Nonviolent Revolutions and Democratisation

The effect of state seizure and campaign size on post-revolution democracy.

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Abstract

Recent research into the nature of nonviolent movements has largely focused on the differences between violent and nonviolent movements. It concludes that nonviolent movements have more favourable democratic outcomes more often. Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) show that regime change brought about by violent movements is likely to create new autocracies, as opposed to regime change brought about by nonviolent movements that considerably increase the likelihood of a transition to democracy. Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005, p. 2) conclude that “how a transition from authoritarianism occurs and the types of forces that are engaged in pressing the transition have a significant impact on the success or failure of democratic reform”, with nonviolent movements more likely to result in post-conflict democratisation. Chenoweth & Stephan (2011, p. 202) find that even failed attempts at nonviolent revolution are more likely to result in more democratic and peaceful societies than successful violent movements. However, little research has explored variation in the outcomes of nonviolent movements, in terms of post-conflict democratisation. While most nonviolent revolutions appear to have post-revolution democratisation as a result, but some result in continued, or more extreme, authoritarianism. Recent examples include Egypt (2011) which shifted from a pre-revolution polity score of -2 in 2011 to a two-year post-revolution polity score of -4 in 2013, and Thailand (2006), that moved from a pre-revolution score of 9 in 2006 to a score of -1 two-years post-revolution in 2008 (Gurr, Jaggers, & Marshall, 2010).¹ This thesis seeks to explore what activists can do to increase the likelihood of post-nonviolent-revolution

¹ The polity data, taken from the Polity IV project (Gurr, Jaggers, & Marshall, 2010), will be discussed at length in the thesis.
democratisation by focusing on two factors: the seizure of the state by members of the revolutionary movement and the campaign size of the revolutionary movement. State seizure has been much debated in revolutionary theory with some claiming it is vital for making societal changes, such as democratisation, while others claim the opposite. Campaign size appears to be an important factor in revolutionary success according to research that compares nonviolent movements with violent movements, and to the theory developed by nonviolence theorists. However, neither of these variables have been explored empirically to understand their effect on post-nonviolent-revolution democratisation. These variables are tested while controlling for some of the structural factors that may possibly be necessary, but not sufficient, for democratisation. The empirical component of this thesis involves statistical analysis of 50 cases of successful nonviolent movements that occurred between 1945 and 2006. Three main findings are made: (1) state seizure does not appear to negatively affect post-revolution polity scores; (2) state seizure has an initial positive effect of democratisation, soon after the completion of nonviolent revolution, but does not appear to contribute to long-term democratisation; and (3) the size of a successful nonviolent campaign does not appear to have an impact on post-revolution polity scores.
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# Table of Contents

**DECLARATION** ..................................................  II  
**ABSTRACT** .........................................................  III  
**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** ...........................................  V  
**LIST OF FIGURES** .................................................. VIII  
**LIST OF TABLES** .................................................... IX  

**INTRODUCTION** ...................................................... 1  

**LITERATURE REVIEW** ............................................... 7

**DEMOCRATISATION** .................................................. 8  
**THREE PATHS TO DEMOCRATISATION:** .......................... 9  
**STRUCTURAL CAUSES** ............................................. 9  
**AGENCY OF ACTORS TO CREATE DEMOCRACY** ............... 12  
**DEMOCRATIZATION THROUGH REVOLUTION** .................... 19  
**VARIATION IN NONVIOLENT MOVEMENTS** ......................... 26  

**THEORY** ............................................................. 29  

**WHAT IS A REVOLUTION?** ......................................... 29  
**WHAT IS DEMOCRATISATION?** .................................... 32  
**SEIZING THE STATE AND DEMOCRATISATION** ................. 37  
**THE ARGUMENT FOR SEIZING THE STATE** ....................... 39  
**THE COUNTER-ARGUMENT TO SEIZING THE STATE** ............ 47  
**ARE NONVIOLENT REVOLUTIONARIES FOR OR AGAINST?** ...... 52  
**GANDHIAN AND PRINCIPLED NONVIOLENCE** .................... 54  
**SHARPION AND PRAGMATIC NONVIOLENCE** ..................... 60  
**NONVIOLENCE SUMMARY** ......................................... 62  
**HYPOTHESIS 1** ....................................................... 63  
**CAMPAIGN SIZE AND DEMOCRATISATION** ......................... 64  
**HYPOTHESIS 2** ....................................................... 68  
**SUMMARY** ............................................................. 68  

**RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS** ............................. 72  

**UNIT OF ANALYSIS** .................................................. 73  
**DEPENDENT VARIABLE** ............................................ 74  

**INDEPENDENT VARIABLES** .......................................... 78  
**INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 1: STATE SEIZURE** .................... 78  
**INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 2: CAMPAIGN SIZE** ................... 83  

**CONTROL VARIABLES** ............................................... 84  
**CONTROL VARIABLE 1: REGIME TYPE** ........................... 85  
**CONTROL VARIABLE 2: DEMOCRATIC NEIGHBOURS** .......... 90  
**CONTROL VARIABLE 3: INCOME** .................................. 91  
**OTHER POTENTIAL CONTROL VARIABLES** ....................... 95  

**METHOD OF ANALYSIS** .............................................. 96  
**BIVARIATE TESTS** ................................................... 97  
**MULTIVARIATE TESTS** .............................................. 99  
**ROBUSTNESS TESTS** ............................................... 101
RESULTS

1) STATE SEIZURE 104
2) CAMPAIGN SIZE 119

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 136

HYPOTHESIS ONE 136
HYPOTHESIS TWO 141
THE EFFECT OF CONTROL VARIABLES 142
FUTURE RESEARCH 143
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 143
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 146
CONTROL VARIABLES 147
ALTERNATIVE RESEARCH METHODS 152

THESIS SUMMARY 154

BIBLIOGRAPHY 156

APPENDICES 166

APPENDIX 1 - 198 METHODS OF NONVIOLENT ACTION 166
APPENDIX 2 - EXCLUDED CASES FROM THE NAVCO 2.0 DATASET. 170
1) MADAGASCAR – MADAGASAR PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT -2003 170
2) SENEGAL– ANTI-DIOUF -2000 170
3) MEXICO – ANTI PRI -2000 170
4) GHANA– ANTI-RAWLING -2000 170
5) CROATIA– SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM -2000 170
6) CROATIA– SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM -1999 171
7) NIGERIA– ANTI-MILITARY -1998 171
8) TANZANIA– PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT -1994 171
9) TANZANIA– PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT -1993 171
10) MALI – ANTI-MILITARY -1992 171
11) SLOVAKIA – PUBIC AGAINST VIOLENCE -1992 171
12) TANZANIA– PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT -1992 171
13) GUAYANA– ANTI-BURNHAM/HOYTE -1991 172
14) KYRGYZSTAN– DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT -1991 172
15) SLOVENIA – INDEPENDENCE - 1991 172
16) CZECHOSLOVAKIA – VELVET REVOLUTION -1990 172
17) TAIWAN – PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT -1985 172
18) ARGENTINA – PRO-DEMOCRACY -1982 172
19) GREECE – ANTI-MILITARY -1974 173
20) GREECE – ANTI-KARAMANLIS -1963 173
21) CAMEROON – ANTI-COLONIAL -1960 173
22) CYPRUS – ETHNIKI ORGANOSIS KYPRIOS AGONISTON-1959 173
23) GHANA – CONVENTION PEOPLE’S PARTY MOVEMENT-1957 173
24) MOROCCO – MOROCCAN INDEPENDENCE WAR -1956 173

APPENDIX 3 – STATE SEIZURE BY CASE. 174
List of Figures

Figure 1 - Different Conceptions of Revolution .......................................................... 59
Figure 2 – Polity Scores Over Time, Pre- and Post-Revolution. ................................ 105
Figure 3 – Kernel Density Plot for State Seizure Variable and Polity Scores, Two-Years Post-
Revolution ...................................................................................................................... 108
Figure 4 – Kernel Density Plot for State Seizure Variable and Polity Scores, Five-Years Post-
Revolution ...................................................................................................................... 108
Figure 5 – Kernel Density Plot for State Seizure Variable and Polity Scores, Ten-Years Post-
Revolution ...................................................................................................................... 109
Figure 6 – Scatterplot of the Residuals, Two-Years Post Revolution. ...................... 116
Figure 7 – Scatterplot of the Leverage, Two-Years Post Revolution. ....................... 117
Figure 8 – Scatterplot of the DFBeta Statistic Results, Two-Years Post Revolution .... 117
Figure 9 – Dot Graph of Mean Polity Scores Over Time for Different Sized Campaigns 120
Figure 10 – Scatterplot of the Residuals, Two-Years Post Revolution. ..................... 132
Figure 11 Scatterplot of the Leverage, Two-Years Post Revolution. ......................... 133
Figure 12 – Scatterplot of the DFBeta Statistic Results, Two-Years Post Revolution. 133
List of Tables

Table 1 - Results of one-way ANOVA test with the state seizure variable and the polity score...107
Table 2 - Results of one-way ANOVA test with the state seizure variable and the change along the polity score. ........................................................................................................................................110
Table 3 - Results of one-way ANOVA test with the state seizure variable and the categorical polity score. ........................................................................................................................................111
Table 4 - Results of Linear regression, two-years post-revolution. ..........................................................................................................................112
Table 5 - Results of Linear regression, five-years post-revolution..........................................................................................................................113
Table 6 - Results of Linear regression, ten-years post-revolution. ..........................................................................................................................113
Table 7 - Results of Logit regression with state seizure variable, two-years post-revolution.....118
Table 8 - Results of Logit regression with state seizure variable, five-years post-revolution.....119
Table 9 - Results of Logit regression with state seizure variable, ten-years post-revolution.....119
Table 10 - Results of one-way ANOVA test with the campaign size variable and the polity score. ........................................................................................................................................122
Table 11 - Results of Pearson’s correlation test with the campaign size variable and the polity score. ........................................................................................................................................123
Table 12 - Results of one-way ANOVA test with the campaign size variable and the change in polity score. ........................................................................................................................................125
Table 13 - Results of Pearson’s correlation test with the campaign size variable and the change in polity score. ........................................................................................................................................126
Table 14 - Results of one-way ANOVA test with the campaign size variable and the categorical democracy measure. ........................................................................................................................................128
Table 15 - Results of Pearson’s correlation test with the campaign size variable and the categorical democracy measure ........................................................................................................................................129
Table 16 - Results of Linear regression, two-years post-revolution. ..........................................................................................................................130
Table 17 - Results of Linear regression, five-years post-revolution..........................................................................................................................130
Table 18 - Results of Linear regression, ten-years post-revolution. ..........................................................................................................................130
Table 19 - Results of Logit regression with campaign size variable, two-years post-revolution...134
Table 20 - Results of Logit regression with campaign size variable, five-years post-revolution...135
Table 21 - Results of Logit regression with campaign size variable, ten-years post-revolution....135
**Introduction**

In recent years we have seen a vast increase in the number of nonviolent revolutions – people’s movements that have overthrown regimes using primarily nonviolent means. Many of these have resulted in the democratisation of societies that have long been governed by authoritarian regimes.

Recent research has shown that, when compared to violent revolutions, nonviolent revolutions have been more successful in removing oppressive regimes and in achieving positive long-term outcomes that reflect an increase in human freedoms such as democratisation (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). However, there is unexplored variation within nonviolent movements. While many successful nonviolent movements result in long-term democracies, others do not. The causes of this variation are yet to be explained. This thesis will explore variation in the success/failure of nonviolent revolutionary movements in terms of post-revolution democratisation, and ask what nonviolent activists can do to increase the chance that their revolution will lead to democratisation.

This is important to understand because the result of any revolution has a direct and significant impact on many people. It is assumed that if a nonviolent revolutionary movement overthrews a dictator and fails to create democratisation, it will negatively impact on people’s freedoms. Their nonviolent movement will likely lose momentum; their effort will not have resulted in the changes that they hoped for; and as a result they will not only have failed in creating a more free society, but may lose hope that they can create the changes that they want in the future. In short, whether they succeed or fail, revolutions make dramatic differences in people’s lives, especially social revolutions. Classic
examples of this are the French and Russian revolutions (Skocpol, 1979), but we can also see the effects of revolutions today, in the divergent outcomes of the Arab Spring (Springborg, 2011). Revolutions also have important regional and global consequences.

If activists know more about what they can do, in which circumstances, to make democratisation more likely after a revolution, then theoretically this variation in the long-term outcomes of nonviolent revolutions can be reduced. It is possible that activists can perform certain actions to create democracy and prevent a reversion to authoritarianism. This may mean that we get closer to ensuring democratisation post-revolution.

A case of concern is Egypt after a nonviolent revolution removed long-term President Hosni Mubarak from power in 2011. There was hope for a more democratic Egypt as protesters occupied Tahir Square in Cairo, and citizens nonviolently resisted the government, resulting in the 30-year authoritarian ruler of Egypt stepping down from the presidency (Gardner, 2011). However, the long-term outcome in Egypt has been continued, if not increased authoritarianism, with brutal crackdowns on protest movements to consolidate the regime's rule. A military coup, mass arrests and imprisonment of activists and journalists, and violent repression of protesters, was not what the people's movement in Tahir Square was aiming to achieve (Aboueldahab, 2014). Critics now fear that the dictatorship of Mubarak will be recreated under a different guise (al-Anani, 2014). The question remains, what went wrong?

The seizure of the state by revolutionaries has long-been posed as necessary for creating major institutional change post-revolution. This is because the state
structure is seen as vital for implementing wide-reaching societal changes and protecting against challengers. Other revolutionaries, including prominent nonviolence theorists, have rejected this position claiming that state seizure will only lead to more authoritarianism, or at least, no more democracy. In other words, some revolutionaries argue that seizing the state is essential for any democratisation process, while others argue that seizing the state prevents social revolution – including democratisation.

This argument has yet to be tested, so we have no empirical evidence to support either argument. Despite this, many revolutionary movements (although not all) follow the advice of a particular theorist (whether this is Lenin or Mao, Kropotkin or Bakunin, Gene Sharp or Gandhi, amongst others), and depending on what that theorist recommends as a course of action, they attempt to do. More knowledge on whether seizing the state is a significant factor in achieving democratisation after a nonviolent movement may help activists choose what advice they follow. This may lead to higher levels of post-revolution democratisation, and possibly the avoidance of outcomes that mimic the Egyptian situation currently (2013-2014).

At a superficial glance we can see different outcomes in nonviolent groups that take different approaches towards the state. When we look at Egypt (2011 onwards) for example, the protesters did not take state control. Questions can be asked as to whether this left a power-void for other groups to step into, or whether they ever really gained power because they did not plan how to deal with the state during the political revolution. Alternatively, did this happen because other factors prevented it from being possible? If there were a wider reaching
Sharpian plan, would we be seeing successes rather than failures? This can then be compared to cases like Serbia (2000), where a coalition did seize state power, and we have seen much more positive outcomes (Ackerman & DuVall, 2001). However, it is unknown if seizing state power itself had a significant effect on democratisation in Serbia, or if other factors were more important. Alternatively, we could look to the Philippines (2001) or Madagascar (2002) where there appeared to be no change in democracy after the revolution.

As well as the effect of state-seizure on post-revolution democratisation, I will explore another factor that may be significant in making democratisation more likely: campaign size. This has been chosen based on suggestions put forward in the nonviolence literature. In short, the reason that campaign size may be significant is because it may assist in creating a more democratic society as it helps to decentralise power across society; reflects many groups within society; reflects a large percentage of that society; and allows for continued nonviolent action against authoritarianism.

There is a large gap in all of the literature on revolutions as they do not fully answer whether these factors lead to democratisation. The revolutions literature rarely engages with the anarchist and nonviolence literature. The nonviolence and anarchist literature has critiqued revolutions literature, but has not left us with a complete understanding of what you do with the state once you have

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2 This refers to a plan based on the work of Gene Sharp, whose work has been used by many nonviolent movements to guide their campaigns. Some of Sharp’s theoretical work will be discussed in the theory chapter below.

3 Serbia’s polity score went from a -6 pre-revolution to a 7 post-revolution (Gurr, Jaggers, & Marshall, 2010).

4 Philippines with a polity score of 8 pre and post-revolution and Madagascar with a score of 7 pre- and post revolution (Gurr, Jaggers, & Marshall, 2010).
brought it down if you do not seize it. This gap needs to be examined to find out which critique results in post-revolution peace in which circumstances, and why. If the nonviolence/anarchist literature is correct, then there needs to be more discussion on what the alternatives to seizing the state are, and where alternatives have been used successfully or unsuccessfully. If incorrect, then maybe there are some lessons that can be taken from the revolutions literature. Either way, the more knowledge on this area that can be given to nonviolent activists, the greater chance that they will plan strategy in a way that maximizes the chances of creating democratic post-conflict states.

In this thesis I test two hypotheses:

H1) The seizure of the state increases post-nonviolent-revolution democratisation.

H2) Mass participation in the nonviolent revolutionary movement increases the likelihood of post-revolution democratisation.

A quantitative analysis was adopted to test these hypotheses. Initially, bivariate tests were utilised to identify if each independent variable presented in the hypotheses correlated with democratisation. After this, multivariate tests were used so that control variables can be included. The control variables used include income (GDP), the prevalence of democratic neighbours, and regime type pre-revolution. As will be explained, these are all variables that are outside of activist’s control that are likely to have an effect on democratisation. The tests are carried out at two, five and ten-years after the revolution.
The results suggest that state seizure effects democratisation positively at the two-year mark. However, as time goes on there is next to no difference in the amount of democratisation between countries that have a revolution with state seizure, and those that had a revolution without state seizure. The campaign size of a movement appears to have no effect on post-revolution democratisation.

This thesis will be structured as follows: (1) a literature review of the democratisation literature, focusing on democratisation from below and then democratisation through revolution; (2) a theory chapter which will develop the rationale for the hypotheses identified; (3) methods and research design; (4) results; (5) discussion and conclusions; (6) a summary of the main findings and how they relate back to the literature.
**Literature Review**

In this chapter I will provide an overview of the literature on the causes of democratisation, which can be split into three categories: structural causes, elite driven causes, and causes that emphasise mass collective action. I will briefly review the research on all of these, before focusing in on collective action, which is the focus of this thesis. Within collective action, the literature on democratisation through revolution will be outlined, followed by, more specifically, democratisation through nonviolent revolutions. This overview will result in the identification of a gap in the research that will be the focus of my theory and testing: this is the effect of seizing the state in a nonviolent revolution, and the campaign size of a movement, on post-revolution democratisation. There is variation in levels of democratisation after nonviolent movements, and as will be explained and tested during this thesis, the seizure of the state and/or campaign size may help provide answers to why there is this variation.

Before I start to review this literature it is important to define what is meant by democracy. Much of the literature that will be covered in this chapter focuses on “democratisation”, although the concept of democracy may change in different cases. For some, democratisation may mean the transition to a certain political system. For example Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) define this as “a regime in which those who govern are selected through contested elections” (p. 15), or a move to become a liberal democracy. Others, such as Teorell (2010, p. 31) define democracy as “a graded phenomenon” that is “a regime, the features of which any country can approximate more or less well at any given time point”. Thus the term democratisation “implies the process
through which countries become more democratic” (p. 32). This research will use
the latter definition, democracy as a graded phenomenon, but literature that uses
either definition will be discussed in the literature review as both can provide
valuable insights. Democracy and democratisation will be defined in a more
comprehensive manner in the next chapter.

**Democratisation**
The democratisation literature emerges from four broad research disciplines.
These are: the elite democratisation literature; the social movement literature;
the nonviolence/civil resistance literature; and the revolutions literature. From
these pools of research, three paths to democratisation are identified. These are
(1) structural causes of democratisation; (2) changes driven by the actions of
elites; (3) collective action.

There are obviously many factors that contribute to democratisation in different
scenarios, places, and times. This has led some scholars, notably Limongi &
Przeworski (1997) and Przeworski et al. (2000) to suggest that the onset of
transitions, whether authoritarian or democratic, are random. They take the view
that the best that can be done is to study what influences the stability of
democracies (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; Przeworski et al., 2000).

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5 It is worth noting that the majority of democratisation literature treats
democracy as a western liberal democratic system complete with a strong state
structure. This differs from more radical views of democracy that can be found in
other literature. This will be addressed in the next chapter when democratisation
is defined in detail.
This is, however, largely opposed (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Wright & Escriba-Folch, 2012). There are many factors that contribute to democratisation, and as Celestino and Gleditsch (2013, p. 386) argue, “transitions to democracy are much more likely under specific triggers, such as nonviolent direct action, and a favourable transnational context”. I will now present the literature as "three paths" to democratisation: structural causes, agency of actors, and finally democracy through revolution.

**Three paths to democratisation:**

**Structural causes**

Structural causes are simply causes that come from the structural make up of society. They tend to not vary much over time (although they are variable). These include economic structures, social factors, class structures and the type of authoritarian regime. Depending on the variable, they may or may not increase the chance of post-revolution democratisation.

The first democratisation theories were based around structural causes of democratisation. The most notable work is Lipset (1959) who noted that countries that had gone through a social modernisation process were more likely to be democratic. A range of structural factors are considered important for democratisation. Three of these - income, democratic neighbours (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013) and regime type (Geddes,1995; Ulfelder, 2005) - will be discussed in detail in the methods chapter. This is because they are used as control variables in the statistical analysis. Other important structural factors - such as socio-cultural factors, the effect of other nations and the current world system, and the presence of oil - will be discussed in the conclusions as these are
factors that could be controlled for in future research. Because the effect of structural factors is not the primary focus of this thesis, and the constraints of this thesis only allow for limited discussion, I have chosen not to outline them in detail here, but instead focus on actor driven democratisation that is the direct concern of this research.

In early works, the actions of individual or group actors were largely put into second place, and were mostly seen as a result of structural factors that were “given causal primacy” (Teorell, 2010, p. 18). The focus here was almost purely on finding structural prerequisites for democracy (Zherebkin, 2009). Most structural theorists in this camp, Lipset among them, did, however, acknowledge that regime change could only occur due to the actions of various actors (Teorell, 2010, p. 18). There was quickly a realisation that, as described by S. P. Huntington (1991, p. 107), that there was a need to move from the “causes” of democracy to the “causers” of democracy. Whatever the structural conditions, it will take an actor to make changes that lead to regime change.

Due to the lack of emphasis on the role of actors, as time went on most regime change and democratisation research focused more clearly on actor’s agency to create regime change. This is not to say that the structural perspective then became void, but rather that by itself, it is now mostly considered incomplete. However, the structure vs agency debate is still alive as different stances give more weight to each side and different forms of agency. Some scholars argue that transitions can only occur when opportunities are provided due to specific structural conditions, while others emphasise the agency of actors to create conditions and spaces for change.
Throughout the democratisation research we clearly see different stances on agency and structure. Social movement scholars like Giugni, McAdam, & Tilly (1999) and Meyer (2004), look at outcomes and the central role of strategy and strategic choice, as do nonviolence scholars that take the distinction between violent and nonviolent tactics as their focus, such as Schock (2005). These focus much more on the agency of collective actors to create change, and in the interest of this thesis, create change through revolution. Having said this, they by no means dismiss the role of structures – for example Nepstad (2011) points out that structures such as certain economic conditions and the availability of free space in which to organise, may be necessary but not sufficient factors for a successful revolution. Scholars that have focused on elite driven changes, such as O'Donnell’s and Schmitter's (1986) influential work, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule”, also focuses on agency but mostly the agency of elites alone.

Scholars studying revolutionary theory have previously given more weight to structures. Schock (2013, p. 281) states that they have had an “emphasis on how economic, political, and demographic change alters class relations and state structures to produce revolutions (e.g. Skocpal, 1979; Goldstone, 1991).” Whether revolutions theorists are looking through a Marxist, modernisation theory, or state-centred lens; they most often conclude that certain structural conditions are needed to allow revolutions, but revolutionaries are still needed for any revolution. More recently theorists have put more of a focus on this later point ( Parsa, 2000; Goodwin, 2001; Foran, 2005) suggesting that revolutionary movements may be able to create, not just exploit, opportunities to seize state power.
Despite the move away from structural causes of democracy, many of these structural factors (economic structures, social factors, class structures, the type of authoritarian regime, and democratic neighbours) may be necessary but not sufficient for the positive long-term outcomes of a regime transition. Alternatively they may simply provide information on factors that may make the chance of a positive transition being more or less successful.

These arguments, about economic structures, social factors, the type of authoritarian regime, and increasing the chance of democratisation, will be addressed in more detail in the methodology chapter below, as some of these factors are likely to have an impact on post-revolution democratisation. They will need to be controlled for in the statistical analysis to ensure that they are not what is causing democratisation rather than the factors I will be exploring. Many structural causes, such as those that are determined by other states or the global economy, are not things that activists within a country are likely to have control over. Because of this, while not forgetting the importance of structural factors, the rest of this chapter will focus on the agency side of the structure vs agency debate. I will review the literature that focuses on the “causers” of democracy, as it is what activists can do to create democratisation that is the concern of this thesis.

**Agency of Actors to Create Democracy**

Karl and Schmitter (1991) provide four ways in which regime transitions occur, two elite driven and two mass-driven. First, regime transitions can occur through a pact (which is elite-driven by negotiation), second, through imposition (which is elite-driven by force), third, through reform (which is mass-driven by negotiation) and finally, through revolution (which is mass-driven by force). Each
of these are potential pathways to democratisation. I will now explore them, starting with the elite driven perspective and then moving onto collective action.

**Elite Driven**

The earliest transition theorists to consider agency in creating change placed primary importance on the elite driven perspective. These theorists were writing in what S. P. Huntington (1991) described as the second wave of democratisation that came after World War Two (the first wave coming after World War One). After this came a third wave of democratisation$^6$ that would result in more theories placing an emphasis on the mass-driven perspective of transitions. However, despite a growing number of studies that examine mass-driven change, the “elite driven” view has become “virtually hegemonic” (Collier & Mahoney, 1997) in the democratisation literature. However, as will be shown when the literature on nonviolence is discussed latter in the chapter, this may be changing.

The seminal work that outlines this framework is O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), partially building on Rustow (1970), and other work has followed this.$^7$ O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) suggested that the process of moving from an authoritarian state to a democratic state involved going through a series of phases - initially constructed by Rustow as the *preparatory, decision* and *habituation* phases and used by O’Donnell and Schmitter as the *liberalisation, democratisation*

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$^6$ The third wave was generalised by Huntington (1991) as 1974-1991, but could include late revolutions such as the ‘colour revolutions’ in Eastern Europe.

$^7$ See also Malloy and Seligson,(1987) and Higley and Gunther (1992).
and consolidation phases⁸ - and no structural conditions were needed to start moving along these phases, i.e. actors had the ability to make them happen and democracy could develop under a range of different structural circumstances.

O’Donnell and Schmitter did, however, acknowledge that structural conditions might effect regime change in the long term (pp. 4-5), and they did not ignore the fact that mass uprisings often occurred in periods of democratisation. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, pp. 53-4) state, “in some cases and at particular moments of the transition, many of these diverse layers of society may come together to form what we choose to call the popular upsurge.” However, although O’Donnell and Schmitter recognise the occurrence of popular upsurge they see it as being symptomatic of democratisation rather than a cause of democratisation (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, pp. 54-6). Ulfielder (2005, p. 313) writes, “their analytic framework focuses squarely on the strategic choices of elites, and popular action is considered relevant primarily for its indirect effects on intra-elte bargaining in situations in which a transition is already underway.” Non-elite actors are seen more as bystanders in the transition rather than a driver of change. Teorell (2010, p. 4) summarises their work as saying that “…democracy has been brought about from above through the strategic skills, at times sheer luck, of elite actors manoeuvring under profound uncertainty (Rustow, 1970; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986)”. Elite bargaining skills are seen as key to the result of a regime transition.

⁸ Rustow (1970) describes the preparatory phase as “a prolonged and inclusive political struggle” that sets off the democratization process (p. 352); the decision phase as “a genuine choice” to democratize that does not flow automatically from the previous phase – a small group of leaders are likely to make this choice (p. 356); and the habituation phase where the decision is “transmitted to the professional politicians and citizenry at large” (p. 357).
Other scholars disagree with this elite-driven view, suggesting that actors can direct a popular upsurge that has an important role in the initiation and outcome of regime transitions, and in the case of revolution, may mean that the choices made by elites are much less relevant as it is actors from below that drive change.

**Collective Action**

Although many still hold the elite driven perspective on transitions, others acknowledge the role of social actors in creating change. According to Teorell (2010), the roots of this perspective can be found in the work of Moore (1966). Moore examined the role of the peasantry and the upper classes in societies that industrialised – some ending in authoritarianism, others in democracy. He is famous for writing the phrase "No bourgeois, no democracy" (Moore, 1966, p. 418). His argument could be summarised by saying that differences in the fortitude of the bourgeoisie in a given country, allow for differing ways of modernising through different revolutionary processes. This is because people in rural settings, no matter what class they belong to, will approach politics in ways that are determined by the strength of the bourgeois. A strong bourgeois is more likely to result in "revolution from above", elite driven, rather than "revolution from below", collectively driven. This view is compatible with much revolutionary theory of regime change, notably Marx and other leftists who emerged in the 19th century. ⁹ Theories that acknowledge the role of collective action in democratisation often emphasise class division with different competing interests. Here, regime change comes from below rather than above.

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⁹ Although, there is disagreement as to exactly how this process works, and how revolution can occur in different societies.
As mentioned above, until recent years this research was largely structural, yet encompassed collective actors. The strength of actors (of classes and alliances) was tied to structural conditions, as were their motives (the working class want to overthrow the bourgeoisie due to the conditions they live in that are created by capitalism). In Marx's view this would inevitably lead to the overthrow of capitalism by the working class (McLellan, 2006). In this way the revolutionary regime transition literature has been largely structural. However, much research conducted since the third wave of democratisation, including that on nonviolent movements/civil resistance, as well as the social movements literature, has given a greater role to mobilised collective actors, their agency in mobilising, and the choices they have to create and not just exploit opportunities created by structural conditions. They suggest that mass mobilisation can and does effect democratisation, often in a positive way. In other words mass-mobilisation is not just a symptom of a weak regime but it can in itself weaken a regime and in some cases make it collapse.

Typical of this approach is the work of Collier and Mahoney (1997), who make three points about the overall perspective of the elite-driven transitions literature above. Firstly, they state that it emphasizes leadership and crafting and therefore places much more importance on individual actors as opposed to collective actors. Secondly, they write that the work often defines actors “strategically with respect to their position in the transition game” (p. 286) which puts aside questions about class-defined actors. Thirdly, it is often state-centric, and this leads to the subordination of social actors. Therefore the theoretical assumptions of this set of research “almost preclude the problematization of the labour
movement and collective action in the first place” (p. 286) - the focus of Collier and Mahoney's research. Collier and Mahoney (1997) and (Collier, 1999) supplement the focus on elites with one on collective action as they find that collective action carried out by unions and labour-affiliated parties have a significant impact on transitions. They arrive at this conclusion based on research from South America and Southern Europe. Their findings suggest that popular groups can make change from below and play a direct role in transitions. Rueschemeyer (1992) finds similar conclusions on mass mobilisation from below – conclusions that are much inline with revolutions theory to be discussed in the next chapter. In addition to this, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) find that the threat of mass mobilisation from below, puts pressure on elites to make democratic reforms.

Others have come to similar conclusions. Valenzuela (1989) argues that the best recipe for democratization is when labour organisations are mobilised in high numbers at “certain critical moments of the breakdown of authoritarian institution” (p. 450). He then says that this must be ensued by “restraint when the political agenda shifts in favour of redemocratization” (p. 450). This suggests that popular upsurges are effective, but can also have the potential to be damaging depending on the actions of labour movements.10

Bratton & Van de Walle (1997) find that collective action played a significant role in pressurising authoritarian rulers in sub-Saharan Africa to liberalise or democratise in the 1980's and 1990's. Others such as Tarrow (2011) and Tilly

10 Interestingly, Teorell (2010, p.116) finds no support for a link between labour strikes and democratisation in the third wave.
(1978) also suggest that uprising from below can be a key driver in regime change. Finally, In stark contrast to the elite driven perspective, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) suggest that democratisation does not occur without collective action - they are inseparable.

The conclusion of this body of research on actor driven transitions is that popular collective uprisings maybe a “decisive factor in a significant subset of regime transformations” (Ulfelder, 2005, p. 313), however this does not necessarily mean that it is a necessary nor a sufficient condition for democratization (Ulfelder, 2005; Przeworski et al., 2000, p. 114-7)

Some have taken a differing perspective on the role of popular uprisings suggesting that they may have negative effects on the chance of democratic outcomes. Karl (1990) suggests that stable democracy has not resulted when mass actors have gained control over ruling classes; Huntington (1984) states that democracies have rarely emerged as a result of mass political action; Weiner and Özbudun (1987) suggests that left-wing parties often provoke authoritarianism; Levine (1988) suggests that conservative transitions are more resilient than those from popular uprising. This is however challenged by Bermeo (1997) who finds that there is “compelling evidence that high levels of popular mobilization do not inevitably side-track the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule” (p. 314).

Finally Teorell (2010, p. 4) states that “the ‘social forces’ tradition (Bellin, 2000) were to prove correct as democratisation during the third wave has been triggered by mass mobilisation from below”. It appears that pressure from below has been the key motivating factor in the third wave (post-cold-war) of
democratisation – the colour revolutions in Eastern Europe being a prime example. However it is worthwhile noting that elite choices may still have an impact depending on how they respond to protesters (Nepstad, 2011), and that elite decisions interact with decisions from below. In other words, elite choices may still have an effect on the outcome of a regime changes, whether or not there is a popular uprising. An example of these two theories of change interlinking is seen in Collier (1999).

This collective driven approach is consistent with the body of literature that specifically focuses on nonviolent revolutionary regime transitions. Although many mentioned above include nonviolent movements in their analysis, nonviolence is not their specific focus as they also assess violent regime changes. Another important point is that collective action is not necessarily revolutionary. In other words, collective action may result in reform that creates democratisation while not aiming to overthrow a regime, however this is not the concern of this thesis. The research specifically focusing on revolutionary transitions will now be explored.

**Democratization through Revolution**

Democratisation through revolution implies a regime change, caused by bottom-up action that occurs outside of state institutions. Therefore it is different to voting, lobbying and solving disputes through the legal system, although these

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11 As mentioned earlier, Huntington (1991) generalised the third wave as 1974-1991, but the third wave of democratisation can be considered to go further, into the 21st century.
events may also occur during the revolution but not be the primary mode of change.\textsuperscript{12} This could be achieved with violent or nonviolent means.

Recent research suggests that nonviolent revolutions are more successful and are more likely to result in post-conflict democracies than violent attempts at revolutionary change. This is a sub-branch of literature on mass-driven change that focuses on tactical choice - especially the choice between violent and nonviolent tactics.

Nepstad (2011, p. 4) states that nonviolent revolutions have flourished since 1986 (in other words, during the third wave of democratisation), and most often under authoritarian regimes. In studies looking at specific cases of popular action, including Bermeo, 1997; Bratton and van de Walle (1992); Collier & Mahoney (1997); Wood (2001); Schock (2005); Slater (2009), it is suggested that nonviolent people’s movements can produce transitions to democracy from below. In addition to this Martin (2007) argues that the historical record of nonviolent resistance shows that it is more successful than conventional politics or violent resistance. He also suggests that it often has higher levels of popular participation and a compatibility of means and ends.

Large-N studies also come to similar conclusions, notably Toerell (2010), Ulfelder (2005), Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005), Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and Celestino and Gleditsch (2013).

Toerell (2010, p. 216) finds that peaceful anti-government demonstrations can promote changes that result in higher levels of democracy, whereas riots and

\textsuperscript{12} A more comprehensive discussion of what is revolutionary will be provided in the next chapter.
strikes do not have a positive effect. Interestingly, Teorell (p. 101) states that "what I observe (during the third wave) is not an upsurge of popular protest that is an integral part of the democratisation process itself. What is being captured is instead the impact of popular mobilisation in one year on the propensity to democratise the following year, all else being equal, which lends stronger support to a causal interpretation of its impact". Ulfelder (2005) also finds support for the positive role nonviolent action can play in regime transitions, particularly under authoritarian single party and military regimes.

Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) looked at 67 democratic transitions that occurred from 1973-2004 and found that “the types of forces that are engaged in pressing the transition have significant impact on the success or failure of democratic reform” (p. 2). Their findings show that the presence of a nonviolent movement during the period of transition was a major source of pressure for change to democracy in most transitions. They conclude that “how a transition from authoritarianism occurs and the types of forces that are engaged in pressing the transition have significant impact on the success or failure of democratic reform” (p. 2).13 They find that out of the 67 transitions studied, “only two transitions that have led to high levels of freedom today were driven from the top-down by power holders and one by external military intervention” (p. 5).

Johnstad (2010) tests and expands on the Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) study using a sensitivity analysis to assess the validity of “their finding that

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13 Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) also conclude that there were few positive effects on freedom from elite transitions; that prospects for freedom are enhanced when the opposition is nonviolent; and finally, that transitions lead by nonviolent action we more likely to be democratic in 2004.
nonviolent civic action improves the durability of democracy” (p. 464). Johnstad (2010) finds that “the analysis shows that this correlation has statistical significance and remains significant with Polity IV and the Economist Intelligence Unit regime indices replacing the original Freedom House data” (p. 464). This suggests that Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) results are robust to changes in how democracy is measured. In addition to the Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) results, Johnstad (2010) also finds that “civic transitions to democracy result in significantly stronger post transition economic growth than do transitions driven by power holders” (p. 464). Additionally, if violence is used in a transition the chance of post transition violent conflict dramatically increases. Johnstad (2010) concludes that “contrary to the assessments of some political scientists, nonviolent mass action must be regarded as an effective means not only for tearing down existing autocratic regimes but also for paving the way for durable democracy—at least during the period of time covered by Karatnycky and Ackerman’s study” (p. 475).

Similarly to Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005), Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) find that, when compared to violent revolutionary regime change, regime change created by a nonviolent resistance campaigns have resulted in higher levels of post-conflict democracy. They suggest that violent insurgency sometimes overthrows regimes, however the long-term consequences are not desirable and may lead to less freedom than before as the new regime operates in an authoritarian manner (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 208). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, p. 202) have also shown that there is likely to be a recurrence of
civil war within 10 years after a violent revolution but significantly less chance of war after a nonviolent revolution.

Arguably Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) and Stephan and Chenoweth's (2008) most important finding, after looking at 323 major campaigns from 1900 to 2006, is that nonviolent campaigns were successful in achieving their aims 53% of the time (compared to violent campaigns that had a 26% success rate). This finding is much in line with the previous work on actor driven transitions.

Additionally, although violent movements may make short-term gains they are not usually long lasting - even failed attempts at nonviolent revolution are more likely to result in more democratic and peaceful societies than successful violent movements (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p.202). A valuable point in this regard can be taken from Randle (1994, p. 113) who says that nonviolence may diminish “humiliation, hatred, and desire for revenge” which are potential causes of further conflict. Due to the lack of killing, there may well be lower grievances to deal with after the revolution. Nonviolent movements are also less likely to destroy vital infrastructure during conflict. In contrast, civil war for example is likely to create public health problems for these reasons (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p.206). Intact infrastructure is likely to result in less hardship post-revolution, which is a stronger foundation to construct a peaceful society on.

Recent empirical work supports this, showing that nonviolent movements tend to have higher levels of participation (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Schock, 2005). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011 p. 32-33) show that the average nonviolent campaign has over 200,000 members which is about 150,000 more that the average violent campaign. This is significant because the more people out on the
streets partaking in nonviolent resistance, the less are participating in activities that allow the government to function.\textsuperscript{14} This means that the government has less power, but also that the nonviolent movement has an increased ability to resist. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) suggest that the reason for higher participation numbers in nonviolent campaigns is because of lower participation barriers. Nonviolent movements have less physical barriers (p. 34), lower informational difficulties (p. 35), less moral barriers (p. 36), and lower commitment problems (p. 37). Ulfelder (2005, p. 317) also suggests that “...nonviolent collective action seems more likely to attract new participants than violent collective action, if for no reason other than the concerns of potential participants about their personal safety.”

This is likely to have an effect on the long-term outcomes of a nonviolent revolutionary transition because higher levels of participation in the movement are likely to lead to higher political involvement after the revolution (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 207) which may in turn lean towards a more democratic system as there is already direct political participation from the masses. This is especially true when people feel that they can make a difference – a likely outcome after partaking in a successful revolution.

Nonviolent campaigns are more likely to use consent in decision-making processes (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p.208). This may favour more democratic

\textsuperscript{14} Having said this, certain sectors of the population can likely apply more damage to the regime when they do not perform their usual tasks. For example, if the police and army refused to obey orders this is likely to be extremely detrimental to any regime as the regime would lose its ability to use physical force to control protesters. This would likely be more damaging to the regime than other sections of the workforce going on strike.
governance after the revolution. The movement is also more likely to be participatory rather than secretive and hidden, where decisions are only made by a small number (Randle, 1994; Schock, 2013).

Sharp (2012) argues that during a violent revolution the majority of the population have no say in the direction and actions of the movement during conflict, and through the weakening of civil society groups, they have little say post-conflict. In short, violent revolutions are less likely to lead to post conflict democracy due to a centralising impact. On the other hand, nonviolent movements tend to de-centralise power which gives the masses a greater ability to hold elites accountable (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 61).

Schock (2013, p. 285) summarises this nicely as he states that “...beyond the strategic effectiveness in promoting regime change, the nature of the resistance may shape the post transition regime and society. By contrast, violent social movements, when successful, tend to result in the centralization of power, which in turn promotes power differentials between ruling and subordinate groups.” Celstino and Gleditsch (2013, p. 391) come to a similar conclusion. They state that “violence tends to strengthen hierarchy and decrease diversity on the dissident side, as nonconformists are purged or marginalized. By contrast, nonviolent movements tend to be broader based than violent movements and are often decentralized, loose coalitions of diverse actors.” In other words within a nonviolent revolution, there is less likely to be domination from one group, and therefore it is likely to be more democratic that violent movements run by one dominant group.
Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) have found similar results. They show that regime change brought about by violent movements is likely to create new autocracies as opposed to nonviolent movements that are likely to considerably increase the likelihood of a transition to democracy. This is true especially under favourable international environments.

In summary, the research suggests that nonviolent revolutions often result in transitions that lead to a range of positive outcomes, including the primary focus of this thesis – increased democracy.

**Variation in Nonviolent Movements**

Despite the many successes of nonviolent revolutions, and their impressive success rate when compared to violent revolutions, there is still unexplained variation. As has been shown, nonviolence often leads to increased levels of democratic participation after a revolution. However, some nonviolent revolutions that succeed in overthrowing a dictator are not democracies 5 or 10 years after the revolution. As previously mentioned, Egypt appears to be an example of this. At the time of writing (2013-2014) the hope that the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 would create more freedom and a more democratic society, is quickly fading in the wake of oppressive state backlashes against protesters and journalists, and a military coup d'état - extremely undemocratic events. Why is this? It is this gap that is the concern of this thesis.

This research will explore two potential answers to this puzzle by focusing on what nonviolent groups *do* (in terms of their strategy or lack of, and actions) during their campaign and how this effects the transformation of society after a dictator or regime is removed through a nonviolent revolution. Specifically, how
seizing or not seizing the state, and the campaign size of nonviolent revolutionary movement, affects increases or decreases in institutional democracy post-revolution.

There is a long debated argument within revolutionary circles over whether or not the state needs to be seized in a revolution in order for the revolutionaries to ensure changes in society. These go back at least as far as the Jacobins during the French Revolution, and continued onto Marxism and Anarchist thinkers in the late 1800’s to early 1900’s – specifically in arguments between Marxists and Mikhail Bakunin in the 1st international.\footnote{The first international, or international workingmen’s association (IWMA), founded in 1864, was an organization put together to unite revolutionary left-wing groups (Sandle, 2013, p. xxxii). See Kinna (2005, pp. 27-37) for a brief overview of this debate between anarchists and Marxists.} As will become clear in the next chapter, different stances regarding state seizure still guide academics and indeed revolutionaries up to this day. A recent example can be seen in a document by Baburam Bhattarai (2004) who was a Nepalese Maoist guerrilla during the Nepalese civil war, entitled “the question of building a new type of state”. In this document he clearly outlines his position for seizing state power. So far, there has been no empirical research to test what the effect of state seizure is on post-nonviolent-revolution democratisation is. In fact, the question of the state is largely ignored in both empirical and theoretical work on nonviolence. There is one exception to this in a chapter in a book called “Social Power and Political Freedom” written by the prominent nonviolence theorist Gene Sharp (1980).\footnote{Chapter 12, entitled “Popular Empowerment”.} before much of his work, such as “From Dictatorship To Democracy”, became popular and spread around the world. Here, Sharp does not explicitly lay out his
position on seizing state power. However, he does suggest that there are dangers presented by the state as it centralises power post-revolution, and offers a few points on what may need to happen to ensure democratisation after the fall of a regime. This needs to be explored further, and tested, in order to access what the role of the state is in post-nonviolent-revolution democratisation. The next chapter outlines reasons why we might expect that capturing the state is an important precondition for democratization.

A second variable that may positively effect post-revolution democratisation is the campaign size of the revolutionary movement. This is because movements with higher number may be able to exert more force, which can be used against new rulers. It also suggests that there will likely be more people and groups in the revolutionary movement. The diversity that this results in may lead to a more democratic society post-revolution. This will be discussed in the next chapter. It is hoped that testing both of these variables will provide answers to why some nonviolent revolutions succeed in creating democratisation while others fail.
**Theory**

As can be seen in the previous chapter, regime changes caused by nonviolent revolutions do happen, and they result in democratisation more often than violent revolutions. However the question of why some nonviolent movements result in democratisation, while others do not, remains open. This thesis will first test whether the seizing of the state significantly increases the chance that nonviolent revolutions will result in democratisation or autocratisation. Secondly, it will test whether the size of the nonviolent campaign matters for post-conflict democratisation. The logic that derives these two expectations will be outlined in this chapter. This will lead to the development of two hypotheses that will be tested through a large-n quantitative analysis.

This chapter will be presented as follows: revolution and democracy will be defined; the argument for seizing the state will then be outlined, followed by arguments against seizing the state; this will provide suggestions of alternative factors that may be necessary to create post-nonviolent-revolution democracy, of which campaign size has been selected for testing.

What is a revolution?

Revolution must be defined as it determines my sample of cases. There are many definitions of revolution, but broadly they fit into two categories: short-term, encompassing a single event, and long-term, with multiple events.

In the short-term view the revolution is seen as a single event, often known as the political revolution. This is the forcible transfer of state power from one bloc of actors to another through a revolutionary uprising (Tilly, 1993; Lenin, 1932). This
is the moment, often referred to as a specific date, where the current regime loses power. According to the dominant Marxist-Leninist influenced revolutions literature, this is also the moment when representatives of the revolution (often) in the form of a vanguard party, seize the state thus becoming a new regime. The regime differs from the state, although the two words may sometimes get confused. In the context of this thesis, the regime is the group of people, elites, who control and coordinate state institutions to work for their own aims. The regime is like the person who controls a machine. As will be shown later in this chapter, not all revolutionaries agree that the state must be seized in a revolution. Broadly, what can be agreed upon is that the political revolution is the moment when the current regime no longer holds power due to pressure or force created by the revolutionary movement.

The long-term view, commonly referred to as the social or great revolution, is not a single moment, but a longer period in which radical social change occurs. It is a process where society is reshaped in the fashion the revolutionaries deem fit. However this may not be the case if other groups are able to co-opt the revolution from the revolutionaries, in other words, if a counter-revolution occurs. The assumption is made that the revolutionaries retain control after the regime is overthrown. According to this definition, the revolution is complete once dramatic social change has occurred. This will involve a moment where the current regime falls. As Vladimir Illich Lenin (1932, p. 32) stated, the revolution involves “…the adjustment of the lives of tens of millions of people”. You could say that if this happens in the way the revolutionaries were advocating for, the social revolution was successful.
There are common threads throughout all definitions of revolution, political and social. These are that changes come from the bottom-up as people’s movements force the current rulers out of power; this often involves mass mobilisation; and unconventional means are used (Tilly, 1993).\textsuperscript{17} Political revolutions certainly have these aspects to them, but it is arguable as to whether a social revolution does.\textsuperscript{18} Revolution differs from a coup d’état, which is driven by an elite minority. Therefore coup d’états are not the concern of this thesis. Unconventional means are acts that are performed outside of the current state, or constitutional structure, such as parliamentary reform, lobbying, or the justice system – all of which are increasingly less likely to be legitimate paths that lead to change, the more authoritarian a regime is. These must be observed for a revolution to have happened. A nonviolent revolution is when revolution occurs without the use of physical violence.

Most research and revolutionary theory has in fact focused on how \textit{revolutionary situations} can turn into \textit{revolutionary outcomes}; that is, how uprisings can result in the political revolution. A revolutionary situation is a term conceptualized and defined by Tilly (1993, p. 10) as a situation where “two or more blocs make effective, incompatible claims to control the state, or to be the state”. One bloc is necessarily the state itself. When the revolutionaries succeed in overthrowing the regime we can say that there has been a \textit{revolutionary outcome}. However, little

\textsuperscript{17} Unconventional means exist outside the normal set of state authorized procedures such as voting, lobbying and the use of a judicial system. For examples of nonviolent unconventional means see Sharp (1973, pp. 117-435). A list of his 198 methods of nonviolent action mentioned in these pages is provided in Appendix 1. Unconventional means could also be violent, e.g. guerrilla warfare.

\textsuperscript{18} We may see revolutions that, after the political revolution in which the state is seized, bottom-up action is prevented and political and societal changes are very much top-down. The Chinese revolution is a clear example of this.
thought has gone into what actions result in positive long-term outcomes such as post-revolution democratisation, compared to work that explores the gap between how campaigns successfully move from a revolutionary situation to a revolutionary outcome.

The subject of this thesis could be framed in the question: “How can nonviolent revolutionary movements that successfully achieve a political revolution succeed in creating a social revolution, in so far as their political revolution resulted in increased democratic institutions within the society concerned?” I will now define the term “democratisation”. Democratisation in relation to revolution can then be comprehensively discussed. The specific concern of this thesis could be framed as nonviolent revolutions that achieve democratisation as part of a social revolution.

What is Democratisation?

It is important to expand on the definition of democracy presented in the previous chapter. This is because the theoretical approaches discussed in this chapter, and the research mentioned in the literature review above, often conceptualise democracy and democratisation differently to each other. In general, democratisation theorists envisage democratisation as a shift towards a liberal democratic mode of governance. Alternatively, revolutions theorists and leaders of revolutionary movements hold more radical views of democracy. This will now be explained.

The meaning of democracy is rarely challenged within the democratisation literature. It is mostly agreed that democracy contains specific features. These are, according to Hadenius and Teorell (2005), “…the existence of certain fundamental democratic rights involving universal suffrage, free and fair elections, and the
upholding of a number of political liberties” (p. 88). Key attributes of a democratic government that allow these features to exist securely are presented by Dahl (1971 pp. 2-4) as contestation and participation. Contestation is when people in a country have unhindered opportunities to: (1) “formulate their preferences”; (2) “signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action”; (3) “have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government.” Participation is when the population of a country can equally participate in contesting the government.

Accepting this, democratisation can then be viewed in two ways:

1) The move to a particular political system that has certain qualities (as above) – the most significant being where those who govern are selected by elections where the opposition have a chance of winning (Przeworski et al., 2000, p. 16). The opposition must have a chance of winning the elections. This view of democratisation is a categorical distinction. Democratisation occurs when a regime changes to fit this strict criterion – it either does or does not, and therefore is or is not a democracy.

2) Teorell (2010, p. 31) suggests that the features of a regime and/or a country can and do change. Democratisation is viewed on scale, where a regime can move towards democracy or authoritarianism. It occurs when there is a move towards democracy on this scale. Here democratisation can occur without meeting the categorical definition presented previously. For this view of democratisation, there is not a set political system that is democracy. There are however certain things that can be observed in any given society that make it more or less democratic, rather than simply
being a democracy or something else entirely. This measurement of
democracy is continuous as it is measured as more or less along a scale.

While these definitions are acceptable within the democratisation literature, they
do not all encompass certain aspects of democracy when the word is used from
other standpoints. For example, these definitions, both of democracy and
democratisation, do not sit comfortably with the anarchist (including Gandhian),
Marxist (of any kind), or even Sharpian (at least as defined in some of his earlier
work), definitions of democracy that are to be discussed in this chapter. It is
beyond the scope of this thesis to comprehensively define “what democracy is”
through a Marxist or anarchist lens, but a broad definition of what democracy is
conceived as from a leftist point of view has been provided by Herbert Read
(2002). Read (pp. 14-36) suggests that democracy can only be achieved when
three conditions are met:

1) “...all production should be for use, and not for profit” (p. 15).

2) “...each should give according to his ability, and each receive according to
   his needs” (p. 15).

3) “...the workers in each industry should collectively own and control that
   industry” (p. 15).
What runs through this is the idea that *equity* is vital for democracy.\(^\text{19}\) There are elements of this idea in the previous concept of democracy - for example universal suffrage is considered a key element of democracy - but Read's conception applies the concept of equity to all of peoples lives, not just when voting, but also in the workplace and other societal institutions – within all aspects of life. Liberal, capitalist, democracies do not allow this. As Read writes, we cannot see any examples of his “ultimate” democracy on a large scale – “Democracy has been promulgated and its principles endlessly proclaimed; but no country in the world has ever, for more than the brief space of a few months, been put into practice” (Read, 2002, p. 15). So how does this radical view of democracy fit with the above definitions of democratisation?

Definition-one, clearly does not fit with Read's radical view of democracy. What Przeworski et al., (2000) describe does not go far enough, as the cut-off for what is democratic does not meet Read's standards of what can be considered democratic. Definition-two may or may not fit depending on how it is conceptualised. For example, if liberal democracy at the far end of the scale, is the most democratic we can get, then the theory does not fit. However, if the democratisation scale runs from outright violent authoritarianism at one end to Read's democracy at the other, then it may do. Societies can be observed to be democratising as they move along the scale towards equity. Read’s definition of

\(^{19}\) Equity is not to be confused with equality. Bronfenbrenner (1973, p. 10) writes that equity “...implies that the distribution of... whatever is being distributed will be in accordance with principles of justice” and it is therefore a subjective matter. In short, equity means that those who have the least will be given the most, and those that already have the most will be given the least. This puts everyone on a level playing field. This is different from equality, where everyone is given the same amount of whatever is being distributed, regardless of what they had in the first place.
democracy is not a completely different concept to the definition of liberal democracy – a society that has free and fair elections is more democratic than one that does not – but for Read, liberal democracy is by no means the end point.

Another important conflict to consider in this discussion is the conception of the state. While liberal democrats and Marxists alike see the state as part of democratisation,20 anarchists see the state as inherently undemocratic and dominative. These points will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter under the heading “the counter-argument to seizing the state”, but again, looking through an anarchist lens, a country could be viewed as more or less democratic even if it does not have Read’s ultimate democracy.

These conflicts are important to bear in mind while reading this chapter, as many of the revolutionary theorists discussed, both violent and nonviolent, would not view a liberal democracy as a full democracy. However, the statistical analysis (to be presented in the next chapter) will be measuring institutional democracy, much in line with the second definition of liberal democratisation above.21 It will view democracy as a scale, however this scale will not be able to measure Read’s definition of democracy. This is not necessarily problematic, because as Read

20 Their views on the issue differ significantly. Liberal democrats see the state as inherent to democracy; the purpose of elections being to choose new heads of this state. Marx himself saw the state as a construct that would wither away after revolution. It would not be part of a communist world system. However, it was considered necessary for the initial transition to communism.

21 The level of democracy and the amount of democratization in a society will be measured using the Polity IV scale (Gurr, Jaggers, & Marshall, 2010). This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, but key components of a democratic country are: voting in regular elections; competition in elections where opponents have a greater than zero chance of success; and where there is an independent judiciary.
suggests, his radical democracy has not been seen on a large scale. As this research is focusing on past nonviolent revolutions that occur on a national level, if Read is correct, we can assume that none of these movements resulted in Read’s conception of democracy. As Read’s democracy has not yet happened, I cannot measure and test it. Therefore this research will be exploring variation between authoritarian regimes and imperfect democracies. However I take the view that we can still measure a shift towards or away from democracy, even if no case in the sample achieves perfect democracy. In other words, a move from authoritarianism to institutional democracy is still democratisation, even though it has not lead to ultimate democracy. I will now discuss the possible effect of state seizure, and then the campaign size of a movement, on post-nonviolent-revolution democratisation.

**Seizing the State and Democratisation**

To my knowledge, scholars conducting empirical research into nonviolent resistance movements have not investigated the problem of seizing state power. However, it is an important question, and in order to find answers it is necessary to first look to other areas of thought that may provide theoretical insights into the reasons for and against seizing state power. Most of this thought can be found within the Marxist and anarchist traditions.

Wallerstein (2000, pp. 151-152) explains that leftist revolutionary politics through the 19th century involved two steps - to seize state power and then transform society. This was for three reasons: (1) “it seemed to be the only way to overcome the accumulated economic and cultural power of the privileged strata”; (2) “the only way to ensure that new kinds of institutions could be constructed”;
(3) the only way to “maintain against counterattack”. This idea, still held by many revolutionaries and revolutionary theorists,22 appeared to many to be the only way a social revolution could be successful. However, as Wallerstein (2000, p. 152) points out, it often failed, as the second step of the two-step process rarely happened. This failure has led to disillusionment into the 20th and 21st century with leftist politics – possibly a reason why the question of state seizure has not been explored in relation to nonviolent revolution. We do not have empirical evidence either way for the outcomes of state seizure in nonviolent revolution, and as will be shown in this chapter it is a concept that is adopted by some, contested by some, and ignored by others. Activist’s stance in relation to the question of state seizure could possibly change the outcomes of their campaigns, and more specifically for this thesis, whether nonviolent revolution results in democratisation. I will discuss both points of view, for seizing the state and against seizing.

Wallerstien’s (2000) stance fits well with the anarchistic argument against state seizure. However, Wallerstien’s discussion is centred on leftist revolutionary politics that are aiming for the conception of democratisation that is demonstrated above by Read (2002). It is possible that this anarchistic stance speaks to why we do not see radical democracy anywhere in the world on a large scale. However, it does not explain variation in the levels of democracy we do see between countries that have experienced revolutions. I will take the position in this thesis that Wallerstien’s argument is strong in terms of explaining why we do not see radical democracy anywhere. The anarchist position appears to be strong

22 Especially those following in the footsteps of Lenin and Mao Zedong.
if the aim of a movement is to create a radical democracy with complete social equity. However, the argument for state seizure seems to offer a more plausible definition for the variation in the levels of democracy we do see currently in post-revolution societies, although, as Wallerstien acknowledges, it has failed to bring about radical/ultimate democracy. I will now present the logic of each position before presenting my hypothesis.

**The Argument for Seizing the State**

“The basic question of every revolution is that of state power. Unless this question is understood, there can be no intelligent participation in the revolution, not to speak of guidance of the revolution...” - Vladimir Il'ič Lenin (1964)

In order to comprehend the argument for seizing the state in revolution, I must first review the revolutions literature’s conception of the state. In any revolution, the revolutionary movement will necessarily be challenging the state/the controllers of the state as their primary target. This is because it is the state, and the elites that hold power over it, that enforce the current status quo – what people can and cannot do; how much freedom people have; the direction a society takes. That is, until the populace reclaim this power. Any revolutionary movement that wants democratisation must concern itself with the state because it is the state’s power that prevents changes towards democratisation occurring without revolution. On the flipside, the state must also neutralise the threat presented by a revolutionary movement if it is to maintain its position.

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23 It is acknowledged that even in the largest revolutions, only a fraction of the population actually participates. Therefore, we are only ever going to be looking at a subset of the whole population.
Goodwin (2001, p. 11) provides a definition of the state that gives further insights into its nature. The state is:

“...those core administrative, policing and military organizations, more or less coordinated by an executive authority, that extract resources from and administer and rule (through violence if necessary) a territorially defined national society... generally, states claim the right to exercise final and absolute authority (i.e. sovereignty) within national societies.”

Goodwin alludes to the state’s coercive capacity (of which it theoretically holds a monopoly) through the security forces. He suggests that there is an “executive authority”, or group of elites, that hold the reigns of state power and therefore the ability to utilize the state’s coercive capabilities for their own ends. These elites (whether democratically elected, or as part of an authoritarian regime) extract resources from people living within the state’s territory (often a nation-state) through taxes and labour, and use them in the interest of “the nation” - in the interest of the elites who control state power. It can therefore be assumed that the more authoritarian a state is, the more elites are able to use these resources for their own means without the populace being able to challenge them through state structures, such as through the judiciary. The populace, or society, which is defined as the people living in territory controlled by the state, are therefore subject to the state’s will. When the populace acts in a way that opposes the state, that state has the option of using coercive means to maintain control.
This can be seen as an over-simplification for five reasons: (1) The state can and often does provide services that benefit the populace - some of the resources pulled from them are then used for social good through, for example, health, education, transport, and sanitation systems. (2) In different states, to varying degrees, the populace may have ways of challenging the state’s decisions and processes through institutional means such as voting, lobbying and legal systems, or at least perceive that they do. The more authoritarian the state is, the less opportunity for this. (3) As Goodwin (2001, p. 11) points out, he “…make[s] no assumption… that states are unitary actors that are not themselves potentially driven by conflicts of interest, identity, and vision”. That is to say, there is unlikely to be in any state, a small group of individuals who have complete control, and oversee every single aspect of the state, which is itself likely to be a vast set of institutions, operating to achieve many different goals. Some of these goals are bound to be contradictory. (4) The state may well hold a monopoly on coercive force, but different states vary in their capacities. (5) Some authoritarian states may still be heavily constrained in what they can do by other institutions such as religious groups or the military.

Although over-simplified, the discussion of the nature of the state as presented above gives us a way of conceptualizing how grievances may be formed, and why the state can be seen as the source of the populace’s grievances. As the rule-makers and enforcers who help to create the social environment that the populace live in, elites that hold the reigns of state power decide what people are entitled to, what they have access to, and how wealth is distributed.
Another term that must now be defined is *state power*. State power is, to put it simply, the capacity and ability of the institutions that make up the state to achieve their purposes and enforce their laws over the territory that they have jurisdiction over. If the state is strong it is more able do this in the face of internal and external threats. Leon Trotsky (1909, p. 234) famously noted that the defining characteristic of the state is that it monopolises its means of coercion in society.\textsuperscript{24} If this monopoly weakens in relation to potentially competing groups, there is a reduction in state power. However it is important to remember that the state’s power, reinforced by its security forces, may not have the same amount of power in all parts of its territory (Herbst, 2004) – for example the state may hold more power in urban as opposed to rural areas. We can see from this analysis why the revolutions literature (as a whole) advocates for the seizure of the state. Firstly the current controllers of the state have to be removed, and secondly the state can then be used to implement revolutionary changes. I will now expand on this concept.

The political revolution, synonymous with the seizure of the state, necessitates the social revolution.\textsuperscript{25} In other words, the state cannot be used to implement changes until the current regime has been removed through a political revolution. As the political revolution is being achieved, the revolutionaries, often as a vanguard party but sometimes as a coalition of parties, are encouraged to seize the state. Here we see representatives of the broader revolutionary movement take command. This concept is summarised nicely by Newman (2011, p. 348) who states that “the classical model of revolution is constructed around the image

\textsuperscript{24} This concept was later adopted by Max Weber (Goodwin, 2001, p. 12).
\textsuperscript{25} See Tilly (1993); Tilly (1978); Tarrow (2011); Goodwin (2001).
of a centralized place of power – the political space of the state – which can be seized, taken over, mastered by a revolutionary vanguard.” As mentioned in the previous chapter, many Marxists of different shades have touted this logic time and time again, as they argue that the seizure of the state would be necessary for social revolution. The logic they use is also applicable to democratisation.

The justification for seizing the state can be largely summarised in two points:

1) **It allows for a revolutionary vanguard to make sweeping changes across society:** The controllers of the state are the rule makers and enforcers who help to create the social environment that the populace live in – what they are entitled to, what they have access to, how wealth is distributed. Seizing state power therefore allows for the restructuring of society and the ability to pay-off any debts to groups that helped with the success of the political revolution by joining the revolutionary coalition. The state structure is seen as a neutral tool. Whoever controls it can use it to shape society as it sees fit. In short, state seizure gives revolutionaries the power to democratise.

2) **It protects against challengers:** If revolutionaries can seize the state then they can remove current power-holders from all of their positions. In some violent revolutions this has been termed “purging the old guard”. They can also use the state’s resources and institutions to defend their new regime – notably the security forces. Tilly (1978) states that the “reconstruction of a single polity through the victory of the alternative coalition, through it’s defeat, or through the establishment of a modus vivendi between the alternation coalition and some or all of the old members; fragmentation of
the revolutionary coalition” (p. 45); and the “reimposition of routine
governmental control throughout the subject population” (p. 46) is needed
to achieve positive long-term outcomes, including democratisation, and, this can only happen if the state is seized. It is assumed here that the new leadership needs to now make sure it is the sole sovereign, and then must make the state perform the roles it did before the revolution (political revolution) or reconstruct and operate new institutions that equal major social change (social revolution). In other words, the revolutionaries must effectively take the seat of the former regime as mentioned above, but quickly use this to change and control the state institutions how they see fit.

Selbin (1993) adds to Tilly’s conceptions. He takes the view that it is the revolutionaries’ (conceptualized as necessarily being part of a vanguard) choices and actions that determine their ability to make social change after the point of the political revolution. Selbin lists three phases of revolution: insurrection, political victory, and finally the transformation of society (pp. 12-13). The final stage is complex, as the new leaders have to undertake two large and essential tasks: (1) institutionalization, which is the “establishment of some sort of at least minimal government that can gain international and domestic acceptance” (p. 14). Here we see a similar conclusion to Tilly. To institutionalize the revolution, old institutions, controlled by the ousted regime, need to be either dismantled, replaced or reconfigured. This allows for immediate control of the state (especially the state security forces) and lays the foundations for the second task. (2) Consolidation, which is “...tied to the function, autonomy, and reproduction of
the new regime”, and is absent in Tilly’s approach. Consolidation is based on the “institutionalization of the regime’s norms and structures, the expansion of its legitimacy, and the removal of obstacles” (Selbin, p. 21). Selbin states that in order to consolidate, the populace must be convinced that political victory (that is, the political revolution) does not signify the success of the revolution – the ‘social revolutionary project’ must be embraced.

Selbin’s conclusion is that only when there is a commitment to both of these tasks can a social revolution be achieved. It allows the revolutionaries to fill the vacant gap left by the ousted regime, thus preventing a power-void from being created that other groups could step into. The key here, which is absent from much revolutionary theory, is an emphasis on the fact that the revolutionary leaders need to stay intact, and they need to actively communicate and work with their populace. The unquestioned or unwavering basis of both Tilly’s and Selbin’s arguments is that the state is seized by revolutionaries and used for long-term institutional change. State seizure gives them the power and ability to make changes if the state is the most powerful set of institutions within a given country – which is likely.

The crux of this research project is to test whether these assumptions about state seizure, assumptions that have been made by many revolutionaries since Marx and even before him, are true in nonviolent revolutions. If they are, we could say that it is vital that a nonviolent revolution seizes the state in order to be able to make the changes that allow democratisation, and ensure that challengers with competing agendas cannot hamper the democratisation process. However, it is unlikely to be this simple and many theorists have rejected this approach
altogether. There is a plausible counter-argument, which I will outline in the next section before stating my position.

However, before I move on, it is important to note that I assume nonviolent movements have preferences towards democratisation that may not be seen in violent movements. Nonviolent movements tend to be more diverse than violent movements (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). This means that there are many participating groups that have an interest in preventing the emergence of a new hegemon, post-revolution, in order to maintain an equal say in decision-making. Therefore, protecting any democratisation that has occurred becomes a priority, and is preferable, as it serves all groups. This idea will be discussed in more detail throughout the thesis, but I mention it here as few nonviolent revolutions aim to create autocracies.\footnote{I cannot find an example of a large nonviolent movement that is aiming to autocratise, although elements within the movement may not be democratic.} Even those campaigns that contain authoritarian elements are often accompanied by a range of more liberal democratic voices. A campaign that may be described as having authoritarian aims is Iran (1979). However, here, liberal democratic groups took part in the revolutionary movement, and many in the movement were calling for democratic reforms. Many of the democratic participants were executed post-revolution (Kurzman, 2004). However few movements appear to follow this pattern. Many nonviolent movements do not appear to use violence post-revolution to purge people who hold positions of power (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p. 210). Considering this, it would seem that it is less likely than a nonviolent movement would make authoritarian changes once they controlled the state after seizing it.
The Counter-Argument to Seizing the State

“And there are those who, like us, see in the State, not only its actual form and in all forms of domination that it might assume, but in its very essence, an obstacle to the social revolution...”
– Peter Kropotkin (1943, p. 9)

As long as the argument for state seizure has been around, there has been an anarchist response that offers a plausible counter-argument to the seizure of the state, and points to dangers in much of the revolutions literatures approach. The majority of academics and revolutionary theorists have ignored this anarchistic response. However, nonviolent revolutionary thinkers have largely adopted it.

Anarchist theory is an oft-ignored body of revolutionary theory that does aim to remove the state’s power, but does not aim to seize state control. The anarchist perspective “combine[s] a socialist critique of capitalism, a (laissez-faire) liberal rejection of the State, both as a status quo and as a vehicle for social change, with a socialist insistence upon human solidarity and communitarianism” (Goodway, 2013, p. 1). A rejection of the state, and in fact all forms of domination is what defines anarchism. As above, the state itself is still viewed as an undemocratic entity that takes resources in the shape of time and money from the populace and uses them for the “national interest”, which is ultimately seen as the interest of elites. The key difference to revolutions literature however, is that the state is seen to always undesirable, no matter who is in control of it. I cannot claim to be offering a comprehensive view of anarchist theory, which unlike Marxism or Leninism cannot be attributed to one person or set of ideas, so this is a very broad conception of an anarchist response. Neither am I using a particular anarchist framework or stance to analyse the state-seizure approach to revolution, but the
term “anarchist” is used broadly to explore alternative theoretical links between state seizure, and the possibility of autocratisation. I will now attempt to apply an anarchistic lens to look at the state seizure argument.

The anarchist argument for not seizing the state can be largely summarised by saying that the state-seizure approach strengthens and increases the central power of the state, and as far as I can see, could have three immediate implications which could prevent rather than increase the chance of democratisation after a nonviolent revolution:

1) **Centralisation and counter-revolutions:** The method of change involves strengthening the central power of the state, meaning that a small number of people (likely to be in the capital city) can make sweeping societal changes across the nation in question (Newman, 2011). Even if this new leadership means well, if it is removed in a counter-revolution, a situation is created where new rulers can use a stronger and more centralised state to implement authoritarian changes. This may result in an authoritarianism that is worse than the previous one – where the new dictators have a better ability to implement their will in a wider-reaching way, and where it is harder for activists to resist. Of course, this position depends on a counter-revolution happening.

2) **The method of creating change, in and of itself, is undemocratic:** State seizure often involves a small number of revolutionaries centralising power, as opposed to dispersing it wider and giving it to more people – in other words they strengthen rather than disperse the state. As power is centralised, a small group of people make sweeping changes on behalf of
everyone else rather than dispersing that power, letting people make the
decisions that affect them. A vanguard of elites makes and ensures the
revolutionary changes for the majority. According the vanguardist
approach, nobody else has a say while this is happening. Therefore other
groups may not be able to participate in decision making if they disagree
with the revolutionary vanguard. In other words, according to the
anarchist, seizing the state, and making top-down changes is inherently
undemocratic and disempowering. It leans towards authoritarianism
rather than democracy, as it does not include any perspectives of people
outside of the party that is taking power. Only a small percentage of the
nonviolent revolutionary movement could ever take positions of power in
the state, which leaves the majority of the movement powerless.

3) The state structure is not neutral: The assumption that the state is a
neutral structure that can be used by whoever controls it in order to
achieve their desired ends may be false. The anarchist says that the state
structure is authoritarian in-and-of itself (Carter, 2000). This can be
taken two ways. Firstly, anarchists argue that all states are hierarchical
authoritarian structures and by their very nature prevent democracy and
serve elites (Kinna, 2005). Secondly, a less radical approach may suggest
that the same authoritarian state structures that persisted before the
revolution will still exist when they are used by the new regime, and this
will prevent democratisation. In short, the anarchist rejects the seizure of
the state because “in seizing control of the state and using it to

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27 Carter (2000) provides an in-depth discussion of the logic of state power from
an anarchist perspective.
revolutionize society, the vanguardist strategy only reaffirms and reproduces state power.” (Newman, 2011, p. 350). Following this logic, the state will not “whither away” after being seized and manipulated as Marx and Lenin (amongst others) envisioned. Marx’s conception was that after the state was seized and the *dictatorship of the proletariat*\(^{28}\) was imposed, that the state would whither away as it would no longer be needed.\(^{29}\) Anarchist’s reject this and often point out that it does not happen.\(^{30}\) In the view of the anarchist, state seizure strengthens the state, moving in the opposite direction to what Marx predicted.

The underlying argument here is that democratisation is hampered through centralization, as increasing power is given to the new guard so that they can *impose* their revolutionary changes. Seizing the state enhances top-down undemocratic rule. If the new guard is only representative of one demographic, this is even more problematic for democratisation. If these conclusions are correct, the seizure of state power by a revolutionary vanguard (the political revolution) may hinder rather than create the conditions for radical social change (the social revolution). The anarchist response is still arguing for revolution, but

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\(^{28}\) This is a key concept in Marxist and Leninist thought. Miliband (1991, p. 151) writes that the dictatorship of the proletariat “...in Marx’s view of it, was meant literally... he meant by it not only a form of *regime*, in which the proletariat would exercise the sort of hegemony hitherto exercised by the bourgeoisie...but also as a form of *government*, with the working class actually governing, and fulfilling many of the tasks hitherto performed by the state”. For Lenin’s interpretation see Lenin’s “State and Revolution” (1968).

\(^{29}\) We can see here that Marx did not see a hierarchical state system as desirable.

\(^{30}\) The Russian Revolution is an oft-used example, with anarchists stating that Lenin’s method of revolution and view of the state is what lead to authoritarianism. Leninists and Trotskyists blame a Stalinist “counter-revolution” within the party, which lead to either a breakdown of the worker’s state (See Trotsky (1972) “The Revolution Betrayed”) and/or state-capitalism (See Cliff (1974) ”State Capitalism in Russia”).
not for the political revolution in the way that it has been framed in the revolutions literature. Current power structures must fall, but they must not be seized because they are the ultimate problem.

There is quite clearly an issue for revolutionaries when planning their strategy. My view is that the anarchist approach, in theory, offers a more plausible approach to creating radical democracy. It is clear, as Wallerstien (2000) has acknowledged, that revolutionaries aiming to create societies with radical forms of democracy have failed, some may say disastrously – key examples being the Russian Revolution and Stalin’s regime which emerged soon after, and the Chinese revolution which was followed by Mao’s great leap forward. In both examples we see complete failures in creating radical democracy. It also seems logical that if the position of the hegemon is to be removed from society, it cannot be done by creating another hegemon. This is arguably what happens when the state is seized. The focus of this thesis however, is to explain the variation been the levels of democratisation observed in post-nonviolent-revolution societies – none of which have totally removed these hegemonic positions of power from their societies, although they may have weakened their control on society. It is questionable as to whether the anarchist approach can explain this variation, as none of these movements could be painted as anarchist success stories. Is it possible that those nonviolent revolutions in which the state was seized could manipulate state structure in a way that leads to more institutional democracy, as it will be measured here? I think that the state seizure example suggests that it could, although the action of seizing the state may prevent the formation of

31 In other words, the state still exists.
radical democracy. In my view, the anarchist argument does not provide a strong counter-argument in explaining variation in the level of institutional democratisation in past nonviolent revolutions, nor does it attempt to, as the formation of liberal democratic systems post-revolution is not it’s aim.\textsuperscript{32} It has been explored as it is a common counter-argument to state seizure, however, due to its aim of “statelessness” I do not deem it help in explaining variations in institutional democracy. However, due to a lack of research there is currently no empirical evidence available to discern what the effect of state seizure has been on post-nonviolent-revolution democratisation. I will now attempt to place nonviolent revolutionary theorists into this debate, before developing further theory to be tested.

\textbf{Are nonviolent revolutionaries for or against?}

“A nonviolent revolution is not a program of seizure of power. It is a program of transformation of relationships ending in peaceful transfer of power” - Mohandas Gandhi (1949, p. 8)

The nonviolence theories lean towards the anarchist stance regarding the seizure of the state. Some, mostly principled nonviolence and civil disobedience literature, sits firmly within it. Other theories sit somewhere in-between the two positions but lean towards the anarchist perspective, notably the theory built up around pragmatic nonviolence theory. However, the empirical research on

\textsuperscript{32} It was not the aim of many revolutions theorists either, but their logic of state seizure still applies, no matter what kind of society the revolutionaries aim to create. Their key argument is that state seizure allows the revolutionaries to reshape society in whatever way they want, whether it is to set up communism or a liberal democracy.
pragmatic nonviolence discussed in the previous chapter does not engage with this debate.

There are two types of nonviolence: (1) pragmatic nonviolence, largely theorized by Gene Sharp (1973; 1980; 2005; 2012) - here nonviolence is chosen because it is more successful, and has tactical advantages over organised violence, and, (2) principled nonviolence, where nonviolence is also chosen for moral reasons. Key to both is their conceptualisation of power and therefore change, which differs from the revolutions literature. Power is seen as pluralistic rather than monolithic (Sharp, 1973, p. 9). That is, power is given to elites through cooperation and obedience from the masses. This is different to the monolithic view, which takes the position that the group with the biggest capacity to exert force through violence is the most powerful. Therefore you can remove a regime not by taking its seat, but by removing its support. This is explained by Robert Helvey (2004) using the “pillars of support” theory. The army, the police, workers, civil servants, religious institutions, the media, the tax system, all act as pillars that give a government its power, or hold it up. As these pillars are pulled away, broken down, or won over to the other side through civil disobedience and nonviolent direct action the regime falls because the people who run the system no longer participate in it. In this model, there is no seizure of power.

Both pragmatic and principled nonviolence have largely been strategic and forceful. However, as shall become clear, they have some differences in their conception of the state, which may have a significant effect on their strategies. I will now briefly discuss the positions of Gandhi and then Sharp in regards to the state, and post-revolution democratisation more generally. This will also form the
basis for discussing campaign size in relation to post-revolution democratisation in the latter part of this chapter.

**Gandhian and Principled Nonviolence**

Gandhi was both a theorist and practitioner of nonviolence. He saw nonviolence as not only the most successful, but also the only possible way to successfully deal with injustice; and further, as the only morally acceptable way to deal with injustice. The idea of seizing state power conflicts with the “four S's” of Gandhian philosophy that help summarise Gandhi’s thought:  \(^{33}\)

1\(^{st}\) – **Swaraj.** This means freedom or self-rule. Gandhi believed that to have peace, we need to foster swaraj within ourselves, and society. He encouraged self-directed participatory structures of government and saw this as helping people to reach their full potential, and as the foundation that would lead to the growth of a truer moral civilization and a common understanding of mutuality. Iyer (1973, p. 253) writes that:

“...the State, in Gandhi’s view, cannot claim inalienable, unchallengeable authority for itself or for its laws as long as it is an essentially coercive agency, even if it secures the tacit assent and acquiescence of its citizens or the active consent of the majority of their chosen or nominated representatives... Gandhi felt that the citizen was entitled to appeal to the law of dharma [natural law], with which both satya [truth] and ahimsa [nonviolence] were identified, in the face of the overwhelming might of the centralized State of today.”

\(^{33}\) These ideas are found in many of Gandhi’s works, but a good starting point for exploration is “Hind Swaraj” (1931) which provides a comprehensive introduction.
He continues (p. 254):

“Gandhi regarded the state as a ‘soulless machine.’ The state represents violence in a concentrated and organized form. The individual has a soul, but as the state is a soulless machine, it can never be weaned from violence to which it owes its very existence.”

The state will always prevent swaraj as it is inherently coercive and violent. A peaceful society in Gandhi’s view could only happen if people were free from coercion.

Swaraj is linked to the 2nd “S” – Swadeshi, which means neighbourliness and localness. Put briefly it meant that decisions should be made at the local level by those who the decisions affect.

The 3rd “S” is Satyagraha. This is the method of overcoming evil, where the truth is used to overcome the unjust. It was Gandhi’s concept of nonviolent action that is used to break down oppressive and violent structures. It is not meant to defeat the other, but is a process of transformation of relationships and thinking where all move together towards what Martin Luther King Jr. termed “the beloved community” (King, 1963). This was a forceful, but also loving process. The combination of these leads to the 4th “S”, Sarvodaya, meaning justice for all beings.34

For Gandhi, the state both prevents self-rule, and is a source of violence and coercion, and therefore it could not be used to end violence. According to a

34 For a more in-depth discussion of these concepts see also Dalton (1993) and Jahanbegloo (2013).
Gandhian/anarchist view of democracy, if democratisation is to occur, power should be decentralised. Satyahagraha is not consistent with seizing, as this means defeating the other, crushing them, which he said would not lead to peace. Means are not considered separate from ends. Therefore Gandhi was both opposed to “seizing”, and to “the state”. Gandhi’s theory was positioned against the state and was anti-state in nature. The state’s law can only be accepted if it is just, if not, it should be rejected and not participated in.

Gandhian thought influenced many other principled nonviolent proponents such as Bart de Ligt and Martin Luther King Jr. Many of these people have put it into practice and adopted it as a guide in their actions. Kinna (2005, p. 154) provides a valuable summary of Gandhian revolutionary thought as she discusses the activist Alan Lovell. She writes that:

“developing this logic, anarchist peace protestors argued that non-violent civil disobedience was a perfect match for anarchism. Alan Lovell, an anarchist member of the Committee of 100 (the organization founded in 1960 from within the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) argued that Gandhian non-violence ‘was something new’. It broke the fantasy of exercising state power and stemmed ‘from a different attitude to politics ... more relevant ... than Marx'. The ‘whole question of non-violent civil disobedience’, he argued, ‘is very closely tied up with decentralisation’.”

To relate back to the definitions of revolution provided in the first half of this chapter: the principled nonviolence approach rejects the political revolution, but aims for social revolution (See Figure 1). Therefore, I assume that movements that follow Gandhi’s work will not be seen trying to seize state power. They are
not trying to “defeat” or punish their “opponent”. However, according to the theory of nonviolent power mentioned above, a revolution could still occur and be secured without seizing the state. Pillars of support that hold the regime up could be removed through protest, disobedience and nonviolent direct-action, thus pulling a regime down. These same tactics can be continued to be used after the fall of a regime, thus protecting against future authoritarianism. Any new regime will also require consent to rule, so if disobedience is sustained on a mass level, authoritarianism, theoretically, cannot take hold. As this is happening, new institutions can be set up by the populous that replace the repressive state structures.

I see three interrelated conditions that would have to be met in order for this to happen: (1) mass participation would have to continue after the fall of the regime; (2) This would most likely require a principled and strong commitment to nonviolent action by a large percentage of the populace; (3) it would require an extensive and wide-reaching mobilisation network that that could coordinate in order to respond to any attempts to re-invigorate authoritarian rule. These factors would be needed to prevent a new authoritarian regime from being formed, as they would not be able to build/strengthen any pillars of support. All of these factors would likely need extensive planning and promotion of nonviolence. However, few movements have actually played out like this, so my comments are purely theoretical. To my knowledge, we cannot know how a situation like this would play out by looking at any case in the past. This is not to say that it is not possible, just that it cannot be observed. This leads to a similar problem as the anarchist literature above in regards to explaining variation in
democratisation that is observed post-nonviolent revolution. While the anarchist position above suggests that state seizure cannot lead to radical democracy, a view Gandhi would appear to agree with, Gandhi also suggested that it is not necessary as we can wage nonviolent struggle in a way that does not necessitate state seizure. While this is interesting, and likely valuable, information to those who wish to use nonviolence, it does not suggest why we see variation in institution democracy post-revolution - in past nonviolent revolutions that have not taken an anarchist-Gandhian approach and have not achieved anarchist-Gandhian societies. Therefore, I reiterate that while state seizure may prevent radical democracy from taking place, and, while there may be better alternatives to state seizure, in observable past nonviolent revolutions (remembering that none of these movements have resulted in anarchist societies) where the state was seized - we may see higher levels of institutional democracy than where it was not seized. This is because it may allow nonviolent revolutionaries to quickly manipulate state structures to, for example, create in independent judiciary or set up a competitive electoral system. Gandhi, like the anarchist position above, has not provided a counter-argument to this. He has however expressed that we will not see an equitably anarchist society, or in Gandhi's case a truly nonviolent society, occur because of it.

I will now provide an examination of Sharpian nonviolence, which may offer an alternative explanation for the variation in levels of institutional democracy observed post-nonviolent-revolution. Sharp, who is not an anarchist, is much more ambiguous than Gandhi in his stance on the role of the state in nonviolent
revolution. He does not paint it as an inherently undemocratic structure, but warns against the strengthening of its socio-political power.

**Figure 1 - Different conceptions of revolution**

- Revolutionary Situations
  - Most research fits here (e.g. mobilization, structural conditions, tactics, violence vs. nonviolence etc.)

- Revolutionary Outcomes
  - Gandian, Nonviolence, Civil Disobedience and Anarchist theories of revolution mostly fit here.
  - Revolutions literature mostly fits here
  - Political Revolution (Seizure of the State and Change of Regime)
  - Social Revolution (Great Revolution)
**Sharpian and Pragmatic Nonviolence**

In pragmatic nonviolence, the theory of power is the same as in principled nonviolence. Robert Helvey who developed the pillars of support theory, is a pragmatist. However, unlike in Gandhian nonviolence, there is no moral reasoning against seizing the state. Discussions about the state and its dangers are rarely mentioned in the pragmatic nonviolence literature - the vast majority of which has been produced by Gene Sharp (1973; 1980; 2005; 2012). From viewing a range of Sharp’s work I identify three factors that he sees as key to long-term success, that link into the state seizure argument. Having said this they do not directly answer the question of state seizure. They provide warnings against it while not directly opposing it. Sharp’s view on “long-term success” does not exclusively focus on democratisation, although democratisation forms an essential part of it – hence the name of his book, “From Dictatorship to Democracy” (2012). The three factors are:

1) **Planning:**

Planning strategy is vital for any movement, as a lack of planning on how to transition to a more free and democratic system could lead to a new dictatorship (Sharp, 2012, p. 61). Sharp provides steps on how to plan strategy to reach democracy (Sharp, 2012, pp. 67-91). This does not link directly to state seizure, but suggests it is vital to plan what the movement will do once a regime falls. State seizure may be one of the options available.

2) **Redistribution of power**

A key part in this strategy must include a redistribution of power across society after the regime falls. Sharp (2012, p. 77) writes:
“To accomplish these objectives, the chosen means of struggle will need to contribute to a change in the distribution of effective power in the society. Under the dictatorship the population and civil institutions of the society have been too weak, and the government too strong. Without a change in this imbalance, a new set of rulers can, if they wish, be just as dictatorial as the old ones.”

This means that it is important to decentralize power in order to avoid another dictatorship. That is, the less centralized power in the state, the more chance of success – an argument that speaks to the anarchist view on the seizure of power. In other work, He does provide more insights into his view on decentralisation that is not provided in the “revolutionary handbooks” discussed so far. Sharp (1980, p. 320) writes that in a violent seizure of power:

“...the loci of power come increasingly under centralized State control, or are outright destroyed. As a direct consequence, the rest of the society becomes weak in comparison to the State apparatus... When this has occurred, whoever can control the State apparatus is likely to have little trouble in controlling the society for their own purposes. This happens even when those purposes are very different ones from those of the earlier social reformers and revolutionaries who used the centralized State simply to meet human needs more adequately and to build a better society. A State apparatus which is strong enough to free us is also strong enough to enslave us.”

This quote shows why Sharp emphasizes the need for decentralized power. Maldistribution of power has harmful effects on societies and therefore seizing the state and increasing its capacity to make changes moves away from democracy and popular empowerment rather than closer to it. However, Sharp
does not go as far as the anarchist approach as the issue seems to be around the
type of state rather than any state. He also does not present a position on seizing
or not seizing the state, but warns against centralisation and state strengthening.

3) **Construction of new institutions and restructuring of old institutions**

Sharp advocates for the strengthening of the independent institutions of society
both before and after the fall of the regime as this increases the likelihood of
durable democracy. This means that power distribution is already changing when
the political revolution occurs. The revolutionaries must plan this so that they can
best transition to a new system, effectively dismantling the dictatorial structure
along with the old political order. Some of these new institutions could be set up
as alternative institutions to those under state control, possibly as part of a
parallel government even before the regime falls. Restructuring can also be
partially achieved through constitution drafting (Sharp, 2012, p. 119) to provide a
desired framework for the new government, ensure a division in authority
between legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, and put
strong restrictions on the security/intelligence forces to prevent them from
interfering. Again, we see Sharp warning against centralisation and state
strengthening, as he suggests that activists need to create counterweights that
strengthen society.

**Nonviolence Summary**

It is safe to say that none of the nonviolence literature promotes the capture of the
state at the commencement of a successful nonviolent campaign. They do,
however, vary in the strength of their criticisms of it. It is worth noting that most
of Sharp's works do not really discuss the issue of securing post-revolution
democratisation in any detail, even less so in regards to the seizure of, or nature of, the state. While Gandhi was clear on his stance regarding the state, he never put together a work that laid out what “Gandhism” was. His thoughts on the state are dispersed throughout his vast writings. Therefore, this is a confusing issue for anyone following any type of nonviolence approach, principled or pragmatic, when they want to plan what to do with the state. As a result, despite the state being a key to the success or failure of any revolution, there is the possibility that the question of the state is not asked at all by activists. As is clear, Sharp does offer factors that may influence post-revolution democratisation, but none of these address whether or not state seizure is important.

**Hypothesis 1**

For the reasons mention above, the anarchist response brings up legitimate concerns about the revolution’s literatures stance on the seizure of the state. In effect, the anarchists are simply presenting a picture of what we would expect to see in a fully democratic society, and pointing out that this needs to be *lived* now, pre-revolution, if it is to be observed post-revolution. They then point out the hierarchical structure of the state runs contrary to their equitable vision of democracy, more so as the state becomes stronger and more centralised. This seems rational, as removing positions of hegemonic power by creating a new hegemon, as espoused by Marxist theory, does not seem logical, and when it has been attempted in the past has never worked.35 Therefore, I presume that the arguments raised by the anarchists have a truth to them in regards to the creation of radical democracy and why radical democracy has not be observed on a large scale.

35 Again, a communist/anarchist stateless society cannot be seen anywhere on a large scale.
scale post-revolution. My view is also that the anarchist theory cannot explain the variation in democratisation post-nonviolent revolution. This is because it is arguing anarchy vs. the state system, rather than the reason why we see more and less democratic state systems. While the creation of an anarchist society may be prevented by state seizure, the state seizure argument gives a plausible reason as to why we see variation in post-nonviolent-revolution democratisation. This is because it allows revolutionaries to quickly manipulate the structures that allow for institutional democracy such as voting in regular elections, creating competition where opponents have a greater than zero chance of success, and where there is an independent judiciary. If this happens, I would expect to see higher levels of post-revolution institutional democratisation, in cases where the state was seized (but not see an anarchist society).

Therefore, I present the first hypothesis as:

“The seizure of the state increases post-nonviolent-revolution democratisation”

**Campaign Size and Democratisation**

As is shown above, Sharp and Gandhi propose other factors that may well be relevant for post-revolution democratisation. One of these factors is the movement itself. The rest of this chapter will present one more hypothesis based on this, which will explore the role that campaign size has on post-revolution democratisation. It is possible that campaign size is important for the

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36 I had initially planned to also use the diversity/inclusivity of the movement, and the institutions built by the movement, as two more independent variables. However, due to space constraints in a master’s thesis this has not been possible. I will provide a brief discussion of these two factors in my conclusion as they could be used in future research.
post-revolution stage in terms of democratisation.\textsuperscript{37} Because this idea is both discussed much less in the literature, and where it is mentioned is not contested, this is much more simplistic to explain.

Campaign size has been chosen over the other factors outlined by the nonviolence theorists because there is a plausible theoretical reason for why it might increase the chance of post-revolution democratisation as well as empirical support for campaign size influencing the outcomes of revolutions. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, pp. 39-41) find that campaign success is linked to campaign size, with larger campaigns succeeding more often than small campaigns. Put simply, this is because larger campaigns can be more forceful, and also harder for a regime to crush. If this is true over all revolutions (both violent and nonviolent), it may well be true within only the nonviolent revolutions. Also, the increased force that the movement can produce may be used to force democratisation as well as the success of the political revolution. If protests can continue after the political revolution is complete, then protesters can prevent new leaders of the state reverting to authoritarian rule, as they continue to use nonviolent action. In short, high participation allows the protesters to hold any new elites that emerge accountable, thus preventing autocratisation.

Not only does higher participation equate to more force, which can be used against new rulers. It also suggests that there will likely be more people and groups in the revolutionary movement. This would suggest that the larger a movement gets the more diverse it becomes. These groups will probably have an interest in maintaining a democratic system once it has been created. The

\textsuperscript{37} We could say for the social revolution as opposed to the political revolution.
collective action of these groups could prevent one group within the movement from developing itself as the new hegemon. This means that higher participation not only holds new rulers to account, but may also prevent unwanted rulers from emerging in the first place. All groups participating have an interest in preventing the emergence of a new hegemon as this would mean that they would not have an equal say in decision-making. Therefore, protecting any democratisation that has occurred becomes a priority. In summary, campaign size may give more “power to the people” pre and post-revolution making it easier for them to collectively direct the new post-revolution society. It reduces the state’s executive top-down power post-revolution, while strengthening the population, and protects against challengers.

Based on the information above, I assume that nonviolent movements that have lower participation are the ones that are more likely to fail – both at achieving a revolution (as suggested by Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011) but also in achieving democratisation. It is possible that campaign size may be a more significant factor in creating democratisation than state seizure. I will aim to test this in my statistical analysis.

Sharp (1980; 2005; 2012) also suggests that campaign size, specifically mass participation that is sustained, may have a positive effect on democratisation. In Sharp’s view, nonviolent action needs to continue after the political revolution\(^\text{38}\) in order to defend against coups and threats from foreign governments.\(^\text{39}\)

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\(^\text{38}\) “Political Revolution” is not part of Sharp’s terminology.

\(^\text{39}\) Sharp has written extensively on these issues. A good starting point is “The Anti-Coup” (Sharp & Jenkins, 2003), as well as more general books such as “Waging Nonviolent Struggle” (2005).
Although a constitution may be written, it cannot be relied upon as a safeguard against future dictatorship. The population can permanently apply political defiance making it harder to return to dictatorship, the higher the participation the more effective this can be. In other words they must be prepared to continue struggling. The population could also prevent foreign threats using civilian based defence strategies.\textsuperscript{40} This continued struggle and participation is likely to mean that people are more empowered and feel that they can and are making change (Sharp, 2012, pp. 120-121). People need to continue to participate in society to avoid dictatorship. He states "Nonviolent struggle by the subordinate can provide an alternative to both such violence and the growth of State power" (Sharp, 2005, p. 517).

This is also needed to achieve decentralization: Sharp (1980, p. 339) states:

"Without the direct participation of the population itself in the effort to change, no real changes in the relative power positions between the population and whoever occupies the position of ruler are likely to occur. At most, a new group will replace the old one as ruler."

This links into Sharp's work as mentioned above, the need to decentralise power, but here we see mass participation as the key – not state seizure. Without this Sharp sees democratisation as a much less likely outcome. Participation makes power shifts sustainable. To return to one of the points made earlier, Sharp (2012) sees planning as vital to this.

\textsuperscript{40} Sharp has laid out a plan for this in his books "Making Europe Unconquerable"(1985) and “Civilian-Based Defense”(1990).
Hypothesis 2

As alluded to above, is:

“Mass participation in the nonviolent revolutionary movement increases the likelihood of post-revolution democratisation”.

The basic rationale for this is that, mass participation will strengthen the population as it allows them to exert force, which means they can hold elites accountable, as well as directly affect the way society functions.\footnote{It is important to note that due to the constraints on this MA thesis I will not be able to test sustained participation over time, but only participation in the year of success. This is a preliminary exploration and more research will likely be needed to further explore this concept. However, it is assumed that participation in the year of success reflects the amount of people actively involved in nonviolence when actions start to take place to create democratisation, or not, as the case may be.} Therefore, we are more likely to observe democratisation when mass participation is present. As well as “freeing” the population as they become active participants in the revolutionary movement, the campaign size could theoretically help to decentralise power, spreading it across society rather than concentrating it in the central government.

Summary

My position is that the state is too significant to ignore, and how a movement relates to it must be well thought out in order to achieve the best possible outcomes, in this case, democratisation. Given the power of the state in society, and the decades-long debate around how to deal with the state in revolution, this could potentially be a major oversight in the nonviolence literature. Alternatively, other factors may be more important. I assume that there are other, activist-made, factors that influence democratisation. I have chosen one other possible
democratising factor for testing, campaign size, as well as state seizure. This factor has been chosen as it has the strongest links, theoretically and empirically, to democratisation out of all of the democratising factors suggested by Gandhi and Sharp. The results of each independent variable can then be compared. Due to space constraints on this masters thesis I am unable to test more factors, which could be explored in future research.

Looking at past cases of nonviolent revolution can provide insights into what activists can do to increase the chances of democratic outcomes post-revolution. While doing this I acknowledge that there may be other actions that can be taken, such as those outlined by Gandhi and the anarchists, that could be used successfully in the future, but which I cannot observe in past revolutions with the current data available. Despite the division in the theory between the Marxist influenced revolutions literature that promotes state seizure and the nonviolent/anarchist literature that largely oppose it, we do see nonviolent revolutionary groups taking a variety of a approaches to the state. Some aim to seize, while others do not. We also see variation in how much effort is put into increasing participant numbers. Different approaches, in different situations, are likely to have various outcomes.

\[42\] Other groups take a unique approach to taking power as they combine nonviolent action with elections, as explained by Nepstad (2011, pp. 11-12). In some dictatorships elections are often used purely to create the façade of democracy. Nonviolent movements may use these elections, with the aim of building up support for an opposition party or coalition and for exposing the dictatorship’s fraudulent elections. This can lead to the fall of the dictator as they relinquish control to the opposition party, as mock elections now become real elections due to mass action. Alternatively the dictatorship is pulled down through nonviolent methods after the election is obviously rigged. It goes without saying that this method can only work in authoritarian regimes that hold staged elections. However, this process can be used to seize the state or not.
To recap, the hypotheses to be tested and discussed in the remainder of this thesis are:

H1) “The seizure of the state increases post-nonviolent-revolution democratisation”.

H2) “Mass participation in the nonviolent revolutionary movement increases the likelihood of democratisation”.

If these hypotheses were correct then we would expect to be able to observe them in past nonviolent revolutions.

There are likely other factors, many out of activist’s control, than influence democratisation after a nonviolent revolution. These will need to be controlled for, and a discussion of what they are is provided in the next chapter. However, they are not the primary concern of this research, which aims to explore factors that activists may be able to create through their own efforts. For example, they may be able to increase participation in the movement, but they cannot make neighbouring countries democratic. As has been mentioned, these questions are yet to be researched. If empirical support is found for any of the theory mentioned in this chapter, it may provide knowledge that allows activists to do certain things that prevent a slump back towards authoritarianism after the moment a regime falls.

The next section will take the form of a methodology chapter, and I will use a quantitative approach to test the research question. The results of the

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43 See Celestino and Gleditsch (2013), whose work will be drawn upon in the next chapter.
quantitative analysis will then be presented. Conclusions will then be drawn as the results are linked back to the theory presented up unto this point.
Research Design and Methods

Up to this point, I have established that while theories have been developed to suggest that the seizure of the state is a significant factor in the outcome of revolution, there is little empirical research on how nonviolent revolution effects post-conflict democratisation. The same applies for campaign size in relation to democratisation after a nonviolent revolution.

More specifically, the aim of this research design is to determine two things:

1) To test if the two independent variables, presented in the two hypotheses, are correlated, individually, with democratisation. Democratisation will be split into three dependent variables (to be discussed) that measure democratisation differently. This is done through bivariate tests to be discussed later in this chapter.

2) To determine if any relationship obtained in the bivariate tests also hold when control variables are included. This allows me to control for the effect of other possibly spurious factors (to be outlined below) that could plausibly have a causal effect on both the independent variables and the dependent variables. Robustness tests are then run to assess the scrutiny of the findings to violations of modelling assumptions and influential observations.

This chapter will provide a detailed outline of how the research will be conducted. It will do this by providing an overview of the unit of analysis; the dependent variables; the independent variables; the control variables; and the statistical tests to be used, before proceeding to the results in the next chapter.
Unit of Analysis

The NAVCO 2.0 (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013b) database was used to identify “successful” nonviolent campaigns. This provides information on major violent and nonviolent campaigns from 1945 to 2006. I have then selected all of the cases coded as successful campaigns that used primarily nonviolent methods in the NAVCO 2.0 data. In NAVCO 2.0, campaigns are defined as “a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective” (p. 2). Campaigns are coded as successful when the “campaign achieved 100% of its stated goals within a year of the peak of activities” (p. 17), and they are primarily nonviolent if nonviolence was deemed to be the “primary type of resistance” (p. 6). This leaves 75 cases of successful nonviolent movements. Successful movements are selected as these are the movements that have a non-zero probability of seizing the state. Also, non-successful cases could not be counted as revolutions, but rather revolutionary situations that did not result in revolutionary outcomes.44

The NAVCO 2.0 database was selected as it provides a large amount of information on nonviolent movements, and it also provides the year on year campaign size. It does however have limits when it comes to testing this theory as it only picks up on the largest nonviolent movements. These may be the movements that are most likely to democratise as they have already grown to a large size while other smaller attempts that failed may not be picked up on in the database. This may understate the role of mass participation, as it could be the case that smaller movements do not result in democratisation as often.

44 Refer to the previous chapter’s “what is a revolution” section.
Alternatively, this may overstate the role of mass participation as cases with lower participation that may have been successful were left out. This cannot be known in this study.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is democratisation. This was measured using the Polity IV dataset (Gurr, Jaggers, & Marshall, 2010). They take the Webster’s New World College Dictionary definition of a polity as a “political or governmental organization; a society or institution with an organized government; state; body politic” (Gurr et al., 2010, p.1) All polities are seen as a subset of authority patterns, which are defined as “a set of asymmetric relations among hierarchically ordered members of a social unit that involves the direction of the unit....The direction of a social unit involves the definition of its goals, the regulation of conduct of its members, and the allocation and coordination of roles within it” (From Eckstein and Gurr 1975, p. 22). Gurr et al. (2010, p. 1) state that “while authority patterns and polities are inclusive classifications that refer to any social unit’s potential for political action, the Polity project focuses specifically on the more or less institutionalized authority patterns that characterize the most formal class of polities, that is, states operating within the world’s state system.” Because these authority patterns are based on states and state institutions, what is being measured is institutional democracy.

The Polity IV Data is recorded from 1800-2012 for all nations.\(^{45}\) Each year a nation is given a democracy score and an autocracy score. The polity score is

\(^{45}\) New 2013 scores were added in for Serbia and Georgia to ensure that they had ten-year post-revolution scores. For Czechoslovakia, the five and ten-year post-
calculated by taking an autocracy score away from a democracy score, which
gives each country a final polity score between -10 and +10 for each year. Scores
are determined by observing constraints on the executive and the openness,
competitiveness\textsuperscript{46}, and regulation of recruitment to the executive (Gurr et al.,
2010).

As discussed at the beginning of the previous chapter, this is not the same vision
of democracy as expressed by many nonviolent and revolutionary thinkers. However this is not necessarily problematic as a shift in the polity scale towards
democracy can still be viewed as democratisation whether or not the +10
measurement is viewed as being truly democratic.\textsuperscript{47}

However, the polity scale is state-centric, and cannot provide a gauge of more
radical types of democracy that may be taking place outside of state institutions.
Institutions that could be considered democratic, or part of an ideal democratic
society, that run parallel to official state institutions, may be missed. Another
example of this could be protest movements, like the ones that may have lead to
revolution, that continue to be part of the democratic process after the revolution.
Protest movements may continue to use nonviolent action to hold the
government accountable as well as force democratic changes, although they may
not take part in electoral politics or state institutions, or even parallel institutions.
This leads onto another limitation- a key element that the Polity IV data misses is

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{46} Competiveness is measured in two ways, using “the degree of
institutionalization, or regulation, of political competition” and “the extent of
government restriction on political competition” (Gurr et al., 2010, p. 71).
\textsuperscript{47} Refer to the beginning of the theory chapter for more detail of the concepts
discussed here.
\end{flushright}
information on the population’s participation within as well as outside state
institutions, which as Kellstedt and Whitten (2008, p. 98) state, may be
understandable due to the scope of the data set that goes back to the year 1800.
While it is understandable, it could be problematic because, as has been made
clear in previous chapters, peoples ability to freely participate in the political
process and have an effective say on the future direction of the society in which
they live is seen as a key element of democracy in many definitions discussed
throughout this thesis.

Another key concept that is missed is that of equity.⁴⁸ There is no measure of not
only participation, but also the participation of the poorest in society, the
working-class, and minority groups, as well as the rights that these groups have.
In larger research projects, the Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Dataset (2010)
could be incorporated to help solve this problem. It would be possible to score
highly on the Polity score while still having major social divisions. There is no
measurement of welfare, healthcare and education programs for example, all of
which could be measures of equity. As a result, this is a weakness of this research,
which cannot fully capture the concept of democracy espoused by revolutionary
thinkers. It is outside the scope of this master’s thesis to generate a more
comprehensive way of measuring democracy and democratisation.⁴⁹ For the
purposes of this thesis, the Polity IV data provides the best measurement of
democratisation as it’s 20-step scale can provide a more comprehensive analysis
of changes in democracy than other scales that have less categories to measure,

⁴⁸ Again, see the beginning of the previous chapter for a brief discussion on equity
and democracy.
⁴⁹ I will briefly discuss other ways that this could be done in future research in my
last chapter.
and are therefore viewed as less comprehensive.\textsuperscript{50} It is also well used, which makes the results comparable to other research that uses the same measure. For example, by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) – both of which are key reference points for this study.

There are three dependent variables based on the polity data. The first is the “polity2” score data. The second is the change along the polity scale, which will allow me to see how much states are shifting along the scale post-revolution. The third is a categorical measure of democracy, where countries are viewed as a democracy if they have a score of six or above.\textsuperscript{51} This last dependent variable allows me to see whether or not the revolutionary movement achieves high polity scores post-revolution. For example, a regime with a polity score of -10 could be overthrown, and two-years later the new polity score is 2. This would be a large shift along the scale, but the country would still be viewed as being fairly autocratic. If the categorical measure was used by itself it would suggest there had not been democratization, even though there had been significant changes within the country. Alternatively only using the polity change data, would not tell us how democratic the country was. The results with each dependent variable can then be compared.

\textsuperscript{50} An example is the Freedom House scores (“Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology,” 2014) which provide a seven point scale ranging from Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0).

\textsuperscript{51} This is a way of measuring democratization that I have learnt away from in earlier chapters because it may miss significant movement towards democracy in cases that do not meet its democratic threshold. It is included, mostly so that the results of testing different dependent variables can be compared with each other, as well as a way of seeing if there are significant shifts to the highest end of the polity scale.
Democratization is measured at 2, 5, 10 years after the revolution. Teorell (2010) found that democratisation tends to occur a year after regime transition. As democratisation is seen post regime transition, I have chosen to use three post-revolution measures. This allows us to see firstly whether there has been democratisation and secondly if the new polity score has been maintained, improved upon further, or decreased.

**Independent Variables**

The independent variables are as listed in the hypotheses. These are: state seizure and campaign size in the movement. Each of these will now be discussed.

**Independent variable 1: State Seizure**

Data on state seizure has not been collected in existing research. Therefore, I have added two lines of code to the information obtained from NAVCO 2.0. The first line specifies whether the state has been seized or not in successful nonviolent campaigns. Cases were either given a 1 to indicate state seizure or 0 for no seizure. Cases that could not be coded were given a -99. The second line of code determined whether the code for state seizure was reliable. Cases deemed to be reliable were given a 1 and less reliable cases a 0.5. This is to allow the statistical tests to be run with and without the cases that are less reliable.

I will now outline the criteria for coding; the search methods used; reasons for missing or un-codeable cases; and the reasons for less reliable cases.

**Criteria for coding**

A case was coded as state seizure when leaders of the nonviolent movement were observed to be in the highest position of government (i.e the head of state,
president or prime minister) after the nonviolent movement had overthrown the previous regime. Interim governments still count as state seizure providing that the state was seized and used to implement this and they do not directly result in the old regime regaining power. If a protest leader assumes the highest governmental position through an election, after the nonviolent movement has removed the regime, this is also state seizure.

Obviously, for state seizure after a nonviolent revolution to have occurred, a nonviolent movement must have been clearly identified. More specifically, acts of protest and/or non-cooperation and/or direct action\(^{52}\) that targeted the ruling regime must have been observed on a large scale.

Coups by the military or other non-protest groups are not counted as state seizure because members of the revolutionary movement did not seize the state. A coup could be described as an attempt by a group of elites to take over the state with the support of the military, or part of the military (Powell, 2012). An exception to this rule could be in a case when the revolutionary movement gets into government within one year after the coup without further nonviolent action needed – i.e the military coup only leads to an interim government and then the protesters take control through an election. The only example of this in my sample is Mali (1991). Another exception is when the coup leaders/ armed forces have already joined the protest movement and are seizing the state as part of the nonviolent opposition movement (they were not bystanders that then assumed

\(^{52}\) Three categories of nonviolent methods identified by Sharp (1973). See Appendix 1.
power). An example is Sudan (1985). In this instance the state seizure was not a coup, although it may still have been reported as one in the media.

The timeframe for coding whether or not state seizure had taken place was if the nonviolent movement leader had taken the highest government position one-year after the current regime loses power. If there was an interim government then this was extended to two-years as setting up a new type of government may take longer than a year, but the nonviolent movement leaders must assume power within this two-year period.

There are limitations to this definition of state seizure. It is possible that the new head of state is merely a puppet leader. It is not possible to gauge how complete the state seizure is. We do not know if other important members of the old regime still have positions of power, and how much of an effect this has. For example, a new parliament entirely made up of people from the nonviolent campaign, or a parliament the same as it was in the old regime just with a different head of state, are two quite different scenarios. It is also questionable whether a new president is representative of the participants in a protest movement. If either of these scenarios happened, the leader being unrepresentative or if much of the old regime still maintained influential positions within the state, then this would not be a complete seizure of the state. It may be possible to clear these issues up using case studies, but because of the time and resource restrictions of a MA thesis, this was outside the scope of this research.

**Search Method**

The search method started by referring to the Swarthmore Global Nonviolent Action Database (Lakey, 2011) and then conducting a search of news media
articles using the Factiva (2014) news media search engine. When this failed to find results, resources from the Albert Einstein Institute (AEI) (2014) and the International Centre for Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC) (2014) were referred to in order to gain background information. With new information another Factiva search was then conducted. Wikipedia was also used to find basic information if none could be found elsewhere, but no information from this source contributed towards the coding outcome, as it is potentially unreliable. Anything new found via Wikipedia, in terms of the names of participant groups, leaders, or events, were then searched again through the Factiva database. If no information could be found after this, I conducted a search for academic articles. If there was still insufficient information the movement was coded as -99, un-codable.

There are limitations to this coding process. Firstly, as touched on above, this method cannot give the researcher in-depth understanding of the intricacies of each specific scenario. Secondly, a level of bias is inevitable when looking at media sources. The media may promote certain groups or leaders in the protest as the most significant while ignoring or playing down the role of others; it may only provide in-depth coverage of some cases and not others which could be due to bias or to access to the country of concern; it may label events incorrectly – for example terms like coup or riot maybe used incorrectly. Also only English language articles could be accessed whereas media written in other languages may have provided further information. As above, case studies and expert opinions may have helped gain a better understanding of the cases and therefore increase the reliability of the coding. However, due to the constraints of a MA thesis this search method was deemed the most appropriate, and in the majority
of cases it was clear as to whether the state was being seized or not, as well as who the key players were.

**Missing cases**

Early in the coding process it became clear that a number of cases taken from NAVCO 2.0, 25 out of 75, were un-codeable for various reasons. These cases were removed from the sample.

One case, Argentina 1987, was coded as -99 because it did not fit the criteria of regime change through revolution. This is because it was a campaign that prevented a coup. Protesters were protecting rather than opposing the current regime. However, this was the only case of its kind. In some cases, no evidence could be found of nonviolent movements taking place in the relevant year. In others there appeared to be some kind of nonviolent protests within the same year as an election, but the protesters demands may not have been connected to changing the government and/or they did not seem to be part of a nonviolent movement that removed the regime – i.e. the change of government appears to simply have been through a normal election process. In other cases there appeared to be an election, and no evidence of a nonviolent movement. A small number of cases appeared to be miscoded. For example paramilitary groups were sometimes coded as nonviolent movements, and no evidence of a nonviolent movement could be found in the search process for the same country and year. See “Appendix 2” for a list of cases with the reasons why they could not be coded. It is entirely possible that a different search method would mean that some of these cases would be able to be coded. For example, in a large research project it
may be possible to consult with country experts to find out about the cases. This may provide information that media searches could not.

**Reliability of the code for state seizure**

The reason for coding some cases as less reliable (0.5) is linked to the limitations mention above. Firstly, the definition of state seizure may mean that new puppet presidents are put into power. This may make it appear that the state has been seized when in-fact much of the old regime remains. Cases where reports were found suggesting that this could be the case, notably the Cedar revolution in Lebanon (2005), were coded as being unreliable as there was no way to clarify this information. Secondly, the data collection method did not always provide clear information - especially in some of the movements in Africa, and movements that occurred during the breakdown of the Soviet Union - or multiple sources that could verify the information found. Whenever limited and/or vague information was found, the case was marked with a 0.5 for reliability. As has been mentioned, case studies in future research may be able to clarify these cases.

**Independent variable 2: Campaign Size**

Mass participation was measured using the variable in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013b) - estimated campaign size (camp_size_est). This is coded as follows: 0=small (hundreds to thousands), 1=medium (tens of thousands), 2=large (above one hundred thousand), 3=extremely large (above one million), -99=unknown (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a, p. 6).

This is a rough measurement, but as NAVCO notes, “a precise accounting of the number of campaign participants may be difficult to determine” (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013a, p. 10). Rather than using a variable that attempts to be more
precise but undoubtedly has errors, this variable has been selected as it groups campaigns together that are around about the same size. While this is arguably less precise than using exact campaign sizes, there is less error involved. The campaign size was also measured the year of success.

Control Variables

The chosen control variables were selected based on the results of previous empirical research as they could both be plausibly related to the dependent variable, democratisation, and the independent variables. This means that they are antecedent test variables, meaning that they affect both the independent variable and the dependent variable (Babbie, 2010, p. 454). Each choice of control variable, and the logic of its selection, will now be discussed. The control variables in this study are: the regime type being challenged, the presence of democratic neighbours, and income (GDP).

As will be clear from previous chapters, this research takes the view, backed-up by recent evidence, that social movements can create democratisation and revolution, and there are different ways to go about this. It also assumes that nonviolent revolutionaries can do specific things that will increase the likelihood of democratisation, and that this can occur under different structural conditions. Nepstad's (2011) argument, that there may be other structural factors necessary for a nonviolent revolution, is accepted. Nepstad (2011, p. 6) writes, “...a theory of revolutionary success or failure must...include an assessment of structural conditions and revolutionary strategy”. Structures are likely to play important if not necessary roles in a nonviolent revolution, as Karl and Schmitter (1991, p. 5) state, “...the choices by actors, whose identities are essentially unstable, are in a
very limited way constrained by institutional rules or their structural positions.”
As the interaction between structural conditions, outside the control of revolutionaries, and the agency of the revolutionaries in creating democratisation is unknown, the most significant structural conditions that could both affect democratisation (the dependent variable) and the ability of the revolutionaries to achieve state seizure and/or a high campaign size, must be controlled for in order to determine how significant the independent variables are in determining democratisation.

Much of this research that tests these factors (income (in GDP), regime type being challenged, and the presence of democratic neighbours) have not been tested on democratisation with specific reference to nonviolent revolutions. The rationale for their selection and their measurement will now be outlined.

**Control Variable 1: Regime type**

**Rationale**

It is widely regarded that regime type may make transition to democracy more/less likely and certain types of transitions maybe more or less likely to succeed. Key works are Wright and Escriba-Folch (2012), Geddes (1999b) and Ulfelder (2005). All discuss the idea that different types of authoritarian regime maybe affected differently by various challenges to their rule. In the same way they may respond differently to various threats and use different methods to try and retain power. The main types of authoritarian regime, according to Geddes, are: personalist, single party, and military.

Geddes (1999a, p. 20) defines personalist regimes as regimes where “the leader, who usually came to power as an officer in a military coup or as the leader of a
single-party government, had consolidated control over policy and recruitment in his own hands, in the process marginalizing other officers' influence and/or reducing the influence and functions of the party." In this type of authoritarianism, the state is effectively an extension of the individual leader. Single party regimes are defined by Geddes (1999a, p. 20) as a regime where "the party has some influence over policy, controls most access to political power and government jobs, and has functioning local-level organizations." Here, a bureaucratic organisation has control rather than a single dictator. Finally, Military Regimes are "governed by an officer or retired officer, with the support of the military establishment and some routine mechanism for high level officers to influence policy choice and appointment" (Geddes, 1999a, p. 20).

From these definitions we can see that different types of authoritarian regimes may react differently to a nonviolent revolutionary challenge. For example members of a military regime may put the survival and efficacy of the military as the most important thing to secure (Ulfelder, 2005), possibly above their stay in power. Wright and Folch (2011, p. 309) find “empirical support for the argument that political parties can increase the likelihood of a democratic transition” and suggest, “that party legacies can play a similar role of protecting elite interests in a subsequent democracy” (p. 308). Their finding that parties may destabilize dictators by increasing the chance of democratisation opposes some literature, which argues that authoritarian parties stabilize dictators.53 Wright and Folch (2011, p. 291) also point out that single party regimes have “extensive patronage networks” which means more support and a better ability to mobilise support.

In addition, Ulfelder (2005) has shown that the type of regime may have an effect on whether “contentious collective action” is successful or not. Ulfelder’s conclusion is that “some kinds of autocracy are more vulnerable to breakdown in the wake of contentious events than others, and that the strength and direction of this effect varies not only across types of authoritarianism, but across forms of collective action as well” (p. 314). This follows Geddes (1999) who argues that different types of authoritarian regime breakdown in different ways. Geddes’ (1999) findings show that personalist regimes are least vulnerable to internal splits and they normally end when the dictator dies or in severe economic downturn. In a similar way, single-party regimes are durable. Military regimes on the other hand frequently collapse during leadership struggles because, as mentioned above, military personnel often favour the survival of the military and their military positions over political power. If certain types of state breakdown more easily, it may be easier for nonviolent revolutionaries to seize control of them and make democratic changes to the state structure.

Ulfelder (2005) also finds different autocracies are more vulnerable to contentious collective action. The results show that contentious collective action has no significant effect on the risk of regime breakdown in personalist regimes and that single-party and military regimes “are more likely to break down following nonviolent, anti-government protests.” Considering this, it is logical to assume that certain regime types may find it easier to retain power (prevent transition), especially if they have more of a focus on regime survival and if they can mobilise more support – they are less likely to want to negotiate, concede defeats, and with support can theoretically provide a more powerful challenge to
the resistance movement. With support, the elites have the ability to give orders to people who will then perform tasks that allow the regime to function.

While these findings relate to the likelihood of transition, they are likely to be important in terms of the long-term outcomes of a nonviolent revolution, such as democratisation for three reasons. (1) Because it means that it may be easier for some regimes to hold onto some of their power in the revolution, and possibly regain more power after the revolution. (2) This point is yet to be researched, but it is plausible that regime type effects democratisation, but also the independent variables that are the concern of this research. If some types find it easier to maintain power, they may find it easier to prevent nonviolent revolutionaries from doing things like mobilising large numbers of people. They may even make it harder for the state to be seized. A possible reason for this is that some regime types may have more loyal or better-trained and resourced security and intelligence forces that can both prevent organisation with society and crackdown heavily and effectively on protesters. This also means there maybe less space in society to safely organise and mobilise people to take part in revolutionary actions. (3) If the state structures themselves are more authoritarian in their make-up, post-revolution democratisation may be less likely because the revolutionary movement has to make more dramatic changes to them so that they function democratically.
Measurement and definition

To measure regime type, I take the Polity IV score one year before the success of the revolution.\textsuperscript{54} This has strengths and weakness when answering to the three points above. The major strength is that it allows us to see how authoritarian a regime was before the revolution, and we can then ask how much of an effect being more or less authoritarian has on the likelihood of democratisation. It does not however allow us to determine between Geddes’s regime types – military, personalist and single party. This would involve creating more data, which is outside the scope of this thesis. This means we can control for the effects of how authoritarian a regime is in the polity scale, rather than the specific make-up of an authoritarian regime.

Polity scores are measured before and after nonviolent revolutions. The initial measurement of democracy has been lagged one-year before the success of the nonviolent movement.\textsuperscript{55} This is because a reading on the year of the successful movement would provide false results. If, for example, a revolution took place in January of a given year, and then democratisation occurred throughout that year, this would be an incorrect baseline measurement because it does not give us a measure of democracy while the country of concern was under the authoritarian rule being challenged by revolutionaries. Therefore, a reading of democracy one

\textsuperscript{54} Cases in countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union were given the Soviet Union scores when data was not available for them pre-revolution. The only case was Russia. Countries that were former part of Yugoslavia –Slovenia – were given Yugoslavia’s scores when data was not available for them pre-revolution. Data is missing pre-revolution for Zambia and Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{55} Other years before the revolution, where a nonviolent movement may have made democratic gains, are not included. This is because this research is concerned with democratization \textit{post}-revolution.
year before the revolution gives us a more accurate idea of the “democraticness” of the country before any of the independent variables occur.

**Control Variable 2: Democratic neighbours**

**Rationale**

Stewart (2009, p. 646) writes, “...while originally the focus in this literature [democratisation] was almost wholly on domestic factors...more recent research explores the role of external influences.” Notably this is the argument that the prevalence of democratic neighbours affects the chance that a regime transition will result in increased levels of democracy: the more democratic neighbours, the more likely the transition will result in democracy (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006).

Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) suggest different mechanisms as to why this could be: Firstly, nonviolent movements may have better access to resources from neighbouring countries if they are democratic. This may mean that the nonviolent protesters have an increased ability to mobilise large numbers of people and/or use resources to effectively seize the state. Secondly, costs to authoritarian rules may increase when democracy becomes more common among neighbours, which could give “more incentives for elites to support democratic reform when an autocratic regime falls” (p. 391). This support from democratic neighbours may continue post-revolution, thus making it easier for the new leaders, as well as those working from the grass roots, to create and maintain democratisation.

This argument is linked to the amount of resources that a nonviolent movement can obtain, which will be expanded on in the next section on “income”.

90
**Measurement and definition**

Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) define “democratic neighbours” as “the proportion of neighbouring states that are democracies within 500km of a state’s borders, using the Polity > 6 threshold and minimum distance data calculated from the Cshapes project…” (p. 393). The data has been taken directly from the Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) replication data. The reading for democratic neighbours has also been lagged to the year before the revolution in case there were changes in this during the time revolution occurred.

**Control Variable 3: Income**

**Rationale**

Lipset (1959) first proposed the idea that economic development, as part of societal modernisation, is a significant precondition for democratic rule. This conclusion is widely recognised today as having an effect on democratisation. Higher levels of economic development leads to a higher probability of transition and democratic consolidation. The amount of income a country has could have a significant effect both on the likelihood of democratisation and of the independent variables outlined.

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56 Cases in countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union were given the Soviet Union values when data was not available for them pre-revolution, These cases are Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus. Countries that were former part of Yugoslavia – Serbia and Slovenia - were given Yugoslavia’s scores when data was not available. Data is missing for Zambia, so the nearest democratic neighbours data, from one year-post revolution was used.

57 Revolutions tend to spread from country to country as was seen in the Arab Spring (Springborg, 2011). If the measurement was taken from the year of revolution, we could mark a country as having democratic neighbors when in fact it did not. For example, if a revolution takes places in January in one country, and then a neighboring country has a revolution in November and democratization takes place, the second country would be recorded as a democracy when in fact it was not.
In terms of nonviolent revolutionary movements, dire economic conditions could have multiple effects: firstly in the mobilisation phase, more people may be willing to risk their lives and confront authoritarian regimes as part of a nonviolent movement because the conditions that they are living in are so bad or have declined. Therefore we could see how dire economic conditions could be seen as a causal factor of revolution.\textsuperscript{58} Also, low income (GDP) may well increase the chance that we see a revolution occur that aims to democratise society so that those living in poverty for example get a larger share of resources. We could also expect that the lower a country’s income, the more people struggle to meet their needs. This may result in larger participation and diverse participation as all or most groups in society become affected. A regime may also be weakened if there is an economic downturn, which may decrease its ability to prevent a nonviolent revolution or to stop protesters from successfully seizing the state.

However, Nepstad (2011, p. 7) points out that favourable conditions “...offer the potential for revolutionary change, but people are still in need to turn these opportunities into action”. In other words, economic downturn is not sufficient for a nonviolent revolution, but may make a revolutionary’s task easier. To support this theory, Haggard and Kaufman (1997) find that autocracies and democracies are more likely to breakdown during periods of crisis as they lack resources to sustain regime support, and one of the key pathways as to how democratisation can occur is by popular protest. Przeworski et al. (2000) find that authoritarian regimes often fall during an economic crisis. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) find that when democratisation occurs, it survives in those

\textsuperscript{58} However, Butcher and Svensson (2014) do not find support for this.
countries that have a certain level of economic development – above $6000 per capita. This would suggest that low income would also be connected to less democratisation. Therefore economic conditions effect democratisation in the short and long-term.

Alternatively, this argument can be turned upside down. Higher income may be causally related to democratisation and the independent variables. This would provide a stronger causal explanation for building democratic institutions, as there may be more money and resources in society available to organise and coordinate this. It could also be linked to mass participation and diverse participation as there could be more money available for training, “advertising”, coordination and communication, transport, and propaganda that motivate people to protest. This could be because the revolutionaries can increase their visibility, and therefore make themselves look like a large and well-organised group. They can produce many more visible signs of the campaign than they have people, which along with better equipment, could also make them look more professional and prepared to challenge the regime. High income could also provide a causal explanation for state seizure if it means that resources can be provided to help this happen, or training can be conducted on how this can be done successfully.

In terms of the dependent variable, democratisation may well be more likely after revolutions in countries with higher incomes. This is because there is likely to be money/resources available to help the new leaders deliver on their promises, continue to fund democratic institutions, and oppose any challengers to the new order (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). After the revolution is complete, it is
plausible that if economic conditions were bad, the revolution maybe overturned. More groups may start fighting as their conditions have still not improved, and the revolution may not be seen as productive or legitimate. Eckstein (1982, pp. 43-94) argues that economic underdevelopment and the dependence on the world economy in the Third World may significantly restrict efforts to change socioeconomic structures radically – the exception being when new leaders can find a foreign sponsor, thus continuing the dependency on other nations. In addition to this, Foran and Goodwin (1993, p. 211) state that “in the post-World War 1 context, the United States generally attempted to exploit the vulnerabilities of the new regime for their own economic and geopolitical purposes.” In other words, world powers will not just leave post-revolution states alone afterwards, and this will effect what a revolution is able to achieve. It could be that a country with higher income, and therefore resources, is able to fend off foreign powers and determine its own way more effectively.

In summary, levels of income and therefore the ability to purchase resources, may shape actors and therefore effect how they can act (Haggard & Kaufman, 1997). This could include their ability to seize the state and/or mobilise large numbers. However some oppose this perspective, suggesting that economic modernisation does not effect transitions to democracy (Przeworski et al., 2000). Rather they suggest that it helps sustain a democracy once it has been created. Teorell (2010, p. 57) finds support for this in the third wave of democratisation as he states that there was not a “…tendency among modernising countries to advance towards democracy. Rather, there was a tendency for less modernised countries to revert
to authoritarianism.” This means that the less modernised tend to be the countries where we see the opposite of democratisation.

**Measurement and Definition**

Country income is measured in gross domestic product (GDP) per-capita. The data has been taken from the Gleditsch (2002) GDP and Population data. GDP represents the value of goods and services produced in a country in a given year. The higher GDP, the more money is in the country’s economy. It has been selected for use here, as it is the most commonly used measure of “development”. As with other variables above, the GDP measurement is lagged one year before the revolution. This is because after a successful revolution, there may be more investment in the given country’s economy, which could significantly alter the GDP for that year.

**Other Potential Control Variables**

There is the possibility that other factors could influence both the dependent variable and independent variable. However the most significant ones, that can be measured in a project of this size, have been selected. It is possible future work will control for other variables that change the results reported here. As mentioned in chapter one, there are many factors that are linked to the success of revolution. Other possibly significant factors that could be affecting both the dependent variable and the independent variables will be discussed in my

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59 Cases in countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union were given the Soviet Union GDP values when data was not available for them pre-revolution, These cases are Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belarus. Countries that were former part of Yugoslavia –Slovenia - were given Yugoslavia’s scores when data was not available for them pre-revolution. Data is missing for Zambia.

60 The ones, in my view, with the best theoretical and empirical basis based on the literature that I have read.
conclusions. The fact that they cannot be accounted for in this study is a limitation, but it is acknowledged that they could be of importance and future research may need to consider them.\textsuperscript{61}

**Method of analysis**

The method of analysis used in this thesis has been designed in order to see if there is a correlation between the independent variables and democratisation, and to account for possible spurious factors (the control variables) that could affect the results.

When starting this design process I have followed Kellstedt and Whitten (2008, p. 51) who write that there are four hurdles that must be crossed before you can claim a causal relationship between variables. While I do not expect to find a causal relationship here,\textsuperscript{62} I have followed this advice in order to rule out problems that may occur with the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables. The first hurdle is covered when we ask if there is a credible causal mechanism that connects the independent variable to the dependent variable. This has been addressed in the previous chapter. The second hurdle is to establish whether the dependent variables could cause the

\textsuperscript{61} Three that will be discussed are, social-cultural factors, the international environment, and the presence of oil in a country.

\textsuperscript{62} This is because democratization, like most social phenomena, is a very complicated process. It is likely that multiple factors contribute to democratization, and I cannot control for all of them within this thesis. Also, my sample size, due to the nature of what I am studying is not large enough. The larger the sample, the closer I could get to assuming causality, and have less error in my results (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013, pp. 141-142). It is also likely that some cases of state seizure lead to democracy and others do not which would suggest that state seizure does not force democracy in all cases. If it did force democracy in all cases we could say that it is causal (Manheim, Rich, Willnat, & Brians, 2008, p. 422).
independent variables. As the independent variables occur before the dependent variables this is not likely to be the case. The bivariate tests to be discussed below seek to answer hurdle number three which asks if there is covariation between the independent variables and the dependent variables. The final hurdle will be tackled in the multivariate tests where the control variables will be included. This allows me to rule out, or identify, any spurious factors – income, democratic neighbours, and pre-revolution polity score - that may be influencing the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables. Before any tests were conducted I examined descriptive statistics. This allowed me to identify any major outliers, and ensure that there is variation in the data – without which any regression models would not be able to be used. I will now discuss the bivariate tests, and then the multivariate tests, in detail. The STATA (version 13) program has been used for all statistical analysis.

**Bivariate Tests**

Bivariate tests look at the “statistical association between the independent variable and the dependent variable” (Babbie, 2010, p. 445). These tests allowed me to test whether state seizure and campaign size correlate with democratization, 2, 5, and 10 years after the nonviolent revolution. I also tested these variables against the change that has occurred along the polity scale, and with a cut-off point (>6) on the Polity IV scale to assess whether or not the regime has changed to what could be considered a high score on the scale. As explained above, this has been done to see if there are similar results, or not, when the outcomes are compared. Also, as above, each dependent variable provided me with different information regarding: (1) the relationship with the polity score
itself; (2) the relationship with how big or small a shift along the polity score has
been made by a country; (3) whether the country is now high on the polity score
(6 or above) post-revolution.

Each independent variable, state seizure and campaign size, was tested using a
one-way ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) test.\textsuperscript{63} These tests were run with each
individual independent variable being tested against each individual dependent
variable, making six ANOVA tests. Each test was repeated three times at the
different year measures. This makes for eighteen ANOVA tests overall. An ANOVA
test measures statistical significance through the use of variance (Babbie, 2010,
pp. 493-495).\textsuperscript{64} It is an appropriate test for testing a continuous variable against a
categorical variable. Here the dependent variable is continuous (the polity scale)
and the independent variables are categorical (the revolutionary movement
seized the state or it did not). It is also appropriate for two categorical variables
such as when testing with the categorical measure of democracy. However, the
campaign size variable is actually an ordinal variable rather than a categorical
variable. With an ordinal variable each score has values, some more or less that
the previous one, but the difference is not completely quantifiable –there is no
measure of distance between each category as they are not equal units (Manheim
et al., 2008, p. 428). Kellstedt and Whitten (2013, pp. 112-114) write that:

\begin{quote}
If we treat an ordinal variable as though it is categorical, we are
acting as though we know less about the values of this variable than
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{63} One-way because it involves only one predictor variable (Bhattacherjee, 2012,
p. 132). This is opposed to a two-way ANOVA test that can be used to test more
than two variables (Babbie, 2010, p. 495).

\textsuperscript{64} Cases are put into groups representing the independent variable, which are
then analyzed in terms of a dependent variable. How much the groups differ is
then related to the standard of random distribution.
we really know. On the other hand, treating an ordinal variable as though it is a continuous variable means that we are assuming that it has equal unit differences. Either way, it is critical that we be aware of our decisions. We can always repeat our analysis under a different assumption and see how robust our conclusions are to our choices.”

Taking this advice on-board, I chose to perform two sets of bivariate tests, one treating campaign size as categorical and the other as continuous. I then compared the two results to see if there was a significant difference. For the categorical variable, campaign size was tested two ways: (1) as 0-4 with each size category65; (2) split into large campaigns with over a million participants and smaller campaigns with less than one million participants, thus making two categories. This allowed for more results to be compared, which gave further confidence in the findings when the results of all tests were similar. As a continuous variable campaign size ranged from 0-4. The second bivariate test to be used, which treated the campaign size variable as continuous, was a Pearson’s correlation test (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013, pp. 164-167). Put simply, this allows us to see if changes in the independent variable, campaign size, are associated with changes in the dependent variables (Babbie, 2010, p. 95).

**Multivariate Tests**

Multivariate tests were used to estimate the effects of multiple variables together. If the bivariate tests found that there was a correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variables, the multivariate tests can assess whether or not other spurious factors (control variables) were potentially

65 I have actually used a two-way and a one-way ANOVA test – both results were comparable.
confounding these results. In the multivariate tests, the influence of the control variable on the independent variable and the dependent variable were held constant (Manheim et al., 2008, p. 304). The coefficient of a variable of interest shows the impact with the effects of all other variables held constant. If the relationship remained the same as in the bivariate tests, I could say that the relationship has survived control (p. 305), thus increasing confidence in the findings.

As with the bivariate tests, the type of data used determines the multivariate test. Both tests used in this thesis are multiple regression models, which create an equation that describes the specific function of how two variables relate to each other (Babbie, 2010, p. 473). From this, p-values can be calculated to determine how statistically significant the relationship is between the two variables, taking into account the control variables which are treated as additional independent variables. It represents the “impact of two or more independent variables on a single dependent variable” (Babbie, 2010, p. 475). For the categorical dependent variable, democracy or not democracy, I used logit regression. For the two continuous dependent variables, I used linear regression. This produces a linear equation, which if graphed produces a straight line (Allison, 1998, p. 3).\(^{66}\) A p-value produced tells me how confident I can be about rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no effect between the independent variable and the dependent variable.

\(^{66}\) The logit regression works differently, producing an “s” shaped curve. Unlike the linear regression, the graph’s y-axis will have a maximum score of one and a minimum of zero.
Robustness Tests

I have conducted five robustness tests on the multivariate test results. These are to identify any problems with the tests that could be skewing the results or to see if my results are being driven by influential cases. These are: (1) to test for multicollinearity; (2) to look at the residuals; (3) to test for heteroscedasticity; (4) to look at the leverage; (5) and finally DFBeta statistics. I will now briefly discuss each one of these.

Multicollinearity occurs when two of the independent variables are perfectly correlated (Allison, 1998, p. 63). If multicollinearity were present (it does not have to be perfect multicollinearity) it could change the coefficients and their significance. Most often this can lead to the conclusion that neither of the two independent variables of concern have an effect, when one of them may in fact have a strong effect (Allison, 1998, p. 63). To test for the presence of multicollinearity I used VIF (variance inflation factor) statistics\(^{67}\) that can be run after a regression model in STATA. As a correlation between independent variables increases, the VIF will also increase (Gordon, 2010, p. 386).

Secondly I looked at the residuals. Residuals are calculated by obtaining the predicted polity score produced by the model, and then taking away the actual polity score post-revolution. Multiple regressions have two purposes, which are “prediction and causal analysis” (Allison, 1998, p. 1). This study is not aimed at creating a prediction model, but it is still useful to know how accurate my predictions are before I make any conclusions. The bigger the residual produced, the less reliable a model is at predicting post-revolution polity values. Looking at

\(^{67}\) This is a tolerance statistic. More specifically, it is the reciprocal of tolerance (1/tolerance) (Allison, 1998, p. 141).
the residuals allows me to identify outliers. The key point of looking at the residuals is to ascertain “how much the regression results would change if each individual observation were deleted from the analysis” (Allison, 1998, p. 89).

Outliers need to be identified to determine if they are influential. An influential observation is defined as an “…observation whose inclusion in or exclusion from the data file greatly changes the results of the regression analysis” (Gordon, 2010, p.362). If there is a theoretical reason why this case is different, it may be worth running the tests while excluding it to see what difference it is making. I do not want to report results that depend on a single, or a few, cases because this would reduce the confidence that what we are observing is a general relationship that holds across multiple cases.

The next test is for heteroscedasticity, which allowed me to see if the residuals are evenly distributed. This is an assumption I made when conducting multivariate tests. The linear regression model assumes that the variance of errors are constant, or homoscedastic (Gordon, 2010, p.380). If there is heteroscedasticity this is not the case. Heteroscedasticity can lead to inefficiency and biased standard errors, although it would have to be severe to have a serious effect (Allison, 1998, pp. 127-128). To see if this was having an effect I re-ran the regressions controlling for this to see if this changed the results. This was done through STATA, which can calculate various heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (Gordon, 2010, p.384). I then compared new values with the original results.

Leverage and DFBETA statistics show possible effects on the coefficients in terms of how much they are being pulled in each direction by specific cases. Leverage
“measures how far observations fall from the centre of the predictor variables” (Gordon, 2010, p.367). The further observations fall the greater their influence on the coefficients. Calculating DFBETA (difference in beta) statistics shows me which cases most influence the size of individual coefficients. More precisely it “capture(s) how each coefficient changes when a case is excluded from the sample” (Gordon, 2010, p.367). Both can be calculated in STATA after the initial regression is run.

My initial plan was to repeat this whole process, from bivariate testing through to the robustness tests, with the unreliable 0.5 cases taken out. This was to determine their effect on the results. However, this made the sample size too low to yield meaningful results, so I have not been able to. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapters. The next chapter will present the results of the statistical tests. This will then lead onto a discussion of the results, and conclusions.
Results

In this chapter I will outline the results obtained from the statistical tests presented at the end of the last chapter. A discussion of the results will be provided in the next chapter, where I will link the findings back to previous research, my hypotheses, and outline possible areas for future research.

This chapter will be split into two sections, one for each independent variable.68 In each section I will start by giving a brief description of the data. I will then show the results of the bivariate tests for each independent variable in relation to the dependent variable.69 After this, I will present the results of the multivariate tests, which include the control variables. I will then discuss the results of the robustness tests in order to assess the sensitivity of my findings. Details of all the tests used, and the rationale for using them, are as outlined in the previous chapter.

1) State Seizure

Description

Out of a sample of 50 successful nonviolent campaigns, 27 seized the state and 23 did not.70 Before discussing the test results it is important to get an idea of what the differences in democratisation are for revolutions with state seizure compared to those without. The box and whisker graph presented (See Figure 2) outlines the polity scores for campaigns that seized the state and those that did

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68 Initially I had planned a third section where I would re-run all of these tests without the cases coded as less reliable for state seizure. I have decided not to do this as it makes the sample too small for statistical analysis.

69 There are three dependent variables because of the three democratisation-measures used.

70 See Appendix 3 for exact cases.
not at different time intervals: one year pre-revolution and two, five and ten-years post revolution.

**Figure 2 – Polity scores over time, pre- and post-revolution.**

![Polity Scores Over Time](image)

It is clear from looking at this graph that whether the state is seized or not, on average, we are likely to see democratisation after a successful nonviolent revolution. Having said this, revolutions with state seizure appear to score slightly higher on the polity score. The mean scores are higher for the two and five-year post-revolution marks on the scale, and the variation in polity scores is smaller. The bulk of observations also fall within a smaller range, higher up the scale. Some of the statistical tests in this chapter will test if this is a significant difference.
It is worth bearing in mind that there appears to be more variation in polity scores pre-revolution for state seizure, with a greater number of them having higher polity scores pre-revolution. We can see that the range of polity scores within the group where the state was seized is higher, although the mean polity scores are similar. Where the state was seized the mean pre-revolution polity score is -3.32 and where it was not seized the mean polity score is -3.696.

**One-way ANOVA: State seizure with Polity IV data**

In the first one-way ANOVA test, with the state seizure variable and the Polity IV data, we find an insignificant correlation (using the p=<0.05 cut off) at the two-year mark, with the resulting p-value equalling 0.0919 (See Table 1). We could say that this is approaching significance. We can see that the mean polity score, two-years post-revolution, when the state is seized was 6.59, compared to where it was not seized, where the mean was 4.52. However, as time moves on we get insignificant results, suggesting that the relationship is only strong in the years that are closer to the political revolution. This is because the democracy scores for countries where the state has been seized and counties where it has not been seized get closer together as time moves on. By the time the ten-year post-revolution mark is reached the mean polity scores are much closer together, with a mean score of 5.42 when the state was seized and 5.45 where it was not. Put simply, the differences become marginal over time.

To further demonstrate this point we can see changes in the Kernel density plots below (See Figures 3-5), as we observe the distribution of polity scores when the state was seized verses when it was not. Initially, after two and even five-years, it appears that the revolutions with state seizure have higher polity scores, but we
can see that by the tenth year the scores are very similar. By ten years the graphs have more or less converged. Both are at the democracy end of the scale.

Table 1 – Results of one-way ANOVA test with the state seizure variable and the polity score.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State seizure two-years post-revolution</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Seized</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.5217391</td>
<td>5.5748589</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.5925926</td>
<td>2.6349611</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>4.3272275</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0919</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State seizure five-years post-revolution</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>Freq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Seized</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.5652174</td>
<td>5.5581724</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.4074074</td>
<td>4.3875634</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>4.9259413</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5523</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State seizure ten-years post-revolution</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>Freq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Seized</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.4545455</td>
<td>4.9350763</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.4166667</td>
<td>5.4367243</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.4347826</td>
<td>5.1452337</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.9804</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

legend:* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

The first graph (Figure 3), which shows the polity scores two-years post-revolution, provides more information. We can see here that in countries where the state was seized, the vast majority of the scores are higher than 5, with only one or two cases sitting below this – the lowest scoring a -2. In cases where the state was not seized we see more of a spread of polity scores across nearly the entire range – the lowest score being a -8. Despite this, in the next graph (Figure 4) we see autocratic regimes start to re-emerge in countries where state seizure took place at the five-year post-revolution mark. By the ten-year post-revolution mark (see Figure 5) the amount of democracy vs. autocracy is similar in cases
Figure 3 – Kernel density plot for state seizure variable and polity scores, two-years post-revolution.

Figure 4 - Kernel density plot for state seizure variable and polity scores, five-years post-revolution
Figure 5 - Kernel density plot for state seizure variable and polity scores, ten-years post-revolution.

where the state was or was not seized. It is also clear that some states have re-autocratised. This graph shows us that state seizure has little effect on the polity score ten-years post-revolution.

One-way ANOVA: State seizure with change in the Polity IV scores\textsuperscript{71}

When state seizure is tested with the change on the polity score scale, there are insignificant results (see Table 2). The mean change, after two-years, for movements that seized the state is 10.08 points on the polity scale, meaning that on average these movements shifted ten points on the polity score towards

\textsuperscript{71} Negative values in this section refer to movements towards democracy on the polity scale. For example, in table two we see that movements that seized the state have a mean of -10.375 at the post-revolution mark. This means that, on average, groups that seized the state in their revolution moved 10.375 points along the polity towards democracy. Results in the tables are shown this way as a result of the way statistical tests and the data have been dealt with while using STATA.
democracy. This is more than where the state was not seized where on average there was a post-revolution shift of 8.2 along the scale. Even though there is a difference here, it is not statistically significant, with a p-value calculated as 0.2970. This suggests that while state seizure’s relationship with the final polity score may be significant, it’s relationship with how much a country democratises post revolution is not. However, a similar trend is found here to the test with the polity score. Over time, the difference between state seizure and no state seizure becomes marginal. At five-years we see a mean of 8.26 points change along the scale when the state is not seized and a mean of 8.88 when it is seized. The p-value here is 0.7599 suggesting that there is little reason to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship. At ten-years we find similar results, with a mean of 9.7 when the state is not seized and a mean of 9.26 when it is. Here the p-value of 0.8196 also does not fall under conventional levels of statistical significance.

**Table 2 – Results of one-way ANOVA test with the state seizure variable and the change along the polity score.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State seizure two-years post-revolution</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Seized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>-8.2173913</td>
<td>6.6260953</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-10.08</td>
<td>5.597023</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>-9.1875</td>
<td>6.1181844</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2970</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State seizure five-years post-revolution</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Seized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>-8.2608696</td>
<td>7.640903</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-8.88</td>
<td>6.2936476</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>-8.5833333</td>
<td>6.9030777</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7599</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State seizure ten-years post-revolution</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Seized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>-9.7272727</td>
<td>6.5696403</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-9.2608696</td>
<td>7.0402569</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>-9.4888889</td>
<td>6.740725</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8196</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
One-way ANOVA: State seizure with the categorical democracy measure

When state seizure was tested with the categorical democracy variable, significant results are found after two-years, with a p-value calculated at 0.045 (See Table 3). This suggests that seizing the state is correlated with democratising past the cut off mark of 6 on the polity score two-years post-revolution. We can see that 89% of movements that have seized that state are democracies, compared to the 65% of movements that did not seize the state.

Again, the difference becomes insignificant by the five-year mark with a p-value of 0.1989. Here we can see that 81% of states are democracies where the state was seized and 65% where it was not. At ten-years this trend continues with a p-value of 0.3355. Here we see 81% where the state was seized and 69% where it was not.

Table 3 – Results of one-way ANOVA test with the state seizure variable and the categorical polity score.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State seizure</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>two-years post-revolution</td>
<td>State Seized</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.65217391</td>
<td>0.48698475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.88888889</td>
<td>0.32025631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.41845196</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>0.045*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>five-years post-revolution</td>
<td>State Seized</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.65217391</td>
<td>0.48698475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.81481481</td>
<td>0.39584739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.4430875</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>0.1989</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ten-years post-revolution</td>
<td>State Seized</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.69565217</td>
<td>0.47047197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.81481481</td>
<td>0.39584739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.43141911</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>0.3355</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

legend:* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
**Linear Regression: State Seizure with the Polity IV data**

This section discusses the results of multivariate tests used to control for income (GDP), democratic neighbours, and pre-revolution polity score. When the control variables are controlled for, state seizure is still insignificant (compared to the standard $p=0.05$). However the $p$-value is still relatively low at 0.093 (See Table 4). Due to the small sample size, and that it follows a similar trend to the bivariate test above – being low at two-years and high at five and ten-years (See Table 5 and 6) – state seizure should not be completely ruled out as a significant variable. This will be expanded upon in the next chapter, but in short, due to the small sample size the true correlation could still be zero or close to it (Allison, 1998, p. 61).

When looking at the coefficients (See Tables 4-6) we see some predictable results, although as has been shown above, not statistically significant ones. When the state was seized, the country of concern is likely to be 2.1 places higher on the polity scale after two-years.

**Table 4 – Results of Linear regression, two-years post-revolution.**

| Variable                   | Coef.   | Std. Err. | $P>|t|$ |
|----------------------------|---------|-----------|--------|
| State Seized               | 2.145331| 1.247238  | 0.093  |
| Pre-revolution Polity      | 0.1715143 | 0.1212666 | 0.164  |
| Logged GDP per capita      | -0.2614731 | 0.400609  | 0.517  |
| Democratic Neighbours      | 0.0934598 | 2.486036  | 0.970  |
| Constant                   | 7.051661 | 3.479966  | 0.049* |

Number of obs = 48  
R-squared= 0.1144  
legend:* $p<.05$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.001$
Table 5 – Results of Linear regression, five-years post-revolution.

| Variable                     | Coef.    | Std. Err. | P>|t| |
|------------------------------|----------|-----------|-----|
| State Seized                 | 0.9700686| 1.447455  | 0.506|
| Pre-revolution Polity        | 0.0470376| 0.1407333 | 0.740|
| Logged GDP per capita        | 0.371857 | 0.4649179 | 0.428|
| Democratic Neighbours       | 4.340727 | 2.85114   | 0.140|
| Constant                    | 0.4295008| 4.038598  | 0.916|

Number of obs = 48
R-squared = 0.0719

legend:* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Table 6 – Results of Linear regression, ten-years post-revolution.

| Variable                     | Coef.    | Std. Err. | P>|t| |
|------------------------------|----------|-----------|-----|
| State Seized                 | 0.5251249| 1.437505  | 0.717|
| Pre-revolution Polity        | 0.0071957| 0.1451235 | 0.961|
| Logged GDP per capita        | 0.2914689| 0.4471875 | 0.518|
| Democratic Neighbours       | 4.209025 | 2.847971  | 0.147|
| Constant                    | 1.815509 | 3.884504  | 0.643|

Number of obs = 45
R-squared = 0.0609

legend:* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

These results come from the use of a two-tailed test. The rationale for this was based on the theories outlined in previous chapters. As some theories suggested that the outcome of state seizure could be democratisation, while others suggested moves towards autocracy, this meant that I could not be sure if state seizure would have a positive or negative effect on the dependent variable. As the tests, and the descriptive graphs up unto this point have suggested only positive, or at least not negative, effects on the dependent variable I will now include the results of a one-tailed test, which assumes that there is a positive relationship.

72 This is based on the positive coefficients produced in the tests (see table 4).
When a one-tailed regression was conducted the new p-values for state seizure are 0.0465 after two-years; 0.235 after five-years; and 0.3585 after ten-years. At the two-year mark, the new p-value is now below the standard significance threshold of p= <0.05.\textsuperscript{73}

Robustness Tests
To check for multicollinearity I ran a test to produce variance inflation factors (VIF) for each variable used in the regression. When the state seizure variable was included with the control variables in this test, the results showed that there was little correlation between the independent variables with VIFs of between 1 and 1.06 for each independent variable.\textsuperscript{74}

I also examined the standardised residuals.\textsuperscript{75} When the residuals are plotted on a scatter graph (as shown in Figure 6) we can identify a few outliers that sit at the low end of the polity scale. These are Haiti, Poland, and South Korea, with Iran and Kenya close to them. Haiti, Poland and South Korea all have residuals that are greater than -2. I have no theoretical justification to remove these cases, so I have opted to leave them in the analysis. They all had nonviolent peoples movements that challenged the state, but none of the movements seized it. There was nothing abnormal about the movements themselves, which followed similar patterns to

\textsuperscript{73} This (standardized residuals) is calculated following MacDonald (2006) who states that when the null hypothesis is zero, then you can simply halve the p-value form the two-tailed regression. Based on the fact that I have found no evidence of a negative effect, the null hypothesis is that state seizure leads to autocratisation. This is not to be confused with my actual hypothesis listed above, but is purely based on the results found up unto this point.

\textsuperscript{74} Allison (1998, p.142) indicates 2.5 as the level of concern, whereas others say between 4 and 10 (Gordon, 2010, p. 387).

\textsuperscript{75} Residuals are calculated by taking away the actual polity score from the predicted polity score produced by the model. The bigger the number this produces, the worse a model is at predicting post-revolution polity values. See the previous chapter for more discussion. Standardized residuals are used.
other nonviolent uprisings. Similar results are found at five-years post revolution with Sudan and Belarus having standardised residuals that are just greater than -2, with Iran, Poland, and Kenya sitting at similar positions. Again, I have no theoretical reason to remove these cases from the analysis. At ten-years Poland, Sudan, Belarus and Iran all have residuals just greater than -2. As the graphs for the five and ten-year marks are very similar I have opted not to include them here. There are no large individual outliers within the sample, with most cases being close to the zero mark. If anything, the model may slightly over predict the polity scores for state seizure, but only slightly, and it is hard to make this claim with the relatively small sample size that is being used. The next test was for heteroscedasticity.\textsuperscript{76} When the regression is re-run taking this into account (using the method presented in the previous chapter), the new p-values are comparable to when the regression was run previously. State-seizure now gets a p-value of 0.093 rather than 0.113. Similar results are found at five and ten-years-post revolution. This suggests that similar conclusions can be draw about the effect of state seizure on democracy either way.

I have also run a leverage test. Here I find one outlier at the two-year mark, which is Madagascar (See Figure 7). However, even though this is an outlying case, it's leverage is low at less than 0.25. Almost identical graphs are produced at the five and ten-year post-revolution marks. Because of this I have opted to leave them out of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{76} This is to find out if the residuals are evenly distributed, which is an assumption made while using the tests presented. See research design and methods chapter.
Figure 6 – Scatterplot of the residuals, two-years post revolution.

The final robustness test is to produce DFBETA influence statistics to see what cases most influence the size of the coefficient for state seizure. When I do this at two-years, I find no results that are of particular concern. As can be seen in figure 8, at most cases are clumped together around the zero mark. There are some slight outliers at the top – Haiti, Kenya, South Koreas and Poland – which may be pulling my coefficients up, while Iran may be doing the opposite. At the five and ten-year mark the spread is very slightly further away from 0 with the extreme cases moving from -0.4 or 0.4 for -0.5 or 0.5. However, there is very little difference in the spread on the cases. The only change being the addition of Belarus and Niger at a similar height to Kenya and Poland. Therefore, I have left the graphs for the five and ten-year-post revolution marks out of this analysis.
Figure 7 – Scatterplot of the leverage, two-years post revolution.

Figure 8 – Scatterplot of the DFBETA statistic results, two-years post revolution.
**Linear Regression: State Seizure with the Polity IV change data**

All results using the change variable are the same as above, except for the lagged polity score, which gets a p-value of 0.000 in every test. This suggests that the more democratic a country is pre-revolution, the further the shift along the polity score scale - i.e. more autocratic states move less along the scale after a successful nonviolent revolution. The robustness tests also show the same results as when they are run with the polity data.

**Logit regression: State Seizure with the categorical democracy measure**

The logit regressions follow a similar pattern to the linear regression with the polity score. State seizure gets a p-value of 0.07 at two-years (See Table 7) which is close to significance. This suggests that we see more cases where the state was seized reaching or going beyond the polity score of 6, than we do where the state was not seized. However at the five and ten-year post-revolution marks it again looks insignificant with p-values of 0.233 at five-years (See Table 8) and 0.381 at ten-years (See Table 9). I will now move on to present the results with the campaign size variable.

**Table 7 - Results of Logit regression with state seizure variable, two-years post-revolution.**

| Variable            | Coef.  | Std. Err. | P>|z| |
|---------------------|--------|-----------|-----|
| State Seized        | 1.401902 | 0.7730265 | 0.07 |
| Pre-revolution Polity | 0.0059591 | 0.0705349 | 0.933 |
| Logged GDP per capita | 0.3021282 | 0.2897826 | 0.297 |
| Democratic Neighbours | 1.25326 | 1.564163 | 0.423 |
| Constant            | 2.445638 | 2.357745 | 0.3 |

Number of observations = 48
Table 8 - Results of Logit regression with state seizure variable, five-years post-revolution.

| Variable                      | Coef.   | Std. Err. | P>|z| |
|-------------------------------|---------|-----------|-----|
| State Seized                  | 0.8575028 | 0.702995  | 0.223 |
| Pre-revolution Polity         | 0.0142749 | 0.0679198 | 0.834 |
| Logged GDP per capita         | 0.1388128 | 0.2367967 | 0.558 |
| Democratic Neighbours        | 2.893047  | 1.551663  | 0.062 |
| Constant                      | -1.319432 | 2.018302  | 0.513 |

Number of observations = 48

Table 9 - Results of Logit regression with state seizure variable, ten-years post-revolution.

| Variable                      | Coef.   | Std. Err. | P>|z| |
|-------------------------------|---------|-----------|-----|
| State Seized                  | 0.2814538 | 0.7618757 | 0.381 |
| Pre-revolution Polity         | 0.0568792 | 0.0793787 | 0.724 |
| Logged GDP per capita         | 1.530883  | 1.283126  | 0.494 |
| Democratic Neighbours        | 1.448397  | 1.621492  | 0.143 |
| Constant                      | 0.161875  | 0.8646139 | 0.617 |

Number of observations = 48

Democratic neighbours could influence long-term democratisation here with p-value of 0.062 five years post-revolution and 0.143 ten-years post revolution.

2) Campaign Size

Description

As can be seen in figure 9, while the mean polity scores pre-revolution vary slightly across campaign size, the distance between pre-revolution and post-revolution polity scores, in terms of the shift along the polity scale, seems quite similar. As can be seen, on average nonviolent revolutions succeed in creating democratisation irrespective of campaign size. They possibly even take a small
step back towards autocracy after the two-year post-revolution mark, which can be seen in the campaign sizes marked 1 and 3.\textsuperscript{77}

The smallest campaign size appears to have a different pattern. As will be explained below, this may be because one case is an outlier. Different tests will also be performed treating the campaign size variable as a categorical and then a continuous variable, for reasons outlined in the previous chapter.

**Figure 9 – Dot graph of mean polity scores over time for different sized campaigns**

\textsuperscript{77} As mentioned in the previous chapter, a campaign size of “0” is hundreds to thousands of participants; a campaign size of “1” is tens of thousands of participants; a campaign size of “2” is above one hundred thousand participants; and a campaign size of “3” is above one million participants.
One-way ANOVA: Campaign Size (as a categorical variable) with the Polity IV data\textsuperscript{78}

A significant correlation is found between campaign size and the polity data at the two-year post-revolution mark. The p-value is calculated at 0.0057 (See Table 10). However it would appear that there is an outlier skewing the results. This is the one very small movement (recorded as “0”) which goes from a -8 to 7 polity score between the two and five-year post revolution measures. The outlier is the Haitian “Anti-Duvalier” movement (1985) and it is the only small successful movement. Here the state was not seized, and the change along the scale is very large which is against the norm. We can clearly see that no other movement of any size experienced this much change. At the five and ten-year post-revolution marks there is no significant correlation found.

Ignoring the Haiti case, we observe some differences in the mean polity scores for other campaign sizes (1-3). At two-years post-revolution, the mean polity scores are 4.875 when there is a campaign with tens of thousands of participants; 6.25 when there is a campaign with over one hundred thousand participants; and 6.25 where there were over one million participants. At five-years post-revolution, the mean polity scores are 3.375 when there is a campaign with tens of thousands of participants; 5.75 when there is a campaign with over one hundred thousand participants; and 4.25 where there were over one million participants. At ten-years post-revolution, the mean polity scores are 3.57 when the there is a campaign with tens of thousands of participants; 5.95 when there is a campaign with over one hundred thousand participants; and 5.09 where there were over one million participants.

\textsuperscript{78} A two-way ANOVA was also used for the tests with four campaign size categories to compare with the one-way ANOVA results. The results were the same.
one million participants. These results are fairly consistent over the three time measures for campaigns with over one hundred thousand participants. However, for campaigns with tens of thousand of participants, and campaigns with over one million participants, the mean polity scores drop slightly after the two-year post revolution mark.

Table 10 – Results of one-way ANOVA test with the campaign size variable and the polity score.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Campaign Size two-years post-revolution</strong></th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Campaign Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.875</td>
<td>5.1668587</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>3.614584</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>2.8643578</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.6888889</td>
<td>4.2148127</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>0.0057**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Campaign Size five-years post-revolution</strong></th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Campaign Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.375</td>
<td>6.9269144</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>3.7329322</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>5.52885</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.9555556</td>
<td>4.8568394</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>0.6039</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Campaign Size ten-years post-revolution</strong></th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Campaign Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.5714286</td>
<td>7.3904701</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.9545455</td>
<td>4.3036781</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.0909091</td>
<td>5.8728961</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.3414634</td>
<td>5.2326368</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>0.7603</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

legend:* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

As the Haiti outlier is present, this maybe skewing the results. In order to rectify this, the one-way ANOVA test was repeated with the Haiti (1985) case removed. When the same ANOVA test is performed without this case we get results that are insignificant. The p-values change to 0.6476 after two-years; 0.4361 after five-
years; and 0.58897 after ten-years. This would suggest that campaign size is not significantly correlated with the polity scores, suggesting that the Haiti outlier significantly influences the p-values.

Finally, when the ANOVA test is completed with only two categories for campaign size (above or below one million participants – see previous chapter for justification), results are similar to when campaign size is tested with four categories. Here at two-years the new p-value is 0.5807; at five-years it is 0.54; at ten-year 0.8026. All of these are calculated without the Haiti case included.

**Pearson’s Correlation Test: Campaign Size (as a continuous variable) with the Polity IV data**

When campaign size is treated as a continuous variable, similar results are found, as can be seen in table 11. The results of the correlation were significant at the two-year post-revolution mark with a p-value calculated at 0.0475. Here, campaign size accounts for 29.7% of the polity score. However, at the five and ten-year mark the results are insignificant with p-values of 0.9971 and 0.8001 respectively.

**Table 11 – Results of Pearson’s correlation test with the campaign size variable and the polity score.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polity Score after 2 years</th>
<th>Polity Score after 5 years</th>
<th>Polity Score after 10 years</th>
<th>Campaign Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score after 2 years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score after 5 years</td>
<td>0.5346</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score after 10 years</td>
<td>0.5479</td>
<td>0.8627</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Size</td>
<td>0.2971</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>0.0408</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>0.0475*</td>
<td>0.9971</td>
<td>0.8001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
When this test was conducted with the Haiti case removed, we get p-values of 0.4712 after two-years; 0.8435 after five-years; and 0.6647 after ten-years. Similarly to the tests above, no correlation is found between campaign size and the polity scores.

**One-way ANOVA: Campaign Size (as a categorical variable) with change in the Polity IV scores**

No significant results are found with the change along the polity score measure (See Table 12). At first glance there appears to be very little difference in the mean change in polity scores across time and campaign size. This means that it is unlikely that even when the outlier is removed that a significant p-value would then be produced. At two-years post-revolution, the mean change in the polity scores is 9.875 points towards democracy when there is a campaign with tens of thousands of participants; 8.913 when there is a campaign with over one hundred thousand participants; and 9.18 where there were over one million participants. At five-years post-revolution, the mean polity scores are 8.375 when the there is a campaign with tens of thousands of participants; 8.478 when there is a campaign with over one hundred thousand participants; and 7 where there were over one million participants. At ten-years post-revolution, the mean polity scores are 8.857 when the there is a campaign with tens of thousands of participants; 9.52 when there is a campaign with over one hundred thousand participants; and 8.09 where there were over one million participants. The p-values have been calculated as being 0.6213 at two-years; 0.6716 at five-years; and 0.741 at ten-years, however, the outlier may be influencing these numbers.
When the test is conducted again without the Haiti case, results are still insignificant, and in fact seem to move further away from the threshold for significance. P-values are calculated at 0.8441 at two-years; 0.97 at five-years; and 0.8614 at ten-years.

**Table 12 – Results of one-way ANOVA test with the campaign size variable and the change in polity score.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Size two-years post-revolution</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Campaign Size</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-9.875</td>
<td>5.3301702</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-8.9130435</td>
<td>7.1217531</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-9.1818182</td>
<td>4.7501196</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>-8.9767442</td>
<td>6.1932697</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6213</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Size five-years post-revolution</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Campaign Size</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-8.375</td>
<td>6.3681686</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-8.4782609</td>
<td>7.2792955</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>7.1972217</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>-8.255814</td>
<td>6.9798793</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6716</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Size ten-years post-revolution</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Campaign Size</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-8.8571429</td>
<td>6.6939916</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-9.5238095</td>
<td>7.1387607</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-8.0909091</td>
<td>7.1617672</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>-9.175</td>
<td>6.9129663</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7410</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

legend:* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Finally, when the ANOVA test is completed with only two categories for campaign size (above or bellow one million participants), results are similar to when campaign size is tested with four categories after two-years. At all year measures
the results are still insignificant. At two-years the new p-value is 0.9972; at five-years it is 0.3920; at ten-year 0.4351. All of these are calculated without the Haiti case included.

**Pearson’s Correlation Test: Campaign Size (as continuous variable) with change in the Polity IV scores**

When campaign size is treated as a continuous variable, the results of the correlation (see table 13), were similar to when it was treated as a categorical variable. P-values were calculated at 0.7152 after two-years; 0.3722 at five-years; and 0.4776 at ten-years. Campaign size is not accounting for change in polity scores at two-years, and accounts for between 11-13% at five and ten-years.

When the outlying case (Haiti) is removed the new p-values are calculated at 0.8392 after two-years; at 0.6432 after five-years; at 0.7608 after ten-years – again, insignificant.

**Table 13 – Results of Pearson’s correlation test with the campaign size variable and the change in polity score.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polity Change 2years</th>
<th>Polity Change 5years</th>
<th>Polity Change 10years</th>
<th>Campaign Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity Change 2years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Change 5years</td>
<td>0.7586</td>
<td>0.9436</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Change 10years</td>
<td>0.7687</td>
<td>0.1395</td>
<td>0.1156</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Size</td>
<td>-0.0573</td>
<td>0.1395</td>
<td>0.1156</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>0.7152</td>
<td>0.3722</td>
<td>0.4776</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

legend:* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

**One-way ANOVA: Campaign Size (as a categorical variable) with the categorical democracy measure**

Similar to above, the results here are fairly consistent over campaign size and time, however we do see a slight drop after the two-year mark (See Table 14). At
two-years post-revolution, on average, 75% of cases were democracies when the
there is a campaign with tens of thousands of participants; 83% when there is a
campaign with over one hundred thousand participants; and 75% where there
were over one million participants. At five-years post-revolution, 62.5% are
democracies when the there is a campaign with tens of thousands of participants;
79% when there is a campaign with over one hundred thousand participants; and
66% where there were over one million participants. At ten-years post-
revolution, 62.5% are democracies when the there is a campaign with tens of
thousands of participants; 79% when there is a campaign with over one hundred
thousand participants; and 75% where there were over one million participants.

Again these results are not statistically significant, with p-values calculated at
0.2747 two-years post-revolution; 0.6964 five-years post-revolution; and 0.7643
ten-years post-revolution. When the outlying Haiti case was removed the p-
values were still insignificant and were further away from the significance
threshold of 0.05. The p-values were 0.8 after two-years; 0.5822 after five-years;
and 0.6581 after ten-years.

Finally, when the ANOVA test is completed with only two categories for campaign
size (above or below one million participants) the results are still insignificant as
when campaign size is tested with four categories. At two-years the new p-value
is 0.779; at five-years it is 0.5164: at ten-year 0.9277. All of these are calculated
without the Haiti case included.
Table 14 – Results of one-way ANOVA test with the campaign size variable and the categorical democracy measure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Size two-years post-revolution</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Campaign Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.46291005</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.83333333</td>
<td>0.38069349</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.45226702</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.77777778</td>
<td>0.42043748</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
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<tr>
<th>Campaign Size five-years post-revolution</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Campaign Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>0.51754917</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.79166667</td>
<td>0.41485112</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.66666667</td>
<td>0.49236596</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>p-value</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Campaign Size ten-years post-revolution</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Campaign Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.625</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>0.41485112</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.45226702</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.75555556</td>
<td>0.43461349</td>
<td>45</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>0.7643</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

legend:* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

**Pearson’s Correlation Test: Campaign Size (as a continuous variable) with the categorical democracy measure**

Like the test above, insignificant results were found with p-values of 0.4886 after s; 0.8338 after five-years; and 0.8211 after ten-years (see table 12). After two-years, the campaign size accounts for 10% of the difference between those movements that became democracies and those that didn’t. When the outlying Haiti case is removed the new p-values are calculated at 0.9213 after two-years; at 0.9643 after five-years; at 0.6122 after ten-years – again, these are insignificant.
Table 15 – Results of Pearson’s correlation test with the campaign size variable and the categorical democracy measure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Categorical Dem. 2 years</th>
<th>Categorical Dem. 5 years</th>
<th>Categorical Dem. 10 years</th>
<th>Campaign Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Categorical Dem. 2 years</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categorical Dem. 5 years</td>
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<td>0.3798</td>
<td>0.7345</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Campaign Size</td>
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<td>p-value</td>
<td>0.4886</td>
<td>0.8338</td>
<td>0.8211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

legend:* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

**Linear Regression: Campaign Size with the Polity Data.**

As there was no significant difference above between treating campaign size as a categorical or a continuous variable in the bivariate tests, I have chosen to treat campaign size as a continuous variable in the multivariate tests. Also Allison (1998, p.10) states that this technique is often used with ordinal scales, such as this one, and that there are no good alternatives. It is the combination of the ANOVA test results and Allison’s (1998) advice that has lead to the use of linear regression. In the regression, campaign size gets a relatively low p-value of 0.089 for year two (See Table 16). At five and ten-years they get much higher with p-values of 0.816 (See Table 17) and 0.847 (See Table 18).

We can see by looking at the coefficients in table 16 that campaign size is linked to higher polity scores at two-years post-revolution, but only marginally. At the five and ten-year marks there is little difference, demonstrated by the coefficients of less than 1.
Table 16 – Results of Linear regression, two-years post-revolution.

| Variable             | Coef.    | Std. Err. | P>|t| |
|----------------------|----------|-----------|-----|
| Campaign Size        | 1.546105 | 0.8846871 | 0.089 |
| Pre-revolution Polity| 0.1427291| 0.1211086 | 0.246 |
| Logged GDP per capita| -0.393363| 0.399223  | 0.331 |
| Democratic Neighbours| -1.610115| 2.61216   | 0.541 |
| Constant             | 6.541938 | 3.913144  | 0.103 |

Number of obs = 43  
R-squared = 0.1376

legend:* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Table 17 – Results of Linear regression, five-years post-revolution.

| Variable             | Coef.    | Std. Err. | P>|t| |
|----------------------|----------|-----------|-----|
| Campaign Size        | -0.2502461| 1.067309  | 0.816 |
| Pre-revolution Polity| 0.0717396| 0.1461085 | 0.626 |
| Logged GDP per capita| 0.2619225| 0.4816327 | 0.590 |
| Democratic Neighbours| 3.768984 | 3.151375  | 0.239 |
| Constant             | 2.432913 | 4.720916  | 0.609 |

Number of obs = 43  
R-squared = 0.0469

legend:* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Table 18 – Results of Linear regression, ten-years post-revolution.

| Variable             | Coef.    | Std. Err. | P>|t| |
|----------------------|----------|-----------|-----|
| Campaign Size        | 0.2086619| 1.070187  | 0.847 |
| Pre-revolution Polity| 0.0220886| 0.1532469 | 0.886 |
| Logged GDP per capita| 0.2161805| 0.4729956 | 0.650 |
| Democratic Neighbours| 3.784999 | 3.178996  | 0.242 |
| Constant             | 2.319355 | 4.71786   | 0.626 |

Number of obs = 40  
R-squared = 0.1491

legend:* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
The same regression was run without the Haiti outlier. This makes the results look insignificant. At two-years the p-value for campaign size is 0.641; at five-years 0.874; and at ten-years 0.826.

Robustness Tests

Just as with the state seizure variable above, to check for multicollinearity I ran a test to produce variance inflation factors (VIF). When the campaign size variable was included with the control variables in this test, the results showed that there was little correlation between the independent variables, with VIFs of between 1.03 and 1.08 for each independent variable.

When we take a look at the standardised residuals, results are again very similar to the robustness test above (See Figure 10). Iran, Haiti, Poland and South Korea are all slight outliers with negative residuals. What is different here is that Peru is also a slight outlier with a positive residual that is greater than 1.5. As it is the only low campaign size with success, the same regression was run without Haiti-for reasons explained earlier in this chapter. Apart from the exclusion of this case, I have no theoretical reason to remove any outliers just as with the state seizure tests. At five and ten-years very similar results are found as when the state seizure variable was used. Here Sudan, Algeria and Niger also become outliers sitting at the same level as Poland, Iran and Haiti. South Korea and Peru are no longer outliers.

When the regression was re-run in order to control for heteroscedasticity, the p-values do change quite significantly. P-values for campaign size were now calculated at 0.294 two-years post-revolution; at 0.846 five-years post revolution;
and at 0.881 at ten-years post-revolution. This makes the results move further away from significance.

In the leverage test I find three outliers – all of which have results of between 0.3 and 0.4 (See Figure 11). These cases are Madagascar, Haiti and Peru. For the same reasons presented above, I do not see these cases as problematic for my results as these outliers are still close to zero. In other words they are not big outliers. This applies to all year measures.

**Figure 10 – Scatterplot of the residuals, two-years post revolution.**

There is more variation with the DFBETA influence statistic than with the state seizure above. One clear outlier is identified which is, unsurprisingly, Haiti (See Figure 12). As mentioned, the regression has been re-run without the Haiti case. At the five and ten-year post-revolution mark the results are the same apart from two cases: Poland with a positive score of just over 0.5 and Iran with a negative score of just under -0.5. This means they may be slightly influencing my
coefficients, but as I have said previously, I have no theoretical reason to remove them. This applies to all year measures.

Figure 11 Scatterplot of the leverage, two-years post revolution.

Figure 12 – Scatterplot of the DFBETA statistic results, two-years post revolution.
**Linear Regression: Campaign Size with the change in the Polity Data.**

Results here follow the same pattern as with the state seizure variable. All results are the same as with the straight polity data, except for the lagged polity score, which gets a p-value of 0.000 on every count. As I have said above, this suggests that the more democratic a country is pre-revolution the further the shift along the polity score scale. The robustness tests also show the same results as when they are run with the polity data.

**Logit regression: Campaign Size with the categorical democracy measure**

The Logit regressions give no significant findings, suggesting that campaign size is not a contributing factor to achieving a polity score of 6-10. Campaign size gets a p-value of 0.529 at two-years (See Table 19), 0.505 at five-years (See Table 20) and 0.926 at ten-years (See Table 21). When Haiti is removed the p-values change to 0.765 at two-years, 0.584 at five-years, and 0.916 at ten-years post-revolution.

I will now move on to present the results with of this analysis in light of the hypothesis and the existing literature.

**Table 19 - Results of Logit regression with campaign size variable, two-years post-revolution.**

| Variable                      | Coef.    | Std. Err. | P>|z| |
|-------------------------------|----------|-----------|-----|
| Campaign Size                 | 0.3136831| 0.4983149 | 0.529|
| Pre-revolution Polity         | -0.0063918| 0.0683017 | 0.925|
| Logged GDP per capita         | -0.3577501| 0.2954845 | 0.226|
| Democratic Neighbours        | 0.6092575| 1.496867  | 0.684|
| Constant                      | 3.026461 | 2.541057  | 0.234|

Number of observations = 43
Table 20 - Results of Logit regression with campaign size variable, five-years post-revolution.

| Variable               | Coef.   | Std. Err. | P>|z| |
|------------------------|---------|-----------|-----|
| Campaign Size          | -0.3744334 | 0.5615155 | 0.505 |
| Pre-revolution Polity  | 0.0289536 | 0.0684208 | 0.672 |
| Logged GDP per capita  | 0.1127055 | 0.2361107 | 0.633 |
| Democratic Neighbours  | 2.878303  | 1.687083  | 0.088 |
| Constant               | 0.0108786 | 2.145575  | 0.996 |

Number of observations = 43

Table 21 - Results of Logit regression with campaign size variable, ten-years post-revolution.

| Variable               | Coef.   | Std. Err. | P>|z| |
|------------------------|---------|-----------|-----|
| Campaign Size          | -0.0492466 | 0.5273075 | 0.926 |
| Pre-revolution Polity  | 0.0318317 | 0.070429  | 0.651 |
| Logged GDP per capita  | 0.1186949 | 0.232272  | 0.609 |
| Democratic Neighbours  | 1.96044  | 1.5823    | 0.215 |
| Constant               | -0.2675482 | 2.185981  | 0.903 |

Number of observations = 43
Discussion and Conclusions

In this chapter I will do two things: (1) I will deliver my interpretation of the results provided in the previous chapter. I will do this by giving an overview of the results in relation to the two hypotheses. This will include relating the findings back to previous research as identified in my literature review and also the information provided in the theory chapter. I will also discuss the impact of the control variables on my results. (2) I will outline possibilities for future research that could strengthen and/or expand these findings.

Hypothesis One

The results of the statistical analysis give some interesting insights into the first hypothesis, which was: “the seizure of the state increases post-nonviolent-revolution democratisation”. Firstly, it appears that nonviolent revolutionary movements that seize the state tend to be more democratic than movements without state seizure two-years after the political revolution. However, as time goes on there is no difference between the levels of institutional democracy observed in countries where the state was seized and in countries where it was not seized. This could reflect two mechanisms: (1) early democratisation, or (2) re-autocratisation.

As I said in the previous chapter, the results did not meet the standard threshold for significance (p=<0.05), but due to the small sample size, they should not be ruled out. Allison (1998, pp. 57-58) states that “we could say that small samples have low power to test hypotheses...” and that approximations (determined through p-values) deteriorate when the sample size is small. The sample size used here is small (50 cases), and therefore Allison’s statement is relevant. The
correlation between state seizure and polity score (at two-years) was close to significance in the bivariate test with a p-value of 0.0919. When tested in my linear regression model against the polity variable and the control variables, there was a p-value of 0.093. This is above the 0.05 significance threshold that is commonly used, but given the small sample size it should not be ruled out as the true p=-value may be lower if more cases were included. However, as Allison states, there is currently low power to test the hypothesis. That means findings must be viewed with caution until further research can be conducted that either strengthen or weakens the results. It is also worth noting that these are likely to be conservative results, as there may be other cases of nonviolent revolution that may be able to be added to the regression in the future, which could increase the significance.79 Similar results were found for the categorical democracy measure at two-years post-revolution with a significant p-value of 0.045 in the bivariate test, and a close to significant p-value of 0.07 in the multivariate logit regression with the control variables included. The same trend is also observed as the results are insignificant at five and ten-years post-revolution. As for the other dependent variable, the amount of change on the polity score, state seizure did not appear to be significant in the bivariate tests or the multivariate linear regression. This means that state seizure does not appear to affect the amount of movement along the polity scale. Structural factors, to be discussed latter in this chapter, may be more significant in determining how much of a shift along the scale there is.

These findings have implications for hypothesis one, which cannot be answered with a straightforward yes or no. At two-years post-revolution we could say that

79 See Appendix two. These cases may be able to be included in future work if more information is gathered.
state seizure appears to have a positive impact on post-revolution
democratisation. However as time goes on, at the five and ten-year post
revolution mark there seems to be no difference whether the state was seized or
not. Therefore, the hypothesis does not seem to reject the null hypothesis if we
look at long-term democratisation and does seem to reject the null hypothesis in
the short-term.

An important question to now ask is why? Possible answers to this can be drawn
from the information provided in the literature review and the theory chapter of
this thesis. From the literature reviewed, a couple of key works stand out. These
are Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Przeworski et al. (2000). Both studies
conclude that there are many factors that cause democratisation in different
circumstances, and subsequently that democratisation is random. While state
seizure appears to be significant, or at least approaching significance, at the two-
year mark it is likely that as these studies suggest, more factors are needed in
order to create democratisation. We may only see the effect of some factors after
the two-year mark. In other words, state seizure may be one of many triggers for
democratisation, but alone, it is not a sufficient trigger for sustainable
democratisation. This is not surprising considering the other work (mentioned in
the literature review, methods and to be discussed in this chapter) that has
provided evidence for other factors being significant in democratisation - many of
which are structural. To briefly recap, these include the control variables used,
which were: income in a country, the presence of democratic neighbours, and the
type of regime being challenged. More potential influential factors will be
discussed below as they could be used as control variables in future work.
If other structural factors are necessary to create sustained democratisation, it may suggest that while activists in a nonviolent revolutionary movement can perform certain actions, such as seizing the state, that may have a positive effect on democratisation, they may not over-ride structural factors that increase democratization. In other words, you may still need certain structural conditions for democratisation, as defined by the Polity data. Nepstad (2011) suggests that some structural factors maybe necessary but not sufficient in successful revolution, and one may hypothesise from these results that this is also the case when achieving democratisation post-revolution.

In so far as the theory provided above (chapter two) is concerned, the results offer no definitive answer to the debate between the revolutions theorists, anarchists, and nonviolence theorists, but they do provide some insights. Firstly, state seizure in a nonviolent revolution does not appear to have an adverse effect on democratisation, especially at the two-year post-revolution mark. Only one case sits below the 0 mark on the polity scale at this point. As time goes on the vast majority of cases remain at the high end of the polity scale, however a small number do sink back further into authoritarianism and remain there.\(^80\) From the anarchistic arguments made, we may have expected the opposite of this, although the potential negative effect of state seizure in the countries that did move backwards into authoritarianism cannot be ruled out in this research. The revolutions theory/Marxist/Leninist arguments made find some support in that positive effects on democratisation are observed at the two-year mark. However

\(^{80}\) These are Sudan (1985), Belarus (1991), and Niger (1992). Others autocracies and then re-democratize over time, such as Thailand (2006) where the polity score goes from 8 to -5 after the revolution, and now sits at a 7 (7 years post-revolution).
they do not explain why cases that did not seize the state could result in comparable democracy scores ten years post-revolution.

Of course, this does not mean either argument can be confirmed or rejected for three reasons: (1) I do not assume that these theorists were suggesting that the only important factor for success was state seizure, just that this has been a primary focus of this thesis. As will be discussed below, there are other alternative factors suggested by the some of these theorists that may be important in achieving post-revolution democratisation. (2) The arguments made were often discussed in relation to revolutions that were both violent and nonviolent. It is likely that nonviolence itself is a strong factor in democratisation regardless of state seizure, which means that if similar tests were conducted on violent revolutions the results may change. (3) The radical arguments discussed were largely made by people who were aiming to create a communist and/or stateless society. It may be true, for example, that state seizure cannot happen if you want to create a stateless society. From my knowledge, none of the movements included in this study, for the large part, were aiming to create an anarchistic society and therefore this research cannot give any answers on the most effective ways to achieve anarchy, but only institutional democratisation.

In conclusion, a case for activists seizing the state could be argued in that they are likely see democratisation sooner than if the state was not seized. Future testing may provide further insights into the strength of these findings, and I will give some suggestions below. However, before I do this, I will discuss the second hypothesis.
**Hypothesis Two**

Hypothesis two was: “Mass participation in the nonviolent revolutionary movement increases the likelihood of democratisation”. At first, the results showed that when the campaign size variable was tested against the polity scores, campaign size was a significant factor in democratisation at the two-year mark. However, it became clear that this result was being driven by an outlying case, Haiti, which was the only small and successful campaign.\(^{81}\) Once this case was removed from the statistical tests, the new results were insignificant at all year measures. This was true for all three dependent variables used, in both the bivariate tests and the multivariate tests. These results, therefore, suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis.

This result is surprising, as it runs contrary to what we would expect after reading the research that compares violent and nonviolent movements. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, pp. 39-41) find that campaign success is linked to campaign size in their study that tests both violent and nonviolent movements. They find that larger campaigns succeed more often than small campaigns. As explained previously, I could find no theoretical reason why this would not be the case for nonviolent movements prior to conducting the statistical tests, as we would still expect larger nonviolent movements to be able to direct more force against the regimes that they are opposing, and I also expected this to translate into a larger democratising force post-revolution. However, after finding these results I can suggest two possible reasons to explain this. The first regards the campaign size

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\(^{81}\) The only campaign with only tens to thousands of participants that was successful according to Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) criteria. See Methods chapter for more detail.
in relation to the country size. For example, a million protesters participating in a revolutionary-movement in a large country, such as in Philippines (1986), is quite different to a million protesters in a smaller nation, such as Serbia (2000) or Portugal (1974). It is plausible that a million participants are more forceful in a country with a small population. If true, this could explain the results because large campaign sizes in large countries and small campaign sizes in small countries maybe comparable. The second, campaign size, may not be as important as what the campaign is targeting in its actions. If we return to the pillars of support theory discussed in previous chapters, certain pillars maybe more essential in holding up a government and allowing it to function. It may also be true that some of these “pillars” are more important to either pull-down, or to win-over, if we are to see post-revolution democratisation. A small movement that targets more important “democratising pillars” may be more successful in creating democratisation than a large movement that focuses on less important pillars. For example, it is possible that the army may be significant. If the army is on the side of the revolutionaries post-revolution, they may not interfere in the democratisation process, which may lead to higher levels of democratisation because it can progress unhindered. This example is merely speculative, and more research would be needed to conclude if this is the case.

The effect of control variables

Few changes were observed when the control variables were included in the multivariate tests. That suggests that income (GDP0, democratic neighbours, and the pre-revolution polity score had little effect on the independent variables. This is seen by they way there is little difference in the p-values that were calculated in
the bivariate test and the p-values calculated in the multivariate tests. However, it is possible that there are other structural factors, which could be used in future research, which may produce different results. Other structural factors that could be tested will be presented later in this chapter. I will now outline possibilities for future research.

**Future research**

I will now discuss possible future research. This will include: identifying other potential independent variables; identifying new dependent variables; possible improvements for the current dependent variables; identifying other potential control variables that could be used in future research; and finally other research methods that could be used to further examine the question of what activists can do to increase the likelihood of democratisation, and to strengthen the findings of this thesis.

**Independent Variables**

There are certainly many other actions that activists could take that might effect post-revolution democratisation. Two of these might be: (1) democratic institution building pre-revolution, and, (2) the diversity of the movement. I deem these to be alternative variables that are most likely to have a strongest effect on democratisation, based on the theory presented above.

**Democratic Institutions**

Sharp's point about *restructuring old institutions and creating new ones* is directly addressed through the building of democratic institutions in civil society before the political revolution. If this happens it helps address his second point of the need to *redistribute power across society*. The stronger civil society institutions
are, the larger their role in society. Also, the more people participating in these institutions means that less people are relying on the state, operating outside of the state structures more, and thus making the state’s pillars of support more vulnerable to mass action. This allows for community decisions to be made at the local level by local people. Therefore, the state structure has less of an influence making it harder for a regime to implement authoritarian policies.

Furthermore, democratic institutions can act as hubs to facilitate continued nonviolent resistance as they provide open spaces for training, organising and communication. This helps address Sharp’s other points: the need for sustained nonviolent action and planning. In summary, democratic institutions at the grassroots means that changes to society are not made by a few sitting at the centre of power, but constructed and developed by the acts of the majority. Here we see democracy in action, albeit restricted, before the regime falls. We also see Gandhi’s swadeshi (localness) and swaraj (self-rule) enacted here as people start to reclaim the space around them and make decisions that affect their immediate surroundings. Small local groups formulate, control and make decisions increasingly in their own communities, away from the centralised state. These new local democratic institutions can then work as a network, between diverse groups, to continue to mobilise and resist nonviolently across society in a satyagraha (nonviolent action) movement, in order to achieve sarvodaya (justice for all living beings). It is hypothesised that if these institutions are strong they will help build democracy post-revolution as they enable people to participate in political decision making as well as actively building the institutions themselves.
Diversity

The more diverse movements are, the more of society is captured in them. This allows for societal interconnection between class, ethnic, religious, ideological, and regional divides. Diversity suggests that there is a broad representation and participation in the movement from groups across society. If maintained, this is likely to cross over into the new social order after the political revolution – both in-terms of representation in a new government, or simply in the ability of all groups to continue participation in the democratic process through the mobilisation networks that they have formed.

The more diverse a movement is, the more groups there are across society that have an interest in maintaining democracy after the political revolution. The fact that they have all collectively been involved in the revolutionary process, may ensure that they all get a say in how society is run because they will have all had an active role in societal change. It is assumed that they will all be in favour of democracy as this form of governance will recognises their diverse preferences and needs. In other words true democracy provides equity, which could be seen as benefiting every group.

Therefore, a bloc of diverse groups may be more likely to work together to create and maintain democratic changes in order to safeguard against all of society's power moving back to only one group because this is beneficial for all. In order to prevent power moving back into the hands of only one group, members of this newly formed, diverse, post-revolution coalition may have to work together to defend against any threats towards democracy and therefore their stake in the countries decision making. It may be likely that if a diverse range of groups all
have a stake in the new post-revolution society, they will work together to resist against any group that attempts to exert themselves as the new hegemon. In other words, they will have an interest in working together to resist any authoritarian groups that wish to gain the sole-position of power from within their own coalition, not just from external threats or threats from members of the old regime.

Without a diverse movement it is plausible that there will be less interest in democracy. If a revolution is conducted mostly by one ethnic group for example: (1) the power is then likely to reside with that one ethnic group rather than all ethnic groups after the political revolution; (2) other ethnic groups will have less motivation to defend the revolution and revolutionary changes as they have not had any “buy-in” to the process. This logic could be applied to other groups: class, religious, ideological, urban/rural, and regional.

**Dependent Variables**

The democracy measure can be improved using the current polity score and/or by adding more information from other datasets. Firstly, the polity score could be disaggregated. As previously discussed, the polity variable is made up of multiple variables, which are: the competitiveness of political participation; openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment; and constraints on the chief executive (Gurr et al., 2010, p. 14). If one of these variables increases while another decreases in an equal amount, the polity score remains the same. This means that by using the polity score alone we may miss more specific institutional changes that are happening in each country post-revolution. It would be of value to do more testing with the independent variables and these disaggregated polity score
variables as new dependent variables to get more specific information on exactly what is being effected by the independent variable and also to make sure that no information is being missed. Secondly, different measures of democracy that take into account equity and rights could be used. This is important because, as discussed, these are concepts that are integral to many definitions of democracy, but are not necessarily correlated with institutional democracy (as measured by the polity scores).

**Control Variables**

There are other structural factors that may need to be controlled for, as it is plausible that they could be affecting both the independent and dependent variables. Three that could be used are discussed below. These are socio-cultural factors, the international environment, and the presence of oil. I have chosen these three, which could be split into more specific factors, for discussion as they find support in the literature and because they could influence both democratisation and the independent variables, as will be discussed. Other factors not discussed here may also be significant - For example, patriarchal or ethnic divides may prevent the involvement of certain groups in society which in turn could prevent mass and diverse participation, as well as preventing democratisation itself if certain societal groups are excluded (Svensson & Lindgren, 2011). Also if a security force is made up of one cultural group, and this prevents defections, it may be harder to seize the state. The factor to be discussed have been left out of this analysis because I did not view them as having strong links to both the dependent variable and the independent variables when

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82 See Nepstad’s (2011) discussion of the Moi regime in Kenya and the failed nonviolent uprising that challenged it.
compared to the control variables selected. The control variables selected plausible correlates to both,\textsuperscript{83} at least I with the available data, and considering the size of this thesis in which I could not have done more coding of different variables. \textsuperscript{84}

\textit{Socio-cultural factors}

Many different social and cultural factors have been suggested as having an effect on regime transition towards democracy. This includes: the impact of colonialism, which as Teorell (p. 39) states, “has been associated with underdevelopment and high levels of social fractionalization, which in turn impede democratic development” and these effects may be different depending on the colonial power ruling (Teorell pp. 39-40); religious composition, as the prominence of certain religions may be linked to democracy or authoritarianism (Fish, 2002; Lipset, 1994); language; the way the country has been governed in the past; whether there have been resistance movements in that country/region in the past; cultures of obedience; gender equality which may hinder democracy (Fish, 2002) and patriarchy, as patriarchal groups may create conditions where men are more likely to join armed groups (Fish, 2002, p. 30); ethnic division which may lead to one ethnic group forming a single-party authoritarian regime to favour their own group (Horowitz, 1985; Svensson & Lindgren, 2011); and the roles of different ethnic groups in the make up of the security forces/politics may effect the success of nonviolent revolution because if the security force is made up of a deferent ethnic group they maybe less likely to defect (Nepstad, 2011); or alternatively

\textsuperscript{83} Based on the factors that are most strongly correlated in previous research, as outlined above.

\textsuperscript{84} See method’s chapter for a discussion of the selection of control variables.
ethnic diversity may allow nationalist mobilisation against a regime and therefore increase the chance of democracy (Beissinger, 2007); the size of a country, small may mean more chance of democratisation (Boix, 2003, p. 44); and population density, as state power may be easier to administer over a densely populated area (Herbst, 2000).

Teorell (2010, p. 52) upon testing some of these theories concludes “democracy during the third wave of democratisation arose and sustained itself under variegated sociohistorical circumstances”. The exception being the prominence of Islam (although restricted to North Africa and the Middle East) and country size – small countries were more likely to transition to democracy (p. 53). As transitions to democracy obviously happen under a range of these circumstances, it can again be suggested that in some contexts these factors may be necessary for a positive transition through nonviolent revolution, but not sufficient, and certainly not applicable to all cases, places and time periods. Also some of these factors are suggested to promote democratic transition by some, and authoritarianism by others, which does not make for a coherent theory. It was beyond the scope of this thesis to control for socio-cultural factors. They may or may not have a significant effect on post-nonviolent-revolution democratisation.

**International environment**

The world systems theory (Wallerstein, 1974, 1987) offers other insights into factors that could effect democratisation. It states that wealthy core countries exploit the poor periphery through trade, gaining wealth at the periphery’s expense. To do this, the core countries work with those in the “core of the periphery” – i.e. the elites within the periphery. Dictators, for example, (at the
core of the periphery) are more receptive to the core countries demands, and the cores find it easier to achieve their aims by working with dictatorships rather than democracies. In this process both the core and the core of the periphery benefit, at least economically. This may mean that trade dependent countries are less likely to democratise.

This theory has been empirically tested by (Li & Reuveny, 2003, 2009) who find support for it. They conclude that the volume of trade and investment has a negative affect on democratisation. Teorell (2010, p. 99) finds support for the argument that trade volume impedes democratisation, at least in the third wave of democratisation, but states that why this is the case may be unclear. This suggests that trade and investment may have a negative effect on the chance of democratic transition in poorer countries, and therefore it is possible that nonviolent revolutionary movements may find it more difficult to achieve success when that success would be challenging powerful international interests – this however is yet to be tested in regards to its impact on nonviolent revolutionary transitions towards democracy.

It is likely that other countries will try to sway both the outcome of the nonviolent revolution and the direction a new society takes. They could do this by funding groups they favour, putting embargoes on groups they dislike, or through direct military intervention. It has been beyond the scope of this thesis to fully take these factors into account, but it is acknowledged that they could be significant in whether or not democratisation occurs. Parts of international influence were controlled for in the multivariate regression when democratic neighbours were taken into account, but it is acknowledged that this does not fully reflect the
international community’s role in post-revolution democratisation. A key reason for leaving this factor out is the complexity of the measurement. It is not fully possible to measure the intricacies of the relationship between many different countries and the country of concern in each case identified in NAVCO 2.0, at least not in the scope of a master’s project. This could be a future research project if new data was developed and added to the NAVCO data.

**Oil**

Many researchers have discussed the effect of oil on democracy. Results largely suggest that the presence of oil has a negative effect on democracy. Ross (2011) concludes that oil wealth and corruption may threaten democratic reforms in countries that were part of the Arab Spring. Ahmado (2013, p. 1238) suggests through a meta-analysis that oil wealth “…may have an indirect negative effect on democracy through it’s adverse impact on education” but not through retarding modernisation as others have claimed. Oil wealth that impinges on gender equality also has a negative effect on democracy (Ross, 2008). Furthermore, Smith (2004) finds that the presence of oil often leads to regime durability. The research above suggests that the presence of oil would make democratisation, the dependent variable, less likely. However, Smith (2004) also finds that the presence of oil results in less cases of anti-state protest and civil war. The study also rules out repression as an alternative explanation. This second finding suggests that there may also be a link to the independent variables used in this thesis. Furthermore, Fjelde (2009, p. 199) suggests “that oil-rich governments can use political corruption to buy support from key segments of society, effectively outspending other entrepreneurs of violence.” It is possible that they cannot only
“buy-out” those who would promote violence, but also those who may launch nonviolent struggles against the hegemon. It would be possible to control for oil in future research.

**Alternative Research methods**

Alternative research methods – quantitative, qualitative and mixed - could be used in order to validate the findings in this thesis and further explore the question of what activists can do to achieve post-revolution democratisation. I will now briefly discuss these.

In regards to quantitative research, apart from what has already been discussed during this chapter so far, there are improvements that could be made to the current project. Firstly, rather than measuring the time intervals at 2, 5 and 10 years, time measurements could be taken at all years. This would mean that we could identify whether a country’s polity score is increasing or decreasing during the gaps that are not measured. It is possible that other events influence democratisation that occurs post-revolution in the years that are not measured. As tests have only been conducted at three time intervals, I cannot rule this out. Secondly, it would be useful to create new variables for regime type, as the pre-revolution polity score does not take into account the specific nature of a regime. New codes could be developed based on Geddes (1999) and Ulfelder (2005) who split authoritarian regimes into different types such as military, personalistic, or single-party. Finally, improvements could be made to the current data to improve the accuracy of the results. For example, experts could be consulted on the un-codeable cases that are outlined in Appendix 2. This could clarify the nature of the movements and may mean that they can be coded and included in the statistical
tests. The dataset could also be expanded to include movements that occurred up to 2011 so that the Arab Spring uprisings were part of the analysis. This would allow for more cases to be tested, although only at the two-year post-revolution mark.

There are other possibilities for testing the hypotheses using qualitative research methods. This would enable more in-depth knowledge of certain cases. Case studies could be used to look at cases that are abnormal, such as Haiti, or cases that there is confusion about, such as the un-codeable case in Appendix 2 (George & Bennett, 2004). In-depth case studies may also give some indication of alternative factors that increase the chance of democratisation post-revolution – both ones that activists can attempt to make happen and ones that activists cannot control for. Mixed methods could also be used, incorporating these case studies with the statistical analysis.
Thesis Summary

This research has attempted to test previous unexplored hypotheses on what factors affect post-nonviolent-revolution democratisation. More specifically it has tested, through a quantitative analysis, two factors that activists may have control over. This has been done while controlling for structural factors that may be necessary but not sufficient for post-revolution democratisation. The factors tested were the seizure of the state by members of the revolutionary movement and the campaign size of the revolutionary movement, while controlling for income (measured in GDP), the presence of democratic neighbours, and the level of democracy in a country pre-revolution. Results suggest that state seizure is related to increased levels of democracy, and to achieving high scores (above 6) on the polity scale, two-years post-revolution. However, as time goes on there appears to be no differences in the amount of democratisation between cases with or without state seizure. No relationship was found between the size of the shift in democracy along the polity scale and state seizure. This appears to be affected by the pre-revolution polity score that seems to be a major factor in determining the amount of change observed along the polity scale. The campaign size of a successful revolutionary movement appears to have no significant effect on democratisation.

Overall we can conclude three things from this thesis: (1) that state seizure does not appear to negatively affect post-revolution polity scores; (2) that state seizure has an initial positive effect soon after the completion of nonviolent revolution but does not appear to contribute to long-term democratisation; (3) that the size of a successful nonviolent campaign does not appear to have an impact on post-
revolution polity scores. Further research that would make the results more accurate, as outlined in this chapter, is advised before these findings are recommended to activists who are planning strategy.
Bibliography


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Appendices

APPENDIX 1 - 198 Methods of Nonviolent Action

THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT PROTEST AND PERSUASION

Formal Statements
1. Public Speeches
2. Letters of opposition or support
3. Declarations by organizations and institutions
4. Signed public statements
5. Declarations of indictment and intention
6. Group or mass petitions

Communications with a Wider Audience
7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols
8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications
9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books
10. Newspapers and journals
11. Records, radio, and television
12. Skywriting and earthwriting

Group Representations
13. Deputations
14. Mock awards
15. Group lobbying
16. Picketing
17. Mock elections

Symbolic Public Acts
18. Displays of flags and symbolic colors
19. Wearing of symbols
20. Prayer and worship
21. Delivering symbolic objects
22. Protest disrobing
23. Destruction of own property
24. Symbolic lights
25. Displays of portraits
26. Paint as protest
27. New signs and names
28. Symbolic sounds
29. Symbolic reclamation
30. Rude gestures

Pressures on Individuals
31. "Haunting" officials
32. Taunting officials
33. Fraternization
34. Vigils

Drama and Music
35. Humorous skits and pranks
36. Performances of plays and music
37. Singing

Processions
38. Marches
39. Parades
40. Religious processions
41. Pilgrimages
42. Motorcades

Honoring the Dead
43. Political mourning
44. Mock funerals
45. Demonstrative funerals
46. Homage at burial places

Public Assemblies
47. Assemblies of protest or support
48. Protest meetings
49. Camouflaged meetings of protest
50. Teach-ins

Withdrawal and Renunciation
51. Walk-outs
52. Silence
53. Renouncing honors
54. Turning one's back
THE METHODS OF SOCIAL NONCOOPERATION

Ostracism of Persons
55. Social boycott
56. Selective social boycott
57. Lysistratic nonaction
58. Excommunication
59. Interdict

Noncooperation with Social Events, Customs, and Institutions
60. Suspension of social and sports activities
61. Boycott of social affairs
62. Student strike
63. Social disobedience
64. Withdrawal from social institutions

Withdrawal from the Social System
65. Stay-at-home
66. Total personal noncooperation
67. "Flight" of workers
68. Sanctuary
69. Collective disappearance
70. Protest emigration (hijrat)

THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION: (1) ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS

Actions by Consumers
71. Consumers' boycott
72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods
73. Policy of austerity
74. Rent withholding
75. Refusal to rent
76. National consumers' boycott
77. International consumers' boycott

Action by Workers and Producers
78. Workmen's boycott
79. Producers' boycott

Action by Middlemen
80. Suppliers' and handlers' boycott

Action by Owners and Management
81. Traders' boycott
82. Refusal to let or sell property
83. Lockout
84. Refusal of industrial assistance
85. Merchants' "general strike"

Action by Holders of Financial Resources
86. Withdrawal of bank deposits
87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments
88. Refusal to pay debts or interest
89. Severance of funds and credit
90. Revenue refusal
91. Refusal of a government's money

Action by Governments
92. Domestic embargo
93. Blacklisting of traders
94. International sellers' embargo
95. International buyers' embargo
96. International trade embargo

THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION: (2) THE STRIKE

Symbolic Strikes
97. Protest strike
98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike)

Agricultural Strikes
99. Peasant strike
100. Farm Workers' strike

 Strikes by Special Groups
101. Refusal of impressed labor
102. Prisoners' strike
103. Craft strike
104. Professional strike

Ordinary Industrial Strikes
105. Establishment strike
106. Industry strike
107. Sympathetic strike

Restricted Strikes
108. Detailed strike
109. Bumper strike
110. Slowdown strike
111. Working-to-rule strike
112. Reporting "sick" (sick-in)
113. Strike by resignation
114. Limited strike
115. Selective strike

**Multi-Industry Strikes**
116. Generalized strike
117. General strike

**Combination of Strikes and Economic Closures**
118. Hartal
119. Economic shutdown

**THE METHODS OF POLITICAL NONCOOPERATION**

**Rejection of Authority**
120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
121. Refusal of public support
122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance

**Citizens' Noncooperation with Government**
123. Boycott of legislative bodies
124. Boycott of elections
125. Boycott of government employment and positions
126. Boycott of government depts., agencies, and other bodies
127. Withdrawal from government educational institutions
128. Boycott of government-supported organizations
129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents
130. Removal of own signs and placemarks
131. Refusal to accept appointed officials 132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions

**Citizens' Alternatives to Obedience**
133. Reluctant and slow compliance
134. Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision
135. Popular nonobedience
136. Disguised disobedience
137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse
138. Sitdown
139. Noncooperation with conscription and deportation
140. Hiding, escape, and false identities
141. Civil disobedience of "illegitimate" laws

**Action by Government Personnel**
142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides
143. Blocking of lines of command and information
144. Stalling and obstruction
145. General administrative noncooperation
146. Judicial noncooperation
147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents
148. Mutiny

**Domestic Governmental Action**
149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays
150. Noncooperation by constituent governmental units

**International Governmental Action**
151. Changes in diplomatic and other representations
152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events
153. Withholding of diplomatic recognition
154. Severance of diplomatic relations
155. Withdrawal from international organizations
156. Refusal of membership in international bodies
157. Expulsion from international organizations

**THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT INTERVENTION**

**Psychological Intervention**
158. Self-exposure to the elements
159. The fast
   a) Fast of moral pressure
   b) Hunger strike
   c) Satyagrahic fast
160. Reverse trial 161. Nonviolent harassment

**Physical Intervention**
162. Sit-in
163. Stand-in
164. Ride-in
165. Wade-in
166. Mill-in
167. Pray-in
168. Nonviolent raids
169. Nonviolent air raids
170. Nonviolent invasion
171. Nonviolent interjection
172. Nonviolent obstruction
173. Nonviolent occupation

**Social Intervention**
174. Establishing new social patterns
175. Overloading of facilities
176. Stall-in 177. Speak-in
178. Guerrilla theater
179. Alternative social institutions
180. Alternative communication system

**Economic Intervention**
181. Reverse strike
182. Stay-in strike
183. Nonviolent land seizure
184. Defiance of blockades
185. Politically motivated counterfeiting
186. Preclusive purchasing
187. Seizure of assets
188. Dumping
189. Selective patronage
190. Alternative markets
191. Alternative transportation systems
192. Alternative economic institutions

**Political Intervention**
193. Overloading of administrative systems
194. Disclosing identities of secret agents
195. Seeking imprisonment
196. Civil disobedience of "neutral" laws
197. Work-on without collaboration
198. Dual sovereignty and parallel government

APPENDIX 2 - Excluded cases from the NAVCO 2.0 dataset.

Here is a list of the 24 cases removed from the statistical analysis because they could not be coded. The reason for each case’s exclusion is briefly outlined. These cases maybe legitimate, but as insufficient information has been found in support of them, they cannot be coded. Future work may be able to rectify this problem by using different research methods.

1) Madagascar – Madagasacar pro-democracy movement -2003
The Radsiraka regime, the target of this movement, appears to have already been overthrown in 2002.85 There is no evidence found of this movement taking place.

2) Senegal– Anti-Diouf -2000
The only evidence found is of an election. No evidence of nonviolence found.

3) Mexico– Anti PRI -2000
Some evidence that there was an anti-PRI (ruling party) protest in February 2000. However it appears to be an election, not a nonviolent movement/revolution that was creating change.

4) Ghana– Anti-Rawling -2000
No record of a nonviolent movement found.

5) Croatia– Semi-presidential system -2000
No sign of protest except from a small group of farmers. There was an election in this year.

85 The 2002 movement is included.
6) Croatia— Semi-presidential system -1999
No sign of protest except from a small group of farmers.

A protest movement did occur; however the transition to “democracy” appears to be top-down. The death of the president was followed by the defence chief becoming president, and then calling elections. Elections were already planned to happen in October, even before the president died, so the protest movement did not appear to influence this. Any record of protests appear small – e.g around 3000 people in a population of 104 million.

8) Tanzania— Pro-Democracy Movement -1994
No evidence found of a nonviolent movement

9) Tanzania— Pro-Democracy Movement -1993
No evidence found of a nonviolent movement, as in the Tanzania case above.

10) Mali – Anti-Military -1992
No evidence of a nonviolent movement found. There was a movement in 1991.\(^{86}\)

11) Slovakia – Public Against Violence -1992
Appears to just be an election after the Velvet Revolution. There were a few small-scale cases of nonviolent action in this time, but not a major campaign.

12) Tanzania— Pro-Democracy Movement -1992
No evidence found of a nonviolent movement, as in the Tanzania cases above.

\(^{86}\) The 1991 movement is included.
13) Guyana– Anti-Burnham/Hoyte -1991
No record of a nonviolent movement found. If there was a movement in 1991, President Hoyte stayed in power until 1992, after the campaign would have finished.

Descriptions of “ethnic violence” and “mass rallies” were found in 1990. Other news articles others suggest anti-government protests and students protesting ethnic violence. The only record was of a large May day protest in 1990. Ethnic violence followed this, and then President Akayev was elected in late 1990. No evidence that he was part of a protest movement. Although there were clearly protests, insufficient signs of a nonviolent movement was found.

No evidence found of nonviolence in this year, but there was a nonviolent movement in 1990.

16) Czechoslovakia – Velvet Revolution -1990
No nonviolent movement in this year. The Velvet Revolution ceased in December 1989. The velvet revolution is coded.

17) Taiwan – Pro-Democracy Movement -1985
Democratization did occur, however I cannot find an example of nonviolence, therefore cannot code.

18) Argentina – Pro-Democracy -1982
No nonviolent movement found. A revolution did occur one year later.
19) Greece – Anti-Military -1974
No evidence of nonviolent movement found. There was a polytechnic uprising in 1973, but no evidence found suggesting that this was the cause of democratization.

20) Greece – Anti-Karamanlis -1963
No examples of nonviolent action can be found.

21) Cameroon – Anti-Colonial -1960
No examples of nonviolent movement can be found.

22) Cyprus – Ethniki Organosis Kyprios Agoniston-1959
This appears to be a violent movement. The NAVCO 1 codebook describes it as violent so this maybe a coding mistake.

23) Ghana – Convention People’s Party movement-1957
No Nonviolent action found for this year. There was nonviolence used in the late 1940’s to early 1950’s.

24) Morocco – Moroccan Independence war -1956
This movement does not appear to be nonviolent - possibly a coding error.
**APPENDIX 3 – State Seizure by Case.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases with state seizure:</th>
<th>Cases with no state seizure:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2) Brazil (1985)</td>
<td>2) Venezuela (1958)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15) Benin (1990)</td>
<td>15) South Korea (1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16) Zambia (1963)</td>
<td>16) South Korea (1987)</td>
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<td>24) Kyrgyzstan (2005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>25) Bangladesh (1990)</td>
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<tr>
<td>27) Philippines (1986)</td>
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