD in the Philippines, and Constitution writing in Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of intervention</td>
<td>Mandated intervention (ICG and IMT in the Philippines)</td>
<td>Independent interventions (Nepal)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My findings suggest that the escalation of violence is one key factor that contributes greatly to the triggering of third-party coordination. Issues of global interest and issues that represent the core values of third parties also often work as driving factors behind coordination. In both case studies, human rights concerns were a core issue that brought many international actors together, because this is an issue of global interest and provides legitimacy to the rhetoric of many Western countries. Additionally, complex issues in the peace process often motivated third parties to take coordinated action, such as issues around integration and rehabilitation in Nepal. Coordination decisions of third parties often depend on a cost-benefit analysis of their incentives, as in Nepal, and the failure of previous unitary intervention practices, as in the Philippines.

In some situations, third-party coordination has taken place spontaneously, but there has been no coordination in other situations. For example, in both cases this research found scenarios in which coordination practices changed in different phases of conflict. Along
with shared political interests (as argued in the literature), a number of CPM factors mentioned above can contribute to such shifts in coordination practices. However, not all of these factors contribute to the occurrence of coordination in each armed conflict and peace process.

This research also indicates that third parties, particularly external ones, are often interested in collectively intervening in immediate issues related to conflict, but not so much in structural issues that pushed the country towards a violent conflict in the first stance. This suggests that third-party coordination is often more concerned with dealing with the symptoms rather than the prevention of conflict. There is no explanation in the existing literature regarding third-party motives to intervene expeditiously and proactively to exposed issues relating to conflict. I argue that such tendencies are seen because third-party interventions often take place (despite early warning mechanisms to avoid the possible escalation of conflict) after the situation begins to deteriorate, and in such situations their primary concern remains to protect civilians and minimise the risk of genocide and protracted violence. Third parties tend to focus on achieving short-term conflict resolution goals, such as the reduction of violence and human rights abuses and the facilitation of peace negotiations, as these actions are considered to be within their global responsibilities, rather than addressing the root causes of conflict.

There are significant levels of development and economic intervention carried out by third parties to address some of the root causes of conflict, such as poverty, inequalities and discrimination. However, they are often implemented as part of their own institutional development assistance framework and to advance the policy interests of their own country or institution, and rarely under a common development cooperation framework designed by a group of third parties.\(^{20}\) As a result, many of these developmental efforts suffer from unhealthy turf battles between donors, lack of breadth and depth, and lack of coordination.\(^{21}\) Development interventions also suffer from

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\(^{20}\) Some countries have also developed provisions such as basket funds, where many different donors put money into a common pool and allow the national government to operate that fund under conditions set forth by the donors. However, this is not a widely practiced strategy for a coordinated action.

\(^{21}\) The international donor community has adopted a number of declarations and resolutions, such as the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action for aid effectiveness, and they highlight the
corruption and bad governance in conflict-affected countries, adding to their lack of effectiveness in addressing the root causes of conflict.

This research also demonstrates that coordination through certain intervention structures can be a useful strategy, as shown in the Philippines. Intervention structures come into existence when the conflicting parties have enough power to regulate third-party intervention efforts through mandates. However, simply forming an intervention structure does not guarantee that effective coordination takes place; how these intervention structures are constructed is crucial. In the Philippines, the government and the rebels carefully selected the members of the ICG and the IMT. They chose interveners they believed would be most useful in supporting their negotiations. A good balance between state and non-state third parties was also helpful. The lack of active intervention by multiple global and regional powers was another crucial reason why it worked well.

In the existing literature, the formation of institutionalised third-party coordination mechanisms is mentioned as a useful strategy for conflict resolution and meaningful interaction between intermediaries (Strimling 2006); such practices are also seen in different conflict contexts under names such as Contact Group, Group of Friends, and so on (Whitfield 2008b). The uniqueness of the Philippines case is that intervention structures were mandated by the conflicting parties, combining both state and non-state actors into the intervention structures. This suggests that mandate-based third-party intervention can be an important strategy for the occurrence of coordination even among third parties with heterogeneous characters, as mandates compel them to work collectively and put their cultural and political differences aside. Mandate-based intervention structures are helpful because they bind third parties to intervene in a conflict with a particular approach and in particular areas. However, a state suffering from armed conflict needs to have sufficient political capacity to frame mandates wisely and regulate the involvement of third parties through the mandates. Healthy lines of communication between the conflicting parties is also crucial for establishing mandate-

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harmonization of donor countries to coordinate their efforts and procedures to avoid duplication. However, such practices are not translated effectively in actual practice. See more at [http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccaheadagendaforaon.htm](http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccaheadagendaforaon.htm).
based intervention structures, as this helps them to talk openly about which third parties to accept for what intervention actions.

7. Conclusion
This research demonstrates clearly that coordination does not take place simply as the result of the desires of third parties or conflicting parties; rather, a ripe moment is required for the occurrence of coordination. Coordination also requires the readiness and realisation of needs in terms of both supply (third parties) as well as demand (conflicting parties). Likewise, there are a number of contextual, policy and motives factors which contribute to the coordination of third parties.

This research also suggests that the occurrence of third-party coordination is often an organic or spontaneous process during phases of escalation in armed conflict. In both case studies, coordination occurred with minimal pre-planning by either the third parties or the conflicting parties. Instead, coordination evolved as a relatively spontaneous process and was largely driven by the needs of the conflict-ridden country or the interests of third parties. Importantly, while third-party efforts are often coordinated on issues that are the outcomes of an armed conflict, such as human rights violations and conflict monitoring activities, there is often a lack of coordination on issues that have been the main causes of conflict.

The roles of the conflicting parties in third-party coordination have been largely ignored in the literature. Yet the Philippines case demonstrates that the conflicting parties can play a vital role in third-party coordination, as occurred with the formation of the ICG and the IMT. It is the conflicting parties who have the best knowledge regarding the need for third parties to support the peace process. They can make judgments about which issues require a coordinated third-party support and which do not.

In the next chapter I examine the relationship dynamics and power status of third parties and their impact on the coordination processes. I focus particularly on how different kinds of third parties (local versus external, external versus external, and local versus local) interact, behave, coordinate, and perceive each other in peace processes.
Chapter 6
The Impact of Relationship and Power Dynamics on Third-Party Coordination: Perceptions of Third-Party Practitioners in Nepal and the Philippines

1. Introduction
In the previous chapter I outlined some of the salient conditions identified by practitioners that led to the occurrence of third-party coordination in Nepal and the Philippines. I further provided insights into the similarities and differences in third-party coordination practices in these two distinct conflicts. In this chapter, presenting the experiences and perspectives of third-party practitioners and other relevant stakeholders from these conflicts, I explore the influence of relationship dynamics and power status on third parties’ coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes.

I argue that the nature and characteristics of third-party relationships are an important influence on the occurrence and outcome of coordination. Symmetrical dialogue and communication praxis among third parties on issues around adopting a common intervention strategy can make their relationships stronger. Alternatively, the lack of such practices can make their relationships weaker and even counterproductive to conflict resolution. While third-party relationships can never be perfect due to different intervention approaches, priorities and interests, a good working relationship is crucial to conflict resolution success, as well as demonstrating a high standard of ‘intervention ethics’ in conflict resolution processes. In this light, this chapter explores some of the key factors that influence the dynamics of third-party relationships. In particular, it identifies factors that are crucial to the relationship dynamics between local and external third parties, among external third parties, and among local third parties.

This chapter also examines the extent to which the power status of third parties has an impact on their relationships and the coordination process. I argue that power status is the most important factor in shaping the dynamics of third-party relationships. Third parties which are considered ‘powerful’ within a conflict context are often less inclined to maintain good relationships with other actors, because of their direct access to and
leverage over the conflicting parties. Differences in strategic priorities are also a major barrier to smooth third-party relationships among powerful third parties. A multiplicity of powerful third parties in a conflict intervention process is the worst case scenario, as such a situation leads to unhealthy competition.

As outlined in Chapter 2, three research propositions frame the analysis of these dimensions:

*Proposition 1:* Third-party coordination is easier among actors who share more or less similar values and ideologies and have similar origins. Conversely, it is more difficult for third parties who have dissimilar values and ideologies and different origins.

*Proposition 2:* The existence of formal intervention mechanisms endorsed by the conflicting parties makes third-party relationships and coordination processes stronger than independent intervention mechanisms.

*Proposition 3:* The power status of third parties is the most important factor influencing the third-party coordination process.

In the following three sections, I highlight the relationship dynamics between local and external third parties, between external third parties, and between local third parties. In the fifth section, I explore third-party power differences and their impact on coordination. In the sixth section, I undertake a synchronised analysis of both cases. The final part of the chapter summarises the main findings and explains their significance.

2. **Perceptions of the Relationship between Local and External Third Parties**

2.1 **Local-External Third-Party Relationships in Nepal**

A number of respondents representing local third parties expressed the opinion that there was a lack of friendly relationships between local and external third parties in Nepal. The dominating nature of external third parties was thought to be a major factor behind this situation. One respondent, who belongs to a local NGO, stated that the attitude of external third parties towards local third parties is demeaning, as they treat the local third parties as if they have no idea about the political context and the evolution of the peace process in Nepal (Interview N-25 & N-30 2012). The domineering nature of the external
third parties is partly due to their greater resources and partly because of their wide range of conflict resolution experiences, which the local third parties do not share:

*Local Third-Party: Coordination depends on the attitude of different actors who are now engaged in the peace process... We would be happy to coordinate with external interveners, if they think that there are people in Nepal who are well informed about Nepalese context, but we only require enhancing our capacity in particular areas. That means, good attitudes of outsiders encourage us to coordinate with them (Interview N-30 2012).*

Difficulties in access to each other are another factor behind the lack of harmonious local-external third-party relationships. External third parties can easily reach local third parties. In contrast, local third parties often find it much harder to approach external third parties. One respondent, who belongs to the NGO Federation of Nepal, noted, “Relatively, local third parties have a good relationship with other local third parties; their access to international actors is not very good” (Interview N-39 2012). In a few exceptional cases, some local third parties, particularly those who are closely allied with the top leaders of one or both conflicting parties, and who are working on the so-called ‘hard’ issues of the peace process such as security, were able to form a good relationship with external third parties. But while these few local third parties work closely with external third parties, at the local level they prefer to work directly with the conflicting parties because of their direct access to them. In this regard, one of the respondents affiliated with a Kathmandu-based think-tank stated the following:

*Local third-party: We have shared most frequently with European Ambassadors. We also have shared information with India, the UK, and the US government on a regular basis and with China to some extent...We have [an] information-sharing level of coordination with international actors who are concerned about this [security] issue... Since we are directly working with stakeholders of the peace process and we have an informal agreement with them about the confidentiality of our intervention, so only very few organisations at the local level know about what we are doing on this issue (Interview N-28 2012).*

Competing and conflicting relationships have also been found to characterise local-external third-party relations in Nepal. Such conflicting relationships have been observed when they both engage in similar kinds of interventions with more or less similar institutional mandates given by the conflicting parties. The contentious relationship between the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) of Nepal and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) country office is a relevant example.
The mandate of both the NHRC and the OHCHR was to monitor human rights violations during the conflict (from mid-2005 onwards) and in the post-agreement period. The NHRC, being a local third party, felt that there was no need for the OHCHR to perform the same task that a local institution was capable of doing. The OHCHR wanted to work with a broader mandate, as they had earned a good local and international reputation for their human rights monitoring work in Nepal, particularly during the period of conflict and right after the ceasefire in 2005 and 2006 (Interviews 2012). Rivalry between the NHRC and the OHCHR continued until the termination of the OHCHR mandate in December 2011. The following observation was shared by an external conflict expert working in Nepal:

*External third-party:* Two main human rights bodies, OHCHR and the National Commission on Human Rights, they did not have a good relationship... they saw each other as rivalries. I think it’s a turf issue as NHRC felt they don’t need an international body while local bodies are there... There is lots of politics goes into them. There is that kind of awkward relationship and maybe that’s one of the reasons why the OHCHR mandate was always so tenuous (Interview N-23 2012).

Some local third parties accused the external third parties of having a victory-sharing mentality, as they did not enter the conflict system immediately after its eruption, but waited until the conflict ripened so that it would be easier to resolve. One respondent, who heads a Kathmandu-based human rights NGO, expressed the following:

*Local third-party:* International actors were attracted to actively intervene in Nepal's armed conflict and peace process when the conflict was leading towards settlement. They did not play any effective role when the country was experiencing [an] intense level of violence. It was local third parties intervening in conflict during the time of intense war (Interview N-25 2012).

This finding supports what Lindgren et al have identified as one of the main reasons behind the existence of a multiplicity of interveners in peace processes. They argue that “multiple mediators might be more of a symptom than a cause for successful mediation, as the number of third parties increase only when the agreements draw near” (Lindgren, Wallensteen, and Grusell 2010, p.17)

Local third parties have also blamed external third parties for not being sincere in their resolve to reduce the intensity of violence, as they experience no direct impact of violence themselves. A respondent from a local NGO had this to say:
Local third-party: If violence increases in Nepal, it has a direct impact on us... Our sole interest is focused on reducing violence... If there is violence in Nepal, we are the one who should bear the cost of conflict... That’s why our work is related to our sense of responsibility towards our society. We have not found similar feelings with external interveners (Interview N-30 2012).

In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that one of the reasons for the occurrence of third-party coordination in Nepal was the growing intensity of violence. The statement above seems to contradict this conclusion. However, such a critical comment about external third parties could be the product of unpleasant relationships with particular external third parties in the past. It could also be an expression of dissatisfaction with the heavy presence of external third parties, particularly in the post-agreement period.

Another common local third-party accusation is related to external third parties’ interests in advancing their own agendas, rather than addressing the actual needs of the country. Local third parties defined this as a ‘commitment problem’ for external third parties. Some of the respondents also suggested that the external-local relationship was based on ‘the need’ of the country in a particular period, rather than on an actual motivation to coordinate. A respondent who represents a local NGO stated:

Our collaboration with others is guided by the fact [of] whether it becomes necessary to solve or pay attention to a particular national issue or not. Working with outside actors means to gain expertise, which we are lacking at the national level... For example, let’s talk about some new agendas of the current peace process: constituent assembly, federalism, and security sector reform. For the constituent assembly, we have more than enough experts within the country, so there is no need to gain expertise from outside. In the case of federalism, we have built up expertise within Nepal... In the case of security sector reform we could also build up our expertise with the help of outside actors, which could not be possible due to the bad partnership. In one of our partnerships with an external intervener, our interest was to build national expertise rather than having an external one, but that was not agreed by our external partner (Interview N-30 20012).

Local third parties were also quite critical of the imbalanced partnership they had with international actors. Local third parties felt that external parties were contributing to their own agendas, rather than to actual local agendas related to the peace process. A respondent who belongs to a Kathmandu-based human rights NGO expressed the following:
The international community works with local civil society, but they do not work with the agenda of local civil society. The international community brings their agendas and encourages local actors to develop a project according to their guidelines and requests us to submit a proposal. They often provide support for 2-3 years, then they stop. It means that they have not given us an opportunity to design peacebuilding projects based on the local needs; in fact, we are compelled to work to advance their peace agenda. In principle, it seems like we have a good coordination with them because we are partnering with external interveners. In a practical sense, we are not coordinating (Interview N-25 2012).

In contrast, external third party respondents highlighted the interdependence between local and external third parties. An external third-party practitioner and a representative of a European diplomatic mission in Nepal made these comments:

Third-party practitioner: International donors for credibility, for access... need local actors. They are useless at institutional level and at personal level if they do not have local partners (Interview N-23 2012)

Diplomat: Normally, national NGOs know better the context and problems. In Nepal, things are complicated for the international. They [local NGOs] can definitely know better than the international. Then also in terms of ownership, but also for the sustainability of the project, because many of the internationals at one point they go. While national NGOs they do not go. They also have a better relationship with the government. They have better negotiating power and challenge the government (Interview N-26 2012).

A number of respondents observed that funding-based relationships are the common basis for coordination between local and external third parties. However, this was often limited to a set period of time and dominated by the powerful third parties (i.e., the donors). Sharing of information is another area of coordination, but such sharing has mostly been one-sided, as local third parties feel that they are sharing information about the political context, but then do not hear back from the externals. An interviewee at the NGO Federation Nepal said that they were frequently consulted by external interveners to understand the perspectives of civil society in the peace process; however, they never received information and political analysis from the external interveners. This indicates that while local third parties have been used by external third parties as a key source of information, there is little reciprocity.

It seems clear from this interview evidence that the perception of local third parties towards external third parties is not very positive or praiseworthy. Ironically, although local third parties are critical of the policies and strategies of external third parties, they
still maintain relationships at different levels, such as implementing joint projects, exchanging information, and getting involved in issue-based coordination. By contrast, external third parties are much more positive about their relationships with local third parties. For political and strategic reasons, external third parties cannot ostensibly undermine the supremacy of local ownership in the peace process, and have adopted a more balanced approach to their relationships with local third parties.

2.2 Local-External Third-Party Relationships in the Philippines

Local third parties have given mixed responses regarding their relationships with external third parties involved in the Moro conflict. On a positive note, local third parties recognise the importance of external third parties in the GPH-MILF peace process, as they have been instrumental in internationalising the conflict issues. They also believe that the ‘mere presence’ of external third parties has been beneficial in making the government more committed to a negotiated solution. They also consider external third parties to be key collaborators in conflict resolution activities such as peace monitoring. Respondents acknowledge the interdependence of local and external third parties, particularly in terms of monitoring the ceasefire and the implementation of peace programs. Local third parties have been highly supportive of the work of external third parties in such endeavors. But locals are not happy when the credit for their joint work goes to the external third parties and they are perceived solely as the implementing partners of the external third parties. Local third-party respondents had this to say:

[Local third parties] are vital players in the peace process but it seems to me sometimes that it’s the internationals that get all the credit, and locals don’t, which is a shame... The thing is, with credit comes resources (Interview P-4 2012).

The locals don’t have a choice except to work closely with international institutions to have the funding necessary. As far as the international institutions are concerned, they really don’t have a choice except to work with the locals after they have the network and they are the ones who do the work. There is a synergy of interests... one cannot exist without the other (Interview P-4 2012).

Despite the perceived interdependence of the local-external actors, some respondents expressed the view that the potential contribution of local third parties to the peace process is undermined by the presence of external third parties. They stated that while
they sometimes think of externals as partners or supporters for their cause, at other times they see them as competitors:

*Local third-party: We are their partners. For example, in our peacebuilding program it is the Nonviolence Peace Force that is our partner on the ground. On some of our programs like the rehabilitation aspect, it’s the JICA [Japan International Cooperation Agency] who’s our partner. In the advocacy we have always a close relationship with IMT... Yet sometimes we also see that these INGOs become competitors of the local NGOs... To us this is not fair (Interview P-33 2012).*

Turf battles over resources also adversely affect the relationship between local and external third parties. Many local parties think that external third parties, particularly the international organisations, exercise undue control over the small amount of resources allocated to conflict resolution efforts in Mindanao, which were supposed to be controlled by local third parties (Interviews 2012). One local third-party respondent said, “I don’t mind if … [external third parties] come in as long as they bring their own money. But [if] they get their resources … from the embassy … which could have been allocated to local groups, then I have a problem with that” (Interview P-24 2012).

In addition, the tendency of externals to directly implement projects at the local level has been perceived as another threat to local ownership of the peace process. One respondent said, “Some international organisations which are implementing projects … [are] a threat [to us] … This adds to the competition in getting resources for the projects of local organisations” (Interview P-34 2012). It is also a concern that external third parties, particularly the international organisations, are destroying local NGOs’ capacities by taking their most competent human resources. One respondent said:

*There are also problems of the presence of the international organisations; they don’t consider the situation of the local civil society groups. The local groups suffer from financial constraints. They cannot pay more for their personnel unlike the international organisations. We had experienced already that some key staff… left the organisation to work for INGOs, [where] they are highly paid. This affects the normal flow of the work of the local organisations (Interview P-32 2012).*

On the other hand, some local third parties who have a close relationship with the Moro rebel groups are positive about their relationship with external third parties. One respondent, who belongs to a Moro-led NGO, made this comment:
Because of the longer time spent in the negotiations, we have several observations... International figures who are involving themselves in finding a lasting solution to this issue are very much appreciated by the wider community of the Bangsamoro, in the sense that we feel it [is] very effective. Since secession of hostilities between both parties, little by little hostilities trim down to zero, so there was no encounter between the government forces and the MILF. The hostilities were brought down also because of the participation of international personalities (Interview P-36 2012).

Resource concentration in Moro-dominated regions in recent years, and external third parties’ preference for working with Moro-led civil society organisations, are major reasons why these organisations accept external third parties in Mindanao. Some of the respondents from non-Moro NGOs maintain that some external third parties prefer to work with Moro-led NGOs in order to capture the attention of the MILF (Interview P-20 2012).

Some local third parties are suspicious of the massive presence of external third parties in the peace process. One local third-party respondent voiced this concern:

> We also don't know really the interests behind all these many international organisations. This is a very globalised negotiation where everybody is involved. Of course they have interests. Sometimes we suspect that these multinational organisations have interests in our resources (Interview P-36 2012).

Local third parties are at times opposed to the heavy international involvement in the peace process because they believe that external involvement does more harm than good, especially when they lack knowledge and understanding of the conflict context, even if they have conflict resolution experience from other conflict settings. These local third parties suggest that they should lead the intervention process, while international third parties should provide the necessary back-up (Interviews 2012).

By contrast, external third parties are quite receptive to relationships with local third parties, and most seem aware of how important it is to win the hearts and minds of local third parties in order to continue their presence in Mindanao. They acknowledge local third parties as an invaluable component of the peace process. One respondent who belongs to an international NGO said, “The locals have their roles and value to the process. Their roles are even more important than ours… Our role is really to help them” (Interview P-15 2012). Another external respondent stated, “We respect the primacy of
local actors/local CBOs [Community Based Organisations], CSOs, and other actors on the ground” (Interview P-31 2012).

There are obvious reasons for the positive attitude of external third parties towards local third parties. First, external third parties, particularly those working at ground level, are well aware that they cannot function properly without strong support from local actors. Even those working at the national level rely on local third parties to get updates on the conflict situation on the ground, and to understand popular sentiment about the peace process. Second, recognising local third parties also means respecting local ownership of the peace process, and acknowledging the reality that respecting locals makes external third parties’ presence more acceptable:

*External third-party: From our side, what we do is as much as possible enable the local ownership. Sometimes it is uncomfortable being in a structure where we are wondering if we are not undermining local ownership... All of the actors in the ICG are deeply connected and networked with a wide range of local actors (Skype Interview P-17 2012).*

Third, external third parties are well aware of domestic sentiment regarding international third-party engagement in the peace processes, and know that they cannot function effectively if they antagonise local sentiment. One of the respondents who belongs to the International Contact Group stated:

*In the Philippines, there is this sentiment of not allowing the foreigners to be involved in the process too much. And that kind of nationalism is exclusive... The civil society is the same, they are very strong and very clear that this process is their peace process and it doesn’t belong to us... In the Philippines, generally, [people] don’t want the internationals to be the primary actors. For them, it’s their process. They will work it out. The Moros will work out their part. The Philippines government will work out their part. That’s why it’s critical in the talks [that] ICG doesn’t talk in the talks (Interview P-16 2012).*

Lastly, international third parties are also aware that local third parties are not always happy with active and influential international actors because locals have not found a meaningful role in the peace process. One of the respondents who belongs to ICG commented:

*They [local third parties] are generally glad for the [international] attention. They sometimes regard the internationals as overshadowing the national government. Those [local third parties] active in the negotiations are somewhat*
resentful that they don’t have direct access to the negotiations the way we do (Interview P-14 2012).

3. Perceptions of the Relationship Dynamics among External Third Parties

3.1 Relationship Dynamics among External Third Parties in Nepal

Due to geopolitical factors, external actor relationships in Nepal are often found to be competitive and conflictual, and harmonious only in exceptional situations. One such occasion was in late 2005 and early 2006, when they all shared a collective interest in terminating the decade-long Maoist armed conflict and reinstating democracy in Nepal. During that period the conflict had reached a stalemate, and the democracy movement against the King was also nearing victory. In other words, the conflict was ripe for resolution. The external third parties took this as an opportunity to share in the success by expressing their unanimous support for the process. Several respondents observed that human rights concerns were a key contributor to maintaining workable relationships among the majority of external third parties in Nepal. Almost all Western donors have been very vocal in their criticism of human rights abuses committed by both parties. However, some external actors, particularly India and China, did not collaborate with other external interveners in the human rights and transitional justice agendas.

But although human rights concerns brought many third parties together in Nepal, this issue has also been a factor that has weakened third-party relationships. As claimed by respondents, China and India are not particularly concerned with Nepal’s human rights record, whereas the so-called donor community has made human rights a fundamental component in shaping their policies in Nepal. This has been a primary factor behind the sometimes unfriendly relationship between certain external interveners. One respondent who represents a European diplomatic mission, and who wished to be anonymous, stated:

*The West tends to say... we will keep money but be careful... no human rights violations. And India just says okay... When it comes to UNMIN, India was against the presence of UNMIN here and I am sure that it was also the backing of India that allowed Nepal just to say no. We don’t need any more, same when it comes to OHCHR, they have a different way of working which I in a way also accept. No, it’s not only our Western way of intervening, if you call it intervention. In the end, I regret that of course, because I think only a coordinated manner would allow Nepal to progress easily. I think this won’t happen. China and India have overarching interests themselves in this country. They are not interested in coordination (Interview 2012).*
There are also a few positive aspects to external third-party relationships in Nepal. As expressed by the respondents, information and political analysis-sharing was very good during the conflict phase. There was also an attempt to set a common intervention goal by introducing Basic Operating Guidelines for all development partners working in Nepal. However, this process was not entirely successful because powerful third parties such as the US did not agree with some of the provisions, and some other third parties, such as India and China, did not participate in the guidelines formulation process (Interviews 2012).

Conflict resolution experts interviewed in the field suggested that it was very difficult for international actors to act beyond their own agendas. This is particularly due to ideological differences and partly due to competing interests on issues such as federalism, the governing structure of the state, and security sector reform. They therefore have a tendency to not coordinate with those who disagree with their conflict resolution model. One respondent, who represents an international NGO, also expressed that every third-party intervener in Nepal had different measures of intervention success. Differences in intervention style and approach have also been an obstacle to coordination (Interview N-11 2012).

### 3.2 Relationship Dynamics among External Third Parties in the Philippines

The relationship dynamics of external third parties in the Philippines occur mainly within the various intervention structures established by the conflicting parties, such as the ICG and IMT. There are also some relationship dynamics among a few external third parties who act beyond the formalised intervention structures.

There were mixed responses from interviewees regarding the relationship dynamics of third parties who were part of formal intervention structures. Most of the ICG members interviewed in the field expressed similar opinions on why they had friendly and workable relationships. One important factor was their different strengths and positions in relation to the GPH-MILF peace process. For example, state actors, due to their diplomatic relations with the Philippines government, engaged in specific intervention actions, such as leveraging the conflicting parties at the top level. Non-state actors, by contrast, were mostly involved in interaction with broader segments of society around
information gathering, which was then used by state actors in their leveraging efforts (Interview P-14 2012). Under the mandate, the non-state actors also acted as the spokespersons for the ICG, informing the public about progress in the peace process. In this sense, their roles were complementary in making the ICG a more effective third-party intervention structure. One of the members of the ICG made this comment:

In the ICG we play complementary roles and there is no doubt that Malaysia plays a leading role... The facilitator is confident that his presence is not threatened by the ICG and he can ask the help of the ICG whenever he needs to. Between the states and the NGOs, it’s the same. The states have come to acknowledge that NGOs have advantages. One is that NGOs are not constrained by their governments. They can talk to whoever they want and whatever we want and this is something that the diplomats can’t do. Second, we have the technical expertise on conflict transformation, which again the diplomats don’t have. But at the same [time], the diplomats have a level of leverage on the parties which NGOs could never have... The government plays the role of leveraging and the NGOs play the role of thinking out of the box (Skype Interview P-17 2012).

A key reason behind their workable relationships, then, is that their different strengths and positions lead to a certain level of interdependence. As one of the respondents explained:

Reconciliation Resources had done a lot of peace work. TAF [The Asia Foundation] has been doing a lot of work for years, decades... In terms of dividing the work, we never competed anyways in terms of how we work operationally on the ground as NGOs. There is healthy competition but we are not duplicating. There is a lot of communication among us. We have the effort to support NGO communities down there, to try to build up their capacity, to play a bigger role in this peace process. We communicate regularly with each other on the ICG. I think each one brings something special to the table. Japan, for example, because of its work in the IMT and JICA being down there, brings a special understanding of the situation and it plays a special role that we don’t have, and Britain doesn’t have. Saudi Arabia has its special role. It’s hosting the OIC, for example (Interview P-15 2012).

On the other hand, some ICG members have also expressed that they do not always have smooth relationships, having experienced a number of tussles due to differences of opinion on how to provide support to the peace process. Consequently, they have sometimes criticised each other’s intervention strategies. However, they conceal such differences from the conflicting parties, so as not to give a negative impression and to present a united front. As one ICG member said,

In most cases, they [ICG members] get along each other but sometimes they also become impatient with each other because things are not being understood.
There are instances where essentially the state parties would say that what one NGO has done is not a good idea... All these usually take place inside the circle (Interview P-14 2012).

Relationships within the IMT have also been found to be positive as well as negative. A respondent representing a European diplomatic mission emphasised that personality played a key role in whether or not the relationship was smooth:

Within the IMT, the relations between the civilian and the military components are quite good. The relationship between the security component and us is quite extremely good. But our coordination with the civilian protection component which we are supporting, and our leading coordination with HRDC, is not good because probably of some personality issues. And within the civilian and security component itself, it’s very challenging, because of the personality issues... We kind of speak to each other but we never build up same mechanisms or joint tools and a uniform interpretation of our mandates (Interview P-9 2012).

Competitive relationships are another factor that has made the third-party coordination process difficult in the Moro conflict. Competing goals are particularly prevalent among bilateral agencies. An external third-party practitioner, who desires to be unidentified, spoke to this concern:

As in the case of development assistance in Mindanao, the best to do is for all the development institutions to come together, have a common goal and divide among themselves... That does not really happen, because the bilateral agencies have clear instructions from their capitals. Even though common sense will dictate a convergence of priorities perhaps, geographic areas perhaps, it does not really happen (Interview 2012).

Third parties often want to take sole credit for each intervention action. This problem is particularly prevalent among external third parties, who provide financial and technical support for different projects and programs in conflict-affected areas. Such identity and visibility consciousness has promoted competition among interveners, leading to support for both necessary and unnecessary projects in conflict-affected areas. This also leads to project overlap. A respondent representing the donor community stated:

Yes, there is a problem of duplication of programs. In reality, the coordination of the government is not so strong. There is not so much competition. But there are more questions related to identity and visibility. That’s what most particularly drives the differences among the bilateral agencies (Interview P-10 2012).
4. Perceptions of Relationship Dynamics among Local Third Parties

4.1 Relationship Dynamics among Local Third Parties in Nepal

The dynamics of local third-party relationships in Nepal are quite distinct from one phase of the conflict to another, as well as within the same phase. Several respondents asserted that, due to their stronger harmonious relationships, local third parties were able to intervene collectively during the period of high-intensity violence from 2001 to 2005. For example, CSOs had a unified voice during that period regarding an active UN presence in Nepal, working closely together to make the OHCHR’s role active and effective in investigating human rights abuses (Upreti 2006). A coordinated civil society response was also visible during the People’s Movement in early 2006, when they took a lead role in organising mass agitation against the undemocratic takeover of state power by the King (ICG 2006, Upreti 2006). Clearly a smooth relationship was indispensable during this time of intense conflict in order to sustain their efforts in a volatile political environment.

A number of respondents pointed out that harmonious local third-party relationships could not be maintained after the period of intensified conflict. Several factors are relevant in this regard. First, there were differences in opinion among local third parties regarding the modality of the peace process, influenced by their ideological closeness with one or other of the conflicting parties. The report of the ICG supports this interpretation:

Civil society was unified and important during the April movement but since then group and individual interests have diverged. Some have adopted a radical stance, pushing policies such as a republic; others have been drawn into the fringes of government… The Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and Peace, the most prominent such group, played an important role paving the way for the April movement. However, its campaign for a republic and insistence on rapid implementation of agreements led intellectuals close to the SPA to accuse it of being soft on the Maoists, a charge its leaders deny (ICG 2006, p.21)

The election of the CA and the subsequent political environment was another crucial factor which undermined the harmonious relationship between local third parties. A respondent who belongs to a donor agency commented:

*During the CA election period there were some common agenda (making Nepal a secular state, republic state, federal government and so on) of all political parties, and those agendas also became the common agenda for all civil society groups. However, in the constitution making process other agendas came in,*
such as inclusion, governance, foreign policy and so on. Civil society was divided [on] these agendas (Interview N-7 2012).

These examples suggest that the lack of a common understanding among local third parties of post-conflict issues was the result of different ideological orientations and institutional beliefs. Local third parties’ stances on particular issues were also guided by the nature of the funding they received from particular donors.

4.2 Relationship Dynamics among Local Third Parties in the Philippines

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) who acted as local third parties were effective peacemakers in the Philippines. Civil society-led peace initiatives included consolidated mass campaigns during the outbreak of violence, and calling on the parties, especially the government, to continue with the peace process (PDF 2008). Local third parties were also involved in the peace process in a number of other capacities, such as watchdog, service provider, and advocate of alternative policies (Ferrer 2006). They were involved in both formal and informal capacities. The Mindanao People Caucus (MPC) and the Mindanao Human Rights Action Centre (MinHRAC) can be characterised as formal involvement, whereas the Mindanao Peoples Weaver (MPW), the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS) and the Mindanao Solidarity Network engaged in informal involvement.

There were mixed views about the relationship dynamics of local third parties in the Philippines. Most respondents acknowledged that local third parties had a more or less coordinated relationship on issues around peace advocacy and peace monitoring. Almost a decade of conflict resolution engagement, proactive dialogue and active communication played an important role in bridging the gaps between them. They also acknowledged that local third parties had good relationships despite different interests and occasional tussles over limited resources. They recognised the importance of working with other local third parties and sharing resources and knowledge. One respondent who belongs to a Manila-based NGO said, “It’s not good to have conflict with people who are leaders in their particular area of expertise; the most logical thing is to work with them” (Interview P-4 2012).

Despite improved relationships in the past decade, there have been occasions where local third parties have expressed conflicting opinions regarding broader solutions to the
conflict, such as on issues around the MOA-AD\textsuperscript{22} and the proposed Bangsamoro sub-state. There were other occasions where third parties experienced difficulties in coming up with a common position on certain issues due to divergent identities. A local third-party respondent based in Davao City, who wished to be anonymous, commented:

\textit{Because of... differences in the roles, and in how they tried to look at the root causes of the conflict, oftentimes you have tensions among the CSOs, and this is still continuing until now. For example, the reactions of the MOA-AD, the discourse in the CSO was basically that. Some organisations were saying we should come out already with a position, supporting the MOA-AD, let it out in the public, whereas other groups in the network [do] not necessarily endorse the MOA-AD. Some groups are actively campaigning for the Bangsamoro state, some are not. These are continuing tensions going on now (Interview 2012).}

There is a tendency in the Philippines, and particularly in Mindanao, to believe that the peace talks are only relevant to certain regions of Mindanao. This attitude has clearly weakened local third-party relationships. Similarly, there is often tension between Manila-based and Mindanao-based organisations regarding each other’s roles and responsibilities in the peace process. There is also tension between Muslim and non-Muslim CSOs. Muslim CSOs can be classified into different configurations, such as Tribal, the islands of Mindanao, Sulu Basilan, civil society in Maranaw, civil society in Maguindanao, and Northern Mindanao (Interview P-18 2012).

Perceptions of bias towards a particular conflicting party have clearly contributed to making local third parties’ relationships less harmonious. For example, some respondents from Manila and non-Moro CSOs suggest that the MPC and CBCS are closely aligned with the MILF (Interview P-20 2012), whereas some respondents from Cotabato City contend that some CSOs working in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao are in fact working for the Manila government instead of being neutral actors. Religion has also been suggested as an impediment to local third-party harmony. One respondent, representing a Mindanao-based NGO, alluded to this dynamic:

\textit{We kind of work with some groups who are into peace and development initiatives... But we can’t establish coordination with the Moro organisations because they say we don’t have similar Islamic values (Interview P-22 2012).}

\textsuperscript{22} In July 2008, representatives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) announced the finalisation of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), an agreement that was expected to bring about peace in the Mindanao region (Hayudini & Guzman 2010).
On the other hand, a network formation strategy has sometimes contributed to cordial local third-party relationships. One of the respondents from Cotabato City argued that good relationships among local third parties were due to their association in various civil society networks:

_We have coordination because so many of us are also part of the other coalitions. But we can’t deny that we have our own interests of course. For instance, the Mindanao Emergency Response Network, their mandate is just to respond to emergency situations. While other organisations like the Mindanao Alliance for Peace is more political, it was born because it wants to have activities that can have a direct impact on the peace process… These are all organisations helping the peace process move forward. Our relationship is helping each other without running against each other (Interview P-33 2012)._

Another respondent explained that there was a lot of networking among local third parties, and that generally they have developed a culture of “coming together” (Interview P-4 2012). The CBCS is a relevant example in this regard. Before its establishment in 2003, hundreds of Moro organisations were working on their own, sometimes cheating, competing, and pulling each other down. The formation of the CBCS, according to one respondent, has helped to alleviate these negative aspects of their former relationship. MPW is another successful example, as it helped to unify both Moro and non-Moro-led civil society networks from all over the country. MPW comprises seven different peace advocacy networks, whereas CBCS is a network run by Moros.

CSOs from both Manila and Mindanao are organised through different networks and coordination forums, and have experienced some problems in their relationships. First, there are significant overlaps between CSO activities and other networks, which means that many CSOs work more or less on similar issues. For example, MPW is part of various CSO networks, such as Waging Peace Philippines and Kilos Kapayapaan (Interview P-5 2012). Second, there is confusion over embracing a single peace advocacy strategy, because different networks have different policy interests. One respondent from a Manila-based peace institute spoke of these challenges:

_[We] just need to be conscious of the processes and ways of networking. Like, for example, you want to make a statement, you need to be careful on the decisions and what other key leaders have to say regarding the statement, and also be careful to inform people. There is just a need for everyone to be aware of what’s happening to avoid misunderstanding (Interview P-5 2012)._
There are other challenges among civil society networks, including weaknesses in consolidating their intervention efforts. Sometimes they have problems in coordination because different networks are scattered across different parts of the country. Personality clashes have also been reported as a challenge to harmonious working relationships among networks, as has competition in obtaining funding from donors (Interviews 2012).

5. Perceptions of The Role of Power in Third-Party Relationships

5.1 Power and the Dynamics of Third-Party Relationships in Nepal

In Nepal the power status of third parties can be measured in terms of their economic and political influence over Nepal. Based on this classification, India, China and the US are powerful actors, and the UK, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries are medium powers, as they offer significant peace and development assistance to Nepal but have relatively little political influence. The UN, INGOs and NGOs fall into the category of least powerful third parties, as they are often obliged to operate under the rules and regulations of the government of Nepal, and their mandates can be changed if the government is not willing to support their activities. The termination of the UNMIN in January 2011 and the revocation of OHCHR’s mandate in December 2011 are relevant examples in this regard.

Several respondents expressed the view that powerful third parties were very difficult to approach, which reduced the level of interaction and impeded a smooth relationship. The main problem they experienced with the US was the lack of mutual information exchange. India and China were unwilling to work closely with other external actors. Due to their unique historical relationship and political and economic influence over Nepal, they have the ability to influence the national political process without any coordination with other external actors. In this regard, a European diplomat, who wished to be anonymous, stated the following:

Regarding coordination... there are three countries which are little bit on the edge of the margin... the US, who are carrying their own exercises... and they are not very open in sharing... they are very good in asking for information but in exchange we get very little from them... India... for obvious reasons, the Indians are always being reserved.... because of their bilateral personal relationship with Nepal ... to which we don’t have access... And of course China... China is very silent... India has attended UNSTEIN group meetings a
couple of times, but mostly has not attended. China has never attended. So it’s still a quite low level but it’s growing. It’s very impossible to approach China... we have invited them on several occasions... either they don’t give us a response or when they respond, it’s totally out of context (Interview 2012).

Likewise, an interviewee at the Swiss Embassy in Kathmandu explained that they do not have a coordinated relationship with India, China and the US. His relationship with the representatives of these countries has been limited to rarely organised meetings based on personal contacts. He believes that these countries are not in favor of coordination:

[Our relationship] with India and China [is] almost not in existence yet... With the US, yes we meet the USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] and the embassy, but not on the regular basis. Once again, it’s based on personal relationship unfortunately... I met the first secretary of India once... China and India never participated in this kind of meeting... I don’t think they are in favor of coordination (Interview N-17 2012).

There are other examples which suggest that the global and regional powerhouses are reluctant to be part of coordinated intervention efforts. For example, the US, India and China chose not to be signatories of the Basic Operating Guidelines-2003, whereas most other Western donors, including the UN, adhered to the guidelines (Interviews 2012). India and China also did not participate in the Peace and Development Strategy formulation process, even though they are primary providers of assistance to Nepal’s peace and development processes. They also did not actively participate in the International Development Partners Group meetings, a coordination forum for development partners in Nepal (Interview N-3, N-17, N-23 & N-26 2012). The tendency of powerful interveners to work in isolation can be understood from multiple perspectives, but the most important factor is their direct leverage over the conflicting parties, which allows them to push their own agendas. This finding supports Ricigliano’s (2003) argument that governments engaged in conflict resolution are often unwilling to coordinate with other third parties because their engagement is based on fulfilling their own national interests.

Power differences among third parties have clearly weakened their relationships. Some respondents expressed the view that it is very hard for the less powerful third parties to access their more powerful counterparts. An interviewee at the UN said that she did not have any personal or institutional relationships with her counterparts at the Indian and
Chinese Embassies in Kathmandu because she did not have access to them. She had some coordination with a counterpart at the US embassy, but found that there was ‘no point of coordination’ with them. She further stated that UN and donor relationships with local and international organisations were adversely affected by power differences. The UN and donor agencies can easily access I/NGOs whenever they require their support, but this is not the same for I/NGOs, as it is often difficult for them to approach the UN and the donor agencies (Interview N-2 2011).

The role of power in third-party coordination processes can also be seen at the organisational level. Many respondents from national and international organisations felt that INGOs hold more power than local NGOs. INGOs only coordinate with NGOs when they have funding to implement projects at the local level, because they cannot work directly due to legal and technical constraints. Many respondents felt that INGO-NGO collaboration was solely based on implementing such projects, and that they would not continue their partnership after the termination of a grant. A respondent representing an international peacebuilding NGO commented:

> It’s easy to work with local organisations because we are benefited because of existing INGO-NGO power dynamics. NGOs are loyal towards INGOs, as INGOs are financially [more] resourceful than NGOs. No matter how much we articulate INGO-NGO relationship as a partnership, NGO perceives INGO as a funder. In this sense, it’s relatively easy to work with NGOs... In some ways it’s easier... but in some ways it’s difficult as well... Sometimes NGOs cannot fulfill our expectations [delivering projects] due to their existing level of skills, expertise and qualities (Interview N-12 2012).

The funding priorities of different countries are also a crucial factor shaping the relationship dynamics of external third parties. European diplomats expressed the view that they can coordinate among themselves because they provide peace support funding in more or less similar areas. For example, major European donors contributed to the NPTF and the UN Peace Fund working in the area of post-conflict reconstruction, compensation to victims, human rights, and other peace promotion activities. However, they experienced difficulties in coordinating in these areas with the ‘big players’ (Interview N-4, N-17 & N-26 2012). This suggests that countries who are considered small powers in Nepal, and who had different funding priorities than the big powers, cherished their friendly working relationships because of the commonalities they shared.
However, these small powers were not very influential in the peace process, and were not valued by the conflicting parties because of their lack of power compared to the powerful actors. A respondent from a European embassy shared that in 2011-12 they made a big push to introduce a justice-friendly TRC bill. However, they found it quite difficult to persuade the conflicting parties, as they did not have enough power to do so, even in a coordinated effort. They realised that if China and India had pushed this issue, they might have had an impact on the conflicting parties (Interview 2012). The major powers, however, hold conflicting opinions on Nepal’s political development. China has adopted a non-intervention approach, and India plays an active but indirect intervention role. The TRC bill and other human rights and justice issues are not a priority for India or China.

There are varying opinions on the relationship between third-party interveners. One respondent from the European Community accepts that the US, India and China are difficult actors with whom to coordinate, owing to their different intervention approaches. Yet he is optimistic about the growing attendance and involvement of these actors in meetings convened by the NPTF, and even some interest shown by these actors in becoming formal contributors to joint funding mechanisms:

*The donor group supporting the NPTF has... been pretty open to invite other donors to the meetings of the donor. And usually what happens is that we have colleagues from the US attending donor group meetings... I have attended coordination meetings where India was also represented but that was rather on a specific issue on the integration of cantonments issue. I haven’t seen a Chinese representative yet. As we all know, it is generally more difficult to get Chinese or Indians or in part also Americans to join such harmonised efforts of donors as compared to other bilaterals. I have found it encouraging that our colleague from the US indicated that they are contemplating to join NPTF (Interview N-6 2012).*

Statements such as this indicate that power status has been instrumental in influencing relationship dynamics and coordination processes. Powerful third parties have been less interested in coordinating with other third parties, while less powerful third parties have to rely on the generosity and willingness of the powerful third parties.

Preferences for coordinating with other interveners are influenced by a number of key factors. First, less powerful third parties are often interested in coordinating with other third parties to strengthen their position in the peace process. Second, countries that have...
similar values often desire to come together, as this strengthens their intervention. European coordination on human rights and democracy promotion is a relevant example in this regard. Third, powerful actors prefer not to coordinate because their stronger position means they are not required to, and because often they do not have a history of coordination with others. Similarly, powerful third parties do not coordinate with others when there are different working styles, different interests, and when there is no compelling reason to establish a working relationship. Consequently, powerful interveners prefer to avoid the involvement of other external third parties because they wish to monopolise the intervention business themselves.

5.2 Power and the Dynamics of Third-Party Relationships in the Philippines

In contrast to Nepal, most respondents in the Philippines expressed the view that the power status of third parties had no significant impact on their relationships or the coordination process. Rather, every third party has a unique position and strengths, which has made them interdependent in the conflict intervention process. For example, NGOs know much more about the conflict context than most diplomats. On the other hand, when it comes to putting direct pressure on the government and the rebels, state actors have been more effective than the NGOs because of their leverage over the conflicting parties. This has been particularly observed among interveners who belong to the ICG. One respondent who is an ICG member expressed this in the following terms:

*Power dynamics doesn’t really work so much... And the reason for that is that, people like us in the NGOs know so much about the conflict than the diplomat does. They often tend to defer on sensitive judgment about the peace process. Not about what is the best approach to the Philippine government or for that matter the MILF, they do not defer to us on that because they are diplomat and that is their core competence. They know how to relate to other states and stuff like that. But in terms of setting around talking, it could hardly be helped. The diplomat is only here two-three years. The power dynamics does not work. What it does is it’s not really a matter of different powers but different styles of working. And they can intersect (Interview P-14 2012).*

Another respondent, who is a local third-party practitioner, has observed no discernable clash between third parties due to their different power status; rather, the accumulation of different forms of power has contributed to the progress of the peace process:

*The creation of all these structures [mainly the ICG and IMT] based on the TOR is a product of the demand from the ground. While they may have different power*
status in the structure, they move and work accordingly... I also believe that there are regulatory mechanisms at work in the structure [like the ICG and the IMT] to regulate the power dynamics of the structure. It is a very controlled environment for the internationals to work in but it is an environment that there is a mutual check and balance at the same time. They bring their power status to provide more guarantee, and more fuel to the peace process for it to go forward (Skype Interview P-13 2012).

A number of respondents expressed the view that third parties involved in the GPH-MILF peace process did not experience adverse effects due to their power differences. In fact, despite the large number of powerful actors, several respondents claimed that they enjoyed relatively harmonious relationships. There are several reasons for this. First, several respondents pointed out that none of the third parties really had the capacity to dominate, which means that there was a kind of equal power status in the peace process. Second, most of them were bound to formal intervention structures like the ICG and the IMT, which meant that they had limited scope to exercise their power independently. For example, the IMT had clear lines of authority because it is structured somewhat like a military organisation. The head and deputy head of mission receive all reports from the different components of the IMT, and when there are problems, such as IMT members acting on their own, the head of the IMT can impose the stated protocol (Interview P-1 2012).

Third, due to the existence of a stable and strong government in the Philippines and a relatively good relationship between the government and the rebel group, third parties are not in a position to exercise their power in isolation. For instance, during the high-level negotiation process, Malaysia as a facilitator to some extent controlled the process, while the ICG played a consultative role. However, both panels have the final word regarding the direction of the peace process. The panels also have the authority to say when they require third parties and when they do not. Miriam Ferrer, a panel member, said, “In some moments, the panels requested that the ICG should not be present in the room, when some security matters were discussed” (Interview P-1 2012).

Finally, as discussed in the previous chapter, the maturity of third-party relationships also ensures that the power status of third parties plays a limited role in the coordination process. Understanding their differences and respecting each other’s strengths and
weaknesses is a prominent determinant of power differences playing no significant role in the coordination process. An ICG member interviewed in the field had this to say:

*Government has one way of looking at the conflict. NGOs may have another. We converge all the perspectives by listening to each other and respecting each of the opinions of the different groups... All the different programming of the each member actually complements each other. It's really hard to explain how it works but it does. It works simply because everyone is different. It creates an atmosphere of respecting differences, in which case it is possible to find a common ground (Interview P-16 2012).*

6. Third-Party Relationships and Power Dynamics: A Synchronised Analysis of the Cases

This section provides an analysis of how third-party practitioners perceive the role of relationship and power dynamics in third-party coordination in Nepal and the Philippines.

6.1 Research Propositions and Their Relevance to the Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Propositions</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proposition 1</strong>: Third-party coordination is easier among actors who share more or less similar values and ideologies and have similar origins. Conversely, it is more difficult for third parties who have dissimilar values and ideologies and different origins</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proposition 2</strong>: The existence of formal intervention mechanisms endorsed by the conflicting parties makes third-party relationships and coordination processes stronger than independent intervention mechanisms</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proposition 3</strong>: The power status of third parties is the most important factor influencing the third-party coordination process</td>
<td>×</td>
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</table>

Three research propositions were developed for the purpose of this particular analysis. The first proposition was that third-party coordination in peace processes is easier among actors who share more or less similar values and ideologies, and who have the same
origins; conversely, coordination is more complicated among third parties who have very
distinct values and ideologies and different origins. In relation to Nepal, this research
confirms that third parties who share similar values and approaches tend to have
coordinated relationships. Local and external coordination on human rights is one key
example of this. Here, my research proposition is largely upheld. However, this is not
always the case, as there were some problematic issues. In the Philippines third parties,
even with divergent values and approaches, have maintained coordinated relationships.
Two major factors – formalised intervention structures such as the ICG and IMT, and the
maturity of the relationships during the course of the peace process – contributed to the
maintenance of good working relationships. In this sense, the first proposition was not
upheld in the case of the Philippines.

A second research proposition stated that the existence of intervention mechanisms
endorsed by the conflicting parties make third-party relationships and coordination
processes stronger than independent intervention mechanisms. This proposition is clearly
upheld in the case of the Philippines, as the ICG and the IMT contributed greatly to the
strengthening of third-party relationships. Also, there were more relationships problems
among those involved in independent coordination mechanisms than those in mandated
intervention mechanisms. Conversely, in the case of Nepal, mandated intervention
mechanisms were absent, which means that there is no basis for comparison and the
second proposition has limited relevance.

The third proposition was that the power status of third parties is the most important
factor in the coordination process. While power differences among third parties clearly
played a crucial role in the dynamics of third-party relationships in Nepal, it was not
equally important in the Philippines. This proposition is thus upheld in Nepal, but not in
the Philippines.

In addition, this research provides a number of interesting and important findings on
third-party relationships which are not highlighted in the existing literature.
6.2 Relationship Dimensions and Third-Party Coordination

Third-party relationship dynamics are an important part of third-party coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes. Previous explanations have focused largely on the relationship between official and unofficial interveners (Böhmelt 2010, Fisher 2006). My research explores other relational dimensions, particularly the relationship between local and external third parties and among external third parties. Local-external third-party relationships are found to be one of the most striking and crucial aspects of intervention coordination. This finding also affirms the notion of hybridity (Jarstad and Belloni 2012, Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012, Millar, Lijn, and Verkoren 2013, Richmond 2009), as the relationships between local and external third parties are found to be confrontational as well as cooperative in both case studies.

This research provides a number of insights into the root causes of third-party relationship problems. Relationship problems between local and external third parties have emerged mainly because of the lack of honest and sincere dialogue in defining their intervention roles and scope during armed conflicts and peace processes. There is also a question of who will decide where and how to intervene. External interveners often enter a conflict-affected country with a set intervention agenda. Local parties find such intervention practices unacceptable, as they assume they know the problem better than external third parties, and thus desire to be the leading actors in intervention processes. Local third parties are dissatisfied mainly due to their limited intervention roles in the peace process.

Although the existing literature emphasises the joint involvement of local and external third parties in various conflict resolution efforts (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001b, Garb and Nan 2006, Wehr and Lederach 1991), my research suggests that they are often perceived as competitors rather than partners. In both case studies, local third parties often consider external third parties a necessary evil, because while they are seen to be resource-rich, they are also perceived as a threat to local ownership of the peace process.

I argue that it is an equal responsibility of both local and external third parties to mitigate their competing behaviors and move towards strengthening their relationships. In this
regard, local third parties should give adequate space to external third parties and attempt to identify issues that could be better addressed by external third parties. External third parties should intervene in a conflict without undermining the local ownership of the peace process. All these actions require judicious thinking and sound understandings of the local conflict context, which this research shows are often lacking in external third parties. External third parties should intervene in a conflict with an in-depth understanding of a particular conflict context and with locally grounded conflict intervention strategies, rather than basing their intervention only on their previous experience in other conflict settings. Previous experience can help them to come up with better intervention strategies, but even the best strategies will fail if they are designed without adequate understanding of the conflict context.

This research reveals that interdependence is a crucial factor in determining strong third-party relationships, which previous research does not highlight. Interdependence among third parties is essential, as both local and external third parties need to supplement each other’s intervention efforts. As widely argued in the literature, a single type of third party, with limited skills and strengths, cannot fulfil the conflict resolution needs of present-day armed conflicts (Paris 2009, Regan and Abouharb 2002). A conflict-affected country requires multiple actors, both local and international. However, third parties cannot be interdependent if they are unaware of each other’s intervention actions and goals, and if they are not coordinating through formal and informal intervention structures. In order to be interdependent, third parties must take part in effective coordination mechanisms.

This research also led me to the conclusion that a sense of respect is another crucial component of healthy third-party relationships. Regardless of different power status, working in different levels of conflict, and with different roles, each third-party desires to gain respect and acknowledgement for their work from other third parties. Less powerful third parties and local third parties are much more eager to garner such respect, as they want to be acknowledged by others regarding their contribution to the peace process. Respect can be in the form of recognising everyone’s importance in the peace process. It can be also reflected in the generosity and flexibility shown by third parties to freely meet and interact with other third parties. It can further be seen in the valuing of the sentiments
of local third parties on the one hand, and accepting the presence of external third parties on the other. It is often difficult to realise a sense of respect through policy measures set by themselves or the conflicting parties; it can only be achieved by changing attitudes and knowing others more fully through dialogue and interaction. This research suggests that it is the equal responsibility of both local and external third parties to mitigate their relationship problems. Local third parties must be liberal enough to provide adequate space for third parties, whereas external actors need to accept the given space without undermining the local third parties’ importance in the peace process.

Differences in intervention strategies and priorities have been identified as a major contextual factor adversely affecting third-party relationships. This problem can be addressed by developing a *culture of collective intervention*. Third parties must have a genuine commitment that intervention strategies will be developed not because of their own readings of the conflict, but based on what is identified through a joint political analysis. In this regard, third parties can form a joint task force to obtain regular political updates and analysis and formulate intervention strategies according to those analyses. Likewise, as seen in Nepal’s case, third parties can also commonly develop basic operating guidelines for maintaining the ethics of intervention.

Most importantly, in order to enhance relationships among third parties, three categories of actors – the conflicting parties, powerful third parties, and global institutions – must each play an important role. The conflicting parties can enforce third parties’ intervention in the conflict, based on the given mandate. It is obvious that third parties tend to intervene independently when there are no regulations and structures in place to monitor their activities. Mandates contribute to the uniformity of intervention approaches among third parties. If local and external third parties are involved in similar intervention actions, their intervention jurisdictions must be separate and very clear, to avoid the feeling of rivalry. Likewise, conflicting parties need to have a commitment that they will not accept individual third-party support in the case of intervention actions that require broader third-party support. Such commitments compel third parties working on similar issues to coordinate before approaching the conflicting parties.
In the case of powerful third parties, it may be difficult for the conflicting parties to direct them to work under certain intervention structures. Yet powerful third parties’ genuine interests and commitments are crucial to developing friendly relationships among a diverse range of third parties. Powerful third parties have the capacity to bring a number of less powerful third parties together, if they are easily accessible to other third parties to meet and communicate in a timely manner. However, this depends on their genuine commitment to establish a good working relationship with other third parties.

Global institutions, particularly the UN, can serve in an acceptable coordinating capacity for improving relationships among a wider range of third-party interveners. The UN can convene regular meetings and interaction forums, work as an information hub, and even take initiative to accumulate resources required for particular intervention actions. The UN on many occasions has taken such initiatives, but if such processes were institutionalised this could contribute to improving third-party relationships and better coordination in conflict resolution. The United Nations Peace Building Commission (UN-PBC) is an important step in that direction; however, UN-PBC has been limited to post-agreement coordination and only in specific countries. A mechanism similar to UN-PBC, focusing on both during- and after-conflict coordination of interveners, would be useful.

This research both confirms and contradicts a number of arguments made in the existing literature. It also fills some of the gaps that have been identified in the existing literature. Nan (2003), in her framework on ‘intervention coordination,’ briefly discusses the need for strong relationships and interconnection between various kinds of third parties, such as between governmental and non-governmental and local and international institutions. She also mentions some strategies for making third-party relationships stronger. However, this does not inform us about the crucial factors which influence the dynamics of third-party relationships. This research begins to fill this gap by outlining some of the major factors that are pertinent to third-party relationship-building.

Jackson (2005) concludes that if different types of mediators can maintain their relationships over time, this can lead to more effective third-party coordination. This notion is compatible with one of my findings from the Philippines case, namely, that
maturity in the relationship promotes third-party coordination. Strimling (2006) suggests that an ‘institutionalized mechanism’ can contribute to third-party coordination because it would “promote regular, sustained, and meaningful interaction between intermediaries” (p. 116). My findings confirm that institutionalised mechanisms such as the ICG and the IMT have been very helpful in making third-party relationships and coordination stronger in the Philippines. Moreover, Nan (2003) suggests that financial, strategic and psychological factors can obstruct the third-party coordination process. Specifically, competitive funding processes, lack of shared conflict resolution goals, approaches and strategies, third parties competing to gain prestige, and the lack of personal relationship-building and trust among third parties are factors which can impede third-party coordination. My findings are consistent with these conclusions, except that my research extends to the coordination challenges in the relationships between local and external third parties, among externals, and among local third parties.

6.3 Power Dimension and Third-Party Coordination

This research has shown that the power status of third parties played a crucial role in third-party coordination and defining relationships in Nepal, but was less significant in the Philippines. Factors such as the multiplicity of powerful third parties in intervention processes, unwillingness by powerful actors to coordinate with other third parties, lack of accessibility to powerful third parties, the lack of a culture of coordination among powerful third parties, and direct access to and leverage over the conflicting parties by powerful actors all contributed to a lack of coordination by powerful actors in Nepal. In the Philippines, on the other hand, factors such as recognising everyone’s importance in the peace process and a sense of interdependence among third parties mitigated the influence of power on third-party coordination processes. Good lines of communication between the conflicting parties and intervention structures such as the ICG and the IMT also diminished the role of third-party power.

This research therefore both confirms and contradicts a number of power dynamics arguments made in the conflict management literature. For example, Jones (2001) has argued that intervention mechanisms, if they are led by a major power, can promote third-party coordination in conflict resolution processes. Contrary to this, the Philippines case
demonstrates that intervention mechanisms established by the conflicting parties can work effectively without a leading role for powerful nation states. The maturity of the third-party relationship, the uniqueness of third parties in terms of their expertise, and a sense of interdependence were also important factors in third-party coordination.

This research partly contradicts Kriesberg’s (1996) argument about the role of power in shaping the dynamics of third-party coordination. Kriesberg argues that powerful nation states rarely coordinate because of their larger scale of operation and diverse range of engagements. Contrary to this suggestion, my research demonstrates that unwillingness to coordinate, the lack of a culture of coordination, and difficulties in accessing powerful third parties by less powerful third parties are some of the main reasons why powerful third parties do not coordinate.

Ricigliano (2003) has highlighted the ‘realpolitik’ prevalent among governments, larger organisations and NGOs as a barrier to coordination between multiple actors. Ricigliano argues that a government engaged in a conflict-affected country works primarily in its country’s own ‘national interests,’ and is therefore often ambivalent about coordinating with other governments and NGOs. My research largely supports his arguments, as it finds that third-party interveners with strategic interests in conflict-affected countries, and with higher leverage over the conflicting parties, are less willing to coordinate. By contrast, third-party interveners with low or no strategic interests are more willing to coordinate with other third parties. Ricigliano’s argument about coordination between NGOs being impeded by ‘competitive funding processes and shrinking resources’ is also very much supported by this research.

7. Conclusion
One of the major contributions of this chapter has been its analysis of the dynamics of third-party relationships beyond the official-unofficial dimension. This revealed that relationship problems are ubiquitous and can be found among externals and between local and external third parties. The chapter further revealed that debilitated third-party relationships, in their various subsets, are basically the product of power differences and traditional rivalries, attitudes towards each other, differences in intervention strategies and priorities, and actions taken by third parties. Most of the relationship problems can be
addressed either through policy measures or through continuous dialogue and interaction. The formation of intervention structures mandated by the conflicting parties is one policy measure which can improve third-party relationships. Encouraging changes in the attitudes and behaviors of third parties is equally important. The table presented below summarises the key elements that adversely affect third-party relationships in all subsets, and provides some approaches and strategies for preventing these relationship problems.

**Table 6.2: Problems and Likely Solutions of Third-Party Relationships**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Elements</th>
<th>Factors that have a negative impact on third-party relationship dynamics</th>
<th>Mitigating third-party relationship problems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power differences</strong></td>
<td>Multiplicity of powerful third parties with no converging issues&lt;br&gt;Powerful actors’ unwillingness to coordinate with other third parties&lt;br&gt;Difficulties in accessing the powerful third parties by less powerful third parties&lt;br&gt;lack of a culture of coordination among powerful third parties&lt;br&gt;Powerful third parties’ direct access to and leverage over the conflicting parties</td>
<td>Genuine commitment and willingness of powerful third parties to strengthen their relationships and engage in coordination&lt;br&gt;Recognizing every third party’s importance in the peace process&lt;br&gt;Sense of interdependence&lt;br&gt;A good line of communication between the conflicting parties&lt;br&gt;Existence of intervention structures, such as the ICG and the IMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitudes towards other parties</strong></td>
<td>Predetermined attitude of a third-party towards other third parties, and lack of dialogue and interactions to break such stereotypes</td>
<td>Getting involved in continuous dialogues and interactions to break stereotypes and redefine relationships, through their association in various coordination forums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Differences in intervention strategies and priorities</strong></td>
<td>Interventions based on their own readings of the conflict and the priorities of their governments and institutions</td>
<td>Developing a culture of intervention, which is based on the joint analysis of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actions taken by the conflicting parties</strong></td>
<td>Absence of coordination mechanisms</td>
<td>Conflicting party-facilitated coordination mechanisms to converge third-party intervention efforts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This research also led me to conclude that third-party relationships in armed conflicts and peace processes take a long time to strengthen. Third parties initially enter into conflict as an individual intervener and try to intervene in a conflict through their own efforts. Relationships evolve and strengthen according to the level of interaction with other third parties. This is also determined by the nature and characteristics of the conflict. A violent and protracted conflict contributes to making third parties’ relationships stronger, as
unitary intervention efforts in such situations cannot be properly operationalised due to the complex political environment. In the next chapter I take the analysis one step further and examine the contribution of third-party coordination to successful peace processes.
1. Introduction

In the previous chapter I examined the influence of relationship dynamics and the power status of third parties on coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes. In this chapter I assess the effectiveness of third-party coordination. Specifically, I argue that coordination effectiveness relies heavily on the strength of coordination processes and strategies, and this I have termed coordination success. Coordination effectiveness, on the other hand, can be defined as the direct and indirect contributions of third-party coordination which take a country from conflict to peace through one or many intervention actions. Third-party coordination effectiveness includes contributions towards immediate and short-term intervention goals, such as the reduction of violence, the prevention of mass killings, confidence-building measures, breaking negotiation stalemates, and signing ceasefire deals and peace agreements. It also includes more long-term goals, such as implementation of peace agreements, post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives, minimising the risk of violent conflict recurrence, and the establishment and functioning of various democratic institutions to sustain the peace process. In this chapter I assess coordination effectiveness on the basis of two research propositions:

Proposition 1: The joint involvement of both local and external third parties in intervention efforts has a higher potential for coordination effectiveness than the involvement of only local third parties or only external third parties.

Proposition 2: The existence of formal intervention structures mandated by the conflicting parties makes third-party intervention efforts more effective for conflict resolution than settings that lack such structures.

In the course of investigating these propositions, this chapter differentiates third-party coordination success and coordination effectiveness based on relevant examples observed in Nepal and the Philippines. Fundamental questions which this chapter attempts to answer include: a) what leads to coordination success? and b) what leads to coordination
effectiveness? The existing literature does not differentiate between the core meanings of these two dimensions. I argue that coordination success measures the strengths and depth of third-party coordination, and that it can be measured with a number of indicators, such as in-depth coordination versus superficial coordination, high coordination commitment versus low coordination commitment, and meeting and information-sharing coordination versus action-driven coordination. Coordination effectiveness measures whether the coordination can be shown to have had an impact on the actual peace process. However, from an analytical perspective it is difficult to discuss these two components separately, because they are interrelated and both may appear in each coordination process. I therefore take an integrated approach, whereby I present a number of examples related to third-party coordination attempts to identify whether they represent coordination success or coordination effectiveness or both.

This chapter is structured as follows: In the next section, I present a number of examples related to third-party coordination in Nepal that were seen in different phases of conflict, and categorise them according to whether they fall into the category of coordination success or effectiveness or both. In the third section, I provide a critical assessment of third-party coordination effectiveness in Nepal. In the fourth section, I present a number of examples to demonstrate the contribution of formal and informal intervention structures in conflict resolution in Nepal and the Philippines. In the fifth section, I provide a critical assessment regarding their contributions to conflict resolution. In the sixth section, I summarise key points drawn from the chapter and assess the relevance of the research propositions. In the final section, I provide concluding remarks.

2. Third-Party Coordination Events and Their Contribution to Conflict Resolution

Several examples from Nepal and the Philippines demonstrate how shared intervention goals and the convergence of local-external third-party interests have contributed to coordination success and effectiveness in conflict resolution. This section discusses some of those cases.

2.1 Human Rights Protection as a Shared Intervention Goal in Nepal

Three different examples of local and external third-party coordination and collaboration on issues around human rights provide an empirical basis for assessing coordination
success and effectiveness in Nepal. The first example is concerned with overall human rights advocacy efforts in Nepal during the intensive armed phase of the conflict. It has been argued that in Nepal, the “human rights issues had come to play a central role in national political discourse about the conflict” (Rawski and Sharma 2012, p. 175). Evidence suggests that the coordination efforts of local human rights organisations and external actors, particularly UN human rights monitoring missions and other international organisations, were highly effective in reducing the number of conflict-related disappearance cases during the conflict (Farasat and Hayner 2009, Rawski and Sharma 2012). Other human rights-based coordination included the joint involvement of the NHRC and external third parties in preparing a ‘draft human rights accord’ to present during the peace talks in 2003. While the conflicting parties did not agree with the NHRC, the interveners considered it a successful coordination process (Farasat and Hayner 2009).

There has been a consistent unified voice from many external and local third parties calling for respect for human rights in Nepal (Mason 2009). During the intensive armed phase of the conflict, and even in the post-agreement period, both local and external third parties, with the exception of India and China, shared a common goal of improvement in the human rights situation, and their clarity on this agenda made their intervention efforts very focused. A number of respondents, representing both local and external third parties, claimed that they were successful in achieving their goals, mainly because of collaborative lobbying and advocacy efforts soon after the eruption of violent conflict, which also continued into the post-agreement period (Interviews 2012). Although the local-external third parties did not form any joint coordination mechanisms or task-force groups for their advocacy efforts, they coordinated informally through exchanges of information and regular meetings, either collectively or bilaterally (Interviews, 2012). External third parties also provided resources for local third parties to carry out their activities, which was a soft form of coordination. In sum, strong coordination took place between local and external third parties and such coordination was most enacted during the intensive armed phase of the conflict.
A second relevant example of local-external third-party coordination was on issues around the establishment of the OHCHR in Nepal. It has been argued that the OHCHR would not have been established without the collective advocacy of local human rights groups and the international community (Whitfield 2008a). Concerned about the growing intensity of the conflict and the widespread violation of human rights, external interveners, particularly the European nations, lobbied the government and the UN Human Rights Council for an independent human rights monitoring mechanism. Local third parties also expressed the need for an independent and reliable human rights institution:

The case of the establishment of OHCHR is instructive. Human rights defenders lobbied intensively for its creation with the UN and diplomatic community in Nepal and abroad. This civil-society-led campaign involved submitting complaints to UN human rights mechanisms, issuing joint public statements, and making multiple trips to Geneva, several European countries, and the European parliament (Rawski and Sharma 2012, p. 181)

As a result of sustained advocacy, both in the national and international arenas, the government agreed to establish the OHCHR office in 2005. Third-party coordination then also contributed to the effective operation of the OHCHR (Heiselberg et al. 2007, Upreti 2006, Whitfield 2010). External interveners such as Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, Canada, US, Switzerland and Norway provided necessary resources and coordinated support for the OHCHR, and local human rights organisations worked in conjunction with the OHCHR in collecting, investigating and verifying human rights atrocities. As claimed by a number of respondents, the coordination process was successful because all of the actors had a common goal and a genuine interest in investigating and publicising human rights violations.

Local-external third-party coordination on OHCHR issues, which began even before its operation, continued until the time of its termination in Nepal. In this sense, there remained a long-term coordination commitment among third parties to make OHCHR’s work effective. As a result, from 2005 to 2010 the OHCHR recorded 12,866 violation cases that occurred between February 1996 and November 2006 (OHCHR 2012). The consensus is that “[t]he presence of OHCHR… moderated the repressive response of the authoritarian state to the People’s Movement that defined the King’s rule, thereby
facilitating a positive and nonviolent outcome of the conflict” (Frieden 2012, p. 107). The OHCHR’s presence in the country during both the conflict and the transition period was effective because local people gained the confidence they needed to communicate openly with OHCHR staff about the abuses they had experienced or witnessed (Mahony, Nash, and Tuladhar 2011, OHCHR 2012). Regrettably, the OHCHR failed to generate sufficient pressure to induce the government to take further action against those involved in the atrocities.

The third example of local-external third-party coordination was seen in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) establishment process. Local CSOs and a number of European countries raised a collective voice in support of a TRC, and supported the conflicting parties in drafting a TRC bill that met international norms (MOF-Denmark 2013). However, this particular post-agreement coordination effort was not effective for a number of reasons. First, third parties focused primarily on the integration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants and the constitution-building processes, and thus devoted fewer efforts to establishing the TRC. TRC formation remained a lower priority on the intervention agenda for third parties at the beginning of the post-agreement phase. Second, there was a lack of political will among the conflicting parties, due to the fear of being prosecuted by the TRC. Third, the lack of active involvement by India, China and the US also undermined the TRC formation process.

A number of respondents claimed that the TRC formation process was not an issue of major interest to the big powers in Nepal, suggesting that coordination effectiveness is often contingent on the support of the powerful intervening third parties. Moreover, the joint advocacy and lobbying in the beginning phase were conducted with only limited involvement of local human rights groups. The external third parties, particularly the European nations, came on board with a stronger voice for the TRC formation, particularly after the completion of the integration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants (Interviews 2012). There was thus a delay in strong collaboration, even among like-minded local and external third parties.

There are also cases where only local third parties were involved in human rights protection and promotion initiatives in Nepal. Evidence shows that on a number of
occasions local third parties, particularly human rights organisations, were collectively involved in investigating and reporting human rights violations. They also organised large peace rallies to pressure the government into peace talks, and formed a civil society coalition called Civic Solidarity for Peace involving more than 200 organisations (Farasat and Hayner 2009). The formation of the Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Coordination Committee (HRTMCC) by more than 40 organisations is another example of local third-party coordination on human rights issues (Forster and Mattner 2007). Various campaign-based peace actions, such as the formation of the national Coalition for Children as a Zone of Peace (CZOP), advocating for children and educational institutions to be treated as a zone of peace, is another relevant example in this regard (Dahal 2006). CZOP was established in 2003 as a coalition of NGOs, INGOs and UN agencies working to protect children in Nepal from the ongoing armed conflict (Shrestha 2008).

The commitment and readiness of local third parties was a key factor behind their collaboration in various peace initiatives, particularly during the conflict period. To a certain degree, it can be evaluated as a coordination success of local third parties, because campaign-driven initiatives and the formation of coalitions and networks among a wide range of third parties occurred based on a shared commitment to get involved in various peace initiatives. However, in terms of their impact on the broader peace process, little can be observed. First, campaign-driven initiatives contributed to raising awareness among the public on peace and human rights, but they did not create any substantial impact on the dynamics and direction of the peace process, mainly because these were interventions taken only because of the initiative of less powerful third parties. Second, the issues chosen for coordinated third-party actions were not highly attractive for the conflicting parties, and therefore they did not make any substantial commitments to address them. Third, although the local third parties raised some genuine concerns to be addressed in the peace process, the coordination was soft, and thus had insufficient impact on the peace process. Moreover, the coordination of local third parties, without the active support from external third parties, was rarely taken seriously by the conflicting parties.
2.2 Other Issue-Specific Third-Party Coordination in Nepal

Some issue-specific third-party coordination demonstrates its success, as well as effectiveness, in the peace process. One such example is related to external third-party coordination for broader political change in the country. As discussed in Chapter 5, the occurrence of third-party coordination was seen particularly in the intensive armed phase of the conflict, and during the period of extreme political crisis. This was not just an occurrence of third-party coordination; rather, it contributed to conflict resolution through the creation of a significant amount of pressure on the conflicting parties to find a negotiated solution to the conflict. Evidence shows that after February 2005 the international community, with the exception of China, put forward a more or less unified condemnation of the violence and repression committed by the government (Suhrke 2009, Whitfield 2008a). For example, “India led condemnation of the king’s actions and was joined by the United States, the United Kingdom and other EU countries … Vocal diplomatic protests were made, lethal military assistance was suspended, and ambassadors recalled” (Whitfield 2008a, p. 18). Key donors, including the Swiss and the Norwegians, reduced or threatened to cut off aid (Suhrke 2009). These coordinated efforts contributed to the success of the 2006 People’s Movement against the King. Several interviewees testified to this effect, affirming a level of coordination success as well as effectiveness in that particular period.

Although these examples demonstrate the impact of external third-party coordination on the broader political transformation in the country, it is also relevant that the external third-party coordination supplemented the intervention initiatives of local third parties. After February 2005, local third parties, particularly civil society organisations and occupational groups, jointly conducted a nationwide movement for peace and democracy, supported and participated in by dozens of organisations. Local third parties were actively involved in political parties’ led People’s Movement, and were instrumental in organising mass rallies and public demonstrations, especially when political parties were unable to organise such activities. Local third parties hosted several rounds of pre-planning meetings to maneuver their campaigns. They even conducted public fundraising campaigns to support the People’s Movement (Interview N-1, N-7, N-20 & N-30 2012).
It can be argued that mobilising dozens of organisations and thousands of people throughout the country would scarcely have been possible without strong coordination and collaboration among local third parties. This can thus be considered a strong example of coordination success from an intervention planning and action perspective. It can also be evaluated as one of the best examples of coordination effectiveness, as it helped to spark a larger movement. Its coordination success and effectiveness can also be evaluated on the basis of the moral and political support it received from external third parties. The actions taken by external third parties at the higher political level also supplemented the coordination effectiveness.

A number of respondents claimed that external third-party coordination on issues around the integration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants was another example of coordination success and effectiveness. The UN convened a large working group of donors to discuss the integration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants, which proved to be an effective avenue for exchanging information and ideas (Interview N-2, N-3 & N-24 2012). Pooling resources from different donors was another coordinated event to support this process (Interview N-2 2011). UN personnel stated that they believed they had done a ‘pretty good’ job in terms of coordination with other third parties on this issue. One UN official said:

*The UN interagency rehabilitation program, rehabilitating the Maoist combatants... is the best coordinated program I have ever seen. Donors are coordinated, the entire international community comes under one coordination mechanism that is chaired by Robert Piper. And then the UN agencies came together in the finest of ways ... supporting the discharge process as well as in the rehabilitation program... The discharge process when they signed was just an event. But the things that went behind, UNMIN was doing its political negotiation, UN country team was putting pressure from its own side... Donors are all coordinated. They get their funding through... For UN agencies to coordinate like that, including OHCHR... five agencies to coordinate without an issue... perfect, I think (Interview N-2 2011).*

Landmine clearance is another significant achievement which resulted from local-external third-party coordination. As claimed by an official at the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, and further emphasised by a respondent from the donor community, the landmine action group was able to bring a number of NGOs, INGOs, UN agencies and concerned government agencies together for a nationwide de-mining campaign. The
landmine action group initially built a consensus that this was an important component of the peace process, which could save hundreds of lives after removing the planted mines within a short period of time. They then organised a nationwide campaign for mining awareness, and consulted with the Nepal Army and the Maoists to consider this a priority issue in the post-agreement period. Due to the coordinated efforts of many different actors, Nepal largely achieved this goal in the five years following the termination of armed conflict. Altogether, the Nepal army has cleared 170 of 275 fields where it had planted home-made bombs. Similarly, UN arms monitors have destroyed around 53,000 homemade bombs which rebels brought with them after they entered the cantonment (Guardian 2011).

2.3 The Convergence of Interests and Successful Third-Party Coordination in Nepal

Interest convergence has also contributed to making coordinated third-party interventions more effective. For example, there was a convergence of interests among local and external third parties regarding the establishment of the UNMIN. From early 2000, CSOs made a strong call for a UN presence in Nepal, as it was considered a neutral agency that could take a lead role on issues around the management of arms and armies, and the integration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants. It was also believed that UN involvement would be acceptable to influential foreign powers, such as India and the US (Upreti 2006). Both conflicting parties, especially the Maoists, were in favor of the UN overseeing post-agreement conflict management initiatives. CSOs and other third parties (excluding India and China) lobbied for the engagement of the UN, and were successful in 2007 when UNMIN began its work.

Other relevant examples of coordination success include donor coordination during the formulation of the PDS. In late 2009, major development partners gathered to identify gaps in their intervention actions in Nepal. They assessed their own work and concluded that they lacked a shared peacebuilding strategy to avoid the risk of duplication (UNDP 2011, p.2). Based on the need for an integrated post-agreement peacebuilding framework, the UN created the PDS in January 2011 (Interview 2012). UN personnel interviewees stated that the PDS does not exist in most countries or most transition processes around
the world. It was crafted in Nepal with the participation of a broad cross-section of local and international organisations, local and international subject experts, UN agencies, bilateral aid agencies, international financial institutions, non-governmental organisations, think tanks and others (UNDP 2011). Its value lies in several areas.

First, it is a detailed and comprehensive peace and development framework aimed at supporting the implementation of the CPA. Second, it clearly outlines the short-term, medium-term and long-term peacebuilding needs of the country, as identified through a broad consultation process with relevant stakeholders. Third, it provides important information about existing local-donor coordination mechanisms to address peacebuilding needs. PDS, despite its being initiated by external third parties, can be considered a good example of coordination success. However, its contribution to the peace process cannot yet be evaluated because of the lack of sufficient evidence of its effective implementation by the concerned actors.

Donors’ adoption of Basic Operating Guidelines (BOGs) is another example of coordination success during the escalation phase of the armed conflict. The BOG was initially devised in 2003, and revised in 2007 (UN 2013). It aims to “… delineate the responsibilities of all parties to the conflict with respect to the maintenance of development space and access to beneficiaries, while increasing their attention to the possibilities of promoting assistance to the conflict’s resolution” (Whitfield 2008a, p. 8). Additionally, it seeks to “set out common minimum working standards which clearly define what kinds of influence or demands from the rebels or the government that donors will not accept” (Kievelitz and Polzer 2002, p. 46). There were ten signatories to the BOG in 2003, including the European Commission, Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA), SDC, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Norwegian Embassy, DFID, JICA, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the Embassy of Finland, and the Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV). By 2009 there were 13 signatories of BOG, including three new members, namely, the UN, AIN, and Australian Government Overseas Aid Program (AusAID) (UN 2013).
It is difficult to assess the direct substantive impact of BOG in the conflict resolution process in Nepal, as it has not guaranteed the day-to-day coordination of external third parties. However, a number of respondents from the donor community claimed that it has made their relationships stronger and promoted successful third-party coordination. Nan and Strimling point out that coordination works well once there are defined roles, trust and respect among interveners (Nan and Strimling 2004). This argument is affirmed in the case of BOG. Third parties who were involved in formulating the BOGs had a defined goal. They also trusted that everyone who signed the document would follow what had been agreed upon.

Despite BOGs’ significance, the three major external interveners, namely the US, India and China, have not yet endorsed it. The lack of powerful actors’ support in this case may have impacted its effectiveness. The BOG cannot be considered an example of fully effective third-party coordination as long as there is no participation or endorsement by these powerful external interveners.

3. Assessing Third-Party Coordination Effectiveness in Nepal

A number of conclusions can be drawn on the basis of coordination practices discussed in the previous sections. First, varieties of third-party coordination practices, such as local-external, only local, and only external, have taken place in Nepal; however, the majority of coordination has occurred between local and external third parties. The existing literature argues that both local actors and international actors must work together to obtain the best outcome of intervention efforts (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001b, Garb and Nan 2006, Gizelis and Kosek 2005, Pèlerin 2007, Wehr and Lederach 1991). This research directly confirms this argument, as well as my first proposition that intervention efforts where both local and external third parties are involved are more effective than the involvement of only local or only external third parties. Third-party coordination in Nepal on issues around human rights, violence reduction and reinstating democracy was relatively effective, with the active partnership of local and external third parties. Local-external third-party coordination has a high potential for coordination effectiveness because the joint involvement of both types of third parties can create significant pressure over the conflicting parties. Moreover, the coordinated involvement of a broader
spectrum of third parties can also enhance the legitimacy of issues and create pressure on conflicting parties to respond to their concerns.

Second, coordination success requires high levels of commitment among third parties, and must be in-depth and action-driven, rather than simply meeting and information-sharing. Most of the observed coordination practices met the criteria of partial coordination success, as they have adopted at least one strategy for successful coordination. Nan (2003) suggests that information-sharing and joint analysis among third parties is pertinent for a short-term and minimal level of coordination. This research confirms that third parties in Nepal often had only a minimal level of coordination. Some common coordination approaches adopted by third parties included regular meetings and interactions, idea and information exchanges, identification of common issues for intervention, and formulation of intervention strategies with the participation of a wide range of local and/or external third parties. Third parties in Nepal also formed informal working groups and coalitions for peace and human rights, where they made some efforts in terms of division of responsibilities and contributions of resources. However, none of the coordinated third-party actions in Nepal adopted all of the approaches mentioned above. Coordination was thus only partially successful.

Third, some of the intervention efforts in Nepal were successful only because of third-party collaborative efforts. The case of the establishment and effective operation of the OHCHR and the reduction of human rights violations through lobbying and advocacy, investigation and dissemination campaigns is one example. Some of their contributions are blurred with other national political processes, such as the establishment of the UNMIN. Moreover, the integration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants happened not just because of third parties, but because of it was also a priority for the conflicting parties. However, it can be argued that local-external third-party coordination created pressure to speed up these processes. In some respects, collaborative efforts also contributed by providing useful advice and the necessary resources to accomplish these important aspects of the peace process.

Fourth, coordination is often a one-off event in armed conflicts and peace processes. Thus, its contribution to peace processes can only be measured on the basis of a particular
case, or limited to discrete issues rather than the broader peace process. That is, third parties tend to be involved in a particular limited intervention event or phase, and in many cases, successful third-party coordination is short-lived. For real coordination effectiveness, the existing literature has suggested the need for a long-term, strategic and highly collaborative effort among third-party interveners (Strimling 2006). This research confirms that there has been rare long-term or highly collaborative third-party coordination in Nepal; rather, it has typically taken place to address an urgent issue or achieve a short-term goal. Once third parties achieve their goal, they do not tend to continue to coordinate.

There is also no guarantee that coordination success leads to coordination effectiveness as well. Coordination success is an effort made by third parties with the hope of obtaining a positive outcome in the peace process. It is also an indication that third parties agree to meet and talk on a regular basis, develop a common intervention strategy, establish good lines of communication, and achieve a common understanding of the conflict context and intervention priorities. Despite all these common efforts, however, coordination effectiveness can only be achieved when other factors, such as the motives of the conflicting parties and the extent of third-party leverage over the conflicting parties, are also favorable.

In other words, the type of third parties who have achieved coordination success, and the ways in which the conflicting parties have responded to their coordinated efforts, matter a great deal in determining coordination effectiveness. If coordination success is achieved by a large group of less powerful third parties, the conflicting parties may not listen to their advice. But if coordination success is achieved by even a small group of both powerful and less powerful third parties, then the conflicting parties may be more interested in responding to their concerns. This leads me to conclude that two prominent factors – who achieved coordination success, and how conflicting parties respond to the coordination success – have a great bearing on coordination effectiveness.

The evidence presented above also demonstrates that coordinated third-party interventions in Nepal did not contribute greatly to the smoothness of the peace negotiation until late 2005 and early 2006. In the negotiation periods of 2001 and 2003,
third parties could not create enough pressure on the conflicting parties to find a negotiated solution. Third-party efforts were also not sufficiently organised and powerful until late 2005, because of the lack of convergence of interests among major interveners or coordination between local and external third parties. This further justifies the assertion that coordination on its own is not enough; it also requires third-party leverage and pressure. This argument can be linked with the existing literature, where scholars have argued that mediation efforts by superpowers and high-ranking officials have better chances of mediation success than less-powerful actors (Bercovitch 1993, Siniver 2006, Svensson 2007a, b, Touval and Zartman 1985). Markus Heiniger, Special Advisor for Peace Building in Nepal for Switzerland, confirms this point:

In the case of Nepal, the external actors took, and continue to take, a variety of strategic positions although perhaps to a lesser degree than in other processes. India and to a certain extent the US (and partly the UK too) have tended to favour the hard-power approach with the aim of making Nepal’s stability the main goal combined with a fundamentally critical assessment of the Maoist movement. Other, mainly European, actors have followed a soft power approach combined with concepts related to conflict transformation. Through this approach they have tried to engage with the Nepalese actors and to support them in establishing and maintaining a common agenda and process without giving up their own basic values, e.g. on human rights. Of course, a certain amount of competition between the external actors for public visibility, for example, could and can still be observed, and many challenges still remain, for instance with regard to the dialogue on the two basic approaches mentioned above. Nevertheless, as appears from this process, the existence of a variety of external actors is conducive to supporting a peace process as long as a certain ‘corridor’ of common ground can be maintained.23

The conflict management literature argues that the nature and characteristics of mediators and the timing of interventions determine the outcome of mediation (Bercovitch 1986, Kleiboer 1996, Regan and Stam 2000). The Nepal case has demonstrated that the nature and characteristics of conflict and timing factors were indeed influential for coordination effectiveness. Some of the most effective local-external third-party coordination was observed only once the conflict intensified in Nepal and the coordination was focused on urgent agendas, such as the reduction of violence, resumption of peace negotiations, and the reinstatement of democracy. While most of the campaign-driven peace support

23 Markus Heiniger, the Special Adviser for Peace Building in Nepal for Switzerland, draws some conclusions from the Nepal case for future use in accompanying conflict transformation processes in general, keeping in mind that every conflict is unique.
actions conducted by third parties in the beginning phases of the conflict can be seen as examples of successful coordination, they were not effective in terms of any measurable contribution to the peace process. One of the reasons for this was the lack of active local-external third-party coordination.

When it comes to the implementation of peace agreements and sustaining the peace process, local-external third-party coordination shows a mixed result. Some of the intervention efforts, such as landmine clearance, the integration and rehabilitation of discharged combatants, and the formulation of PDS, were effective in terms of producing positive outcomes in the peace process. However, no evidence is found where a coordinated third-party intervention was able to create a substantial impact, such as sustaining the peace process, a complete reduction of violence, or a full-fledged implementation of the peace agreement. This indicates that third-party coordination, regardless of its strengths, can on its own only create a limited impact on the peace process. It generally contributes either to addressing a specific issue of the peace process or to consolidating the interveners’ efforts.

4. Intervention Structures and their Contribution to Conflict Resolution

In this section I assess how formal and informal third-party intervention structures have contributed to conflict resolution in Nepal and the Philippines. This section particularly evaluates the contribution of the ICG, the IMT, and other informal third-party coordination mechanisms in the Philippines. It also assesses the contribution of various third-party coordination mechanisms in Nepal.

4.1 IMT and ICG in the Philippines

The IMT and ICG are the two major structured frameworks designed to coordinate external third parties in the GPH-MILF peace process. The key function of the IMT is to support the GPH and the MILF in creating peace on the ground by monitoring the ceasefire, overseeing the humanitarian and rehabilitation component, and reporting back to the peace panel members about the progress achieved for sustaining peace (Khan 2007). As claimed by a number of respondents, the IMT made some real contributions to the peace process. For example, a number of respondents believe that the IMT was effective in maintaining the ceasefire. One respondent, who belongs to the government
peace panel, stated that the general feeling towards the IMT is positive, because their presence brought the level of hostilities to almost zero in 2012 (Interview P-1, P-36 & P-37 2012). Another respondent, who belongs to IMT as a representative of a local third party, suggested that the IMT’s presence had provided ‘confidence’ that peace was going to be achieved at the local level (Interview P-37 2012).

Other major contributions to the peace process include the IMT’s active monitoring and investigative role in the Basilan fighting between the government security forces and Moro rebels in October 2010, where 19 soldiers and a number of local people were killed (Interview P-6 2012). A number of respondents claimed that the immediate presence of the IMT in the violence-prone areas of Basilan forced a cessation of fighting, and also resulted in saving the lives of hundreds of civilians and prevented their possible displacement. The monitoring and investigative role also forced the government and the peace panels to respond to this situation promptly (Interview P-1, P-31, P-36 & P-37 2012).

Despite these contributions to the peace process, the role of the IMT has also been criticised or minimised. Government peace panel member, Miriam Ferrer, expressed the view that the IMT was not the sole agency who contributed to bringing peace on the ground; they supported the peace but were not really the key actors. She felt that “the key actors are really the two parties, through the ceasefire mechanism” (Interview P-1 2012).

Another respondent, who is a Manila-based third-party practitioner, expressed the view that, while the role of the IMT was contributory and important in the early phase of the peace process when there was a hostile relationship between the government forces and the Moro rebels, with the rapid decline of skirmishes between the MILF and the government the role of IMT declined (Interview P-20 2012).

The ICG is another important formal third-party mechanism in the Philippines. The formation of the ICG was a strategic decision by the conflicting parties to create a favorable atmosphere and regain trust in resuming peace negotiations. One respondent

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24 According to the IMT official website, the incidents related to ceasefire violation were 698 in 2002, and this came down to 18 in 2004 immediately after its establishment. The numbers of violation cases increased by 218 after the withdrawal of IMT in 2008/2009. However, the numbers of violation cases sharply declined until 2012, when they decreased to zero. See more at http://imtmindanao.org/about-imt/.
explained that the ICG emerged as a “product of compromise” because the government could no longer resist the MILF’s desire to have more international actors involved in the peace process. At the same time, they wanted to get mandate-based support from particular third parties, rather than open-ended support by many third parties. In other words, the failure of previous single-party intervention efforts inspired the parties to create multiparty intervention structures.

The ICG worked primarily as a confidence-building entity which contributed to the smooth running of the negotiation process between the GPH and MILF. As one respondent, who is former director of the Office of the Presidential Advisor to Peace Process, explained, the ICG can be considered fairly successful because of the way it helped to shepherd the peace process and make sure that the conflicting parties kept talking until they found a common basis for agreement (Interview P-2 2012). The ICG also provided a more holistic analysis of the peace process, which in the past had been hampered by the views, positions and accusations of the main facilitator, Malaysia (Interview P-18 2012). Miriam Ferrer, the government peace panel member, stated that although the ICG’s basic role was to act as an observer, its facilitative role was quite important in the early phases of the negotiations in 2009.

They were organised in 2009 because of the breakdown of the peace process in 2008, [in] the revival of the process, where both parties developed the terms of reference. It was quite a really critical period because we don’t know if the doors will be opened again for negotiations. There were critical moments during that phase... to some extent, the ICG did help to facilitate (Interview P-1 2012).

Two respondents, one who belongs to the International Crisis Group and another to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, said that the ICG’s contribution was ‘pretty constructive’ because it was “smoothing the rough edges of the process and catching it from falling.” After disagreeing with the government’s proposal for resolving the Bangsamoro issue, the MILF had officially walked out of the talks after the meeting on 27-28 January, 2010. However, the ICG and the Malaysian facilitator convinced the MILF to return for the next round of exploratory talks with the government. Other respondents expressed similar views, such as a former member of the ICG, who found the ICG’s coordinated efforts to be helpful in keeping the peace process alive when it was close to breaking down. However, such contributions were not publicised, because
discretion was required and ICG members were not allowed to make comments on such matters publicly, according to the mandate (Interview P-6 2012).

The formally coordinated presence of the ICG also contributed to minimising the suspicions that had been generated in the past regarding the motives of external third parties. For example, during the presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, there were many negative reactions to international third-party interventions, especially concerning Malaysia’s involvement. Several respondents claimed that the involvement of the ICG, together with Malaysia, in the high-level negotiations worked as a checks-and-balances mechanism (Interviews 2012).

However, despite its perceived contributions, the success of the ICG in the broader peace process is questioned, because of its narrowly defined mandate and its lack of a defined role in the intervention processes. There were also instances where ICG members, instead of focusing on their roles in the negotiation process, were involved in other activities that did not require them to be a member of the ICG. In this regard, one of the respondents from International Alert Manila expressed the following:

*I know they are good at bringing resource persons to talk to the two parties and bring them to the UK, Ireland and all that. But you don’t need to be part of the ICG to that. You can be a donor country and offer the two parties to go outside. So what makes the ICG different? (Interview P-18 2012).*

This respondent also felt that the ICG was limited because it didn’t actually sit in on the real negotiations. Instead, they were only involved when they were invited in. There was thus a distance between them and others in the negotiation room. In other words, the ICG merely increased the size of the audience in the peace process. One respondent who wished to be unidentified expressed the view that such formal intervention structures could sometimes prolong the conflict:

*With these different structures..., the problem becomes [that it is] not urgent anymore. Compare this with a situation where there is chaos, armed conflict, this pushes the people to look for a real solution, because it’s painful... With so many interveners crowded around the conflict, the urgency to revolve is dissipated (Interview P-2 2012).*

Overall, both ICG and IMT do provide ample examples of coordination success and effectiveness in the GPH-MILF peace process in the Philippines. First, both of these
structures largely enabled the successful performance of their mandates, and this is also acknowledged by the people involved and the peace panels. For example, the key mandate of the IMT was ceasefire monitoring and stopping ceasefire violations on the ground, which was achieved under the given mandate. The key role of ICG was to prevent the negotiation process from failing and to encourage parties to stay engaged in the negotiations, and it was very successful in this context. It would be difficult to fulfil their mandates without in-depth coordination among third parties involved in the process. It would also require good coordination with the peace panels, the lead facilitator (Malaysia), and other local and external third parties who are not part of the ICG and IMT. Since there is no strong criticism regarding their roles in the peace process and their internal and external coordination, this indicates their coordination success.

Second, ICG’s presence as a unified group in front of the panels (also discussed in Chapters 5 and 6), and IMT’s strong chain of command within its structure present another way to evaluate their coordination success. For example, ICG consists of both state and non-state actors, and coordination requires a genuine commitment to work together under one structure. IMT incorporates both military and non-military personnel, and thus coordination for them could be a challenge. However, they successfully worked under the same structure with nominal coordination problems. It can reasonably be argued that, without real coordination commitment, it would be difficult to work with persons from different cultural and institutional backgrounds.

This leads to the conclusion that giving similar intervention mandates to a group of third parties (who must work under the same structure) has the potential to lead to third-party coordination success. Regardless of cultural, institutional and ideological differences, mandates bind each member to the structure, allowing them to do only certain things in the peace process and in a certain way. Mandates also provide a solid basis for measuring the effectiveness of third-party intervention roles. The simple formula is this: Third parties will be effective in supporting the peace process only if they accomplish the given mandate. Not fulfilling a given mandate can be considered an intervention failure. But intervention failure can also be the product of other contextual factors, such as the
hurdles created by uncompromising agendas in the negotiations, the influence of spoilers, and violation of ceasefire agreements by one or both conflicting parties.

4.2 Informal Coordination Mechanisms in the Philippines

Along with formal third-party mechanisms, informal third-party coordination mechanisms were also in existence in the Philippines. The Multi-donor Trust Fund (MTF) and the Mindanao Working Group (MWG) are two notable donor coordination mechanisms that currently function to support the GPH-MILF peace process and the Mindanao issue in general. The MTF was officially set up in 2005 at the request of the Philippines government, and has supported confidence-building in the peace talks. As one respondent, who wished to remain anonymous, noted, “The difficulties in working in conflict-affected areas sort of demand the setting up of a simple and common mechanism by which the agencies can channel the assistance to targeted implementing agencies” (Interview 2012). MTF mainly operates in sites that are identified by the two peace panels as conflict-affected areas. Canada, Sweden, New Zealand Aid, USAID, AusAID, and the EU are contributors to the MTF, and the World Bank channels the funds. MTF administers a total of 16 million US dollars annually, although, the initial target was 50 million US dollars (Interview P-19 2012). As one respondent said, donors at present do not seem interested in contributing significantly to MTF, as some donors prefer to contribute more assistance once the peace agreement is signed.

Overall, MTF can be regarded as a significant donor effort to coordinate the developmental interventions of bilateral and multilateral donors engaged in Mindanao. When it comes to the effectiveness of donor coordination in the Philippines, MTF is a good example of pooling donor resources to support the peace process. However, it suffers from insufficient resources and an inability to accumulate the targeted amount to carry out broader peace intervention actions in the Mindanao region. The lack of broader participation by donors is a major reason why MTF is largely unable to achieve its goals.

MWG is another donor coordination mechanism working as a sub-structure of the Philippines Development Forum. It is focused on addressing broader economic issues, but its work is also supportive of the GPH-MILF peace process. MWG is composed of around 30 individuals representing the donor community, with an influential role for
some of the bigger donors, namely the World Bank, the ADB, Japan, the US and
Australia. MWG does not play an executive role but, as pointed out by one respondent
from the donor community, is more focused on coordination and information sharing
among external interveners working on Mindanao issues (Interview P-10 2012). This
mechanism cannot be considered a successful coordination, as it is only focused on
information sharing among donors, without a joint intervention strategy.

No notable informal coordination mechanisms exist that include international
peacebuilding organisations working in Mindanao. However, local third parties have
established several coordination mechanisms, including: Bantay Ceasefire, MPW, Kilos
Kapayapaan at Katarungan (KILOS), Inter-Religious Solidarity Movement for Peace
(IRSMP), CBCS, MPC, Mindanao Peoples Peace Movement (MPPM), Mindanao
Solidarity Network, and Agong Network.

Bantay Ceasefire came into existence in January 2003, led by the Initiatives of
International Dialogue (IID), the then secretariat of the MPC. It was established with the
participation of civil society peace activists and grassroots community volunteers. The
initial idea was to carry out an assessment of the ceasefire mechanism established by the
Government and the MILF – the Local Monitoring Team (LMT) (Eviota 2005). Since
then its work has focused on “prevent[ing] war in their communities by supporting a
ceasefire, reporting violations of the ceasefire agreement, and in general reducing threats
to the safety and security of civilian populations in conflict-affected areas in Mindanao”
(MPC 2013a). Initially a total of 60 members were involved in its first investigative
mission in January 2003; this has now risen to over 600 volunteers. They are actively
engaged in seven provinces in South, Central and Western Mindanao.

Bantay Ceasefire contributed to the peace process through an active and impartial
investigation of a number of incidents that violated the “truce agreement of the
Government and MILF;” it also “lobbied its findings and recommendations to both
parties in conflict, and even sought the intervention of diplomatic communities in finding
resolutions to the perennial conflict situation in Mindanao” (Ibid). Bantay Ceasefire
volunteers were involved in the Buliok war investigation mission of February 2003, and
the accompaniment mission in Ahan, Guindolongan, Maguindanao in August 2005,
where Bantay Ceasefire volunteers accompanied the return of more than 200 displaced families to their villages to harvest their crops. They also responded to the August 18, 2008 Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte attack on the civilian population, and the April 2009 accompaniment mission in Datu Piang, where they exposed harassment against evacuees and the poor situation in the evacuation camps (Ibid). Bantay Ceasefire was also independently involved in third-party monitoring missions when the IMT was unable to do so due to its limited mandate (Arnado 2011). One such case was the GRP-MILF Joint Independent Fact-Finding Team, which investigated the August 10, 2007 Basilan incident, where 10 members of the Philippines Marines were decapitated in Albarka, Basilan. This is an example of the supplementary role played by Bantay Ceasefire in support of IMT. However, there is no clarity regarding whether Bantay Ceasefire assumed this role in coordination with IMT or as an independent intervention. The impact of Bantay Ceasefire has been expressed as follows:

Bantay Ceasefire volunteers’ ceasefire monitoring activities have a deep impact on the local stakeholders. Conflict actors are cautious in their actions on the ground as they know that there will be civilian-led ceasefire monitors that watch their actions. On the other hand, community people realise they can do something to prevent conflict escalating near their homes and farms (MPC 2013b)

The above analysis shows that Bantay Ceasefire has been relatively effective in ceasefire monitoring and the investigation of human rights violation cases, although there is no clear evidence on whether the monitoring reports they have produced have been used to directly support the peace process.

MPW is another local third-party network actively involved in peace advocacy, both at the local and national levels. MPW is a conglomeration of seven networks of peace advocates, and includes NGOs, academics, religious groups, human rights groups, people’s organisations and grassroots communities. MPW emerged in May 2003 with the aim of establishing a common advocacy platform for advancing a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The conveners of MPW include the IRSMP, the CBCS, the MPC, the MPPM, the Mindanao Peace Advocates Conference (MPAC), the Mindanao Solidarity Network, and the Agong Network. MPW has been very successful in bringing a diverse range of local civil society networks together to raise their collective voices for peace, mainly through advocacy, lobbying, media campaigns, and the issuance of press
statements. One of the respondents, Gus Michlat, from Initiative for International Development, defined MPW as a kind of Mindanao Contact Group with very similar functions to the ICG, but from a local perspective:

*What we were pitching for is a counter-mechanism to the ICG... a Mindanao Contact Group or... a de facto local contact group. MPW acts as a conduit for local groups and civil society groups. There is no Terms of Reference but there is a tacit understanding. The point is there [is a] mechanism that has been built to establish the relationship among groups that have been there anyways (Interview P-24 2012).*

The uniqueness of MPW is its inclusion of diverse civil society networks with Moro as well as non-Moro from all over Mindanao. In this sense, it is a good example of coordination success. However, no significant examples are identified that justify its impact on the peace process, except its awareness-raising among the public, and its involvement in peace advocacy through various conferences and seminars.

The CBCS is the only Moro civil society network. It was established in 2002, and is composed of 168 Moro-led CSOs spread around Mindanao. CBCS’s primary goal is “to unify and consolidate the Bangsamoro civil society organisations for collective action toward social and human transformation” (CR 2013). As a peace advocacy network, CBCS is involved in activities similar to those of other civil society networks. For example, in May 2008, CBCS issued a press statement expressing its concern over the withdrawal of the Malaysian contingent from the IMT. In August 2008, when MOA-AD was not put in place due to a decision by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, CBCS was one of the organisations to file a motion for reconsideration (Interview P-32 & P-36 2012). Although the court eventually denied their appeal as unconstitutional, nonetheless this was an example of collective advocacy. Because of their collective advocacy efforts on behalf of Moro-led organisations, they are frequently considered to be biased towards the MILF, and do not have a good relationship with government agencies, particularly the Office of the Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process (OPAPP) and other organisations close to the Manila government.

For the most part, the informal coordination mechanisms in the Philippines are found to be successful, as all above-mentioned mechanisms have at least followed the minimal level of coordination described by Nan (2003). They are also successful in many other
ways. The MPW is a successful coordination effort in that it has incorporated a diverse range of civil society networks as conveners. The CBCS is also successful in bringing together more than 150 Moro-led CSOs. Bantay Ceasefire is another successful coordination due to its contribution to the collective monitoring and investigation of human rights violations. All of these networks have achieved, to some degree, the goals which they have set for themselves. However, their specific contributions to the peace process are difficult to measure, which in the case of mandate-based intervention structures was more straightforward.

As identified in Chapters 5 and 6, many informal coordination mechanisms emerged in the Philippines when the violence began to accelerate after 2000. Raising a unitary voice against violence was in itself a major step towards ensuring better third-party coordination. Many of their coordinated efforts were limited to responding to a particular incident related to the armed conflict. For example, MPC participated in investigating some ceasefire violations, but this research could not find any evidence of how those investigations were responded to by the conflicting parties, or how they helped those who were victimised. MPW, CBCS and other CSOs have been engaged in a number of peace advocacy initiatives, but again, there is no detailed evidence about how the CSO-led peace advocacy was responded to by the conflicting parties. Their contributions tend to blur with the efforts made by the IMT, the ICG, and the conflicting parties. Bantay Ceasefire maintains that they contributed significantly to the monitoring and investigation of ceasefire violation cases, but the IMT makes the same claim. The work of IMT is more recognised than that of Bantay Ceasefire, mainly because IMT is a mandate-based intervention structure in the peace process and is endorsed by both conflicting parties, whereas Bantay Ceasefire is an informal mechanism. Overall, however, it can be concluded that the CSOs in the Philippines have shown a higher level of ‘coordination commitment’ because of their various efforts to come together, form networks, and even networks of networks so as to speak with one voice to support the peace process. This is an example of coordination success.

With regard to other informal intervention mechanisms in the Philippines, many can be presented as examples of coordination success, but not as demonstrably effective in terms
of producing measurable outcomes. The limited contribution of coordinated local third-party efforts is due in large part, to their low level of leverage over the conflicting parties. It is also the result of the lack of strong collaboration between local and external third parties, and contextual factors such as the unwillingness of the conflicting parties to make concessions given their military victory mentality, and the presence of ‘spoilers’ in the peace process.

4.3 Coordination Forums in Nepal

As in the Philippines, many coordination attempts have been made among third parties in Nepal, both during the conflict and in the post-agreement period. Third-party coordination forums came into existence to exchange information and take action on issues around human rights, development, and other issues related to the conflict and the peace processes. Also, as in the Philippines, no formalised third-party coordination mechanisms were initiated by the conflicting parties in Nepal. Instead, both external and local third parties took the initiative to form coordination structures, often called a network or working group. These structures have been formed particularly among homogeneous groups of third parties, such as the diplomatic community, the INGOs, or NGOs. They are usually horizontal coordination structures where only one set or segment of third parties have organised as a group, and they are generally loose structures in which decisions are non-binding. Some of these coordination networks are also project-driven, and when the project terminates, the network tends to vanish. This section examines the contribution of some of these coordination mechanisms to conflict resolution in Nepal.

The Peace Trust Fund is probably the most organised peace intervention structure in Nepal. The NPTF, which came into existence in 2007, is a government-donor funding mechanism designed to support a number of peace initiatives, with particular focus on cantonment management, the rehabilitation of combatants, conflict-affected persons and communities, security and transitional justice, the Constitution Assembly, and peacebuilding initiatives at the national and local levels. Donors involved in the NPTF

25 Although many of the coordination networks are very homogeneous, Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative (NTTP) is an exception, as it is a hybrid form of third-party mechanism.
have claimed that their coordinated intervention, together with the government of Nepal, has contributed to conflict resolution in several ways. One contribution is that they have provided one-third of the total NPTF budget, which in turn has helped the government to support various post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction initiatives. A respondent claimed that NPTF was a very useful structure because it facilitated the rebels’ remaining in the cantonment by providing basic facilities and setting up necessary infrastructures (Interview N-26 2012). The NPTF’s assistance in infrastructure-building motivated many combatants to stay inside the cantonment because they were relatively comfortable “compared to other conditions they would have had” (Ibid).

A coordinated effort from the NPTF donors was also helpful in providing support to the Special Committee Secretariat on the Integration and Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants. In September 2010, the UN Security Council decided not to extend the mandate of UNMIN. As a direct consequence, considerable pressure was put on the government of Nepal. The cantonment issue was the most crucial challenge, as there was no obvious mechanism to replace UNMIN. In response, the government came up with the idea of establishing a Special Committee with a secretariat, to provide support for the management and integration of Maoist ex-combatants. At that point it was unclear how the Special Committee would be funded. Several donors in the NPTF were keen to provide funding for the Special Committee Secretariat through a bilateral agreement. One respondent said that the donor community held “quite some discussions” on this issue, because it was a major interest for many donors, as “this would give them enormous access to a very crucial structure in the peace process” (Interview N-6 2012).

The discussions eventually led to an agreement that the NPTF should be the funding mechanism for the Special Committee Secretariat. This is an example of coordination success, where the several rounds of discussions among third parties facilitated this important decision without significant differences in opinions. It also prevented the possibility of competition among third parties for providing support to the Special Committee Secretariat. It can thus also be considered an example of coordination effectiveness, as this process helped the conflicting parties to resolve one of the challenging issues of the peace process.
The development partners, who are also active interveners in the peace process, have been informally organised into different high-level coordination forums in Nepal. Peace Support Working Group meetings, the Nepal Portfolio Performance Review, the Nepal Development Forum, the Utstien group (currently known as the International Development Partners Group), and the governance donor group are all examples. Designed to coordinate various development efforts in Nepal, in the past few years they have also focused heavily on creating programs that directly support the peacebuilding needs of the country (Jnawali 2012). There are other coordination forums convened by donor communities in Nepal. The Centre for Constitution Dialogue (CCD) held coordination meetings on constitution drafting. Another group called Areas of Violence was formed by the international community during the time of conflict, and re-formed in 2010 just before the Maoists’ nationwide protests. This group was mainly focused on exchanging information, estimating the proximity and seriousness of violence, and exploring possible strategies to stop the escalation of violence.

As discussed in Chapter 6, despite the existence of several coordination mechanisms there is little evidence that they had a good relationship or a significant level of interaction with each other. This is because they emerged at different time periods and were initiated primarily for the purpose of advancing the interests of a particular block of third parties, such as the donors, the INGOs, or local third parties. Even the primary level of coordination, the exchange of information, is often dominated by the powerful third parties. Their contribution to the success of the overall peace process seems to be limited to certain key areas. For example, they have contributed to “sensitizing stakeholders to specific issues, deriving peacebuilding strategies, and formulating approaches to working together with the government” (Jnawali 2012, p.22). They also helped the government of Nepal sign the National Action Plan in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820. As claimed by one of the respondents from a Kathmandu-based diplomatic mission, who wished to remain anonymous, these forums have been effective in addressing conflict-related concerns during moments of crisis:

*The forums, I would say, have been effective in cases of crisis... We have been able... to get together in a joint position, joint message and joint concern that we*
Could take to the government, say, we would like to talk to you about this because we are concerned about recent developments (Interview 2012).

Established in August 2005, the Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative (NTTP) is an informal third-party coordination mechanism established with the aim “to facilitate processes that enable Nepali stakeholders to develop common ground within their often opposed positions, to provide support to the government and political parties to engage in a sustained dialogue.” NTTP claims that its approach is track-one-and-a-half diplomacy because, on the one hand, it directly works with the conflicting parties, while, on the other hand, it also works with other segments of society, such as women, youth, ethnic groups and CSOs. NTTP is a hybrid informal third-party mechanism, as it is comprised of donors such as the US and Switzerland, as well as local third-party facilitators like Padmaratna Tuladhar and Daman Nath Dhungana, and external experts/mediators such as John Paul Lederach and Martin Stuerzinger. The initial idea behind the NTTP was to support the government’s Peace Committee Secretariat responsible for the management and coordination of negotiations between the government and the Maoists. However, after seeing the inactivity and administrative flaws of the peace secretariat, the international community turned towards supporting and strengthening the work of Padmaratna Tuladhar and Daman Nath Dhungana, two local facilitators of the peace process.

NTTP provides a neutral venue for the conflicting parties to engage in honest and confidential dialogue, and an informal negotiation space where influential leaders have an opportunity to develop their negotiation positions and establish informal understandings. Leaders of the conflicting parties have met several times since its establishment, and have engaged in several rounds of dialogue, building consensus on some highly contested issues (Interview N-20 & N-21 2012). In addition to facilitating dialogue, the NTTP also took a number of concrete steps when post-agreement negotiations were stalled or about to crumble. For example, a political confrontation in April 2010 was resolved through the support of NTTP facilitators. An NTTP report commented:

Another crisis loomed in April 2010 as the Maoists and the ruling coalition adopted a confrontational mode. The President, at the request of the NTTP

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26 E-mail correspondence with Bishnu Sapkota, November 27, 2013.
facilitators, hosted the first ever meeting of the chiefs of the three major parties. During the rest of the month the NTTP played a central role in facilitating most of the high-level negotiations that took place, and the facilitators assisted the big three parties to adopt a more conciliatory position on most of the outstanding issues (NTTP 2011, p.3)

The NTTP has also been instrumental in resolving other post-agreement political crises. For example, a crisis emerged in July 2010 after the breakdown of the government of national consensus. NTTP facilitators at that time “acted to sustain the dialogue process, meeting with the President, Prime Minister and top-level leaders of the major parties” (Ibid, p.3). Consequently, as claimed by one respondent from the NTTP secretariat, because of the NTTP forum the conflicting parties agreed on the governance structure of the state, a highly contested constitutional issue for the conflicting parties. However, this has not yet materialised as a formal decision, partly due to continuing bargaining on other constitutional issues, and partly because of the lack of a CA body.

For a number of reasons, NTTP can be viewed as a solid example of coordination success as well as effectiveness. First, there is a good division of labor among the third parties involved in NTTP. Among the different interveners, the donor communities are responsible for providing resources to support dialogue and secretariat management, but they do not have access to the negotiation agenda or the outcomes of discussions. External experts share their experience with the conflicting parties and provide options for negotiation and settlement. The local facilitators convene the actual dialogue, which on some occasions cannot be accessed by the external experts. The NTTP secretariat is primarily responsible for the management of the forum on behalf of the facilitators and international experts. It also helps the parties to formalise the agendas which were agreed informally in NTTP forums. In this way, they have a clear division of labor. No other coordination mechanism in Nepal has found such an effective division of labor as NTTP.

Second, as claimed by respondents who are part of the NNTP forum, the relationships between the third parties is mostly transparent. They organise a joint meeting before convening any negotiations to make sure that everyone is on the same page, and all seem to have accommodative personalities. At the same time, they admit that their relationship is not always smooth. Because of the distinct ideologies of the local facilitators, they sometimes express conflicting opinions on particular issues related to the peace process.
There are also periodic problems among external facilitators, as some of their recommendations favor one side or the other. However, they resolve these differences through joint meetings.

Besides the high-level coordination forums, other informal coordination forums have also been established by national and international organisations working in Nepal. One such group is the Security Sector Reform Group (SSR Group), set up as a loose network for organisations and experts working on security issues in Nepal. One conflict and security expert interviewed in the field expressed the view that this mechanism did not work effectively as a coordination group, despite the engagement of high-profile security experts. While the SSR Group had access to the conflicting parties, and people associated with the group had some knowledge of the issues, the level of trust by the conflicting parties was low. The reason for this lack of trust was that, in the year of its establishment, the strategic importance of the SSR Group was high due to its close connection with the King, the Nepal Army and political parties. After the abolishment of the Monarchy, it could not maintain its good relationship with all major stakeholders in the peace process (Interview N-28 2012).

Another informal third-party coordination mechanism is the Security Sector Network. Despite its real potential as a common platform for sharing information and ideas on security-related issues, it could not function adequately due to controversy over the significant involvement of retired army officers and members of the elite classes of society. The public perceived that the network was aligned with the Nepal Army, and its neutrality was questioned. Some also charged it with being too close to conservative forces in the country. A lack of transparency in implementing projects was another major concern among network members (Interview N-28 2012).

Another security-focused coordination mechanism, the Security and Justice Coordination Group, was led by International Alert. It emerged in 2006 after realising the need for better coordination among the different international organisations and agencies working in this particular area. Its primary focus was on exchanging information among international community members and mapping the security situation and intervention actions to be carried out in Nepal. It further aimed at the “design of a roadmap for
international support to JSSR [Justice and Security Sector Reform in Nepal]” (Crozier and Candan 2010, p. 21). As claimed by a respondent from an international peacebuilding NGO, this mechanism was effective in terms of identifying who was doing what in the field of security and justice, and which donors were prioritising funding in these areas. It also helped to identify key issues which were under-prioritized by donors, NGOs and INGOs (Interview N-14 2012). However, simply identifying unaddressed issues cannot be considered a significant contribution to the peace process. Therefore, its overall contribution to the peace process is inconclusive.

Several respondents agreed that INGO/NGO-led coordination mechanisms often functioned properly until they began to receive funding from donors. Coordination mechanisms were rarely a voluntary initiative guided by a long-term vision. Instead, as claimed in an interview with a conflict expert, they were usually guided by monetary advantage and vested interests (Interview N-31 2012). They often later collapsed, even if they had the potential to contribute meaningfully to the peace process. One respondent, who belongs to an international peacebuilding NGO, gave the example of a group called Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups (CAFAG), which dealt with child soldier issues. The network functioned well because it received funding from UNICEF, but there was no guarantee that it would continue after the termination of funding. Another useful coordination mechanism was School as a Zone of Peace, convened by the Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), a national human rights organisation. This network is currently dysfunctional due to lack of funding (Interview N-12 2012).

Indeed, many of these informal networks and coordination structures are often not functional for long periods due to a lack of funding. It can be argued that funding is one of the important aspects of coordination success and durability of coordination networks over time. However, funding is not the sole determinant of such failures; factors such as the coordination commitment of network members and the urgency of issues in the peace process also play a prominent role in the continuation of coordination networks. Funding may determine the scope of interventions, but a minimal level of coordination, such as
exchange of information, organising periodic meetings, and the sharing of political
analysis can be done with limited or no funding.

The above analysis shows that often coordination mechanisms cannot be sustained as an
institutionalised platform for providing continuous and effective support to a peace
process. While informal coordination mechanisms are less effective in the broader peace
processes, they nonetheless provide a congruent space for many third parties to exchange
information, and for relationship-building and networking among organisations working
on similar issues. One respondent expressed the view that coordination meetings are
effective in terms of information-sharing, because many organisations are able to gain
valuable information without spending scarce resources. In the absence of coordination
meetings, they would have to spend considerable time and resources obtaining
information, such as risk assessment, context analysis, and updates from the conflict-
affected communities (Interview N-12 & N-31 2012).

One can also observe fluctuations in the effectiveness of third-party coordination in
Nepal. Many of the post-agreement third-party coordination efforts are very superficial,
as they are directed towards hosting meetings and exchanging ideas and information.
Many coordination mechanisms are also project-driven, or have competing goals. The
need to coordinate may no longer be pressing in the post-agreement phase, when there is
no significant level of violence. There are a few exceptions in which third-party
coordination has directly contributed to the peace process. For example, joint donor
contribution to the NPTF to support the post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding
initiative was significant. The role of NTTP in removing political deadlocks is another
example of both process and outcome effectiveness.

5. Assessing the Contribution of Coordination Mechanisms in Conflict Resolution

This research shows mixed results in terms of Proposition 2. When it comes to the
contribution of formal intervention structures in broader conflict resolution, the ICG and
IMT in the Philippines have been effective in many different ways. They have performed
their roles and held to their mandates more or less satisfactorily. It can be reasonably
argued that these structures have contributed significantly to the peace process through
ceasefire monitoring, the facilitation of formal and informal dialogue, idea sharing,
breaking the political impasse, and encouraging the parties to resume negotiations. Moreover, coordination processes within the ICG and the IMT remained positive, as there were no major complications in their relationships.

For a number of reasons, the ICG and the IMT are examples of coordination success. First, members of these structures intervened in the peace process as a united group. Second, they strongly followed their mandate and had clarity and a strong sense of awareness about how they needed to support the peace process. Third, they had a genuine commitment to working together under one structure and that commitment was reflected in day-to-day actions. Fourth, ICG and IMT were involved in targeted interventions, such as shepherding the peace process, providing a holistic analysis of the peace process, and monitoring the peace process. There was no confusion among interveners regarding where to provide support and where not to.

In contrast, for a number of reasons, the effectiveness of informal third-party mechanisms in broader conflict resolution processes is often hard to measure. First, informal mechanisms are typically quite limited in terms of their intervention scope, as they either tend to fulfil a small goal of the peace process or make their intervention actions more systematic but without aiming their impacts on the peace process. For example, the formulation and implementation of the BOGs in Nepal was a relatively successful third-party coordination among the donor community in Nepal, but it had no ambition to create a significant impact on the peace process. Likewise, MPW and CBCS were established with the aim of bringing a diverse range of local CSOs and networks under one umbrella, but had no ambition to be significant players in the GPH-MILF peace process.

Second, informal coordination mechanisms, because of their lack of standing in the peace process, are often less recognised by the conflicting parties. It is thus hard to measure their effectiveness in conflict resolution, except by their own claims or appreciation by the public for their perceived effectiveness. In Nepal, the two coordination networks working on security sector reform became less credible to the conflicting parties in the changed political scene after the abolishment of the Monarchy in 2008. Lack of transparency in the internal decision-making process was another contributing factor to the lack of successful third-party coordination. In the Philippines, Bantay Ceasefire,
despite its important contribution to the peace process, was less credible than the IMT. Being a mandated intervention structure, the IMT had far more leverage in the broader peace process than Bantay Ceasefire. In short, informal coordination mechanisms often lack formal recognition from the conflicting parties, a problem not encountered in mandate-based intervention structures.

Third, informal coordination mechanisms which typically focus on ‘soft’ issues (from the conflicting parties’ perspective) may not have high national significance, or they may be overshadowed by other ‘hard’ issues. In such cases, despite successful coordination third parties may be less effective in contributing to the broader conflict resolution, or their contribution may be blurred with other political processes. For example, the CSOs which led peace awareness and advocacy programs both in Nepal and the Philippines made indirect contributions to the progress of the peace process. But their impacts on the peace process are difficult to quantify. In contrast, intervention actions that are focused on the hard issues of the peace process, such as the integration and rehabilitation of combatants in Nepal, are easier to measure, as they can be quantified on the basis of their outcomes.

6. Discussion and Analysis

This section summarises the key points drawn from this research, and attempts to assess the relevance of the research propositions, as encapsulated in Table 7.1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Propositions</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upheld Partially Upheld Not Upheld</td>
<td>Upheld Partially Upheld Not Upheld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposition 1: Joint involvements of both local and external third parties in intervention efforts have a higher potential for successful conflict resolution than the involvements of only local third parties or only external third parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proposition 2: The existence of formal intervention structures mandated by the conflicting parties makes third-party intervention efforts more effective in conflict resolution than settings that lack such structures</td>
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As discussed previously, the first proposition is upheld in the case of Nepal, where local-external third-party coordination is found to be highly conducive to conflict resolution. More or less successful as well as effective local-external coordination on human rights and violence reduction is the best example. In contrast, the first proposition is not upheld so significantly in the Philippines, for the following reasons. First, this research could not find any exemplary joint intervention efforts of local and external third parties, except that observed in the IMT and some funding-based local-external coordination. Second, most of the intervention practices in the Philippines are quite homogeneous in nature, as in many cases only external or only local third parties are involved, rather than joint efforts of both actors. The first proposition is thus only partially upheld in the Philippines. However, the second proposition is upheld in the Philippines, where formalised intervention structures are found to be more effective for conflict resolution than informally convened coordination mechanisms. The second proposition is only partially confirmed in the case of Nepal, as there is no such strong existence of formal intervention mechanisms and, as discussed above, informal coordination mechanisms have not contributed significantly to conflict resolution.

This research both confirms and challenges a number of claims made in the literature regarding coordination effectiveness. As suggested in the literature, third parties should coordinate at the ‘right moment’ to make the intervention efforts effective (Susskind and Babbitt 1992). This research generally confirms that, both in Nepal and the Philippines, third parties have collaborated when there was an urgent need for a coordinated response to conflict situations. However, a question arises here, namely, how do third parties know when the right moment is? Each third party may define a right moment differently. For example, a highly escalated phase of a conflict can be a right moment for some third parties, whereas others may find the post-agreement phase the right moment for third-party coordination. I argue that the whole conflict cycle in itself is a right moment for third-party coordination. Coordination should begin in the early phases of conflict and continue until the conflict is settled adequately. However, the nature and characteristics of third-party coordination will differ in each phase of the conflict. For example, information and political analysis sharing can be an indication of effective coordination.
during the time of conflict, whereas sharing of resources can be highly important in the post-agreement phase. In other words, right moment coordination is context-influenced.

Crocker et al (2001) have argued that proper attention to the selection of coalition partners is a prerequisite for the effectiveness of multiparty mediation. The ICG and IMT formulation processes in the Philippines seem to contradict this argument. It was not a third party which selected the members of the ICG and the IMT; rather, the conflicting parties selected them and assigned them specific roles. I argue, therefore, that while proper attention to the selection process is obviously an important step when forming a coalition or group of third parties, it can be at the initiative of either a third party or the conflicting parties, depending on the context of the coalition formation process. If the conflicting parties are selecting the members of certain intervention structures, they first need to bear in mind what types of third parties can get along, and what kinds of mandates can contribute to keeping them united for the desired time period. If the conflicting parties form intervention structures, they need to make careful decisions regarding which third parties will best fit into which structures. This also suggests that the identities of the third parties and their acceptability to the conflicting parties is a key factor for coordination effectiveness. If third parties are selecting coalition partners for certain intervention actions, then a primary focus may be bringing major powers on board. If that is not possible, then at least like-minded third parties should be brought together.

Strimling suggests the need for an institutionalised intervention mechanism to “promote regular, sustained, and meaningful interaction between intermediaries” (Strimling 2006, p. 116). The Philippines case demonstrates that institutionalised third-party mechanisms are important forums for third-party support for conflicting parties. However, there is no guarantee that an institutionalised intervention mechanism will always be present, because such mechanisms tend to emerge only when they are needed to address a particular aspect of the peace process. There is also no guarantee that an institutionalised mechanism will actually result in regular, sustained and meaningful interaction among interveners, as third-party coordination is a very dynamic process which continues to evolve in different phases of the conflict. Despite these limitations, institutionalised
mechanisms are the best option for coordinated third-party intervention in armed conflicts and peace processes. This research also verifies the assertion that institutionalised mechanisms, even if they are formed in the later stages of a conflict cycle, are more effective than informal coordination mechanisms.

According to the literature, the selection of a lead actor for major mediatory efforts, and especially for the implementation of a peace agreement, is pivotal for strategic coordination among third-party interveners (Jones 2001). This claim is largely upheld in this research. For example, the coordination forums on the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist ex-combatants in Nepal worked quite well because of UN leadership. The IMT in the Philippines also operated well under the leadership of Malaysia. At the same time, acceptance of the leadership role of certain third parties can be a real challenge, particularly when there is a multiplicity of global and regional powers. In Nepal, for instance, the plethora of global and regional powers in the peace process was a complicating factor. Because Nepal is located between two emerging global powers, India and China, it has become a country of geopolitical interest for the US, the EU, and especially for India and China as they seek to advance their national security interests. As a result, all of these major powers prioritised their own direct and indirect interests in intervening in the conflict and peace process. It is difficult to imagine a collective intervention by these countries, as they have no history of coordination or of viewing Nepal’s political development through a single prism. Acceptance of any one of these actors as a leading actor is almost impossible, as none of the actors will work under the leadership of the others.

What makes third-party coordination a successful event in the peace process? The existing literature highlights the determinants of coordination effectiveness and strategies for optimising coordination effectiveness (see Chapter 2). But in the literature there are no integrated discussions of coordination success; rather, some components of coordination success have also been defined as coordination effectiveness. This research has attempted to draw a distinction between coordination success and coordination effectiveness, and to identify components of successful third-party coordination. Table 7.2 summarises the major components of coordination success drawn from this research
and compares them with coordination effectiveness components discussed in the literature.

Table 7.2: Components of Successful and Less Successful Third-Party Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components of Successful Third-Party Coordination (Identified through this research)</th>
<th>Strategies for Optimising Coordination Effectiveness (As discussed in the literature)</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Common intervention goals</td>
<td>- Proper recognition of interests of each third-party intervener</td>
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<td>- A genuine interest in collaboration</td>
<td>- Interveners’ commitment to work under certain principles</td>
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<td>- Commitment or readiness for coordination</td>
<td>- Inclusion of powerful third parties within the coalition</td>
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<td>- Democratic decision-making process among interveners</td>
<td>- Major power leads the coordination processes</td>
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<td>- A long-term coordination commitment</td>
<td>- Sharing of information</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Involvement of major powers</td>
<td>- Institutionalised mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Sharing of resources and establishing a basket fund</td>
<td>- Coordination between the headquarter and the field</td>
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<td>- Bringing a diverse range of third parties together</td>
<td>- Early and continuous consultation and maintained relationships</td>
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<td>- Proven track-record of resolving internal disputes</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Transparent relationships</td>
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<td>- Level of trust by the conflicting parties</td>
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<td>- Division of labour among interveners</td>
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<td>- Long-term support for the broader peace process or for a particular aspect of the peace process</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Adhering to the mandates</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Neutrality of the network</td>
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This table demonstrates that two common factors – the involvement of powerful third parties in the coordination process, and the commitment and readiness of third parties to work under certain intervention principles – are crucial for coordination success as well as effectiveness. However, a number of other factors mentioned above are also found to be crucial for coordination success. I argue that if any coordination attempts incorporate at least five (out of 15) components, that can be considered successful coordination.

This research also leads to the conclusion that coordination effectiveness can be evaluated from two main aspects: a) how it affected the main peace process; and b) the smaller goals and aims interveners set with the hope of ultimately contributing to the peace process. While informal third-party coordination mechanisms are often less effective in terms of directly contributing to the peace process, many of them are somewhat effective in achieving smaller goals set by themselves. This buttresses the claim that informal coordination mechanisms can be considered useful for bringing many third parties together, and this in itself can be an achievement, if there were no such mechanisms in the past. Yet merely bringing a group of third parties together does not
always contribute to conflict resolution, particularly if there are no clear reasons behind attempting such coordination. As argued by Nan (2003), coordination should be stopped if it starts producing worse results in the peace process.

7. **Conclusion**

To gain an in-depth understanding of the impact of third-party coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes, it is important to understand ‘coordination success’ and ‘coordination effectiveness.’ Effectiveness of third-party coordination should not be evaluated only on the basis of certain actions and strategies adopted by the third parties in the course of conflict intervention. Rather, one must ask how certain coordinated efforts have actually contributed to the peace process; only this can inform us about actual coordination effectiveness. Unfortunately, there is a lack of general understanding, both in academic and policy circles, about the precise meaning of coordination effectiveness. Often coordination success and coordination effectiveness are framed as one concept.

Likewise, ‘coming-together’ practices of third parties, such as issuing joint press statements, organising peace rallies, drafting a common agenda for peace and the advancement of human rights, and convening meetings for information-exchange have been understood as indicators of coordination effectiveness. In fact, these actions should be considered as key indicators for achieving coordination success, but they do not guarantee the achievement of a specific conflict resolution goal, unless each of these activities in itself has been objectivised as a smaller conflict resolution goal.

This research provides a basis for redefining coordination success. A simple way to evaluate coordination success is to examine whether the third parties who are united in a certain coordination structure are able to make their relationship stronger and continuously engage in various intervention actions. Activities such as regular meetings and interactions, idea- and information-exchange, identifications of common issues around intervention, and the formulation of intervention strategies with the participation of a wide range of local and/or external third parties can contribute greatly to coordination success. Likewise, adoption of at least five components of coordination success highlighted above can be defined as coordination success.
Third-party coordination success is only a first step towards coordination effectiveness. Coordination success provides a motivation for third parties to get involved in actual intervention efforts, helps them to come up with better intervention strategies, and clarifies their roles. This optimises the chances of obtaining positive outcomes to their intervention efforts. It is thus the first responsibility of third parties to make their coordination attempts a success, with the hope of making their intervention efforts effective in terms of the broader outcomes of the peace process.

While many coordination attempts are successfully coordinated, only a few have actually contributed to the broader conflict resolution process. I argue that, despite its few limitations, formalised intervention mechanisms mandated by the conflicting parties are more contributory to conflict resolution than informal intervention mechanisms formed by third parties. In contrast, informal coordination networks intervene at a distance from the conflicting parties, and do not have a formal mandate to intervene. For this reason, the conflicting parties will not have any compulsion to listen to their voices. In any case, independent third-party coordination mechanisms have often been directed towards their own institutional interests rather than the peace process. Nevertheless, informal coordination networks can sometimes be effective for raising awareness, political mainstreaming of people’s desire for peace, and creating a peace constituency within a particular conflict-affected country or community.

In the end, there is no guarantee that third-party coordination success will make a direct contribution to the peace process. However, coordination success can complement efforts to make the peace process durable and disciplined. In the final analysis, the success of third-party coordination depends on factors such as who is coordinating with whom, when they are coordinating, and how are they coordinating.
Chapter 8
Major Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

1. Introduction

This research has provided an in-depth exploration of three fundamental dimensions of third party coordination: a) the conditions for third-party coordination, b) the relationships and power dynamics of third parties and their impact on coordination processes, and c) the effectiveness of third-party coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes. This investigation has been achieved primarily through an analysis of the views expressed by third-party practitioners and other relevant stakeholders in the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and the Moro conflict of the Philippines. The general theoretical and empirical literature on this subject, particularly in the context of the two cases examined here, is inconclusive on several key questions. This study has focused on three of these questions:

1. Under what conditions do third parties coordinate their intervention efforts?
2. How do third-party relationship dynamics and power differentials influence coordination behaviours?
3. To what extent does third-party coordination contribute substantially to conflict resolution?

This research provides rather equivocal results regarding the occurrence of third-party coordination, largely because it is different from one conflict context to another and from one conflict stage to another. In some cases, third-party coordination practices are very different even within the same phase of the conflict. In other words, the occurrence of third-party coordination is highly contingent. However, the research does provide some indicators of how coordination takes place among third parties and the extent to which it contributes to conflict resolution. Some findings confirm the applicability of previous research findings, whereas other results generate new perspectives on third-party coordination. This chapter provides an overview of these findings, and outlines some theoretical and policy implications of the research. Importantly, I have also highlighted
some of the limitations of the study and suggested a few directions for future research on the subject.

2. **New Perspectives on the Conditions for Third-Party Coordination**

   Similar to the arguments made by Klandermans (1984) and Fireman and Gamson (1979) regarding Resource Mobilisation (RM) theory, this research has shown that third-party coordination is frequently a self-interested activity, where a coordination decision of third parties is often based on a cost-benefit analysis of their participation. In contrast with Parry’s (2004) argument about third-party coordination and complementary roles as an imperative for a successful conflict management, this research demonstrates that coordination occurs largely when third parties feel it is primarily in their interests and only secondarily for the benefit of the conflict-affected country.

   Third-party coordination is also largely a mission-driven event. It tends to occur primarily to address a particular event or incident or to achieve a particular outcome, such as the reduction of violence, pressuring the conflicting parties to sign a peace agreement, or showing greater respect for human rights. In other words, the necessity, loyalty and responsibility factor, as argued by Fireman and Gamson (1979) in RM theory, is the key reason behind third parties’ decision to collectively take part in such mission-driven events. However, there is no guarantee that the third parties will opt to continue coordinating after addressing a particular issue. In this sense, coordination is a contingent strategic decision by third parties, rather than what Crocker et al. (2001) describe as an important strategy to gain necessary ‘political will’ and ‘muscle’ to bring conflicting parties to the negotiation table.

   This research also identifies a distinctive perspective than previously claimed in the literature. One innovative finding of this research concerns identifying the role of the conflicting parties in facilitating third-party coordination processes. The existing literature asserts that the role of the lead agency and the mutual policy interests and initiatives of third parties are key to the occurrence of third-party coordination (Iji 2005, Iji and Fuchinoue 2009). This research, in contrast, has found that the roles of the conflicting parties are also quite crucial. Conflicting parties, with the formation of mandate-based intervention structures, can encourage a diverse range of third parties to
work together as a united group, making a measurable and meaningful contribution to the success of the peace process. This further justifies the claim that the occurrence of third-party coordination has multiple dimensions. At times it requires an eagerness and the proactive initiative of third parties; on other occasions it requires the initiative of conflicting parties; at yet other times it is guided by a particular conflict context. It is thus ill-advised to generalise about the occurrence of third-party coordination, as there are no fixed rules and conditions for how and when it will take place.

But while third-party coordination is a contextual process, its occurrence also exhibits some common scenarios, at least in the cases selected for this study. One major scenario is that the coordination practices change in different phases of the conflict. Little or no coordination takes place in the beginning phase of the conflict, a lot of coordination takes place in the intensive armed phase, and no or less coordination takes place in the post-agreement or political normalisation phase. In contrast with Svensson’s (2009) finding about the lack of third-party coordination during the intensive armed phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and improved coordination in the later stages of the conflict, this research shows that third parties in both Nepal and the Philippines often coordinated during the time of crisis. Local-external third party coordination on violence reduction and human rights protection efforts, and the Basic Operating Guidelines adopted by ten different external third parties, are examples of third-party coordination in Nepal during the crisis phase. By contrast, under more normal circumstances they did not actively coordinate, but rather competed for resources, dominance and recognition.

The Philippines case also confirms that the political turmoil and pressure of violence contributed to the occurrence of third-party coordination. Coordination, particularly among local third parties, from both Manila and Mindanao and with both Moro and non-Moro, occurred from 2001 onwards, when the major clash between the government and Moro rebels resulted in civilian killings, demolition of infrastructure, and displacement of thousands of civilians. This indicates that third-party coordination is often a needs-based activity, rather than a usual practice that automatically takes place in conflict resolution processes.
Along with shared political interests (as argued in the literature), a number of factors contribute to shifts in coordination practices. This research has identified six major factors that contribute to the occurrence (or lack of occurrence) of third-party coordination. These indicators include: the power and position of government and rebel groups, the duration of conflict/negotiation, the intensity of the conflict, the characteristics and composition of third parties, issues of intervention, and the type of interventions. Yet one cannot conclude that all of these factors contribute to the occurrence of coordination in each conflict and peace process. Previous research, despite its focus on highlighting the conditions for the occurrence of third-party coordination, did not provide sufficient explanations in this context. This research has filled this gap to a certain extent.

The research also concludes that issue-based third-party coordination is one of the common practices seen in both intensive armed phases and the political normalisation phases of conflict in Nepal and the Philippines. Issue-based third-party coordination practices have three main characteristics: a) the majority of third parties have coordinated on issues of international concerns, such as human rights; b) the majority of third parties have coordinated on contentious issues of the peace process, such as the integration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants (in the case of Nepal); and c) many of these issue-based coordinations are observed only among homogeneous groups of third parties, such as those who are concerned only about human rights, those who represent only Western countries, or those who share similar cultural values and political ideologies.

Offsetting this finding, this research also demonstrates that there is a positive relationship between the homogeneity of the interveners and their coordination. Coordinated efforts by the European countries working in Nepal, and the sequential and simultaneous coordination of the OIC members during the GPH-MNLF negotiation process in the Philippines, are examples of this process. This finding somewhat supports the argument made by Crocker et al. (2002) and Miall (2004) that the diverse nature and characteristics of mediators make their coordination processes difficult because of managing and connecting varieties of interests and positions. However, this research has also revealed that coordination among heterogeneous interveners was only possible when they were
forced to work together within formalised intervention structures mandated by the conflicting parties. The ICG and IMT in the Philippines are examples in this regard. Such structures contribute not only to enhancing the occurrence of third-party coordination, but also to making the intervening roles effective in the peace process. However, a careful selection of third parties, the absence of powerful third parties, and a sense of interdependence among the associates are all crucial in making formalised intervention structures contributory to the success of the peace process.

In a broader framework, the readiness of third parties to coordinate is a crucial factor in the occurrence of coordination. Context, Policy, and Motive (CPM) are three major factors which predispose third parties to coordinate, where context and motive often encourage a spontaneous coordination, and policy often forces third parties to coordinate. Context factors, such as the pressure of violence, urgent issues such as human rights, and the presence of a lead agency greatly contribute to a spontaneous coordination among third parties. Motive factors, such as personalities, personal relationships, and the convergence of interests also encourage third-party coordination. Policy factors such as the provision of mandate-based intervention structures and third parties’ own decisions to coordinate further contribute to the occurrence of coordination. There are no such specific explanations in the existing literature regarding the occurrence of third-party coordination. This research thus provides a new perspective for understanding the occurrence of third-party coordination.

2.1 Ripeness Theory and Third-Party Coordination

The notion of ‘ripeness’ in conflict resolution is quite compatible with the occurrence of third-party coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes. Zartman (2006) argues that ripeness arises only when the conflicting parties reach the stage of a mutually hearting stalemate due to the destructive nature of the conflict. Third-party coordination both in Nepal and the Philippines began to take place only when the conflict began producing dire results. In other words, the destructive nature of conflict was a key factor behind the readiness of third parties to coordinate. Violence created a ripe moment for coordination.
Moreover, the arrival of a ripe moment in conflict resolution processes is only possible when a ‘sufficient’ number of people from both conflicting parties internalise the conclusion that negotiation is necessary to halt the destructiveness of the conflict and compromise is essential for successful conflict resolution (Greig and Regan 2008, Lounsbery and Cook 2011). Third-party coordination also has a potential to effect conflict resolution only when a large number of local and external third parties have a convergence of interests leading to collective conflict intervention. The ripeness theory also posits that ripeness does not take place when a conflict has low intensity, because one or another conflicting group may then still have expectations of achieving something out of the conflict (Kleiboer 1994, 1995). Third-party coordination does not occur very often when there is a low level of violence. In such situations, third parties do not accept the urgency of coordination, as it does not pose any serious threat to their policy and strategic interests. This finding confirms that an understanding of the notion of ripeness is crucial in understanding the occurrence of third-party coordination.

2.2 Motives Theory and Third-Party Coordination

One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that coordination is often guided by the institutional or strategic interests of third parties, rather than a real motivation to coordinate with others. This finding in some ways converges with Iji and Fuchinoue’s (2009) argument that coordination is based on a broad coincidence of interests and the commitments of third parties. But it is very difficult to observe such moments on a regular basis, because the motives of third parties often do not match with each other. As explained in the literature, we can observe varieties of third parties’ interests in peace processes. Scholars such as Kleiboer (1995), Stedman (2001), Iji (2001), and Kathman (2010) argue that security and strategic and humanitarian interests motivate third parties to intervene in a conflict. Touval and Zartman (1985), Crocker at al (2004), and Janus (2009) contend that a combination of humanitarian, security and strategic interests motivate third parties to intervene. Greig & Regan (2008), Hoglund & Svensson (2009 & 2011), Smith (1985), Wall et al (2001), and Young (11972), argue that third parties’ motivation to intervene is guided by their desire to gain prestige, satisfaction, rewards, incentives, and a zeal to make things different in conflict-affected countries or communities.
This research has shown that coordination can be far-reaching even when organisational, institutional and governmental interests do not converge in a particular phase of conflict. In Nepal many third parties entered the conflict with their own institutional interests; however, they converged during the time of intense crisis in late 2005 and early 2006. This active coordination among third parties did not continue after the signing of the peace accord in November 2006, because each third party wanted to establish the supremacy of their particular conflict resolution model. There was thus a real difference in coordination behaviour from one phase of the conflict to another.

Similar examples can be seen in the Philippines. There was no evidence of a common forum or intervention coordination structure for many years after the eruption of the GPH-MILF conflict. However, following the formation of the IMT in early 2010, the local and external actors expressed an interest in working together under the auspices of the IMT. I argue that the decision by external and local third parties to join the IMT was based on their individual institutional interests. In part it was to gain prestige, and in part it was to enhance their national and international profiles as peacemaking institutions. Regardless of differing institutional orientations, cultural differences and personality differences, they were forced to coordinate, as they were bound by the IMT’s code of conduct.

These observations suggest that third parties, except during the intensive armed phase of conflict, do not play a proactive role in initiating coordination; rather, they are compelled to coordinate through formalised intervention mechanisms. Third parties, particularly the less powerful ones and those who are new to conflict resolution, find that joining intervention structures is strategically beneficial, as this gives them direct access to the conflicting parties and establishes them as important actors in the peace process. Third parties who have no previous experience in working under intervention structures also find it useful to be part of them because they want to gain experience working in collaboration with other actors. The interest shown by a sizable number of third parties to become members of ICG and IMT justifies this argument. Finally, some third parties are interested in becoming part of formalised intervention structures because of the demands or wishes of their local counterparts.
The convergence of interests can bring diverse kinds of third parties together. In the context of Nepal, small powers were more inclined to coordinate with other small powers, or with big powers when they desired to gain influence. Big powers were not typically interested in coordinating with other big powers or with small powers. However, they coordinated when they believed that coordination would help to advance their agendas. For example, India wanted to be a leading third-party actor in resolving the Maoist armed conflict and reinstating democracy in Nepal but, in a politically strategic region, India could not bypass other local and external actors active in Nepal. It was indispensable for Indian representatives to obtain the necessary support from other actors. It can thus be concluded that coordination is highly contingent and contextual. It may be among a homogeneous group of third parties, a heterogeneous group, or it could be a random, spontaneous coordination. Factors such as the political context, the convergence of interests, conflicting parties’ attitudes towards third parties, and the presence of formalised intervention structures all play a role in determining the forms of coordination that take place. That said, coordination does seem more likely to occur among homogeneous groups of third parties.

3. New Perspectives on the Impact of Power and Relationship Dynamics on Third-Party Coordination

3.1 Power and Third-Party Coordination

Svensson’s (2007b) argument regarding the need for the joint involvement of power and pure mediators to enhance the prospect of mediation success can be taken as a point of reference for evaluating the role of power in the occurrence and outcome of third-party coordination. The notion of power and pure mediators can be interlinked with local-external third-party coordination, where externals can be defined as power mediators and locals as pure mediators. In this sense, Svensson’s arguments support my findings, as the joint involvement of local-external third parties in Nepal did contribute to conflict resolution.

However, Siniver’s (2006) claim regarding the positive relationship between the power status of third parties and mediation outcomes is somewhat contradictory to my findings,
because the power status of third parties does not always play an influential role in the outcome of third-party coordination. The influence of power over the conflicting parties largely depends on the context of intervention and the power and position of conflicting parties. The power status of third parties played an influential role in the occurrence and outcome of coordination in Nepal, if only when the armed conflict reached its peak and started producing dire results. But in the Philippines, in every phase of conflict, there was no such influence of the power status of third parties on the occurrence and outcome of intervention.

Whereas the existing literature provides no significant discussions regarding the impact of power on third-party coordination processes, this research has identified Power, Leverage and Access (PLA) as three crucial variables which significantly affect the coordination process. Asymmetrical power relationships between third parties negatively affect the opportunity for successful third-party coordination. Successful coordination is more likely when there is interdependence between the third parties, well-established intervention structures, and effective communication. However, the role of the power status of third parties is contextually contingent. If the state is very weak while the third parties have a high level of leverage over the conflicting parties, then power will likely play a significant role in the coordination process. By contrast, power differences do not play a significant role in coordination processes if the state is relatively strong and the conflicting parties have good lines of communication in the negotiation processes. Table 8.1 summarises these points.
Table 8.1: PLA Framework to Explain the Occurrence and Effectiveness of Third-Party Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Explanations</th>
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<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
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| Power status of third parties        | - Powerful third parties are less willing to coordinate with other third parties  
- Less powerful third parties are more willing to coordinate with other third parties |
| Presence of powerful third parties   | - Multiplicity of powerful third parties decreases coordination among interveners.  
- Convergence of interests among powerful third parties has the potential to contribute to conflict resolution. |
| Power and position of the government and the rebel group | - Existence of a weak government and an opportunist rebel group decreases the chance of third-party coordination  
- Existence of a comparatively stable government and strong rebel group increases the chances of third-party coordination |
| **Leverage**                         |                                                                                                                                              |
| More leverage over the conflicting parties | Decreases the chance of third-party coordination                                                                                   |
| Less leverage over the conflicting parties | Increases the chances of third-party coordination                                                                                     |
| **Access**                           |                                                                                                                                              |
| Third parties’ direct access to the conflicting parties | Decreases the chances of third-party coordination                                                                                     |
| Third parties’ lack direct access to the conflicting parties | Increases the chances of third-party coordination                                                                                     |

3.2 Relationship Dynamics and Third-Party Coordination

Third-party relationship dynamics are an important aspect of third-party coordination in peace processes. Previous explanations have focused largely on the relationship between official and unofficial interveners (See Böhmelt 2010, Fisher 2006). This study has explored other relational dimensions, particularly the relationships between local and external third parties, among local third parties, and among external third parties. Local-external third-party relationships were found to be one of the most striking and crucial aspects of intervention coordination.

Regarding the impact of relationship dynamics on third-party coordination processes, this research has revealed several new findings, which at times also confirm some explanations within existing research. One specific finding of this research is that third parties which share similar values and approaches tend to have a coordinated relationship. This finding is also supported by the RM theory, where scholars argue that
people who share similar interests and beliefs tend to take part in collective action (Fireman and Gamson 1979, McCarthy and Zald 1977). Although homogeneity is highlighted as one of the important components of a coordinated third-party relationship, such relationships have been observed even among heterogeneous third parties, generally in the presence of formalised intervention structures mandated by the conflicting parties, and reflecting a maturity of relationships among third parties. This research has also revealed that intervention mechanisms endorsed by the conflicting parties make relationships stronger than those in independent coordination mechanisms. This further justifies the conflicting parties’ role in enhancing third-party relationships among heterogeneous third parties.

Another crucial dimension of this research is the identification of factors which make local-external third parties’ relationships problematic, as well as those which can improve their relationships. The lack of sincere dialogue between local and external third parties in defining their intervention roles and scope in the peace process has been identified as a primary cause of relationship problems. This research further suggests that it is the equal responsibility of both local and external third parties to mitigate their relationship problems. Considering the importance of multiple actors in the peace process (as argued in the literature), local third parties must be open-minded enough to provide adequate space for third parties, while external actors need to accept the given space without undermining the local third parties’ importance in the peace process. In other words, both local and external third parties need to develop a sense of respect for improving their relationships in conflict intervention processes.

This research also suggests that interdependence is a crucial factor for enhancing third-party relationships. This finding supports Lederach’s (1999) argument that the interdependence gap is one of the key challenges to coordinated relationships of respect and understanding between higher-level leaders and community and grassroots-level leaders. This research further discovered that interdependence is crucial not just between local and higher-level leaders, but also among third parties who are intervening in conflict only at the higher level or only at the local level. Interdependence is necessary between local and external actors, among locals, and among externals. A sense of
interdependence among third parties requires continuous engagement in various coordination events. One of the best ways to realise interdependence and promote coordination is to ensure engagement in various formal and informal coordination forums, where third parties can have an opportunity to expose their intervention strengths and weaknesses to other third parties.

This research has also revealed that third parties must pay attention to the need to make their relationships stronger in order to produce more successful interventions. However, relationship-building among third parties is not an easy process due to five contextual factors: power differences among themselves, attitudes towards each other, differences in intervention strategies and priorities, the nature and characteristics of conflict, and actions taken by the conflicting parties. Importantly, the involvement of powerful third parties produces more relationship problems than the involvement of less powerful third parties. These sorts of relationship problems are difficult to address, as no one entity can bring powerful third parties together unless they are willing. The case of Nepal is quite relevant in this regard, as powerful actors such as India, China, and the US engaged in no coordination for many years. In this regard, the hegemonic attitude of powerful third parties towards other third parties is an important element shaping relationship dynamics.

Third-party perceptions towards each other also determine how they coordinate, as does the nature of their relationship. Relationship-building is thus an important step towards effective third-party coordination. However, relationships take months or even years of continuous dialogue, interaction and collective action to mature. This research demonstrates that the maturity of the third parties’ relationships promotes successful coordination. Regardless of their power status, origin or areas of intervention, they tend to coordinate and coordinate more effectively when they have a strong and mature relationship with other actors. There is no such insight in the existing literature; rather, the literature, particularly the work of Ayden and Regan (2012), only concludes that intervening states that are in cooperative relationships are more successful in terminating conflicts than those who compete with each other to increase their influence over the combatants. The notion of mature relationships as a prerequisite for successful third-party coordination is something unique that has been identified through this research.
4. **New Perspectives on the Effectiveness of Third-Party Coordination**

This research was conducted under the assumption that coordination among third-party interveners could play a constructive role in the successful management of armed conflicts. The research findings only partially support this assumption. Coordination can play a supportive role and help to make the intervention process more organised and disciplined. At the same time, regardless of its strengths, it does not necessarily or substantially affect the peace process. This does not mean that uncoordinated attempts are more effective. Rather, it means that, along with third-party coordination, other factors such as the conflicting parties’ efforts and sincerity, spoiler management during the negotiation and post-agreement processes, and the meaningful inclusion of people’s participation in the peace process all need to be taken seriously.

This research also confirms that third-party coordination works best when collective pressure is applied to achieve a specific conflict resolution goal, especially when such pressure is applied by most of the local and external third parties, particularly the major powers. Third-party coordination has also been effective in terms of its contribution to putting many third parties ‘on the same page’ regarding particular aspects of the peace process. For example, the adoption of Basic Operating Guidelines by the majority of development partners working in Nepal was an important step towards managing their activities during the time of conflict, with more or less similar principles. This action did not support the resolution of conflict directly, but it was an important step towards coherently integrating their conflict interventions. In short, third-party coordination has its limits regarding what it can achieve in the peace process. In order to achieve the broader goal of lasting peace, third parties’ coordinated efforts need to be supplemented by other factors.

The identity of the third parties and their acceptability to the conflicting parties is further found to be a key factor for coordination effectiveness. Coordination effectiveness is also often determined by other contextual factors, such as the motives of conflicting parties and the extent of third-party leverage over the conflicting parties. Third-party coordination generally contributes to addressing specific issues or aspects of the peace process or to consolidating intervention efforts. For example, collective pressure by the
international community in late 2005 and early 2006 was an important step towards bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiation table and ultimately signing a peace agreement in Nepal.

Issue-specific intervention efforts, where both local and external third parties were involved, were also found to be more successful than the involvement of only local or only external third parties. This finding directly confirms the arguments made in the existing literature that local-external coordination in mediation efforts is important to obtain a positive outcome in peace processes (Garb and Nan 2006, Pèlerin 2007). Local-external third-party coordination on human rights, violence reduction, and reinstating democracy in Nepal are examples in this regard. At the same time, this research further reveals that, in some cases, local-external third-party coordination by itself was successful in obtaining the desired outcomes in the peace process. The establishment of the OHCHR office in Nepal and human rights monitoring efforts are pertinent examples. In contrast, on many different occasions local-external third-party coordination only worked as a catalyst in the peace process, providing resources, advice, political guarantees and moral pressure on the conflicting parties.

Another interesting aspect of this research is the identification of the impacts of formal versus informal coordination structures in conflict resolution. The existing literature suggests that the formation of third-party coordination mechanisms, such as Contact Groups and Groups of Friends, are effective approaches to third-party coordination and conflict resolution (Whitfield 2008b). However, existing research has not made distinctions between formal and informal intervention structures and each of their impacts on the peace process. This research has made such distinctions and concludes that formal intervention structures mandated by the conflicting parties are more contributory to conflict resolution than informal coordination mechanisms, as informal coordination mechanisms are less persuasive to the conflicting parties.

In formal intervention structures, third parties in this research were found to be involved in targeted interventions based on the given mandate by the conflicting parties. Targeted interventions encouraged them to be focused on achieving their goals. The contributions of intervention actions based on a given mandate were also easier to measure. For
example, the ICG in the Philippines on several occasions saved the GPH-MILF peace process from failure by convincing the parties to stay engaged in the peace negotiation processes. Third parties’ commitment to work under one structure, without major complications in their relationships, was another reason behind coordination success as well as effectiveness. Third parties’ presence as a united group in peace panels, rather than relying on their individual relationships with the conflicting parties, also made their coordination a successful approach to conflict resolution. One major indicator of their effectiveness in the peace process is that their contributions are acknowledged by the conflicting parties and the public.

Most of the informal mechanisms can be taken as examples of successful coordination, as they have demonstrated a higher level of coordination commitment to respond to conflict collectively through lobbying, advocacy, and campaign-based initiatives. These mechanisms are also found to be a congruent space in which third parties can exchange information, engage in relationship-building, and network among like-minded organisations. However, they have made only nominal contributions to conflict resolution. Some of their contributions are also blurred with national political processes or the contributions made by formal intervention structures. Core reasons behind their lack of effectiveness in conflict resolution include lack of focused intervention, limited intervention scope, low level of leverage over the conflicting parties, lack of credibility by the conflicting parties, lack of strong collaboration between local and external third parties, and the influence of contextual factors. Many informal coordination mechanisms have focused their intervention actions on malleable issues of the peace process, which the conflicting parties do not consider highly significant for the broader peace process. In short, informal coordination mechanisms cannot be sustained as an institutionalised platform to provide continuous support to the peace process.

The relationship between third-party coordination success and effectiveness is another important finding of this research, which previous research has not really explored. Coordination success has the potential to contribute to coordination effectiveness. However, third-party coordination success does not guarantee coordination effectiveness.
Are there any similarities and differences in context, intervention strategies, and characteristics of conflict which have influenced the outcomes of mediation, as well as the outcomes of third-party coordination? This research finds that determinants of mediation outcomes, such as the identities of the conflicting parties, the nature of disputes, and the characteristics of mediators (Bercovitch 1986, Kleiboer 1996) are also found to be quite relevant for influencing the occurrence and outcome of third-party coordination. Specifically, this research highlights the relationship between the characteristics of third parties and intervention strategies in the coordination processes. Some of the arguments made in mediation effectiveness theories have been confirmed by this research, while others contradict my research findings.

For example, in mediation effectiveness theory, Regan (1996) concludes that, for effective conflict resolution, the intervention strategies of third parties play a more important role than the characteristics of the conflict. My research, however, concludes that characteristics of conflict often motivate third parties to adopt a particular intervention strategy. For example, broader local-external third-party coordination was an intervention strategy during the time of high political crisis in Nepal in late 2006 and early 2007. Likewise, in the Philippines the formation of the ICG and the IMT as intervention strategies emerged when the conflict context at that time demanded such structures after the failure of unilateral and locally driven third-party efforts. In both of these cases, the characteristics of the conflict played a prominent role in adopting a certain intervention strategy.

The findings of this research also both confirm and contradict a number of arguments made in the existing conflict management literature, including the importance of third-party coordination from the top to the local levels for achieving a sustainable peace (Kriesberg 1996). My research finds that coordination in both cases existed between a number of third parties, such as local-external, local-local, and external-external, and was mostly focused on addressing a particular event or incident related to the peace process, rather than being aimed at achieving a sustainable peace. This finding supports Nan and Strimling’s (2004) argument that the best collaboration among third parties occurs when they establish shared goals in order to achieve certain outcomes.
The existing literature also highlights the importance of a lead agency or lead actors for coordination effectiveness (Iji 2005, Iji and Fuchinoue 2009). My research confirms that the role of a lead agency can contribute to the occurrence of third-party coordination and make the intervention process more organised and disciplined. This is also found to be useful in driving the agenda of intervention in direct and indirect collaboration with other third parties, and was also effective in achieving small goals. In short, this research confirms that the inclusion of powerful third parties in the coordination process is quite important for obtaining positive outcomes (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001a).

5. The Future of Third-Party Coordination

Successful and effective coordination does not occur by chance or happenstance; rather, it requires the willingness of both supply (third parties) and demand (conflicting parties). The political context must also be favorable to the occurrence of coordination, and other factors such as convergence of interests and formation of intervention mechanisms are also necessary. Based on these findings, I have come up with a set of strategies which have the potential to contribute to the greater effectiveness of third-party coordination in contemporary conflicts and peace processes.

First, based on the finding that coordination often drops off in the post-agreement phase, it is important to pay special attention to third-party coordination in the post-agreement or political normalisation phases to ensure that these intervention efforts continue. The conflicting parties, particularly governments, can play a crucial role in ensuring third-party coordination in this particular phase. In this regard, they first need to prioritise the core intervention agenda of the post-agreement or political normalisation phase. Based on this assessment, they can then call for third parties to provide necessary support to address this agenda under the intervention mandate. Once the conflicting parties have a list of acceptable third parties, they can then make a judicious decision regarding who should be part of certain intervention structures and in what capacity. The conflicting parties also need to build consensus and make binding commitments that they will not accept individual third-party intervention when coordinated third-party support has already been agreed upon. The conflicting parties’ commitments to accept only coordinated third-party support are crucial for outcome-oriented third-party coordination.
Establishing various kinds of intervention structures can also be useful in the pre-agreement phase. Conflicting parties should take a proactive role in forming such intervention structures to provide an opportunity for heterogeneous groups of third parties to work together. However, conflicting parties should pay particular attention to selecting appropriate third parties in each intervention structure, based on the needs of the peace process. The ICG and IMT are a good model in this regard. Conflicting parties may choose to design additional intervention structures so that they can formally involve more local and external third parties. For example, conflicting parties can form a Local Contact Group (LCG) to work as a watchdog of the peace process, something which the ICG and IMT type of structure was unable to do. The LCG can incorporate a group of selected local third parties which could bring local voices into the peace process. Peace Support Donor Groups are another structure with the responsibility of garnering financial support to ensure the success of the peace process. These groups can also be useful for launching integrated peace and development initiatives in conflict-affected regions.

Second, it is very important to make sure that third parties are coordinating not only on issues that are the product of the conflict, such as human rights protection and violence reduction, but also on structural issues that are the source of the conflict. Third-party coordination on immediately exposed issues can minimise the cost of conflict and take a country from violence to peace. However, such coordination efforts cannot be very effective for the sustainable solution of the conflict, as the immediate prevention of violence is only a temporary solution, and can be short-lived. Third-party coordination must be directed towards addressing the systemic issues related to the conflict. For example, if grievance is one of the root causes of conflict, then coordinated third-party support should be focused on addressing the root causes of grievances, and this could be done by launching a long-term project through the joint initiatives of third parties. Both Nepal and the Philippines have formed a National Development Forum and other countries have similar types of structures; external donors play a significant role in shaping the agendas of the forum. In this regard, both local and external third parties can collectively pressure the government to consider conflict-creating issues as a key priority.

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27 Nepal has a forum called Nepal Development Forum and the Philippines also has a Philippines Development Forum.
of such forums. Development interveners, while designing their development assistance frameworks, can include the structural issues surrounding conflict as one of their high priorities for intervention for at least five to ten years after the termination of conflict.

Third, not every issue relating to specific conflicts requires coordination. Considering the sensitivity of the peace process, some third-party interventions need to be discrete. It is also very difficult to coordinate on everything that third parties do (Interview N-7 & N-27 2012). However, the exchange of information and general lines of communication among interveners should be maintained in each phase of the conflict. This could be done either informally or by establishing an information platform. In Nepal the UN has launched the website United Nations: Nepal Information Platform,\(^\text{28}\) where all activities conducted by UN agencies are listed. A similar kind of public information hub can be developed with a particular focus on providing information about the conflict situation, political analysis, and the activities of interveners. This would allow an opportunity for every intervener to get to know more about others’ activities, and to share analyses of the political context. Such an integrated information system would also help to avoid the duplication of intervention efforts.

Fourth, a strong and effective lead agency that keeps track of all third-party efforts can be an important way to make the coordination processes more effective. If the state affected by conflict does not have sufficient capacity to coordinate intervention efforts, then the UN can be an acceptable lead agency to formalise and strengthen coordinating mechanisms in the initial phase. Later on, national institutions such as a National Peace Commission or Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction could take on such a role. A lead agency should have a clear goal and method for facilitating coordination in different phases of the conflict. There is a positive relationship between strong local peace institutions and third-party coordination. Local peace institutions are particularly important for facilitating coordination among third-party interveners in post-agreement peacebuilding initiatives.

\(^{28}\) More details of the website can be found at [http://un.org.np/](http://un.org.np/).
There are a number of ways in which a local peace institution can contribute to third-party coordination. First, it can come up with a list of issues that require coordinated third-party intervention in both the pre-agreement and post-agreement phases. Second, it can suggest what kinds of third parties are needed to address a particular issue, and how they could engage in intervention processes. Third, a local peace institution can also monitor the activities of third parties and provide necessary support for making their intervention efforts effective. If third parties are overstepping the mandate, it can also direct them to follow the mandate strictly. Finally, based on the needs of a peace process, a local peace institution can also facilitate the entry and exit process of third parties in intervention processes.

Fifth, coordination among third-party interveners is really only possible when major third-party players reveal their interests, demonstrate commitment, and take a lead role in coordinating various efforts before and after the signing of peace accords. It is also equally important to understand the coordination behaviours of each third party and their expectations about incentives, in order to ensure that a sufficient level of coordination will take place. Thus, a coordination commitment among third parties is essential to obtain the best outcome of third-party coordination. Coordination commitment by third parties can be encouraged and constructed in various ways. First and foremost, third parties need to be conceptually clear that their decision to collectively intervene in a conflict is directed towards helping a conflict-affected country to come out of the quagmire of violence and proceed to a sustainable solution. Second, third parties need to be committed to continuing their coordination efforts until they achieve their desired intervention goals. Third, if third parties begin coordinating in the pre-agreement phase of conflict, then the same coordination spirit should continue even in the post-agreement phase. Finally, third parties should be ready to coordinate with any type of third party, regardless of their power differences, origins, and strengths in the peace process.

Sixth, the problem of poor coordination cannot be addressed properly unless third parties develop a culture of intervention. A culture of intervention incorporates activities such as third parties’ engagement in intervention processes on the basis of a joint analysis of the conflict, coordinated intervention planning, accumulation of resources in a basket fund,
and working hand-in-hand from pre-agreement to post-agreement phases of conflict. To realise all of these activities in actual practice, third parties need an institutional and policy commitment to work with other third parties. In this regard, third parties, in their official policy documents, should clearly specify coordination (from the early phases of conflict to the post-agreement phase) as one of their core intervention strategies, and they should adhere to their written policy.

Finally, understanding the ripe moment for coordination is another crucial step for effective third-party coordination in peace processes. Conflicting parties must be aware of when they need coordinated third-party support and when they do not. Third parties must also be aware of the political context that requires coordinated third-party intervention in armed conflicts and peace processes. A better understanding of conflict context and the behaviours of the conflicting parties can help them to identify the ripe moment for a successful and effective coordination. Regular discussions and communications among third parties regarding the situation of conflict are also essential for recognising the ripe moment for actual coordination.

6. Limitations of the Research
This research has largely fulfilled its objectives. However, despite conducting this research with a well-designed research method, there are some limitations in terms of its results. One key limitation is related to its inclusion of only two cases, both of them representing the Asian context. This means that the findings relating to the occurrence and effectiveness of third-party coordination cannot be fully generalised to other contexts. However, these findings can be an important point of reference for understanding the deeper dynamics of third-party coordination.

Another limitation of this research relates to the significance of the two cases for understanding the dynamics of third-party coordination. One case (Maoist armed conflict of Nepal) is a short-term conflict, and the other (Moro conflict of the Philippines) is a long-term conflict. A critique of this research can be related to the comparability of cases, as the nature and characteristics of the conflicts are somewhat different. Since this research adopted a multiple case study method, rather than a typical comparative model, it was more an attempt to understand the dynamics of third-party coordination in two
different conflict contexts and their significance for broadening our understanding of third-party coordination. This research should therefore not be understood primarily as a comparative study simply because it incorporated two cases; rather, it should be considered as a multiple case study, where the theme of third-party coordination has been explained through an in-depth analysis of two cases.

Another limitation of this research again relates to the comparability of cases, despite some fundamental differences in intervention practices in these two conflicts. The Nepal case mostly dealt with the dynamics of third-party coordination in the context of informal and active third-party involvements. In contrast, the Philippines case was assessed mostly to understand the dynamics of third-party coordination in the context of formal and structured third-party interventions, along with some informal third-party interventions. Despite these differences, both were found to be very significant because each case aided in reaching the conclusion that third-party coordination rests on very contextual processes from one conflict to another. Since conflict contexts are different, third-party intervention practices are also different, and thus third-party coordination practices also differ somewhat.

Finally, due to the lack of other sources of information, I have adopted in-depth interviews as a crucial source of information. Yet there is no sufficient triangulation of the results due to the lack of other secondary sources of information. Despite any limitations associated with interviewing, this approach has met the objective of my study, because I wanted to solicit the views of third-party practitioners and other relevant stakeholders who are dealing with third-party coordination issues on a regular basis, and to understand their perceptions of coordination issues in armed conflicts and peace processes.

7. Future Research
As argued in this thesis, the subject of third-party coordination in conflict resolution is not well conceptualised in the conflict management literature. There are thus a large number of issues to be investigated under this theme. This research has attempted to provide a picture of the conditions under which third parties coordinate, and to explore the impact of third-party relationship dynamics on coordination. It has also examined the
role of power in coordination processes, and assessed coordination effectiveness in conflict resolution processes. On this basis, I suggest three areas that are highly pertinent for future research.

First, there should be further exploration of the applicability of different coordination approaches and strategies, such as Collective Conflict Management (CCM), Networks of Effective Action (NEA), Intervention Coordination, and the formation of formal and informal intervention structures in various conflict settings. In particular, there should be the incorporation of more cases and large-N studies of coordination actors and practices.

Second, there should be more in-depth analysis of third-party coordination in the pre-agreement versus the post-agreement political environment. My research shows that third-party coordination is more frequent in the pre-agreement political environment than the post-agreement environment, and I have provided some reasons why this might be. However, in-depth research on this particular topic could suggest concrete policies and strategies for making third-party coordination more effective in the normal political environment, particularly during the post-agreement period.

Third, future research should focus on the role of the conflicting parties in promoting third-party coordination. This research has indicated that conflicting parties can play a very important role in facilitating third-party coordination. But clearly this topic requires further research to explain how conflicting parties can make the intervention process more coordinated in both the pre-agreement and post-agreement phases.

8. Concluding Remarks
This study was conducted with an aim to identify the limits and scope of third-party coordination in conflict resolution processes, and to evaluate whether it can be a more effective conflict intervention approach than other approaches. This research has found an answer, demonstrating that third-party coordination is a very complex, strategic and dynamic process which requires a convergence of multiple interests in order to be effective. It is also a contingent process, which is often short-lived, issue-based, and continually evolving in each phase of the conflict. Coordination practices are also somewhat different from one conflict context to another. While third parties often do
coordinate, their coordination should not be taken as a given. In fact, in practice it is inconsistent and sporadic. Often they only resort to coordination when it appears that their interventions cannot occur without it, and that they cannot operate in isolation. From this perspective, coordination can appear almost as a last resort rather than a generally desired objective.

Coordination processes can also be negatively impacted by personal, institutional, cultural and geopolitical factors. It is very difficult for third parties to change these factors. In other words, third parties, as with any groups, institutions or regimes, are ‘products’ of their operating environment. These deep-rooted impediments to third-party coordination are a perennial challenge for policymakers and conflicting parties, especially if they desire to have coordinated third-party intervention in peace processes. Formalised intervention structures like the ICG and IMT, which are mandated by the conflicting parties, are a potentially useful way to address this problem. However, when and on what grounds such structures eventuate also determine their effectiveness.

Third-party coordination, despite its existence as a sporadic conflict intervention strategy, has the potential to demonstrate the urgency of a particular issue. Yet managing the competing goals and diverse motives of interveners is one of the most challenging aspects of the third-party coordination process. Often third parties do not want to modify their intervention goals and policy interests, until the domestic political environment and certain policy provisions force them to do so. The occurrence of coordination becomes even more difficult when multiplicities of global and regional powers are involved. It is even more challenging when there is an expectation of coordination among the powerful interveners, and between less powerful and powerful interveners. In order to address these challenges, the existence of formalised coordination mechanisms to keep a track record of all third-party efforts that have occurred during and after the signing of a peace agreement can be a strategy for making the coordination processes more effective.

Coordination is possible when there is a clear goal and method of coordination, a sense of team spirit, a sense of belonging, and a shared understanding among third parties regarding the limits of coordination. Practicing the existing coordination mechanism only occasionally does not prove that it contributes to the sustainable resolution of conflict. At
the same time, it is clear that collective actions of third parties can create real pressure on the conflicting parties to find a middle-ground solution to the conflict. The existence of coordination can also pave the way for third parties to measure the impact of their contributions to the resolution of conflict. Collective efforts can legitimise their roles and mainstream their work into policy and political discussions. If their involvement is fair and transparent, this will ultimately help to gain trust from the public and demonstrate that they are serving the best interests of people rather than the vested interests of the conflicting parties. Coordination can also contribute to the effective deployment of resources. In the absence of such coordination, third parties lose their reputation and become less effective in the remaining work of the peace process.

For better third-party relationships and coordination effectiveness in peace processes, three categories of actors – the conflicting parties, powerful third parties, and global institutions such as the UN – each play a prominent role. Conflicting parties can play a role with the formation of formalised intervention structures, whereby a diverse range of third parties can work together under a given mandate. Powerful third parties, demonstrating their loyalty to coordinate with other third parties, can make a huge difference in conflict intervention processes. They can also act as a lead agency to bring a diverse range of third parties under a coordination mechanism. Finally, global institutions such as the UN, because of their neutral image, can act as a coordinating agency among third parties regardless of their power differences and states of origin.

As this research has suggested, attention to third-party coordination is extremely important in the post-agreement period, because it often does not take place proactively or spontaneously in this particular phase. Since both Nepal and the Philippines are in the post-agreement phase, I see significant policy implications of my research findings in both of these countries. Nepal is in the midst of its peace process, and a number of issues are vitally important during this phase: writing a new constitution, restructuring the country in terms of federal states, forming TRC and Disappearance Commissions, completing post-war reconstruction programmes, and conducting socio-economic development programmes. All of these activities can be more effectively implemented if there is judicious coordination among third parties involved in post-agreement initiatives.
Likewise, in the Philippines the GPH-MILF signed a comprehensive peace agreement on 27 March 2014, and this means that they now require an effective implementation of the provisions of the peace agreement in order to sustain the peace process. Coordinated third-party intervention is critically needed during this sensitive period.

Finally, this research leads me to conclude that coordination cannot be an ultimate intervention strategy for a third party *per se*. Coordination has its own limitations. It is costly and time-consuming. It takes a lot of effort. It also requires swift decision-making and consensus-building efforts. In most cases coordination only contributes to making the intervention processes more organised and disciplined. It does not last for a long time, because often coordination takes place to address a specific need. However, a coordinated intervention action can also become an ultimate strategy in the peace process when the majority of third parties, including the powerful ones, have a shared political interest in resolving conflict and sustaining peace.
Appendices

Appendix 1: Ethics Approval from the Otago University

Dr I Svensson  
National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies  
117 Albany Street  

21 October 2011

Dear Dr Svensson,

I am writing to let you know that, at its recent meeting, the Ethics Committee considered your proposal entitled “Dynamics of Multiparty Intervention in Conflict Affected Countries: A Case Study of Nepal and the Philippines”.

As a result of that consideration, the current status of your proposal is: Approved.

For your future reference, the Ethics Committee’s reference code for this project is: 11/265.

Approval is for up to three years. If this project has not been completed within three years from the date of this letter, re-approval must be requested. If the nature, consent, location, procedures or personnel of your approved application change, please advise me in writing.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Mr Gary Witte  
Manager, Academic Committees  
Tel: 479 8256  
Email: gary.witte@otago.ac.nz

Cc: Professor K Clements  Director National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
Appendix 2: Information Sheet for Research Participants

[11/265] [10 October 2011]

Dynamics of Multiparty Intervention in Conflict-Affected Countries: A Case Study of Nepal and the Philippines

Information Sheet for the Participants

Thank you for showing an interest in this project. Please read this information sheet carefully before deciding whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate, we thank you. If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for considering our request.

Background and Purpose of the Research

The dynamics of multiparty intervention is an important and relevant area of study, as there is a growing trend of the involvement of varieties of local and external third parties from pre- to post-peace negotiation processes in different conflict-affected countries around the world. Thus, this research aims to assess the dynamics of multiparty intervention in conflict-affected countries and its overall impact on conflict management processes. This research will be primarily based on field research in Nepal and the Philippines, where the researcher interviews the representatives of internal and external third-party interveners, leaders of conflicting parties, and peacebuilding scholars and practitioners to understand their perspective on the coordination aspect of multilateral peace interventions. As a final output of this research project, the researcher aims to have clarity on the definition of ‘multiparty intervention,’ suggest a ‘third party coordination’ theoretical framework (with policy implications) for the management of internal armed conflicts, and address key policy challenges associated with multilateral conflict management processes.

The Procedure and Duration of Interview

If you decide to participate, all that will be required of you is an interview with me, to last between sixty minutes to ninety minutes at a location of your choice. You are welcome to request that our discussion last shorter or longer than this general time frame. During our conversation, I will first gather a personal history of your experience with conflict and peace processes in Nepal, your opinions regarding third-party roles and interests, impact of multiparty intervention on the management of conflict, and coordination challenges and opportunities in the presence of multiple interveners. You are welcome to approach this topic through personal experience, research and study-based analysis, the work of your organisation or any other means you find appropriate.
Any Risk or Discomfort Involved

No risk is involved due to your participation in this research. Rather, your participation will provide valuable support to the successful completion of this research. Inputs given by you will be useful to developing theories on conditions for effective third-party coordination. The information you share will be analysed with that of other participants to assess the dynamics of third-party intervention in the international peacemaking processes. It will be used to write a thesis and potentially other papers, reports, and journal articles. Fragments of your interview may appear in the final report, but will only be identified by alias. Your name and your associated institution will only be publicised if the consent is given. Otherwise, your name will not be used in any publication, paper or report.

Privacy

To preserve your privacy, you will be granted anonymity in the event that your commentary is included in my final research product. Additionally, all recordings of conversations will be erased after I have synthesized the information they contain. Under no circumstances will your personal contact information, including e-mail address, home address, and phone number be released to a third party. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw your consent and to discontinue participation at any time without prejudice.

The interviews will be partially transcribed. This means that someone beside the researcher may hear your interview, though this person will not know your name. The researcher is a PhD candidate and his supervisors will also be able to listen to the interviews and read transcripts and summaries.

The spreadsheet that links names with other personal data, the actual digital recordings of the interviews, and any transcriptions will be retained in safe storage for five years at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Otago University, Dunedin, New Zealand. After five years they will be destroyed.

Reasonable precautions will be taken to protect and destroy data gathered by email or on the web. However, the security of electronically transmitted information cannot be guaranteed. Caution is advised in the electronic transmission of sensitive material.

The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand), but every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity. You are quite welcome to request a copy of the thesis from the University of Otago. You can access the thesis online at http://otago.ourarchive.ac.nz/.

If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact either: Prakash Bhattarai or Dr. Isak Svensson at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. Dr. Svensson’s office number is +64 03 470-3592. Prakash Bhattarai’s email address is bhapr971@student.otago.ac.nz and Dr. Svensson’s email address is iask.svensson@otago.ac.nz.

The University of Otago Human Ethics Committee has approved this study. If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated, and you will be informed of the outcome.
Appendix 3: Consent form for Research Participants

Dynamics of Multiparty Intervention in Conflict-Affected Countries: A Case Study of Nepal and the Philippines

CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS

I have read the ‘information sheet’ concerning this project and understand what it is about. All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request further information at any stage.

I know that:

1. My participation in the research project is entirely voluntary;

2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage;

3. Personal identifying information will not be retained and the interviews, the raw data on which the results of the project depend, will be retained in secure storage for five years, after which they will be destroyed;

4. This project mainly involves a semi-structured questioning technique. The general line of questioning includes questions about conflict context in Nepal, my organisation/agency’s role as third party intervener, how we have cooperated and coordinated with other third parties, impact of such coordination or un-coordination, and the challenges and opportunities that I or my agency has faced or identified in the context of multilateral third party coordination. If I feel hesitant or uncomfortable to answer some of the questions, I may decline to answer any particular question(s) and/or may withdraw from the project without any disadvantage of any kind;

5. There is the possibility that expressing my opinions regarding the dynamics of multiparty intervention in conflict-affected countries may bring up some controversial issues.

6. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity should I choose to remain anonymous.

7. I, as the participant: a) agree to being named in the research, OR
b) would rather remain anonymous
I agree to take part in this project.

.............................................................................    ................................
(Signature of participant)       (Date)

The University of Otago Human Ethics Committee has approved this study. If you have any
concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the Committee through the
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +64 03 479 8256). Any issues you raise will be
treated in confidence and investigated and you will be informed of the outcome.
### Appendix 4: List of Individuals Interviewed in Nepal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Organisation</th>
<th>Date of Interview and Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N-1</td>
<td>Pritush Maharjan</td>
<td>Capacity Development Officer, Collective Campaign for Peace (COCAP)</td>
<td>Kathmandu 21 December 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-2</td>
<td>Monica Rijal</td>
<td>Programme Specialist-Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding &amp; Recovery Unit, UNDP Nepal</td>
<td>Kathmandu 23 December 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-3</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Senior official at Peacebuilding and Recovery Unit, UNDP Nepal</td>
<td>Kathmandu 10 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-4</td>
<td>Ms. Kristina Lie Revheim</td>
<td>First Secretary – Political, Norwegian Embassy</td>
<td>Kathmandu 02 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-5</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Embassy of Finland</td>
<td>Kathmandu 13 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-6</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Advisor at Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF)</td>
<td>Kathmandu 18 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-7</td>
<td>Dr. Prabin Mahandhar</td>
<td>Head, Canadian Cooperation Office (CCO)</td>
<td>Kathmandu 13 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-8</td>
<td>Mr. Murari Shivakoti</td>
<td>Acting Programme Coordinator, DANIDA, HUGOU</td>
<td>Kathmandu 16 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-9</td>
<td>Maria Ana Petrera,</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Mission, DANIDA, Embassy of Denmark</td>
<td>Kathmandu 16 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-10</td>
<td>Sarah Levit-Shore</td>
<td>Country Director, The Carter Center</td>
<td>Kathmandu 9 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-12</td>
<td>Rajendra Mulmi</td>
<td>Country Programme Director, Search for Common Ground Nepal Office</td>
<td>Kathmandu 9 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-13</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>The Asia Foundation</td>
<td>Kathmandu 27 December 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-14</td>
<td>Rebecca Croizer</td>
<td>Country Programme Manager, International Alert</td>
<td>Kathmandu 10 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-15</td>
<td>Subindra Bogati</td>
<td>Coordinator, NAVA Project, Small Arms Survey</td>
<td>Kathmandu 12 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-16</td>
<td>Lex Kassenberg</td>
<td>Country Director, Care Nepal</td>
<td>Kathmandu 16 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-17</td>
<td>Martin Stuerzinger</td>
<td>Senior Adviser for Peacebuilding, Embassy of Switzerland</td>
<td>Kathmandu 16 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-18</td>
<td>Pradeep Gyanwali</td>
<td>Secretary, Nepal Communist Party, United Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML) and government peace panel member</td>
<td>Kathmandu 19 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-19</td>
<td>Khimlal Devkota</td>
<td>Central Committee Member, United Communist Party of Nepal Maoist (UCPN-Maoist)</td>
<td>Kathmandu 27 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-20</td>
<td>Padmaratna Tuladhar</td>
<td>Government-Maoist peace dialogue facilitator</td>
<td>Kathmandu 27 December 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-21</td>
<td>Bishnu Sapkota</td>
<td>Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative (NTTP)</td>
<td>Kathmandu 6 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-22</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>International Peacebuilding and Mediation Expert</td>
<td>Kathmandu 17 December 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-23</td>
<td>Philip Viser</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution Expert</td>
<td>Kathmandu 9 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-24</td>
<td>John Tyynela</td>
<td>Former Political Affairs Officer, UNMIN and OHCHR</td>
<td>Kathmandu 3 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-25</td>
<td>Subodh Raj Pyakurel</td>
<td>Chairperson, Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC)</td>
<td>Kathmandu 23 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-26</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Delegation of the European Union to Nepal</td>
<td>Kathmandu 24 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-27</td>
<td>Leena Rikkila Tamang</td>
<td>Head of Mission International IDEA, Nepal Office</td>
<td>Kathmandu 29 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-28</td>
<td>Geja Sharma Wagle</td>
<td>Program Coordinator Nepal Institute of Policy Studies (NIPS)</td>
<td>Kathmandu 10 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-29</td>
<td>Dr. Bishnu Pathak</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution Expert</td>
<td>Kathmandu 27 December 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-30</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution Expert at the National Peace Campaign (NPC)</td>
<td>Kathmandu 27 December 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-31</td>
<td>Shobhakar Budhathoki</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution Expert, National Advisor, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)</td>
<td>Kathmandu 31 January 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>N-35</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Kathmandu 20 January 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>N-36</td>
<td>Dr. Deepak Prakash Bhatta</td>
<td>Secretariat Member of the Special Committee for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of the Maoist Army Combatants, Government of Nepal</td>
<td>Kathmandu 6 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-37</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Peace Working Group, Association of International NGOs in Nepal (AIN)</td>
<td>Kathmandu 23 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-38</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Under-Secretary, Ministry for Peace and Reconstruction (MOPR)</td>
<td>Kathmandu 03 January 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>N-39</td>
<td>Dr. Netra Timsina</td>
<td>President, NGO Federation of Nepal</td>
<td>Kathmandu 24 January 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>N-40</td>
<td>Chup Thapa</td>
<td>Team Leader, Conflict Management Program, Federation of Community Forest Users, Nepal</td>
<td>Kathmandu 7 January 2012</td>
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</table>
## Appendix 5: List of Individuals Interviewed in the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Organisation</th>
<th>Date of Interview and Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-1</td>
<td>Professor Miriam Coronel Ferrer</td>
<td>GRP-MILF Peace Panel Member</td>
<td>Manila 11 July 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-2</td>
<td>Bong Montesa</td>
<td>Former Director, Officer of the Presidential Advisor to Peace Process (OPAPP)</td>
<td>Manila 13 July 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-3</td>
<td>Raymundo B. Ferrer</td>
<td>Retired General Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
<td>Manila 12 July 2012</td>
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<td>P-4</td>
<td>Amina Rasul</td>
<td>Philippine Council for Island and Democracy</td>
<td>Manila 6 August 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>Karen Tanada</td>
<td>Director, GZO Peace Institute</td>
<td>Quezon City 18 July 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-6</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Former Member of International Monitoring Team (IMT)</td>
<td>Manila 16 July 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-7</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>UNDP Philippines</td>
<td>Manila July 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-8</td>
<td>Bryony Lau</td>
<td>Senior Analyst, International Crisis Group</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P-9</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Delegation of the European Union to the Philippines</td>
<td>Manila 26 July 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-10</td>
<td>Sam Chittick</td>
<td>Governance Programme Manager, Australian Agency for International Development (AUS-AID)</td>
<td>Manila 9 July 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-11</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Manila July 2012</td>
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<td>P-12</td>
<td>Rachel Aquino</td>
<td>Civil Society Activist</td>
<td>Quezon City 28 July 2012</td>
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<td>P-13</td>
<td>Cris Cayon</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution Expert</td>
<td>Skype conversation May 2012</td>
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<td>P-14</td>
<td>Dr. Steven Rood</td>
<td>Country Representative The Asia Foundation and the member of International Contact Group</td>
<td>Manila 12 July 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-15</td>
<td>David Gorman</td>
<td>Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) and the member of International Contact Group</td>
<td>Manila 11 July 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-16</td>
<td>Emma Leslie</td>
<td>Member of International Contact Group</td>
<td>Manila 8 July 2012</td>
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<td>P-17</td>
<td>Kristian Herbolzheimer</td>
<td>Member of International Contact Group, Conciliation Resources</td>
<td>Skype Conversation 16 June 2012</td>
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<td>P-19</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>World Bank Group</td>
<td>Manila 02 August 2012</td>
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<td>P-20</td>
<td>Eddie Quitoriano</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution Expert</td>
<td>Quezon City 16 July 2012</td>
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<td>P-21</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
<td>Manila 02 August 2012</td>
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<td>P-22</td>
<td>Starjoan Villanueva</td>
<td>Executive Director, Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao (AFRIM)</td>
<td>Davao City 16 August 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-23</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao (AFRIM)</td>
<td>16 August 2012</td>
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<td>P-24</td>
<td>Gus Miclat</td>
<td>Initiative for International Dialogue (IID)</td>
<td>Davao City 26 August 2012</td>
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<td>P-25</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Service (CRS)</td>
<td>Davao City 16 August 2012</td>
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<td>P-26</td>
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<td>Mindanao Development Authority</td>
<td>Davao City 15 August 2012</td>
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<td>Mindanao Development Authority</td>
<td>Davao City 15 August 2012</td>
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<td>P-29</td>
<td>Ma. Teresa Gabaesin</td>
<td>Mindanao People’s Caucus (MPC)</td>
<td>Davao City 15 August 2012</td>
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<td>P-30</td>
<td>Ghazali Jaafar</td>
<td>Second Vice-President, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Central Committee</td>
<td>Cotabato City 11 August 2012</td>
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<td>P-31</td>
<td>Jeya Murugan</td>
<td>Senior Program Manager Nonviolentpeaceforce in the Philippines</td>
<td>Cocabato City 9 August 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-32</td>
<td>Ismael G. Kulat</td>
<td>Programme Officer, Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS)</td>
<td>Cocabato City 9 August 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-33</td>
<td>Mr. Bobby Benito</td>
<td>Director, Bangsamoro Center for Just Peace (BCJP)</td>
<td>Cocabato City 8 August 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-34</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>United Youth of the Philippines – Women (UNYPHIL-Women)</td>
<td>Cocabato City 9 August 2012</td>
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<td>P-35</td>
<td>Rahib L. Kudto</td>
<td>Director, United Youth for Peace and Development (UNYPAD)</td>
<td>Cocabato City 8 August 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-36</td>
<td>Hadji Murshid Mascud (Duma)</td>
<td>Vice-President, Mindanao Alliance for Peace (MAP)</td>
<td>Cocabato City 8 August 2012</td>
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<td>P-37</td>
<td>Zen Malang</td>
<td>Director, Mindanao Human Rights Action Group (MINHRAC)</td>
<td>Cocabato City 9 August 2012</td>
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<td>P-38</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Mindanao Trust Fund</td>
<td>Cotabato City 9 August 2012</td>
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<td>P-39</td>
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<td>Civil Society Activist</td>
<td>Cotabato City 9 August 2012</td>
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<td>P-40</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Mindanao Women Advocacy for Good Governance (MWAGG)</td>
<td>9 Cocabato City August 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-41</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Women rights activist in Cotabato City</td>
<td>Cocabato City 10 August 2012</td>
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<td>P-42</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Women Affairs Committee (WAC)</td>
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<td>P-43</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Moro Women Development and Cultural Centre (MWDECC)</td>
<td>Cocabato City 10 August 2012</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 6: Semi-Structured Field Research Questionnaire for Nepal

Questions for organisations and agencies who worked as third-party interveners (local, national and international):

1. What were/are your major peace/conflict interventions? How have you been supportive of the peace process?
2. What are your conflict intervention approaches and strategies?
3. Why did you decide to intervene in conflict?
4. What sorts of organisational or individual mandates have you received as a third-party intervener? Who gave you that mandate and when?
5. How is your relationship (competing or complementing) and level of interaction (friendly/unfriendly, regular/irregular) with other third parties?
6. What are your key areas of coordination and collaboration with other third-party interveners?
7. Have you coordinated with a particular type of third party (such as only with local NGOs, only with the UN, only with political interveners, and so on), or with a diverse group of third parties?
8. How do you make decisions about whether or not to collaborate with other third-party interveners?
9. What have you achieved while collaborating with other third parties, which otherwise would not be possible?
10. What sorts of difficulties have you experienced while collaborating with other third-party interveners?
11. If you have cooperated with other third parties, how was your relationship with them before cooperation? How did it change after cooperation?
12. If you have not cooperated with other third parties, how is your current relationship with them?
13. In your organisation’s experience, when and how have you benefited because of coordination with other third parties? Have you also experienced any disadvantages because of coordination with other third-party interveners?

Questions for Government Officials/Peace Implementing Agencies/Political Leaders:

1. How have you experienced the involvement of varieties of third-party interveners supporting conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes?
2. Why do you believe there are so many third-party interveners? What kinds of relationships and levels of interaction do they have with each other?
3. How have third-party interveners been helpful, and how have they not been helpful?
4. How are the varieties of conflict management and peacebuilding efforts contributing to the broader agenda of peace? How are such efforts linked to each other?
5. What is your observation regarding the coordination dynamics among third-party interveners? E.g., how do external and internal parties work at different levels coordinating with each other?
6. Does government have any policy or operational guidelines that help to facilitate coordination and cooperation among third-party interveners?
7. Have you developed any mechanisms that ensure coordination and cooperation among third-party interveners? If yes, how is such coordination functioning? If not, why have such mechanisms not been developed?
8. Is government using any tools or frameworks to measure the effectiveness of multiparty intervention? If yes, what kind of framework and how does it work? If no, why is there no such framework?

Questions for Conflict Resolution Experts:

1. What is your assessment regarding the involvement and contribution of diverse types of third parties in the peace process, from past to present?
2. Every third party has different motives, intervention goals, and policy interests behind their involvement in the peace process; how do you assess the extent to which their different efforts are contributing to the broader peacemaking process? How do you know that different third party efforts are converging with each other?
3. Are there any variations in third party mandates and their implementation in practice? If so, what sorts of variations have you experienced?
4. How do you assess the role of various intervention structures? How coordinated are their efforts in supporting the peace process?
5. What kind of power status does your group have in third-party intervention processes?
6. How do different third parties that you are aware of interact with each other to shape their relationships in armed conflicts and peace processes? How effective are these interactions?
7. What types of third parties are more willing to coordinate with other third parties? What types are less willing to coordinate? Why?
8. Have you experienced any challenges with large numbers of diverse third parties coordinating their activities?
9. How have you experienced relationships between internal and external third parties? What is the impact of these relationships on the conflict resolution process?
Appendix 7: Semi-Structured Field Research Questionnaire for the Philippines

For Third Parties (local as well as external, particularly the members of ICG, IMT, CPC, Security, and those who are not part of any coordination structure)

1. What is your intervention goal as a third-party intervener?
2. What sorts of mandates have you received as a third-party intervener in the Philippines?
3. How is your relationship (competing or complementing) and level of interaction (friendly/unfriendly, regular/irregular) with other third parties?
4. How do you interact with different third parties within the structure of ICG, IMT, CPC, or Security group? How effective are your interactions in achieving your individual or shared goals as third-party interveners?
5. How do you participate in intervention actions besides the existing third party coordination structures mentioned above?
6. How does the power status of your group affect the third-party coordination process?
7. In which phases of conflict has third-party coordination been more effective or less effective? Why?
8. How has the lengthy duration of conflict influenced third-party coordination processes in the Philippines?
9. What types of third parties are more willing to coordinate with others? What types of third parties are less willing to coordinate with others? Why?
10. What are your key areas of coordination with other third-party interveners?
11. How do you make a decision about whether or not to coordinate with other third-party interveners?
12. Are there any policies and strategies in place that compel third parties to coordinate in intervention actions?
13. Do you coordinate with third parties with similar characteristics, or you also coordinate with a diverse range of third parties?
14. When have you benefited greatly because of your coordination with other third parties? Have you also experienced any disadvantages because of coordination with other third-party interveners?

For Peace Panel Members (current and former), Experts, Scholars, and Government Officials

1. What is your assessment regarding the involvement and contribution of multiple third parties in the Mindanao peace process in the Philippines, from past to present?
2. Since third parties have different motives or intervention goals, how do you know that their diverse efforts are contributing to peacemaking processes in the Philippines? How do you know that different third party efforts are coordinating effectively with each other?
3. How do you assess your third-party role as a member of ICG, IMT, Security, or CPC team? How coordinated are the efforts of these various groups?
4. How does the power status of a particular third party affect the third party coordination process?
5. How do different third parties interact within the structure of ICG, IMT, CPC, and Security group? How effective are their interactions?
6. Third parties are also active beyond the coordination structures mentioned above. How have you seen them intervene beyond the existing coordination structures?
7. How has the lengthy duration of conflict influenced third-party coordination in the Philippines?
8. What types of third parties are more willing to coordinate with others? What types of third parties are less willing to coordinate with others? Why?

9. In which phase of conflict have third parties taken more coordinated action, and in which phase of conflict have they preferred more isolated intervention? Why?

10. Around which issues have third parties taken more coordinated action, and which issues lack third-party coordination?
References


