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Abstract

The present study utilises a Durkheimian approach to study alcohol in society and education, centrally drawing on the sociological works of Emile Durkheim and those of the neo-Durkheimian sociologist, Stjepan Mestrovic. Durkheim's sociological concepts and commentary, and Mestrovic's perspective, refashioned, is applied to the present context, of which alcohol is a part. The argument to be advanced, is that in the Durkheimian sense, societal and educational alcohol issues, as part of wider social change, are in a state of excessive anomie and egoism caused by neoliberal philosophy, policy and practice. Mostly, the theory of James M. Buchanan will be drawn upon as standing for neoliberalism.

Mestrovic's interpretation of Durkheim in the light of his view of the indirect influence of Arthur Schopenhauer on Durkheim, particularly with regard to Schopenhauer's view of will and representation, provides a fresh reading of Durkheim's work. Mestrovic's adaptations challenge the received view of Durkheim as a functionalist, and Enlightenment positivist interested in social order. This is explained by noting Mestrovic's application of those adaptations to some of Durkheim's central concepts, and, Mestrovic's identification of the contemporary relevance of Durkheim, culminating in what Mestrovic calls postemotionalism.

Mestrovic's Shopenhauerian Durkheimianism, and Durkheim, can be critiqued from the perspectives of a number of commentators, poststructuralism and, Jennifer Lehmann's critical structuralism with regard to issues of particularly gender, but also culture, as well as for exhibiting essentialist and liberal strains. Buchanan is also liberal and essentialist, but differently to Durkheim, holds to an economic, individualistic and clearly positivist view of society and education. By comparison with Durkheimianism, however, Buchanan's perspective is a good representative example of true neoliberalism. Durkheim in particular, is rendered as a liberal - by comparison to Buchanan, a very social democratic liberal thinker, but one still in need of further adaptations over and above those made by Mestrovic for a Durkheimianism relevant to contemporary issues of gender and culture with regard to policy and practice in society and education where alcohol is concerned.

Mestrovic's perspective and Durkheim's concepts, when modified by way of discussed and synthesised supplementary, high-modern and poststructural, post-
Freudian feminist, and semiological, radical theories of gender and culture, is relevant for studying society and education.

The application of Durkheimian perspectives, so rendered, means that various issues related to alcohol such as, alcohol and other addictions and dysfunctions, gendered drinking, gendered family relations, alcohol use and abuse, media advertising, research studies philosophies, culture, local and global markets, as well as legislation, can be seen in an alternative way.

Following Durkheimian perspectives means that education can be contextualised accordingly. Educational governance, professionalism, teacher training and curriculum reform policies and programmes related and specific to alcohol education, can be interpreted in alternative ways to those currently accepted.

Durkheimian perspectives on society and education: highlight the damage caused and the conservatism entailed by neoliberal philosophy, policy and practice, and; provide alternatives to the current societal situation, as well as the current drug education market in Aotearoa/New Zealand.
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Linzey, and John Morss are excellent scholars and teachers, who are not staff members of the School of Education at the University of Otago. I believe they are casualty victims of what I see as the egoism and anomie that currently effects education. My scholarly teachers have influenced this work in many ways. Any faults herein are my responsibility.

An earlier edition of the University Handbook for PhD Study published by the University of Otago contained some sage words, which as I recall were made in the Middle Ages, stating that a thesis is never completed, only submitted. I have found that since originally submitting the current study for examination, that is very much the case. A significant period of time has passed between my having been examined and submitting amendments to this thesis. With that passing of time and changes in my personal and professional societies, I have further acknowledgements to make.

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Introduction

Why a thesis?

The present thesis is in the form of an argument which seeks, by way of a centrally Durkheimian reference, to make an incursion into society and education where alcohol is concerned, particularly examining the decade or so leading up to and the time around the millennium. Making this entry in this way entails dealing with a number of alcohol, societal, and educational issues regarding justice, morality, health, and their opposites. Alcohol is situated in a society that is historicised, gendered, cultured and politicised. Durkheimian perspectives clearly identify education as a society in itself, but broadly influenced by society at large.

This thesis fills a conceptual gap that has remained, despite the effervescence that has existed around educational policy in the two decades. The impact of neoliberalism on education has been studied from the well established positions of Marxism, Weberianism and critical theory, as well as from more recent perspectives postmodernism or poststructuralism. However, Durkheimianism has not, until now, been adopted as a way in which to conceptualise educational philosophy, policy and practice. The present study addresses this important and fertile but missing sociological dimension to studying society and education in contemporary times by drawing on the original works of Emile Durkheim as well as a present day Durkheimian, Stjepan Mestrovic. Durkheimian perspectives, centrally influenced by Durkheim and Mestrovic, can be utilised, if by way of required modifications, to understand alcohol in society and education.

This thesis studies social change. In Aotearoa/New Zealand – in this country, society and education have experienced massive change. This change has been influenced by the social movement - that is, the philosophy, policy and practice in society and education of what has been variously called the New Right, neoclassical liberalism, economic rationalism or what will most often be referred to herein as neoliberalism. A widespread phenomenon internationally with regard to western developed nations, neoliberalism has also had a profound effect both animating and revolting against society as experienced in this country. More specifically and as a result, neoliberalism has been influential with regard to the educational context, where radical changes have taken place. Alcohol issues have been affected by these changes, driven by the social movement of neoliberalism, its philosophy, policy and practice.

The thesis is Durkheimian and the order of the thesis involves theory, then gender and culture, then society and politics. Finally, by having first related theory
variously to gender and culture, politics, and society, and once contextualised in this way, education is considered.

When, as this thesis shows, alcohol and the society of education are specifically contextualised in the broader educational policy arena seen as impacted on by neoliberalism, alcohol education in the context of drug education and health education generally, can be seen as being in a state of derangement. Students cannot be said to be receiving a professionalised education with regard to alcohol education. Viewed from Durkheimian perspectives this situation can be broadly regarded as a result of the current market in drug education. That result is itself a product of a society and education affected by a perspective profoundly opposite to Durkheimian perspectives. That opposite perspective is neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism can be identified with regard to a number of contexts and issues. Durkheimian perspectives are put forward as an antidote to the negative effects of neoliberalism where alcohol, society and education are concerned. A sort of remasking of these issues is possible through Durkheimian perspectives applied to alcohol issues in context, particularly for present purposes, in the field of education.

This thesis is a study using Durkheimian perspectives for viewing alcohol legislation, use, treatment, education, advertising and research as in a state of excessive egotism and anomie. Neoliberal social, economic and political policies are a part of and reflect an anomie and egoistic society, leading to chronic societal incohesion, even potential breakdown.

This perspective can be variously contrasted with, used to critically consider and be critiqued from a neoliberal theoretical position. James Buchanan is a neoliberal at the forefront of a group advocating a position that is known as public choice theory. The sociological and economic disciplines and perspectives represented in looking at Durkheimianism and Buchanan's theory respectively, involves drawing points of contrast between the two with regard to epistemology, method, politics and institutions. Aspects of these factors and issues related to them are relevant where education is concerned, both with regard to Buchanan's and Durkheimian direct references to education, as well theoretical and practical implications in the societal context concerning alcohol education. As will be shown, alcohol is related to a number of social and individual forms of suffering that have historical and cultural sources. Those sources are exacerbated by the influence of neoliberalism.

This thesis is an argument that regards existing empirical findings of studies of experiences and behaviours of people. This thesis: is original; contributes to existing knowledge, and, extends knowledge; critiques, and; makes conscious -
society and education with regard to alcohol. This thesis offers the identification of a problematic that is studied by explanation, clarification, criticism, and, identification of constructive alternatives. In this thesis, a problem of human suffering is not solved, but ameliorations are offered.

Why Theory?

The theoretical component of this thesis is mostly concerned with the thought of three professorial thinkers. One is from the past and two are of present times: Emile Durkheim - a late nineteenth and early twentieth century French educationalist and first Sociology Professor; James M. Buchanan - a mid-to-late twentieth century southern United States political economist of institutions and Nobel Prize Winner, and; Stjepan G. Mestrovic - a Croat-American, Syracuse postgraduate (PhD), Fulbright scholar, and Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M University.

Theoretically a diverse range of secondary theories are also considered with regard to the three central thinkers. Secondary theories are those of, high modernism, poststructuralism and gender studies in their post-postructuralist, post Freudian, semiotic, indigenous, and other radical forms. Secondary theories are useful in the current study, variously for the critique, but also for the entrenchment and supplementation of Durkheimian perspectives.

A critical attitude is taken towards all three central theorists, but there is a bias taken, against, particularly the second. Buchanan is thus treated antagonistically and as representing neoliberalism, viewed here as leading to a more dangerous individualised, conservative, economistic, psychologised, desecularised, compartmentalised and competitive society, particularly in education. A bias is taken, towards, Durkheim, and Mestrovic, who is heavily influenced by Durkheim, having been a socially based thinker who lauded the idea of a social world with a complex theory of collective individualism, holism and a secularised religion of difference, based on what is shared by people in society. Durkheim made a number of observations, studies and critiques that are relevant to consider, both for understanding Durkheim's social theory generally with regard to issues such as those Durkheim was interested in, and specifically, with regard to their relevance when relating Durkheimianism to alcohol, society and education. These aspects of Durkheim's social theory are approached by way of explaining some of Durkheim's central concepts. Durkheim's articulation of the concepts of homo duplex, social facts, collective representations, the cult of the individual, anomie and egoism are utilised for foundationally explanatory, and subsequently critically comparative and applied purposes.
Mestrovic's use of Durkheim's theories is then explained by way of detailing the adaptations and applications that Mestrovic makes of Durkheim's concepts of *homo duplex*, social facts, collective representations, the cult of the individual, anomie and egoism. Mestrovic follows Durkheim but claims that at least two generations of scholars and researchers who also claimed to do so, have mostly failed. Their failure, Mestrovic argues, was due to their decontextualising, or misinterpreting Durkheim variously as an optimistic capitalist, positivist, Comtean, social realist and organismistic thinker, examining the problem of social normlessness, and significantly, interested in the Hobbesian issue of social order. Mestrovic contextualises Durkheim, with regard to the late nineteenth century penchant among European artists and intellectuals for the early nineteenth century German philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer. In considering the context of Schopenhauer's fashionability in the *fin de siecle* intellectual milieu of the late nineteenth century and in picking out indirect influences of Schopenhauer in Durkheim's own work, Mestrovic uncovers a representationalist, skeptical, pessimistic, anti-modern, idealist and metaphysical Durkheim who recast Schopenhauer's notions of the will and idea, and Mestrovic claims that this view had relevance to notable social practices, problems and issues at the turning of the twentieth century. Mestrovic recontextualises Durkheim in this regard and examines, Durkheim's, and also, if to a lesser degree directly, Schopenhauer's relevance in current times.

This study will also critically assess the validity and value of Mestrovic's theoretical contribution to the study of Durkheim and sociology. It will be shown that Mestrovic contributes significant insights into the study and contemporary application of Durkheim's thought, on Durkheim's life, work, and legacy for society, particularly here, in regard to education. Mestrovic's historic and philosophical contextualising of Durkheim and discussion of other commentators provides a distinctive, new or emergent view of Durkheim - a thinker whose political philosophical, epistemological, dualistic orientations, and cultural criticisms have been often overlooked. Perhaps most surprisingly from an educational perspective, despite the posthumous publication and translation of Durkheim's lectures, particularly as the books *Education and Sociology, Moral Education* and *The Evolution of Educational Thought*, Durkheim's educational sociology and philosophy has been largely overlooked where recent reforms have been concerned, compared to Durkheim's "classical" sociologically periodised peers Karl Marx and Max Weber. Mestrovic's Schopenhauerian perspective on Durkheim and the ramifications of that view considered beside the received view of Durkheim and its influence on generations of
social scientists, leads to the conclusion that Durkheimianism of the sort Durkheim and his immediate disciples envisaged has only been utilised in a piecemeal and intermittent way. The situation being such, Mestrovic sees the import of Durkheim's thought not so much in the research and commentary considering Durkheim but in alternative perspectives that exhibit affinities with Durkheim's view.

Secondary scholarship on Durkheim is massive, and on Mestrovic sparse and underapplied, but growing and also related to education. Rather than retreading familiar and standardised social scientific views on Durkheim, Durkheim, having been treated expositionally in particular, and extended by way of Mestrovic's adaptations to the received view of Durkheim as well as the implications of this transformation, will be subjected to some potentially devastating critiques. Whilst a theoretical bias for Durkheim and Mestrovic has been acknowledged, Durkheim and Mestrovic are also critiqued and treated as needing revising or supplementing due to the sexism in both and the religious and deterministic tendency in the latter. Both are too accepting of what is a limiting liberalism, as direct comments and radical socially-orientated feminist, and post-poststructuralist perspectives display when applied to both Durkheim and Mestrovic. From the critical structuralist position, Durkheim can be interpreted as neoliberal.

This is a potentially devastating criticism. The critical structuralist view of Durkheim as a neoliberal can, however, be mediated and dispensed with by way of expositionally and critically studying a representative of neoliberalism proper. James M. Buchanan is utilised in this way. Buchanan's is a truly neoliberal perspective. Public choice theory is the term most often used to denote Buchanan's economistic view of society and education. Buchanan's view will be explained by way of some central concepts advanced by Buchanan in some of his various sole and co-authored works.

Once Buchanan's theory of society and education is explained, Buchanan is then approached contentiously. Rather than being a 'straw man' for neoliberalism, considered from and in contrast to Durkheimian perspectives and alternative perspectives that in some ways are more in accord with Durkheim, Buchanan clearly represents approaches and views that both Durkheim and Mestrovic opposed. Neoliberalism will be viewed as leading to the sort of society and education that runs counter to the views of morality and justice inherent in Durkheimianism.

Theoretically, Durkheim, Mestrovic and Buchanan can be seen to stand for different sorts of liberalisms. Liberalism has been perhaps the most entrenched and progressed ethic in modern developed democracies. As there are different sorts of philosophical liberalisms, there are in turn, different sorts of liberal policies and
practices that follow. Theoretically identified limitations in Durkheim and Mestrovic's liberalisms and Buchanan's liberalism, establish grounds for reconsidering the morality and justice of such liberalisms when taken from the views of gender and culture. Gender and culture are problematic from the views of such liberalisms. Gender and culture cannot be overlooked, and radical social theories will be utilised to supplement Durkheimian perspectives.

Compared to Buchanan, Durkheimian perspectives are more theoretically open to modifications that account for the social basis of gender and culture in society and education. However much extra theories are required for the purposes of that modification, theory alone, is not sufficient for modifying Durkheim and Mestrovic to deal with gender and culture where alcohol in society and education are concerned. Theory needs to be considered in the context of empirical research on gender and culture where alcohol is concerned.

**What is meant by "Durkheimian Perspectives"?**

The Durkheimianism of Mestrovic and Durkheim himself influence this study. Durkheimian perspectives involve examining structuring by social institutions such as the family, religion, the State, politics, economics, the judiciary, and education. But Durkheimian perspectives go further than that, in also studying representations. Durkheim was trained as a philosopher in an intellectual context concerned with representation. Durkheimian perspectives involve philosophical issues concerning structure and representation.

In considering the contemporary context, Durkheimian perspectives utilised herein are true to Durkheim in spirit rather than to the letter. A strict adherence to Durkheim or Mestrovic will not suffice to study the complexities of what is variously held to be the modern/hypermodern/postmodern/postcolonial/postfeminist context of present times. The Durkheimian perspectives taken in the present study emanate significantly from Mestrovic's studies into Durkheim and Durkheimians, as well as, through supplementation, non-Durkheimians. Through Mestrovic's studies a view can be taken of Durkheim's orientations regarding political, social, economic and cultural questions relevant to present times. Influenced primarily by Mestrovic and Durkheim – if approached in part as problematic, this study seeks to establish a sort of critical theoretical view of self and others in context, applying that view to alcohol in society and education.

Such a perspective is always going to be selective. Such selectivity also entails deemphasising the many diverse perspectives on Durkheim and Durkheimians of different sorts, as well as various theories regarding alcohol, society
and education. Secondary literature regarding Durkheim abounds. In the interests of avoiding repetition in a field that is so widely utilised by so many disciplines, secondary literature on Durkheim is approached by way of Mestrovic's selection of secondary literature that he uses in aligning it with or delineating it from his position. In being selective, the risk of redundancy can be avoided.

The perspectives in the present study are true to Durkheim in spirit by seeing social facts as related to other social facts in obscure or stark ways. For the present purpose of studying alcohol in society and education, Durkheimian perspectives present a different Durkheim and Durkheimianism from that defined in extant misrepresentations and misunderstandings of Durkheim. Then in the context of neoliberalism, ramifications of such a transformed Durkheim are studied and discussed by critiquing Mestrovic and are dealt with through discussing gendered and cultural social theories, finally synthesising emerged salient orientations for Durkheimian perspectives on society and education. Durkheimian perspectives retain the central concepts Durkheim used to explain and study society, but they are transformed by supplementations drawn from social, gendered and cultural theories.

Why Durkheim?

Durkheim was a thinker who is relevant to the topic of alcohol in society and education, despite possible immediate appearances to the contrary. Durkheim was a late nineteenth century and early twentieth century French social theorist whose contributions to understanding society and education can be relevantly applied to alcohol issues today.

Durkheim's theories are one hundred years old. There are always going to be problems such as those of, redundancy, contradiction and irrelevancy present in the project of recontextualising such a thinker from a different historical point into the present. But it is possible to take the good parts of a theorist from the past - that is, those parts that are relevant and useful, whilst maintaining a critical awareness of the limitations presented by such as thinker that need accessorising for problematics in current times. It is possible to get enough out of an 'old' theorist to see what they stood for and represent that position in the present context and for present purposes, such as studying alcohol in society and education.

Durkheim's enigmatic approach to studying the State, politics, communities and education was very complex. Durkheim argued for a strong State, but feared its power when individuals faced it alone politically. Durkheim believed that within communities, relations, traditions and rituals create solidarity-enhancing effervescence, but studied the importance of some rigid differences between groups,
the complex meanings behind those distinctions, as well as the rituals involved in merging distinct groups, and, believed that collective social movements and activities could be destructive and sick, as well as benign and healthy.

Education formed a significant part of Durkheim's lecture schedule, evidently a central topic indicated by three of his posthumously published books being comprised of lecture material regarding education and schooling. Considering Durkheim with regard to alcohol, society and education is relevant in these senses even if Durkheim did not commit to this topic specifically.

In more recent times alcohol addiction and abuse has been predominantly studied from the individualistic views of medicine and psychology. There are several dozen different theories of addiction, some which intersect and some that foundationally differ from others. Sociology has not been applied fully to the relation between alcohol and education. Sociology has offered a number of theories of addiction, some of which will be referred to in the present study. However, much of this material, even that which purports to be Durkheimian, is based on views of Durkheim's work which, when considered from the perspectives held to in the present study, psychologise Durkheim, view deviancy as concerned with changing the minds of the wayward so they can reintegrate with a normal society, or view society as changing into or having become a normless context.

The concepts Durkheim used and selected for utilisation in the present study are *homo duplex*, collective representations, and the cult of the individual, social facts, anomie and egoism. Doing justice to these concepts is itself an undertaking of some immensity. However, in doing so, other concepts and terms Durkheim utilised for studying society and education will also be referred to. Some of the concepts Durkheim utilised but which are not focused on particularly herein are: the sacred and profane; collective effervescence, renovated rationalism; collective consciousness, and; the corporation. Indeed, these additional concepts will be applied to the case of alcohol in society and education, so must be explained. However, they will be treated in the broader context of explaining the centrally selected concepts Durkheim utilised.

*Why Mestrovic?*

Mestrovic is a neo-Durkheimian sociologist in holding to the central beliefs and concepts of Durkheim, emphasising certain themes in and influences on Durkheim, and, applying them to contemporary social phenomena. Mestrovic provides an emergent, new, controversial, if unfashionable view of Durkheim, by positioning Durkheim's ideas in the context of the intellectual milieu of late nineteenth
and early twentieth century "fin de siecle" pessimism and Romanticism, and especially for Mestrovic noting the influence of the early nineteenth century philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer at the time.

Mestrovic makes 'adaptations' to Durkheim in the sense of attempting to change the received views of Durkheim as an optimistic, rationalist, unquestioning capitalist, sexist, cultural chauvinist, positivist, Comtean, Kantian, cognitivist, interested in concepts that are expressed in contemporary terms as normlessness, social order, reification, social action, deregulation and collectivism. Mestrovic's adaptation of Durkheim means that Durkheim can be apprehended as a thinker who wrote with great pathos, enigma, pessimism, or at least a very sombre optimism in the style of late nineteenth century fin de siecle thinking.

Mestrovic takes that fin de siecle view, examines various social scientists of Durkheim's time and their precursors, and favouring Durkheim, applies it to culture and the social sciences, questioning societal and scientific views of the self, society, knowledge, psychology, health and sickness in present times.

With regard to contemporary society, Mestrovic contributes lexiconically with the term 'postemotionalism', which denotes a societal and individual state of anomie, and egoism that is not so much after as against the emotions. In such a context people shape themselves and others by way of a number of intensely felt, but ultimately, inauthentic emotions. Mestrovic claims that as emotional responses have been filtered through an excess of rational and cognitive thought, emotions are processed, mechanised and commercialised. Society has sought to suppress the will to life (from Schopenhauer). But the will to life cannot be suppressed, rather it is reasserted through the very rationalised representations that are supposed to erode the will - that is the unconscious, the irrational, tribal, passionate, emotional, feminine, and pessimistic. This ignored unity, or as Mestrovic puts it: 'will as representation', is present in postemotional individuals, societal institutions and thought, as well as international relations, national strife, research communities, media, schools, parenting, leisure and intimate relations.

Mestrovic's own references to alcohol in society and education, as well as neoliberalism are few and scattered throughout his sociology. The topic at hand is not one of Mestrovic's own specialisation. It would be premature, however, to assume that Mestrovic's theory should be rejected as irrelevant on such grounds. A theorist's perspective, even if in need of being viewed somewhat critically, can be applied to an issue that is not focused on by them. Mestrovic's repositioning of Durkheim, and Mestrovic's own sociology derived from that resiting, provides a number of concepts and orientations, some of which are relevant and useful, others
which are unsuitable for societal alleviations and in need of supplementation. That supplementary treatment is undertaken herein.

*Why is there a need for "Critiquing Mestrovic"?*

A number of critical points will be made of Mestrovic in the context of discussions and specifically with regard to gender and also culture. The contextualisation of Mestrovic with regard to secondary literature referring to Mestrovic, other neo-Durkheimians and other non-Durkheimian social theories is important and needs to be taken up. That undertaking will have to be deferred to elsewhere, as to seriously approach such an analysis would divert from the central focus of the present study. Nonetheless, Mestrovic's neo-Durkheimianism will be contextualised with regard to the non-Durkheimian critical structuralism of Jennifer Lehmann in particular, commentaries on Mestrovic, and Foucault's poststructuralism. That contextualisation will be used to identify the need to address problems of gender and culture relevant to understanding alcohol, society and education.

A critical orientation to considering Mestrovic avoids dogmatically adhering to a view that might contain shortcomings, as it will be shown that Mestrovic's does. However much Mestrovic adapts the received beliefs of Durkheim through using Schopenhauer and the nineteenth century *fin de siecle* spirit to claim a new Durkheim and Durkheimianism for contemporary times, Mestrovic holds to some biases, preconceptions and misconceptions that have ramifications for how relevant that Durkheimianism truly is for present society. Furthermore, examining Mestrovic critically entails bringing into question some of Durkheim's own problematic beliefs. Mestrovic's sociology offers much, but not enough for Durkheimian perspectives for understanding alcohol in society and education. Limitations in Mestrovic and to a lesser extent, Durkheim, focused on herein concern issues of metaphysics, representation, gender and culture.

Mestrovic, then, provides a Durkheimian perspective, but one that can be explained as relevant to understanding alcohol, society and education, if by way of being critiqued and reformulated by way of supplementation.

*Why neoliberalism?*

Neoliberalism is the central target for argumentation and is viewed herein as a powerful but dangerous phenomenon in this society at this particular historical juncture. At a time when greater social justice is potentially more attainable than at other times given the contributions of socially-orientated theories of gender and
culture, society has experienced the entrenchment of the individualistic, positivist and conservative position of neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism is a very influential 'social movement' by appealing to ideas and sentiments of choice, freedom and rugged individualistic autonomy, as well as democracy. Neoliberalism has become part of all social institutions in a small nation like that of Aotearoa/New Zealand. This social movement has had a profound impact on the State, legislation-making, non-governmental organisations, and educational policy and practice.

Durkheim has been underutilised as a source for understanding neoliberalism. Durkheim's insights are still relevant today. Durkheim was strident in criticising reductionism, individualistic psychology, and economistic apprehensions of individuals, society and institutions. Durkheim criticised theorists and practitioners such as Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer who were the antecedents of neoliberalism. Durkheim's comments regarding liberalism are definitely relevant to the social movement and entrenchment of neoliberalism today.

James M. Buchanan's neoliberalism is focused on in the present study. It would be a mistake to view Buchanan as the central figure of neoliberalism - he is not. Neoliberalism is a large, multilayered and complex social movement comprised of people, organisations and institutions from diverse intellectual, cultural and social fields. Being of such a composition, to do justice to neoliberalism would require an in-depth study in itself. That undertaking will not be made herein.

To generally understand neoliberalism, the study of a specific thinker will more than suffice as there are even differences in the focuses amongst the advocates of 'public choice theory' which Buchanan was a founding member. Public choice theory is just one, if prominent, aspect of the social movement of neoliberalism. The present study will not dwell on neoliberal theories related or different to Buchanan's. Some will, however, be briefly referred to in the context of discussions. Coleman, Becker as well as Chubb and Moe will for instance be treated in this way. There are a number of neoliberal theorists who could be referred to, but will not be herein. Focusing on Buchanan, does, however, provide one good representative of neoliberalism. Buchanan specifically does have much to offer in considering the influence of neoliberalism in society. Furthermore, Buchanan's co-authored *Academia in Anarchy* is an important and underutilised text where neoliberalism in tertiary education in particular and education generally is concerned, and could be considered one blueprint for many of the changes that were instituted in the educational sector of Aotearoa/New Zealand. Yet the Central Library at the University of Otago had not issued that text for a number of years prior to 1998 - a
period in which tertiary education was widely discussed and experienced much ongoing change.

Public choice theory has been one influential neoliberal approach that has had a big influence on Aotearoa/New Zealand society and education. In one sense, the lack of mass and fierce opposition to neoliberalism in Aotearoa/New Zealand is a staggering phenomenon. However, freedom, autonomy, choice, efficiency and justice are central terms in the language of neoliberalism, which promotes notions of a small State, individual freedom, responsibility and ruggedness – concepts that resonate settler traditions in this country. The observed acceptance and appeal of neoliberalism demonstrated by some academics and many in the general population represents some deeply felt sentiments and ideas. Critically viewed from Durkheimian perspectives these sentiments are open to manipulation by cognitively-oriented rationalisations. Neoliberalism moulds ideas of, and feelings for freedom, choice, autonomy and so on, by way of very reasonable and rational approaches to desirable outcomes. Neoliberalism seems to make sense - it seems to stand to reason, and, for people’s longing to be free. But in fact, neoliberalism is justified on core rational grounds. It takes reason to the extreme. Arthur Schopenhauer, as Mestrovic points out, noted that people can be completely reasonable and vicious - the two were quite compatible for Schopenhauer. Durkheim at one point noted in exasperation that we have reasoned so much. This excess of reason is present in neoliberalism generally, and in Buchanan specifically. Neoliberalism is an excess of the mind, cognition and reason at the expense of the heart, feelings and passions. Neoliberalism is socially dangerous by twisting and manipulating people in a way that can be interpreted, by drawing in part on Mestrovic, who argued that they experience deeply felt sentiments that are inauthentic, as part of what some of Durkheim’s immediate disciples called the total social fact, exhibiting social, physiological and psychological dimensions.

Drawing on Durkheimian phraseology, the concept of the cult of management, theorised in examining the application and response to public choice theory and related particularly with regard to education, is a lexiconic contribution made for the purposes of better understanding the representation of neoliberalism in education.

In the Durkheimian sense, a cult is something that inspires and restricts. Cults insist that people behave in certain ways. For Durkheim, the positive cult is that which is allowed whilst the negative cult refers to those things that people cannot do. The cult of management fits with these definitions. The cult of management glorifies management, not just of the workplace or institutions in the simple sense of
the neoliberal social movement's aspect of 'managerialism' or 'New Public Management'. However, it encompasses managerialism, which has been very influential in Aotearoa/New Zealand and will be argued that similarities exist between managerialism and public choice theory. They are both compatible with the cult of management. Management is highly valued by both managerial and public choice theory aspects of neoliberalism. But where managerialism is institutionally and organisationally focused, Buchanan's theory, which shares such interests, also leads to a form of management of the self and others. The cult of management seeks to make management a societal phenomenon effecting the rational thought and emotions of persons. The cult of management leads to a less authentic, spontaneous and idiosyncratic existence as people are led to believe that management is desirable and commonsensical.

There are contradictions in neoliberalism, such as that it is claimed to provide greater choice, social mobility and better social services to the less well off, and yet it appears that neoliberal reforms in Aotearoa/New Zealand have overall been of great benefit to the better off, whilst the less well off have suffered economically. There has not been a purported 'trickle down' effect, where the wealth of the better off runs down the economic hierarchy to the less well off through freeing up markets. The important point in considering neoliberalism from Durkheimian perspectives is that neoliberalism is seen for the contract-based, positivistic, excessively individualistic, economic, conservatively-principled, reductionist, psychologised, mathematico-logical theory that it is.

From Durkheimian perspectives, neoliberalism can be seen as a representation, and Buchanan exhibits all the features of this representation and the worst part of human nature as normatively power-seeking. Neoliberalism is a view that turns selfishness into a cult. Or, it could be said, as will be explained in the present study that neoliberalism stands for the lower pole of homo duplex representations of self and society, opposite to the cult of the individual - it is anomie and egoistic. Buchanan has been one of the theorists utilised in creating this state of society and education, standing for neoliberalism, and the central specific vehicle for critiquing the social movement, its philosophy, policies and practice in general.

Why Buchanan?

Buchanan typifies neoliberalism - but further, in the Durkheimian sense and terminology, Buchanan can be seen as a representation - denoting the French language's meanings which transcend the boundaries of English meanings of the word in translation, but which in French has connotations of standing for, as well as
being an entity itself in the sense of having, like social facts for Durkheim, the power of force - force that cannot be altered by individuals alone.

Whilst the present study focuses on Durkheimian perspectives on alcohol, society and education, to understand the social and educational changes that relate to alcohol in contemporary times it is necessary to understand the philosophy, policy and practice of neoliberalism. I view not studying a neoliberal position in some depth to be a form of censorship. Knowing an opposite discourse, bias or angle is an essential part of critique. This undertaking requires the study of the actual works and words of at least a thinker who is a good example of, and has been drawn upon for reforms, if often unacknowledged - as will be argued later in considering specifically educational usages of Buchanan's views. Buchanan is utilised mostly herein as standing for neoliberalism which from Durkheimian perspectives is considered as societally and educationally dangerous.

Buchanan's view of society and education encapsulates a number - that is, enough of the features of neoliberalism to stand as a symbol of that social movement. Buchanan sees the State as having grown out of proportion and control in regard to the citizenry, their rights and preferences and so seeks to limit the size and power of the State by treating government employees with suspicion, seeing them as economising individuals and no different from any other individuals in this regard. Seen suspiciously, the State needs to be treated with more economic as opposed to social imperatives in mind. So viewed, Buchanan has sought to take away the power of government employees, whether in the legislature, the judiciary or the bureaucracy, who act according to their definitions of utility by setting in place legislative rules and policies that cannot subsequently be easily changed.

Buchanan seeks to make law and order a more stringently set factor in society. Laws are needed that recognise the moral rights of individuals to decide what they prefer. But Buchanan is not a libertarian neoliberal. Buchanan holds strongly to Protestant puritan morality. It is moral to allow individuals to choose how to invest in what they identify as important to them, and that is partly why Buchanan opposes government power. In pursuing their self interest government employees seek to expand their budgets and their departmental powers. For Buchanan this most usually results in inflated taxation and public debt. By applying economic imperatives to the case of government, Buchanan pursues a moral economic argument in favour of minimising the size of the State and maximising the moral rights of individuals. But this moral approach, for Buchanan, does not extend to social morals in terms of the redistribution of wealth. Rather it is the excesses of budgetary inflation and Keynesianism that has led to the decreasing importance of
and respect for morality in society. People have become intoxicated by such economic excesses and this has affected the way they view their lives and world. So whilst what is important to people is a subjective matter, it does not extend to being able to impose individuals' valued choices onto others.

Buchanan's notions of *homo economicus*; the economics of politics; government failure; producer rents, and; a theory of constitutions will be explained. Those concepts demonstrate Buchanan's view of how human nature can be perceived, adopted for comparing institutions, applied to the working of politicians, government and government workers, as well as the rules under which those actors and other citizens can behave. It will be apparent that Buchanan's view of society and education differs enormously from that of Durkheim's.

Buchanan structurally appears in the present study subsequent to the section, 'Critiquing Mestrovic', in which it is alleged by Lehmann that Durkheim was a neoliberal. Buchanan is situated strategically in this way to advance an argument that, put simply is: "Well, you have been shown how Mestrovic's social theory and Durkheim's sociology have some serious problems - but if you thought that was problematic, then look at this (Buchanan)."

In the present study, Buchanan is considered as the representative - not personally or wholly responsible, for a social movement that is a central part of the problem with contemporary society which is so heartless, hard headed, pitying, isolating, or as Durkheim put it in considering the society of his time - anomie and egoistic. The relevance of examples of this state of society will be related to Buchanan in later parts of the present study.

As will be shown throughout the present study, neoliberalism is egoistic and anomic, it is excessively individualistic, it is rationalistic in the extreme, as well as masculinist, punitive, and conservatively and economically orientated. Buchanan can be viewed as an epitomising neoliberal in these senses. To repeat, Buchanan should not be seen as the neoliberal theorist, in the sense of being the master, high priest or leader of neoliberalism. Buchanan is of great relevance and importance in the 'social movement' that is neoliberalism, and, has been utilised for neoliberal purposes in a number of societal and educational contexts in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Buchanan is a good representative for other neoliberals, and, offers a truly neoliberal view specifically.

*Why Gender and Culture?*

Whilst Buchanan's theory is not useful for and does not positively contribute to Durkheimian perspectives, gender and culture are relevant to neoliberalism and
the topic of alcohol in society and education. In addition, Durkheim and Mestrovic exhibit problems with regard to gender and culture. Women, men, Maori, youth and socioeconomics need to be studied with regard to theory and context to understand the relevance of Durkheimian perspectives. To address gender and culture with regard to the topic, Durkheimian perspectives need to be critically addressed by positioning them with regard to critical social theories. There are differences between these theories and Durkheimian perspectives. Differences will be discussed in the process of, or contextualised within an outlining of gendered and cultural dimensions of alcohol. International theoretical and empirical research material will be drawn on and applied to theoretical issues and related to empirical findings in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

As well as contextualising theoretical and empirical material with regard to alcohol and society, discussing gender and culture comparatively facilitates a supplementation of Durkheimian perspectives, making them more relevant and useful. Whilst Durkheim and Mestrovic offer useful sociological insights for understanding social phenomena their theories have limitations that need to be addressed by way of representational and structural social theories. There is a need to go further than relying on Durkheim and Mestrovic, unmodified.

Whilst Durkheim’s theory can be delineated from neoliberalism and Buchanan’s theory, through critiquing Mestrovic, shortcomings in Durkheim’s and Mestrovic’s theories can be identified. The perspectives of high modernity, poststructuralism, post Freudian, post Jungian psychoanalytic and radical feminism, as well as semiotic and cultural theory can be drawn on to examine selfhood related with regard to addictions, intimate and other human relationships, as well as societal issues of power and control, contextualised internationally and related to the national situation in terms of alcohol with regard to violence, gender and culture in history and contemporarily. Drawing from these theories to consider addiction and alcohol in society and education from Durkheimian perspectives provides relevant and useful supplementary theoretical concepts for understanding social change.

Studying gender and culture, provides further necessary conceptual tools for Durkheimian perspectives on alcohol in society and education. The explanation and discussion of secondary theories utilised in reference to Durkheim and Mestrovic, addiction, masculinity, femininity, culture and violence provides perspectives that are different in many ways, yet through pulling strands of secondary theories which can be spun and woven together with Durkheimian perspectives, areas of similarity can be utilised, contributing to a supplemented Durkheimianism. By way of critique and
through synthesis, Durkheimian perspectives can be enhanced. This stance is sociological, critical, analytical and inductive.

Why Society and Politics?

The sociological undertaking of examining society and politics regarding alcohol involves seeing issues in a wide context. That context has been influenced by neoliberalism, so society and politics will be studied by way of relating implications of theoretical discussions and syntheses to alcohol in international and global issues, as well as with regard to alcohol practices, advertising, research and legislation in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Durkheimian perspectives can be applied to society and politics.

Alcohol issues in society have been studied internationally using Durkheim, but that research has mostly been undertaken with received and mistaken views of Durkheim. Examining neoliberalism’s impact on society and particularly social practices regarding alcohol, considered from Durkheimian perspectives formed in the present study provide an alternative view of the context and the examinations of practices that have been undertaken in this country.

Durkheimian perspectives can be applied to research data, showing how alcohol problems can be tied to neoliberal societal change, when society is seen as a holistic entity, in which parts impact on other parts. Looking at the period in which neoliberalism came to prominence, the effects on public health and social practices by adults and youth, provides a context for analysis. Society, studied from Durkheimian perspectives shows that irrationality is very much part of life and that neoliberal and other economic assumptions about the rational basis to life should not be singularly accepted. Examining various demographic adult and youth groups of people and their practices reveals a number of gendered, risk taking, contextual problematic, criminal, even suicidal behaviours associated with alcohol. Examining different research methods and findings through Durkheimian perspectives sheds new light on such practices in a social context. Society is studied with regard to contextualising Buchanan’s sort of perspective, as well as by making comparative or critical points provided by interpretations from Durkheim’s, Mestrovic’s, and supplemented Durkheimian perspectives for the purposes of a reconsideration of alcohol in this country, Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Societal and political dimensions of alcohol advertising are also of importance. Advertising has burgeoned as regulations have been weakened so thoroughly as part of neoliberal reforms regarding accessibility to and marketing of alcohol. In alcohol advertising, the Durkheimian notions of representations, anomie
and egoism come to the fore. Looking at the context of advertising’s expansion and the powerful position of the industry juxtaposed with that of public health interests, highlights that pro-drinking messages regarding alcohol abound. Durkheimian perspectives can be used for examining and analysing portrayals of masculinity and femininity, culture, class, mateship and sport. Youth and adult viewer’s positive attributions of drinking means that cultural representations can be studied as being utilised, manipulating emotions by industry for the purposes of making sales. These manipulations impact on people’s wish to drink, whether underaged youth, legally sanctioned drinkers, or recovering alcoholics.

Whilst alcohol studies have contributed much to examining alcohol use, abuse and advertising issues, they rely heavily on some very accepted psychological views of individuals and society as individualistic – a tendency throughout the history of psychology. Particularly social learning theory animates a lot alcohol studies research. Whilst not totally individualistic, this basis to psychological theory and particularly social learning theory, can be critiqued from Durkheimian perspectives for not connecting representation with structure as a social phenomenon, for reducing macrological factors to individuals and for having a sterile view of emotions. A sociological and especially Durkheimian emphasis is needed in alcohol studies, as despite the move to the acceptability of harm reduction approaches in alcohol studies, a rationalistic basis to use and abuse is most often accepted therein. Whilst present, the socially based irrational and unconscious dimensions of alcohol use and abuse in advertising studies are muted in comparison to the psychologically individualistic dimensions, which have commonalities with neoliberalism. Alcohol research and practices are contextualised with regard to societally identified and changing, factors and phenomena. Sociological Durkheimian perspectives are needed.

Where politics is concerned, Durkheimian perspectives can be applied to the situation nationally and globally generally, and, where alcohol is specifically concerned. Durkheim’s notion of politically inclusive collective occupational groups can be partially identified historically and seen as under attack due to neoliberalism, as can the situation for welfare recipients. The confluence of neoliberalism and emerging information technologies has led to the expansion of an anomie and egoistic society. Considered globally, capital has expanded into new frontiers of developing nations, in part through such new technologies. Often associated with globalisation, this expansion raises a number of ethical questions where political rights and responsibilities are concerned. Marxist and hypermodern views are apparent and Durkheimian perspectives can be applied to this economically driven
political situation. Alcohol markets and accessibility are related to this situation on a global scale. Furthermore the electoral process of national and other democratic politics has been influenced by excessive individualisation, which is subject to exacerbation, by technological changes. Face to face intersubjectivity and solidarity is on the wane in private and professional life.

Examining neoliberal legislative and policy changes bring political atomisation and its harms into sharp focus. Legislation has allowed youths access to alcohol at a younger age. There have been few protective policies at State level to deal with such changes. The process of legislative change can be examined and critiqued from Durkheimian perspectives. Seen in the context of neoliberalism, the State can be viewed as having failed by retreating from its social imperatives, becoming simply an overseer and manager of social life.

*Why Education?*

In the present study education is examined to understand the impact of neoliberalism specifically there with regard to alcohol, and the impact of the wider social context in which alcohol and education is situated. Alcohol education specifically, considered from Durkheimian perspectives, must be understood as enmeshed in societal relations broadly, but also within the context of the society of education in schools. Alcohol education is now part of a market in education, and drug education is itself a market in this context. From Durkheimian perspectives, education is affected by wider societal factors. Critically addressing educational philosophy, policy and practice is the approach utilised to understand those factors. Having studied the importance of societal factors, it could be argued that societies other than those of education are the sites to make alterations in how alcohol is viewed, used, and to counter its abuse. However, whilst society broadly considered is important in this regard, evidence to be provided and Durkheimian perspectives applied in the following will make it clear that education is very important.

Neoliberalism will be examined with regard to school governance, teacher professionalism, enterprise culture, teacher education and competencies related to alcohol issues. Whilst early childhood life experiences through to tertiary education issues are relevant, primary and secondary education will primarily be viewed as important sites for alcohol educational issues. Various aspects of neoliberalism have impacted on education. The way in which schools are run, how teachers are viewed and valued, the role of education with regard to national economic advancement, how teachers are trained and the knowledge they are taught have all been impacted
on by neoliberalism. Alcohol issues can be implicated with regard to neoliberal changes in these areas of education.

Neoliberal educational changes have led to a market in drug education. Different providers try to distinguish themselves by offering services that draw schools to contract them in. Considered from Durkheimian perspectives, there are a range of factors like: the history of drug education; punishment policies when drug use is identified; media studies; spirituality and culture, and; educational research, that relate to neoliberalism and drug education.

Education is the key to addressing structures and representations experienced by the child and young person where the role and position of alcohol in society is concerned. Education provides the opportunity for experiencing knowledge which can be reflected on, beside that imparted by the family and peers. Education is a compulsory undertaking from six to sixteen years of age in Aotearoa/New Zealand. To take part in education in the school is to be a member of a society and assists the citizen to partake in the nation itself, various societies within it and global society. Educating citizens also benefits society by placing children and youth in a context where they can engage in interactions with peers from different backgrounds and experiences. Those interactions further assist in realising the aims of the democratic society.

Public health information relating to alcohol whilst having an important role to play in changing people's beliefs over and emotional attachments to alcohol consumption is not enough to facilitate the minimisation of harm. Public health information is provided in a context where people have often already taken on beliefs about alcohol. Public health is not necessarily dialogic. Nor is it necessarily conveyed in the linguistic forms familiar to different people - and this is not simply to refer to differences between languages, but also the various relevant vernaculars within a particular language and their meaningfulness to intended audiences.

By the time students have reached the age where they can legally consume alcohol, they are beyond the legal age required to remain at school. Schools exist in a context that has been greatly effected by neoliberalism. Alcohol legislation has also been affected by neoliberalism since the late 1980s. Specifically with regard to young people, the legal age for drinking was lowered from twenty to eighteen years of age in 1999. Education has a role in dealing with the possibly negative health outcomes in society that can result from these changes. Education must work with and not against student voice and vernaculars. That does not mean that education should accept the knowledge of students as leading to less harmful health outcomes.
Rather, in modifying knowledge that might otherwise lead to negative health outcomes, education must work through student voice and vernaculars.

Through Durkheimian perspectives and in viewing educational philosophy, policy and practice as having been influenced by neoliberalism, the position of alcohol issues in education can be better understood. The market in drug education created by neoliberalism needs to be replaced with a workforce of professionally trained health educators to work beside regular classroom teachers.

The "life history" of Alcohol in Society and Education: Durkheimian Perspectives

Using the term 'life history' is somewhat inexact with regard to historically determining the starting point for an argument, hypothesis or analysis - all which are the approaches adopted herein. This is more so the case when the related issue is alcohol, which in a country and culture such as this one in Aotearoa/New Zealand, is embedded in practices that are imposed, but societally and individually central to life therein. For most people alcohol is a part of and impacts on their lives before being conscious of it. Alcohol is often utilised as part of dealing with or taking part in seemingly innocuous social rites of passage such as family, friends and relatives get togethers and special occasions. Later and consciously alcohol is often involved if not central to, teen underage experimentations, reaching a legal drinking age, 21\textsuperscript{st} birthday parties, 'hens' parties' and 'stag-dos' for brides and bridegrooms preceding marriage, festive meals, get togethers, public events such as celebrating national, recreational and sporting identity, as well as less savoury or desirable activities such as dealing with stressful life occurrences whether public or private, familial or intimate through acute and chronic drinking.

This study could have turned out to be concerned with a number of other sorts of topics and issues, given the researched route traveled in preparation for what became that, which follows. As well as the alcohol issues to be discussed and which are disseminated in the common discourse of media and mass society, a number of relevantly emergent drug issues were notable over the period in which this study was undertaken. This study could have been about other controversial intoxicating or otherwise psychologically affecting commodities such as MDMA ("Ecstasy") and Ecstasyesque or ersatz/adulterated copies, methamphetamine, cannabis, SSRI anti-depressants (of which the brand 'Prozac' is most often associated), male-genital erectile medication (e.g., brand 'Viagra'), fat-uptake inhibitors (e.g., brand, Xenical) and pharmaceutical treatments for ADHD and ADD (e.g., brand, 'Ritilin'). This study is not centrally about these drugs. Cannabis will be referred to in discussing drug education anomie and harder illicit drugs in making
concluding remarks. Other of what are seen herein as social malaises and excesses were also notable at the time of the present study's central enquiry. Suicide rates rose to levels that were high by historical comparison in this country and in comparison with other countries. Food addictions related to anorexia and bulimia were also of social topic and concern. Intimate self-other addictions and dysfunctions were topical. Gambling addictions were also notably emerging, as was the emergent notion of information technology addictions, such as that to the Internet. Non-alcoholic illicit and pharmaceutical intoxicating commodities, suicide, anorexia, co-dependence, gambling and the Internet will be briefly referred to in the context of following discussions. The conceptual, practical and research implications of Durkheimian perspectives for these topics are of great social importance, whether it be by way of either: specifically, in the context of particular references, or; by way of themes developed, and; the representation overall in the present study - alcohol is not the only topic that can be studied. Emergent implications by way of Durkheimian perspectives focusing on the above non-alcohol addiction issues will have to be identified elsewhere, given the particular focus on alcohol herein. Alcohol does, however, provide a good example of how Durkheimian perspectives can be applied to society and education. More particularly, alcohol shows how historically and culturally embedded phenomena can be reshaped through social change.

My undergraduate and postgraduate studies in political theory, educational philosophy and theory, critical psychology, sociology, gender studies, and sexualities also influenced the life history of this thesis. In terms of research that backgrounds this study, two of my pieces of research, one carried out, and one prepared for and proposed, but not conducted are of importance. The first was the dissertation paper written as part of the requirements for the fulfillment of a Diploma in Arts, which I was subsequently awarded with distinction. That research was into Alcoholics Anonymous and dysfunction considered from a Durkheimian perspective. In the process of studying that topic I came across, then utilised and herein revisited, a paper written by Glenys Barker in the journal *Sites*, which sociologically analysed the 'escape attempts' made by a couple of artists in Aotearoa/New Zealand. In that paper Barker made reference to the sociologist Mestrovic and I interloaned a paper Barker cited by Mestrovic on the 'civilisation and its discontents' theme in Durkheim's *Division of Labour*. Although I could see some affinities with the view of Edward Tiryakian, I was taken with Mestrovic's view of Durkheim, given its difference to those I had experienced having read the conclusions of George Simpson, Lewis Coser, Anthony Giddens, and Steve Taylor. I have revisited some recountsings of Durkheim's claims by these authors herein still finding them of value in this regard (I
also have accumulated and read a 300 millimetre-high pile of articles and book chapters of secondary sources by various authors, mostly published between 1996 and 2001 regarding and utilising Durkheim and Durkheimian views on various societal and educational issues. None of those sources appear in the present study. They have, however, been formative in the sense of providing me with further evidence of Mestrovic's distinctive take on Durkheim. But Mestrovic's view was distinctive.

Having completed the dissertation paper, I interloaned a copy of Mestrovic's *Durkheim and Postmodern Culture*, and subsequently, all nationally available research articles and several books soley authored by Mestrovic in preparing for and conducting the research herein, up until 1999. It was during studying that material that I developed what I have come to intellectually consider and call by analogy a 'bad taste in my mouth' (where my mouth is the metaphor for my thoughts), regarding Mestrovic. Some of Mestrovic's claims ran counter to my understanding of critical sociology and I was interested to know more about the context of Durkheim's writings which Mestrovic drew passages from. It was due to that intellectual feeling, intuition or sense that I returned to Durkheim in the original texts (translated into the English language) and studied Durkheim in greater depth. In a similar vein I also began looking for and considering commentaries and references to Mestrovic by various authors commenting on, and reviewers of, Mestrovic's publications. That undertaking developed into 'Critiquing Mestrovic' and subsequently necessary suppletions for Durkheimian perspectives.

The second piece of research that informs the present study was a proposed but not conducted study for the purposes of a Master of Arts degree, within the former Education Department, University of Otago. That research was to enquire into alcohol portrayals in a weekday primetime television soap opera produced in Aotearoa/New Zealand for the purposes of informing societal and educational policies and practice. Proposed implications for societal issues were those of soap opera scripting and portrayals as well as broadcasting guidelines. Implications for education were proposed to relate to particularly Health, but also Social Studies, and English syllabuses/curriculum, as well as unit and lesson plans.

That proposed study was inspired by prior research undertaken by Casswell, Mortimer and Smythe (1983)¹ concerning the Aotearoa/New Zealand soap opera *Close to Home*, which the study was to replicate by examining the contemporary soap opera *Shortland Street*, updating the earlier research and extending it by

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applying post-Freudian feminist social theory to observed portrayals regarding alcohol. I had chosen that social theory due to two reasons. Firstly from studying the perspective, as taught by Mark Olssen concerning the topic of male violence in his masculinity, power and education paper, and, under Joe Diorio in his paper concerning philosophy sex and education, as well as in 1995 as a staff member, sitting in on Joe Diorio's 200-level paper regarding women and educational theory, wherein depictions in film were utilised as one example of how gendering is carried. I recall, upon Joe Diorio's lecture recommendation, hiring a video of the movie of *The Maltese Falcon* starring the actor Humphrey Bogart. I watched the movie scene by scene, and sometimes shot by shot, recording my observations in handwritten notes with minute and second timing by them, training myself to look for the depictions, and switches, of gender stereotypic behaviours of the characters portrayed.

Secondly, I chose post-Freudian feminist social theory, as in preparing for the proposed research, I had requested and studied a copy of research undertaken by Television New Zealand regarding the demographics of viewership of its production, *Shortland Street*. That research showed that a significant number of *Shortland Street* viewers were middle class, teenaged to middle-aged women of European-descent. I believed that those findings indicated that the social theory I had chosen was more suitable to viewers than the Durkheimian social theory I had nonetheless continued studying, if at that point to a lesser degree.

Seeking appropriate institutional feedback and support I applied to the Alcohol Liquor and Advisory Council (ALAC, a quasi-autonomous non-government organisation funded through a portion of alcohol taxation) for scholarship funding. The proposed study was a content analysis interpreted through post-Freudian feminist social theory. I believed the study had societal and educational relevance, given the significant number and demographic of women viewing *Shortland Street* nationally, and the increased number of women who had taken to consuming alcohol in recent times.

I priced out the study, given the materials (television, video recorder, video tapes, thesis printing and reimbursement of a suitably educated postgraduate student conversed in the chosen social theory and depictions to be observed for). The methodology involved two people, myself and the postgraduate student both viewing portrayals of alcohol - testing for interobserver reliability, as well as interpreting the characters, number of instances, contexts and consequences portrayed, by way of the social theory selected to study *Shortland Street*. This replicated and extended the earlier research into *Close to Home*. 
ALAC declined my application, claiming the research was not in accord with its strategic plan. Not wishing to undertake socially unuseful research and despite having prepared further, by among other things, studying academic research into gender and portrayals concerning *Shortland Street* itself, the U.S. situation comedy *Home Improvement* and the U.K. soap opera *Emmerdale*, as well as alcohol portrayals and adolescents, I decided not to undertake the proposed research. Some of the work undertaken in preparing for that research is retained in the present study, refocused, with regard to analysing alcohol advertising, and gender and culture from Durkheimian perspectives, as well as (if subtextually) critiquing alcohol studies.

I was and remain as convinced that media studies (of print, radio, television, film, Internet and other information technologies) are important for understanding and critiquing contemporary society and education as I was in 1995. Subsequently, research has been reported in the media regarding culture and *Shortland Street*, and the utilisation of *Shortland Street* in school programmes regarding moral education. I assure myself with the belief that the proposed and prepared for but unconducted research was ahead of its time.

I turned my research focus to studying Mestrovic and Durkheim, alcohol and society where education is concerned. Another factor that influenced the present study was changes in my immediate academic society which previously had research, teacher education as well as counseling orientations, but which became teacher education focused. As a result of those changes, and seeking to retain the relevance of the research in the context of that society - to remain part of that society, I became more interested in formal school education and alcohol, considered from Durkheimian perspectives. At that time I was also undertaking reading into material that forms a background to, but is not directly utilised in the present study such as the international anthropology of drinking by men, and genetics and alcohol.

With regard to the content of the present study, I came to see similarities, as addiction discourses both literally but also metaphorically can be related to various issues and theories studied herein. Literally, addiction, self-harm and destruction will be referred to by way of the classical sociological study of and references to suicide by Durkheim, and Mestrovic's references to barbarism, drug abuse, stress, and socially excessive centrifugalism and centripetalism. Durkheim and Mestrovic, I believe share some views on such issues. Other addiction and self destruction discourses specifically referred to herein are those emanating from: Marxist and neoliberal political economics; social learning theory; homeostatic family systems
theory; modernism and postmodernism post-Freudian feminism; poststructuralist masculinity and feminist theory; semiotics; and Maori perspectives supplemented by post-Freudian feminist and postmodernist multiculturalist perspectives.

Why the thematics?

Certain themes are pursued throughout the present study. Morality, justice, authenticity and their opposites are repeatedly revisited. Alcohol in education and society is centrally studied here, involving extrapolations both from Durkheimian and non-Durkheimian perspectives, whether for synthesis or critique. The terms used to denote themes should not, however, be interpreted in narrow ways. Durkheim was interested in those themes and treated them seriously in seeking to establish a 'science of morals'. In terms more commonly used today, Durkheim could be said to have been undertaking a sociology of institutions and the embodiment of morality and knowledge in society and education.

Durkheim referred to society in different ways. A school, even a class of students and teacher, can constitute a society, as can group of people in any social situation where various socially valued ideas and feelings that animate life exist. As well as being concerned with micro social contexts, society for Durkheim was also the macrological 'whole of society', so to speak. Durkheim referred to both contexts. In the sense that Durkheim viewed society as composed of a number of interrelated parts, and ideally constructively interlinked through various communicative channels, societal holism is an important theme from Durkheimian perspectives.

Durkheim also referred to society through metaphors of plasticity, disintegration, and disease. Metaphors were used by Durkheim often to show that there is something structurally and representationally interrelative in society.

Approaching societal and educational issues related to alcohol by way of themes leads to a clearer view of the influence of individualistic psychology, economistic theories, conservatism, and the appearance of phenomena as fostered by neoliberalism. Thematics means that Durkheimian perspectives can be examined alongside other perspectives.

Human suffering is a terrible thing and sociological orientations can be applied for recommending ways to reduce that suffering and the pain that accompanies it. It ought to be the duty as well as the desire of social researchers to contribute to alleviating societal suffering wherever possible. Alcohol leads to much suffering, but alcohol, when considered from the sociological orientation, is situated in a complex web of societal and educational influences. Alcohol cannot be long separated from such influences, even for analytical, speculative or intuitive study. To
understand alcohol-related suffering it is necessary to contextualise suffering in its social milieu. The theme of human suffering runs throughout the present work. The approach advocated herein is of searching for authenticity where alcohol is concerned.

To mention the term authenticity, even if approached critically, is almost banned in contemporary culture. The influence of extreme relativism expounded by, among other approaches, excessive postmodern theories in which idealist textualism reigns, has led to a situation where any claim to authenticity is seen as in fact being some sort of theoretical, cultural, economic, gendered or sexual imposition. "Whose authenticity?" is the question posed to any claimant of the term. I am not anti-relativist, or anti-postmodern. The opposite is the case and for Durkheim the former concept was anathema to his project. Culture has good and bad features. Durkheim's formulation of *homo duplex* with regard to the individual and society recognised this notion. Durkheim saw collective effervescence a 'hot' time of social tumult and alterity when rules that usually apply – collective representations, are set aside and passions reign. Representations and passions can tend towards growth or decay for Durkheim.

Authenticity in this sense related to alcohol means finding a way into drinking that unmarks the passions behind acts of and related to consumption. This is the role of authenticity and alcohol needs to be approached with a critical orientation, looking for what lies beneath the masks of justifications related to drinking. Conscious, rational thought alone is not the answer, as it is the mask that hides emotions and passions, irrationality and the unconscious lying beneath. Excesses of cognition applied to the passions is what Mestrovic believes in large part defines postemotions. What is sought herein is a project of becoming, a way of being with regard to alcohol. It is critical of both emotions and rational thought. It is an authenticity which seeks to make the self and society things of beauty, of morality and justice - things that reduce human suffering. Authenticity is about caring for the self and caring for others, trawling through social structures and the objects and representations of desire, emotion and passion, with an acute awareness of the violence and ruptures that accompany these facets of the self and society.

*Why use the texts and text as such?*

The texts used herein are for specific purposes. With regard to the use of texts as such, texts have been selected and uniquely utilised with the purpose of studying Durkheimian perspectives, delineating them from alternative perspectives, as well as for considering alcohol in society and education. The strategy applied with
regard to the texts used is a conscious attempt to focus on Durkheimian perspectives, contrasted with neoliberalism, supplemented with theories on gender and culture and applied to, alcohol in society and education. Theoretical and empirical texts have been selected and used for these purposes.

With regard to the use of text there has been particular attention paid to respecting the authorship of those whose perspectives and studies have been drawn on. No emphasis has been added to others’ text. Where authors have placed emphasis in their writing or added to others’ work by use of italics, that text is left in original. If authors using others’ text have emphasised it I have identified that the emphasis is theirs wherever possible. The treatment of text in this way particularly applies to Mestrovic's use of text, especially that of Durkheim's writings. Making points in advancing arguments quoting others' work, Mestrovic often utilises the method of adding emphasis through the italicisation of originally plainly written text of others. Where this has taken place it has been identified as such, most often with the phrase "adding emphasis" with regard to Mestrovic and other authors referred to in the present study. This has been necessary to avoid the misapprehension that I have added the emphasis, or that authors I have utilised have quoted text, adding emphasis, when the emphasis was in the original passages.

Where authors utilised have made translations from various languages into English, the preferred phrase to denote such cases is "translating, quoted/cited". This avoids the possibility of readers going to English translations of texts to find that passages do not appear in the pages referred to.

Emphases made in the present study with regard to highlighting points, appear by way of the writing. Using italics, I have emphasised only my own text and others’ writing is presented as it appeared in the works utilised. The preference is to emphasise aspects of quotations by way of paraphrasing surrounding writing, introducing and thus contextualising the quoted passages.

The text carrying the argument in the present study is structured into three levels. On the first level there are five sections to the study. On the second level, each section contains a series of chapters, headed by bold text. On the third level, some of those chapters contain subsections. Where subsections do appear in chapters, they begin with headings in italics. The section, chapter and chapter subsection headings are presented in the Table of Contents as they appear in the body of the work itself.
SECTION 1:

DURKHEIM AND MESTROVIC
Durkheim and Mestrovic

Durkheim

Durkheim was a central founder of the discipline of Sociology (the study of society) and is usually positioned beside Karl Marx and Max Weber in this regard. Together they are considered as the classical three of Sociology. Classic sociological ideas are relevant to studying alcohol in society and education and have been applied to western developed and developing societies subjected to neoliberalism. Marx has perhaps been the most taken up and critiqued with regard to world economic, historical and political circumstances affecting education. Weber has been influential in understandings of the state and its institutions and societal forms of rationality in schools. Durkheimianism has had less impact on critical social and educational policy discussions relative to Marxism and Weberianism in this country. The present study alters that situation. Durkheim was a sociologist and educationalist whose comments and viewpoint is highly relevant to societal and educational issues today. Specifically with regard to education, contrasted with Marx and Weber, Durkheim was a lecturer to trainee school teachers, it was claimed by Durkheim's disciple, Paul Fauconnet, for up to two thirds of his lecturing timetable. Durkheim was quite clear in claiming that education had an important part to play in society, and, that education reflects its surrounding society. Durkheim believed that sociology had an important role in understanding and contributing where social institutions, legislation, politics, social policy and education were concerned.

Durkheim studied society as a structural entity, and, a context full of representations and feelings. Social structure figures repeatedly in Durkheim, where social organisations and parts of society are concerned specifically or in relation to others. Representations as ideas figure prominently in Durkheim’s writings and beside them, Durkheim also often mentions the sentiment or emotions of society.

Durkheim always studied society from a moral point of view, in the sense of attaching that term 'moral' to a concern with the notion of social justice realised through societal peaceability wherever possible. Durkheim was not a revolutionary, yet studied revolutionary social changes historically. Durkheim was not a political radical, yet drew on socialist and liberal views and promoted what was at that time a radical socially-centered discipline, and, was active in academic, national and international politics. Durkheim was not an extreme relativist, yet argued that social phenomena always have to be considered relative to cultural and historical contexts.

This series of chapters deals with a number of Durkheim's ideas broadly by way of utilising a number of Durkheim's central conceptions of: homo duplex, social
facts, collective representations, the cult of the individual, egoism and anomie. Durkheim's broad ideas circulate around his central idea of the importance of society. Durkheim used the term to refer to society as a whole, in the sense of for instance a nation, and at others to refer to a group within the whole of society, such as a school.

*Homo duplex* was Durkheim's view of a two-poled human nature - one end tending to narcissism, the other to society, others and morality. Social facts are made of cultural and historical traditions and ideas that are concreted in social practices, institutions and laws - phenomena that are as real as anything in nature. Collective representations are surrounding social ideas and feelings some which are set and clearly defined, such as social facts and others which are diffused and obscure, but which have the power to force people to act. The cult of the individual was Durkheim's view of a becoming and future moral system where the person - that is the person in general with rights and dignity, is raised to the point of being god - a cult that counters excessive anomie and egoism. Egoism is an inward-turning state of excessive individualisation where people are dislocated from others in societal institutions and organisations due to the reduced quality of relationships therein, and care only for themselves. Anomie is where, in society, desires are unrestrained and representations are deranged, affecting individuals and the whole of society.

There are other concepts of Durkheim's that will be explained in the context of explaining the above-mentioned concepts for the purposes of discussion and application. These are the collective conscience, the sacred and the profane, renovated rationalism and the corporation. These concepts will be subsumed within the central concepts at hand. The sacred and the profane can be found referred to in the chapters regarding *homo duplex* and collective representations. The collective conscience is referred to in the chapter regarding anomie and the corporation is referred to in the chapters regarding the cult of the individual, anomie, egoism and collective representations.

The following chapters concerning Durkheim will set one of the grounds on which subsequent analyses will be undertaken, because the present study will involve studying phenomena that are related to alcohol in society and education, such as economics, knowledge, and institutions of family, school, work and religion. Explaining Durkheim by drawing on such phenomena also assists in giving form to Durkheim's diverse studies and commentaries.
Homo duplex

This chapter, homo duplex starts by explaining Durkheim’s view of human nature in society. Durkheim’s use of the concept of homo duplex - an interpretation of human nature that is united and two-poled, one tending to goodness, morality, society and the sacred and the other to evil, immorality, egoism and the profane. Durkheim’s view of homo duplex was, for Durkheim, relevant to the purpose of understanding social problems, history, change and constancy. But Durkheim’s take on this concept of human nature ran in an opposite direction than what may at first appear as an individualistic orientation to explaining the individual-society dualism. An individualistic orientation to this concept would be where factors were contained within people, that is, individual people are responsible for society. Such an orientation was not Durkheim’s. Rather, Durkheim held to a view of an individualised, amoral self in tension with a societal and holistic side of human nature. What is good in individuals, the higher pole of human nature or homo duplex for Durkheim was sourced in society. For Durkheim, to find what is good, healthy, moral and just – to alleviate suffering, research must be undertaken on society. Individuals when focused on in social isolation contextually are the source of untruth and what is not good or just. What is good has to be known, taught, learnt, and taken on as an integral part of the self.

Durkheim utilised a concept of a two-poled human nature. One pole was lower, in being immoral, profane and selfish. The other pole was higher, in being, moral, sacred and social. Durkheim believed that the notion of homo duplex could be traced back to Plato, with whom Durkheim agreed in arguing that:

*Man is double because two worlds meet in him: that of non-intelligent and amoral matter, on the one hand, and that of ideas, the spirit, and the good, on the other. Because these two worlds are naturally opposed, they struggle within us; and because we are part of both, we are necessarily in conflict with ourselves.*

The lower pole of human nature is interested in sensations, interests and perceptions. The higher pole is about morality, disinterest and conceptions. For

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Durkheim, the body is profane and perceptive in comparison to the sacred, conceiving soul, represented by the impersonality of morality and language, but always open to subjectivised versions of these shared concepts.4

Each of us puts his own mark on them; and this accounts for the fact that each person has his own particular way of thinking about the beliefs of his church, the rules of common morality, and the fundamental notions that serve as the framework of conceptual thought. But even while they are being individualized - and thus becoming elements of our personalities - collective ideals preserve their characteristic property: the prestige with which they are clothed. Although they are our own, they speak in us with a tone and an accent that are entirely different from those of our other states of consciousness. They command us; they impose respect on us; we do not feel ourselves to be on an even footing with them. We realize that they represent something within us that is superior to us.5

Durkheim saw human existence as a battle of the forces of homo duplex in which society must impose its higher morality onto individual human beings.

The painful character of the dualism of human nature is explained by this hypothesis. There is no doubt that if society were only the natural and spontaneous development of the individual, these two parts of ourselves would harmonize and adjust to each other without clashing and without friction . . . 6

Durkheim's conclusion regarding the future was that

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... since the role of the social being in our single selves will grow ever more important as history moves ahead, it is wholly improbable that there will ever be an era in which man is required to resist himself to a lesser degree, an era in which he can live a life that is easier and less full of tension. To the contrary, all evidence compels us to expect our effort in struggle between the two beings within us to increase with the growth of civilization.7

Durkheim began the essay, 'The dualism of human nature and its social conditions', noting that both poles of human nature need to be studied to sociologically make sense of the social constitution of morality.

Although sociology is defined as the science of societies, it cannot, in reality, deal with the human groups that are the immediate object of its investigation without eventually touching on the individual who is the basic element of which these groups are composed. For society can exist only if it penetrates the consciousness of individuals and fashions it in "its image and resemblance." We can say, therefore, with assurance and without being excessively dogmatic, that a great number of our mental states, including some of the most important ones, are of social origin . . . it is impossible to attempt to explain the whole without explaining the part - without explaining, at least, the part as a result of the whole.8

Durkheim, in implicitly referring to his notion of homo duplex, argued that the development of civilisations had radically reshaped people's thinking and concepts about themselves and others by making people into more social beings than was the case in traditional societies. However, modern individualism's egoistic

tendencies, when magnified beyond what is societally authentic, strips away the reality and meaning of social interaction.

Social man necessarily presupposes a society which he expresses and serves. If this dissolves, if we no longer feel it in existence and action about and above us, whatever is social in us is deprived of all objective foundation.9

Durkheim implicitly referred to his notion of *homo duplex*, emphasising that it is the social pole that should be realised in education.

. . . a system of ideas, sentiments and practices which express in us, not our personality, but the group or different groups of which we are a part; these are religious beliefs, moral beliefs and practices, national or professional traditions, collective opinions of every kind. Their totality forms the social being. To constitute this being in each of us is the end of education.10

To understand human nature, Durkheim believed it was necessary to study history, academically and in schools. History, for Durkheim, reveals the various ways in which people are constituted, in a way that reflection alone cannot reveal, going on to state

. . . how little we know ourselves . . . we contain within us hidden depths where unknown powers slumber but which from time to time may be aroused according to the demands of circumstances . . . {people have} . . . an unconscious psychic life beyond that of consciousness . . .11

Education is not an imposition that opposes the nature of people. Rather, for Durkheim, education evokes what is better in human nature, what is more special - what is social. This specialness is expressed in the notion of *homo duplex*, as:

> The individual, in willing society, wills himself. The influence that it exerts on him, notably through education, does not at all have as its object and its effect to repress him, to diminish him, to denature him, but on the contrary, to make him grow and to make of him a truly human being.\(^{12}\)

Durkheim rejected the idea that government had no place in moral and intellectual education, or that it should be left completely up to individual parents, because:

> Education is then conceived as an essentially private and domestic affair. When one takes this point of view, one tends naturally to reduce to a minimum the intervention of the State . . . \(^{13}\)

If Durkheim was opposed to free choice in education as leading to the inflation of the lower pole of human nature, he was also similarly critical of a psychologically focused education.\(^{14}\) Durkheim viewed education as always seeking to meet societal requirements. Education is good for people as it invests them with supremely important characteristics that allow society to be somewhat peaceable. Sociology, Durkheim believed was the best way to determine the social currents that need to be part of the education of people. The method of teaching social imperatives could be informed by psychology, but psychology was, for Durkheim, insufficient for finding out what it is that needs to be taught, that, was the important contribution of sociology to education. Durkheim referred to sociology’s contribution to education by reference to *homo duplex*, as

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under whatever aspect one considers education, it appears to us everywhere with the same character. Have we not expressly recognized that we owe to education the best in us? But this is because the best in us is of social origin. It is always to the study of society, then, that we must return; it is only there that the pedagogue can find the principles of his speculation. Psychology will indeed be able to indicate to him what is the best way to proceed in order to apply these principles to the child, once they are stated; but it will hardly help us to discover them.  

Human nature, as homo duplex, for Durkheim is central to understanding people and their society. Durkheim saw human nature as having a tendency towards what today is called narcissism. That tendency was undeniable for Durkheim. However, Durkheim did not want society to resign itself to the lower pole of human nature. Durkheim also believed that human nature had another side. The higher pole of human nature concerns morals, giving to others, conceding to the power of society and the collective beliefs that allow society to continue without lapsing into anarchy and self-interest. It was Durkheim's belief in a two-poled human nature, and his concerns over the possibility that the lower pole could become dominant, that led him to advocate for an education and society that sought to temper the lower pole, to rather, instill and maintain the integrity of the higher pole of homo duplex.

The moral nature of Durkheim's view of homo duplex is clear, but it should not be confused simplistically with a view of people as born-evil, as epitomised by the Christian notion of the self. That is not to say that Durkheim’s concept of homo duplex is not etymologically related to Christianity or religion in general. Indeed Durkheim saw in religion what was good in society, as religion for Durkheim was societally sourced and expressed people’s most cherished meanings and feelings.

Durkheim was not a utopian. A perfect world of only higher pole homo duplex was not a possibility for Durkheim. Durkheim's sociology was an attempt to identify and eliminate or at least alleviate lower pole homo duplex socially sourced

phenomena. For Durkheim lower pole excesses in societal thought, history, economics, politics, psychology and education tended to unbalance *homo duplex* tipping the world into anomie as the infinity of desire and egoism, the infinity of dreams. *Homo duplex* is identifiable in each of these societal fields for Durkheim.
Social facts

This chapter regarding social facts starts by explaining Durkheim's view of social facts as having the force of a thing. Social facts are phenomena that place constraints on individuals and society. They are socially sourced and can be socially beneficial or destructive, depending on their relevance to society at a given point in its history. An explanation will follow in which Durkheim's view of how to reveal facts, how they are distinguished from opinion and ideology, how they can be unconscious and historically and culturally relativistic, but also always possibly normal or pathological. Durkheim's example of crime as a social fact will be noted in this regard. This chapter makes particular use of Durkheim's view that social facts are about socially generated meanings that imbue things, that can change, or lie dormant or become unimportant, depending on their relevance to society at a given point in its history.

Durkheim argued that individuals were not the place to look for in identifying social facts. Durkheim was a holist. In Durkheim's view reducing social facts to the conglomeration of individual's consciousnesses would not reveal social facts.

Education was also a social fact for Durkheim who looked to sociology for the explanation for social problems. Durkheim was not averse to psychology and was willing to see psychological approaches that admitted the social as the source of ideas and feelings as approaches that should be included in schools. Once those social sources and requirements had been identified by sociology, individual psychology also had a role to play in shaping knowledge so that it would be best learnt by students, all whom have different needs and orientations.

Durkheim believed that social facts needed to be studied as a social entity and not by way of economics. Social facts were related to economics in Durkheim’s view. However, economics should be subject to and constrained by society. The notion of collective secondary groups or the corporation standing between individuals and economics and between individuals and the State was the solution for the economically related social problems that Durkheim observed in his time.

Durkheim's breakthrough was in his sociologically viewing social facts in a new way. This is expressed in Durkheim's classic claim that when studying society: "The first and most fundamental rule is: Consider social facts as things." Sociology was the discipline for studying society, in Durkheim's view. Sociology's work was to look at society, question its supposed normality, and identify its pathologisation, where apparent. Durkheim rejected the meaning and nature of society variously defined by religious, agnostic, socialist and classical economic views.

The common flaw in these definitions is their premature attempt to grasp the essence of phenomena. They presuppose propositions which, true or not, can be proved only at a more advanced stage of science. This is just the case where we should apply the rule previously established. Instead of aspiring to determine at the outset the relations of the normal and the morbid to vital forces, let us simply seek some external and perceptible characteristic which will enable us merely to distinguish these two orders of facts.17

Believing it was necessary to check whether social facts are normal or pathological, Durkheim argued that some social facts are remnants of previous eras and are normal, but unsuited to the new context and their relevance is therefore illusory.18 Other social facts, when still general in the society, can be pathological if the conditions for their existence are different from those which were present in their previous context.19 The pathology of facts must also be considered in the context of whether they are necessary or useful to the normal, as something may be useful but not necessary and therefore pathological, if for instance a fact may be useful in dealing with the sick, but mistakenly assumed to be necessarily applied to the normal as well.20

In arguing that it was important to study social facts sociologically and not psychologically, Durkheim believed that it was also necessary to assume that individual consciousness is subject to the consciousness of society.

If social life were merely an extension of the individual being, it would not thus ascend toward its source, namely, the individual, and impetuously invade it. If the authority before which the individual bows when he acts, feels, or thinks socially governs him to this extent, it does so because it is a product of social forces which transcend him and for which he, consequently, cannot account. The external impulse to which he submits

cannot come from him, nor can it be explained by what happens within him.\textsuperscript{21}

The social physiology that is sociology's matter for study, in Durkheim's view, was not about looking at persons in the way individual physiological matter is seen as inherently set, discovered and worked upon. Rather, people are seen as results of their subjection to forces in society which act on people without their knowledge of them, where "... just as we may not be aware of atmospheric pressure on our bodies. It may be also that we capitulate without resistance."\textsuperscript{22} Social forces might be concretely based and strongly felt, but they do not have to be. Usually, however, social forces are moral, and acquiesced to, as well as felt most strongly when people resist, question and rebel against them. They "... react against him and attest to their superiority with the usually irresistible energy of their reaction."\textsuperscript{23} Such forces really exist, they have the affect of 'constraint' on society.\textsuperscript{24}

Having developed the social forces of rules and morals and ideas before individuals enter it, and in continuing after individuals depart, society, through social facts in the final analysis imposes itself on people, rather than people having the impositional upper hand.

*We must, then, seek the explanation of social life in the nature of society itself. It is quite evident that, since it infinitely surpasses the individual in time as well as in space, it is in a position to impose upon him ways of acting and thinking which it has consecrated with its prestige. This pressure, which is the distinctive property of social facts, is the pressure which the totality exerts on the individual.*\textsuperscript{25}

Durkheim argued that it was necessary to look at collectivities to understand what social phenomena are and why they occur. Individuals cannot provide that knowledge. Sociology is in this sense, so distinct from psychology that

\textsuperscript{24} Durkheim, E. (\{1922\} 1956). Education and Sociology, p.77.
... every time that a social phenomenon is directly explained by a psychological phenomenon, we may be sure that the explanation is false.

Social facts elude consciousness. Obscure forces of which people are not conscious shape the psyche of persons. There are unconscious social facts.

It is useless to argue that those representations that pass for unconscious are only perceived incompletely and confusedly; for this confusion can have only one cause, simply that we do not see all that these representations comprehend- that there are real and effective elements which are not, consequently, purely physical facts, and which are not, however, obvious to the consciousness. This obscure consciousness is a partial unconsciousness, and we must once again remember that the limits of consciousness are not the limits of all psychic activity.

Durkheim was quite clear in seeing social facts as socio-historical and cultural, rather than psychologically sourced. "The determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding it and not among the states of the individual consciousness."

Durkheim was not opposed to sociologists who seek to study social facts as taking on psychological insights and tuition. But Durkheim argued that sociologists, then, had to free themselves of the confines of psychology as the study of social facts requires an involvement with sociology and not psychology.

Psychological training, more than biological training, constitutes, then, a valuable lesson for the sociologist; but it will not be useful to him except on condition that he emancipates himself from it after having received profit from its lessons, and then goes beyond it by special sociological training...

Durkheim was, however, supportive of psychologies that studied mental life as social phenomena. Society is multifaceted. Various forms of ideas and feelings intermingle and react with each other. Psychologies which are not individualistic can provide a way into studying society as

*a vast system of sui generis realities made up of a great number of mental strata superimposed upon each other, far too profound and complex for the conscious mind to pierce, far too specialized to be accounted for by purely physiological considerations. It is thus that this spirituality by which we characterize intellectual facts, and which seemed in the past to be either above or below the attentions of science, has become itself the object of a positive science . . . a psychological naturalism has been founded . . .*30

Durkheim was severe in his approach to critically apprehending classical political economics. For instance, in his reviewing Vilfredo Pareto – an undertaking that deserves to be noted in full, Durkheim was dismissive.

*This is an essay in justification of the old abstract and ideologically inclined method of the orthodox political economics; it aims to formulate a general method from all the social sciences. The author does not seem to doubt that if science proceeds effectively from abstractions, to be legitimate, it must comply with certain conditions that are not met by abstractions in orthodox economics.*31

Durkheim argued that the individualism he believed in should be separated from that held to by economists and utilitarians, which he condemned as an anarchic " . . . crass commercialism which reduces society to nothing more that a vast apparatus of production and exchange."32 Durkheim critiqued the lack of morality in


economic relations for presenting and unhealthy state, which results in little discipline and "... effects that spill over beyond the economic sphere, bringing with it a decline in public morality."³³ Durkheim viewed economic relations as being those of war, of dominance and unbalance, in need of a set of rules to protect the individual and make peace between people within economic relations.³⁴

Economically focused views could not solve societal problems for Durkheim. Economics is interested in the profane and the observable. Durkheim viewed society as a sui generis force, which can be observed historically in the socially sourced and sacred power of religion.³⁵

That which is sacred is that which is set apart, that which has nothing in common with the profane. It is evident that moral facts have this character. Never do we admit that a moral value can be expressed in terms of economic values - I would go as far as to say temporal values.³⁶

Durkheim believed that social changes alter social facts. Durkheim observed this in his time and looked to the necessity of the formation new social groups to deal with the changes such as the lessening importance of the family, the rise of industrialism as well as the growth of the State. Those changes required a new way in which to organise society. In the context where families' intergenerational transference of wealth is hampered by family dissolutions and ruptures, and where the State's processes, size and complexity would result in a squandering or misdirection of people's economic legacies, Durkheim saw professional groups as the historically relevant redistributing social institution in this regard.

There would have to be secondary groups, more limited in range and closer to the facts in details, to be able to fulfil this function. We could hardly choose any better suited to the task than the professional groups. They are well equipped to manage any particular set of interests and could branch out in to all parts of the country; at the same time they would take into account the regional differences and purely local affairs. They

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would satisfy all the conditions for becoming in a sense, in the economic sphere, the heirs of the family.\textsuperscript{37}

Fauconnet noted that Durkheim believed education was a social fact.\textsuperscript{38} Durkheim believed that pedagogy should call on the science of education, embryonic in his time, as well as psychology and sociology to guide it.\textsuperscript{39} Durkheim had high hopes that education would become a scientific enterprise. To achieve that end, Durkheim put forth three features that would have to be fulfilled. The first was to identify an object and to study 'verified, selected facts', the second was a homogeneity of facts for research 'able to be classed in the same category', and the third was a disinterested approach to apprehending the consequences of results, 'to express reality, not to judge it'. Continuing:

\begin{quote}
This being established, there is no reason for education not to become the object of an inquiry which might satisfy all these conditions and which, consequently, presents all the characteristics of a science.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

Durkheim was opposed to introspection and psychology as sources of discovering what is appropriate to education. Individual's minds and thoughts are insufficient to provide knowledge about social facts. Social facts, having the strength of force are the things to study to understand human meaning and human behaviour. To apprehend these things, Durkheim argued that sociology is the true source of guidance in education.\textsuperscript{41} The social totality which is the social fact of education always reflects society, for Durkheim. Education is a social institution, practice, and, fact. Education reflects history and contemporary society. The beliefs, emotions and ideas of society are reflected in education, which seeks to instill itself in its members, because

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} Fauconnet, P. (1922) 1956. 'Introduction to the original edition: Durkheim's pedagogical work'. \textit{Education and Sociology}. p.27.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Durkheim, E. (1922) 1956. \textit{Education and Sociology}. pp.102-103.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Durkheim, E. (1922) 1956. \textit{Education and Sociology}. p.94.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Durkheim, E. (1922) 1956. \textit{Education and Sociology}. p.134.
\end{itemize}
... education, as practiced in a given society and considered at a given moment of its evolution, is a totality of practices, of ways of doing things, of customs which constitute perfectly defined facts and which have the same reality as other social facts... They constitute... real social institutions.42

Denying social facts, such as the importance of education in a social context, endangers health and life itself.

*It is idle to believe that we raise our children as we wish. We are forced to follow the rules which prevail in the social milieu in which we live. Opinion imposes them on us, and opinion is a moral force whose constraining power is not less than that of physical forces... we can try to live otherwise than the nature of our physical milieu implies; but then death or illness are the penalty of our revolt.*43

Durkheim saw psychology as having a role in education. While history and pedagogy are the approaches that will allow an understanding of what outcomes education should head towards, psychology will allow an approach with which those ends can be sought whilst recognising an individual's learning needs.

... in order that this ideal may become a reality, it remains necessary to mold the conscience of the child to it... it is up to psychology, and more specifically, child psychology... And since no method can be applied in the same fashion to different children, it is psychology, too, that should help us to cope with the diversity of intelligence and character.44

Durkheim envisaged the development of another and particular type of psychology, in its infancy in his time and that would be most applicable to classroom education considered as a small-scale example of wider society. In the societal microcosm of the classroom, students take on beliefs and sentiments not found in

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individuals considered in isolation. Classrooms seen as collectivities can produce morbid and beneficial excitement. Teachers must have tools at their disposal which allow them to capitalise on the latter and avoid the former. That is psychology's role in education for Durkheim.45

Durkheim viewed educational institutions as socially disciplined, small-scale examples of society and though acknowledging that psychology, 'the science of the individual',46 has a part in informing pedagogy, also saw a definitive role for sociology in education

. . . because the ends of education are social, the means by which these ends can be attained must necessarily have the same character . . . One can foresee, then, what sociology, the science of institutions, contributes to our understanding of what pedagogical institutions are or to our conjectures on what they should be. The better we understand society, the better shall we be able to account for all that happens in that social microcosm that the school is.47

Durkheim's reflections on education in early twentieth century France, appear as relevant to the discipline at the turn of the twentieth century in Aotearoa/New Zealand, such as when he claimed:

The profound transformations which contemporary societies have undergone or which they are in process of undergoing, necessitate corresponding transformations in the national education. But although we may be well aware that changes are necessary, we do not know what they should be. Whatever may be the private convictions of individuals of factions, public opinion remains undecided and anxious. The pedagogical problem is, then, posed for us with greater urgency . . . 48

Social facts are socially sourced. Society and not individuals are the central matter to understand social facts. Psychological and economic views will not
provide true knowledge of the meanings, beliefs, emotions, and ideas. Social forces of which people are only partially conscious, impose themselves on people. The study of social facts, even where they affect individual's thoughts and actions, to be true and accurate, for Durkheim, must be undertaken by way of sociological research. Education and language are social facts. Education reflects the wider society and the specific milieu in which it takes place. Teachers need sociology to understand what needs to be taught.

Durkheim's argument was that social facts have the power of force, getting into people in society, compelling and constraining them in a way not to be confused with how persons' minds psychologically control them. Social facts are socially sourced for Durkheim, who delineated them from psychological facts. Durkheim rejected the idea that the psychological could explain the social. Durkheim did not reject psychology completely in the study of social facts, but did argue that sociologists should study psychology only for the purposes of understanding the effect of society on individuals' minds. Education is a social fact reflecting wider society and sociology must guide education with regard to what students need to learn.
Collective representations

This chapter concerning collective representations notes the relation and distinction made by Durkheim between individual persons’ representations and those of society - those that are collective. Collective representations significantly impact on people, and were for Durkheim the explanation for behaviour, as opposed to for instance, a purely biologically viewed, inherited explanation for behaviour. Society raises people up from their being only self-interested. Society is embedded in and has the moral power to raise individuals above themselves. A sense of social belonging was very important for Durkheim, who saw representations of the family with its associated power through bonding and feelings as protecting people from becoming detached and self-destructive. However, collective representations can be both beneficial and harmful. Durkheim pointed to history as a source of knowledge regarding harmful representations in social and historical contexts. Social hardships can also align society around representations of nationhood and solidarity.

Durkheim saw private property as a collective representation, sourced in history and the sacred. The social contract was an historical event resulting from the decline of religion and emerging individual rights, where the religious representations of the sacred were conferred onto the idea of the human person with rights and responsibilities.

Durkheim's relation of what he believed were sentiments and ethics in collective representations related to intellectual matters and science will be explained, as will Durkheim’s criticisms of the disarrayed situation he saw in the social sciences in his time.

Durkheim’s view of the importance of a common education to impart collective representations will be explained. Durkheim rejected extreme parental choice in education for going against collective representations. But nor did Durkheim believe that the State could perfect representations for society. Teachers play an important role in society for Durkheim, in having to be alive to societal collective representations to pass onto their students. In modern society collective representations are secular and scientific but still sourced in tradition, history and religion.

When Durkheim discussed collective representations he was demonstrating his view of how a socially based and socially prioritised society interacts with individual people's feelings and thoughts regarding it, other people and themselves. Collective representations are formed in culture, history and society. They are greater and more powerful than individuals’ representations. By interacting with
others, individuals, for Durkheim, are involved in a context that cannot be captured by reference to participating persons' individual representations. The interactions create powerful social forces. When historicised and culturally contextualised, these forces could for Durkheim be seen as made up of ideas and sentiments.

If one can say that, to a certain extent, collective representations are exterior to individual minds, it means that they do not derive from them as such but from the association of minds, which is a very different thing. No doubt in the making of the whole each contributes his part, but private sentiments do not become social except by combination under the action of the sui generis forces developed in association. In such a combination, with the mutual alterations involved, they become something else. A chemical synthesis results which concentrates and unifies them. Since this synthesis is the work of the whole, its sphere is the whole. The resultant surpasses the individual as the whole the part. It is in the whole as it is by the whole. In this sense it is exterior to the individuals. No doubt each individual contains a part, but the whole is found in no one.49

Durkheim rejected genetic arguments for individual behaviour, rather, Durkheim saw socially generated ideas and feelings - collective representations, as what is passed from one generation to the next, arguing "... only very general, very vague dispositions, expressing the characteristics common to all individual experiences, can survive and pass from one generation to another."50 Society in general is responsible for making people more fully developed, as if left to their own devices, people could only act in a self-interested way. In considering the collective

... it is society, indeed, that draws us out of ourselves, that obliges us to reckon with other interests than our own, it is society that has taught us to control our passions, our instincts, to prescribe law for them, to subordinate our personal ends to higher

ends. As for the whole system of representation which maintains in us the idea and the sentiment of rule, of discipline, internal as well as external - it is society that has established it in our consciences.\(^{51}\)

Durkheim explained what he believed was the influence of collective representations with regard to individual and social creation and illness. Durkheim believed that collective representations of decay and destruction could be related to suicide historically, pointing to for instance Roman, Greek and Ottoman societies as well as France prior to the Revolution, all which experienced increased suicides when they became politically ruptured and decadent.\(^ {52}\) Collective representations can also be benign. Some national and political crises bond society by enhancing socially shared ideas of patriotism, nationalism and society. Such collective representations are able to make society more cohesive and united.\(^ {53}\) Married men commit suicide a third less than single men, that number dropping to a half when having children.\(^ {54}\)

Durkheim viewed private property as sourced in collective representations of religion, the sacred, and the taboo with regard to land. Durkheim explained and critiqued Kant's view of self and property as a space-time battle between the sacrosanctity of the noumenally objective, and the simpler phenomenal thought of temporality, where anyone's objective will is expressed in justly made claims to property in a context where all people can trust that others will respect one's property as one does that of others.\(^ {55}\) Durkheim also saw labour as an insufficient source of justification for property, because, Durkheim argued, values are socially constructed,\(^ {56}\) and where it is society's opinions, diversities, accidents and fortuities, and not just an individual's work, that mostly constitute property.

The contract proper was for Durkheim a result of the decline in the importance of religion, accompanied in time by the emergence of individual rights. The solemn oath lost its social importance as related to religious ideas which were less socially meaningful. However, remaining socially entrenched, the ideas of sacredness sourced in religion remained, if converted, as a societal influence suited to the needs of the new increasingly secular context, which although deriving its

meaning from religion came to have a sacred conception of people, with rights, desires and duties, all implicit within the concept of the contract proper.

Had it not been for the existence of the contract by solemn ritual, there would have been no notion of the contract by mutual consent. . . If we are to understand this new form of contract, we cannot proceed from the nature of the will of the words that declare it: there is nothing in the word to bind the individual pronouncing it. The binding force, the action, are supplied from without. It is the religious beliefs that brought about the synthesis; once formed, other causes sustained it, because it served a purpose.57

Collective representations, for Durkheim, also affect intellectual life, as thought is influenced by ideas and feelings that are a central part of the society of scholarship. For Durkheim these representations should be recognised as delineated from, but central to what are the facts revealed through science.

Along side of this actual, realized science, there is another, concrete and living, which is in part ignorant of itself, and yet seeks itself; besides acquired results, there are hopes, habits, instincts, needs, presentiments so obscure that they cannot be expressed in words, yet so powerful that they sometimes dominate the whole life of the scholar. All this is still science; it is even its best and largest part, for the discovered truths are a little thing in comparison with those which remain to be discovered. Moreover, in order to possess a good idea of the first and understand what is found condensed therein, one must have been close to scientific life while it was still in a free state; that is to say, before it became fixed in the form of definite propositions. Otherwise, one will have the letter, but not the spirit. Each science has, so to speak, a soul which lives in the conscience of scholars.58

When intellectual communities set up barriers between their discipline and those of others and are orientated in different directions, they are disjunctive and in a state of agitation. Durkheim argued for a position that embraced interdisciplinary relations between academic professions. Anarchical intellectualism was the result of conflictual representations in this area of society as

\[ \ldots \text{the jurist, the psychologist, the anthropologist, the economist, the statistician, the linguist, the historian, proceed with their investigations as if the different orders of fact they study constituted so many independent worlds.}^{59} \]

Collective representations are also important in education. Despite recognising that people come from various backgrounds, Durkheim believed that a common education is needed.

\[ \text{There is no people among whom there is not a certain number of ideas, sentiments and practices which education must inculcate in all children indiscriminately, to whatever social category they belong \ldots}^{60} \]

Durkheim discussed the role that the State has in education, believing that parents should have the option of choosing private or public education, the State, stepping in where parents neglect their responsibilities, but not being permitted to impose particular ideas in the way for instance Durkheim viewed some of his contemporaries’ educational approaches purported they should. Searching for a position between coercive and freely chosen or what would today be called totalitarian and libertarian education respectively, Durkheim argued that without being impositional, the State has a positive role in ensuring that there is something of a general education provided for all children, as

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its role need hardly remain so negative. If, as we have tried to establish, education has a collective function above all, if its object is to adapt the child to the social milieu in which he is destined to live, it is impossible that society not have a part in it, since it is the reference point by which education must direct its action? It is, then, up to the State to remind the teacher constantly of the ideas, the sentiments that must be impressed upon the child to adjust him to the milieu in which he must live . . .61

While rejecting the idea that individual representations regarding free choice held to by parents or students should be given priority, Durkheim also believed that the State and teachers act unjustly and without authority when attempting to themselves construct the beliefs of students. Collective representations are the products of society - not, the products of individuals or institutions. Rather, individuals and institutions carry the collective representations of society.

It is not, indeed, up to the State to create this community of ideas and sentiments without which there is no society; it must be established by itself, and the State can only consecrate it, maintain it, make individuals more aware of it . . . and the teacher is remiss in his duties when he uses the authority at his disposal to influence his pupils in accordance with his own preconceived opinions, however justified they may appear to him.62

In addressing collective representations imparted through education, Durkheim made an analogy between the teacher and the priest. It is clear that for Durkheim, the teacher must modestly but authoritatively divine the moral character of society and pass it onto students.

The lay teacher . . . is the agent of a great moral person who surpasses him: it is society . . . the teacher is the interpreter of the great moral ideas of his time and of his country. Let him be attached to these ideas, let him feel all their grandeur, and the authority which is in them, and of which he is aware, cannot fail to be communicated to his person and to everything that emanates from him. Into an authority which flows from such an impersonal source there could enter no pride, no vanity, no pedantry. It's made up entirely of the respect which he has for his functions and, if one may say so, for his office. It is this respect which, through word and gesture, passes from him to the child.\textsuperscript{83}

Collective representations guide and shape people and groups. Collective representations are sourced in history and culture. Individuals are too indeterminate to provide an explanation for the source for collective representations. Collective representations explain the sentiments and beliefs in science, education, the State, private property, individual rights and the social contract. Collective representations reform and shift, changing as they interact and as society changes. Collective representations can be beneficial or dangerous, depending on the state of society in which they occur. When collective representations are in disorder, intellectual thought and disciplines are similarly disordered. In times of social upheaval, created by, for instance war, however, sentiments and ideas can form powerful bonds between people who work for the good of all. To understand collective representations, society must be looked to. The State has a role of instituting collective representations and teachers much discern and pass them onto students. The modern State has a role in instituting collective representations and teachers have an important role of discerning and passing on collective representations.

\textsuperscript{83} Durkheim, E. (1922, 1956). Education and Sociology. p.89.
The cult of the individual

Durkheim saw the concept of the cult as arising in different cultures and in different periods of their history. Cults are used by societies to shape individuals according to the demands of the social context. Societal cults can also be mistaken. Durkheim, looking to European history, identified the Renaissance in particular as a period wherein the intellectual cult tended towards embracing infinitiy. Durkheim also looked at his own context, discerning mistaken cults there too. In that last regard, Durkheim particularly criticised the subjectivist cults in utilitarianism and pragmatism.

Durkheim saw the cult of the individual as the true and benign cult for his social context and as an historical product of socially sourced religious sentiments and ideas imparted to the concept of the human person as a sacred representation. The cult of the individual, for Durkheim, holds society together in an historical context where people have little else in common due to the diversity in modernity. Durkheim criticised Kant for having a natural view of human rights. For Durkheim the rights of the individual are social products and the subject of a cult, which gives people claims to dignity and fairness.

The cult of the individual is an historical product of the emergent situation where groups and families can no longer provide people with a cult that suits the new social context, which Durkheim observed in his time. The concept of private property was invested with society’s view of the sacred also attached to individuals in society. But this, for Durkheim, did not mean that people have exclusive claims to their property. Society, which is the source of that concept and what maintains it, can make claims to having rights to some property as well.

Durkheim believed that the State had a pivotal purpose of ensuring that the cult of the individual, rather than traditional or excessively individualistic versions of the self and society is enacted. A strong State was needed to ensure Durkheim’s cult of the individual. However, Durkheim also believed that the State was so big, powerful and spread out throughout society, that individual people who attempted to approach it alone are most often overcome and powerless against it. In seeking to mediate the State’s power in this historically necessary relationship between individuals and the State, Durkheim proposed that collective delegated social groups something like workers guild groups of the past, and which Durkheim called the "corporation", should be recovered and reinvigorated for the purposes of this communication between individuals and the State to ensure the individualistic cult's realization and maintenance.
Durkheim pointed to the importance of education in ensuring that the cult of the individual was central to a society with a specialised division of labour and massive differences between people. Durkheim believed that people needed something to share with others in such a society. The cult which education imparts, was meant to provide that collective property. Also as part of the cult of the individual, education must also respond to the individual personalities that emerge in such a social context. Teachers must be cognizant of the specific personalities of individual students created by this context and teach them in accord with those individualities, if the cult of the individual is to be maintained. Looking to individuals was not the source of understanding or realising the cult of the individual. Rather, for Durkheim, the individual is found by looking to history and culture, as properties of individuals are variously formed there.

Durkheim held to a complex view of the individual. The cult of the individual is the representation for a benign modern society. Durkheim distinguished that cult – that collective representation, from other cults historically and similarly egoistic representations in contemporary times that created selfish cults.

There is not a single thing that can be identified as 'the individual' for Durkheim. Rather, the 'individual' of modernity is a collective representation, and product of the social fact of increased diversity in society. Traditional societies also had versions of the individual. Durkheim did argue that the modern western individual is an advance on traditional societies, in that the individual is invested with greater respect than in earlier times or different cultures. However, Durkheim argued that by examining traditional cultures, complex forms of thinking are identifiable there, just as they are in modern societies. Sometimes traditional cultures have richer understandings of humanity than those held by modern science, which can overlook the complexities in traditional societies' thought. In this regard, Durkheim argued

\[ \ldots \text{the truth is that if, in our attempt to form a picture of man as he really is, we concentrate solely on one particular and allegedly superior people, our view of man becomes severely narrow and distorted. } \ldots \text{In the myths, legends and skills of even the most primitive peoples there are involved highly complex mental processes, which sometimes shed more light on the mechanisms of the human mind than the more} \]
Durkheim identified different cults of knowledge historically. For instance, in referring to the bookish and dialectically determined knowledge of the Middle Ages, Durkheim did not reject the intellectualism of the Middle Ages on the grounds that books and argumentation therein were misguided. Rather, in that 'cult of the book', Durkheim argued, the only way to determine truth, was through reading and using the information gained through doing so, then confronting others over their opinions. That cult was relevant and relative to its historical period. Durkheim commented on the transition between that Scholasticism and the Renaissance, where formally the book and dialectical argument based on it were revered in the form of a 'cult', sanctified and special. In the Renaissance, however, there was the emergence of the idea of the 'Thing' behind the book. Durkheim argued that in the Renaissance, "... there appears for the first time the idea of a new kind of curriculum whose object will be not to train the mind in formal intellectual acrobatics, but rather to nourish it, to enrich it, to give it some substance." However so it might have been a step forward in ascertaining the truth in concrete social contexts, the Renaissance, for Durkheim typified in Rabelais' thought, led to a new cult that was an anomic desiring of the infinite - and unrealisable.

Durkheim also was concerned about infinite seeking cults in his own time. In this way Durkheim's benign cult of the individual can be distinguished from other cults, such as that of utilitarianism which Durkheim criticised for being an 'egoistic cult of the self'. Durkheim also argued that pragmatism was an infinite seeking cult, opposite to that of seeking the truth in the historicised sense that sociology did. Durkheim saw pragmatism and sociology as sharing a belief in the attempt to 'soften' Truth, which had been seen as set by classical rationalist thought. Sociology, for Durkheim, approaches this issue by seeing human life as a becoming of people in history which has no start or end, where everything that is social, including human truth, is constructed by people, and where the imperatives and classifications central to reason itself are a product of history. But Durkheim was

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critical of pragmatism's starting with the concept of action by individuals to explain this becoming and softening approach to the truth.

Pragmatism, in fact, claims to explain truth psychologically and subjectively. However, the nature of the individual is too limited to explain by itself alone all things human. . . How could reason, in particular, have developed in the course of the experiences undergone by a single individual? Sociology permits us broader explanations. For it, truth, reason and morality are the results of a becoming that covers the entire unfolding of human history.69

Durkheim noted that all pragmatists see intellectual and lived experiences as entwined. In the pragmatism of James there is a link between the logical and the psychological. For Durkheim, pragmatists " . . . refuse to separate these two sciences."70 Durkheim noted that was a view shared by Dewey, but to a lesser extent, as Dewey, for Durkheim, saw the need for the personal to be somewhat managed. For Durkheim, individual feelings and what is useful, are what is true in pragmatism. Durkheim implied that this essentially profanes the truth by basing it on both the individual and utility, ignoring the constraining and collective aspects of the truth. Pragmatism, for Durkheim, took relativism too far by individualising truth. Sociology has a relativising analysis too, but it is one that accepts the historical relevance of thinking and institutions of former times, and, the way in which diversity allows different people to see parts of what is, in contemporary times, a complex truth.71 Pragmatism, however, collapses all truth into individuals and utility, such that Durkheim concluded that " . . . the proposition that the useful is the true is a formula that brings us back to utilitarianism. The pragmatist theory of truth is a logical utilitarianism."72

In what would appear to be an implicit reference to his notion of the cult of the human being, human person, man, or individual, Durkheim noted that the idea

of the sacred human, as what is shared by all people and to be relieved of suffering, in modernity, is the historically specific representation developed out of earlier conceptions of the sacred being expressed in collective societal worship and protection of religious deities, and collective sentiments of the family and political groupings. Rights of persons are carried by the cult of the individual.

To emphasise the social source of this cult, in reference to Kant, Durkheim rejected arguments for natural rights derived from human nature. Human rights, for Durkheim are sourced in societies' apprehensions of what people are - conceptions that are constituted in culture and history. Durkheim believed that the increased importance of the human being in society is evidenced in the reduced rates of homicide. Further, in critically interpreting the labour-mixed-with-material arguments justifying some claim to products of that labour as a view which is shared by both classical economists and socialists, Durkheim saw little in the premise for this justification, quoting J.S. Mill with regard to the former approach and its view of rights to ownership, noting that age, rationality, and competency based legal exclusions to the rights to one's property and inheritance are historically constructed. Durkheim believed that strictly speaking, the labour-ownership argument was incorrect, arguing that people, as owing and sometimes having to sacrifice their lives to society, have obligations to relinquish some of their private property for the collective. "The cult of the human person in no wise excludes the possibility of such obligations." But Durkheim was not denying the importance of private property in modern societies. On the contrary, for Durkheim, private property was inextricably bound up with the individualism of such societies. Having a religious basis reflecting the needs of societies historically, the notion of respect for private property, had for Durkheim come to be closely associated with respect for individuals' dignity, liberty and personhood contemporarily.

*Individualism would be no more than a name if we had not some physical sphere of action within which we could exercise a kind of sovereignty. When we say that individual property is a sacred thing, we do no more than state in symbolic form a moral axiom*

that cannot be gainsaid, for the cult of the individual depends absolutely upon it.\textsuperscript{79}

Durkheim claimed that the State's purpose is to organise society around developing ensuring the idea of, respect for, and morality of, the individual as a sort of secular societal religion.\textsuperscript{80} The expansion of State is the collective manifestation of society's movement towards respecting people's individual rights. The two are bound up together. For Durkheim, if the individual is to be empowered with the sanctity of a secular cult, the State also has to expand.

\textit{We can understand that the functions of the State may expand, without any diminishing of the individual. We can see too that the individual may develop without causing any decline of the State, since he would be in some respects the product himself of the State, and since the activity of the State would in its nature be liberating to him. Except for the abnormal cases . . . the stronger the State, the more the individual is respected.}\textsuperscript{81}

Durkheim alluded to his concept of the cult of the human person as the educational ethic to represent the collectively sourced individualistic nature of modernity. Equality involved ensuring that all people learnt to respect the sanctity of the notion of the individual. The secret, Durkheim believed was to ensure that individuals are respected without lapsing into 'particularism' where individuals live in atomistic social groups.\textsuperscript{82} It would be a mistake to interpret Durkheim as taking a simple or mostly individualised view of learning. Durkheim rejected Mill, Herbart, Kant and Spencer for assuming that education was an individualised matter of developing generalisable human tendencies through an education applicable to all cultural and historical contexts.\textsuperscript{83} Durkheim viewed individual's learning as driven by their social and historical context. Appealing to history, believing that every society expresses the need to inculcate its ideas into its people, Durkheim argued

that modern education should look to society and not individuals as the source of the cult of the human person as an educational need.84

However, Durkheim recognised that individual difference is the product of modernity and argued that education needed to recognise the diversity in people’s individual learning needs. For education to be successful, teachers need to be able to critically look at their students, reflect on their observations and find ways of teaching that foster and cater to, the various differences that appear between students.

Indeed, once the individual personality has become an essential element of the intellectual and moral culture of humanity, the educator should take into account the germ of individuality that is in each child. He should seek to foster its development by all possible means. Instead of applying to all, in an invariable manner, the same impersonal and uniform set of rules, he should, on the contrary, vary and diversify his methods according to temperaments and the configuration of each intelligence.85

The cult of the individual is a product of society and culture, it is not found by referring to individual people. Durkheim believed that every culture has a view of the individual that creates people, and believed that modernity had produced a new sort of individual. That view of a person, that cult, invested with sacred power is one cult that can be identified historically. Cults can be positive or negative. Durkheim sought to institute the cult of the individual - the collective representation for modernity, by way of the expanded State, education, and the corporation.

Anomie

This chapter regarding anomie begins by explaining Durkheim's view of anomie and social change with regard to Durkheim's fourfold typology of fatalistic, altruistic, anomic and egoistic, moralities driving different societies, the people therein and their suicidal tendencies. Durkheim identified two sorts of societies. Pre modern 'mechanical' societies are notable for exhibiting little division of labour and their predominant types of suicide noted therein are those of fatalism, where people take their lives due to experiencing excessive regulation, realising their despotic and ultimately diminutive living conditions will not change, and altruism, where one's life is not valued compared to the importance of the group. Modern, for Durkheim, 'organic' societies with an advanced division of labour mostly exhibit anomie and egoism as societal tendencies and those two types of suicide result from there being little control over people the lack of integrating groups respectively. Modern societal anomie and egoism further erodes the collective unison of people's thinking. Durkheim called this the 'collective consciousness', which is strong in and central to fatalistic and altruistic mechanical societies, making people feel as if they belong and are obliged to things outside themselves. In organic societies, however, people are infinitely freer to pursue their own wishes, and their individuality which should be expressed in the modern collective consciousness as the unifying cult of the individual, but which is weaker than its premodern form, resulting in excessive individualism. For Durkheim that situation creates a dangerous cult of the self, which leads to the pathologies of egoism and anomie, most notable in suicides orientated by those tendencies.

Modern society, which frees individual people, also gives them the impression that anything is possible. This notion of the infinite is central to anomie. Durkheim was critical of the concept of the infinite, which has variously arisen in history. Durkheim distinguished between people who push for needed social change and those who go too far in seeking the infinite. For instance, Durkheim saw the status and praise seeking educational approach of doing as one wished in the Renaissance as anomie. Anomie has also been countered historically when opposed by representations that collectivise. Durkheim implied that the Jesuits countered Renaissance anomie by establishing a religious and also an intellectual and social corporation.

The infinite works against society, it leads to greed, excesses, and intemperance. Durkheim saw anomie particularly in the unmoderated economics of his time, which for Durkheim lacked an ethics, other than that of selfishness. Durkheim saw the State as having a role in protecting from the anomie in
economics. Seeing the State as having a positive role to play here, Durkheim rejected the shrinking of the State and budgets where the State is viewed as ideally pursuing a negative role. Durkheim envisaged that to counter anomie in society, the State would, like its budgets, have to expand and act positively.

As well as being present in economics, anomie is present in politics. Durkheim viewed the State as having to be free of the immediate wishes of the people. The State needs to contemplate issues over time before acting. The problematic relationship between the power of the State and the individual, who is also subject to desires with regard to democracy could be addressed, Durkheim believed, by way of corporate and regional groups through which voting would be enacted and passed on. Durkheim distinguished his view of the State from socialist and classical economic positions in being neither merely a part of economic functioning, or a do-nothing observer of economics respectively. Rather for Durkheim, the State was viewed as justified in intervening in, and communicating between the parts of society responsible for economics.

Durkheim believed that the corporation would put collective ethics into economics, by imposing on people the importance of their obligations to others, and would be responsible for providing extra-work activities such as those related to the arts, to imbue people with a greater sense of belonging, as opposed to the encroaching sense of anomie in society.

From mechanical to organic solidarity

To distinguish anomie, Durkheim argued that a fourfold typology in social formations is identifiable. In this sense Durkheim delineated fatalism and altruism as manifestations of traditional, or what he called mechanical societies, whereas egoism and anomie are more identifiable in modern, or what Durkheim called mechanical societies. Egoism will subsequently be explained in a separate chapter, but it should not be considered as severed conceptually from anomie, as the two tendencies coexist in modernity. Although centrally explaining anomie at this point there will be passing references to the concept of egoism. In this sense, it is requested that the reader bears with this situation until the following focus on and exposition of egoism.

Anomie for Durkheim was a malaised, anarchic and effervescent immorality that affected what he called organic societies, identified by having an advanced division of labour. Durkheim argued that in earlier societies, the community had been held together by imposing stringent limits on its members’ freedom. People were constantly subjected to the authority of that group. Durkheim called those
groupings mechanical societies. Durkheim, in discussing mechanical and organic societies, made what is a famous link between socially generated suicide and social change. Durkheim interpreted suicide as historically constantly occurring and socially driven and evidence of the particular type of morality that drove industrial society. Without the social restraint that kept suicide rates down in earlier societies, industrial society potentially presented a context for more pathology and suicide.

Discussing earlier restrictive and repressive mechanical societies, Durkheim saw two societal tendencies that drove people to commit suicide. One version was fatalistic suicide, whereby people's lack of individual freedom meant that they destroyed themselves in depression and fatalism. Fatalistic suicide is the suicide of, for instance, the slave who takes their life in resignation to their subjection. In another vein, altruistic suicide is observable in moderately repressive societies, taking place when the pressure to conform is so strong, that people see their lives as expedient to the cause or belief they are socially immersed in. The altruistic suicide destroys themselves willingly, with a sense of exertion, conviction and zeal. The Hindu widow who becomes sati: through ritually committing suicide by throwing herself on her husband's funeral pyre, is an example Durkheim noted. Durkheim did not see altruistic suicide taking place often in modern society, other than in repressive contexts like the armed forces.

The specialisation of labour through industrialisation and the resulting move to organic society had changed the types of suicide. By breaking down the traditional connections between individuals and organisational structures like the Church and feudal lords, variations in lifestyles challenged the shared behaviours of the group as in mechanical societies and became instrumental in forming qualitatively different connections between people. That new functional interdependence under a specialised division of labour created a new, organic society. The interdependence of organic society, in Durkheim's mind, required that its members share a group of ideas so they would adhere to the new grouping's moral rules. Durkheim called that shared motive the collective conscience.

Durkheim believed that the cult of the individual would replace earlier mechanical

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societal forms of the collective conscience. But anomie stood in the way of this new cult.

In society, human consciousness's duality of ideas and sentiments are enacted. The ideational, in representational insignia and anthems, and the affective through the emotions, interact to provide a foundation of unity in society. The collective conscience was for Durkheim a super-ethereal part of society which bound people to adhere to the rules of their society. As a higher conscience that holds people to their social obligations, the collective conscience was more forceful in simpler mechanical societies. Nonetheless, Durkheim saw it as an essential, if diminished motive in industrial society, not to promote a movement back to the type of authority of earlier European and other mechanical societies, but to show that there was no denying the moral domination of a given society, as to do so would be to deny society and oneself. Durkheim believed that recognising the cult of the individual was recognising self and society in its organic form. Durkheim believed that the ideal of the dignity of the individual is the collective consciousness of modern society, which although is weaker than in traditional societies, at the same time leads to deep sense of society wherein the division of labour is central in its exhibiting a centrally sociological as opposed to economic affect on society.

Anomie is the barrier that along with egoism holds back the cult of the individual. Changes in society such as that Durkheim argued existed in the move from mechanical to organic society, bring forth the idea that there are no limits to what can be attained. In such a context people are without discipline, they cannot be satisfied, they do not feel the authority that morality had earlier imposed.

The notion of the infinite, then, appears only at those times when moral discipline has lost its ascendancy over man's will. It is the sign of the attrition that emerges during periods when the moral system prevailing for several centuries, is shaken, failing to respond to new conditions of human life, and without

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any new system yet contrived to replace that which has disappeared.  

Durkheim argued that without limits being realised in people, without a disciplined, and tempered approach to the physical and social worlds, people and society lapses into what appears to be attractive, but which is really anomie.

If such limits are lacking, if the moral forces surrounding us can no longer contain or moderate our passions, human conduct - being no longer constrained - loses itself in the void, the emptiness of which is disguised and adorned with the specious label the infinite.

Anomie and the intellect in history

Durkheim distinguished between a justified push for social change seen in figures like Christ and Socrates, both who severely questioned authority, and anomie in arguing that "... the former is natural, healthy, and fruitful; the latter is always abnormal since it prompts us to alienate ourselves from the basic conditions of life."  

For Durkheim anomie is a social state that can appear in various historical periods. Durkheim seemed to conclude that people in the Renaissance lived an intellectually immoral life, stating: "... it is beyond dispute that at this period we can see a kind of general enfeeblement of moral feeling... for them the supreme goal was to possess a name which was upon everybody's lips."  

The Renaissance for Durkheim was not the flowering of the intellect and creation in the way it is depicted by most commentators. Durkheim held that the Renaissance was a period of immorality where people did as they wished, without moral restraint.

The anomie of the Renaissance was opposed by a new intellectual force represented by the Jesuits, who as a corporation in the middle of the sixteenth

century stood for the reinstallment of restraint on thought and interceded into university life, reimposing order.\textsuperscript{105}

\textit{Economic anomie}

Modern societal industrialisation whetted people's appetites. Driven by the idea of their being able to acquire more, they became increasingly competitive for the resources that had become available through greater specialisation, when in fact the interdependence that emerged made that greater effort unnecessary.\textsuperscript{106} The pursuit of more for itself was cutting people off from the reality of the world as a social entity, people were withdrawing from sociability, away from their true selves and into the intemperance of anomie. This was not for Durkheim a normal state of being in industrial society, but a diseased malformation of its true possibilities of integration and community.\textsuperscript{107}

Durkheim argued that business and industrial ethics were particularly anomie by comparison to those of the judiciary, law, military and church, in exhibiting "... imprecise. . . precepts . . . backed by public opinion and not by the law . . . {they are} . . . indulgent . . . almost arbitrary . . . for the most part removed from the moderating action of any rules."\textsuperscript{108} Durkheim believed that unregulated economic relations were a danger to society, as people's amoral activities in the public and economic spheres became learnt and seemingly unproblematic, spilling over into other aspects of life, debasing life, stripping it of its moral qualities and people's obligations to one another.

\textit{The functions of this order to-day absorb the energies of the greater part of the nation. The lives of a host of individuals are passed in the industrial and commercial sphere. Hence, it follows that, as those in this milieu have only a faint impress of morality, the greater part of their existence is passed divorced from any moral influence. How could such a state of affairs fail to be a source of demoralization? . . . Let us see, then, how the}

unleashing of economic interests has been accompanied by a debasing of public morality.109

Durkheim criticised economics for creating anarchical and warlike affects in society. “The feelings of general hostility and mutual distrust that result, as well as the tensions necessarily caused, become distressing conditions when they are endemic.”110 Arguing against laissez faire economics' lack of any rules or regulations, Durkheim believed that organic society had brought about the situation where people were less able to define the limits of anti-sociality, for instance

... amongst the classical economists it is because the economic functions were studied as if they were an end in themselves, without considering what further reaction they might have on the whole social order. ... But production is not all, and if industry can only bring its output to this pitch by keeping up a chronic state of warfare and endless dissatisfaction amongst the producers, there is nothing to balance the evil that it does.111

Anomie and the State

Durkheim believed that the State had a role to play in protecting people from the tyranny of anomie. Durkheim argued that the State must ensure that people’s human rights should be protected. However, Durkheim also rejected minimal state aims of a "negative justice"112 expressed by diverse commentators seeking individualistic policies and reduced budgets. Although acknowledging that budgets can be unfairly inflated, their expansion was for Durkheim to be expected.113

Durkheim’s position on the State differed from that of socialists and economists, in that the State, for Durkheim, was rightly embroiled centrally in issues of morality as opposed to equally shared economic well being and freemarket commerce, where for Durkheim the State’s work was to institute justice and rules in economic and industrial relationships.

. . . the State does not inevitably become either simply a spectator of social life (as the economists would have it), in which it intervenes only in a negative way, or (as the socialists would have it), simply a cog in the economic machine. It is above all, supremely the organ of moral discipline. It plays this part at the present time as it did formerly, although the discipline has changed. (Here we see the error of the socialists).\(^{114}\)

Durkheim was critical of democracy when it leads to excesses of diversity in society and chaotic, disruptive, and unstable politics, as society cannot develop under these superficial circumstances which are at base, anomic.\(^{115}\) The State must remain somewhat autonomous from its citizenry who might impose their superficial wishes upon it. However, the State must be in contact with individuals without exposing them to its power. Durkheim envisaged that two intermediary groups, one regionally constituted to elect members to political positions, and secondly, professional groups, might be able to play this role in democratically electing governments, arguing that

. . . *our political malaise is due to the same . . (cause) . . as our social malaise: that is, to the lack of secondary cadres to interpose between the individual and the State. We have seen that these secondary groups are essential if the State is not to oppress the individual: they are also necessary if the State is to be sufficiently free of the individual.*\(^{116}\)

*The corporation - a modern panacea for anomie*

The corporation or professional grouping was one of Durkheim’s solutions to economic, political and social anomie, as although opposing anomie requires a strong State, the State’s role in being the regulator in society is linked up with Durkheim’s advocacy of various collective representations, perhaps most importantly that of the cult of the human person - another arm to Durkheim’s solution for the problem. Durkheim believed that secondary groups interceding

between individuals and the State were needed to protect people from excesses of the State, which is so complex and large that it could not adequately mete out justice to all individuals. To ensure an unviolent moulding of individuality secondary groups, Durkheim claimed needed to be instituted, as

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\text{... if that collective force, the State, is to be the liberator of the individual, it has itself need of some counter-balance; it must be restrained by other collective forces, that is, by ... secondary groups ... It is not a good thing for the groups to stand alone, nevertheless they have to exist. And it is out of this conflict of social forces that individual liberties are born.}^{117}
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Durkheim argued that 'to be shot of anomie', society needed professional organisations, or corporations, responsible for ethics and regulation in the economic area to offset excessive competition. Durkheim admitted that economic groups got together for conferences, but criticised them for maintaining their unity only for the duration of their time together. Durkheim also critiqued unions for being private organisations unlinked with others, and by not having the authority of law, being only the most elementary form of the corporation where it is '... the law of the strongest that decides and disputes, and a state of out and out warfare prevails.'^{119}

Durkheim believed that ethically organised production would be needed regardless of whether the context was capitalist or communist. The latter approach, for Durkheim, missed the point in this regard through prioritising collective ownership as the first reform necessary in society where in fact

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\text{... this state of anarchy comes about not from this machinery being in these hands and not in those, but because the activity deriving from it is not regulated. And it will not be regulated, nor its moral standard raised, by any witchcraft. This control by rule and raising of moral standards can be established neither by the scientist in his study nor by the statesman; it has to be the task of the groups concerned. Since}
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these groups do not exist at the present time, it is of the greatest urgency that they be created. The other problems can only be usefully tackled after that.\footnote{120}

Noting the tendency of people to reject professional groups due to their drawbacks exhibited historically, Durkheim believed that corporate, guild or craft union models needed to be reworked if anomic factors in society were to be countered. Durkheim argued that professional groups must reflect ideas specific and relevant to each practice, imbuing members with those ethics, and, warned against their being spontaneously and unthoughtfully established or imposed by outside interests.\footnote{121} The family for Durkheim, does not have as much power as that lying in the possibility of the corporation, and observable as having been present in the guilds of the past. The corporation, in modernity would replace the historically important position of the family.

\textit{In emphasising this parallel, I do not, however, say that the guilds or association of the future should or could have this domestic character. It is obvious that the more they evolve the more they must develop original characteristics and the further they should get away from the antecedent groups for which they are in part the substitutes.}\footnote{122}

The corporations, as Durkheim envisaged them, would be responsible for providing activities like drama, music and further education outside work time for people to establish ". . . feelings of solidarity as well as a certain homogeneity of intellect and morals, such as that readily engendered by the exercise of the same profession."\footnote{123} Durkheim, in arguing that the obligations would differ in varying types of industries, saw the need for professional ethics as pivotal to a peaceable economic system.\footnote{124}

\footnote{120 Durkheim, E. ((1950) 1957). \textit{Professional Ethics and Civil Morals}. p.31.}
\footnote{121 Durkheim, E. ((1950) 1957). \textit{Professional Ethics and Civil Morals}. p.13.}
\footnote{122 Durkheim, E. ((1950) 1957). \textit{Professional Ethics and Civil Morals}. p.27.}
\footnote{123 Durkheim, E. ((1893) 1984). \textit{The Division of Labour in Society}. p.liii.}
Durkheim believed that his proposal for secondary, professional groups - that would temper individuals' and groups' anomic tendencies, bringing peace in economic affairs, would in turn make society in general more benign.

Anomie is a product of social change - the social fact of societal breakdown, intellectual thought and economics, where seeking the infinite becomes embedded. Durkheim identified anomie historically and in his contemporary society. Anomie is the product of the movement from organic to mechanical society wherein there is an increased division of labour. Anomie stood in the way of the cult of the individual. Anomie, Durkheim believed, could be identified in socialist and classical economic theories. Anomie also affects intellectual pursuits. The State has a responsibility to stand in and arrest anomie by putting rules in place that mediate group demands. Suicide is one indicator of anomie, another is increased differentiations of wealth and a lack of morals that guide economics. Durkheim saw the corporation as tempering anomie by representing people before the State and fostering morality in business and economics.
Egoism

Whereas anomie leads to infinite desires, egoism leads to infinite dreams. Durkheim saw the inclusion of people in integrating social groups as the way to avoid the selfishness and inwardness of egoism. Being included in integrating social groups strengthens, sustains and makes people feel as if they belong.

For Durkheim, egoism arises out of social change where morality is also in a state of flux and where existing institutions either, are not available or relevant enough for people to become a part of them, and are isolated as a result. Durkheim's view of the corporation as a solution to egoism will be explained as will Durkheim's attack on classical economists' rejection of the collective in this regard. Contrary to some popular conceptions, Durkheim believed that a strong sense of nationalism was not necessarily egoistic. Durkheim was critical of moves in his time to establish an international State, preferring to first focus on strengthening and stabilising the nation before moving into a phase of internationalism. However, Durkheim saw a strong State as necessary for combating egoism.

Egoistic suicide is discussed in connection with societies that do not integrate their members, and, Durkheim's identification of this being the case in modern, industrial, organic society. Durkheim sought to manage liberalism believing that if left unchecked it would lead to egoism and egoistic suicide and using history was very critical of the Renaissance educational approach and society itself as leading to increased egoism. In the Renaissance aristocratic life became available to a new class, that of the bourgeoisie. Renaissance society made people too dreamy, interested in the praise of others, but also, too free from them. Education has the important role of raising people above themselves and to realise their sociality.

Egoism and integration

Durkheim noted how the integration of people is the panacea for modern society where individualism has become excessive, people withdraw from social life, social institutions fail to provide quality contexts to integrate people, and an excessive individualism rules over members of the community.

The more weakened the groups to which he belongs, the less he depends on them, the more he consequently depends only on himself and
recognizes no other rules of conduct than what are founded on his private interests.  

When integrative, society operates cohesively through its shared understandings, responsibilities and freedoms. When not integrative, people have to depend on themselves and are weakened, as their ties with society are loosened. Durkheim sought to ensure that people become enmeshed in quality integrating contexts. Integration buttresses and enriches people. Durkheim believed that disrupted social habits and beliefs are the source of disharmony in modernity. Distinguishing between sharp changes which themselves increase societal egoism, and entrenched negative changes which separate people from their communities and society in a severe way, Durkheim was more concerned about the second of these sorts of changes. Entrenched excesses of individualism create entrenched egoism.

If these assertions occur not merely occasionally and as passing crises, but become chronic; if individual consciences keep reaffirming their autonomy, it is because they are constantly subject to conflicting impulses, because a new opinion has not been formed to replace the one no longer existing.

Egoism, politics and economics
Durkheim saw egoism as becoming reflected in politics where in modernity, people became more free and self-interested. Durkheim feared that anarchy would be created by a society that was subjected to the unending dreams of the masses. Durkheim proposed that the corporation could avoid egoistic democratic elections. The corporation, Durkheim believed, was needed to play a role in politics by avoiding the "individualistic particularism" resulting from an excessively individualist voting system. Durkheim was concerned that democracy would falter due to the input of the diverse interests of constituents and electors, who in their excessive individuation, were unfortunately often poorly informed, clouding the central societal

issues needing to be addressed by deputised representatives. With regard to political elections, Durkheim saw the need for secondary groups between voters and the State. Votes would be organised through the institution over time and after group deliberation. Durkheim sought to institute integration by way of the corporation so that people would not turn inward and egoistic.

*If each individual, independently, comes along with his vote to set up the State or the organs which are to serve in giving it definite form; if each one makes his choice in isolation, it is almost impossible for such votes to be inspired by anything except personal and egoistic motives.*\(^{128}\)

Durkheim questioned whether the confederation of European states being developed in his time would be able to truly capture human life as an internationalised State was intended. Instead, Durkheim argued for a more developed, peaceable nationality as the first step towards a further form of humanity. Building up national sentiments were important for international peace in Durkheim's mind, believing that international issues would loom larger as international cosmopolitanism expanded. The nation also needed to be more expansive to deal with that internationalisation.\(^{129}\)

Durkheim criticised the egoism of classical economists for seeing groups as opposite to individuals' true needs and wants. Egoism in economics can also lead to anarchy. To counter that Durkheim saw secondary corporate groups as fostering the sort of shared sentiments that Durkheim thought were central to morality and selfhood. "So it is a strangely superficial notion - this view of the classical economists, to whom all collective discipline is a kind of rather tyrannous militarisation."\(^{130}\)

**Egoistic suicide**

The egoism generated by a lack of integration removes people from being part of society and causes egoistic suicide

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So we reach the general conclusion: suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups of which the individual forms a part. If we agree to call this state egoism, in which the individual ego asserts itself to excess in the face of the social ego and at its expense, we may call egoistic the special type of suicide springing from excessive individualism.131

Societies that do not integrate their members, whether it is with regard to, for instance religion, politics or the family, leave people in a moral vacuum wherein suicide results. However, when society imposes the power of the collective through morality, people are better protected from possibly lapsing into egoism. For Durkheim, that was because

... as collective force is one of the obstacles best calculated to restrain suicide, its weakening involves a development of suicide. When society is strongly integrated, it holds individuals under its control, considers them at its service and thus forbids them to dispose wilfully of themselves. Accordingly it opposes their evading their duties to it through death.132

Industrial society, coupled with excessive individualism means people are more deeply hurt by their negative experiences. By comparison, when people are bonded to society, they are bonded to life.

For they cling to life more resolutely when belonging to a group they love, so as not to betray interests they put before their own. The bond that unites them with common cause attaches them to life and the lofty goal they envisage prevents their feeling personal troubles so deeply.133

Religion and egoism

Individualism, when taken to excess, for Durkheim, led to a world where people egoistically draw into themselves, questioning the purpose of their existence. This is just as much the case for the religiously tending person as any other, if their religion fails to integrate them. Without certainty, the religious person who is not integrated comes to question the meaning of their lives.

. . . the more the believer doubts, that is, the less he feels himself a real participant in the religious faith to which he belongs, and from which he is freeing himself; the more the family and community become foreign to the individual, so much the more does he become a mystery to himself, unable to escape the exasperating and agonizing question: to what purpose?134

Protestant life, free of stringent rituals and unquestioned commitment in the way other Judeo-Christian traditions demand, was for Durkheim both, an indication of the decreased social importance of those stringencies, and, an explanation of Protestant egoistic suicide. Suicide in that church was explained by Durkheim, who argued that “. . . the proclivity of Protestantism for suicide must relate to the spirit of free inquiry that animates this religion. . .”135

Historical egoism in society and the intellect

Education was fundamentally important for Durkheim, as it drags people from their individuality up to sociality, even if it is a difficult and even unenjoyable experience. Using the Renaissance example of Montaigne and the Epicurean education as the sort he opposed, Durkheim went on to argue that:

To learn to contain his natural egoism, to subordinate himself to higher ends, to submit his desires to the control of his will, to confine them

within proper limits, the child must exercise strong self-control.\textsuperscript{136}

Durkheim saw the Renaissance as generating a new class of the bourgeoisie who could for the first time live a life similar to that of the aristocracy. That social change, for Durkheim, led to egoism, as in the discovery of freedom there is the discovery of dreams of the infinite. Durkheim saw the humanism of the Renaissance as immoral and egoistic.

\textit{The humanist, the man of letters, thinks of little else other than being brilliant, being attractive, having his talents enjoyed and admired. He largely loses sight of himself. Before all else he is athirst for praise, and the love of praise is a narrowly egoistic sentiment.}\textsuperscript{137}

Durkheim argued that people's natures do not tend towards giving, selflessness and morality, believing, by implicitly referring to his notion of \textit{homo duplex}, that education's role is to impart sociality, and, responsibility to others. Education must add society and all that is better to the egoistic self which is the lower pole of human nature. People might have indeterminate inherited capacities, but in the main, for Durkheim, people are constituted by their society. Their society must instill moral tendencies for societal peace. This is a constant responsibility of education. Durkheim asserted all people need to be integrated to protect themselves and their society from lapsing into egoism, such that:

\textit{To the egoistic and asocial being that has just been born it must, as rapidly as possible, add another, capable of leading a moral and social life. Such is the work of education, and you can readily see its importance. It is not limited to developing the individual organism in the direction indicated by its nature, to elicit the hidden potentialities that need

only to be manifested. It creates in man a new being.\textsuperscript{138}

Egoism, along with anomie is part of the change from mechanical to organic society. Egoism reigns therein unless people are part of integrating social groups. When not so integrated, people are left to defend for themselves, they cannot, and instead lapse into a dreaming of the infinite and the special suicide which is egoistic. Integrating social groups protect people from egoism and suicide by strengthening people from excessive individualism. Durkheim believed people are born egoistic, they tend to the lower pole of human nature. Education must impose morals and obligations onto individuals who would otherwise tend to self-interest only. Durkheim saw nationalism which makes people feel as if they belong as a way to move towards internationalisation and cosmopolitanism. Entrenched excessive egoism cuts the meaning out from under people's lives, they are left isolated. The corporation, Durkheim believed, could protect and nourish people, as well as assist, inform and represent them with regard to democratic elections. Classical economics opposed collectivities, which for Durkheim, led to a deeper egoism. Religions can also foster egoism by not integrating their members, leaving them to dream of infinity which cannot be realised and results in suicide.

Implications
To conclude the series of chapters regarding Durkheim's concepts, it can quite accurately be said that Durkheim held to a very social and holistic view of society and education.

In explaining Durkheim's concepts of \textit{homo duplex}, social facts, collective representations, cult of the individual, anomie and egoism, the foundations have been set for the subsequent discussions and applications, which constitute the present study. Durkheim's concepts will be drawn on extensively in this undertaking.

Durkheim's concepts highlight a thinker who sought to institute sociological views as central to understanding society and education. Durkheim was not averse to other disciplines such as history, philosophy, the natural sciences, economics or psychology \textit{per se}. In fact Durkheim often drew on different disciplines to illustrate points. However, Durkheim was often highly critical of the ways those disciplines had developed and this is most evident in his references to the cases of economics and psychology. Durkheim critiqued both the left and the right where concerned

\textsuperscript{138} Durkheim, E. (\{1922\} 1956). \textit{Education and Sociology}. p.72.
with economics. Similarly with regard to psychology, Durkheim sought an approach that avoided the power of the masses and a psychology of the individual in the strictest sense.

Durkheim’s concepts were complex in the sense that they often convolved around some central themes. Morality, justice and authenticity as, rights and responsibilities in economics, politics and history, appear repeatedly in Durkheim’s work. Today these themes might be expressed as care, inclusion, values and equity. These themes, as will be shown particularly in the subsequent sections regarding gender and culture and thereafter, are very important for considering alcohol in society and education. However, Durkheim has also been criticised, again, as will be shown in the chapter concerned with critiquing Mestrovic.

I point, however, to the fact that Durkheim’s sociology is from the turn of the nineteenth century and this raises the issue of how relevant Durkheim is for studying contemporary issues regarding alcohol in society and education. Durkheim’s sociology is not, on its own, sufficient for this task. Durkheimian perspectives are the approach adopted for the present study. It is useful to utilise an approach that is influenced by Durkheim and applied to the contemporary context. The sociology of Stjepan Mestrovic is of interest in this regard. Mestrovic draws significantly on Durkheim’s sociology but also adapts Durkheim in two senses, by challenging the received view of Durkheim, and, by drawing on a number of other philosophies and social theories and applies that adapted Durkheimianism to the contemporary context. It is towards considering Mestrovic’s adaptation and application of Durkheim that the present study now turns.
These chapters are concerned with Mestrovic's adaptation and application of Durkheim's concepts, which Mestrovic has undertaken largely by way of the use of Schopenhauer. These chapters examine Mestrovic's sociology, outlining Mestrovic's view of Durkheim generally and subsequently explaining that view in series, focusing on each of the five Durkheimian concepts of *homo duplex*, social facts, collective representations, the cult of the individual, anomie and egoism. Mestrovic variously adapts Durkheim and applies Durkheim to contemporary social life and thought, finding the contexts wanting.

Mestrovic questioned the received view of Durkheim by focusing on the historic context in which Durkheim was situated, analysing that intellectual milieu's *fin de siècle* or end-of-the-century pessimist and anti-Enlightenment mood in which German Romanticism was influential at the end of the nineteenth century, and showing how that indirectly influenced Durkheim's thinking about modernity and society. Mestrovic also applied this approach critically to contemporary modern and postmodern social and theoretical contexts and discussions, in the development of a perspective that Mestrovic came to term 'postemotionalism'.

Postemotionalism is influenced by Durkheim, who Mestrovic believes has been very mistakenly received as a positivist and a functionalist who wished to change deviants so that they could fit into normal society. Mestrovic's assertion is that Durkheim was in a large part anti-positivistic and seriously questioned the benefits of Enlightenment. Rather, Mestrovic claims, Durkheim was influenced by the anti-positivist and anti-Enlightenment view of the German Romantic philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer viewed society and individuals as influenced by the 'will to life' – a force that animates all living things. Some criticisms of Schopenhauer will be noted, along with Mestrovic's defense of Schopenhauer with respect to those criticisms.

Mestrovic's extrapolation of the import of Schopenhauer for contemporary times will then be explained. Mestrovic applied Schopenhauer to the social sciences, their philosophies and their methods. Then, Mestrovic's comments on the critical implications of Schopenhauer's philosophy with regard to contemporary moral theory will be explained, as will Mestrovic's view that the heart should be reintroduced into social thought and society.

Mestrovic's investigations are mostly conceptual, but Mestrovic has also undertaken analysis of legislation and has used the methods of interview and participant observation to empirically apply his sociology to social phenomena.
Mestrovic’s sociological contribution of the concept of postemotionalism is important and also represents the culmination of a shift in emphasis in Mestrovic’s thinking – a shift that can be called one from sombre optimism to pessimism. This shift in emphasis is noted and discussed in the final subsection of the series of chapters concerned with explaining Mestrovic.

Explaining Mestrovic’s adaptation and application of Durkheim somewhat ‘updates’ Durkheim and provides a significant perspective for sociologically considering alcohol in society and education.
**Durkheim as a radical social theorist**

Mestrovic interpreted Durkheim as a more critical thinker than many previous readers, especially those of the Anglo Saxon origin who, Mestrovic argued, overlook Durkheim's actually very pessimistic views regarding industrialisation and modernity's possibilities. Focusing on Durkheim's irrationalist leanings, Mestrovic argued, allows a reevaluation of Durkheim's place as a critic of economic activities and crises, and their anomic effects on diverse social institutions and people within society.

Mestrovic has argued that Durkheim offered a radically critical view of society. For Mestrovic, understanding Durkheim in this way entails contextualising Durkheim’s thought in terms of his cultural milieu and the nineteenth century fin de siècle or end of the century pessimism that animated European intellectuals and artists who were enamored by the philosophy of the early nineteenth century German philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer. Mestrovic believed that, so interpreted, Durkheim’s thought can be applied to contemporary individuals and society and Durkheim’s relevance for social theory can be reevaluated.

Mestrovic’s interpretation of Schopenhauer’s influence on Durkheim has further relevance than to Durkheim’s significance for social theory generally, society and individuals, as Mestrovic’s sociology is itself animated by a Schopenhauerian-Durkheimian orientation.

Mestrovic drew on Schopenhauer’s concept of the will to life – a force in nature, people and society and in being the other side of the idea or representation. Mestrovic also looked to the will and idea reflected in the distinction of the heart from the mind, where the mind has come to dominate in Enlightenment thinking and the heart has been ignored by comparison.

Schopenhauer was a pessimist who believed that the will means that all living beings suffer. Whilst lauding compassion as a goal, Schopenhauer did not think it could be simply taught and Mestrovic believed that such ideas influenced Durkheim, evidenced from his 1885 early postgraduate student study in Germany. Durkheim, Mestrovic believed, can be better understood as influenced by Schopenhauer as part of his intellectual context.

Working from that understanding, Mestrovic believed that Durkheim’s constant use of the notion of representations could be better apprehended by seeing Durkheim’s application of the ‘will’ from Schopenhauer, termed differently and manifested in Durkheim’s views of constraint, collective conscience, society and the division of labour. Mestrovic believed the influence of Schopenhauer is
particularly notable in Durkheim’s references to anomie, which Mestrovic claimed appear almost to mirror Schopenhauer’s references to the will.

Durkheim’s alleged Schopenhauerianism makes intelligible Durkheim’s gloomy predictions for increased societal unhappiness, inductive research method and the importance of morality. Furthermore, with regard to current times Mestrovic noted that the mind has come to dominate over the heart and that rationalistic views are entrenched at the expense of the heart. This orientation is apparent in social scientific and moral theorising as well as methodologies for studying phenomena. With regard to politics and society, mind orientated approaches have dominated such that the Holocaust occurred and where today’s postmodern culture embraces a cruel orientation due to following the dictates of Nietzsche and attendant rejections of the possibility of compassion.

**Durkheim and the fin de siècle**

Mestrovic read Durkheim through a Schopenhauerian framework, believing that Durkheim was immersed in what Ellenberger (1970) called the *fin de siècle*, or end of the century, civilisation and its discontents pessimism of many authors other than Freud in the last decade of the 19th century. Examined sociologically, a *fin de siècle* spirit animates individual and collective life in the lead up to and following the turn of a century. Sociology was born in the *fin de siècle* spirit of western cultural irrationalism, a common feature of thinking in that period. As an instance, Mestrovic noted, Park and Burgess’ (1921) textbook writings of that movement. Nineteenth century *fin de siècle* thinkers viewed modernity negatively, although perhaps somewhat of an advance on less technologically developed societies.

Durkheim, for Mestrovic, was a *fin de siècle* thinker, viewing people as guided by irrational forces of feelings, passion and desires, forces which individuals are not aware of, yet behave in light of them and rationally explain them after the fact. Mestrovic saw Durkheim as a *fin de siècle* thinker who conceived of a social realism, truth and an absolutism of sorts in modernity, where individuals’ mental

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subjectivity and will apprehends the will of the general and constantly changing and ultimately victorious life of society over the individual.144

Focusing on Durkheim's interpretation of the economic sector and its tendency to foster anomie within its confines and in the wider society, Mestrovic noted the gloomy tone of much of Durkheim's work, wherein the increased division of labour and technological progress were seen as leading to more human unhappiness than before.145 Mestrovic argued that Durkheim meant economic anomie to be the central idea of Division of Labour, wherein the lack of an ethics in industrial society's economics subsides into the rest of people's lives. Mestrovic believed it interesting that research into the connections between anomie and the economy that Durkheim forged in his theories has not been undertaken.146 Mestrovic noted the Stock Market Crash of 1987, the Reagan Administration's economic deregulations in the United States, various business scandals, cases of insider trading and socially outrageous events in politics, religion and other social establishments as objects for research into anomie.147

Mestrovic's analysis of Durkheim renders new prospects for reevaluating the connections between people, their society; its dominant themes and directives. This approach has been applied to art as representative of the underlying social nature of existence. As Barker pointed out, Mestrovic (1985) noted a critique of the descent of social bonds in favour of lower quality social contacts in Durkheim's thought,148 and interpreted Durkheim's individualism both as subjective through one's egoism, and, collective through the compulsion of social power over individuals as socially constructed subjects, the latter being so much so that 'geniuses' do not individually make discoveries, but merely perfectly refract what everybody else imperfectly already apprehends.149

Mestrovic argued that Durkheim was more of a radical sceptic than Marx or Freud; a radical critic interested not only in the unconscious, but also the conscious state, saturated by the unknown.150 Mestrovic argued Durkheim's belief was that

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the analysis of cultural information provides researchers with the necessary information with which to make judgements about the collective consciousness and it is a psychological state in individuals and where, judgements about that are as scientific as those resulting from a controlled experiment.\textsuperscript{151} Through this interpretation, anomic and egoism, which confuses and separates people so they believe that they exist apart from the social world, can be critiqued to show that people are really ultimately social beings, whose society's collective forces follow them always.

Mestrovic believed that Durkheimianism is about seriousness, unsentimental, sober and honest optimism in the face of an apparently pessimistic, alarming and decadent world.\textsuperscript{152} Mestrovic, noting that Bougie argued that Durkheim was following in the spirit of Darwin, believed that this approach to apprehending Durkheim would have made irrelevant all the discussion of Durkheim as a functionalist teleologist (Bougie also believed that Marx was a \textit{fin de siècle} thinker who saw life as struggle - and was not simply or only a utopian).\textsuperscript{153} Bougie (1932) argued that \textit{fin de siècle} was about habits and values, (discussions that Mestrovic believed have been dropped in this \textit{fin de siècle}).\textsuperscript{154}

\textbf{Mestrovic, Schopenhauer and Durkheim}

Mestrovic's allegation that Schopenhauer influenced Durkheim is pivotal to Mestrovic's sociology and Mestrovic's viewpoint regarding Durkheim would be incoherent without reference to Schopenhauer. An explanation of Mestrovic's linkage between Durkheim and Schopenhauer is required.

Mestrovic, in various works utilised herein, has claimed that a Durkheimianism influenced by a relation between Durkheim and Schopenhauer has critically important relevance to and implications for social, critical and moral theory, sociology, society and education. Mestrovic's Durkheimianism with regard to these issues can better be understood by referring to his claim that Durkheim was indirectly but heavily influenced by a view of the world as driven by oppositional and also dialectically related forces, and a series of dualities and concepts that Schopenhauer argued for. Mestrovic has drawn on these concepts in his own sociology. Mestrovic was particularly interested Schopenhauer's discussions of the


will to life - a destructive force underlying and vitalising all living things. The concept of the will to life relates to other issues Schopenhauer discussed such as compassion, the Enlightenment, egoism, rationality/irrationality, consciousness and unconsciousness. Mestrovic, in explaining Schopenhauer’s arguments, positions and concepts, has differentiated Schopenhauer’s from Kant’s philosophy, and commented on Marxist and logical positivist interpretations of Schopenhauer. Mestrovic has pointed to the influence of: Schopenhauer’s philosophy in the intellectual context which Durkheim lived within; German philosophy on Durkheim, who studied in that country, and; criticism and commentary made of Durkheim in his own time, maintaining that these factors indicate that Schopenhauer influenced Durkheim. This Schopenhauerian Durkheimianism has been recontextualised, reinstated and applied by Mestrovic, raising points for critically considering the social sciences, politics, economics and society.

Mestrovic has drawn heavily on Schopenhauer's concept of the will to life. Mestrovic believed that Schopenhauer's view of the will to life contributes to what was his pessimism of believing that enlightenment leads to egoism. This has been particularly relevant for Mestrovic where Durkheim is concerned, and, to contemporary societies where rationality/irrationality, the feminine and the emotions are concerned.

Mestrovic argued that Schopenhauer is a marginalised figure in the history of ideas. For Mestrovic this has led to a neglectful attitude towards the influence of Schopenhauer's philosophy on an intellectual movement which pursued, what Ellenberger called the fin de siècle spirit of the late nineteenth century. Mestrovic thought it interesting that Schopenhauer, who at the very least was a notable influence on late nineteenth century philosophy, continues to be "suppressed - if not repressed" in the majority of sociological texts. This could be because, as Ellenberger (1970) noted, contemporary people would have difficulty understanding the massive influence of Schopenhauer on the intellectual community at the end of the nineteenth century.

Mestrovic argued that Durkheim held dearly to at least two of Schopenhauer's concepts, one evidenced in Durkheim's use of the term

'representation' and the other in Durkheim's use of Schopenhauer's metaphor of the 'will'.

Schopenhauer's concept of the will to life

Mestrovic noted that Schopenhauer sometimes referred to his concept of the will to life as the heart, that is, with respect to passions, desires, unconsciousness, and compassion. Schopenhauer argued that the will to life (the heart) is always stronger and of more import than rationality (the mind). Simmel (1907) noted that for Schopenhauer will is never satiated, and never tired. Mestrovic added that Schopenhauer's point was that the imposition of rationality only serves to inflame the will, rather than impede it. Schopenhauer saw the will as a despotic, blind, omnipotent force that uses reason for its purposes. On the other side of representation is the will. The will is the source of the power in desire and spontaneity. The will works without intellect, it is active when people sleep and in non sentient living things such as plants. For Schopenhauer, because the will is infinite it leads to people always wanting more and never being satisfied. As Mestrovic put it in quoting Schopenhauer:

*The will 'is a striving without aim or end' (Schopenhauer, {1818}1977: 414) so that 'suffering is essential to life' (Schopenhauer, {1818}1977: 410). Human egoism is the cause of all social strife, according to Schopenhauer, and leads to immorality and unhappiness.*

Mestrovic saw Schopenhauer's philosophy as an attack on the philosophy of egoism and its human advocates and practitioners who see little value in others and who trample on the will of others. Egoists disrespect other's will to life, most

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extremely in committing homicide, but also in deceiving, defaulting, or ruling tyrannically over others. Mestrovic believed that the egoist, in Schopenhauer's view, can never be happy because egoism cannot be satisfied. Achievements do not satisfy because egoists seek the infinite - a wanting, that is produced by disrespecting others' will.¹⁶⁶

Schopenhauer described the suicide, not, as giving up on the will to live, but only their life, which is a manifestation of the will. Suicide, although appearing to the contrary is thus, "a phenomenon of strong assertion of the will",¹⁶⁷ as the suicidal person wills life, but is deeply dissatisfied with what life offers them. Willing an unregulated access of the body to its wishes but unable to attain full access, suicidal persons experience great suffering. Suicide results from the will to life being stymied - from being able to exert itself fully in its human form. Schopenhauer argued that it is "... just because the suicide cannot give up willing, he gives up living."¹⁶⁸

Representation

Schopenhauer sought to recompose the subject-object distinction revealed so forcefully by Kant, who argued that the thing in itself or noumena can never be known objectively by knowing subjects in relation to it. Schopenhauer's triumph, which Mestrovic noted scholars agree on,¹⁶⁹ was in stating that images held by knowing subjects are as objective as the reality of the thing in itself. Mestrovic noted that this was because Schopenhauer saw the representation as having another side, and that is the 'will'. Locked into an antithetical relationship, the will and representation or idea are a unity. Whereas the idea stands for the mind, the will stands for the unconsciousness, the 'heart', the impulsive, irrational, emotional, affectionate, and dreams.¹⁷⁰

Mestrovic argued that Schopenhauer viewed the subject and object debate as one that he could not take sides on in the sense that it was worthless to start inquiry with persons' subjective views, or, objective reality "... the representation mediates the object and subject and is always susceptible to the more powerful will.

Schopenhauer posits a *homo duplex* within a *homo duplex*."¹⁷¹ Mestrovic noted that Schopenhauer began *The World as Will and Idea* with the claim that the world was idea, a truth for all living things but consciously held in human consciousness. Human consciousness means people realise that their knowledge is not, for instance of the sun or earth itself, but as idea in relation to consciousness. “No truth therefore is more certain, more independent of all others, and less in need of proof than this, that all that exists of knowledge, and therefore this whole world, is only object in relation to subject, perception of a perceiver, in a word, idea.”¹⁷²

*The will and the heart versus the idea and the mind in Enlightenment*

The will is the heart; it is passionate, desirous, unconscious, obscure, emotive, perceiving and irrational. It is in battle with the idea or the mind, which is representational, conceptual, abstract, reflective and thinking. By prioritising the heart, and its ultimately dominating power over driving individuals and the universe, Schopenhauer, Mestrovic believed, was rebelling against the Enlightenment trend of claiming the triumph of the mind.¹⁷³ Schopenhauer held that the heart is stronger than the mind, the will is stronger than the idea, and that the intellect is subject to the will,¹⁷⁴ arguing that “... the will is not conditioned by knowledge, as has hitherto been universally assumed, although knowledge is conditioned by the will.”¹⁷⁵

Schopenhauer is also, for Mestrovic, relevant to the heart and mind distinction with regard to Schopenhauer’s project of transcending the noumenal-phenomenon dualism through examining the heart as opposed to the mind. The heart corresponds to the intuitive, inductive and unconscious noumenon. The mind involves abstraction, rationality, concepts and phenomenon. The heart is capable of exposing the illusions of phenomena, and for Schopenhauer, is the more powerful of the two.¹⁷⁶

Mestrovic argued that Schopenhauer held to a view of there being two sorts of knowledge, one being intuitive and the other being rational. Intuitive knowledge

attempts to apprehend what is 'reality' and what are illusions of it, whilst rational knowledge seeks to affirm 'truth' and evade erroneous judgements. Schopenhauer's conclusion was that intuitive knowledge, driven by the will, was the strongest form.\textsuperscript{177}

\begin{quote}
For in all ages and countries the words understanding, intellectus, acumen, perspecacia, sagacitas, etc., had been used to denote the more intuitive faculty . . . and its results, which differ specifically from those of Reason here in question, have always been called intelligent, sagacious, clever etc. Intelligent and rational were accordingly always distinguished from the other, as manifestations of two entirely and widely different mental faculties.\textsuperscript{178}
\end{quote}

Enlightenment thinking was a social development that had subjected the heart to the mind. Schopenhauer inverted this belief, through viewing the 'will' and 'idea' as moving together but in an antagonistic relationship, contracting people's emotional capacities, but also increasing their hunger for desirous objects in life.\textsuperscript{179}

Schopenhauer argued that the will could somewhat be addressed by his directing his philosophy at an elite group who should be seeking "will-less-ness" through consciously and voluntarily entering into ascetic, contemplative, and disciplined practices.\textsuperscript{180} Schopenhauer believed that 'will-less-ness' was only possible to be attained by these 'geniuses' or through some people's practice of Hinduism, and not by the whole of humankind.\textsuperscript{181}

\textit{Schopenhauer's pessimism}

Schopenhauer was a pessimistic thinker in seeing the will as leading to constant suffering, and in critiquing the Enlightenment and western religions.

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Mestrovic pointed out that for Schopenhauer the will is never satiated and that its inflammation leads to increased suffering, a point that Schopenhauer made clearly.

*All willing arises from want, therefore from deficiency, and therefore from suffering. The satisfaction of a wish ends it; yet for one wish that is satisfied there remain at least ten which are denied. Further, the desire lasts long, the demands are infinite; the satisfaction is short and scantily measured out. But even the final satisfaction is itself only apparent; every satisfied wish at once makes room for a new one; both are illusions; the one is known to be so, the other not yet. No attained object of desire can give lasting satisfaction, but merely a fleeting gratification.*\(^{182}\)

Mestrovic saw the notion of suffering as central to Schopenhauer's philosophy. For Schopenhauer, humans are hungry in desiring but come up short on satisfaction, and life is a constant prolonging of misery from one day to the next. In Schopenhauer's view "...suffering is essential to life..." where "...every biography is the history of suffering..." and "...the will, of which human life, like every phenomenon, is the objectification, is a striving without aim or end. We find the stamp of this endlessness imprinted upon all the parts of its whole manifestation."\(^{183}\)

*The more intense the will is, the more glaring is the conflict of its manifestation, and thus the greater is the suffering.*\(^{184}\)

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For Schopenhauer, a pessimistic view was the only honest course to take, arguing that its opposite:

*Optimism, when it is not merely the thoughtless talk of such as harbour nothing but words under their low foreheads, appears not merely as an absurd, but also as a really wicked way of thinking, as a bitter mockery of the unspeakable suffering of humanity.*

As Mestrovic noted, Schopenhauer held to a view that modern religions were pessimistic as he argued “...let no one think that Christianity is favourable to optimism; for, on the contrary, in the Gospels, world and evil are used as almost synonymous.” Like Freud's civilization and its discontents theme, enlightenment, for Schopenhauer leads to boredom and suffering, not, a Kantian satisfaction. Schopenhauer did not believe that compassion is an intellectual capacity that can be taught, as it is a part of the human makeup that resides with its opposite, egoism. Mestrovic claimed even if one looks for them, there are only a few examples of Schopenhauer's (1818) 'spontaneous desire' that can be noted in contemporary societies.

*Defending Schopenhauer*

Mestrovic noted some of the commentary over Schopenhauer such as that in Lukacs' Marxist claim that Schopenhauer was the bourgeois precursor of a line that finished in Hitler, and Bendix's logical positivist claim that Schopenhauer was one of a number of nineteenth century iconoclasts who rejected scholarly distance. Mestrovic argued that Schopenhauer's will and idea view of *homo duplex* (a view Mestrovic believed Durkheim also embraced) means that

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Schopenhauer by comparison to Marxism presents a two sided and less rational approach. And when related to Bendix, Schopenhauer for Mestrovic was not an iconoclast but rather traditional in that *homo duplex* has a long history in Western thought.\(^{191}\) Kant also had a version of *homo duplex* but it was something very different from that of Schopenhauer and Durkheim as he concluded optimistically that tensions within what they all saw as humans' dualistic nature, could be partially resolved.\(^{192}\)

**How Mestrovic believes Durkheim was Schopenhauerian**

Mestrovic argued that the concept of will to life in Schopenhauer's philosophy featuring desire, passion and feeling was intellectually entrenched in the nineteenth century *fin de siècle* spirit that was predominantly cynical and dark in its outlook and thought.\(^{193}\) Mestrovic argued that Schopenhauer's philosophy was influential in the work of a number of European philosophers, social scientists and artists at the turn of the century. Philosophers in this list were: James, Bergson, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Nietzsche; social scientists were, Freud, Simmel, Durkheim, Weber, Wundt, Ribot, Pareto, Jung, Tonny, Mosca, Tarde and Le Bon; and artists were, Maupassant, Mann, Conrad, Proust, Joyce, D.H. Lawrence, Hardy, Yeats and Joyce.\(^{194}\)

Mestrovic cited as specific evidence of Schopenhauer's influence on Durkheim, that in Durkheim's study reports home from his time in Germany in the mid 1880s, he noted that Schopenhauer was 'in vogue' there.\(^{195}\) In Germany six years before undertaking the study that became the *Division of Labour* Durkheim wrote essays praising the ethical approach to business adopted by some German economists, compared to Kantian, utilitarian and French approaches.\(^{196}\) Durkheim studied under Wundt in 1885, and 1886, the year Wundt's *Ethics* was published. Mestrovic argued that *Volkergeistesäule* (folk psychology), Wundt's central

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contribution to social science, is not clearly apprehended in contemporary thought, but strongly influenced Durkheim. Wundt was apparently a disciple of Schopenhauer, and Durkheim reported that he had attended a number of Schopenhauer conferences in Germany. Mestrovic claimed that Durkheim's favouring Wundt can be understood, noting that Durkheim, a polemical thinker, always referred to Wundt respectfully, utilised Wundt's *Volkerpsychologie* for his approach to representation, Wundt's ethics for his moral science, and, Wundt's thought came from a Schopenhauerian (and Steinthalian and Lazarusian) background. Durkheim (1897) acknowledged that Schopenhauer was a symbolic thinker influencing the previous *fin de siècle*, and, Andre Lalande, who was Durkheim's colleague in the French Philosophical Society, and friend, argued that Schopenhauer was such a big influence on Durkheim that his students nicknamed him 'Schopen'.

Mestrovic believed that Filloux was right to ascribe Ribot's and Renouvier's essays on Schopenhauer as having influenced Durkheim. Simon Deploige (1911) claimed that Durkheim was always less French and rationalistic than German and Romantic in his outlook. Mestrovic noted Lukes' (1982) quotation of Durkheim's defense against Deploige's criticism of Durkheim's 'theft' of Wundt's and other German ideas, to which Durkheim replied by explicitly claiming responsibility for bringing German ideas into France and sociology. Mestrovic wanted to avoid addressing the reasons for Durkheim not frequently referring to Schopenhauer as an influence. Mestrovic rejected any


need to prove direct links between Schopenhauer and Durkheim, as unneeded and impossible. Mestrovic was satisfied that Schopenhauer was so influential that Durkheim could not have escaped the context where Schopenhauer's philosophy supplanted that of Comte's vulgar positivism.\textsuperscript{206} Mestrovic, however, speculated on why Durkheim did not make his linkages with Schopenhauer clear, proposing two possible reasons. Firstly, it might have been the case that Durkheim's own conceit may have forestalled making his discipleship of Schopenhauer transparent. Secondly, it may have been that Durkheim, working in the fin de siècle context and spirit, may have anticipated that readers would recognise that as a commencing point. Mestrovic noted that whatever the case in fact, unfortunately due to the destruction of Durkheim's notes in the second World War, the complete affirmation of this Schopenhauerian linkage might never be known.\textsuperscript{207} Mestrovic noted that Durkheim's notes were forgotten, left behind by his family when they evacuated their Epinal home in the Second World War and new occupants threw the notes out with other household refuse.\textsuperscript{208}

Mestrovic believed that Durkheim, needs to be reappraised in something like the way Wittgenstein has in recent times been recovered from the earlier conclusion that he was a logical positivist.\textsuperscript{209} Mestrovic argued that contextualising Durkheim, rather than being irrelevant as Parsons saw it, is in fact of great importance, as the former fin de siècle it was saturated in a pessimistic outlook.\textsuperscript{210} Schopenhauer's philosophy is central to this contextualisation for Mestrovic. Mestrovic argued that Durkheim focused on collective representations throughout his life. Mestrovic argued that for Durkheim, as for Schopenhauer, collective representations are never misplaced in either the objective or subjective senses. Rather, Durkheim, Mestrovic believed, saw representations as existing totally or partially in the unconscious. Every person interprets representations in their own personal way, but the representations remain objective despite the subjective apprehensions of individuals.\textsuperscript{211} Durkheim's followers were philosophically interested in Schopenhauer and the primacy of representations and
symbols that deceive in their outward appearances and the hidden in the unconscious - an approach that is a refraction of Schopenhauer's attempt to reveal irrational forces in life.\textsuperscript{212} Mestrovic maintained that Durkheim was evoking the will when claiming that collective representations undergo a twisting through the unconscious, meaning that subjective views of collective representations are as defective as people's introspection over their individual representations. Mestrovic argued that that was what Durkheim was claiming in 'Individual and Collective Representations'.\textsuperscript{213}

Mestrovic pointed out that Durkheim used the metaphor of the will to stand for the body, desire, passions and appetites.\textsuperscript{214} Mestrovic argued that Schopenhauer's 'will' was what Durkheim was referring to when discussing the importance of contratinte in social facts. Mestrovic utilised the Littre, which is the French equivalent of the Oxford English Dictionary, to explain that the importance of Durkheim's use of contratinte with regard to Schopenhauer is that contratinte refers to things that oppose the will. Mestrovic argued that given Durkheim's intellectual milieu, constraint is a relevant concept to denote that social facts are the point at which will and representation converge.\textsuperscript{215} Mestrovic saw the will to life of Schopenhauer as reflected in Durkheim's concept of the collective conscience, which can be seen as the social aspect of the will as it works on persons without their knowledge. The division of labour is sourced in the social will, as are representations, which are partially independent from persons and which reform and are reshaped on their own. Anomie is also sourced in the will, as is scientific bias. But the will is also the foundation for various societally beneficial phenomena.\textsuperscript{216} "Society seems to play the same role in Durkheim's sociology that the 'will to life' plays in Schopenhauer's philosophy."\textsuperscript{217}

Mestrovic believed that Durkheim held to Schopenhauerian pessimism, arguing that as modernity advances the 'general happiness of society is decreasing'.\textsuperscript{218} 'Nothing is more doubtful'\textsuperscript{219} wrote Durkheim, than that unhappiness

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  \item \textsuperscript{212} Mestrovic, S. (1992). Durkheim and Postmodern Culture. p.35.
  \item \textsuperscript{213} Mestrovic, S. (1988). 'The social world as will and idea: Schopenhauer's influence upon Durkheim's thought'. Sociological Review, 39, p.685 cited Durkheim's (1924) Sociology and Philosophy.
  \item \textsuperscript{214} Mestrovic, S. (1988). 'The social world as will and idea: Schopenhauer's influence upon Durkheim's thought'. Sociological Review, 39, p.678.
  \item \textsuperscript{216} Mestrovic, S. (1988). Emile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology. p.4.
  \item \textsuperscript{218} Mestrovic, S. (1989). 'Rethinking the will and idea of sociology in the light of Schopenhauer's philosophy'. British Journal of Sociology, 40(2), p.284 quoted Durkheim (1893) 1933, p.249.
  \item \textsuperscript{219} Mestrovic, S. (1989). 'Rethinking the will and idea of sociology in the light of Schopenhauer's
accompanies societal development, and that development's spontaneity is a process without aim or end.\textsuperscript{220} for Mestrovic, evidence that Durkheim's \textit{Division of Labour} was a 'civilization and its discontents', and not, a societaly progressive text. Mestrovic noted that Baillot had already commented on the similarities between Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's (1897) views of suicide. For both, the act is not the Kantian and Enlightenment triumph of the mind over the heart, but the opposite, in the uncontrolled and too powerful will, exacerbated by social development.\textsuperscript{221} Mestrovic, in noting the similarities between Schopenhauer's philosophy and Durkheim's sociology, went so far as to state that: "There are several passages in The Division of Labor in Society which mirror Schopenhauer's thought so closely that one is almost tempted to suspect Durkheim of at least minor plagiarism."\textsuperscript{222}

Mestrovic argued that Durkheim's view of homo duplex was as pessimistic as Schopenhauer's. Schopenhauer argued that 'a double existence may be attributed to everyone' and that 'here exists an actual antagonism'.\textsuperscript{223} And Durkheim argued that: 'All evidence compels us to expect our effort in the struggle between the two beings within us to increase with the growth of civilization.'\textsuperscript{224}

Further with regard to pessimism, Mestrovic believed that the central point of agreement between Schopenhauer and Durkheim is their view that the 'will' (for Schopenhauer) and anomie (for Durkheim) involves an insatiable and unlimited force that causes suffering.\textsuperscript{225} The will in Schopenhauer's philosophy stands in opposition to representations, it is insatiable, a 'bottomless pit',\textsuperscript{226} which is very much like Durkheim's view of anomie as a 'bottomless abyss',\textsuperscript{227} and, it is conjoined

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  \item \textsuperscript{221} Mestrovic, S. (1989). 'Rethinking the will and idea of sociology in the light of Schopenhauer's philosophy'. \textit{British Journal of Sociology}. 40(2), p.284 quoted Durkheim (\textit{1893} 1933, p.337).
  
  
  
  
  
  
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with progress, civilisation and the division of labour. Mestrovic noted that Durkheim's Sorbonne colleague Bergson concluded like Schopenhauer and against Kant that Enlightenment intelligence tends to lead to egoism, not ethics.228 This was the same view, Mestrovic believed, that Durkheim, in following Schopenhauer held to.

Mestrovic believed that Durkheim, like Schopenhauer, argued that ascetism was the solution to anomie, or the inflammation of the will. The asceticism central to religion is also integral to other areas of social life where people must restrain their instinctual tendencies to live in society, which although

\[ \ldots \text{exalting the strength of man, \ldots is frequently rude to individuals; it necessarily demands perpetual sacrifices from them; it is constantly doing violence to our natural appetites, just because it raises us above ourselves.} \] 229

Mestrovic also saw affinities between Durkheim and Schopenhauer with regard to societal research. Durkheim's Rules, Mestrovic argued, reflects Schopenhauerian thinking where Durkheim criticised social science for studying 'pure conceptions of the mind',230 and sociology for having 'dealt more or less exclusively not with things {perceptions}, but with concepts'.231 Mestrovic argued that Durkheim was evoking Schopenhauer's view of the heart as opposed to the mind, where, sentiments, emotions, habits, instincts, emotions, the soul, the personal, experiences and hopes are stronger in science, 'even the best and major part of it'.232

Durkheim and Schopenhauer, Mestrovic believed, also shared similar views of morality as irrational, as impositional and representational, unconscious. Durkheim, Mestrovic argued, held to a Schopenhauerian view of morality as based

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on irrationality, in for instance the case of the ideal of egalitarian morality, which contradicts the case in fact where people are unequal intellectually, physically and psychically.

Some powerful cause must therefore intervene which makes men other than what they are in tangible experience, which makes us see them in such away that they appear equal to us and which consequently transfigures them.233

Mestrovic argued that Durkheim, like Schopenhauer, took a critical view of modernity and Enlightenment, seeing those changes as inflaming the will, leading to increased social injustice, and immorality.

For Durkheim as for Schopenhauer, egoism is a state in which the unfettered, modern will tramples on the 'will to life' of other persons due to a lack of compassion. Durkheim felt that the process of modernization would lead to increased individualism conceived of as this benign, 'higher', irrational 'cult of the individual' as well as the cancerous egoism and anomic. This complexity in Durkheim's thought has been missed completely by writers who start with the premise that he was a 'pure mind' positivist. It is high time one appreciates the fact that Durkheim was a Romantic who wrote in the fin de siècle spirit of his times.234

Schopenhauer's import for current times

Mestrovic referred to the will to life of Schopenhauer as the heart, the irrational, habits, as well as Schopenhauer's view of compassion. Also evoking Durkheim, Mestrovic commented critically on contemporary modernist and postmodernist theory and research in the social sciences, particularly sociology.

moral theory, education and philosophy. Society is also relevant from this perspective.

Mestrovic repeatedly stated that sociology was born in the *fin de siècle* spirit of western cultural irrationalism, contendening that since early in the twentieth century, allusions to the heart have been systematically removed from the discourse of social science, in favour of a search for value-free, rational, goal directed focus, where the mind has ruled at the expense of the heart. Mestrovic argued that utilitarianism pervades economics, and cognitivism and behaviourism in psychology - two examples of social sciences that are even more heartless than today’s rationalistic and optimistic mind-focused sociology. Mestrovic claimed that there is little textbook reference to the themes of pessimism in sociological thinking, rather, it is hidden by a blind acceptance of progressions, scientific faith and an 'almost sappy, boosterish vision of life'. Mestrovic believed this overlooked an important historical pessimistic veer in an otherwise optimistic historical tradition that started with Comte and Saint-Simon, and that has been restored in contemporary sociology. For Mestrovic, today’s sociology follows Saint-Simon, who believed in historical progress through societally organic epochs and Comte, who believed that science should rid itself of metaphysics. Mestrovic claimed that James, Herbart, Wundt, and Freud were some of the people to actually, and sometimes literally, refer to the 'heart', of Schopenhauer's philosophy, by evoking habit, passion, desire, the unconscious and instinct. Today, references to the heart are interpreted as metaphysical allusions to be treated unseriously.

Mestrovic believed that today’s preoccupation with phenomenon and ignoring the noumenon was not present in late nineteenth century sociology, which studied emotions, perceptions, the will to life, the unconscious, the heart, and habits, and asserted that most contemporary sociology is based on Kant's conclusion that the empirical must be founded on *a priorism* and studying phenomena, because the noumenon for Kant was unknowable. With regard to

positivistic researchers' interest in establishing reliability through replication and the attempt to falsify prior findings, both Schopenhauer and Durkheim rejected the approach to science that emphasises the need to continually verify hypotheses empirically. Durkheim held that one-off well designed experiments were sufficient and Schopenhauer earlier argued that as people return to the researched topic slightly differently every time they attempt to verify findings, they are possibly going to conclude differently on different occasions. Schopenhauer argued therefore that 'one good case holds for a thousand'.

Schopenhauer's position on cause differed from that of many contemporary researchers who attempt to identify first, primary or basic causes. Schopenhauer argued that every cause is linked to an effect which itself is attached to a never ending series of cause and effect relations where researchers' identification of a cause is in fact an arbitrary choice and a judgement, not an observation.

**Schopenhauer, Durkheim and moral theory**

Mestrovic noted that leading discussions and research in morality circulate around Habermas' and Kohlberg's essentially rationalist and duty-based Kantian theories, which neglect the irrationalist and compassion-based philosophy of Schopenhauer.244 Also Piaget, Mestrovic noted, pursued the Kantian notions of transcendental duty and cognitive decision making in his science of morality. Mestrovic argued instead that enquiries could be made into ideal morality, interpreted not by how one particular and perhaps mistaken generation acts in reality with regard to morality, but rather, by studying manifestations of recurring ideals of what is moral behaviour, identified as similar over various generations.245 Habermas (1987) attempted to complete the Enlightenment project partly through rejecting irrationalism as negative only.246 Mestrovic's approach was to propose that Schopenhauer and Durkheim be utilised as alternatives to Kohlberg, Habermas and Piaget where morality is concerned.247

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Mestrovic argued that the issues of the real versus the illusory, relativism, duty and compassion, which are all relevant to moral theory, could be addressed by applying the implications of Schopenhauer's criticisms of Kant. As compassion, in the sense that Schopenhauer philosophised it, was for Mestrovic, largely overlooked in contemporary moral theory, an additional extension of this philosophy could be an enquiry into ways of studying compassion as a social fact. Mestrovic argued that sociology would be transformed by adopting the opposing side of the phenomenon of Kant. In accepting the unconscious, habits, intuitive and passionate elements of the body, sociology could approach society as psychoanalysis approaches clients, also dropping naive realism for intuitive and analytically inductive qualitative and quantitative methods. This is a pressing issue as contemporary positivism's dogmatism has, for Mestrovic, forbidden and repressed research into nineteenth century fin de siecle mysticism (Jung), the will (Schopenhauer), social Being (Durkheim), the Virgin (Henry Adams), archaic pacifism (Veblen), Eros (Freud), and left-handedness (Hertz). Sociology that attempts to interpret culture without emulating the methodologies of the 'hard sciences' has been marginalised as irrelevant.

With respect to the implications of applying, what Mestrovic thought was the idealism in Durkheim's study of moral facts, to contemporary moral theory, rather than continuing along lines of enquiry that assume what moral activity is, deductive apprehensions of what is moral thinking, and focusing on cognition, Durkheim's and Schopenhauer's criticisms of Kant could be applied to the study of morality by inductively examining both, people's actual moral behaviour, and, their constructions of what is ideal moral behaviour. This study, Mestrovic believed, would restore a discussion over what Durkheim intended by looking at social facts, and, alter what is presently considered relevant material to enquire into when looking at moral development. Durkheim believed in the unconsciousness, but not in a mystical or irrational way as naive scientists assume today in their

248. Mestrovic, S. (1989). 'Moral theory based on the 'heart' versus the 'mind': Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's critiques of Kantian ethics'. Sociological Review, 37(3), p.445. For Mestrovic's discussion of the problems raised by Durkheim and Schopenhauer with regard to morality here, see: pp.446-447 over determining the reality versus illusion of collective values if existing opinions do not equate with ethics; pp. 447-448 over increased cultural relativisation or societal opposition where held moral values of social groups differ; pp.448-449 where the casting of compassion as a desire and as to behave morally, as opposed to acting and thinking morally as a duty is concerned, and; p.449 over methods of studying compassion as a social fact.


acceptance of witnesses’ and agents’ perspectives. For Durkheim the study of the unconscious was an additional way to undertake sociological research.252

Interventions based on the heart

Social interventions based on what Mestrovic saw was the important factor of habits are relevant, in that rather than seeking to change adults’ consciously held normative values, interventions would focus on establishing concretely in children what has become feared by adults - that is, irrational parts of life that forerunners of sociology recommended for study but which have been smothered by fear of the irrational itself.253 Mestrovic favoured Veblen and Horkheimer, Durkheim and Freud over Marx, believing that although Marx showed great empathy for the downtrodden and whose work on alienation is excellent, Marx, also was a utopian societial engineer who held the bourgeois in contemptuous regard, and like Hegel, believed that history could be anticipated or concluded. Mestrovic believed that by holding to: Sorokin’s (1959) view that inequality must be accepted and dealt with by distributing wealth; Durkheim’s view of the social and cultural reasons for individualism; Freud's view of the nonrational as the ground for modern cruelty; Veblen’s view of cultural and historical, rather than class-based reasons for barbaric habits, and; Horkheimer’s unrecognised use of Schopenhauer, alternative intellectual traditions could be applied to morality in modern life. Taking his lead from those thinkers, Mestrovic sought to counter Habermas' view of the rational, with the non rational element of compassion, derived from Schopenhauer, who rejected Kant and Hegel as well as having been Nietzsche's master.254 Mestrovic believed that the Enlightenment and not irrationalism are to blame for social, economic and political crises with regard to morality in this fin de siècle,255 in addition, arguing that atrocities committed against humanity might be more accurately perceived when viewed as a result of too much rationality and the mind. It might have been possible avoid catastrophes like the final solution of Hitler, had there been more compassion and morality of the heart in various Third Reich actors.256

Early in the nineteenth century, Schopenhauer argued that people’s infinite desires for rationally led to their insatiable search for more material goods, that when unrealised, increased the likelihood of suicide. In contemporary western nations, suicide rates are higher than in the last century, and, continue to be higher than in traditional cultures. Mestrovic saw Schopenhauer as critiquing modern societies where what is desired in such societies is not able to satisfy the will. Today, as Mestrovic put it, from such a perspective: “The will no longer, properly speaking, strives after ends - it merely strives, infinitely.”

Mestrovic believed that when considered by way of Schopenhauer, collective representations, although sourced in the will, have the ability, through being in a dialectical relationship, to constrain it even though it is constantly changing. The pathology of anomie results when the will is not constrained by collective representations, and fragmented culture is a result of representations becoming separated from the will.

Mestrovic believed that Schopenhauer's perspective is as applicable to postmodernity as it was relevant to modernism. Mestrovic also saw postmodernism as working out morality from the basis of the mind at the expense of the heart. Asserting that ambiguities of the heart in postmodern culture allow a Schopenhauerian analysis, Mestrovic argued:

\[ \ldots I \text{ believe that postmodernist bad taste originates in the mind, not the heart nor its sentimental derivatives. What is often referred to as bad taste, kitsch, cliche, and cheap sentimentality bespeaks a dominance of abstraction that fails to find a genuine emotional component in phenomena. Postmodernist, cheap sentimentality betrays itself by its commercialism. Emotion and nostalgia are typically used to sell something, or for some other rational, instrumental purpose. In the context of Schopenhauer's philosophy, genuine, sublime emotion is essentially 'will-less', non-calculating, non-instrumental, and without rational or conscious purpose and plan. Such 'will-lessness' is becoming increasingly rare in the postmodernist world.} \]

Mestrovic believed that contemporary postmodern thinkers have ignored Schopenhauer's view that it is possible to be sympathetic and compassionate, instead opting for either chaos or liberation. Durkheim's approach, a refraction of Schopenhauer's philosophy of will and idea goes beyond postmodern's view of circulating fictions without principal meanings. For Mestrovic, postmodern writers do not refer to states before, during or following modernity, believing they are all part of the oppressive narrative structure of enlightenment thinking. By comparison, Schopenhauer and Durkheim adopted complex standpoints on these issues, as they did not see human nature as something that was fundamentally changeable. Schopenhauer argued that the will to life did not change and Durkheim saw homo duplex as the same human nature, reshaped in all societies. However, with respect to the world as idea or representation, there is change in that modern people have to consciously deal with a lot more than in past formations of society and so are not as happy as people in earlier historical periods. Mestrovic believed that there are moral alternatives to critical theory, postmodernism and neoconservatism (critical theory, which cannot deal with the contradictions of individualism and social conformity, postmodernism, which cannot address the sadism and hate rather than liberatory products of freedom from dominant narratives, and, neo conservatism expressed by Christopher Lasch, Robert N. Bellah and Allan Bloom who seek a return to traditional life), by tracing of a line of thinking from Schopenhauer, Durkheim and Veblen. This line according to these thinkers implies that two forms of individualism can be displayed: one, that is narcissistic and egoistic, and another; that is peaceable and seeks tolerance towards others.

Mestrovic also argued that the postmodernist, Baudrillard, in following Nietzsche tends towards taking a cruel orientation, similarly to and as a consequence of accepting the ideas of the proto-postmodernist, Nietzsche, who raged against compassion. Baudrillard follows Nietzsche's view of people as warriors in an anomic, consuming society imbued with the will to power. Schopenhauer was interested in compassion and realised that suffering was the cure for egoism in modernity, whereas Nietzsche, criticised compassion as the

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morality of the weak through his connection of that orientation with Christianity. Mestrovic believed that what were Schopenhauer's feminine views and compassionate orientations, are obscured in social theory by Nietzsche's masculinist view of power in society.

Mestrovic's interpretation and adaptation of Durkheim arose from interpreting Durkheim as a radical social theorist who was indirectly influenced by Schopenhauer. Favouring Schopenhauer over the proto-postmodernist Nietzsche and in seeking to formulate a critical theory other than that of the current leading Frankfurt School thinker, Habermas, Mestrovic argued that a new social condition has emerged in society. Mestrovic came to term the social condition “postemotionalism” – described through variously integrating the work of: Durkheim; George Ritzer who undertook a Weberian analysis in the McDonaldization of Society (1992) where society is highly rationalised; David Riesman who identified other-directedness and inside dopesterism; the Foucauldian leisure theorist, Chris Rojek, who argued that society is increasingly shaped by intellectualisation and bureaucracy; Henry Adams, who analysed that the mechanisation by the dynamo has replaced the emotionalisation of the Virgin; Hebert Marcuse who articulated the concept of a ‘happy consciousness, and; George Orwell who argued that an ideological shaping of populations takes place by way of various rhetorical articulations. Mestrovic challenged the over emphasis on rationality as exemplified by postmodernists, or modernists like Anthony Giddens, who for Mestrovic is far too optimistic regarding human agency.

Postemotionalism denotes a societal state regarding emotions and rationality, used “... to conceptualize a new hybrid of emotions-as-representations.” and a world that is ‘against’ (as opposed to strictly ‘after’) the emotions, by mechanising them, constructing them to be expressed as: outrage, that is not followed with action; tolerance that is a pretence of correctness; intense but vicarious experiences; widely available emotional engagements that are prepared and staged, and; a bland niceness and tolerance. Consumerist, cultural, educational, information technological, community, internationalised, domestic, national and social relational, postemotional society is an inauthentic, narcissistic, aggressive, simulated world, for Mestrovic, one with few apparent rectifying features.

For Mestrovic Durkheim’s radical social theory is an important reference point for enquiring into postemotional society with regard to: examining how contemporary but historically sourced imperatives regarding appropriate punishment for law breaking have been undermined by the use of emotionally charged historical events and facts, superimposed onto the present and used to justify crime; understanding the fatigue from the infinite wanting people experience regarding desire; conceptualising dualisms such as that between collectivism and individualism; grasping why, in following the spirit and social character of their times, citizens elect politicians with particular personalities; the entrenchment of anomie; the excesses of reason; the emotional basis to and splintering of collective belief and energies; the drying up of the sacred and the collective emotions and solidarity that it inspires, leading to nostalgic and simulated, so failed, attempts at its recovery through imitating or vicariously observing events or rituals and; the increasing individualisation, private nature of and swift dealing with, grief.

Mestrovic’s interpretation and adaptation of Durkheim was based upon a reading of Durkheim as a radical thinker. Mestrovic’s view was that Schopenhauer indirectly influenced Durkheim such that Durkheim adopted a pessimistic but dialectic view, by integrating Schopenhauer’s views of the will to life with regard to representation, into his sociology by way of the concept of society. Durkheim’s references to representation were salient and Mestrovic believed they contain influences from Schopenhauer. Durkheim’s view of suicide as an abyss of desires, Mestrovic believed, is very similar to the view of the will that Schopenhauer argued existed and Durkheim’s view of the independence of representations from individuals and social structures. Seeing Durkheim in this way allowed Mestrovic to attempt a salvaging of Durkheim from the received view that Durkheim was a logical positivist. That recovery from the view of being logically positivist is not that unlike the one undertaken by scholars where Wittgenstein’s philosophy is concerned.

There is very little positivism in Durkheim’s theory when considered as influenced by Schopenhauer in the way Mestrovic had.

Such an orientation identified in Durkheim’s sociology has theoretical, methodological and social implications. Following the interpretation, theory, Mestrovic believed, can be reconsidered such that mind-tending rationalist approaches of Kant, Habermas and Kohlberg, accepted by different scholars can be challenged and potentially replaced by theories that consider the will, the unconscious, irrationality and desire. Durkheim did not believe that morality was rationally based. The heart is central to the theory Mestrovic pursues, such that theorists like Veblen, Horkheimer, Freud and Sorokin can be given an airing, challenging Marxist, postmodern, and, some liberal theories that can lead to narcissism.

Methodologically, adopting a ‘one-good-experiment’ approach to research and studying morality intergenerationally are the implications that Mestrovic identified through following Durkheim’s radical social theory influenced by Schopenhauer. These methods could replace those where the replication for verification, and, for instance, snapshot, or life history and longitudinal studies of members of single generations are concerned respectively.

Mestrovic believed that following Durkheim’s Schopenhauerian influenced sociology had contemporary societal implications, challenging orientations where the heart is viewed either as irrelevant, as in modernist, or ambiguously as in postmodernist views. For Schopenhauer the will to life is omnipresent and Durkheim believed that human nature was *homo duplex*, reshaped in different societies and historic contexts. Such views of society are complex are as that of for instance Baudrillard’s postmodernist views of society as made up of circulating fictions and animated by the will to power of Nietzsche, as viewed by Baudrillard. For Mestrovic, society has become mind-centred such that compassion is not taken seriously and ascetic, will-less behaviour is hard to identify. This societal situation, for Mestrovic is a product of a fragmented society where *homo duplex* representations are deranged such that collective representations are unable to constrain anomie orientations towards the infinite. Mestrovic interpreted contemporary western societies as anomie, using the term ‘postemotional’ to denote a context where emotions are shaped such that they are felt but not acted on and where they are no longer hinged on authentic collective sources but based on imitations of them, so increasingly are less imbued with the energy they once had.
Mestrovic's adaptation and application of *homo duplex*

This chapter is concerned with Mestrovic's discussions of Durkheim's *homo duplex*, related to the individual society dualism, representations, the history of representation, and the concept 'homo duplex' itself. Mestrovic adapted Durkheim with regard to relating *homo duplex* to various dualisms in society, social theory and psychology, such as the distinction between the sacred and profane, but also the feminine and masculine, the subjective and objective, will and idea, ego and id, as well as the heart and mind. Also, Mestrovic's relation of Durkheim's *homo duplex* to history, language, culture, religion, and anomie in economics, society, social institutions, history and the intellect will be explained.

Mestrovic argued that *homo duplex* helps to explain Durkheim's view of the constant dually wrenching factors of individual and collective representations in life, believing that *homo duplex* should be seen as the way in which Durkheim avoided the determination of people's lives by factors like the collective conscience and social facts. Durkheim, in Mestrovic's interpretation, saw two factors in individualism that impact on people in modernity. One is the collective representation of the individual diffused through society, and free of subjective interpretations, the other is the egoistic and tyrannical force of the will. In this way, Mestrovic believed, Durkheim can be seen as seeking a middle ground between idealism and realism, the subject and the object, in people, society and sociology.

> 'Indeed homo duplex is the theme of The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (Durkheim, (1912)1965:13-200). In it, he argues against the "social reality" so callously attributed to him by thinkers from Parsons to Lukes. What Durkheim ((1912)1965:31) really said about epistemology and the sociology of knowledge is that: "The rationalism which is imminent in the sociological theory of knowledge is thus midway between empiricism and a priorism."'

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Mestrovic believed *homo duplex* explains Durkheim's perspective of the individual - society dualism, which he saw as two dimensional as opposed to the oversocialised interpretations of society developed by modernist functionalism and postmodernism. Rather, Durkheim, Mestrovic believed, argued for a view of the self as strong, where the individual's will is always seeking to overcome social influences and ideas, and where society must perform a sort of violence on an individual's egoism, restraining individuals so that a benign individualism is made possible.

Mestrovic saw Durkheim's view of *homo duplex* as related to his utilisation of Schopenhauer's view of the body as will, and society as idea, an interpretation that can be traced back to Plato, where *homo duplex* is one of a number of dualisms like perception versus conceptions, unconsciousness versus consciousness, and the feminine versus masculine. Mestrovic saw a linkage in Durkheim's view of *homo duplex* that is closer to the vision of self and society argued for by Schopenhauer than that of Kant. Whereas Kant argued that the thing in itself (here, in Durkheim's reference to the soul) could not be understood by people, Schopenhauer countered that although a conception of the thing in itself might be unattainable, perception is possible, and perception is attained through an intuitive approach relying on the body. Mestrovic saw *homo duplex* as a concept Durkheim shared with other thinker's ideas like Veblen's barbarism versus matriarchy and Simmel's masculine objectivity versus feminine subjectivity, both who respectively sought the reunification of these dualistic factors in their works.

In Durkheim's view, Mestrovic believed, rationality is based in the social, not the individual as Kant for instance argued. Rationality as social is therefore opposite to the barbaric and the compassionate, which are part of the stronger elements of human nature, parts that are insatiable, not the source of society seen as a collection of individual representations. For Durkheim, Mestrovic believed, society involves doing a form of violence to the self, a sacrificing of one's own for that of the collectivity, where communication is about a battle between various dualisms embedded in our also dual human nature.

Durkheim's work subsequent to 'The dualism of human nature and its social conditions' was that of writing *La Morale*, unfinished due to his death. However, Mestrovic saw the concept of *homo duplex* in all of Durkheim's work, wherein: life is a mixture of collective and individual representations; anomie is the result of human desire without limits, and; the lower pole of humanity is the source of these desires, stronger than and potentially threatening to the stability of society. Mestrovic argued that Durkheim's notion of *homo duplex* applied to the contemporary context implies a critical apprehension of postmodern writers and their detractors, who see the Enlightenment as the only factor to be embraced, or rebelled against. The lower pole of *homo duplex* was to Mestrovic, more powerful than modern and postmodern narratives, with a history and influence that is stronger than the influence of social changes seen in the last three hundred years. Collective psychic health in the contemporary context was in Mestrovic's view, reliant on reuniting the will with the idea. Excesses of the will are realised in social pathologies, boredom and pain, as masses of representations overstimulate people, broadening possibilities and desires beyond that which can be realised.

It becomes evident through Mestrovic's Schopenhauerian interpretation of Durkheim that civilisation has brought about more unhappiness in society, where there is an ignorance of the lower pole of human existence as being stronger than that of the higher pole of society, and where the will is stronger than the idea. Mestrovic saw anomie as founded on the concept of *homo duplex* in which desires, something like those described in Freud's concept of the id, are unleashed and set upon society, not, on a concept of normlessness, as for instance Merton most frequently refers to anomie.

Mestrovic viewed *homo duplex* as related to economic anomie through the economic sphere's embracing of the lower pole of human nature and its insatiable desires, a derangement where the division of labour is organised abnormally, out of accord with a given society's historic and social development. Durkheim’s view, as Mestrovic noted, was in opposition and a reaction to, classical economists' arguments that structuring society and economics around the ethic of self-interest would lead to a desirable capitalism. Durkheim believed that such an approach was perilous and volatile. Durkheim, Mestrovic believed, saw religious elements as present in economics, as much as in all other social phenomena, where the

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economic is egoistic and therefore profane, and must be kept separate from and subject to the higher pole of *homo duplex* sacred ideals of morals and constraints enshrined in the State and taught in mediating institutions of the community, school, family, workplace and church.304 *Homo duplex*, Mestrovic believed, helps to elucidate Durkheim's perspective, in that society can be seen as subject to stronger forces of sympathy and desire, where anomie as *dereglement* – a derangement, sin or immorality embraces and institutionalises negative egoistic desiring elements of human nature - elements that must be countered by reforming social institutions like the nation, the State, the family, Church and corporations towards greater sympathy and compassion, restraining individuals so that a greater social cohesion and happiness may be realised. Durkheim, Mestrovic believed, focused on the economic sphere of society as providing the negative aspects of *homo duplex* with a site for development, and was critical of economic habits extrapolated onto various other social institutions. 305

Anomic societies address knowledge through emphasising and focusing on subjective or objective factors in life. Durkheim argued that *homo duplex* partially involves uniting these two approaches, especially in education and sociology, which should balance humanistic subjective and scientific objective research and learning.306 Durkheim's conclusion was not that Western formulations of *homo duplex* are superior to those of other cultures, but rather that Western culture displays various possible historic expressions of life just as, for instance, Aboriginal culture presents others. In both instances, Mestrovic believed, Durkheim was not attempting to devise a positivistic functionalist formula for explaining and dealing with deviance and integration, but was rather showing how *homo duplex* is the foundation for religion.307

Seeing Durkheim's position as an alternative to extreme sociologism or psychologism, Mestrovic believed that Durkheim's *homo duplex* view of representations, critiqued utilitarian, and present forms of economic theory, which rely on the unrestrained ego.308 Mestrovic believed that when society is conceptualised as a system of representations, it can also be seen as sick when *homo duplex* is out of kilter, where conscious social motives are asynchronous with the unconscious will of society.309 When individualism focuses on this lower pole of

homo duplex, Mestrovic argued, narcissistic tendencies are socialised, affecting social phenomena like politics where the will of the people becomes egoistic and subject to the abyss of desires. Political anomie is thus also related to homo duplex where excesses of individualism that embrace the will, cause imbalances in society leading away from the benign and collective forms of individualism Durkheim argued for.310

Mestrovic’s sociology requires the body and its will to interpret the more collective elements of social life, but sociology must also always be cautious in avoiding becoming subject to the body’s egoistic tendencies and focus on its compassionate parts interacting with sociological training and the reasoned parts of life.

Homo duplex is a unity of higher and lower pole tendencies in individuals and society. Those tendencies are constantly in battle in both entities and in the representations of them. Determination by collective representations and social facts is a social reality, but it is always confounded by homo duplex, which also has individualistic and egoistic as well as immoral tendencies. A peaceable society requires the unity to be in balance.

Mestrovic believed that Durkheim’s concept of homo duplex refracts Schopenhauer’s concept of the will and idea, where the will becomes the body, irrationality, profane and the lower pole and the idea becomes society, rationality, the sacred and the higher pole of the duality. For Mestrovic, Durkheim sought to bring the two tendencies together creating a balance not unlike Durkheim’s belief that epistemology and the sociology of knowledge is a mid-point between rationalism and empiricism. Durkheim, Mestrovic claimed, did not reject the body but saw it as a source for enquiring into the thing-in-itself, or noumenon. However, the will, Mestrovic argued, has had three centuries of reign, hidden by the rationalisations of mind-centred cultures. Similarly to where Freud’s concept of the id was concerned, the will is stronger than the idea and must be constrained rather than rationalised.

Mestrovic believed that Durkheim, through the concept of anomie had revealed that economically orientated views of the individual and society had changed each entity, such that a demoralisation had taken place. When unconstrained, economics tends to the lower pole of homo duplex and this becomes habitually applied to other parts of life such as society and individuals. Durkheim critiqued socialists and classical economists for favouring economics and seeing economics as the source of morality. For Durkheim, such an approach is a recipe

for anomie in economics, politics and society, as *homo duplex* representations become distorted.

Durkheim, Mestrovic argued, viewed society and individuals in such a way that excessive sociological or psychological apprehensions were each insufficient for explanation. Each of those tendencies, when extreme is as anomic as tendencies to extreme objectivism or subjectivism. Seeking a balance between diverse social currents, Durkheim, Mestrovic believed, viewed social institutions of the State, religion, family, workplace and school as central. Sick societies have *homo duplex* representations that are unbalanced. Durkheim’s countering of this tendency, Mestrovic argued, requires that the consciousness of individuals be in accord with the unconscious will of society.
Mestrovic's adaptation and application of social facts

Mestrovic's adaptation and use of Durkheim's concept of social facts will be explained in this chapter, including Mestrovic's view of Durkheim's use of the concept of the unconscious in regard to social facts, and Mestrovic's distinction of social facts as social products, by, society - which are true social facts, distinguished from those produced, in, society. An explanation of Mestrovic's utilisation of the unconscious in relation to social facts, which for Mestrovic brings into question individuals' opinions and subjective viewpoints, will be undertaken. Mestrovic's view of the social ramifications of the unconscious with regard to social facts will be explained, as will Mestrovic's notation of Durkheim's argument that language is a socially sourced fact imposed on people.

Mestrovic studied Durkheim's notion of social facts, seeing Durkheim's and his followers' studies, as those in the pursuit of a science of moral facts.\footnote{311} Schoenfeld and Mestrovic noted that in the introduction to La Morale, which Durkheim began writing before his death in 1917, Durkheim claimed of his sociology:

> We shall therefore call it "Science of Morality" or "Science of Moral Facts," understanding thereby that it deals with moral phenomena or moral reality as it can be observed either in the present or in the past, just as physics or physiology deal with the facts that they study.\footnote{312}

Mestrovic saw the study of social facts as one aspect of that project. Durkheim's study of moral facts involved treating morality impersonally in the same way as social facts. A science of moral facts allows a broad analysis of problematic social phenomena, not just suicide and crime.\footnote{313} Mestrovic argued that

> . . . to study morals as social facts in a Durkheimian fashion, one would study the subjective representations or society's ideal and real norms, as well as the 'thing' aspect of social


Mestrovic examined the meaning of the term ‘social fact’, pointing out that Durkheim used the French term *fait social*, which does not simply translate as ‘social fact’ in the English meaning. *Faite*, in French, is derived from *faire*, which relates to all sorts of social ‘doings’.315 Mestrovic concurred with Willer, who argued that the French word *fait* used by Durkheim and often translated as ‘fact’, is more commonly used in French to denote ‘act’.316 Mestrovic argued that constraint is not the centre of Durkheim's thought but is instead a signal towards recognising social facts.317

This interpretation, for Mestrovic meant that a number of social things like suicide, but also religion and socialism can be analysed. Mestrovic saw Durkheim's (1895) book as revealing illusory aspects and appearances, as well as underlying realities and resolutions of social decadence.318 Mestrovic noted that Durkheim's interest in social facts was realised through utilising various social statistics to analyse consumer, conjugal and economic trends in society.319

Mestrovic identified Durkheim's method for studying facts as:

1. Questioning and being contemptuous of subjective, popular and scholarly beliefs about objects of study.320
2. Discounting subjects, witnesses, agents and society's opinions, to get "an angle", that is in the French language's sense of *le biais* on the topic, that extends beyond simplistic observation, description and classification.321

3. The angle involves carefully rejecting subjective elements to discover causes, functions, sentiments that produce, and needs that are met by, social facts.

4. Scientifically rearranging the problem in such a way that some constructive result may occur.\(^{322}\)

Schoenfeld and Mestrovic noted that an important issue for Durkheim was making sociological distinctions between normal and pathological social facts. This was done by avoiding ideological distinctions made by powerful social actors and organisations as well as distinctions constructed through public opinion.\(^{323}\) Mestrovic argued that Durkheim's (1895) method was inductive, seeking to eliminate preconceptions to get at objective social facts, arguing that conceptions come from perceptions, and not, as is argued today, from other conceptions.\(^{324}\)

Mestrovic recounted Durkheim's view of the unconscious with respect to social facts, collective representations and the collective conscience. Mestrovic argued that successive authors have misinterpreted Durkheim in seeing norms (Yorberg, 1982), constraint (Hund, 1982), commonly shared cognitive and normative ideas (Berger and Berger, 1975), political leadership (Hagehorn, 1983) and any product of social interaction (Wallwork, 1972), as social facts.\(^{325}\)

Mestrovic argued that Durkheim made a distinction between social facts produced in society and social facts produced by society.\(^{326}\) Mestrovic implied that scholars confuse the two types of social facts, in their belief that second order social facts produced in society are the prime social facts. This mistake, Mestrovic believed, has not only led to a misinterpretation of Durkheim as describing social facts produced in society when Durkheim was interested in social facts produced by society, but has also led to the flawed assumption that the individual's perspective is a valid area of inquiry to focus intently on.\(^{327}\) Durkheim was less interested in amassing knowledge about social facts than in discovering the causes of social facts, often hidden by the unconscious.\(^{328}\)


Mestrovic argued that this was evident in Durkheim's approach to studying the collective conscience where:

The society that morality bids us desire is not the society as it appears to itself, but the society as it is or is really becoming. The consciousness which society may have of itself which is expressed in general opinion may be an inadequate view of the underlying reality... It is also possible that... certain principles... may for a time be relegated to the unconscious and so appear not to exist.329

Durkheim (1908), Mestrovic believed, had a complex understanding of the unconscious in his thought.330 The idea of the unconscious both promotes and undermines modernity. The unconscious breaks down accepted middle class traditionalism and rationality, and, can oppose the social action of rationality.331 Mestrovic was critical of Protestant culture which, Mestrovic believed, is deeply fearful of the unconscious.332

Mestrovic also addressed what he believed was Durkheim's study of language as a social fact, shaping and influencing human behaviour and thinking. Mestrovic noted that Saussure (1916) described langue, langage and parole through Durkheimian terminology, in referring to language as 'a social fact'.333 Saussure claimed that language was a social fact, a statement that is still being debated today, but one that did not need explaining to his contemporary audience due to Durkheim's having established this point clearly. Today, Mestrovic argued, postmodern philosophy ignores or does not know how to approach language considered as a social fact.334 When words are perceived as social facts, their lack of personalised meaning leads to a countering of egotism and the lower pole of homo duplex, the pole to which

p.275.

Mestrovic argued postmodern theorists hold to, increasing their own and others’ anarchy and anomie.335

Mestrovic repeatedly referred to what he thought was the vacuous concept of the social fact of anomie as 'normlessness' that has been mistakenly attributed to Durkheim by sociologists Merton and Parsons and psychologists alike, when compared to the rich and deeper meanings for suicide and self-ruination actually expressed by Durkheim and Durkheimians who articulated the concept of the total social fact,336 which is physical, psychological and social.

In referring to the operationalisation of the total social fact as three dimensional, Mestrovic argued that Seyle's foundational works on stress337 shares some affinities with Durkheim, wherein psychological stress defence mechanisms apply to societies just as they do to cellular biology and where stress can have particular features without a clearly identified cause. For Mestrovic, Seyle's approach is like that of Walter Canon, who argued that "... the homeostasis of the individual human being is largely dependent on social homeostasis",338 is reminiscent of Durkheim's view that broad societal factors and collective representations have repercussions at the individual level.

Mestrovic doubted that positivistic approaches could serve in operationalising the total social fact due to their strict separation of the subject and object. Mestrovic favoured a 'naturalistic' approach in which the three aspects of anomie as a total social fact could be studied to identify their coinciding existence in societies.339

Mestrovic argued that to understand the implications of considering anomie as a total social fact, various social activities and their accompanying physiological and psychological aspects should be qualitatively studied to discern what, and whether any effects are evident. As an example, Mestrovic proposed that lynch mob actors could be investigated with regard to their subjective psychological experiences and whether any physiological effects like, for instance diarrhoea, occur beside that social act. In the quantitative sense, Mestrovic argued that rates of lynch mobbing could be cross-referenced with other expressions of anomie.340

Schoenfeld and Mestrovic saw justice as a social fact, arguing that for Durkheim, contracts were sacred and collectively sourced, invoking a moral dimension superseding the agreeing parties' particularities. Justice is a normative influence here, stopping the stronger party from exploiting the weaker. Justice evokes sentiments and concepts that are greater than contract conditions and individuals' intentions expressed within the agreement. Justice in this way is a social fact, higher than individuals and external to their agreements in contract form.\textsuperscript{341} Although admitting that it is very difficult to specify how Durkheim's concept of justice as a social fact could be operationalised, as well as raising problems with respect to debates over is-ought and fact-value distinctions and imperatives, Schoenfeld and Mestrovic argued that Durkheim's concept of justice provides a useful framework with which to apprehend society in the contemporary context.\textsuperscript{342}

Mestrovic implied that consciously and unconsciously, so psychologically, as well as physiologically and socially, postemotionalism is a total social fact affecting other social facts such as language and justice. For instance, postemotional types experience fatigue over compassion - a mechanised product of commercialised culture for mass consumption and which leads to pity and not the true compassion of \textit{caritas}.\textsuperscript{343} With regard to justice, Mestrovic pointed to the trial of O.J. Simpson for double murder as an example where the imperative for justice was overcome by the postemotional penchant for seeing all sides, or where every person's view of the case is irretreivably biased, both which lead to people's inaction. Internationally the inaction over the 1990s Balkans Wars is another example for Mestrovic where world leaders, like their citizenry experienced revulsion, but were unable to be committed such that they acted on their physiological reactions and emotions.\textsuperscript{344}

Mestrovic worked with Durkheim's view of social facts, arguing that the concept of the social fact has often been understood. Durkheim called his sociology the science of moral facts and Mestrovic believed that it was a science with broad ranging relevance.

Mestrovic noted Durkheim's method for studying social facts involved largely disregarding taken for granted assumptions regarding them to see the

real causes and reasons for social facts, which are concerned with goings on produced by society and not simply constraint therein. This can be assisted by perception and sometimes can involve the unconscious, which is where motives are often situated – unknown by individuals and institutions but subject to the same method for inquiry.

Mestrovic pointed out that for Durkheim language is a social fact in being impersonal, as well as historically and community sourced. Seen in that way, language creates society as well as being created by it. That, for Mestrovic highlights Durkheim’s claims that society is as natural as individuals and that social facts can be distinguished from psychological facts.

Mestrovic drew on the Durkheimian notion of the total social fact that encompasses the social but also the physiological and psychological dimensions, to argue that when society is out of kilter, people within it cannot be completely balanced and that such issues can be studied empirically. Although more difficult to study, justice is also a social fact in standing over individuals, protecting them from exploitation.

Through the postemotional concept, Mestrovic can be seen as evoking the total social fact where people, subject to an industry that imparts culture, have worn out their compassion, are unable to act upon it and this has repercussions on the social, psychological and physiological dimensions of life. Postemotionalism is an anomic total social fact for Mestrovic.
Mestrovic's adaptation and application of 'collective representations'

This chapter explains Mestrovic's taking from and applying Durkheim's concept of collective representations. Mestrovic believed that representation was central to Durkheim and was very similar to, and reflected, Schopenhauer's position regarding rationalism and empiricism. Mestrovic's distinction of his take on Durkheim compared to other commentators will be noted, as will Mestrovic's belief that the concept of collective representations has relevance for contemporary studies of society as an alternative to individualistically orientated investigations. Mestrovic saw postemotional society as replete with manufactured emotional representations, pointing to Balkanisation and the neglect on the part of populations where considering the suffering of others is concerned. Postemotional representations can be identified in children's education and peer groups. Postemotional collective representations also extend to politics and sport.

Mestrovic took Durkheim's view of collective representations very seriously. In studying this concept, Mestrovic argued, Durkheim attempted to renovate rationalism. Mestrovic saw Durkheim's refracted Schopenhauerian sociology as viewing society as based upon representations - a merger of rationalist and empiricist ideas. Mestrovic noted that the word *representation* in French translates literally into 'idea' in English. Mestrovic argued that for Durkheim, in the *Rules*, representations behave in the way of things, existing somewhat independently and having a *sui generis* force. There and elsewhere, Durkheim argued that they also often escape consciousness. Society is composed of ideas along with feelings.

In Durkheim's essay 'Sociology in France in the nineteenth century', Mestrovic noted that Durkheim asserted that societies "... are nothing if not systems of representations ... and the essential object is to study how collective representations are formed and combined." Mestrovic noted that in The *Rules* Durkheim argued "... we had expressly stated and reiterated in every way possible that social life was made up entirely of representations."

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349. Mestrovic, S. (1985). 'Durkheim's renovated rationalism and the idea that "collective life is only made of..."
Mestrovic noted that Durkheimians constantly referred to representations, a clear pursual of their leader’s concept which made it possible for them to break away from positivism and towards what came to be termed ‘renovated rationalism’.

Bougie in a lecture at Columbia University stated the view that Durkheim was not a materialist but was a renovated rationalist, true to the spirit of rationalism, injected with the spirit but not enslaved by, positivism. By reforming rationalism Durkheim, Mestrovic believed, led the way towards an approach which was neither entirely Cartesian or Kantian, in *The Forms* claiming:

> Thus renovated, the theory of knowledge seems destined to unite the opposing advantages of the two rival theories, without incurring their inconveniences. It keeps all the essential principles of the a priorists; but at the same time it is inspired by the positive spirit which the empiricists have striven to satisfy. It leaves the reason its specific power, but it accounts for it and does so without leaving the world of observable phenomena. It affirms the duality of our intellectual life, but it explains it, and with natural causes.

Mestrovic believed that Durkheim’s ‘renovated rationalism’ was very similar to Schopenhauer’s ‘transcendental idealism’ in attempting to avoid what he believed was the mistake of Kantians, who took concepts, which are actually formed, or chosen to express perceptual empirical experiences, and reified them, turning science into a conceptual game. Opposing that tendency in *a priorism*, Durkheim, Mestrovic believed, argued along with Schopenhauer when stating “... in order to be objective science must start from sense-perceptions and not from concepts that have been formed independently from it.”

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research involves more than observation, noting that sociologists as a group have become separated due to the inductive versus deductive epistemological polemic, relegating induction to being relevant to qualitative research only. Mestrovic believed that adopting Durkheim's approach leads to a critique of research communities for missing the important point that the observation of individuals' representations, which positivistic-valuing approaches favour, are always the least appropriate phenomena to focus on in examining social facts, when compared with the importance of focusing on collective representations in the social realm to explain the individual representations of persons affected by their social milieu. Durkheim, Mestrovic argued, did not believe that all of society is a result of collective representations, but rather saw a continuum of individual to collective representations, constantly reworked by individual psychical factors. The collective can never be equated with the individual and that is why Durkheim discounted the relevance of individual actors and witnesses, he saw no point in sociology's focusing on the individual's perspectives.

Mestrovic conceded that whilst neither Schopenhauer nor Durkheim rejected deduction nor considered induction unproblematic, their point was that empirical study should not start with concepts or deduction. Mestrovic argued that when considering what he thought was anomie, Durkheim did not start with a concept, but the sorrowful, unhappy, and malaised societies he observed at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Mestrovic believed that Durkheim's inductive approach is relevant to contemporary Western societies where anomie still exists but is presently apprehended as collective and individualised representations of stress, disordered sleeping and drug addiction. Eastern European societies, themselves in a state of flux as they move from one social structure to another also reflect malaise and discontent of the sort Durkheim identified as pathological in the Rules.

Mestrovic and Brown believed that Durkheim utilised the concept of dereglement or derangement to explain how representations become subject to
collective malformations. Mestrovic went so far in his Schopenhauerian representationalism, that he saw postemotionalism as exhibiting representations individually and collectively of *homo duplex* in dereglement where by way of education, politics and commerce, the emotions are manipulated and reworked, further agitating the relationship between the two poles of life in a world that is 'will as representation'.

Mestrovic, in distinguishing his position from those of modernism and postmodernism argued that modernism saw the world as filled with set and unvital categories, and postmodernism as having seen the world as without foundations, fictional, abstracted and devoid of emotions. Mestrovic's postemotionalism, he argued by comparison, is about a material world full of fictions which are immersed in dislocated and supplanted emotions, engineered by what Adorno called the culture industry, which in postemotionalism is for Mestrovic “... the dawning of artificially contrived authenticity, or what I call the authenticity industry.”

Mestrovic argued in opposition to the proto postmodernism of Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy* where myths could be separated from modernity's intellectualisation to become liberatory where human spirit is concerned. Mestrovic argued instead that postmodern approximations and the celebrations of myths and fictions have not liberated people. Nor does postemotional society lead to liberation, as myths and intellectualisations are mixed therein, altering emotions.

*Against Nietzsche, I would point out that abstract mores, laws and government are not the problem - for what could they be but abstract? - but that abstract emotions are. The notion of an abstract emotion seems to be an oxymoron, yet is exactly what I intend in the theory of postemotionalism. It is not cultural sterility but emotional sterility that plagues our present fin de siecle. With the postemotional concept, I am proposing something new, not a struggle or balance between will and idea, but the will as representation or idea.*

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Mestrovic critiqued postmodernity to differentiate a Nietzschean world of circulating fictions with his one of circulating emotions where collective representations are concerned. In evoking the will with regard to the emotions in this way, Mestrovic drew on Schopenhauer's view of the ever striving and destructive will to life. Implying that a derangement is spread through the postemotional condition, Mestrovic pointed to the collective representation of Balkanisation - the splintering of identity and solidarity internationally and in different communities nationally. Mestrovic believed that the unexamined issue of barbaric cultural habits needed to be addressed in an alarming context where people are currently seeking a "New World Order (or what has subsequently come to be called 'globalisation') on the flimsy basis of surface transformations to modernist, egalitarian ideals". Mestrovic saw western tolerance over the violence in the Bosnian war as a Veblen-like, quasi-barbaric cultural habit of coolly considering the suffering of other humans.

In what can be viewed as having identified a derangement of knowledge, technology, community and commerce and in critiquing Toffler and Toffler's argument that information systems will allow internet cosmopolitanism, Mestrovic, in seeing the internet as about knowledge constituted by information, argued that information is insufficient alone in providing a base for community which is really founded on sentiments and emotions. Mestrovic, in evoking Durkheim, suggested that in postemotional society "... 'we have reasoned so much! We know so much more information than our ancestors.'" For Mestrovic, however, the excessive focus on what is at base a cognitive focus in an information world, has not potentially or in reality made it a better place, as postemotional persons are in fact increasingly bewildered and lonely. The diverse, battling "spins" over this knowledge, Balkanises local communities of various communities of interest or location which are hostile to nearby communities, revealing the unspoken of the underside of political and academic uses of the concepts community and communitarianism. Commercial interests manipulate people's orientations in these regards for economic purposes.

It is a paradox of contemporary cultures that they simultaneously promote individualism as well as automated emotions... advertisers have perfected

the skill of appealing to tastes, not of a whole strata of society, but a particular neighbourhood, block, lifestyle, and other very narrow categories. The contemporary consumer is... an agent convinced that he or she possesses some degree of freedom to choose group identities, and this belief makes the agent a target of manipulation by corporations who pitch advertisements in relation to specific subgroup versions of emotional reality. And heightened consciousness will not alter matters... {as} contemporary advertisements sell feelings, moods and emotions that are synthetically attached to a given product. Billions of dollars are spent on achieving and maintaining consumer "loyalty" to a particular emotional experience.368

In what can be seen as representations of childhood in postemotional society, Mestrovic, in updating Riesman's distinctions between inner-directed and other-directed life where teachers and students are concerned, noted that Riesman had pointed out that whereas in earlier times inner-directed teachers were 'socially and emotionally aloof'369 from the child and interested in the child's achievements, later, when other-directed, teachers became interested in children's smiles and their niceness, play, and the peer group as a social enterprise.

Mestrovic argued that these tendencies have become exacerbated in the school and other social contexts children inhabit. In the school the peer group is of central importance, where one's seating with regard to the status of one's peers is of uppermost relevance, where making friends quickly is a priority but wherein one is not bound to an allegiance to them. In postemotional social contexts children are entertained by pre-packaged entertainment and refreshments to ensure that they are nice to the adults caring for them - adults "... and the teacher now includes the day care attendants who are paid minimum wage ... "370 who must themselves be nice care givers together participating in what Mestrovic believed was a 'niceness' something like Marcuse's 'happy consciousness' where oppositional, hesitant and critical thinking is eroded by a learned obedience and acquiescence to unconsciously adopted normative but manipulations of one's views held over and actions made by the self and with regard to others.371

Neoliberal politicians such as the inner-directed 1990s US House of Representatives Speaker Newt Gingrich who led the 'Republican revolution', do not do well with the public by provoking public indignation when their programmes are not 'nice'. Neoliberals, Mestrovic argued are not, however, escapees from postemotionalism, through: using the technology of the media in presenting well planned packages of what are emotional deformations of historical phenomena; being masters of adopting an indignant demeanour; promoting tolerance on the part of particularly white men, and; mostly giving off an air of being nice.372

Collective events such as sport are not for Mestrovic civilised examples of rule-based collectivities, they are in fact, barbaric, day long experiences, and fantasies of violence.373 Mestrovic saw contemporary sports events as evidence of the private barbarism that still prevails despite the public facade of civilisation. At the sports event, supporters call for their team to kill the opposition, and the media report games where one team massacred the other. Supporters shout profanities, leave rubbish at venues and build a mystical and sacred aura around mascots, rituals and performances conducted before and during the actual playing of the game. Additionally, with regard to the present case “... the liquor that is consumed - suggests that Veblen's barbaric habits operate despite the civilised constraints and rules that are supposedly imposed on the contest.”374

It can be seen with regard to what are collective representations, Mestrovic was arguing that contrary to Durkheim's hopes for a post religious societal renewal embracing of a spontaneous secular collective effervescence that would renew faith through group assemblies and ceremonies, in postemotional societies, collective effervescence is created through strategised, engineered and packaged emotions with regard to representations. For Durkheim group assemblies like those in religion allow people to connect with the sacred, collectively realised in faith rejuvenating 'imitative rites'.375 The closest social practice that resembles imitative rites, for Mestrovic, is the group activity of following sport. However, sport fanaticism and totemism, despite raising emotions, does not leave fans with renewed faith in the sense Durkheim intended. Rather, Mestrovic argued, the emotions expressed in fans' collective effervescence are more of an inauthentic brief emotional reprieve from their otherwise bleak lives, and could be said to "... constitute a postemotional imitation of imitation rites."376

This chapter has been concerned with Mestrovic's work on the concept of collective representations in Durkheim, explaining Mestrovic's study of Durkheim's epistemology considered as 'renovated rationalism' - a point Durkheim sought as being mid-way point and solving the problems in the debate between rationalism and empiricism. Mestrovic introduced Schopenhauer's relevance to qualitative and quantitative research debates and crises in social research where, for Mestrovic, the views of individuals are suspect unless representations are acknowledged as individual and collective. Mestrovic examined the relevance of collective representations for contemporary society where self abuse, addiction, and, social change in Eastern European post-communist nations are concerned.

The postemotional concept is utilised by Mestrovic to denote a world of deranged collective representations - derangements of social and individual representations of *homo duplex*. Mestrovic identified the collective representations in postemotional society as circulating emotions. Postemotional society is one of prepackaged and sometimes purchased emotions, metaphorically and actually related to Balkans Wars, indicating societal breakdown and genocide. Mestrovic drew on the work of Thorstein Veblen's view of modern barbarism, extending Durkheim's analysis of representations to note the inauthenticity of representations and people’s lives in postemotional society. Information technologies, advertisers, politicians, teachers, children’s peer groups, niceness, and self and other relations are all related to collective representations of postemotionalism.
Mestrovic's adaptation and application of Durkheim's 'cult of the individual'

The cult of the individual is an historical product preceded by earlier, even ancient cults that like the cult of the individual, were collectively sourced. There are alternative cults to that of the individual. Mestrovic saw Durkheim as opposing the anomic individualistic cult of the self expressed in classical economics. The cult of the individual encourages social justice by expressing the sentiments and ideas attached to people concerning rights and dignity — often in tension with public opinion and the reality of exploitation and abuse. Nonetheless, Mestrovic believed that Durkheim’s concept of the cult of the individual has an important contribution to make in promoting authentic, constructive communication between people such that a benign individualism is possible without lapsing into malignant forms which are anomic or egoistic. Postemotional society, however, does not tend towards such a situation. Rather, postemotional communication, understanding and tolerance is a rhetorical pretence of the cult of the individual as envisioned by Durkheim.

Mestrovic pointed out that for Durkheim societal cults have great force. This is as true for traditional as it is for modern societies. Durkheim saw the totemic cult of seeing animals or vegetables as imbued with the sacred as sourced in 'a vague power spread though these things'. The collective is important to the cult as it is what secures the well being of the individual. This is the collective and sacred basis of Durkheim's 'cult of man' in modern societies where "... man has become a god for men." Mestrovic believed that Durkheim was arguing that when in a state of anomie, societal representations will be in discord, rupturing beneficial cults. In writing Professional Ethics and Civil Morals Mestrovic believed Durkheim adopted the stance that the cult of the individual is the new cosmopolitan ethic and social rule for modernity, savaged by the anomie contained in the self-interested basis of classic economic theory. For Durkheim, the individualistic view that one's life is entirely one's own is wrong. In referring negatively to classical economics, Durkheim argued that the “... cult of man is something accordingly very different from the egoistic individualism above referred to, which leads to suicide”.

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Mestrovic and Brown believed that anomie was for Durkheim a case of the defiling of justice, a profaning of the *cult de l'homme*,\(^{381}\) inferring that in Durkheim's writings justice is interpreted as bringing together "the necessities of social cohesion with the principle of individualism".\(^{382}\) Schoenfeld and Mestrovic noted that in the essay 'Individualism and the Intellectuals', Durkheim distinguished between the egoistic individualism of Spencer and an individualism of the social institutional kind Durkheim advocated for. The linguistic similarity between the two approaches was criticised by Durkheim as a similarity in language only, arguing that individualism did not mean that the source of his approach was the individual.\(^{383}\)

Comte's optimistic positivism was usurped at the end of the nineteenth century and what replaced it was a pessimistic irrationalism, what Nietzsche described as the case where "... the cult of feeling was erected in place of the cult of reason".\(^{384}\) Mestrovic and Brown argued that rather than dwelling on the mechanical and organic societal arrangements as many scholars do, *The Division of Labor in Society* should be apprehended more often than it is presently, as a work about the cult of truth and the cult of the individual.\(^{385}\)

Mestrovic argued that Durkheim's ideal of a moral individualism or cult of the individual has, in terms of its internationalisation, come to pass as Durkheim foretold. Democracy and individual human rights, as well as those of children and ethnic minorities, are forms of increased dignity held for human persons. For Mestrovic, these can be seen as generally agreed upon ideals, despite cases of public opinion to the contrary.\(^{386}\) Schoenfeld and Mestrovic argued that the cult of the individual is present in the triumph of individualism over totalitarianism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, expressing a concern for the weak and powerless in society.\(^{387}\) Schoenfeld and Mestrovic argued that:

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In sum, the most radical element in Durkheim's brand of individualism is that it is not based on the egoistic, utilitarian, profane, isolated individual. Rather, the sacred aura that is attached synthetically to individuals in modern societies is derived from the sacred power of the group.388

With regard to cultural relativism, Mestrovic argued that Durkheim did differentiate in degrees between different societies' moralities. However, he also argued for a cosmopolitanisation of humanity, where in Western societies regardless of one’s attachment to one or more of numerous groups, people should be informed by an ideal of the human person that imbues all social groups.389

Mestrovic also, however, pointed to the barriers to a cult of the individual in contemporary societies where the treatment of children is concerned. Mestrovic noted that Durkheim wrote specifically about the weak position of children,390 yet sociologists rarely raise his writings in their discussions over morality and children. Durkheim also commented that a Sioux Indian chief was appalled at the physical punishment meted out to white children by their parents. The chief thought they were barbarians for treating their children in such a way.391 For Durkheim, the use of physical punishment, despite being a product of culture had in his time come to be seen as "... repugnant, something that revolts our conscience - in a word, something immoral". These issues, Mestrovic believed, raise a number of questions over enlightenment, which should lead to the cult of the individual, but where that does not always occur in reality.392

392. Mestrovic, S. (1989). 'Moral theory based on the 'heart' versus the 'mind': Schopenhauer's and Durkheim's critiques of Kantian ethics'. Sociological Review, 37(3), p. 451 quoted Durkheim's (1925) 1961, p.183 Moral Education. If I could add here that children are still not accorded full and equal human rights in western legislation and societies where for instance physical punishment is concerned. Mestrovic’s point is also relevant here in that so called enlightened and rights-respecting countries would be recognising the cult of the individual for children if their rights to education were not removed in the form of suspensions.
The study of morality, informed by Durkheim and Schopenhauer, Mestrovic believed, would look at actual and ideal moral behaviour and also, the "thing" of morals, that is, the objective nature of morals that allows representations to emerge. By utilising a mind versus the heart approach, Mestrovic argued that various societies which favour one of those two poles could be compared to see if they exhibit more animal abuse, and childism. Mestrovic believed it would be interesting to compare modern societies that favour the mind, with traditional societies, to see whether enlightenment leads to more or less compassion. With regard to childism, Mestrovic noted that Western youths commit most criminal acts, violence is one of the leading correlations in youth mortality. Mestrovic raised a number of rhetorical questions over whether Enlightenment and changed thinking about children correlates, and whether derogatory language and terminology referring to children is an artefact of formerly lower societal individualisms.

Mestrovic noted Habermas' (1987) call to find a rational intersubjective communication that will replace the nihilism and neo-conservatism of postmodernity, and Habermas' admission of the difficulty of discovering a way to institute that communication. Mestrovic argued that Durkheim's fin de siècle irrationalism encapsulated in the 'cult of the individual' is a partial solution to the problem of finding a way for the coalescence of individualism and community.

Whilst societies have embraced the cult of the individual, Mestrovic also argued, societies have also changed so that people react with feigned, mechanised, insincere, manipulated, inauthentic emotions that contradict the cult which Durkheim argued for. Postemotionalism appears, for Mestrovic, to be a cult. This could be called a cult of postemotions. Anomic, this cult can be identified by a general demeanour expressed by all political and ideological quarters of society. Institutionally and socially, what could be called Mestrovic's articulation of the cult of postemotions is a rhetorical approach to tolerance. Whilst Durkheim did argue for tolerance in his cult of the individual, postemotional society presents tolerance in a bland and prepackaged way. Mestrovic argued that rather than being held as something spontaneously or disinterestedly responded to, tolerance in the cult of postemotions is something that is managed, prepared, and a presentation. People

in postemotional, contemporary societies Mestrovic argued, mistake their feigned indignant reactions for true moral repulsion.396

The cult of the individual is meant to be a cult that, as a representation, supports ideas and feelings of the person in general and contributes to the unity of society and is opposite to that of the cult of the self presented by extremely individualistic economics. As a concept related to justice, the cult of the individual is sourced in group-based sacredness. Attempts to alleviate the discrimination against youth and other marginalised people in society is sourced in the cult of the individual, but the compassion and sympathy evoked by the concept is fraudulent in postemotional society. The cult of the individual, a compassionate but distant respect for the dignity of persons can often be difficult to see in postemotional society.

Mestrovic's adaptation and application of Durkheim's concept of anomie

Mestrovic interpreted the concept of anomie used by Durkheim in its historical and etymological context, applying anomie to various phenomena, such as legislation regarding, and definitions of mental illness, as well as society, economics, politics, psychology, physiology, social science and social theory.

Durkheim's genius was to apply the typically fin de siècle insight to society conceived as a totality sui generis, a being with its own will that is something other than the sum of its parts. This is the full import of Durkheim's famous yet still misunderstood concept of the anomic society.397

Anomie as dereglement

Etymologically and linguistically, Mestrovic and Brown argued that with regard to anomie seen as deregulation and normlessness – the most common are impoverished translations of the term dereglement that Durkheim utilised in his writings. In French the term denotes the immoral or suffering. In this way anomie is more like madness or a sin, than concerned with deregulation or normlessness. Anomie as dereglement is a derangement,398 and when viewed as a social fact, implies a state of immorality.399 Mestrovic and Brown noted that Durkheim rejected the notion held by Guyau that anomie could be moral.400

Mestrovic and Brown criticised Merton’s interpretation of anomie as normlessness, arguing that in his dictionary, Johnson’s (1785) view of lawlessness was one where laws are rules of action, axioms of science, decrees, statutes, customs, and laws of mechanics, jurisprudence and the Bible. Anomy was for Johnson more like the French ‘derangement’ than Merton’s ‘normlessness’ as a synonym for lawlessness.401

Mestrovic and Brown saw Durkheim's references to *anomie* as sociological conclusions regarding a sacrilege of domestic, intellectual, conjugal, economic and religious social practices. Lalande argued that *regle* is not descriptive but rather prescriptive. The *Littre* (*1863* 1963), the French dictionary comparable to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, and authored by a follower of Comte, defines *deregle*, firstly, as no longer regular, secondly as an intestinal disorder (which Mestrovic and Brown saw as unrelated to anomie), thirdly as corrupt, 'dissolute conduct', and fourthly, as a 'violation against the poetic rules'. Mestrovic and Brown believed that these meanings of *deregle* denote the concept of derangement.

Mestrovic and Brown translated the French edition of *Suicide* (*1897* 1983b, p. 283) regarding Durkheim's reference to anomie in the business world. Although conceding that Spaulding and Simpson's translating 'regle de dereglement' as "a rule that is a lack of rule" (*1897* 1951, p. 257) is better than translations of 'normlessness' by others, Mestrovic and Brown, in translating a passage from the original French text of *Suicide*, argued that what Durkheim really meant was that in economics:

*The passion for infinity is commonly presented as a mark of moral distinction, even though it cannot so appear except in deranged consciences which establish as a rule the derangement from which they suffer. Since this disorder is at its apex in the economic world, it has most victims there.*

Mestrovic critiqued Merton for accepting Parsons' rationalistic interpretation of Durkheim's view of anomic agency as a case of socially set means and ends responded to in a context of normlessness. Drawing on Schopenhauer, Mestrovic believed that Durkheimian thought on agency is really about the 'will', which is sourced in individuals and not society and which, contrary to Parsons' and Merton's view of persons as being towed by what they think they desire, really propels them

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unconsciously through its blind and despotic force. Wants, Mestrovic believed are rationalised after the fact. They are not rationally guided. And 'normlessness' diminishes the tension between will and representation which Durkheimians emphasised.406

Mestrovic critiqued Merton's extension of Parsons' functionalist focus on 'the problem of social order' where anomie is concerned. Mestrovic believed that Merton rejected a Freudian type of interpretation of anomie, ignoring the important link between Freud and Durkheim, reflected in the notion of homo duplex, which is not unlike Freud's view of the ego versus the id. For Mestrovic, both thinkers' concepts refracted Schopenhauer's notions of the will and idea.407 Mestrovic argued that if anomie is not sourced in a desiring body driven by the will, then Merton has a problem. Without the will manifested in individuals, the source for anomie would have to be society. But, Mestrovic noted, Merton viewed society as rational and yet also as creating its own sickness (being the anomic state of normlessness). Without a two-poled view of human nature such as that in Durkheim's view of homo duplex, Merton, Mestrovic believed, is unable to explain how a rational society could produce irrationality or pass it onto its inhabitants.408

"Anomie" as a concept for societal research

The concept of anomie, whilst utilised by social scientists, is not well known by the public and is obscured, making it difficult to be applied to the analysis of the economics of modernity. This is problematic and compounded by what is now the descent of Marxism and its concept of alienation.409 Mestrovic agreed with Tiryakian that despite the complete eclipsing of Durkheim's views of economic anomie and the concept of anomie generally, anomie remains a useful concept with which to analyse social institutions.410 Anomie can be seen in a number of social phenomena, particularly with regard to economics. Mestrovic noted that in Suicide, besides the focus denoted by that book's title, Durkheim noted that a number of different things can be viewed as anomie, such as: bankruptcies (1897) 1951, p.

prices of needed foodstuffs (\textit{1897} 1951, p. 244); the amassing of wealth, its concentration, and a widening gap between rich and poor (\textit{1897} 1951, p. 244); alteration in taxation laws (\textit{1897} 1951, p. 249ff); rapid expansion of trade and industry (\textit{1897} 1951, p. 243); world fairs and expositions (\textit{1897} 1951, p. 244); wider media attention to tax law changes (\textit{1897} 1951, p. 249); wider media attention to deregulatory laws (\textit{1897} 1951, p. 255); increased deregulation (\textit{1897} 1951, p. 255); more novelty shops (\textit{1897} 1951, p. 255), and; more businesses selling hedonistic, exotic, sensual and novel products (\textit{1897} 1951, p. 256).\textsuperscript{411}

Mestrovic argued that anomie is only utilised by social scientists in the study of delinquency and criminality, ignoring its application to ethicality and crime in business and economics\textsuperscript{412} when it was “... Durkheim's proposed project to engage in the scientific study of morality that singles out economic anomie as the major culprit in the public debasement of morality.”\textsuperscript{413}

\textit{Economic anomie}

Mestrovic saw Durkheim's \textit{Division of Labour} as addressing deeply embedded economic anomie in the centre of societal and capitalist institutions. This is an approach that restores Durkheim from being interpreted as an optimistic defender of the \textit{status quo}, to his real position of having been a critical pessimist in the \textit{fin de siecle} sense that characterised many late nineteenth century scholars.\textsuperscript{414} In his \textit{Rules}, Durkheim noted that economic abnormality is problematic due to being segmented, and morbid when this practice is universalised.\textsuperscript{415}

\textit{Alongside religion, the economic infrastructure was one of Durkheim's favourite targets of discourse, and he attacked it as a fertile source of anomie. Again, he regarded the economic crises of his day as a symbol of a deeper underlying disorder.}\textsuperscript{416}

Durkheim argued that the 'unlimited aspirations' of an anomic society always entails some sort of pessimism. Economic anomie is the result of people's desire for acquiring more that goes beyond their actual situation, and extends into the political, religious and domestic spheres.

*Professional Ethics and Civil Morals* contains a criticism that business is the only profession that does not have a code of ethics, which although quite normal in terms of classical economics (1950 pp. 14,15 (original French)), raises self interest to the level of being a rule, by viewing economics as the primary purpose of society, but actually poses a public hazard and amoral state of being in society.

In *Socialism and Saint-Simon* (1928) Durkheim criticised classical economic theory and to a lesser extent Saint-Simon, as extending anomie. Both approaches sought to make the profane, material and egoistic economic world the lead societal moral rules which are sacred: “The very idea of such fusion was revolting-like sacrilege ((1928) 1958b: 41).”

In *Socialism and Saint-Simon* anomie as *dereglement* is depicted as a symbol for disease where economics inflames appetites which become insatiable and Marx and the socialists are noted for their giving a 'shriek of pain' resulting from collective social malaise (1928 1978 (original French) p. 27). Durkheim argued that sociology, in its debt to society, is a practice that should be directed towards solving social problems. In this sense Durkheim shared a belief with Marx that science should contribute to the betterment of human life where people are to be considered existentially, rather than hypothetically. But Durkheim did not endorse Marx's solution to nineteenth century economics. In a review of Gaston Richard's *Le Socialisme et la science sociale*, Durkheim rejected Marx's concept of value seeing it as based upon the idea that value is a function of the duration of time spent labouring. Durkheim argued instead that the factors of work difficulty and competition should also be considered when accounting for value. Rejecting

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the move of revolutionising labour, Durkheim argued that more justice should be incorporated into present social frameworks, as societal malaise was universal in society for Durkheim, rather than specifically centered in one social group as Marx claimed.

Mestrovic believed that Durkheim prophesied the postmodernist "success-at-any-cost 'ethic" embedded in the lack of a code of ethics in the business sector, and noted an increasing popular interest in questioning the assumption of rational markets and individuals. "For Durkheim, the economic sphere of life, which is the source of immorality, has become penultimate in social life, and transforms all our other actions." Mestrovic was critical of the Brady Commission's inquiry into the 1987 Stock Market crash which blamed trading mechanisms and computerisation, without investigating contributing philosophical, psychological and social factors. Mestrovic suggested that a return to nineteenth century German fin de siècle economic theory might provide some clues towards that explanation.

Political anomie

Mestrovic and Brown believed that Durkheim criticised government for becoming the 'tool and servant' of anomie, failing to be the regulateur of economics, based on Durkheim's assumption of a secular interpretation of a sinful negligence in not containing infinite profane desires for economic acquisition.

Mestrovic and Brown noted that Durkheim started his Professional Ethics and Civil Morals by stating that a science of morality should study moral and juridical facts in society, and that as a book about anomie, Professional Ethics and Civil Morals studied morality in democracy, business and classical economic theory


with the intended outcome of ridding anomie from society. Durkheim linked utilitarian laissez-faire capitalism with democracy, criticising utilitarians for being delusional in assuming that the masses' appetites would be satiated by capitalism, when in Durkheim's view laissez-faire capitalism makes people less patient and more desiring (1950, p. 22 {original French}). Durkheim also viewed democratic government, interpreted as the will of the people as leading to anomie politically, just as utilitarianism similarly leads to anomie economically, on account of politics becoming subject to individuals' desiring of the infinite ({1950} 1983c, pp. 96, 108).  

For Mestrovic the societal philosophies of politicians such as Gorbachev and Reagan shared a hopeful belief that people's output and lives would be improved by moving towards more minimalised sorts of approaches to government. These are political examples of the invisible hand of Adam Smith which goes unrecognised in both Reagan and Gorbachev. Mestrovic argued that the strong State that is in communication with the nation whilst not tending towards totalitarianism is a possibility, unrealised due to a deafness to the political theory of Durkheim, and noted government 'deregulation' of significant areas of life in contemporary Western societies has led to the State losing strength, and not necessarily enhancing its communication with citizens. Less well off people's position has been made worse, a result of the conservative politics and politicians' deregulatory policies. Unregulated capitulation to the 'will of the people' leads to anomie and social malaise.  

**Contra-anomic corporations**

Mestrovic noted that Durkheim sought the reinstitution of the 'corporation' into social life, to combat the evil of economic anomie that spills over into and deforms domestic and conjugal life.

Mestrovic believed that seeing the 'corporation' as a solution to anomie is problematic when the word 'corporation' today invokes images of glacial rigidity and


hard rationality, and argued that Durkheim’s vision of the corporation was one opposed to modern labour and labour relations which were divorced from the heart.\textsuperscript{436} For Durkheim, the corporation (within the workplace), as the socially sacred would transform life by embracing the heart, where the world of work would itself constitute a society, a wellspring of life \textit{sui generis}, based on and potentially replacing the centrality of family relations.\textsuperscript{437} But Durkheim was not an enemy of the family and sought to inculcate aspects of humane notions of selfhood and domesticity into both men and women, rather than institute an equality of hardness in the public sphere. In \textit{Suicide} Durkheim noted that when the family is ignored in favour of work, the family stops its tendency to ‘circulate’ as it had before.\textsuperscript{438}

Mestrovic noted that due to economic needs, parents must both work to maintain a middle class standard of living. It is clear that for Mestrovic the economic is central in postmodern life, very much in the way that Durkheim noted that economic anomie spills over into the domestic sphere, making it more anomic. Family problems of divorce, delinquency, suicide, etc, have increased since Durkheim’s time, and Mestrovic suggested that a Durkheimian empirical analysis of these factors should be undertaken to discern ways of making the workplace and the private sphere \textit{foyers} of society, and, convincingly saturate these spheres of life with the ideals of individualism and liberalism.\textsuperscript{439} Mestrovic saw echoes of Durkheim’s ideas about the corporation and the family in labour organisation in the Japanese workplace, and, the Swedish formation where fathers and mothers are provided with the funds to take long periods off work to spend formative time periods with their babies, thus retaining the \textit{foyer} of the domestic sphere of society.\textsuperscript{440}

\textbf{Religious anomie}

Mestrovic argued that for Durkheim, religion is not something that can be reduced to the opium of the people, or the psychological needs of its followers, instead, it is a system of representations that reflects society’s collective conscience.\textsuperscript{441} Mestrovic argued that anomie also affects religion and that

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\item \textsuperscript{441} Mestrovic, S. (1991). \textit{The Coming fin de siècle: An Application of Durkheim’s Sociology to Modernity and
Durkheim, like Schopenhauer, believed that pessimism underlies modern religions. Mestrovic believed that this could be attributed to the viciousness and suffering and pain of the Enlightenment where appetites for objects of desire are thereby expanded by "... in a word, anomie", where pessimism is a collective representation. Schoenfeld and Mestrovic studied religion with regard to collective representations of the feminine and masculine. Informed by Durkheim, and Jung, Schoenfeld and Mestrovic sought to identify feminine and masculine characteristics in both women and men irrespective of gender, criticising both the chauvinist position and that of some academic feminists calling for discarding the voice of the feminine. Schoenfeld and Mestrovic claimed that Gilligan's concepts of caring and mutuality, which capture roles of being charitable, motherly, generous, merciful, loving and giving are related to and prioritise these feminine characteristics.

Schoenfeld and Mestrovic saw Christianity's establishment of Protestantism as representing a movement from a mother to a father centered character of society that coincided with an emerging business world of capitalism - a new rationality to religion, a less emotional bourgeois, matter-of-fact simplicity in approaching prayer, church architecture, interior and aura. In evoking an approach like that of Durkheim's *Forms*, Schoenfeld and Mestrovic argued that different religious depictions of feminine views of God in theologies have an effect on different facets of religion, and, that differing concepts of God affect non-religious parts of society, especially economic ones. These religious changes for Mestrovic relate to the increasing societal use of the masculine, the mind and the rational, as opposed to the earlier interest the feminine. Mestrovic implied that the religious changes from the feminine and forgiving Marian values in Catholicism to the masculine and punishing values in Protestantism, have contributed to a social context of anomie. Mestrovic believed that Durkheim's *(1897) 1951* work was a long winded argument against Protestantism, and blamed that church for suicide.

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Postmodernism. p.195.


**Intellectual anomie**

Mestrovic saw Durkheim as viewing the Industrial Revolution similarly to the Renaissance. It was not a flourishing of civilisation, but a period of entrenched moral and intellectual anomie, pushing the limits of the human will into embracing the notion of the infinite. Mestrovic believed that Durkheim, in seeking to counter intellectual anomie, sought a holistic sociology, a humanistic world with a cosmological centre where sociology could replace philosophy, not as an imperial, but rather a unifying discipline in a new world were every fact must be considered culturally in its context. Schoenfeld and Mestrovic noted that in opposition to Max Weber's vision of a value-free sociology, Durkheim envisaged a value imbued sociology. Anomie affects scientific and intellectual thought when the 'letter' not the 'spirit' of science is followed where Mestrovic and Brown noted that for Durkheim, anomie in the intellectual realm was noted in relation to anomie generally.

Socrates' and Christ's opposition to irrelevant morals in their societies was not seen by Durkheim as anomic. Rather, Durkheim saw those two as deviants representing the morality that was the healthy and real truth of their times, oppositional to that adopted by their judges. However, for Durkheim, some anomie is necessary for social progress. When the will that Schopenhauer wrote of is not restrained it leads to what Durkheim termed anomie, which though appearing unproductive, is actually necessary, and when not excessive, drives the advancement of humanity.

Mestrovic agreed with Allcock, who introduced Pragmatism and Sociology, believing that pragmatism was intellectual anomie for Durkheim. Mestrovic believed that in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life Durkheim dually attacked the economic anomie in utilitarianism which in modern societies found expression in moralities founded on utility, and the intellectual anomie in pragmatism for reducing reason to the experience of individuals - both unshackled

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the will and made it subject to the infinity of desires and upset the balance in human nature.\textsuperscript{455}

For Mestrovic, pragmatism and postmodernism are similar in that they share a playful, relaxed attitude to truth. Shallow, false, and contradictory, valuing changeability and focusing on the immediate, concrete and instrumental aspects of truth, postmodernism and pragmatism fail to focus their analyses on that which is not always conscious, the masked, and that which problematises understanding.\textsuperscript{456}

Mestrovic implied that anomie can be identified both in today's lay people thinking that they are able to comment as unprofessional sociologists, and some sociologies for trying to react to this situation by copying natural scientific approaches rather than realising that hard facts are still part of a social context.\textsuperscript{457} Mestrovic argued that postmodern culture cannot outgrow the need to integrate both scientific and collective representations. A separated and anomic culture infects and separates scientific research, making it anomic too.\textsuperscript{458} Mestrovic argued that if the postmodernists were truly sincere they would have to address why their cultural milieu is so saturated with images of the apocalypse, violence, as well as destructive and brutal practices dressed up as fun activities and topics.\textsuperscript{459} Ignoring the importance of the former \emph{fin de siècle}: "Postmodernism is not really new, original, or genuine. It pretends to rebel at modernity, whereas it merely extends it."\textsuperscript{460}

Whilst critiquing postmodernism, Mestrovic also rejected the conservatism of Bellah et al.'s (1985) call for a return to the republicanism of earlier times, and Bloom's (1987) desire to replace cultural relativism with old-style ethnocentrism.\textsuperscript{461} Postmodernism, pragmatism and neoconservatism were all anomic for Mestrovic.

\textit{Juridical anomie}

With regard to relating the juridical to intellectual anomie, particularly that sourced in pragmatism and utilitarianism, Mestrovic and Cook, utilising Durkheim's

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\item \textsuperscript{456} Mestrovic, S. (1991). \textit{The Coming \emph{fin de siècle}: An Application of Durkheim's Sociology to Modernity and Postmodernism}, p.79.
\item \textsuperscript{458} Mestrovic, S. (1992). \textit{Durkheim and Postmodern Culture}, p.146.
\end{itemize}
concept of anomie considered as dereglement, inductively studied the dangerousness standard for compulsorily committing persons to mental hospitalisation in all United States, states' legislation, which is informed by various relevant disciplines' commentaries and research. As well as citing various state governments' legislation in verbatim as examples of the diverse definitions and applications of the "dangerousness standard", the concept, for Mestrovic and Cook, contributes to the failure to reform: psychiatric laws; civil rights; controls over professionals, and; societal biases in national and international contexts.

Mestrovic and Cook argued that, in the Durkheimian sense, the dangerousness standard is an example of dereglement of the intellectual which is anomic - a disorganisation and lack of across-disciplinary communication, overspecialisation, a misplaced allegiance to specified rules within disciplines at the expense of pursuing the spirit of scientific enterprise, and, a poor reglementation of what is accepted as truth. This approach to scientific research is, for Mestrovic and Cook, accompanied by a pragmatic and utilitarian approach, that respectively subjectivises, relativises and personalises knowledge and truth, and, results in submitting presenting patients to the dangerousness standard despite its being hotly debated over in various disciplines.

Mestrovic and Cook did not criticise the legislation regarding the dangerous standard for its relativism as a criticism of relativism per se, rather, Mestrovic and Cook's point seems to be that within a particular nation, such diverse legislation is a sign of anomie.

Anomie as a total social fact

Mestrovic sought to argue through the Durkheimian approaches of Mauss and Halbwachs, that Durkheim's conceptualisation of anomie is socially, physiologically and physically evident as a total social fact, which for Mauss was

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approached by Durkheimian sociological researches into the mind, body and society, in combination.  

Mestrovic examined social manifestations of the total social fact, arguing that Durkheim also referred to this facet of anomie in his references to grinding poverty as a protector from suicide when compared to the effects on suicide rates in times of economic fluctuations, an effect Mestrovic believed Durkheim viewed as a result of the *dereglement* of representations in society. In its social sense, anomie is the derangement of representations, the upturning of morals and the unleashing of desires in economics and politics. As a sort of derangement or madness, anomie for Durkheim was a social state people fail to recognise as it is everywhere.

Yet these dispositions {toward anomie} are so inbred that society has grown to accept them and is accustomed to think them normal. It is everlastingly repeated that it is man's nature to be eternally dissatisfied, constantly to advance, without relief or rest, toward an indefinite goal.

Physiologically, anomie was a suffering and painful experience expressed by Durkheim in the terms *tourment*, *souffrance*, and *douleur*. Durkheim believed that neurasthenics were weakened so that sufferers experienced pain more easily through a hypersensitivity to the environment. Mestrovic argued that in contemporary society neurasthenia as depression, is a 'mark of distinction' rather than a weakness, that although not accounting for the social element, does, however, capture the physiological and psychological dimensions of anomie well.

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Psychologically, in *Suicide*, Durkheim referred to anomie variously as fatigue, agitation, excessive excitement, disenchantment, frenzy, impatience, feverishness, distress, restlessness, insatiability and misery. Mestrovic asserted that Durkheim may well have also referred to stress, had that concept been articulated at the time.\textsuperscript{475} Durkheim's (1893) argument about the movement from mechanical to organic society (which Mestrovic interpreted as the movement from the heart to the mind) has created the anomie egoist.\textsuperscript{476} Mestrovic cited Magee's (1983) claim of Schopenhauer’s influence on Tolstoi, and saw Tolstoi's character Anna as a Baudelairean female dandy, and the same sort of suicidal anomic (wealthy, rational, self important, and dissatisfied) person that Durkheim described.\textsuperscript{477} Durkheim noted that people can experience neurasthenia and yet continue to exist in society (and are even occasionally rewarded for this). Some are, however, predisposed to suicide. Mestrovic believed that these people are "...society's anomic innovators, and are masters of representing society to itself."\textsuperscript{478} Veblen (1899, p. 70) thought the same of alcoholics and neurotics.\textsuperscript{479} Mestrovic made a parallel between James' (1902) description of 'once born' middle class, rationalist optimism blinded to its synthetic, wasteful, indulgent existence, and the egoistic and anomie person of Durkheim.\textsuperscript{480} For Durkheim the neurotic, who at face value contributes nothing to society, in Durkheim's perspective is actually a contributor to the ultimate well-being of society. Mestrovic argued that stress is the new heroism reflected unconsciously in modern media through depictions of characters who live double lives, and where it looks like many contemporary people expect themselves to be superhuman.\textsuperscript{481} Mestrovic noted Seligman's (1988, p. 50) observation of a tenfold increase in depression over the last fifty years or so, and compared Seligman's view of pathology resulting from 'rising expectations' with Durkheim's anomie as the infinity of desires.\textsuperscript{482}


Mestrovic believed that anomie considered as a total social fact has yet to be seriously applied in societal research. Mestrovic argued that in researching the social dimension of anomie as a total social fact, totalitarian and democratic societies could be compared with regard to their rates of social injustice, magic, superstition, social unrest, their degree or acceptance of democracy, as well as their adoption of pragmatic philosophies and policies. The psychological dimension of anomie could be studied by way of modifying existing, or constructing new measures, of irritability, impatience and insatiability with regard to the phenomenon of neurasthenia Durkheim commented on. Physiologically, anomie could be studied through an examination of people's attempts to suppress their pain by drug abuse, alcohol misuse, food misuse and other dysfunctional foodstuff consumption practices. Mestrovic believed that Durkheim indicated that the three aspects of anomie could be examined, a proposal that has not been consciously tested yet.

Mestrovic concluded that Durkheim did mean to refer to anomie as a total social fact, wherein society is so demoralised that people subjectively see their lives as at an end - effects that unconsciously, can spontaneously or eventually impact terminally on human physiology by way of suicide, itself, the most destructive end on a scale of human self abuse and saw, sports, familial and other group practices where morale is of importance to their activities as institutions that could be studied as examples of the total social fact. Similarly, excessive drug users, and the accident prone could serve as examples in the search for understanding societally-founded demoralisation.

Mestrovic argued that Durkheim saw asceticism as unable to be practised in a widespread scale simply because modern society offered so many things to be desired and so saw society as the constraint, protecting people from the will. But Mestrovic argued that “... for society to accomplish this task, it would have to be healed of anomie. An anomic society can only breed anomie in its members.” Mestrovic noted that a life of solitude and asceticism is only just tolerated, and

believed that the postmodern fear of boredom, even though saturated in imagery, totems, almost unlimited choice and diverse electronic media entertainment, is the source of this prohibition. 490 Mestrovic was critical of societal inauthentic optimism in the face of this fin de siècle's common beliefs in economic and political immorality and greed, and juxtaposed this context with nineteenth century fin de siècle concerns with others, compassion and sympathy. 491

Postemotional anomie

Any possibility of a true and spontaneous effervescence that takes place by authentically embracing the, will, heart, passions, unconsciousness and compassion is forestalled for Mestrovic when there is a social context of postemotionalism. It appears that for Mestrovic, postemotional society is a barbaric, sick, and in Durkheim's terminology, egoistic and anomic context, where by way of technological, political, social, institutions or organisations, emotions are filtered through what appear to be frameworks that are seen as overrationalised or real and hyperreal but are really hard, mechanised, cognitively filtered, prepackaged emotions. People are still emotional and emotions are still intensely felt, but emotions are not idiosyncratic, but are managed by the self and others not acted upon. For Mestrovic, the will drives even these lived realities. The will as representation in current times is present in a number of social contexts, such as those of politics, international relations, community, education and the social sciences

Mestrovic argued that whereas critical theory was a response to Stalin's and Hitler's modernist atrocities, and postmodernism responded to modernist communism in collapse, and late Western modern capitalism:

I propose that postemotionalism ought to be regarded as a new theoretical construct to capture the fission, Balkanization, ethnic violence, and other highly emotional phenomena of the late 1990s. 492

Mestrovic reinterpreted Rojek's (1995) distinction between what he called Modernity 1 and Modernity 2, which Rojek believed could be used to identify uniting

and diffusing, as well as similar and different aspects of modern and postmodern life. Modernity 1 is the attempt to control social and natural phenomena exemplified by concepts such as Nietzsche's Apollo, Henry Adams' dynamo, Orwell's machine, Ritzer's McDonaldization and Bauman's gardener. Modernity 2 is expressed in Nietzsche's Dionysus and the contingent, transitory, Baudelarian ideas, the latter who shared with Simmel, the notions of the carnival, repetition, dream-like consumption and circulations.493 Mestrovic lauded Rojek's distinction of two modernities as identifying the tensions in the drawing back and forward between them, and, as a way beyond Habermas' goal of completing the Enlightenment, or nineteenth century optimism of believing in the will's winning over bureaucracy, mechanisation and hardness. However, Mestrovic critiqued Rojek firstly on the grounds of not having identified Schopenhauer's will to life as the underlying concept for Nietzsche's authentic Dionysian force which Rojek favoured, and secondly, for not examining Modernities 1 and 2 with regard to current societal emotions - what is, for Mestrovic, postemotional society.494 Nonetheless, Mestrovic argued that Rojek's distinction of two Modernities can be utilised as

... a springboard for elaborating on the following ideas: (1) "Modernity 1 has entered a new phase in which it seeks to order and control and aspect of Modernity 2 that has always been seen as the most autonomous and unruly aspect of human life, namely the emotions. (2). Ultimately, Modernity 2 'wins' in the battle with Modernity 1 . . . by giving the seemingly rational and orderly forms an emotional appeal and allegiance that runs counter to what Modernity 1 is . . . all about. The end result is the postemotional social world that is the subject of the present discussion. (3) The most important illustration of how Modernity 1 and Modernity 2 interact is the creation of artificial (Modernity 1) communities (Modernity 2). The confluence of these two social forces is responsible for the dawning of artificially contrived authenticity, or what I call the authenticity industry.495

Mestrovic believed that postemotionalism brings a new view and is an alternative to critical theory. For Mestrovic, postemotionalism is different from the outcome prophesised, for instance by Adorno, who saw a context of mass society and commodification.\textsuperscript{496} The sorts of things Adorno discussed with regard to the culture industry and mass society such as the distortion of truth, capitalists selling products by appealing to a supposed authentic self concept and community, in postemotionalism, for Mestrovic, work at the local and specific level.\textsuperscript{497}

Mestrovic had prefigured postemotionalism in \textit{The Barbarian Temperament} wherein there was a general linkage made between Durkheim and Veblen. Mestrovic took an increasingly critical view of sport, advertising, traditions and habits. Mestrovic noted that the love of using intoxicants and alcohol reflect Veblen's view of barbarism still present in modern society.\textsuperscript{498}

\textit{Narcotics have not only become bigger business than Veblen could have imagined, alcohol and tobacco lost the sinful taint they had in his time. For example, Virginia Slims sells its cigarettes by wrapping them up in feminism with its famous line for denoting prestige, "You've come a long way, baby." Anhauser-Busch broadcast advertisements that link their beers to American Civil Religion: . . . George Washington required beer as a staple for his troops at Valley Forge, and beer is part of "The American Way of Life." The mighty Phillip Morris Company discounts medical reasons against smoking by shrouding itself in the United States Constitution in its advertisements. More than ever, athletic and sexual prowess are associated with intoxicating beverages and narcotics: one's favourite sports and sex idols try to sell one these poisons as a sign of "making it".}\textsuperscript{499}

Referring to international relations, Mestrovic believed that postemotionalism with regard to the 1990's Balkans Wars involves, the 'misuse of emotional history'\textsuperscript{500} in evoking memories of the Holocaust and adhering them to Croatsians, making it very difficult to determine whether Balkans wars are being

fought in the present or the past. Mestrovic believed that postemotionalism over the Balkans is evidenced in the reception of the female youth, Zlata Filipovic's diary on her experience as a Serbian aggression victim living in Sarajevo. Zlata was compared to the World War II Jewish diary writer, Anne Frank, rather than interpreted in any sort of original way.501

The history of western European and U.S. societies is also misused in postemotionalism. Postemotional histories are vicarious, as persons' memories and the resulting emotions felt are of facts and events that they have not even personally experienced.502 For Mestrovic, people's emotions in postemotionalism are not worn away as Freud argued, rather, Mestrovic believed, emotions are strongly felt by postemotional persons who are traumatised for life. Dead memories are evoked by various social groups such as feminists and African Americans. Politically correct terminology also protects bigots who can hide using "... carefully, rationally, artificially crafted post-memories".503

Mestrovic used Riesman's (1950) identification of other-directedness to partly explain postemotionalism. Riesman's view was that the other-directedness of niceness, managed habits and dispositions was anomie. The concept of other direction is retained by Mestrovic. Critiquing the requirement of being 'nice' as a feature of all professions, Mestrovic argued that this postemotional demeanour is really an artificial and feigned cordiality similar to that which Riesman identified.504 Post-other-direction has led to an entrenched anomie state in society where: "The anomie deadness of emotion has become the the normative postemotionalism."505 Postemotional society is an anomie society.

Mestrovic claimed that Durkheim's concept of 'anomie' has been misunderstood, most often as meaning 'deregulation' or 'normlessness', so looked to French linguistic meanings and the history of the concept, concluding that sin, derangement, immorality, suffering and madness were the connotations that Durkheim attached to it. Mestrovic believed Durkheim identified social change as a spontaneous and irrational product of unconscious forces at the societal level involving representations of *homo duplex*. So interpreted, Mestrovic went on to critique commentators on Durkheim who saw rational social action as explaining society and anomie for their view of society and individuals, as ultimately lacking a

process for anomie to emerge when compared to the term dereglement related to *homo duplex*.

Mestrovic believed that Durkheim saw anomie as relating to a number of social phenomena, particularly those related to economics and the impact of anomie in economics on other aspects of society. In this regard Mestrovic believed that Durkheim critiqued both capitalist and socialist economics, believing Durkheim followed Schopenhauer, reflecting a view of a two-poled human nature. For Mestrovic this meant that Durkheim was not interested in anomie as affecting only subcultural deviants, but as a societally wide phenomenon, in modernity, most often sourced in economics. Mestrovic believed that Durkheim’s view of anomie has repercussions for how economics is viewed and treated contemporarily.

Political anomie is a result of the freemarket and the will of the people seen as the solution for social problems. Mestrovic critiqued the contemporary political belief in shrinking government and the increased influence of the market in spheres that government used to be centrally concerned with. As in economics, in politics, when citizens are able to govern due to their will, they believe they can get anything, but government yielding to the market and the will of the people leads to anomie in politics.

Noting Durkheim’s solution to anomie through the notion of the corporation, which was meant to temper malignant economic forces, provide a modern alternative to the centrality of the family and insulate family life from the harshness of economics, Mestrovic saw the corporation as having relevance for contemporary times for work and the family.

Religious anomie is a result of the increased pessimism that Mestrovic believed that Durkheim, like Schopenhauer, noted in modern religions. In addition, Mestrovic argued that modernity has involved a religious emphasis on the masculine, replacing earlier religious emphasis on the feminine. This reorientation, Mestrovic believed, had implications beyond religion in carrying similar tending representations into other parts of society, especially economic ones.

Mestrovic believed that Durkheim was challenging the tendency towards pursuing the infinite in the intellectual realm by advocating for sociology as becoming a holistic and culturally relevant way to conceptualise society. Intellectual anomie can be seen when intellectual disciplines and pursuits become as fragmented as other dimensions of society. Some anomie is required for society to change, but entrenched anomie is socially dangerous and Durkheim saw that as the situation in modernity. Mestrovic believed that intellectual anomie is rampant in contemporary society. Laypeople have become more knowledgeable and some
social scientists have responded to that by seeking to entrench natural scientific methods. For Mestrovic, intellectual anomie is present in postmodern thought, just as Durkheim identified it in utilitarianism and pragmatism, the latter of which Mestrovic believed shared a frivolous and contradictory nature with postmodernism. Mestrovic concluded that intellectual anomie is throughout contemporary societies, reflected in people’s seeking to complete the enlightenment or trying to move beyond it through a disenchantment that does little more than repeat the pessimism of the former fin de siècle. Applying his analysis of intellectual anomie to legislation, Mestrovic believed that the diversity in definitions of the dangerousness standard is an example of the anomie of pragmatism applied to legislation.

Looked at as a totality comprised of the body, mind and society, anomie, Mestrovic believed could be seen in deranged societal representations where: people who are different are excluded; sex and violence is fun; economic crises abound; professional ethics are diminished, and; relativism has been taken to the extreme. A number of people suffer from living in the weakened and painful physical state of neurasthenia, for which they are seen as distinctive and suffer psychologically as well. Mestrovic believed that stress is the contemporary extension of the sickness of neurasthenia and also reflects anomie. Mestrovic proposed that a range of social phenomena from food and substance addictions, suicidal tendencies and the morale in social practices could be examined for the three dimensions of the social fact.

For Mestrovic, postemotional society is anomic as emotional life is now prepackaged, filtered and mechanised as the will is still apparent but has become a representation, a situation Mestrovic explained by reference and alterations to Rojek’s identification of two modernities – an approach which supersedes critical theory’s attempt to complete the Enlightenment for a rational world and overcome mass society, by looking to the emotions and societal niches. Advertisers of commodities drawing on emotionally appealing imagery, Balkanisation of national and international societies, historical and emotional references attached to present activities and putting a nice and tolerant but ultimately conformist face on, over various issues are all examples of this for Mestrovic.
Mestrovic’s adaptation and application of Durkheim’s concept of egoism

In this chapter concerning Mestrovic’s adaptations of Durkheim’s concept of egoism, some of the affinities egoism has with anomie will be drawn on by way of noting Mestrovic’s emphasising the language of dereglement used by Durkheim. In considering various aspects of Durkheim’s view of egoism, Mestrovic examined or commented on: the State; duty and desire; its historical manifestations and consideration; intellectual thought in the present and past, and; mental illness and integration. Mestrovic can be interpreted as having reorientated from sombre optimism to a deep pessimism, expressed in the concept of postemotionalism. This is exhibited by considering his comments on international relations over morality, consumerism, mixes of the traditional and the contemporary, sport, the feminine, and sociological thinking.

Anomie and egoism, dereglement and suicide

Durkheim believed that integration was as central to countering egoism as restraint was to countering anomie. Mestrovic pointed out that Durkheim made linkages between anomie and egoism, noting that in Suicide, Durkheim undertook a literary analysis of the texts Rene and Raphael wherein characters express the ideas of egoism and anomie. Anomie is expressed wherein fancies, imagination and pleasures are goals that are never met, and egoism is manifested in indifference, melancholy, silence and solitude. The two states differ, but they are also similar. Durkheim argued:

This description conclusively illustrates the relations and differences between egoistic and anomie suicide, which our sociological analysis had already led us to glimpse. Suicides of both types suffer from what has been called the disease of the infinite . . . The former is lost in the infinity of dreams, the second in the infinity of desires.

Studying Durkheim’s concept of egoism with regard to the concept of dereglement, Mestrovic and Brown argued that an often cited passage in Suicide

regarding egoism and anomie related to deregulation is very misleading due to its mistranslation. Spaulding and Simpson's translation states that the:

Two factors of suicide, especially, have a peculiar affinity for one another: namely, egoism and anomy. . . It is indeed, almost inevitable that the egoist should have some tendency to non-regulation; for, since he is detached from society, it has not sufficient hold upon him to regulate him . . . Inversely, an unregulated temperament does not lack a spark of egoism; for if one were highly socialized one would not rebel at every social restraint.508

Quoting the text in French, Mestrovic and Brown believed that Durkheim's true meaning was that egoism and dereglement are compatible, rather than the mistaken translation which implies that Durkheim argued that egoists are 'unregulated', adding in reiteration that the concepts implied by the prefixes of 'non' and 'de' with regards to terms such as regulation have only recently been affixed to the English and French languages.509

Durkheim is well known for his discussions about the importance of duty as an opposing force to egoism. Schoenfeld and Mestrovic, in approaching Durkheim's attack on egoism, focused on the other important facet to Durkheim's onslaught against egoism, that facet being the force of desire, noting that Durkheim rejected excessively individualistic individualisms which were egoistic and "... rooted in our bodies".510 Mestrovic noted that Durkheim argued that it is not irrationality, but spontaneity and naturalism that evokes altruism, which co-exists with egoism.511 Schoenfeld and Mestrovic argued that Durkheim was not only interested in what life is but also was concerned with what life ought to be like, where practicality is not a matter of pragmatist or utilitarian issues which Durkheim saw as egoistic, but is an issue of morality.512
Mestrovic believed that Durkheim argued for the importance of desire in following moral rules as they are sacred things, love objects and aspirations that attract people. The 'cult of the individual', or the 'cult of the human person' are examples of that non-egoistic morality\textsuperscript{513} for Durkheim, who argued “... the qualification "moral" has never been given to an act which has individual interests, or the perfection of the individual from a purely egoistic point of view ...”.\textsuperscript{514}

Mestrovic argued that in \textit{Suicide}, Durkheim sought to make a distinction between collective and egoistic individualisms, as well as normal and pathological forms of suicide.\textsuperscript{515} Mestrovic believed that Durkheim saw both reduced (modern) and excessive (premodern) integration as leading to suicide when arguing that: 'If... excessive individuation leads to suicide, insufficient individuation has the same effects.'\textsuperscript{516} Mestrovic argued that Durkheim should not be confused with taking a sentimental view of traditional, mechanical societal life before egoism existed. Rather, Durkheim, Mestrovic believed, saw elements of egoism there, which although not as prevalent as in organic society, were still present. Like Durkheim, who argued unromantically of pre-modern village life in criticising the brittle social solidarity therein, the Durkheimian, Halbwachs, argued that although peasant life did entail shared winter evenings, it was also mostly a separate familial kinship that was often about an unhelpful, envious, sour and detesting attitude towards neighbours. Without any corporate life or common goods projects, thrifty but expansionist villagers exhibited an egoistic individualism and disregard for others.\textsuperscript{517}

Modern society needs to integrate people to avoid egoism. Whilst Marx saw the State's eventual passing in its necessity to watch for human selfishness, Mestrovic believed that Durkheim was more pessimistic than Marx. Whilst not seeking to withhold 'the will of the people' politically, Durkheim believed an ongoing dialogue would be required between the State as the rational organ, and the irrational will of the people.\textsuperscript{518}


In *The Evolution of Educational Thought*, Mestrovic believed Durkheim argued that the Renaissance was a period that posed a problem still unsolved today, where humanism is a goal to be sought, but its pursuit raises the possibility of a lapsing into egoism. For Mestrovic, Durkheim's criticism of Rousseau and Montesquieu positioned them not in the accepted way as Romantics but instead as Enlightenment thinkers interested in society as an extra natural occurrence, an artifice beyond the individual. Mestrovic saw Durkheim as seeing society as not just a subjective, superficial and rational place, but a socially real place in the Schopenhauerian sense, beyond and exterior to what is conscious.

**Intellectual egoism**

Mestrovic noted a link in Durkheim between intellectual pursuits and egoism. Mestrovic believed that for Durkheim, true science was not about adhering to the letter, but rather the spirit of scientific enquiry, by having an open and critical mind. Mestrovic claimed that contrary to the misinterpretation of the scientist as an egoist and solitary individual, the ideal scientist is actually impersonal, objective and disinterested, representing the most developed consciousness and highest form of sociality. When paying little attention to public opinion and subjective observations, Mestrovic believed that scientists, by attempting to be impersonal, for Durkheim actually act in a highly social way.

Mestrovic believed that Durkheim's sociology was a reaction against *laissez-faire* thinking, which is egoistic, and argued that neo-positivism is also egoistic, personal and subjective by being driven by rigid paradigms and the social influence of opinion. Because of this, positivism cannot delve below the surface of society to research underlying realities. Mestrovic claimed that there is largely a tendency towards positivism in contemporary moral philosophy, psychology, and sociology when by comparison the founders of those disciplines researched all aspects of culture and attempted to forge non-religious understandings of

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morality. Mestrovic did not believe that sociology without imagination and based on individuals was able to deal with the dilemmas of postmodern society, and argued for the realisation of the balancing of feminine archetypes to counter the extreme rationality and egoism presently dominating sociology.

But if Mestrovic criticised the egoistic excesses in rationality he also criticised what he saw as postmodernism's egoistic theoretical rejection of all Enlightenment thinking, a move that actually leads to neoconservatism, a schizophrenic selective knowing, fantasy-like optimistic apprehensions of society, narcissistic self defence, and a failure to distinguish between the real and the unreal.

Mental illness and suicide - social integration versus social support

Mestrovic and Glassner proceeded along a line similar to that of the Durkheimians, Mauss and Halbwachs by assuming that stress contributes to illness and that this assumption appears at first glance to be particularly true for people who lack social supports. Mestrovic and Glassner sought to find a sociological explanation for stress, which can be caused by so many diverse events. Mestrovic and Glassner argued that the central link in sociologically examining stress is social integration, a concept that can be studied by way of Durkheimianism. Mestrovic and Glassner believed that people's movements in and out of being socially integrated to meaningful socially supporting groupings underlie all the commonalities to stressful life events studies, and that this factor is really more powerful than other insulating factors that might be involved, such as employment promotion or where income dependency or earnings are maintained. If people remain within or are reintegrated into, meaningful social groupings they are, for Mestrovic and Glassner better able to cope with stress.

Mestrovic and Glassner summated that most stressful life events research is poorly theoretically grounded, and in their Durkheimian view, much research like that of Gibbs and Martin's 'status integration' or Dohernwend and Dohernwend's stress from normlessness, even when referring to, or seeking to extend Durkheim, builds on

528. Mestrovic, S. & Glassner, B. (1983). 'A Durkheimian hypothesis on stress'. Social Science and Medicine, 17(18), p.1315 noted that the best known events are marital reconciliation, personal injury, marital separation, illness, losing one's job, death of a close member of one's family, jail, death of a spouse, retirement and divorce are listed in Holmes and Rahe's (1967, pp.213-218) article in J. Psychosomatic. Res. 11.
versions and interpretations of Durkheim which have expired in their critical usefulness. Rather, Mestrovic and Glassner sought to apply an approach to stress and integration, utilising Durkheim's notion of *homo duplex*. This view is in accord with Mestrovic's other comments on the dereglement of representations.

Mestrovic and Glassner argued that Durkheim's view of representations, facts and *homo duplex* implies that lists of life events simply accepted as stressors is an insufficient explanation. Items which appear on lists of stressful events have been around for centuries without being seen as problematic. From a Durkheimian perspective, for Mestrovic and Glassner, events can become stressful. They are not intrinsically stressful, yet typically today, they are accepted as so, a result of historically specific *homo duplex* imbalances in social constraints around what Durkheim (1897) argued are the fourfold representations of anomie and egoism, fatalism and altruism. In this view, when dislocated or relocated, individuals are problematically situated in relation to societal existence and lose themselves in depression, sickness and social withdraw.

Mestrovic noted that Seyle (1978) saw the need for people to earn the gratefulness of others in his view of 'altruistic egoism', wherein people's selfishness is balanced by their compassion, resulting in being insulated against modernity's unavoidable stressfulness. Mestrovic saw contemporary stress research by comparison as raw egoism in its view of people as supports and, objects for one's benefit, rather than as invoking any moral philosophy or any call to be more reciprocally giving or compassionate to others.

As well as having used Durkheim's sociology to study egoism in the developed West, Mestrovic has utilised it for the purposes of studying mental health in a developing nation. In India, Mestrovic seemed to be claiming, traditionalism is still overbearing, but village life is in flux due to social change, affecting mental health.

Mestrovic took Durkheim's cultural relativism over approaching different societies with regard to egoism, anomie, fatalism and altruism and interpreted mental illness in India. Mestrovic is quite alive to the notion of cultural relativism with regard to the diverse ways in which different nations conceptualise universal concepts. Egoism, like anomie, fatalism and altruism should be regarded in this

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way. A clear example of this awareness in Mestrovic's thought is Mestrovic's qualitative research into Indian psychiatric interview screenings for commitment to inpatient or outpatient treatment, symptoms of patients, and Hindu temple treatments for mental illness.

Mestrovic confidentially interviewed resident and chief psychiatrists and staff in an Indian mental hospital. Mestrovic also spoke to patients receiving psychiatric and Hindu religious and magical treatments, and their family members. Mestrovic also undertook participant observation in one psychiatric hospital and one Hindu temple. Mestrovic interpreted the data gathered by way of Durkheim's ideas of integration, anomie and collective representations.

Mestrovic pointed to the cultural relativism apparent in definitions of mental illness, where Indian collective representations of family responsibilities, regular bathing, regardless of the cleanliness of water used, superstition regarding hexes and possession, religious and psychiatric institutions, as well as tradition mixed with justice and fairness captured in the panchayat (a village meeting), are in relation with the social fact of mental illness. The mentally ill person's consciousness is situated somewhere between these forces, where in India, delusions that are part of the social fact of mental illness are made up of representations, some which express collective, and others that express individualised representations. Mestrovic noted Durkheim and Mauss' claim that magic, although composed of collective representations is against religion and the social. Mestrovic saw magic as anomic, agreeing with O'Keefe's estimation of Durkheim's *Forms* as claiming that magic emerges from but is opposite to religion. Magical dimensions to Hinduism are embedded throughout Indian culture and are therefore central to psychiatry in India. Patients' reports of the influence of magic in their symptoms is one of the least important signs of mental illness in India.

Mestrovic interpreted magical beliefs instilled into Indian views of mental illness, not as primitiveness, but as a reflection of a modernising society moving from village to urban living, or in Durkheim's terms, experiencing the shift from mechanical to organic social solidarity. Mestrovic predicted that the amount and fervour in Indian temple healing will increase as this process continues.

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With regard to Durkheim's claim of poor quality integration as causing suicide he noted that Eastern and Indian suicide victims are most often young people and women who are contextualised within complex intrafamilial relations with regard to culturally and traditionally imposed responsibilities, as well as those to their interfamilial others through arranged or lived marriages. Existing in this context, mixed with an historic period of change, Indian youth and women committing suicide reflect Durkheim's often overlooked claim that too much, as well as the often recited Durkheimian claim that too little, integration is bad for people. For Mestrovic Eastern and Indian women and youth could, from a Durkheimian view be seen to experience excessive altruism and fatalism.539

*Mestrovic's sombre optimism and egoism*

Mestrovic's sociology if viewed as a whole is notable for its vacillations between a sombre optimism and pessimism. A closer examination, I believe, reveals an overall turning phase from a sombre optimism to pessimism. Although often pessimistic, Mestrovic's earlier work is also optimistic, particularly at one notable point, where in the later pages of *Durkheim and Postmodern Culture* Mestrovic took on an optimistic, if sombre outlook. There, it appears Mestrovic applied the sort of integrating, effervescent, secure, compassionate, perspective he saw as expressed in Durkheim. There also, is a point for delineating Mestrovic's sombre optimism and pessimism. Mestrovic's comments in *Durkheim and Postmodern Culture* regarding internationalised morality, community, traditions in mixture with the present, capitalist consumerist experiences, sport, Giddens and compassion will be explained. They will then be compared with comments made by Mestrovic on the same phenomena by way of the concept of postemotionalism, which will be related to egoism. Mestrovic's sombre optimism and pessimism can be identified through being studied in this way.

Mestrovic argued that around the world, postmodern people are discovering and demanding all sorts of new rights which are similar. Durkheim saw such democratic moves as the logical outcome of a society that exhibited an increasingly larger division of labour. Most people agree on human and individual rights in a way not possible in earlier historical periods. Mestrovic believed it appears that Durkheim was right in arguing that humanity itself is the god of modern (and postmodern) times.540

This is a conception of persons and morality based in history and tradition of society, changed for present times. Durkheim's sociology, Mestrovic believed, challenged views of linear progress and endings to traditionalism advocated for in positivist analyses of civilisation. Durkheim saw the old blending into and reemerging with the new in a dialectical relationship. Mestrovic viewed postmodern society as a strange mixture of the old and the new, the individual and the collective, citing the case of the various groups that people can now join as examples. There are health groups and help groups and even groups for people who join too many groups. Mestrovic believed that members expect increased democratic organisation and their ultimate autonomy rather than the authoritarian group structures that existed two or three generations ago.

When sombrely optimistic, Mestrovic believed there were some socially uniting places in postmodern culture reflecting both altruistic and individualist representations when considered from a Durkheimian view. Mestrovic pointed to the mall, which is so large that it defends people from the small town idle chatter and observation that identified traditional society, but is not as impersonal or as threatening as the big city. Mestrovic argued that when in the mall, people can retain their individuality, even though that sometimes descends into unnecessary consumerism. Mestrovic raised the possibility that postmodern persons still have an awareness of and drive towards community and collectivity. Questioning the assertions of some postmodern authors who argue that the mall and Disneyland are the domains of the middle class only, Mestrovic claimed that such places are now the sites for numerous consumer surveys, 'safe' trick or treating, group jogging, health screening, sharing food and drink and so on. Mestrovic compared the mall to the old town square and argued that it might be the postmodern site for 'collective effervescence' and shared sentiments of the community. Mestrovic even defended Disney World from the criticisms and mocking undertaken by some postmodern authors who see it as a hyperreality and fantasy. Mestrovic saw Disney World as a Durkheimian sacred site, innocent and mother-centered as opposed to the outside profane real world masculine barbarism, found in drugs, sport, war and hunting. Mestrovic was even willing to see consumer loyalty to products, characters and personalities as altruistic loyalty and community-based

542. Mestrovic, S. (1992). Durkheim and Postmodern Culture, p.136. I think that Mestrovic was getting a bit excited here and unnecessarily optimistic about the autonomy and individualism that really exists in these groups. I cannot help but be a bit sceptical about what is really the limited autonomy that actually exists in these groups when members often rely on the authority of canonical authors, theorists and personalities.
beliefs that can be interpreted as something more than only egoistic tendencies.\(^{546}\)

Mestrovic saw things like Disney World and McDonalds, not as mass conformity, but as part of the cosmopolitisation of society and the world, and also as collectively binding in their promotion of family values through collective representations manifested in playgrounds and so on.\(^{547}\)

Mestrovic evoked the feminine in believing that despite academia's ongoing pursuit of rational social action, cognitive psychology and rational choice theory, there were also new ideas emerging that expressed the heart of Durkheim, Schopenhauer and other fin de siècle thinkers. Mestrovic believed that Carole Gilligan's criticism of Kohlberg was a good example of challenging a culture where "... feminine, pacifist, nonaggressive voices have been almost completely suppressed."\(^{548}\) Mestrovic believed that some postmodern discourse (that which advocates peace and Mother Earth as opposed to that which promotes violence and warring) is in line with Durkheim's advocacy for a united world wherein peace, and compassion reign supreme.\(^{549}\)

Mestrovic looked to Durkheim to provide a cosmopolitan centrifugal altruism as an answer to an excessively rationalised New Right, New World Order. The New Right proposes a rational new world order based on a shared consensual rationality. Mestrovic claimed that this rationality is egoistic with a focus on the individual's maximising their particular interests and desires. That view of rationality was rejected by Mestrovic for being unable to provide social solidarity. For Mestrovic, Durkheim's view of a new world order provided an alternative to that of the New Right by arguing for internationalised empathy and compassion. As Mestrovic argued: "It is important to realise that communism, socialism, and capitalism share the same modernist dream of conquering the centripetal aspects of human nature."\(^{550}\)

Mestrovic criticised modernist views for assuming that ideologies are the only way to finding some kind of 'harmony'. Durkheim saw societies as starting with their own collective representations but becoming more cosmopolitan as various cultures' collective representations enter into and transform each society's collective representations.\(^{551}\)


\(^{551}\) Mestrovic, S. (1992). Durkheim and Postmodern Culture. p.146. In my understanding of Nietzsche, opposite Mestrovic's apparent apprehension here, harmony is not the result the will to power, but an ongoing battle.
Mestrovic also rejected Giddens' (1990) modernist claim that postmodern does not exist and belief that is rather being the case that contemporary society is an extreme and universalised modernity. Mestrovic believed that the postmodern does exist even if it is problematic, difficult to identify defining foundational points, or unclearly and consciously apprehended. Mestrovic believed that something mistaken took place in the modern project. Mestrovic argued that universalised modernisation, globalisation and democratic liberalism has not been the outcome, as the forces of traditionalism, as a centripetal directionality, is still very apparent.

Mestrovic, in seeing contemporary culture as will and idea, critiqued theorists who interpret the postmodern project as a simple opposition to Enlightenment projects, for their overlooking that individualism and democracy are ideas that are actually gaining strength under postmodern conditions. Last century's extreme individualism has, for Mestrovic, been surpassed by a collective vision of elevating the status of, for instance, the family. Postmodern people are also incredibly sentimental. What is regarded by some as simply kitsch, is in Durkheimian terms, actually objectified elements of human ideas of altruism and care. "A completely new version of community is emerging in the postmodern world, a synthesis of will and idea."

**Mestrovic's deep pessimism: Postemotionalism as egoism**

With the postemotional concept, Mestrovic turned away from some of his earlier optimism regarding internationalisation and community. Mestrovic's discussions of postemotional society sometimes refer to egoism or anomie implicitly and simultaneously. Relating this point with regard to postemotionalism, the conceptual connection between anomie and egoism as both tending towards the infinite needs to be maintained in considering Mestrovic's perspective. A number of themes which run through postemotionalism as egoism are also present in Mestrovic's earlier references to the postemotional concept. Some of these are with regard to: an inactive international community in the face of human rights abuses and genocide; post-history, victim culture, post-memory traumatised social groups; mechanised, prepackaged emotions and simulation of Disney and other McDonaldisations; the feminine in mother-centered Slavic culture as leading to genocide; Balkanised international and local communities; Giddens as the arch modernist who typifies western tolerance of genocide in the Balkans, as well as

promoting synthetic traditions and a homogeneous sociology and the will as representation in postemotionalism. To make these distinctions, some points made earlier will be briefly returned to here for comparative purposes regarding Mestrovic's shift from somber optimism to deep pessimism.

With regard to the old and new mixing in contemporary society, the history of western societies are misused in postemotionalism. Postemotional histories are vicarious, as persons' memories and the resulting emotions felt are with regard to facts and events that they have not personally experienced. Mestrovic apparently viewed postemotional groups not as united but as existing in an egoistic context where history is manipulated by collectivities and individuals for their present needs. The possibility of a mixture of traditional and contemporary, altruistic and narcissistic forces which Mestrovic earlier saw in Durkheim and Postmodern Culture was replaced in Postemotional Society with an extended form of Riesman's view of an other-directed society, for Mestrovic, exhibited in Balkanised communities, which take a history, manipulating and applying it for the purposes of advancing particular views, arguing with and contradicting those of others.

In distinguishing Mestrovic's sombre optimism where Disney experiences are benign and about sharing in sentiments with family members and the group, in Mestrovic's pessimism, the view is changed to one where Disney presents a simulation and prepared package of authentic emotions, rituals and history. Mestrovic's use of Ritzer's concept of McDonaldization is useful in this regard. Mestrovic utilised Ritzer's (1992) concept of "McDonaldization" as a prefiguration which for Mestrovic 'foreshadows' postemotionalism. McDonaldisation for Mestrovic is the rationalisation of escape, as McDonalds "... stands for the values of efficiency, quantification, calculation, predicability, and control."

The negatively interpreted overbearing group and prepared emotions, are also present in consumerist contexts like McDonalds, which can be compared with Parisian coffee houses. The Parisian coffee house gives people the experience of a one-to-one interaction, or a context of solitude, in which ordering and partaking in food and drink involves uncertainty. By comparison

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... other-directed and postemotional types find such isolation unbearable, and also object to the independability or even rudeness of service at such cafes. McDonalds promises the postemotional utopia of foolproof, friendly service in a “nice” atmosphere in which one is in the midst of a throng.\[560\]

Mestrovic rejected the notion that postmodern reuse of the old and reproductions are what Durkheim had in mind in discussing the reviving effect of ritual, arguing that commemorative rituals firstly, are often cause for hostility, and not unity,\[561\] secondly, create uncertainty over which part of historic events should be focused on in the ritualised collective recalling of the past,\[562\] thirdly, are planned Disneyfications of history that claim authenticity but are synthetic,\[563\] and fourthly, involve the evocation of collective memories that can be used to hide underlying aggression.\[564\] But, Mestrovic commented, Durkheim's vision of the renewal of society through the cosmopolitan ritualisation of collective memories, seemed innocent when considered besides contemporary corrupt utilisations of history.

Mestrovic's references to the feminine and mother as a force for altruism and compassion alternate when Durkheim and Postmodern Culture is compared with later references, where the feminine, whilst being retained as a possibly, is viewed with more pessimism, and is seen as a source of hate, scorn and malice. In Mestrovic's later references to the heart and the feminine in, for instance, Slavic culture, the feminine of Mary where guilt is not shed was seen as leading to excess and genocide in the Balkans.\[565\]

Comparisons can be made between Mestrovic's sombre optimism over increased centrifugality with what can be interpreted as a later pessimism of viewing postemotional centripetal social forces. As a precursor to postemotionalism, in The Barbarian Temperament, Mestrovic, drawing largely on Veblen's idea of barbaric

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563. Mestrovic, S. (1997). Postemotional Society. p.116 noted the proposal to build a theme park in Atlanta to commemorate the life of Martin Luther King replete with a time machine attraction that transports customers to the scenes of a hologram of King confronting the forces of the police and firehoses.
564. Mestrovic, S. (1997). Postemotional Society. p.116 noted Serbian claims that the 1389 war that they lost with Muslims in Kosovo was the justification for genocide in Bosnia.
and resistant cultural habits, believed that aspects of society in the 1990s could be studied, where the wasteful and status seeking pursuits of the leisure class have become those for the less well off as well, where there are constant crises in economics, institutions and politics, as well as fever paced religious fetishism. Western hunger for consumerist products has led to a situation where those products are increasingly made in, and are environmentally to the detriment of, Third World nations, and, there are constant wars around the world. All of these features have become more and more observable. At the same time there has been less of a sense of common caring and love for others, authenticity and altruism.566

Community is seen as good, without qualification, or recognised that it can be cancerous as well.567 This postemotional situation with regard to information and community extends to the Internet. “The so called community of Internet users is not a real community because one can enter or leave the interaction in cyberspace at will. One does not have such freedom in real communities.”568

Resisting McDonaldization Mestrovic believed, could perhaps be undertaken by way of nationalism, but Mestrovic immediately rejected that possibility on the grounds that nationalism could really, rather, lead to situations of excess identifiable in Serbia.569

In considering the context he analysed, Mestrovic supposed that if the collective consciousness is waning, consequences could be firstly, that people will nostalgically seek the past in an unconscious sentimentality for what has gone, and secondly, that social life will become more fragmented and split up into numerous mini consciousnesses.570 While admitting it was beyond the confines of his study therein, Mestrovic noted that Durkheim sought a collective consciousness of cosmopolitanism which united and imbued the diverse 'mini consciousnessses' in society.571 Mestrovic criticised views of community as something that can be formulated and instituted. "It is my contention that a "properly constructed" community can never be genuine."572 Mestrovic's analysis is so pessimistic that it is difficult to see how his line of reasoning could lead to such a unity. Centripetal rather than centrifugal forces are apparent in Mestrovic's pessimism.

Compared to the sombre optimism evidenced towards the end of Durkheim and Postmodern Culture, as Mestrovic later noted, his Barbarian Temperament was about applying Schopenhauer to expanded consciousness, as increasing suffering in people and society. The suffering apparent, Mestrovic argued, was not responded to in the sense of authentic compassion or caritas, but as pity and narcissism.\(^{573}\) In postemotionalism, compassion is a luxury good, it is consumable, and can create fatigue, and is where emotions “... carry no burden, no responsibility to act, and above all, ... emotions of any sort are accessible to nearly everyone.”\(^{574}\) Emotions are egoistically experienced.

Mestrovic's turn from sombre optimism to pessimism is bound up in his political affiliations with the Croats in the Balkans Wars,\(^{575}\) and Balkanisation can be observed generally, as Balkanisation is both a term applied to the term's namesake geographical area, and as a metaphor for community and societal breakdown. The term 'postemotionalism', Mestrovic argued, is able to express the 'fission'\(^{576}\) exemplified in the contemporary Balkans where violence over ethnicity, which at its foundation is emotionally based, is addressed in a mechanical way. Mestrovic argued that postemotionality with regard to the Balkans, involves the selected use of history invoked by the West for whom the conflict is reminiscent, at the cultural level, of European 10th and 11th century Crusades, which Mestrovic, in referring to that historical fact, recalled that the Crusades were about genocide and not a laudable series of events.\(^{577}\)

Mestrovic believed that Serbian propaganda attempting to justify its actions, arguing that the battle with Turkish Moslems in 1389 and later Croatian compliance with World War II Nazis, meant that both Moslems and Croats were interpreted by the West as having 'asked for it'. That view had been swallowed wholesale on the part of the West, ignoring the fact that Croatia had a strong anti-Fascist movement, and that French, and Norwegian authorities and some contemporary leaders in their youth, themselves, were more collaborative with Nazis than the Croats.\(^{578}\)

Mestrovic argued that the Balkans conflict was not just about Bosnia. This was evidenced, for Mestrovic, in the keen interest displayed by the cultural consciousness expressed in the West's media.\(^{579}\) The revision of history exhibited by the West involves what Mestrovic argued could be termed in status nascendi - a

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revision in real and present time. "The postmodern aspect of the Balkan War stems from the fact that so many of the rationalizations focus on the past, rather than the present."

Mestrovic disagreed with Baudrillard's assessment of Bosnia as the West's imposition of its disarray on Eastern Europe, a result of a postmodern world full of swirling textual fictions without foundation. Rather, Mestrovic believed that postemotionalism explains how with regard to Bosnia, that fictions are applied but have foundations in dead emotions of Western history. In fact, Mestrovic argued that the term 'postemotional' should replace 'postmodern' as most postmodernisms elevate the text to a reverential position when texts are, for Mestrovic, about cerebral imagery and perpetuate modernist biases, and therefore do not, as their authors claim, rebel against modernity. Rather, they refer to the real death and destruction of the Vietnam and Gulf Wars as television wars. Postemotionalism factors in the dead emotions being displaced from the past into the present, in a way that postmodernism cannot.

It would appear that for Mestrovic, postemotions can also be seen as related to egoism as social relations with others are managed, prepared and routinised. They are also first experienced in a personal but vicarious way by individuals. People are not spontaneous, rather "... the other-directed postemotional type in all professions automatically rehearses in advance the imaginary emotional reaction of others, and thereby lives the emotion vicariously before it is allowed to be expressed."

Another point of distinction between Mestrovic's sombre optimism and his pessimism is his movement from critically tolerating to attacking Giddens. In Mestrovic's Anthony Giddens: The Last Modernist, the supposed subject of biography is subjected to a sustained and critical attack. Camic noted that Mestrovic made a number of statements about Giddens such as seeing his work representing "... what is wrong with sociology.", as well as its being "shallow", "arrogant", "trite and superficial.", "little more than rhetoric, cliches, and slogans", compared himself with Schopenhauer, in battle with Hegel (that is, Giddens) "the great charlatan", and saw the acceptance of Giddens as standing for the

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Veblenian leisure class dominating the social sciences. Mestrovic's earlier tolerance is replaced with detestation.

A final example in this brief comparison between Mestrovic's sombre optimism and pessimism is his changed view of the world from one where will and representation synthesise, to one where, to reiterate what was noted earlier: "With the postemotional concept, I am proposing something new, not a struggle or balance between will and idea, but the will as representation or idea.”

Postemotionalism, for Mestrovic, is full of egoism, whereas in some of his earlier work, where despite being very sombre, Mestrovic also exhibited some optimism. In later work, Mestrovic turned to a dark pessimism, an abhorrence for Giddens, a negative attitude towards the feminine, a distaste for Disneyfication, the mall, internationalism and community. Egoism along with anomie, reigns in postemotional society where people turn inward, are selfish and seek dreams over reality and falsehood over authenticity.

Mestrovic believed that postemotionalism was egoistic through the use of and reinsertion of history into the present for present purposes, the frequenting of food outlets where any idiosyncracies in products or service are eliminated, where the feminine is a source for ethnic hatred and societies become inward looking and Balkanised. The postemotional type is egoistic for seeking to experience emotions vicariously and in a prepared way. There is very little true community on the internet and people can log off whenever they wish and compassion is a luxury that can be consumed and forgotten.

In this concluding chapter considering Mestrovic's adaptation and application of egoism, Mestrovic's etymological approach to, and translations of Durkheim's work related to anomie and egoism has been noted, whereby Mestrovic argued that rather than interpreted as unregulated, by way of the concept of dereglement, and when translated and linguistically considered, egoism can be seen as compatible with anomie. Desire and duty could coexist in a non-egoistic morality of individualism for Durkheim. Montesquieu and Rousseau were critiqued by Durkheim for seeing anything beyond the individual as false and for extending Renaissance egoism. Intellectually attempting to distance oneself is a moral and social activity from Durkheim's view, and Mestrovic critiqued positivism's egoism and for being unable to explore beneath surface appearances of culture.

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Postmodernism was also egoistic for Mestrovic, in being unclear over what is real and unreal.

Examining contemporary stress research from the view of Durkheim, Mestrovic argued that derangments in representations of *homo duplex* and the lack of integrating social groups explain stress better than the lack of social supports, which can exist but not create solidarity. Mestrovic also examined excessive integration in India as it develops out of a traditional society.

Drawing on the notion of the unconscious, Mestrovic claimed that people can feel happiness but be unhappy and in decay when living in an egoistic social context. In contemporary Western societies, decadence and heroism coexist in egoistic views of people and in depictions in the media. Egoism leads to narcissistic forms of liberalism if not tempered by collectivism, yet Mestrovic believed that in society today the dominance of the beliefs of either the will to power or rational choice mean that Durkheim’s sort of view is not fashionable.

*Implications*

Mestrovic’s sociology adapts and applies Durkheim. Mestrovic has challenged the received view of Durkheim as a functionalist, postivist and social realist, seeking to adapt that received view. In that adaptation, Mestrovic also adapts Durkheim by contextualising Durkheim with regard to his intellectual milieu, particularly focusing on Schopenhauer. For Mestrovic, drawing on Schopenhauer reveals a more complex Durkheim with regard to a number of societal phenomena and concepts and contributes to a more applicable Durkheimianism.

Mestrovic explored the ramifications of a Schopenhauerian Durkheim with regard to a number of dichotomies that are related to and arise out of considering the world as driven by will and idea. Mestrovic makes a significant contribution by considering Durkheim as having had a view of the unconscious, particularly where social facts and representations of *homo duplex* where individuals and society are concerned. Using the concept of dereglement, or derangement, Mestrovic adapts the received ideas of anomie and egoism from those of ‘normlessness’ or ‘deregulation’ and applies the notion of dereglement to individuals and society seen as in suffering, pain and sin. Mestrovic believed that Durkheim was concerned about justice and that the cult of the individual, both rational and irrational was the ethic for contemporary societal peace replacing the anomie and egoism in the ethic of selfishness bought on particularly by classical economics. Mestrovic detected anomie and egoism in contemporary society, run by markets and economics and believed that Durkheim’s notion of the corporation is relevant for today.
Mestrovic was concerned about the historical shift to Protestant Christianity and the diminution of feminine Marian representations in religion and society generally. Mestrovic believed that intellectually society today is in disarray as a result of neoconservatism and postmodernism — a repition of the conservatism and excesses of pragmatic relativism Durkheim noted in his social context.

Anomie can be seen as a total social fact and by extension, Mestrovic examined anomie and egoism in contemporary society through his concept of ‘postemotionalism’ through which Mestrovic consolidated his adaptation and drew on Adorno, Riesman, Orwell, and Marcuse in doing so. Postemotionalism is featured by an authenticity industry, post-memory, post-history and Balkanisation. Postemotional types are also post-other-directed and are unable to act in accord with the intense emotionality that they experience.

The anomie Mestrovic identified also relates to egoism. Mestrovic explored Durkheim’s references to egoism in intellectual history. Contemporarily, people are seen as suffering from stress as an event which can be consciously recognised, when Mestrovic believed that stress should be seen as a social fact, unconsciously held and resulting from deranged representations leading to egoism. Mestrovic believed that stress and other manifestations of egoism relate to Durkheim’s comments on mental illness.

Mestrovic’s sociology can be seen as following a trajectory from sombre optimism to deep pessimism. Postemotionalism represents the pessimistic turn Mestrovic took following his (1991) *Durkheim and Postmodern Culture*.

Mestrovic adapts and applies Durkheim, revealing a pessimistic Durkheimianism for considering contemporary society. That orientation is particularly important for considering alcohol in society and education. Mestrovic’s, as well as Durkheim’s, sociology provides a good foil for the excesses in contemporary society. Durkheim was particularly concerned about the rise of economically focussed views of society. Mestrovic has also studied contemporary economic centredness. Mestrovic adapts Durkheim providing a contemporary Durkheimianism applied to society.

However, Mestrovic’s and Durkheim’s sociology cannot be accepted unquestioningly. There are identifiable faults in both sociologists’ thought. There is a need to consider criticisms of Durkheim and Mestrovic. The third part of this section will take up this need, focussing particularly on Mestrovic, but also Durkheim.
Critiquing Mestrovic

Having explained the selected concepts of Durkheim, and Mestrovic's adaptation and application of them with regard to society and social science including education, the study now turns to studying Mestrovic critically. Mestrovic can be critiqued both directly and indirectly. Indirectly Mestrovic will be critiqued with regard to gender through the influence of Schopenhauer's infamous misogyny. Directly, Mestrovic will be critiqued with regard to gender but also aspects of culture - especially where issues specifically relevant to this country are concerned.

Scholarly comments on Mestrovic will be drawn on, particularly those of Jennifer Lehmann who as well as centrally focusing on Durkheim considered from critical structuralist, multicultural, feminist perspective, also comments on Mestrovic critically. Lehmann believes that Durkheim was an assimilationist, and that Durkheim hierarchically viewed class, culture and gender. Gender is also an issue over which Mestrovic will be critiqued, particularly as having a certain sort of essentialist view.

Michel Foucault's philosophy will also be applied to the case of Mestrovic, and, Lehmann. Foucault's concepts of discourse, will to knowledge, power/knowledge, discipline, technologies of the self, and effective history will be briefly drawn on and applied to the cases of their perspectives, viewed as emergent.

‘Mestrovic's essentialism’ is a phrase used to describe an orientation that Mestrovic takes with regard to gender. This orientation of Mestrovic’s is pointed out first with reference to scholarly reviews of some of Mestrovic’s texts. Mestrovic’s views of gender will be examined, as will Schopenhauer’s and Durkheim’s. Mestrovic’s essentialism is partly due to an imputation made from Mestrovic’s Schopenhauerianism. Schopenhauer is well known for his misogyny. Schopenhauer’s position regarding women will be explained and critiqued. Also of relevance to Mestrovic’s essentialism is Lehmann’s critical structuralist view of Durkheim and similarly orientated points made explicitly of Mestrovic.

This chapter concludes with Lehmann’s criticism of Durkheim for having been a neoliberal. Lehmann argues that Durkheim’s politics are such that Durkheim can be aligned with thinkers who sought to modify classical liberalism. Lehmann’s view of Durkheim and Durkheim’s view of liberalism and stance regarding classical liberalism will be examined, interrogating Lehmann’s view of Durkheim as having been a neoliberal.

Mestrovic's sociology depends largely on a Schopenhauerian, nineteenth century fin de siecle viewpoint. It is in the problems raised over issues encapsulated here, in what is Mestrovic's reference point, that a discussion will be
undertaken over what is a deterministic tendency in Mestrovic's work. Aspects of the former fin de siècle will be focused on, in particular, and relating to both of the two criticisms to be made of Mestrovic's essentialism, Schopenhauer will be implicated.

The first criticism of Mestrovic's essentialism is based on Schopenhauer's misogyny where his essentialisation and demeaning of women will be discussed and by implication imputed to Mestrovic. As further indictment of Mestrovic, a feminist-multiculturalist-critical structuralist perspective of Durkheim with regard to liberalism, race, class and particularly gender, will be explained and its implications will be similarly imputed to Mestrovic by way of a critical discussion and is relevant to neoliberalism, gender and culture.

The second criticism of Mestrovic's essentialism also relates to Schopenhauer. Foucault's philosophy will be utilised to generally critique Mestrovic and particularly argue that Mestrovic holds to an essentialist view of the self, and society. Schopenhauer's view of the will to life is of particular interest and relevance where this argument is concerned. The consequences for Mestrovic will be imputed as part of a critical discussion.

Critiquing Mestrovic's determinism with regard to gender

Numerous critical points can be noted about Mestrovic's view of gender. With regard to women, Gane (1992) argued that Mestrovic "... suggests that women should stay at home and develop a proper appreciation of their role as mothers". However, Gane perhaps overstates the case here as Mestrovic also saw echoes of Durkheim's ideas about the corporation and the family in labour organisation in the Japanese workplace, and, the Swedish formation of such ideas where fathers and mothers are provided with the funds to take long periods off work to spend formative time periods with their babies, thus retaining the foyer of the domestic sphere of society. Additionally, and to be fair on Gane, elsewhere, Mestrovic was also encouraged by men's increased involvement in childcare, even if this was, ironically, a possible indication for Mestrovic of an increase in the essentialist element of the 'heart' in society.

Cohen (1993) disputed Mestrovic's (1992) claim that if he was to be criticised on his view of feminine and masculine, it should have been criticism that is

grounded in an interpretation made by way of Jung's views on archetypes, wherein the feminine and masculine are aspects of men and women, rather, than regarding the feminine as denoting women and masculine denoting men. Cohen argued that he 'had chosen other grounds' on which to write his review of Mestrovic's *Durkheim and Postmodern Culture*.

I believe there are some good reasons for Cohen's adopting this alternative orientation. This is what I shall do in critiquing Mestrovic by making relations between Schopenhauer's views of women and essentialism, and considering the implications of this relation for Mestrovic's Durkheimianism.

Gane (1992) has called Mestrovic's interpretation of Durkheim as heavily influenced by German Romanticism as 'profoundly perverse' and from which the 'consequences are equally bizarre', such as Mestrovic's own admission that Durkheim would probably deny his having being influenced by Schopenhauer. Gane's point is very accurate, as when speculating on why Durkheim did not make his linkages with Schopenhauer clear as perhaps being due to Durkheim's conceit or anticipating readers' recognition of Schopenhauer as a commencing point, and having noted that Durkheim's notes were destroyed in World War II, Mestrovic, who has formed a career on his interpretation of a Schopenhauerian Durkheim, and through the articulation of possible ramification of that linkage for Durkheimian sociology, moral theory, politics, economics, education, gender, and multiculturalism, might have drawn a huge sigh of relief. As Gane put it, a Germanic-influenced Durkheim is an interpretation that "... has not been detected by any other analyst of Durkheim . . ."

Schopenhauer did comment on the feminine and masculine in society. However, thanks to feminist scholarship regarding sexism in the history of thought, Schopenhauer's misogyny is well known. When Schopenhauer referred to women it was always by way of his taking a stance of superiority towards them.

Ellen Kennedy (1987) noted that in the chapter 'Über die Weiber' ('On Women') contained in *Parega und Paralipomena*, Schopenhauer's misogyny is quite clear in his discarding women as the 'under sized', 'narrow-shouldered', 'broad hipped', 'short legged', 'number two of the human race'. In Schopenhauer's mind

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women are destined to live the life of a child due to their capacity for child bearing. Additionally Schopenhauer saw women as irrational, lacking foresight and having no capacity for appreciating the arts.\textsuperscript{597} Chris Weedon (1999) in commenting on Schopenhauer's influence on Freud's view of women, noted that Schopenhauer argued that a woman "... pays her debt to life not by action but by suffering, through the pangs of childbirth, subjugation to the man, to whom she should be a patient and cheerful companion."\textsuperscript{598}

Schopenhauer clearly held to a deeply biological view of gender, which sounds very similar, in the way Hamlyn described it, to sociobiological views today. In Schopenhauer's view the concept of love is a delusion that really has the will to life underneath. The will to life forces the propagation of the species by way of social values such as attractive features of lovers and marriage. Being besotted in as yet unrealised love is the immortality of the will, one's species forcing the union, not individuals. However, and again similarly to sociobiology today, Hamlyn noted gender differences in men and women. In Schopenhauer's view, men seek love in women, which they then neglect following their satiation, leading to their looking around for other women. Women are different in having their love increased upon satiation, leading to a tendency of holding onto that one man. Love is really will to life, species reproduction and protection, refracted.\textsuperscript{599} However, when these supposedly 'biologically-set' tendencies of the human species, driven by the will to life are looked at more deeply, the gendered results for society are clearer. For instance, Linda Bell (1993) noted that Schopenhauer thought that women are weak in the body and the mind, determined to be that way by biology.\textsuperscript{600} "You need only look at the way in which she is formed to see that woman is not meant to undergo great labour, whether of the mind or body."\textsuperscript{601}

Bell argued that Schopenhauer's misogyny went so far that he stated that 'dissimulation is innate in women',\textsuperscript{602} believing that because women tell so many lies, their testimony in court should hold less weight - their lying being due to women's biologically set weak powers of deliberation and relatively weak social position with regard to men. Hamlyn has noted that although Schopenhauer saw

women and men as both better when led by compassion compared to the other human sources of agency, egoism and malice, women were only led by compassion to take philanthropic sorts of actions, where men were additionally and more importantly led to actions of justice.603 Cohen (1993) in this respect rightly noted that Mestrovic's setting aside of Schopenhauer's misogynistic Romanticism is problematic as Mestrovic "... seems to claim the virtues of his Romantic sources as if their shortcomings had no standing." 604 It is hard to read 'On women' 605 today without cringing in embarrassment, or recoiling in disgust given the way in which Schopenhauer wrote about women's character, work, practices, tendencies and social position.

Mestrovic's omission of a discussion of these issues, does, as Cohen suggests, generally have implications for his theory and it relates to assumptions of an essentialism that is inherent in Mestrovic's second master, Schopenhauer's work.

Schopenhauer's philosophy has somewhat been defended in regard to misogyny by Hamlyn, who in commenting on Schopenhauer's approach to the 'genius' of artists whose productions overcome the will, argued that Schopenhauer's claim that women could only ever be talented and never geniuses, was a view which was a result of "... personal factors but also certainly culture-dependent..." 606 ideas. Unwin Books, in introducing their selection of essays from five of the seven volumes of Parerga and Paralipomena noted that Schopenhauer experienced a prolonged legal battle with a woman who sued and won against him after he pushed her down some stairs outside his home on account of her gossiping at his door. 607 Hamlyn also defended Schopenhauer from feminist critics, arguing that the views in 'Über die Weiber' do not really arise from Schopenhauer's central philosophy as much as they do his temperament. Hamlyn wished not to comment further on Schopenhauer's statements there, "... except in so far as they connect with any doctrine that can be regarded as a consequence of the main argument." Hamlyn in continuing, seemed to believe that the gendered aspects of Schopenhauer's philosophy could be subsumed within Schopenhauer's broader linking of sexual reproduction with the will to life. 608 Hamlyn believed that in such references, Schopenhauer's statements about gender can be seen as related to his

central philosophy, others Hamlyn argued, "... can only reflect his personal and sometimes idiosyncratic feelings."\textsuperscript{609} Magee defended Schopenhauer as reflecting the misogyny of his social milieu but presenting it in his own personal way, arguing that Schopenhauer did view women as primarily playing a societal role of nourishing and assisting men. "At the time he wrote, this may well have been what most people thought, including most women. But he expresses it in a belittling way."\textsuperscript{610}

Magee argued that women's condemnation of Schopenhauer with regard to his views on women is often based upon personal ignorance of the work, 'Über die Weiber', which actually, according to Magee, contains a number somewhat complimentary statements about women, when Schopenhauer made comparisons with men, and, that Schopenhauer made derogatory statements elsewhere specifically about men.

Magee noted that women who had taken him to task over Schopenhauer's 'Über die Weiber' as reflecting a misogynist position, often had not personally read or refused to read the essay, believing that Schopenhauer did not deserve being read or was a bad philosopher for having held to such views on women. Magee argued that such detractions are like claiming that Dostoevsky was a bad or undeserving writer who should not be read because he was anti-Semitic.\textsuperscript{611} Magee noted that he had often experienced women comment derogatorily about what is wrong about men in a way that compares with Schopenhauer's comments on women. Magee argued in the cases of women's commenting on men or Schopenhauer's on women, the use of a derogatory tone does not mean that the speaker is not articulating the truth, even if only in part.\textsuperscript{612}

Magee argued that in 'Über die Weiber' Schopenhauer made a number of complimentary statements about women, such as that women achieve their rational maturity earlier at eighteen years of age compared to men's maturity in that regard being attained at twenty five years, and that women are better consultants than men where delicate issues are concerned due to women's ability for seeing matters clearly and without clouding them by compounding the situation with additional related concerns. Schopenhauer also argued that women are good at seeing through pretence, have a disposition that is happier, more compassionate and sympathetic than men, and, that women are sources of sustenance for the young, pleasure for adults and solace for the old. Magee argued that these comments

\textsuperscript{612} Magee, B. (1983). The Philosophy of Schopenhauer. p.257
Magee concluded that 'Über die Weiber' was a case of Schopenhauer's commenting on a societal subgroup who exhibit particular peculiarities which "... Schopenhauer evaluates in too intolerant and one-sided a way" as opposed to being a case of unproblematic misogyny. Magee noted that Schopenhauer made more derogatory comments specifically about men "... in his writings than in those of any other well-known writer". As one example, Magee noted the case in another essay in Parega and Paralipomena where Schopenhauer, in reference to governance, himself placed emphasis in his writing when referring to the group 'men' as a problem. Magee argued that for Schopenhauer, society was presented with

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\text{... the difficult task of governing men, that is to say, of maintaining law and order, peace and quiet among many millions of a boundlessly egotistical, unjust, unfair, dishonest, envious, pernicious, perverse, and narrow minded race, to judge from the great majority.}
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Schopenhauer, according to his defenders seems to be a philosopher, the person, who should be always considered cautiously in regard the philosophy he espoused. The person, Schopenhauer, often wrote in irritation and spite about his society and its inhabitants, especially about his contemporaries Fichte, Schelling, and especially Hegel. In that case according to Unwin Books, an orientation that was "... carried to ridiculous extremes ...", and that started with Schopenhauer's timetabling his lectures at Berlin University at the same time as Hegel's. Student attendance at Hegel's lectures was high and he was very popular at the time. Schopenhauer dropped his lectures after a term due to little student interest. A bachelor and an egoistical person, Schopenhauer sought fame, which

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was denied him until late in life. Schopenhauer was born 22 February 1788 and died 21 September 1860. Schopenhauer never was accepted in academia and he lived within the geographic boundaries of, but apart from as well as critiquing, the society of Germany.

Cohen (1993) in reviewing *Durkheim and Postmodern Culture* argued that to accept Mestrovic's arguments, readers have to be partial to 'loose interpretations and overstated themes'. Cohen argued that in critiquing contemporary social thought, and in attempting to counter the overlooking of Durkheim's Romanticism Mestrovic 'intentionally overstates his case', but for Cohen this emphasis itself overlooks the weaknesses of Romanticism. Although believing that Romanticism and *homo duplex* are worthwhile options to pursue rather than postmodernist nihilism, Cohen concluded that such approaches and concepts 'deserve better' as Mestrovic's linking of Schopenhauer to Durkheim is little more than "plausible (and sometimes implausible)". Camic (1999) has argued that Mestrovic's claim that much sociology ignores Romanticism's influence on the history of the discipline is "flaccid", given that as Camic claimed, Mestrovic also, overlooks the importance of many thinkers in focusing particularly on Durkheim. Camic was also critical of Mestrovic's arrogant attitude in contrasting his sociology with that of Giddens. In elaborating on Mestrovic's comparing himself to Schopenhauer in battle with Giddens as Hegel, Camic noted Mestrovic's claim that it took fifty years for Schopenhauer's philosophy to be recognised as representing the inner thoughts of people, when Hegel was accepted immediately, but was subsequently critiqued as deceptive. Camic in concluding, responded to this claim and Mestrovic's statement that it was an "open question" as to when he would be accepted, believing that Mestrovic had said enough to illuminate his arrogance and pride. It could be said that Mestrovic shares these tendencies of character with Schopenhauer. In explaining and discussing Schopenhauer's essentialism and sexism regarding women, I claim that this is shared point between Schopenhauer and Mestrovic. That point is of an essentialism that is highly exclusive of women.

In considering the issue of misogyny and links between Schopenhauer, Durkheim and Mestrovic, it is clear that Schopenhauer, the person, was a contradictory and idiosyncratic individual. But claiming, as do Schopenhauer’s defenders, that various parts of a philosopher’s work should be accorded to their temperament, social milieu, and experiences within that context is an easy thing to do - as easy as Mestrovic's claim that Schopenhauer's philosophy can be linked to Durkheim by way of indirect links and refractions. By comparison, the commentary by feminist scholars on Schopenhauer is based upon the idea that the personal viewpoints of a philosopher are just as important as, and relate directly or indirectly to their work. In such a view the two cannot be separated.

One possible point for an intersection between Schopenhauer and Durkheim in this regard, that Mestrovic overlooks, is present in Jennifer Lehmann's study of Durkheim. Lehmann, although not undertaking a study of the private and public Durkheim herself, supported this connecting of the public and private evidenced in her lauding of the work of other writers looking into such aspects of Durkheim, calling Pickering's (1994) study of Durkheim's Jewishness 'important' and Gane's (1993) inquiry into the private sphere lives and public sphere studies of Durkheim along with Marx and Weber as "sorely needed."

Additionally in this regard, Lehmann acknowledged the assistance of the women in Durkheim's life who are not present in his work. Lehmann recognised the absent mother Melanie Isidor Durkheim; absent wife and collaborator Louise Dreyfus Durkheim, and; Marie Durkheim, the absent daughter.

The critical structuralist critique

Lehmann herself undertook a socialist feminist critical structuralist, or alternatively, cultural studies and multiculturalist interpretation of Durkheim. Lehmann argued that her approach was similar to, but not an unquestioning acceptance of, deconstruction. Lehmann similarly to deconstruction, argued for a close reading of Durkheim that uncovers inconsistencies and ambiguities without seeking a final or essential Durkheim, and that situated Durkheim within the episteme of humanism, but also breaking from that episteme in being anti-humanist with regard to what Lehmann argued was his collective subjectivity and social determinism. However, unlike deconstruction, Lehmann situated her studies of Durkheim within modernism and structuralism as opposed to deconstructionism and

its flight from or completion of ontological or epistemological concerns. In
distinguishing her study from deconstruction, Lehmann critiqued that approach for
tending to lead towards accepting an infinite number of possible interpretations and
a textualist emphasis wherein the earth is made up of various different texts situated
within the totality of the episteme. Lehmann by comparison, sought a finite reading
of Durkheim's texts, revealing their meaning. Lehmann also rejected deconstruction
for doing away with social structures which affect persons in various ways, and for
assuming that all other approaches other than itself can be situated together, as
representing the episteme from which deconstruction is the only approach that can
be used to escape. Lehmann believed that such an orientation reveals
deconstruction's philosophical as opposed to social or political emphases, which
Lehmann preferred. Lehmann believed that her critical structuralism accepts that
social structures exist, that science is a political and problematic social product, and
that knowledge is an approximation of what are these real but troublesome,
determining but changeable social structures.628 Lehmann's undertaking as such
was to look into Durkheim's social theory identifying contradictions, reversals, and
differences therein as well as its structural implications for society. Lehmann
studied Durkheim's thought with regard to class and race, but especially for
purposes here in particular, sex. Lehmann's argument was, that once studied
closely, in these regards, Durkheim is revealed as a thoroughly conservative
thinker.

Lehmann (1995) looking into race, class and sex saw dominant and
subordinate theories of each of these categories or groups of people in Durkheim's
social thought. The dominant theory of race involves Durkheim's claim that as
organic society was more closely realised, race would be of less and less
importance as hereditary traits and caste declined in favour of learnt abilities and
merit.629 The subordinate theory here which Lehmann identified, was that of
Durkheim's insertion of race in the form of the structure of caste as an
intermediary between individuals and society, advocating for horizontal mobility
only, as well as critiquing workers' higher aspirations as anomic.630

The dominant theory of class is that class should disappear and that its
continuance is a leftover from traditional society. Societal development, Durkheim
believed would lead to increased structural difference at the level of the individual

and sex', *American Sociological Review*, 60, pp.570, 571.
and sex'. *American Sociological Review*, 60, pp.571-572, 572 concluding that "Durkheim's implicit
discourse is really a discourse of modern racial castes."
where social needs are so complex and in flux that functionally, group similarities would be of decreasing importance. Here, Durkheim argued that two forms of phenomena stood in the way of organic solidarity: the inheritance of wealth and ascription or the forced division of labour, each needing to be addressed because they led to people being accorded social value that did not match up with their abilities, as less well off people with more valued abilities can be contracted unjustly at a lower wage than they should and wealthier people being accorded higher status and recompense for labour although they might have less ability.631

Durkheim's subordinate theory of class, Lehmann argued, legitimises class differences and could be identified in Durkheim's acceptance of inequality at the individual level of persons' ability and acceptance of unequal socially accorded value for different sorts of occupations. Lehmann asserted that Durkheim rejected egalitarianism as primitive and communistic, and accepted inequality with regard to private property and income. Drawing on Durkheim's ambivalent orientation with regard to race, related to his theory of the corporation, Lehmann argued that Durkheim supported the notion of class, his ambivalence evidenced in his view that in modernity, abilities are inherited at the level of groups, justifying, Lehmann believed, the ascriptive determination of employment according to race,632 and the latter theory, implicitly leading to the result where the corporations would offer little mobility within or outside their confines, bolstering existing social stratification and stopping intergenerationally higher aspirations.633

More specifically for present purposes of establishing linkages between Schopenhauer, Durkheim and Mestrovic, Lehmann argued that Durkheim held to dominant and subordinate theories of sex. Lehmann argued that Durkheim was a very conservative thinker with regard to women, fearing socialism, sexual desire and feminism in relegating women to an inferior caste position.634

Lehmann argued that with regard to sex, Durkheim's dominant theory was quite different to those regarding class and race as well as his views on the individual and society. Durkheim's view was that women and men were biologically different and distinct beings leading to his view that they should serve different


functional roles in society. Similarities between the sexes were a feature of primitive societies, but differences and inequality was the feature of social development.\textsuperscript{639} Durkheim's dominant theory positions women as having biologically set tendencies and as a result, suited to the affective role of motherhood in the private sphere. Men are more social and so are suited to the intellectual roles and public sphere of culture, economics and politics. This separation of the sexes creates a conjugal solidarity matching the case of the societal division of labour creating organic solidarity.\textsuperscript{636} Lehmann saw this view as expounded in \textit{The Division of Labour} where women as a group have tendencies toward the emotional and the familial and that this structure historically has meant that women are defined in relation to men. Not therefore taking part in modern organic solidarity, women are viewed as inhabiting conjugal society and the private sphere. Women are in a different world from men.\textsuperscript{637} However, Lehmann believed this first view of Durkheim's, expressed in \textit{The Division of Labour} is not the only possible one.\textsuperscript{638} The subordinate theory of sex Leumann identified in Durkheim's theory was that of women's inclusion in the public sphere by taking on feminine positions of work. This theory is part of Durkheim's solution to the problem of women's increased likelihood to commit suicide when married, compared with men for whom marriage and suicide is inversely related. Durkheim in this way argued that women would work in aesthetic jobs and men in jobs that are scientific and otherwise socially utilising, believing that this could possibly lead to increased similarities, legislated equal opportunities, even the incorporation of men's' and women's activities.\textsuperscript{639}

Mestrovic does not explicitly endorse this sort of position in his sociology, although he implicitly comes close to it in his liberal democratic and dialectical interpretation of Durkheim where collective representations of the feminine and the masculine can over time transform into new combinations. Given Schopenhauer's


influence on Mestrovic and Schopenhauer's biologism, however, it seems less likely that a transformation such as that could ever be possible by following Mestrovic.

Lehmann (1995) believed that Durkheim's first subordinate theory holds the implication that women's remaining in the private sphere is anomalous, both in Durkheim's theory of and in modern liberal society itself. This theory means that a correction can be made to Durkheim, as Durkheim's notion of the individual could be altered to accept and assimilate women into the public sphere.640 This is the sort of view that Tiryakian (1981)641 held to as being a possible outcome of Durkheim's theory of gender. Lehmann (1994) too, at first glance seemed to take this approach to apprehending Durkheim's views on gender, arguing that Durkheim needs reconstructing by way of jettisoning the sexist ideology inherent within his thought and its sociological legacy, admitting women, as men are, into the modern category of the abstract individual.642

However, having noted Durkheim's apparent accordance with feminist and liberal positions in his subordinate theory of sex, Lehmann argued that in fact Durkheim's references to this subordinate theory are so conditional, evidenced in a number of related points made by Durkheim, that the subordinate theory is rendered neutral, reverted, and finally, cancelled out. Lehmann argued that Durkheim's intention of creating a sexually specialised division of labour, an interdependent and organic solidarity as well as enhancing the functionally structural aspects of the public sphere is qualified by Durkheim's statements regarding women's suitability to paid employment relating to women's nature. Lehmann argued that Durkheim claimed that women are naturally suited to the arts and literature, as well as other feminine work, and, would mostly tend to choose similar work due to having similar aptitudes.643 Lehmann noted the further qualification affecting this subordinate theory, in that Durkheim earlier pursued the socialisation of women to address the problem of marriage leading to increased suicide of asocial beings: women, thus bolstering his argument for the prohibition of divorce, an argument Durkheim revisited in 1906 modifying his argument somewhat in stating that, women are not negatively affected by the social world because women are asocial beings, as opposed to the earlier claim that women were not affected by social currents, having not participated in the public sphere. Lehmann's view was that, although

Durkheim advocated women's equal rights to opportunities and mobility enshrined in law, his qualifications reveal his belief in a naturally based and what is in effect an ascribed and sexually specialised caste. The second reading of gender viewed through Durkheim's view of deviance as expounded in *Suicide* essentialised women as asocial, biologised beings compared to social and socially determined male beings. Lehmann looked to Durkheim's work on women in that text, seeing Durkheim's view of fatalism as relating to the caste of women, as beings who are not subject, as are men, to the currents of society. Women, Lehmann believed Durkheim was claiming there, are amenable to being socially regulated and integrated due to their biologically determined fatalistic tendencies.

This view of Durkheim's endorsement of sexual caste could also certainly be applied to Schopenhauer who similarly biologised women, and by extension, also Mestrovic, despite his having ostensibly advocated for the merging of the forces of masculine and feminine.

Lehmann (1993) in the context of noting and commenting on discussions over Durkheim's social determinism, made specific reference to Mestrovic's pursual of a representationalist view of Durkheim's theory, as transcending the dualisms of the subject/object, or the voluntarism of individual versus social determination. Lehmann argued that Mestrovic's representationalism was something like Parsons' voluntarism and social action in adopting "... a form of idealist social determinism." This comment will be returned to later.

Lehmann's distinction of a second subordinate theory of sex in Durkheim's theory is relevant to Mestrovic as it is a theory that deals with issues of representation. Lehmann argued that Durkheim's third theory, or his second subordinate theory of sexual caste is revealed in a reading of his writings on representations of the sacred and profane. In his *Incest: The Nature and Origin of the Taboo*, Lehmann detected another of Durkheim's theories which differed from the dominant theory wherein primitive societies were identified as exhibiting no differences between men and women. In *Incest*, however, primitive societies are portrayed as exhibiting sexual differences where women were different to, separate from, and unequal when compared with, men. Drawing on his use of the notions of the sacred and profane, in *Incest*, Durkheim argued that the incest taboo was an

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example of the distinction between the asocially profane and socially sacred. Blood in that instance, represented society and as such was sacred, leading to the case where women when menstruating were seen as similar to men - a sacred-profane distinction that also applies to sacred women within the clan compared to profane women outside the clan and sacred within-clan familial relationships compared to sexual extra-clan relationships. Blood, with its socially sacred implications means that women, who in menstruating were closely involved in what represented the sacred element of the clan, had particular sanctions and prohibitions imposed upon them, as did sex, which for women involved the same sexual organs as menstruation.

Lehmann noted three logical implications of this second subordinate theory of sexual caste, one being that Durkheim contradictorily positions women as sacred but also socially subordinate compared to men, the second which relates to the first in that due to his ever present situating of women as asocial and men as social, Durkheim should have argued that women are profane and men sacred, and thirdly, that modern sexual difference was not an evolutionary change from primitive similarities of men and women as the dominant theory argued, but an evolutionary development along the lines of a societally primitive sexual difference.

\[\text{Durkheim maintains a self-contradictory, and essentially conservative, theory. His theory of women is a theory of caste . . . the private, domestic, "interior", "affective" familial function is singular. Women inhabit, a mechanical society.}\]

Lehmann's identification of a number of contradictions in Durkheim's work relied upon a close reading of Durkheim's scattered references to class, race and sex, but more centrally for present purposes, Lehmann's studies relate to an identification of an essentialism like that which feminist scholars have noted in Schopenhauer's philosophy. Lehmann has noted the essentialism in Durkheim, and, as I have claimed, that essentialism can also, by implication, be identified in Mestrovic's sociology.


Tiryakian (1995), in reviewing Lehmann, evoked Durkheim's 1896 claim in *Le socialisme* that socialism represented societies' cry of anger as well as their pain. Tiryakian believed that Durkheim's characterisation could be applied to Lehmann, whose interpretation of Durkheim "... will strike some as a cry of fury by a latter-day Erinye." Tiryakian argued that Lehmann's scholarship was not as primary as her throwing of a number of critical structuralist phrases and terms at Durkheim. Tiryakian supported that claim by pointing out that many of Durkheim's views were common in his social milieu and that Lehmann judges them, not by what were current points in debates at that time, but by her contemporary "'evolved" standards. Tiryakian believed that to prove her thesis through scholarship, Lehmann should have studied the historical material on women at the time in relation to men in the public sphere, women's franchise and divorce debates as well as Durkheim's theory with regard to his contemporaries in Europe and the United States. Tiryakian particularly pointed to Lehmann's overlooking of Karady's collection of Durkheim's work that contains a public debate over divorce that Durkheim took part in, and was challenged therein by two feminists. Tiryakian also argued that Lehmann misrepresented Durkheim with regard to his views on patriarchy and capitalism, both that Lehmann argued Durkheim was a staunch advocate of. Tiryakian noted that Durkheim saw the classical Roman family as a manifestation that improved the position of women, so patriarchy for Durkheim in Tiryakian's view, was not the preserve of feudalism or capitalism, and, as Tiryakian pointed out, Durkheim criticised free market capitalism and did not promote capitalism in the way that Lehmann presents the case; an undertaking made by Lehmann, without, as Tiryakian pointed out, citing explicit references by Durkheim in that regard. Cladis (1995) picked up on the general thrust of Tiryakian's last points, taking them further. Cladis concurred with Lehmann's view that nineteenth century women's silence should be ended by recovering their voices, that Durkheim had a pretty poor view of women by today's standards, and, that Durkheim's views contributed to biases in classical sociology whose legacy is still felt today. Cladis, however, believed that Lehmann's view of Durkheim's having held to various theories on women was so improvisational that in effect it obscured Durkheim.
This is a rather ironic criticism of Lehmann given statements noted earlier, which Lehmann made about the hidden in Durkheim’s social theory.

Cladis paid particular attention to Lehmann’s collection of Durkheim’s scattered references to women, noting what Cladis believed was Lehmann’s problematic decontextualisation of Durkheim’s writings. Cladis believed that Lehmann repeatedly used a series of statements made by Durkheim in various different places, weaving them together to form an interpretation of Durkheim as viewing women as biological and asocial. As evidence of this claim, Cladis presented three instances where Lehmann selected passages from Durkheim’s texts that supported her interpretation, but omitted Durkheim’s nearby or immediate preceding or subsequent claims in context, where Durkheim made statements questioning the status quo and tradition where women’s issues were concerned.

Both Mestrovic and Lehmann are scholars of Durkheim whose work, although radically different to each other’s and despite presenting radical perspectives on Durkheim, can be severely criticised from others within the field of scholarship. Some criticisms and counter criticisms can also be made of Lehmann and Mestrovic given their respectively different theories and standpoints.

Tiryakian’s and Cladis’ comments on Lehmann (1994) can be reinterpreted by way of the postemotional concept. Lehmann represents the will of society, the cry of anger in late modernity, a socialist tending feminist critical structuralist or cultural studies and multiculturalist, Lehmann evokes these emotions by rationally constructing a view of Durkheim loaded with jargon, terminology and a viewpoint that decontextualises and misrepresents Durkheim’s theory. Lehmann’s rational construction of an argument which reinterprets Durkheim along such lines is evidence of what can be viewed as Lehmann’s postemotional tendency to change history, evoke strongly experienced but standardised emotions of outrage and offence, even to a certain degree of Balkanisation, where interpreters of Durkheim who have not utilised feminism or critical structuralism are, by implication, a group to be opposed and derided.

From Mestrovic’s earlier references to what he called intellectual anomie in the contemporary social sciences, it could be interpreted as following that Lehmann’s critical structuralism represents a turn of the twentieth century, societal cry of pain, outrage, which seeks justice and truth mistakenly by altering social structures of race, ethnicity, culture, class and gender. Lehmann, by basing societal analyses on such an overly rationalised concept of society, understood as

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structures, seeks to get the most - morality, truth and justice, from the least - a cognitively defined restructuring of economics, politics and society.

With regard to Lehmann's identifying Mestrovic's representationalism as being similar to Parson's voluntarism and social action in adopting idealist social determinism it should be noted that Mestrovic critiqued Parsons on the issue of rational social action with regard to anomie which Mestrovic interpreted not as normlessness over social rules, ends and means, but as the social will unleashed. Voluntarism involves conscious rational action, which is an interpretation of Durkheim Mestrovic has critiqued.

With regard to essentialist gendering, Lehmann's interpretation of Mestrovic as pursuing socially deterministic idealism is understandable, and can be applied to Mestrovic with regard to the feminine and masculine, given her own critical structuralist assumption of socially real and identifiable structures which determine people. From Lehmann's sort of perspective, what is feminine and masculine in society is closely linked to the socially real structured castes of men and women. Due to the idealist tendencies which Lehmann ascribes to Mestrovic, it can be implied as following that for Mestrovic, gender roles of the masculine and feminine are archetypes or representations which determine persons as they are ascribed by the metaphysical power of the will in representations.

It follows that given what Lehmann called Mestrovic's tendency to accept a type of socially determinist idealism, sex, gender, masculinity and femininity are forms of action that people are somewhat forced to take on by social currents partially sourced in the will. They are also less easy to transform when seen primarily as representations as opposed to structures. Representations are harder to clearly identify, position and alter. Representations can also be used to appeal to historically and traditionally accepted forms of gendering as well as masculinity and femininity, such appeals are, by implication, to essentialist views of such social phenomena, bolstering the status quo. This would appear to be an implication of Lehmann's comments on Mestrovic.

Mestrovic might respond to this criticism by arguing that representations are historicised due to their plastic and autonomous nature, but also have a history and tradition of the sacred and profane that should not be jettisoned simply on the grounds that they have dominated certain groups of persons in the past. They are socially real in that society is a real and sui generis force manifested in representations, but unlike Lehmann's view, they are not, for Mestrovic sourced in social structures - they transcend structures.
Nor is Mestrovic willing to idealise any one conception of society as Lehmann does by implication, in opposing a set and hierarchalised world of structures where the structured group, men, and by implication, the masculine, is positioned as superior, powerful and oppressive to women, the inferior and feminine. Mestrovic by using representationalism transcends this limitation, for instance in viewing how Slavic mother-centered culture can be oppressive, totalitarian, vicious and genocidal.

Mestrovic's further reply could be that he advocates for the merging of what are the cultural archetypes or representations of feminine and masculine, and that Lehmann's structuralist interpretation overlooks the representational nature of these forces, which transcend social structure. They cannot be captured fully by social structures because looking into representations involves delving into their other side - the will. The will involves the unconscious and the irrational. Critical structuralism applied to Durkheim, when examined by Mestrovic's sort of view, seeks to rationally order Durkheim's thought by setting it in cognitively apprehended frames of reference - the very things which Mestrovic believed Durkheim sought to transcend. To put it another way, it could be said that from Mestrovic's viewpoint, Lehmann somewhat de-emphasised collective representations, which are fluid, plastic, malleable and partially autonomous, favouring instead, social facts, which are concretised representations and have more permanence and are more clearly identifiable to the conscious mind than collective representations. Mestrovic believed that he had tried to counter the prevailing ideas in contemporary society with an alternative vision of society. Mestrovic appeared quite sincere with regard to his attempt to uncover and although with reservations promote the feminine. However, given the preceding discussion, Mestrovic's attempting to secure a "significant coup" has, I believe, failed. Mestrovic, for this reader has not been able to fully "... convince the reader that Emile Durkheim, the alleged prince of positivism and functionalism, was actually a feminist of sorts. . . .

Rather, Mestrovic in lauding the family, the corporation and representations, becomes subject to the criticisms made by Lehmann of Durkheim. The case there, as was the case earlier with Schopenhauer, showing that biological determinism underlies the theories of Mestrovic's masters.

The first criticism of Mestrovic then, circulates around issues of gender where by way of explaining and extending critical reviewers' points and a critical

structuralist approach, the shortcomings of Mestrovic, and Durkheim, can be identified. To make Durkheimianism relevant to and useful for studying alcohol in society and education these shortcomings will have to be subsequently addressed.

Foucault, and Mestrovic's essentialism

Having addressed the first, gender-based criticism of Mestrovic, study now turns secondly to critiquing Mestrovic by drawing on Michel Foucault's philosophy to identify the Christian liberalism, and view of the will that underlies Mestrovic's sociology. Foucault's philosophy is utilised, problematising Mestrovic's view of the body, world, self and truth. Foucault's view serves to provide insights contributory to a critically conscious approach to Mestrovic, and Durkheim, for the purposes of establishing relevant Durkheimian perspectives on alcohol and society. Further shortcomings in Durkheim or Mestrovic when unmodified, are identified by way of applying Foucault to them.

Mestrovic can be seen as a liberal Christian, or more precisely a liberal Catholic. The liberalism that Mestrovic advances, in drawing on Durkheim for support, is something very different to the Kantian and Hegelian as well as Anglo, contractual and utilitarian versions. This largely stems from his use of Schopenhauer's notion of the will to life and its tendency to lead to egoism for Schopenhauer and also anomie for Durkheim, in Mestrovic's view. The will to life is relevant with regard to Mestrovic's use of the concept and his linkage of it to a Judeo-Christian-influenced argument that anomie is like or is, sin.

Sin is central to the Christian idea of a fallen selfhood, and its resurrection and transcendence as foundational to understanding traditional western ethics. This tendency is identifiable in Durkheim's liberalism in which the exalting of the person, is the person in general where God is the individual, distinguished by Durkheim from other liberalisms where it could be said that God is self. A partial self abnegation through duty and desire is central to Durkheim's social theory, as individuals in society have violence done to their nature, a social imposition converting people to orient themselves toward others and social rules for the purposes of social peace, which is also realised and maintained by the equal requirement that a certain degree of disinterest in others is shown by people. Mestrovic clearly adopts a similar position to Durkheim in arguing that society is riven with both egoism and particularly, anomie, which can be evidenced among other things in various manifestations of Balkanisation of communities and societies, and, for criticising the all pervading influence of the peer group as postemotional. Each are forms of constraint, but ones that are anomie.
The issue of Mestrovic's liberalism, with regard to that of Durkheim's and Mauss', will be addressed later. With regard to the particular discussion here, the liberalism that Mestrovic argues for is always informed by Christian morals and concepts. In this sense Gane's (1992) labeling of Mestrovic's The Coming Fin de Siecle argument as being that of 'a very curious even bizarre neo-Catholic' is quite accurate. Mestrovic appears to hold to Catholic precepts and argues that Protestantism compared to Catholicism is dominant in social theory and philosophical thought and research communities, as well as many cultural collective representations. Mestrovic also critiques the masculinist assumptions that he believes run with Protestantism's focus on a male figure exemplified in Jesus Christ, compared to the assumptions of the maternal, forgiveness and compassion that run with the Catholic focus on Mary. It is this tendency that Mestrovic argues for as potentially leading to a more authentic postmodernism – that was, in his sombrely optimistic phase.

Mestrovic railed and raged against postmodernism seeing it variously as egoistic, anomic, relativistic, subjective, optimistic, pragmatic and nihilistic. Mestrovic focused on Baudrillard's postmodernism. Mestrovic's criticisms of postmodern theory can be critiqued, in that Mestrovic did not distinguish between different sorts of postmodernism. I will, in brief, make this distinction as part of what will be a wider following explanation. I will not, however, critique Mestrovic from a Baudrillardian postmodern perspective. Rather, I shall utilise Michel Foucault's postmodernism or, as I prefer, poststructural philosophy for this purpose. Mestrovic's representationalism can be critically interpreted by way of a poststructuralist perspective like that of Foucault.

Mestrovic sees a number of sacred - profane distinctions in representations, particularly focusing on the notion of homo duplex in individuals and society, and this provides a good example of Mestrovic's essentialising of evil. Homo duplex is subject to reglement and dereglement. The source of anomie and egoism is in the profane body, in the will unrestrained - an essential, if metaphorically based force that drives people and society into dysfunction and dissent. These appeals to homo duplex are appeals to essentialism, where the body is profane and society is by comparison, sacred. The body is desiring, excessive, and potentially insatiable, something to be examined, denied, punished and transcended for society to have any primacy. The body is the site of societal representations, but these are always, for Mestrovic, as for Durkheim, partially

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representations of something real, like society for Durkheim, or the will for Mestrovic.

Mestrovic's liberal or neo-Catholic sociology can be seen as an alternative to what he viewed were hard-edged neoconservative solutions of punishments by way of the social exclusion of the evil and the guilty. In critically commenting in this regard, Mestrovic argued that:

*Schopenhauer taught the exact opposite: The wise person and the saint realize that there exists a commonality between "us and them", because we all share the same will to life. This is what he meant by compassion, the realization of co-suffering, and co-responsibility in human evil. For this reason Schopenhauer praised the Christian doctrine of original sin as a profound piece of cultural wisdom. Again, to try to appreciate Schopenhauer in this regard is not to advocate a vulgar version of neoconservative Christian ethics, which is often pugnacious and punitive, and which worships a militant Jesus who battles Satan for supremacy of the world. Rather, Schopenhauer, as well as Veblen, Durkheim, and many of the other founding fathers of sociology regarded the focus on self-abnegation and compassion as the kernel of Christian morals as cultural artefacts or habits that are essential to understanding the other side of the barbarism within western culture.*

Foucault's philosophy relates to and can be generally applied by, starting with considering issues and themes raised by this statement. Foucault was interested in, or commented on the weak and dispossessed in society, Christian morals, the self and its abnegation, the will, dualities and truths of the human mind, body and society.

In this regard, subject matter in some of Foucault's major texts was related to people like the mentally ill, the imprisoned, and the sexually different. Foucault, a career academic took part in social movements and protests regarding

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political and educational reform in Tunisia and France, prison reform, and labour conditions.\textsuperscript{663} The dispossessed were of great interest to Foucault.

In approaching the western Christian tendencies to cultural self-negation, Foucault referred to the will, following his philosophical master, Nietzsche, who rebelled against Schopenhauer's notion of compassion for others with the view that compassion was about self-negation and the herd morality of the masses, leading to the denaturing of people and resentment, not justice. But Foucault did not conclude in an elitist way, that a few geniuses could address the will to life as Schopenhauer argued, or similarly that a few leading Supermen or Superwomen, the \textit{Übermensch}, could face their mortality, eternal recurrence, and reveling in the will to power as Nietzsche believed. When considered with regard Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's views of people and society, Foucault's argument was that the 'will to knowledge', (which was the title in the French edition of \textit{The History of Sexuality. Vol, 1}) could be applied politically and strategically by anyone, including the dispossessed, and, collectives.\textsuperscript{664}

Foucault did, however, somewhat take on the notion of the will to power of Nietzsche, who argued that its violent, irrational nature is to be celebrated and advanced, as opposed to Schopenhauer's view that genius elites should attempt to minimise it.\textsuperscript{665} The will to knowledge was used by Foucault to study power as a strategic, political relation between people, for instance as Olssen (1999) noted, in drawing on Nietzsche's view of strategies and battles over power and knowledge; a "hostile engagement of forces . . . Nietzsche's hypothesis".\textsuperscript{666}

Foucault did not believe that power should be viewed as manifested in a person, a group of people or an institution. Foucault argued that studying power, required a researching that examined the continually varying relations in small-scale relations allowing global or macronomic control. There, power/knowledge or "distributions of power" and the "appropriations of knowledge"\textsuperscript{667} can be seen to operate in the continuous exchanges taking place in power relations. In this regard, as Olssen (1999) noted, Foucault, in criticising Hegelian dialectics of history and

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\textsuperscript{663} Miller, J. (1993). \textit{The Passion of Michel Foucault}. pp.170-171; 185, 187, 192; 206 respectively.
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Marxism drew on Nietzsche's view of power and knowledge in history, by rejecting totalities, determinacy and the interconnections between the parts of, and the whole of society, in favour of differences, as well as "... incompleteness, indeterminacy, complexity, and chance."668

By examining the various positions that discourses take, new perspectives can be taken on different discourses by explaining how, for instance, an accepted discourse can use the same theory that is also utilised by an unaccepted discourse for another purpose. Power-knowledge is thus intertwined with discourses, where discourses can support and sabotage power, as they are 'tactical elements'669 acting in the context of the multiple, complex and contradictory relations in society.

Foucault argued that truth is not set, but when viewed as bound up in power/knowledge, can be challenged as it is related to systematised power and power's effects as a "régime of truth". Challenging the truth, Foucault argued, should not be apprehended as a matter of changing people's thinking or consciousness. Instead, Foucault believed, changes should be seen as alterations and replacements of the régimes that produce truth, thus disengaging the power that truth bears, from the institutional, hegemonic, social and economic régimes that truth acts within.670

It was in this sense that Foucault argued for the study of subjugated knowledges. Subjugated knowledges, for Foucault, are of relevance to study in two ways. Firstly, they are knowledges that lie below the surface of thinking, exhibit an immediacy in their appearance historically, yet were hidden by standardised ways of knowing at the time. Secondly, the idea of 'subjugated knowledges' refers to a number of invalidated knowledges that fail to be accepted in the terms of accepted scientific thought and practice. When these oppositional knowledges that directly challenge the accepted way or form of knowing reemerge, Foucault argued, a critical apprehension of their objects is made possible.671

The ability of people to make changes is related to Foucault's concept of resistance. Resistance explains how people can challenge accepted truths - the effects of power/knowledge. Foucault argued that: "Where there is power, there is resistance. . ."672 Resistance is not power's dialectical opposite, nor does it stand

outside of power. Power and resistance share space and time\(^{673}\) where "... points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network."\(^{674}\) There are various sorts of resistance that can be manifested globally. Resistance can be the binary opposite to accepted power in the sense of revolt or rebellion, but most often, resistances are multiple and transient, making inscriptions on people and society.

Foucault, in his later work was interested in the way that people seek to transform themselves into certain sorts of ethical beings. Foucault made a distinction between two coexisting sorts of morality. One sort is that which refers to a ""moral code"".\(^{675}\) Code-based morality involves rules of conduct promulgated by social institutions. The other sort of 'morality' is that which people live and experience and is defined by people’s actions, given their surrounding moral environment. It is ""the morality of behaviours.""\(^{676}\) Foucault studied the various ways that people can possibly act within a cultural context which promoted certain moral rules.

Foucault, in this regard, studied sexuality and the aesthetics of the self, critically looking at Christian morals, contrasting them with those of Ancient Greece. Ancient Greek society favoured an ethics of the self where sexual acts were ruled by the \textit{aphrodisia}, which meant they had to be in accord with nature.\(^{677}\) In Christian society, renouncing oneself and venerating a pure virginal status was of utmost importance. Christianity evaluated morality with regard to sex, by reference to the performance of specific sexual acts ""... and the development of a hermeneutics of desire together with procedures of self-decipherment.""\(^{678}\)

Other aspects of Foucault's philosophy relevant to Durkheim's and Mestrovic's sociology can be apprehended by way of Foucault's interrelating concepts of discipline, anatomo-politics, biopower, and governmentality, as well as the constructed self - one of central concerns in Foucault's studies into modern forms of power. These concepts can be applied to the notions of constraint and postemotionalism.

Contemporary thinking, living, society and persons are a product of what Foucault identified as a historic change from monarchical power which ended in the

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\(^{673}\) Foucault, M. (1980). 'Truth and Power (Interviewers: Alessandro Fontana, Pasquale Pasquino)'. In Gordon, C. (Ed.). \textit{Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977}. p.142 Foucault responded to a question regarding the techniques of power and the interviewers' assertions that, despite Foucault's claims otherwise, his view of power could be seen as appealing to power as an absolute and always present, thus preserving the Marxist assumption that in the final analysis power serves the capitalist need to shape the body for production.


middle of the eighteenth century. Under monarchical power, people's bodies belonged to, and were subject to the determinations the sovereign. In a monarchical society sovereignty lay in the power of the monarch whose life was seen to embody the nation. In the society that has superseded monarchical society, citizens collectively are seen to embody the nation. Their health and life, their contribution to society's existence and prosperity through contributing to economics and politics became as important as the monarch's was in earlier times.

Foucault's view of modern power, and the relating of things such as the state, nations' economics and wars, capitalism, welfare and politics is accompanied by his study of discipline. Disciplinary modern society replaces monarchical society. Foucault identified an increase in disciplining discourses in society following the end of monarchical society. Most people would think of discipline as a matter of having the imposition of rules, codes, and principles made by oneself or others. Such a view of discipline is reminiscent of Durkheim and Mestrovic. While Foucault's concept of discipline can be seen in part as implying, by consequence, such a view, it would, however, be a mistake to sum up Foucault's view of discipline with that definition, or by according to it the value implied by Mestrovic and Durkheim. Foucault used the term discipline in a novel way. Where most people would think of professions or scientific groupings, Foucault used the term 'discipline' or sometimes, 'disciplinary blocks'. Hence, for Foucault, when people become subject to the thinking, commentary and activity of disciplines they become disciplined.679

Bio-power is related to governmentality as well as discipline and was Foucault's macrological way in which to perceive power/knowledge, where various societal institutions like hospitals, prisons, mental hospitals and schools perpetuate ideas about what is to be normal. By way of statistical formulas, and other technological applications in the social and natural sciences used by institutions, very societally legitimised forms of knowledge promulgate conceptions of what it is to be a citizen, in an individualising of each person and sort of person. By classifying and characterising all people into different sorts, there is a normalising - that is, a categorisation, of everyone in the population. The whole of society is then capable of being organised, regulating the population by the means of categorisation.

Nation-states developed since the end of monarchical society have in various ways, made investments in their populations, as healthy and educated persons are needed by states in competition with others, whether it be in war or

economics. The welfare of populations can be seen in this way as suiting the needs of the state, shaping them so that they are useful for its competitive purposes.\textsuperscript{680} Through bio-power, the physical force that was required to control society in monarchical times is not necessary, as by conceiving of the population as educable, it is also seen as controllable.\textsuperscript{681} Monarchical power can still be resorted to where riots and uprisings are concerned, but for the most part, it is peaceably administered.

Anatomo-politics is related to bio-power, but rather than being about the shaping of the social body, anatomo-politics is about the shaping of individual persons' bodies.\textsuperscript{682} Anatomo-politics for Foucault relates to Foucault's concepts of modern power, discipline and governmentality, as power/knowledge relations in history and society shape persons' bodies.

The construction of the body also relates more broadly to Foucault's view of the constructed self. Identity of the self was for Foucault a result of historically dependent conditions and circumstances where people come to see themselves and are seen in terms of the various available views of what it is to be a person in their society. Foucault did not lapse into linguistic idealism where there is nothing but discourse or where people are completely constructed by discourse.\textsuperscript{683}

People are constructed and construct themselves by way of discourses in society, rather than having a deep self that has to be discovered, returned to, or liberated. Foucault argued that people in the West have come to see themselves as free thinking, independent individuals who can choose whether to follow or to reject a number of social morals. Foucault identified the growth of this view as resulting from the end of monarchical society where, rather than being subject to the sovereign ruler, each person came to be seen as a sovereign ruler of their own life. This freedom was \textit{not} real for Foucault. As Marshall and Marshall\textsuperscript{684} pointed out, for Foucault, people are actually less free in conceiving of themselves as self-determining as it is this very conception of individuals' freedom that subjects people to dominations of discourse. Foucault in this way differed from neoliberals who also argue against the State's intrusion into their lives. Neoliberals think that people are

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capable of free thought and independence and so should be left to do as they will. Foucault believed that people are always situated within relations of power from which they cannot extract themselves. Freedom, for Foucault, is realised by accepting this positioning and using it, repositioning oneself in various ways, resisting the dominations which people are subject to, and constantly examining and challenging one’s own positions and those that others place them within.

Relations to oneself can be oppressive and controlling where people aid dominations by others or by facets of their own selves. Foucault commented critically on what he called the 'Californian cult of the self' in which persons exhibit resistance by way of self-help books, manuals and group encounters, seeking to free themselves from society as a part of becoming an ethical person, but in fact subject themselves and aid in their subjection by dominating discourses. Relations to the self can also exhibit other forms of resistance where people are aware of ongoing societal dominations but seek to constantly strategically, critically and reflectively position themselves historically, politically and culturally with regard to various discourses.

The point of Foucault's historical view of the self is that it is almost so thoroughly constructed in history, that any appeals to naturalness, essentialism, similarities, solidity, and origins of rationality or emotions, are replaced with historically accidental, fragmentary, multiple, disunited social practices, habits and procedures which reveal the power/knowledge that truly underlies and makes the self. In commenting on the emotions in this regard, Foucault argued:

*We believe that feelings are immutable, but every sentiment, particularly the noblest and most disinterested, has a history... "Effective" history differs from traditional history in being without constants. Nothing in man - not even his body - is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis of self-recognition or for understanding other men.*

Foucault took a position diametrically opposed to Mestrovic's and Durkheim's. With respect to the various notions of constraint and force, postemotionalism, history, the State, the self, education, and selfhood. Durkheim's

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study of social and moral facts and Mestrovic's sociology in general can be interpreted as exhibiting aspects of what Foucault called power/knowledge, discipline, bio-power, normalisation, governmentality, anatomo-politics, technologies of the self, and other views of the constructed self.

Durkheim's sociology can be interpreted as a liberal discourse, tied up with forms of social and individual health such as that described by Foucault as bio-power and anatomo-politics respectively. For instance with regard to bio-power, statistical methods such as those which Durkheim used in *Suicide* the whole of society has come to be shaped, as politicians, bureaucrats and academics utilise the new registers and other indicators supplied by statistics and statistical methods to plan and shape the populace. Durkheim's sociology presents an example of bio-power, which the State, for Durkheim, the brain of society, is in constant contact with various social institutions, not least among them that of Durkheim's proposed corporation. The corporation was intended by Durkheim to instill ethics relevant to each part of the division of labour, interrelating through their corporate bodies and the State. The whole social body is intended to be shaped for the purposes of bio-power, when considered from Foucault's perspective.

With regard to anatomo-politics, individuals' bodies are shaped and classified so that they can be more useful and manageable through concepts, like for instance, anomie, where certain dispositions, habits, and statements are used as indicators of the need for an intervention and reshaping.

Durkheim's views of the pathological and normal with regard to social facts can be interpreted as categorisations, and normalisations of persons with regard to social phenomena. Concepts of anomie and egoism applied to people can be similarly interpreted as normalisations. For instance, in Durkheim's references to characters in literature, such as those in *Rene* like Rene and Raphael who lived what could be said to be Foucauldian limit experiences of morality were interpreted as anomic or egoistic.

Durkheim's educational views can be seen as part of a disciplining society. Durkheim can be seen as promulgating discipline and integration in education to address societal anomie and egoism respectively, for the purposes of governmentality. Specifically with regard to Durkheim's social milieu, Durkheim's educational prescriptions can be seen as constructing persons through a compulsory education in the secular Third Republic. The State, through governmentality takes over the responsibility for the population, from the monarch and the church. Governmentality is supported and promulgated by Durkheim with regard to education, which shapes people into useful citizens who embrace the cult
of the individual, viewed as a noble and disinterested sentiment, but really making people more docile and manageable, from Foucault's perspective.

Durkheim's view of constraint assumes an essentially-based, and potentially insatiable human nature or *homo duplex* which tends to the desirous and needs to be restrained if anomie and egoism are to be avoided. The self, for Durkheim, is shaped differently in different historical periods, but there is a deep self in Durkheim's view. Foucault criticised such interpretations of the self.

Durkheim's view of history searches for constants and origins, by examining the social facts of a given historical juncture, with regard to the history, evolution and current appropriateness of those facts. Durkheim believed that history was homogenous, and developmental with historically relative but also ideal types in each period or moment. Durkheim's historicism is like the traditional histories which Foucault critiqued, in comparison with his view of effective histories constituted on a view of societal power/knowledge relations.

Foucault's later studies, with regard to forms of moral activity and history relates to Durkheim and Mestrovic, in that by way of a genealogy of ethics looking into technologies of the self, Foucault was studying different sorts of morality, and what constitutes, represents and supports what is accepted as legitimate. Foucault's historical study of morality is a direct challenge to Durkheim's and Mestrovic's sociologies which focus on code-based morality, and view ethical positions which challenge those codes as pathological. As noted, Foucault's and Durkheim's historicisms are radically distinctive. Foucault sought to identify the emergence of discourse in historical and cultural contexts, whilst Durkheim sought to discover the normal and pathological forms relevant to each historical context. Mestrovic in his more pessimistic interpretations of contemporary society, such as where there is no clear way out of the historic context of postemotionalism, also accepts Durkheim's view of anomie as social pathology.

Mestrovic's tendency to adopt the very Judeo-Christian, self denying and negating perspective which Schopenhauer, Veblen and Durkheim argued for can be critiqued from a Foucauldian view for accepting such artefacts as truths. It was these very artefacts reflecting ideas like original sin that limit and define what is evil and what is guilt, which for Foucault can exclude people. Foucault's argument was that the confession was a cultural artifact that, defined, classified and transmitted allowable forms of selfhood, and, which is reshaped by historically emergent discourses like psychoanalysis for similar purposes.687

Mestrovic sees experiences of cultural relativism and groups' collective aspirations within countries as anomic Balkanisations of various societies. Balkanisation and fission are very useful concepts to understand and critique cultural relations. However, the other side of Mestrovic's critique of culture is a severe disparaging of cultural relativism. This stance is very problematic from the perspective of a country such as Aotearoa/New Zealand which is a nation that was founded on a bicultural constitutional document, The Treaty of Waitangi. In such a country, cultural relativism is central to the conception of society. The history of Aotearoa/New Zealand clearly displays that biculturalism has not been honoured on the part of colonising Europeans. Some first steps are now being taken with regard to compensation for past injustices and the institutionalisation of Treaty clauses, but these are only just beginning. Cultural relativism is central to the recognition of the Treaty. Historically the Treaty has been disregarded on grounds very similar to those with which Mestrovic held in critiquing cultural relativism. In this sense when viewed from Foucault's philosophy, Mestrovic fails to recognise the difference that a bicultural society should pivot on.

Foucault's view of the constructed self is very relevant with regard to Mestrovic's postemotionalism. In utilising Rojek's (1995) distinction between two modernities, Mestrovic argued that postemotionalism is an unauthentic state resulting from the reemergence of Modernity 1 which sought to control what was natural - a quest that Modernity 2, in seeking the spontaneous, the willing and authenticity opposed. Mestrovic critiqued Rojek for overlooking the emotions in both Modernities 1 and 2, and essentially, the implication of Mestrovic's view of the emotions is that they have an unruly power and nature that is natural and essential. Foucault opposed the idea that aspects of persons and society like sentiments were natural. From a Foucauldian view this could be the more complete answer to Williams' (1997) comment that Mestrovic does not define what the emotions are over and above their tendency to "... in true postmodern style, 'float'..." But Mestrovic is not (at least a conscious) postmodernist. Mestrovic has denied that he is a postmodernist. One example of a distinction between postmodernism and Mestrovic's view is that for Mestrovic, cultural artefacts are not, as postmodernists claim, always dominating discourses. Turner (1999) also claimed there is an absence in Mestrovic's approach to the emotions, noting that there is a diverse history of studying the emotions exhibited in Hume, the Cambridge Platonists, and Wesleyan Methodists, among others, who Mestrovic

Turner argued that postemotionalism "... is probably too blunt an instrument to capture the place of "emotion" in (what we may call) the social cartography of thinking, and doing." Because postemotionalism involves a swirling of representations (or as Williams put it, where emotions 'float') it tends towards totalising all societal phenomena with its singular conceptual framework. Foucault's philosophy can be applied here with regard to the intricacies, and mechanisms of societal domination. Foucault's concepts of power/knowledge, discourse, discipline, governmentality, bio-power, anatomo-politics and technologies of the self provide a deep, complex and multifaceted way in which to interpret the societal domination that Mestrovic called postemotionalism.

Postemotionalism could be interpreted as the extension of governmentality and bio-power at the end of the twentieth century, shaping persons into more docile beings by constructing a discourse of the emotions, imparted by way of the disciplines of education, politics and the media. Power/knowledge is applied in such a way that people's habits and orientations are shaped on the personal level of anatomo-politics, and, technologies of the self where certain moral dispositions are required for persons to turn themselves into particular sorts of ethical beings. In short, from a Foucauldian perspective, postemotionalism is not a social state of anomic representation as Mestrovic implied. Rather, what Mestrovic described could be seen as extended forms of social control beyond those referred to as postemotional, through a more historically nuanced view as that of Foucault's.

Lehmann's critical structuralist approach is, like Mestrovic's, subject to an interpretation and critique from a Foucauldian view, when the body is seen as subjected to power/knowledge and discourses, which are not fully captured in conceptual, structures as Lehmann argued, or, representations of society as Mestrovic argued. Rather, for Foucault society, the body and human nature are seen as bound up in battles over knowledge, historical practices, trajectories and junctures. This is the very sort of notion of sex and the body in society which Durkheim and Mestrovic have held to. Nor is Lehmann immune from Foucault's observations, in seeing the bodies of persons as deterministically tied up with hierarchies and dualities in social structures between westerns and easterns, women and men, capital and workers, capitalism and socialism.

From a Foucauldian approach, Mestrovic and Lehmann, just two among a number of scholars of Durkheim, can each be interpreted as putting forth different discursive claims to the truth and challenges to accepted ways of viewing Durkheim. They could, in this sense, each be interpreted as expounding what Foucault called

subjugated knowledges. Lehmann and Mestrovic each do this in different ways. Mestrovic argues that representations of Schopenhauer, German romanticism and other nineteenth century fin de siècle thinkers have been suppressed in social theory, and Lehmann, that socially structured and hierarchical castes have been hidden in social theory.

Mestrovic and Lehmann each make statements regarding social phenomena, they speak with the authority of university professorship, they appeal to accepted conceptions of disputation, albeit based upon the different influences of German Romanticism and socialism respectively, and they each hold to deterministic views, even though Mestrovic's can perhaps be interpreted as idealist and Lehmann's as realist.

Mestrovic and Lehmann each sabotage power by breaking the silences over influences on, or viewpoints in Durkheim's social theory. Both also support power by endorsing different, but established traditions of social criticism.

Mestrovic and Lehmann also leave certain things unsaid. In Lehmann's case the unsaid is an acceptance of and alliance with a utopian conception of society where social differences would be fully appreciated and valued, and where inequality would be eliminated due to social restructuring and revolution. Mestrovic also leaves some things unsaid and this relates to his essentialism. With regard to sex, for instance, sacred and profane distinctions implicitly apply in Mestrovic's thought. Due to Mestrovic's advocacy for the acceptance of Schopenhauer's philosophy and its relevance to Durkheim's social thought, as well as contemporary sociology, moral theory, economics, politics and society, Mestrovic also takes on the essentialism, for instance with regard to gender that has been identified in both thinkers' work. This connection also gives greater credence to the similar criticisms previously noted, made of Mestrovic by Cohen and Gane.

From a Foucauldian view, the discourses of Mestrovic and Lehmann are in battle, they are entwined in power/knowledge relations. Each discourse also affects the practice of sociology as their interventions into the power/knowledge of that discipline must be accounted for, whether in criticism or acceptance. Each purports to speak the truth about Durkheim and social theory, and each discourse can be utilised to critique the other.

Mestrovic's view of gender, when interpreted from Lehmann's sort of position, due to its essentialism implies that women are inferior to men. For Lehmann, feminine archetypes or representations in society manifest themselves fundamentally at a structural level as well as the cultural representational level where, as Mestrovic has claimed, for instance the feminine is an aspect of men and
women. For Lehmann, the inequality of men and women is a social fact, as is sexism – they are not simply representations. This sexism is that which Schopenhauer explicitly, and by extension Mestrovic implicitly, shares with Durkheim.

Drawing on Foucault, Lehmann's critical structuralism can be criticised for leading to a sort of essentialism. Without entering into what would have to be a long discussion over relevant points raised as a result, Lehmann, despite rallying against the biologically essential, in pursuing a socially determinist, critical structuralism, drawing on Althusserian philosophy with its concept of interpellation, leads to a point of view where bodies, biological bodies with particular sexual characteristics, are central for structural recognitions of people. Following Foucault's view that even bodies are not sufficient for recognition, Lehmann can be criticised for inadvertently appealing to biological essentialism.

Also, Mestrovic's discourse can be used for the criticism of Lehmann. For instance, Lehmann's critical structuralist interpretation of Durkheim can be approached by way of the postemotional concept. In this regard, Mestrovic might respond to Lehmann's views on Durkheim by arguing that Lehmann reinterprets and reinvents the past, that is, the classical sociology of Durkheim, by appealing to and manipulating the emotions of readers where gender, caste and culture are concerned. A number of points of critique made by some reviewers of Lehmann's (1994) work, can be used as support for this application of postemotionalism, even if they were unintended as such by their authors.

Lehmann's critical structuralism applies all the rational and cognitive filters of categorisation, ordering, and arranging in an intentional way, which Mestrovic has identified as components of postemotional approaches, which seek to evoke a desired and now standardised, if critical, feminist emotional response in, this case, readers of her work.

Mestrovic and Lehmann could each be interpreted from a Foucauldian view as the studying of history, bringing out submerged and hidden discourse, on the heart and will of Schopenhauer, and class, culture and gender respectively. This interpretation is particularly ironic in Mestrovic's case wherein a revulsion for Baudrillardian postmodernism and postmodern is apparent. The irony is that Mestrovic does not recognise that it is postmodern thought and contexts that have made his sort of contextual and theoretical approach to apprehending Durkheim's thought as influenced by eighteenth and nineteenth century German romanticism possible. The sort of refracted influences approach, so often argued for by
Mestrovic, is only possible to be accepted in a social, historical and theoretical context such as the present one, which is sometimes termed postmodern, wherein a representational rather than explicit interpretation of a theorist's influences is acceptable, and, capable of being fairly widely published in mainstream academic journals. Despite all of Mestrovic's vitriolic rhetoric on the evils of the extreme relativism, boosterish optimism, narcissism, sentimentality, extreme subjectivity, barbarism, masculinity and hard heartedness in postmodern theory, Mestrovic and his sociology could be a representation, of an (unconscious, perhaps denying) inductee of postmodernity. But Mestrovic's essentialism, borrowing from Durkheim and Schopenhauer must be seen as precluding such a view, and Mestrovic has claimed his is not a postmodernist perspective, and, criticises postmodernism as barbaric in doing little more than taking Kant's and Hegel's views to the conclusion that history, philosophy and culture is ending. Rather, Mestrovic has admitted to using the concept of postmodernism as a tactic to entice readers to study his work. Sproule (1994) noted this "paradoxical" stance, which Mestrovic has taken towards his readers, believing that people would not otherwise give his fin de siecle masters fair consideration.

Alternatively it might be that Mestrovic is just an old fashioned sentimentalist. Mestrovic's approach can be apprehended in this way, criticised as a late twentieth century sentimentalism for a time when sociology and society were objectively apprehended, but also in comparison to contemporary society, simpler and more cohesive. This was the sort of comment that Turner (1999) made of Postemotional Society in seeing Mestrovic's possible "nostalgia" for traditional societies' authenticity. However, such an interpretation overlooks Mestrovic's point of seeking to return to the previous fin de siecle and thinkers, who were the founders of sociology, and looking at their starting points and their recontextualisation in present times.

Gane (1992) argued that Mestrovic could be seen as an optimistic Schopenhauerian, but in total, saw Mestrovic's theory as representing 'sociological solecism', and despite acknowledging that readers might feel for some of the things that Mestrovic argues for, the argument also for Gane exhibits 'sheer poverty in sociological terms'. These points can fairly be made of Mestrovic who can at times with his mixture of old and new phenomena, and use of largely ignored


theories, appear absurd. But the impoverishment that Gane identified can alternatively be interpreted as a rediscovered innocence and freshness, or a reinitialised sociology, represented in the spirit of the former fin de siècle. The secret, it would seem for Mestrovic, is to reselect liberal discourses that can, for him, better explain human life. In this regard Mestrovic's approach is one of

. . . striving to uncover the pessimistic humanism in fin de siècle social thought with the overall aim of attempting to establish a new ground for liberalism. If liberalism cannot be established on a neo-Kantian, neo-Hegelian, rational basis, for all the reasons already noted, it should not be abandoned to either postmodernism or a return to status quo of social order. . . 694

Defending Mestrovic

The explicit and implicit criticisms of Mestrovic discussed herein could be interpreted as justifications for eliminating Mestrovic's thought as relevant to issues of gender, class and culture with regard to alcohol and education. I beg to differ with that interpretation. I believe that there are limitations to the applicability to Mestrovic's theory and the criticisms made here are to show that. Mestrovic has not necessarily revealed the Durkheim, or a Durkheimianism suited or adequate to deal with all social phenomena. An ambivalent, cautious and critical approach to Mestrovic's theory is required, and by focusing on gender, a justification is provided for this undertaking. Mestrovic has, however, through his view of representationalism, reinstated Durkheim's relevance to the present day. Representations are an important part of contemporary cultural life. Some defending points relevant to the critical component of addressing Mestrovic can be made.

Regardless of the gendered and essentialist implications for Mestrovic due to his adopting a Schopenhauerian and Durkheimian perspective, in his criticism of excessive masculinity, hardness, the mind pole of the heart-mind duality, in looking for feminine representations, in his lauding of criticisms of Kant made by Schopenhauer and so on, Mestrovic can also, with respect to moral theory, be seen as agreeing broadly with Gilligan who saw contemporary moral theory as interested

in preconceptions, deduction, and cognition (Mestrovic noted that Gilligan (1982) critiqued this approach).695

Gilligan can also be seen as evoking Schopenhauer's representationalism. Gilligan's moral theory evokes woman as the unconscious, the heart and compassion. This is not explicit in Gilligan, but the affinities are clear. Gilligan uses the heart and mind, even if not in a dialectical fashion. It is perhaps in this regard that Mestrovic critically commented on Gilligan but did not elaborate further than criticising other feminists for seeing the feminine as weak and false in noting that:

*Lawrence Kohlberg's (1981) Enlightenment-based understanding of moral development has been challenged (albeit not effectively) by Carole Gilligan's approach.*696

For Mestrovic, contemporary sociology is based on the mind and rationality as exemplified by Habermas, Piaget, Kohlberg, rational choice theory and cognitive psychology, whilst thinkers who advocate morality and consideration of the heart are dismissed as irrelevant.697 With regard to the feminine, Mestrovic's point is that such considerations are suppressed in this rational, mind based social context. Gilligan argued a similar case in her criticism of moral theory.

Gilligan would probably not wish to be associated with Schopenhauer, firstly, due to his alleged and highly likely misogyny when regarded from feminist philosophy, and secondly, although not divorced from the first, Schopenhauer adopted biological determinism, a perspective that Gilligan attempts to avoid in taking a socially generated view of feminine and masculine distinctions and values. It could also be critically claimed, following Mestrovic, that Gilligan has made a career from adopting and reifying in the notions of feminine and masculine, the heart and mind, will and representation, all derived ironically from Schopenhauer, without adequately acknowledging that influence. In regard to their use of these concepts, these affinities can be drawn between Mestrovic and Gilligan. But this would be unfair on Gilligan, who sought to reclaim and establish a voice different to that expressed in the pessimism and will to life of Schopenhauer.

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Mestrovic can also be defended on the account of it being the case that despite the tone of the preceding discussion, Mestrovic has also been critically acclaimed. There have been positive points of comment made by some of the scholars reviewing Mestrovic's work, whether or not those comments were part of, subsequently followed by, or elsewhere also, part of their subjecting Mestrovic to criticisms.

Examining seven reviews of Mestrovic's books available through academic journals physically subscribed to by the University of Otago since 1990, four reviewers found something positive to comment on.

Mooney commenced by commenting that Mestrovic, with his "... unique approach to Durkheim and classical sociological theory ..." presented a different voice, something: "We hear a great deal these days about the need to hear..." 698

Sproule argued that in approaching the issue of barbarism in society, that it was "... to Mestrovic's credit that he chooses to tackle it at all let alone bring to the work a compound of formidable sociological skills and finely wrought human sympathies...", later concluding that

...Mestrovic has done nothing less that reaffirm that morality has been - and remains - a central concern. At a point in time when a new and more 'civilised' epoch and the final banishment of 'barbarism' are regularly heralded, Mestrovic's analysis for all its flaws is both brave and timely. Sociologists will ignore it at their peril.699

Turner started his review of Postemotional Society calling that book an "... excellent critique of contemporary society ...", and Williams proceeded arguing that: "As Mestrovic rightly notes, the missing ingredient in most sociological theorising is the role of the emotions.", and concluded that Mestrovic had produced an "... insightful, thought-provoking book, which deserves a wide readership, but one which, for this reviewer at least, was too 'postemotional' by half."700

There are certainly problems with Mestrovic's sociology that can be identified by reference to his masters, Schopenhauer and Durkheim. Mestrovic fails to convince that Durkheim was a feminist, when Durkheim is considered by way of Lehmann's interpretation. By examining feminist criticisms of Schopenhauer, Mestrovic's use of Schopenhauer's philosophy is also problematic with regard to gender. Foucault's philosophy reveals problems with Mestrovic and also Lehmann, the latter who has also been criticised by scholars for misrepresenting Durkheim. This is an incidental irony, given that critics of Mestrovic, argue something similar of Mestrovic, who has been seen as overstating the case of Romanticism in Durkheim's thought. There are limitations to the applicability of Durkheim's and Mestrovic's sociology for considering issues of alcohol in society and education, particularly with regard to essentialism, gender, class and culture. The critique above partially provides the grounds for questioning the relevance of Durkheim and Mestrovic for the topic at hand. This is an issue that will be returned to later in a considering the liberalism in Durkheim's and Mestrovic's sociology.

Liberalism is an important concept to consider with regard to alcohol in society and education and Durkheim's liberalism has been interpreted in a way that has important ramifications for considering the topic. In this regard, Lehmann took the critical structuralist position to the point of believing that Durkheim: sought to limit working class aspirations; opposed the destruction of the structures of capitalist society, and; saw revolutionary activity as primitively opposing private property and the means of production. Lehmann thought that Durkheim was wrong to see an evolutionary social development and amalgamation as a true panacea for societal malaise. Lehmann took the critical structuralist position so far as to condemn Durkheim.

He foresaw and advocated the social and statist reforms endemic to late capitalism. Durkheim was a quintessential and prototypical neoliberal, a neoliberal ahead of his time. Lehmann did reject revolutionary activity in favour of incremental changes. Durkheim held history and traditions in high regard. Revolutions for Durkheim, destroy the best and the useful in society - they are anomie, the way in which for

instance he viewed the Renaissance period as sweeping away all that was good in Scholasticism. Durkheim’s liberal orientations were to preserve the important social developments and remnants of history. However, if Durkheim was a 'prototypical neoliberal' it is unlikely that he would have walked around the grounds of his university with his nephew's socialist newspaper hanging ostentatiously from his pocket.703

These points aside, there is a particular reason why Lehmann is mistaken to call Durkheim a neoliberal. This mistake arises from Lehmann’s unusual use of the term 'neoliberalism'. For Lehmann, it denotes the mid twentieth century forward approach which Offen called 'soldarism', or Tiryakian noted as that of 'New Deal Democrats'.704 This is due to Lehmann’s use of critical structuralism wherein any liberal perspective is treated suspiciously for being an ideological support for capitalism. Critical structuralism allowed Lehmann to collapse Durkheim into the concept and term of 'neoliberalism'.

This claim is important and has consequences for considering Durkheim’s, and by extension, Mestrovic's sociology. There are different sorts of liberalisms and Mestrovic's co-master, Durkheim, had a particular take on that view of people and society. I disagree with Lehmann that Durkheim was a neoliberal.

Labeling Durkheim as a neoliberal is a noteworthy claim with potentially devastating consequences for the present study. To address the claim of Durkheim’s alleged neoliberalism, it is informative to consider that sort of liberalism.

Implications

Critiquing Mestrovic has revealed issues for Durkheimian perspectives regarding neoliberalism, gender and culture that need to be addressed. Critically considering Mestrovic has entailed raising a series of discussions and commentaries specifically concerning Mestrovic and been by way of discussions considering Schopenhauer and Durkheim related to Mestrovic. Foucault’s philosophy has also been utilised to alternatively view points of relevance where essentialism, knowledge and truth are concerned. Mestrovic and Durkheim have been rendered problematic and this impacts on the relevance of Durkheimian perspectives. The relevance of theory is important when to be applied to phenomena such as alcohol in society and education.

Whilst critical structuralism contributes little directly to Durkheimian perspectives regarding alcohol in society and education, it does contribute indirectly. Despite making a number of good comments on gender and culture, raising general issues that need to be returned to and addressed for the purposes of establishing a critical and contemporary Durkheimianism, Lehmann’s social theory is not directly useful on the grounds of being selective, decontextual, for strangely viewing ‘neoliberalism’, as well as being inwardly, desirously and infinitely structuralist. Gender and culture will be returned to in context as well as theoretically. However, first it is necessary, to understand that, from Durkheimian perspectives, gender and culture are part of a social context influenced by theory.

Indirectly, however, Lehmann's comments are of great importance where representations versus structures are concerned. Mestrovic in particular can be seen to be leaning too far towards representationalism, and that needs addressing. Durkheim's concepts need supplementing too and socially based theories that refer to structures and representations will need to be studied in depth to establish the grounds for Durkheimian perspectives on alcohol in society and education.

The excessive approach taken by Lehmann towards Durkheim is apparent and clear and this is clearest with regard to Lehmann's understanding of what constitutes 'neoliberalism'. Durkheim's liberalism, for Lehmann, is neoliberalism. From the sort of orientation centrally taken in the present study - that towards Durkheimian perspectives, Lehmann's conclusions lead to a curious, but ultimately misguided and unuseful view of Durkheim's liberalism.

Durkheim was not a neoliberal, in terms of these perspectives. Rather, Durkheim was a social-to-liberal democrat - a thinker holding to a social basis and who rejected what were accepted economistic, psychological, subjectivist and biological views of the time. Durkheim did seek to modify liberalism and individualism, to ensure that society did not lapse into chaos and selfishness - not for the purposes of social control.

To reiterate, the critical structuralist approach, for reasons noted above, will not be centrally used for this study. However, Lehmann’s points regarding gendered aspects of society that are structural are pertinent, and structural elements of society and education will be taken up in the section immediately following the next.

Lehmann's critical structuralist misapprehension of Durkheim as 'neoliberal' will be dealt with through clarification of the implications of the social movement, theory and application of neoliberalism seen from Durkheimian perspectives. To make Durkheimian positions clear with regard to neoliberalism, and, to understand
the societal and educational importance of neoliberalism vis-à-vis alcohol, an exposition and critique of neoliberalism is required.

There are then a number of reasons for the discarding of and turning away from critical structuralism, to understand the representation of neoliberalism and its effects on alcohol in society and education from Durkheimian perspectives. To understand alcohol in society and education an incursive turn is needed into the theory, as well as application and response, in context, to neoliberalism. This turn will allow a clearer contextualisation of the application and response to neoliberalism in Aotearoa/New Zealand and its relevance to alcohol, society and education therein, considered from Durkheimian perspectives. This turn will be towards critically studying the neoliberal theory of James M. Buchanan.

A turn towards and incursion into neoliberalism will assist enormously in critically dealing with these issues. To clearly understand the critical import applying Durkheimianism to neoliberalism for the purpose of studying alcohol in society and education, neoliberalism proper, as opposed to that of Lehmann's misapprehension needs to be addressed, Buchanan providing a good example for explanation of neoliberalism' and critique from a Durkheimian perspective.

Issues of gender and culture have been raised by considering Mestrovic's sociology and need to be addressed. Those issues will be taken up in Section 3. First, however, a neoliberal perspective needs to be considered to highlight the importance and impact of neoliberalism in contemporary society and with regard to Lehmann's claim regarding Durkheim's alleged neoliberalism.
SECTION 2:

BUCHANAN
Buchanan

In this section, the neoliberal thought of James M. Buchanan as what is often called public choice theory will be studied. An exposition of Buchanan's thought is for strategic, analytic, and inductive purposes. Buchanan will be shown to have a radically conservative, limited, market orientated, punishment tending view of treating people and society. This is the very sort of view that represents neoliberalism. Studying a real 'neoliberal' serves to delineate Durkheimianism from neoliberalism, dealing with what is Durkheim's alleged 'neoliberalism' - a curious accusation, as it will be subsequently shown that Durkheim's theory, and Mestrovic's comments on economic rationality and the New Right, lead to orientations opposite to those of neoliberalism.

Buchanan's neoliberalism serves as an example of what Durkheimianism is opposed to. To understand this opposition, neoliberalism needs to be explained. By explaining neoliberalism - Buchanan's sort as a representation of that liberalism, Durkheimianism can be delineated from and used to contextualise, and critique neoliberalism with regard to alcohol in society and education. Durkheim's and Mestrovic's social theories might presently look undesirable. They contain problems that need addressing. But if Durkheimian perspectives appear questionable at this point, by studying a neoliberal theory and viewed in context, Durkheimianism is by comparison rendered desirable, and preferable. If it appears that Durkheim and Mestrovic are suspect liberals when viewed from Lehmann's position, examining Buchanan shows how conservative liberalism can be when taking an economistic view of society and education.

Public choice theory has been very influential in Aotearoa/New Zealand State and societal restructuring since the 1980s. In considering alcohol in society and education from Durkheimian perspectives, Buchanan provides an exemplary representation of neoliberalism that can be used for critically comparative purposes.

That discussion follows as part of critiquing Buchanan and is relevant, as Buchanan and Mestrovic, and particularly, Buchanan and Durkheim, comment although in radically different ways, on similar, if not the same societal phenomena. Durkheimianism and public choice theory are, in the main, polar opposites, as will be pointed out when critiquing Buchanan. But first, the aspects of Buchanan's theory to be mindful of with regard to the subsequent critique and comparison are those concerned with what is moral, the State, democratic decision making, the individual and society, institutional activities, human psychology and nature, and
especially, as well as fundamentally where Buchanan is concerned, economics. Additional points of interest are Buchanan's comments on morality, justice, the good, the contract proper, rights and obligations, rules and punishments.

Buchanan holds to an economic view of individuals and society. People are to be seen, for analytical purposes, as economisers - that is, as actors who will behave in such a way as to increase their own stocks of goods, whether physical in terms of, for instance property, or intangible, for instance as empowerment. People analytically considered in this way are what Buchanan calls utility maximisers. Social phenomenon can be studied by way of considering people in this way. When society is considered as composed of numerous competing or coalescing utility maximisers, economistic diagnoses of behaviours in various institutions can be undertaken.

Buchanan has researched various social and in particular, State, institutions, such as the judiciary, the legislature, the constitution, bureaucracy, as well as education, believing that the welfare state founded on social democratic concerns, structures and beliefs leads to the breakdown of justice and morality where society is concerned.

Buchanan believes that society and education can be better dealt with by applying the view of an economist. Buchanan's is a neoliberal economist's view of society and education. Buchanan's neoliberalism, with regard to later contextualising public choice theory to the topic at hand, can be better understood by way of the exposition of the concepts of *homo economicus*, the economics of politics, government failure, producer rents and a theory of constitutions.

Buchanan applies his analysis to social institutions of education, politics, bureaucratic systems, governance and accountability issues, believing that the historical situation created by nineteenth and twentieth century politics, policy and theory have resulted in an excessive socialisation of resources in the control of a few public sector, legal and educational, state organisational members. This tendency has, for Buchanan significantly contributed to a breakdown in moral standards. For Buchanan, society has come to adopt false views of human nature, public, political and bureaucratic institutions and actors.

When introducing his 1975 work, Buchanan, although noting that his position had somewhat changed from viewing the collective as a product of individuals' values to be studied by way of positive-sum approaches, argued

\[\ldots I\text{ remain, in basic values, and individualist, a constitutionalist, a contractarian, a democrat - terms that mean essentially the same thing to me.}\]
Professionally, I remain an economist. My purpose .

. . is to "explain" some of the apparent sociopolitical malaise that I observe with the professional tools of the economist and from the value position stated.\(^{705}\)

_Homo economicus_

Buchanan used the notion of utility maximisation to explain human behaviour, in setting up constitutions and in acting in the postconstitutional context. Buchanan's concept of utility maximisation is central to understanding the public choice view of how politicians, bureaucrats and educators act. Within the concept of utility maximization is the idea of an economising person. It is human nature to economise. Buchanan uses the concept of _homo economicus_ to explain this view of the self.

Buchanan argued that public choice theory can start with the assumption of _homo economicus_ for two reasons. One, that it is really up to other people to prove that alternative models of people's actions should be used for analysing politics and economics, and two, that it makes sense philosophically to use the same model of behaviour, applying it to different contexts.\(^{706}\)

Brennan and Buchanan argued for the benefits of abstraction using _homo economicus_ with regard to: the purposes of theorising; its use in the comparison of alternative constitutions, and; the options taken in choosing between institutions as well as internal institutional decision making. _Homo economicus_ has a history in political economy, and can be related to abstractions, constitutional choice, postconstitutional choice and institutional behaviours.\(^{707}\)

Brennan and Buchanan related _homo economicus_ to classical political economy focusing particularly on Adam Smith who argued that the butcher, may possibly, but need not have any care for the welfare of customers, yet in acting self interestedly, through trading, does act in customers' interest.\(^ {708}\) Adam Smith, Brennan and Buchanan believed, held the notion of morality dearly and recommended the first pages of _The Theory of Moral Sentiments_ for reading, where Smith argued: "Humanity does not desire to be great {or we may add to be rich} but

to be loved",\textsuperscript{709} to support their interpretation that Smith's use of \textit{homo economicus} was not because it described human nature, but rather that it served the purposes of studying the transformation of private into public interest. To assume that people were publicly minded all the time would have eliminated the very need to consider the importance and relevance of studying the arrangement of constitutions.

Brennan and Buchanan argued that economising behaviour might well be observed in people who although acting self interestedly in their market exchanges, can still act altruistically in the political realm. This is simple economic behaviour for Brennan and Buchanan, where actors conserve their altruism and spend it in politics. The conclusion that people should therefore be using more political as opposed to market models was rejected by Brennan and Buchanan, claiming that such a focus might result in the destruction of motivating factors that encourage the economising of altruism.\textsuperscript{710}

Brennan and Buchanan believed that despite the empirical observation that people might act altruistically, \textit{homo economicus} still serves the purpose of providing a model of behaviour for enabling the making of normative proposals over institutions. Although not necessarily being the only model, or the one that is best for, or most like, actual human behaviour, for Brennan and Buchanan, \textit{homo economicus} is particularly well suited to constitutional level discussions.\textsuperscript{711}

With regard to applying public choice to constitutional choice, the analysis Brennan and Buchanan sought is a matter of choosing between various sorts of rules as opposed to the approach of choosing various sorts of persons. Methodologically it makes sense to use one sort of model of people's behaviour and testing behaviour in various contexts to attain data that is 'derived',\textsuperscript{712} as opposed to using tests based on the supposition that different sorts of models of behaviour apply to different sorts of institutions.\textsuperscript{713} Brennan and Buchanan argued that public choice since the 1960s had started to question the idea of government as a benevolent despot, and \textit{homo economicus}...
*homo economicus* is useful for analytical purposes as people have, for Brennan and Buchanan, often mistakenly assumed that different sorts of behaviours apply in political as opposed to market contexts.\(^7\) \(^14\)

Buchanan openly acknowledged that public choice theory is methodologically individualistic, as opposed to working with measurable units that are considered organic or holistic as the cases of political parties, regions or nationalism present. While not denying that it might be possible to construct a public choice analysis upon the ‘romantic’\(^7\) \(^15\) notion that people might act according to the public good, Buchanan noted that for the most part public choice theorists start from the economic assumption that individual actors do what they think is the best for their individual utility, which is a subjectively defined value in which economic well being is a factor.

Brennan and Buchanan, in picking out Stigler's' view of *homo economicus* as a particular example, distinguished their belief from that of their economist colleagues' excessive use of *homo economicus* in believing that the concept can be stretched far enough to accurately describe people and believe that it is a postulate that can be considered as founded on an empirically scientific basis.\(^7\) \(^16\) Brennan and Buchanan feared that an excessive use of *homo economicus* for scientific predictive purposes would lead to economics depending on a useful but singular and overextended concept. Rather, Brennan and Buchanan argued, *homo economicus* could be used for scientific methodological purposes in comparing various possible constitutions.\(^7\) \(^17\)

Brennan and Buchanan argued that *homo economicus* applied to constitutional designs is of a different sort to versions used in economic predictive science where *homo economicus* is conceived of as having factors in utility functions which are clearly identified, conditional, and quantified - something like net wealth maximisation. In constitutional design contexts, Brennan and Buchanan argued, *homo economicus* can be interpreted as utility maximising, having a utility function composed of anything. In choosing constitutions, *homo economicus*, in the way Brennan and Buchanan saw the abstraction, assumes that no one else will choose constitutions that will favour other people, where acting morally is a

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personal choice and not something that will necessarily be good for others. In this way choosers are able to protect themselves from a possibly despotic ruler, even if they believe they are more likely to get a benevolent ruler, something like in the example that Brennan and Buchanan provided where a builder is being contracted to build a house. The customer looks around at earlier work and references from former customers, trusts the integrity and ability of the builder and so on. But at the point of making a contract over the building at the lawyer's office, the customer wants contractual rules and safeguards that will protect them from exploitation, were the builder to turn out to be so inclined. The builder also contracts against becoming exploited by the customer. The point of using homo economicus for Brennan and Buchanan is in this way methodological; to find out whether in the case of various institutions, private interest can be turned into public interest in the way that such market contracting works.\footnote{Brennan, G. & Buchanan, J. M. (1984). 'The normative purpose of economic "science": Rediscovery of an eighteenth-century method'. In Buchanan, J. M. & Tollison, R.D. (Eds.). The Theory of Public Choice II. p.389.}

\textit{The economics of politics}

For Buchanan, people, defined by reference to their utility function or their own personal set of preferences, can be observed with regard to market purchases or political choice. Different political views are for Buchanan explainable, in fact desirable, as different preferences are the key to economic exchange. If, as Buchanan put it, one person prefers apples to another's preference for oranges, opportunities for trading arise. But Buchanan was not about to claim that political exchange was as simplistic as his economic exchange example. He claimed that this was the case in two ways, each of which required a separate analysis for public choice theory. One way that economic exchange differed was that for Buchanan, political exchange, or constitutional arrangements like protection of property and persons, restrictions on government and the protection of contractual rights must first be established, as that is what allows safe economic exchange to take place. This required the public choice theoretical analysis of constitutions - an extension of the social contract tradition and history. Exchange in politics also differs from the economic case as political exchange is more difficult, involving every one of the participants in the exchange, not just two traders in exchange. This for Buchanan required public choice analysis of political institutional theory, which encompasses theoretical issues around, rules for voting, competition in political elections and parties, bureaucracy and voting behaviour.\footnote{Buchanan, J. M. (1984). 'Politics without romance: A sketch of positive public choice theory and its normative implications'. In Buchanan, J. M. & Tollison, R. D. (Eds.). The Theory of Public Choice II. pp.14-15.}
Having just cited J.S. Mill on the natural tendency to insure against the abuse of power by government, Brennan and Buchanan argued that despite market expressions of such abuse having been realised for a long time, there is a lack of societal recognition that it is the same in the case that Mill was referring to. They believed there was a, "... continuing neglect (perhaps even denial) of the political aspects ..." of the same assumption that is applied to economics. Bureaucrats, politicians, and the judiciary might authentically work for the public good, but the public needs protection from actions of self interest, where they can "economize on love". As *homo economici*, the assumption that people will act as such is still a useful way to think when considering institutions.

Buchanan argued that politicians are given enormous power that is only partially curtailed by their political party, and wish to be elected again. Politicians will choose that option which means they maximise their utility, not, that of their constituents.

Once elected, a politician has considerable freedom for choosing his own preferred position on spending or tax issues. He is constrained by voters indirectly through prospects for reelection, for long-term party support, for generalized public acclaim. But even for the politician who is highly sensitive to these indirect constraints, there remains freedom of choice over substantial ranges of the political spectrum. Within what he treats as his feasible set, the politician will choose that alternative or option which maximizes his own, not his constituents' utility. This opportunity offers one of the primary motivations to politicians. In a meaningful sense, this is "political income," and it must be reckoned as a part of the total rewards of office.

Pointing out that a significant proportion of public monies in contemporary democracies is spent on the bureaucracy that distributes goods, Buchanan believed

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that an analysis of the behaviours of elected institutional actors’ possible effect on how decisions are made are necessary as:

It is unrealistic to assume that elected officials who occupy executive and legislative positions of responsibility have no personal preferences about the overall size of responsibility have no personal preferences about the overall size of the public sector, its sources of revenue, and, most important, about the particular components for public outlays. A person who is genuinely indifferent in all these respects would not be attracted to politics, either as a profession or as an avocation. Politicians are likely to be those persons who do have personal preferences about such matters and who are attracted to politics precisely because they think that, through politics, they can exercise some influence over collective outcomes.724

Noting that there had been a significant increase in government budgets, Buchanan argued that the tendency towards increased spending is one exhibited by representational actors who by definition have interests in trying to "do good"725 by collective approaches. Unlike minimal or anti state political actors, such politicians

... are quite likely to be those who seek to accomplish their own preferred social objectives through collective or governmental means. By contrast, those persons who, ideologically, desire that the governmental role in society should be reduced to minimal levels are unlikely to be attracted to politics. Few natural anarchists or libertarians frequent capital cloakrooms.726

The second political type, that of the minimal state persuasion is the more overt utility maximising, power, authority and arbiter seeker, thriving on others

seeking out their help. Opposed to the political person who has ideological preferences, the power seeking politician, Buchanan argued, is the preferable sort, due to the actual source of decision making becoming more transparent as voters are, through that person, more able to clearly identify where decision making takes place, and who through power seeking politicians, can identify who is electorally accountable for decision making when in office.

If the list or menu for choice should be fixed in advance, the behavior of politicians of such nonideological stripe might produce results that are closer to the true preferences of voters. This correspondence would emerge from the desires to meet the demands of the largest possible number of constituents. In such a case, no directional bias would be introduced by the necessary departures from pure democracy. When the list or menu for political choice is not predetermined, however, the directional bias toward expanded budgets again arises.727

**Government failure**

Buchanan saw his position as explaining the failure of public sector organisations and institutional actors, a "theory of public goods" as: "Politico-legal order is a public good; disorder is a public bad. There are two sides to the coin."728 In the 1960s, people started to realise that the pragmatic approach to government was not working. For Buchanan the proliferation of programs created by the legislature, formed unrealistic expectations and ignored the constitutional issues raised by such expansionism. Buchanan believed that citizens started to realise that 'government failure'729 was taking place where spend thriftiness, and the enacting of unrealistic programmes were concerned. Citizens also increasingly criticised the governmental level of the judiciary for pursuing activism and exceeding its legitimate protective state activities.730

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Buchanan was concerned that a Hobbesian Leviathan would result from unlimited government, a phenomenon he saw as present in 1960s and 1970s government organisations structured around democratic decision making.731 Buchanan was critical of Deweyan and Marxist influences on social policy in the twentieth century, preferring the approaches to apprehending government exhibited by eighteenth century philosophers in their scepticism that the state could solve social problems. Citing in particular the work of the father of political economy, Adam Smith, Buchanan noted that a laissez-faire approach freed commerce from mercantilist constraints, and, provided a precept for the ordering of society.732

In examining the phenomenon of Leviathan in modern society, Buchanan argued that the judiciary and government executive change laws without consent of the public's individual members, an effect of the state when it adheres strictly to democratic constitutional dictates, let alone when made worse by the situation which Buchanan argued existed, where normal constitutional arrangements are manipulated at will by the state.

*To the extent that majoritarian democracy uses governmental process to modify the basic structure of individual rights, which are presumably defined in the legal structure, there is an encroachment of the domain of the protective state. Dominant coalitions in legislative bodies may take it on themselves to change "the law," the basic constitutional structure, defined in a real and not a nominal sense. To the extent that the protective state acquiesces in this constitutional excess, the social structure moves toward "constitutional anarchy" in which individual rights are subject to the whims of politicians.*733

Buchanan believed that a new philosophy was needed to reinstate the public's faith in government. The judiciary would stop creating legislation and focus on law imposition and conciliation, the legislature would stop taking goods off some and giving them to others, citizenry would be stopped from seeking to get individual goods through government bureaucracies and by supporting certain politicians, and,

academic and media organisations and representatives would stop judging social advancement by observed increased annual budgets and the amount of legislation passed.\footnote{Buchanan, J. M. (1975). The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. p.177.}

Buchanan, despite acknowledging that various other theoretical approaches to critically appreciating politics and government as failing might have been adopted by academics, also implied that public choice theory's observations are very similar to those made by, citizens, who clearly see governments displaying an ongoing failure to realise their electoral pledges.

\begin{quote}
The romance is gone, perhaps never to be regained. The socialist paradise is lost. Politicians and bureaucrats are seen as ordinary persons much like the rest of us, and "politics" is viewed as a set of arrangements, a game if you will, in which many players with quite disparate objectives interact so as to generate a set of outcomes that may not be either internally consistent or efficient by any standards.\footnote{Buchanan, J. M. (1984). 'Politics without romance: A sketch of positive public choice theory and its normative implications'. In Buchanan, J. M., & Tollison, R. D. (Eds.). The Theory of Public Choice II. p.20.}
\end{quote}

Buchanan and Devletoglou believed that people cannot expect bureaucratic decision makers to choose other than that which they themselves prefer. Any other action would mean that choosers were 'behaving perversely'. Under the conditions where faculty members can, when entry requirements are instituted, choose who will and who will not enter study according to their own personal preferences,\footnote{Buchanan, J. M. & Devletoglou, N. E. (1970). Academia in Anarchy: An Economic Diagnosis. p.38.} Buchanan believed that

\begin{quote}
... here and elsewhere, we recognise no supermen. The producers, whether of automobiles or education, are ordinary mortals. They are little different from you and me. They are neither more or less self-seeking. They are forced by institutional circumstances to make subjective or personal choices among potential consumers. And they are, in fact, doing "what comes naturally" to them when they behave so as to enhance their own comforts. Indeed, they would be behaving perversely if these
\end{quote}
should be neglected. They, therefore, appoint as consumers those who best fit their own subjectively determined criteria, whatever these may be.\textsuperscript{737}

Buchanan and Wagner argued for capital and labour cost adjustments and disinflationary policies as contributions to attempting to cure the economy. Economic recession is an acceptable effect of this alteration. "Recession is an inherent part of the recovery process; it is the economic analogue to a hangover for a nation that is drunk from Keynesian stimulation."\textsuperscript{738}

Buchanan and Devletoglou argued that tertiary education should be opened up to market conditions for the purposes of increasing the diversity and excellence of the sector who could

\ldots tap the powers of competitive or market-orientated behavior \ldots put maximum emphasis on satisfying the customer and community \ldots universities would have much more freedom in deciding how to use their wealth \ldots each university would be become an independent producer capable of establishing and maintaining a distinctive character about which students and parents could inform themselves before making their choice \ldots Every university in the business would have an incentive to attract students, and every successful university would have the opportunity to build upon its own success.\textsuperscript{739}

\textit{Producer rents}

Producer rents is a term Buchanan used and which is synonymous with another more popularised term, provider capture. In discussing "Bureaucratic rents and franchise", Buchanan noted that where government hires in services from the private sector, various public sector inspectors, and other evaluators will need to be employed, making a considerably large bureaucracy necessary. When government is expanded into producing goods itself, the bureaucracy grows even more, as does the problem of employees’ demands for producer rents.

Once direct production is attempted, massive numbers of additional employees are needed. If government produces postal services, mail clerks, postmen and postmasters must be hired. If government produces education, administrators, teachers, supervisors, and custodians become government employees along with others who must evaluate the credentials of those who produce the services. The list can be extended almost without limit.740

Buchanan critiqued the double power government employees have compared to non-government employees or elected representatives. If bureaucracies were reduced, Buchanan argued, the bias in budgetary decisions and directions would be altered. However, with a large, and in his view, expanding government sector, Buchanan was concerned that as government employees (according to Buchanan comprising one fifth of all employees nationally in the United States) are noted for voting more often than private sector employees, the former had an unfair advantage in realising their individually perceived goals. Unlike the ideal situation where government employees would carry out the directives of government, real life government institutional decision making is constrained and to a certain degree driven, by government employees.

Within limits, the non elected government employee makes final decisions about government actions. Stated in a somewhat converse way, the legislature or elected executive can never exercise full control over the behavior of bureaucrats in the structural hierarchy, and any attempts to gain full control would involve prohibitive costs...Within the constraints that he faces, the bureaucrat tries to maximize his own utility. He is no different from anyone else in this respect. He can hardly be expected to further some vaguely defined "public interest" unless this is consistent with his own, as he defines the latter.741

Government is multifaceted and requires a bureaucracy to operate, coordinate, delegate and put into place various government policies and law. This step for Buchanan raises the problem of bureaucrats who use the system in which they have power to make so many decisions in, to secure outcomes that favour their own preferences, set constituents against each other over various relevant issues, and seek to increase the size of their budgets and departments. For Buchanan, public choice theory involves addressing the excessive size of government that results from this situation, by viewing elected government as a monopolising exploiter of citizens, not, a vehicle to realise their collective and shared needs for goods and services.\textsuperscript{742}

Buchanan believed that public choice theory has a contribution to make in addressing government and bureaucratic excess. Buchanan recommended that governments should be constitutionally constrained and predicted that bureaucrats would resist the limiting of government. Buchanan warned against violent lurches to the left or the anarchy of the right in dealing with these excesses.

\begin{quote}
Western societies face a task of reconstruction; basic political institutions must be reexamined and rebuilt so as to keep governments as well as citizens within limits of tolerance . . . We must indeed keep the "miracle" of social order clearly in our mind as we seek ways and means of reforming arrangements that seem to have got out of hand.\textsuperscript{743}
\end{quote}

Producer rents extend to state sector education, from Buchanan and Devletoglu's economic perspective. The non existence of price mechanisms in free education, leads to the need to ration educational goods where people who make rationing decisions rule totally over others, a natural tendency of people, because

\begin{quote}
. . . as anyone who has suffered the abuse of petty bureaucrats knows, rationing embodies power of man over man. At this point we face another fact
\end{quote}

squarely. Individuals enjoy power. They relish opportunities to control the lives of others, and there are few exceptions to this generalization. Faced with what appears to be an almost limitless demand for whatever he may offer, the producer begins, all too naturally, to enjoy his role as chooser. Is it so strange that we should predict some loss of humility here? Is it not probable that the producing "faculty" member would begin to think himself omnipotent - or, indeed, to fashion himself as being in unique possession of the relevant criteria for good judgement?\(^\text{744}\)

Bureaucratic decision making respects the desires and utility maximisation of producers, that is, faculty staff, and not consuming students and taxpayers,\(^\text{745}\) and

\[\ldots \text{perhaps the most bizarre feature of the whole institutional structure.} \{\text{is that:} \} \text{Quality variables or components will always be adjusted so as to meet the utility of the producer rather than of the consumer or user.} \text{746}\]

Buchanan and Devletoglou believed that faculty members are given too much power and choice over curriculum material. This situation highlights the increased costs for faculty members in teaching different and diverse course material over time. Because students are unable to choose curriculum material, staff teach the same things that they learnt themselves when students,\(^\text{747}\)

\[\text{The educational mix that is offered will represent faculty preferences} \ldots \text{Curriculum, university organization, instructional procedure - they will all remain almost immune from variations in student - consumers' tastes. We should, therefore, predict}\]

reasonable stability in these offerings over time. Innovation will not be a characteristic of faculty-controlled quality. . . For the most part, faculties will continue to teach what they themselves were taught. It is costly to offer new subject matter.\textsuperscript{748}

Theory of constitutions

In addressing public choice theory's focus on "the economic theory of constitutions",\textsuperscript{749} Buchanan situated the analysis as being interested with what can be considered legitimate limits on the power of government. Buchanan argued that public choice theory draws on two-century old social contract theory, believing that eighteenth century constitutionalists had the mixture of rights held by individuals versus the government more accurate, in comparison to nineteenth and twentieth century assumptions that regularly spaced and free political elections could provide limits on government excess. Public choice theory, by inquiring into theories of constitutions, for Buchanan raises a number of questions with regard to the perimeters of political interventions, political decision making structures, quantities of national products subject to government seizure, and the amount and terms of franchisement.\textsuperscript{750} The state enforces the law as an umpire would in a game situation.

\textit{This is precisely the functional role assigned to the state in its law-enforcement task. The state becomes the institutionalized embodiment of the referee or umpire, and its only role is that of insuring that contractual terms are honoured.}\textsuperscript{751}

Buchanan saw the movement to a postcontract context as requiring the state being split into two sorts and functions - that of the productive state and that of the protective state, each which must remain separate from the other. The productive state is responsible for the good and justice. The protective state treats all people neutrally and is fundamentally legal.

The distinction between the constitutional and the postconstitutional stages of social contract allows us to interpret the state, the collective agency of the community, in two separate roles. Failure to keep these roles distinct, in theory or in practice, has produced and continues to produce major confusion.  

This legal or protective state, the institutions of "law" broadly interpreted, is not a decision-making body. It has no legislating function, and it is not properly represented by legislative institutions. This state does not incorporate the process through which persons in the community choose collectively rather than privately or independently. The latter characterizes the functioning of the conceptually separate productive state, that agency through which individuals provide themselves with "public goods" in postconstitutional contract.

Buchanan noted that underlying a discussion of the productive state is the problem of distinguishing between private goods and public goods, as well as the related concern over defining and protecting individual property rights. However, Buchanan conceded that there should be some publicly provided services, in recognising that:

Government is a productive process, one that ideally enables the community of persons to increase their overall levels of economic well being, to shift toward the efficiency frontier. Only through governmental-collective processes can individuals secure the net benefits of goods and services that are characterized by extreme jointness efficiencies and by extreme nonexcludability, goods and services that would tend

Buchanan argued that social "representation" where legal issues are decided by multiple representatives as in appellate appeal and review courts and juries is the result of people's confusion between the productive and protective state. For Buchanan that reflects a "simple blindness to the distinction between the protective and the productive state, between the external enforcement of contract and contract itself." Buchanan criticised the situation where the judiciary, who are part of the protective state, in a position confusion of what is being distributed act as if they were part of the productive state.

 Appropriately, the judiciary, as an element of the enforcement structure, is independent of the choice-making arm of the collectivity, the legislature. However, as the judiciary itself violates the terms of its own contract by explicitly engaging in legislation, in genuine "social choice," its independence from choice-making rules has been properly brought into question. The legal or protective state, as such, is not "democratic" in the sense that collective decisions are reached through some voting process, whether this be majority voting or otherwise.

Buchanan did realise that some historic differences regarding different people's capacities and environments meant that generalisable ideals applicable to all contexts do not exist. However, Buchanan saw the economic as fundamental to society and people's acting in accord with laws, where

\[
\text{... there is an economic basis for constitutional contract among persons. There is, similarly, an economic basis for adherence to any existing set of rules, to those that define the status quo. This}
\]
Economic uncertainty along with fear of punishment are reasons in cost-benefit thinking for people's participation in adhering to laws, regardless of both one's status as an original or inheriting contractee and of the better or worse off positions people are contextualised in. This economic selfhood is in all human choosing, so the protective state must ensure that it imparts punishments for rule breaking. Buchanan explained people's defaulting on agreements as generations passed from one to another, a phenomenon wherein defaulting increases over time as the distance between the status quo in one generation and expectations inheritors have over rights and obligations they would like to renegotiate. Buchanan believed it unlikely that more severe punishments and commitments would become acceptable, opting instead for his argument that the original contract should be renegotiated. Buchanan saw the status quo as a reality fundamental to apprehending any social, historical and legal institutions, and was opposed to idealised alternatives.

The uniqueness of the status quo lies in the simple fact of its existence. The rules and institutions of sociolegal order that are in being have an existential reality. No alternative set exists. This elementary distinction between the status quo and its idealized alternatives is often overlooked. Independent of existence, there may be many institutional-legal structures that might be preferred, by some or many persons. But the choice is never carte blanche. The choice among alternative structures, insofar as one is presented at all, is between what is and what might be. Any proposal for change involves the status quo as the necessary starting point. "we start from here," and not from some place else.

Buchanan was not optimistic, nor was he utopian. Buchanan was not promising social perfection through constitutional reform. But that reform had to take place, at societies’ contractual base. Buchanan argued that thinking needed to move beyond the surface meddling in institutions driven by pragmatism, evolution, utopianism, and accident, towards an approach informed by philosophical principles, in accord with human nature, and that realistically reconstructs the constitutional arrangements in society.

*History need not be a random walk in sociopolitical space, and I have no faith in the efficacy of social evolutionary process. The institutions that survive and prosper need not be those that maximize man’s potential. Evolution may produce social dilemma as readily as social paradise.*

In a subsection called 'Intellectual bankruptcy' Buchanan noted the debates between public choice and welfare, freemarket and socialist economics where “modern man seems to be in need of sociopolitical "conversion" to a new conception of society” if the possibly necessary constitutional renewal is to occur. Buchanan argued that the only other political alternative to the existing situation might be that of despotism. Buchanan and Wagner argued for renewing an earlier belief that in contradiction to the beliefs fostered by the 'Keynesian conversion', budget balancing should simply be a given in government. "Restoration will require a constitutional rule that will become legally as well as morally binding, a rule that is specifically written into the constitutional document of the United States."

Buchanan believed that taking a constitutional focus and stringent enforcement of the breaking of constitutional rules was an approach that could be applied to education, tertiary education in this case, where student and academic radicals, who thought that constitutions and their enforcement were not important, could try out their approaches in a market. Buchanan and Devletoglu believed that spatially separate anarchist universities could be established as an alternative to traditional constitutionally-based institutions. In the new competitive environment,

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traditional institutions could then require students to pledge their allegiance to its rules upon the understanding that rule-breaking would lead to their ejection from studies. A choice of traditional versus anarchist universities might provide social, economic and educational knowledge regarding the usefulness of one system in comparison to the other.765

Implications

Buchanan's use of the notions of *homo economicus*, an economics of politics, a theory of constitutions, producer rents and government failure, provide a different perspective to that of the sociologies of Durkheim and Mestrovic. Buchanan takes an economic view of the self, as well as society and its institutions. For Buchanan people are selfish and dominating, and this must be accepted and worked with. Society has morals, but at base, it is made up of individuals that must be looked to if society is to be explained. Representatives of individuals are themselves individuals with their own preferences. Institutional actors, if given the freedom will choose options that suit their own preferences. For Buchanan, government and its institutions have become subject to the preferences of individuals who have the power to choose on behalf of others and collectives that do not respect the wishes of citizens. The legal realm has been taken over by social groups and state institutional actors. Society has been debased, due to its ignorance of economic imperatives. Romantic, collective and socialist perspectives need to be eliminated from the state and society. New economically-sourced rules need to be instituted to limit the power of bureaucrats, politicians and social groups.

Buchanan provides a good example of neoliberalism in taking a particular view of human nature, economics in politics, the failure of the state, principally self serving behaviour of government workers, as well as sorts of, limits to and reconstructions of state power.

Buchanan viewed human nature economically and individualistically applying that view to government, constitutions, and contracted exchange, for methodological purposes.

An economist's view of politics is present in Buchanan's comments on political groups and actors' behaviours as running along lines of those in a market. Political exchange at the precontractual level is what makes economic exchange possible, and political exchange postcontracturally explains the actions of persons and groups. Both contexts can be studied for Buchanan as in each case the economising self chooses individualistically and selfishly - as in a market context.

Government failure was identified by Buchanan as present in the judiciary, politicians and bureaucrats including tertiary educators who since the Second World War had failed to institute voters' choices as policy and practice, by manipulating the distribution of rights and properties in accordance with their preferences. Voters and taxpayers choices and preferences are not realised.

Constitutionally, government was for Buchanan becoming too interventionist, overtaxing and overspending due to productive state expansionism. Buchanan sought to rewrite constitutional bases in society so that the dabbling of politicians, bureaucrats and the judiciary which reflected the productive state running into and affecting the protective state would stop, and so that educational institutions could compete in a market.
Critiquing Buchanan

Critiquing Buchanan is fundamental to establishing the relevance of Durkheimian perspectives for examining alcohol in society and education. Neoliberalism has been applied to numerous societal contexts in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Buchanan's is a good representation of neoliberalism generally by way of embracing and so working with: utility; the market; competition; self interest, the minimal state; contractualism, and; positivism. To varying degrees, Durkheim opposed these very orientations that Buchanan represents.

Critiquing Buchanan by way of secondary commentators, but more importantly by comparison with views extrapolated from Durkheim's concepts and commentaries highlights the relevance of Durkheimian perspectives for studying neoliberalism’s impact on society. Buchanan's public choice theory (a prominently used term for one approach in what is the broader theory of rational choice), critiqued from Durkheim's position, is illuminating for distinguishing Durkheimian perspectives. Buchanan and Durkheim can be situated together with regard to exhibiting similar interests in their theories, but Buchanan runs opposite to Durkheim.

Buchanan has been considered by commentators from the perspectives of State theorisation generally as well as through historical and critical biography. These two perspectives illuminate and consolidate by supporting the sorts of orientations that are applied in critiquing Buchanan specifically from Durkheimian perspectives.

By critically examining Buchanan's view through commentaries and taking Durkheimian perspectives, founding material will be garnered for the case of understanding societal and educational transformations as wrought by neoliberalism, studied through Durkheimian perspectives.

Dunleavy and O'Leary argued that in economic theoretical terms, public choice theory can chiefly be comprehended by way of its antonym of private choice. Public choice theory is variously known as collective choice, rational choice theory, social choice and mathematical political theory.

Dunleavy and O'Leary summed up public choice theory as a composition of the four-fold influences presented in: Jeffersonian democratic philosophy; neoclassical economics, social contractarianism, and; mathematical political models. Thomas Jefferson was aggressive in his stance against structures in his context that would today be recognised as centralised governments and professional bureaucracies. With a Rousseauian-like romanticism for rural-style democracy,

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Jefferson argued that enough protected private property was the source of good republicanism and democracy. Jeffersonian democracy in public choice theory is evident in the promotion of less central government and more local government, and the criticism (which Dunleavy and O'Leary believed was a caricatured view), of big bureaucracies and government attacking individuals. Riesman noted Jefferson's influence on Buchanan's political economy, seeing it as 'eminently sensible', given their perspective, that Buchanan and his colleagues in 1957 established their first research centre into public choice calling it the Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy.

Dunleavy and O'Leary noted how influential neo-classical economics is on public choice theory. Public choice theory uses the tools of economics to study: political failure; the negative effects on individuals resulting from the design of political markets, and; ways to identify in politics what are people's real choices, sorting their different preferences by attempting to copy the economic market wherever relevant.

Dunleavy and O'Leary noted that social contractarianism is an influence on public choice theory by drawing on Locke, Rousseau and particularly Hobbes, all of whom envisaged situations where rational individuals are given a choice between living in a state of nature or opting to pledge allegiance to a contract, trading their freedom for protection from the State. Public choice theorists delve into questions over what are the principles that underlie acquiescence to the contract, and what are the legitimate extents which government can go to.

Dunleavy and O'Leary noted that public choice theory was positivistic in following the three step process of first formulating abstractions, secondly theorising how those abstractions should apply and work out, and thirdly, testing those theorised abstractions against the empirically known world. Public choice theory is also positivistic, Dunleavy and O'Leary believed, in rejecting inductive reasoning - that which is built on empirical knowledge. Deducted knowledge is the foundation for the approach of logical organisation and empirical testability in public choice theory. The quantification of phenomena, mathematical processes and other tools of an "economics of politics" favouring the operationalisation of theories, making measured and careful explanations by following through from first universalisable abstracted propositions, usually for a self interested, fully informed, rational and

utility maximising person\textsuperscript{774} (like \textit{homo economicus}) is important for public choice theory. Dunleavy and O'Leary also believed that public choice theorists are positivistic in arguing that values and facts should be parted.\textsuperscript{775}

Dunleavy and O'Leary noted the methodological individualism in public choice theory, in rejecting as fallacy the idea that holistic entities beyond individuals exist, as well as rejecting functionalist concepts.\textsuperscript{776} Public choice theory is interested in micro-based behaviour that explains the macropolitical, where although altruism might exist in society, it is claimed that microlevel models of self interested, subjectively choosing, egoistic individuals are the best to use in explaining collective behaviour.\textsuperscript{777} Public choice theory, for Dunleavy and O'Leary, reflects an ethically individualist values system which seeks to realise people's equal access to politics and a welfare maximising liberal democratic state.\textsuperscript{778}

Public choice theory looks at the input side of politics by focusing on: rewriting constitutions so that they are more democratic; the problems with interested groups' activity which leads to a bigger state, and; market behaviour by political parties.

Political party market behaviour is evident in three ways. Firstly there is the problem where successive parties when in government, in seeking to please potential voters, manipulate the economy before an election creating a sort of political economic cycle as governments perhaps cut taxes or increase spending in the lead up to an election - moves which might be reversed after polling day. Secondly, there is the problem of exceeding budgets where governments overspend and deficit funding is deferred until sometimes generations later. But by putting off confronting the reality of debt financing, government incurs costs where borrowing more money leads to poor economic performance through either: borrowing off shore or from citizens pushing up the debt interest, or; borrowing domestically, increasing the money supply and inflation. The latter although possibly acting as a temporary buffer for government by reducing the government's actual debt servicing in real terms and pushing up incomes so that more people are liable for increased progressive taxation, can also lead to governments' ability to out


\textsuperscript{775} Dunleavy, P. & O'Leary, B. (1987). \textit{Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy}. p.88. That facts and values can be vigourously separated. Facts are the domain of positive public choice theory, values of normative public choice approaches.

\textsuperscript{776} Dunleavy, P. & O'Leary, B. (1987). \textit{Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy}. p.91. Commenting on functionalism noting public choice theory argued "that social science explanations must be intentional, based upon the intended or unintended consequences of purposeful human action".


compete private sector markets, undermining the private sector’s necessary contribution to the nation’s economic base.\textsuperscript{779}

Thirdly, Dunleavy and O’Leary argued that public choice theory notes the problem in input politics which involves a bidding war between parties in and outside government. Opposition parties can make extravagant policy claims to entice voters, driving up the expectations of voters. Despite this leading to the case where if elected the party might be expected to institute its costly and wild claims when outside office, opposition candidates are themselves forced to make extravagant claims, as if they did not, the incumbent government would appear more favourable.

Marginson interpreted Buchanan from a Foucauldian perspective, arguing that Buchanan had created a new discourse, a new science and presented a conservative, Christian perspective on politics and economics.\textsuperscript{780}

Riesman's (1990) considered view of Buchanan is of relevance to the present study, in two senses. First, with regard to his prior biographies of Titmus, Galbraith, Marshall, and most relevantly, Adam Smith, Riesman is well positioned to be considered as presenting an authoritative interpretation. Second, Mestrovic can be considered as somewhat of a disciple of Riesman, lauding his similar position to that of Durkheim, particularly in regard to his contribution of the notions of inner and other directness to sociology. Incidentally, Riesman contributed the foreword to Mestrovic's (1997) \textit{Postemotional Society}.

Riesman treated Buchanan's morality with great care. Unwilling to submit to the conclusion that Buchanan presents moral nihilism - the conclusion that Riesman argued Barry made in pointing to Buchanan's acceptance of initial preconstitutionally situated inequalities permitting contracted slavery,\textsuperscript{781} Riesman believed that Buchanan's is a crusading morality, one which is grounded in Kant's morality, one which is grounded in Kant's principle under which people ought to treat people as ends and not means. For Riesman, Buchanan's morality presents a mixture of conservative culture and individualistic libertarianism.\textsuperscript{782}

\textsuperscript{782} Riesman, D. (1990). \textit{The Political Economy of James Buchanan}. p.117 - a point made while contextualising Buchanan within his own family history of a grandfather who lived in an religious rural community and who in 1891 was voted Governor of Tennessee, and a mother with a background of Presbyterianism and of having a number of family members becoming preachers, p.118.
Buchanan's morality can be seen as radically different to Durkheim's with regard to what Riesman argued was Buchanan's rejection of social organicism, for what Riesman argued was a sort of approach adopted where society is like an ongoing game that various individuals enter and exit.\textsuperscript{783}

Riesman believed that Buchanan saw people as risk avoiders, not risk seekers, for instance in his approving references to the Founding Fathers' constitutionalism with their focus on various constraints on government. Buchanan criticised the excess of the government Leviathan in contemporary society as outside the realms of what the Founding Fathers would have imagined or tolerated. They did not therefore need to institute measures for dealing with government centralisation of the sort seen in modern society.\textsuperscript{784}

Education for Buchanan, Riesman argued, is a matter of building up Smithian moral capital for future generations by teaching stability, rule boundedness and order, common languages intergenerationally for continuity, balanced budgets, identified and possibly altered rightful claims to portions of public goods, and, allowing only minimum bureaucratic and governmental intervention.\textsuperscript{785}

Riesman (1991) used the language of Durkheim in noting that Buchanan's work attempts to address problems in each of these areas so "... that encroaching anomie might significantly be stemmed ...",\textsuperscript{786} as Riesman believed that Buchanan thought he could partly explain the 'recrudescence of anomie.'\textsuperscript{787} Buchanan, Riesman believed, did this by focusing particularly on government's excessive intrusion into individuals' lives. Riesman saw the concept of a creeping "... anomie in the work of Buchanan\textsuperscript{788} as functionally similar to Marx's argument regarding the proletariat's role played in revolution. Durkheim saw anomie as arising in his context as well, but critiqued economistic solutions to societal anomie. Buchanan's solution to anomie is economic and not bureaucratic. Durkheim, in reviewing Merlino argued that as society grew, so in turn would the State and bureaucracy. Durkheim critiqued Merlino's revisionism of socialism through an approach not unlike Buchanan's neoliberalism. Durkheim rejected Merlino's advocacy of the splitting up of services between the public and the private as in fact an 'anarchistic', 'true sociological heresy' and contradicting the historical growth of the State exhibited from ancient Greece and Rome, medieval to nineteenth century Italian, German and French


European societies. What Merlino proposed, for Durkheim, was an 'impossible regression' where:

The State is considered as antagonistic to the individual and it appears that the former can only expand at the expense of the latter. Nothing could be more contrived than this so-called antagonism, the idea of which Merlino is quite wrong to borrow from orthodox economics.789

With regard to Buchanan's references to the sources of morality which Durkheim focused on, Riesman politely concluded his comment on Buchanan's interpretation of societal anomie stating: “... it is surprising that he does not have more to say about the origin and nature of multi-period normative standards.”790

Durkheim critiqued from Buchanan's viewpoint: Human nature and institutions

Buchanan's view of human nature leads to criticisms of Durkheim where human nature is concerned. Because Durkheim held to a highly social view of human nature, from Buchanan's viewpoint, Durkheim made the mistake of assuming that what Durkheim identified as the social pole of human nature was itself natural. There might be moral, altruistic, giving, even selfless people in the world. But Durkheim, from Buchanan's sort of perspective went too far and sought to build society on what are only additional and secondary tendencies, added onto what are primary and self interested motivations.

From Buchanan's position, Durkheim's view of institutions is one in which people must be assumed to be very altruistic and without any personal preferences, which Buchanan repeatedly argued was not the case as institutional actors often act very selfishly, in seeking to expand the size of their budgets and in making decisions that suited their preferences and not necessarily those of their employers, customers, clients or constituents.

Durkheim's view of the corporation is, from Buchanan's position, a recipe for expanded bureaucratisation of labour relations, and the State, where all the way along the lines of communication that Durkheim envisaged, bureaucratic actors, in

fact for Buchanan, seek to expand their own budget and control over the communications and other utilities arising from or related to it.

Through the corporation, ethnic minority groups are accorded higher moral grounds and attain extra rights - rights which are additionally manipulated by other institutional actors for their own interests or those whom they are contracted to represent, when considered from Buchanan's position.

Buchanan's position applied to Durkheim's view of the corporation with regard to legal representation implies that people need more stringent rules and contractarian arrangements to avoid the slippage into the situation where monopoly providers are wrongly given the decision making powers over others' interests. The corporation, which as Durkheim called for it, would take on all sorts of responsibilities and where its 'integration' of members might entail their legal representation as well. The legislative ramifications, from Buchanan's sort of perspective, result from a situation where corporations would have greater decision making power arising from the problem of corporate actors making trade offs when there are different levels of representation provided for different clients' cases. Clients would have no other choice of representation due to the near monopoly power of the corporation. From Buchanan's perspective Durkheim romanticised the corporation, making it appear moral and just when it was really a proposed bureaucracy, an organisation charged with and funded for providing services, and, an organisation inhabited by people - ordinary people, choosing people with their own preferences and constraints. Durkheim's proposed corporation is from Buchanan's sort of perspective, a recipe for institutional failure.

Buchanan critiqued from Durkheim's viewpoint: Human nature and institutions
Buchanan's argument that human nature is at base self interested and conniving is the sort of view of persons that Durkheim identified as anomie and egoistic. Durkheim's work can be regarded as an attempt to address the problem of egoism in individuals and society promulgated by, among others, economistic views. Although Durkheim was willing to admit that self interest was one of the elements of human nature, he did not give up on altruism, duty and the desire to do good. For Durkheim these were the best parts of human nature, not something to be relegated to the status of accident or personal choice.

Buchanan and Devletoglou in seeing educationalists as bureaucrats who like all people seek to dominate others, make what is the distinction between Durkheimianism and public choice theory clear. Where Durkheim distinguished between the lower pole of homo duplex which is desiring, selfish and power seeking,
and the higher pole which is giving, desiring otherness, disinterested and duty bound, Buchanan's public choice theory sees *homo economicus* as triumphant over societal constraint and determined to be power seeking. Fostering otherness in faculty staff members is futile in public choice theory as *homo economicus* is too strong to be overcome by the sorts of forces susceptible to what Durkheim identified as the higher pole of *homo duplex*. Durkheimians are equally concerned about bureaucratic excess, however, they do not give in to the forces whether individual or social, that generate that sort of behaviour. Durkheim's solution was to attempt to foster the sort of ideas and sentiments that historically have moderated selfish behaviour by instilling institutional members with greater consideration for others and respect for what their social institutions stand.

With respect to institutions in particular Brennan and Buchanan, in applying the concept of *homo economicus* to institutions as a model that is standard for assessing individuals and the institutions themselves, regard issues that relate to *homo economicus*, such as historical, cultural and professional values, which are considered as of central importance from the position of sociology and the sociology of knowledge, as something able to be set aside. In Durkheimianism, the retreat into abstractions that factor cultural and collective representations into mathematical formulae and individuals' utility is an excessive retreat into turning society into economics. In the article 'Individualism and the intellectuals' Durkheim criticised such approaches by dismissing the economists' view of society as passe.

Durkheim's approach to explaining the way in which property was established and institutionally protected differs significantly from that of classic and neoliberal thinkers. For Hobbes and Locke, property is justified according to natural rights and the mixing of labour in an abstract explanatory state of nature. By comparison for Durkheim, property is explained from an historical, social and cultural perspective. Buchanan follows the contract tradition in seeing warring precontractual beings, resolved by an abstract contract to withhold attacks. Durkheim's explanation of the development of private property is richly historical when compared to the classical liberal notions explained by way of synthetic and abstract explanations evident in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau or Kant, or for that matter, their ersatz and developed ideas expressed in the neoliberal theorists Rawls, Nozick and, of course, Buchanan.

From the view of Durkheim, Buchanan holds to an excessively economistic view of motivations of institutional actors, and his apprehension of institutions themselves. For Durkheim, institutions and their members must hold to high moral

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standards, especially in educational contexts where the morality of society must be interpreted and applied. This involves discipline and intuition, but not market disciplines of contracting and strategy anticipation of the sort of economics Buchanan argues for, but rather, the ascetic discipline of self awareness and control, and, the intuition of feeling. Durkheim adopted a highly qualitative approach to economics and social life, wherein through employment and its diverse social activities in the dense social context of modern life, people are able to meaningfully experience the workplace and others, enriching public and private affairs. This is exactly the difference between Durkheim and Buchanan with regard to professional issues. For Durkheim, professional ethics are varying and qualitative, whereas for Buchanan, ethical issues are matters to be as quantifiable as possible, rule-bound and constitutionally set. In Buchanan's institutional comparisons, justice is efficiency and individually-centred outcomes. For Durkheim justice is in enrichment and societal effects. Buchanan's approach tends towards the establishment of competitive systems of management, decision making and production. Durkheim's approach tends towards the establishment of cooperative systems of organisations, procedures and interactions.

Durkheim was of course very critical of the unions he saw in his time due to their excessively socialist bias. Durkheim's vision of the corporation or professional group system was an ethical and professional service and qualitative standards-based association dedicated to worker and employer, industry and commercial relations. Unionism by comparison has been notable for its conflictual relations with both the State and with employers.

This has been the case where teacher unionism has been concerned as much as in the case of private sector industrial relations. This situation, analysed by neoliberal critics as an example of teacher self-interest or as Buchanan would say, producer rents, reflects the very approach to relations that Durkheim was criticising in his time. The polar positions presented by both socialist and economic apprehensions of organising society are as present today as they were one hundred years ago. The corporation as Durkheim envisaged it has not become the institution it was meant to be. Very few countries today seek to establish a structure of ethical reciprocal industrial and economic relations and rules. In its unionised form, collective organisations remain, where they still have any influence, entrenched in antagonism and aggression internally and in their relations industrially and economically.

Buchanan wanted to renegotiate the contract, essentially to keep institutional and social arrangements in accord with human nature, protecting from
expectation renegotiators emerging intergenerationally. Rather than exploring the meanings and ramifications of focusing on historicised and cultural aspects of morality as Durkheim did, Buchanan wants to, where possible, separate these aspects of decision making off from an essentially economic selfhood when considering the contract, a positivistic assumption here in Buchanan regarding individualistic apprehensions of people’s decision making and the law. Buchanan claimed that historically contextualised ethical systems are of less importance in comparison to the foundational economising self, where rule enforcement is the other approach, an alternative to voluntary ethicality.792

For Durkheim, ethics are the very basis of the law and enforcement wherein representations are embodied in law historically, whereas Buchanan wants the law to ensure the recognition of individuals' ahistorical economic self preferences, first, in arguing the need for strong enforcement of the law as a primary when dealing with emerging intergenerational expectancy renegotiators. Buchanan wanted to renegotiate the contract from the position society finds itself in now, rather than referring to an idealised view of what society should be like. Renegotiating the contract for Buchanan starts ‘from here’, ‘the status quo’.793 Like Buchanan, Durkheim did see the importance of working from what is known, in advocating working with what Buchanan called the status quo as a source of reference for his argument for the renegotiation of the contract. However, note how Buchanan wants to establish rules for procedure that set obligations and rights. Durkheim also saw traditions as an important part of a societal reappraisal, but Durkheim, I believe, would oppose the completed reconstruction of rules of action that Buchanan sought, perhaps on the grounds of rejecting what Buchanan called the ‘status quo’ could be conceived as material to have economic approaches to the contract superimposed upon. Durkheim would see decision making approaches as part of the history, sentiments and beliefs in various societal practices, in which economics is one that Durkheim discussed and concluded that when applied in an unlimited way in society, politics and the State, was largely anomie and socially dangerous.

Durkheim saw justice as able to be sourced in the present. When Durkheim focused on religion as the source of the contract, it was not to argue that religion is the answer to contractual problems, justifications, etc. It is a mistake to assume that Durkheim is arguing for religion as the source of a solution to social problems. Rather, Durkheim was utilising history to explain how social practices came about, why people hold social laws in high regard, why the social contract is a relevant topic

for study. The contract is a social fact, is based on historic practices moulded by social, historical and cultural change. Durkheim was seeking to explain and preserve the sentiments that underlay the contract. The contract is a collective representation of social needs and ideas. Buchanan by comparison wants to return to a rigid interpretation of some founding laws that resulted in justice. Buchanan wants the letter of the law, whereas Durkheim held to the spirit and a view of objective non observable forces expressed in laws - laws that change over time, laws that with regard to the State and individual as a collective representation should be further developed and enlarged.

For Durkheim, desire was a part of acquiescing to legal rules alongside duty, whereas Buchanan opts for duty only as the source of acquiescence. Desire for Buchanan is expressed by economically concerned cost-benefit weighing desire, it is not the desire of sentiments and beliefs that Durkheim argued were so important for solidarity.

Implications

Buchanan's theory is radically opposed to Durkheimian perspectives. Durkheim takes a collectivist, qualitative, historicist, cooperative view of social institutions and persons. Buchanan can be seen from Durkheim's view as excessively individualistic and competitive in orientation, holding to a positivistic epistemology and viewing society as economic with regard to society and politics and promoting principally punishing minimal State, as well as rule-bound contractarianism and moral principles.

Having examined Buchanan with Durkheim regarding issues of human nature and institutions, Buchanan's representation neoliberalism in general is clear when seen from Durkheim's perspective. The distinction between the two liberalisms provides evidence that Durkheim was not a neoliberal, as Lehmann argued. When compared to Durkheim it is Buchanan that is neoliberal in approaching society, individuals and institutions as from an economic, individualistic, self interested, rule based, and ahistorical, perspective.
Public choice theory: The application and response

Having theoretically outlined Buchanan and critiqued that neoliberal view through commentaries and Durkheim’s perspective, a turn to considering the neoliberalism of public choice theory in relation to the social context, methodological orientations, alcohol, and addiction, makes case for case for apprehending the topic of alcohol in society and education from perspectives Durkheimian clearer.

To understand the case, a focusing in on the context of Aotearoa/New Zealand society and education is required. Societally, considered in the broadest sense, the neoliberal approach has been applied to a number of countries' individuals, societies and institutions, however, perhaps none more so than Aotearoa/New Zealand. Buchanan is further relevant in that public choice theory has been applied specifically to the society of education. Regarding the contexts and the cases of public sector restructure, politics, and bureaucracy where public choice theory has generally been taken up in Aotearoa, critical points have been made by way of comparisons with public sectors in other countries, and regarding general issues of social policy and in relation to educational policy in particular.

A lexiconic contribution called the 'cult of management' will be offered with regard to neoliberalism. This concept draws on Durkheim's phraseology regarding various cults, which in Durkheimian terms refers to social contexts of effervescence and constraint.

There are a number of aspects of society that public choice theory overlooks with its economistic view. Studying the ramifications and application of neoliberalism in context with regard to society, education and addiction reveals these omissions.

In the present case generally, public choice theory has been applied to various public sector institutions in this country. Public choice has been relevant to education specifically as will be later shown here, however, to contextualise public choice generally, the approach has been analysed by Boston (1991) as relevant to general public sector issues nationally.

Boston (1991) argued that public choice theory was one of the influential theoretical approaches applied to the reorganisation of the public sector in this country, identifying neoliberal ideas adopted by the Labour Government 1984-1990 in restructuring central and local public sector government.794

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794. Boston, J. (1991). 'The theoretical underpinnings of public sector restructuring in New Zealand'. In Boston, J, et al. (Eds.). Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution. pp.2-4. Also therein, Boston noted the theoretical approaches of agency theory (pp.4-7), transaction-cost analysis (pp.7-8) and managerialism and the new public management (pp.8-10). Each of those three theoretical approaches are relevant to the present study, however, analysis cannot be undertaken here, due to the confines of space.
Boston believed that public choice theory's criticism of bureaucratic and political actors' behaviour in increasing budgetary support and their sectarian support for policy, can be seen as influential in government restructuring with regard to: the development of larger Ministerial staff - providing greater Ministerial monitoring of departments and other sources of advice; increased Ministerial activity in the appointment of departmental heads; more transparency in bureaucratic policy making and departmental activities, reducing sectorial decision making on policy; decoupling the executive and central bank, allowing greater bank independence; proposing to legislate constitutional fiscal imperatives, and; as Boston argued was most notable, and is of relevance to education for present purposes, the splitting of policy advice from implementation within departments. 796

Increasing the staff in Ministers' offices results in Ministers’ ability to have better lines of communication with regard to department activities. Increased staffing means that, rather than having to rely on advice and communications from department actors whose utility maximisation would mean that their interests might oppose their own, Ministers can have their own resource in the form of Ministerial staff whose own utility-maximising activities are more likely directed towards office interests, meaning Ministers can make decisions based on information from more reliable sources. In *Limits of Liberty* Buchanan warned that departmental interests and those of its actors conflict with those of their masters. By being more involved in departmental appointments, Ministers can have more input in checking for sectorial-led and poor quality decisions over appointments in the behaviour of departmental actors. Buchanan and Devletoglou (1970) warned of similar tendencies in faculty members' admissions policy decisions.

Boston (1991) argued that despite the case where most countries retain their use the 'sectorial' approach which utilises vertically integrating policies and practice, this country's bureaucratic reorganisation has pursued the Swedish approach of 'functionalism' 796 which separates policy, implementation, regulation and advice. Boston implicitly referred to *homo economicus* and rent seeking when noting that Treasury (1987), despite warning against the excessive costs resulting from '{t}oo rigorous a separation', 797 was concerned with bureaucratic or producer capture displayed by sectorially organised departmental participants who

recommend policies which suit those participants, such as public provision and reciprocated assistance, rather than transfers of monies. The functional approach, by encouraging contestability is claimed to lead to greater departmental concentrated effort and accountability. Although advocates of 'functionalism' argue that contesting advisers logically have an interest in establishing strong links with provisional services as part of their work, a potential problem that Boston claimed could result, was advice that had little relevance to concrete practices and limitations as advisory functions are not integrated into and therefore not fully informed about implementation organisations.798

Boston did note that a case can be made supporting the creation of policy advisory departments for their having dealt to areas where advice was piecemeal and where lines of communication were breached. In that regard, Boston referred to the Ministry of Womens' Affairs as an example of providing policy advice to bureaucracy advocating for women. However, Boston also believed that there are only a number of good policy analysts available in government at any one time, meaning that when some areas take a large proportion of those analysts, the ability to study other areas is diminished. Additionally, analysts are overworked as many departments have small policy groups.799

Boston believed that the central change brought about by the fourth Labour government was the separating of departmental policy advice and regulation from implementation - a move that was supported by radical democrats and devolutionists.800 Education was one of the departments that experienced such a shift.

Boston also addressed the justificatory argument that restructuring of the public service dealt with the problem of producer capture (for Buchanan, producer rents or rent seeking) in bureaucracy, arguing that in fact Ministers are in most cases quite aware that departmental advice sometimes reflects bureaucratic political issues. Moreover, Boston argued that sectorially organised Ministries often had independent advisers contracted in to provide additional input. Other mediating influences such as the State Services Commission, the Audit Office, the Official Information Act, and Parliamentary Select Committees, Boston believed should have been sufficient to deal with the bogey of capture.801

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savings supposedly made from bureaucratic restructure, Boston noted that in the period between late 1986 and mid 1990, redundancy pay outs cost over $310 million. The educational administrative alterations made following the Picot Report and *Tomorrows Schools* were supposed to save $100 million. In reality the savings were far less than expected, leading to the initiation of the Lough Report review in that area.\(^{802}\)

Boston et al. (1996) saw public choice theory as being applied to this country's public management model with regard to the attempt to make politicians' behaviour more transparent where decisions to provide subsidies and make intercessions are concerned.\(^{803}\)

Boston et al. noted that reports on defence and a State Services Commission review promoted the separation of policy and implementation functions on the grounds that former vertically integrated departments led to provider, producer or bureaucratic capture.\(^{804}\) Education similarly experienced an attempt to somewhat separate the State's bureaucracy from having control by minimising its role. As it was stated in the Picot Report: "... our views are that the government should take only those administrative decisions it needs to take; and that all other administrative decisions it should pass to the learning institution."\(^{805}\)

Boston et al. (1996) doubted that the notion of capture is able to fully justify the separation of policy and implementation, noting that such actions only deal with provider capture and do not address client, ideological, professional, regulatory or technical capture. In the United States, regulatory capture is an area of concern where although regulatory organisations are separate from advisory and delivery functionaries, interested industrial parties outside the regulatory organisation are suspected of wielding influence. Internal bureaucratic interests are those to which capture is usually applied in justifying policy and provision splits. The case of regulatory capture exhibits the dangers posed by external interests in an environment where policy and provisional functions are separated. Boston et al. (1996) argued that policy and implementation splits might in fact be very risk laden.\(^{806}\) Additionally, research in the United Kingdom found little support for

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viewing central government departmental behaviour as that of budget maximisation. Rather than focusing on capture, Boston et al. argued that Schaffer’s advice of pursuing multiple advocacy, institutional pluralism, departmental advice from both inside and outside organisations, consultation and open government are approaches that designers of organisations should adopt. Those are the very sorts of approaches that Durkheim advocated for.

It would be an untrue claim to say that public choice theory has been the single most influential factor effecting state sector restructuring. In that neoliberal project, other influential theories were also incorporated and applied. Those theories, despite having subtle differences and varied degrees and contexts of application, have been important. In addition to public choice theory, Boston (1991) noted the influence of agency theory, transaction-cost analysis, and new public management or managerialism. To focus briefly on the last of these theories, here for critical purposes, and for future analytical purposes in the present study, managerialism, assumes that private sector management should apply in the public sector. Boston noted a number of problems with this central tenet of managerialism and distinguished managerialism’s belief that politicians should remove themselves from interfering to let managers manage, as different from that of public choice theorists who seek to deal with bureaucratic excess. Walsh (1991) also argued for a similar idea in stating:

"Public choice theory is concerned to restore the primacy of elected representatives and is suspicious of the bureaucracy’s usurpation of power. Managerialism heads off in a different direction. Where public choice theory wants to restrain the power of bureaucratic managers, managerialism wants to enhance their power. It attributes poor public sector performance to poor management systems, particularly the cumbersome constraints,"


This statement is not entirely correct, as although I agree with Walsh who pointed out that public choice by comparison with managerialism, is concerned with the 'primacy of elected representatives', Buchanan went further and sought to constrain politicians as well. Buchanan did seek a minimal state, and to limit bureaucratic rent seeking. However, Buchanan was not averse to management systems being instituted. For Buchanan strong managerialist structure is acceptable as long as it is small, economically efficient, and free of sectarian policy making and implementation. Buchanan, with his own constitutional focus did not reject bureaucracy but sought arrangements that would eliminate rent seeking, like for instance in (1975) arguing that bureaucrats could be disenfranchised as part of their work contract.

It could even be argued that Buchanan's approach is the road to increased management, not just in the public sector but in the more broad societal sense as under such neoliberal reforms such as that experienced in this country, goods and service policy advice, and implementation is contracted out to local competing public and private sector providers. As the private sector takes on the responsibilities formerly dealt with by the State, it too must put in place organisational – managerial structures to deal with responsibilities. Management does not go away in this context, in fact it expands as it is required for operational purposes in numerous and perhaps competing organisations. People within those organisations are also required to change and adapt to such an environment where for instance short term contracts and percentage of growth-driven bonuses among other conditions are imposed upon them. Those changes have transformed society and its members in new and significant ways as life itself has increasingly become a process of the management of oneself. It is not always very apparent, or necessarily immediately observable but it is everywhere, it is expected, it is required, so much so that inattention to management becomes unthinkable, inexcusable. Management becomes a societal cult. I will call this cult the 'cult of management'.


Treasury (1988) as endorsing the notion of there being three types of 'capture': consumer capture where one set of people who use state services have preferred access to those services over other sets of people; provider capture where people who work for the state in transferring the state goods act in their own interests not those of the people whom they make the transfers to, and; administrative capture, where people who work for the state in organising but not actually transferring goods themselves, act in their own self interests rather than that of organisational quality. Bertram (1988) had traced the concept of 'capture' used by Treasury (1984) back to Le Grand's (1982) reworking of public choice theory, which he used criticise the British welfare state in, for example, not providing equality as the middle class consume more of the state services than do the less well off. Treasury agreed with Le Grand in citing the case of the education system which is used more by the middle class than other groups.  

Peters and Marshall (1996) made a number of critical points about public choice theory's approach of attacking the welfare state. Among them some are that, firstly, public choice theory assumes that superior status of economic views of the State over other apprehensions - an a priori argument that results in State provision being seen as a zero-sum game secondly, economies of scale and externalities are ignored, and thirdly, through welfarism, the State, contrary to Le Grand's (1982) claims of its inability to deal with inequality, had according to O'Higgins (1985), been able to oppose and protect against further exploitations between 1976 to 1982.

Peters and Marshall argued that public choice theory was prevalent in Treasury's (1987) briefing and the Department of Education's (1987) report, popularly called the Picot Report, in its use of the various senses of the concept of capture, where some people whether they be consumers, legislators or public servants are seen as attempting to manipulate the system for their own interests and where pluralist visions of the State which pursue sharing and consensus are eschewed in favour of seeing the state as composed of workers who must be constrained and removed from having discretionary powers. 

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Peters and Marshall criticised both Treasury (1987) and in particular, the Department of Education's (1987) popularly called, Picot Report, focusing on the lack of any evidence of either to support their arguments in the case of bureaucrats and government giving in to sectorial interests, or with regard to evidence that consumer choice in education creates equity. Instead Peters and Marshall argued, both documents accepted that the market can better provide for the less well off and argue that the State should be reduced. As Peters and Marshall noted, links between both documents and public choice theory are evident. Public choice theory is interested in relocating management and provisional issues at the local level. What this ignores is the importance of the State in ensuring that people are able to receive their share of publicly provided services. Choice and markets in those services are equity in the sublime. As Peters and Marshall noted in quoting The Royal Commission on Social Policy:

*First, social control may require the restriction of choice of some persons in terms of wider community interest. Second, choice must not be encouraged at the expense of an equitable distribution of services . . . Third, in some localities such as isolated rural areas, only one form of provision may in fact be feasible.*

Public choice theory negates the importance of these concerns in favour of apprehensions and solutions derived from economics. Such an economic focus has implications for the issues raised by the focus on alcohol and education in the present study. Economics cannot deal with socially generated, historical, gendered, cultural, drinking practices, policies, legislation and education. Public choice theory reduces the social to and prioritises the individual. From Durkheim’s perspective it seeks to get a moral State from the immoral of economics, the most from the least. It is anomie.

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Individualism and holism

Public choice theory views people as utility maximising *homo economici* - a view that has been applied to alcohol. In such a view people are apprehended as making rational choices with regard to addictive drinking.

Gary Becker, a scholarly associate of Buchanan has pursued an approach similar to that of Buchanan's, but applied specifically to traditional, habitual and addictive use of alcohol. Becker is better known in educational circles for his analysis of 'human capital theory', an approach that is reflected in neoliberal policy making, emphasising individuals' responsibility for their education.

Becker's rational theory of addiction shares the approach of methodological individualism with Buchanan, so a brief explanation of rational addiction is of relevance here. Becker and Murphy (1988) proceeded with the assumption that people are rational utility maximisers and alcohol is a consumable good. Individuals' rational addiction can be explained through their utility, depending on a mixture of: their past consumption of goods - a learning through activity resulting in their 'consumption capital'; initial assets; their present expenditure; the function of their investments; price fluctuations, and; externally driven depreciations over time, and, internal investments in people's internally fluctuating valuing of goods.

Habits, Becker claimed, are often mistakenly considered, even often by economists, as irrational. Alternatively, Becker believed, habits can be apprehended as rationally derived, similarly to other choices. They are economical in creating efficiencies by reducing people's costs of information seeking and its application in new contexts.

Alcohol provides an example of one rational addiction among those of many other potentially addictive goods. An excessive habituation is bad if consumption lowers one's utility, measured for instance, by future damaging, incurred by present consumption when known to be harmful. Present consumption is likely to be increased due to the comparative value established from

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818. Due to the confines of space, human capital theory and its application to education cannot be analysed in the present study, suffice to say that Becker sees people as rational utility maximisers who will invest in their education up to the point where returns in the form of future earnings and status diminish by relation to the costs laid out or borrowed as consumers, and where user pays educational participation is correlated with economic growth. For some local commentary on human capital theory see Marginson, S. (1997). 'Is economics sufficient for the government of education?'. *New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies*, 32(1); Fitzsimons, P. (1997). 'Human capital theory and participation in tertiary education in New Zealand'. In Olssen, M. & Matthews, K. M. (Eds.). *Education Policy in New Zealand: The 1990s and Beyond*. (pp.107-129).

819. Due to the confines of space, the present study will be unable to explain, relate and critique Becker's approach in such a way to fully analyse his approach to alcohol use and abuse.


increased past consumption, at which point tolerance sets in, lowering present utility. The highest point of utility exists at a continued high point in consumption, and utility drops over the subsequent period as people get used to that level of consumption.

Some habits, like drinking alcohol, might decrease the attention people pay to future rates of discounting, where they may internally increase their future discounting rate, transforming a habit into a fierce addiction. Addiction also occurs when current increased consumption leads to a more likely increase in future consumption.

Becker's notion of rational addiction is able to accept and explain changes, differences and situations in social and cultural contexts. For Becker, utility explains: returning Vietnam veterans' rapid reduction in heroin use when returning home; the relation between bad habits and future discounting rates with regard to correlations of consumption of alcohol with that of other risky goods and undertaking risky activities; individuals' increased likelihood to become addicted when they prefer immediate gratification over deferred gratification; fluctuations of individuals' particular standard of living contributing to their increased happiness or unhappiness and suicide; peer pressure's transformation of habit into addiction; reduced welfare payments affect on populations' reduced dependence on welfare in the long term; the affect of welfare for the elderly in reducing parents instilling the tendency for children's caring for the elderly; women's childhood sexual abuse resulting in an adult hatred of men, and; teenage heavy drinking contributing to a life of alcoholism, or other entrenched habits, traditions or addictions.

Utility explains the influence of childhood experiences for Becker where, consistent with the Freudian imperative of childhood experiences determining individuals' lives, parents' behaviour in contributing to their children's learning by

doing as a child, becomes the referent for adult individuals' preferences and choices, traditions, habits and addictions with regard to conjugal, political and religious phenomena. Parents contribute to their children's adult preferences for Becker, whether or not they care for their children. Caring parents might for instance, Becker believed, abstain from smoking or attend church despite themselves enjoying smoking or rejecting religion in the belief that not smoking or religious participation is good for their children. Uncaring parents, although perhaps not abusing or neglecting their children, might still attempt to adapt their children so that as adults their preferences will favour the parents, for instance Becker argued, through instilling guilt feelings for caring for elderly parents.836

However, individualist approaches are not the only explanations for alcoholism. Nor is neoclassical political economically-inspired theory like that of Becker's the only way of explaining alcoholism. There are holistically tending explanations for addiction and dysfunction that range from the conservative to the radical.

Conservatively, viewing alcoholic families as a system and context, wherein the alcoholic member becomes the focus of the family's problems, insulating members from expressing their aggression, has been an area of interest of research into alcoholism in the family. This family systems theory views the family as a homeostasis-seeking group, actually resisting interventions for treatment of the alcoholic member.837

The formation of ACOA (Adult Children of Alcoholics) coincided with analysis of the families of alcoholics, through the interpretive framework of family systems theory and families being interpreted as dysfunctional. Children of these families were exhibiting recurring patterns of behaviour. Children of alcoholics can grow into adults with problematic lives. The influence of being raised in an alcoholic family results in the reproduction of alcoholism and alcoholics' children becoming adults concerned with taking care of others.

Family systems theory explores alcoholic families, seeking out the alcoholic member, advocating removal of that identified subject, transforming both the identified subject and the remaining family members and then returning the member to the family.838

A Durkheimian analysis would find this analysis wanting. Family systems theory does recognise at the domestic level, the interdependence avoided by the alcoholic or identified member, and the way that other members of the family also experience the drives and withdrawals of anomie and egoism due to this breakdown in the interdependence of the family. Despite disclosing the social nature behind myths of the alcoholic as an isolated loner, and the alcoholic's attempts to attain distance or a sense of satisfaction from desires unleashed, family systems theory's focus is on the importance of the identified subject and the family unit. From a Durkheimian view, family systems theory does not link the family to the wider society and its forces.

A Durkheimian viewpoint could advocate an immersion of people into society rather than simply in the family self-help context. Reconstruction for Durkheim was at the societal level not just that of the family who are really driven by society's broader directions. The family's problems would have to be dealt with in that context by reforming education and employment through first removing the flawed economic conditions that create anomic and egoistic acts like alcoholism, dysfunction and codependency in people.

There are other, more radical holistic approaches to alcoholism besides family systems theory that go beyond explaining just family relations, examining and critiquing wider social wholes and relations. Singer (1986) took a holistic approach influenced by the political economy of Fredrick Engels, and applied it to anthropological research into alcoholism.

Singer argued that Engels' references to alcohol raise six pertinent points. Firstly: "Abusive drinking is a health and social problem of tremendous magnitude." Singer related this to the West's alcoholic products entering traditional societies, and increased cirrhosis mortalities, as well as alcoholism hospital admissions in the West. Secondly: "Abusive drinking develops under identifiable social conditions that are the product of class relations", which Singer explained by rephrasing Sennet and Cobb in seeing alcohol misuse and addiction as "... among the hidden injuries of class and racial stratification", where as

Vogt noted, in 19th Century Germany, alcohol was payment for rural workers, and urban workers were often sought and were paid their wages in bars and saloons, and, as Brenner argued, within the capitalist economic cycle, economic recession leads to higher rates in consumption immediately and cirrhosis subsequently, as well as people drinking to avoid anxiety. 843 Thirdly: "Given class conflict, heavy drinking may serve as a mechanism of in-group social solidarity."

where for instance, New York workers in the 1830s, faced with industrialisation's radical transformation of their lives, where cottage workshops were turned into factories, owners moved out of the premises into houses and mansions, free labour emerged where strangers rather than local people were employed on contract rather than local community bases, and where there were numerous places selling alcohol, heavy drinking became the mark of one's working class identity. 845

Fourthly: "The extent of drinking and alcohol-related problems, however, is tied to the availability of alcohol", 846 where availability and outlets, correlate with increased associated problems. Fifthly: "A key role in the promotion or at least facilitation of availability is played by the State", 847 where Makela et al., who studied eight industrialised states argued that the State had tended to suppress non-commercial supply and encouraged more open markets in commercial areas where alcohol control policies were concerned. And finally, there is: "The other major role played by the social class that controls and profits from alcohol production and distribution", 848 where profit seeking multinational conglomerates, have increasingly penetrated developing and industrial nations' markets, claiming that their multi million dollar advertising campaigns are not intended to increase consumption but rather attract consumers to switch to their brands.

Singer extended what can be seen as his radical but holistic political economy of alcoholism to critique: alcohol as part of a process that controls labour; biomedical treatments and explanations for alcohol which individualise the problem,

and; excessive bureaucratisation of life in general, and State monopolies over and revenue raising through alcohol production in Soviet countries creating alcohol problems there.\textsuperscript{849}

Singer's perspective of political economy differs radically from that of Becker who assumes neoclassical economic fundamentals in that Singer looks to factors in society, history, culture for base explanations for alcoholism, whereas Becker, although admitting history and culture into the factors that contribute to utility, always returns to and favours the primacy of the individual.

Singer's perspective, in being holistic does share some things with a Durkheimian approach. Singer's holistic view of social problems in a class differentiated society where group solidarity can become built around freely available alcoholic products produced by multinationals and supported by State policies which favour their industry, raises similar concerns for society as those Durkheim expressed. However, the two positions also differ in that Singer, in utilising Engels was aligned with a Marxist approach that sees all social ills as sourced in class and race labour relations.

For Durkheim, the problem of labour was not based on the result of an exploited class as in socialist and communist interpretations. Although Durkheim recognised that much wealth was being amassed in a few places leaving some people with little, economic reorganisation was for Durkheim a societal and community project, not based only on types of theories which argued that economic class and the inherently evil nature of private property were the sole sources of social problems. Although sympathetic with socialism, Durkheim favoured the concept of republican individualism,\textsuperscript{850} believing that Marxist and socialist concepts, though offering some possibilities for social needs were too extreme and did not properly theorise the true illness in society. Durkheim alternatively saw class conflicts and those theories themselves as indications of industrial society not yet encompassed by an organic cohesion.\textsuperscript{851}

Luke (1987) could be said to be aligned with Durkheim's approach in dealing critically with excessively individualistic methodologies. Luke (1987), cited Buchanan\textsuperscript{852} in a group of a number of choice theorists. Utilising various authors' statements to outline the definitional and explanatory methodological individualism

\textsuperscript{849} Singer, M. (1986). 'Toward a political-economy of alcoholism: The missing link in the anthropology of drinking'. Social Science and Medicine, 23(2), pp.123-126.


that underlies rational choice theory. Luke (1987) argued that rational choice theories, due to their methodologically individualist assumptions tend towards psychologism methodologically. This, for Luke, fails to openly acknowledge and deal with the macrological issues that underlie and are the foundations of individual choice - a partial blindness that allows choice theorists to deduce individualistic conclusions, omitting the macrological in social life. Luke's criticisms are notable for their similarities with Durkheim's rejection of individualistic apprehensions of social phenomena.

Critiquing explanatory methodological individualism, Luke argued that a reductionist tendency permeates rational choice theory, where only individual choices, preferences and utility are acceptable explanations of society. This leads, for Luke, to rational choice theorists' adoption of an underlying individualistic explanatory methodology. As rational choice theorists do not accept any entities other than individuals, Luke argued, rational choice theorists are able to conclude that individuals are sufficient elements to be used to explain macro-social factors.

Luke believed that definitional methodological individualism by accepting individuals as the only empirically verifiable elements in the world in which choices take place, can be relevantly used only to initially outline the macro-social, arguing that rational choice theorists go beyond the limits that definitional methodological individualism can be usefully applied to society. Observing individual actions and relations between individuals participating in various institutional contexts as rational choice theorists do was of relevance to Luke. However, Luke argued, rational choice theorists, by denying the supra-individual ignores a number of pertinent factors that comprise individuals' choice making acts.

Choice theorists, Luke argued, create a fallacy by starting with the initial dual postulates of explanatory and definitional individualism and taking them too far, resulting in the reduction of macro-social issues to individualistic postulates, thus exceeding the parameters it can actually explain - small scale committee voting, in some cases leading to the further fallacy of methodological psychologism.

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Methodological psychologism in rational choice theory is evident in analyses that for explanatory or definitional purposes reduce collective and macro social entities to the micro-level decisions in the individual minds of their constituents. Luke critiqued methodological psychologism for ignoring the independence of the social, where extra-individual, historically grounded factors within, for instance a school, cannot be fully expressed by the choices of individual members of the student body.\textsuperscript{859}

Methodological individualism is insufficient for expressing what Luke believed was the nature of historical and societal practices as based on various ideas and purposive values. Individuals’ observed choices are part of wider social groupings and institutions. Luke believed that reducing the macro to the individual in the way rational choice theoretical methodological individualism does, falsely assumes that groups and institutions are merely the sum of individual choices and utility. Methodological individualism only accepts that which is observable, for Luke, resulting in rational choice theorists often denying the existence of, or interpreting the macro-social, as simple abstractions, ignoring the macrological notion of the social as \textit{sui generis} phenomena.\textsuperscript{860}

Durkheim repeatedly referred to society as a \textit{sui generis} entity, superior to and more than the sum of its parts. Luke, in critiquing the reductionist tendencies in rational choice theory evokes a similar view of the social to that held by Durkheim.

Methodological individualism in rational choice theory is not useful for explaining macro issues related to choice for Luke, as individual choices can reveal little of the world other than the momentary choice an individual might make at one point. Such a focus, for Luke, ignored macro issues where collective pasts and futures exist without any necessary call to refer to, let alone rely on, any one or number of observed individuals’ choices usefulness in revealing the future and past in their particular preferences.\textsuperscript{861} The individual for Luke should be interpreted, something like the way in which Durkheim (1895) saw the individual: as an insufficient source of determining social facts.

Luke argued that in reality, methodological individualism's individual is a social being. However, as rational choice relies on an individualistic apprehension of the world, dealing with the individual’s truly social being, would require either,


Methodological individualism seeks to explain and predict social facts, working from the individual to the macro case. Durkheim held to historical, social and cultural concepts, irreducible by comparison, to individual cases. Rational choice theory's methodological individualism as Luke interpreted it, is a polar opposite to Durkheimian sociology.

Implications

In conclusion, this chapter concerned with public choice theory in social and institutional change as well as methodological issues regarding addiction has questioned neoliberal view of alcohol, society and education. Public choice theory has been influential in neoliberal public sector sector change, particularly in education in this country. Public choice theory has also been criticised in that regard. The methodological individualism in public choice where rational choice is the core to understanding phenomena also relates to alcohol use and addiction. Becker's theory of rational addiction goes too far. It seeks to get too much from what is so little – individual utility. Further, the methodological individualism underlying neoliberalism generally, and Buchanan's view in particular, is from Durkheim's perspective, itself insufficient for explaining social phenomena when society is viewed as a sui generis force. Holistic theories of method and addiction offer perspectives more useful for viewing society as an entity.
Liberalism in Durkheim, Mestrovic, and Buchanan

Having identified the distinctions between Durkheim’s and Buchanan’s theories, particularly where holism and reductionism are concerned, examined the impact of neoliberal public sector change and the implications of rational choice for considering addiction, the evidence for refuting Lehmann’s claim of Durkheim’s alleged neoliberalism can be completed by examining the political ramifications of distinctions between different sorts of liberalism. Durkheim’s complex political theory of the corporation regarding holist versus individualist orientations is relevant, and contrasting Durkheim and Mestrovic with Buchanan on the role of government clarifies the divergent forms of liberalism influencing Durkheimian versus public choice perspectives, concluding the rebuttal of Lehmann’s claim of Durkheim’s neoliberalism.

Durkheim’s, Buchanan’s and Mestrovic’s different views of the importance of religious ideas on society and politics are also evident. Focussing on religious influences on Mestrovic’s liberalism and their relevance to particularly gender, highlights the need for supplementary social theories for Durkheimian perspectives.

Graham (1988), rather than focusing on distinguishing between methodological individualism versus holism, addressed problems created by politically holist versus individualist approaches, himself favouring the politically individualist view. Graham’s (1988) points are relevant to Durkheim’s political theory and view that education should be a corporate life.

Graham’s (1988) points on political holism are relevant to Durkheim’s political theory. Durkheim has often been accused of adopting a politically holist position. The claim made by Ranulf (1939) that Durkheim was a proto-fascist is a classic example of that politically holistic critique. The criticism of Durkheim as a political holist, however, overlooks the central importance Durkheim placed on individualism in modernity. Admittedly, Durkheim argued for holism, in that he believed that individualism was a product of modern society, where to realise the social source of their individuality, all people should belong to one of a various number of societal corporations. Further, Durkheim (1950) did believe that compulsory membership in corporations was necessary for effective communications between individuals, those they contract with, and the State. Additionally, Durkheim also saw the corporation as a potential conduit for political voting. However, to make the conclusion that Durkheim was a political holist by way of pointing to these sorts of tendencies in his political theory, overlooks the

notion of the cult of the individual, his very politically individualist but also collectivist tendency.

Durkheim's vision of a number of societal corporations was, he believed, well exemplified by the school. This was apparent in his (1925) \textit{Moral Education}. The school, for Durkheim was a holistic environment, passing on to students a whole range of ideas and sentiments necessary for a peaceable modern social life. Durkheim sought to establish integrating environments in a number of social institutions. Integration did not, however, mean that individuals were subservient to the whole. Durkheim's notion of the cult of the individual precludes any such conclusion. Individuality was fundamental to modernity where people had so little in common other than their shared humanity. The secret, Durkheim believed, was to arrange corporate affairs in education and elsewhere, so that individualism did not give way to egoism and anomie. Extreme political individualism, it would appear for Durkheim, results in anomie and egoism, whereas corporate life, in education and other social institutions, tempers those tendencies by way of reminding people of the holist ontology to society and its values that are above and beyond them.

It is these apparently contradictory holist and individualist positions that Durkheim sought to reconcile in his political theory, the notion of the corporation, and the cult of the individual and education. That is why it is a mistake to conclude that Durkheim was a political holist. However, it is this very sort of conclusion that is made by neoliberals approaching perspectives like Durkheim's which are informed by social ideas. Buchanan was critical of Deweyanism, Dewey being the one pragmatist that Durkheim was tolerant of, but who Buchanan linked with governmental holism. For Buchanan any such sort of approach like that of Durkheim's is bankrupting and romantic. Neoliberals have sought to replace the whole and the collective, for instance as represented by the State, seen as consumed and administered in coercive ways, with the part, which is the individual, seen as competitive as well as self seeking and organising. Durkheim by comparison was interested in pursuing a mixture of a pluralist collectivity and moral individualism. Durkheim agreed with neoliberals in arguing that people can tend towards selfishness and excess, but for Durkheim that activity resulted if they are situated in contexts, both specifically and more broadly, that are governed by acute and entrenched, distorted and malformed societal representations. Anomie and egoism were the ultimate products of such an environment. Anomie and egoism are manifested socially and individually for Durkheim. From Durkheim's perspective
alcohol issues related to education must also be seen as both individual and social, where the individual is produced in and by a social context.

At this point in having explained and critiqued Buchanan’s neoliberalism, explained how public choice theory has been applied to society and education in this country, and in having related holist and individualist tendencies in Durkheim and Buchanan, it is useful to return to Lehmann’s claim that Durkheim was a neoliberal. I disagree with Lehmann and in having considered Buchanan’s neoliberalism the distinction between true neoliberalism – that is, the sort represented by Buchanan, and Durkheim’s liberalism is clear. However, some additional comments consolidate the repudiation of Lehmann’s claim.

Lehmann’s unusual use of the term ‘neoliberalism’ obscures the differences between solidarism and the New Deal, and neoliberalism as neo-classical economic liberal thought, which is what the term refers to in this study. Lehmann’s definition is impoverished. Neoliberalism, as defined in this study refers to a collection of loosely associated philosophies - one of which is Buchanan’s. Neoliberalism is opposed to the state in its solidaristic form. Lehmann’s definition is misleading, as its use denotes an unclear distinction between collective forms of individualism such as the one Durkheim argued for, and those such as Buchanan’s. There is a clear distinction.

Making some comparative points between Durkheim, Mestrovic and Buchanan regarding the State highlights such necessary distinctions. Durkheim saw the State as an historical product and the centre in which a number of relations and representations coalesce without lapsing into being dominating, or, under the rule of the people. The corporation with its collective force, could oppose the State, and could protect people from overcoming and from being overcome by it. The State is an historic product, is made up of a number of relations and sentiments that cannot be understood by reference to its parts. The State has a responsibility to further the cult of the individual when people have become so differentiated that their only similarity is their humanity. The State should neither become subject to economics, in the sense that Durkheim believed socialism saw it as becoming a cog in the wheels of economics, but nor should it stand back from economics in the sense that classical economics argued. The State is involved in watching over and insuring that contracts are seen through. But the State is involved in more than that for Durkheim, in also being involved in non-contractual issues, such as trust and morality. Durkheim critiqued both socialism and classical economics for seeing morality as emerging from economics. This was not the case for Durkheim who argued that such approaches sought to get the most from the least, or the moral
from the immoral. The State should be seen in a similar way, as a simple economic and contractual view of the State cannot express its historical purpose of greater societal morality.

Buchanan saw the state as best understood as sourced in an abstract social contract, sought to reduce especially centralised state government power and size, individualising the state by viewing it as made up of a group of individuals with their own utility maximising behaviour, and individual preferences. The state for Buchanan should centrally be protective of, but producing some services for, contracting individuals.

Buchanan was suspicious of the notion of a collectivity or something like a group, considered as something more than a collection of individuals, and was concerned about groups' utilisation of such notions to take over control of state institutions, as was the case in Buchanan's (1975; 1977) claims that Deweyan philosophies had dominated and contributed to government failure. Buchanan saw the world through positivism and methodological individualism which is a Kantian world of observable and measurable phenomena, undertaken by looking to individuals. Buchanan's methodological individualism and positivism means that any notion of macrological or *sui generis* concepts such as 'society' cannot exist.

Buchanan argued that the State and its arms should clearly set out the rewards and punishments that are entailed in social contracting, with regard to, as Buchanan and Devletoglou (1970) argued, university students contracting to adhere to university rules. Buchanan (1975) was also concerned that the protective State might become besieged by productive state thinking where, for instance, the judiciary changed protective state laws through legal precedents based on social groups' beliefs and claims. Buchanan sought to remove the power of bureaucrats, claiming they had double voting rights in both being citizens and bureaucratic organisational voters. Government failure was a product of a mixture of social and political breakdown, resulting from: romantic and socialist ideas; the increased freedom of the population; increased demand for state services (1970), and; expanding budgets due to such demands (1977). Additional factors contributing to government failure, for Buchanan were politicians given the power, by Keynesianism, to extend spending far beyond budgeted parameters (1975; 1977), and bureaucrats who seek to increase their university (1970), and departmental (1975) budgets, as part of their personal utility.

A failing state for Buchanan, required increased departmental separations between policy, advice, and information and governance, to avoid such rent seeking, a constitutional renegotiation that starts over, leading to a post
A constitutional framework that eliminates the power of judicial, bureaucratic, and political actors, as well as assuring there is a strong but minimal state.

Buchanan viewed the state as something that should be approached by reducing it to its individual cases by looking at bureaucrats, politicians, citizens, academic teachers, and parents as utility maximisers.

Mestrovic wanted the institution of paid parental leave and sought a strong State. Mestrovic (1997) saw the possibility of nationalism and the State as leading to a better society, but saw nationalism as leading to cultural fission and the State's use of such sentiments to oppress people. Mestrovic saw the State as a structure that is rich with representations that can be turned to genocide.

The liberalism in Durkheim's political theory was very socially orientated, radically different and opposed to Buchanan's individualistic and conservative liberalism. Durkheim was not a neoliberal. Lehmann's allegation of Durkheim's neoliberalism can be dispensed with. However, Durkheimian perspectives must be relevant to current times. By analysing religious underpinnings of different forms of liberalism represented by Buchanan, Durkheim, and particularly, Mestrovic, grounds for considering a range of contributing additional social theories can be established.

Religion in Durkheim's, Mestrovic's, and Buchanan's liberalisms

Buchanan's liberalism is informed by Jeffersonianism and the Protestantism of the Southern U.S. Buchanan can be seen as seeking to instill the Protestant work ethic and asceticism back into society and politics. Buchanan opposed welfarism. But it would be a mistake to view Buchanan as simply a Calvinist religious conservative. Buchanan evoked Nietzsche, who opposed religion, to explain how economics provides another 'window' to view political and social life through.

Durkheim was from a Rabbinatical family background and attended a Catholic school. Durkheim was an agnostic, and in a secularising spirit drew on religion to explain the societies that it expressed, and where religion has meaning in the contemporary world, in unusual places such as science, which Durkheim saw as religion, refined. Judeo-Christian sentiments are throughout Durkheim's sociology. Durkheim sought a secular society with rich emotions and ideas with religious origins and force. The cult of the individual best expresses this linkage for a secularised world where the representation of the human person is god. Religion is the historical source of the notion of the human being, held in high regard, private property, and the contract proper. Durkheim's view in this regard, was that religion was of great importance to secular society.
Mestrovic's liberalism is informed by Catholicism. Mestrovic critiqued Anglo Saxon society and academia for being Protestant based and masculine as a result of valuing Jesus over Mary.

To label Durkheim, Mestrovic, and Buchanan, Durkheim, was a social liberal republican democrat, social, in that Durkheim sought a highly collective State and society and liberal in that he applauded meritocracy and did not like socialism. Durkheim was sympathetic to socialism but was not as politically active as his nephew and collaborator, Mauss. Durkheim sought a republican democratic system, organised by way of the corporation, which would be an important medium representing people.

Buchanan is a neoliberal - a neoclassical political economic liberal theorist. Buchanan drew heavily on Hobbes, Smith, Pareto, Jefferson, Kant and Wicksnell in this regard. Buchanan sought to utilise eighteenth century economics to understand, analyse, and restructure contemporary society and its institutions. Buchanan, in following Jefferson preferred local government over central government.

Mestrovic's liberalism is one which is difficult to simplistically pin-point. Mestrovic interpreted Durkheim as a liberal democrat. Mestrovic distinguished Durkheim from other liberal thinkers, such as for instance Weber, who Mestrovic saw as pursuing a value free, compared to Durkheim's value laden sociology. Mestrovic's liberalism is informed by turn of the nineteenth century intellectual thinking and thinkers evidenced in his use of Freud, Veblen, Jung, Schopenhauer and Durkheim.

Mestrovic's liberalism is problematic and cannot be separated from what appear to be his religious beliefs. Mestrovic is certainly not fond of the political left, but is equivocal in some cases. This ambiguity is evident in Mestrovic's scathing criticisms of Adorno and Horkheimer (1993), and Habermas, of the Frankfurt School, for being optimistic, bankrupt Enlightenment thinkers seeking utopias and ideal contexts for discussion. Mestrovic also critiqued Althusser for holding to a view of the centrality of structures over representations. Mestrovic (1997) was very critical of the left, seeing its influence in the notion of 'political correctness' as part of postemotional niceness and tolerance. Yet elsewhere (1997), Mestrovic utilised Adorno's concept of the culture industry, pointed to Schopenhauer's influence on Horkheimer, and, if ambivalently, used Marcuse's One Dimensional Man to explain aspects of postemotionalism.
Looking to the political right, Mestrovic also criticised neoliberalism for holding to positivistic views, rational choice theory, and exhibiting the masculinist will to power of Nietzsche.

But nor can Mestrovic be simply labelled a neo conservative. Mestrovic distinguished himself from Fukuyama, and, Bloom, whom Mestrovic saw as falsely believing in the end of history or wanting to conservatively return to earlier times, respectively. Somewhat controversially, Mestrovic also labelled Christopher Lasch as a neo-conservative.\(^{864}\) That interpretation conflicts with other commentators, for instance Frosh, who, incidentally to the problem of labelling Mestrovic, noted that Lasch, though difficult to classify, was broadly New Left.\(^{865}\) I concur with Mestrovic with regard to *The Culture of Narcissism*,\(^{866}\) which does read as a call to reinstate the power of the father to curb excessive narcissism, in a sense not unlike that of Buchanan and Wagner’s (1977) call for curbing the excesses of a society drunk on Keynesianism.

If Mestrovic is not left and is not right, then another source of identifying his liberalism might be sought in looking to convergences with other interpreters of Durkheim as a liberal, or in looking to contemporary liberal moral theorists for similarities. But those interpreters do not provide answers either. Mestrovic critiqued Lukes as mistakenly viewing Durkheim as a social realist, and even as accepting Parsons’ view of anomie as normlessness. Mestrovic was also increasingly contemptuous of Giddens’ modernist and optimistic sociology. Nor did Mestrovic tolerate liberal moral philosophers such as Kohlberg, who Mestrovic saw as a neo-Kantian, Enlightenment masculinist.

It could perhaps be claimed that Mestrovic is not even a liberal, but is postmodern, after all, the term appears in the title of two of his books considered herein. But this would be a mistake. When Mestrovic referred to postmodern theory, such references should, unless otherwise qualified, be read as referring to Baudrillard, something like in the way readers should treat Durkheim’s references to socialism as referring to Saint-Simonians. Mestrovic finds all that is wrong with postmodernism in Baudrillard. Mestrovic's use of the term 'postmodernism' is for the purposes of critique, even admitting (1993) to misleading readers by evoking the term so that the thinkers he revisits will be given a fair hearing. Mestrovic's comments on Baudrillard are usually fairly made, but Mestrovic is mistaken in rejecting postmodernism altogether on the ground of problems identified in

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Baudrillard. Baudrillard can be identified as espousing a postmodern theory that is subject to the criticism of being textually idealist, in refusing any narrative’s worth over another, for seeing the world as hyperreality, and made up of circulating fictions. All postmodernisms are not subject to this criticism. Foucault for instance, as Olssen noted, has been defended by Marshall as avoiding the charge of textual idealism. Mestrovic comments very little on Foucault. This is unusual given that Mestrovic has acknowledged Chris Rojek, who takes a Foucauldian view of leisure theory, as a reader and commenter on draft chapters of one of Mestrovic's books, and, whose Foucauldian view of Modernities 1 and 2 Mestrovic (1997) has utilised. For his part, Rojek has also acknowledged Mestrovic's influence, and incidentally, has co-edited a text critically discussing Baudrillard, which Mestrovic has cited.

The previous discussion of Mestrovic's use of Schopenhauer’s 'will', versus that of Foucault's use of Neitzsche's 'will', highlights one way to better understand Mestrovic's liberalism. Mestrovic likes Schopenhauer's reinterpretation of Kant's metaphysics of a real noumenal versus a phenomenal experienced world. The thing in itself of the noumenal world was accessible through intuition, for Schopenhauer. Mestrovic also approves of Schopenhauer's philosophical study of egoism, in which people are viewed as having potentially destructive and willing bodies that have to be denied and tamed through asceticism – a successful undertaking for a few elite geniuses. If this idea is generalised, and in looking at Mestrovic's preferred metaphysics and view of the body, Mestrovic's liberalism can be best understood, and those preferences added to by Mestrovic's religious tendencies reveal the governing sources of his liberalism.

Mestrovic is a neo-Catholic liberal democratic sociologist. Neo-Catholic, in that he favours Catholicism and Mother Mary - the compassionate and feminine, over Protestantism, Jesus, and a punishing, masculine God. Mestrovic is also faithful to his church. Nowhere in the works utilised herein, is there a thoroughgoing self-criticism in the form of a critical engagement with the Catholic church. The rest of the world might be drowning in anomie and egoism, but it seems that for Mestrovic, everything is alright at the Vatican. In a sense, this leads to an unquestioning attitude to structures and institutions. Anomie is clearly sin for Mestrovic. This reflects his borrowing from nineteenth century thought, but also can be interpreted as reflecting his religious orientations. In such a view, the body and

869. see Rojek & Turner's (1993), (Eds.) *Forget Baudrillard?*
the lower pole of what Durkheim called *homo duplex*, is sinful, and where the unconscious, with regard to things such as what Durkheim called social facts is seen to be hiding the truth of a sin which hides within.

Mestrovic is new Catholic in that he draws on Schopenhauer, who was a staunch atheist, with a pessimistic outlook. Mestrovic is liberal democratic in that he lauds democracy and human rights, but is suspicious of left-of-centre social democratic perspectives, and its accompanying, so called, political correctness.

Schopenhauer's views of a dangerous egoistic body and a real transcendent noumenal world, which contrarily to Kant's view, can, be glimpsed by people in the phenomenal world through intuition, reflects a Judeo-Christian penchant for seeing the body as sinful and seeking to have visions of heaven. If Mestrovic could drop those Christian views, his sociology could take on viewing the will as something of the world and not reliant on essentialist metaphysics, as Foucault, for instance, apprehended the concept. As already noted, Mestrovic's acceptance of Schopenhauer's metaphysics gives his epistemology meaning, where life is one of will and representation. Mestrovic's religious influences could be seen as unDurkheimian given, to reiterate, that Durkheim, despite being raised on Judaism in his family and having attended a Catholic school, was an agnostic who sought to further the secularisation of society and sociology. Mestrovic does not follow his primary master (Schopenhauer, I believe, being his second) in this regard. Rather, Mestrovic is more of a liberal, neo-Catholic sociologist, analogous to a nineteenth century missionary, seeking to purge new territories of their sinful beliefs and practices. This missionary-like zeal explains Mestrovic's attitude to various alternative theories. His religious preferences are central if submerged in his sociology. To be fair, at least Mestrovic is honest and open about his religious preferences and devotion. This honesty is more laudable when compared to the stance of academics who hide their religious beliefs behind various theoretical and philosophical bushels. However, it is also issues related to Mestrovic's neo-Catholicism that limits his liberal sociology.

It is with regard to Mestrovic's view of representationalism related to his neo-Catholic view, that another source of his liberalism can be sought. Mestrovic sought to have the representation or archetype of the feminine to be reinstated in society after being repressed by Protestant culture. The feminine, for Mestrovic, has important links with Mother Mary and associated ethics that need to be put back into the world. To study this representation of the feminine, Mestrovic has drawn on Carl Gustav Jung's theory of archetypes. It is in considering Mestrovic's focus on nineteenth century *fin de siecle* thinkers that his liberalism becomes more
apparent. As Cohen noted, it is as if Mestrovic thought that "... only a few exceptions ... prevent the clock on fruitful ticking from stopping with the passing of Durkheim and Jung." Mestrovic sought to rescue *fin de siecle* thinkers from obscurity and apply them to contemporary society. But it is this very central sociological use by Mestrovic of one hundred year old theories, unthoroughly modified for contemporary society, mixed with his religion, which guides his liberalism.

Mestrovic's liberalism is relevant to the present study as it poses a problem of how to undertake a Durkheimian perspective of contemporary issues, in his using a sociological position that draws heavily on turn of the nineteenth century liberal thought, coupled with neo-Catholicism. This is particularly evident with regard to Mestrovic's view of gender. Mestrovic used Jung to understand feminine and masculine archetypes as collective representations. Mestrovic argued that we should look to Jung to understand the feminine and the masculine arguing: "I should like to be spared the inane criticism of equating feminine with female - and hereby disavow this connection completely. If I am to be criticised, I ask to be read vis-a-vis Carl Gustav Jung's (1959) writings on archetypes." A reliance on classical Jungian archetype theory is problematic with regard to gender. Feminists might well take issue with Mestrovic's claim that equating the feminine with women is an 'inane' thing to do.

The feminine and masculine, as Mestrovic claimed, is, a collective representation that changes over time, recombining the old and the new. But gender is also a social fact - a crystallisation of representations in structures and institutions. And social facts, as Durkheim (1895) argued, should be treated as things. Representations of gender are crystallised in structures of relations, power, and signification. This is what Mestrovic misses in focusing on collective representations, or Jungian archetypes of the feminine and masculine.

Feminist scholars of psychology have critiqued Jung on his very notion of the archetype and its relation to sexed bodies which Mestrovic disavows as inane. Whilst noting that Jung's archetypes involve seeing the feminine and masculine as part of both men and women, Denmark and Fernandez also argued that Jung saw archetypes as based, in part, on unchangeable, historically collective happenings in society. "Thus for Jung, gender-role differentiation is the inevitable result of sex-

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linked masculine and feminine polarities. Females are seen only from a male point of view. 

Radical feminist philosopher, Mary Daly, has criticised Jung for viewing the woman of the Great Mother archetype as possessed by men. Elsewhere, Mary Daly has critiqued Jung for holding women back by situating maternal mothers as having little influence compared to the archetype imposed on women that really gives mothers their influence. Daly saw Jung as making maternal mothers as unimportant and then blaming mothers, for instance, in 'suck up' the existence of their daughters. Daly went on to argue that Jung's reference to maternally sucked-dry daughters is part of patriarchal preparations for women to be marriable, empty commodities for men, who can then get their wives to suck up their projections. Mary Daly saw Jung's archetypes as a seductive but ultimately androcentric concept. The feminine and masculine in women and men of Jung's archetypes is, for Mary Daly, a tokenistic inclusion that makes women feel as if they are included by its complementary approach, when it is really oppressive.

It could be argued that feminist psychologists and radical philosophers are unrepresentative of a perspective that can fully grasp the implications of Jung's archetypes. But by looking to post-Jungian feminist thought, this assertion is seen as unfounded. Lauter and Carol Schreier Rupprecht argued while Jung was a great inductive and synthesising thinker, he did, with regard to the feminine and masculine, link culturally produced gender differentiations to sex differentiations - a case where Jung's laudable use of induction was overcome by his penchant for dichotomies. 

Wehr argued that Jung, by way of archetypes, ontologised what are in fact realities that are socially constructed. Wehr argued that Jung missed this important distinction and instead conferred "... divine sanction to psychological experiences that are culturally-based." For Wehr, Jung imposed a

\[... \text{religious and ontological status on behaviours, moods, and even uncontrollable vices, which can be...}\]

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explained on other grounds. These grounds do not involve us in categories of the sacred, as we try to understand ourselves and others, to change our behaviour, and to become free from stultifying roles and compulsions.\footnote{Wehr, D. S. (1985). 'Religious and social dimensions of Jung's concept of the archetype: A feminist perspective'. In Lauter, E. & Rupprecht, C. S. (Eds.). Feminist Archetypal Theory: Interdisciplinary Re-visions of Jungian Thought. pp.22, 32.}


These differences aside, post-Jungian archetypal feminism, as other feminisms do, addresses the issue that Mestrovic believed was 'inane', concluding contrarily to Mestrovic, that the feminine and the masculine are representations that refer to the biological sex of women and men. Mestrovic overlooks the importance of gender in studying archetypes. Feminists' criticisms of Jung point to what is a serious omission in Mestrovic's sociology. Mestrovic lacks a theory of gender and this is a result of his reliance on his neo-Catholic interpretation of idealised but deterministic feminine and masculine types, such as those which Jung claimed existed. Additionally and further, Mestrovic's use of nineteenth century thought, and more recent perspectives that share a similar sort of liberal persuasion where sex-
neutral capacities are said to lie in both women and men\textsuperscript{883} leads to the determinism which Lehmann identified in Mestrovic's thought. As archetypes exist as representations, they are idealised and deterministic in Mestrovic's neo-Catholic liberal democratic sociology. This tendency largely ignores the social structures, institutions and relations of power and signification which impart feminine and masculine subjectivities to people.

Mestrovic's liberal sociology is, then, limiting in two important senses. Firstly, in holding to a neo-Catholic perspective largely unquestioning of that church, and classical Jungian archetypes as representations, Mestrovic takes a \textit{status quo} and essentialist approach to structures where issues of culture and politics are concerned.

Secondly, Mestrovic's liberal sociology is limited in relying on nineteenth century \textit{fin de siecle} theorists and that period's intellectual context and focus on an essentialist approach to metaphysics related to epistemology and human nature. This is perhaps best expressed, again, in his reliance on classical Jungian, rather than feminist post-Jungian thought in addressing gender. These two limitations also are related, given Mestrovic's assimilation of Schopenhauer's metaphysics into his neo-Catholic liberal democratic sociology.

With regard to gender, Mestrovic's problematic focus on classical rather than post-Jungian feminist thought is compounded with his allegiance, by implication, with Schopenhauer regarding gender, given his reliance on Schopenhauer, who was a misogynist. Additionally, and further, given Lehmann's criticisms of Durkheim with regard to sexism, racism and class, her critics' comments aside, particularly Mestrovic's, but also Durkheim's sociology, can be seen as problematic with regard to studying contemporary issues of gender, socioeconomics, and culture, related to alcohol in society and education.

These are the reasons that Mestrovic's sociology needs to be supplemented or 'renovated', in the sense that Durkheim used the term with regard to rationalism, in pointing out its limitations, such as when Durkheim distinguished his view of that renovating project from pragmatism's view, in his \textit{Pragmatism and Sociology}. Unrenovated rationalism, Durkheim believed, was unable to deal with the complexities raised in modern society where Truth is seen as changing. In a similar sense, Mestrovic's liberal sociology needs supplementing to be relevant to contemporary issues such as gender and culture. With regard to these issues, Mestrovic is a bit old fashioned and should perhaps know better.

\textsuperscript{883} see for instance J.S Mill's \textit{On the Subjection of Women}. 
These criticisms could be opposed in simply stating that Mestrovic fails to meet the bland standards of academic political correctness. I disagree. Essentialist metaphysics and related epistemology, human nature and society, compounded with an exclusive focus on representations over structures, which not incidentally, is related to Mestrovic's religious tendencies, cannot deal with the complexities, intricacies and production, of gender, intimacy, culture and socioeconomics in society, affected by neoliberalism.

Durkheim alone, will not be useful for studying issues of gender and culture, given Lehmann's criticisms. Mestrovic's liberal sociology is also problematic given its neo-Catholic, conservative basis, classical Jungian archetypal view of gender, and, rejection of extreme cultural relativism which has been critiqued herein as being unable to deal with constitutional and cultural biculturalism. Mestrovic's sociology does have a number of redeeming features with regard to these issues, such as his focus on compassion, the feminine, his pessimism, the postemotional concept and his sensitivity to issues of culture expressed in the notion of cultural fission and Balkanisation. But Mestrovic's liberal sociology is not sufficient on its own or simply in combination with Durkheim to deal with issues of gender, socioeconomics and culture relevant to a study of alcohol in society and education. There are limitations to their sociologies. They need altering and supplementation for the purposes of taking a Durkheimian perspective.

Implications

In advancing a Durkheimianism, social theories on gender and culture need to be introduced for critical and interpretive purposes if neoliberalism is to be addressed and related to alcohol in society and education. This will require an openness to considering and synthesising theories that do not always emanate from Durkheimian scholarship to get a sense of how a Durkheimianism can be furthered.

This undertaking will not always be defensive, or, assert the superiority of, Durkheim and Mestrovic over alternative perspectives. This comparison, critique and synthesis, which is required, precludes such an orientation being adopted in all cases. I will, however, continue to pursue Durkheimian perspectives, in the spirit of what Schoenfeld and Mestrovic (1989) argued was Durkheim's view that sociology should seek to help make a better society and better science. I see criticism as one part of this Durkheimian project. Specifically in this regard, neoliberalism, especially that of Buchanan will continue to be drawn on, as will the contexts to which neoliberalism has been applied. Buchanan's positivism and methodological
individualism is mostly useless for studying issues of culture and gender when society is sociologically considered as more than a sum of its parts. But Buchanan will, nonetheless, be dawn upon with regard to neoliberalism's view of the individual, the family, the State, addiction and treatment.

To undertake this supplementation I will not consider the post-Jungian feminist approach. Rather, to reiterate and follow Cohen's claim, "I have chosen other grounds ..." on which to criticise Mestrovic. I will, however, adopt something like Mary Daly's method that post-Jungian feminists recommended. For the purposes of better apprehending culture and gender, and even if contradictory and perverse, I will 'spin' among the fields of modernism, post-structuralism, feminist object relations theory, post-Lacanian feminism, and semiotics. Insights from these diverse fields will be explained, discussed, compared, critiqued, applied, and finally, synthesised for the purposes of a Durkheimian perspective on alcohol in society and education. This approach differs from standard methodology. Mary Daly, who in her (1973) book attacked religion as patriarchial, argued:

The tyranny of methodolatry hinders new discoveries. It prevents us from raising questions never asked before and from being illumined by

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885. Daly, M. (1990). Gynecology, the Metaphysics of Radical Feminism: With a New Intergalactic Introduction. Explained spinning as being about women realising new knowledges and a Spinster 'being' (p.391), relating to other women as 'Sparking Selves', as sisters becoming pyrotechnic (p.383). That spinning requires the unweaving, unknotting and unsnarling of patriarchy (p.386), so that women can realise their innocence, considered as the hurt and injury of being born into a patriarchial society (p.413), to reweave and realise self definitions as opposed to those of children and men (p.3). From Mary Daly's perspective, my use of spinning as a method is more than perverse and contradictory. Mary Daly would undoubtably find my adoption of the method offensive and oppressive, given that I am a man and therefore represent patriarchy. As such, I can never be a Spinster (p.413), a Crone (p.384), a Hag (p.409), a Spider Woman, a singer (p.402), a Snake Goddess (p.402) or an Amazon, spinning in new time/space (p.3). Nor can I even be a Swinger (p.393) or a Painted Bird (p.407) - terms Mary Daly uses to denote women who, even if unknowingly, support patriarchy. Men spin for Mary Daly, but in the technological spinning of the wheel and automation - perhaps a good metaphor to explain Mestrovic's view of postemotional mechanisation of the emotions. Mary Daly examined the semantic etymology of spinning, exploring various meanings sourced in Latin and Sanskrit (pp.389-392, 404), as well as the historical importance and meaning for women in spinning, which was a rite of passage (p.176), practiced by independent and roaming nuns (p.465 {ff: 18}) and was treated by males with jealously and fear. Incidentally to Durkheim's claims, Mary Daly viewed the Renaissance as the historical period where spinning was destroyed by male society (p.177). Durkheim also saw the Renaissance negatively, viewing it as being an anomie period that swept away Scholasticism. Mary Daly commented that while Durkheim's (1912) The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life articulation of the term strength-giving might be useful for "... a woman dis-covering her Background ..." (p.49), and that embedded is 'thought-provoking' (p.109) for studying subliminally imposed messages in film, television, print media and music, the terms sacred and profane are not the property of Durkheim and other authorities (p.49).
ideas that do not fit into pre-established boxes and forms.  

Radical feminist philosophy will not be utilised to advance Durkheimian perspectives. However, Mary Daly made an excellent point in arguing that method is: "One of the false gods . . ." that imposes an "invisible tyranny" on academic, philosophical and religious thought. The avoidance of standard methods will entail considering contradictory perspectives.

A postmodern, or more accurately, poststructuralist perspective will be considered. Mestrovic critiqued Baudrillard's postmodernism for seeing a world of appearances, of circulating texts and hyperreality. Textual idealism is clearly identifiable in Baudrillard. A poststructuralist view of gender which draws on Foucault, who as Olssen has noted, Marshall, identified as avoiding the criticism of being a textual idealist, will be considered.

Mestrovic cited Gilligan as arguing for the reinstallation of the feminine in society. Gilligan is part of a feminist scholarship tradition sometimes called relational theory. Relational theory will be utilised, particularly with regard to a modernist view of gender and addiction.

Mestrovic focused on representations. Perspectives that similarly focus on such issues, as signifiers and significations with regard to gender and culture will be studied.

These approaches will be varyingly related to alcohol and other substance, as well as relational addictions, with regard to gender and culture. Aspects of social theories will be synthesised for the purposes of undertaking Durkheimian perspectives regarding alcohol, society and education in the context of neoliberalism.

887. Due to the confines of space, homosexuality with regard to alcohol and addiction will not be discussed herein. Homosexuality in men and women with regard to alcohol and addiction is an important issue. The omission of a discussion of homosexuality and alcohol herein should not be mistaken as implying this issue's unimportance. With regard to lesbians, see Wilsnack's (1984, pp. 189-277) chapter in Wilsnack and Beckman's (Eds.) Alcohol Problems in Women, wherein amongst considering other issues related to women, regarding sex, violence and drinking, lesbian and addiction treatment entry rates, increased reporting of being gay when entering treatment, and reported consumption rates (218-219) are discussed.
SECTION 3:

GENDER AND CULTURE
Gender and Culture

Introduction

In this section I consider the issues of gender, and culture with regard to analysing alcohol in society and education from Durkheimian perspectives. In noting Lehmann's view of Durkheim as being a sexist, as well as an elitist with regard to gender, class and culture, and in critiquing Mestrovic and Buchanan for their liberalisms and religious tendencies, which particularly in Mestrovic's case entails limitations due to the Christian metaphysics which affects Mestrovic's epistemology, serious shortfalls have been identified in each thinker's social thought. I would be intellectually dishonest to have side-stepped pointing out these shortfalls. With regard to intellectual honesty, there are also many other critical comments, and claims of limitations made by commentators of, for instance, Durkheim, some of which are briefly referred to in the introduction of this study. Due to the confines of space, and choices made regarding the theoretical positioning of the present study with regard to neoliberalism, aspects or interpretations of Durkheim's social theory have been obscured, omitted and suppressed. To some degree, this is always unavoidable. I have, rather, chosen to highlight problems raised by Mestrovic's sociology, given that despite perhaps being unfashionable and in need of renovation, it presents a relatively, new, alternative, and even radical, view and utilisation of Durkheim.

Having noted shortfalls, however, I wish to continue pursuing Durkheimian perspectives. This is particularly problematic with regard to Mestrovic, who I will continue to draw on for critical interpretive purposes, but who has now been criticised as implicitly misogynistic, conservative, and even though neo-Catholic, holding to an essentialist metaphysical position. Mestrovic lacks a theory of gender and may be severely criticised for his view of cultural relativism. These aspects regarding gender and culture are of central relevance to considering the problematic of alcohol in society and education. To reiterate, my discourse, or bias, whether considered in the sense expressed in Durkheim's view of studying social facts, by what, in the French term le biais, means taking an 'angle', or, in the nineteenth century fin de siecle social scientific sense of 'sin', is Durkheimian. I draw on Durkheim in this undertaking. Also to reiterate, this Durkheimian perspective is influenced, but not endorsed by, Mestrovic. I will continue to draw on Mestrovic's thought, which does has a number of redeeming features, such as: representationalism; studying the implications of dereglement; taking a pessimistic orientation; calling for compassion; evoking the feminine; offering the many
dimensional postemotional concept, and; critiquing cultural barbarism. These concepts are all useful for critical purposes.

However, I reserve the right to continue to both critique and utilise Mestrovic's sociology, from this point forward, by way of supplementation, in drawing on, comparing, critically commenting on, and, synthesising, social theoretical frameworks for viewing gender and culture that can additionally inform a Durkheimian study of alcohol in society and education. Identifiable contradictions in Mestrovic's claims and sociology itself, related to alternative social theories will be discussed.

Some preliminary linkages will be made between theory, and empirical as well as historical findings, regarding gender, culture and alcohol to ground the present study as sociological in approach.
Gender as a social fact

There are a number of studies of gender that can be related and applied to, as well as utilised as a critique of, informal alcohol education and its study from a Durkheimian perspective.

Viewed from such a perspective, gender is a social fact, a construction of a set of habits, collective representations, ethics and sentiments associated with people according to their biological sex, but socially constituted revealing the sickness or health of a given society or culture at a given historical juncture. Gender as a social fact is relevant to alcohol education as alcohol use and abuse related statistics and problems vary across various time periods and cultures. The present study uses a framework in which to site a Durkheimian view of alcohol in society and education, partially through apprehending gender as a social fact. A relating of some gender relations theorisations and studies, to alcohol in society seen as contextualised within a wider framework of social, economic, institutional, political, sexual, and historical relations, provides a context in which to promulgate a Durkheimian apprehension of neoliberal society.

One way in which to theorise gender is by way of postmodernism or poststructuralism. Robert Connell has undertaken this task. Carrigan, Connell and Lee (1985) summed up a number of studies and perspectives regarding gender from Freud to Chodorow, Marxism to poststructuralism, favouring this final approach. Connell was not, however, uncritical about that approach.

Connell (1987) saw gender as constituted emotionally, existentially and postructurally, pointing for explanatory purposes to the institutions of the family, the state, and the street as examples of institutionalised gender. Connell argued that sexual divisions of labour can be clearly identified in such institutions. The family perhaps most obviously reflects these divisions around issues of income and nurturance, for instance.

In focusing on the wider context, the state also exhibits gender issues through its divisions of personnel according to gender. Connell, focusing on gender, critiqued various alternative views of the State. Liberal interpretations which see the State as an arbitrating institution (a view that Durkheim held to), but captured by men, was criticised by Connell for not explaining its poor treatment of gay men. The Foucauldian view of the State, Connell believed, did not account for the role of sexually political 'interests' along gender lines invested therein. Freudo-Marxism, for Connell, did not explain why gender is essential to State capitalism.

And feminist criticisms of the State as oppressive of women, Connell argued, did not explain why the State oppresses women, when it could do so to anyone, and does also oppress men. Connell preferred to view the State as reflecting historically emergent masculine practices.892

The street, despite the appearance of being simply a series of sites, is an institution for Connell. Connell argued that especially in areas close to town and city centres, the street is a male dominated institution where women are unsafe and forced to retreat into the domestic sphere.893

Connell, in borrowing from Marxist phraseology and philosophy, especially that of the early twentieth century Italian, Antonio Gramsci, saw masculine gendering as hegemonic, calling this, 'hegemonic masculinity'. Hegemonic masculinity is connected with patriarchy and violence, but not in a simplistic manner. Hegemony, in the sense that Connell utilised the term and concept, refers to what is commonsensical and most apparent in society's wide social framework. Hegemony also allows for some differences, and change. But when men are complicit in the oppression of women, hegemonic masculinity is promoted.894

The concept of hegemony cannot, for Connell, be applied to femininity in the same way as masculinity can to men for two reasons. Firstly, women by comparison to men do not hold threats of violence over other women in the way men do over other men, and secondly, women’s domination over their opposite sex is not present in the case of femininity. There are more diverse forms of femininity that are allowable, compared to forms of masculinity, but they can be orientated to support existing power, and Connell gave the term 'emphasised femininity' to forms of femininity where women orient themselves to the desires and advantages of men.895

Connell also drew on Freudian and psychoanalytic theory as well as the Marxist social movement of the ‘Red collective’ to explain the sexualisation of social relationships with regard to emotional attachments made by people. The 'structure of cathexis' is the phrase Connell used for this dimension of sexual politics. Cathexis assumes sexual difference, expresses Freud's view of simultaneous affection and hostility as ambivalence, and, Jung's view that repressed emotions cannot be expressed publicly.896
Connell, borrowing the term from Jill Matthews, called the macroscopic dimension of gendering the 'gender order', which is the "... term for the structural inventory of an entire society." The gender order is an historical construction in any given society. The gender order can also apply to society considered as a milieu, such as that of youth peer culture. Similarly unfixed in such societies, the gender order is discreet there. The gender order is, however, not the total explanation of sexual politics in society. Nor is it all determining, as within the gender order there exist a number of variances in how gender is perceived, as people experience multiple life situations.

Connell's concept of 'gender regimes', which is the "... term for the structural inventory of a particular institution.", relates to diverse fields such as those of economics, industry, and the State. Gender regimes are also present in schools. Gender is found throughout the institutional framework of schools, such as in the operations of the division of labour and authority structures, the emotions surrounding roles that different teachers take on as tough or soft, as well as those in the school generally regarding compulsory heterosexuality. Gender regimes are also contributed to by the school's filtering of cultural gender symbols. But schools also have their own gendered codes regarding uniform, clothing and language, as well as curriculum content where certain forms of knowledge are seen as feminine or masculine. "The totality of these arrangements is a school's gender regime. Gender regimes differ between schools, though within limits set by the broader culture and the constraints of the local education system." Gender regimes can by enforcement, subordinate teachers and students. But where teachers and students challenge the gender regime, it can be transformed. For instance, with reference to students and gender regimes in the institution of the school, Connell has noted how a totality can change. Commenting on Draper's study of a school merger, Connell noted that the structural change of the school led to gender
regimes changing, where boys were found to wear eye makeup and girls flouted the school uniform rules.904

Structure, the sexual division of labour and cathexis, together, contribute to societal and institutional gendering. "The division of labour, the structure of power, the structure of cathexis are the major elements of any gender order or gender regime."905

Gender is a mixture of self and society for Connell where society is a force on people, impressing and dominating them. Connell called this domination, structure. Poststructurally, Connell saw structure as always creating, giving individuals’ actions meaning, such as the case of rape, which supports male domination.906 Connell drew on Satrean existentialism to argue in a way related to such dominations, that it is a case with regard to hegemonic masculinity of ‘bad faith’, to not call into inquiry and transcend the layers of experiences that people undergo with regard to sexual politics. People renege on that responsibility when for instance complying with sexist discourses to ease their own projects. When reneging in this regard, "collective projects" result, under which forces for transformation are neutralised.907 Working class males can take on hypermasculine orientations in the face of social change which threatens their traditional power in society. Connell evoked the notion of ‘protest masculinity’ to explain men’s sexist response to such changes. Another masculinity is what Connell called ‘complicit masculinity’, which middle class men take on where they might be somewhat flexible in not always displaying stereotypical masculinity, but still support masculine projects through their use of resources of various sorts.908 In comparing these two orientations, Connell argued that the middle class complicit masculinity is more sustaining of masculinity, as although protest masculinity is clearly about hegemonic masculinity, due to the marginalisation of working class men, it is less robust and seamless compared to complicit masculinity which is glossy, less costly for the men themselves, as well as less progressive in changing sexual politics.909

The alternative to exhibiting such ‘bad faith’ is men’s ‘negation of masculinity’ as a

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repudiation of patriarchy, exhibited by cross dressing and transsexual men who offer an alternative, although not yet apparently executed counteraction.\textsuperscript{910}

Structure then, interacts with agency, which for Connell is the embodiment and symbolism of discourse as practice. Practice is the small scale and indeterminately, but potentially powerful possibility in an otherwise structured world. Connell has discussed this with regard to bodies, ",... seen as sharing in social agency, in generating and shaping courses of social conduct."\textsuperscript{911} Connell, referring to practice by way of what he called the 'body-reflexive', however, argued against the idea that agency is simply sourced in the biology of human beings. The body-reflexive can be seen in the various ways that people can, either, as well as simultaneously, accept or challenge standard understandings of oneself in society, especially with regard to sexuality and gender. This for Connell can be identified in practices such as heterosexual couples' sexual experimentation, homosexual encounters, autoeroticism, and training for sport.\textsuperscript{912}

Connell critiqued views of agency and social change simply built upon the notions of changing gender roles or negating male sexuality, believing that such views led to disembodiment and anaesthetising. Connell's argument was that social change required challenging approaches to viewing masculinity.

\begin{quote}
\textit{A politics of social justice needs to change body-reflexive practices, not by losing agency but by extending it, working through the agency of the body...{a}... re-embodiment for men, a search for different ways of using, feeling and showing male bodies.}\textsuperscript{913}
\end{quote}

Some research has been undertaken into masculinity in this country that utilises Connell and relates to alcohol. I will note some more of this research later and consider it from a Durkheimian perspective. However, to briefly outline the relevant linkages here, one study is Kraack's (1999) utilisation Connell's theory of masculinity for the study of the behaviours and interactions of mostly university student patrons of a pub in Dunedin. Kraack argued that hegemonic masculinity was observable there, but also noted that women students who shared the same

interests, especially that of supporting the same regional rugby football team as the men, were observed to challenge the men’s dominance by breaking into their groups through dressing and painting themselves in team colours, singing rugby songs, and sharing in the viewing of televised rugby games.\textsuperscript{9,14} Connell is mostly a poststructuralist but also a Marxist male who is pro-feminist, seeing gender as a battle between and marginalisations of, ideas and practices regarding sexuality, and economics, as well as political, social and psychical life.

Some general comparisons can be made between Connell and Durkheim. Connell’s position on gender is relevant to Durkheim through his view of structure-agency, the gender order, gender regimes and hegemonic gendering. Connell’s gender regimes are the multiple experiences of gender people live in. Durkheim too saw a multiplicity of sorts in his acceptance of individual representations in a hierarchical relationship with collective representations.

Connell’s organic gendering offers a counter hegemonic perspective, wherein individual and life enhancing possibilities are made possible. Durkheim’s possibilities of this sort are present in his ideas of collective effervescence, facts revealed through one-good experiment, and the ‘genius’ as really making social ideas more conscious.

Connell’s structure-practice is very slightly similar to Durkheim’s \textit{homo duplex} wherein social and individual life is a mixture of oneself and society as an individual-society dualism in society and the self.

Connell’s gender order is a societal gendering system in which a hegemonic favouring of certain members of society appears through compelling and acceptable ideas imposed on all society. This view can be compared with Durkheim’s collective representations, profane and sacred, anomic and egoistic, \textit{dereglements} of what society requires at a given moment.

However, critical comments can also be made in simply starting with the similarities just noted. Structure-practice is a \textit{constant} battle, whilst \textit{homo duplex} embattled representations although embattled can be somewhat \textit{placated}.

These differences between Durkheim’s and Connell’s approaches are apparent with respect to their views of gender and society, and with regard to the metaphors of sickness versus battle the two separately focus on. Durkheim worried about conjugal anomie as a result of a changed but disordered relations as a symptom of social sickness. Connell’s view is one of battling hegemonic and

\textsuperscript{9,14} Kraack, A. (1999). ‘It takes two to tango: The place of women in the construction of hegemonic masculinity in a student pub’. In Law, R., Campbell, H., & Dolan, J. (Eds.). \textit{Masculinities in Aotearoa/New Zealand}. 
counter-hegemonic and masculinities with gender regimes, and structures that dominate and exclude within the gender order. The distinction between Connell and Durkheim is that Durkheim's anomie and egoism in *homo duplex* are types of sickness, whereas for Connell, structure-practice is a battle and intersection of discourses and practices. This battle view is a metaphor that, like Foucault, Connell in this regard shares with Buchanan. Durkheim by comparison Mestrovic believed, saw representations in relation, repelling, and antagonistic, sacred and profane, moral and sinful, but also changing and merging.

For Connell, due to his poststructuralism, structure-practice is almost totally socially formed by comparison to Durkheim and Mestrovic, for whom *homo duplex* representations are somewhat set in human and social nature - disruptable, deranged, and degradable, but ultimately essential, by comparison to Connell. And although radically different in other respects, this view of irresolvable battling characteristics in human relations is shared with Buchanan, compared with Durkheim, and Mestrovic (when sombrely optimistic), who saw some sort of mediation and peace as a possibility.

In attempting to theorise gender from a Durkheimian perspective, and with regard to Connell, some points will be made using education and schools as an example. I use education as an example here for two reasons. Firstly, Connell's researches have often been concerned with issues surrounding schools, teachers, students and young people. Secondly, education is my principal field of study and analysis. These points will be made with regard to the same or similar phenomena to illustrate how Connell and Durkheim differently approach the same phenomena. This will be done with the intent of getting an angle on masculinity and violence. Masculinity will be focused on.

The gender order is the overarching framework for Connell, expressed in the dominations of gender and class in patriarchal and capitalist societies. Features of the gender order with regard to education are overall policies that reproduce gendering, and promote the interests of capital. The equivalent of a gender order for Durkheim is the overarching representations - sentiments and ideas that bind a society together in some sort of peace. In education this requires a curriculum that is broad enough to ensure that all students are imbued with similar collective representations.

Gender regimes in education are the particular school policies and traditions that, usually for Connell, impose stereotypical gendering. Gender regimes in school might involve various rituals and songs that impose masculinity. For Durkheim the equivalent of gender regimes are specific school practices that can bind together or
throw people apart. A regime could be egoistic and anomic, failing to socially integrate, or set safe limits for students. An example of the former would be a school culture of ignoring or playing down bullying, due to perhaps, concern about the school’s reputation, and the latter, a culture of violence that cannot be managed. Excessive integration or limit setting that is not in accord with surrounding representations, such as those of youth culture and rights will also fail to be beneficial, especially given Mestrovic's criticisms of Indian suicide as well as stress events research philosophy. If schools' traditions are to be meaningful, they have to be accompanied by quality social integration and interrogated for their relevance with regard to social change. School traditions and practices need to be seen as changeable but also invested with importance. Rugby teams do not have to partake in songs and games about sexist and violent topics. Success at sport does not mean that a male is a real man and academic success is not feminine and “pointy headedness” in the school where gender (regimes for Connell) is concerned.

Protest masculinity, for Connell is where, given a changing society, boys and young men respond by constructing and adopting very stereotypical masculinities. An example would be the rugby playing student who possibly facing blue collar work or unemployment upon leaving school, takes on a macho discourse of violence, sexism and racism. From a Durkheimian perspective protest masculinity is anomic and egoistic, partly reproduced in the school as a result of massive social and economic change. School advertising on uniforms, in newspapers, on the radio and television, constant fundraising, and different schools seen as having hierarchically viewed statuses and students, are all sorts of boosterish, excessive, economically modeled representations that are anomic and egoistic.

Counter-hegemonic masculinity in schools is exhibited for instance by the effeminate or gay male student or teacher who challenges the hegemonic masculinity of the school. From a Durkheimian view, the counter-hegemonic could be a deviant in the sense of Durkheim's references to Socrates and Christ, pushing the school culture to accept the new realities of society, or, the student could be anomic and egoistic, shocking for its own sake, and so on. The difference for Durkheim between the counter-hegemonic of Connell and the anomic, is a matter of degrees, even if, the limit that might separate them was not identified by Durkheim. Limits are to be questioned for Connell, in following Foucault.

In some senses there is a chasm of differences between Mestrovic and Durkheim, and Connell. I will not repeat poststructuralist criticisms and perspectives here, having done so earlier with reference to Foucault. This is not to
imply that Connell can be subsumed under the label 'Foucauldian'. Connell is more socialist than Durkheim or Mestrovic. Connell also draws on other philosophies like those of Satre and Freudianism, and Gramscian Marxism. I will not enter into a discussion of these influences and issues related to Durkheim and Mestrovic, as to do them and Connell justice would, in itself, entail a substantial research undertaking. The point is that with regard to considering Durkheim and Mestrovic with regard to Connell, given their wide differences, and particularly due to Mestrovic's essentialism and rejection of postmodernism, a complete merger of Connell's and Mestrovic's theories is unlikely and would be very contradictory. However, by way of Connell, some salient points for Durkheimian consideration emerge, such as: protest masculinity which can be interpreted from a Durkheimian perspective as anomie and egoism; counter-hegemonic masculinities as emergent recombinations of representations in a similarly changing society, and; hegemonic masculinity as traditional representations that have outlived their relevance, where action that is inspired from them is deranged, leaving the individual and group with a sense of dissatisfaction and hunger that will not be satiated.

Another male sociologist and sometimes gender researcher is Anthony Giddens. Giddens argued that society is not actually postmodern in the way Connell presumes, but is rather a context of high modernity. Giddens situates gender within the wider framework of what he calls structuration. Giddens analysed addictions generally, those in family, and centrally, regarding heterosexual relations of intimacy in society. Giddens studied the contemporary context of globalised society and personal relationships therein, viewed as a mixture of the old and new, always with the potential to be either beneficial or harmful. In particular for present purposes in this regard, Giddens looked into the idea of addiction in contemporary western societies. Giddens linked this up with relationships with significant familial and intimate others, organisations and global culture.

Giddens is influenced with feminist object relations theories, which focus on gendered differences in how men and women are raised. Giddens is particularly influenced by Chodorow (1978) who argued that mothering in patriarchal western societies is notable for creating differences in the sorts of early childhood experiences that boys and girls have. Chodorow argued that socially constructed norms of society are present in the first relations that people experience. The very manner in which people relate to their children structure the child's later relation to people and the world in general. These self-other relations echo throughout life organising personal and societal relations. Chodorow's theory situated as a feminist version of psychoanalytic object relations, is relevant to the present study.
as it is often identified as aligned with Carole Gilligan's, as part of what is sometimes termed relational theory.

Feminist object relations theorists rework the traditional Freudian account of gendering. In the classical account, people are gendered through the instilling of the societal order of the superego and its corresponding reality principle, which takes place as a result of the Oedipus complex resolution. To Freud, children are essentially libidinal beings with a potential to be ruled by the pleasure principle, experiencing their mothers as first love-objects.

In the classical Freudian account, preoedipally, the child is a bisexual subject with no distinction between self and other, its primary caregiver is undefined as a different person. At this stage the infant is a subject struggling for the satiation of basic drives and instincts, desire presenting itself at the point of satiation. As the infant decides it wants more but is withheld this gratification it comes to recognise this other as one with its own subjectivity. Here, from the tensions of need and want, ambivalence is created wherein the child experiences feelings of love and hate. As the child struggles with these conflicts it believes it can be in control.

The Oedipal complex, a development process, changes all this. As the daughter realises she does not have a penis so cannot heterosexually consummate her desire to reconnect with her mother, she experiences penis-envy and turns to her father, blaming her mother for not providing her with a penis, internalising this energy becoming both narcissistic and masochist, a more passive subject without a strong superego or instilling of the reality principle. The boy with his penis, is able to perform the sexual act but fears that his father will jealously sever his sexual appendage, so economically he represses his desire, is able to fully break with his mother and identify with his father and the masculine world, seeking a woman as a partner in adulthood - a better investment of energy. He is a more active moral being, with a strongly instilled superego, and an externally aggressive subject.

Primarily, feminist object relations theorists are critical of the essentialist and sexist basis to Freud's thought, as under its terms women are incomplete, and determined to remain undeveloped due to penis envy. Nonetheless, to transcend the constraints of crude reductionist biologism, feminist object relation theorists

build on the basic model through reconstruction and by focusing on different aspects of development.

Object relations theory focuses on the preoedipal relations between the developing child and its surrounding objects - that is, its mother, father or other significant others. Object relations theorists believe this juncture to be the defining point in subjectivity. A tradition founded by a loose grouping of analysts in the 1930s, object relations asserts that it is the early relationship between mothers and children that define the psychic life of the individual. The early object relationists are critiqued for their sexism in mother blaming, but are also recognised as contributing to beneficial changes in the care of children. Feminist object relation theorists have reinterpreted the central tenets of their legacy, focusing on parenthood, or more precisely, motherhood, as primary caregiving and its effect on people. Feminist object relations theorists see the family as the site for the reproduction of cultural sexual inequalities. Focusing on and critiquing the cultural reality of exclusively women's primary caregiving, authors analyse these conditions as creating a climate wherein relations between the sexes are acted out in a dominant and subordinate manner. As the psyches of women and men are organised differently and hierarchically, parts of people's selves are excised or unrealised according to one's sex.

Feminist object relations theorists believe that mothers unconsciously view their children differently. Boys and girls are seen as distinctly different subjects and are thus accorded particular treatment. Girls are seen to share similar attributes, appealing to the mother's experience and self-identity. The daughter also realises that she is like her mother, a subject with unmet needs and represses these to become a more relational, giving being.

The son's experience and the way the mother conceives of him differs from that of the daughter. The mother, in accordance with culture sees the boy as stronger and different, propelling him from the relation earlier, so he must establish an identification with this masculine culture. The mother is seen by children of both sexes as an omnipotent being as she provides, or can refuse to provide food and care, so both sexes do experience a narcissistic wounding at her

919. see Deutsch, H.; Horney, K.; Klein, M.; Winnicott, D.W., and; Bowlby, T.
hands, but the boy’s relation is more problematic as he must completely reject his experience of her.

As Chodorow noted, these conditions undermine the traditional oedipal situation as children’s gendered psyches are already prepared for its instigation. The father at the oedipal stage enters, representing an identity that is truly other, a different and established self, representing the masculine identity for the boy to appropriate and a definite object for the girl to eroticise, but not emotionally identify with.

These early experiences are associated with the wider culture where the feminine is seen in terms of a potentially omnipotent force, which must be overcome for the survival and advancement of masculine culture - an example being the systematic destruction of the ecological environment. With regard to women and men, masculine identity is founded on the rejection of the feminine, evidenced in men’s resistance to childcare, and in the splitting of love and work. For women, these conditions mean that mothering is construed problematically. If women want to procreate, they are expected to full-time mother and be in paid employment, are accused of being unmotherly if wanting childcare to be provided, greedy if wanting their partners to take part in childcare, or lazy if solo parenting and on welfare.

With regard to intimate relationships, pre-oedipal relationships mean that women establish connected identities and thus have richer inner object worlds. Their connection with their mothers is retained into adolescence, wherein each unconsciously attempting to resolve their differences and retaining their relationship can deal with the tensions often evident at this stage.

Adolescent males are estranged from their mothers as explained. Masculinity as historically constructed and present in the object relations between them, finds fathers’ and sons’ relationships taking place on a separated level. In relations between the sexes, early object relations resurface when women and men meet in adulthood. When men and women unite as heterosexual couples, their object relations have prepared them in different manners for this context. Men have had to subordinate their feminine aspects, they are ambivalent

about their relationships with women, but still have internalised and repressed their love for their mothers. Heterosexuality is most likely for men, due to that early relation. The man seeks a relation that reflects his first experience.

Women have been prepared to act in relation. Men usually cannot reciprocate the relational qualities that constituted women's early relationship. To regain that experience, women, due to cultural taboos are less likely to become lesbian than seek maternity, and thus reproduce motherhood.

This reproduction reifies the arrangements of the family and the organisation of society. However, as Chodorow argued, this situation is not natural, as it in fact alienates people from their possibilities and their world. The dominant pattern of women's exclusive primary child caring results in deformations of psychological differences between and within women and men. Women are psychically affected as exclusive mothering means women are unable to establish a truly ambivalent relationship with either parent and are forced to turn love and hate inward, becoming more needy of relationships and masochist compared with men.

Men are particularly problematic. The experience of exclusively women's parenting and men's subsequent rejection of the importance of this experience, means that the past, internalised and repressed, conflicts and confuses the present, so that women appear fearsome and threatening beings to be dealt with by objectification and subordination.

Chodorow argued that the solution to this perilous situation was shared parenting, so that children would internalise the psychic features of both parents. In this way, women would not be perceived as loving objects, nor would men be seen as subjects to be loved and cared for by women.

Giddens takes on Chodorow's insights seeing an engagement with Freud as a way to find a reflexive and ordered self narrative. Chodorow, for Giddens, provides a way to see that trust has been compromised for men, who due to their separation cannot be interdependent with others. For Giddens, Chodorow's sort of perspective explains that men are deprived as well as dominating, the penis is a

symbol of power that masks a primal loss, and where masculinity is the problem of modernity as it is the "... detour in the development of identity".

Giddens' interest in identity links with his interest in intimacy. Men have a "... lapsed emotional narrative of the self...", which is evidenced in men's reports that they do not have close friends. Close friendships are something very different from the comradeship of male groups. Intimacy is what Giddens was commenting on, and as Jary and Jary argued: "For Giddens, intimacy is above all a matter of emotional communication with oneself and others in a context of equality." When women are compared with men they are "... 'emotional revolutionaries' ..."

Giddens looked forward to a time when there would be a widespread intimate context of 'confluent love'. Confluent love is a self aware conditional relationship capable of being reviewed, a relationship that Giddens refers to as reflecting a democratisation of the emotions. Giddens situates this ideal relationship of confluent love as emerging out of an historical trajectory. Giddens pointed to the eighteenth century as a point at which a narrative emerged where people could have a self-identity. At that point the concepts of the home as emotional and work as rational and economic, and, as separate from each other, led to the emergence of motherhood. 'Romantic love' characterised that change. Romantic love was a feminine construction where love was meant to be something that lasted forever, justified women's motherhood and created a situation of new forms of intimacy, especially with regard to women.

The next change, due largely to the availability of reliable contraception, was to that of the possibility of the 'pure relationship', where the relationship is maintained for the sake of having a relationship. The pure relationship requires that people know themselves, are inherently trusting and is a dialogic, emotional and cognitive opening up to others. The pure relationship is entered into for the

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purposes of gaining things that associating with another or others brings. The pure relationship relies on a view of who others are as persons, rather than what they do. Marriage in a context of a pure relationship is not a case of ownership, but one of making a public statement symbolising the relationship. Confluent love as well as 'plastic sexuality' are part of the pure relationship where heterosexuality is no longer the only normal sexuality, but where various sexualities are possible. Giddens pointed to the case of lesbian relationships as reflecting the ideal of a pure relationship. Lesbian relationships, whilst not exclusively or always reflecting this tendency, tend to be based upon negotiated and conditional circumstances and understandings.

This pattern was also reflected in parent-child relationships and new forms of authority therein, displaying a dialogic 'negotiated authority'. This new form of parent-child relationship reflects greater democratisation. In this democratisation, children are viewed as being more informed by parents about decisions made on their behalf, with a view that if they were adults they would agree with their treatment. They are "... implicit equals, even if empirically the parent holds the greater authority." Giddens, using the ideal of democratisation, dialogue, confluent love, pure relationships and the emergence of plastic sexualities, believed that a new form of interrelating between people is possible. Giddens call was to replace economic maximisation with the democratisation of the interpersonal and a new accommodation of the two sexes. This is not, however, in the main, the case at the present time. To explain the present situation as well as its possibilities, Giddens drew on theories of addictions, the dysfunctional family, and the notions of fundamentalism and traditions.

Giddens saw a number of problems with regard to family relations, discussing 'toxic parents' and the growth of 12-Step group and self help movements that arose out of addictions. Such movements and parents problematise adult selfhood through looking to dysfunctional family relations, memories and experiences in terms of codependence, abuse and neglect. For Giddens

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heterosexual gender relations in high modernity often lack intimacy, sharing and equality.

Giddens argued that the contemporary globalised world and its societies creates two polar opposites, one that is conservative fundamentalism and the other, detraditionalisation or post-traditionalism. The term fundamentalism is fairly new, appearing in the *Oxford English Dictionary* only since the 1950s. In fundamentalism, change and discussion is denied as groups attempt to impose old ideas on new situations - traditionally defending traditions, and is opposed to the dialogical and social reflexivity.\textsuperscript{948} Forms of fundamentalism for Giddens were Mao's *Little Red Book*, Ayatollah Khomini's video taped lectures distributed internationally, and, Western decadence.\textsuperscript{949} Fundamentalism, Giddens believed, should be distinguished from tradition and autonomy. Fundamentalism is tradition, besieged,\textsuperscript{950} and exhibited by taking a traditional approach to dealing with the problems of traditions. Detraditionalisation or post-traditionalism is bi-directional in leading to either a positive viewpoint and equality, or, the driven and uncontrollable states of addiction and compulsiveness.\textsuperscript{951} The two poles interrogate and question identity.

Contradictions also emerge in dialectical, globalised societies shifting regarding dealing with the problems of traditions in fundamentalism and post traditionalism. To make this point, Giddens pointed to the illogical situation presented by neoliberalism, in postraditionally unleashing free market forces, which are seen as transcending culture, whilst also using fundamentalism in seeking to instill nationalistic sentiments and a Strong state. Giddens argued that if, as neoliberalists argued, markets are unharmfully transgressive of, or unrelated to individuals, cultures, and national boundaries, things like national defense would have little meaning and would not be required. Giddens noted that neoliberalists believed that globalised capitalism would eliminate the need for defense. Yet neoliberalists also argue for a strong State and nationalism. This, for Giddens, is one of the senses in which neoliberalism is contradictory in being both conservative and post-traditional.\textsuperscript{952}

The global scene needs what Giddens calls 'dialogic democratisation', defined generally in its most ideal form, as involving autonomous, mutual, actively trusting, self knowing, giving, cognitive, emotional, and negotiated relations.\textsuperscript{953}

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Giddens argued that this democratisation applies also to personal, organisational, social movements and self-help groups.954

Traditions are multiple, changing, and are reconstructed for purposes of power throughout history, as people push them forward and challenge them. Traditions do not disappear but rather burgeon in a contemporary cosmopolitan society and world, which Giddens argued is increasingly characterised by 'post-traditional' societies.955 In Western society today, sex, food and love are things that people partake in according to traditions - they involve defined ways of living. And when they have difficulties with these things in their lives, it is tradition that now encourages them, and, as it is sometimes claimed, everyone, to get therapy for their addictions.956

Addictions and compulsions are products of developed nations and their middle classes. Addictions started with drugs and alcohol and then moved out to other areas. Addicts for Giddens, are held in an awe of the past, they seek what was once, their angst subordinating their choices.957

Giddens noted seven characteristics of the addictions as being: (a) where a 'high' is a release, a feeling of elation that is special, becoming so attractive that it dominates over any other sensation; (b) a 'fix', necessary to be taken when cyclic psychological angst, despair and vacuity returns; (c) a 'time out' when persons seek (a) and (b) to deal with ordinary events and life experiences that seem strange, or, where this situation is inverted and the 'time out' involves seeing (a) and (b) as disgusting; (d) a 'displacement of self' under the influence of a high; (e) a sense of disgrace and regret over losing oneself, leading to a negative loop that feeds one's dependence and lowers one's self esteem; (f) a process of 'layering' where one addictive object is replaced or supplemented with another (such as smoking instead of drinking), and; (g) where people deviate between discarding and holding tighter to their usage, as all addictions are pathologies of self discipline (for instance with regard to this bi-directionality, exhibited anorexia or bulimia).958 "Every addiction is a defensive reaction, and an escape, a recognition of lack of autonomy that casts a shadow over the competence of the self."959

In alcoholic families, parents treat their children in a similar way to other 'toxic parents'960 by variously expecting them to cover up for them, not allowing

them to develop, controlling and oppressing their feelings, treating them with constant sarcasm and rudeness, and physically or sexually abusing them.961

Achieving independence from one's parents is about changing one's self-narrative and asserting one's rights. Moving beyond compulsively recreating childhood has its parallel in moving beyond addictions, which are themselves created by earlier learned habits.962

Giddens noted that the concept of the addict had been extended to relationships between people where the affliction can be recognised by poor attention to the monitoring of oneself and others that is necessary for pure relations, sinking one's identity into that of another or routines, an inability to open up to another needed for intimacy, and an entrenched inequality over what are gendered and sexual differences.963

Codependence is such a situation. The codependent emerged from the earlier term 'enabler'. The codependent either or both consciously or unconsciously supports the addicted person. The emergence of codependence came about when it was revealed that the partner of an addicted person was seen as suffering as much if not more than the addicts themselves.964 The concept of relationship codependence came about with the belief that persons can become addicted to relationships themselves. These relationships become 'fixated',965 where rather than built around another's addiction, the relationship itself becomes the object of the addiction in providing security through entrenched habits or aggression, but where they are in denial of their dependence. As with the partner of the substance addict, the codependent needs to make a 'loving detachment', which although appearing narcissistic and egoistic is really the first step towards realising confluent love.966

Giddens argued that these sorts of situations occur due to a lack of autonomy in people's relationships. Autonomy can only be realised, for Giddens, if there is more equality or democracy in relationships, or what Giddens argued was a much needed 'democratisation of the emotions'967 that extends from family relations between children and parents to intimate relations, national and international contexts. One area for democratisation is organisations which are themselves part of a globalised context. Corporate building as a project of the early twentieth

century is over, where today, large corporations are stripping down, copying their smaller competitors, and are less hierarchal. Decentralisation has taken place but is not inevitably going to continue when organisational change is considered as dialectical. Organisations that are 'post-bureaucratic' are able to bring in 'social reflexivity', 'devolve responsibility', are based on 'active trust', and rely on 'expanded dialogic space'.

Giddens saw self help groups and other new social movements, the number of which are burgeoning, as an area, which along with the personal, organisational and global, is up for democrationisation. Giddens believed that self-help groups are of more consequence than social groups. Giddens argued that self help groups mean that people can keep up where the "... denaturing of nature, regularly outstrips democratic controls offered in the formal political domain", and are better than social movements, in being more democratically dialogic compared to social movements, which can also throw up emotionally appealing but demagogic leaders.

In what is the meeting point for two areas for democratisation, Giddens noted that sexual addiction is a new form of addiction that has led to the formation of Sex Addicts Anonymous, who have modeled their movement on the 12 Steps in Alcoholics Anonymous' Big Book, and believe that sex addiction should be included in diagnostic handbooks as 'hyperactive sexual desire disorder'. Compulsive sexuality with regard to sex and pornography, Giddens believed, is a result of historically constructed social oppressions, invented motherhood, the denial of women's sensuality and a unquestioning acceptance of male sexuality.

Giddens also argued that food addictions are the product of contemporary Western societies' abundance of food and where everybody seems to be dieting. Giddens argued that in this context, women with eating disorders have now become pathologised, replacing those who were identified in the past as suffering from hysteria. Dieting, rather than being concerned spiritual asceticism historically, today connects with people's sexuality, their identity and their physical appearance as they fight to manage their lives. "Emaciated bodies today no longer bear witness to ecstatic devotion, but to the intensity of this secular battle."

Giddens argued for an emotional perspective in apprehending the way people communicate and cooperate as well as commit to other people. For Giddens the erotic needs to be brought back in the spirit of mutual relations in the

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way Marcuse argued for an aestheticism in life. The erotic should not be seen by way of women's impurity or inequalities between partners. Giddens believed that the world needs notions of the sacred, morals that arch over everyday life, the passions reinvested into politics, and finding things that are worth dying for.

An in-depth study of Giddens with regard to Connell, Durkheim and Mestrovic would require a massive scholarly undertaking, and there is already a significant body of scholarly discussion over Connell and Giddens that will not be focused on herein. Rather, some critical and comparative points will be briefly discussed.

Just as Durkheim was in seeking to revitalise the emotions, the heart, feelings, sentiments, collective effervescence, the cult of the human person into social and private life, Giddens can also be seen as pursuing a similar project by arguing for increased eroticism, equality, communication, self expression, love and trust. Mestrovic has critiqued Giddens severely for his modernist project, in which Mestrovic paints himself as revolting against with the will, the heart, pessimism and the feminine. Mestrovic has a point. Giddens does appear, in part, to adopt a rationalistic and overly optimistic orientation to the emotional issues he approached, but Giddens also made numerous references to the emotions, the erotic and the sacred - the very things that Mestrovic argued that he, not Giddens, stood for.

Additionally, Giddens provided an argument for apprehending how emotions with regard to gender and intimacy are constructed in contemporary western societies. That argument was backed up by reference to some powerful thinkers. Chodorow is amongst them and focused on here. In addition, Gilligan, whom Mestrovic referred to with regard to the feminine is a relational theorist who could also be seen as having relevance to Giddens’ analysis. Essentially, Mestrovic has failed, so far, to present a thorough and authoritatively grounded view of gender. Mestrovic's only references are to the heart and mind, the feminine and masculine, the will and idea. These references do not illuminate real life emotional and intimate contexts where the emotions are constructed, evoked, and, pathologised in anomie. Mestrovic needs Giddens or Connell, or something like the thorough argument that both have produced to alleviate this missing element in his sociology. This is because Mestrovic lacks a theory of gender. Giddens could provide this, as could Connell. Giddens, like Mestrovic was interested in dualisms when compared to Connell. This is particularly the case where essentialism and the theory of poststructuralism

is concerned. Giddens was critical of feminist manifestations of that theory, which sees moving signifiers, and critiques essentialism, which Giddens believes detracts from the idea of sexual identity necessary for a narrative of the self. Giddens, believing that as male language can be as equally deprived and dominated, recommended tossing that 'post-structuralist lens' but maintaining the post-Lacanian notion of a 'fragmented and contradictory' sexual identity. Giddens, whilst retaining this element, chose to reject post-Lacanian feminist psychoanalysis in favour of feminist object relations psychoanalysis. Giddens is also critical of Foucault's view of a decentered self. Structuration theory involves a 'duality of structure', where persons have a reflexive input into structures which also dominate.

Giddens' structuration and use of object relations is not, however, unproblematic, given poststructuralist views of gender. As Maharaj pointed out, Connell has critiqued Giddens for taking a determinist and unhistoricised view of structure and practice. Connell argued that Giddens' structuration misses the possibility that the linkages between structure and practice can change in history where practice could be turned against, onto, or, into structure itself as an object. For Connell, Giddens' structuration reproduces existing structures, which favours the status quo and continued oppressions.

Giddens also utilises Chodorow, who Connell, in Carrigan et al. has critiqued as in the functionalist tradition of role theory. In partly utilising Mestrovic's adaptations for a Durkheimian approach, the present study has avoided the received view of functionalism as central in Durkheim.

Additionally, although from another quarter, Chodorow's theory, which focuses on the importance of particular family roles, has been critiqued for not applying to all cases where class and culture are concerned. Feminist object relations has been critiqued from feminist post-Lacanian psychoanalytic perspectives for missing the fundamental point that it is

significations and not parenting that is responsible for gender. In this sense, as Gardiner pointed out, feminist object relations is criticised for taking a prima-facie, common sense analysis, which is culturally essentialist and empiricist in viewing joint parenting as a solution to gender inequalities and abuses. Seeing joint parenting as irrelevant when the actions of men and women mean completely different things, post-Lacanian feminists believed that it is representational structures wherein parenting and all other human activity takes place that are the sites for analysis and change.

As Barrett noted, post-Lacanians criticise object relations for interpreting joint parenting as an analysis of socialisation that works, when psychoanalysis is the study of the confounding of that process.

Post-Lacanian feminism is relevant to a Durkheimian view of alcohol in society and education in seeing symbolic representations in language, subjectivity and filmic depictions, as well as taking a view of the feminine and masculine.

Post-Lacanian feminists criticise object relations feminists as they hold to an interpretation of the classical Freudian model that focuses more on different aspects of the developmental account of the establishment of subjectivity, than their object relations colleagues. Following the tradition formed by the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, these feminists argue that it is the cultural instilling of the dominant language of and representation by men that constitutes people’s subjectivity in the world. It is argued that it is this symbolic world of language, not actual experiences of early social relations that constructs alienation in the family, society and in the relations between men and women therein. In this sense, post-Lacanian feminist analyses are psychoanalytic, but also relate to semiotics, which is the study of the (re)production signs, signifiers and the signified - the study of representations.

Returning to the classical Freudian account of early development to explain this distinction, Lacan’s view, was that rather than libidinal drives or object relations, subjectivity is explained by looking to the point at which the child enters the symbolic world as a result of the castration complex at the oedipal stage. Prior to this point, the child had experienced itself first as in symbiosis with its mother, and then slowly came to recognise itself as something other to its mother by way of viewing itself in a mirror or similarly reflected in its mother’s eyes. The child at

that point was still seeking omnipotence, striving to be in control. The oedipal stage, as in the classical account changes all this.

The child recognises that its mother will not be able to truly provide it with the means to realise its omnipotent end and cannot recouple with the child. She provided only a transient illusion of omnipotence. It is the father that represents Lacan's concept of the phallus. In Lacan's view it is at the oedipal stage that the father steps in and separates the mother and child. All children experience a castration in the face of the awesome realisation of culture and one's powerlessness in comparison to the phallus. As a result of this, all people, are doomed to exist in a fragmented and illusory way, and can never attain the power or wholeness that the phallus offered.987

There is, however, a difference between the sexes. As the boy realises a similarity between himself and his father who represents the patriarchal culture, he is thus imbued with a greater sense of identification with this culture. And girls, also seeing a physical similarity to her same sex parent and difference and inferiority to the father as representative of culture, become problematised, because for Lacan, culture can only ever be patriarchal,988 there is no representation of women. She is lacking.

Post-Lacanian feminists accept that this culture and its language is patriarchal, but deny Lacan's assertion that this arrangement wherein women are without representation is timeless or unchangeable. This group, although taking up different projects for making changes, similarly seek to reinterpret or reconstruct language so that it reflects women, believing this would lead to people's equality.

While retaining a focus on the family, in this view the traditional nuclear form where the father steps in is not necessary, as the mother is sufficient to represent the phallus in using the language of the cultural order of patriarchy.989

Kristeva argued that patriarchy needs to be changed from within by analysing and reconstructing its language, wanting an androgynous language articulated by men, and, women, believing that would undermine the traditional constructions of masculinity and femininity. The family is a prime context for research. Motherhood is essentially a division of the flesh, and Kristeva argued that this leads to two forms of discourse, a masculine one that is rational and analytical, and a feminine one that is more autobiographical and lyrical, speaking directly from the intuitive expression of maternity.990 This approach to post-Lacanian feminism

accepts the legitimacy of men’s desire, but seeks to further illuminate mother-child discourse during the preoedipal period.\textsuperscript{991}

Kristeva was critiqued by Mitchell, another post-Lacanian feminist for being apolitical, and failing to move beyond merely disrupting the patriarchal symbolic.\textsuperscript{992} Irigaray also rejected Kristeva’s acceptance, arguing that the gendering and psychological differences of women and men are historical constructions, that rather than being accepted, should be enquired into, studying how people are (re)produced for the needs of the economy.\textsuperscript{993} Gallop also, argued that the monogamous family bolsters patriarchy, and promoted infidelity to undermine that structure’s phallic control under which women’s sex is possessed by their partners and is an important site for the subordination of women.\textsuperscript{994}

Post-Lacanian feminism sees society as male centered and privileged. Women are positioned, subordinated and prescribed as objects of exchange between fathers and lovers for men’s appropriating desire. This symbolic structuring has been analysed in art and film wherein women and men are portrayed in manners reflecting this positioning. Men are portrayed as dealers, looking disinterestedly through the viewer, beyond or away to the side. Women are portrayed as inviting, compelling, and penetrable commodities.\textsuperscript{995}

The signification of women and men as variant and hierarchicalised subjects, means that desire is also prescribed. Women are forced to deny any unconsciousness that might arise from bodily experiences, for that of men’s projects and projections. Women have to hide the blood and its potential power, which signifies women’s specificity. Instead, women are internally torn apart, women’s difference is seen as an illegitimate forgery, and for that women are punished with shame and chastisement.\textsuperscript{996} This signification of women (as lacking) is also used on men. Men unconsciously assume authority in desire, and labour, where for instance, working class men compensate for their own subservience to other men by feminising those outside their group. Or in the military, trainees are abused as women, faggots, cunts and queers.\textsuperscript{997

Post-Lacanian feminists argue that patriarchy in the unconsciousness of women needs to be explored and reconstructed.\textsuperscript{998} Irigaray argued that presently, women are only able to articulate themselves by way of masculine representations, which whether articulated 'rationally' or in the oppressed somatic voice of hysteria, leave women resubjected. Irigaray believed that a language which speaks of mother-child expressions and views the conscious and unconscious, not as hierarchical but as different syntax is needed if women are to be allowed to retain their bodies, and emerge from silence and subjugation.\textsuperscript{999} Irigaray argued that women are the unconscious, neither open nor closed, beyond description, multiple and decentered.\textsuperscript{1000} Men's hierarchicalisation of the conscious over the unconscious, means that it must be subjected, oppressed, and repressed. A women's symbolic is needed in the view of post-Lacanian feminists. Just how possible this \textit{écriture féminine} is currently possible is, however, at issue.\textsuperscript{1001} Within post-Lacanian feminism there is, however, an agreement that womanhood and motherhood are sites that should be celebrated - not lacking, but potentially subversive and alternative.\textsuperscript{1002}

From a post-Lacanian feminist perspective, Mestrovic's observation that Durkheim, like Freud, saw people's individualisation of collective representations, as character or personality, as being set due to early childhood experiences is problematised. Mestrovic's observation, considered from a post-Lacan feminist perspective, leads to mother blaming. As women do most of the childcaring, it follows that according to Mestrovic's observation that children who later in life act and think anomicly or egoistically, can be explained by poor parenting - that is, poor mothering. To follow Mestrovic's observation is to ignore and fail to take into account that women's exclusive parenting is situated in a wider context of eurcentric, capitalist patriarchy. It is there that post-Lacanian feminists look to explain women's currently denied, oppressed and repressed position. Because women are signified as other and as lacking, women are excluded from the Symbolic. To use Durkheim's terms to explain the case, women are treated the way they are, due to anomie and egoism with regard to gender. The cult of the individual does not extend to women. Rather, it is a case that Durkheim's

\textsuperscript{1001} Irigaray, L. (1985). \textit{Speculum of the Other Woman}. p.232, argued that this language cannot be described in current discourse. Sprengnether, M. (1990). \textit{The Spectral Mother: Freud, Feminism and Psychoanalysis}. p.218 noted that Kristeva, however, doubted that a language of maternity is recoverable, instead arguing that men and women should together attempt to rework the existing Symbolic.
occasional references to the cult of the individual as the cult of man is quite accurate in this regard. Women are excluded from that cult and need to be able to express and develop the language of womanhood and maternity to counter and change it. The Symbolic needs to be feminised. This criticism could also be made from a feminist relations theoretical approach, mindful that the explanation and solution is differently approached. There, it is a case of shared parenting that, for instance, provides the solution to the cult of man, considered as sexist.

Both object relations, and, post-Lacanian feminist psychoanalysis, can be critiqued for adhering to the notion of woman as natural. As Frosh pointed out, whether valorising primary caregiving or womanhood through shifting and intuitive significations, there is a tendency on the part of feminist object relations, and post-Lacanians, to romanticise the experience, risking traditionalism and biologism.\footnote{Frosh, S. (1987). The Politics of Psychoanalysis: An Introduction to Freudian and Post-Freudian Theory. p.205} Also as Gardiner argued, both groups tend to view women as more psychologically healthy than men,\footnote{Gardiner, J. K. (1992). ‘Psychoanalysis and feminism: An American humanist's view’ Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 17(2), p.453.} a point that is relevant, even if, as Chodorow noted, post-Lacanian feminists incorrectly see object relations as mistakenly viewing women as having healthier psyches than men as an illusion of signification.\footnote{Chodorow, N. (1989). Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory. p.190.} These shared valorising tendencies, even if disputed amongst neopsychoanalytic feminists themselves, might be products of middle class centered views of relations and significations, given what Segal noted was Kum-Kum-Bhavnani's claim that black and working class women have always had to be aggressive - as men are, to survive in a supremely oppressive world.\footnote{Segal, L. (1990). Slow Motion: Changing Masculinities, Changing Men. p.268 cited Kum-Kum Bavnani.} A wariness is required in this regard. The issue of culture with regard to post-Lacanian feminism will be returned to later, in considering Maori specifically.

Mestrovic when sombrely optimistic implied that women are psychologically healthier than men by viewing the feminine, the left hand, compassion, the heart, and Mary as a voice that has been obscured by masculine, right handedness, and the mind of Enlightenment. However, when pessimistic, Mestrovic argued that the feminine is pathological and genocidal, and that postemotions apply to women as well as men where, for instance, 'lookism' is concerned.

Mestrovic's view aside momentarily, it can be seen that Giddens, when compared with Connell, takes an approach which is more in accord with Durkheim. This is almost undoubtably and uncoincidentally a result of Giddens' scholarship on Durkheim and the influence of that study on his own sociology. Giddens utilises the
ideas of illness and health, exploitation and morality, seeing them as implicit within societal practices in a way similar to that of Durkheim. In this sense, Durkheim and Giddens share a health and sickness perception of society. By comparison, metaphors and themes of sickness and health for Connell are set aside for a view of society as a battle, and of hegemonies of gender in society, causally leading to the consequence of people's ill-health. Feelings, love and sentiments are not central for Connell - as they are constructed, differing from Giddens who rejected Foucault's idea of a constructed self, resulting from technologies, which for Giddens takes a mono directional view of power-knowledge. Giddens argued instead for an 'institutional reflexivity' because for Foucault, in Giddens' view, the effects of discourse do not reflect back into institutions and discourses, and the self is not continuously self interrogating the past, present and future. Foucault is a leading influence on Connell's theory, and Connell could be said to share some of the aspects that Giddens critically noted in Foucault. These could be identified as the gender order, hegemonic masculinity, and gender regimes as mostly dominating, and despite Connell's view, usually accepting the dominance of structure over practice.

In utilising Chodorow, Giddens reduces the origins of explaining the reproduction of structuration to the family. Although it can similarly be said that Mestrovic, in seeing Durkheim as sharing with Freud the notion that the early years of life are central to the impression of representations that shape how people individualise representations throughout life, implicitly adopts a developmental view in this regard, Giddens, in adopting Chodorow takes on a critical period view of development. Compared with Freud's critical period in the fact of the Oedipus complex, Durkheim by comparison somewhat avoids, or at least is able to shift the setting of the individualisation of representations in early childhood development, as a sensitive period, and, affected by experienced social factors. Similarly, Connell and Mestrovic focus on wider influences than the family. Both Giddens and Chodorow referred to mothering within a wider framework of modernity, patriarchy and capitalism. But for both Chodorow and Giddens, it is the family and parenting that is pivotal. For Mestrovic, Connell, and of course, Durkheim, who saw the family as the important foyuer, the family is situated within wider contexts, whether they be structures, practices or representations.

Connell, similarly to Mestrovic, when compared with Giddens, is also somewhat pessimistic. In this regard Connell is closer to Mestrovic in seeing change as an undetermined possibility. I see this pessimism and indeterminacy as their shared legacy of Schopenhauer, if through Nietzsche and Foucault, for Connell.

Giddens by comparison is very optimistic. This can be seen in Giddens' reference to the family. Although not focused on herein given the established linkages between Mestrovic, Gilligan and Chodorow, Giddens (1992) also utilised the Freudo-Marxist Herbert Marcuse's theory, especially that espoused in *Eros and Civilisation* to explain ecstatic intimacy in an ideal situation of the pure relationship and confluent love. Mestrovic also utilised Marcuse. But Mestrovic utilised Marcuse's *One Dimensional Man*, making special use of the notion of 'happy consciousness' therein. Giddens sought an optimistic conclusion to the modernist project, realised in eroticised, authentic selfhood and society. Mestrovic did not accept that completion as a possibility or desirable. Giddens, given Mestrovic's use of Marcuse could be interpreted as having a happy consciousness, which is one of the dimensions of postemotionalism.

Giddens' optimism is also present in the ideal concept of confluent love between parents and children as 'negotiated authority.' Mestrovic saw the postemotional child as fawned over by parents and adults - not allowed to be bored, alone, or without peers. The postemotional child is shaped and led to take on certain orientations, such as knowing how to, if not always being, 'nice'. Mestrovic pointed to an underlying barbarism in how children are referred to as 'kid's 'rug rats' and so on. The democracy of the postemotional child is about magic solutions, group wishing that must be realised, and the right to never be unaccompanied or bored. For Mestrovic the democracy of the postemotional child is not dialogical, confluent or pure, it is democracy viewed by way of the will as representation.

The postemotional concept can also be applied to Giddens' idea of dialogically democratising self help groups. From Mestrovic's point of view, self help groups can lead to an oppressive peer group where everyone is tolerant and nice to others as part of a bland McDonaldization of pre-packaged, unburdened, group emotions. Giddens is too optimistic in concluding that self help groups are life enhancing.

Giddens also accepts that post-bureaucratic organisations can be socially reflexive and dialogic. There too, postemotions and Balkanisation within as well as between departments, and other organisations can lead, not to active trust, but fission.
Giddens and Durkheim are modernists (despite Mestrovic's claims that Durkheim was anti-modernist) when contextualised as in comparison to the postmodernism of Connell. For Durkheim and Giddens there is something real and true that exists, it can be harmful or beneficial and can be revealed within society and individuals, whilst Connell's poststructuralist unmasking, indeterminacy, multiplicity and rupture assumes that possibilities are endless each, may be life enhancing or oppressive. Mestrovic (1997), like Connell, sought to demystify, debunk, deconstruct and decentre by way of postemotionalism. But the postmodern, for Mestrovic, in approaching that theory by way of Baudrillard, is cognitive and hyperreality and nothing but appearances under which is 'structured, mechanical postemotionalism'.

A similarity between Giddens', Durkheim's and Mestrovic's arguments are that they share a belief in the existence of real, although changing, truths, identifications and prescriptions with regards to gender in different historical and social contexts. Whilst not for the status quo, Durkheim, Mestrovic and Giddens are more similar to each other than to Connell in this regard.

There are also significant differences between Mestrovic and Giddens. Giddens argued for the notion of autonomy as opposed to addiction as an ethical pivot in high modernity. Mestrovic's comments on Reisman's view of autonomy can be evoked here. Mestrovic argued that Reisman's hope for some autonomy as an alternative to other-directedness was an excessively optimistic one. Rather, Mestrovic argued the post-other-directed postemotional type was more likely. From Mestrovic's perspective a democracy of the emotions where people view their lives reflexively and reflectively is a view that the emotions are either rationally sourced or can be authentically realised through being rationally considered. The options between autonomy and addiction might not even exist in a world of postemotions where a varied array of synthetic, prepackaged, mechanised emotions which are strongly experienced are available for consumption. Addiction is more likely to emerge than autonomy when considered from Mestrovic's perspective. As an example, returning briefly to and applying Mestrovic's approach to studies in this country which have utilised Connell might elucidate a Durkheimian view of that work. Campbell et al.'s (1999) study, with its focus on 'images' in beer advertising could, from Mestrovic's view be interpreted as one of representations in postemotional society, where dead memories of masculinity are stripped of their historicity and context, repackaged, and retold for the benefit of profit, but with the social cost of increased anomie. In the context explained by Kraack, media images,

masculinity, alcohol, group identity converge. A mixture of peer pressures, traditional ideas of manhood and nationalism are compounded by the sports channel with its beating music, short shot, frame by frame, zooming and panning editing of footage. On the sport channel, nationalistic and macho sentiments are instantaneously televised to sites where alcohol sales and consumption takes place. There is a mixture of the emotions and history in commentaries, and advertising billboard and breaks, compounded by the intensity of the social and alcohol-fuelled context in which viewers experience the event. This mixture of emotions is also put to use for the purposes of economic profit by the media, hoteliers, and alcoholic drug producers. Giddens might respond to this scenario, which follows Mestrovic, as a situation that could lead to addictions where drinkers come to associate the images and feelings with times past, losing their personal autonomy through addictions. From Mestrovic's sort of view, the point is that there is little opportunity for autonomy to emerge in what could be seen as societal, psychological and physiological dimensions of anomic total social fact articulated by the Durkheimians Halbwachs and Mauss. Socially, there is an excess of national sentiment, alcohol and other consumable goods' sales and media transmission revenues for broadcasters. Psychologically, there is the simultaneous deadening, and, intense feelings experienced, which are coupled with and affected by the physiological effects of alcohol consumed.

The autonomy that Giddens envisioned cannot emerge from this social context. Addiction does, as people come to associate and consume alcohol with sports and social events, seeking the intensity of emotions offered by media and social groups. And these addictions do not have to emerge as being to physiologically intoxicating commodities. Following Mestrovic, an addiction to the fleeting intensity of such experiences might also emerge - an addiction to prepackaged, mechanised and copied postemotions. This view of postemotions as a total social fact could be viewed as being extendable to intimate relations where, probably mostly women, become codependent. Codependence is a very good example, using Mestrovic's recontextualisation of Riesman's other-directedness, as postemotionalism, where the individual gives themselves over to strongly felt and intense, but mechanised, prepackaged emotions of love and care for others. Giddens assumes that tendencies towards such undemocratic and addictive situations can be overcome through reflexivity, democratisation and reflection. This cuts to a central difference between Mestrovic and Giddens. The case can be interpreted as one where Giddens essentialises a rationality that can control the emotions, and Mestrovic interprets an opposite view of the situation. Mestrovic's
essentialism involves essentialised emotions. In postemotionalism, those essentially based emotions are, by individuals and others, mechanised, and cognitively and rationally filtered for the purposes of being felt by oneself and others. The democratisation of the emotions of Giddens is a recipe, given a postemotional society, for anomie and egoism.

Implications
Given these various similarities and differences, revising Mestrovic with regard to gender is not an unproblematic task. Mestrovic, in critiquing anti-essentialism, and looking for places where the feminine, the unconscious, and compassion exist, could lead to amenable convergence with Giddens' view of gender. But for Mestrovic, Giddens is the arch-villain of sociology, a modernist, and latter-day Hegel to Mestrovic, portrayed as Schopenhauer. Also Mestrovic, in debunking, demystifying and deconstructing could be more inclined to adopt Connell's view of gender, but from Mestrovic's perspective, given the focus on Baudrillard, postmodernism is cognitive, masculine, and hard-hearted will to power. Mestrovic perhaps should be more inclined to this tendency, given his acknowledgments of and references to Chris Rojek, who takes a Foucauldian view of society and particularly its forms of leisure. Mestrovic does not draw on Foucault, who from Mestrovic's perspective can be seen as accepting Nietzsche's view of the will as will to power which was the antithesis of Schopenhauer's will to life.

For the purposes of the present study, in advancing a Durkheimian study of alcohol and society focusing particularly on neoliberalism as anomie and egoistic, a path will be continued to be followed by intuitively, but analytically, drawing and commenting on, as well as synthesising the views of gender discussed so far, and those raised in research yet to be discussed.
Femininity as a social fact

Women's alcohol consumption is on the increase. Combined with the historical abuse of drugs like amphetamines and laxatives, addiction to alcohol, foodstuffs and relationships are phenomena that are becoming of more relevance and concern in relation to women and femininity.

Research has been undertaken particularly into women's addictions utilising Durkheim and relates to Giddens' references to addiction. Garret (1996) argued that Durkheim could be drawn on to understand people as they struggle to deal with anorexia nervosa. Garret utilised Durkheim's argument in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life to interpret anorectics as they attempt to gain entry back into society. Garret argued that such a view means that anorexia and recovery can be seen as involving rituals and stages that people undergo on their way to complete selfhood. In the anorectic stage, refusing foods identified as 'fattening' is a sort of homage to society's disapproval of those foods, in the search to be seen as a more worthy person. In the recovery stage, Garret argued, the various rituals that are conducted can be seen as part of a people's reentry into the community, who are made stronger as a result of what they have endured. For Garret, anorexia can be seen as people's connection to the negative cult, 'a means to an end; a condition of access to the positive cult'.

Garret, in reading Durkheim's (1912) work, without reference to Durkheim's other writings took a sort of celebratory approach to apprehending anorectics. Garret pointed out that spiritual dimensions seem to be observable in recovering anorectics, who experience religious-like conversions to reinterpret and establish their connections with themselves, others, and nature.

Garret, however, made only passing references to the contemporary contextualisation of anorexia with regard to in broader society - Durkheim often placed central importance on broad society in many of his works. That omission on Garret's part is understandable given the focus on Durkheim (1912). Although Garret did not interpret them as such, the autobiographical material provided by Garret's participants in recovery does read as symptomatic of their experiencing anomie, in descriptions of their lives before receiving treatment as the experience of 'distortion', 'energy', being 'agitated', self-destructive', and 'hyperactive'. Garret, in not apprehending participants as anomics, tended to individualise those

symptoms as indicative of what is in turn an individualised 'negative cult', which is just a part of their movement towards greater social acceptance and higher levels of personal spirituality in the 'positive cult'. To be fair, Garret's selecting *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* meant that the analysis of anorectics avoided use of the concept of anomie, given that book's being, as Tiryakian put it, 'void of the term'.

The concept of anomie is relevant to Garret's research as it might explain participants' addiction to food and eating. For instance, rather than seeing getting over anorexia “ . . . and the rituals which accompany it are the reconnecting part of the ritual, where the individual is reincorporated into the community, strengthened through suffering”, recovery could be seen as a process fraught with problems. When society itself is interpreted as anomic, the recovery of people subject to its force, in this case people like anorectics, is made that much more difficult. Garret, by selectively utilising only Durkheim's study of religion proper does not address what is the mainstream society, inhabited by those who do not have food addictions. Despite making comments to the contrary, mainstream society is ultimately interpreted by Garret as the positive cult. From a perspective based on a wider reading of Durkheim, however, mainstream society, given its increased atomism, self interestedness, and excessive marketisation and competition is not the positive cult, but is the cult of the self. The individualised and non-communal dimension to this world is evidenced in Garret's noting that many of the anorectics had recovered from anorexia without the help of clinical interventions.

From Durkheim's perspective, truly moving to a positive cult and recovery needs to be mediated by way of assembled group contexts. Not, by oneself. By comparison, some of Garret's recovering anorectic participants saw themselves as recovering through their own means. From a Durkheimian perspective, if the anorectic is not helped by way of being imbedded within meaningful group assemblages, anomie and egoism will ensue. The anorectic may well recover, in that they start eating again, however, they might lapse into egoism and anomie with regard to other pursuits, even giving, altruistic pursuits, which are still deranged, for instance in codependence. Another point of relevance here is Mestrovic's criticisms of stressful life events schools of thought where people are seen as supports. Mestrovic believed that such a view leads to egoism, where people come to see others as people who can be imposed upon without a


reciprocal commitment by the supportee. Mestrovic pointed to the importance of the quality of integration, not just that there is a group to be integrated into, for support. As well as endorsing anorectics' dealing with their addiction by themselves, Garret overlooked the importance of quality group assemblages in people's recovery.

Garret made a lot of the personal spiritual dimension relevant to recovery where some anorectics looked to new religious, magical and spiritual cults as well as traditional religions for support. Some of these cults and religions could be highly suspect when considered from Durkheimian perspectives. Mestrovic noted that Durkheim distinguished between religion and magic which profanes the sacred. Magical cults do this by subjectivising representations. Garret's view of personal spirituality is sourced in William James' philosophy, which was utilised by Garret. This influence, compounded with anorectics' appeal to religious cults is relevant to Garret's viewpoint with regard to the marriage that Garret attempted between James and Durkheim.

Garret can be criticised for taking James' position on spirituality and sometimes placing it beside or in the context of Durkheim's view for the purposes of support, without noting the sustained polemical position Durkheim took towards James in much of his work, especially perhaps, in Pragmatism and Sociology where Durkheim described James' pragmatism as a public danger. Garret also argued that like James, Durkheim shared a belief that sometimes excessively aesthetic people within the negative cult provide models which others can use to see the importance of transcendence. However, it must be pointed out that for James, transcendence in the form of being twice born is a personal and subjective experience, where for Durkheim it is in the form of collective effervescence in the context of groups. Garret in this way can be said to mistakenly represent Durkheim as a subjectivist like James. Because Garret undertook a selective reading of Durkheim, missing the importance of Durkheim's view of anomie and egoism in society, the economic, political and social aspects of society that Durkheim studied as causal of those maladies, seen for example as expressed in Giddens' discussion of 'toxic parents'. Or, another example could be Connell's references to gendering, relevant here when anorexia is considered as a protest femininity, in a world where women should be able to succeed and where body image should not be important. But due to hegemonic masculinity, the gender order and gender regimes,

considered here as anomie and egoistic from Durkheim’s perspective, women are unable to succeed, as despite being told that girls can do anything, and where possibilities are said to be endless, there may rather be massive contradictions with regard to structure, cathexis, in the institutions of the family and State as well as competition the workplace, and little support for working or unpaid mothers. In focusing on one’s body image and in denying oneself the very material that sustains life, the anorectic can be seen as exhibiting protest femininity, or, egoism and anomie. Without taking in the causal factors in social, economic and politics for anorexia implied by the concepts of anomie and egoism, Garret, by implication, in being led by James, takes a subjectivist view of causes and cures, in seeing the case as personalised anorexia, the negative cult, addressed by recovery to reenter a normal society, the positive cult. Using the Durkheimian concepts of anomie and egoism in modern society, precludes the conclusion that society is a positive cult.

Other research into women’s addictions takes a problematic view of culture and society. Traditionally men have featured more prominently in figures of people’s alcoholic drug consumption and treatment. Alcoholism is medicalised, but the context around alcohol addiction is now seen as personally and socially sourced.¹⁰¹⁹

There are fewer women than men alcoholics in treatment today, but there is agreement that there are as many women as men alcoholics.¹⁰²⁰ There is an increasing number of research initiatives questioning the assumption that alcohol problems are mainly a men’s issue. Women drink more now than at any time in recent history, some advertising of alcohol is now specifically directed at women.¹⁰²¹ But there are still strong proscriptions to women's drinking and drunkenness that hide women’s alcoholism, perhaps forestalling women from seeking assistance. For instance, the way women are made to feel uneasy, scorned and sexually harassed by men if not escorted when drinking in public houses.¹⁰²² Also, 50% of alcoholic and 36% of non-alcoholic women who in one study agreed with the statement that “A woman who is drunk is more obnoxious and disgusting than a man who is drunk” do not tolerate drunkenness in women.¹⁰²³ Such representations are part of the way women’s drinking is constructed.
Broom noted that in historic times of economic problems, the funding of women-centred and targeted programmes for drug treatment is problematised. This adds to a history in treatment that reflects a male centered view that dominated views of addictions up until the 1980s. Adding women to male drug treatments will only, Broom believed, lead to 'more of the same'. Broom argued that androcentrism is often unconscious and cannot recognise its masculine subject. Nor is the feminine subject understood, due to the expulsion of women's legitimacy.\textsuperscript{1024}

The exclusion of women takes place in the taxonomy of drinking and harm, where for instance, women's mortality rates from breast cancer are not correlated with alcohol use.\textsuperscript{1025} Women's physiology means that women get drunk quicker,\textsuperscript{1026} and there is agreement that physiologically, women, on average, are harmed quicker than men who drink as heavily.\textsuperscript{1027}

In commenting on other addictions, Broom noted that women's addictions to diet pills and laxatives used to attain a slim body, are not usually counted as 'drug-related harm'.\textsuperscript{1028} The exclusion of women is also the case where women's addictions to medically prescribed drugs are concerned. Broom noted that women's: use of medically prescribed benzodiazepines; excessive investments in significant others contextually, and; sexual abuse as an aetiology, related to addictions, are examples of how women addicts are subjected to the forces of gender.

Male drinking is sometimes still an heroic and public, 'letting off steam'. Benzodiazepine use by comparison is viewed as private and about women's inability to manage. Users are viewed as having an internal problem and as isolated, poor and suffering. When physicians prescribe pharmaceuticals for women who have been subjected to domestic violence, without meaning to, they are contributing to the oppression of women. There is little acceptance on the part of medical practitioners and the public that prescribed pharmaceutical addictions really exist, and that doctors do no harm.\textsuperscript{1029}

Significant others are also important factors in women's addictions when the physical and social harms of drug use are seen as extending beyond the user.


\textsuperscript{1026} Crawford, R. (1986). 'But I'm Only a Social Drinker... ' A Guide To Coping With Alcohol. p.74.


There are economic factors to women's reliance on men where wives of addicts might stop women from leaving them. Women are socialised to care for and love others as part of a feminine identity. This leads to a situation where "... both alcoholic men and their dependent wives who remain in unacceptable situations are enacting destructive gender formulae: Gender organises the alcoholism."\footnote{Broom, D. H. (1995). 'Rethinking gender and drugs'. Drug and Alcohol Review, 14, p.413}

During its early development, AA membership was, as it is today, significantly composed of men. Those members in intimate relationships found that when they had been drinking, their behaviour altered the relationship they had previously experienced with their partners. The debilitating effects of drinking and the descent into alcoholism had meant that as alcoholics and their partners withdrew from outside social relationships, their partners often took over the alcoholic's former responsibilities by calling employers when they were hungover, cleaning up their drunken messes, acting as a dispenser doling out money, drinks, and taking up extra work to pay for more alcohol.\footnote{Haaken, J. (1993). 'From Al-Anon to ACOA: Codependence and the reconstruction of caregiving'. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 18(2), p.329.} AA believes that these new patterns and responsibilities become a part of the alcoholic's and their partner's lives, borne out through fellowship discussion wherein sober members explained how when feeling elated or depressed over their sobriety or wanting to become more active socially or intimately, their partners could not share and were often antagonistic to their feelings. This factor and the experiences of the partners of alcoholics who felt they had no one to share their feelings with,\footnote{Royce, J. E. (1981). Alcohol Problems and Alcoholism: A Comprehensive Survey. p.261.} led to the establishment of Al-Anon.

Al-Anon, like AA is programme and fellowship was established for partners of alcoholics who were experiencing anger and resentment even though their partners may have stopped drinking.\footnote{Haaken, J. (1993). 'From Al-Anon to ACOA: Codependence and the reconstruction of caregiving'. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 18(2), p.329.} The sensations that partners of alcoholics were feeling and the negative effect they were having on the alcoholic, led to early partners of AA members being called 'enablers', as their behaviour was seen as actually enabling the alcoholic to take another drink. Al-Anon members are urged to reinterpret their partner, not as a bad person but instead as a sick person suffering from a disease that alcoholics cannot control. Al-Anon interprets partners of alcoholics as also sick as a result of living with an alcoholic's and their own denial.
and lies in their lives. Partners of alcoholics urge to blame the alcoholic is interpreted as a symptom of their sickness.\textsuperscript{1035} To learn about themselves and their partners, Al-Anon members, like their partners if attending AA, are taught to evoke and use the 12-Steps and a Higher Power for strength and resolve.\textsuperscript{1036}

Early Al-Anon members were encouraged to push aside their negative thoughts with affirmative ideas and to boost up their partner.\textsuperscript{1037} Contemporarily, Al-Anon is infused with Freudian thought wherein unconscious motivations are manifestations of the disease that enablers or codependents suffer from as a result of living with an alcoholic, and Al-Anon members are now told to direct their negative energy and anger into emotional detachment.\textsuperscript{1038} Al-Anon educates partners to change their own behaviour, not to interfere in the alcoholic's life, let them make their own decisions and accept them, without attempting or expecting them to change.\textsuperscript{1039}

Membership in Al-Anon displays a strong gender specific representation. In the United States 87\% of Al-Anon members are women.\textsuperscript{1040} It is difficult to get heterosexual men to attend Al-Anon as their partner's alcoholism can seem especially shameful or threatening to their selfhood. This can lead to a lot of frustration and possible violence on the part of those men, when alternatively Al-Anon believes it offers them an opportunity to communicate and discuss their concerns.\textsuperscript{1041}

Women addicts are also enmeshed in social relationships that discriminate and oppress. If in a heterosexual relationship, women in recovery are disadvantaged in comparison to their male counterparts, whose partners more frequently get involved in alcoholic partners self-help and support groups.\textsuperscript{1042} Without an understanding partner, sobriety is endangered\textsuperscript{1043} as self-dignity, denied emotions and vulnerability on the part of male partners of alcoholic women, can

\textsuperscript{1037} Haaken, J. (1993). 'From Al-Anon to ACOA: Codependence and the reconstruction of caregiving'. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 18(2), p.334 noted that in the 1950s Al-Anon members were encouraged to read Norman Vincent Peale for inspiration.
\textsuperscript{1038} Haaken, J. (1993). 'From Al-Anon to ACOA: Codependence and the reconstruction of caregiving'. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 18(2), pp.333, 335.
\textsuperscript{1042} Crawford, R. (1986). 'But I'm Only a Social Drinker...' A Guide To Coping With Alcohol. p.98.
work against her attempts to stop drinking. One study disclosed that only 18% of heavily drinking women reported that their partners drank less than them.

The increasing number of women attending AA meetings has led to discussion over, and the establishment of gender differentiated meetings. In Finland, gender specific interests were noted in the concerns over menstruation, abortion, incest and menopause that women alcoholics took to, and were uncomfortable about discussing, in mixed gender AA meetings.

Some assessments are that about 70% of women in treatment for drug and alcohol abuse have been somehow assaulted or sexually abused, especially as children. Life story research on drug-abuse in women disclosed that 50% of the respondents had been sexually abused in the past, and women reported that they felt uncomfortable about discussing their pasts in mixed gender group contexts. These factors support the argument for gender divided meetings.

In other cases, women expressed a wish to be in AA fellowship with men as they were when drinking, and interpret their gender as secondary to their being alcoholic. The size of the local population will often determine whether mixed gender meetings take place. Research on the Finnish AA did not disclose any blatant gender dominated talk as AA discourages interruptions and 'cross-talk', although the authors were mindful of gender differentiated styles of talking that might lead to confusion, limiting free discussion in mixed gender meetings.

Treatment centres that provide childcare are few, which might be one reason that fewer women enter treatment compared to men. If childcare were instituted there could possibly be an increase in demand.

Howard argued that gender issues are apparent in women's drug use generally. Their male partners often introduce women to drugs. Substance abusing women are also regarded more negatively than their male counterparts. When

working on the street in the sex industry, substance abusing women seem to be more psychosocially stressed than substance abusing male street sex workers.\textsuperscript{1053}

Very negative connotations are assigned to women's alcoholism. Husbands of alcoholics are more likely to leave their wives than women with alcoholic husbands, and there are strong moral concerns where the custody of children is concerned.\textsuperscript{1054} This standard view of women as caring or 'other directed' is one that has been used in programmes to stop women from smoking and drinking. Broom argued that this approach to prevention which focuses on foetuses or children, obscured women who do not have children, who are harmed by drugs that do not affect their children, or who are not responsible for children anymore, and leads to "...reinforcing the stereotype that facilitated use in the first place."\textsuperscript{1055}

Iris Marion Young studied social views of pregnant addicts, in part, drawing on feminist relations to critique approaches treating identified people by way of legal punishments. Iris Marion Young rejected punishment approaches. Implicitly referring to the rational choice view of drug use, such as that of Becker's which uses cost benefit approaches for the justification of legally punishing pregnant addicts. For Buchanan, it is a similar case. From Buchanan's perspective, viewing women and men through theories of gender and culture is mistaken. Like socialism, social democracy and Keynesianism, such views are romantic and unrealistic. From Buchanan's sort of view, such theories overlook the economic basis to life. Codependence, and addiction, from Buchanan's sort of view, is a case of poor economising. Seeing people as utility maximisers, Buchanan's sort of view is one where poor parenting (and in a capitalist and patriarchal world that translates into poor mothering) is the cause of addiction. Buchanan was critical of Keynesianism. From Buchanan's sort of view, parents lower children's utility when they are raised in a Keynesian world. In such a world, children, nor parents, are fully aware of the true rewards and punishments, or costs and benefits associated with excess - they overspend, and overindulge, as does the Keynesian State. In Buchanan's sort of view, the solution is similar to that which Giddens noted as a contradiction in neoliberalism. That is, that traditional family values should be applied to deal with the problems in the tradition of the family, and economics should be applied to the running of government. From Buchanan's point of view, the State should legally

\begin{itemize}
\item[1054.] Crawford, R. (1986). 'But I'm Only a Social Drinker...': A Guide To Coping With Alcohol, p.74, 98.
\end{itemize}
punish pregnant addicts hard as they threaten to severely lower the utility of their children.

Iris Marion Young argued that policies that accept a view of persons as rational choosers undergoing a 'cost benefit calculation' with regard to pregnant addicts are faulted. Cost benefit views of persons, Iris Marion Young thought are applicable to cases where increased fines are imposed to stop illegal car parking, but drug users are different. The high costs that face a pregnant addict are not going to stop them using. It might not be within her power to stop. Addiction, Iris Marion Young believed, is not about self control. People might choose to first use drugs but once addicted, people are not free agents. Believing that people are able to control themselves, Iris Marion Young believed, leads to seeing the punishment of pregnant addicts as a matter of desert. Addiction is a condition of being, not an action. This view has only been realised for a few decades, reflected in a landmark case finding that the criminalisation of drug addiction is an act of 'cruel and unusual punishment'. A feminist relations approach of 'care' in ethics, Iris Marion Young believed, views pregnant addicts differently to that of punishments by seeing addicts differently from how purely social contract models of responsibility would. Care involves questioning the equality presumed in the contract model. Rather, Iris Marion Young argued, care is about seeing unequal relations between people that often are not consciously or rationally entered into, but are sourced in family and kinship ties and bonds. Unequal social relations should in turn lead to a questioning of the ethics used to determine issues in such contexts as: "the structure of moral obligations and responsibility in such relations operates more through empathy, and through the acknowledgment of pregiven interdependence and connectedness, than through contracts and promises."

Iris Marion Young saw support for punishing as resulting from the 'war on drugs'. The war on drugs is a neoliberal approach to illicit intoxicating commodities emanating from the United States. Iris Marion Young saw the war on drugs, which leads to an approach that seeks to punish pregnant addicts by prosecution, as a sexist and racist policy that leads, in particular, to black women, being constructed in a racist society as bad mothers who would be better to not enter into maternity. Such women are doubly discriminated against by a society that is unequal

economically, and where due to their position therein, come into direct contact with the State more often than white women. Black women's punishment is tolerated more often, as black women are seen as bad mothers.

With regard to women as a general group, and in drawing on a feminist object relations perspective, Iris Marion Young saw the punishment of pregnant addicts as a societally manifested expression of gender and identity reminiscent of

*the feeling we all had as children of rage toward our mothers who were not always there for us, did not always respond to our needs and desires, and sometimes pursued their own purposes and desires. The mother who harms her child is not merely a criminal; she is a monster.*

Giddens' comments with regard to gender refer to: women's drinking to excess being viewed negatively; drinking women and childcare; alcoholic women's invisibility expressed through treatment rates, and; the lack of support, comparatively by the significant intimate others of heterosexual alcoholic women, noting that modern society still holds to sexist views of addictions. There is, from Giddens' sort of perspective, a great need for the democratisation of the emotions where women's alcoholism is concerned.

The formation of ACOA (Adult Children of Alcoholics) coincided with analysis of the families of alcoholics, through the interpretive framework of family systems theory and their being interpreted as dysfunctional. Children of these families were exhibiting recurring patterns of behaviour. Children of alcoholics can grow into adults with problematic lives. The influence of being raised in an alcoholic family results in the reproduction of alcoholism and alcoholics' children becoming adults concerned with taking care of others, 50% of daughters marry alcoholics and 50% of sons become alcoholics themselves. ACOA focuses on the former outcome, exploring why and how some children of alcoholics exhibit a tendency to being drawn into relationships where they are preoccupied with providing constant emotional support for someone else, which is called codependence. ACOA membership estimations in the United States note regional variations, but is thought

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to be composed of up to 80% of white middle class women\textsuperscript{1062} who might also attend Al-Anon.

ACOA, although a 12-Step group interested in alcoholism, are no longer formally affiliated with AA, Al-Anon, Alateen or Alatot. ACOA accept members who have come from families other than specifically alcoholic, by welcoming people from addictive or otherwise dysfunctional backgrounds. ACOA, through experience and readings of codependence literature, have formed a "Laundry List" of ACOA attributes and peculiarities, and are motivated by the less emotionally constrained human capability movement's ideas of the 1960s and 1970s in comparison to AA and affiliated groups. By legitimating the exhibition of antagonism toward members' parents as evidence of the division between the family's hostility and devastation represented by the disease that their parents suffered from, whether it was alcoholism or codependence, and their 'inner child', ACOA offers its members an opportunity to learn to think of and for themselves, what they want, rather than suffering from the familial pathology of self-denial and the pandering to others that is codependence.\textsuperscript{1063}

The burgeoning number of self-help books and 12-Step groups, at least in the United States, where 15 million people belong to some 500,000 recovery groups and 100 million people are related to someone with an addictive behaviour, displays a deep undercurrent of people's dissatisfaction with their lives, and how they perceive themselves in the world.\textsuperscript{1064}

Some commentators have argued that treatment groups for women addicts should be based around the feminist relation theory, such as that which Giddens draws on. Zelvin argued that treating women addicts must be considered in the context of codependence. Addiction in this view, is a maladaption in attempting to connect, rather than a failure to separate from others.\textsuperscript{1065} Drawing on feminist relational theory, Zelvin argued that women's relations with others is central to women's addictions, the onset of some of which are preceded by events in relations such as the end of an intimate relationship or the death of a significant other. Alternatively, women's addictions are sourced in women's relationships with others that use drugs\textsuperscript{1066} or through the of use drugs to deal with emotionally detached or

unsupportive partners. Some women addicts enter into dysfunctional relations such as prostitution to pay for substances, or trade sex for drugs.¹⁰⁶⁷

Women addicts' relations with their intimate life partners, children, parents and abusive others also need to be taken into account¹⁰⁶⁸ as they can also be codependent, endangering women's sobriety and maintenance of treatment. Zelvin noted that despite the outward appearance of women today being able to be emotionally and economically independent of others, culture still tells women to be caring to their men. Women are still told that having a partner completes a woman. Romantic love is still promulgated where boundaries between self and other will become blurry and where it is promulgated that sexual excitement will be maintained forever, unless women are somehow faulted. Television, movies, advertising, popular music, and literature promulgate these ideas of fused egos, broken borders, reading the minds of intimate others, and full but unverbalised expression between partners.¹⁰⁶⁹

These ideas support codependence as women do not attend to their own needs but overspend time and emotions with others, concerned about saving and directing addicts. The blurring of borders between self and others promulgated by romantic love, in codependence, leads to less autonomy and self assurance. This also is identified in dysfunctional families where members take on roles of being a scapegoat, a mascot, a lost child, or a hero.¹⁰⁷⁰ Children from these families become used to excessively taking care of others and seeking their approval.

*Codependency arises from women's socialization to perceive their relational skills as weaknesses and to connect at any price, regardless of the presence or absence of mutuality. The efforts put forth to form and sustain relationships become distorted and maladaptive.*¹⁰⁷¹

Zelvin defended the notion of 'disease' with regard to addiction, seeing the term as standing for spiritual, physical and psychological symptoms. The spirit, for

Zelvin, citing a central AA text for support, runs loose in addictive diseases, felt as hopelessness, and anguish. Codependence is part of the disease of addiction in the case of many women for Zelvin, who cited case studies to identify this tendency in women. With regard to alcoholics, in one case a woman, Kate, in recovery met a man, Bill, at AA, moved in with him and stayed beside him even after his relapse into which she too followed a year later. Kate's partner became increasingly abusive, hospitalising her at one point, after which she left him and sobered up. Against the wishes of her supporters in AA, Kate stopped attending meetings, then severed ties with her sober fellows there and with her other sober friends. Taking up the relationship with Bill again, she once again relapsed, took up prostitution to pay for the drugs she had turned to, and died on the street.

The case of Kate, for Zelvin, is one that links codependence and the woman addict. Kate did everything that a woman is expected to do in romantically falling for Bill, and in seeing her relationship with him as central. When Kate met Bill there was a lot of mutuality between them, but when he relapsed it was reduced, yet she stayed with him, even though doing so threatened and eventually ended her sobriety. In treatment and when sober, Kate used her relational skills to care for others, at AA meetings, in home meetings, as a sponsor and as a friend. What Kate did not attend to, was her codependent tendency to downplay the harmful nature of her relationship with Bill. In that relationship, which led to her relapse and contributed to her mortality, Kate misused her relational skills obsessively - they destroyed her.

Treatment that uses feminist object relations, Zelvin believed, needs to be gender specific. Women addicts entering treatment are probably going to be codependent as well. Treatment needs to realise and value the significance of women's attempts to connect, even if it appears malformed. Women addicts, considered as fundamentally relational beings means that treatment needs to utilise women's relational skills for the purposes of assisting their recovery, by establishing mutuality, positively developing relationships with peers, treatment providers, self help groups, sponsors, and family members.

In concluding, Zelvin argued that women, as relational beings, are very good at establishing communities, so support networks need to be constructed amongst addicts.

Creative solutions to common problems can be based on relational skills and the principles of mutual aid. The relational model emphasizes that women's development is based on connection rather than separation, that the self-in-relation is valuable for both the individual and society, and that healthy relationships are mutual and growth enhancing. Addicted women tend to be codependent as well as chemically dependent as a result of their psychological development, their socialization as women, their dysfunctional family origins, and their relationships with other addicts. Therefore, both addiction and codependency issues must be addressed in treatment.1076

Giddens would probably agree with Zelvin's twist to the addictions of relationships in codependency and substances in women, seeing them as simultaneously observable, with regard to his concerns over mutual, dialogic, democratic and reflexive relations. Zelvin's wish to utilise women's relational skills in treating recovering women addicts by establishing communities along the relational lines can, however, be critiqued given Mestrovic's claims about the importance of ensuring that groups which integrate the individual are of a high quality. This might not necessarily take place in self help or treatment programmes. Mestrovic liked the relational and feminine aspects of Gilligan's feminist relational theory, but considering object relations based treatment by way of the postemotional concept, groups and therapeutic relationships can easily lead to intensely experienced but mechanised and rehearsed emotions. Participants might very relationally, but postemotionally, express emotions which have been experienced vicariously, in the group context, or preplanned and packaged in one-on-one treatment contexts.

Despite favouring care over punishment of pregnant addicts, Iris Marion Young implicitly critiqued the relational model of treatment, seeing counseling as involving relations of power in treatment contexts, as part of a wider society. For Iris Marion Young, these relations are maintained, in treatment, by viewing addicted women in particular ways. Iris Marion Young drew on Foucault to critique treatment programmes. Treatment is seen as calling the client into participation. Iris Marion

Young utilised Foucault's concept of 'normalisation' wherein the expert language, the power/knowledge of the treatment provider is used to categorise people in recovery, shaping them to be certain sorts of beings. Treatment imposes social norms of the 'good woman' and 'good mother', some of which are not objective but culturally specific ideas about what constitutes such beings. Women addicts in treatment are expected to earn their children by being good housekeepers, dressing respectfully, adopting a work ethic and a self sacrificing attitude. A good woman is also part of being treated where women are encouraged not to wear makeup and high heeled shoes, be demure and speak pleasantly. If alcoholic women in recovery experience a relationship separation, they are cautioned not to rush into a relationship or multiple serial couplings with people as this is seen as leading to emotional turmoil and unstable intimacies.

Confessional techniques in group counseling are borrowed from AA group confessionalists. Drug counseling confessionalists, Iris Marion Young believed, lead to a depoliticised view of the addict. In being encouraged to be self reflective, the confessional in drug treatment also individualises the addict. This stance, Iris Marion Young argued, is typical in treatment, even if some treatments do take in the broader context. For Iris Marion Young this individualisation is similar to the social contract model of ethics.

\[ It \text{ enlists the patient’s own complicity in her adjustments to existing institutions and relations of privilege and oppression, by encouraging her to construct herself, or at best her family, as the source of her pain and her problems. This self-reflective exercise diverts her from locating her life in the context of wider social institutions and problems and also discourages her from forming dialogic bonds with others in relations of solidarity and resistance.}\]

Steadman Rice, drawing on Foucault, has approached the issue of codependence, which is adopted by Zelvin using relational theory. Steadman Rice,  

similarly to Iris Marion Young, saw both empowerment and domination in that discourse. As Giddens noted, Foucault viewed the concept of the addict as a way to control the population, a new network of power/knowledge relations that was established in the nineteenth century. The discourses of the 'good woman' and the 'good mother' used in treatment, which Iris Marion Young critiqued, could also be interpreted from a post-Lacanian feminist perspective as signifiers that reinstate women's oppression and repression, through treatments which are supposed to empower women.

Looking into perspectives on women and addictions reveals the gendered and cultural power relations that interact with representations of women.

Women's gender-distinguished substance and relational addictions can be interpreted as discourses of femininity contextualised within gender regimes and the gender order, products of hegemonic masculinity. Women's addictions can also be seen as reflexivities that are toxic and excessively giving relations, or, significations that mean that women are repressed, denied and repressed. Women's addictions are results of societal, not individual, anomic and egoistic. When considered as social products, women's addictions are in opposition to the cult of the individual, they are rather, about the cult of the self (emotionally needy men, and women who gain their selfhood from caring for them). The collective representations are ones of giving and care that are socially pathologised in the addictions as the lower pole of *homo duplex*. Addiction is an anomic social fact. Women's addictions are products of barbarian temperament, masculine enlightenment and the dereglement of representations. Pessimistically interpreted, contemporary society is one of the postemotions. Women's addictions manifest this as a group in codependence, and, given Iris Marion Young's comments, in treatment which imposes what can be reinterpreted as post-other-directed, intensely and genuinely felt, but destructive emotions.

In studying the case of alcohol and women particularly in this country, women's position in society generally is of importance where conjugal and family relations and social beliefs are concerned. The role of mother as moral keeper is a deeply imbedded and powerful representation that has a long history in this country. Phillips (1986) studying gender stereotyped humour in the interwar (between the First and Second) period noted that mother was often positioned as the keeper of habit and action in her children and husband. Mother was often noted for her

getting family members to 'do something' and not sit around inside her territory, interrupting her work, whether 'doing something' was children's going out to play or husband's tending to lawns or other domestic-related chores prescribed for men in the sexual division of labour existing at that time. Phillips argued that the socio-economic conditions that existed at that time were such that men were needed as labourers and whose dominance it was perceived, needed to be strengthened. Phillips coupled that with a utilisation of Chodorow's argument regarding an absent father missing in action, and an average marrying age of 29 years, resulting in the fear of the feminine in men, and of women generally within society, explaining why women came to be perceived and portrayed as irresponsible with finances, nagging, self indulgent and too talkative. Phillips argued that this view of women in the interwar period was unjustified as the evidence of the time displays that women in that period were actually very frugal in their spending, rather than irresponsible as the humour of the time implied.

Phillips' study of interwar period humour, sexual division of labour, family, life, femininity and masculinity, reveals the contradiction in gendered societal relations with regard to embodied symbolism, institutions, significations, and objects considered as collective representations and social facts.

Drinking and domesticity: Women and alcohol

In the late nineteenth century, the family came to be seen as a way to counter men's irresponsibility. As respectable European institutions, it was thought the promotion of marriage and the family, would lead to perseverance, saving, and purchasing a home so that men could be controlled. Perceptions of women as natural purifiers of morality were seen as central to civilising men. Early in the twentieth century, the magazine Women's Weekly contained a regular column "Dorothy Dix's Letterbox" which often featured stories of woodpiles and children left in dereliction by womanising but married fathers.

Women's exclusion from being able to drink in licensed premises, despite women's increased consumption overall in the middle of the twentieth century meant that a context for continued misogyny was constructed. Ideas of women as responsible, moral beings remained entrenched. Frank Sargeson's stories portrayed women as in unhappy oppressive and isolated marriages. Husbands,
ill-prepared for intimacy and fatherhood abounded, due to their having spent so long in relative independence.1087

As Durkheim argued with respect to culture and history, it can be easier to note collective representations in other contexts, as Durkheim did of Aboriginal culture, and in commenting about ancient Roman and Renaissance Europe, than one's own. Similarly, hindsight made possible by the passage of time since the interwar period, allows an interpretation of collective representations regarding the language and humour of gender at that time as based upon the ideas of women as harassing men about their activities, gossiping, and stupid.

For the purposes of this study, the view of women advocated for in publications in the interwar period should be placed in the context of not only gender relations and the sexual division of labour, but also related to the legal context regarding alcohol. Prohibition was in its heyday at that time. Women were prominent in activities relating to maintaining the temperance movement's momentum. Alcohol is related in the sense that women were seen as contributing to the sanctioned context standing in the way of men's rights to having a drink by himself or with his mates. Collective representations of women and alcohol were primarily attached to men's concerns and sentiments that women opposed drinking and men's group activities, an attempt to profane the sanctity of the male group and the camaraderie of drinking together. For instance, after the Second World War women were unlikely to be seen drinking in a public bar, but women's drinking at parties increased.1088

The temperance movement involved the relating of alcohol *per se* as evil, unleashing the beast in men and degrading society. The temperance movement from a Durkheimian perspective can be interpreted as ideology in the sense that Durkheim (1895) discussed and related to social facts of the sort that Mestrovic (1984) argued Durkheim believed were the true social facts produced *in* society, as opposed to the social facts of masculinity, gender and alcohol produced *by* society.

O'Neill and Jolley (1996/1997) drew on women's history in this country and described the history of its domestic education. From its initiation as a gender specific training for motherhood, domestic service work and moral education for pakeha and Maori women, domestic education has reflected particular ideas about femininity, class and society. In the late nineteenth century, industrialisation had drawn a number of working class women away from employment in domestic work, and there were moral concerns regarding Maori culture, family breakdown, the

future of the British Empire, and men's drunkenness. Schooling was a pivotal site for dealing with these issues wherein ideas of masculinity and femininity were established and have subsequently been slightly reworked since that time. Throughout this country's history there has been a division of labour taught, which relies on gender. Early this century there was an assumption that home science was a useful subject for girls to learn at both primary and secondary school, preparing them for there future lives. Home science was made compulsory for all girls in 1916 in the belief that it suited girls' nature. A Chair of Domestic Science was established at the University of Otago's School of Home Science in 1911. McDonald (1984) believed that the establishment of the Chair was a reflection of the concerns regarding class and gender that existed at the time.

Femininity can be seen as a social fact, variable across historical and cultural periods, a reality that does not determine, but rather, influences individual and social action and thought. Consider for instance, the case of the massive market in women's magazines, a form of literature which purports to speak for women of today. Women's magazines seek to construct markets in both the sales of publications themselves, and the promote and advertise various women's products that range from beauty and health care to sexuality and drug use. Alcohol advertisements are becoming increasingly present in these magazines. Alcohol consumers are one of the markets these magazines direct their messages at. Women's magazines among other facets of the beauty industry are today important sites for the construction of femininity, an area of research and critique taken up by Wolff (1990). Interpreted as representations of social facts, the massive international market in these magazines can be seen as reflecting collective representations of femininity at this historical period in a similar way to that in which Phillips (1986) interpreted between war humour. The present could also be interpreted through Durkheim to unmask changes in and remnants of, pathological and regenerative elements in social life. I will not provide any examples from this element of the media herein. However, there is at present a need for research that seeks to distinguish between ideological social facts in society, like the existence of women's magazines and those that are produced by society, like

1092. Unfortunately space precludes the study of this literature in this study, however, a research project enquiring into this popular literature through Durkheimian approaches would generate insightful findings.
excessive exercisers, bulimics, anorectics, depressives, and neurotics as a result of the anomie and egoism that is expressed in women's magazines and which is sourced in a similarly tending wider social, economic and political context. Future studies could enquire into a number of women's magazines to get an idea of the number of femininity issues raised and impressed in articles, facts are apprehended as goings on, habits, and sentiments expressed as a reality, which in the context of contemporary societal complex social and psychological life wherein advertisements and articles provides women's magazines readers with other, possibly experientially important, but unfortunately ideologically driven components of social life that expresses anomic social facts like excessive femininity. Studies could enquire into how people feel about their reading magazines and relating those experiences to their feelings of selfhood, intimacy, and as consumers, interrogating whether those feelings are contradictory and ambivalent or always positive, and that would, given Mestrovic's criticisms and suspicion of people's conscious opinions, require more in depth study into unconscious social facts as well as conscious social facts.

Women and the liberalisation of alcohol

Commenting on the 'place of alcohol in the lives of New Zealand women' project in general, Park (1990) argued that women tended to see themselves as 'good women' controlling men's drinking whether they be partners or guests. For many young women in particular drinking alcohol was a symbol for their adult maturity, which Park speculated was possibly a borrowing of men's traditional practice of symbolising their reaching adulthood by drinking. There remains much uncertainty for women regarding when they should offer alcohol, a response which is marked in older women. Younger women, however, exhibited less ambivalence about the rules of the alcohol game and are themselves purchasing alcohol, particularly wine as a part of the goods of hospitality, exchanging alcohol at home and in the public sphere as wives of corporate leaders and as career women in their own right.

With regard to non-dominant cultural group women, there is a wide variety of beliefs about and use of alcohol. Banwell (1988) noted that many older women participants born in the Cook Islands, never learnt to drink and some were

concerned that pakeha drinking practices would have a negative impact on their children. Neich and Park (1988) interviewing Samoan women, found that similarly to Maori women, Samoan women drink less often than pakeha women but when they do they drink larger quantities. Maori women's drinking is raising some concerns, as whilst many older women do not drink at all, younger women are reportedly consuming a lot of alcohol at social occasions which increasingly involve alcohol and where people “let down their hair” and do not count how many drinks they have consumed. For some Maori, alcohol represents an historical process of land alienation.

These researches reveal that today's women, with regard to drinking are currently positioned within a changing environment where there are contradicting moralities - that is, representations, about themselves and alcohol. There are intergenerational differences, and, differences between women from similar social groups, regarding what is deemed appropriate and acceptable drinking and views of drinking in general. There are also coexisting representations of liberation of the self and one’s responsibilities to others. These issues regarding the morality of drinking and views of drinking do not take place in a vacuum. Women's drinking should not be detached from a wider and changing social context. The liberation of women and drinking, can be seen as a furthering of the cult of the individual (viewed as Lehmann's identification of Durkheim's {here considered in its unqualified form for explanatory purposes} first subordinate theory of sex where Durkheim argued that women should be included in the public sphere). However, alongside the liberating potential in women's drinking is the social environment created by neoliberal restructuring.

Wyllie, et al. (1993) undertook a qualitative study into the impact of legislative changes making alcohol more readily available in Aotearoa/NZ. With an interest in the normative and impulse buying implications related to increased consumption, alcohol related problems and freer availability fostering beliefs that alcohol is less of a drug, the authors interviewed 160 respondents in the Auckland area who had purchased alcohol from supermarkets over a three month period. The study focused on women drinkers of wine (the alcoholic drug product legally


available for sale in supermarket outlets in Aotearoa/NZ at the time) who represented 100 members of the sample (the remainder comprised of 40 wine drinkers who were men and 20 women who consumed alcoholic drugs other than wine).1099

Women purchasers who bought most or all of their wine from grocery outlets felt that the environment of the supermarket was a safe, normal and acceptable women's domain compared to specialist liquor stores which were felt to be male contexts in which a women's making purchases of alcohol was perceived by participants to be brazen. The purchasing of wine in a supermarket for these women was made easier as the wine could be thought of in the context of the shopping overall, was physically easier to hide in that context, and browsing could be undertaken without sales staff contributing their opinion or help as they were perceived to do in specialist stores. All supermarket purchasers noted upcoming social events as a reason for making a purchase. Frequent drinkers noted the influential factors of sales promotions, tastings and specials leading to the stockpiling of wine, a practice shared, though to a lesser extent by infrequent drinkers. Some frequent drinkers reported increased wine consumption at the expense of other alcoholic drugs, a change that did not, however, lead to their increased consumption overall.1100

Wine purchasers who did not buy from supermarkets noted a number of reasons for not frequenting such outlets. Justifications ranged from: a distaste for alcohol and food being so closely associated especially where youth were concerned; a perception that supermarket purchasers were thoughtless and not seriously appreciative of wine, to; beliefs that it is men’s role to purchase wine, that specialist outlets had a better and wider selection, a mystique, and were a special place to browse the selection and discuss various products with outlet's staff.1101

Casswell et al. (1993) concluded that there were strong indications that wine alcoholic drug product sales through supermarket outlets made women feel more comfortable about making purchases, in support of their normalising theory. With respect to the other responses regarding the overall consumption and impulse buying by purchasers, Casswell et al.'s (1993) respondents did not believe their overall consumption had increased, where impulse buying was evident in regular

drinkers’ purchasing activities, influenced through in-store advertisements, promotions and specials.1102

Following Durkheim’s perspective, legislative changes regarding wine sales in supermarkets is reflective of the collective representations in this country. Women are clearly a target in this piece of social engineering, where wine (and to a lesser extent, cider) products were initially singled out as acceptable products for sale in very publicly accessible outlets. Notice that despite beer sales being later legislated for, the traditionally masculine alcoholic beverage of whisky along with other strong liquor is not for sale in supermarkets.

Grocery and supermarkets are places inhabited mainly by women consumers, the exclusion of strong alcoholic drug products reflects deeply held collective representations regarding women's temperance and moral keeping. From a Durkheimian perspective, the respondents of Casswell et al.'s (1993) research discloses the attending contradictions created when cultural practices change. Undoubtedly, the societal acceptance of women's drinking is an extension and development of the cult of the human person. However, the tensions created by this context of change mitigates against a final conclusion that inevitably women's drinking is socially beneficial or individually unproblematic.

Social changes have meant that more women feel comfortable about purchasing and carrying alcohol, just as women today contribute to the economy in the way men do. Alcohol provides middle class women with one way to enter power circles, for instance by partaking in wine tastings and other events.1103

On the individual plane, alongside reporting the benefits of an inclusive and safe environment created by supermarket wine sales, some of Casswell et al.’s respondents perceived alcohol purchasing as audacious, something to conceal, a distasteful association of drugs and food, and as a gender inappropriate activity. These reported contradictions are matters of relevance from Durkheim’s perspective, as they tell of the historically embedded representations in the process of realignment along gender lines, through social change. Durkheim warned of the anomie and egoism that is generated when this process is not accompanied by solidarity-producing and enhancing institutional and ethical factors. An important issue with regard to the neoliberal context is whether these factors are present. As an example, consider the decreasing importance that collectives like the system of

unions have in people's lives today. On the social plane, while women are making an increasing contribution to public sphere commerce, particularly in the service sector of the economy, collectivities are coincidentally disappearing, especially for employees. Durkheim warned of an unmindful and disorganised approach to including women in the workforce. Neoliberalism, with its distaste for most collectives, impacts on society by often removing, reducing or reforming the ethical and institutional factors that are parts of the context in which women's increased alcohol consumption is taking place.

The assumptions in this selective approach to legislating sales outlets and product offerings also betray a cultural perspective that distinguishes masculine from feminine appropriate practices. The bulk barn, wholesale, specialist sales outlets are perceived as masculinised, something similar to the way premises licensed to sell alcoholic products for consumption therein are apprehended.

In 1983 Casswell argued that although women's consumption had increased reflecting a movement towards a converging of consumption levels between men and women, the case of there being no increase in women's heavy drinking at that time could, she believed, possibly be explained by social changes regarding the acceptability of women's drinking not extending to the case of heavy drinking. The visibility of women has increased in recent history, a move parallel to that which was reported during the second World War and was followed by reports of increased women's alcoholism during the immediate post War period. From a Durkheimian perspective the social and individual injuries of increased women's alcohol consumption might take some time to become evident, as the wounds inflicted can fester, unidentified in family and school environments which also are being transformed by neoliberal economic, social and institutional planning, obscuring societal breakdown.

With regard to social justice and the State's involvement in fostering the cult of the human person, consider statistics released by the State that describe a context wherein although constituting an increased prevalence of women graduating from school and tertiary institutions, women are still only paid 80% of what men are. Collective advocacy of the sort Durkheim argued for in his notion of the corporation would be one way for women in particular, but also male workers, to make presentations to the State regarding such injustices. The Employment Contracts Act of the 1991 introduced a factor that worked against unionism which

was one manifestation, although imperfect, of the sort of collective activity that Durkheim argued for and could be said to have existed in some form in this country before neoliberalism's ascendancy. Neoliberalism has failed to replace a similar socially supporting organisational structure of the sort that would meet Durkheim's definition of corporationism. Compulsory unionism, although not in fact materialising the notion of the corporation Durkheim envisaged, was closer to that vision than the notion of unionism encapsulated in the Employment Contracts Act 1991. This aspect of neoliberalism does not present women with an environment wherein self employed and employed workers in business, industry and commerce are encouraged to foster professional integrity in their work activities in a manner Durkheim argued for in his notion of the corporation. Rather, workers are increasingly individualised through separate and confidential employment contracts, and business competition.

Additionally, given the aforementioned issue of equal recompense for equal labour, Durkheim (1950) addressed this issue generally, arguing for notions of morality that avoid such exploitation. Specifically with regard to women's pay compared to men's, men can today be conceived as the contemporary equivalent of the group of people who Durkheim argued take the 'lions share' of what results from exchange when unjustly determined. The corporation's fostering greater professional ethics and the State's fostering the cult of the human person as Durkheim envisioned they should, are, due to the embeddedness of neoliberalism, fading into the distance societally where individuation is concentrated through policies and movements that argue society should be centrally driven by economic imperatives, increasingly part of most individual and social activities and thought.

Implications

Considering femininity as a social fact and related to alcohol could allow future research into a number of existing and emerging statistical and qualitative data, contextualised in terms of Durkheimian thought on work, and cross referenced to discern anomie and egoism in collective representations of effervescence and morbidity. When changing legislation and the social and economic climate are considered together, women's alcohol issues are ones that a range of interested parties in the public health and education and elsewhere should be spending more time and funding researching and addressing. There is, from Durkheimian perspectives, much future research yet to be undertaken in cross referencing

common physical illnesses, psychological stress, depression, self abuse and destruction, victimisation, educational attainment, individual debt, business practices, family, friendships, associates and enemies in work, family and leisure activities, as well as, socioeconomic, cultural and intergenerational continuities and differences in the lives of women, related to alcohol, and the neoliberal context.
Masculinity as a social fact

Masculinity has strong links with alcohol and can be apprehended in Durkheimian terms. These relations are apparent in historic and contemporary drinking practices studied by social theory research as varying within and cultures and societies. Masculinity does vary across cultures but is almost invariably today a patriarchal social practice where men are able to socially, politically, economically and culturally have more control, authority and influence by virtue of biological sex. Masculinity is mostly authoritative, forceful, and privileges men.

Phillips' (1987) study of masculinity was a milestone in fostering an understanding of tau iwi patriarchal culture historically. In that work, Phillips explained, discussed and analysed a number of issues relevant to gender, in particular masculinity, and for present purposes, alcohol in this country. As history, from a Durkheimian perspective, is the resume from which cultures mould ideas variously, Phillips' study can be seen to have articulated a series of social facts, collective representations, anomie and egoism historically.

The temperance campaign early in the twentieth century was a response to the irresponsible, unattached cultural image of manhood present at that time.^{1107} Male identity was limited to activities, in the private sphere domestically, as gardeners of vegetables (not flowers), cooks (over the campfire), and cleaners (of the car) segregated from women, and recreationally outside the home, as pig hunters, rugby players and socialising with groups of men seeking a haven from women who sought to disband their friendships.^{1108} During World War II, literature defined women as disloyal, sexually objectified, morally prudish, male group splitting, and man trapping.^{1109}

Mens' grouping: Alcohol and self identity

Phillips saw issues of repression throughout tau iwi male history in this country. In Alexander Bathgate's Waitaruna, a man is portrayed as withdrawing from others after his mate drowned.^{1110} The pub, for Phillips, provided men with a site to release the tensions of repressed body, possibly through an oral gratificatory response to societal pressures where: "Drinking was the most acceptable prop for men struggling to be independent and confident in a capitalist individualist society."^{1111}

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Phillips believed that six o'clock closing, voted for in 1918, represented a battle and a splitting within men as a group rather than between competing social groups, as "... men were separated from themselves." Consuming large amounts of alcohol was considered quite acceptable, but to confess that one was intoxicated was effeminate. Rugby team members were permitted to talk about sex, but discussing romance was a topic that would give men reputations as weaklings. Early twentieth century media portrayed men as if they were bonded to their jobs for life. Learning to be physically tough, romping, and drinking with their mates, mid twentieth century men had repressed their emotions since departing from their mother's care.

Phillips detected an ambivalence about women in literature from the First World War forward, citing Francis Jackson's *Passage to Tobruk* as an example where men are portrayed as going to war partly to abscond away from slave-driving women to the freedom of drinking and growing a moustache. In the frontier society, drinking often developed into sprees, when men got together, as a man who drank alone was treated with apprehension, he "... was no man, only a thing". Later, the lone street drunk, in the 1950s was seen as a disappointing example of manhood, letting all other men down.

From its first beginnings in this country, there were strong relations established between rugby and alcohol. Appealing to people throughout this country, with fewer distinctions of class, rugby's rough and tumble image called to shared ideas of masculinity. Phillips argued against the idea that rugby appeals to men's latent homosexuality, but believed that tau iwi unmet needs for closeness were provided for by the physical nearness in rugby. Rugby, Phillips believed, specifically, provided a mechanism to control working class males as "an effective antidote to hooliganism", and generally, fostered manliness, individual effort for the good of the team and promoted the virtues of fighting against life's troubles. Rugby implicitly supported the violent, drinking culture of this country, so much so

that some early twentieth century hotels refused to serve rugby teams. This reality of rugby has often been hidden by myths portraying All Blacks, (the national rugby team’s) members, as cultural ambassadors. The evidence provided by former member’s accounts, state the actual case of high alcohol consumption after-match events.\textsuperscript{1125} Rugby came to be seen as the measurement of the nation’s health.\textsuperscript{1126}

\textit{Public drinking, violence and alcohol}  

Figures for the period starting in the nineteen hundreds forward, wherein thirty to fifty per cent of violence has been associated with alcohol gives the impression that in Western thinking, alcohol consumption has been interpreted as a mechanism for unleashing aggression, violence and inhibitions,\textsuperscript{1127} an association that is not shared in all cultures. In this country’s early European history, alcohol, aside from its practicality as a liquid source of food for vitamins and sustenance compared to polluted water sources and bacteria-ridden milk, was a way to improve the taste of endless meals of fatty mutton, stave off the loneliness men experienced in isolated frontier contexts, and when droving, shearing, whaling and boundary-watching men were in town, pubs were sites for information, entertainment, company and relaxation when other activities were not available.\textsuperscript{1128} Violence was a common outcome of many drinking sprees.\textsuperscript{1129}

The separation of the genders was a part of identity. Men born between 1911-1916 started work at 12 years old. Only ten per cent of those men were married at 24 years of age, and as a result many men had spent one and a half decades of their lives relatively autonomous from women, instead, playing sport and drinking alcohol.\textsuperscript{1130}

Public drinking by men was of concern in the 1870s due to beliefs about men's loss of self control, and their acting violently on the streets.\textsuperscript{1131} The onset of World War I male-only military service raised concerns about groups of men drinking together, away from the civilising company of women. Legislation was enacted that banned ‘treating’ or ‘shouting’ (the practice where drinkers involved in a drinking occasion take turns at purchasing drinks for their companions), intended to avoid hooliganism. The amount of public drinking decreased during the interwar period, where drinking became hidden in clubs and was somewhat privatised into

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drinker's homes.\textsuperscript{1132} This changed when legislation introduced six o'clock closing for licensed premises (often euphemistically referred to as the 'six o'clock swill'), with a similar societal lack of entertainment, bringing back something akin to the 'sprees' of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{1133}

\textit{Temperance as education}

As Eldred-Grigg reported, tau iwi alcohol consumption was very high throughout the nineteenth century. In the 1840s consumption was as high as 45 litres of spirits and 14 litres of beer, dropping to 24 litres of spirits in the 1860s, and beer consumption at 167 litres during the 1870s. There was more spirits and wine consumed in this country compared to the United Kingdom at the time. Beer consumption levels were half that of the United Kingdom up until the 1880s.\textsuperscript{1134} Legislative changes introduced during the period between 1860 and 1915 reflected social concerns regarding alcohol. Sunday closing was introduced in the 1860s, licenses could be revoked from 1881, premises' closing hours were lowered from midnight to 11 pm in 1893, and lowered again to 10 pm, along with the legal age raised from 18 to 21 years old and barmaids being made illegal in 1910.\textsuperscript{1135}

From 1870 to 1920 temperance was a constant political issue. Undermining the traditional pioneering and drinking male image, between 1900 and 1930 fifty per cent of the population supported temperance.\textsuperscript{1136} Legislated temperance (prohibition) was thought to be a way to restructure the young nation of tau iwi away from its infantile beginnings into a civilised, respectable society that delayed gratification and embraced capitalism, replaced uncontrolled, violent pioneering thinking with family and responsibly orientated men, who would work more efficiently and embrace the Protestant work ethic and self restraint.\textsuperscript{1137} Prohibition was a direct attack on masculinity by challenging ideas regarding alcohol and manhood. Prohibitionists portrayed drinking men as losing their judgement, unbalanced, weak, and effeminate.\textsuperscript{1138}

The 1946 Royal Commission reflected a cultural apprehension for pleasure, in arguing for schooling policies that imparted ethics ranging from moderation to temperance.\textsuperscript{1139} Parents were ambivalent about, on the one hand imparting the

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idea that drinking is wrong, and on the other, drinking, smiling and behaving happily when intoxicated.\textsuperscript{1140} The issue of whether licensed premises should be open for limited periods became an electoral issue, one that resulted in the institution of six o'clock closing in 1918.\textsuperscript{1141}

The view of male aggression and need to control access to alcohol is applied varyingly to both Maori and Pakeha male stereotypes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. They are collective representations, signs of collective beliefs and feelings. The history of men's separation from women, repression, the male group, public violence, and temperance as education reveals deep social fears about marauding groups of drunken men, as well as solitary men. Men were definitely viewed as a potentially uncivilised and excessive group in society, and temperance legislation was a clear example of this view. Male fears and derision of women for splitting up groups of men also pervades Phillips' accounts of masculinity with regard to alcohol. Another theme is a picture of a rather empty masculinity where men had few options for recreation other than sport and alcohol. Phillips' history can be seen as revealing deep cultural sentiments of fear regarding incivility, excess and isolation, or what Durkheim called anomie and egoism. Civilisation, temperance and community could be said to have been the sacred representations of the time, profaned by the drunkenness of men. A real concern about the ability of the individual to control their drinking and selves comes through in Phillips' history.

Alcohol is revealed as still playing an important part of masculinity in this country when demographic breakdowns are performed on consumption figures. Casswell (1992) found that young male drinkers between 18-30 consumed thirty per cent of alcohol consumed in this country. This group were the most likely to want to see prices come down and were in support of longer opening hours. Fifty per cent of these men were single, drank every couple of days, consumed an average of three bottles (size unspecified), believed more than others that alcohol helped their sociability and reported more problems as a result of their drinking.\textsuperscript{1142}

\textit{Semiotics and drinking}

Alcohol is an imbedded part of masculinity in this country, but drinking styles and their meanings differ in different contexts. Hodges (1985) in drawing on

semiotics, compared two different significations in styles of drinking vernaculars, that is, the way "... that alcohol appears and is described in common situations ...",\textsuperscript{1143} studying their underlying philosophies in making this point. One style is what Hodges called the 'dinner party set', where wine selections and its consumption is viewed as part of a well organised and carried out occasion of entertainment and socialising. In the dinner party set, wine is sipped, with the glass being placed back on the table between sips. Wine drinking for dinner party set participants evokes the history of wine, wine cellars, and of connoisseur's judging by for instance its, taste, bouquet, nose, legs as well as other aspects and terminology. Refusing drinks by placing one's hand over the mouth of one's glass and politely declining is quite acceptable, what is not acceptable is people's acting in an unsavoury and rowdy manner in displaying 'bad form'.\textsuperscript{1144} Such behaviour is responded to by the hostess, approaching another participant who will accost the drunkard and quieten them down. The dinner party set involves bringing together a group of people for a polite and stimulating event, arriving, participating and leaving without the creation of discomfort or disharmony for anyone attending.

A second vernacular is that of what Hodges called the 'Anchorman Association',\textsuperscript{1145} which involves two forms of comportment when heavily intoxicated by the excessive consumption of alcohol. Hodges (1985) studied the Anchorman Association, an all male group which was formed in 1967 in a University of Otago hall of residence which was made co-educational in 1983. Anchorman Association membership was attained by displaying the ability to consume six 1 litre jug measurements of Sparkling Speights Ale within four hours without vomiting. They where considered as macho. Other inductees were not so lucky. They displayed the second form of comportment. "Failed attemptees exhibit numerous behaviours, including babbling incoherently, stumbling about and falling over, unconsciousness and the ultimate disqualification, crapulence."\textsuperscript{1146} Failed candidates were considered as childlike for being unable to control their bodies. The Anchorman Association ritual was part of a wider local drinking group who took part in regular heavy drinking sessions, 'shouting' (purchasing) each other in a series of reciprocated rounds of purchased drinks which each had to consume. The most composed drinker in the face of stupefying intoxication was the most macho, the


“biggest man”. Another practice is the 'bong' drinking of large quantities of beer through a funnel and pipe instrument, as a way in which the young males challenged their limits, both in terms of their physiological ability to ingest large amounts of alcohol without vomiting, excreting, or urinating, and the challenge to maintain a sober demeanour in the face of extreme intoxication.\textsuperscript{1147}

Hodges believed that studying excessive drinking means that alcohol studies can move beyond simple physiological explanations for alcohol's ability to eventually put all humans into a stupor. Rather, Hodges argued, physiology is only one factor in what is a multidimensional series of culturally driven meanings to do with boundaries of alcohol abuse - which is imbedded in a series of social interactions between people. Hodges saw Anchorman Association alcohol abuse as the tool for the testing of boundaries, the experience of taking on and being under authority of, a changeable self, and the challenging of life's security and continuity.\textsuperscript{1148} By comparison, Hodges argued, the dinner party set involved a set of secure, bounded, benign, civil and amused orientations where alcohol is concerned.\textsuperscript{1149}

Masculine practices of shared drinking and the pursuit of greater socially contextual standing through excessive consumption can be seen to be linked to these culturally relevant, though anomically distorted signs of collectivity in the contemporary context, where gendered economic, social and political relations representations are in flux. This could be said to be the case by contextualising Anchorman drinking, both within an institution undergoing change regarding its practice of excluding women, and within a wider social context questioning men's and women's social roles and identities.

Hodges (1989) explained a male gendered approach to drinking in Southern Aotearoa/New Zealand student and local's drinking practices, examining alcohol in relation to a number of ritualised, and relational factors around particularly, gender, which Hodges interpreted semiotically wherein the body is coded through the consequences of drinking to excess. The messages are about interpersonal status, dependence, commitment and ownership.\textsuperscript{1150} Hodges believed that this semiotic code in the form of various ritualised drinking practices might explain important origins to and expressions of male alcoholism in society, where coming to rely on

drinking rituals is a representation of males' inner loss of masculine power and a search for assistance from, bonding with, and embracement by, a potent guardian. Drunkenness is a different bodily state which for Hodges is a signifier of being part of a heightened sensory experience aligned with fellowship and loyalty in the ties of the male group. Identifications of particular drunken bodily functions such as vomiting and urination and modes of comportment such as incapacitation, are external signs of an inner change that are parts of this semiotic code.

Hodges semiotically noted a series of symbolic categories relating to manhood and alcohol. In these categories, immature males are distinguished from mature males. Hodges charted various sorts of factors that related to this distinction. Immature males who do not play well are signified at rugby clubs following the team’s game as 'tits of the week', whilst mature males are defined as top players who are skilled and loyal. Immature males are fed on 'mother’s milk', whilst mature males are fed on alcohol. Immature males have low status, whilst mature male have high status. Immature males must receive alcohol, whilst mature males donate alcohol.

In the behaviour Hodges enquired into, male group identity and power was built upon a series of social occasions like meetings at bars or people's homes, running groups, 21st birthday celebrations and stag parties, where men, despite sometimes focusing on one male participant, would engage in sharing the experience of consuming large amounts of alcohol in various challenging events, where drinking males seek to remain somewhat coherent and rational, able to stand up without assistance and remain calm when involved in intimately challenging events in group witnessed rituals. For instance a 'flying 69er' is when two males with their trousers down and their shirts pulled up run towards each other, leap into the air and land on the ground positioned in the oral sexual position '69' in which each partner’s genitalia are situated at the face of their partner.

Hash House Harriers is a running and drinking group, where groups of men follow a route marked by a turn taking host and route plotter. Group members run around the locality, stopping occasionally at various places to ingest more alcohol. In the Hash House Harriers there is the practice of initiate and turn taking members drinking from a penis shaped yard glass at the host's home which is the final stop.

plotted along the route. "Tickles Challenge' is a Hash House Harriers ritual where two males standing face to face, undressed from the waist down, each confront the task of grasping each other’s testicles without laughing or grinning. Hodges argued that this homosexual sort of behaviour on the part of those overtly heterosexual men is a requirement of their need to maintain a relaxed demeanour with their peers in the face of a context where society requires their establishing sexual contacts with women.1155 This is not easy, in Hodges' view, as women are negatively perceived and where male-male relations and drinking are prioritised over relations with women in the men he studied. In drinking rituals, real time is suspended. The drinking leaves the men with a reenergised masculinity, free to reenter the profane world.1156

These are extraordinary social practices which can be interpreted as something like the Aboriginal ritualistic practice that Durkheim commented on where social groups that ordinarily maintain distinctions between people, at certain times, through intense social and collective forces, threw their usual morals out and had sexual intercourse with numerous others in a liminal social space and through collective effervescence. But Hodges' men are not part of an intense and meaningful collective social group. Rather, Hodges’ men are involved in the sorts of fraternal groups that Giddens distinguished from truly intimate contexts, or Connell identified as the gender order and gender regimes of the peer group. From a Durkheimian perspective, southern drinkers are seeking the infinite. The rites and rituals of the flying 69er or Tickles Challenge are copies of real rituals, like the copies Mestrovic argued exist in contemporary sporting gatherings. Intoxicated, in a group running around residential streets, the Hash House Harriers are a packaged, planned copy of the marauding mob, so feared in the collective representations identifiable in Phillips' history of pakeha male culture.

Hodges also semiotically analysed linguistic and gendered factors in drinking, seeing the demeaning of women through a series of drunken linguistic put downs and jibes that are made to men who leave drinking situations to be intimate with women.1157 The men Hodges observed, viewed non-drinking men as "poofers' and 'wankers' who rejected the company of men to masturbate by themselves. 'Cunt struck' men are seen as weak for submitting to the power of women's sexual

Drinking to excess as a gratifying pursuit is defined by Hodges as analogous to sexual gratification, evidenced in the language of drinking expressed in terms such as 'fucked', 'rooted', and 'shagged out'.1159 Also 'dick' or 'prick', similarly to being called a 'tit', is a form of signification. They are put-downs that refer to small male genitalia or women's breasts which are distinguished from the value of big penises and high status in masculine society.1160 The 'tit of the week' is seen as a fool, who is incompetent, threatening the order and unity of the team. Commanded to drink alcohol donated to them, the 'tit of the week' is signified as drinking the urine ('piss') from the penises of his superiors. 'Piss' is a force of vitality. 'Getting pissed' is language signifying sustenance intimately and sensorally gained from other men, where exchanging 'piss' from one better man to another lesser man is about the mechanics of how drinking status is maintained in that culture. Where being 'pissed off' is about agitation within the bounds of fraternity and where to 'take the piss' is to detract from a man's status, as parts of men's being overcome by masculine culture.1161 In hotels and bars, men's drinking prowess, skill, guts and courage is a normative code. In such a context, disagreeing with others quickly explodes into violence of the verbal or physical kinds. Sharing a drink (sharing piss) is the signifier for dealing with such antagonisms.1162

When referred to as 'tits', males are seen as unmasculine and immature. This state of childish immaturity is overcome by the summons to 'drink piss' where the reference to the emotions and sensorial of mother's breast is replaced with sustenance and aroused senses gained by being gifted alcohol by superior males.1163 Feminist object relations are relevant here with reference to the mother as omnipotent force to be overcome. These forms of signification are also present in relations to women. Men bragged about having gone out with women, regaling their friends about how they had 'rooted her silly'.1164 For Hodges, the men saw the creation of sexual excitation

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in women as a sign of male mastery and women's powerlessness, something like the powerlessness the men experienced when they submitted to intoxication. Women are a threat to male groupings, which for Hodges, explained one participant's account of an occasion where he had set a date to meet a woman, was abstaining from drinking with his friends before the meeting so as not to be drunk, and they spiked his drink so that he was heavily intoxicated by the time he met her. For Hodges, the practice involved punitive measures for the man questioning the men's group authority by being led to embarrass himself with the woman through his intoxicated actions and words. Fraternity is a distinct reality where men's relations with men are superior to men's relations with women. That is what Hodges thought was taking place when he observed one male who had his female partner with him when out drinking, and became more and more abusive of her the drunkeknife he got. Her perception was that it was just him, drunk. Hodges saw the case as socially constructed significations where being drunk and treating her in such a manner signified the superior relations he had with his mates.

Although acknowledging that when in groups, the observed men did joke around about love, Hodges believed that ultimately, most of the time men did not discuss emotional issues. For Hodges the men saw the exposure of their emotions as weak and as representations of women - they refused, for Hodges, to accept what was really their need for women, but hidden by their adherence to myths about male independence from women. Marriage in this context creates a potential schism between men - a state of limbo, confusing men's ties to men. 'Stag' parties for bridegrooms, arranged by male friends, for Hodges, are ritualised events where male group power is reasserted in the face of the threat of its usurpation by heterosexual coupling and intimacy. In 'stag dos' that Hodges observed, the bridegroom would participate in a number of drinking games, drinking jugs of spirits, or yard glasses of spirits or beer. Although all the men drink, the bridegroom is the centre of drinking feats which often lead to vomiting. “His severe vomiting attests to his supplication and re-dedication to the disciplines of male society”.

Hodges believed that the closest thing to ritual circumcision in pakeha society was the practice at some stag parties where the groom to be, having become excessively intoxicated, has his pubic hair shaved, or genitals dyed by his friends as their masculine entry even into the bed of the newlyweds, where the power and evidence of ritualised male group drinking is imposed and prioritised over the newlywed groom's intimacy with his wife on the wedding night.1170

In Hodges' study, women are seen as a real threat to men's group power. Men's fears of women and their threat of breaking up the group is certainly reminiscent of the fears identified in Phillips' history. Hodges study focused on a small group of men in one geographic location. However, it is probably fair to say that the situation Hodges described takes place in many other different settings. This might be particularly so in a society that is dealing, with resistance, to changing gender roles and practices and where massive social structural change has taken place, undermining traditional representations of masculinity.

For instance, it seems that what goes for the groups of men who drink alcohol, especially beer, also goes for the men who produce it for them. This can perhaps be said of this country's richest man, Douglas Myers, who at the time of announcing his decision to stand down from being Chief Executive of Lion Breweries to focus on investments in brewing in China, stated his belief that declining beer sales here were partly the result of men's discovery of women as people to share time with as opposed to their mates.1171 Perhaps Myers' withdrawal from this country to reinvest in alcoholic drug production in China can be seen in this light as a prudent investment in markets sited where men's power still reigns supreme and where advertising can build upon this traditional Chinese male masculinity and various drinking cultures to make increased profit from alcohol production. It could be supposed that something like what Connell called the gender order has somewhat changed, or that men have become more 'civilised' and enlightened, indicated by decreases in beer consumption. I shall claim otherwise with regard to that sort of apprehension of alcohol and society later, in studying reduced alcohol consumption overall nationally.

To return to the micro case of what is in fact also part of macrological social and economic context, Hodges' semiotic approach to alcohol implies that the ideas of masculinity being about young men's getting together on regular occasions to drink excessively are dangerous but intense experiences those men sought for the reasons of pleasure, independence, challenge, socialising and 'intimacy'.

In their separation from women, mateship, knocking, suffering physical hardship and sexism, the young men Hodges described, are reminiscent of the tendencies Phillips noted in pakeha masculinity historically. From a Durkheimian perspective this is not an accident. They reflect collective representations. Hodges’ study can be interpreted not just in semiotical terms but also Durkheimian terms, where in a changing world of work and intimacy men deal with their uncertainty, their anomie, in putting down women and men that threaten who in marriage threaten their group’s identity in the future. Such activity is very reminiscent of Connell’s view of protest masculinity. In an anomic neoliberal context, ‘post feminist’ or new conservative representations of women are likely, more so when fuelled by alcoholic intoxication. Considering Giddens in this regard, the Southern NZ drinking vernaculars do not lead to increased sharing, intimacy, a democracy of the emotions, tradition or autonomy. Southern NZ drinking vernaculars reflect fundamentalist masculinity. One’s friends are toxic like the toxic parents Giddens referred to. Heterosexual dialogic intimacy between participating males and their women intimate others is reduced by rites and rituals that participants might feel uncomfortable about sharing with their opposite sex partners, as those rituals involve handling and utilising images of male sexual genitalia and references to women in a way that might be considered disgusting and demeaning. From a Durkheimian perspective, the male drinking group is not socially integrating, it is nothing like a corporation or a group assemblage. The male drinking group is about social contacts, it is about postemotional vicarious emotions and the pressure of the peer group. Whilst not postemotionally ‘nice’ it is anomic and egoistic, contextualised within an institution undergoing change with regard to the sexual politics of gendering within it. The Anchormen and their student associates who participated in Hodges’ study, were two years into a process of the coeducationalising of their boarding hostel, and in 1985, also situated within a broader economic context of the onset of massive social change.

When representations change radically in modern societies, anomie and egoism ensue. Southern New Zealand drinking is like that. It is founded on old representations of manhood that are no longer relevant or meaningful to the contemporary context. But they are evoked in postemotional dead memories, for the purposes of simulation of rituals, experienced vicariously in the peer group who watch the initiate drink from a penis shaped yard glass, or members partaking in a ‘flying 69’. Southern New Zealand drinking rituals are like Mestrovic’s reference to

magic. They are anomie reuses of old rituals, simulations of authentic rites that are sourced in society and religion. Magic copies religion, but it is composed of the profane whereas religion is composed of the sacred.

Sadly, those young men in seeking to attain a state of control in the face of alcohol's ultimate power over them, evoked many pakeha masculine collective representations historically. The point is that those icons are not relevant any more, but as postemotional sentiments, they are repackaged for the purposes of excessive consumption in the face of not just the power of the drug of alcohol which itself offers infinity as a magic potion, but the force of a society, changing its representations, and whose people are sensitised and compulsive through its enlightenment, disorder and desires for infinity.

But seeing masculinity as a social fact is not simply a matter of viewing early to mid 1980s Dunedin mainly student and other young men's rites of passage as some sort of a practice at a specific historical and social juncture that occurs on its own, outside of what is a wider context. It could be conjectured that what could be described as the anomie displayed especially by the Anchorman Association was a rather entrenched male dominated institution out of pace with the world outside its walls. However, if that were the case, binge drinking would have been a brief acute aberration historically. This has not proved to be the case. Youth binge drinking, as I shall note, has increased in the face of decreased consumption overall. A Durkheimian perspective can contextualise Southern New Zealand drinking as itself reflecting a general societal tendency towards postemotional use of dead memories, that relates to other social considerations and research of what is really this entrenched chronic anomie.

Masculinity is a social fact, changing through history but always with cultural representations - collective representations that have a history, a dark side and as I shall claim later in discussing alcohol advertising, are selectively used in social and commercial contexts where pakeha, gender and race relations are concerned.

**Masculinity, alcohol, and violence as a social fact**

The Roper Report (1987) noted clearly that alcohol is consumed prior to numerous interpersonal cases of violence annually, occurring in various contexts, many of the cases never result in court proceedings.1173

Utilising the 1988 public morbidity files representative of all public and private hospital institutions’ discharges and deaths nationally, public sphere

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violence related to injury and death was not found by Langley, Chalmers and Fanslow (1996) to be more likely in or about licensed alcohol outlets than in the private sphere or other public sphere sites when hospitalisation and death were considered together. That study was related to this issue in that although unable to access measures of alcohol in injured or dead victims of violence, Langley, Chalmers and Fanslow (1996) investigated the relation between violence and licensed premises.

Between 1978 and 1987, of 523 homicidal mortality cases, 249 were in the private sphere, 59 took place on roads, streets and highways, and 67 were sited in public places. Of this latter number, 49 occurred within or about the area surrounding licensed premises (12.9% of specified places and 9.4% of the total number of homicides).1174

In the sample of 1376 cases of injuries from violence which constituted of 56% per cent of the total sample (2460), identified due to their hospital admissions file's identification of the site in which the assault took place, 616 took place in the private sphere. In the public sphere, roads, highways and streets were the sites for 292 cases, and of the remaining 336 cases, 251 represented places which were in or about licensed premises of two types, two hundred and twenty cases being taverns, hotels or "pubs", and 31 being nightclubs.1175

Langley et al. (1996) recognised the limitations of their approach due to injured parties' unwillingness to report their assault, public sphere roading as a site for violence resulting from both parties initial encounters in licensed premises prior to the actual site of violence, as well as the total homicide samples being small and the issue of validity brought about by there being a lack of regular taking of blood alcohol consumption readings in mortality cases. Additionally, Langley et al. believed that their identification of homicides and hospitalisation resulting from encounters in licensed premises (9.4% over ten years and 10.2% for 1988 respectively) underestimated the real rates of violence in or about licensed outlets, does not encompass doctors’ surgeries or accident and emergency services, or the emotional and psychological impacts of violence and mortality.1176 Certainly, however, the study by Langley et al. (1996) provides evidence against the societal

perception of violence in licensed premises as a significant problem.\textsuperscript{1177} The violence reported most often took place in the private sphere.

New government policies, due to recent contemporary historical and social changes in how seriously domestic abuse is regarded, have led to the problem now being seen as a social and not a private matter by the public through increased awareness of the link between domestic violence and among other things, the misuse of alcohol. The original 1992 Hamilton Pilot Project regarding domestic violence, resulted in a summary report, recommendations and subsequent legislation change where reporting, arrest, and protection by non-molestation orders were concerned. Alcohol is implicated in a significant number of domestic violence cases, but is not necessarily singularly causal. In 1994, 20,000 women and children presented at Women's Refuges. Refuge workers identified alcohol as being involved in most cases.\textsuperscript{1178}

Leibrich, et al. (1995) interviewed a number of men over their views on domestic violence. The method was a two step process involving a first phase with 2,000 men and a second phase with 200 of the original group.

With regard to alcohol and violence, 57\% of first phase men saw the factor of alcohol (alternatively to those of money related stress, unemployment and a loss of control over one's anger) as an important causal factor in men's hitting their partners.\textsuperscript{1179} Second phase participants were asked questions formulated to check on the responses, indicating the causal factor of alcohol and violence. The refined questions posed in the second phase were designed to check for this. Two such questions were that: "something in the alcohol which makes people violent", and; "drinking alcohol brings violence to the surface".\textsuperscript{1180} Ninety eight per cent of participants disagreed with those statements, with only four men agreeing with them. Initially then, and perhaps given the wording of the original questions, a majority of the men in phase one were freely able to see alcohol as a causal factor. The second phase seemed to change or correct the association men made between alcohol and violence.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{1177} Langley, J., Chalmers, D. & Fanslow, J. (1996). 'Incidence of death and hospitalisation from assault occurring in and around licensed premise: A comparative analysis'. \textit{Addiction}, 91(2), p.990 cited the Roper Report (1987, p.51) wherein hotels were identified as the most likely place for the incidence of violence after the domestic context.
\item \textsuperscript{1178} Te Puni Kokiri & Alcohol Advisory Council of New Zealand. (1995). \textit{Te Maori mete Waipiro (Maori and Alcohol)}, p.21 cited National Collective of Independent Woman's Refuges' Statistics.
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Liebrich, et al. (1995) later commented on their findings, noting that men in this country saw violence as linked with alcohol but also economics, job problems, relationship issues, the personality of different men, general stress, women's actions, and family background. Liebrich, et al.'s overall impression was that if men were unable to meet or change their view about what is expected of a man, then when they experience disempowerment, distress, and are unable to communicate in problematic situations, men will deal with the stress by being physically violent.1181

Liebrich et al. also speculated that alcohol was not a cause, but a trigger for violence, and that people could avoid violence by avoiding drinking when arguing or avoid arguing when drinking.1182

Leibrich et al.'s comments on their first versus second phase findings are interesting. Leibrich et al. claimed that first phase participants' responses in viewing violence as caused by alcohol was a result of a poorly worded question. This might have been the case, but it also might be that representations of excess and alcohol are so strong that participants unconsciously chose to view alcohol as a causal factor, and only chose not to view it that way in the second phase because the question was so pointedly directed at depicting alcohol as a purely physiological fact, that participants would not choose that option unless they held to a distinct and strong biologically essentialist view. It could be said that the first phase question got to the unconscious linking of alcohol and violence as a social fact. Following a rather public debate in the media and an ensuing meeting with the Beer Wines and Spirits Council, Maria Bradshaw, of Women's Refuge conceded that there was not clear evidence of a physiological cause for violence resulting from drinking alcohol. However, Bradshaw went on to argue that being drunk was not an excuse for violence. Bradshaw argued that there exists a cultural belief in this country that rational control is lost when people are intoxicated by alcohol.1183 Bradshaw's argument seems to be that social and cultural beliefs are as strong as biological effects of alcohol. Men are violent when under the influence of alcohol because they believe they can get away with their actions given the excuse of drunkenness. They unconsciously act violently when under the influence of alcohol and then

1183. National Radio, Checkpoint (9/12/96, 5:25 pm),
rationalise their actions after the fact. The representation of alcohol has a dark side of irrationality, violence and excess.

**Implications**

Alcohol and violence are linked within wider, intimate, economic, societal, and familial relationships. Alcohol is not dominant within this linkage in a biological sense, but rather is invested with the triggering role of being utilised by people in social contexts as they attempt to deal with their problems. Rapid social and economic change brings on various effects on people, as representations which were formerly applicable have less meaning and force as before. Nonetheless there is a linkage. Alcohol and violence is a social fact. Collective representations of alcohol and violence have for generations excused verbally, physically or emotionally violent behaviour on the part of intoxicated persons – particularly males. Examining masculinity, alcohol and violence historically and in the context of economic and social change reveals that behaviour can be ‘out of sync’ with changing societal factors and how society is really becoming.
Maori and alcohol

Cultural research into alcohol has displayed differences in Maori and non-Maori overall consumption, consumption on drinking occasions and frequency of drinking occasions. Members of non-dominant cultural groups are notable internationally to be more likely to feature in problem drug use statistics. Issues and research findings relevant to Maori will be referred to elsewhere in the present study, however, some specific historical and statistical material will be covered at this point to contextualise Maori and alcohol. Also with regard to this contextualisation, a Maori perspective, supplemented by post-Lacanian feminism provides a way into reframing academic forays into researching Maori. Maori and alcohol cannot be separated from enduring exploitations by pakeha culture.

Alcohol issues related to Maori were noted as early as 1820. By 1840, alcohol was noted as implicated in Maori social displacement. In 1847 Governor Grey, concerned with public drunkenness and disorder enacted the Sale of Spirits Ordinance, which banned Maori from purchasing or selling alcohol. The Kingitanga movement of the nineteenth century was very influential in attempting to keep alcohol out of the lives of Maori. At that time, King Potatau Te Wherowhero instituted a system of people known as Watene who prevented people from taking alcohol onto Marae. The Waikato areas under control of Maori remained 'dry' from 1854-1954, with the King Country areas similarly controlled.

A 1910 Act legislated against drunken Maori or their wives being sold or served alcohol. That legislation, like that of earlier times reflected the benevolent but paternalistic and temperance thinking of Christian Europeans. The Licensing Amendments Bill 1948 led to equality between Maori and non-Maori with regard to access to alcohol. That legislation also instituted the Maori warden system. In 1949, pakeha voting on prohibition elected overwhelmingly for its termination and the institution of six o'clock closing, Maori voted that prohibition should remain. Post-World War II thinking about the drinking of alcohol

by Maori has focused on Maori having equal access under non-discriminatory legislation.1191

Overall Maori drink about the same amount of alcohol as non-Maori. However, for Maori, consuming events are notable for high consumption - nearly twice that of non-Maori, where rather than drinking moderate amounts frequently as non-Maori are do by comparison, Maori drink large quantities on intermittent occasions, such that Maori drink twice the amount of non-Maori on occasions.1192

In one estimation, 43% of fatal drink driving accidents involved Maori.1193 Maori appear to be under-represented in soberly contextual car accidents causing injury, but over-represented in alcohol contextual injury causing accidents.1194

Youth suicide is linked with alcohol in fifty per cent of cases.1195 Of the 142 young people aged under 25 years who committed suicide in 1997, 25% were Maori.1196 Maori alcohol related mortality was higher than that of non-Maori, by 2.7 times more for men, and 1.6 times more for women.1197 In 1997 there were two and a half times as many Maori deaths for coronary heart disease than there were for non-Maori.1198

Langley, Chalmers and Fanslow (1996) found that among the factors of males generally, unknown perpetrators, end of the week and evening encounters, Maori were significantly represented in homicides in licensed premises. Maori were also significantly represented in the findings regarding non-fatal assaults.1199

Alcohol issues with regard to Maori should not be separated from wider contextual factors of cultural domination which impact on Maori with regard to, for instance, penalisation and health. Maori, although comprising fifteen per cent of the nation's population, make up fifty per cent of the prison population.1200

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Department admits alcohol and drug use is central to prison subcultures and society\textsuperscript{1201} but there are not enough drug treatment services for inmates and this might contribute to recidivism.

Maori men and women, compared with non-Maori adults are more often admitted to psychiatric hospitals for drug and alcohol abuse. Maori readmission rates were slightly less for dependency and psychosis related to alcohol compared with non-Maori between 1986 and 1991. Maori are eight times more likely to be readmitted for alcohol dependency on the grounds of drug psychosis.\textsuperscript{1202} Also, Maori, especially those aged 19-25 years old are more often arrested than non-Maori for drinking to excess.\textsuperscript{1203}

In 1995, Te Puni Kokiri and ALAC argued that research or statistics with regard to Maori specifically and alcohol related issues were often hard to come by with regard to: “current drinking patterns and trends”; unintentional injuries; family violence, and; foetal alcohol syndrome.\textsuperscript{1204} Maori life expectancy is less than that of non-Maori, at being 8 years less for men and 9 years for women.\textsuperscript{1205} Maori and alcohol should not be considered without close attention to Maori and poverty, self assurance or esteem, and cultural positioning.\textsuperscript{1206}

Te Puni Kokiri and ALAC also provided a list of research imperatives which included: alcohol's impact on Maori health; the effectiveness of early interventions and treatment for Maori; results for Maori from early prevention, treatment and intervention methods; Maori attitudes on alcohol and health; attitudes of people and institutions providing treatment services to Maori; alcohol and other drug use by Maori; the relevance of health campaigns in the media directed at Maori, and; organised research that enquires into Maori responses to advertisements by commercial and health interests related to alcohol.\textsuperscript{1207} One of these research recommendations will be particularly addressed later in the present study. In addition to noting the issues of use and related problems, a notable focus will be made with regard to advertising. At this point, discussion will focus on issues with

\textsuperscript{1204} Te Puni Kokiri & Alcohol Advisory Council of New Zealand. (1995). Te Maori me te Waipiro (Maori and Alcohol). pp.17, 21, 22 respectively..
\textsuperscript{1207} Te Puni Kokiri & Alcohol Advisory Council of New Zealand. (1995). Te Maori me te Waipiro (Maori and Alcohol). p.35.
regard to institutional and societal representations of Maori, as well as touching on relevant public health campaigning, which will be related to Maori.

Applying a Durkheimian approach to this area is doubly problematic given both the history of alternative 'Durkheimianisms' used to study indigenous cultures, and Mestrovic's sociological claim against cultural relativism in particular.

The evocation of Durkheim's concepts, as well as, Mestrovic's sociology, reconsidered, and contextualised with regard to Maori and alcohol cannot avoid the perversity of intellectual colonialisation as cultural imposition. Mestrovic has taken a polemical stand on cultural relativism in its extreme forms. To reiterate my earlier noted standpoint on that view, being bicultural, as this country's constitutional equivalent in the Treaty claims to be, is to accept an extreme cultural relativism similar to that which Mestrovic, from a Croat-North American perspective critiqued. Despite having relevance with regard to such issues where the postemotional concept is concerned as I shall shortly show, Mestrovic's sociology taken in total, without reconsideration of Durkheim for contemporary times can, for instance here with regard to cultural relativism, lead to a valuing of the colonisation of Maori by pakeha, a Christian-centered liberalism, and eurocentrism. I have already pointed these shortfalls out, yet seek to apply a Durkheimian discourse to analyse alcohol, in society and education with a particular focus on neoliberalism. For this reason Connell has been drawn on, as has, Giddens and feminist relational theory to study issues of gender and the sexual politics of alcohol, men and women. Even those supplementary theories aside, it would be a mistake to treat Mestrovic's stance on culture as unproblematically culturally insensitive. Mestrovic is quite alive to cultural complexities and conflicts, given his politically motivated analyses in support of oppressed Croats in the Balkans. Balkanisation and societal fission is one facet of postemotionalism that is particularly relevant to culture.

By taking a Durkheimian approach, there are some interesting points which Matahaere-Atariki made in asserting a Maori perspective, supplemented, and relevant for present purposes, by post-Lacanian feminism in particular, and generally, multicultural and postmodern theories, to consider 'post colonialism', as academic and intellectual neo-colonial significations of Maori, Maori masculinity in film, and, accompanying androcentrism and eurocentrism regarding Maori men, families and culture.

Considering Maori with regard to alcohol and anomie requires an historical and contemporary contextualisation, with regard to cultural practices and the implications of unequal cultural relations. This undertaking in researching, also requires a focus on the notion of colonialism. In this way, discussing Maori and
alcohol is like all representations of Maori, as Matahaere-Atariki pointed out, in always being fraught with reductionism and abstraction. Maori are other, defined by the symbolic of white settler males. This requires an investigation into structural dimensions and mechanics of this view of Maori, as well as colonisers.\textsuperscript{1208}

Matahaere-Atariki argued that moving to a position of 'post-colonialism' cannot be achieved by seeing Treaty settlements as a 'partnership'. That apprehension, Matahaere-Atariki believed, conceals the unseverable links with colonialism.\textsuperscript{1209} It is a similar case when studying Maori subjectivities, for Matahaere-Atariki, who in referring particularly to the masculine, believed such an undertaking involves studying the element of the production of subjectivity.

Matahaere-Atariki, drawing on post-Lacanian feminist film theory noted that the white cultural tradition of making analogies between white women and black men with regard to sexuality is a signification that makes indigenous women invisible and conceals the hierarchy that exists between white women and black or indigenous men. In such a context, black and indigenous men, Matahaere-Atariki argued, are hyper inflated and Maori women are present only as phantoms, hiding the violent and oppressive white male.\textsuperscript{1210} Whilst not explicitly stating the case as being such, Matahaere-Atariki also applies a metonymy, in seeing the symbolic as settler as well as patriarchal, and the other as Maori, as well as women, mindful that hierarchies still exist between the latter two groups.

Matahaere-Atariki, in adopting such a stance related these issues of signification to the film \textit{Once Were Warriors}, which depicted a dysfunctional, violent, and I add, often alcohol-fuelled Maori family. Studying colonials’ and students’ responses to that film, Matahaere-Atariki noted that for the former, there was: an equating of Maori selfhood and family violence with iwi whanau; a context where pure Maoriness can be seen as violent; an instinctual, genetically-based Maori male violent warrior; a violent, and threatening or tragic Maori man; a Maori man coming to know himself at the expense of the abuse of Maori women with clear failures; Maori abnormality and deviance, and; a failing Maori man and Maori private life.\textsuperscript{1211}

\textsuperscript{1211} Matahaere-Atariki, D. C. (1999). 'A context for writing masculinities'. In Law, R. et al. (Eds.). \textit{Masculinities in Aotearoa/New Zealand}, pp.112-113 cited \textit{Once Were Warriors} (Director: Lee Tamahori) which was first cinematically screened in Aotearoa/New Zealand in 1997.
Students, the latter group Matahaere-Atariki studied, noted the colonialism in the film, and how colonialism affects Maori communities. What students did not note, however, was the complexity of relations in society that colonialism entails. The students in considering the film, in the final analysis, Matahaere-Atariki believed, saw failing and pathologised individuals in a Maori family. Rather, Matahaere-Atariki argued, *Once Were Warriors* should be critically apprehended as signifying the post colonial political and economic inequality, disempowerment, and underclass of Maori.\(^{1212}\)

Matahaere-Atariki also commented on academic studies into Maori, noting that in that context Maori perspectives are treated as "a perspective", in the sense of simply being another counter-narrative. Matahaere-Atariki argued that, like feminist claims about women, Maori difference as a 'co-presence' is denied and this hides the omnipresent 'singular traces of colonial footprints' in the academy.\(^{1213}\) In such a context where co-presence is denied, neo-colonial political interests are instead furthered by a space taken by the colonisers loathing for the 'other' and an angst-ridden reaction to Maori, who are seen as abnormal.\(^{1214}\) Racism is the pakeha orientation to dealing with Maori co-presence.

Criticising the settler dominated academy for valorising thorough referencing, reading, and rational dispositions taken in studying Maori, Matahaere-Atariki saw the academic stance of disinterest, as potentially one of knowing only a little about the subject and as really about being engulfed in interest, as in quoting Spivak she noted that "... the will to explain {is} a symptom of the desire to have a self...", For Matahaere-Atariki generally this is the gaze of the privileged, producing, in writing and images of the other - viewing, the 'other'. This is something that is never disinterested.\(^{1215}\) Viewing the other, in terms of post-Lacanian feminism is always about domination, subjection, oppression and repression. Matahaere-Atariki, in rejecting the notion of partnership and in pointing out the absence of Maori as co-present, appeared, although not explicitly having claimed as such, to hold to a perspective closer to Irigaray than Kristeva. Matahaere-Atariki, it seems, sought to oppose the omnipresence of the white male settler, with the symbolic of Maori, rejecting the 'partnership' approach to the symbolic structures that Kristeva called for with respect to men and women.

Matahaere-Atariki has a good point in personally noting that as a Maori academic she struggles to avoid being positioned as a communicant of Maori culture (as the other) and how, for instance masculinity therein, is to be read or written about. Rather, Matahaere-Atariki sought to engage with the space for discussion of that phenomenon. Matahaere-Atariki also thought that such a project should not be left to Maori only as an excuse for non-Maori to avoid the subject. Rather, in accepting the inevitability of reductionism and abstraction in the symbolic, Matahaere-Atariki believed that investigations should be made into institutions interested in constructing and retaining specific images and expressions of Maori and colonisers.\textsuperscript{1216} I concur with that view, noting that personally as a fifth generation tau iwi male, that the perversity which Matahaere-Atariki intends in using the terms ‘Maori’ and ‘native’ interchangeably,\textsuperscript{1217} is for me a problem of perversity in the sense of seeking to apply Durkheimianism to Maori related to the topic of alcohol in society. The attempt of undertaking this analysis might be \textit{unavoidably} perverse, as perhaps would be any analysis in the terms of power and signification as Matahaere-Atariki described the case, with regard to the post colonial intellectual and social context. For instance, Mestrovic’s, Durkheim’s and Buchanan’s viewpoints could be interpreted as part of the post-colonial gaze that constructs Maori as other, manifesting what Matahaere-Atariki identified as settler significations.

I seek to critically interrogate society and consciousness. Through previous discussions, I have sought to allow the theoretical ground to solidify. I shall continue to utilise a Durkheimian discourse and here, step away from the study of spaces of history, statistics, and policy recommendations, towards the theoretical the space of Maori. With interest and believing that the ground herein is now firm enough, I seek to traverse, as a moving over and departing, this Maori space with respect and compassion, seeking to leave it undamaged with regards to past, present and future discussions. I start with the suffering in society. Maori suffer greatly. Neoliberalism has not and will not alleviate this suffering. My orientation here, as elsewhere is pessimistic and critical.

Although Maori cannot be simplistically equated with any other indigenous culture, for the purposes of explaining the problem of utilising Durkheim to study Maori, commentary on anthropological analyses of a first national group elsewhere can be drawn on. Anthropologists seeking to explain indigenous people’s drinking


have evoked Durkheim. Moore (1990), commenting on Australian research into Aborigine alcohol use, critiqued those studies for their tendency to utilise the notion of anomie (along with cultural disintegration and breakdown of traditional life).\textsuperscript{1218} Anthropological studies into Aboriginal drinking have had a strong history of interpreting and applying Durkheim from a strong functionalist position. Functionalism in various forms has led to for instance viewing indigenous people and alcohol positively, in looking to the meanings attached to drinking in trading contexts, and negatively, where indigenous cultures are viewed as weak and unable to deal with the demands of social change.\textsuperscript{1219}

Durkheim's notion of anomie has also been utilised similarly in psychology and sociology, leading to various interpretations of research findings where culture is concerned, one of them has been condemnation of traditional and indigenous cultures such as those which Moore critiqued, as well as the condemnation of Durkheim as being a belittler of non-modern culture. I see the latter interpretation as an excessively critical conclusion to make. Durkheim's discussion of mechanical versus organic society in \textit{The Division of Labour} could give a reader the impression that Durkheim belittled traditional cultures. However, Durkheim also, in the \textit{Forms} described rich, intense and complex social arrangements around religious practices in traditional societies, and in \textit{Moral Education}, even if in making a comparison in discussing the importance of teachers avoiding excessive authoritarianism over students, explicitly argued against the immorality of the colonial imposing their view and culture on indigenous persons.

Durkheim's views on the moral and the sacred, accepts fully that the totem can be a carved piece of wood, a handmade three hundred foot structure of stone or the notion of the human person. Each totem is invested with the sacred power of the collective. In comparing these totems, Durkheim did think that the sanctity of the person was a higher morality than that of its predecessors. However, he did not condemn traditional cultural apprehensions of society and individuals, rather, seeing features that modern Western cultures shared wholeheartedly in earlier historical periods and as traces contemporarily.

Lehmann (1996) argued that cultural assimilation was a tendency in Durkheim's theory, specifically\textsuperscript{1220} - a criticism that although fair if considered simply


at face value and without critically engaging with Lehmann's own scholarship which led to that conclusion, I believe, fails to conceive of Durkheim's cosmopolitanism, as what might be a relevant way of conceiving this country's bicultural constitution, and possibility of becoming a bicultural and, multicultural society as an expression of the cult of the human person in which diversity leads to so many differences between people that the only similarity left between them is their shared humanity. Difference is fundamental to the basis of this society. It lies unconscious but denied in relations between Maori and pakeha and might explain the latter's historical - cultural representation of chastising of its own cultural members when they differentiate themselves, and denying the legitimacy and value of Maori difference.

Land claims, considered from a Durkheimian perspective, although a focus of current discourse on biculturalism are often only seen one dimensionally - the dimension of pakeha. The concept of property as taonga (treasure), of its alienation as an affront against one's rangitiratanga (chieftainship), of the injustice in its failure to be returned as discriminating against people's culture, is often not really accepted. In pakeha culture that which is Maori is not sufficiently held to be moral in the sense that one acts with disinterested respect for other's culture in the way Durkheim conceived of cosmopolitanism. Rather, Maori are apprehended anomically and egoistically where pakeha either think that 'full and final settlements' of cash and assets are sufficient to realise justice and morality, a Durkheimian case of getting the most from the least, the moral from the immoral. Or, pakeha withdraw into their monocultural history and existence, rejecting groups around them which are part of what is only starting, but is turning to a biculturally organised and increasingly a demographically multicultural society.¹²²¹

Instead, pakeha have come to postemotionally respond to issues with regard to Maori. Whereas in earlier times racism was overt and verbalised, postemotional racism is expressed in tolerance which hides underlying eurocentrism, where racists can appear as nice. Rather than as a respect for others as an ethic, respect is often rather things one should not or cannot any more consciously verbalise. In this way there is not an interrogation of the racist thought, ideas and beliefs as unjust habits and ethics, interpreted as a sort of sin or pathology in the terms of a Durkheimian perspective. Pakeha postemotional types

¹²²¹. Due to the confines of space I can only touch on what is the massive issue. There are numerous dimensions to biculturalism and neoliberalism in this country, and I can only briefly comment on the pakeha dimension. To date, rhetoric about localised control hides the fact that Maori still need to be able to access State organisations, and despite their erosion, partly through the criticism of pakeha capture, the State is not seen to be providing for Maori. A Durkheimian perspective might enquire into Crown and Maori, Crown and iwi, intra and inter iwi relations, iwi and runanga investments and programmes, successes and scandals, where neoliberal social, cultural and economic reforms are concerned.
know how to respond in 'bicultural' encounters regarding rituals and practices, yet these are blandly undertaken, vicariously pre-planned and experienced.

Or in another context, consider the contradiction of the use of the haka in sport and social relations nationally and internationally and portrayed in the media for viewer catchment and as a marketing tool for economic profit. The haka, a sacred Maori practice, ritualised and preparatory for battle and war, is widely utilised by Maori but also pakeha in a number of contexts. The haka is a sacred practice reserved almost exclusively for men in Maori society. It is masculine, and threatening. On one hand, optimistically, the haka when utilised by pakeha might be seen as a societal respect for Maori culture and life, a bicultural celebration of Maori culture as a symbol of this country's spirit, represented in its ritualised use preceding events of collective effervescence and important social activities. On the other and pessimistic hand, the haka is an interesting motif, ritual and expression represented in a social practice, especially where majoritarian, power-holding colonial pakeha society is concerned. Perhaps it is in a fearful and defensive response on the part of pakeha culture, a representation of pakeha underlying concern and perennial hysteria where Maori men, masculinity and control are concerned, that requires the sometimes alcohol-fuelled acting out, mastery over, imposition on, and colonisation of the haka, treating as profane what is sacred to Maori.

In reference to the postemotional dimension of Balkanisation and fission, cultural relations today although appearing tolerant and nice, could be seen as inauthentically masking an underlying barbarity. Particularly that of the post colonial pakeha. Whilst being nice to Maori and tolerant of Maori culture, Balkanisation emerges in pakeha community responses to issues raised by Maori and Maori-related projects and resources.

Neoliberalism has contributed to a more atomised and uncaring and poor quality relational society. Communities have become fragmented and hierarchalised. There is a greater gap between the rich and poor. The effects of neoliberal structural change has impacted particularly on Maori. Such inequalities and impoverishment cannot be imposed without creating effects. When considered by way of Balkanisation, neoliberalism sets up society for future cultural fission as the 'haves' and the 'have nots', the latter who figure notably as effects of neoliberalism are further apart than before. Being nice and tolerant will not solve this situation. It is more likely to lead to anomie and egoism, the infinity of anarchy and the infinity of cultural narcissism.
In the milieu of neoliberal society, Maori will continue to suffer. Neoliberalism is contrary to Maori epistemologies and views of persons. Where for instance Buchanan argued for an individualistic approach to seeing society, Maori, like Durkheim, focused on representations that are collectively derived. Buchanan saw human nature as dominating and self interested. Durkheim also saw that tendency, but always argued for the sense of otherness and morality of the collective in his view of human nature. Buchanan's approach it must be noted has been adopted in many social policies where bureaucrats have been seen as acting self interestedly and not in the interests of Maori, justifying what have been a number of successful programmes designed by Maori, for Maori. Although of course being motivated by more than just economic concerns, Maori have recently exhibited a determination to go further than many other social groups in setting group solidarity and employment as moral and social goals for the State to be realised in going about the Treaty claims process and demanding that Treaty guarantees are institutionalised, and following State organisations to see those through. The problem is that there are not adequate connections for Maori with the State, in fact there might be less of a connection with the State that helps their interrelations, what with the legalistic claim and counter claim battle of historical evidence presented in the Waitangi Tribunal. Maori have little reason to trust the State in these circumstances, which just adds to the historic antagonism already felt. For its part, the State, especially when neoliberal, touts 'fiscal envelope' concepts of full-and-final contracted settlements. In such an approach financial and other resources are considered as compensations made. Following compensation, relations are meant to start again, as Buchanan argued, from here and not somewhere else. We will always start from somewhere else. That somewhere is history. That history in this country is one of colonialism and white male dominance.

What is, however, shared between the State and Maori in a context of neoliberalism is the notion of decentralised, self-autonomy which from a Durkheimian perspective is unfortunate, if understandable for Maori, given historical and contemporary experiences of State injustice. Maori sovereignty and neoliberal social movements meet at this point. There are of course significant differences between Maori world views and those of human nature where, for instance Buchanan's view of utility maximising individuals is concerned. However, in the face of disenchantment with the State's slow, piecemeal and incomplete recognition of Maori Treaty rights and Maori-appropriate provision of State services, devolution and local management and provision have appeared to be desirable options for many Maori.
From a Durkheimian perspective, centrally self-autonomous management will not cure injustices for Maori. Strong mediated relations between the State and individual iwi need to be fostered, as they should, for Durkheim, between the State and all people. However, even if current iwi and State connections were claimed to exist presently through runanga (assemblies) and trust boards, that would not help Maori interests in the economic and industrial sphere where Maori who work in non-iwi organisations are concerned. The corporation was meant, in Durkheim's mind, to deal with the issues that emerge in the sphere of economic relations. In this regard, Peters and Marshall's (1996) comments are relevant, where they argued that methodological individualism, which I have identified in Buchanan's thought, leads to the status quo with regard to minority group interests, as only the individual's interests are pursued in such a perspective. Methodological individualism is inherent in neoliberalism - that is not the case where Durkheimianism is concerned, nor for Maori.

Matahaere-Atariki's study into post-colonialism is of relevance with regard to neoliberalism. It appears, whilst not explicitly defined, that for Matahaere-Atariki 'Post-colonialism', denotes the sense of the prefix 'post', as 'against', in the same sense as Mestrovic attached the prefix to the emotions considered in society. Matahaere-Atariki certainly did not describe or analyse contemporary times with regard to Maori masculine subjectivities as 'after' colonisation in the sense that colonisation no longer exists.

Post-colonialism co-exists with or entails neoliberalism. Although 'post-colonialism can be interpreted as subsuming neoliberalism, it would be a mistake to simply do so in an unproblematic way, as Lehmann did for instance with regard to viewing Durkheim as a neoliberal, where that term is used to denote both neo-classical liberal social-economic theory and welfare liberalism. Such simple classifications, or significations, obscure the important differences between those two tendencies of liberalism. A Durkheimian perspective views welfare liberalism as better than neoliberalism, even if it might be interpreted as still manifesting 'post-colonial' gazing of the white male settler. At least with welfare liberalism, institutions and bureaucracies that produce and represent the gaze are collectivised.

Durkheim's notion of the corporation involves structures that cannot be separated from a political, intellectual, social and economic focus on representations that Mestrovic argued transcend structures, and which make up social life. The corporation in that context was seen by Durkheim as integrating, or in today's

language being inclusive of individuals, with regard to the necessarily and historically manifested big and widespread State.

Neoliberalism such as that of Buchanan erodes the State, is suspicious of and aggressive towards collectives. Through Buchanan's sort of perspective, the State provides diminished, compartmentalised, competitive and individualised structures which might be more, not less, difficult for Maori to access. On the part of settlers, 'smaller is better' is a compelling and boosterishly optimistic metaphor in a small island nation seeking to economically 'take on' globalised markets. From a Durkheimian perspective, the big State is preferable to the small, lean, mean State which to evoke another metonymy as the other side of the representation, could be seen as analogous to the white male of diminutive stature who in a masculine-dominated patriarchal world actually values (penis) size, feels as if he is undervalued and threatened, so acts with viciousness and hyper masculinity.

Approaches shrinking the State such as that which the neoliberalism of Buchanan seeks to institute, will not change the gaze from the settler, to one which is more just, such as a gaze taken with Maori as a co-presence. When the anomie and egoism of neoliberalism is seen as spreading to all people, the gaze is more likely to be one made through a squinting, screwed up, self interested, atomised, excessive and disapproving aperture.

The characterisations in Once Were Warriors should, as Matahaere-Atariki argued be critically engaged with as contextualised in relation to power, status and inequality. Any gaze of the white male settler must be contextualised mindful of neoliberalism, as neo-classical liberal social-economic theory, and as being an important part of the contemporary context of post-colonialism. The transformation of complex significatory structures and their production in favour of Maori, which it can be assumed Matahaere-Atariki seeks, will not take place under neoliberalism. To evoke Mestrovic and considering the neoliberal context in which it was produced and received, Once Were Warriors is will, that is the social will as representation. Neoliberalism pathologises and individualises difference. This is because the unconscious, racism and other things which cannot be completely rationally, consciously and physically observed and measured is refused legitimacy, or its existence is denied.

What applies to social receptions of filmic representation and the State also applies to academia. Buchanan's view of organisations is that increased competition, efficiency, separation and marketisation should take place. This leads to the marketisation of academia, economies of scale, and the pursuit of student consumers to whom funding is attached. This neoliberal context is likely to impact
negatively on Maori academics and academia. In neoliberalism, co-presence is replaced with competing intellectual commodities where demand and market share are of utmost importance. Maori presence is not denied in this context, but is, similarly to Matahaere-Atariki’s claims, diminished when viewed as another provider offering a niche intellectual commodity.

The Balkanisation of academic institutional departments and institutions following neoliberal restructuring and management principles and imperatives is not good for Maori. Maori are likely to be marginalised by way of academia’s adoption of the sorts of things Buchanan argued for. In those terms, for instance, Maori academics are rent seekers like all other people and should be treated similarly - by reducing Maori academic groups and representatives access to institutional decision making as much as possible.

The fission in the Balkanisation of the academy is affected by neoliberalism where departments and institutions are pitted against each other as they compete for students, contracts, and funding. Academics are less likely to pursue inter-disciplinary research as what are, due to neoliberalism, diminished dominions of academic departments which are defended against other disciplinary departments 'attacks' on their students and knowledge. Maori suffering is maintained and furthered by this fission.

Being intellectually interested as opposed to disinterested becomes subject to this neoliberal, economically focused philosophy. Maori are not free from being subject to, or taking these interests. Derived from management theory and used for the purposes of academic institutional management, 'interests' become influenced by an economic focus rather than those of social justice, where for instance, the contracting of Maori onto academic staff becomes a prudent marketing decision, as neoliberal abstractions and reductions of Maori are pursued, over a critical attendance to the responsibilities of what are white male settler dominated institutions which could be pursuing social justice. In such a neoliberal context, Maori academics agitating for institutional and social change, are likely to be constructed according to post-colonial settler signifiers such as those which Matahaere-Atariki noted in other societal responses to filmic representations of Maori.

Following Mestrovic's views of the 'compassion fatigue' that can result from the explosion of emotions in postemotionalism, partly attempting to adopt a 'disinterested' standpoint might not be as damaging as Matahaere-Atariki argued. But nor should disinterest be exclusively pursued, as that orientation can quickly lapse into the significations that Matahaere-Atariki identified. Following Durkheim's
aims for social science, academics should be both interested and disinterested, interest, involving the starting point for inquiry, which is central, disinterest involving doing thorough research and referencing of sources so that other interested parties can inquire into and interrogate them. Interest can be seen as something like a starting point, which as Schopenhauer argued, is more important than all the theoretical tools used to argue a perspective. This tendency, postmodernised, is expressed in Matahaere-Atariki's use of Spivak's 'will to explain'. From a Durkheimian perspective, interest/disinterest is about taking starting points, such as the suffering and pain in society, disinterestedly and thoroughly researching, taking the contested knowledge gained from thorough research and self critically synthesising, and supplementing it with societally and academically critical attention to issues related to the topic. Academics are enmeshed in and contribute to, the reproduction of unequal relations. But Durkheim argued that morality starts at the point of disinterest. Without disinterest, the unbounded immoralities of anomie and egoism ensue. Mestrovic, like Matahaere-Atariki also somewhat problematised 'interest', in noting that postemotional society is not free of the subjective, and the emotions - dimensions which are also important to post-Lacanian feminist focuses on desire, the unconscious and signification. Postemotionalism is an objective social reality, but it is one that is a thorough and intense subjective emotional state of society and the individual, that is cognitively filtered and mechanised, vicarious and pre-packaged will as representation.

Mindful of these concerns, a settler Durkheimian perspective is a bicultural post-colonial academic orientation that is critically: cognitive and emotional; conscious and unconscious; feminine and masculine; compassionate and dutiful, self and other. A Durkheimian perspective, can in this regard be useful in considering neoliberalism and Maori with regard to alcohol in society. It is in this spirit that I traverse Maori space.

Care must be taken not to reify Maori drinking as an individual or cultural pathology. By looking at society broadly, macrological pathology can, rather, be identified. It cannot be assumed that Maori culture can be treated as frozen in some former time. Rather, Maori is a transformed and transforming culture in a hierarchalised relation with settler culture, which also changes. These principles have to be kept in the forefront of the minds of settlers thinking of approaching the study of Maori and alcohol. There are various pathologising representations or significations of Maori that cannot, at this time be separated, from the post-colonial context.
Imposing settler perspectives of identity and addictions will not address the suffering of current Maori lived subjectivities. Criticisms of Chodorow's theory for not applying to all cultures is very relevant with regard to Maori, as are the comments made by post-Lacanian feminists, given Matahaere-Atariki's metonymic reworking of that approach to supplement a Maori perspective.

Maori need to discuss as a community and engage with settler forces in the State, society and academia that are involved in the reproduction and construction of subjectivity and alcohol. This cannot be a discussion and critical engagement initiated by settlers. Nor should settler, 'solutions' and theories be simply applied to Maori, by Maori, unproblematically. Mindful of these matters, however, Maori and alcohol should not be considered as something that settlers should or can step back from and be left for Maori to assume all the responsibility for. That would be to renege on the responsibility to recognise the reproduction of present (although somewhat historically transformed from former) blaming of Maori for what are settler imposed views of pathologised, tragic, failing, self abortive, violent, uncontrollable, and drunk, Maori.

My settler Durkheimian approach is sociological. I oppose simplistic, reductionist, psychological, individualistic, and genetic perspectives, in favour of socially-based theories. Drawing unproblematically from other indigenous groups engagements with alcohol issues, or Maori engagements historically, will not benefit Maori. Also, at this point, Maori critical engagements with historical and contemporary material will always entail the settler, given Matahaere-Atariki's claims. That social fact cannot be denied.

Durkheim was a 'social constructionist' and 'sociologist of knowledge' in contemporary terms. Lehmann's criticisms of Durkheim, which translate into viewing Maori as exhibiting group-based hierarchalised differences from non-Maori, is a deconstruction that implies Maori will not be benefited by a Durkheimian perspective. I beg to differ, as although making good points which cannot be completely denied, Lehmann's assertion, that fundamental subtextual arguments which hierarchalise are identifiable in Durkheim's social theory, is a construction has been criticised for relying on selective readings. Following Durkheim's social constructionist perspective, even where identified, genetically and physiologically influential theorised or empirical factors are always shaped, mediated and applied according to the representations in contexts in which they are identified. When biological facts are unproblematically assumed as determining, the social context which legitimates and perhaps already assumes them to be the case is obscured. Durkheim sought a societal cult of the individual and a cross-disciplinary research
community to respect, not deny, difference. Neoliberalism is by comparison a cult of the self that denies the collective, individualises, and pathologises difference. Durkheim's argument in total is that pathologies are not group based, as Lehmann's criticisms imply. Rather, pathologies are societally based. Individuals and groups are pathologised by a pathological society.

From a Durkheimian perspective, settler culture is individualistic, and more so when affected by neoliberalism. Biological facts are subjected to more powerful social facts and collective representations. Biological findings or claims must be approached as problematically filtered and refracted by settler perspective which need to be critiqued. Maori voices on alcohol need to be allowed to speak. This should not be pursued unproblematically. For instance, drawing on post-Lacanian feminism in such a manner could make Maori less visible in being positioned metonymically to women with regard to the symbolic.

It could be interpreted as being the case that Matahaere-Atariki sought a situation of dialogic democracy between Maori and settlers. But Giddens’ approach to democracy is too optimistic. The dialogical cannot take place in what, to draw on and alter Connell’s terminology, is a context of settler hegemony in the cultural order. This context refuses Maori co-presence.

The study of the production and maintenance of Maori subjectivities with regard to alcohol can be studied by way of drawing on other perspectives in other contexts, such as Saggers and Gray did, in drawing on Singer’s Engelian politically economic view, applied to the case of Aborigines and alcohol.

Most politically economic views of addiction focus on demand rather than supply. Becker did discuss supply, rejecting the extreme libertarian view that all drugs should be legalised, on the grounds that when economically considered, legalisation, by lowering price leads to increased use, and especially by the poor.1223 But Becker's ultimately methodologically individualist, neo-classical liberal view of rational addiction is mostly one where demand-side issues are focused on in looking at people's drinking as concerning their utility. Becker's neoliberal rational addiction can also lead to a view of addicts as weak willed.1224

Singer's Engelian view takes a socially-based view of addiction which, among other things looks to supply-side issues. This was the focus undertaken by Saggers and Gray in studying the structural dimension that under girders the supply of and demand for alcohol, related to, if differing in theoretical orientation from,

Matahaere-Atariki’s claim that attention should be given to the reproduction of significations. For Singer, as Saggers and Gray noted, this involves looking into “. . . the larger structures, patterns and processes that create the settings, bring into being social groups, produce and promote the intoxicants, and generate the motivations for prodigious consumption.”

Saggers and Gray looked to the State, noting that in Australia since the late 1980s, the State has been supportive of increased relaxation of alcohol legislation in an historical period where service industries involved in alcohol sales have been on the rise. Historically and similarly to Aotearoa/New Zealand, as it can be added, the State has imposed legislation specifically regarding first nationals’ access to alcohol as a form of paternal protection, changed in the late twentieth century, to the pursuit of Aboriginal equality with non-Aboriginal Australians over access to drinking, enshrined in law.

Saggers and Gray also enquired into profit seeking on the part of the alcoholic drug industry believing that the representation of the 'drunken Abo' is one that hides questions over who benefits in terms of power and profit from supplying alcohol, and, hides cultural hierarchies and domination. Saggers and Gray saw producers, sellers and others related to the sale of alcohol as the groups and individuals who immediately profit from increased availability. Increased consumption, Saggers and Gray argued, is the aim of national and multinational producers seeking to increase sales across the market. Aboriginal consumers are, however, a small niche market often overlooked in sales promotions. Saggers and Gray argued, that to study supply-side issues, a focus should be placed on regional and local geographical contexts where Aboriginal people comprise a large portion of consumers targeted for alcohol marketing and sales.

Saggers and Gray pointed to research undertaken in such contexts. One study undertaken in the Northern Territory town of Tennant Creek, looked into events following the 1987 sale of the Tennant Creek Hotel, which had traditionally

1228. Saggers, S. & Gray, D. (1997). ‘Supplying and promoting ‘grog’: The political economy of alcohol in Aboriginal Australia’. *Australian Journal of Social Issues, 32*(3), p.221 (ff. 1) noting that research is still to be undertaken over Aboriginal groups’ more prevalent ownership of alcohol supplies outlets, where increased sales to profit community revenues, might contribute to excess consumption. That research, needing to be mindful of Aboriginal supplier’s contextualisation with regard to macro and micro level structures.
been frequented by Aboriginal drinkers, to Frontier Holidays. Frontier Holidays introduced the practice utilised in its hotels elsewhere, of live sex shows encouraging audience participation and allowing underaged drinkers access to the establishment during the shows. Although noting that definitive proof that the shows were targeted specifically at Aboriginal consumers cannot be determined, Saggers and Gray argued that given that Tennant Creek had only one other hotel, and that Aboriginals mostly frequented the Tennant Creek Hotel, local suspicions were that Frontier Holidays were directing the shows at Aboriginal customers.

In opposition to the sex shows, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal community groups, tribal elders, local politicians and public health representatives formed a coalition, pitted against the interests of miners, cattlehands, hoteliers and other interested parties who wanted the shows to continue. Legislation followed this debate, which was compounded with community concerns elsewhere. That legislation required that alcohol licensed suppliers forewarn the community of upcoming shows, and imposed directives banning underaged persons access to the shows as well as banning audience participation and close physical proximity to sex show performers. For Saggers and Gray, that example was one that exposed the competing interests of the Aboriginal community, and licensees, who if unopposed have the power to introduce practices that give people reasons to drink alcohol and constitute drinking groups in a specific context which itself is part of a broader framework of relations.1229

A new programme, intended to approach Aboriginal drinking from a supply-side view has been instituted in Tennant Creek and involved a thirteen week trial of a 'grog free day' where for the first time, bans were placed on Aboriginal and non-Aboriginals. Tennant Creek, with a population of 3000 citizens, 35% of who are Aboriginal, instated Thursdays as when bottle store and front bar sales were banned, following a request from women members of an Aboriginal community group to the Northern Territory Liquor Commission. Alcoholic drug suppliers in Tennant Creek opposed the ban. One supplier claimed that the ban had led to a $5000 loss, or half the overall weekly takings, in its first week of institution.1230

In concluding, Saggers and Gray argued that looking to supply side issues entails a shift from demand-side approaches which reduce issues down attending to individuals in Aboriginal groups and their demands for alcohol. A supply-side focus

by comparison sees Aboriginals as enmeshed in dominating social relations and with regard to availability, looks to

*the alcohol producers and promoters who aggressively seek to increase their market share when health authorities the world over are arguing for moderation, and agencies of the State which have the legislative authority to limit market expansion but which, for ideological reasons, may prefer the excesses of the free market*.

The issues of supply related to producers and the State relates to Matahaere-Atariki’s claim that there is a need to examine the production and maintenance of Maori subjectivities by the settler. Matahaere-Atariki’s focus was on the symbolic, whereas Saggers and Gray’s study focused on economic structures of capitalism. But the two are linked. For instance, advertising and televised depictions of sport and sportspersons are symbolic dimensions to an Engelian view of the political economics of alcoholism. As already noted, a simplistic drawing from Maori historical practices with regard to alcohol is a misleading way to view Maori needs in the present. The incidental similarity between Tennant Creek Aboriginal community sourced moves to change supply-side controls and those practised by some iwi historically is an area of inquiry Maori might wish to take up elsewhere.

From a Durkheimian perspective, were such supply-side issues to be taken up, for them to be beneficial, they would have to take place in a context where Maori and State relations were mediated through representative frameworks interlinked with local and central government. Maori would have to have differentiated connections with the State over non-Maori, whom, the State, as The Crown here represents, considered in the context of the Treaty. Maori would have to be represented in the contexts of work, and, through iwi community Durkheimian corporations, in having this differentiated connection. There would also have to be numerous relevant corporations instituted in society, interlinked with the State.

To return to the case in Australia, Saggers and Gray did note that some policy decisions were influentially contributed to by Aboriginal community groups. However, from a Durkheimian perspective, the existence of groups, even when a

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specific group might be very integrating (from Durkheim, or today as 'inclusive') of its members, and evoke rich and effervescent collective sentiments and ideas, it does not mean that the group is integrated (or included) by the State, and this can be the case even when increased relations between the group and the State are identified. It is the quality of those relations, as well as the existence of the relations that counts most dearly. Quality integration does not follow simply from the fact that there are State and group relations. This is particularly the case when compounded by the individualising tendency of neoliberalism contextualised in the State and society. Neoliberalism is blind to groups and collective ideas that are generated by a society seen as more than the sum of its parts, the macrological, and the sui generis. Neoliberalism has been applied to the case of the Australian State, as it has here.\textsuperscript{1232} The neoliberal State does not provide the system of corporations which could have input over public policies where alcohol is concerned. A system of corporations is a romantic, collectivist, socialism from the perspective of neoliberalism. Instead the neoliberal State seeks to individualise groups to avoid log rolling in relations between groups, and the State, such as that which Buchanan (1975) commented on. Freeing markets to alcohol with regard to where things such as advertising, age restrictions and suppliers are concerned is the approach of neoliberal State, which promotes maximum individual freedom. From a Durkheimian perspective, the minimal, devoluted, competitively organised, split-up, neoliberal State, reneges on its responsibility to ensure quality integration of all, and differentiated access for Maori as Treaty partners. A system of corporations, Durkheim believed, would lead to a better understanding and sharing of quality collective representations. Neoliberalism due to its methodological individualism cannot even accept the very notion of the collective, which is the centre of Maori.

As well as being relevant to first national people's drinking, an Engelian view of supply-side issues, despite ultimately being inadmissible in a complete form to a Durkheimian perspective, points to the power of the State, and that of alcoholic drug producers and suppliers. Also, drawing on a post-Lacanian feminine view, supplements a Durkheimian perspective by looking to the power and appeal of the symbolism in collective representations as could be seen in the sex shows in licensed premises. In this sense, supply-side and significatory issues of drinking with regard to Maori will be returned to later as part of a broader discussion over alcohol availability, use and advertising.

\textsuperscript{1232}\textbf{Marginson, S.} (1993). \textit{Education and Public Policy in Australia}. 
Implications

The preceding discussion on gender and culture has provided a broader framework in which to consider Durkheim's concepts and commentary.

I shall continue to draw on Durkheim's concepts and commentary. I shall also continue to utilise Mestrovic's interpretations and adapted use of Durkheim. The meanings of a Durkheimian perspective, relevant to alcohol, society and education is, however, deepened by having drawn on social theories of gender and culture.

Considering social theories of gender and culture has supplemented and broadened Mestrovic's sociology of the feminine and masculine by referring to more than classical Jungian archetypes. With regard to a Durkheimian perspective of the feminine and masculine: Connell provided a sexual politics of discourse and practice situated within gender regimes and the gender order, espousing the power/knowledge of gendering; Giddens, and feminist object relations identified the relational aspect to gendered identity, and addictions; Hodges noted the semiotic relationship between alcohol and hierarchized gender; Matahaere-Atariki in drawing on post-Lacanian feminism to supplement a Maori perspective, pointed to the complexities and consequences of the significatory structure in gender and culture.

Having noted, discussed, compared, and critiqued aspects of social theories on gender and culture, the contributions they make to a Durkheimian perspective can now be noted.

'Homo duplex' is supplemented with: Connell's cathexis and the body-reflexive as emotional symbolic embodiments of discourse which are part of representations as practice which can be either supportive or transformative with regard to the status quo; reflexive, relational, emotional and cognitive self and society of feminist object relations and Giddens where aspects of the self are internalised or excised; semiotic and post-Lacanian significatory and hierarchized structures with regard to identity, gender and culture.

'Social facts' are added to by way of: Connell's totalities of gender regimes and the gender order; the post-traditional, or fundamentalist societies Giddens discussed; Chodorow's view of capitalist patriarchy's reproduction through exclusive mothering of children, and; men's and white male settler's hierarchized, unjust and harmful comportments, as well as media depictions, settler reactive social and academic significations, of gender and culture in semiotical terms, and those of post-Lacanian feminist-supplemented Maori perspective respectively.

'Collective representations' are appended: with Connell's view of hegemonic masculinity; Giddens view of fundamentalist responses to traditions, versus post-
traditional reflexive, if partially traditional responses, such as the addictions which forestall dialogic democracy in intimate relations, institutions, societies and the global world; by looking to the dominating, hierarchical, and abusive significations - that is imposed signs, symbols and embodiments which construct gendered and cultural subjectivities for Hodges and Matahaere-Atariki.

The 'cult of the individual' is accessorised: by Connell's search for social justice through re-embodiment; in Giddens' ideal of dialogic democracy in various contexts; in feminist object relations by seeking the balance of masculine and feminine, by way of relations as Chodorow argued for, and, an attention to subordinated and dominant attributes which are required to be realised in individuals and society by way of relations that are based on what other relation theorists call 'care' or the 'feminine voice', and; admission of women and non dominant cultures to the Symbolic, as well as Maori, specifically, as a co-presence.

'Anomie' and 'egoism' considered as 'dereglement' is supplemented by: Connell's view of protest and complicit masculinities in the gender order; through critiquing the discourses of the 'good woman' or 'good mother' imposed on women, and especially for Iris Marion Young, women who are in treatment for addictions; Giddens' views of fundamentalist reactions to change, or posttraditional sex, relationship, and substance addictions and other forms of non-dialogic relations; an excessive giving to others in relation as a usually women's gender specific intimate and social relation, and in men and masculine dominated cultures' expressions, which rage against non-European women, the feminine, and the mother; looking to subjectivities adopted by men seeking an all encompassing embrace through drinking rites, drinking to excess, and drunken comportment, which for Hodges involves performative, hierarchized, male-male masculine and feminine signifiers, and, significations that are also hierarchised in men's and women's relations, and; the subjectivities imposed on Maori by settlers, which pathologise Maori families and individuals, hyper inflate Maori men's masculinity, obscure Maori women, and deny Maori co-presence.

Mestrovic's view of 'representationalism is given greater depth with regard to gender and culture by way of: the notion of hegemonic masculinity; addictions as a pole of post traditional societies; the relational settings in which individuals' life long orientations towards individualising representations take place, as well as the societal view of the relational feminine and mother as something to be dominated and defiled, and; significations that explain the reproduction and imposition of southern male masculine, and Maori subjectivities.
Compassion is supplemented by: Connell’s view of the maintenance of the status quo as its opposite in displaying Sarenean 'bad faith'; mutuality, giving, autonomous, trusting relations; men’s and women’s relations accepted as unequal as a first step in seeking their balance, by drawing on the feminine caring voice in ethics; calls to admit women’s and mothers’ intuitive signifiatory voice to the symbolic; and, in challenging the significations that reduce and abstract Maori in oppressive and repressive ways such as, by pathologisation and the denial of co-presence.

'Barbarism' is appended; by hegemonic masculinity which is oppressive of men and particularly women; fundamentalism, toxic parents, relationships, and addictions; relations-based instrumental male rages against the mother and the feminine; significations of masculinised hierarchies, or, significations in film, society and academia that pathologise Maori and deny Maori co-presence.

Pessimism is supported: in Connell’s rejection that quick fixes can be made to hegemonic masculinity by way of role theory; by Giddens’ concerns over the possibility of addictions or fundamentalism coming to dominate over dialogic democracy; through feminist relation’s theory’s acknowledgment that masculine psyches dominate in society wherein unequal relations are internalised in familial and intimate relations; in hierarchalised signifiers that construct the subjectivities of southern drinking men, their women partners, or, denying women entry into the symbolic, and; with regard to culture, maintains the omnipresent settler, denying Maori co-presence and positioning Maori as pathological.

The postemotional concept is contributed to with regard to: the emotions, where cathexis is about the structuring of the emotions in society, where people take on and are placed within certain subject positions; post-other-directedness, is given more scope by way of the concepts of complicit masculinity which is nice and appears tolerant and flexible but which is really a shiny and seamless form of masculinity. In Giddens the concept is expressed in the loss of emotional autonomy in codependence and other addictions, the excess of giving, for women, or instrumentalisation, for men, where gendered relations are conceived of uncritically responding to community concerns over drugs in punishing pregnant addicts. Or in the case of significations, the stultifying peer group of southern drinking males who deny members establishment of intimacy with women, or the right to their own idiosyncrasies. With regard to culture, significations are present in post-colonial academic tolerance of Maori as a counter-narrative, that obscures, oppresses and represses Maori as a co-presence. Significations also deny women’s difference; fission and Balkanisation which are given more depth when considered in the terms
of hegemonic masculinity which is often violent and oppressive of different men, women and people with multiple sexualities, or can be seen in the relational or symbolic splitting of mothers and children, men and especially women. This concept is also relevant to considering settler significations of Maori which reinstitute colonial representations, pathologising Maori and banning Maori from a position of co-presence; post and dead memory status nascendi historical revisions, which are present in 'bad faith', where hegemonic masculinity is reinstated through men's unquestioning attitude to gender in a changed social context. It is also present in societal views of women, treatments of addictions, and depictions of women that reimpose women's oppression, explained by and reproduced in early childhood relational of significatory facts. This tendency can also be identified in post-colonial settler significations of Maori families and masculinity which are neo-colonial, reproducing Maori as other.

Social theories of gender and culture have provided a deeper structural dimension to social facts without lapsing into the excesses of Lehmann's sort of approach, and, highlighted the complex, intricate, productive, hierarchised, unequal social relations involved in representations relevant to a Durkheimian perspective. A Durkheimian perspective is enhanced by considering these theories, in that the suffering, pain and anguish in society is more clearly understood and intensely felt. As noted, there are many differences between the social theories of gender and culture. Those theories also differ from Mestrovic's and Durkheim's. Also as just noted, there are similarities that can be drawn. Remaining mindful of their differences, and the contradictions inherent in any attempt to draw, in what Mary Daly called 'spinning', among different fields, it is in the spirit of these, shared, sentiments, synthesised, that I shall from this point forth centrally apply Durkheim's and Mestrovic's concepts, as well as related comments and arguments. Retaining a critical viewpoint and accepting that such a discursive strategy does not avoid the inherent contradictions in drawing on different social theories on gender and culture, Durkheimianism will be treated, in most cases as standing for these shared ideas and sentiments. Used for an analysis of alcohol in society and education in the context of neoliberalism, a Durkheimianism spun of fibres shorn from a mixture of social theories of gender and culture revealing force relations as social facts, provides the recoil for a conceptual move from the limitations of Durkheim's, and particularly Mestrovic's sociology, to better address this topic by contemporarily viewing new and emergent discourses as carrying what are reformulations of representations.
SECTION 4:

ALCOHOL, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS
Alcohol, Society, and Politics

Alcohol and life in Aotearoa/New Zealand

Linking alcohol and anomie

In many ways alcohol abuse is an excellent example of anomie. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads people into physiological and psychological states in which individuals desire more and more alcohol, excluding all else. Alcoholic behaviour is an example of the abyss of desires Durkheim described. Alcoholics seek more and more alcohol, shutting out previously significant people in their lives when those people question their abuse of alcoholic drugs. The alcoholic desires so much more than their circumstances are often able to provide, and will sacrifice intimate relationships, career opportunities, and quality lifestyle opportunities in favour of pursuing and consuming more alcohol. These are, from a Durkheimian perspective, individual expressions of wider societal anomie and egoism.

The literature review approach taken in the present study cannot address individuals' responses to rational choice, versus moral and desirous issues with regard to alcohol, related to gender, ethnicity, culture, and society in the present context. A Durkheimian perspective can, however, still be applied to existing studies by situating that research in a context wider than that of the individual's particular experiences and feelings only, seeking a social foundation for life experiences, identifying social disjointedness and recommending solutions for that unfortunate situation. The individual is still to be taken into account in the present case. Durkheim's analysis was not intended to negate the importance of the individual. In fact, for Durkheim, modernity's personhood of the individual was central to and advocated for in his sociology. Durkheim sought to give individualism further meaning by directing it away from egoism and anomie. The individual's experiences and behaviours were central points of analysis that Durkheim studied, but rather than looking into individuals in particular, Durkheim addressed individuals by way of their social, national, cultural and historical contextualisation.

Barker (1991) undertook a Durkheimian analysis of a couple of this country's artists and their work as socially based expressions of their being. As opposed to interpretations of artists and poets as socially withdrawn people, prophets and proclaimers of authenticity, and definers of truth, free from social

1233. There would be definitive benefits gained from research that combined the individual’s viewpoint within and about the wider (changing) social context. That research is beyond the scope of this study. I will, however, reinterpret some research that somewhat researches in this way.
conventions and constraints, Barker believed that artists and their work can be seen, like all people's, as socially immersed expressions of their interdependence within the social totality.

Margaret Mahy described the division of labour, apparent through her housekeeper and other service people that allow her to write in what would at first glance, and in the traditional way that artists are construed, appear as a secluded context. The interdependent division of labour apparent in Mahy's life, discloses how the interdependence of the social world is always apparent in facilitating her work. Mahy, in writing, exists within a social context that structures her life and gives meaning to her work. Writing viewed in this way, is a societal action, not individually based, but social in nature.

Barker (1991) also examined cartoonist Burton Silver's discussion about withdrawal, citizenship and work. Silver noted how when traveling overseas his "goofing off" by not engaging in social life, often was acceptable and unproblematic. Silver explained how once, when visiting Australia he spent five months in the bush alone, without concerning himself or others, yet upon returning to Aotearoa/New Zealand he experienced a compulsion within himself and from people around him to "do something", and to contribute to his home country's community.

Barker's analysis displays in the Durkheimian sense, how people's actions in art and in other matters are always social, and how the collectivity affects people, structuring their individual actions. The interdependence in society in Mahy's case displayed the organic solidarity Durkheim (1893) noted in modernity, where specialisation, in Mahy's case as a writer, is facilitated by various contractual social relations with others who themselves reciprocally depend partly on Mahy's contracting their services. Durkheim sought to go further in noting the moral dimensions over and above the contractualism of the modern relations that Durkheim analysed, and are still apparent today. Silver's experience of feeling the pressure to 'do something' reflects one's society's moral forces as powerful dimensions of life, when compared to life as an overseas tourist where 'goofing off' and withdrawing from social interaction is acceptable. It could be said that collective representations regarding work in one's home country, for Silver, led to his deciding to 'do something'. Silver's decision should not be regarded as simply a

normative duty-bound doing. Desire, as Durkheim (1925) noted, is the other side of collective representations, of morality, where people want to act for society. For Durkheim, people desire society. When people want to 'do something', desire is a powerful force, equal to that of duty.

Research like that of Barker's has implications for a Durkheimian study into social explanations for people's dysfunctional use of alcohol. Barker somewhat contextualised two artists' lives. Socially contextualising alcohol issues to education requires both perceiving similar social forces in action to those described by Barker, and, going beyond the parameters Barker set, to include historical, cultural and gendered issues, and examining research within a changing society as that presented by Aotearoa New Zealand in the last 15 years.

An interpretation of Durkheim's views of the possibly regenerative ideas in corporate organisations and their existence in contemporary life can contribute to a view of society as composed of representations that can be solidaristic and integrating of people who might otherwise become anomic or egoistic. Alcohol abuse does create individual states very similar to those that Durkheim described as present in the social situation as he saw it. Alcohol issues are part of a wider and changing social context. Education reflects the state of the society in which it takes place. Where society is egoistic and anomic, alcohol in society and education in its formal and informal manifestations will also be egoistic and anomic.

Some Durkheimian inspired research has been undertaken in respect of alcoholism but most analyses have taken place on the premises that alcoholics are deviants, and that Durkheim was a normative role-theorist. Normative strains are but one element of Durkheim's thought. Durkheim did repudiate theories that advocated revolution, believing that the State could not be dismantled or used purely as an economic functionary. As a liberal, Durkheim favoured the reformation of existing institutional frameworks by instilling them with greater integrity. However, commentators have interpreted Durkheim as a theorist interested in maintaining order in the Hobbesian sense, the view of Durkheim, interpreted as a radical critic of society and its ailments is of interest in this study. It is this type of interpretation, infused with the foregoing explanation that will be pursued where education, alcohol and society is concerned.

1239. In Suicide (pp. 77-81) Durkheim did look at alcoholism, his interest in testing other's claims in relating alcohol as a cause for suicide by studying consumption rates, alcohol related crime and insane admissions regionally. Durkheim was not convinced that there was a link.
Durkheim's study of social life is still relevant today. The contemporary cultural and societal collective and individual can be seen in a number of examples in this country, wherein education and other social institutions and practices relevant to alcohol can be analysed for their intellectual, economic and political quality and use by way of Durkheimian concepts. *Homo duplex*, social facts, collective representations, the cult of the individual, anomie and egoism, can be applied to the social context in which alcohol issues are situated today.

With respect to this country's education system, Durkheim's perspective is applicable to this societal institution that Durkheim often referred to as always influenced by collective representations of societies at any given time. Education has reflected the shift towards a liberalism of the sort Buchanan advocated for and which is similar to the liberalisms Durkheim critiqued in his own time. Understanding the collective representations in alcohol education requires an initial wider contextualising of alcohol through an overview of the societal, institutional and legislative changes enacted which reflect the excessive liberalism in this country generally, and which will, then, be applied to education specifically

**Economics and alcohol**

Alcohol consumption is part of a complex web of social and economic relations that exist in this society. In the perspective of Mestrovic's Durkheimian approach, this country provides a relevant example for the case of economic anomie in contemporary society.

Mestrovic believed *homo duplex* provides a basis upon which to analyse contemporary economic theory, where the New Right seeks to limit, and the Left to extend state involvement in people's lives. With regard to the New Right, neoliberals seek to extrapolate Western free market capitalism onto Eastern societies and post communist nations. Free marketeering utilitarianism, de-emphasising non-economic moralities and pivoting on self interest is egoistic and desiring and cannot provide the life, justice and fairness enhancing moral social rules with which to advance a benign internationalised individualism in the form Durkheim envisaged. Neoliberal claims that capitalism will efficiently provide more benefits for the working class than socialism, can be criticised by Durkheim's view that unregulated capitalism benefits the wealthy and is as anomie as the welfare state that completely absorbs the economic sphere of life. Durkheim envisaged a third approach, one that balanced the opposing forces of *homo duplex* in developing diversity and individualism.1243

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Aotearoa/New Zealand, in 1997 was rated the fourth least regulated state in the world. This economic context has been recently and swiftly created by the restructure of numerous and fundamental social, economic and moral institutions, designed in the neo liberal framework. These changes have impacted on the lives of all people within this country and have transformed, and in some cases destroyed the way in which people relate to the world, each other, and themselves. The contention of this approach will be that these changes have recreated similar circumstances that Durkheim critiqued in his time: deregulation and utilitarian-based economics; the promotion of egoistic and anomic desires through increased individuation, competition, marketisation, and; a deepening and cynical approach to the separation of people in society. I am especially interested in cases where these changes relate to the contexts, consumption and potential abuse of alcoholic substances are concerned.

In this respect, I will first focus analysis on economic and other forms of anomie considered as a dereglement of social facts, by way of analysing especially the consumption, sales and advertising of alcoholic products, before relating this Durkheimian position to formal education, a sociology of education related partially by themes that emerge when looking first to alcohol, drugs, economics, politics, research and consumption in the broader context. This country’s social institutions have undergone a number of radical changes and these have been discussed nationally and internationally in academic, and popular media cultures.

Legislation regarding various aspects relevant to alcohol has undergone a number of changes in the last decade. Debates at the time of the changes must be contextualised as part of an environment wherein a number of shifts regarding control and influence were taking place in this country. After years of political control in the hands of the National Party, headed by their charismatic leader Robert Muldoon who managed the economy in a unilateral manner, implementing policies of protectionism and other extreme regulatory measures, the Labour Party elected in 1984 and reelected in 1987 pursued economic and social measures that were part of a freemarket, neoliberal nature. Labour Government reformers sought to free Aotearoa/NZ from the yoke of paternalism it had historically worn. Those late 1980s reformers sought to distinguish this country as mature and innovative, free from the immaturity of its British colonial societal and fortress economic mentalities. The study of the making of alcohol legislation must be situated in this context. Deregulation was (is still at present) one of the catchwords of neoliberalism. Neoliberals adopt a rhetorical perspective of freedom wherein government is a force that often unjustly and unnecessarily intervenes in the personal and public lives of
citizens and consumers. Government regulation is one of the ways in which that intervention takes place. It is not surprising that alcohol legislation became entwined in the zealous reforming mood of politicians at the time. Alcohol, which in this country had a long history of stringent regulations, became another social issue to be dealt with. Deregulation would show that this country could drink responsibly in a manner displayed by other European nations. As Casswell (1992) noted, in the rush toward realising the environment in which this country's drinkers could display their maturity, policy makers initially overlooked public health aspects of reform in favour of their ideological standpoint, as well as that of their socio-economic status, evidenced particularly in legislation that licensed supermarkets to sell wine.

Casswell (1992) believed that philosophically neoliberal central government policy is opposed to that of public health ideology.\textsuperscript{1244}

Legislated taxation on alcohol has been linked to increases decided by general price rises - legislation that has appeared to be partly responsible for reducing alcohol consumption in Aotearoa/NZ.\textsuperscript{1245} There has been suspicion that the alcohol industry has challenged\textsuperscript{1246} the existence of a government quango the Alcohol Liquor Advisory Council (ALAC) established following a 1976 Royal Commission into the Sale of Liquor, dedicated specifically to alcohol issues, and funded directly from alcohol sales taxation, raising approximately $6 million per annum.\textsuperscript{1247}

\textit{Alcohol research into Aotearoa/New Zealand adults}

Social issues related to alcohol use by adults have enquired into socio economic status, gendered, cultural, lifestyle, and group identity, contextual, and historical factors that relate to alcohol use.

Alcohol is the most commonly used recreational drug in this country. In 1990 88\% of respondents, in a telephone response collecting study conducted in Auckland and the Bay of Plenty, had in the previous year used alcohol for recreational purposes, followed by use of the drugs, tobacco (39\%) and cannabis (marijuana) (30\%).\textsuperscript{1248} These statistics put this country's annual consumption of

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alcohol in line with that of Australia and the United States, although lifetime use was 8% higher here than in the United States.\textsuperscript{1249}

Considering alcohol in society from Durkheimian perspectives requires that it should be considered holistically, mindful of the practice of abstinence, and, with regard to other drugs used. For instance of 5,475 people surveyed in 1998, the number of people who reported having not used any drugs, including alcohol, over the last 12 months had increased from 11% to 15% between 1990 and 1998. With regard to multiple drug use 8% of people in 1990 had tried alcohol, cannabis, tobacco and one or more drugs, and that number had increased to 15% in 1998. Additionally, people who had only consumed alcohol dropped from 23% to 19%, and people who had only ever used alcohol and tobacco decreased from 23% to 15%. Those who had imbibed alcohol, tobacco, cannabis and any further drugs in the last year increased from 2% to 5%, in comparing people's reports in 1990 and 1998.\textsuperscript{1250}

New Zealand men on average spend $50 on alcohol per week. In the year ending March 1992 alcohol sales totalled $2.7 billion, or $782 per person.\textsuperscript{1251} Alcohol is implicated in 80% of domestic violence cases, and 60% of fatal car accidents on New Zealand roads have alcohol involved. The economic costs of drinking with regard to absenteeism and lost production have been estimated at $57 million per annum.\textsuperscript{1252} The economic and social costs of harms related to alcohol have been estimated at $2 billion per year. Additional to lowering labour productivity and performance in employment, alcohol and harms are involved in violence and related aggravations, cancers of various sorts, injuries and fatalities.\textsuperscript{1253} These startling statistics have been responded to by some government agencies, as evidenced, for instance, in New Zealand Police policies regarding arrest procedures in domestic violence cases, drink driving campaigns, and legislation regarding server practices and the sale of alcohol to intoxicated persons have been amended.

\textsuperscript{1252} Jones, S. Casswell, S., \& Zhang, J-F. (1995). 'The economic costs of alcohol-related absenteeism and reduced productivity among the working population of New Zealand'. Addiction 90, p.1459.
There has been a decline in the average amounts of alcohol used per person. By 1989 the average litres of absolute alcohol consumed annually was 10.2 litres per person compared to 12.1 in 1978.\textsuperscript{1254} In 1978 measures of death, psychosis and psychiatric admissions related to men and women displayed no major convergences between men and women. At that time, based on self reports, heavy drinkers were of the ratio of three men to one woman.\textsuperscript{1255} However, people's self assessment of their unhappiness with their consumption displayed a twofold increase in people who were drinking more than they were happy with by 1989.\textsuperscript{1256} Field and Casswell (1999) found that more drunkenness was self-reported in 1998 than in 1995, especially by women.\textsuperscript{1257} These are revealing statistics, and of significance from a Durkheimian perspective. Durkheim believed that society expressed its tendencies in conscious and unconscious ways. Although more people claim that they are more unhappy with their drinking than in prior studies, from a Durkheimian perspective it is worth remaining mindful that unhappiness over one's drinking might reflect people's increased generalised and deeper unhappiness with life than that of people in the past. The Auckland study of 1989 was conducted in a period in Aotearoa/NZ history where massive social, economic and political turmoil took place. It is not unreasonable from a Durkheimian view to question the assumption that being unhappy with one's drinking is simply a direct indicator of an increase in alcohol moderation, or temperance thinking as Casswell (1992) for instance assumes. Wette et al.'s (1993) claim that higher price and taxation impacted on consumption levels throughout this period\textsuperscript{1258} perhaps better explains the 'moderation' or 'temperance' thinking of 1989 Auckland drinkers. With a shrinking economy and expendable income at that time threatened by economic recession, it is conceivable that drinkers might well have thought they were drinking more than were happy with. Martin et al.'s (1992) study indicated that frequent drinkers are a section of the population to be concerned about with respect to their comprising the most proportionate group of respondents with alcohol related problems, in that although on average not significantly representative, frequent drinkers contributed the greatest to the total number of alcohol related problems.\textsuperscript{1259} This group's

\textsuperscript{1259} Martin, C., Wyllie, A. & Casswell, S. (1992). 'Types of New Zealand drinkers and their associated alcohol-
consumption level and related problems should be kept in mind when considering some alcoholic drug product labeling and media reporting of the benefits of consuming alcohol, in particular, red wine. The safe level of drinking recommended by ALAC is exactly that of the British Royal Colleges (representing, general practitioners, physicians, and psychiatrists). Women should drink no more than 14 standard drinks in a week, and no more than four on any one occasion. Men should drink no more than 6 drinks on any one occasion no more that 21 drinks a week. Casswell believed those limits ignored the potential harms from consuming to upper recommended drinking limits rather than the benefits of lower limits, which can be as low as one drink every 2 days for consumers seeking the reported coronary benefits of taking alcohol. Casswell (1996) was concerned, about the media presenting inaccuracies, decontextualising consumers’ (mis)interpretations, and, the informational milieu, of media messages in which the upper limit reporting takes place. The high number of problems reported by Martin et al.’s (1992) regular Auckland drinkers need to be considered in this context.

Martin et al. (1992) enquired into respondents’ experiences of problems related to their own and others’ consumption of alcohol. For men, high consumption was related to more problems. For males, high consumption in hotels was an indicator of more problems. However, due to their being the most representative group, infrequent early evening drinkers reported the most problems (26%). In the case of women, young heavy wine or beer consumers reported the most problems, however, in comparison to their male counterparts identified as hotel or tavern drinkers, young heavy wine or beer drinking women experienced problems resulting from other people's consumption rather than their own.

A society’s historical and cultural ideas regarding alcohol consumption should be taken into account when analysing the impact of reported recommended upper limits of consumption. Durkheim argued and explained that societies’ tendencies to express their historically specific sentiments in various ways at

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particular times can be studied by way of their morbid and pathological, changing, emerging and residual historical expression in ideas of various sorts.

In conjunction with these policy and social changes, which certainly give the appearance that New Zealand drinkers are acting more responsibly, statistics regarding alcohol issues can be interrogated from a Durkheimian perspective. In a context where alcohol availability has increased and legislation regarding the broadcast of advertisements for alcohol in the electronic media have been relaxed, first in 1987 and further in 1992, the nature of drinking needs to be considered, as does the type of drinking, what is being drunk and who is doing that drinking.

This study of alcohol in society has a particular focus on the role of education, both where New Zealand schooling is concerned and where other social institutions are involved. This is pursued in the sense advocated by Durkheim wherein 'education', although referring to schooling specifically as Durkheim indeed did, also refers to education in the societal sense. Groups and organisations from various areas of research communities, women's groups and refuges, to medicine, vintners, distillers, brewers and drug educators, to name a few, are involved in a debate concerned with the benefits and drawbacks of alcohol availability and mis/use for society and its individuals. Where society promotes ethics of the market in various sectors of people's lived world, all these practices and group activities can become anomie. A market in information regarding alcohol produces anomie practices in both producer advertising and public health information. Both can be discompassionate, savage and excessively violent.

As a society we are learning something, both from this debate, and, our various experiences of alcohol. These experiences are varied due to cultural, gendered, and economic differences in drinking practices, attitudes and expectations, and these will be reviewed in the present study. However, in the Durkheimian sense there are also commonalities with respect to alcohol use. These commonalities or collective representations are useful to research as they are the exterior or mask for the underlying experiences and nature of alcohol mis/use in this society.

Martin et al. (1992) utilised results of a study into drinking in Auckland mid 1986. Of an original sample of 3,010 participants, excluding 15% who described themselves as non-drinkers (17% women, 13% men), and 22% who had not consumed alcohol in the last week (26% women, 17% men), 1,902 drinkers (906 women and 996 men) were studied by way of face to face and questionnaire inquiries. Drinkers were grouped into gendered clusters (10 for women and 12 for men) according to their drinking style, content, type of product, place of
consumption, duration of drinking period, people accompanying during drinking, age, socioeconomic, family size, marital status and educational qualifications. Participants were also asked to relate (in a yes/no answer form) their experiences of problems encountered as a result of their drinking or another's drinking in the last six months.  

The drinking undertaken in 1986 featured in Martin et al.'s (1992) study of gendered, situational, style, content and frequency of factors. Fifty eight per cent of men's drinking was in the private sphere, 40% partaking in infrequent drinking once to three times that week with an on occasion consumption of 51 mls, consumed and generally representative demographically, in age, occupation and socioeconomic status; 18% frequent early evening drinking usually a with spouse, were mainly over thirty five years of age and from middle to upper socioeconomic status. The remaining forty two per cent of drinkers, clustered into ten different drinking types consumed alcohol in the public sphere.

Seventy per cent of women drinkers consumed alcohol in the private sphere. Fifty four per cent were clustered as infrequent light drinkers, consuming alcohol in their own home with friends and/or a significant other present. On average occasions, infrequent light drinking women consumed 26ml absolute alcohol and were representative of the total sample of women drinkers with respect to age, marital status, socioeconomic status and educational qualifications. Sixteen per cent of female drinkers were clustered as frequent early evening drinkers. Averaging six occasions a week, women in this cluster on average occasions consumed 26ml in the private sphere with their significant other. Mostly non-Polynesian and married, fifty three per cent did not have children living at home. Members of this cluster were representative in educational levels and socioeconomic status, (gauged by the main income earner in the household).

Men's power to change societal practices is related to alcohol and economics. Wette et al. (1993) theorised that beer drinkers, consumers of the greatest amount of the population’s total, when faced with increased taxation, and therefore cost, will drink less, and within their social interactions when drinking, influence their non-beer drinking associates, reducing their consumption as well, an argument that has been applied to tobacco consumption issues as well.

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power to change other people's social habits by example is one powerful social factor influencing drinking, however, Wette et al.'s study relies too much upon econometric assumptions like those which Buchanan's associate Becker made in his theory of rational addiction. Wette et al. implicitly assumed that alcohol reduction can be explained through utility maximisation where the returns from purchasing alcohol for consumption increasingly diminish as a result of increased costs through taxation. What Becker, and, Wette et al. missed is the Durkheimian insight that alcohol consumption can be influenced by *irrational* addiction. Influenced by egoism and anomie, people will either excessively feel life too intensely in the infinity of dreams or exceed themselves in the infinity of desires. In either case the cost of the taxation of alcohol for consumption is not the overriding factor in addiction from a Durkheimian perspective. Drinking with others as influences, cost and addiction cannot be explained by individualist utility maximisations of those in that mathematical morality. The social fact of gender and collective representations of masculinity, and contextualised drinking better explains why men drink to excess.

*Alcohol research into Aotearoa/New Zealand youth*

Research into youth alcohol use in this country has widely studied a number of factors, like: parental and peer influences; prior, use and approval; linking individual's perceptions of advertising depicting alcohol in conjunction with various lifestyle messages; violence, aggression and crime; gender; and culture. These various factors can be interpreted as social facts and collective representations of social change, which raise concerns where alcohol is concerned.

As a general rule, in attempting to predict young people's experimental use of licit and illicit intoxicating substances, the best indicator is the fact that young people are young. U.S. studies predict that only 6% to 10% of adolescents are substance dependant. In most cases, as a World Health Organisation report (1995) argued, adolescent drug use is functional as opposed to pathological or mindless. Western countries have noted a leveling out in adolescent alcohol and tobacco drug use, however, from a public health perspective those drugs still produce the most negative impacts.1269

Youth substance use in this country is similar to that identified in similar OECD countries, where family context, individual personality, substance using peer, varying exposure to substance, and social disadvantage issues were identified as

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influential factors in leading to problem or harmful substance use. Internationally, increased youth homicide and suicide rates have been correlated with substance use.

Fifty per cent of attempted and completed suicides are correlated with alcohol. Of all OECD countries, Aotearoa/New Zealand has had the most youth suicides. 16 in 100,000 people who are youths commit suicide. Langley has argued that knowledge about and prevention of suicide compared to that of, for instance drink driving is scant, citing as an example the massive database that the Land Transport Safety Authority has on drink driving and public monies granted for prevention, contrasted with information and funding regarding suicide.

Some of the research into alcohol and youth in this country, relevant to the present study can be separated into three approaches. One approach to studying consumption is through examining existing statistics on alcohol consumption related issues, another is in the form of the survey, and a third is in the longitudinal study of birth cohorts. Langley et al. (1996) in comparing injury and death rates between various public spheres and the private sphere, discussed their finding that 17% of non-fatal incidents in licensed premises involved people under 20 years of age (at that point the legal age from when people in Aotearoa/NZ could legally consume alcohol).

Another approach is to study consumption by way of survey interviews and questionnaires. Young people in this country (18-19yrs) display some of the highest levels of the population’s alcohol consumption. However, in one phone based study in 1990, fewer 17-18 year olds had never tried alcohol compared to comparative findings from New South Wales in Australia or United States figures. Telephone based survey results need to be considered with caution, however. As Black and Casswell noted for instance, Maori and Pacific Island

people are underrepresented by about 25% in phone surveys,\textsuperscript{1277} an issue that should be applied to socioeconomic status also.

In a snapshot study of 282 University of Canterbury psychology students Hughes (1993) examined the relationship between participants' pursuit of enhanced sensation and tobacco, alcohol and caffeine use. Hughes utilised Zuckerman's (1971) 'Sensation Seeking Scale', which by way of a questionnaire measures participants' motivations which are: thrill and adventure seeking; experience seeking; disinhibition seeking and; susceptibility to boredom.\textsuperscript{1278} Men reported significantly higher consumption - two times than that of women, and, higher thrill and adventure seeking and boredom susceptibility ratings. Both women and men displayed significant relations between alcohol use and their overall Sensation Seeking Scale scores.\textsuperscript{1279} Men's' overall sensation seeking behaviour was more prominent than that of women.\textsuperscript{1280}

Another snapshot study of youth alcohol use was ALAC's (1997) phone survey contracted to the Business Research Centre. Of a total sample of 500 14 to 18 year old participants, 25% had binged on an occasion, by drinking five or more drinks of alcohol in the last two weeks.\textsuperscript{1281} Half of the participants were light drinkers, consuming one to four drinks on the last occasion, were more likely to have consumed at home, and comparatively consumed less often than other drinking participants.\textsuperscript{1282} ALAC (1997) thought that some light drinkers would possibly be at risk of heavier drinking in the future.\textsuperscript{1283} Non drinkers were represented by 20% of the total sample.\textsuperscript{1284}

Heavy drinkers, consuming five or more drinks, composed approximately 30% of the total number of participants. Seventy five per cent of heavy drinkers consumed beer on their last occasion, 30% having consumed spirits, and heavy

drinkers were, compared with light drinkers more likely to have consumed a 'rocket fuel' multi-alcoholic concoction.1285

Half of the heavy drinkers defined themselves as light drinkers. Only one in twenty five youths defined as heavy drinkers thought they were so.1286 Similarly to other studies into drinking, ALAC (1997) found a cluster of heavier drinkers drinking 80% of the alcohol. Slightly over half of the heavy drinkers were male and Maori were slightly overrepresented.1287

Hardly anyone purchased alcohol from cafes, restaurants or supermarkets. Bottle stores were the most popular outlets to purchase alcohol from, as one drinker in nine bought alcohol from those outlets. Only one in twenty five youth participants purchased alcohol from pubs or hotels.1288 Twenty five per cent of heavy drinkers thought they had cut down on their drinking and a third thought they were consuming more than their right amount.1289

Field and Casswell (1999) undertook a national survey on a number of drug issues in this country, with regard to which youth and alcohol gender issues are of relevance. Of the participants aged 18-24 years, half the men consumed six or more drinks per week, compared with a third of the women who consumed at least four drinks per sitting on a weekly footing. Forty per cent of men and almost twenty five per cent of women aged 18-19 years consumed enough alcohol to feel drunk at least once a week. This was part of a general increase in participants' self reported drunkenness.1290

An Auckland Medical School report found that of patients presenting to participant General Practitioners in Auckland between 1995 -1996, sixteen per cent of all patients reported problems with work, friends, family and the law in association with excessive drinking to be defined as alcohol dependent or at risk. Particularly, low socioeconomic male patients aged between 18 and 24 years old were of concern, being the largest number of patients reporting such associations and consumption levels.1291

The increased self-reporting of drunkenness in youths surveyed, could be seen as individual responses to socially based anomie and egoism driving some young people to states of angst and it seems increased alcoholic intoxication, risk taking and stereotypical gendered beliefs with regard to seeking sensation and taking risks.

Young men from low socioeconomic backgrounds are at risk with regard to the impact of social and economic changes, as they are situated historically in a context where permanent or reliable employment in many traditional industries is disappearing. Growing service and tourist industries, although diversifying, are still steeped in representations of femininity – an economic turn in gender and power that contradicts intergenerationally social and class related and transmitted stereotypic gender hierarchical roles. In addition, the present context features an explosion of consumable and technological offerings. But attaining them, for this group of people, is simply unrealistic. In such a context drinking to excess, creating havoc and destruction through rebellion, frustration, anger and depression is not surprising. In fact, a better question to raise might be over why one would not tend to excess when the world seems so limitless yet so unfair and cruel. Anomie and egoism might be formed in this fashion for this particular group of people. Anomie is manifested differently in different people in society.

Snapshot and national surveys and questionnaires are one way in which youth alcohol issues can be studied. However, the snapshot survey and questionnaire approach to research is limited by its inability to explain factors related to alcohol across people's lifespans. Longitudinal research where participants are studied at intervals throughout their lives is an approach that by comparison to random snapshot research, is able to deepen research insights by relating various factors associated with alcohol at different points throughout participants' lifespans.

Connolly et al.'s (1992) study as part of the life-longitudinal research on an original sample of 1661 babies born in Dunedin during 1972, argued that at 15-years, peer company, female peer approval, disposable income, one's own purchasing of alcohol as well as female parental consumption, low socioeconomic status, and the participants' own consumption at nine years was related to increased most recent and/or usual consumption.

That sample of 337 female and 369 male youths, also found that 68 per cent of respondents overall believed they would get drunk again in the future. Low socioeconomic status led to the consumption of greater amounts of alcohol on fewer occasions. Disposable income was also a factor in increasing consumption
levels, even when socioeconomic status adjustments were made. The amount of drinking undertaken by parental mothers was influential, independent of other factors when 15-year-olds were asked if they would get drunk in the future. Individuals’ pre-adolescent drinking was an influential factor in increased adolescent consumption. Adolescents drink more when with peers than with parents, and females had drunk slightly more on recent occasions (18.4ml) than their male counterparts (16.8ml). Participants were more than three times likely to have last consumed alcohol with peers than with adults and more than seven times more likely to have consumed with peers than alone. In addition, the site of drinking on the last occasion was twice as likely to have been at another’s home or another place altogether, than at one’s own home.1292

Durkheim’s beliefs about societal exposure, habit, sentiment and ethicality can be related to Connolly et al.’s research. Mother’s approval and one’s own drinking at nine, points to issues regarding habits and ethical understandings regarding the consumption of alcohol. Sentiment is apparent in the form of female peer approval reflecting a cultural practice regarding mother and wife (girlfriend or young lover for heterosexual male youths in that study) as the keeper of morality, the taming of dangerous instincts, outbursts, excesses and violence of men. Women have been constructed as temperance seekers and this collective representation can be seen in youth drinking, even if females were more likely to have consumed more than males on the last drinking occasion. What is possibly obscured in this research is the codependence of female peers and mothers. Temperate drinking males could be at the expense of codependent women who give excessively of themselves, seeking to control the drinking and behaviours of men. Codependence there might involve, for instance female peers who spend their time, energy and emotions attempting to connect with male significant peer others, but due to a patriarchal culture attempt to make those connections in maladaptive ways.

Fergusson et al. (1996) studied the links between alcohol misuse and juvenile offending at the ages of 15 and 16 years in 953 participants in a longitudinal study of an original 1265 participants born in Christchurch mid-1977. Rather than a strong causal association between alcohol misuse and juvenile violent and property offences, Fergusson et al. (1996) argued that gender, family social position, childhood disadvantage, family history of alcohol and drug abuse, participant IQ, 

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delinquent peers, early conduct and alcohol use were variously influential. Information was supplied by self report and parents.

Overall, 12.8% of participants committed property offences, 7.2% of participants were classified as violent offenders and 8.3% of participants were identified as hazardous or abusive drinkers. 18.4% had family histories of alcohol and drug abuse, 24.2% of parents used illicit drugs and 37.2% of parents smoked tobacco.\textsuperscript{1293}

With regard to gender, females who misused alcohol were 5.7 to 12 times more likely to offend and males were 5.7 to 5.9 times more likely to offend than participants who did not misuse alcohol. Alcohol misusing males, in a small but significant way, were more likely than females to commit violent offences.\textsuperscript{1294}

Associations regarding the family were evident in socially disadvantaged adolescents being more likely to misuse alcohol and commit violent and property offences. Also, family adversity, family history of alcohol and drug abuse were also associated with these offences. Parental tobacco and illicit drug use were significantly associated with offending but not with alcohol misuse.\textsuperscript{1295}

Regarding individual characteristics, there was more juvenile offending and alcohol misuse noted where participants exhibited early conduct problems, were more offending when aged fifteen years and where they had started drinking at an early age. Lower IQ and more offending were associated with more offending, and there were fair indicators that where peers were delinquent, participants misused alcohol and committed more offences.\textsuperscript{1296}

Fergusson et al.'s (1996) study displays that alcohol and offending is a socially caused phenomenon as participants' misuse of alcohol was not directly a cause for offending. Alcohol is in this way not involved as a direct causal reason for offending, it is rather imbedded in a social context that produces both alcohol misuse and juvenile offending. Additionally, a number of these factors are relevant to issues of socioeconomics. Fergusson et al.'s (1996) research could be further cross referenced for gender, class and ethnicity where participants' social embeddedness is concerned. Successive birth cohort studies would study changes in these patterns historically and geographically.

Longitudinal studies like that into the Christchurch participants born in mid-1977 should also seek to explain both the intricacies of the specific contexts in which youth drinking, and, the wider social context in which participants are situated. Focusing on family background without reference to the changed context due to economic restructuring that impacts upon families who might exhibit what would could be considered dysfunctional use of intoxicating substances, only provides a part of the picture. Describing families as dysfunctional individualises the case. What is missing in such analyses is a full account of the maladaptive society that causes dysfunction at the familial level. Mestrovic commented on poorly integrating groups as an issue of quality, not quantity where the degree to which a group attains homeostasis depends on the homeostasis of society. When societal homeostasis is upset, such as when neoliberal policies are instituted, the homeostasis of societal groups are upset.

Fergusson et al. (1995) studied 16 year olds inquiring into the spectrum of practices composed of regularity of drinking, amount consumed on occasion, bingeing within three months or experiencing five or more alcohol related problems, indicating that 7% to 10% of the participants were problem drinkers. Indicators were that heavy drinking at 14 years, parental change, parental drinking and social disadvantage were associated with participants' likelihood that they might affiliate with substance users. Risk factors found to be related to alcohol abuse at 16 year olds were affiliations with substance abusers at 15 years, gender as male and the amount consumed at 14 years.

In a later analysis of this particular 15-16 year old sample of the Christchurch cohort, Fergusson and Lynskey (1996) studied the links between alcohol misuse and sexual activity and risk taking, finding gendered, contraceptive and sexual health, early sexual activity, family social positioning and adversity as well as delinquent peer and novelty seeking behaviours as being influential. Here too, a direct causal relationship between alcohol misuse and sexual risk taking was rejected overall. With respect to gender, early sexual activity in females was associated with alcohol misuse for girls, while unprotected intercourse was related to alcohol abuse in males.

When considered from a Durkheimian perspective the females’ early sexual activity could be seen as an attempt to connect with others in a world that promotes women's romantic love, significations of maturity and femininity which can lead to a life of excessive giving of self for others. For the males, who entered into unprotected sex (which means that their partners were also unprotected) they too seek to attain a gendered identity that reflects relations, significations and power. Unprotected sex by young males can be seen as a form of deranged belief in one's grappling with danger yet seeking to be embraced, subduing women the other, believing that one can be in control.

Fergusson and Lynskey (1996) argued that one problem or risk factor is a good indicator that individuals might also have other problems or factors as well, advocating for the recognition of a number of social factors that should be addressed in conjunction with alcohol misuse and sexual risk taking when considering the treatment of various adolescent problems.1301

This is an insightful and holistic approach to take in viewing young alcohol abusers, but again, from a Durkheimian perspective, sexual risk taking and alcohol misuse takes place in a particular, and for the Christchurch participants a changing, social context throughout life’s pathway. Although Fergusson and Lynskey (1996) noted the importance of being mindful of social factors in relation to adolescent alcohol misuse and sexual activity and risk taking, Fergusson and Lynsky (1996) do not explain or relate the social context in which the Christchurch participants are embedded. An account and critique of the neoliberal context these adolescents have spent their life's learning in, would give their results more meaning. Family histories of childhood adversity, social position, novelty seeking, and risky activities are all goings on which take place in the contemporary context which promotes the ideas of a culture with more apparent societal ethics of risk and expediency, excess and an early entry into the public sphere of economics where adolescents are concerned. In this context where students and youths are faced with decreased future opportunities in even the most privileged socioeconomic contexts, the anomie in society will affect all participants in various ways. It is not the case that present studies into youth and alcohol are wrong, it is rather a situation where researchers fail to relate their findings sufficiently to the social context. Findings are presently presented in an ahistorical and largely asocial way, as researchers fail to critically contextualise their studies by reference to a social theory. An anomie context is

going to construct environments that increase the risk factors and risk taking in adolescents.

**Implications**

There are a diverse range of factors that relate to alcohol use and alcohol related problems in adults and youth, and correlations can be made between different factors. To examine these factors from Durkheimian perspectives, they need to be contextualised within a macrosocial context of change. The use of intoxicating commodities by youths and adults is part of a social, cultural and gendered context affected by economics and politics. Issues of relations, significations, and power within which alcohol other substance use, as well as risk taking takes place need to be considered in this regard. Without looking to context, extra-individual influences of alcohol use can be overlooked and individual psychological explanations can be emphasised. Alcohol studies researchers often overlook the impact of social and economic change on research participants. It can sometimes appear as if participants’ lives are lived in some sort of social vacuum. There have been massive changes in this country, which have taken place throughout the period in which most consumption research examined and discussed herein was conducted. Neoliberalism has been an important influence impacting on people in society. The factors noted above need to be considered in that context. There are other factors that need to be taken into consideration when relating alcohol and neoliberalism, and those the factors of structures, significations and relations with regard to the marketing of alcoholic drug products.
Alcohol advertising

The context

Alcohol educational philosophy, policy, curriculum, contexts, imperatives, pedagogies and programmes must take into consideration the importance and influence of alcohol advertising within the social, political, cultural and economic context. That is not to say that schools should be, or are the only organisation to be responsible for protecting against excesses in advertising. With this in mind, issues related to broadcasting rules and regulations will be looked into. Lessening the damages from alcohol cannot be realised in education unless there is a thoroughgoing inquiry into and confronting of the elements within society that create a climate wherein such behaviour is contemplated and tolerated. Without such inquiries the barbaric activities that often precede, accompany or follow people's misuse of alcohol will either be retained or be deflected onto other individuals and social practices.

The media have become a powerful source of informal alcohol education information. This study accepts media information as education, not in the formal sense of schooling, but where schooling's relevance to students is concerned, the information that children and adults deal with in their daily lives. This media material is hence relevant to education as persons' acceptance, rejection or indifference to advertising of alcoholic drug products must be considered in the context of the representations which advertising promotes and its use of salient features in culture which might be highly, relevant, meaningful and desirable in their lives. For instance, in the case of school students, formal schooling, public health information advertisements and those for alcoholic drug products and producers are often experienced concomitantly in the space of perhaps a day wherein particularly adolescent students might also be considering relevant issues like partying, sport, group acceptance and sexual identity, as well as lifestyle and gender issues.

I am interested in exploring the social and educational ramifications of considering research into the wider contextual influence of alcohol advertising in the media on people's associations between imagery and alcohol. From a Durkheimian perspective, broadcast advertising of alcoholic drug product brands and alcohol producing companies utilise collective representations relating them to alcohol for economic profit. This can be interpreted as an attempt to reformulate concepts of drinking by making company product more desirable than that of competitor products. Industry representatives argue that their interest is not in increasing consumption, but in convincing consumers to change to their brand.1302 Each

1302. Morrinson, B. (director) & Grieve, W. (producer), (1994). Booze Culture. interviewed Brian Blake,
marketeer in seeking to stand out from their competitors seeks to invest in the production of more eye, mind and heart catching advertisements to encourage brand allegiance or swapping. This has led to a proliferation of alcohol advertisements. The opportunities for people to think about consuming alcohol are increased in this context when alcohol use representations in advertisements are interpreted as related to economics, masculinity, femininity, class, ethnicity, and cultural icons.

The issue of whether alcohol advertising results in increased consumption levels is a very controversial issue. The Durkheimian position adopted for present purposes leads to an alignment with the public health movement viewing alcoholic drug product advertising as socially and individually dangerous where unsafe consumption, as well as related detriments are concerned.

Dominion Breweries and Steinlager Limited in supporting the national rugby team the All Blacks launched major television advertisement programmes that worked around legislation banning televised alcohol advertising on public health grounds. The campaigns were legal as, Dominion Breweries ostensibly was advertising the company by way of the use of one of its brands' symbols, that of DB beer and under the registered name Steinlager Limited, New Zealand Breweries, who manufacture the beer Steinlager were each allowed to have their advertisements broadcast.

Casswell (1995) noted that Aotearoa/New Zealand has seen a movement towards adopting freemarket ideologically driven economic and social policies. In the context created by a then concomitant economic recession, the deregulation of the media broadcasting industry changing the situation from one where State only broadcasters who had a monopoly on broadcasting, were faced with new competition from broadcasters completely funded through advertising revenue, increased pressures were exerted on broadcasters seeking innovative ways to source more revenue. Pursuing reductions in barriers to alcoholic drug product advertising served the economic needs of broadcasters, advertisers, vintners, brewers and sports groups. Perhaps it is not surprising given the revenues at stake...

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that as Thomson et al. pointed out, in addition to government funding of $2 million in 1991, when the advertising policies came into practice in 1992\textsuperscript{1307} broadcasters contributed $2 million to public information programmes. Those policy changes followed earlier legislative changes regarding licensing, opened up the media to having more freedom to advertise alcoholic drug product brands after 9 pm and before 6 am. This led to a fourfold increase in alcoholic drug product advertising spending on television.\textsuperscript{1308} Over twenty times as much money was spent on alcoholic drug product compared to alcohol and public health advertising in 1995.\textsuperscript{1309} An ALAC telephone study inquiring into 249 Christchurch people's knowledge of safe levels of drinking found that a 17\% of (181) participants, equally represented with regard to gender, had heard of ALAC guidelines. Public health promoters are in a double bind with regard to promoting safe levels of drinking, in that promoting safe levels can lead to raised drinking levels as light drinkers may increase their consumption.\textsuperscript{1310} Research undertaken by Alcohol and Public Health Research Unit (situated within the University of Auckland’s School of Medicine, hereafter APHRU) prior to the changes in broadcasting rules\textsuperscript{1311} displayed that people who had been exposed to moderation messages, were more supportive of moderation than those not exposed to those messages. That research indicated that in an environment where no alcohol advertising is allowed, public health messages have an effect on people's temperance where alcohol is concerned. However, evidence for advertising as having a negative effect on public health and therefore warranting more legislative regulation has been inconsistent.\textsuperscript{1312}

Casswell (1995) noted inconsistencies in and personally rejected as simplistic econometric studies for being methodologically problematic and often without revealing significant or consistent results where advertising and consumption are concerned. Those econometric approaches, Casswell argued in citing Saffer (in press at the time), tended to assume that producer expenditure on advertising was an approximate measure of people's experience of alcoholic drug product advertising, and could be therefore reliably correlated with overall

\textsuperscript{1311} Casswell, S. (1995). 'Does alcohol advertising have an impact on the public health?'. Drug and Alcohol Review, 14, p.401 cited Casswell; Gillmore; Maguire; Ransom (1989)
population consumption levels - a flawed measure for Casswell, when it is considered that consumption correlations with expenditure can display the case of diminishing marginal returns from expenditure on advertising relative to consumption. Massive increased or reduced changes in expenditure are required to determine the accuracy of econometric approaches. Studies, as Casswell pointed out have not all been conclusive on this point. Thompson et al. (1994) believed that this was an important factor in the BSA’s decision not to maintain alcohol advertising bans.

Casswell believed that studies considering consumption and advertising issues over time reveal another perspective on this issue. Saffer (in press) examined 17 countries over 14 years and found that where bans have been imposed on advertising significant decreases in alcohol consumption and related car accident rates accrued.

Positivistic explanations, whether economistic or longitudinal, do not seem to provide answers to the question of whether alcohol advertising and harms are causal or closely related. Positivistic approaches seek to operationalise a theory and apply it repetitively to establish reliability. Mestrovic claimed that Durkheim was anti-positivistic with regard to Durkheim’s reference to ‘one good experiment’ revealing the unconscious and social facts. That approach might better explain alcohol advertising situated in a social context soaked in markets, choice and utility through neoliberalism.

Advertising for alcohol products becomes one of a number of images in the over-advertised television media in this country. Remain mindful that this country has, at certain times over the last decade had the highest number of advertisement minutes per free to air network broadcast hours in the world. Accepting the argument that inconclusive links between advertising and increased consumption justifies fewer limits on advertisements would, I believe, be a mistake. A number of studies are based in the laboratory, on selected populations, fail qualitatively and do not provide natural settings for their contextualisation. Studies like those undertaken by APHRU avoid many of these problems and provide more interesting material for analysis from a Durkheimian perspective.

Alcohol advertisements can have vast amounts spent on them when compared to the budgets available for health promotion advertising, creating what

Wallack (1983) called a "hostile environment" with respect to informal alcohol education. Enormous amounts of money are spent by producers to advertising interests who utilise various professionals, some psychologically trained, to think of innovative ways of presenting alcoholic drugs on broadcast media so that they are attractive relevant and desirable products to purchase.

In 1992 Casswell anticipated that there was little likelihood that legislative control on advertising would be forthcoming. That prediction has proved to be the case.

**Alcohol advertising: Gender and culture in Aotearoa/New Zealand**

In this country, one organisation stands out for its ongoing interrogation of the context and impact of alcohol advertising is the APHRU. APHRU have studied the impact of alcoholic drug product advertising particularly since a point in 1987 when the major brewers started their television advertisement programmes.

Wyllie et al. (1989) found among other things that of 9-14 year old males interviewed in a telephone survey of 302 participants randomly selected, 84% had seen the Dominion Breweries advertisement that depicted a dramatic scene set in this country's frontier history where a wagon nearly falls as it crosses a bridge on television. Forty three per cent of participants realised it was a beer or the DB brand advertisement, and 62% thought it advocated beer drinking. When asked, 45% of participants thought that the advertisement would appeal to people who enjoyed physical hardness, outdoors and energetic activities.

Eighty four per cent of the participants Wyllie et al. (1989) interviewed had seen the Steinlager Limited sponsorship of the All Blacks advertisement. That advertisement portrayed a series of action scenes of rugby players hot and sweating. Some shots were in slow motion. Some shots were darkly lit, as if it were the evening. The music to the song 'Stand by me' played in the background. The Steinlager name was depicted on the rugby ball and was shown at the end of the advertisement. A strong theme of patriotism was evident in the advertisement with an appeal to stand by the All Blacks, as the manufacturers were. No beer was depicted as being consumed in the advertisement.

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In another study Wyllie, Zhang and Casswell (1994) found that 25% of male respondents at least occasionally felt like getting up and having a drink after watching alcoholic drug advertising on television. Casswell (1995) cited Wyllie et al.'s (1994) finding that young adults who liked alcohol advertising also consumed alcohol more often and reported more alcohol-related problems.

Casswell noted the wider social contextual climate with respect to alcohol is affected by alcoholic drug advertisements, arguing with reference to Miliou’s (1986) argument that television is part of a process that legitimates public issues. In relation to this issue Casswell cited some recent television advertisements wherein the alcoholic drug beer is related to the founding of NZ as a nation, linking its production to Captain J Cook, wheat growing and harvest, as Aotearoa/New Zealand nationalism.

These are the deeper sociological elements that advertising both taps into and expresses. Although difficult to operationalise and measure, the sorts of things Durkheim was arguing for and was analysing are still relevant today in the context of linking alcohol advertising and consumption. Advertising can reflect collective effervescence and malaise. Partying, pubbing, sports and rock concert event going are some examples of the effervescence in some advertising.

APHRU have qualitatively studied (12-13 and 15-16 year old) young people's responses to alcohol advertisements. Casswell reported on Maori and Samoan respondents’ comments on a Coruba Rum advertisement where an animated Coruba bottle distorts, and, transforms into musical instruments. The respondents got a message that Coruba meant having a good time; was produced for partying; makes people happy and have a good time; made one feel like wanting to get drunk; looked yummy; in the advertisement, had a good song and a dancing bottle, and; looked like something participants hoped their parents would buy that evening. Casswell pondered on the implications of that advertisement when considered in light of the impact of competing educational messages about alcohol.
The children participants reflect the collective elements of having fun and partying conveyed in the Coruba advertisement. Advertising is a social fact in modern life. People do have free will and are not automatons blindly accepting media messages. Children, however, are not all or always able to discern in the way adults are able to more often do. Advertising influences people, it might not determine people's choices but picks up consciously and unconsciously on societal ideas and sentiments. The children and youths' responses to the advertisements are telling with respect to these social facts and collective representations.

The target group of most beer advertising, Casswell (1992) maintained, is middle and lower socio-economic group men. Wylie and Casswell (1987) examined this issue with respect to men's feelings of self esteem, wherein group acceptance in association with drinking alcohol boosted participants' perception of their self worth. Wyllie and Casswell (1989) found that in 1988 there was a cluster of 20% of male drinkers who consumed more than 33% of the total alcohol in that study. Half of those men were single, they tended to support lower pricing and freer availability of alcohol and believed that drinking alcohol made it easier to talk to people. Alcohol, and for this group of men, in particular, beer, becomes linked with associated masculine ideas. Through targeted advertisements, alcoholic drug producers can capitalise on group beliefs about appropriate or ideal images of selfhood, as macho, tough and masculine kiwi jokers, powerful collective representations of masculinity in this country, from a Durkheimian perspective. Advertising can in this way be considered as one of the wider social factors relevant to alcohol and Durkheim.

Myths in culture regarding taking risks, frontier society and physical endurance are applied by advertisers in constructing advertisements to boost alcoholic drug sales. Postemotional sentiments are utilised by the electronic media to advertise for alcoholic drug products.

A Bernadino wine advertisement depicted a group of women at a cafe who drink Bernadino following one of the women having announced that she was getting married. Responses by participants involved statements like: “Happy elation.

Really bouncy and exciting" from a pakeha woman in the 18-29 year old range; “At parties or special occasions people tend to drink more . . . or faster . . . it's what happens . . . it's expected . . .” by a Maori woman in the 18-29 year old age bracket; “You just think, I want some of that now” by a 12-13 year old Maori girl.1330

A Coruba Jamaican rum advertisement depicted animated musical instruments, tropical palm trees and a rum bottle set to music and lyrics. Participants responded with statements like: “That makes you feel good when you drink it. Fun to drink, gets you into a funky kind of mood" by an older Samoan girl in the 18-29 year old range; “I feel like drinking it and getting drunk . . . it looks nice and yummy to me” by a 12-13 year old Samoan girl.1331

Thomson et al. (1994) assigned trained and experienced film and advertising industry people to analyse 1992/3 alcohol advertisements. Lion Red sponsorship advertisements were classified by those industry observers as aggressive, macho, portraying a life of hard knocks and editing that emphasised, repetitive, tribal beats and warring rhythms.1332

For instance, a Lion Red advertisement featuring a pub talent quest purported mateship and group involvement of whole bars occupants who eventually rejected all competing alcohol products: "Red blooded, blood brothers. It's the only drink we drink around here mate!"; where everyone became one of the 'boys' - even the women.1333

Another advertisement studied was one for Dominion Breweries brand DB Bitter that depicted imagery of a pakeha man who having been 'away' somewhere, entered public bar thick with an aggressive atmosphere as well as dark lighting and entered into an interaction that appears to be leading to his physically fighting with a Maori male patron. The pakeha man drinks some DB Bitter then says: "Told you I'd come back" diffusing the tension and establishing mateship between the two characters. One advertising industry analyst believed this implied that the beer was the foundation of their friendship. Another DB Bitter advertisement featured some of the same (mainly Maori and Polynesian) characters transforming a "yuppie" bar into a working -class public bar. The advertisement’s conclusion features the

implied damaging of a Porshce car with a chainsaw as it blocked the delivery of DB beer to the pub (justifying the symbolic destruction of a person from a different social group’s private property). Casswell (1995) cited Wyllie and Casswell's (1992) claim that low socio-economic status (or class) men sometimes cement their relationships through an affinity with one brand of alcoholic drugs. Casswell and Zhang (1998) noted that alcoholic drug industry leaders realise the importance of the link between consumers’ brand allegiance and sales. Tough, hard, macho men and mateship through drinking in groups of men is a feature of beer advertising directed at young men. Sally Casswell has argued that rugby, racing and beer is still a part of culture wherein heavy drinking is still very acceptable.

These advertisements are very reminiscent of Mestrovic's claims that advertisers have changed their targeting where niche markets, localised communities are concerned. The DB Bitter advertisements can be interpreted, from a Durkheimian perspective, to do just that. The macho men are played off against each other, the working class is pitted against the middle class 'yuppies'. Violence and masculinity looms over the advertisement given its being set in a darkened bar scene, thick with intercultural and interclass tension. The DB Bitter advertisements are very postemotional. They seek to evoke, and manipulate the emotions of viewers. The images in the DB Bitter advertisements can be interpreted as pathologising Maori, Pacific Island and working class men as violent. The advertisements are significations or representations that are part of the way in which people's subjectivities are established. Alcoholic drug producers, manipulate drinkers from various sectors of society to see and feel certain things by way of portrayals in advertisements.

Casswell (1995) noted a communication expert’s comment that alcohol advertisements show people who drink as winners and where health promotion advertising by comparison say its not good to drink too much there is a really problematic situation of choice set up for the teenager with an identity crisis. Alcoholic drug product advertisements are notable for their failure to inform of

possible adverse consequences of drinking alcohol. The violence and injury, long and short term morbidity and death, of excessively consuming individuals and others within their social context is completely ignored in alcohol advertising. Alcohol advertising like that of the DB beer advertisement instead create a series of images where working class macho pakeha, Maori and Pacific Island men are depicted as interacting in physically threatening, violent, and aggressive ways to each other, and with regard to others. Those demeanours, habits and place are portrayed as completely compatible with the control held and resolutions made by the characters in these depictions. The possible violent, aggressive and antagonistic results of approaching others in the way the DB beer advertisement depicts characters doing is completely disregarded. Masculinity, class, and ethnic social factors and societal collective representations are utilised repackaged postemotional dead memories broadcast on free to air electronic media.

Casswell (1995) noted that in Thomson et al.'s (1994) study, recovering alcoholic participants interviewed about their responses to advertising reported that they felt that advertisements had impeded their recovery and felt, socially left out and alienated, reminded of what was now missed in their lives, and that the advertisements were an imposition into their home environment where they used to drink, and where, other than having electronic media images flooding in, now, have alcohol banned. The recovering alcoholic participants found the advertisements made the idea of drinking again very tempting, making them consider that they could perhaps have a drink without harm.

Recovering and in treatment alcoholics can, from a Durkheimian perspective be interpreted as anomies in society, having sought the infinite, soaring in their pursuit of more and more alcohol, disregarding everything and everyone else, and to have fallen so far, alcoholics are people hypersensitised and hyposensitised to living, life, and themselves. Anomies can tell society a lot about itself as they specifically feel its effects so much more than others generally do. This does not mean alcoholics should be held in disregard. Alcoholics must be treated with great respect and compassion. The intensity of suffering with which anomies have experienced life must be held in this regard. Douglas Myers argued that alcohol has a positive and a negative side and that society has to deal with those issues.

It is hard not to be struck by the intensity of emotions expressed in Thomson et al.’s (1997) quotations of the accounts of alcoholic participants’ responses to alcohol advertising. Participants reported their responses to spirits, beer and wine advertisements, in seeing them variously as: appealing (in making alcohol appear “exotic”, and “a journey of fantasy”, as well as “illicit”); creating strong feelings (in being “clever, alluring, romantic, potentially dangerous. I'm part won over, part angry”); excluding (by promoting the idea that: “Drinking is a social norm; so if you abstain there's something wrong with you - or so the ads are meant to make you feel”); communicated through the powerful medium of the television (and therefore experienced as “more sensory. You can't dismiss it. Your attention is drawn {as a member of} . . . a captive audience”); intrusive (a participant stating: “I have a rule that no alcohol comes into my home, yet I have to watch people in ads drink in my home”); misleading (because: “They don't show anyone vomiting in a corner or falling over”); impacting on their desired recovery (because: “Ads do trigger old feelings”), and; contributing to their failure to maintain abstinence unless counteracted by a supportive treatment programme (one participant stating: “I relapsed without treatment. TV ads weakened my resolve”).

Recovering alcoholics, considered from a Durkheimian perspective, despite undoubtably having other particular circumstances in their lives swaying them towards reconsidering their sobriety, reported to Thomson et al. how threatening alcoholic drug advertising was. They also reported how enticing, desirous and dangerous those advertisements were for them. Durkheim claimed that anomies felt life more intensely than others. Recovering alcoholics are a rich source for interpreting feelings, sentiments, habits and tendencies in society that many people might not consciously be aware of but nonetheless are subject to in a neoliberal context partially fostered by and reflected in postemotional alcohol advertising.

Connell’s perspective has been applied to studies in this country with regard to masculinity, alcohol advertising, and gendered drinking.

Campbell et al. (1999) argued that a context of changed alcohol advertising and opening hours legislation had changed the way alcohol is experienced in life, and has broken down the separation of alcohol in place and time. Campbell et al. (1999) argued that despite the fact male rites of passage binge drinking, and male dominated pub drinking continues, cafe, restaurant and wine drinking has

increased. Beer producers have responded by building cultural and social archetypes of masculinity into their advertisements. Beer drinking in this regard, Campbell et al. argued, has changed into something that is also just as much a matter of 'images',\(^\text{1344}\) where advertisements that project particular views of what beer should be associated with, as it is a matter of consumption. Advertising adds another and new layer of complexity to 'the body-reflexive of drinking',\(^\text{1345}\) and where additionally as Star (1993) put it there, in semiotic terms, for instance, Lion Breweries cashed in on hypermasculinity in sponsoring the All Blacks rugby football team.\(^\text{1346}\) From a neo-Marxist position, Bassett (1987) saw the ideology of competitive individualism as maintained and reflected in televised cricket where viewers are connected to, for instance bowlers who are portrayed as involved in a macho battle with batsmen by way of shots of the players, flipped to shots of the crowd, and where nationalism, loyalty and the State are mixed with commercial interests and advertising,\(^\text{1347}\) alcohol industry ones among them.

The postemotional concept is thoroughly relevant here, where brewers evoke feelings, and ideas, appealing to, great sentiments such as pride, teamwork battling, triumph and support which are really about masculinity, nationalism, physical hardness, competition, individualism, peer contexts, and especially, the emotions. Alcohol advertising is a synthetic, copied, dead memory, post-memory, post-other-directed, Balkanised example of postemotional society.

Advertising is synthetic, by creating a false sense of community and teamship to make economic profit, promoting professionalised sport through the multinational media. Advertising connected with sport fosters alcoholic drug industry interests who use sports events to manipulate people's emotions.

Advertising when coupled with sport, copies images of battles, conquests and losses through editing and references to former or present controversies, or debates. Advertising involves evoking dead memories of former sport achievements and failures, using them in the present to provide people with an intense emotional experience associated with drinking alcohol. Alcohol advertising related to sport evokes emotional post-memories of events and traditions which the viewing individual or group has not experienced themselves but is invited to associate with as part of their identity, which is shaped and used for the purposes of


economic profit by producers seeking to link viewers' emotionality regarding drinking with their taking in the emotional experience of witnessing the sporting event. Advertising works on the post-other-directed peer group by aligning team support with alcohol branding or consumption generally, wherein the group member or supporter is encouraged to drink the similar brand or alcohol itself as part of supporting a team or following the sport. Advertising also involves Balkanisation of supporters against rival supporters, brand allegiance, women and men.

Campbell et al. (1999) also argued that alcohol advertising changes the way alcohol is viewed and experienced, as advertisements can be viewed in numerous locations at many times of the day as part of a context which features a breakdown in 'time and space', as satellite fed sporting events are viewed in bars and homes. The viewed events are sourced from international sites with different economies, markets, and advertising that accompanies them.

Campbell et al.'s conclusion was that masculinity and beer have come to be involved in a complex relationship contemporarily, due to the mixture of particular historic conditions where powerful brewing companies, and changing social and economic conditions are concerned. Through the use of the media, alcoholic producers whilst seeking to brew and promote boutique brands have also invested other particular beer brands with socially iconic important images, to maintain a hegemonic form of masculinity associated with beer drinking in this country. From Mestrovic's perspective these are postemotionally centred.

The histories, memories and emotions appealed to differ with regard to advertisements targeted at men and women. Advertisements directed at men play on dead memories of nationalism, physical hardness, outdoors pursuits, male exclusivity, aggression and other aspects to masculinity. Dead memories, histories and emotions are evoked to reinstitute traditional forms of masculinity in a repackaged form. The basic tenets of stereotypical male identity remain. The power of those stereotypes is arguably intensified by advertising that appeals to strongly held emotional appeals like the national sport of rugby as well as heavy and intense musical rhythms and chants. In the case of male target audiences, advertisers exploit dead memories and revise history to reinstitute traditional masculinity.

With regard to women, advertisements manipulate memories and history utilising notions of women's liberation and freedom from tradition. The traditions

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from much earlier historical periods like the formation of this country as a European
dominated nation, and colonial outpost will not do in the search to convince women
to drink as women’s’ drinking was not encouraged at those times. Rather, alcoholic
drug producers draw upon emotions from more recent historical facts which are
amenable to being applied to advertising by depicting women as breaking out from
being quiet, sexually prudent, as well as conservative and temperate where alcohol
is concerned. Such themes in advertising targeting women draw on dead memories
and revisions of history to manipulate viewers to regard alcoholic products as the
way in which to become more liberated and free whilst retaining one’s femininity or
womanhood.

Alcohol advertising in this way contributes to the maintenance of societally
normative emotions with regard to gender. Men, faced with a changing
environment with regard to social and economic conditions are offered a withdrawal
and escape route into an overladen concept of masculinity that seeks to get so
much from so little, and similarly women are offered revolt and liberation by way of
what in fact could contradictorily be the actually disempowering effect of the
consumption of alcohol, given the endurance of negative attitudes towards women's
advancement, the case in fact where employment is concerned, as well as the
sexualisation of women for men's consumption.

It is not good enough to assume, as some versions of postmodernism
might, that women’s drinking and depictions of drinking are counter-hegemonic,
forms of resistance and plays upon discourses of the traditional and stereotypical
when compared to male depictions for instance. Rather, depictions of each gender
in advertising utilise a cynical, postemotional ideology which reworks history,
memories and emotions to offer authenticity when in fact the depictions run counter
to what might be real societal authenticity where men's and women's contributions
to the non-stereotypical and equality are concerned.

argued by way of the theories of Baudrillard and Christopher Lasch that this country
has experienced a thorough going change in the way that advertising and
sponsorship in the electronic media is involved in re-presenting the reality of history
by its depictions in the present.

Gordon Campbell has called 'marketing the memories' (NZ Listener, August 20, 1988) in a phrase that recalls Lasch's concern for the fact that nostalgia has become a marketable commodity. . . emphasizing that 'the market' must create the illusion of a shared past, since only when nostalgia is enshrined as a community of shared values can it function as a marketing tool.1351

Peters and Marshall (1996) went on to comment on changes to public broadcasting in this country where company and corporate sponsorship of television programmes has become 'thinly disguised'1352 advertising, for instance noting Mobil Oil Company's sponsorship of 'Te Maori' and 'Masterpiece Theatre', incidentally with regard to the present study, this latter programming time slot was subsequently renamed 'Montana Sunday Theatre', Montana being primarily a vintnering corporation. The problem with Peters and Marshall's analysis of the representing of history by way of the electronic media is that it is based on a curious, but ultimately undermining use of Baudrillard and Lasch. Mestrovic has criticised Baudrillard as the postmodernist par excellence. The negative interpretation of the postmodern made by Mestrovic has been critiqued herein, given that there are other forms of postmodernism that Mestrovic overlooks. Baudrillard can, however, be interpreted as a textual idealist. Peters and Marshall's other philosophical tool for studying the media was Lasch, whom Mestrovic, to reiterate, has critiqued as neoconservative, rather than New Left. On this conclusion, I concur with Mestrovic. It is Peters and Marshall's problematic mix of textual idealism and neoconservatism to study 'the children of Rogernomics' that is problematic, rather than the import of their statements. The relation of 'Rogernomics' - a term that refers to the neoliberal economic policies instituted by the fourth Labour government, whose Minister of Finance through much of the 1984-1990 period was Roger Douglas (and who subsequently formed the small but influential neoliberal political party, The Association of Consumers and Taxpayers {ACT}), to the social construction of the self, assisted by information technology is pertinent. Youths of today have been constructed in a context created by Rogernomics and media deregulation has been a feature of that neoliberal restructuring. That restructuring has effected culture.

But utilising Lasch and Baudrillard to analyse the case was a mistake, and a breach in an otherwise excellent (1996) collection of essays. In that breach postemotionalism is better for explaining the case of media manipulations of memories and self.

Implications

The children of Rogernomics have been raised on a largely televised diet of, among other presentations, advertisements that rework history for present purposes of profit and control. The children of Rogernomics have post-memories, partially instilled through advertisements that seek to create an emotional experience that relates to gender, culture and class. Alcohol is marketed by this postemotional approach. History is used in this processing and mechanisation of the emotions. In advertising the children of Rogernomics learn of history *status nascendi*. Alcohol advertising is anomic and egoistic, it manipulates people's emotions, and it obscures the harms caused by alcohol in society, by presenting alcohol variously as fun, masculine, feminine, class orientated, and linked to history and sport.
A Durkheimian critical evaluation of alcohol studies

Alcohol studies in this country tend to remain theoretically quagmired, trapped particularly by their commitment to social learning theory and an epistemology has remained largely unchallenged in alcohol studies' psychologically focused approach. Alcohol studies in this country have revealed numerous, insights and interesting qualitative and quantitative research into alcohol beliefs and practices. The research data gained from those studies, and interpretations in its light, have contributed enormously to an awareness of alcohol issues. However, the knowledge gained from these studies has failed to fully grasp the deeply sociological and emotional dimensions of alcohol usage and marketing at this time.

I have one particular reservation about alcohol studies research undertaken, specifically that by the APHRU into alcohol advertising. My problem is with the theoretical positions taken by the APHRU, where research tends to adopt some very standard, normative, psychological and sociological positions. For instance, in examining youth responses to advertising Casswell and Zhang (1998) endorsed the approach of Bandura (1986).1353

Bandura's social learning theory purports to explain behaviours and beliefs through the concept of modeling, wherein people learn through viewing behaviours, language and practices of socially valued actors, copying and themselves exhibiting the activities of their models. Social learning theory argues that people learn through their observing, imitating (or modeling) others, mediated interpersonally by a mixture of both explicit reinforcement, and the subtleties of norms and attitudes.

Social learning theorists believe that their approach explains and can be utilised to enhance educational institutional and intergenerational and societal practices. Social learning relates to alcohol education by explaining the initiation and development of drinking behaviours as a result of viewing media images and interpersonal relations with regard to alcohol.

Bandura (1977) argued that learning takes place by way of consequence-regulated behaviour, cognitive or symbolic representation and, observation.1354 Consequence regulations are a balance of punishments and rewards both experiential and abstracted, in their vicarious and symbolic forms, the consequences of actions is one of the foundations of learning.1355

Cognitive or symbolic representation is the individual's anticipations and recollective thinking about scenarios and events. Cognitive representation is the way in which people rationalise, discriminate, and develop stable concepts of the self and others, as well as to define behaviour that can be reinforced.\footnote{Strickland, D. E. \& Pitman, D. J. (1984). 'Social learning and teenage alcohol use: Interpersonal and observational influences within the sociocultural environment'. Journal of Drug Issues, 14, p.139 cited Bandura (1977).}

Observation is second hand learning through the experiences of others. Observation allows individuals to consider subtle reinforcement probabilities, situation and context appropriateness behaviour and the motivation to imitate, due to arousal from observed reinforcements and the emotional prompts provided by modeled persons.\footnote{Strickland, D. E. \& Pitman, D. J. (1984). 'Social learning and teenage alcohol use: Interpersonal and observational influences within the sociocultural environment'. Journal of Drug Issues, 14,p.139 cited Bandura (1977).}

Strickland and Pitman (1984) agreed with Bandura (1977) that experiences with significant others are the most influential factors. Peer and familial significant others govern the sources of punishments and reinforcements and provide guides for predicting others' responses to behaviour. Social learning, when interpersonal, is very influential by giving functional meaning, providing similarities between people, allows behaviour maintenance and a variety of both negative and positive reinforcers in a way not possible where the comparatively passive factor of media viewing is concerned. However, when similar to the actual personal and vicarious experiences people engage in, media depictions can, in social learning theory powerfully contribute to the initiation and maintenance of drinking behaviour.\footnote{Strickland, D. E. \& Pitman, D. J. (1984). 'Social learning and teenage alcohol use: Interpersonal and observational influences within the sociocultural environment'. Journal of Drug Issues, 14, p.140 cited Bandura (1977, pp.117-128); Akers et al. (1979, p.638).}

Strickland (1984) noted that a number of studies indicate that interpersonal adolescent relations are affected by the media, and argued that resistance to susceptibility was a result of peer and parental norms, and behaviours, familial interpersonal harmony, the fostering of independent thought and not applying normative behaviours in media images to individual's own lives.\footnote{Strickland, D. E. \& Pitman, D. J. (1984). 'Social learning and teenage alcohol use: Interpersonal and observational influences within the sociocultural environment'. Journal of Drug Issues, 14, pp.140 cited Bandura (1977, pp.24, 101-102); Akers et al. (1979, p.638).}

There appears to be increased peer influence where direct modeling of behaviour, and parental influence where the reinforcement of normative beliefs are each concerned.\footnote{Strickland, D. E. \& Pitman, D. J. (1984). 'Social learning and teenage alcohol use: Interpersonal and observational influences within the sociocultural environment'. Journal of Drug Issues, 14, pp.144-145.} Bandura (1995) argued that social learning can be applied to the case of efficacy. Bandura did not hold to a completely rationalised self in action. Rather, it
could be said of Bandura that he held to a thinking and planning-governed view of the self, believing that: "Most human action is cognitively generated. People motivate themselves and guide their action anticipatorily by the exercise of forethought."

Bandura noted that a strong sense of efficacy is the road to personal and collective success. A sense of efficacy is established by way of four factors; firstly, in first hand experiences of mastery and success, secondly, through vicarious experiences of others' success, thirdly by verbal social persuasion, and fourthly, through persons' physiological and emotional perceptions of being aroused by success. Cognitive motivation to act successfully is generated by expectancies of success, orientations toward goals and attributing external factors as causes of setbacks. Bandura had earlier alluded that a lack of efficacy was responsible for alcoholism.

From a social-learning point of view, alcoholics are people who have acquired, through differential reinforcement and modelling experiences alcohol consumption as a widely generalized dominant response to aversive stimuli.

At the levels of social institutions and society itself, Bandura believed that efficacy is also important. Bandura argued that:

A major goal of formal education should be to equip students with the intellectual tools, efficacy, beliefs and intrinsic interests to educate themselves throughout their lifetime.

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In commenting on formal schooling health programmes, Bandura argued that a comprehensive as opposed to piecemeal approach should be taken, as attempts to change specific behaviours will not be as successful as multidisciplinary approaches that seek to unite the home and school life of students.\textsuperscript{1367}

Societally, efficacy can assist in communities who are dealing with social change. Collective efficacy can assist in the realisation of community health. Individuals and communities need to work together to be efficacious - they need to 'think globally, act locally' over health issues.\textsuperscript{1368}

Social learning moves beyond innate explanations for learning. With regard to alcoholism, this, as Bandura noted represents a move from a 'biomedical' to a 'biopsychosocial' model.\textsuperscript{1369} Social learning theory, Howard and Hollander believed, moves beyond behaviourism by including cognition as mediating between the environment and individuals - individuals who hold images in their memories, integrate those memories with previously garnered knowledge, generalise images to rules regarding behaviour, and, use them to address new situations. This cognitive focus is important for Bandura who renamed his approach 'social cognitive theory'.\textsuperscript{1370}

Social learning theory has been hugely influential in alcohol research. This influence can be seen historically in the academia of psychology in the late twentieth century. Behaviourism had been the earlier dominant paradigm and was criticised for its focus on reinforcement schedules. For many in the generation of young academics training throughout the 1970s to 1980s social learning theory appeared to deal with the problems of behaviourism without questioning their fundamentally individualised view of learning. APHRU researchers appear to believe social learning theory is the best framework to interpret how advertising impacts on drinking, brand allegiance and aggression. I conclude this from the repeated references made to social learning theory in APHRU members and associates research. Social learning theory's psychologism implies conservative sociological dimensions for alcohol, a normative psychological theory, reducing learning down to the individual's observations and simple copying of other people's activities. Howard and Hollander (1997) seemed to argue similarly to my point here on social learning theory's individualistic orientation in noting that social learning

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theory utilised behaviourist assumptions. Despite noting that social learning theory was part of a 1960s movement from innateness to socialisation in explaining learning, where the behaviourist limitations regarding thoughts, emotions and vicarious events could be somewhat addressed and advanced forward from, Howard and Hollander argued that social learning theory suffered from not being able to address social structural issues.\textsuperscript{1371} Howard and Hollander argued that although similar to social constructionism, in focusing on socialisation, social learning theory suffers from not being able to address societal structural issues, for instance, where Howard and Hollander are concerned in the case of gender, where the family, schools and the workplace can differently reinforce similar gender stereotyped behaviours.\textsuperscript{1372}

With regard to postemotions, social learning or social cognitive theory does evoke the emotions with regard to perceived arousal, but this can be seen as a bland and mechanised emotionality, developed on from what Reisman called 'other-directedness'. In the view of social learning theory, others in one's context are used as supports or models for behaviour. Although moving beyond simplistic innate arguments for behaviour and moral development, social learning still focuses on cognition as the source for healthy and unhealthy behaviours and so does not really move that far forward from a position like that of Becker's view of rational addiction. Idiosyncratic approaches are less likely to be accepted and valued in Bandura's search for personal or collective efficacy, as in postemotional society the peer group of parents and children sets smaller and smaller limits on what is defined as appropriately efficacious. Coupled with globalisation, which currently denotes an economically defined view of an interdependent world, conservatively and managerially defined and production-orientated neoliberal formulae, processed through rationalistic and cognitive filters producing 'efficacy' are more likely to be adopted. Bandura himself reflects a certain conservatism when referring to the changing international scene of altering and relaxed borders of nations allowing drug syndicates to capitalise by creating a "... soaring narcotics trade" in Eastern Europe. What Bandura overlooks in his approach to efficacy in drug issues is the attempt of legitimate drug traders in the form of international corporate alcohol producers to gain a foothold and grow their share of the market in such countries. There are political and economic structural dimensions to efficacy where drug use is


Social learning is unable to address such issues. Rather, personal and collective efficacy for Bandura seems to be a matter of rationally adopting the 'right' attitude. In postemotional society the right attitude is a mechanised and routinised, unauthentic but genuinely felt affect.

Alcohol studies that adopt social learning theory are unable to extract themselves from accepting a perspective, which despite having the word 'social' in its name and orientation, in the main, philosophically assumes, and empirically applies an individualistic approach by not dealing with epistemological and structural aspects to social life. Social learning theory can be critiqued from a Durkheimian perspective for not adequately explaining society as made up of representations, other than those of individuals. Despite taking an open view of the relationship between individuals and their environment where consequences of behaviour, skills, and immediate social factors are concerned, each of those elements are referred to only in terms of individuals in environments.

Partanen and Montonen (1988) noted that with regard to alcohol and media studies social learning theory was less sociological when compared to other approaches for instance like the 'cultivation' view of advertising where the media filters and draws on the social context to represent symbols and versions of reality for viewers and potential customers. Cultivation approaches are more similar to the sort of approach in Durkheim's focus on representations, and by extension, Mestrovic's postemotional approach as advertisers use dead memories to sell alcoholic drug products. Social learning theory, which is a dominant theme in alcohol studies in this country is sociologically impoverished and focused on individuals by comparison to cultivation theory, as well as Durkheim's and Mestrovic's sociology. Mestrovic has pointed to the focus on cognitive approaches taken to apprehending its opposite - the emotions with the concept of postemotions, where even the most strongly felt emotion is most often filtered and acted upon in terms of cognitive representations. Social learning or 'social cognitive' theory is unable to address such socially structured and epistemological concepts due to its focus on individuals and cognition.

Similarly, interpretations of findings through longitudinal research taking place into Dunedin and Christchurch born participants holds to individualist psychologies in reducing social structural and representational life to individually contextualised factors. From a Durkheimian perspective, much research in this country adopts theoretical bases that are highly subject to the sorts of criticisms from a social theory-based educationalist perspective on educational psychology.

Olssen (1991) addressed the individualist bias in the history of educational psychology, making a number of pertinent criticisms relevant to alcohol studies generally and APHRU research specifically.

Olssen (1991) noted that psychology's establishment can be traced back to the work of Wilhelm Wundt who established a laboratory in 1879 Germany. I have already noted the connection between Wundt and, Durkheim, who studied under Wundt in the same year that Wundt's *Ethics* was published. Durkheim followed Wundt in conceptualising the mind as a social phenomenon, not individualised, in the way late nineteenth and early twentieth century Anglo Saxon and North American psychologists, borrowing from and subsequent to Wundt viewed psychology. Those psychologists held to a view that psychology was distinct from philosophy, and also could be modeled on the natural science's positivistic bases of empiricism, value and theoretically-free objectivity, methodological unity, universal generalisations and laws, as well as methodological individualism. Those psychologists were also responsible for establishing the statistical methods and concepts like variance, significance, correlation, means analysis, regression and the normal curve. Many of these statistical approaches are still held in high regard by psychologists and are consistently utilised by APHRU and other alcohol studies researchers in this country. Durkheim's *Suicide* of course was pioneering in its use of statistics to study societal phenomena. But there, Durkheim applied a concept of an ontologically social source to representations. And that use of the ontologically social in *Suicide* is the very difference between Durkheimianism and alcohol studies as they stand at the present time. Alcohol studies, due to their theoretical biases tend, by comparison with Durkheimianism, to adopt individualism and psychologism.

Behaviourism's philosophy of instinctual responses effecting action and thought in consuming and viewing contexts with regard to likings for, expectancies to, and consumption of alcohol is another philosophy of the self and learning which is adopted by alcohol studies.

Freudian approaches are also adopted by alcohol studies, evidenced in the utilisation of psychodynamic approaches to advertisement effects noted in, for

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instance Wyllie, Zhang and Casswell's (1998) study into positive responses to beer advertisements, coupled with participants drinking and associated problems.\(^\text{1377}\) As Olssen (1991) noted, Freud's approach and that of subsequent Freidians has been widely criticised for an adherence to accepting instinctual responses to family environments in infancy and early childhood as formulating individual's life choices, where society's role is to tame and direct instinctual drives so that individuals can live productive lives.\(^\text{1378}\)

Essentially, alcohol studies tends to make the same classic mistake evident in much educational psychology, wherein researchers are blind with respect to macro issues due to their focus on, and reduction of social structural issues to, individuals. As Olssen (1991) succinctly put it:

> Because psychology lacks a defined theory of knowledge, it is unable adequately to conceptualise or understand the relationship between individuals and complex social structures.\(^\text{1379}\)

Alcohol studies, from a Durkheimian perspective can be said to be in a state of anomie and egoism. The three theoretical approaches adopted are subject to the sorts of criticisms Mestrovic made: about behaviourism as cold and hard over rationalisations and the masculine; about Durkheim having taken a 'civilisation and its discontents' theme like Freud but treating the problem as one of too little rather than too much restraint, and; of Parsons and Merton for mistakenly interpreting in Durkheim and applying the notion in their sociologies, that anomie is about normlessness. Social learning theory can be seen as accepting a similar view with regard to interpreting learners as needing to have appropriate models and rules to be normal. Social learning theory also can be seen as accepting a rational social action approach like that of Parsons, a voluntarism where individuals cognitively plan their actions. From another angle taken through evoking the postemotional concept, peer relations, niceness, optimism, are all notable in social learning theory.

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To be sure, there are some excellent aspects of alcohol studies that should be acknowledged. Stewart (1997), and Wyllie et al. (1997) did apply some criticism to the social institutional structures that are relevant to alcohol public health research and advertising. However, most of the commentary and research in alcohol studies is normative and individualist in nature. Alcohol studies need a more thoroughly sociological and, specifically, social theoretical epistemology and ontology to drag research out of the confines of individualistic apprehensions of alcohol related public health issues - an area in which education is of course situated. A Durkheimian approach offers the sort of social analysis that could be very useful to alcohol studies and education. The social as well as the natural sciences are begging for a thorough-going analysis that will enable them to contribute to as well as be more valued by society. Truth is postemotionally Balkanised with regard to various spins over issues made by various interested parties in alcohol and public health.

Viewing research communities and research itself as driven by collective representations and postemotions, just two Durkheimian and neo-Durkheimian concepts among others, might be the way to understand the need for, and justify, the reinvigoration of research imperatives and funding, as well as inter institutional and interdisciplinary collaborations in this country. Social theory and philosophy should be seen as having much to contribute to this endeavour.

From a Durkheimian perspective, normative individualistic ontologies and epistemologies which are mostly adopted by alcohol studies researchers, are pragmatic responses to a funding community and context wherein research and funding proposals that prioritise the social over the individual are perceived as unserious. The perceptions of funders reflect the collective representations regarding the individual and society in this fin de siecle.

Durkheim was not denying the sanctity of the individual as a self directing and thinking being. However, Durkheim saw the individual and individual agency as sourced in society, which is the entity that makes individualism possible and meaningful. This important interpretation of the relationship between individualism and society has often been overlooked in western European social scientific circles, where the idea of the social as an entity in itself, creating the quality of as well as shaping and guiding individual experiences, has been rejected. In a notable manifestation of this phenomenon Olssen noted Manicas’ (1987) pointing out that both the Russell Sage and the Ford Foundations along with leading psychologists in the 1950s argued that the American Foundation of the Social Sciences should have
been renamed the American Foundation of Behavioural Sciences. Socially ontological and epistemological critical approaches to understanding and researching alcohol issues are still unfavourable in the eyes of research funders who themselves were educated in the context of Cold War academia. The irony is that in a context today where socially-based theories have some credence compared to former times, the view adopted to study alcohol has the word social in it but still maintains a very individualistic psychological standpoint. 'Social learning theory' is social mostly in name only as social learning theory lacks a structural and sociological epistemology. Social learning research takes place in a social environment, but beyond that point, social learning theory is individualistic in its orientation.

The present context of what is broadly neoliberal government thinking has generally reentrenched conservatism in alcohol related panels and working parties wherein Cabinet in 1994 directed ALAC to include alcohol industry representative membership when considering alcohol issues as I have noted. The alcohol industry, also as I have noted, is notorious for its individualisation of the aetiology of alcohol related harm, justifying industry advertising portraying excessive, risk taking and extreme images of gender and alcohol. On the other side of the argument are public health researchers who, although by comparison with the alcohol industry are more interested in socially based approaches, still accept individualistic theories like behaviourism and social learning theory as legitimate and of central interest. At present, given these factors as well as that of tight fiscal restraints, research, which enquires critically into alcohol issues in ways that do not involve standard theoretical perspectives, is unlikely to gain public or private funding or scholarship support. Alcohol research, funding, and interested party commentaries can be seen to reflect something like the intellectual anomie which Mestrovic believed existed in United States academia and can be considered postemotional in that the language of 'the social' is utilised but is applied individualistically, drawing on dead memories of individually based responsibilities of parents, peers and individuals, whether they are drinkers or researchers. 'Sociology' and 'social theory' remain terms that are marginalised in alcohol studies in this country. A thorough going sociology of alcohol from a Durkheimian perspective would argue against alcohol advertising,

and, ultimately conservatively driven imperatives in research grants, scholarships and publications.

Harm reduction appears to be in the ascendancy in alcohol and public health research perspectives. Often, however, due to a tendency to focus on individuals and in being conservative through adopting particularly psychological epistemologies, alcohol and public health research in the current social context tends to overlook and obfuscate the deeply and fundamentally sociological issues related to society, particularly when it is considered, as Durkheim argued, a *sui generis* force subject to anomie. In this regard the concept of harm reduction provides one good example example of such a representation overall.

Single (1995) outlined the difficulties in defining just what harm reduction is. Harm reduction was a reaction to zero-tolerance approaches to drug use. Harm reduction emerged in a context where AIDS and other sexually communicable diseases were not being positively dealt with by only prohibitory policies and legislation.

Many groups have variously interpreted the notion harm reduction. For instance 12-Step and other abstinence programmes argue that they are reducing harms resulting from drugs by encouraging the abstention from use. Single disagreed with that apprehension seeing harm reduction as referring to persons who although possibly wishing to stop using, continue to use drugs and who should be treated with dignity for making that choice. However, Single argued, respecting persons does not mean that open legalisation should also follow, believing that “harm reduction focuses on problems, not use *per se*.” Single seems to take a liberal and progressive approach to harm reduction, by treating users who might be for instance underage drinkers, in a humane way without assuming that their use should be condoned. However, as Single noted there are various ways that harm reduction can be defined. The case which Single cited of 12-Step and recovery movement representatives believing, in promoting abstinence, that they represent a harm reduction approach indicates one dimension of the notion which is more conservative than the idea that Single advocated for. Even more conservative perspectives can also use the rhetoric of harm reduction where for instance even the zero-tolerance perspective can be said to seek to reduce harm by seeking to absolutely limit people's access to drugs.

A number of issues are raised by the concept of harm reduction for alcohol studies, where as McCoun (1998) in reference to the United States context and

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from a psychological perspective discussed how with regard to particularly the illicit, but also general drug studies area, a number of dilemmas are presented where policies of enforcement, legislation, health and treatment are concerned.

McCoun (1998) pointed out that harm reduction defined as zero tolerance is usually, called use reduction or *prevalence reduction*, which emphasises reducing supply or demand as imperatives. In supply reduction, the focus is on enforcing laws, stemming source country supplies, whilst demand reduction focuses on treatment and prevention. Use reduction, MacCoun (1998) argued, is a policy that seeks to reduce the number of people who take up use and promotes abstinence for those who already use drugs. This is probably the most often endorsed approach in this country where illegal drug use such as underaged alcohol consumption is concerned. MacCoun (1998) believed that prevalence reduction can increase harms by not intervening in those that already exist and by prohibition itself causing them. At best, prevalence reduction can indirectly reduce harms, in the worst case, it increases harms, as due to the unavailability of drugs, users ingest their supply in dangerous ways.

Harm reduction is often criticised as being as a way for legalisation to become instituted, as it is focused on users of drugs and not the victims of for instance drug related violence, and, as passing on a message that drug use is acceptable.

Quantity reduction perspectives can be interpreted as widely adopted in the policies, and although perhaps less overtly, the minds, of alcohol studies researchers in this country. This adopted position is quite understandable, as this perspective is quite relevant to alcoholic drugs, which as McCoun pointed out, are drugs that the public will accept the concept of their being consumable in safe amounts; an acceptance that is not made where other drugs are concerned.

Essentially, considered from Durkheimian perspectives, alcohol studies are often conservative, or at best only simplistically liberal and progressive, as macro health and macro harm issues are always framed in terms of public acceptance and therefore arguably, public opinion - a guiding principle that Durkheim argued was opposite to social facts, as public acceptability and therefore opinion and ideology guides the feeling of alcohol studies and policies. It can be added that MacCoun's argument from the United States, the psychological take, as indicated by its title,
was apparent in the few and limited references to social factors with regard to explanations for these issues therein.

Harm reduction psychology, although being a sociological improvement on the psychology of social learning theory, still assumes a rational mind and world where users of drugs, if informed about their options are assumed to make choices that are healthier. Harm reduction fails to address the non-rational dimensions to drug use where users, even when not using the quantities or on occasions enough to be categorised as chronic, acute or addictive, will use drugs anomically or egoistically if their social context, considered more broadly than the realm of public health, is anomic and egoistic, in the political, intellectual, social and economic senses. Harm reduction holds to an excessively, cognitive, rationalistic, and optimistic view of human nature and society.

The psychologically individualist basis to the theory of learning adopted by the APHRU is apparent in two other noted theoretical standpoints taken with regard to studying advertising and alcohol. One is relevant in terms of arrangements working with instinctual utility seeking and the other drives and motives each relevant to this study. These are respectively the behaviourist and psychodynamic approaches to learning, their adoption in alcohol studies evidenced in, for instance, Wyllie, Zhang and Casswell's (1998) apparent interpreting as influential both conditioning and psychodynamic, as well as social learning processes in viewer's learning from and active engagement with advertisements. Mestrovic commented on the lack of the heart in behaviourist psychology, and, noted similarities, for instance with regard to the unconscious, and also differences such as where constraint is concerned, between the father of psychodynamism, Freud, and Durkheim. Behaviourism has been roundly criticised for having a biological basis to viewing learning, as have psychodynamic explanations.

From a Durkheimian perspective alcohol studies would be better to enquire into and draw on perspectives such as those represented by Lannon and Cooper (1983), who Wyllie, et al. (1998) cited as their psychodynamic influence. Alcohol


1389. Due to the confines of space, I will not enter into a discussion and criticism of these two approaches, suffice to say that behaviourist and psychodynamic perspectives rely on assuming foundational instincts which are physiological, as opposed to the social and individual basis to the will which Mestrovic appealed to in his Schopenhauerian-influenced Durkheimianism and which is pivotal to the present study. Teasing out the similarities between behaviourism and public choice theory would be a worthwhile endeavour, as would be a discussion of Mestrovic’s critical approach to Freud in relation to Schopenhauer, Durkheim and postemotionalism. My focus here is on critiquing social learning theory - a currently influential approach in alcohol studies, and particularly for present purposes, alcohol education.

studies researchers, especially those inquiring into alcohol advertising, do not cite this material as often as they do Bandura, and Bandurian-influenced work. Lannon and Cooper's approach is more in accord with a Durkheimian perspective as they refer to aspects of self and society such as the unconscious, the personal, diffusion, idiosyncrasies, intuition and divergences. However, even Lannon and Cooper do not adopt very critical social theories with regard to studying advertising and alcohol.

In the neoliberally influenced context of alcohol studies and funding for alcohol studies, critical social theoretical approaches to apprehending alcohol in society are unlikely to receive much attention or support. In this sense, alcohol studies central adoption of normative individualist psychological theories like that of Bandura's is a pertinent choice. The social, interpreted as cognitive by Bandura, is more marketable and acceptable in such a context. That approach, however, maintains a status quo in alcohol studies. It fails to move beyond the normative, into studying alcohol issues radically and as deeply embedded in culture, society, and people.

One way into examining the normative tendencies in alcohol studies is to consider some critical perspectives coming out of drug studies - an area of research that seems to incorporate alcohol in what is a multi-drug context.

Moore (1990) critiqued a paradigm of epidemiology, medicalisation, social and individual psychology in youth drug studies. Moore argued that there was a need for drug education to borrow from sociological approaches that have not previously been linked to drug use. Citing among others, the youth sociologies of Harry Becker (1964), Metzer (1964), Young (1971), Stuart Hall (1976), Paul Willis (1977), and Dorn (1983), Moore argued that contemporary studies into problem youth drug use tend towards epidemiological studies and definitions and treatments of problematic use.

Moore (1990) cited Mugford's (1988) notion of a 'pathology paradigm' in youth drug research which assumes deficits in youth's inability to refuse, their lack of information over, and their failure to partake in activities other than intoxicating commodities, as well as Dorn and Thompson's (1976) criticism of drug use as simplistically explained by excessive individual rebelliousness and

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A postemotional explanation also emphasises the socially as opposed to individually pathological.

Moore believed that research might have valuably contributed to an understanding of decision making to start and develop drug use, and, identified a number of individual factors involved in youth drug use. However, Moore argued, this model of research had also meant that other important factors for research were ignored. Moore advocated for a greater research emphasis on the symbolism, the settings and the lived beliefs and experience of drug use, as well as gender, social class, age and ethnicity issues related to drug use. There is a tendency, Moore argued, for research to collapse social and cultural issues down into individual issues. This is the very sort of point that has been developed herein, but by way of a Durkheimian perspective.

Moore argued that many youth drug studies fail to apprehend the influence of socially contextualised meanings that drug use can have for users. By example, Moore cited Feldmans's (1968) study into the case of black American experiences of heroin use, where users were seeking to become 'stand up cats' partly by using drugs. Those youths used drugs because to do so imparted greater social standing, not because they had poor social refusal skills or low self esteem.

Similarly, criticising research into Australian Aboriginal alcohol use studies in his own country for tending towards utilising social disintegration, anomie and traditional organisational breakdown theses, Moore (1990) citing other research argued that Aboriginal alcohol use often has important social meanings ranging from being declarations of equality with white Australians and a symbolic reaffirmation of one's autonomy, to legitimated situational drunkenness and the integration of alcohol into traditional trading practices. Moore was pointing to the societally generated feelings of belonging, selfhood and community in Aboriginal drinking.

Moore's point is relevant with respect to the present study. But firstly, in dealing with Moore's (1990) criticism of anomie-focused research, I believe that what must be pointed out is the tendency of researchers to utilise the notion of anomie individualistically, as for instance Srole did in his individualised inventory of factors indicating anomie, rather than socially, in the sense of studying white Australian culture's failure to provide an integrating context for Aboriginal

perspectives, culture and beliefs. To comment on Moore's (1990) citation of alternative interpretations of Aboriginal alcohol use, Aboriginal people perhaps would not be compelled to express their belief in their equality with white Australians by drinking alcohol if it were clearly the case that Aboriginal culture were fully respected in dominant culture Australian society. White Australian disregard for Aboriginal culture and persons historically and unfortunately contemporarily is notable and evidenced in Saggers and Gray’s reference to the dominant group Australian's view of the 'drunken Abo'.

Sociologists have used Durkheim's notion of anomie in various ways, leading to often unfounded generalised criticisms of the notion. Perhaps the most well known sociological manifestation of anomie is in the work on deviance undertaken by Robert K. Merton (1968) who formulated a number of strategies it was believed deviants utilised in response to their experiences in an anomic social context (defined by Merton as a situation where people have goals that they do not have the means to realise). Merton's anomie theory has rightly been criticised for assuming that anomic deviancy is the preserve of disadvantaged people.1396 It is evidently not the case that drug abuse is only a non dominant social group issue only, even if many cases do reflect that pattern. Mestrovic has argued that Durkheim never argued the case in the way Merton did. For Durkheim, anomie pervaded all social sectors of society and was not the preserve of the powerless in the way Merton presented the case, or in the way the research Moore (1990) critiqued, appeared to assume anomie affected Aboriginal groups and not people of other groups.

There is a tendency in this country where, like in the case of Australia, researchers fail to critically interrogate the ways in which the specific social contexts in which alcohol use exists, are related to the wider social, economic and political contexts, in the way in which sociologies of youth refer to drug use. The sociologies from Becker to Dorn that Moore (1990) cited, each take a wider social contextualisation, and of importance to the present study, seek to critique that context's relation to youth issues. By comparison, much of the research into alcohol studies in this country refers only in passing to research like that of for instance Boston's (1992) or Phillips' (1987) contributions. There is also largely a tendency, of taking so measured an approach, that critical comments on culture and society are weakened.

With regard to giving attention to the meaning of specific contexts to drug use there is much work still to be given in studying the lived subjective experience of alcohol use. As Moore (1990) noted, much youth drug use research enquires into what participants report their activities are, report their beliefs are over various issues and influences, and report what they believe they will do in the future. This for Moore (1990) results largely in a great deal of cultural rhetoric and forms the majority of research used for policy planning. Research, Moore argued, needs to go beyond the homogenising or individualising tendencies of research that fails to enquire into the socially relevant meanings, and the contexts in which use takes place. Moore (1990) recommended an ethnography of the specific contexts of drug use informed by an approach breaking subcultural groups ('quasi-groups') down into their own various subgroups and contexts ('action sets'), the relations between, and memberships within, each sub-group.1397

Moore can be critiqued from a Durkheimian perspective for holding to a neo-Marxist view that limits the frame of reference. In drawing on, for instance Willis, and, Young, Moore is led by neo-Marxist sociology and sociology of knowledge. Durkheim acknowledged that socialism was a cry of pain for the suffering in society, but rejected that approach. For Moore the answers to social problems are to be found in structures of class. Durkheim rejected this view, arguing that anomie affected the whole of society, but impacts on different parts of society and people differently. People share the same humanity and share in their suffering, where through the cult of the individual, the wealthy person could no more see another person suffer than they could someone they loved personally. It would be revolting to do otherwise. Focusing on class structures in looking for solutions was as anomic as the freemarket economics that had created such differentiations, for Durkheim.

Although not using Moore's approach, as noted previously, some qualitative work has been done that goes towards understanding alcohol use in this micro group way. For instance, research inquiring into the group identity built around brand faithfulness was the beginnings of micro situational drinking practices, related to a larger context. However, that public health research perspective views the context only as widely as psychological, instinctual and stereotypical behaviours, defined in the terms of modelling, affective and behavioural learning provided by peers, the media and cultural norms. These theoretical perspectives continue to dominate in alcohol and public health research.

Durkheim's sociology, with its epistemology, view of human nature, explanation of society as representational, its aim aimed for a society of the human person, realised through a corporation, enriching the life which people experience, through corporate relations with others that bond people to others and curb excesses in various activities, has something to contribute to alcohol studies. Durkheim's sociology sought to make an increasingly complex and intense life more tolerable by defining, understanding and enhancing the quality of experiences people undergo linking them to the wider social context.

Implications

A Durkheimian sociology of alcohol would enquire more deeply into the micro contextual experiences of users of alcohol, linking those contexts up with macro context factors, critiquing both contexts and formulating solutions to their societally generated egoistic and anomie tendencies.

Psychology, even in its social form, retains an individualistic tendency that pervades youth alcohol studies. Sociology, by comparison tends to examine the otherness on which being relies, and is marginalised in a research context driven by individualised longitudinal, sequential, and snap shot studies, which fail to interrogate the socially structured general societal and specific acting, thinking and moral contextual circumstances participants are imbedded in. Participants’ emotions, feelings, cultural, class and social views, intimacies, as well as their views of gender, relationships, oneself and others are all of interest, and not just with regard to participants’ self esteem or ability to refuse. Rather, from a Durkheimian perspective this material would be reflective of social currents, collective representations, social facts, anomie, egoism, and the cult of the individual, all of which are concepts and tendencies relevant to the current social context in which people are postemotionally manipulated.

Stein (1991) pointed out that 'research' means to re-search, or take another look at a situation or phenomena, rather than faithfully and uncritically embracing historically developed practices.1398 This has been the role of sociology in the social sciences, and is an approach that should be applied to the alcohol research context. A Durkheimian epistemology of representations by way of an approach suggested through the preceding discussions is useful in contributing to what is the dark problem of alcohol abuse as a toll paid by society.

Political anomie

Alcohol plays a big part in the life of this country. Consumption is a factor in many people's daily lives. However, it would be foolhardy to assume as do methodologically individualist approaches, such as that of Becker's that alcohol issues are personal ones. It should be quite obvious at this point in this study that alcohol issues are more socially concerning than immediate individualist based observations and research would indicate. Politics are also part of the context of alcohol in society.

Considering alcohol issues as social facts allows an analysis with respect to Durkheimian discussions of homo duplex, collective representations, the cult of the individual, egoism and anomie. By examining industrial relations as well as global and local factors using these Durkheimian concepts, the dangerous influences of neoliberalism with regard to politics can be further revealed.

Brewers, distillers and vintners have had perhaps the most control over public debates. That is the claim at least of public health alcohol studies researchers who note the huge budgets available for advertising alcohol. Producers raise millions of dollars in taxation for the government, and have increased input into public health policy than before. Public health perspectives are not new in opposing alcohol industry imperatives.

As noted earlier, public choice theory has been applied to political and social institutions in this country. Neoliberalism is not founded on a central governmental coordination of economic functions of the sort Durkheim argued for. The approach of neoliberalism is rather more like that of the excessive individualisms Durkheim critiqued when considering his predecessors and contemporaries. Neoliberalism is the contemporary form of the individualisms exemplified by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hume, Mill, Spencer, and James whom Durkheim in some cases borrowed from, but also in every case severely critiqued. Egoistic and anomic, phenomenal only, positivistic and superficial, built on fear and duty only, the individualisms Durkheim argued against are the antecedents to neoliberalism. In this sense neoliberalism is not fascist or totalitarian. In an excessively reactive, revolutionary and fevered approach to the welfarism present in the west, which itself was born of a recognition of the excesses of former freemarket liberalisms present up to the 1930s, neoliberalism delivers societal power into the hands of wealthy entrepreneurs, industrialists, nationally and multinationally. In a misguided belief that a strong and regulating government is socially and individually dangerous, neoliberalism 'devolves' power into the control of non-governmental organisations. However, devolution is a term that falsely
implies democracy, freedom and progress. The sale of a number of state owned assets for the sake of international debt servicing is a neoliberal approach to economic woes relying among other concepts on, methodological individualism, rent seeking and utility maximisation. The example of Buchanan is just one manifestation of this approach and is one of the thinkers implicitly appealed to in various approaches to social policy and economic provisions.

*Durkheim and the corporation today*

Durkheim’s concept of the corporation as source of understanding and communication where human activity is concerned is relevant to the contemporary context. Social organisations reminiscent of corporations used to exist in this country in the form of regulated unionism. Prior to the rise of neoliberalism, there existed what has come to be called the ‘settlement’ between government, industry and labour. The settlement was sited within the period of Keynesianism and Fordism, an arrangement of understandings between the State, labour, industry and economics of the sort Marcuse discussed in his study of one dimensionality in those relations in the middle of the twentieth century.

Unionism, although criticised for its bureaucracy its sexism, racism and homophobia at that time, served some sort of corporationist functions in terms of shared economic ethics and practice within associations where there was a series of shared sentiments and interests, discussions and studies of economics, society and life.

Durkheim criticised unionism at his time for exhibiting the economic anomie of socialism, which for Durkheim sought to base all ethical life on the economic sphere and which was really an overly rationalised, utopian, positivistic, and optimistic approach to considering ethics. Unionism in those conditions, for Durkheim, also became anomic as a result of the association between that economic anomie and its competing and radically opposite orientation of excessive liberalism. Despite these problems, unionism did provide something like the sort of labour, employment, and social relations Durkheim argued for. Durkheim was as disenchanted and critical of the revolutionary social outlooks of the socialists as he was of the extremely individualistic social control focused arguments of utilitarianism. Both were despotic for Durkheim. Durkheim’s view of the corporation was one based on the idea that the context in which people do their work in public sphere life is very influential on their lives in general (if attempting to exclude women, who in his view were sheltered from anomie through the private sphere). Work was in one sense profane in being concerned with survival, but also was
about evoking beneficial collective representations in activities, not unlike the ideas and sentiments expressed by the former guilds. Durkheim's vision of the corporation was one of shared interest, not a bland sort in the sense of having something in common and where people keep in contact with each other, but one where there are real bonding interactions between people who do a similar sort of thing in work.

The post-Fordist, postmodern, postindustrial and neoliberal context of today is one where corporation-like institutions of the sort Durkheim envisaged are fewer than before. The ongoing affects of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, despite discussions over its affects on the comparative benefits for the economy, labour and employers, has reduced the number of occupational groupings available to many people. The sort of occupational groupings Durkheim envisaged were through bondings between people working in various contexts, linked by an institutional structure through which to engage discussions over its specific practices and its place in society as a representative of workers before the State. Unionism provided the possibility of an institution, able to be reformed. The Employment Contracts Act 1991 broke it down instead.

Combined with the Employment Contracts Act, labour market relations and conditions were altered towards an expanding services sector providing an increasing number of short term contract, part time employment contingent forms of work. The culture created in this context is one of self interest, transience, insecurity, stress, and particularly in the service industries, is of the sort Mestrovic believed Durkheim critiqued in his study of excessive social contacts as opposed to bonds, especially when economically unfettered and anomic. Many people are increasingly economically unrepresented in work issues and have less solidarity with which to stand against institutions like employers, the State and local government.

The Employment Contracts Act, through its promotion of individual rather than collective contract agreements, negated occupational groupings like unions, eliminating connections between the State and employees. The State in that context only communicated with some interests, as employee representation was either not realised due to dispersed individual contractees, or otherwise, remaining groupings appeared weak and not truly representative as their membership was so low. The State, in that situation also became unauthoritative in its decisions, as it was uninformed of the views of some economic groups, risking becoming subject to the interests of select groups, or, ruling tyrannically.

Welfare beneficiaries who have not historically had buffers between themselves and the State, and who are faced with the contradiction of their dependence on the State, and the collective conscience that Barker (1991) noted in Silver's viewpoint about the compulsion in one's society to "do something", might be driven to excess and depression in the face of reduced payments. Beneficiaries in the present context have fewer institutional relations and representations other than those with public and private charity and providing organisations. Where State welfare assistance is concerned, beneficiaries experience harassment and antagonism in their relations with bureaucracies, which perhaps among other things, results in more alcohol related problems. When society becomes less united, people feel they will never achieve a high standard of living but are constantly bombarded with images of home ownership and are faced with an array of consumerist goods, ideas and aspirations portrayed as necessary and normal. When society increases its differences between people without an ethic that holds them together, or when the ethic that is being promoted is one of individual self interest as well as competition between citizens, workers, and industry becomes more agitated. People subject to these forces will 'do something'. People know it, just as it was claimed by Halbwachs that Durkheim saw the suicide as knowing they were going to die, not, that they were going to kill themselves. Just what is it that people will do in being forced to 'do something' is what differentiates people. This is the point of utilising social structure for Durkheim. Different social group members will 'do something' differently than members of other social groups. It is society that makes people do something. When society is in disarray and when there are excessive differences of power, income, as well as increased social polarities and tensions, people become agitated, nervous, depressed and angry. Then they 'do something' - their actions are in accord with their specific context, which makes them subjectivise, individualise and retouch collective representations from the wider social milieu. They are not pathological individuals, they are individuals differently affected by a pathological society.

The example of Silver, extrapolated, in the Durkheimian sense, displays that it is impossible to escape from elements of the morality and restraint that issue from one's nationality and other collective representations. The neoliberal reforms that have taken place in this country's labour relations, work structures, welfarism, and as I will later argue, education, have promoted and anomie and egoistic individualism, the lower pole of homo duplex, contrary to Durkheim's project, but nonetheless perhaps providing evidence for Durkheim's critique of reorganisations of society, such as those presented by neoliberalism. It may be that Durkheim's
idea of the corporation is needed in this context perhaps more than before and might be the reformative, possibly even perhaps the antidote where anomie and egoism are concerned.

Technological revolutions have transformed public life so that communication in the contemporary context is a demanding, complex, layered and instantaneous experience where through faxes, the Internet, email, answer phone recordings and screenings, people can discuss issues in near and sometimes real-time contexts through computerised electronic communication. Ironically, through these technological breakthroughs, people have not become more socially bonded, but rather are more socially in contact with others. Information technological revolutions, coupled with societal neoliberalism have constructed a specific context wherein people may be in instantaneous contact with numerous people all around the globe, yet may also live an insular and barren existence in their own spatial community. The Internet has become a cult where as Mestrovic (1997) argued, if people choose to write letters by hand when they could send an email they are considered strange. Mestrovic was right. We have so much information!

Children sit in front of their screens playing graphically barbaric and violent video and computer simulated war games. Adolescents and youths can log on to web sites on the Internet where they can educate themselves about sexuality from a menu of demeaning and sometimes vicious animated torturous sex acts. Adults and children can through email and chat rooms dwell in a pseudo-intimate and pseudo-sexual relationships with people they might never meet or share true intimacy with, whilst perhaps, where adults are concerned, their partner sits in an adjacent room interacting with their own computer in their own little world. This is the flip side of cyber play, fun, romance, information and sex. Some people are emerging as exhilarated, enchanted, obsessive, addicted and dysfunctional as a result of the Internet. It is an addictive commodity.

This is the dark underbelly of technological revolutions and their impact on people's lives. The boosterish optimism and particularly the notion of the infinite is the other side of technological revolution, very apparent in the promotions and discussions offered by information technology revolutionaries. In those discussions, advocates argue that there is no end point imaginable for information technology and that information technology can solve a number of society's problems, such as transport, company, and cost cutting on labour by having employees work at home, linked to work by the Internet, viewed as a community of ideas and feelings.

These advocates fail to address the damage that information technology can contribute to when socially contextualised. Internet pyramid scams,
unregulated banking organisations, music recording industry “rip offs” are just three of the additional problems noted in recent times. Emerging out of the “cowboy culture” of the U.S., the Internet is often without rules or controls and allows people to seek without end or withdraw into themselves.

Neoliberalism coupled with technology at this juncture, creates a context very reminiscent of the societally constituted infinity of dreams and desires Durkheim warned of 100 years ago. At that time, Durkheim argued the corporation was the antidote for societal egoism and anomie in education, industries, politics and private life. It may be that now, we need the corporation more than ever.

Globalisation and the 'cult of the individual'

The neoliberal argument for globalisation is concerned with access to markets and production sectors where the ethics of the market and economics are either interpreted as separable from culture, or as some sort of acultural ethic and basis for international understandings. There exists a state of anomie in globalisation where these sorts of factors are concerned. For instance, there is a sort of derangement taking place in international relations where first world countries' private and public sector corporations invest in economic affairs in Third World countries on the grounds of cheaper production costs due to reduced labour or environmental management responsibilities. A number of the Third World countries that First World corporations and companies invest in to reduce their costs are noted for their poor health, employment and safety conditions, low pay as well as general economic and social injustices, where there are often big gaps present between wealthy and impoverished citizens. Environmentally, First World organisations have recently been under increasingly legislative and public opinion driven pressure to conform to stringent standards of responsibility and accountability for their waste and by-productive materials about the world, ecology and nature.

Were First World people also to accept the disgusting defiling of that view of nature to which they hold, as every time they flush the toilet, create refuse and avoid recycling, they might better understand their anomie as a dereglement. First World national companies and corporations can find that ensuring the appropriate disposal and reuse of material is often realised at a sizeable cost to profit. Offshore investments in Third World countries can cut this cost and that of labour. In that context, when combined with: investment incentives in the form of tax breaks and so on at the State and local government levels; technological revolutions that have allowed business instantaneous access to and transmission of various forms of
information, and; the faster, reliable and efficient distribution and acquisition of goods internationally, regionally and (but not necessarily) nationally, international economic institutions currently exhibit a (Durkheimian) _dereglement_ in their penchant for free trade, globalisation policies. Companies of the First World can, and, often do significantly better out of offshore, Third World investments in production. Savings in production costs frees company funds for investments in further establishing and expanding markets, market share and profit - one of those ways being through media advertising for and production of alcohol both locally and internationally.

There are of course also positive potentials in the globalisation of relations and trade from a Durkheimian perspective, through the sharing and discussion of internationalised respect for all people. However, investment in Third World countries is sometimes accompanied by First World interested parties' cynical, utilitarian and rationalised exploitation of others, justified by way of appeals to cultural relativism, and the turning away from their cherished ideals about individuality, democracy and freedom where Third World locals are concerned. Rather than in the globalised imagery of harmony through free trade in pursuit of world peace, worker and environmental responsibilities are overlooked by western internationals and expatriates, in the Durkheimian sense, through another current of anomie in neoliberal society.

Giddens is one of a number of Western liberals arguing what is called the Third Way. The Third Way refers to an alternative route to the traditions of socialism and freemarket capitalism. It is a new slogan for supposedly social democratic capitalist governments attempting to distinguish themselves, from neoliberals, and, their socialist, but no longer acceptable tradition. In seeking to find new sources of revenue from selling its nation's products, proponents of the Third Way have turned to the notion of 'globalisation', referring of the distribution of products and ideas on a scale never seen before in human history, as a source of establishing new relationships and communities that despite straddling national boundaries, still serve national economic objectives. These were the sorts of things that Giddens argued for with respect to democratisation.

Giddens (1999) pursued the notion of globalisation, in total, taking a rather optimistic view of this phenomenon, believing it presented great opportunities for communication, liberty and self determination, especially Giddens argued, where

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women and minority group members are concerned. This Giddens believed was also the case for youth.\footnote{Giddens, A. (1999). \textit{Globalisation: The Family}. (National Radio, 2/5/99).}

Giddens argued that what is needed in a globalised world is a 'democracy of the emotions' that applies to intimate personal relationships and those in public contexts.\footnote{Giddens, A. (1999). \textit{Globalisation: The Family}. (National Radio, 2/5/99).} This perspective is similar to that of Durkheim. This is no accident given Giddens' works specifically on Durkheim, his translating to English some of Durkheim's writings, as well as making references to and criticisms of Durkheim. Giddens (1994) for instance called Durkheim's notion of the corporation or professional associations that could compensate for decreased solidarity elsewhere in people's lives as having "... proved, however, to be an impractical dream."\footnote{Giddens, A. (1994). \textit{Beyond the Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics}. p.124.}

However, unionism, perhaps the closest that western nations came to the idea of the corporation, was not what Durkheim argued for, as he was as concerned by the socialist biases he observed in unions formed in his time. The corporation for Durkheim was to moderate behaviours and desires, keeping people within human, peaceable limits. In the contemporary world, corporations could better prepare people to deal with the contradictory and sometimes limitless appearance of globalisation.

Stuart Hall, in responding to Giddens from the audience following one of his (1999) lectures thought that Giddens had a monolithic view of globalisation. Giddens rejected that claim believing that globalisation is multidimensional.\footnote{Giddens, A. (1999). \textit{Globalisation: Run Away World}. (National Radio, 11/4/99).} This might be the case but I tend to agree somewhat more with Hall as, despite undoubtedly having many aspects that are benevolent, friendly, well meaning and constituting cross-national communities of interest, the most powerful dimension of globalisation is that huge factor of international trade. In this country, Bruce Jesson argued that globalisation was a mainly financially based approach that has led to anarchy, and in citing Reich among others argued that this country needs a 'nation building exercise', rather than just increased internationalisation.\footnote{National Radio, \textit{Kim Hill} interviewed Bruce Jesson (18/3/99, 11:15 fam).} Hall in Britain and Jesson, in this country come from a neo-Marxist position in apprehending globalisation and the Third Way. In France, Pierre Bourdieu, who although also influenced by Marxist and socialist thought, can perhaps be seen as best capturing the spirit of Durkheim's focus on reforming institutions, and the representations that they present, argued that the notion of a Third Way diverts attention away from what is really an unbridled neoliberal market approach to society and
internationalisation.\textsuperscript{1406} As Giddens himself admitted, presently there are not any global institutions established, that study and moderate changes in international economic risks that are being taken.\textsuperscript{1407} Risk taking in economic areas can develop to extreme levels if not constrained and reduced. From a Durkheimian perspective, the Third Way could be the road to increased international anomie of enormous proportions.

International relations through globalised trade is a laudable ideal, and one that Durkheim had some good things to say about where his concern for the 'cult of the human person' was concerned. However, laissez faire economic theories arguing for free trade and international competition to increase global prosperity, depend upon an idea of international relationships founded on competition, and unshared knowledge in dealings of trade. Durkheim rejected the idea that a benign internationalism and cosmopolitanism could be formed upon free trade and utilitarianism. Durkheim rejected both of those approaches for their anomic natures. Instead, Durkheim argued for a curbing of the economic factors in international relations, in favour of nation building. An economically focused international relations is an anomic international relations for Durkheim. Durkheim's vision of globalisation was for a greater understanding and international exchanges of each other’s knowledge, history and habits - a coming together of differences in collective representations to be treated carefully and with respect, as people treat other sacred and profane things. Business centred relations cannot provide the context for greater understanding of others as respect for the other's culture. Through economic relations, cultures crash together, driven by the immediacy of the economic, profaning the sacrosanctity of each culture, an international derangement when relations are based on the economics of life. Economically based contemporary international relations are an attempt to get the 'most from the least', morality from the economic, in a similar way to that which Durkheim believed utilitarianism and Saint-Simonian socialism mistakenly assumed was possible.

The Special Economic Zones in China might provide a useful example where the social facts of gender, alcohol and economic anomie are considered with respect to international relations, interpreted as trade-based in the assumptions of free market and utilitarian economics. Alcohol can here provide a useful indicator with regard to collective representations of social facts in the context of contemporary China, and, provides an interesting site for future Durkheimian research where educational, cultural and alcohol studies are concerned. Mao said

\textsuperscript{1406} \textit{New Zealand Listener} (1/1/00, p.33).
that for Chinese communism to really work, 50 years of capitalism would be needed first. Perhaps the Special Economic Zones are an ironic outcome of that flippant, musing statement, made in passing. Within the Special Economic Zones, capitalist and western economics and affluence is apparent, whereas outside their limits, China's communist economy and still often very traditional rural and sometimes subsistence way of living carries on as it has for decades, even centuries, in grinding poverty. Many Chinese people attempt to enter the Special Economic Zones both legally and illicitly, seeking a better life for themselves and their families. The Special Economic Zones do provide a mixture of the ironic and sad in this dereglement of late twentieth century fin de siècle international economics as relations. In Durkheimian perspectives, both China, in pursuing Special Economic Zone quasi-capitalism whilst being a claimant to communism, and Western investing nations and nationals profiting massively from the exploitation of human persons whilst espousing undying beliefs in democracy and individualism, are part of and reflect a context of dereglement of human affairs, globalised. China's communism is contradicted by its quasi-partisanship to its professed foe the decadent West, and Western investors are aware of the vast potential profits that could be made by cornering even a slice of a market as large as that represented by China, and, willing to overlook the many injustices experienced by workers and consumers in that country, Tianymin Square being a shocking representation of the consequences of liberal and democratic protesting in that country. The West is perhaps the most anomie party in this fin de siècle juncture, participating in the breaking of a few eggs to make the Chinese omelette, Mestrovic argued Mao earlier spoke of as being necessary in this spectacular example of the injustices of globalisation. Douglas Myers, who it has been claimed is this country's richest man, and who, as has been noted, transferred his investments in brewing to China, can be interpreted as making a prudent move to a country with a traditional sexual division of labour, unlike the case in this country where, as noted earlier Myers put it, men have “discovered women” and consume less beer than in the past. Whether prudent business investments made for economic profit and that exploit traditional sexual divisions of labour in developing nations meet with the requirements for a globalised Durkheimian cult of the individual is another matter.

The concept of globalisation, with regard to raising East-West, North-South, developing and industrialised, national, cultural and economic issues is important for Aotearoa because as Dale and Roberston (1997) in referring to Kelsey (1996), pointed out this country has experienced a regional repositioning, and is now being touted as an Asian-Pacific nation. This rhetoric could be of questionable
authenticity, when as Dale and Robertson added there is a simultaneous attempt to retain a 'North/West' status similar to Australia in being a sort of Southern Hemispherical England. Encouraged as Baba argued, by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, this country's movement towards a neoliberal approach can be seen to manifest itself with regard to globalisation by way of maintaining northern relations and reconceptualising Pacific and Asian countries from being nations to establish aid relations with to countries who are sources of potential economic profits where this repositioning . . . can be seen as essentially a market-orientated strategy to enable the continuing development of the New Zealand-Asia-Pacific trade relationship.  

Neoliberal globalisation and free trade are important concepts with regard to alcohol. Writing in Canada, Robin Room argued that countries will possibly face more pressure in the future from the international alcohol industry where tariffs and trade agreements are concerned. Nationally, consumer sovereignty is lauded as an ethic to be adopted generally. That ethic, when applied to alcohol, implies that individuals should be free to consume alcoholic drug products whenever desired. But as Room pointed out, that ethic is actually opposed by other ethics that appear in parallel, such as those arguing for greater individual rationality and responsibility where employment, machinery operation, domesticity and child caring is concerned. The outcome of these two competing ethics has been the tendency to reduce all alcohol issues down to those of, for instance, the diseased individual, a tendency I have noted as implied in Buchanan and some other alcohol related studies also.

A globalised alcoholic drug trade is problematic where youth education issues are concerned. In developing countries especially, young people often do not receive drug education as their parents need their children to contribute to the family income or domestic upkeep and are often not able to afford to send their children to school. For young women in developing countries, this situation can be exacerbated by traditional patriarchal practices that ban women not only from education and employment opportunity, but even the most basic equal access as


males to food and other nutritional stuffs.\textsuperscript{1412} With respect to drug education in developing nations, Howard believed western cultures must be very wary of imposing one cultural view of drugs and human development onto the lives of very different peoples internationally.\textsuperscript{1413} In a globalised world driven by neoliberal market philosophy, this could be very difficult to be avoid. Singer's (1986) extensive review and interpretation testifies to what already might be the effects of multinational alcohol industries' penetration into various traditional cultures. From a Durkheimian perspective, the issues of concern could be interpreted as reflecting Durkheim's view of sacred and profane representations in society. The sacred (the embedded meanings and symbols related to alcohol or drug use) can be profaned (by the meanings and symbols of another culture's alcohol use).

The emergence of a globalisation of economic anomie through laissez-faire internationalised economics, causes breakdowns, ruptures and a general dereglement between various cultures' collective representations and borders of culture, as the context is now one of international relations increasingly based on the ethics of market competition, profit, and strategy. Globalisation in this way also impinges on inhabitants of countries whose national economic production is increasingly a matter of supply to the demands of international markets and a dereglement of work within those countries where multinationals run businesses that would be illegal in their Western home countries. From a Durkheimian position, globalisation is anomic. Durkheim critiqued the meaningless of work in modernity, where the specialisation of labour created a chasm to be breached by professionalised ethics. Globalisation means other people who produce products like oneself are often producing those products in far off geographical sites. This distance of geography and culture means that forming any sort of Durkheimian corporation is made more difficult. Information revolutions have increased the possibilities of greater communication and understanding internationally. However, when communications are excessively competitively economically based, they cannot fulfill a Durkheimian corporate internationalism.

Information technology is still the privilege of the well off. Low socio economic group members, usually children in schools, may get to spend some time logging onto and communicating on the Internet. It can be said today that low socio economic group and other minority group members, whether in the public or private spheres, do not as often experience and are unable to afford Internet access

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\item \textsuperscript{1413} Howard, J. (1996). 'Alcohol and other substances: An international perspective on what works in prevention.' The "Perspectives for Change '96" Conference of the Alcohol Advisory Council of New Zealand. p. 8
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presently. Hope (1996), arguing from a critical theory perspective, envisioned a similar possible future where the rich live in high towers of information technology whilst the rest exist without the access to that knowledge and power in a world with continuing class differences, or as Castells (1989) put it - a 'dual city' where information technology is concerned. Many workers may never get access to international communication, with all its purported merits. In the Durkheimian sense a corporate life is very difficult without the shared ethics and feelings for one's work and place. The cultural, psychical and geographical distance of globalisation can, from a Durkheimian position, be seen as an extension of the division of labour and a more anomic situation.

The issues from a Durkheimian perspective are over whether globalisation is going to be able to realise a cosmopolitan global village of respect for others and yet reverence for one's own nation, values and cultures, or, an egoistic withdrawal into one's nation, as part of more generally doing so into one's culture and context therein, as well as an anomic, barbaric, heartless, dereglement, and an postemotional disregard for others, in fruitlessly seeking the infinite. My claim, in following Durkheim and Mestrovic is that the latter tendencies will result

Neoliberal anomie and alcohol

Late 1980s and onwards laws policies and codes with respect to alcohol taxation, deregulation laws sales, opening hours, licensing, can be seen as a result of the economic context that was being fostered. This context was also one of increased public opinion and pressure regarding public health concerns. The result has been a utilitarian, increasingly deregulated, higher taxed, choice-based rationalisation and approach to life. Focused on a rational choosing view of the self, legislation has tended to focus on high taxation coupled with deregulation.

There has been a sort of collective denial about the period before the reforms. As Jesson (1999) argued pre-1984 Aotearoa/New Zealand is often presented as a huge Polish dockyard, saved by neoliberal reforms enacted since 1984, viewed as Year One. Jesson (1999) called this a state of amnesia. This phenomenon of forgetting could rather be interpreted as a postemotional post-memory about the situation before the reforms, where anything before that time was dark and slow, rigid, and oppressive. Everyone does not hold these post-memories. Jesson for instance remembered quite a different history, but for half a generation of

people born and raised in this country, the 1984-as-year-one view which Jesson identified in neoliberal thought in this country, is the history of this country. People raised on neoliberal history live it vicariously in media images of empty streets on Sundays, tales of waiting months for a phone connection and few consumer choices and products. These memories are directed at the emotions. This view of darkness followed by the enlightenment of neoliberalism reform denies the nature and extent of those changes' impact on alcohol related problems and practices in societal, habits and consumption, and their affect on educational issues in both the formal and informal senses.

Alcohol has increased in price when considered in the context of people's disposable income, and by 1990 alcohol was for a short period linked to the consumer price index. That move was representative of the general approach by policy makers in seeking to create a context where consumers can make a rational choice in a context created to provide them with a tension between the increased availability of alcoholic drug products, and the real relative increased cost of those products through increased government taxation. These two competing factors are part of the social context in which alcohol legislation has been reconstructed. In the Durkheimian sense, this context is the very sort that Durkheim criticised in his time, wherein society's anomie features can be seen as an opening up the abyss of desires of anomie, malforming social action from its present requirements, promoting unneeded or inappropriate drinking habits, events, justifications for drinking, as social facts by society opposed to social facts in society, through advertising, and freer access to alcohol. Alcohol now costs more than before. As rational choosers, perpetually responding to market fluctuations and choice, people are assumed to weigh up that greater cost against the cost of missing out on the drinking experience. These competing choices reflect the implicit ideas underlying this reconstructed social context.

These ideas are very reminiscent of Buchanan's utility maximisers where people are assumed to be able to rationally make a decision, balancing the costs of choices, shaping their lives and controlling their environment. However, for Durkheim, people's rationality is imposed upon, reshaped from without, reflecting social relationships and ethics learnt as habit and sentiment, where rationality, one's desire and self interest is a part of the self that is evoked in a dialectical relation with compassion, malformed when excessively irrational or rational. Justice for Durkheim is promoted through representation, caring and sentiment as well as

choice. Choice is not the most important part of life for Durkheim, who argued that choice expressed through the public opinion, democracy and the market did not constitute justice. Choice can easily lead to anomie and egoism where people choose greed over sharing and solidarity as well as a heartfelt respect for others.

Durkheim lived in a time of great anomie and saw the excesses of poverty and wealth created by policies driven by choice, utilitarianism, and minimal government intervention. These types of policies have returned, in some senses fundamentally unchanged as neoliberal, right wing, rationalisations for economic, social and political arguments, formed around a system of beliefs I believe Durkheim would see as anomic.

Alcohol problems can be increased by making consumption seem a beneficial thing, as is freer access, advertising, etc, in a way that an increased cost cannot compete against, especially when a barrage of other anomic economic, political and social factors are also a part of people's lives. Cost-benefit views of persons does not capture the nature of society or the individual. As opposed to rational choosers, from Durkheim's position, people are irrational choosers, who rationalise their choices after the fact.

A related point where this issue of costs versus benefit is involved is the market in gambling that has emerged both within and beside alcohol issues where neo liberal social change is concerned. The deregulation of gambling legislation has been a boon for the alcohol industry, that owns a number of the gambling, coin-driven 'poker' machines throughout this country. In this regard Aotearoa/New Zealand has moved from in 1990 being a highly regulated country where gambling was concerned to one that by the end of the decade had the most gambling machines per capita in the world. The alcohol industry benefits from gambling takings and profits through its dominance in this gambling market and the alcohol sales generated in conjunction with playing. The problems generated by gambling are massive. Sournia argued that the addiction to gambling is as ferocious as that to alcohol. 1417

In this country, there was more money spent in 1998 on gambling than food. 1418 6.5 million dollars a week are passed to the Lottery Grants Board. 1419 In its advertising Pub Charity Inc claims it has 487 members responsible for managing 2,340 machines, and has donated $98 million to communities in its first ten years up until September 1998. Pub Charity Inc claimed to support teachers by investing $300,000 over three years in ERUDITE (Educational Research Underpinning

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Development in Teacher Education), and schools by granting amounts of money "from a few hundred dollars to $20,000". Pub Charity Inc seeks to legitimate bar and tavern gambling on the grounds that gambling proceeds are channeled back into the community 'topping up funds where there's a shortfall from other public sources.' The Compulsive Gambling Society have argued that lowered restrictions on gambling have been undertaken without planning and consideration of the costs incurred as a result, leading to insufficient mental health services to deal with gamblers who instead are turned away when they seek help. The people who are addicted to gambling are the cost, the benefit is that educational research is funded from the profits of that misery, when public sources are not available.

Casino legislation has allowed the establishment of a number of casinos nationally. Alcohol issues are implicated there as well, where cheap and free bar drinks, salty snacks and meal offers are common marketing ploys for casinos. From a Durkheimian perspective, freer gambling legislation and contexts will create and reflect anomie. The Compulsive Gambling Society reported that demands for its services in Auckland had increased by two thirds in the first six months after the Sky Casino opened.

Another argument of the alcoholic drug industry is the claim that having alcohol in society produces some negative things. This perspective assumes that abusive people in the population are always a part of societies where alcohol is consumed. This argument assumes that there are certain people who have tendencies toward alcohol abuse and that regardless of whatever reason there may be for their individual tendencies, it should not impede the rights of those people who do not have those tendencies in life, to enjoy alcohol moderately whenever they are legally allowed. There is a clearly utilitarian motive in this argument where the greatest overall number of people's desires to drink alcohol are to be considered as far more important than the fostering of a fewer number of people's potential or actual alcohol related problems. This also reflects the individual pathologising view that Room, as noted earlier, believed arose out of accepting a consumer sovereignty view of alcohol freemarketing.

As stated, alcohol industry representatives claim to only be interested in market share and often cite research which does show that overall consumption has decreased. However, a Durkheimian perspective can question this argument's main assumption that consumption is principally the marker of problems related with alcohol. Durkheim's sort of position allows a questioning of the apparent and simple assumptions of such a principle, to posit an alternative argument: that alcoholic experiences can be of varied qualities in various contexts, where overall reduced consumption rates are not informative with regard to people's reasons to drink, and where nor do they inform with regard to the quality of their experienced world, considered in the context of the overall state of society in which they live and drink. People might actually drink less and still experience more alcohol related problems within a context which exhibits a wider continuum and number of problems, than in a historical period of higher consumption. Durkheim, when comparing the modern with the pre-modern individual noted that modernity leads to more suffering, or as Mestrovic put it inflames the will and desire. For Durkheim the modern feels more and is more susceptible to life's pains. The violent, delinquent, suicidal, insane, depressed, stressed, sick, bulimic and anorexic, do not necessarily have to drink dangerously with respect to official guidelines to become dangerous, but nor does the executive, the banker and the manager. That is Durkheim's very point with respect to modernity where survival is less of an immediate concern, anomic and egoism are so much more apparent, and Enlightenment, consumerism and excess weaken the psyche.

Underfunding due to rationalisation and downsizing have altered and cut the funding to alcohol treatment programmes, reducing the length of stays at treatment centers, hospitals, community based services, and, changed the provision of alcohol education. Members of the health and education systems' workforce have been subjected to such anomic forces, derived from economics and imposed by freemarket type influences on their work and lives. Workers are expected to integrate more tasks and take on longer work hours, organised along salaried work hour payment for work, without a concomitant rise in income, or, increased professional status. The government's withdrawal from the health and education systems has promoted, in Durkheimian terms, a decorporatisation of relations between health and education services and the state. There is certainly a history of oppositional relations between medical workers unions and successive governments with respect to pay and employment conditions. However, the debates

over reforms in health and education over the last decade have been more vociferously argued than in a long time previously. Workers claim that decreased funding has led to conditions in which they cannot provide quality health and education services to people due to increased responsibilities in an underfunded environment, whilst management members argue that workers are not responding to the new environment and instead use arguments regarding quality care and education for pursuing their aims of securing better income and conditions.

There is a great silence with regard to socially-based aetiologies leading to human tragedies that could be avoided were social and economic policy-makers to realise the anomie they have engendered by following the road of neoliberalism. For instance in health, one might question why in the last decade this country has generated numerous murderers, why more mothers have been committing homicide on their babies and children, or why people seeking emergency alcohol treatment have been turned away from health service institutions to soon afterwards commit suicide. In the case of education, inappropriate alcohol education often is hidden by alcohol studies commentator’s claims of parental lack of surveillance and concern. However, other commentators have noted the strong links between alcohol and suicide, and, as the ALAC (1997) research disclosed, a marked increased in young women's dangerous drinking. My particular interest is in education, and with regard to this area of social policy, the results of one and half decades of neoliberal policy in terms of students’ schooling and informal learning experiences in this social environment are only now emerging and the ALAC research on youth drinking is pointing towards social tragedy where anomie drinking is concerned.

Deregulation and the de-democratisation of the health service, through the marketisation of the health system throughout the 1990s impacted on the way alcohol-related patient needs have been represented and met. Hospital Board executives were not elected democratically, nor were meetings, where many decisions over alcohol treatment services are debated, held in public. Desubsidisation increased the costs of doctor visits for initial and post-sobriety treatment, inflated costs for ongoing medication pharmacy charges and longer waiting lists to get treatment to the person seeking alcohol treatment have been part of the neoliberal project. Alcohol drug treatment has been merged with mental health, possibly leading to the marginalisation of that particular area.1427 It is possible that people seeking treatment may not receive speedy or sufficient treatment. These factors might increase people's alcohol abuse problems as well

as contribute the development of further damage for the drinker (cirrhosis of the liver, suicide) or others (family members, car accidents, etc).

These are further examples of how the economic anomie of the marketplace impacts on institutions, the individual and society. Durkheim spent his whole adult life studying these things. It is important from the Durkheimian standpoint, that there be a recognition of how these policies are part of a culture that has promoted less respect for the cult of the individual, reducing people's, compassion and caring in various social practices which often intersect, at varying points, on people. Alcohol is implicated in alcohol issues where politics are concerned and anomie is apparent there.

Implications

To conclude this section regarding society and politics, when considered from a Durkheimian perspective, neoliberalism has been a central factor with regard to alcohol. Neoliberal social and economic reforms can be related to alcoholic drug related suffering, addiction, and mortality.

Through examining practices regarding the use and abuse of alcohol and commercial and political relations from the global to local contexts, it is quite clear that alcohol issues have become more complex and interrelated with other issues over time. From a Durkheimian perspective holding to a view of collective representations and alcohol in society as a social fact this is quite understandable. When society is seen as a holistic entity of *homo duplex* representations infected by economics it tends towards anomie and egoism.

Taxation changes have assumed a human nature that is a cost benefit assessor. Other legislation has been sourced in neoliberalism regarding age limits regarding to whom alcohol sales can be made to, places of purchase and times of the day when alcohol can be purchased, as well as the array of products that consumers can select from. Consumer sovereignty is central to neoliberalism.

Under neoliberalism, broadcast standards regarding the marketing of alcoholic drugs have been unfettered compared to former times. There has been an explosive growth in the number of advertisements for alcohol. Alcohol is linked with fun, sexuality, masculinity, femininity, and culture in advertisements, as alcoholic drug producers target as many different sectors of the community as possible, giving consumers maximum choice. Alcohol advertising has been found to be very attractive to children and endangering the sobriety of recovering alcoholics who do not have a choice about whether they can view advertisements broadcast on free-to-air television networks.
Alcohol studies communities, to seek funding from a taxation subsidised alcohol and public health authority, have had to deal with the case where representatives from the alcoholic drug industry comprise part of the membership of boards who make decisions on funding grants. Alcohol studies researchers mostly adopt normative, psychological frameworks when formulating their work and interpreting their data.

Social and political aspects with regard to employment and economics impacted on many people who have been thrown back onto their own, and sometimes limited resources, as people have been expected to be more self reliant. Yet research into alcohol use and abuse rarely or only in passing mentions this aspect's influence on adults, adolescents and youths, instead looking into or explaining such phenomena in individualised terms such as, for instance, family dysfunction, parental drug use, peer influences, life histories of substance use, and risk taking.

Neoliberalism is also evident in globalised international economic relations and offshore investments in alcohol industries that have political ramifications. The alcohol industry is now globalised.

From a Durkheimian perspective, Peters and Marshall (1996) were accurate in naming one of their chapters, 'The children of Rogernomics'. Soon a generation of children will have grown up under the influence of neoliberalism without knowledge of a time before. Neoliberalism is selfish, individualistic and excessive, it leads to increased anomie and egoism. Neoliberalism has impacted on the life that the children of Rogernomics have experienced in their schooling, as will be shown in the present study’s the final turn to examining neoliberalism in education.
SECTION 5:

ALCOHOL AND EDUCATION
Alcohol and Education

Introduction to education

A Durkheimian perspective can be applied to the topics of governance, teacher professionalism, teacher training and competencies as well as enterprise in the education system and curriculum - all which are relevant to alcohol education. Education can, from a Durkheimian view, be interpreted as presenting anomie and egoistic social facts, as well as collective and individual representations of, homo duplex, the sacred, and the profane. These are products of neoliberalism imposed on education.

Mestrovic saw contemporary education as displaying two opposing tendencies in thought and practice - one involving the mind, and the other, the heart. With respect to positivistic tendencies, Mestrovic argued that Kohlberg's moral theory was of interest. Believing that Kohlberg leant too far towards a Kantian rationality, Mestrovic interpreted Kohlberg as discompassionate, Kantian, mind orientated and masculine centered. In these respects Mestrovic emphasised the opposite positions taken between Kant versus Schopenhauer and Durkheim, as well as Kohlberg versus Gilligan.

Kant argued that morality was a principle-based matter where there are a number of imperatives and rational formulas. Mestrovic believed that Kant represented an excessive mind-based view of issues related to morality that was highly abstract and hard hearted. Mestrovic saw Durkheim's conception of morality as a desire, sourced in his Schopenhauerian view of the self and society. Considering the example of Titus, that Schopenhauer utilised to delineate his position from Kant's to explain compassion and the heart in caring for, through sparing and respecting the life of the hated and guilty other, Mestrovic argued that Schopenhauer's philosophy leads to an education that teaches compassion rather than the cold hearted rationality based Kantian egoistic moralisms of fear that Schopenhauer criticised. Mestrovic saw Schopenhauer and Durkheim as sharing the view that compassion and respecting others are ethics that cannot certainly be taught rationally - they are sentiments that can, however, be evoked. Durkheim, for instance, saw science as religious in origin, but made more conscious through the study of social relations and habits. A compassionate and moral education, would then for Mestrovic, be one that allowed greater understanding, sharing and empathising with others. These aspects, Mestrovic argued, were for Durkheim and

Schopenhauer, feminine parts of the self, evoked through experiential and educational habits and sentiments. Mestrovic's praise for Gilligan's 'different voice' is based on the supposed affinity with Schopenhauer's emphasis on compassion. For Mestrovic Gilligan was arguing in opposition to the excessive fear and egoism, uncaring, abstract, masculine tendencies in Enlightenment views and experiences of individuals and society. Neoliberalism tends towards the mind and abstractionism.

Adding to the complexity of the argument, Mestrovic also critiqued the contemporary educational approach of subjectivising the study of language by ignoring objective elements of linguistics. In The Evolution of Educational Thought (1938) 1977 Durkheim argued for teaching students the etymology of words as part of a process of disciplining of the mind. Mestrovic asserted that the license in postmodern approaches to education have failed to blend the objective parts of language with the subjective, leading to a unneeded conservative outcry for a return to reading, writing and arithmetic. Baudrillard's (1988) postmodernist claims to life as made of circulating fictions, where linguistics are concerned leads, in Mestrovic's view, to the absurdity of people's inability to communicate with each other, a claim with equal validity to the one made by postmodernism that modern language is so rigid that it is mostly or always oppressive. In Mestrovic's view, oppression of that sort would preclude people's ability to express their subjective wishes. Rather, Mestrovic argued that language is a dramatic interplay of the subjective and objective character of homo duplex.

Mestrovic argued that the Kantian approach to society is present in social institutions. The prison is an example where the prisoner's mind is set right. Mestrovic argued that a different perspective premised on the Schopenhauerian idea of changing prisoners' hearts might be better punishment served, were this Schopenhauerian premise be allowed to replace that of the Kantian focus on the mind where punishment is concerned. This approach could also be applied to the education of students as well, given that at present, education is viewed as a mind-based activity.

Durkheim clearly believed that education, whether at school or in other social institutional settings was about something more than Kantian bland

phenomenalism and the mind. For Durkheim, education was about ethics, habits, feelings and thought, the irrationality of compassion and a respect for others, as well as a certain social disinterestedness that is the egoistic necessity in contemporary society.

Education is of great importance, given Durkheim’s and Mestrovic’s views, as it expresses the complexities of the broader society in which it is enmeshed. Western society has moved toward greater egoistic and anomie individualism through neoliberalism. The case of research into alcohol issues with regard to gender and culture, society and politics reviewed and interpreted herein, displays, from a Durkheimian perspective, historically relevant malignancies in moral sentiments, institutional practices, human relations and selfhood. Extending this analysis into formal education requires looking at the interactions between that sector and other sectors in society. There are links between economics, politics and educational sector issues regarding policy issues like governance, teacher professionalism, the curriculum, teacher education as they relate to alcohol education, as well as alcohol education specifically. There has until recently been a paucity of Durkheimian research in these aspects of education policy related to alcohol education. However, policy changes and research can be applied to the case of alcohol education, interpreted from Durkheimian perspectives where the cult of the human person, collective representations, homo duplex, egoism, anomie, and collective representations are concerned, as education is a social fact.

Anomie and egoism are present in the excessive individualism of neoliberal philosophy applied to education. Reform of the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors of education in this country, impacted on teacher, student community relations, teacher training both pre and in service, job responsibilities and workloads, and was a significant part of the historical context that developed through the broader changes to the State and society, made in the latter half of the 1980s and subsequently extended throughout the 1990s in the form of an enterprise curriculum and culture. Durkheim’s analysis of historical and contemporary educational and other societal practices can be seen as relevant to this context.

From a Durkheimian perspective, and to borrow from Durkheimian phraseology, educational changes in this country could be interpreted as a pursuit of what I call a cult of management. This interpretation involves using the term management to refer to institutional, social and individual activities. The term cult, in its Durkheimian sense will be taken to refer to a number of practices in which various principles and imperatives are assumed to be fundamental realities to social life, organisations and persons. The cult of management has become an important
part of a wider socially anomie context, which reflects a dereglement of representations, which can be viewed as having come to dominate various aspects of education in this country. The cult of management as well as anomic, can be seen as egoistic, leading to subjective particularisms, reducing social solidarity, and fostering individual, social and institutional pathologies. The cult of management is a dereglement of *homo duplex* representations. In applying a Durkheimian approach in this regard, the areas of governance and methods of curriculum delivery will be specifically examined. Buchanan's neoliberal theory can be evoked for the purposes of critical apprehension when the societies of the school and of education are considered from Durkheimian perspectives.

Various social aspects that apply even indirectly to alcohol education are of relevance to the present study. A selection of significant State and private sector sourced policy documents, recommendations, policies with regard to their references to factors, which relate education to other social, cultural and economic issues, will therefore be explained, interpreted and critiqued.

The governance of schools will be examined as an example of institutional change not unlike the sorts of changes Durkheim examined in his studies of economics, society, and education, wherein contemporary neoliberal educational governance can be apprehended as part of an excessively individualistic approach to education that directs the institution and its members away from understandings of the sort Durkheim sought to foster in the various institutions he examined. With respect to governance issues in educational policy, neoliberalism of the sort Buchanan advocated is very evident.

The concept of the corporation will be applied with regard to in service professional and student teacher issues. Durkheim saw the society of the school as the prototypical corporation. Durkheim's view of corporationism is relevant, as governance changes have altered the relations in, and the context of teacher education, initiation, and professional issues that have been interpreted as possibly becoming more subject to marketing strategies. These issues are relevant to the delivery of alcohol education.

Education has been significantly restructured throughout all sectors. A management focus is identifiable in a number of the changes that have taken place. The neoliberal environment has changed the rules of governance, accountability measurements, and the nature of education from having been professionally led, to being a significantly consumer focused undertaking. Restructuring and management issues in terms of school board management, school marketing in
dezoned quasi-markets and that of teacher professionalism are all relevant where institutional participants are concerned.

The curriculum and context in which teachers further initiate students into society is relevant, both specifically in school culture and generally through experiences and qualifications gained for use in participatory adult life. Student and youth alcohol education issues like school to work transitions and gendered youth activities will be examined with regard to the curriculum, which has been altered with a central objective of meeting this country's economic needs in a new globalised context. This aim has meant that a significant reculturing focused on enterprise, an extension of the earlier restructuring in education, has been deemed necessary.

Teacher education and competency issues relate to issues over what is deemed appropriate attitudes and curriculum material for student teachers to learn. International and neoliberal perspectives are each of relevance.

There is a market in alcohol education. The marketisation of alcohol education issues tends towards excessive egoism, anomie and conservatism.
Governance issues

Governance issues have increasingly become concerned with economic ideological imperatives and interests. The neoliberal market orientation to schooling has led to the emergence of the issues of parental choice, control and group representation, raising concerns over social justice and equity. Marketing and governance issues can be examined through Durkheimian perspectives, showing how different schools in a quasi-market context organise student punishments and particularly, the implications for schools where alcohol is concerned.

The ruptures to education created by the neoliberal cult of management is reflected in the technical economic management imperatives reflected in the approach of Picot Report and Tomorrow's Schools documents the implications of which when applied have altered most aspects of education in this country.

Following the Treasury's costing of the Curriculum Review (1987), concluding that there were insufficient funds to deliver the liberal, social, academic, cultural and gendered policies there, the Labour government established a working party to recommend a way to deliver the educational goals in the Curriculum Review. Headed by Brian Picot, a local, supermarket chain magnate, the review party produced the document Administering for Excellence . . . (1988) popularly known as the Picot Report. Following a fever-paced consultation and submission period of several weeks, the government considered the submissions and produced its document Tomorrow's Schools in a period again of only several weeks. Education Minister (and Prime Minister) David Lange put his name to this document. There were twelve thousand submissions on the Picot Report.1432

Tomorrow's Schools advocated more choice in education through market approaches to funding, efficiency, school selection and management. The State, which had developed a large and complex regionalised and centralised Department of Education by international comparisons, was renamed the Ministry of Education under which various former Department responsibilities were devolved down to the local level of schools where a Board of Trustees, consisting of elected members of the community, teacher representatives and the principal, were to be responsible for school management, the writing up of and adherence to a charter agreement with the State. Funding was to be on a State bulk-funded, formulaic splitting between

1432. Unfortunately the submissions generated by the Picot Report have subsequently been lost from government files. Those records might have provided interesting historical and social material for study and understanding, and from a Durkheimian perspective, collective representations, expressions of the state of the society at that time. For instance, comparing the social liberal tone of submissions aligned with the The Curriculum Review: Report of the Committee to Review the Curriculum for Schools (1987), with those of the neoliberal submissions and government documents, would have been one historical study that is not going to be possible without those submission records being available.
the budgets for operations and salaries with granted discretionary budgetary powers for the Board between the two components.1433 Schools would be subject to an audit and review every two years through the State's Central Review and Audit Agency (which was subsequently renamed the Education Review Office), ensuring that schools were meeting their stated objectives and outcomes in charter obligations to student and staff, the community and its resources.1434 Parents would be able to address accountability with regard to these issues by way of the to-be-established Community Education Forums1435 and Parent Advocacy Councils,1436 which would provide a line of consultation from parents to schooling institutions and the Ministry. Under this arrangement, parents were purported to be able to experience greater control over and participation and choice in their children's schooling through being allowed greater responsibility for the administration of their local school and their children's schooling, interests stifled by years of government intervention. Furthermore, parents were able to set up their own school should twenty parents choose a schooling approach which existing local schools were not already providing.1437 Parents were viewed as employers or contractees of educational service providers at their local school, where parents were each purchasing an education on their children's' behalf.1438 Parental choice was extended later in 1991 when Tomorrow's Schools advocacy for the abolition of school zoning was instituted by the incoming National government, allowing parents the choice to move their children from one school to another where possible, as opposed to the former zoning policy under which the decision about which particular state school children attended was made by the geographical location of their parent's housing, a situation in which the better off in society were able to benefit by purchasing property in desirable school's zones. With regard to equity issues, the Tomorrow's Schools reforms were intended to allow local communities to directly address their particular students' extra needs, with the State contributing extra funding to target identified areas of need.1439


A number of government documents besides *Tomorrow’s Schools* regarding educational governance have also addressed and promoted these ideas. The New Zealand Treasury evoked the sentiments expressed by Buchanan (1975) and Buchanan and Devletoglou (1970) with regard to correct market signals, the true cost of education and the right to choose.

*Parents may underestimate the long-term investment benefits flowing from their own contribution to their child’s education and overestimate what educational institutions can achieve . . . As parents . . . value their own time, the state - by subsidising an alternative educational source to the family - is, in effect, imposing a fine on those who wish to utilise their own time to act as an educational source for areas ostensibly covered by the subsidised source.*

Treasury’s acceptance of public choice theory’s argument for splitting up departments into separate agencies was also apparent. "If efficiency concerns lie behind government intervention, then it would be expected that such intervention would focus on developing and maintaining standards and inspection of standards."

The Ministry of Education, in arguing that education should be open to individual preferences and market forces, reflected Buchanan and Devletoglou’s (1970) argument.

*Expanded choice may improve the efficiency and effectiveness of resource use, by better accommodating different cultural needs and preferences, and making providers more responsive to the needs and preferences of students and communities.*

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Treasury's (1987) argument that more privatisation should be promoted, is reminiscent of Buchanan and Devletoglou's (1970) claim that a market and choices should be provided by increased diversity between state and private education providers.

State intervention is liable to quash or discourage the development of new or experimental forms of education provision to meet changing educational demands but which cannot be accommodated within existing institutional forms.1443

Greater choice and decentralisation are two sides of the same coin. The value of choice to students relies on providers being able to offer a diversity of services, and so relies on decentralisation. Similarly, the benefits of decentralisation are dependent on providers being aware of the diverse needs of students, which are made apparent through the exercise of choice. There may be a trade-off between increased choice and fairness of opportunity, if not all groups in society have the same access to choice. Targeting of resources is one way of improving fairness of opportunity.1444

Governance in this new context was organised around State-directed curriculum and standards' monitoring, coupled with increased localised management and control of teachers and capital investments, where schools could advertise, and market to parents the particular academic, social and cultural distinctions that differentiate one school from another. A partially formed market in schooling was created, a 'quasi-market' in education, or as Gordon (1997) put it in studying schools in Christchurch, a 'halfway house' between state intervention and non-intervention,1445 where most funding was still State supplied as were educational services, but where management was increasingly interested in private

sector (parental) choice, service provision that was marketable and the notable increase in competition between schools.

Dezoning, a reform introduced in 1991 was intended to further increase parental choice and power where their children's education was concerned, as students would not be required to attend particular schools according to their parent's geographic residency. Dezoning as part of the marketisation of State schooling has been criticised for creating a market in education wherein advertising is favoured over quality of provision issues. The marketing of schools is necessary in a quasi market. Gordon noted that marketisation had led to a flood of students to better off schools in wealthy areas, and a decline in the roll of less well off schools, meaning that those schools were forced to advertise.

Management issues are to the fore in marketised education. Neoliberal educationalists Chubb and Moe (1990), for Gordon, see good management as localised management - a concept clearly identifiable as concurrent with Buchanan's views. Gordon argued that what is missing in the supposed 'level playing field' of a market in education is that communities to which governance is devolved is composed of differently resourced people. In rich schools lawyers, accountants and successful business people can give of their time and services for the good of the school. In less well off schools, such skills and knowledge, wealth and power might not be available in the pool of parents standing for Board of Trustee membership. There, Gordon noted, members were elected for their business knowledge over any other qualifications or experience, leading to problems of a lack community representation. Schools in communities with high proportions of solo mothers and Maori that were also less well off tended to not be represented. Overall, Gordon argued that equality and democracy were not the outcomes of marketisation. Rather, Gordon believed that Ball (1993) summed up the case well in calling marketisation an impracticable and idealistic case of "Adam Smith meets Mickey Mouse". While not claiming that management is irrelevant to school success, Gordon argued that given the actual and effective differences in the

composition of managerially usefully resourced Boards of Trustees and community, truly good management requires a 'school mix' of students from different backgrounds. Quasi markets lead to less diverse schooling experiences for students as parents choose schools according to their perceived status with respect to ensuring the 'right sort' of students are going to be peers for their children.

Thrupp picked up a similar tendency in studying four Wellington schools’ policies on student misbehaviour, noting a homogenising of socio economic and ethnic group members within schools, but heterogeneity between schools, where the composition of different schools’ student bodies reflected their communities’ family backgrounds, leading to different schools adopting different processes to maintain their operations. For instance, better off schools that Thrupp called Wakefield and Victoria Colleges adopted ‘centralised’ approaches to pastorally dealing with student misbehaviour. Students at those schools were not perceived to be presenting with serious issues that affect their schooling. Given that parents of children attending Wakefield and Victoria, due to their own educational, social and financial backgrounds, and, their own habits and orientations, or what French neo-Durkheimian sociologists Bourdieu and Passeron called cultural capital and habitus, were more likely to support school processes adopted.

Plimmer College composed of students from less well off families adopted a 'mixed semi-counselling approach' to student misdemeanours where students were talked to and encouraged to change their behaviour and attitudes, as well as being sent to senior teachers for routine infractions.

Tui College, the least well off school composed mainly of students from economically poorer backgrounds adopted a 'devolved semi-counselling approach'. Tui College students' backgrounds meant that they present at school with both extra learning and pastoral needs. Tui College students and their parents’ cultural capital and habitus is such that students were orientated differently to other schools’ students and have available differently valued and useful resources. One student for instance was uncontrollable at home, her mother had a drug and alcohol problem and involved in a custody battle with the girl's father where allegations had

been made of his having sexually abused the student. After at first being suspended for acting violently at school, the student upon returning was caught smoking hashish. Schools cannot deal with such cases and as a result, children's schooling is severely curtailed. In such cases, school staff spend a lot of their time dealing with pastoral matters, as well as student background related learning difficulties.\footnote{1455}

Snook noted with regard to the marketisation of education that neoliberalism had required schools and teachers to rely on more than community resources provided by parents but also businesses, in a point that relates to alcohol education. Snook argued that this context created problems where interests of democracy clash with those of economics. As part of a wider discussion on the ideological dimensions of the way in which the subject of Technology might be taught, and where the interests of powerful business interests are furthered by silences over and a lack of critique of the ways in which their economic profits are made, among other things, at the expense of: gender, with regard to bikinis made for nine-year old girls and high heels for women; the less well off such as exploited labour and consumers internationally, and people's suffering and death due to being unable to afford prescriptions nationally, Snook noted that a critical discussion in schools and for students regarding issues related to recreational drugs with regard to tobacco and alcohol industries, would 'probably not' be as likely to take place in a marketised education system. In marketisation where the business community plays a bigger part in contributing to schools, teachers and principals are subject to the interests of the alcohol industry, or at least it would seem, one party within it, given that Lion Nathan contributes significantly to school programmes.\footnote{1456}

From a Durkheimian perspective these findings on marketisation reveal its anomic and egoistic orientation, in opposition to the cult of the individual. The emphasis on perception in parental choice of schools under dezoning is of great relevance. Education has been commodified and economised, both as a market subject to the very frailties and fickleness that, as explained, market behaviour displays. Parents’ claim that their primary concern is the education of their children, however, social issues appear to be foremost in their minds. Gordon's findings reveal the status related views of parents that underlie their spontaneous claims to quality educational practices as the primary factor in decision making. The effects of choosers’ perceptions and rejection of a diverse school mix in this way goes

against the benevolent 'cult of the individual' individualism that Durkheim advocated for. Students, separated by egoistic perceptions where parents seek insular and restricted experiences for their children and anomic attempts to get a valuable education from something as fickle as status, are neoliberally educated in a more atomistic way. It is partly through the diversity of a broad school mix that Durkheim's cult of the individual, a less ambivalent societal disinterest and sentiment, is expressed. Marketisation is another example of the malignancy and excess of social institutional neoliberal egoism and anomie, as part of a society with less solidarity and more social dissension.

The social status issues displayed in parent choice related to social facts as produced in society distinguished from the social facts produced by society which Mestrovic argued Durkheim emphasised. Parent choice over schools creates social facts produced in society where parents can choose, in an excessively individual rights based environment created, not unlike that advocated for by Buchanan, where parents can select among a number of educational providers. What is missing in this apprehension is the unconscious dimension of knowledge, those social facts produced by society, such as social differentiation between schools and students societally. Lying unconscious in the results of status driven parent choice is the selfish lower pole of homo duplex.

This is the very sort of approach that Durkheim was criticising in positivistic approaches when he criticised tendencies towards a focus on the letter as opposed to the spirit of science and the cult of truth. Management and technicist focused education evident in neoliberal governance related to curriculum reform can be seen, from a Durkheimian position, to be an adherence to the letter, not the spirit of education. This profanes the sacred representations of education and attempts to get the most, a quality education system, from the least - that is, an economically driven approach to the social fact of education. Neoliberal reform attempts to derive the moral from the amoral, an example of a society's anomie and a pathologising of its collective representations.

A possibility that follows from Thrupp's observations is that in accordance with their better off backgrounds, students attending such schools are more likely to adopt traditional views of drug use. Better off students may take on something analogous to what Connell called complicit masculinity. Better off students are more likely to be complicit in taking on normative drug use than less well off students, who in this analogy have subjectivities more like what Connell called 'protest masculinity'. Whilst less well off students might still use drugs dangerously and come into contact with school and extra school authorities for their drug use, in
taking on protest subjectivities, they also open up spaces for transformations in drug use that complicit students do not - they are more likely to drink alcohol to excess. Ensuring a good school mix might actually be a public health issue where alcohol is concerned. A school mix peer culture might provide all students with a greater diversity of experiences by way of their informal education as consumers of intoxicating commodities. With regard to alcohol, students who might otherwise become embedded in drinking relations that are part of the boozing culture, by engaging with students of different backgrounds as part of their student peer interactions, a school mix might provide students with opportunities to critically engage with and discuss alcohol consumption and related issues where socioeconomics, gender and culture are concerned. Heterogeneity between schools and homogenisation within schools might be harmful overall where alcohol in society is concerned.

With regard to alcohol issues, schools are now subject to market variables of parent concerns about their children's peers, where, as identified, parents make choices on behalf of their children with market-generated indicators such as status in mind. Schools, especially poor schools, have to market themselves as having distinctive cultures. It is not unimaginable that schools might, even if only in part, market themselves as taking a punishing stance on drugs in school. This might extend to alcoholic drugs. However, given Snook's comments on alcoholic drug industry community interests and contributions to school programmes, it might turn out to be the case that alcohol issues will be deemphasised and taught as moderation, whereas recreational drug issues would be targeted for punishment. This might cause increased harms due to alcohol abuse being deemphasised compared to other intoxicating commodities. Additionally, in wishing to establish their niche educational service provision in the market, schools might also contract in health and drug education programmes that are deemed attractive to parents.
Teacher professionalism issues

Teacher professionalism has been impacted on by neoliberalism as a representation in official government documentation encouraging choice and competition impacting on teachers and the devaluing of teachers and teaching, conflicting with an ideology of cooperation and professionalism and what Durkheim called the corporation. Governance changes impacted on teacher professionalism leading to emergent forms of emotionally managing staff, enculturing teachers to adopt certain sorts of emotional dispositions regarding their work, colleagues and students. Those dispositions can be seen as in accord with neoliberal emphases on utility and contractual rewards and punishments, leading to increased cynicism and a less authentic professionalism.

Public choice theory has been strongly implicated in the restructuring of education with regard to issues that relate to teachers as professionals. Drawing on public choice theory, Treasury applied the notion of rent seeking to educators.

*Given a centralist regime, provider interests will be served by maximising predictability, size of demand, and job security and minimising external interference, performance and measurement or other forms of quality control . . . These provider interests will find reflection in those of government administrators who will tend to welcome the predicability and smooth running produced as well as the absence of probing performance measures and unwelcome results. Provider and administrator interests will naturally strive to ensure the increments to government provision are directed at the main institutions and not at new bodies or those which are low in the pecking order of pressure groups and also that government does not force an uncomfortable pace of institutional change.*

Sullivan (1997) described the unfortunate consequences of the context created by adopting approaches like public choice theory, claiming that neoliberal policies have transformed teaching from a high trust and responsibility, to a low trust form of work.

Sullivan (1997) believed that neoliberalism in education has led to a situation where teachers are not appreciated or valued as in previous times. Sullivan believed that the recent historic devaluing of teachers in society can be linked to the neoliberal model of education where teachers have been conceived of as exhibiting provider capture (for Buchanan, rent-seeking behaviour) as self-interested, low-ranking employees in a management structure, established as part of the administration-focused reforms of Tomorrow’s Schools. Sullivan (1997) noted two ideologies regarding teachers. In one ideology people are perceived of as social, society is cooperative and egalitarian, embracing the idea of a social contract where the State provides social welfare, health and equal opportunity in a socially just way and teaching is child centred, criterion referenced, stimulating and based on a flexible curriculum. Sullivan contrasted that ideology with that of neoliberalism wherein people are presocially and irretrievably self-interested, possessive, wealth and status seeking, where society is capitalist and reducible to its individual components. The State for neoliberals should be as minimal as possible, promoting freemarket and deregulatory programmes, and teaching is the process where individuals benefit personally in the end and so should pay and compete for skills that will benefit them in a competitive employment and economic context.1458

As Thrupp noted, neoliberals do not look to school mix to explain the failures in the competitive market context of education. Neoliberals, rather, blame teachers.1459 For Sullivan, neoliberal policies’ central mission is: to promote quasi-freemarket competition between schools and free choice; excellence, often defined by school’s students examination results; decentralised schools with established management structures; a curriculum directed towards the needs of the nation’s markets, and; teachers, who focus their teaching on the needs of the market, as opposed to their current, selfish exhibition of provider capture.1460 Robertson (1998) argued that teachers’ work has increasingly been subjected to managerialist approaches that standardise and formalise what constitutes quality teaching.1461


Sullivan (1997) argued that the onslaught of neoliberal policies at first destabilised teachers but that teachers have since regrouped and have in defiance, attempted to reestablish the authority and respect as professionals that was accorded to them historically prior to the demoralising influence of neoliberalism applied to education. This movement has evolved into a new conception of the teacher as a postmodern, with an ideology of the needs of teachers (as I would say Buchanan argued teacher ideology mainly consisted of) and also (as I would say Durkheim additionally emphasised, and stressed the importance of a disinterested and irrational but moral cult of the individual) interest and concern for, their students and the wider social context. Teachers, Sullivan noted, have been active in opposing a number of neoliberal policies, most notably vouchers, deregistration of teachers, bulk-funding (renamed direct resourcing), school-contracted management staff, and performance-related pay.

Sullivan (1997) argued that teachers need to be part of a much needed system of working parties, forums and associations that can consider educational issues, from curriculum and assessment to professional equality and training, where parents and teachers can be part of a partnership, together forging a relevant and enriching educational future. This vision of education is something so much closer to that which was advocated by Durkheim, when compared to the bland, profane, overly rational and hard hearted approach advocated for in the neoliberal conception of teachers as service providers of a commodity for sale, publicly or privately in the sense implied by Buchanan. Durkheim's vision of the teacher came from his experiences and his historic and contemporary studies of education from which Durkheim concluded that education was an intense and life changing experience. Sullivan's vision for teacher ideologies in education is something akin to Durkheim's view of the corporation where teachers and parents are not locked into localised parochialism and subjectivity and competitive or antagonistic relationships with other schools, but are instead encouraged and initiated into regional and national associations, with shared practices, interests and ethics and in communication with the State.

The economically anomic is also evident in Board of Trustee management where teachers are severed from their community through accountability and other teacher-parent conflicts generated by parental misunderstanding of the emphasis.

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teachers place in their teaching and their understanding of education. Teachers, like bureaucrats are subject to postemotional collective guilt, blamed for economic failure and social problems. Interpreted as historical revisionists and ideologues they are attacked as self interested, and stifling social progress.

Hartley (1999), in one of the few published educational studies to apply Mestrovic's sociology to educational policy, examined school management issues. Hartley, in also evoking Max Weber who spoke of modernity's 'disenchantment' resulting from the 'iron cage' of an overly calculated industrial society and its 'instrumental rationality' which is relevant to bureaucratic organisations, related Mestrovic's (1997) notion of 'postemotional society' to in-school management hierarchies between heads and teachers, additional to school-parent relations. Hartley took an analytic and speculative approach to the case in Britain and especially Scotland, where after years of market-focused bureaucratic restructuring increasing local governance and seeking to enhance external marketing relationships, other market approaches of 'reculturing' were possibly making their way into internal school relationships.

Whilst noting that the emotional aspects of teaching are not entirely new, as the idea of catering the emotional needs of children goes back to the 1960s, Hartley asserted that external marketing has been an important part of restructuring education, where consumers have been co-opted into committing themselves to their children's schooling, partly by evoking emotional sentiments. Hartley noted that this is a tendency that recent research has identified as central where school advertising imagery can lead to parents' confusion and angst over school choice, sometimes influencing them over and above governmentally supported 'league tables', which in the United Kingdom rank schools by way of student pass rates on examinations. External relationship marketing in education is borrowed from industrial and commercial sectors, where emotional sentiments are utilised to increase or maintain market share, appealing to the emotions of consumers, as opposed to presenting objective evidence of their products' superiority over their competitors' products.

Internal marketing also comes from commerce and industry, where employee emotions are utilised to increase profit and customer commitments. Post-

Fordism, with its focus on employee flexibility over, and increased responsibility for
tactical decisions has been influential in affecting internal marketing. As opposed to
Fordism with its sharp distinction between work and home, where the latter was
seen as a haven from the heartlessness of the work environment, post-Fordism
attempts to deal with market uncertainty and bureaucratic approaches' difficulty in
dealing with that environment, by creating more group work, employee flexibility and
multi-tasking, enculturating employees to see their workplace as a haven and a
devotional site. This is assisted by, for instance, employers' attention to the
contracting out, or timetabling of employees' private sphere responsibilities such as
childcare, lessening their impact on workers' workplace responsibilities.

The reculturing of internal marketing in education, Hartley believed,
involves what Mestrovic identified as 'postemotional' sentiments. Mestrovic argued
that the notion of 'postmodernism' should be replaced with 'postemotionalism'
believing that it better describes the societally widespread processed, insipid and
tyranical morality of being nice to others. In postemotionalism, emotions,
where they are observable, have often been so refined through rational cognitive
processes that they can barely be recognised as emotions. The result
in education is a pseudo; quasi; or as Hartley, using Weberian terminology put it, an
'instrumental' 'sense' of re-enchantment, in the emotions of staff. Hartley
argued that a shaping of the emotions is taking place in what Hartley called
'contrived emotionality', matching Hargreaves and Dawes' (1990) notion of
contrived collegiality, emergent in government documents concerning the
characteristics required in head teaching staff. This reculturing has an emotional
core, which supplements the previous technical focus of restructuring. The central
assumption of internal marketing is that by treating employees as if they were
consumers, they will in turn do a better job of external relationship marketing with
consumers proper. Under contrived emotionality, were it to become widely

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Becomes Home.
Educational Reform: Bringing Teachers Back In.
applied, school heads and managers would be encouraged to act emotionally at work, a postemotional state where they would be expected to instrumentally use their emotions on staff. This approach, Hartley argued, may lead to increased cynicism and an expectation for senior managers to act in a way opposite to their real feelings, perhaps resulting in what Hartley called a 'disenchantment with re-enchantment'. Given Mestrovic's arguments about postemotions, were what Hartley called contrived emotionality to become part of teacher culture, starting from pre-service training, being disenchanted with enchantment is unlikely. Rather, from the postemotional perspective, it is more likely that not just school heads, but all teachers would become subjected to intensely felt, but mechanised emotions and a happy consciousness. Teacher training and schooling would become another part of the authenticity industry. Contrived emotionality could become central to education.

From the perspective of Buchanan, internal marketing is a good application of emotional human capacities to economic ends. *Homo economicus*, for Buchanan, is such that seemingly non-economic capacities can be shaped to economic ends given the appropriate, contractual or educational rewards and punishments. If school heads are aware that utilising their emotions is a requirement of their contractual obligations where non-compliance will result in censure or dismissal, their self interest will lead them to adapt their emotional behaviour accordingly. Contrived emotions can become part of professional utility maximisation.

Hartley, by comparison has utilised Mestrovic's neo-Durkheimianism well in regard to school management. I would, however, go further than Hartley and argue that contrived emotionality (a phrase which given Hartley's seeming preference for Weber could, I believe, be replaced with 'instrumental emotionality') is, from a Durkheimian perspective, a product of an educationally anomic state, wherein market mechanisms are principally used in seeking to create a high quality education system. Economically focused education, whether in terms of restructuring or reculturing, is driven by the belief that economics can increasingly and infinitely be applied to educational issues. From a Durkheimian perspective, economics is not enough. Hartley speculated that the inauthenticity of contrived emotionality in internal marketing could well lead to increased cynicism. Durkheim sought to make social life more authentic and critiqued economic apprehensions for failing to capture the best of humanity. Quality education requires the best of

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humanity, whereas economics expresses its opposite - the lower pole of *homo duplex*.

With regard to alcohol education postemotional internal marketing could come to entail staff taking on emotional orientations within the school to drug issues that are in accord with the school's external marketing. Being a professional teacher could come to entail taking on a postemotional demeanour where teachers plan their emotional responses to students presenting with or raising drug issues that will not endanger the teacher’s professional standing or schools’ reputation or marketability. Professionalism could come to entail certain internal marketing orientated emotional demeanours, which are bland, and normative, even if intensely felt by the teacher. Internal marketing could create a stultifying professional peer group where exhibiting creative and idiosyncratic responses to a student's needs with regard to alcohol would not be acceptable. Were postemotional internal marketing to become the standard in schooling and professional issues, it would be another facet of the cult of management in education, through being anomic and egoistic.
Reforming education for an enterprise culture

The notion of changing culture to be orientated towards enterprise has been increasingly applied to society for the purposes of economically advantaging the nation in competition with others. This has entailed creating a more competitive society nationally, reshaped towards business and technology. Enterprise or the competitive advantage in society is the perceived solution to comparatively internationally poor cultural and institutional practices with regard to national economics and public debt. By examining the core ideas of enterprise culture, the notion can be exposed as leading to a more selfish society. With regard to education, economically competitive practices are apparent. Education is seen as the way to enculture enterprise. A culture of individual interest and reliance, educationally reskilled in economically useful techniques is viewed as pivotal in pursuing the competitive advantage. Enterprise culture or the competitive advantage can be seen as leading to an anomic and egoistic society and education, thick with economic representations, tending to the lower pole of *homo duplex* and opposed to the cult of the individual.

As a result of teacher, parent and business complaints, education generally and here in particular, the curriculum, has undergone a number of alterations. Teachers claimed that the curriculum was inflexible and stifled teacher initiative and creativity, making the issue a part of collective contract negotiations throughout the late 1980s. Business interests were also deeply interested in having greater influence in formulations of the curriculum. Parents were concerned about whether their children's education was going to serve them well in an economy that had been severely restructured from the late 1980s forward. Interested parties' horizons had been both raised with regard to expectations, and lowered with respect to fewer opportunities in the neoliberal context.

One of the most influential studies that advocated for business having more say was Crocombe et al.'s (1991) analysis of this country's economy. Utilising contributing author Michael Porter's model for understanding economics, Crocombe et al. argued that there was a need to upgrade the 'competitive advantage' of the country. Taking a microeconomic perspective, Crocombe et al. focused on the dairy, forest products, electric fencing and software industries to explain how this country had lost its competitive advantage, and to suggest what could be done to upgrade the nation's position. Crocombe et al.'s study is relevant to education due to its repeated references to and criticisms of a number of aspects related to education, particularly the curriculum. Crocombe et al. wanted a more managerial, technological, vocational, economic, business and competitive approach to be taken
in education, arguing that social and academic interests had prevailed for too long, downgrading the competitive advantage of the nation.

Analysing the economy by way of a diamond shaped four-fold matrix developed by Porter, Crocombe et al. argued that microeconomic reform nationally should be centrally driven by the interplay of: firm strategy, structure and rivalry; demand conditions; related and supporting industries, and; factor conditions. Two further, but not central influences on Porter’s microeconomic model are government input and chance. In the main, however, the four-fold influences were, for Crocombe et al., most important in upgrading the competitive advantage.

The notion of factor conditions is related to the inputs a nation makes in upgrading its competitive advantage by way of directing available and innovatively transforming, existing human, physical and natural resources.\textsuperscript{1475}

Demand conditions refer to the nation’s consuming patterns or priorities that can lead to companies’ production of quality commodities, and can be utilised for expanding markets beyond national boundaries by anticipating trends and servicing niche markets globally.\textsuperscript{1476}

Related and supporting industries contribute to competitive advantage by way of the affect of dynamic, geographically intense, and reciprocallly serving or competitive clustered relationships, created through shared industry processes, technology, supply networks, information and so on at the national level.\textsuperscript{1477}

Firm strategy, structure and rivalry refers to the nationally relative aims, configurations and approaches to business through which nations express their internal business rivalry and competition, stimulating innovation, risk taking and effective planning, all useful for upgrading the competitive advantage in markets both nationally and globally.\textsuperscript{1478}

Chance events, through war, invention, breakthroughs and international politics and economics, influence the four factors by upsetting existing advantages held within industry.\textsuperscript{1479}

Government is an indirect influence by working alongside the four factors in encouraging, or where necessary, forcing business to pursue increasingly competitive practices nationally.\textsuperscript{1480}

To explain the model, Crocombe et al. used the example of the sport of Rugby Union, where firm strategy, structure and rivalry can be seen in the strong

competitiveness evident at all sectors of the game from schools to clubs and provincial interests, where demand conditions are the discerning rugby followers, the passion created by the national sport and the eminence of the All Black team, where related and supporting industries are the presence of Rugby League sport and the support of the Canterbury Clothing company branding (subsequently, replaced with contracts with multinational corporations). Finally in their example, Crocombe et al. saw factor conditions evident in the superior coaching, training based on scientific approaches and meteorological and geographical conditions that allow play all year around. The influences of the government and chance play peripheral roles in the Rugby example as they do in the economic case, where international series of games, international rugby boards and other interests and national government funding are concerned.\textsuperscript{1481}

Crocombe et al. argued that economically, this country exhibited a case of 'arrested development' in relying on its factor advantages driven by climate and national economic and recreational interests in sport and agriculture. This reliance, Crocombe et al. believed, had left this country's industries subject to reduced market share. When companies internationally had diversified into producing commodities, this country's businesses had traditionally focused on their factor driven ethos. Further economic development required, in Crocombe et al.'s view, the establishment of internationally successful domestic rivalry to stimulate business innovation.\textsuperscript{1482}

In each of the four factors in Porter's model, education can be implicated. Education is a factor condition through Crocombe et al.'s critique of poorly developed human resources in this country.\textsuperscript{1483} It can be inferred from Crocombe et al., that educational demand conditions and weakly related and supporting industries had not contributed to upgrading the competitive advantage.\textsuperscript{1484} Firm strategy, structure and rivalry can be related to education by way of public providers' tendency to focus on broad based non-competitive programmes as opposed to diverse and targeted courses that meet the differentiated specific needs of individual consumers.\textsuperscript{1485}

Education is relevant to Porter's approach, as Crocombe et al. implicate education in the failure of the nation to meet the demands of economics and the need to upgrade the competitive advantage. In fact it appears that for Crocombe et

al., education is pivotal to realising that objective. Microeconomic reform is the way to upgrade. In commenting on late 1980s macroeconomic reforms encapsulated in the term 'Rogernomics', named after the 1984-1990 Labour government Finance Minister, subsequently knighted Sir, Roger Douglas, Crocombe et al. argued that although Rogernomics was an approach, which tended in the correct direction, its macroeconomic focus was strategically premature. Rather, as Crocombe et al. argued, the correct approach should have been to reform domestic, internal arrangements first, and then institute the Rogernomics-style macroeconomic reforms. Education is therefore central to Crocombe et al.'s project and was something they criticised Rogernomics for, in failing to provide incentives for, or putting pressure on, individuals to update or increase their skill levels.1486

Microeconomic reform for Crocombe et al., then, relied upon the education system's changing the national culture to meet economic needs in educating students so that they learn the skills appropriate to business interests. The two central pariahs Crocombe et al. identified in education, crippling the upgrading of the competitive advantage were the emphases placed on social and academic goals in the system. Crocombe et al. referred to their pariahs of the social and academic repeatedly in their discussing various approaches to, and factors in, the upgrading of the competitive advantage.

Patterns in the economy are problematic, and are sourced in the education system, which focuses on social and not economic values.1487

Government policies reflect the expansion of what Buchanan (1975) called the productive state. For Crocombe et al. this has resulted in an education system that is not narrowly focused on economic issues.1488 Crocombe et al. were concerned about the lack of a managerial, technical and economically-focused curriculum. "A national education system that focuses on academic achievement rather than technical, scientific and managerial skills faces serious difficulties in preparing people to compete in an increasingly competitive world."1489

Crocombe et al. clearly sought increased competition in society to meet those demands. Although acknowledging that as in the health sector, raising the level of competition in education is an 'emotionally charged issue',1490 Crocombe et al. argued that internal rivalry in society can be utilised for the upgrading of the

competitive advantage. "Among the strongest empirical findings from Porter's international research is the association between vigorous domestic rivalry and the creation and persistence of competitive advantage."\(^{1491}\)

The national character, for Crocombe et al., relates to upgrading with regard to the identification of prestige and priorities that a country holds to.\(^{1492}\) Crocombe et al. bemoaned the unsuitability of the 'Kiwi' (Aotearoa/New Zealand) lifestyle for business success.

*Lifestyle considerations limit the success of some of our companies. One software entrepreneur, for example, when asked why his company had not attempted to export a product that was highly successful in New Zealand, said that he earned an acceptable living and would rather spend his weekends sailing than adapting his products for overseas markets. Such choices, though personal and understandable, constrain a company's potential to grow and develop world-class competitive advantage.*\(^{1493}\)

Crocombe et al. argued that people in this country should look to ways of capitalising on national passions for the purposes of economic profit, as "... in New Zealand {,} rugby ... is a national passion ..."\(^{1494}\) "Sport is a national passion in New Zealand ... This has assisted several New Zealand companies to produce world-class products ..."\(^{1495}\)

Crocombe, et al. also argued for greater links between schools, their students and industry. "Industry has an interest in the creation of pools of specialized skills closely related to its needs. This can be enhanced through closer interaction between local schools and involvement in curriculum development."\(^{1496}\)

Crocombe et al. argued for the increased privatisation of education to realise the reskilling of society.

The private sector could . . . play a greater role in the provision of health and education services as well as infrastructural support, areas which are currently dominated by protected state-funded entities.\(^{1497}\)

The Ministry of Education (1997) has adopted a similar position to that of Crocombe et al. "We need a creative, highly skilled, motivated and adaptable workforce that can respond innovatively and quickly to changes in the economic environment."\(^{1498}\)

The dilemma raised by tailoring education to economic demands through neoliberal educational reform is, from a Durkheimian perspective, that of fitting out the society in a garb of excessive economics and individualism by implicitly and explicitly opposing the essentially social aspects of education. Competitive advantage in society from a Durkheimian perspective creates a context filled with attending competition, individualisation, egoism, strategy and aggression. A non-economic and management skills and attitudes focused education is an important part of establishing a critical cult of the human person in the population, an irony perhaps, but none the less central perspective required in a functioning and stable democracy and economy in contemporary local, national and international contexts. However, Durkheim constantly warned of excesses in competition and its dangerous products of anomie and egoism, anarchy and disease. Advancing the competitive advantage is a neoliberal approach not that unlike Buchanan's in its excessively individualistic focus on competitive ethics and habits in society. Crocombe et al. sought to institutionalise and enculture competition and individualism. Durkheim saw similar approaches to society in his milieu as anomie and egoism, or as Mestrovic believed, a leaning towards fostering the selfish pole of homo duplex and an approach Durkheim deplored for its unleashing of destructive forces in the individual and society. Crocombe et al. could be seen as postemotionally laying the economic and the rational over the social and emotional

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aspects of life, cognitively filtering and manufacturing emotions for the purpose of economic profit, or as Durkheim put it, attempting to get the most from the least.

Crocombe et al. argued that the culture of this country, wherein people are too casual in their attitude to their economic and business affairs in not attending to issues if they conflict with family or lifestyle affairs, leads to poor attention to business maintenance and development. Porter et al. also critiqued this country's culture of applying criticism where merit should actually be accorded. Crocombe et al. thought that an easy going attitude to life and a critiquing of others' success were two factors inhibiting advancing competition. Those criticisms are of interest with regard to anomie.

From a Durkheimian perspective, the 'Kiwi lifestyle' with its tendency to adopt a 'laid back' attitude, coupled with a 'tall poppy syndrome' and 'knocking machine' with regard to curbing individual success can be somewhat socially beneficial. Being easy going establishes a tempering of economic factors in life, by pursuing recreational activities. With regard to tempering individuals' excessive tendencies, in keeping successful people integrated into culture by way of reminding the successful (and the unsuccessful) that success does not distinguish one societally from others, the tall poppy syndrome is not necessarily, simply or only a negative social and moral practice, but could also, or rather, be a force that contains the individual's lower pole tendency to selfishness, egoism, and arrogance, by emphasising instead the social, collective, consensual, and peaceable pole of homo duplex.

Crocombe et al. opted for the social planning evident in their advocating for the consensual changing of cultural and individual behaviours towards adopting a specifically economically orientated society. "A turnaround will have to be driven by thousands of individuals behaving differently in their firms, schools, unions, industry associations and government agencies."1499 Crocombe et al. clearly saw the need for the establishment of competitive processes and practices in industry, skills based and economically useful vocationalism, a technological and scientifically emphasised, marketised and privatised education system.

Crocombe et al.'s approach utilised nationally, what Durkheim called collective representations, to advance their argument for microeconomic reform. It could be argued, however, from a Durkheimian perspective that Crocombe et al.'s use is part of the dereglement of representations associated with neoliberalism. Throughout their work, Crocombe et al. made constant references to sport with respect to economics. As Crocombe et al. argued, and probably quite correctly,

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sport, particularly rugby, is what they called a national passion. The All Blacks rugby team has totemic quasi-sacred status in this country, considered from a Durkheimian perspective. The confused, deranged mistake Crocombe et al. made, when considered from a Durkheimian perspective, was in assuming that the collective representations of sport, are equally meaningful in the context of economics. From a Durkheimian perspective this is not so. Rather, Crocombe et al.'s dereglement of representations is a recipe for increased anomie, in mixing the nation's totem: quasi-sacred representations of sport, with those of the profane: economics. Sport and business are not the same. Sport evokes completely different ideas and sentiments from the passions and thinking evident in business. Business involves people's financial livelihoods, whilst sport, in the main and experientially for most, is recreational with an accompanying comparatively friendly even bonding feeling and idea about it. Business, by comparison and in the main, is not friendly. Its very nature is forceful, hard, unfriendly, selfish, and inauthentic.

For example, workers and employers in a firm might collectively share some feelings not unlike those that sports club members share, but this coalescence is superficial only, as in the case of the firm, each individual, due to the individualisation fostered by the neoliberal economic context, is driven by particularised interests and imperatives. Sports club members often labour without pay for the good of their club, employees do not, nor should they, from a Durkheimian perspective. Such an approach would lead to more social injustice, where the stronger, in this case employers, would get the 'lions share' of the benefits of production by exploiting dead emotions for economic profit. This applies particularly to the neoliberal social context where workers and persons are individualised in the sense that collective aspects to work are deemphasised, even spurned, by labour relations and legislation.

The revolutionary view of culture held by Crocombe et al. would, in their view, require an ongoing program that can from a Durkheimian perspective, be seen as an instance of morality as it appears only, that is, as sourced in the economic, as opposed to the moral as it should really be or should be becoming in terms of the cult of the individual. From this perspective, advancing the competitive advantage is a long term policy and programme seeking to radically alter fundamental representations in society so that their pivot and direction is economic.

*We need to rebuild the base of our economy from the ground up so that we can compete successfully in today's global economy. Competitive advantage is*
Education is central to this programme of rearranging the collective representations of society so that they dovetail with economic planning. By adopting an approach that has the long term goal of inserting the economic into people's lives, Crocombe et al. clearly advocate for the rearrangement of education, or the derangement of representations, from a Durkheimian view, so that business, vocationalism and technology become central in the education of people in this country.

Crocombe et al.'s study, with regard to education is another example of the cult of management. Despite using the language of social goals, shared futures and collective interests, Crocombe et al. fundamentally, through their economic formulations, relied on individualisation, competition and management. That reliance is opposite to the social necessities of the sort Durkheim discussed in seeking to make society more peaceable. Promoting an excess in competition - perhaps an unavoidable outcome of a study with a title such as theirs, Crocombe et al. opted for what can be interpreted as an anomic and egoistic apprehension of society and economy, a recipe for excess, greed, as well as societal and self destruction.

Despite these shortcomings, Crocombe et al.'s study has been received, particularly by neoliberal political advocates, as a landmark in constructively dealing with this country's situation in the world economic context. From a Durkheimian perspective, such a reception is not surprising, given the widespread societal dereglement of representations both nationally and internationally through neoliberalism.

Crocombe et al.'s perspective, viewed through a Durkheimian approach, is aligned with the dereglement of representations in neoliberalism that has come to be called enterprise culture. Enterprise culture is an approach to reforming societies by seeking to persuade citizens to adopt new economically relevant ways of perceiving themselves and their social context. Enterprise culture is a neoliberal construct of the self and society, a perspective that shares a number of characteristics with the perspective of Buchanan. Enterprise culture and competitive advantage are synonymous aspects of neoliberalism.

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Enterprise culture is the term given to the neoliberal vision of a culture of business and economically centered thinking. Emanating from the context of the late 1980's Thatcherite United Kingdom, enterprise culture is a notion that seeks to transform society so that financial, management and vocational issues are placed at the forefront of thinking. Enterprise culture has been imported into this country as part of the neoliberal approach to dealing with various societal issues. The concept of enterprise culture, applied to society has serious ramifications for formal education as will be later explained and explored. However, to broadly relate and contextualise the notion for present purposes, informal and wider societal manifestations of enterprise culture will be examined here.

Abercrombie and Keats’ (1991, edited) *Enterprise Culture* studied various manifestations of the notion in society. On the individual level, Heelas has argued that the morality of the enterprising individual is a mixture two poles of apprehending the self, as a prioritised 'sovereign consumer' and 'enterprising self' founded on 'utilitarian individualistic' assumptions, blended with a polarised opposite appeal to an authoritative and occasionally, collective, view of human nature encapsulated in the view of the 'active citizen' and the 'conservative self'. This self-interested view of the self in enterprise culture, is supposed to be balanced by a polarised, collective view of selfhood. "Presentations of the active citizen . . . are basically aimed at criticizing selfish individualism." Related to the active citizen is the " . . . the 'conservative self', defined in terms of those 'traditional' virtues that specify how people should understand and lead their lives. This mode is often spoken of in connection with education, in the family and at school." Neoliberalism, then, seeks to reformulate individuals and society so that each can be better applied to economic goals, where the egoistic and prioritised enterprising and consuming self is to be balanced by the active citizen and conservative self.

Drawing on the perspectives of Tipton (1982), and Bellah et al. (1985), Heelas concluded that it is uncertain that an economically interested but socially responsible citizen would result from enterprise culture's vision of the ideal citizen. Rather, Heelas argued, an excessively hedonistic and anarchic selfhood is an
equally possible, if not more likely outcome from an enterprise culture that essentially pivots on a form of radical individualism and individual wealth creation. Incidentally, Bellah's scholarship is mostly sympathetic towards Durkheim, but Mestrovic has identified Bellah as neoconservative. This is problematic from a Durkheimian perspective. Heelas directly cited Durkheim's (1898) 'Individualism and the intellectuals' which appeared in Bellah's (1973, edited) collection. Had Heelas drawn on Durkheim's (1914) sequel to The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, which explains the notion of human nature as homo duplex and which is also contained in Bellah's (1973) collection, the central points of his chapter in Enterprise Culture would, I believe, have been clearer.

Nonetheless, Heelas, through his application of Tipton's and Bellah's approach, evoked a Durkheimian perspective and critique of the enterprising self. The duality of human nature Heelas interpreted in enterprise culture, is reminiscent of homo duplex and its lower pole, evident in Buchanan's universal application of homo economicus to social and cultural institutions and actions.

From the Durkheimian standpoint, the enterprising/sovereign self is the egoistic, base, amoral, subjective, organismic, sensory pole of life interested in self preservation and living, whereas the active citizen/conservative self is the socially poled, communicative, complex, truer, constructed, conceiving personhood. From a Durkheimian perspective it would appear that, as Heelas argued, the enterprising/sovereign self when emphasised as much as it is enterprise culture is jammed with its opposite and treated as if the two are symbiotic, or, as if the active/citizen is the outcome of its opposites' free expression. There appears to be a privileging of the egoistic pole in the way enterprise culture is applied to the self. The enterprising/sovereign self is egoistic as it focuses on the individualisation of action, whether it be for oneself or for others in the ethically egoistic sense. The enterprising/sovereign self can be interpreted as anomic because, due to its being identified as the source of the active citizen/conservative self, it seeks to derive morality from profane phenomena. For Durkheim, such foolish arrangements unleash base forces of the egoistic, irrational pole of homo duplex leading to anarchic and sick societies, institutions, ideas, feelings and individuals. As MacDonald and Coffield (1991) noted Williamson (1990) put it in commenting on the

second half of the twentieth century: "It is not that people have become more selfish: rather it is that selfish behaviour has become more necessary."

Neoliberalism evokes the selfish aspects of human nature, as Durkheim interpreted it. However, from Buchanan's sort of perspective, the enterprising/sovereign self is the naturally constituted and justly prioritised *homo economicus*, seeking to maximise the self's utility. In a context where individuals can compete fairly, free from their dependence on the State and welfare, obedience to moral and other rules, charitable thinking and respect for others will follow. People, for Buchanan, might choose to act ethically. For instance, Brennan and Buchanan noted Adam Smith's eighteenth century evocation of the notion of how important morality and caring for others is. However, that is always secondary to Buchanan's, and, Smith's basic appeal to a human nature that acts economically regarding utility - a human nature that is *homo economicus*. The active citizen/conservative self is the product of a constitutionally just social context where rights and obligations are clear cut, focused and reducible to individuals.

Heelas was commenting on 1980s Thatcherite British formulations of cultural reformation. However, enterprise culture is not a phenomenon restricted to that culture specifically. In fact, it is this very vision of a conservative and individualistic self and society, balanced by a commitment to others that the advocates for an enterprise culture in this country have argued for. Business interest groups are particularly notable for their support for the notion of enterprise culture. The New Zealand Business Roundtable in 1993 published *Towards an Enterprise Culture*, a collection of 34 numerous speeches, as well as submissions and articles mostly authored by its Executive Director, Roger Kerr in the period August 1992 to April 1993. In that collection, the cultural revolution that is enterprise culture, is clearly articulated, as is the view of the self explained and critiqued by Heelas and relevant to the perspectives of Durkheim and Buchanan.

Kerr (1993) explicitly cited a number of neoliberal tenets in defending the notion of enterprise culture. Kerr cited Adam Smith's view as support for a society that focuses on individuals' moral agency. "The market is inseparable from a wider vision of a society of thinking, valuing, choosing and morally responsible people." For Kerr, selfishness and exploitation are part of the human condition,
not tendencies that are created by capitalism. Kerr argued that it is important therefore that people separate the ideas of market and greediness. For Kerr, selfishness and greed are "... symptoms of a moral malaise to which individuals in any socio-economic system can succumb." Kerr argued that business and capitalism tends towards honesty, trustworthiness, effort, fairness in exchange, and efficient servicing.

With regard to the institution of education Myers (1993) argued that an enterprise culture would require further devolution and marketisation. Although not advocating outright privatisation, Myers argued that state schools should have greater autonomy over management, the curriculum, standards and teacher pay issues. Failing state schools should be allowed to close, and private schools should be funded to the same amounts and through the same mechanism as their state counterparts by way of vouchers, tax break or the existing system being expanded to all schools.1513

Some private and state schools have moved towards pursuing the competitive advantage in adopting innovative and enterprising ways of raising funds themselves. One of those approaches is with regard to selling educational services to foreign citizens and their children. This is an innovative and enterprising approach to dealing with globalisation in the sphere of education. The schooling of foreign full-fee-paying students (hereafter FFFPS) is essentially about the 'exporting' of particularly secondary education, by way of the knowledge and qualifications purchased and earned by foreign citizens studying at school in this country. Dale and Robertson (1997) raised their concerns over FFFPS in state schools. Dale and Robertson argued schools utilise FFFPS to make up shortfalls in their budgets. Figures published in 1995 indicated that schools were funded to 69.6% by the state. The rest of the funding was to be generated by schools. With 60 per cent of secondary schools reporting that they were experiencing deficits, the schooling of FFFPS makes economic sense1514 when the average amount charged for the tuition of a FFFPS is $7,500. Most of the nearly 4,000 FFFPS students enrolled in 1995 were from Asian nations. The case of marketing education for consumption by international students was advocated for by the Ministry of Education.

Education itself has an increasingly international focus. As more overseas students come to New Zealand and more New Zealanders undertake some education overseas, there are opportunities for international economic, social and cultural alliances.

The tuition of FFFPS is a response to a globalised economic context that fits in with local neoliberal representations of innovative fundraising, and management. This response to globalisation has, as Dale and Robertson pointed out, implications for national education issues. Dale and Robertson (1997) noted that 'funding, provision, and regulation' are the three sides to education organised by way of institutions or through 'state, market and 'community'. Dale and Robertson argued that in the context of other educational reforms in this country, the approach of community representatives who manage fundraising by way of schooling FFFPS could partially undermine the State's responsibility to maintain its position of being accountable for public provision within, as opposed to being simply a regulator of what has become a market in education.

Dale and Robertson raised some pertinent points that are relevant to considering the impact on public schooling, funding, regulation and provision as a result of enterprise in education.

I would like to examine another facet of this tendency as although noting the issue of State underfunding of schools that leads to the marketing of education for consumption by FFFPS, the moral dimension with regard to students, teachers and community is somewhat muted in Dale and Robertson's analysis. From a Durkheimian perspective, moral issues are both centrifugal and centripetal.

Centripetally, FFFPS could lead to teacher professional problems, as well as potentially xenophobic responses on the part of students and the community. Teachers in state schools could become mindful of the economic dimension that is part of a FFFPS' attendance in their classes. The economic dimension could lead to teachers paying extra attention to FFFPS, due to their possible concern and awareness that a student who is paying is a student who can complain with more

justification. Another issue is the case in some secondary schools in particular where school management, to provide a niche commodity to distinguish itself from other FFFPS servicing educational providers, have established English as a second language departments to cater for the needs of FFFPS. It might be that the staff contracted there, often with advanced qualifications over their 'normal' classroom teachers are paid comparatively high salaries and experience very good work conditions in teaching students conversation English. This possible situation could lead to conflictual teacher collegial interactions, as regular classroom teachers might be paid less and yet have to deal with large class sizes and all the accompanying control and assessment issues therein, whilst their English as a second language colleagues could possibly be paid more and have comparatively better work conditions due to their taking small classes, justified by for instance pedagogical reasons and that FFFPS' parents pay significant financial costs for their education.

The other centripetal moral issue is that raised by parents in the community who may, despite recognising that taking on FFFPS is good for their children's school due to the revenue raised, feel resentment towards FFFPS. That resentment might be communicated to their children and passed onto FFFPS in the form of bullying or racist slurs.

With regard to the centrifugal dimension, particularly with respect to alcohol, the market in FFFPS is a dimension of enterprise in education that takes a highly rational approach to schooling foreign students ignoring the emotional issues raised by economically driven decision of schools to teach FFFPS. FFFPS might be placed in schools without any other institutional or organisational support. FFFPS are not on exchange programmes that are institutionally and organisationally structured and sensitive to the needs of young people in a foreign country. Some FFFPS' parents do not accompany their children to this country as they remain in their home nation due to work responsibilities. The potential for FFFPS to become or remain detached from the 'communities' that they enter as students and foreign nationals is enormous. The experience of cultural difference is an inevitable occurrence for those students as they struggle not just with language and classroom practice differences, but also social practices of their peers. Alcohol practices might be one of those differences. Some Asian cultures do not utilise alcohol in the cultural sense compared to the way alcohol is imbedded in the culture of this country. In some Asian countries, alcohol is morally and religiously repugnant.
Secondary FFFPS, due to legislative changes regarding the drinking age are now more likely to encounter alcohol as part of their social context whilst studying in this country. For FFFPS from cultures and nations that prohibit alcohol these could be disturbing and emotional experiences, as could alcohol education programmes if attended. Governments neoliberally think they can import students to be educated without attempting to deal with these sorts of issues, which are raised by pursuing the competitive advantage in national and global contexts. This facet of enterprise culture in education reflects postemotionalism in its attempt to lay the imperatives of economics over issues of culture in the belief that the emotions can be dealt with rationally and cognitively.

Enterprise culture in the curriculum is another aspect of education that can be critiqued from a Durkheimian perspective. Myers reported that his company Lion Nathan (at that point) had established links with Avondale College formulating programmes to motivate students, give them contacts with business, work experience and mentoring programmes for students who were at risk. Myers believed that the curriculum needed to be altered to deal with such school and business connections, by catering to the individual needs of students by providing academic, vocational and technical streams. Comprehensive schooling, Myers believed does not produce the sorts of workers needed in the contemporary economic context.1517

Education has in this way been seen as one of the central ways in which to realise this cultural revolution to match that which has taken place in the economic sphere. The notion of enterprise culture implicitly appealed to by Crocombe et al., explicitly advocated for by the NZBR and critiqued, in the context of the United Kingdom by Heelas, had been subsequently adopted by this country’s former National Party led government in formulating its curriculum reforms through the Ministry of Education’s New Zealand Curriculum Framework, administered by the Ministry’s New Zealand Qualifications Authority (hereafter NZQA).

Marshall (1997) made a number of criticisms of the Ministry of Education’s NZQA that centrally regard reforms as business based approaches to apprehending education.

Marshall critiqued the NZQA’s stringent alignment of education with economic and business interests, exploring curriculum and qualifications reforms through the concepts ’busnocratic rationality’ and ’busno-power’, influenced by Weber and Foucault respectively to critique the neoliberal view of human nature and

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society in which people are perceived as autonomous choosers constantly adapting to various consumer markets. The notion of busno-power is derived from Foucault's (1980, p.139) concept of 'bio-power' which Foucault applied in explaining the way in which societal activities are organised to transform and shape individuals and populations so that they are more docile and pliant. Busnocratic rationality is an alternative working of the originally Weberian 'technocratic rationality', and is a way of thinking, a rationalisation of societal and individual activity founded on business-based knowledge and skills, reflected in a number of societal philosophies, attitudes and practices where business orientations increasingly dominate areas of social life generally and permeate education in particular.

Marshall (1997) believed that the neoliberal view of people can be summed up in the notion of the individual as an autonomous chooser. Earlier in collaboration with Michael Peters and in commenting on public choice theory, Marshall related the notion to busnocratic thinking, regarding it similarly to Lyotard (1993), a poststructuralist who critiqued economics and 1960s technocratic educational reforms in France as fraudulent. The autonomous chooser, Marshall (1997) believed is presented as constantly consuming, free thinking and able to decide between choices presented. Marshall implied that the notion of the autonomous chooser is a neoliberal discourse which views and constructs the individual as an effect, perpetually having to choose, and then act. For Marshall, the autonomous chooser is a myopic and accepting principle of existence, shunning other possible life activities people might choose to take. “It seems to be part of one's self to be making continuous consumer-style choices.”

Marshall argued that in the social environment created by neoliberalism, education is focused on a business-based values system that determines the choices that are made available to students, therefore imbuing students with those business ideas, shaping the population and making it more pliant with regard to adopting activities that are socially useful for national economic planning.

Marshall's approach is similar to the view Durkheim held to in describing what he observed and thought were societally questionable and hazardous individualised social forms of thought and action in his time. Marshall's Foucauldian busno-power, Weberian and Lyotardian busnocratic rationality and Deweyan democracy and problem solving philosophical and practical quartet, can be said to

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share with Durkheim,\textsuperscript{1521} his stressing, in the face of increased technological change and economic demands for an increasingly workplace-prepared educational graduate, that students needed a balancing of the natural sciences and the social sciences. Making people into consumers is a way to create more anomie and egoism. Although acknowledging that some vocationalism in education was required, Durkheim did argue for a general and very liberal humanist and scientific technical education to be provided for all students nationally. Durkheim, like Marshall, and Dewey, opposed economistic and individualist approaches to education.

As a sociologist of knowledge, Durkheim warned of economically-based approaches to apprehending people and society, relating them to anomic and egoistic practices. Similarly to Marshall's references to Dewey's liberal humanism, from a Durkheimian perspective, partially by way of what Marshall called busnocratic rationality, social democratic liberalism is broken down.

The neoliberal view of the autonomous chooser is the very sort of individualism that Durkheim opposed in his advocating an institutionally integrative professionalisation of a number of social activities. Rather than accepting and enshrining the notion of individual as a consuming, deliberating, isolated actor, Durkheim sought to establish and enhance the quality of social activities so that people would be more attracted towards participating in them.

The 'autonomous chooser' Marshall described is the very sort of individual apprehension of society and the individual that Buchanan described. The autonomous chooser symbolises the rational utility maximising activities of \textit{homo economicus} Buchanan applied in his methodologically individualistic approach to apprehending various institutions. The autonomous chooser is the individual for a society that embraces the cult of management.

The Durkheimian critique of the cult of management is similar to those raised by the notions of busno-power and busnocratic rationality in critiquing the 'businessification' of individual and social life. An increasing demand is being placed on people's individual responsibility for their management of their often complex, unpredictable and concerning affairs regarding, health, income, accident compensation, welfare and, education. In terms of the individualisation of the cult of management, anomie and egoism result from the uncertainty created by an

\textsuperscript{1521} Marshall's approach in utilising these thinkers could also be analysed as displaying a number of pertinent differences when compared with Durkheim. The confines of space unfortunately preclude an analysis of that sort. My point here is that Durkheim clearly critiqued economically centered apprehensions of society. In that sense, Durkheim and Marshall appear to share some general philosophical beliefs with regard to the social construction of individuals and society.
entrenched morbidity and malaise in an environment that fervently practices the 'rituals' of management on a wider societal scale - entering into most parts of life. Just as individuals are expected to manage their own affairs more and more, the same can be said of most institutional areas of society today. I think an unanswered question is that regarding, where this morbid effervescence in the neoliberal cult of management is leading, both societally and individually.

The Technology Curriculum (1993; 1995\textsuperscript{1522}) considered in the context of enterprise culture, raises issues of relevance to alcohol education, from Durkheimian perspectives. The emergence of a globalisation of what can be considered economic anomie through laissez-faire internationalised economics is part of the Post-Fordist context in which alcohol education, in this modernised, postcolonial society, is embedded.

O'Neill and Jolley (1996/1997) argued that the subject of technology has found its way into the curriculum by way of a simultaneous marginalisation of self produced foodstuffs, deskilling all students, as part of a reentrenchment of the view that women's work is irrational, and through promoting commercialism, consumerism and neoliberalism as a result.\textsuperscript{1523}

O'Neill and Jolley adopted a neo-Marxist feminist position by incorporating Habermas' perspective into their feminist standpoint, examining this country's historical and contemporary framing of, in the main, gender exclusive subjects and capacities. O'Neill and Jolley applied their perspective to the subject of domestic science, or what has come to be called food technology,\textsuperscript{1524} examining the topic in schools, in the context of enterprise culture. Acknowledging that this country has borrowed the notion from the United Kingdom's late 1980s Conservative government, O'Neill and Jolley outlined how enterprise culture, which economically and socially requires an expanded commercialisation of culture and a changed way of thinking about business and its character, also sets out to oppose institutional practices that seek to moderate the market. Education, along with welfare and unionism\textsuperscript{1525} is one of those institutions and relates to the commercialisation of

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culture and thinking about business. Reflecting this thinking, in the United Kingdom, teachers were critiqued for being historical revisionists and ideologues, fostering poor student discipline and participating in social engineering\textsuperscript{1526} - all which are themes developed by Buchanan, and which were also reflected in Crocombe et al.'s critical view of social values based education.

O’Neill and Jolley, in agreement, noted Morrison's claim that enterprise culture affected the United Kingdom's food studies in the education system, where the formation of Conservative government's introduced National Curriculum meant that the subject of home economics was no longer a stand alone subject, but was instead, spread throughout foundational and core subjects. In that context, food preparation was absorbed particularly into technology, food became part of the subject of science with regard to nutrition, and a resource or industry in the subjects of geography, history and technology,\textsuperscript{1527} despite National Association of Teachers of Home Economics (NATHE) argument in an open letter to the then Secretary of State that their subject taught life management, home safety, self reliance, wariness of hazards, analysis of skills, life preparation and problem solving. The Minister's response was that these were "wildly inflated claims" for the teachers to make.\textsuperscript{1528}

Turning to this country's development of its Technology Curriculum O'Neill and Jolley were very critical of the place that food now has. Given that it is only one of the seven areas among those of: materials, information and communication, electronic and control, biotechnology, production and process, structures and mechanisms, all which are optional to teachers and schools contextualised within an environment of competition between schools, "... attitudes held by Boards (many of whom are dominated by males) ...", and the historical legacy of the different positioning of women's and men's interests in education, the further marginalisation of this subject seemed likely to O'Neill and Jolley. The curriculum document itself advocated an increased linkage both in practice, and in the disposition of the subject with regard to the fostering of associations between


commercialism, creativity, specialisation, enterprise, problem solving and the business community. As well as citing examples from the earlier draft versions of the curriculum which commercially related food specifically in stating how five to seven year old students could examine ice block wrappers and design wrappers themselves, and how the final draft also advocated that students learn how to produce, package, promote and undertake market research within the school. O’Neill and Jolley quoted how the final curriculum document applied enterprise generally to education.

Economically, students learn to be creative and innovative in generating ideas, and to co-operate in working to translate their ideas into action. They gain skills, knowledge, and competencies that equip them to undertake many activities and to continue (to contribute) to New Zealand’s social and economic development. They have opportunities for interactions with business and industry that help them to understand and adapt to a rapidly changing world and to take a confident part in shaping the future.

Enterprise culture in education, for O’Neill and Jolley, has changed how students are able to approach food studies, reducing their education of how to prepare and cook foodstuffs, to merely one of several ways that it can be presented, as the focus was now on "... understanding and using safe and reliable processes for producing, preparing, presenting and storing food and the development, packaging, and marketing of foods." O’Neill and Jolley argued that contemporary production of foodstuffs has not led to increased production in quantity but rather the market production of more complex and competing processed foodstuff items, and, more expensive but not necessarily more useful,


nutritious or healthy food than the simple but sustaining food prepared by people themselves. The focus is often on processed foods and the benefits of increased consumer choice and expanded markets. Increasing market share and overall market growth relies on more consumers coming on stream. Deskilling the population’s ability to produce their own food serves this aim. This, O'Neill and Jolley argued, leads to less choice for students, who in the future, due to their deskilling, will not be able to opt for producing their own food.¹⁵³³

Hands-on preparation of food from readily available materials is deemphasised by enterprise education as food becomes commercialised, as a product, as market related, as processed, and as manufactured - part of a restructuring of society that goes beyond the changes in production, consumption and the deskilling of food preparation, as it assumes a particular perspective of people and society, as rational market view of choosers and consumers.

Food studies students in this environment are transformed from learners in home based cooking, to learners in market based demand, production and commercialism.¹⁵³⁴ With regard to the practical case of the deskilling of people with regard to their ability to produce their own food through market and consumerist approaches to apprehending food, O'Neill and Jolley's study of enterprise culture is highly relevant to alcohol education. Where alcohol consumed in the private sphere is concerned, when people are less able to produce their own food, they are unable to provide themselves with nutritional supplements to accompany and counter their consumption of alcohol. Food is usually recommended as an accompaniment to alcohol as a health and enjoyment issue, tasting better through clearing the palate and the perceived mixtures of food and alcohol experienced, as well being a matter of health, as food consumed with alcohol soaks up the alcohol slowing its absorption into the digestive system and can supplement the body with vitamins and minerals depleted through the toxic effects of alcohol.

Where people are deskilled in their ability to produce their own food and are forced to rely on more expensive processed food in the way O'Neill and Jolley (1996/1997) explained the case, it could be argued that people's health is put at risk through an inability to ensure, as would more likely be the case if food studies remained a stand alone subject, that people would be sufficiently educated and able to produce their own nutritious food to accompany their alcohol consumption.

Initially, the onset of intoxication is sped up and people are at risk with regard to physical and mental coordination if alcohol is consumed without food. In the short term, negative after effects of consumption are more likely due to the toxicity of alcohol stripping the body of minerals and vitamins, leaving consumers with headaches, irritability, hypersensitivity and other symptoms associated with a 'hangover', not to mention the public and private violence and property, driving, and risk taking activities related to highly alcoholically intoxicated people's activities. There are also long term health risks of alcohol consumption under these conditions with regard to liver, heart and other organ damage.

Neoliberalism's use of history and culture to reform micro contextual individual, institutional, economic and social philosophy and practice is evident in the case of enterprise culture. Business orientated and technologically capable in their approach to knowledge and skills, enterprise educational graduates will be able to set up small businesses and competently compete with local and global interests by being flexible, innovative and hard working moral persons for whom limits are only those of the mind as opposed to size, or place.

An enterprise education, society and culture from a Durkheimian perspective where alcohol education is concerned, involves the creation of students who are versed uncritically in managerial and economic techniques, uninformed about the social affects of macronomic changes, or the excessive risks taken and not rewarded, by adopting enterprising habits and sentiments. Selfish and competitive to the point of distrusting in other people, cultures and social institutions, enterprising individuals might be candidates for expressing society's anomie and egoism, as excessive and unhealthy consumers of an increasingly diverse range of alcoholic drug products - responses to an environment that detaches them from others, and fosters the idea that economic success is the imperative factor in life. Enterprise in education represents the cult of management. Enterprise culture is anomic and egoistic.
**Teacher education and competencies**

Neoliberal reforms regarding teacher education and competencies question the view of social justice and the relevance of extra-school state sector services to teaching. Teacher competencies in neoliberalism are concerned with local consumer and other market correct orientations. By comparison, whilst reflective practice approaches to teacher training and competencies can be critiqued for having pragmatist and subjectivist orientations, when viewed from Durkheimian perspectives, reflective practice does entail some consideration of matters beyond the market. This approach also entails viewing sexuality and drug education as relevant to teacher education and competencies.

Teacher education and competencies can be approached by studying trends and forms in this area, where different approaches to pre service teacher education changes and differences in this country, as well as where drug alcohol and sexuality issues are concerned internationally. The approach currently accepted is derived from pragmatism and advocates for a view of teachers as reflective practitioners. That liberal social democratic view of teachers and teacher training is in competition with neoliberal views that seek to institute increased choice in teacher education. Teacher education from the neoliberal view needs to be further liberalised and unshackled from its social democratic, feminist, and Maori focused limitations.

As part of the educational reforms teacher training underwent a number of deregulatory changes driven by concerns such as that the school aged population was going to drop over time meaning fewer teachers would be needed. It was decided that 1986 intake was to be the last group of pre-service student teachers to be guaranteed bonded employment in the years following their graduation from Teachers College (the former name for Colleges of Education). The ritual of training and teaching were lost in this reform wherein the Durkheimian corporate view of institutional practices were concerned. Graduate student teachers were devalued by a sort of proletarianisation, or from a Durkheimian position a profaning, of primary and secondary teaching that has been reflective of the anomic and egoistic changes that are part of the neoliberal context. Teacher training was to become governed by the market like other areas in the tertiary sector. Treasury made their neoliberal view clear with respect to tertiary education, reflecting Buchanan and Devletoglou's (1970) perspective.

1535. Butterworth, G. & Butterworth, S. (1998). Reforming Education: The New Zealand Experience. (5th page into Chapter 2, ff. 10) pointed out that in the 1980s, the belief that educational staffing, as well as other resourcing needs for the future were few, which although comforting at the time, led to enormous difficulties for the government in the mid 1990s.
The adaptability of the tertiary sector may be assisted by: - removing central government controls and mechanisms, so that tertiary institutes are free-standing bodies, self-steering in a market place which is contestable; each institution would be a profit centre though with freedom to decentralise profit centers to faculty or departmental level or to form alliances (subject to the usual monopoly control considerations) with other institutions; each institute would have to live with the consequences of its own decisions . . . \(^{1536}\)

In Europe there has been discussion over the issue of what approaches and knowledge trainees should be aware. In that context there has been discussion over whether trainees should be trained in one particular approach, with possible drawbacks that teachers might not be able to diversify, or indeed, even be aware that they hold to a perspective. The alternative argument advanced is that were teachers trained in various approaches, the possible negative outcome might be that teachers' knowledge of any particular approach would be diluted. \(^{1537}\) In Australia, competency is assessed in terms of teachers in-training performance in classrooms, regardless of excellence intellectually. \(^{1538}\)

Also in Australia, there have been conflicts in discussions over teacher education, where support for professionalisation, emerging from universities, where most training has been based, and backed by school systems, schools, unions, and professional organisations, are in opposition to economic rationalist approaches (the Australian term often used to refer to neoliberalism) which advocate for the deprofessionalisation of teacher education. \(^{1539}\) This neoliberal tendency was also briefly enacted in this country in the early 1990s when legislation was passed and later rescinded allowing unregistered teachers to educate in compulsory schooling.

In Aotearoa/New Zealand, commentators have critiqued government intentions to increase in-school training for pre-service teachers, arguing that

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Trainees have often already spent many years in schools and tertiary institutions, and need, as part of their education, to be learning more about the role of teachers. This point is very relevant from the Durkheimian position. As I have noted, Durkheim repeatedly discussed and argued for a greater understanding and interrogation of the role of the teacher in society.

There has been some further commentary on training programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The Auckland College of Education (hereafter ACE) three year programme offers students a choice of a wide range of papers in an open ended way that suit students' particular aims and goals in their search for a well rounded view of professionalisation. This approach has been critiqued for leading to students choosing papers that suit their travel and timetable circumstances as opposed to their professional needs. In contrast to that approach, a professional programme involves a specific education designed by providers with particular goals and outcomes, as well as commitments, ethics, objectives and values in mind. Durkheim would favour the second of these approaches through his focus on the importance of participants' necessary initiation into understanding and valuing the beliefs, discipline and practices relevant to their profession or corporation. By comparison, the ACE programme is reminiscent of the Renaissance education Durkheim ({1938} 1977) critiqued for its subjectivism and by implication, anomie and egoism.

In the United Kingdom, tertiary teacher education institutions pass up to 25 per cent of their funding onto schools to contribute to the length of time student teachers are expected to spend in classrooms there. As an example of what is the general case in the United Kingdom, the University of Oxford, in partnership with the Oxfordshire Local Education Authority promotes a policy where students experience a long internship in one school with the intention that they will understand that particular school's culture. In the United Kingdom the last twenty years has seen a rhetorical rather than actual movement from describing practicing teacher training from in-service training and staff development, to the term 'professional development', wherein teachers focus on the development of their craft, as well as teachers' knowledge and reflection in the paradigm in which

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in-service and trainee intern teachers share and test their perspectives pursuing the pragmatic vision of teachers as being 'reflective practitioners'\textsuperscript{1544}

The notion of the reflective practitioner is problematic from a Durkheimian perspective. Although Durkheim did leniently regard Dewey in comparison to his pragmatist peers, especially James, Durkheim's lectures on pragmatism clearly identify that approach to knowledge as contrary to what he called the cult of truth. Durkheim saw pragmatism as reducing knowledge to an empty game of appearances, a subjectively based view of the world, and a logical utilitarianism. Despite his PhD dissertation having been on the topic of Dewey\textsuperscript{1545} (whom Durkheim respected), Schon's notion of the reflective practitioner shares much with the pragmatist view that Durkheim critiqued. It might be that the notion of the reflective practitioner that is mostly unproblematically accepted throughout the Anglo Saxon world, is a form of intellectual anomie. Anomie is unconscious, a *dereglement* of representations. It could be the case that the 'reflective practitioner' - a concept that emerged in 1980s United States, at that time in the throws of a neoliberal societal reformation, might be an example of this excess of desire, going beyond what the Deweyan concept of reflection is actually able to provide.

Teachers and teacher educators, faced with what was a neoliberal and excessively abstract, technicist and economistic interpretation of their work may have grasped onto Schon's reworking of Dewey. In attempting to attain a moral and just educational philosophy and pedagogy for teachers and teacher education, the material to be considered in 'reflective practice' can be seen as sourced in the subjective contents of teachers' minds - an ideology which although, in my opinion, surpasses that of neoliberalism, also fails to capture the sentiments and ideas imbedded in contemporary education and society 'as it really is or is tending to become'. Schon's approach is ignorant of the sociological implications of postemotional 'critical reflection'. Were pre-service teachers to become educated postemotionally by proxy through being constructed as reflective practitioners, their reflections would be in terms of manufactured emotional dispositions, a happy consciousness, that could be experienced as intense and critical when it would really be framed in terms of internal and external marketing - the stultifying influences of organisational niceties, tolerance and school marketisation. Prepackaged and mechanized, the reflective practitioner might move from being a novice to an expert, refining a Happy Meal of emotions, finely wrought but

\textsuperscript{1545} Bleakley, A. (1999). 'From reflective practice to holistic reflexivity.' \textit{Studies in Higher Education}, 24(3), p. 316 noted that Dewey's concept of 'inquiry' was the subject of Schon's PhD thesis.
inauthentic, where teachers know exactly how to orientate their emotions to reflect on their teaching in a way that feels critical but is really postemotional, led by the peer group and years of training and professional teaching.

From a Durkheimian perspective there are some potentially quality integrating aspects to teacher training as it has developed overseas. Fitzsimons and Fenwick (1997) reported that in the United States alcohol is one of the social issues that student teachers are versed in, others being the abuse of other drugs, child abuse, crime, poverty and homelessness, all increasingly seen as important in teacher education, where a trainee's education is coordinated with criminal justice, nursing, medical, legal and social work agencies. These sorts of links between schools are laudable. To be socially healthy, they would, however, need to be contextualised by way of the utilisation of social theories that avoid subjecting students to pathologising punishments, significations and power/knowledge that individualises student alcoholic and other drug use. For instance if social workers are governed by family systems theory, a series of dysfunctions will be identified in students and their families. If left to the justice system, punishments might be imposed that damage, rather than foster the education of students. For such school and community agency relations to be established in a useful way they would have to be grounded on critical awareness of the macrosocial context and hierarchies of power relationships in which student alcohol issues are contextualised.

Partington (1997) also studied teacher education focusing on courses and institutions in this country, producing a report for the essentially neoliberal New Zealand Business Roundtable's, Education Forum. From Partington's perspective, teacher education nationally was rife with problems, biases, and omissions that contribute to poor educational provision.

Partington (1997) saw various sorts of political correctness throughout teacher education, commenting on gender and Maori-focused courses, was critical of teacher education issues admissions policies with regard to gender, ethnicity and age, examined and questioned the research methods adopted, and curriculum focuses in papers offered in training in this country.

The facets of teacher education that Partington (1997) studied relate both specifically to alcohol education with regard to Partington's direct comments on alcohol related issues to be examined subsequently, and firstly, more generally with regard to the context that Partington describes and the import of his

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recommendation and observations where broad teacher education issues relate to the contextualisation of alcohol education.

Partington (1997) believed there was a tendency in university based teacher education to impose educators' preferred areas of study on trainees, not necessarily imparting teaching-relevant topics to students.

'Waitangism' is the term Partington (1997) gave to what he saw as the tendency of teacher education providers to over emphasise Maori issues in their curriculums, admissions and approaches. Partington (1997) decried 'Waitangism' as a double standard approach to interrelations, expressed in the western cultural tradition of putting down one's own history and culture while simultaneously lauding that of another. Partington linked Maori appropriate education with a double standard in 'constructivist' education where the politically correct support Maori, but attack European appropriate education, with its own history and tradition, which is particularly Christian. Partington in this way linked what he saw as a bias for Maori, arguing that traditions can be full of untruths, and, was concerned that Maori 'ancient errors' about life and the world would persist if Maori cultural approaches were emphasised in teacher education. Partington's (1997) identification of what he called 'Waitangism', from a Durkheimian perspective, expressed historic representations of Maori as uncritical child-like people who are easily led and are in need of guidance by more knowledgable tau iwi. These representations run deep in the historic collective thinking of tau iwi, constituting a form of egoism and anomie in the contemporary context where thinkers like Partington turn inward, seeking to bolster traditional European Judeo-Christian sentiments and are unable to express an 'otherness', and cosmopolitanism of constructing an integrating context or apprehension for the

alternatives presented by Maori world views and practices in teacher education. Alternatively, such thinkers seek to explain teacher education on conservative neoliberal grounds, through market choice terminology – reflecting a desire for the infinite and seeking to get the most from the least.

Durkheim, Mestrovic believed, critiqued excessive cultural relativism but also sought a cosmopolitan cult of the individual, which would integrate various specific consciences of ethnicity and other social groups. The cult of the individual, were it to exist, would enable people and institutions to respect mini consciences like those of diversely different peoples such as Maori and pakeha. In the cult of the individual it would be wrong to question the values of Maori appropriate rituals and values just because they seem unusual to pakeha minds. Exhibiting respect for the Treaty of Waitangi is not some sort of bias, it is rather something like what Durkheim envisaged when he hoped for a cult of the individual. Partington, however, seems to see respect for the Treaty of Waitangi or Maori values and traditions as prejudice.

In a chapter entitled 'Ideological capture', hence of related interest here with regard to Buchanan's expression of this economics-derived concept in the term 'rent-seeking'. Partington (1997) examined the curriculum of teacher education providers by way of course outlines. The University of Otago undergraduate paper EDUC 334: Society and Power, was noted. In a list that included, among others, Durkheim, Weber, Gramsci, Raymond Williams, Carole Pateman, Nancy Chodorow, Foucault and Lyotard, Partington (1997) argued that EDUC 334's curriculum examined thinkers who espouse neo-Marxism, post-structuralism, post-modernism and the sociology of knowledge, criticising that paper as covering an 'unrepresentative' list of writers up for study. Focusing on Victoria University of Wellington and the Wellington College of Education courses specifically, Partington (1997) argued that an indoctrinating approach was apparent in a number of papers for offer. For instance EDUC 151, Partington (1997) conjectured, could be criticised for possibly presenting the historical and contemporary issues relevant to education in a biased and uncritical way. Partington (1997) raised his concerns with 18 of the 23 lectures in that paper, concerns that ranged from the possibility that Rousseau (lecture 1) could be covered without recourse to critiquing his mistreatment and neglect of his various illegitimate children, to an unbalanced study of the New Right and neoliberalism in lecture 5, uncorroborated assertions that women are discriminated against in education (lectures 8, 9 and 10), unrepresentative interpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi and group identity in this country (lectures

11, 12, 13 and 14), and (in lecture 23), teacher pay uniformity and professionalism issues covered as if they were the only way to advance teaching in this country.\textsuperscript{1553}

In a section of Partington's chapter on ideological capture titled, 'No overt politically correct linkage', \textsuperscript{1554} where among the five 100-level lectures at Victoria/Wellington College, Partington selected as not reflecting teacher education's ideological capture and political correctness, one lecture which was an account of a Cook Islands family's living in a different culture, and community education related education issues, a second was concerned with increased state funding for and participation in the early childhood sector. Further, Partington rated the two lectures on instituting the new curriculum, and another - a lecture on information technology, was also judged by Partington as not politically correct.

Partington's approach is one where unless a lecture is about the good news of increased early childhood funding, or the subtle promotion of privatisation through community schooling, is about information technology, or is curriculum implementation focused, content is, politically correct. What Partington overlooked is that the social theory, which he concluded represented ideological, capture and political correctness in teacher education is the very sort that supports and gives meaning to the curriculum material that he also concluded exhibited no overt politically correct linkage.

Partington's (1997) chapter on ideological capture (or rent-seeking in Buchanan's terms) interprets teacher education as thoroughly imbued with a political correctness. This is of interest from a Durkheimian perspective with regard to the sociology of knowledge. Political correctness is a term that can be applied, as Roberts (1998) noted, to a wide range of political or ideological positions.\textsuperscript{1555} Roberts argued that the New Zealand Business Roundtable, via the Education Forum, despite critiquing political correctness in educational curriculums, itself espouses a political correctness - one that takes a market based, economically-focused position on education, and promotes that view as being politically correct. The curriculum is never free of politics. The examination of enterprise culture makes it quite apparent that the curriculum is a key component in cultural reconstruction. A curriculum of enterprise is very evident in the tertiary institution's lectures that Partington identified as nonideological - not displaying overt political correctness. Neoliberal policies' success stories in early childhood education, cultural diversity realised through privately provided education, the New Zealand Curriculum Framework, its implementation, and information technology are all topics

that for Partington are free of political correctness. However, these topics are political and are 'politically correct' in the terms of a neoliberal, interpretation of correctness.

Roberts' (1998) argument cuts to what Durkheim (1895) referred to as the various ideologies advanced by the socialist, the religious person, and the economist. Roberts' position, although different in many respects, also echoes Durkheim's call to consider past social facts and reject current social facts if they do not contribute to meaningful social existence. Durkheim looked to the tendencies in society, where they are garnered from and whether they express socially healthy sentiments and ideas. Neoliberalism revisits eighteenth century economics and political philosophy, applying it to contemporary society in an unhealthy and dangerous way.

It is interesting that Partington himself neglected to cite Buchanan who he implicitly appealed to, or Le Grande from whom Partington explicitly borrowed the term 'capture' and applied it to ideologies in teacher education. Partington accused teacher educators of overt political correctness, indoctrination and ideological capture. It could be argued that the constructors of courses and papers that Partington critiqued, are at least explicit in regarding the theoretical perspectives they believe are important issues for teacher trainees to be conversant with. Partington by comparison, in a report that is over 250 double spaced A4 pages long, neglected to cite the theoretical perspectives he appealed to. That which is explicit can be democratically addressed, whereas that which lies implicit, which is the case of Partington's (1997) report, is ambiguous, unspoken and a politically correct ideology of the market and neoliberalism. Social facts are something different. Social facts regarding over 150 years of Crown indifference and opposition to Maori aspirations, the attack on teacher solidarity brought by neoliberalism instituted in education and various societies' control by the stronger and more able historically, are some of the issues that teacher education must address critically to enable future and in-service teachers to be able to engage with in their professional roles. Where control over these issues has remained in or are tending to return to the hands of the stronger in society, teacher education must continue to be a critical advocate for the weaker, and seek to discern the moral from the amoral or the immoral. The sort of balance that Partington implied should be constitutionally implemented in teacher education is a recipe for the stronger to have the lion's share of society. Opposing social injustice ('social justice' which as can be recalled was a code name for political correctness, for Partington) sometimes entails bringing to the surface and magnifying that which lies implicit and
insidious. Were Partington (1997) and those who share similar political positions more explicit regarding the form of political correctness they adopt, as opposed to, as Partington (1997) did, in leaving his public choice theoretical position only implicit, teacher educators would not have to spend such long periods within papers and courses making explicit to their students the philosophy of neoliberalism that is hidden and unconscious but present in their society and its implications for lived experience. For instance, in this case, had Buchanan or Le Grande been explicitly appealed to by Partington who might have explained the view of human nature and society that those neoliberal thinkers held to, teacher educators who might wish to explain to students the importance of such a report would not have to identify the privatising, methodologically individualist, market orientated tendencies which lie below the surface, unspoken in Partington's (1997) brand of neoliberal politically correct analysis.

Partington (1997) clearly favoured tertiary education policies similar to those which Buchanan and Devletoglou advocated for. Partington believed that there should be increased competition and diversity between providers, citing the success of private Christian teacher training institutes as good examples of the sort of policies that should be pursued.\footnote{Partington, G. (1997). Teacher Education and Training in New Zealand.} However, the evidence of the success of private training establishments in general is not supportive of the sort of position Partington adopted. Very recent reports are that many private sector training institutes are failing. The New Zealand Qualifications Authority released figures stating that a quarter of the one hundred private training establishments in this country had their registration revoked in the last two years of the century.\footnote{National Radio, Morning Report, 27/4/00 (7:30 am).} Such market failures were not without casualties as students enrolled at such institutions had often invested or borrowed thousands of dollars to attend those subsequently deregistered education providers and were left out of pocket and with, incomplete, or, where substandard programmes have been identified, qualifications which could be of questionable quality. Private providers’ claims that they would investigate taking out insurance policies to protect students fees,\footnote{National Radio, Morning Report, 27/4/00 (7:55 am) Gail Woods reported the view of Margaret Yates, Association of Private Training Providers.} although a good measure, only addressed the situation after the fact. Governments who have had a particular penchant for increased marketisation of the tertiary education sector have been blinded by their enthusiasm and unable to foresee that such market failure might result from such deregulation have failed to stipulate legal requirements as measures to protect students and the sector from such outcomes.

Robertson (1998) made criticisms of teacher training by reference to the market in providers of teacher education in this country. Robertson noted that between the early and late 1990s the number of providers had tripled to sixteen with twenty eight centres and forty four programmes up for offer. Critiquing the increased marketisation of teacher education, Robertson argued that the product of that environment which was supposed to break up monopolies and create diversification, was the dominance of one provider, that is - Massey University, controlling fifty percent of the market. Robertson saw the changes in teacher education, where teachers are trained to be post-Fordist self directed, innovative, communicative and flexible workers as leading to increased individualist and selfish approaches to education at the expense of the focus on, the social and otherness traditionally dominating teacher education. Students in such an environment Robertson argued, in quoting Codd (1997, pp. 135-136), were educated under an ideology that viewed 'knowledge as a product, knowledge as performance, knowledge as commodity' as opposed to 'knowledge as insight, knowledge as appreciation, and knowledge as understanding'.

The neoliberal approach, which Robertson criticised as leading to fundamental changes in the nature of teacher education, is fully adopted by Partington. In Partington's (1997) study, alcohol education is a part of the environment in which the more traditionally central issues regarding the historical practice and theory, equality and fairness, policy, and Treaty related topics are covered. Partington did not refer to alcohol issues in the chapter on ideological capture, however, elsewhere in Partington's (1997) report, the author referred to teacher education issues directly related to alcohol education.

In a section titled the 'Transmission of public information', Partington argued disparagingly against drug issues being discussed in schools. For Partington (1997), sex education and drug education is a waste of precious teacher time, given the case for Partington where such education does not statistically reduce pregnancies, sexually transmitted diseases or drug abuse. Partington was concerned that activists were participating in drug education, assuring students that in principle one drug is not different from another. Partington argued that educating teacher trainees in drug education is a side issue only, as often, drug issues in


schools are 'situation-specific' and therefore its study does not contribute to teacher trainee's character. Rather than educated in drug issues, which for Partington are of 'doubtful value', and may represent only 'short-lived enthusiasms', Partington argued that teacher trainees should be encouraged to study extra-curricula public information activities such as road safety and sport. Claims by people who are well experienced over this topic contradict Partington's view. Concerns were raised at the 1999 School Trustees Association Conference where it was argued that alcohol and other drug issues are not specific to particular contexts but are generalised. Regional and cultural differences do not exist, where these issues are concerned. All schools have drug issues to deal with.

Partington overlooked the importance that drugs and sex can have in students' lives. Teachers can be active, contributing to students understanding of their drug use and sexual activities by giving them a context and perhaps assisting students to temper and moderate their relationships as well as their use of and engagements with alcoholic and other drugs. Drug and sexuality issues might be extra-curricula activities, however, if left undiscussed and not addressed in educational contexts, student problems with these extra-curricula phenomena can spill over into and negatively affect students’ engagements in their curricula endeavours. Drug and sexuality issues are not central to the curriculum at present, however, ignoring them as Partington advocated for is not helpful in a context where dealing with extra-school issues are increasingly becoming part of everyday teacher and school life. Drug and alcohol use is an important factor in the rites of passage for many youths in this country. Collective representations of 'getting pissed', 'wasted' and so on, are, and have been highly relevant to the experiences of many males, over time are becoming increasingly relevant to women, and given recent legislative changes lowering the legal drinking age, these rites might soon be experienced by younger aged adolescents. It can be speculated that some of those youths, living in an increasingly stressful and excessively individualistic society, are going to tend towards the anomic and egoistic use of drugs, one of them being alcohol. If teachers are not versed in how to deal with excessive youth alcohol and other drug use and how to respond to it, many young people's lives might tragically become problematic or prematurely ended by overdose, vehicle accidents, suicide and so on. Compared with Fitzsimmonds and Fenwick's (1997) reporting on student teacher educational practices in Western nations, Partington (1997) appeared to adopt an ignorant position with regard to drug and sexuality issues. Fitzsimmonds

and Fenwick (1997) reported on how teachers internationally are well versed in the systems of referral to, and the processes involved within various social services, among them drug and sexuality services. Internationally, schools act cooperatively with those services. Partington in taking a neoliberal view, in contrast, recommended (perhaps in referring to sex and drug education) that teacher educators should be mindful of wasting time on such 'trivial pursuits'.

Teacher education has become marketised. The concept of the 'reflective practitioner' can be interpreted in Durkheimian terms as anomic, or can be subjected to the postemotional concept. However, by comparison to neoliberal views of teacher education and competencies it is benign. Partington's neoliberal view highlights the economically focused view of education that is part of the cult of management. Teacher educators and teacher trainee curricula in the neoliberal view need to be subject to set criteria, dealing with issues that are consciously observable and quantifiable phenomena. The cult of management takes this positivistic view as it cannot deal with social injustice and drug issues as products of society considered as a *sui generis* force that is unconscious. The market based political correctness of neoliberalism is central to the cult of management. It is excessive, inward looking selfish and seeks the infinite. The cult of management in teacher education and competencies is anomic and egoistic.

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Public choice theory and drug educational anomie

Drug education is a politicised area and when situated in a market, hotly debated amongst interested parties taking very different positions on how to best educate students regarding drugs. Educational policy and practices where student drug use is identified, contextualised with regard to educational markets generally, reveals how high the stakes are for schools and how important a good market position is. Identified student drug use threatens market position, and schools can respond so as to maintain their position. Through examining drug education, drawing on concepts of social capital, drug education market techniques, media studies, and examining health education policy making in its political context, conservative tendencies can be revealed. By comparison, the concept of care, community input, in studying language, learning and memory processes, as well as how context impacts on student and teacher interactions where drug issues are addressed in education, shows that market approaches are not necessarily leading to a quality alcohol and other drug education.

Public choice theory is an example of economic anomie. Public choice theory argues against the State's provision of services wherever conflicts of interest might be perceived to exist with regard to bureaucratic decision making. That approach can be applied to drug education, viewing its impact as contributing to the anomie of neoliberalism.

Public choice theory was one of the neoliberal policies utilised to justify the devolution of services and decision making to individual schools. For public choice theorists, devolution is a sensible and rational approach to education as individual and representative parents as a majority, but also teachers and other community members at the local level, can naturally choose the options that suit themselves and students best. Some commentators have argued that the notion of provider capture is a device which excludes teachers and parents, who are portrayed as impediments to change and reforms, from participating in such processes.1565

The administrative, quantified and charter-based restructure of the education system has impacted on policies and practices regarding alcohol education. Public choice theory can be seen to have been influential in the funding structures and the delivery of alcohol education. The Ministry of Education for many years funded a teacher education programme wherein Colleges of Education around the country were responsible for providing trainee and in-service teachers about alcohol issues. That contract ran out in 1995 and as the Ministry has in

general increasingly opted for fostering an environment where funding is directed to individual school Boards who choose how they wish to purchase their alcohol and other drug education services as part of the health curriculum. Accordingly, pre and in-service teacher education regarding alcohol and other drug issues has declined since that time. The government has in this way retreated from taking the responsibility for ongoing development of alcohol education studies. I received no reply from the Ministry of Education from whom I requested information regarding records of alcohol providers to schools regionally and nationally. Public choice theory is implicated in this move by way of being one of the theoretical frameworks utilised by Ministry policy decision making. It would appear that in the Ministry's thinking, individual schools are the best agents to choose education services that suit their students' needs best, rather than the former situation where the State was the central provider of drug education services by way of teacher education regarding, and central responsibility for the delivery of alcohol education, supplemented by the voluntary services of private sector groups and individuals. Provider capture was implicitly evoked by Tom Scott when interviewed alongside, and in opposition to, Sally Casswell, Director of the Auckland Public Health Research Unit, when Scott commented that state bureaucrats have lenient views regarding the use of cannabis.\footnote{1566} Tom Scott, cartoonist and journalist co-authored \textit{The Great Brain Robbery} (1996) with Trevor Grice, head of Life Education Trust. \textit{The Great Brain Robbery}, a drug education book widely distributed around schools in this country due to donations of 4000 copies jointly funded by Brierley and Shell Oil\footnote{1567} who have internationalised interests in alcohol and petrochemicals, is in the main, an attack against the use of cannabis, this country's third most used recreational drug. Casswell's deemphasis of cannabis in answer to Scott's argument was later repeated when Barbara Disley, then, Mental Health Commission Chair cited Christchurch research which found that, as opposed to cannabis, alcohol is seriously implicated in youth suicide by creating disinhibition, increased sensitivity, and contributing to depression in young people.\footnote{1568}

As a general point, mental health service workers and educators have anecdotally reported increased depressive conditions exhibited by children at a much younger age than previously. In 1998, Elisabeth Farrell, South Auckland Coordinator of Public Health Nurses, reported the increased number of 8 and 9 year olds presenting with depression, citing her belief that abuse and poverty were two

significant factors leading to children’s depression.\textsuperscript{1569} Stephen Bell, of Youthline, also noted that callers’ age had dropped since 1996 with children displaying more intense feelings and emotions, as well as extreme behaviours like self mutilation of their arms with knives and barricading themselves in their bedrooms. Dawn Burling, of Henderson South School, believed that the home life of children is reflected in the emotional problems exhibited by students at school.\textsuperscript{1570} It should be added, from a Durkheimian perspective, that the home life of children reflects the wider economic and social context in which emotional domestic life is situated.

It is hard to imagine how legislation introduced in 1999 lowering the drinking age to eighteen years, which, in effect, if unintentionally, allowed children to gain freer access to alcohol, without other significant social and economic changes, could improve the situation that led to such reports. It is outside the confines of the present study to engage in a critical appraisal of specifically cannabis drug education in this country, however, a Durkheimian perspective creates ground for some conjecture to be engaged in over the dereglement of legislation and education regarding alcohol compared to cannabis. Alcohol is promoted as socially acceptable, even healthy when consumed in moderation, regardless of its universally toxic effect on every human organ, whether consumed moderately or otherwise. Cannabis by contrast is perceived as evil, addictive, a path to the use of harder drugs, and brain rotting - a view held to not just by public but also drug education commentators like for instance Life Education Trust educator Barbara McKay, responsible for the Trust’s catchment of 123 schools from Queenstown to Bluff who believed that cannabis is so dangerous that it affects the cognition and memory of young people and ‘takes their life away’\textsuperscript{1571}, or Scott and Grice’s (1996)\textsuperscript{1572} claim that cannabis shrinks the hippocampus - a positivistic argument in the extreme, based on the ‘this is your brain - this is your brain on drugs’, type of argument which Stein (1991) conjectured could in the future be humorously apprehended in a similar way to that in which earlier Reefer Madness approaches are viewed today.\textsuperscript{1573} The cultural and historical relativity of drug use in the Durkheimian sense could in this way also be applied to alcohol in comparison to opiates. These contradictions were overlooked by Scott, who argued that capture was evident in educational bureaucratic culture, which for Scott is liberal and

\textsuperscript{1569} National Radio, \textit{Morning Report}, (15/12/98, 6:30 am); \textit{News}, (15/12/98, 11:00am), reporter: Mary Jane Aggot.
\textsuperscript{1570} National Radio, \textit{Morning Report}, (15/12/98, 8:45 am) reporter: Mary Jane Aggot.
\textsuperscript{1571} National Radio, \textit{Country Life}, (31/10/98, 7:30 am), reporter: Sarah Willis.
\textsuperscript{1572} see Grice and Scott’s (1996) \textit{The Great Brain Robbery}.
parochial with respect to cannabis use. For Scott, this was an unrealistic and unfair position to impose upon schools nationally where drug education is concerned.\textsuperscript{1574} Scott’s argument, like Buchanan’s is that when drug education policy and provision is centralised, as it was historically, bureaucrats shape policies around their own self interest and preferences. Rather, in a public choice theoretical approach, drug education should reflect an individual parent’s preferences as much as possible. In this neoliberal approach, democracy is a matter of locally made decisions, not, those of a research informed, educated intellectual bureaucratic elite who impose their preferences on the rest of the population. Postemotional popularism and local beliefs are at the fore in drug education marketing today.

Since 1987 this approach to alcohol education has been increasingly utilised. The state’s involvement in alcohol education has been shifted from being a provider of services, to funding of contestable contracts and being a regulatory agency. The state only remains involved directly involved where specific teachers have been involved in trainee or in-serviced programmes, or in the form of the New Zealand Police’s ‘Drug and Alcohol Resistance Education’, or, DARE programme - a copy of programmes going by the same name in the United States. In the absence of trained teachers and if for instance choosing the DARE option is deemed inappropriate by Boards of Trustees, individual schools are faced with a wide range of non-state alcohol education services. There is the possibility that given such a wide selection of education services, some of these non-state providers might be basing their approaches on programmes from other countries, or developing their own programmes in the absence of adequate research about the relevance of borrowed, adapted or self developed approaches to alcohol education in this country.

The state has attempted to remove itself from the responsibility of providing alcohol education as an in-context aspect of students’ education. Instead, alcohol education has become a rolling road show. Education providers arrive at schools in big trucks colourfully painted with pictures of animals, looking something like a circus, as in the case of Life Education Trust, or, in the state’s Police provided model in a black sleek car with contrasting colourful bright DARE slogans painted on the side. This boosterish optimistic, circus and entertainment approach to alcohol education is very interesting. Drug misuse can be a very dangerous, life threatening activity. For a moment, compare alcohol education with another life

\textsuperscript{1574} National Radio, Kim Hill, (4/10/96) interviewed: Tom Scott, co-author of The Great Brain Robbery, and, Sally Casswell, Alcohol and Public Health Research Unit.
education issue like suicide or eating disorders. Imagine presenting suicide issues to children in the way it is presently deemed appropriate for alcohol issues. All the care in the world is given in broaching food addiction and suicide issues.

Alcohol education, as I have shown is related to political, social, historical, gendered and cultural issues. Where ideologically driven, alcohol education will miss its true mark or might be overlooked in favour of drug issues that are of more interest to public opinion and political expediency. In 1992 Casswell raised the possibility that education programmes might increasingly turn their focus onto illicit drug issues. There has been increased attention in this regard to the issue of cannabis. There have been a number of reports of students arriving at school in cannabis intoxicated states up and down the country. Some schools like Tauranga Boys High School have reacted by introducing body fluid tests to ascertain whether students have been imbibing cannabis, and have introduced protocols to deal with those students. Those reactions have been critically commented on by drug education researchers and civil liberties campaigners. By comparison, alcohol education issues receive little public attention. Alcohol is mistakenly assumed to be less of a social problem. The economic and social costs of alcohol abuse are enormous and widespread, however, education often appears to present alcohol as if it were a rather unproblematic drug. The reasons for this misapprehension lie in social, historical and cultural unconsciousness. There is a need to break through the socially accepted and seemingly unproblematic elements to engage with the underlying or unconscious issues represented by alcohol, and related to education.

Historically, up to the late 1990s drug education has gone through what Howard (1996) called three generations. The first generation of drug educators were wedded to the view that drug taking was inherently a negative experience. Education in that generation took the form of informing students about the negative effects of drugs in the belief that if people knew what was wrong with drugs they would refrain from using them. From this perspective users were seen as pathologically failing to recognise the negative effects of drugs.

Second generation drug education was founded on psycho-social, affective, and behaviourist models of human learning. Focusing on youth decision making and communication skills as well as self esteem, this blend of behaviourist, social


1576. National Radio, *Good Morning New Zealand*, (21/5/97), Kim Hill interviewed: Bill Holland, Board of Trustees Head, Tauranga Boys High School; Frieda Briggs, University of South Australia, and; Phillip Gordon, civil liberties campaigner.

learning and social inoculation theories assumed that media and peer influences believed to lead to drug use could be countered by improving the personal and social development of youths. Youth substance abuse was in that model explained as a result of low self esteem and poor personal communication and social skills. With regard to peer influences, second generation drug education has been criticised for not identifying whether the determining factor in use is peer pressure or an individual’s choice of associates.1578

Third generation drug education involved what Howard (1996) called a 'social influence' model, focusing on the instilling of decision making and resistance skills in youths.1579 The social influence approach to drug education drew heavily on social learning theory. As noted earlier, social learning theory argues that people learn through their observing, imitating (or modeling) others, mediated interpersonally by a mixture of both explicit reinforcement, and the subtleties of norms and attitudes. Utilising these concepts, third generation drug education focused on media, peer and familial influences on behaviour.1580

Resistance education incorporates social learning theory by encouraging students to conceptualise the effects of drug abuse on the individual, their legal punishment, their body parts and by the consequences for their significant others as a result of drug use. Educating students to ‘just say no’ is undertaken by way of implicitly applying Bandura's (1977) social learning theoretical principles of symbolic representations, observation and consequence regulations which Strickland and Pittman (1984) applied to alcohol studies, instruction using stories, depictions, public health and other media depictions. Resistance education is exemplified by the U.S. Police initiated Drug and Resistance Education (DARE) programme. DARE is utilised both in this country and Australia.

Australian research into DARE identified little immediate significant affects on the initiation of alcohol or tobacco use, or, reduced heavy alcohol use in the subsequent one or two years after students have experienced the DARE programme. Other commentators questioned the effectiveness of school based, police-youth relations building programmes, arguing that benefits accrue to police, not to youth. In Australia, the ALERT and Life Education programmes that, like DARE, also use resistance building approaches, were similarly criticised, and a 1995 Government of Western Australia report indicated that such programmes

relation to school based learning should only be additional. Tobler's (1986) review of 91 programmes found refusal skill training effective where peer led interventions were presided over by mental health professionals, and Eggert et al. (1994) found that with at risk 9 to 12 year olds, programmes which focused on self esteem, interpersonal communications skills and supportive, trusting social networks were observed as effective. Gorman (1995) critiqued the media influence and peer pressure focus of training refusal skills programmes for overlooking other factors like socioeconomic, self conceptual, community dissolute and familial issues, leading to the case where although not harmful, refusal skills education has little effect on student learning. Also, Eggert et al. (1994) in comparing their 101 participants with 158 control group participants found few medium term effects generally or a reversal of the development of substance using behaviour.  

The 'just say no' motif of much resistance skills education leads to a closing off of discussions between teachers, students, parents, as youths are perceived of as suffering from a deficit in their refusal skills. 'Just say no' interventions, Howard (1996) argued, "... miss the point, are naive, simplistic, and decontextualise the initiation and maintenance of substance use."  

Stein (1991) similarly argued that 'just say no' drug education individualises drug use, failing to account for the surrounding and pervading context that influences and makes people's choices possible.  

Howard (1996), in arguing that drug education had to go beyond the limits it sets in focusing on school, media and individual skills issues, cited reports that school based education overlooks extra-school factors, a problem compounded by the little school time given to an issue that saturates youth and the wider culture. Howard argued that a broader than school based perspective was needed to address the various factors that contribute to youth drug use and believed that a number of social factors needed to be incorporated into drug education, regarding:

goal setting; parent education; meeting localised needs; and providing coordinated programmes.

Although supporting school based education, Howard (1996) argued that drug education needs to also expand out from school contexts into youth media, shopping mall, sport and leisure, accommodation and justice contexts. 1586

Howard (1996) argued that within school education needs further attention. Citing Ballard, Gillespie and Irwin's (1994) recommendations developed from the Australian Government's (1992) evaluation of its National Campaign Against Drug Abuse, Howard (1996) noted twelve principles for school education. Those principles broadly emphasised the importance of drug education: remaining administered within school by school staff where external resources are additional complements to, and enhancing, in-school provision; being continuous and sequential over time; being contextualised with regard to socioeconomics, culture, lifestyle and gender, recognising and embracing community and individual activities, values and beliefs, and, encouraging community input into the development and implementation of programmes; as being based on research that is relevant to education target groups, promoting harm reduction and positive long term health consequences. 1587

Howard's (1996) discussion of drug education is highly relevant with regard to a Durkheimian evaluation of the social context of alcohol education. Neoliberalism in education, which Buchanan represents in the present study, has been significantly responsible for the disregarding of drug education issues in the sector. Increasingly, and reflecting Buchanan's stipulations that State provider developed and implemented programmes reflect the biases of those bureaucrats, alcohol education has ironically become open to non-State provider sectarianism. In the Australian case, the government has been central in conducting monitoring and research into drug education. In this country, however, drug education has become something of a charity issue, where non-profit foundations and trusts have been given increased responsibility for provision and where schools complement extra-school provision as opposed to the opposite approach as recommended in Australia. From a Durkheimian perspective, drug education is a matter of justice, not to be left to the vagaries of choice or charity.

Public choice theory promotes school-specific approaches to drug education, where schools can determine the special character it wishes to promote

and choose suitable programmes within confines of the national curriculum guidelines. However, those guidelines provide wide parameters for diverse, and divergent, charter stipulations. Public choice theory in drug education promotes a market context that can lead to excessive diversity, where the perceived needs of parents represent overly localised concerns, obscuring wider contextual influences and factors that relate to and impact on drug use.

By comparison to Durkheim's vision and that of contemporary socially-based educationalists, today's schools fail to provide an integrating environment that captures the notion of the cult of the human person of the sort Durkheim advocated for. This could apply elsewhere with regard to cultural, gender, disability issues, but for the present study's purposes, it raises issues related to alcohol.

Schools, in the main are highly unintegrating where drug issues are concerned. This can be seen in Abel and Casswell's (1998) study of principals and Boards of Trustee members. To see whether different schools handled drug issues differently, Abel and Casswell interviewed the principals and Board of Trustee chairpersons from ten Auckland intermediate or secondary schools chosen for their reflecting a wide selection of demographic, geographic, and school philosophies.1588

At the time of their research Abel and Casswell noted that schools had different excluding options open to them in dealing with student cannabis drug offending. One is the principal's right to suspend students. This can be in the forms of a 'specified suspension' that can be up to a three day period suspension, or an 'unspecified suspension' under which the period of exclusion is a matter left up to the board who have the power to exclude a student from their school up until age 16 years - a move that essentially bans that student from that school, in which case the principal must find the student a placement in another school. Students aged over 16 years can be expelled.1589

Board heads and principals believed that individual students' drug offences were a result of their behaviour being affected by wider social influences like benefit cuts, but many participants were unhappy with being lumbered the role of making up for these sorts of social problems1590 and believed there were poor resources to socially influence and deal with school drug offenders. In interviews, board heads felt there were few support facilities, and those that did exist were difficult to utilise,

were understaffed and underfunded. Principals, who are responsible for finding alternative placements for students they suspend, attempt to find schools by way of their own contacts. If principals cannot find a placement, they hand the case over to the Ministry of Education, which is then responsible for the student. Principals reported that other schools were increasingly reluctant to take on students and confessed that they were also tending to act in the same way. Students for whom placements cannot be found study at home by way of the Correspondence School.

Participants noted the influence of marketisation in education where school drug offences were concerned. Although some schools opted to voluntarily publicise their drug problems to show they were taking a stand on the issue, others felt that it would damage their appearance and the attraction of parents.

*Education has become far more competitive. Far more market orientated. The image has been important. . . . And schools are very sensitive about drug issues in the paper. If parents get the idea that there is bad publicity about drugs, then that can result in say 20 fewer enrolments, therefore jobs. It's a very sensitive area (principal).*

Abel and Casswell argued that a punitive reaction is the behaviour sometimes exhibited by schools faced with market and funding related concerns when dealing with cannabis drug offenders, and recommended instead that schools take a 'community action' approach in creating close relationships with schools and communities, to educate, mobilise, guide and address drug and other social issues, and suggested that schools themselves interrelate with other schools on cannabis drug offending, believing there " . . . could be some value in their sharing information about prevention and management strategies." This implies that

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schools do not interact with other schools for fear that they will become labeled as having problem students, affecting their marketability.

Abel and Casswell's (1998) study paints a picture of education and cannabis drug offence issues where schools are underfunded, experience disorganised relations between agencies and have little agency support, attempt to deal with an over demand for extra school and school services and market forces where public image issues are concerned. Schools display a wide variety of responses to cannabis drug offences.

The diversity in responses in arrangements for punishment or community action, lack of communication and organization and competition and focus on appearances are reminiscent of Mestrovic's criticism of the diverse definitions of the dangerous standard in U. S. State legislation. A state of anomie was Mestrovic's claim there. It might be one that is relevant in this country with regard to the public-concerning drug issue of cannabis offences and school suspensions. There is so much diversity in responses that a dereglement is occurring in how schools respond to issues in their institutions. Students are subjected to the whims of their board or principal where drug issues are concerned. School drug policies are deranged.

Ministry of Education figures for 1998, although noting a drop in drug-related suspensions, identified that of 12,000 suspensions in total (8,500 were boys, 3,000 were girls), 1,800 students were suspended for drugs offences. Violent offences against students and staff comprised 25% of suspensions. Vandalism and arson led to 880 suspensions in that year. Judge Caruthers, speaking at a 1999 conference on school suspensions believed it was a 'national disgrace' that there were eight times as many suspensions in 1998 as there were in 1991.

Students until very recently could be asked not to attend school for quite long periods of time, constituting a defacto suspension only, as under that arrangement the suspension was not officially recorded. Perhaps realising that suspension can constitute the premature truncation of a student's education the Ministry of Education has established a system of recording the number and keeping track of students who are suspended.

Suspended students are excluded from participation in the school. Durkheim (1925 {1961}) argued that punishment was a necessary part of education when in the form of a temporary withholding of the high regard in which people are usually held. For Durkheim, the rule of short term suspension is justified. However, in the case of drug related suspensions, and particularly expulsions, students often

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1598. National Radio, Insight 99, (22/2/99, 8.05 pm).
do not return to classroom education for long periods, as it is difficult finding another school that will accept their placement. In a neoliberal quasi-market educational context, schools are under increased pressure to be presenting a good example to the school and parental community. Accepting students punished for drug offences is less acceptable in this situation, as schools might be subject to increased parental or media scrutiny, affecting school rolls, funding and status. Jeff McIntyre of the Foundation for Alcohol and Drug Education argued that suspensions do not solve drug problems. Schools, especially those which are better off, are unwilling to speak out about alcohol and other drug problems in schools as they are concerned that if reports got out, parents might not want to send their children to the school.\(^1\)\(^5\)\(^9\)\(^9\) From a Durkheimian perspective, this is a situation created by quasi-market enterprise in education created by *Tomorrow's Schools*, and is a reflection of an excess of economistic apprehensions of education, a reflection of wider societal anomie and egoism impacting on education - a product of the cult of management.

Suspended students affected by this situation often wind up on the Correspondence School roll. Urban students in particular are excluded in this situation, where although physically in the general context in which their peers exist, are socially separated from them. Taken out of their educational and peer supported context, in a situation where perhaps having great difficulty in coping with their drug use and perhaps other related problems, suspended and expelled students are unfortunately prime candidates for becoming subject to societal anomie and egoism. For present purposes the focus is on alcoholic drug issues, however, there might be numerous cross references between students suspended for physically violent or property suspensions and drug use, raising questions over whether suspended students are exposed to further alcoholic drugs, perhaps for instance by having available time to associate with same age or older peers who might be drinking in, or purchasing alcoholic drug products from licensed premises during the day.

Former Commissioner for Children, Laurie O'Reilly (1996) argued that alcohol and drug related suspensions reveal a deeper set of issues related to disadvantages in one societal aspect leading to other disadvantages.\(^1\)\(^6\)\(^0\)\(^0\) With regards to truancy, Howard (1996) noted that drug education itself can fail to reach the very people who might need the education most, due to their not attending

\(^{1599}\) National Radio, *News*, (25/7/99, 12 noon), Gail Woods reported from the 1999 School Trustees Association Conference.

Anecdotal reports from Maori Wardens is that a large number of truant Maori are using alcohol and other drugs. "Alcohol appears to be both a cause, and a consequence, of school truancy," That was the claim made specifically with regard to Maori. This might apply to other truant, suspended or expelled students also.

Suspensions and expulsions with regard to drug education and use issues raises concerns over integration and exclusion considered from a Durkheimian perspective. Durkheim definitely rallied against student’s exclusion, but integration of the sort Abel and Casswell identified in the community action approach, is reminiscent of a totalitarian peer group Mestrovic identified in the postemotional type. A stressful life events approach was also criticised by Mestrovic for egoistically teaching people to look to others as supports for one’s use. This implies that, rather than a stressful life events and social supports approach, or the approach of using peer group should be taken to address the difficulties posed by such problematic students. Rather, students should be seen as contributing to and benefiting from social interactions in the community.

The notion of social capital can be seen as a twentieth century fin de siecle representation which uses the language of economics to express views of society. Social capital was discussed perennially throughout the late 1990s and was a pet interest of former National Prime Minister Jim Bolger. Social capital is seen differently by different theorists. I will very briefly outline the perspectives of Coleman, Bourdieu and Putnam. Social capital can be critiqued with regard to alcohol education provision.

Coleman came from a rational choice theory perspective in approaching social capital, arguing that social capital comes about as a secondary effect of other activities individuals participate in. For instance, there is more social capital in religious schools in Coleman’s view, because teachers and parents relations and those between parents are closer due to church and religious affiliations. In his Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association titled ‘The Rational Reconstruction of Society’, Coleman (1993) argued that one way social capital could be enhanced was by use of ‘the carrot’, for instance in paying a bounty to parents and foster parents to care for students who are at risk. Social capital for

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1603. Unfortunately due to the confines of space an in-depth critical discussion of forms of social capital is not possible. My object here is to briefly delineate the different forms and relate the concept of social capital to alcohol education.
Coleman enhances human capital. Coleman measured this by way of correlating parental two parent versus single parent home habitation, the number of children in homes, parent and sibling configurations, mother's expectations of children's academic success, family mobility, and attendance at church services.

Bourdieu's approach drew on Durkheim but was infused with a partial use of Marx - partial as Bourdieu saw conflicts also, within and not just between, classes where persons battle to gain or hold onto positions within institutional frameworks or 'fields' to assist others in, or to improve their own social position and wealth. Social capital for Bourdieu could be seen in relation to a group bounded 'habitus' - outlooks, dispositions, and orientations, institutionalised where social connections are used to enhance social and economic positions as members of groups, organisations, and nations.

Putnam's approach focused on civic participation. Putnam (1993) studied the history of the northern and central territories of Italy, compared with those in the south, historically going back to the Middle Ages. Putnam argued that when civic participation is high and norms are maintained over time as in the case of northern and central Italy, economic success follows. In Putnam's view, governments perform better when citizens participate in social and political life and where there is greater certainty in the community. By comparison, southern Italy exhibited less reciprocity and stability in client-patron relations.

The forms of social capital adopted by Putnam, Bourdieu and Coleman can be critiqued from a Durkheimian perspective. Social capital in the form envisaged especially by Coleman, assumes that rational choice on the part of individuals will result in community and individual success. It is as if in Coleman's view that these results will emerge spontaneously as choice theorists argue markets will produce social harmony. Coleman's approach can be seen as being in line with Buchanan's public choice theory by way of implicitly comparing school, family and community relations with markets. Putnam, Coleman and to a lesser degree, Bourdieu make postemotional assumptions. Putnam and Coleman draw on dead memories of a

romanticised community, revised and applied to the social context today. Putnam, however, by comparison to Coleman utilises an historical method that can capture emotional aspects of community, whereas Coleman's reliance on statistical data makes it difficult to explain the emotions in communities. This is a criticism that could be made of all three forms of social capital. Bourdieu draws on dead memories of nineteenth to mid-late twentieth century social conflicts and applies those memories with regard to class and culture. There is a chasm between the two poles of viewing social capital. One pole is the excessive optimism of Coleman and Putnam who think that social capital can be rationally constructed and on the other is the excessive pessimism of Bourdieu who sees community relations as fraught with conflict.

Of the different views of social capital, Bourdieu's, considered from a Durkheimian perspective best captures the origins and problems of knowledge and power, viewed as capital. Coleman opts for rational choice, conscious decision making and abstractions of society and the emotions. Putnam's approach of utilising historical emotions and ideas, comes a bit closer to a Durkheimian view, but Putnam focuses on civic participation, assuming that if people were civic minded, and participated more, society could be bettered. Putnam assumes too much, believing that the emotions needed for civic participation can be easily and rationally summoned, and, believes that positive social products will emerge from this rationalisation of the emotions for community purposes. Mestrovic pointed to the importance of the quality of social groups into which people are integrated. Putnam, like Coleman in this regard, assumes that integrating citizens will enhance social capital. Mestrovic argued that such rational social action, based around concepts such as community or nationalism could easily slide into Balkanisation. Mestrovic questioned whether community could ever be rationally constructed. Coleman and Putnam assume that it can.

Bourdieu's use of the notion of social capital by comparison does not make this mistake. Bourdieu saw social capital similarly to cultural capital as imbedded in relationships and unconsciousness in society where dominations take place that seem normal and natural. The family's source of social capital is structured within a wider context of hierarchalised power. For Bourdieu, as was the case for Durkheim, social capital is about studying: whose capital is valued; and where it is identified as being exchanged for economic or cultural goods.

1609. If I might comment on Bourdieu's case, however, I sense an attempt on his part to deal with sociological issues by way of his expression of maintaining great sensitivity in undertaking qualitative research. See Bourdieu's (1996) article in Theory, Culture & Society, 13(2), pp.17-37, in this regard.
There are also, however, important distinctions between Durkheim's and Bourdieu's views. Bourdieu, like Lehmann can be critiqued from a Durkheimian perspective for holding to hierarchalised structures of capitalism, a view which is sourced in Marxism, for explanatory purposes, as opposed to Durkheim's focus on representations which, Mestrovic argued, transcend structures. Bourdieu was very interested in representations, for instance in studying those in the media and education, but Bourdieu refused to detach these from what were for him the reference point of primary structures of economic and cultural groups. Bourdieu did not accept Schopenhauer's view that the world of will and representation was real. For Bourdieu, like Lehmann what is real are the social structures of society.

The notion of social capital has been discussed in this country from both ends of the political party spectrum with regard to non-governmental organisations (hereafter NGOs). Sue Bradford who is now a Green Party MP is implicitly aligned with the sort of perspective Bourdieu articulated. Bradford called NGOs the third sector after those of the public and private, noting that there were over 1000 NGOs in this country. Bradford saw community based provision as an excuse for government to reduce its responsibility for provision, contracting out and then cutting back funding to NGOs providing services to communities. In Bradford’s mind, government picked and chose NGOs to contract and research to accept in a politically biased way. Bill English, National Party deputy leader, implicitly drew on the perspectives of Putnam and Coleman by seeing social capital as the way to provide services to the community, arguing that the government often does a bad job of doing things for people by falsely believing it is all powerful by comparison to persons and groups ‘on the ground’. English believed that NGOs should be less involved in research and argued that government should encourage individuals to contribute charitably to NGOs by providing tax breaks for donated monies.1610

It would be a mistake to see NGOs as existing in some sort of harmonious relationship within communities and society. That is not the case, as NGOs, despite often not being profit driven, can be placed in a conflictual, market based and competitive context themselves. In this context NGOs can be seen as subject to the cult of management. This situation can be related to alcohol education.

O'Reilly was concerned that students in this country are experiencing varied levels of drug education, where various extra school agencies with divergent epistemologies and methods sharing little more than their satisfaction that their own

1610. National Radio, *Insight '99*, (18/4/99, 8:15am) another programme addressing this issue was broadcast on that network around the same time (31/1/99).
particular programme is the most appropriate, vie for the attention of schools. O'Reilly argued that with regard to the diversity in drug education approaches,

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\ldots \text{in the competitive market place, agencies are forced to compete with each other. There are no guarantees for long term planning. They lobby and compete with each other and schools can be caught up in this competition.}\]

Drug education providers do compete with each other in attempting to gain a greater share of the market. O'Reilly was calling for a more unified approach to drug education than that created by market competition. However, in the neoliberal context, education has generally become saturated in competition. It is unsurprising that a differentiated and oppositional context exists where providers compete to secure schools' adoption of their approach. There is in this country a micro economic enterprising market in drug education, where schools are able to choose drug education programmes that suit their particular school philosophy.

There is a large market in drug education providers. For instance, in the early 1990s there were eleven different organisations offering their services in the Nelson Tasman Bays region. The approaches adopted to providing drug education varied widely between them. The methods varied from services in training classroom teachers or students for teacher or peer based instruction, to various partnership presentations by classroom teachers and provider representatives, and, provider-presented education.

The issue of the increased privatisation of educational provision is relevant to the specific case of alcohol education. Drug education can be utilised as an example of private education in action. With regard to enterprising management, private donors are sought out, the provider advertises its programme by way of well presented prospectuses and makes representations and proposals for funding to community and local and central government institutions. Enterprising private drug education providers are also innovative and diverse. There are various philosophies and approaches that different providers articulate and argue over.

1613. Personal communication sourced from health promotion network information.
With respect to competition and enterprise, the sheer number of providers of drug education is evidence of a wide selection of alternative providers in the education market, each seeking funding from schools, community and government agencies, as well as attaining a more prominent public profile.

For neoliberals, a functioning market in drug education is an example of privatisation in action. Buchanan argued for greater market choice in education. In drug education terms from Buchanan's sort of view, a market in drug education takes power away from benevolently despotic behaviour on the part of state representatives.

As an example of drug education in the neoliberal context, Life Education Trust is an enterprising NGO drug education provider. Established in Australia, Life Education is a well managed and marketed organisation securing funding both formerly from central government and also from local communities, schools, and private sector donors Glengary Wines, The Wines, Beers and Spirits Council, Magnum Corporation, Brierleys and Shell Oil.

Life Education is enterprising in its innovative approach to securing long term school support. In the Nelson, Tasman Bays area for instance, Life Education made proposals to schools that, given school and local community funding, it could provide ongoing drug education in the region. In that particular case, Life Education proposed that it needed an initial $150,000 towards the purchase of a purpose fitted caravan. Additionally, the proposed the Life Education programme needed $40,000 per annum, $2 per student who attends Life Education and a $12 cost per school, towards installing an electrical fitting for power to be conducted to the caravan when on site. 1614 Economically innovative, Life Education is enterprising in constructing proposals that if accepted would secure long term funding resulting from financial commitments made by schools and other local community interests.

Market innovation of the sort that Life Education exhibits leads to more enterprising competition between providers. In proposing innovative funding formats, Life Education distinguishes itself, motivating competing drug education providers to themselves formulate innovative funding and approaches that distinguish themselves from Life Education according to the price, philosophy, or method of its programme.

In 1993, Australia's National Centre for Health Programme Evaluation assessed the impact of Life Education Victoria's drug education programme. Utilising Life Education student and control participant responses to questionnaire material regarding rewards from and actual drug use, after six years of Life

1614: Personal communication sourced from health promotion network information.
Education experiences, compared with the control group, students who had undergone Life Education were no less likely to use drugs, rather, they were slightly more likely to use drugs. Life Education was also found to be inflexible, difficult to shape to local needs and costly at $5 per student, compounded by community and government funding.  

The irony in the evaluation of Life Education Victoria drug programme is that schools tended to adopt Life Education as an alternative as opposed to being an addition to school-provided drug education, and, although not leading to any reduction in student drug use, indeed, leading to increased drug use, schools and teachers liked the programme.  

The (1993) research on Life Education Victoria, reveals that although appearing to provide an innovative and popular education, privately provided drug programmes were, in fact, of little benefit, perhaps even harmful, and perhaps, costing more than existing school-based provision.

The issue of quality is also of relevance here. As Gordon (1997) and Thrupp (1997) noted in this country, school mix, although leading to a better quality education for all students is disappearing, replaced by homogeneity within and heterogeneity between schools. The social fact is that school mix is beneficial, however, the representations that parents as educational consumers draw on are those of elitism and social standing in their choice of schools for their children. Similarly in the case of (1993) research into Life Education Victoria, although the social fact is that Life Education Victoria has no identifiable benefits, and is perhaps harmful in its leading to increased drug use on the part of students, education professionals, drawing on commercial representations of an attractively marketed, externally contracted drug education provider, were enthralled with the programme. Both cases are examples of anomic tendencies in education, that seek to get the moral from the immoral, the most from the least, a quality general or drug education from elitism and commercialism in society.

The competitive environment in drug education is so extreme that cooperative possibilities are eliminated. Originally it was the NGO, FADE, established in 1985, who introduced the Life Education programme to this country. Subsequent differences in philosophy and between individuals led to the divorcing of the two providers. FADE does not accept corporate sponsorship.

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1617. NZ Listener (4/12/93), pp.18, 17.
antagonism between public institutional and private foundational providers is also evident in Grice's (1993) claim that Life Education's offer to lend one of its caravans to the former Health Department was declined, on the basis of disagreement over their respective drug education perspectives and their competition over resourcing.

A situation exists where there is an extreme diversity in providers. This situation is reminiscent of the legislative context Mestrovic (1986) noted in his study of the diverse definitions of the dangerous standard in various States in the United States. There is so much diversity between various providers that when not even formalised in the sense that the dangerous standard is in various U.S. State laws are, there is little certainty that students in this country are all receiving drug education of similar quality and content - of similar worth. It is rather the case that students receive drug education provided by particular schools or a number of schools in a given area, contingent on the available, or more often in the case of a marketised context, the most popular or enterprising providers external to the school. Diversity itself is not the problem, it is when diversity is taken to the extreme, as marketisation leads to, that diversity becomes anomie. Research into drug education provision requires taking another look at the practice in its context, examining its philosophy and its practice, critically engaging with that material, proposing alternative angles, and following those outlooks towards better formulations.

In many ways, the market in drug education is subject to all the foibles of market competition and market choice generally notable in education presently. From a Durkheimian perspective, the context of drug education providers is one of anomie and egoism, where each particular approach, trust or foundation vainly believes that the particularity of its own programmes are sufficient to deal with youth drug issues. Lost in the infinity of desires, various providers seek to win the support of more and more schools, refining their programmes, defining their specialities. Lost in the infinity of dreams each provider draws into itself, distinguishing itself through specific innovations and strategies, avoiding negotiations with providers who adopt alternative approaches, and who are interpreted as the opposition for each party. To take this consideration further, it could be asserted that it is a bizarre context where providers would want to compete, moreover, be allowed or encouraged to compete against each other. It could in this consideration be perverse, even revolting, that institutions and NGOs are allowed to squabble over an important issue like drug education. Furthermore, markets in drug education contribute to neoliberal representations of commercialism in society, supporting
further erosion for State responsibility for funding and providing equal quality education for all.

In this context of the marketisation of drug education is one important concern. Another is the degree to which drug education provides instruction that is relevant to the lives of students, and the degree to which the school is able to provide an open forum for discussing and addressing real life drug issues is of great concern.

Watson (1996/97) commented on the low status of media studies in this country’s education system. Previously examined alcohol advertising can be related to school education. In schools, Watson argued, media studies is largely taught by way of the English curriculum, whereas Watson argued the Technology curriculum would be well suited to media studies, in having a problem solving, inquiring focus. Watson, who argued for the inclusion of media studies as a bursary subject, noted a tendency for this country’s teachers to either be really interested in or turned off by electronic technologies, reflecting a wider debate over whether theory or practice should be privileged in media studies. Watson argued for the need of a mixture of theory and practice in education, where teachers receive in-service training and schools have editing units and switching units to mimic industrial studio set ups. Media studies as a stand alone subject would give students a better approximate experience of how real media productions work.

However, Watson also argued that media studies had to move beyond simply opting for a functional focus to approaching the subject critically, which is a problem with regard to gaining support from the industry, which would be critiqued by and who do not currently employ from, school media studies students. Watson noted that there are four ways that media studies education is viewed. One is the conservative, anti-media approach that states that children are innocents who should be shielded from grotesque images the media produces. A second view is that of believing there is a need to take a cautious approach to the media for instance where less ‘serious’ soap operas and horror genres are concerned, firing up a debate within media studies about the relevance of content to students versus the discipline’s legitimacy. A third view is that of liberals or progressives who see media productions and reporting as ideologically

conservative, industrialised and commercialised. Watson saw this approach as taking a slightly inoculative perspective and as useful with regard to critical theory at university and not school level study. Fourthly, there is a view wherein media studies is about pleasure in the same way that other subjects like those in the arts and crafts are apprehended. Seen from a Durkheimian perspective, Watson is too quick to relegate liberal and progressive approaches as too sophisticated for school level study. Watson could be accused of having overlooked the sophisticated and intense lives many school aged people experience today. Savvy and streetwise, experienced and cynical, young people might be more prepared to deal with the 'rich critique and discussion' offered by critical theory than Watson presumed. Some pleasurable elements also might be relevant from a Durkheimian perspective with regard to taking an aesthetic as well as a liberal or progressive approach to the media. Interestingly, given his reservations about the fourth, that is the liberal and progressive approach, Watson endorsed the view of Bazalgette (1989) who in appearing to follow the liberal, progressive and pleasurable perspective argued:

*Media education . . . seeks to increase children's critical understanding of the media - namely television, film, radio, photography, popular music, printed materials and computer software. How they work, how they produce meaning, how they are organised and how audiences make sense of them, and the issues that media education addresses. (It) aims to develop systematically children's critical and creative powers through analysis and production of media artefacts. This also deepens their understanding of the pleasure and enjoyment provided by the media. Media education aims to create more active and critical media users who will demand, and could contribute to, a greater range of media products.*

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Watson's comments regarding media studies in the Technology curriculum are also relevant with regard to the Health curriculum. Working from Mestrovic's comments on postemotional society, media studies are relevant to alcohol education with regard to the way alcohol is represented in the media in both advertising and other programming. From a Durkheimian perspective media studies could be put to use in educating students to be critical viewers, interpreters and producers of media products, creating a context where students are not simply subject to an informal but powerful learning process, but where students can learn how to be aware of the competing and unequally powerful positions of interested parties where alcohol is concerned. *Health and Physical Education in The New Zealand Curriculum* (1999)\(^{1625}\) has the potential to allow students to critically engage with media issues in schools in this sort of way.

The (1999) Health curriculum's achievement objectives allows for students to study how health care and physical activity are influenced by 'media messages'\(^{1626}\) in the community and environment from Level 3 (Std 3-4, Yr 6-7) on. Those achievement objectives through inter and intra strand connections can be relevant for students as early on as Level 1 (J 2-3, Year 1). Level 4 (Frm 2, Yr 8) students could take part in making public health and industry advertisements for instance, as alcohol appears specifically as two Level 4 achievement objectives.

Given the evidence of research into the effects on youth from viewing alcohol advertisements, alcohol education can make use of media studies to enable students to be better prepared to deal with the alcohol issues they will face perhaps at a younger age, given drinking age legislation changes. In this regard, parts of the new Health Curriculum, especially with regard to appropriate ages for the onset of alcohol education was less accurate only months after its release.

*Health and Physical Education in The New Zealand Curriculum* (1999)\(^{1627}\) can be interpreted through a Durkheimian perspective as constructed in a context where competing interested parties hotly debated a document that as its chief author Tasker (1996/97) earlier put it, attempted to be 'postmodern'.\(^{1628}\) However, just what this postmodernism is composed of is unclear. There are different forms of postmodernism,\(^{1629}\) yet Tasker (1996/97) did not clearly specify and articulate

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which might be applicable to this country, only going as far as citing Doll (1989) in passing for support. Co-writer Ian Culpan mentioned Foucault in another piece on the document, but if the epistemology of that postmodernism been clearly discussed, the critical element implicit within that view could have been made clearer. The Education Forum's (1988) submission on the Draft version of the health curriculum made a similar point in this regard, continuing in commenting that the concept of developing critical thought used throughout the draft comes from the perspective of critical theory, which also is not sufficiently explained. The Education Forum (1998) believed that the epistemology of postmodernism and critical theory should have been more apparent, so that it could be discussed and attempted to be disproved in what was for them the correct Popperian way of finding what is the best approach. The Education Forum makes a good point here, however, it is also one that applies to the Forum’s work, for instance with regard to Partington’s (1997) work for the Education Forum on teacher education which utilised the concept of ‘capture’ in various ways, as I have argued, without providing theoretical substantiation. Further, the Education Forum's (1998) use of Popper can be critiqued from a Durkheimian perspective for focussing on the mind, and rational social action and solutions. Popperian thought is related to Buchanan's public choice theory, each being representative of the reductionism of things social to individuals, exhibited by rational choice theory in general. Popper and Buchanan both share having faith in rational thought's ability to solve social issues and are unable to accept the notion of society as a sui generis force. Durkheim by comparison held to the belief that 'one good experiment' is enough to reveal social facts. Replication and falsification, when viewed by way of this Durkheimian insight, are not the most useful ways to ensure that the truth is the result that emerges from such an approach applied to social science. From a Durkheimian perspective informed by Schopenhauer, one can be thoroughly rational and completely vicious at the same time. The emotions are banished by rational choice theory, where

stronger 'armature' in some forms of thought and poststructuralisms like that of, for instance, Derrida who sees all life as various texts.


1633. Unfortunately due to the confines of space an in depth discussion with regard to these two thinkers cannot be entered into. However, see Luke, Timothy. (1987). 'Methodological individualism: The essential ellipsis of rational choice theory'. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 17, for a contextualisation of both in this regard.
intuition has no place in considerations of social matter. Durkheimian insights such as that society is more than the sum of its parts and having a *sui generis* force that must be appreciated and critically approached are mystifications for rational choice theory and the Education Forum (1998).

The Education Forum (1998) also critiqued the extreme relativism implicitly adopted in the Draft. The new curriculum, I argue, has led to state schools being able to reinstitute religion into classrooms. Postmodern sentiments, although allowing for the critical elements that can lead to diversity where for instance culture, gender, sexuality, ethnicity and disability are concerned, when viewed from the sort of argument Mestrovic presented can be seen as also simultaneously allowing the possibility for conservatism to continue and flourish, particularly I would like to argue, with regard to Christian spirituality being brought back into the curriculum and schools.

Increased desecularisation, however, was not a concern for Aspin and Rae, who principally featured in acknowledgments as having contributed to the preparation of the Education Forum's (1998) submission on the Draft version of the Health curriculum. Aspin and Rae made many supportive references to the involvement or Christianity and the Church in education like: the importance of especially Christian religion in understanding art; the inability of state schools to teach spirituality, and; the notion of God as the creator lying at the base of any concept of spirituality.\footnote{1634. Education Forum. (1998). *Health and Physical Education in the New Zealand Curriculum: A Submission on the Draft*. pp.xv, 73, 70.}


As it turned out 'well being' came to be defined in the (1999) curriculum by reference to and adaptation of Durie's use of the notion of 'hauora', which encompasses taha tinana (physical well-being), taha hinengaro (mental and emotional well-being), taha whanau (social well-being), taha wairua (spiritual well-
being) each of which is seen to impact on and assist the others when viewed in a holistic sense.\footnote{1637}

The (1999) curriculum was attempting to address the bicultural imperative of recognising Maori world views and philosophies of health - undoubtably a worthy undertaking given the tragic statistics in Maori health and mortality. By including hauora in the curriculum, the Ministry was attempting to realise its Treaty of Waitangi obligations, and the diversity in people's lifestyles and cultures that now exist in contemporary society. This, however, also raises problems with a 'postmodern' curriculum. The new curriculum is part of an enterprising cultural context where neoliberal ideas of constitutionally set rights give individuals maximum freedom and societal neo conservatism tend to win through and become instated. The authors of the curriculum might not have intended this, yet it is the outcome of the mixture of competing powerful, minority and bicultural community concerns expressed over the Draft version. Given much community concern over bicultural issues where even the term 'pakeha' can raise the blood pressure of many dominant group members in this country, it seems unlikely that many schools are going to centrally utilise the spiritual dimension of health advocated for in the (1999) curriculum to educate students about Maori, or for that matter, Hindi, Islamic, Buddhist, or even, Rastafarian spirituality. Rather, it is more likely that school boards, if choosing to instate spirituality education, will choose Christianity as the subject area for instruction. A school can, given the (1999) curriculum, contract a volunteering or financially renumerated religious instructional provider to conduct classes for perhaps half and hour once a week, that a student's parents can choose to withdraw their child from. This situation raises concerns for alcohol issues in schools and secular education from a Durkheimian perspective.

By comparison to Christian spirituality, imagine the prima facie reaction to a situation where schools provided, for instance, instruction for half an hour a week specifically on the labour movement, the history of Maori-pakeha relations, or those of women and men, considered as spiritual issues. The cries of historical revisionism and social engineering would probably be deafening and it is unlikely that if proposed, such instruction would be made into school policy by a Board of Trustees. But the point for present purposes is that representations of the labour movement, culture and gender relations are considered as dangerous and divisive educationally, whilst Christian instruction is considered harmless. Each are loaded with old dead memories from history, but they are also memories that are used

selectively and conservatively in a neoliberally influenced context. It could be argued that religious instruction and beliefs are less relevant by comparison to the pressing issues of industrial labour, gender and culture related to alcohol.

Additionally, Boards of Trustees might in the neoliberal market driven context opt for a policy of Christian spiritual instruction, partly on the grounds that the programme could contribute to bolstering their schools' reputation and marketability. Schools can thus become Balkanised due to their niche marketing of education.

Brother Pat Lynch, Executive Director of the New Zealand Catholic Education Office and member of the Education Forum was excited when the Ministry of Education first released its curriculum statement on the Health curriculum which included, for the first time, the concept of spirituality. Brother Pat Lynch believed there was a need for shared ethics regarding honesty and trust regardless of culture. I believe this is true. However, that might not be the result of the notion of spirituality being taught in schools, rather Christian or other conservative ethics might be taught - an approach I believe is represented in the view of Richard Whitfield who has raised the issue of shared ethics related to another aspect of education relevant to alcohol - the teaching of values.

As Keown (1996) noted, values in education was a topic that was of great interest in the social studies curriculum in the 1960s and 1970s 'New Social Studies' movements. Having lost prominence in the 1980s, values became a topic of interest in education throughout the 1990s. Keown quoted passages from the New Zealand Curriculum Framework (1993) which stated among other things that values such as 'social justice', 'the welfare of others', 'acceptance of cultural diversity', 'respect for the environment', 'individual and collective responsibility' as well as respect and sensitivity about 'the rights of individuals, families, and groups to hold values and attitudes that are different to our own', should be aspects of all curriculum areas. If there was any confusion about the wording of those statements, one need only to look at New Zealand Curriculum Framework (1993, p. 5) to see in model form that attitudes and values, although unspecified there, are intended to be a part of all curricula in this country.

The conservative approach to teaching values was articulated by Richard Whitfield of Astor University in Birmingham. Whitfield was invited to this country in first in May 1997 by the Independent Schools Council who arranged opportunities

1638. National Radio, Morning Report, (9/7/97, 6:35 am).
for his making presentations around various educational institutions. Later that year the *New Zealand Herald* paid for Whitfield’s airfare to return as well as the costs of reprinting his May seminar. Whitfield, who was a natural scientist and became an ethicist, argued in an interview that ‘values’ and ‘character’ are concepts that are taught as politically correct topics in schools. Using Durkheim’s concept of anomie, Whitfield argued that he was not right wing but that there was a need for students to be taught the value of marriage as a contract and the need to adhere to commitments that must be seen through and where young people’s loneliness and disillusionment with a throw away world results in suicide, which was just the tip of the iceberg of social problems.

Whitfield made some pertinent recommendations regarding changing fiscal structural arrangements that currently devalue persons and make them feel disposable, as well as recommending that young people have time to spend with one another, arguing that one sixth of all educational resources should go into relationship education.\(^1640\) However, Whitfield’s position is conservative by comparison to the Durkheimian perspective adopted for present purposes. Whitfield appeared to hint at ways in which it could be made more difficult to get a divorce, which is a Durkheimian position to the letter of Durkheim as opposed to the spirit, and, argued that rational planning needed to replace the current lack of rationality in government planning.\(^1641\) Society has changed, so much so that marriage and divorce are not always the only ways that people express their commitments to each other, or the dissolution of their relationships. Imposing dead memories of monogamous bliss, an occurrence that often was not even the case in times past, will not improve the situation society faces. Whitfield’s advocacy for rational planning smacks of the rational social action perspective of Parsons which Mestrovic critiqued. Whitfield’s approach seems to be some sort of reculturing of the ethics akin to what Heelas critiqued in the enterprise culture of Thatcherite United Kingdom, what Mestrovic called postemotionalism, or an individually focused attempt to change the values of persons so that they conservatively manage their intimate relationships as part of a cult of management.

Compared to the values Whitfield argued for, the sorts of topics which Keown (1996) examined, such as challenging attitudes of violence and injustice, critically considering statements and attitudes of others, as well as one’s own statements and beliefs, appear more useful and realistic.\(^1642\) To get a better

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theoretical handle on the difference between Whitfield's position and that adopted for present purposes, Nel Noddings' (1992) feminist moral philosophy of education is relevant to the present discussion given Noddings' comments on values in education and her identification as a feminist, who like Gilligan, whom Mestrovic approached critically and tentatively, is interested in the concept of 'care'.

Noddings (1992), in commenting particularly on secondary education, argued for the adoption of feminist relations in education. Noddings recommended an educational approach to care, seeing the concept as a 'caring relation', requiring reciprocity where one person might sometimes be the cared for and at others be the carer. However, Noddings argued, caring does not stop at being a relation between persons only. Rather, Noddings believed that caring can extend to ideas, to life that is not human, and to objects. Noddings believed that if caring were truly instituted in schools, students would become educated about some of the big, and for adolescents in particular, important questions, such as those about personal identity, future prospects of personhood and intimacy with others, as well as how others see them.

Noddings argued that there are different components to moral education, being: modelling, dialogue, practice and confirmation. Modelling is where teachers show students that caring is important by establishing caring relations with them and being carers for students even when students are themselves too young to be carers themselves. Secondly, dialogue is a relation without a particular end being assumed, and realised by establishing genuine empathic and considerate connections between people, regardless of whether the matter being discussed is serious or playful. Thirdly, practice is about students experiencing being caring as an action and an attitude. Finally, confirmation refers to being understanding towards others in an environment that is based on trust, as opposed to the fear and penance, confession and forgiveness in religious instruction.

Noddings argued for changes with regard to the planning, preparation and evaluation undertaken by teachers. Where planning is concerned Noddings argued that teachers should confer with, as well as attempt to predict what students want to

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1643. Noddings, N. (1992). The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education. p.21 cited Gilligan's (1982) In a Different Voice. I suspect that Mestrovic might see Noddings' concept of care as a sort of politically correct manifestation of postemotionalism. Noddings' position could be interpreted as resulting in a reification of caring as feminine, or, for women in particular. Unfortunately, due to the confines of space this discussion cannot be entered into here.


study and what is relevant to their lives. This would variously lead to individual, but also group and extra class activities. Additionally Noddings argued, teachers would need to set aside time to confer with their colleagues about their own as well as their students’ development, weaving into their professional approach, an attitude like that of a parent - a caring attitude.1647

With regard to teacher training, Noddings argued that teachers should be taught to take a broad based approach to their work by seeing their subject speciality as bound up and integrated with other subjects, as well as with existential issues by pursuing wisdom, as opposed to a narrow and focused subject orientation.1648

Assessment, Noddings believed, should follow an integration of internal school student issues with community organisations and agencies. Seeing schools as 'centers of care'1649 would mean that community and extra-school professional representatives could meet with students, following their having assessed their own work in groups and individually, to communicate over the interests, concerns and questions that arise from students lives and the work of those representatives.

Assessment issues are raised by Health and Physical Education in The New Zealand Curriculum (1999). A small Christchurch group of teachers, Concerned Teachers, raised concerns over the new curriculum with regard to the assessment of alcohol, other drug and sexuality educational assessments, believing that such topics cannot be assessed in the same way that mathematics can. The Post Primary Teachers Association rejected the claims of Concerned Teachers, believing that teachers should be able to teach and assess health topics similarly to those covered in other curriculum areas.1650 The issue might not be as clear cut as the Post Primary Teachers Association saw it. If student knowledge resulting from exposure to drug and alcohol issues in the classroom is meant to be enhanced, a problem raised is over what knowledge constitutes a pass or a fail. For instance, assessment issues are raised over whether a student who maintained that their, even when occasional, underaged binge drinking was healthy following an alcohol education unit or lesson should be allowed to pass. By drawing on the perspective of Noddings with regard to care, assessments could be built around issues that are raised where the effects on oneself and others regarding care resulting from

1650. National Radio, Checkpoint, (26/1/00, 5:45 pm), reporter: Gail Woods; News, (26/1/00, 6:00 pm).
excessive consumption are concerned. This would be an approach to assessment matters related to emotional and not contract or Christian spiritual issues.

Noddings’ approach to care when compared with the contract-bound view of Whitfield, seems closer in spirit to the sort of education that Durkheim envisaged. There is also no reason to assume that the concept of spirituality was necessary to impart shared values and ethics in schools. The *New Zealand Curriculum Framework* (1993) was quite clear in its claim that shared ethics are important aspects of a peaceably functioning contemporary western society. Given this situation, shared ethics of the Christian-centered spiritual sort are for the most part an unnecessary component in this context, and when relied on as a source of ethics, is rather a way to reintroduce conservative postemotional values built on dead memories of former Christian centered times. Furthermore, attitudes and values are clearly part of the *Health and Physical Education in the New Zealand Curriculum* (1999). Spirituality is part of that component of the curriculum, along with physical, mental and emotional well-being, respecting the rights of others, caring and being concerned for others and the environment, as well as the development of a feeling of social justice.1651 Especially Noddings’ approach to care, and to a lesser degree Keown’s (1996) approach to values in social studies and subsequent (1998; 1999) studies into school studies of the environment1652 are more akin to the sorts of attitudes and values needed in the contemporary context when compared to those advocated for by the Independent Schools Council, The New Zealand Catholic Education Office, the former editor of *The New Zealand Herald*, Richard Whitfield and the Education Forum.

But Noddings’ approach should not be unproblematically interpreted as a panacea for the anomie and egoism, which Durkheim and Mestrovic discussed. Whilst the ‘care’ of modeling, dialogue, practice and confirmation, the integration of schools with community agencies, discussing issues of curriculum and assessment and so on are all indicative of the sorts of themes that Mestrovic and Durkheim drew on, when considered by way of the postemotional concept, Noddings’ caring in relation could be seen as a recipe for increased post-other-directedness, where students are imposed upon by their caring peer group and teachers. Relations with others in a school environment founded on care, when critically considered from the postemotional perspective potentially involve the learning of standardised nice and tolerant habits of emotion and where problems can be solved by getting together

with others whether they be peers, teachers or extra-school community organisational representatives. Care, interpreted in such a way can also become Balkanised where school communities have great intensity due to the establishment of emotional responses deemed appropriate, leading to an uncaring attitude to others from outside one's community. Noddings would no doubt dispute this as being the outcome of care in education. However, it might be the case that rather than the burgeoning of care that Noddings envisaged, societal fission might actually ensue from the attempt to institute care without a supportive, spontaneous environment with quality integrating features.

Keown's approach to values by way of a 'community of inquiry' or action research can also be critiqued given Mestrovic's comments on neo-Kantianism. Keown, in part, drew on Kohlberg's moral philosophy which Gilligan attacked and Mestrovic has also claimed is masculinist, as well as reflecting Enlightenment thinking. Keown also sought to construct a rational community. Action theory is related to the neo-Kantianism of Habermasian utopian thought which seeks ideal speech situations and the completion of the Enlightenment project. Mestrovic and Durkheim criticised utopian thought. Mestrovic criticised Enlightenment thinking and saw Durkheim as having done the same. Keown's approach to values is something like the non-Bourdieuian forms of social capital. Keown's view is one of rational and conscious thought, and rationally constructed communities.

What Keown's approach to values hides is the postemotions of the peer group, mechanised emotional orientations, demeanours and relations that underlie the appearance of an inclusive community. Peer group orientations are all-pervasive as students are required to discuss issues and their wishes with regard to values, amongst themselves as a 'community', as if small scale communities can make a significant change when contextualised within a broader societal context of violence, inequality, racism and sexism. School student 'communities' are not safe islands of rationality and ideal communication. They are engulfed with regard to class contexts, teaching styles and school hierarchies that are themselves governed by a culture of enterprise in neoliberalism.

Having considered the possible problems entailed by spirituality and values in health education, the new curriculum on Physical Education and Health should not be seen as a failure in total. By having a clear set of objectives, *Health and Physical Education in the New Zealand Curriculum* (1999) creates a context where schools must hold to their responsibility to teach health issues. This can only
improve on what was the situation in 1997 when only fifty percent of schools were fully including Health in their teaching.1653

Some excellent programmes have been established to deal with alcohol issues. For instance, the *Tu Tangata* (Stand Tall) programme has had great success in this country by encouraging adults to work with students for both the sake of students and to themselves gain credentials and experiences. *Tu Tangata* is instituted in forty five schools nationally, leading to reductions in student truancy, alcohol and other drug use, and, the concept has been successfully exported to Hawaii and Canada.1654 Also, Gillian Tasker, one of the chief co-authors of the new Health curriculum has previously produced some excellent programmes, like for instance the *Taking Action* (1994) or the *Taking Care of Yourself and Others* (1999) resource kits which address a number of salient issues with regard to alcohol being associated with culture and gender,1655 success and sexuality, sport, and, which encourages in-school teachers to teach drug and alcohol issues. A two and a half day training course for teachers was additionally being organised to accompany the 1999 kit, a proposal received with great interest by teachers and schools.1656

Tasker's programme is teacher-led, viewing teachers as having a central contribution in taking primary responsibility for providing alcohol education. Additionally and importantly, Tasker's education kits build upon student knowledge and places that knowledge in a social context of advertising and other messages that give students' knowledge more meaning and relevance with regard to societal alcohol issues. Tasker's approach is sociological.

Elliot and Lambourn (1999) reported on peer-led approaches being utilised in Auckland schools. Peer-led programmes seek to draw on international research indicating that even in one of the most liberal countries regarding sexuality, Sweden, 41% of youths were uncomfortable about talking with adults - a similar tendency was noted in research co-authored by Elliot in this country. Elliot and Lambourn pointed out that professionals', students', teachers' and parents' different expectations coupled with market pressures, leads to peers being a source of information regarding sex and drugs, a phenomenon that can be used for health education, due to peers having shared experiences and feelings, potentially communicating socially positive values, as well as by being social supports.

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1654. National Radio, *Midday Report*, (20/7/99, 12:15pm), Gail Woods reported *Tu Tangata (Stand Tall)* Director, Kara Puketapu’s comments. Incidentally, a Tu Tangata programme in Wainuiomata is the subject of one chapter in Robinson's (1999), (Ed.) *Social Capital in Action*. Due to the confines of space, a critical engagement with that text cannot be entered into here.
Elliot and Lambourn (1999) reported on how one programme, called 'Peer Sexuality Support' (PSS), students were specially trained at camps to be supports for peers, and referring them to community agencies and school liaison people. Annually, celebrities and other public figures publicly award PSS student peers for assisting other secondary students in dealing with sexuality issues as they related to, among other things, alcohol. For Elliot and Lambourn this was a good example of Bandura's modelling, both for PSS trainees and their student peers, who anecdotally reported enhanced safe sex knowledge, self esteem and confidence, as well as the valuing and respecting of others.1657

From a Durkheimian perspective, there are similar problems with the peer-led approaches studied by Elliot and Lambourn, as those often applied in the realm of public health, peer and advertising studies related to alcohol, due to the use of Bandura, identified herein as a sociologically impoverished theory. For instance, seeing public figures in person handing out an award to a PSS student might not necessarily have as powerful an effect as seeing that figure as one among a number of their peers who might be known to abuse alcoholic drugs, as in the case of parliamentarians, or actors who one day might be, in person, awarding responsible students, and who the next might, in character, be abusing their peers, or, a sportsperson who might subsequently act violently when playing. The sociological effect of the broader context might be greater than the psychology of witnessing such one-off events as Bandurian drug education programmes assume. There was an element of imposition and individualisation in that programme with a focus on individual student attitude changes being sought in student feedback on the programme.1658

This focus on opinions exhibited by the PSS programme, as well as the use of the peer group can be critiqued from a Durkheimian perspective, and, Mestrovic's criticisms of the post-other-directed, or postemotional, peer group apply when seen as all pervasive and socially supportive only in the sense that Mestrovic critiqued stress research. The postemotional social groups to which students are subject to, imposes a prepackaged series of orientations imparted by peers trained in appropriate emotional and cognitive behaviours as part of their work in the programme. And finally, the programme's interpretation through Bandura can itself

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be critiqued from a Durkheimian perspective, in adopting an overly rationalised, cognitivised and psychological approach to the emotions.

By comparison, the Alcohol and Other Drugs Peer Education Project tended towards using a more sociological perspective by including students in the programme design and integrating the programme with local youth agency representatives as well as Maori and Pacific Island community groups, and, the programme included overnight stays at a local marae, meaning that world views that were relevant to many of the students who demographically were from similar ethnic and cultural groups as those who were consulted and actively participated in the programme, were represented throughout. That programme, although still mired in Bandurian thought, offered meaningful and quality social integration, rich in tradition, rituals, ideas and sentiments, which as implied by a Durkheimian perspective are socially beneficial. Elliot and Lambourn (1999) admitted that peer-led programmes were not necessarily the only way to deal with alcohol, other drug, and sexuality education, yet also believed that such programmes were essential to a harm-reduction approach. The various forms that "harm reduction" can take displays that it can be problematical, as any approach in the drug education market can appeal to the concept, which can be used to cover a spectrum from promoting abstinence, to assisted practice. A student relevant, teacher-led and sociologically-based drug education is needed.

Durkheim considered language to be a social fact as well as an event. Language was for Durkheim another example of a social product that can be examined to reveal the elements in society that were responsible for its creation. Language can reveal the social importance of its referent. Consider the language used for drinking. There are a number of terms for drinking (eg, 'shot', "tipple", etc) and even more for drunkenness (eg, "pissed", "squiffy", out of it", "stoned", etc). As London (1991) has pointed out, the number of terms that exist to describe an activity indicate its social importance. London compared the number of terms that there are for drunkenness, and then compared the number of terms that exist to describe "snow". This is done in the classroom so that students can become aware of the great social importance that is placed on drinking in contemporary western cultures. Students are then informed that Eskimos use thirty different terms to

describe various types of snow that exist, and that those terms exist because snow is so central to Eskimo culture so is a topic that has generated many terms. By arguing that this is the case, London cited Levine (1981) who believed that the often violent terms used to describe drunkenness reflect the societal expectation that alcoholic intoxication breaches what is ordinary consciousness and has underlying aggressive meanings. London’s argument reflects the Durkheimian perspective of seeing language as a social fact that Saussure picked up on in his own seminal works. The violent language used to describe drunkenness is also reminiscent of Hodges’ (1985; 1989) semiological argument that young men see the consumption of large quantities alcohol as a challenge to normality and identity.

Sharples (1996) was very critical of the culture of drinking in this country. Addressing youth and alcohol from a broad perspective, Sharples (1996) noted a 'go on the bash', 'drinking to get drunk', 'getting pissed', 'being plastered', 'going on a binge' way of thinking about alcohol that permeates family, work and recreational institutions. Sharples argued for comprehensive interventions and changes in these institutions and those of government and politics.

Sharples (1996) argued that the anti-tobacco, anti-drink driving and Kura Kaupapa movements are all national examples of how changes can be made in societal attitudes. The same, Sharples believed, could be achieved in drinking patterns if the commitment was there.

To comment on one of Sharples' recommendations of how to make alterations, related to education, the Kura Kaupapa movement is one that relates to pedagogical and market issues in education. As Jenkins and Ka'ai (1994) noted, Kura Kaupapa is a Maori-appropriate educational approach established by Maori concerned about the loss of Maori culture and language in a settler dominated society. Te Kohanga Reo (pre-school Maori culture and language nest) was established to address this need in 1982. Te Kohanga Reo led to the establishment of the first Kura Kaupapa Maori (primary school) at Hoani Waititi Maraee in 1985 to cater for graduates of Te Kohanga Reo. Whare Kura is the Kaupapa secondary school and Whare Wananga is tertiary education.

Kura Kaupapa is a separate education system that teaches Maori in Maori language and culture. Because the State does not provide what parents want for their children, and as the State has not changed the system beyond dabbling with Maori immersion, where the State schools provide Maori education, State education has been criticised by Maori.\textsuperscript{1668} To establish tino rangatiratanga (self-determination) in the face of poor State provision, funding, staffing and curricula materials, many Maori have opted for separate Kura Kaupapa education.

In neoliberally supplemented Maori perspectives,\textsuperscript{1669} the State does not provide for Maori as rent seeking bureaucrats will always choose according their preferences, so privatised education is the solution to the structural problems that Maori experience in schools. In discussing Maori and alcohol it was noted that neoliberalism and Maori sovereignty movements meet at this point generally.

From a Durkheimian perspective separate education for Maori is problematic, in that it takes the pressure off State schools to change. Maori, as Treaty partners have a right to tino rangatiratanga, and that should not be denied, and Kura Kaupapa is justly based on the accurate conclusion that the State is currently failing Maori. However, the problem with the neoliberal solution is that it is based on the assumption that it would be unrealistic, or impossible for the State to increase its funding or be reformed and revitalised to become more bicultural. Neoliberalism does not consider these possibilities in seeking to reduce budgets and the State itself.

Applying the postemotional concept, a wholesale movement to separate schooling for Maori could lead to cultural fission and Balkanisation as Maori and non-Maori would become more separated culturally as a result. However, cultural fission and Balkanisation could also result from State schools being pressured to establish immersion units in a generally underfunded environment. As non-Maori racism does exist, authentic biculturalism in the sense of what Matahaere-Atariki called co-presence would not be realised. Even the less inclusive approach Matahaere-Atariki noted, being recognition of Maori as a perspective would be less likely.

Sharples was right, there is much to learn with regard to addressing alcohol issues by looking to Kura Kaupapa for solutions, but from a Durkheimian perspective it is not because Kura Kaupapa is an example of neoliberal market


\textsuperscript{1669} see Awatere-Huata's (1998) \textit{Zero Tolerance}. ACT New Zealand: Wellington.
success. The sources of solutions in Kura Kaupapa are in the pedagogies and the collective community approach to schooling that Kura Kaupapa exhibits. For instance, with regard to school management, Kura Kaupapa schools have Boards of Trustees, but they also maintain their whanau komiti (community committee), which is always referred to before any State policy is implemented. The whanau komiti are responsible for the admission of students, curriculum content, programme monitoring, and teacher appointments. Market issues and potential harms noted in extrapolations of Gordon's and Snook's comments are somewhat avoided in this approach.

With regard to pedagogy related to alcohol education, Kura Kaupapa offers further insights into better practice. Kura Kaupapa works for Maori children as the language and the culture of Maori, or what Thrupp and Wall noted was Bourdieu's view of cultural capital, is recognised and valued by the school. The student's home life and school life are cohesive. Maori students attending Kura Kaupapa schools can exchange their cultural capital for credentials, as Maori language is spoken for a large portion of the school day and the cultural knowledge and values that make up students' experiences outside of the school are incorporated into what takes place and the knowledge transmitted in the school.¹⁶⁷⁰

This general approach to pedagogy, which seeks to work with student prior knowledge for the purposes of teaching new knowledge, is important. This is more so in the case of alcohol education where student prior knowledge might be contradictory to health messages being transmitted by schools. Working with student prior knowledge is central. Otherwise, students will not take on new and contradicting knowledge in such a way that it is seen as relevant to their own lives. Kura Kaupapa works well in this sense in being culturally appropriate. Working with student knowledge is important.

In this sense alcohol education can benefit from research into in-school learning in other curriculum areas. Studies into student learning there have ramifications for alcohol education. Nuthall and Alton-Lee (1997) have researched what students remember about their education. Nuthall and Alton-Lee's study is relevant to the present study in two respects; firstly, because it discloses that students often take something very different away from their studies than their educators seek to impart to them, and secondly, from the Durkheimian position, the

historical period in which the research took place was a time when as a society this country was undergoing massive ruptures and dislocation.

Nuthall and Alton-Lee (1997) have looked into memory with regard to what assists students to remember in class activities and the transmission of knowledge therein.1671

Nuthall and Alton-Lee (1997) argued that differences in attainment have less to do with ability than with the background of students. Students bring to the culture of school a range of experiences that reflect the culture of their home and peers. Some students' out of school culture is the same as that of the teacher who articulates a number of shrouded meanings, and assumptions. For those students achievement is more likely. Some students come from cultures that significantly differ from those of their peers who share a culture with teachers. For those students, Nuthall and Alton-Lee argued, poor achievement is a result of a snowballing affect over time. Living in two cultures, that of their peers and family and another in the school, knowledge relevant to home and peer culture held before entering the classroom, being different to that which teachers and other peers hold, means that equal effort put into classroom contexts will not assist students of two cultures, rather as Nuthall and Alton-Lee argued, they will fall behind others. This view, Nuthall and Alton-Lee argued challenges standard assumptions about student ability.1672

For instance, student participants studied Antarctica and were then asked a year later about the topic. 'Paul' remembered material about a training camp at Lake Tekapo, which a visiting speaker had mentioned only in passing as he had prior knowledge about the topic.1673 'Tui' reflected a different form of cultural knowledge when asked about the topic of rainbows studied in science. Nuthall and Alton-Lee (1997) noted the view that learning takes place in terms of genres of language and thinking which are relevant to particular discipline areas, believing that different students understand these genres differently according to their cultural backgrounds.1674 Tui reflected this cultural difference when studying rainbows. Tui when asked about the topic 'coming up in class' utilised personal experiences with his mother who had told him factually misleading information about rainbows,

prioritising that experience over that of the teacher-directed lesson. The difference between Paul and Tui is that Paul's cultural knowledge was relevant to and able to be integrated with the new knowledge imparted in the school. Students' prior knowledge can interfere with the knowledge of the classroom. Integrating new knowledge requires that students' foundational knowledge from outside the classroom does not interfere with what is learnt therein, as some students' background knowledge creates misunderstandings, as the classroom can appear as threatening, and as classroom mistakes are not understood by them.\textsuperscript{1675}

\textit{... students need to know that when private experiences compete with academic classroom experiences the classroom experience should be given priority. This requires them to know what counts as academic classroom experience, and to have developed an understanding of the hierarchy of alternative experiences and sources of knowledge.} \textsuperscript{1676}

The findings of Nuthall and Alton-Lee (1997) are revealing, from a Durkheimian position, in that despite teachers' child-centred aims of enlightening and making learning fun, culturally relevant representations still held a leading position in the minds of their students. This research could be interpreted as meaning that teaching contexts are presently unable to, in themselves, counter the impact of cultures situated within a wider context that children tap into in their engagements with peers, family and I would add, the media. Schools in this environment face a real challenge in seeking to inspire students into usefully apprehending and succeeding in classroom topics.

Another aspect of classroom activities studied by Nuthall and Alton-Lee (1997) is the way in which students' memory of topics is constructed as representations in memory. Nuthall and Alton-Lee argued that new concepts taken in by students appear to remain in the 'working memory' for about two days. If new relevant representations are not added to working memory within two days students seem to lose the representation from their long term memory. Nuthall and Alton-Lee argued that students need to have three or four separate occasions over that

time period when relevant conceptual representations are presented for representations to be transferred from working to long term memory storage. This is mostly an unconscious process where, in terms of schema theory, representations in memory are encoded not so much by way of the exterior features of language and activities in class, but rather the manner in which the exterior features are experienced and viewed as over time the events are lost from memory leaving behind the meanings imparted. This implies that memory is a process that has multiple layers and that relies on the way in which in-class activities are structured\textsuperscript{1677} around genres which " . . . are part of what constitute culture . . "\textsuperscript{1678} Nuthall and Alton-Lee concluded that to enhance the learning of students who come from diverse cultures:

Facilitating student use of a variety of different language and activity structures through a variety of different media and using a variety of different tools may be the best way to have a deep and lasting effect on how students acquire and use their knowledge.\textsuperscript{1679}

The implications for alcohol education is that schools must establish ongoing and diverse ways in which this area of the curriculum is imparted. Alcohol education cannot be considered to be a topic to be covered in one day in one lesson held by a regular teacher or visiting speaker. Rather, given the research findings of Nuthall and Alton-Lee, alcohol education units need to be established which cover alcohol relevant issues over a sustained period and by using various teaching strategies like for instance, the writing of reports and stories, homework, reading, tests, and small peer group and class discussions. Without this sort of multi-faceted approach to teaching and assessing alcohol education, students might retain misinformation about the topic gained from family and peer as well as media sources, which could be misleading and dangerous to the health of themselves and others, but is retained, as students might find school drug education as irrelevant and inferior to their prior knowledge.

Nuthall and Alton-Lee's research into students' knowledge is insightful and highly relevant to education in this country, but even here the cult of management and neoliberal education policy is linked with alcohol - here with regard to neoliberal policy and alcohol by way of the funding of research noted within (1997), which was contributed to by ERUDITE, the charity set up to fund community projects from the takings from hotel gaming machines. In an enterprise education there is competition and a need to gain funding for research, as is the case where schools now have to make up shortfalls in budgets by approaching the community population and business for monies.

As a part of the cult of management in education, ERUDITE - funds education from alcoholic drug sales based businesses, which doubly cash in, selling alcohol to drinking patrons, some of who also slot money into machines as gamblers. The drinking establishment with gambling machines and betting is one of horse racing, spinning picture wheels, satellite fed barbarian sports, as well as jugs and bottles of piss. The cult of management is present in Nuthall and Alton-Lee as sales from the sites where, for instance, masculinity is acted out as embodied representations and where site related violence and morbidity has been identified, fund education research into student learning inquiring into issues of gender and culture with regard to learning. There is something revolting about a neoliberal funding context where representations of education researchers collide with those of alcoholic drug suppliers by way of their gaming machines. The two are forced together in a derangement that is the cult of management. This cult is throughout education as the State has withdrawn from its mediating role, it has been shrunk so that this offensive situation arises.

That is not to say that Nuthall and Alton-Lee's research is any the less accurate or important. In fact, quite the opposite is the case as Nuthall and Alton-Lee's research is very contributive to a Durkheimian perspective of alcohol in health education, in showing that in this country there are socially-based factors that affect classroom pedagogy. However, solutions to issues in this country will not all come from onshore, or for that matter from nationally legitimated theoretical quarters. Nuthall and Alton-Lee's study can be constructively utilised for an alcohol education, supplemented by overseas drug talk and pedagogy research.

Bernsteinian research into United Kingdom student drug talk provides some insight into improving classroom pedagogy. Jones' (1995) research into student experiences of drug education revealed that much drug education is irrelevant to students. Adopting a participant observational approach to formal drug education classes led by the teacher, off stage small groups in classes addressing drug
issues, as well as holding focus group interviews, informally, Jones noted differing responses from students in the three varying contexts.

In formal class groups, students responded to teacher led activities in providing stereotypic and on cue responses where drug users were seen as 'others' - that is, people who are very different from themselves. Comparing the centre lesson conducted by the teacher with the off-stage in-class discussion groups, students in the groups coordinated by Jones spoke to Jones in a distinguishably different language, to that of the language spoken by the students to their regular educational health teacher. For instance, a regular teacher posed questions like: "do you know drug users?" and this elicited statements that students perceived to be the 'right' answer (of not knowing users), yet in the less formal, off-stage context, students made statements to Jones like: "Yeah, I know someone who's into drugs, but you wouldn't know it. Like he works and he doesn't look obvious." It is evident that students perceived the appropriate language and attitude to be adopted in each of these two contexts to be very different.1680

In the informal group context, further student sophistication with regards to their knowledge about drugs was revealed. Jones noted that in that context students described drugs in the terms of their having permissive attitudes towards drug users they knew, and, saw drug use as a youth culture style issue that was very relevant to them.

Jones, utilised Basil Bernstein's (1977; 1990) notions of classification, code and discourse in context, wherein classified contexts are considered with regard to home and school experiences and knowledge. When students experience a mismatch between the home and school, they change their language to suit that to the language that they perceive as indicating their knowledge of the right answer.1681 For Bernstein, as Harker and McConnochie (1985) noted, students in such positions use the collection code, wherein success is seen as realised by collecting appropriate pieces of knowledge.1682

Jones argued that generally, students did not see any meaningful relationship between the school education and real life issues. Students often felt that teachers knew less about drug issues than themselves, but realising the code of classroom learning, would not question the teacher's ignorance, revealed in their teacher's lack of knowledge about the subtleties and accuracy of various drug

scenarios used for instruction. In that context students became preoccupied with giving the right answer.\(^{1683}\)

For Jones, the irrelevance of school drug education for students meant that the discourse of the 'drug user', became a hypothetical construction, stripped of meaning and a classification between school and real life, resulting in students' uncritical reflection on their own meaningful drug knowledge in their lives, experiences and social circles. Furthermore, Jones argued that drug issues as a style issue, combined with discourse and code in youth culture can lead to the situation where public health promotions are, contrary to their intention, interpreted by youths as reflecting a stylish demeanour turning 'them' drug users, into 'us', of youth culture, raising questions about the effect of excessively targeted group promotions.\(^{1684}\)

Jones observed that students displayed more elaborate language in the terms of Basil Bernstein's (1960) theories on restricted and elaborate language. Bernstein's theory has a problematic history in this country, in that it was drawn upon to advance cultural deprivation theories, which when applied as policy and practice in the 1960s belittled the culture of Maori, which was seen as handicapped.\(^{1685}\) Cultural deprivation also claimed similar things of low socio-economic and other minority ethnic groups. Education was directed to familiarising non-dominant group members in elaborate language codes.\(^{1686}\) Bernstein was roundly critiqued as a cultural deprivation theorist both in this country and overseas, by claims that, for instance, minority group members' language is very complex and knowledgeable.\(^{1687}\)

Jones' use of Bernstein is addressed to aspects of Bernstein's work where context takes in relations of power and non-dominant group people's acquiescence to their subordination by deferral. That is what students do in giving teachers the required answer that is normative and expected. Giving the right answer is seen by students as 'getting it right'.\(^{1688}\) There is still a large portion of determinism in Bernstein's work in this regard.\(^{1689}\) However, the aspect of Bernstein's theory which


\(^{1687}\) see Rosen; Labov; Harker.


\(^{1689}\) Comparisons could be made with the formerly critiqued neo-Marxist view of Willis' view of student resistance, where the lads did not acquiesce but rebelled, to their educational detriment, against the
Jones' drew on is where normative language relates to students' power relations with the teacher – it is restricted language, compared to the elaborate language used by students in less classified contexts. In off-stage and informal groups, students use elaborate language. Unlike in the formal context in relation to the teacher, with regard to drugs, in the informal contexts, students drew on their experiences and knowledge. Different discourses are used for drug talk according to context.

In Jones' study, off-stage small group discussions were pedagogically more effective than regular teacher-led whole class discussions and formal break time groups. In the talk formal breaks, students focused closely on impression management in their talk. Jones noted that formal break discussion groups involved a different code and talk where students saw the context as less about teaching than a conversation. Students asked Jones very few questions there. In the off-stage discussions, students exhibited some impression management but also saw the classroom context as 'formal enough', and in their talk, asked unfeigned questions in seeking information. Jones conjectured that students who are able to form their own groups feel safer about asking questions compared to being watched by their peers and their teacher in regular teacher led class contexts that lead to conformity in drug talk. Jones' argument was that context regulates the content and the performance of discussion rather than determining it, evidenced in students' raising the same issues in different contexts, meaning those issues were not distinct to context, yet students talked less about their own experiences in small groups and teacher led classes.\(^{1690}\)

Harker and McConnochie (1985) applied the notion of code to the need for a bilingual and bicultural education, arguing something similar to Jones, by looking to institute numerous knowledge codes for inquiring into various areas relevant to education. For Harker and McConnochie, culturally appropriate pedagogical methods, different contexts, and alternative ways in which to assess whether students have been transmitted messages are generated from this approach. Harker and McConnochie's approach to Bernstein differs somewhat from Jones' in that they argue that different collection codes are present in the different contexts of Maori and non-Maori learning, as opposed to the case of arguing that Maori use an

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integrated code, whereas Jones can be interpreted as seeing formal teacher led classes as collective code based, while off-stage and formal break discussions as using the integrated code.

Seeing different contexts as subject to different collective codes as Harker and McConnochie did, means that the postemotional concept's dimension of the stultifying peer group can be identified in peer drug talk. This could be said to be more the case than Jones identified it as being, in referring to the Goffmanian impression management that students engaged in during off-stage and formal break conversations.

These comments aside, Jones' study is still similar to Harker and McConnochie with regard to Jones' inquiring into the different contexts in which students discuss issues and the integrated knowledge codes of discussing drug users. In the informal group, students discussed their knowledge as a conversation under the relational ideas of 'them', that is, drug users who students did not know or who lived outside of their area, versus, 'us' and style where drug users are known people who are not seen as addicts or where style is associated with the drug user. This left them open to apprehending health and drug use public information as style. Students, Jones seemed to imply, in not receiving a realistic and relevant drug education in schools that allowed them to see drug issues in a way that is meaningful to them, saw public health programmes in an attractive rather than inoculating way. Jones' is a sociological, not a psychological view.

From the perspective of public choice theory, Jones' research is indicative of the need for the greater marketisation of drug education. Jones' experience of the off-stage and informal group sessions conducted with the student participants, is evidence that students felt unable to freely articulate themselves in front of their regular health educator. From Buchanan's perspective, greater marketisation would foster an environment where providers with programmes and staff who were highly motivated in their niche marketing of education, draw students interest, prior knowledge and confidence out, so that they can openly and frankly discuss and address drug issues. In Colemanian terms as discussed by Wall (1998), an enterprising drug and health education provider will dovetail with the special character of the contractee school, so that the educators can contribute to the social capital of the school. A successful and enterprising drug education provider would emerge with a greater market share due to the popularity of their programme among a number of consuming schools.

That neoliberal conclusion, in accord with the cult of management is not sociologically grounded when considered from a Durkheimian perspective. It cannot be assumed that private and contract provided education is preferable to that of school provided education just because school programmes such as that which Jones described are found to lead to, off-stage frank discussions compared to formal teacher-led classroom contextual normative responses from students. Jones’ study has relevance to school versus contract provided education from a Durkheimian perspective, challenging the view from public choice theory that drug education should be increasingly privatised. The idea of a market of private providers of alcohol and health education is based on an unsociological approach. The cult of education is neoliberal anomie and egoism in alcohol and health education.

Implications

It is clear from the preceding regarding education generally, and specifically regarding drug education, that broader societal neoliberalism has impacted on education. A neoliberal cult of management has become part of the representations of education. Market choice and market imperatives have increasingly become part of the work of schools. School governance, teacher professionalism, enterprise culture, and teacher competencies are all reflective of neoliberalism. As demonstrated, the anomie and egoism of neoliberalism in education has driven education away from the cult of the individual. Rather, lower pole homo duplex representations abound. Under neoliberalism teachers have been positioned as self-seeking and have worked in schools, which due to their positioning in the market, have taken on particular policies regarding student misbehaviour, and, are potentially expected to take on particular emotional orientations with regard to professionalism. Students have received a less holistic education, becoming taught in economically useful skills as part of a culture of enterprise, rather than receiving knowledge for subsistence. Teacher education has been subject to criticism that it is ‘politically correct’. Neoliberal approaches have been influential in each of these areas of education generally.

Where drug education is particularly concerned, State intervention has been undermined by claims that teachers have particular perspectives on drugs that are not in accord with the needs of students, and drug education has often been contracted out to non-State providers. However, external provision has not been proven to work.
In a market environment, punishment policies where students have been identified as using drugs makes it clear that those policies are affected by school market position. Students are often excluded from school participation and need to be integrated with and contribute to their community.

By examining drug education in the context of neoliberalism, media studies could be a useful source of critical skills building for students. Instead, neoliberal perspectives on health education are that religion has a place in State schools, and religion has returned to education through the notion of spirituality. Values education can also be conservative tending. It can, however, draw on notions of community and care as well as draw on socially orientated approaches generally and those offered by Maori perspectives.

Research into learning processes generally show that education needs to take place over a period of time and be contextualised with regard to previous student knowledge and the student’s valuing of the educator. Drug education methods show that less formal approaches enable students to communicate more freely. The relevance of Jones’ work here is that students perceive regular teacher-led alcohol and health education as meaningless. With regard to the secondary school context, teachers clearly need to know more about drug issues relevant to the street, so that when students do talk off stage with people taking on positions such as those in Jones’ research, student knowledge which is shared in off stage lesson groups can be incorporated into teachers’ planning for other lessons that will make up the unit. In fact, Jones’ position is just the sort of role that needs to be expanded were a non-marketised State provided drug and health education to be realised.

A Durkheimian perspective on alcohol, other drug and health education does not deny that secondary people in the classroom interacting with students in the way that Jones, for instance did in studying student knowledge are of use. In fact the opposite is the case, as there is no doubt that a power relation exists between students and regular teachers that might affect the representations imparted therein, given that health and drug issues are sensitive ones.

Jones’ findings are relevant with regard to the lack of teacher knowledge over drug issues considered with respect to the problems of power in current classroom contexts, which can foster stereotypic answers from students leading to the potential case where classroom context health and drug talk can become a decontextualised, hypothetical discourse. A change needs to be instituted that will provide a better and centrally sociologically informed health education, replacing the
market approach currently adopted. This will be explained as part of the following conclusion to the present study.
Summary, conclusions, and recommendations: The future

It is clear from applying Durkheimian perspectives in the original fashion taken, that by the time of the new millennium, neoliberalism was embedded in society and education. Society and education is more anomic and egoistic as a result. Lower pole *homo duplex* representations can be found in a range of societal and institutional contexts due to neoliberalism, and the cult of the individual has not been fostered. Rather, neoliberalism encourages various aspects of postemotionalism. Countering the entrenchment of anomie and egoism due to neoliberalism will not be simple or easy. Once representations are crystallised it is hard to change them. Anomie is a total social fact that affects individuals and society. However, there are a range of general and particular summary conclusions and recommendations that can be offered with regard to the future concerning: research; health education professionals in schools to address the market in drug education, and; concluding with final comments on society and education. To contextualise those offerings, however, the argument advanced in the present study can be briefly retraced.

Durkheimian perspectives have been utilised to understand the danger that is posed by neoliberalism. The harms of neoliberalism are many, but they are often not readily seen. Society can appear to be something but really be something else. This is the power of the unconscious, as explained by Durkheim. Durkheimian perspectives can uncover the hidden currents of society.

Durkheim and Mestrovic's writings have been utilised so that the Durkheimian position is clear. Durkheim was first expositionally approached by way of some of the central concepts that Durkheim utilised with regard to society and education, and was revisited when explaining Mestrovic's adaptations to Durkheim's reception. In this sense, politics, education in its broadest sense, economics, religious and secular society, individualism and collectivism, historical and contemporary society, health and sickness, knowledge and ignorance, truth and untruth, emotions and rationality were noted. Durkheim and Mestrovic both clearly wrote with compassion and concern, exhibiting great sympathy regarding suffering in society.

Durkheimian perspectives have also been examined beside other perspectives such as critical structuralism and poststructuralism. Whilst Durkheim and Mestrovic were identified as problematic regarding gender and culture, the accusation of Durkheim as being neoliberal was refuted through contrasting Durkheim with Buchanan with regard to human nature and institutions, as well as with respect to methodological issues.
Limitations to Durkheimian perspectives regarding gender and culture have been addressed through being supplemented by radical social theories of gender and culture, making Durkheimian perspectives more relevant to the problems associated with alcohol in society and education than those of Durkheim's or Mestrovic's, either singly or in combination. Poststructuralist, high modern, feminist object relations and post-Lacanian, and, semiotic radical social theories have been drawn on, linked to addiction, compulsive behaviours, abuse, violence and death. Radical social theories also offer suggestions about how to treat such issues. Those theories contributed useful contemporary concepts and parts of them were taken and synthesised with Durkheim and Mestrovic's theories. A contemporary Durkheimianism has been formulated and applied to a range of societal phenomena.

Durkheimian perspectives offer alternatives to neoliberal approaches and other perspectives that are similarly individualistic and psychologistic where social and individual pathology are concerned. Two theories focused on as individualistic and psychologistic where the economistic rational addiction theory of Gary Becker and the psychological social cognitive theory of Albert Bandura. Those theories were criticised for their reductionism and lack of structural theory respectively. Addiction and abuse need to be seen in a social context and in a holistic way. This applies to examining global and national societies. By comparison to individualistic theories, Durkheimian perspectives have drawn on theories ranging from family systems and object relations to poststructuralism and Marxist political economics, as they see addiction in a social context. From Durkheimian perspectives, an anomic and egoistic society creates anomic and egoistic people. By examining methods adopted to deal with drug use, holistic, compassionate approaches such as those advocated for by Durkheimian perspectives can be delineated from reductionist, punishing approaches such as those that arise from individualistic psychological and rational choice theory respectively. Addiction and abuse must always be seen in context. Durkheimian perspectives achieve this contextualisation.

Durkheimian perspectives capture the irrational, the passions, the emotions and the heart of society and education. The heart is stronger than the head in Durkheimian perspectives. Attempts to overrationalise life reflects part of the postemotional concept that Mestrovic used to study society. Durkheim also referred to the unseen passions and collective representations that are composed of sentiments as well as ideas. The emotions can be shaped into beneficial or
destructive directions. Anomie and egoism are what result from the destructive lower pole of *homo duplex*.

Durkheimian perspectives are relevant to the present context with respect to critiquing individualistic science, excessive individualism, the freemarket, compulsive behaviours, societal disharmony, the minimal state, decollectivised groups, social disruption and education markets. Durkheimian perspectives provide a central standpoint from which to understand the influence of neoliberalism in considering alcohol in society and education. Neoliberalism is anarchic and a public danger. Durkheimian perspectives reveal this frightening situation and offer ameliorations to its effects.

Concluding comments and recommendations can be made regarding research, and health education professionals in schools to address the market in drug education, considered in the contexts of society and education.

*Research*

The findings from the present study have far reaching implications for research. Durkheimian perspectives, as formulated and applied herein, lead to the conclusion that a research programme needs to be further developed and undertaken. The implications for and conclusions regarding research are theoretical and empirical.

Theoretically, the anomic society as described by Durkheim, as well as adapted and applied by Mestrovic as what became postemotionalism needs to be seriously considered. *Homo duplex*, social facts, collective representations, the cult of the individual, anomie and egoism are all concepts that need to be incorporated into research paradigms. Rather than continuing using economic, positivist, individualised and psychological concepts to understand society, research needs to use Durkheimian perspectives.

When society is considered holistically and as composed from a range of representations that can tend to decay or creation, as opposite poles of *homo duplex*, research can explore a range of phenomena in fresh and productive ways. The concept of the total social fact means that diverse psychological, physiological and social factors in society can be brought together and examined. Society should be tending towards a cult of the individual, yet due to the embeddedness of neoliberalism, anomie and egoism abounds.

Neoliberalism is a social danger that needs to be further researched from Durkheimian perspectives, with the aim of countering its negative impact on society and education. Neoliberalism offers so much but gives so little. Neoliberalism
opens a sky of possibilities and choices. Neoliberalism is infinite tending. It creates desires for a range of choices that cannot be fulfilled. It makes people dream of possibilities that cannot be realised. These are the features of anomie and egoism, respectively. Neoliberalism undermines the sacrosanct collective nature of society, replacing it with an individualised, over rational image of itself and its members. These are the representations of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism in this way fosters lower pole homo duplex representations. Neoliberalism is a dereglement - it deranges representations. Where society should be tending toward embracing the benign collective representation of the cult of the individual, rather, neoliberalism offers a malignant collective representation of the cult of the self. Durkheimian perspectives can examine neoliberalism, both conceptually and empirically. The representations of neoliberalism can be examined in contexts of history, gender and culture. Neoliberalism draws on previous representations, twisting them and investing them with emotions. Neoliberalism has great appeal, but it leads to social disease. The present study has provided guides as to how this project can be undertaken.

Durkheim wrote with great pathos regarding society and education in his time. Durkheim was very concerned about the impact of excessive forms of individualism. Research needs to explore society and education, identifying anomie and egoism and addressing those influences with approaches that embrace the collective cult of the individual. Education is a social fact and impacted on by other social facts and collective representations in society. It is only through looking to broader society, examining homo duplex there, that what is unconscious can be made conscious and what is dangerous can be removed from education.

Mestrovic's contributions to Durkheimian perspectives have been central to identifying postemotionalism as concerned with manipulations of emotions for profit and how postemotions forestall authenticity and justice. This has been shown to be the case where neoliberalism is concerned. More generally, Mestrovic's sociology displays how the heart, emotions, and the unconscious can be identified and studied with regard to alcohol in society and education.

Durkheimian perspectives have informed herein through identifying differences between, Durkheim, Mestrovic and other thinkers with regard to the emotions, diversity, selfhood, unison, balance and social care. As noted previously in the present work, there are also similarities between these thinkers.

The theoretical supplementation of Durkheimian perspectives undertaken herein provides some guidance over how this research project can be further developed. Parts of social theories like feminist relational theory and neo-Lacanian
feminism, semiotics and poststructuralism are useful ways to approach education and society considered from a Durkheimian perspective. Educational theory like that of Noddings’, and, Giddens’ sociology offer something for education to take on - with caution. Giddens’ aim of democratised emotions sounds something like what Mestrovic sought in examining the heart and mind of Enlightenment. Gilligan and Noddings and other feminist relational theorists are interested in authentic and sharing collective emotions, ethics and relations, something like what Mestrovic sometimes sought in cosmopolitanism and quality social integration. A range of social institutions can be studied, identifying: where anomie and egoistic representations exist; how they relate to wider societal representations, and; what can be done to counter them. This cannot be undertaken as some sort of social or emotional engineering, or in a piecemeal fashion. It will require a thoroughgoing and spontaneous rejuvenation of social representations, drawing on the higher pole homo duplex and embracing the collective representation of the human person.

Considering symbolic representations as homo duplex where the phallus and the potential of a women’s language are concerned can be further explored. Similarly the representations of culture where non-dominant groups are concerned can be explored and incorporated into research. The current situation where such theoretical perspectives are marginalised has to stop. Having explored the semiotic application of drinking vernaculars, televised sport and settler representations, it is clear that a more intellectual theoretical base could inform gender and culture issues in more useful ways. The cult of the individual is not being furthered by the current approach to research, rather the social fact of anomie and egoism is fostered.

Research communities are now so thoroughly driven by the cult of management engendered by neoliberalism that a lot of research is expected to generate profits. The disparaging label of ‘blue skies’ undermines theoretical studies exploring immediately non-observable, unquantifiable phenomena. This anti-intellectualisation is abhorrent and reflects a fear of the unknown, the unconscious, intuition, and the emotions. Durkheimian perspectives are opposed to this situation and can offer ameliorations to it. Durkheim argued for the establishment of a system of corporate groups, fostering collective sentiments and a creative, supportive effervescence in society. Those corporations are needed in research, as in other aspects of society. Neo-conservatism coexists with neoliberalism, postmodernism, postcolonialism, feminism, critical theory, communitarianism and normative psychology in the contemporary context. The
intellect is in disarray. There is as much anomie today, as Durkheim noted in his time.

As demonstrated, alcohol in society and education is a rich site for research from Durkheimian perspectives. Alcohol reflects a range of societal representations. Exploring history, gender and culture, clearly shows that there are a range of representations that become part of the complexity of people’s lived experience. Abuse, addiction and violence, coexist with fun recreational practices and representations of community and patriotism. The anomic society engendered by neoliberalism has taken these factors further, commercialising numerous aspects of society. The unconscious and potentially destructive will of society has social and individual force. This force is unleashed by neoliberalism and it deranges representations. Alcohol is a good case to explore the Durkheimian implications for research.

Anomie and egoism affects all of society. Future research can explore how society has become more particularistic as individuals and communities have become more atomised. Particularism leads to an inward looking view of self and society, or a mistaken belief that everything can be realised from one’s own viewpoint. These tendencies towards the infinite are socially and individually harmful. Balkanisation and fission are the products of this anomie and egoism. Future research can explore manifestations of these tendencies, exploring the *homo duplex* representations and how the cult of the individual is not realised when the total social fact is such that society becomes so dangerous that it is threatened by decay and anarchy. The total social fact could be explored with regard to group practices and representations associated with them, correlating the psychological health of members with their physical health and the societal context where alcohol is concerned. Research could explore group practices as expressions of people crying out for authenticity and whether they get postemotionally prepackaged emotions, offered by an authenticity industry. Those group practices could be examined with regard to the arrangements within them and the quality of the integration that they offer. Alcohol use and abuse can be correlated with such practices.

Relationship issues where emotions are concerned can be explored, looking at intimacy and loving, to see whether what Giddens called pure relationships can exist or whether this caring in relation orientated view leads to codependence and substance addiction.

Durkheimian perspective can inform media studies. The media has a massive influence on society and education today. Electronic, print and radio forms
involve passing on ideas and feelings to audiences. This factor in life is not new. Representations of gender and culture can be seen in print media historically, as noted herein. However, Durkheimian perspectives have not been used for this before. Furthermore, neoliberal social change has broadened the horizon of possibilities where media depictions are concerned and alcohol is implicated in this phenomenon. Depictions are formulated for economic profit, as in the case of advertising, shaping emotions, appealing to unconscious motives and desires. As shown, advertisers seeking to entice consumers to purchase their products use gender and culture. Neoliberal freeing of restrictions on depictions in advertising has increased the power of advertisers. Due to the expansion of media interests internationally and technological changes, media depictions are now instantaneously broadcast by satellite around the world. Alcohol advertising is contained in those broadcasts. New media technologies through cellular networks will further the intrusion of advertising into the lived experiences of audiences. The depictions of characters and concepts in advertising require further Durkheimian research. As noted herein depictions are of fun, gender and culture, appealing to masculinity, femininity, ethnicity and social class. Durkheimian perspectives can reveal the anomic and egoistic nature of the homo duplex representations in advertising and how audience appeal and consumption of associated products relate to the total social fact where psychological, physical and social health are concerned. Further research needs to be undertaken where alcohol advertising is concerned.

Aside from blatant advertising in the media, television and cinematic productions also carry representations of gender and culture. Depictions in soap operas and films carry representations. The question from Durkheimian perspectives is how these representations contribute to or undermine the cult of the individual. Media studies can draw on Durkheimian concepts, extending the conceptual framework currently adopted.

Sport is an important part of society and can be further studied from Durkheimian perspectives. The connection between sport and commercial interests can be examined, in addition to what is now the commercial nature of some sports themselves. Through examining the images in sport, people’s perspectives on sport and their practices and health, different factors can be correlated, exploring the holistic nature of experience and social life. Sport draws on competitive representations. Future research can explore how sport has been impacted on by neoliberalism, whether it promotes an excessively competitive society, and how that competition correlates with alcohol use and abuse. Masculinity and femininity
studies can draw on aspects of the postemotional concept such as the peer group to explore the effects of sport where alcohol is concerned.

Global and local connections can be made where media, economic, legal and social relations are concerned. From global international communications technologies, to international agreements regarding laws and economics, to the social understandings between different nations, to local community relations, economic policies and local government policies and legislation, a holistic approach could reveal the way in which all things are interconnected. Durkheimian perspectives can be used to research the correlations between diverse phenomena and the impact on individuals and society where abuse and addiction are concerned.

There is further work to be undertaken, extrapolating Durkheimian perspectives where education is concerned. Deeper analysis into forms of capital with regard to a Durkheimian perspective could be researched. Of particular interest is the neoliberal view of social capital in Coleman's research, versus that of Bourdieu's. Bourdieu's power and structural based approach to representations offers a model that is more similar to a Durkheimian perspective than that of Coleman. Marx and Durkheim influence Bourdieu. Recent Bourdieuan perspectives on capital and the emotions with regard to gender and educational markets would raise interesting discussions and points of similitude as well as difference with regard to postemotionalism. Exploring the emotional investments and results of emotions mixed with education could be explored with regard to care and potential post-other-directed excesses of emotion where schooling is concerned.

Empirical research could enquire into student home and peer knowledge with regard to school taught knowledge to better determine the social facts of alcohol. Research could enquire into the teaching of critical media study skills for students so that they can engage with alcoholic drug advertising that encourages consumers to purchase their brand by appealing to sexuality, femininity, masculinity, nationhood, sport, and fun. Postemotional tendencies where liking of advertising becomes peer pressure and post-other-directedness could be explored. The fostering of compassion as care as well as excesses in relational attempts to connect, exhibited in people's maladaptive attention to other people's needs as a gender issue could also be studied.

Education needs sociology to inform it on drug issues. Psychological and individualised interpretations, compounded by neoliberal economic influences, have dominated for too long, and it is high time for a thoroughgoing addressing of the inaccuracies, insufficiencies, excesses and biases that currently pervade drug studies and drug education.

Future research could explore numerous issues that have been briefly referred to with regard to alcohol herein. The issues treated as such are those of drink driving, indigenous and migrant cultures in a colonised context, various therapeutic treatments, genetics, teenage pregnancy, suicide, depression and other forms of acute and chronic mental health, sexually transmitted infections, other than alcoholic drug and polydrug use, workplace consumption and drug testing, sexualities, unemployment, social class, the family, and eating disorders. A Durkheimian research programme could examine all of these factors. To understand society from Durkheimian perspectives is to interrelate apparently unrelated phenomena. Society is a holistic entity, when considered from Durkheimian perspectives. Society creates *sui generis* phenomena. It is only by looking to the whole and seeing the connections and relations between different phenomena that social facts can be properly understood. An anomic and egoistic society creates anomic and egoistic people. Through exploring various *homo duplex* representations, ways of addressing social breakdown can be identified.

Society should be embracing the cult of the individual, yet neoliberalism has constrained its development.

Society and education are changing. The issue for research from Durkheimian perspectives is what society is changing into – the direction it is tending towards. Society can appear to be tending in certain ways. However, society, considered from Durkheimian perspectives, has unconsciousness to it, just as individuals have unconsciousness. Embedded representations can obscure how society really is or is becoming. The anomie of neoliberalism has this obscuring effect. Research can uncover the unconsciousness of society and reveal its true direction, distinguishing ways to counter maladaptive tendencies.

*Health education professionals*

There is currently a market in drug education and this reflects neoliberalism in the broader society and in education generally. Education has become driven by a neoliberal cult of management. Neoliberal education is anomic and egoistic. In education generally, it leads to poor collegial relations, excessive competition between schools and teacher education providers, and an emphasis on
In drug education particularly the neoliberal cult of management leads to conservatism and a market in drug education. To counter this hazardous situation, a State organised, provided and coordinated system is required. This would offer Durkheimian values in education, countering the lower pole of *homo duplex*.

Schools cannot continue to underplay their role in regard to compassion, the heart, and emotions. These elements are much needed in a contemporary pluralist State and society. Such elements are currently downplayed, as markets and choice lead to increased competition, marketisation and excess. I see Mestrovic as reaching out for such a perspective in his claims of societal anomie and egoism as postemotionalism, and other concepts applied throughout the present study.

The market in drug education raises the possibility that teachers might feel professionally uncomfortable with outside providers services. However, bound by Board decisions and potentially experiencing postemotional practices due to internal relations in school, as well as teacher and community disagreements in external relations, teachers might feel that they have to adopt emotional positions in a way similar to that which Hartley (1999) noted could be a postemotional possibility for teachers with regard to internal marketing. This takes place because drug education is a touchy issue, a moral issue, a status issue that affects the marketability of schools and collegial standing internally. Alcohol education requires an approach that avoids the vagaries and the injuries of the market. Different students are currently experiencing a range of different drug education experiences in this country. It depends on the school’s marketability, its particular approach to dealing with drug offences, its health education contractor, and the funds available for in-service training in an under funded context.

There has been little coordination exhibited on the part of the government where drug education provision is concerned. This perhaps creates a context where there is confusion over what are successful programmes, or, a duplication of services that might not themselves be of good quality if measured by their being relevant to students’ current lives and foreseeable futures where drug use is concerned. A constant and interlinked dialogue between the State and, various community health and social agency connections, community, parent and teacher association representatives, needs to be established. A market in drug education is counter productive to this goal where conservative, opinionated parties are involved in antagonistic relations with other providers, and when schools and other community groups have made fund raising and financial and management
commitments to particular perspectives and providers. The point is that given the diversity in health education providers that are present, there is a lack of standardisation. Currently, providers are approaching the issue of health from so many competing and differentiated positions in a neoliberal market, that there is disunity in this area of education.

Education is one of the ways in which drug and alcohol problems could be reduced. But alcohol education, like all education, is part of and reflects wider social forces and currents. Whilst neoliberalism, even in its social democratic or Third Way form continues to separate people and create disharmony, alcohol related problems are likely to increase. The Labour-led government elected late 1999 repealed bulk funding and zoning, however, excessively economically focused enterprising approaches to thinking about how to maintain school operations remained - a point highlighted by reports of an Auckland school which was running a raffle where the prize was a pallet - that is, 140 dozen bottles, of Steinlager. This example reflects the excess and disregard where alcohol and social problems are concerned. Emotions and sentiments of an enterprise culture are expressed in educational fund raising where parents, teachers and their students learn to think in terms of neoliberalism. Government should step in and set guidelines about what is appropriate, limiting the excesses of enterprise in the cult of management, as when left to its own devices economics has the effect of manipulating the emotions of parents, teachers and students.

Currently, all teachers are not receiving adequate pre-service or in-service training that provides the necessary supports for them to impart relevant knowledge that works with student prior knowledge. Funding needs to be put into this area for developing programmes. The importance of teachers receiving adequate in service training is that given Nuthall and Alton-Lee's research, for representations to become impressed sufficiently, the teacher's transmission of representations to students in lessons has to take place over a number of days as part of a unit that relates to students' prior knowledge, so that when students experience something that challenges the knowledge that comes from home and peer life, in a world where students come from diverse backgrounds, the new knowledge will be introduced in such a way that it weaves into and builds upon students' prior knowledge.

Jones' study implies something similar to that which Nuthall and Alton-Lee (1997) found in their studies of student knowledge and other curriculum areas. The

1693. National Radio, Kim Hill, (6/7/00, 9:05am) Amanda Miller interviewed Mike MacAvoy Chief Executive, ALAC, who commented on a report in the Television New Zealand Holmes (5/7/00, 7pm) programme.
education system might not be providing a sufficiently integrating context where students can bring their home, youth culture, and social circle knowledge of drugs to school, and combine that with school curriculum knowledge and pedagogy. Jones' findings of curriculum irrelevance for students are simply as pertinent to drug education as they are to other areas of the curriculum such as those which Nuthall and Alton Lee studied. It is not so much the factor of school provision that is the problem from a Durkheimian perspective, rather, the factors of youth, ethnic, socioeconomic cultures of, particularly minority group students, versus those of teachers and perhaps in the case of currently popular peer led programmes, student peers that are of concern. Education needs to ensure that the social facts of alcohol along with collective representations of alcohol use and abuse are imparted.

Jones' research reveals the current lack of effectiveness of the school-based version of drug education provision presented by that case where it currently often seems irrelevant for the students. The answer is not more marketisaton of health education. The answer is quite the opposite. Economically derived approaches create havoc and excess, as the current market in drug education displays. Schools currently fail to accurately interpret representations that express the reality, the social facts, of drug use for students in contemporary society, because regular teachers are unsupported by the State. Above all the pressing issues with regard to schooling is the legal lowering of the drinking age - legislation introduced without any clearly mediating, planned and funded policies for education and treatment. By the time youth are old enough to drink, they have usually left school.

Drug education generally, and particularly alcohol education, given the discussions herein regarding the addictions, significations, relations, and discourse, is important and it relates to families, health, risk taking sexuality, sensation seeking, sport, masculinity, femininity culture, and suicide.

This is just to mention the issues related to the alcoholic drug, not to mention the specific issues raised by tobacco, caffeine, pharmaceuticals, and even cannabis, about which there has been a short discussion on herein to magnify this issue of drugs and education generally. There are other addictive issues, such as gambling, food addictions, relationship addictions, or those perhaps regarding obsessions regarding cyber relations. Teachers cannot deal with all these issues by themselves.

From a Durkheimian view of the school experience as a corporate life, Jones' research exhibits how drug education has failed to integrate its students by
not providing a critical, authoritative, realistic and open context for discussion. There is an extreme divergence between the lifestyle and culture of students ('us'), and what is interpreted as depraved drug use (by 'them'), that students utilise in varying drug talk contexts. Drug education in schools, currently fails to provide an environment fitting that of a corporation, and ignores the social facts of drug use, leading to an ideological drug education, constructing unrealistic and uncritical representations of drug use. This anomic and egoistic habituation could be seen to contribute to increased drug use where public health advertising is apprehended by youths as desirable and stylistic when compared to the unrealistic and unrepresentative representations they experience in schools.

Educationally the State needs to provide a cadre of health educational professionals. They would be professionals who would take on roles like those that Jones did in undertaking research into student drug talk. Health education professionals would counter the cult of management that has affected alcohol education.

Regular classroom teachers would have to be in close contact with the professionals imparting the very important knowledge they have of their students, as taking a Durkheimian view of alcohol and health education does not assume that regular teachers do not have knowledge of students, or that students can never talk freely with their regular teachers in every case. Rather, the evidence is that where alcohol and other health issues are concerned, not all students are able to discuss issues with regular teachers. This might be the case even if it were the situation where the much-needed in-service training was provided for. Because the health education professionals would be able to more freely discuss issues of health and drugs with students, students would be more likely to reveal their prior knowledge so that a better education of students with regard to alcohol, among other health issues, could be provided.

A Durkheimian view of alcohol and health education does not assume that the health education professionals would take over the role of the regular teacher. In fact the case would be quite the opposite. Health educational professionals in schools would serve as adjuncts to regular teachers. Regular teachers would need regular in-service training to keep up with various vernaculars, demeanours, signifiers, styles and relations related to drugs and health, but in teaching the relevant units, it would be a case where the regular teacher would continue to lead the classroom activities, with support from assisting visiting State-provided and staffed health education professionals who would teach off-stage, in acceptance that where sensitive issues such as drug issues are concerned, regular teacher and
student relations are going to stymie open discussion. Regular teachers would then be able to find out more about prior student knowledge to better enable the teaching of topics.

In receiving the support of health education professionals and in-service training, regular teachers could carry on the various lessons of the day on the topic that is being covered in the health unit studied over several days or weeks, which might be, for instance, alcohol and health.

By having the professional support of health educators the teacher would not have to fully make discussions an open slather situation in the whole class context where sensitive issues disrupt and overcome the societal microcosm that is the class. If there were a number of health educational professionals taking small groups in the class, student prior knowledge might flow more freely, be passed from the student to the health educator, and from the health educator to the teacher, who could incorporate the knowledge of students back into the next lesson as part of the unit being covered and be integrated with other lessons. The health educators would stay in the class throughout the time the unit was being taught, although perhaps not for the whole school day.

It would be important that this State provided service of educationally trained professionals to support the regular teacher, were provided to every school. It would be a State service, based on secular forms of health, critically aware of the problems and different views of conceiving drug issues, educated in the history of drug use, the history of drug education, gender, culture, socioeconomics, power and control. It would be a benign approach to drug and health education.

Health educational professionals would also be beneficial for students, because students need something standing between themselves and their teacher in a way analogous to the case Durkheim argued the individual needed something between the themselves and the State as provided by the corporation. Students need something to mediate their relations with teachers over this issue, which is loaded with representations, and is part of the structuring of selfhood in society. Were the teacher to be the only contact that the student had in approaching their drug education, the teacher’s power would stymie the student’s ability to communicate in their teacher’s presence - here like an overbearing State. This situation arises with regard to alcohol, drug and health issues because of their particular sensitivity and teachers’ and students’ concerns about their discussion.

State sector organisations could be responsible for staffing and coordinating the placement of health education professionals. Organisations might have to be
established. Alternatively, existing organisations could be revitalised by becoming responsible for this work.

Private enterprise and community initiative innovations in education must, in the interim be tempered by a coordinating and monitoring body to organise, and where necessary, intervene and assure the necessarily secular, bicultural and critical delivery of drug education in State schools. There is no reason to assume that private providers can impart these habits, sentiments ideas and facts as well or better than in-school providers, backed up with a quality, professionalised drug educational professional group.

Local initiatives and community concerns must be balanced by wider contextual community demands. For instance, although drink driving might be a concern for rural communities, focusing on drink driving in drug education in rural schools will not necessarily provide students with knowledge and skills that will be relevant to them. It might be the case that when leaving school, the perhaps poorly performing rural economic context might preclude students pursuing a career in the sector. This might mean that youth will have to move to larger and city centres in search of work, where public transport is a cheaper travel option, rendering their drink driving focused education a wasted opportunity, when urban drug issues might be public drinking and violence, binge drinking and polydrug use. Whilst well intentioned, a local initiative can in this hypothetical case, be one that does not necessarily recognise the social facts of drug use and youth needs. Health education professionals would be well placed to mediate these rural-urban relations when enough educators are trained specifically for this regular teacher supporting role and profession.

Those professionals would have to be well educated with regard to youth issues and vernaculars, relations and representations, as well as educated sociologically and educationally. Those professionals might also be psychologically trained and aware of various theories of learning, but their orientation would centrally be with regard to assisting students from various backgrounds and experiencing different issues created by their different positions, to be able to succeed not only in health related areas, but other aspects of the curriculum. As shown in the present study, alcohol issues are part of an unjust and hierarchical world with regard to gender and culture. Training in social theory and education would be central to those professionals.

Health educational professionals will have to make some assumptions. They will have to assume that students’ alcohol use is the result of gender, of masculinity, of femininity and of culture. It will also have to be assumed that
students will be affected by advertising. Very importantly, health education professionals will have to assume that students have been affected by the social and economic changes wrought from decades of neoliberalism in society.

Trainees would be educated to avoid postemotional tendencies that currently pervade a marketised, competitive and economically focused approach, which constitutes the cult of management in education focusing on the lower pole of *homo duplex*. Health education professionals would promote the cult of the individual, examine and critique collective representations in society with regard to alcohol. They could address societal anomie and egoism.

Trainees would need to be versed in critical media studies of the sorts Watson recommended for tertiary students, as well as the perspectives that Matahaere-Atariki utilised to study significations of Maori, especially masculinity in supplementing a Maori perspective. Alcohol drug advertising would be studied in a similar way. Trainees would need to study feminist relation theory and its relation to addictions both to substances, other consumables and people. Neo-Lacanian feminism and Foucauldian poststructuralism would also be part of the curriculum. Trainees would also be educated in poststructuralist gender studies of Connell, Iris Marion Young's poststructuralist critique of treatments, the modernist view of Giddens and Zelvin influenced by object relations, and, semiotic theory.

Gender and culture would be drawn on in training health educational professionals. Gender and culture has been shown to be very relevant to alcohol issues – particularly regarding alcohol where addiction, codependence, treatment, patterns of use and misuse, historic and contemporary practices and advertising are concerned.

Trainee health education professionals would be grounded in sociology. Trainees would be versed in issues of nutrition and the physiological aspects of alcohol and other drugs. Trainees would also study psychological approaches, but primarily, trainees would study sociological aspects of health. With regard to drugs, harm reduction theory, which although critiqued herein, will have something to contribute, certainly more than Bandura's modeling approach, which is currently being used to teach refusal skills, or Kohlberg's view, both which are individualistic and psychologically based.

This profession would have to be centrally situated in the discipline of education. Tertiary education providers would have to establish programmes for this specialist educational profession. The training would not be concerned with regular teaching. Nor would the training be centrally concerned with counseling, social work or research. Rather, that health education profession would encompass
aspects of each of these dimensions in order to find and teach the social facts of alcohol in society and education.

Neoliberalism will definitely need to be studied, so that health education professionals can understand the harms created by the cult of management in education. Trainee health education professionals would also need to know about the wider effects of neoliberalism. In this sense, neoliberalism would be central to health education.

Training programmes could be established or extended to provide the professionals needed for this education. Some University Education Departments, Colleges of Education and Whare Wananga provide courses that relate to health education as a profession. Education Studies within many institutions, for instance, already provide courses in teacher training, social work and counseling, covering issues such as sociology, philosophy, feminist theory, and social policy. These will be useful arms of Education Studies departments in tertiary institutions, which can be put to use, dovetailed with public health studies and other areas to be researched. Institutions that do not presently provide such courses will have to institute or reinstitute appropriate staffing and courses to meet this need. Treaty of Waitangi requirements will be met to ensure that the cultural needs of Maori are embraced. Health education professional training would have to be bicultural, ensuring that Maori appropriate training for Maori preferred separate schooling and immersion programmes is adequately provided so that Kaupapa Movement and mainstream Maori students needs are met.

There would be more knowledge gained about health issues, amongst them, alcohol educational issues. This profession would provide more knowledge, more teaching about alcohol as a social fact. Research undertakings and findings could also be part of the profession's work. That research would be both theoretical and empirical, integrated with a wider Durkheimian research programme. For instance, health education professionals might enquire into school students who are identified as drug users, study the correlations between various factors in student life. More importantly, educators would work to alleviate the suffering of students.

Health educational professionals in schools are needed to better integrate students into schools and other societies. For instance, students might be better assisted in making transitions from school to employment if educated in health knowledge. Asceticism with regards to alcohol use requires providing children and young people a reason to reject the egoism and anomie that surrounds them. Critical health education could provide students with such reasons. It is unfortunate that this education is necessary, and detractors of drug education should refocus
their critiques on the increasingly barbaric, individualistic and anomic social context that has made this education necessary. Anomie and egoism is part of a societal hyper-Enlightenment, wherein personal and social problems are so much more hurtfully and frequently experienced.

Students today live in an anomic and egoistic world. Society and education is full of lower pole *homo duplex* representations. A critical health education can assist students to deal with the ravages they face in neoliberal society. Through a critical health studies, students could better understand the social facts of alcohol. The history of drug use would be part of student education. If students are knowledgeable about alcohol practices in other historical contexts, they are more informed about their own context and practices in it. Students can be critically informed about how to deal with various situations they will experience regarding alcohol.

A Durkheimian critical health studies in schools would provide students of the future with the ability to deal with the demands of increasing capitalist consumerism and other aspects of a young person’s intense societally embedded life. This learning of self maintenance and critical asceticism as a habit needs to become part of culture, reflected in schooling from pre-school level education onwards, and must be another correlate to the more needed wider societal changes in these issues that relate to human meaning, suffering, ideas and sentiments.

**Alcohol in society and education**

The wider societal context requires changing and Durkheimian perspectives have a contribution to make in this regard. Competition, although currently powerful in contemporary social life, could be replaced by more cooperative and sharing approaches to society and education. Governments currently promote excessive and unnecessary consumerism, using cognitively shaped emotions for national and global economic consumption.

Durkheim’s view of *homo duplex* contributes to society by showing how people are two fold - we do have tendencies that are selfish and tend to excess, but also have a tendency towards otherness and social unity. Such otherness relates to uniting tendencies around, for instance, sporting and nationalistic sharing, but on an integrally founded view of the social pole of humanity.

Many social rituals and events are imbued with alcohol. Less liberal alcohol laws could only contribute positively, and therefore work to reduce harms and create a broader sense and realisation of justice and the role of the emotions in society. From a Durkheimian perspective, increased marketisation and choice
where alcohol is concerned cannot provide this. A culture and system that reflects collective representations of social justice in regard to issues relating to drinking is what would be required. It does not exist at this time. Rather, an unlimited feeling and withdrawal reigns where market choice and increased access is viewed as the road to justice, as if alcoholic cosmopolitanism could flow from legislation itself, and not the society that produces it. When society is not truly cosmopolitan, where it pursues excessively divisive and individualistic assumptions, policies and legislation - it is anomic. Preparing for problems associated with increased access to alcohol is not deemed necessary in such a society, as the market and choice are viewed as the mechanisms for the realisation and expression of justice. Misogyny, racism, masculinity, media imagery, social practices, rites of passage, violence and other problematic social, as well as economic and political issues are obscured, but pushed to excess by markets and choice.

A thoroughgoing process of establishing deeper and genuine emotional relations between and within institutions is necessary. Numerous interagency bonds need to be established between the State, the private, and NGO sectors, but this cannot be successful unless it is constructed spontaneously with, rather than on top of the emotions. Competition has to be tempered. Headlong rushing into an enterprise culture, pursuing the competitive advantage, or, in Third Way, social democratic rhetorical formulations as the knowledge economy or learning society, will not realise this goal.

From a Durkheimian perspective it could be speculated that we might expect to see increases in different social problems, as people's different positioning and experiences in society will be reflected in their exhibiting different, statistically and qualitatively identified problems in many areas. Alcohol does not feature in every case of these statistics, and alcohol consumption overall might decrease. If continuing on as society is tending presently, that is, by living within a Post-Fordist, globalised, highly technological, enterprise, consumer, and socially differentiated situation, people will be able to access a number of forms of information, ideas, products, and so on as life becomes a more intense, complex, multi layered and diverse experience. However, as well as being abled by this information, people will possibly be unable to avoid living a life increasingly saturated in extreme, morbid, forms of economically, and ideologically driven phenomena.

Anomie and egoism will mean that people will become more sensitive to experiences. Life for many more people will feel so much more revolting and intolerable. For instance there might be qualitative and statistically noted increases
in: mortality, alcohol, gambling and pro-gambling legislation, statistical and qualitative data with regard to the disadvantaged position of Maori and low socioeconomic groups; suicide, drink driving injury and mortality, with regard to male youths, as well as; eating disorders, excessive exercise, smoking, alcohol, mental health statistics in middle and high socioeconomic group women.

Alcohol related problems will increase for some people, even if consumption levels continue to drop overall. Suicide rates will fluctuate. Rates of depression will increase. Despite an assumption that this country is free of drug problems that concern other countries, research is showing that the use of some non-traditional drugs - those other than alcohol, tobacco and cannabis is comparative to that of other similar countries. In 1998 there was more use of hallucinogenics here than in Australia, and the use of cocaine and ecstasy was similar to that of Britain. Ecstasy was used as much here as it was in Australia, United States and Britain. Considered from Durkheimian perspectives, the use of these drugs might increase at the same time that overall consumption of alcohol goes down. Given the pressures of contemporary life, people may opt to use designer type drugs like ecstasy which temporarily remove angst, allow the user to continue socialising for long periods of time and perhaps do not leave the user with an intense a 'hangover' effect, so they can continue on with their other commitments, like work, school and family. Such changes in drugs used does not mean that the social environment is improved, rather, the problem is shifted into areas of drug use that are shrouded in silence, due to their illegality. Further research needs to be undertaken into these shifts and other non-drug based altered state creating activities like eating disorders, and various forms of risk taking need to be considered holistically alongside such material.

Increased competition on the individual, educational, social, political, national and international levels is aggressive, morbid, egoistical, and anomie. For Mestrovic, this tends towards the human pole of the mind, the masculine and barbaric – the lower pole of *homo duplex*.

In November 1999 a Labour Party led government was elected into power. That government's leader is making claims of pursuing a 'social democratic' approach. This approach of the Third Way is very questionable, considered from Durkheimian perspectives. The neoliberal cult of management is so embedded, that it is unquestionable. Rather than a social democracy, it can be claimed that what has emerged is what could be called, to rephrase Mestrovic's label of Giddens as representing 'modernity lite', a new politics and economics that is 'neoliberalism

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However, by comparison to the general policy directions taken by the former government, whose former leader wished the party be relabeled as 'radical conservative', that is, in the boosterishly optimistic U.S. sense of 'radical (man/woman!)', the present government moved quickly and decisively, instituting a number of 'social democratic' policies, mediating those of the National government that was in power from 1990-1999.

With regard to the globalisation of the trade in alcoholic drug products, economic issues still reflect a greedy economic attempt on the part of first world westerns to gain access to third world and Eastern economies. Perhaps chiefly among those are markets in China, which European Union and U.S. interests are seeking to break into. Alcoholic drug products are one of the leading commodities that western interests are currently seeking to have accepted for sale in the Chinese market. The New Zealand government signed a free trade deal with the country of Singapore in late 2000. That deal was almost exactly the same as the Closer Economics Relations arrangement with Australia - New Zealand's immediately geographically large economy, cultural 'cobbers' from colonial times, and, a culture and nation about which people from this country are knowledgeable, as well as having family, and friendly connections with. By comparison, it could be asserted even a number of this country's more multicultural persons would know little about Singapore, culture, history, traditions, and sentiments. This comparison of Australia and Singapore, rather than viewed as xenophobic, when considered from a Durkheimian perspective can be seen as a matter of the sacred and profane, the coming together of radically different representations that without adequate mediation, are sacrilegious, revolting and anomie. Free trade involves the collision, not the mediation of representations when free trade is based on economic foundations primarily. Australian traditions, customs, and traditions have been accommodated for, through the establishment of bonds over many years and generations. This is not the case where Singapore is concerned. Globalisation, which is exhibited in free trade pacts, is anomic and egoistic when economically centred. Doing violence to ideas and sentiments of other cultures as unmediated and unlimited, globalisation is about the derangement of representations. The Labour led Government's Prime Minister, Helen Clarke, commented to media following signing the free trade agreement that the government was hoping to pursue free trade pacts with at least one country in South America and with China.

The market in foreign full fee paying students can expect to increase given the marketisation of education and culture. Many of those students will come from

1695. National Radio, News, (20/5/00, 11:00am).
Asian nations. It can be speculated from a Durkheimian perspective that given the economic basis to this market in education, the sacrilege of foreign full fee paying student’s cultural collective representations will continue. From the Durkheimian perspective, the education foreign full fee paying students can be built upon an economistic philosophy of greed and excess for the purposes of profit.

From a Durkheimian position, finding a way out of this deepening state of anomie will require a process of reanimating social institutions and society with representations that encourage cosmopolitanism, not of the sort like that of global economics, as economic globalisation is profane. Rather, Durkheimian cosmopolitanism is that of reaching out in friendliness, otherness, understanding, and caring. Globalisation should be sociological rather than economic.

The Employment Contracts Act has been replaced with more corporation-like union representative arrangements enshrined in legislation (in the face of overwhelming submissions in number and outrage from employer groups and the NZBR). The hope is that it will lead to more of an equal situation between workers and employers where pay and conditions are concerned. The government has also reintroduced something like the former apprenticeship training schemes, which existed before the intense neoliberal policies of the previous five electoral cycles were instituted. Paid parental leave has been introduced.

The government has stopped the State television broadcaster Television New Zealand from investing multiple millions of dollars in expensive digital technology, which would have launched it head-on into market competition with multinational media interests. That move, had it gone ahead, might have led to increased market imperatives of accepting more advertisement work from international and local alcoholic drug producers seeking greater market share. Television New Zealand may have felt pressured to take on more alcohol advertising work to raise revenue.

Announcements related to the health sector were made by government leading up to the 2000 budget, significantly among them with regard to the present study, an increase in funding for drug and alcohol treatment.\textsuperscript{1696}

Health issues such as these might become more pressing in time as, from a Durkheimian position more people will present with various forms of problems that result from the anomie brought on by neoliberalism. With regard to the funding of alcohol and drug alcohol treatment, in a report to the former government, projections were of there being a $29 million shortfall in funding needed. Drug

\textsuperscript{1696} Television New Zealand, \textit{One Network News}, (25/6/00, 6:00 pm).
using is estimated to double in the next five years. The Police, despite believing that more punitive legal measures should be instated around drug offending, have also argued that better, immediately accessible assessment services - those that follow through for people who want to get drug and alcohol treatment, are needed. Instead of getting treatment, people are winding up in being dealt with by the Police as their drinking is pushed to crisis point. Youth offending in 1999 was at the highest point it had been in a decade.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all the problems raised in the present study have gone away under the 'social democracy' of the Labour-led coalition.

This move will require something closer to home and that is a dealing with the issues of barbarianism in collective representations in this country. Foremost is the issue of Maori sovereignty and land rights. There cannot be a clearer example of anomie as a total social fact relevant to this country than the injustice done to Maori historically by the Crown and pakeha. That anomie is physical, psychological and social and is caused by an unequal series of structural and representational dominations by settlers over Maori. Waitangi Tribunal processes are addressing one aspect of this issue. However, in this socially anomic context there remains widespread debate and dissension in, especially pakeha communities over the worthiness and value of this process. Maori group claimant settlements fail to arouse sentiments of national and cultural pride in a significant number of citizens. There is an egoistic tendency to begrudge and deny the extent of claims. Cultural relations are in a Balkanised state.

The Waitangi Tribunal also labours under a mass of extensive and complex claims, and there are anecdotal reports that it is under funded and under staffed, raising the issue of whether it is not invested with the importance that a collective representation of recompense, apology or justice.

Durkheim's sociology has something to teach the dominant group in this post colonial, bicultural society by entreating people to challenge their British and Anglo Saxon based utilitarianism of the greatest good for the greatest number, and attempt to see the effect of viewing social life as made of representations - representations that when seen from a Durkheimian perspective are hierarchized,

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1697. Radio New Zealand, *Morning Report*, 5/10/99, reporter Eileen Cameron (6:40 am); Sean Plunket interviewed John Beatty (Queen Mary Hospital, Hanmer Springs {7:10 am})).
1699. Radio New Zealand, *News*, (17/12/99, 1:00 pm) reported Department of Justice statistics.
unequal and oppressive. Although also presenting challenges to Maori worldviews and policies, Durkheim’s focus on representations also adopts an approach that is similar and could be of use to Maori. Durkheim’s epistemology might be able to contribute something to spanning the state of fission, and the abyss that remains with regard to culture in this country.

In early 2000 ALAC ran a series of advertisements for parents who might be unsure about how to deal with their children’s drinking and related behaviours. Primary caregiving, in particular, women, seem to be powerful influences in people’s life histories with regard to the responsible use of alcohol. There have also been numerous series of ALAC advertisements running, targeting young drinkers by depicting a series of scenarios regarding alcoholically intoxicated adolescent characters at a party subsequently having serious accidents.

Public health messages are powerful advertisements, but so are the numerous others in the constant stream of programmed images, some specifically for promoting, or incidentally involving alcohol, which portray alcohol in desirous or life-like situations, creatively put to use for economic profit, among them being national and multinational interests which are constantly in the process of constructing new and exciting ways to present their products. That advertising or product placement respectively, addresses desirable things for viewing children and youth like depictions of parties, iconic images of men working together, joking and being staunch together. Women are simultaneously or variously depicted as sexual, mysterious or rule breakers. Those images, whether specific to alcohol promotion, or when contextualised with other myths and icons, represent the consumption of alcohol as a normal but attractive cultural and social practice. They are postemotional advertising practices, reusing old, dead memories for market share and expansion. Men are tough, matey, hard working, practical jokers, reminiscent of tradition. Women are sexually available but distant, mysterious, suspect, unpredictable and enigmatic. Series of, or one off advertising campaigns produce a plethora of images and messages depicting those sentiments where viewers are bombarded with new adverts for various products on a fairly regular basis. From a Durkheimian perspective, given the anomie and egoism created by neoliberal excess, increased alcohol advertising contributes to alcohol related problems by offering infinite happiness and solutions to dreams and desires, in an increasingly economically focused and defined demanding, intense, competitive and individualistic society and world.

Children today are often awake to hours later in the evenings than would have been considered appropriate in former times. This means more children and
young people are going to be viewing television broadcast advertisements for alcohol products. The mixture of children's later bedtimes, neoliberal legislation on advertising, programming in the electronic media and the lowered drinking age means there is a shorter period between when viewers first start seeing alcohol advertisements and when those viewers can become consumers of alcoholic drugs. If traditionally bottled and consumed beer and wine products taste unpleasant to young people, there are a range of alcoholic previously mixed and packaged drinks and ice creams and other frozen confectionaries, premixed with fruits, flavours, vitamins, minerals, natural plant extracts and caffeine to make them more palatable and attractive.

In the six months immediately following the introduction of supermarket sales of beer, the lowered drinking age and Sunday trading, revenue from wine sales at supermarkets for the first time in history exceeded that raised by one of the country's stable carbohydrates, bread. Most beer sales were to women customers purchasing designer and top of the market products. With regard to the increased feminisation of alcohol, this society faces challenges where its ideologies of women as temperance keepers are considered from a Durkheimian perspective. Neoliberalism, as Giddens pointed out is contradictory in being conservative in speaking the language of temperance and yet also seeking unfettered markets. Freedom and constraint are mixed in neoliberalism. The same could be said of Durkheim, but Durkheim's solution was collective and opposed to the excesses of the market. Neoliberalism sees the market as leading to greater freedom and democracy. The secret, from a Durkheimian perspective is to distinguish between how society appears, and how it is or is really becoming. The effect of the economic centeredness of neoliberalism applied to society and individuals, is excess and inwardness.

The youth proxy drinking age will drop as underaged young people, for instance, younger siblings, boyfriends but more often girlfriends, associates are supplied alcohol by legally aged youth. This will put youth at risk of becoming victims of random public violence and other crime injuries at a younger age through the freer access to use, or abuse of alcohol. The opportunities for even younger groups of people to be in peer group contexts where alcohol is involved is going to increase.

Parents are being placed under pressure to provide alcohol for adolescent children. Mike McAvoy, Chief Executive of ALAC relayed reports of parents with children under the new drinking age being told that holding a party is not acceptable

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1700. National Radio, Checkpoint, (6/6/00, 5:50pm) reported on an A.C. Neilson poll of 349 supermarkets.
to peers unless alcohol is available. A Southland woman was charged in 1999 for supplying spirits to her teenaged child, who with peers consumed the liquor prior to an alcohol related death.\textsuperscript{1701} In early July 2000 Wellington woman was charged with supplying her 16 year old with a 40 ounce bottle of vodka.\textsuperscript{1702} The reality is that young people are drinking more at a younger age than before. In the results from ALAC surveys taken annually of teenaged people surveyed in 1998, 31% were binge drinking, in 2000 that had gone up to 44%. MacAvoy argued that the proxy drinking age had become the mid-teens.\textsuperscript{1703} When the reality is such as this, parents, and particularly given the research, mothers, cannot be expected any more than schools to bear the burden for establishing healthy drinking practices, when quality socially integrating systems do not exist to facilitate that outcome. Drinking age legislation, broadcasting standards and regulations, institutions representing youth and parents, and relevant public health programmes are some of the non-formal educational dimensions to the changes that are needed in this regard.

Some changes are taking place in establishing connections between schools, the State and community groups. An after and before school hours nursing service has been set up in a South Auckland school,\textsuperscript{1704} and in another school in that area, a Police officer has been employed to work on site providing driver and drug education, as well relational contacts between the school, the community and the Police.\textsuperscript{1705} The first of these initiatives is laudable, making connections between health services and schools. The final initiative is, however, of some concern. The Police do have a role to play in the community by enforcing and providing educational information regarding the law. However, police permanently on site in schools encourages a sense of excessive constraint that is not moral but legal in nature - built on fear and not desire by comparison to that which could be created by professional health educators. Alcohol abuse by young people is a health issue and should not be treated in the punitive way implicit in a permanent police presence in schools. To reiterate the case, a State provided corporation of health education professionals would be far preferable to the current situation that is in a situation of dereglement. Nurses are not educationalists. Nor are police. A critically informed health education is required.

\textsuperscript{1701} National Radio, \textit{Kim Hill}, (6/7/00, 9:05am) Amanda Miller interviewed Mike MacAvoy: Chief Executive, ALAC.
\textsuperscript{1702} National Radio, \textit{Checkpoint} (5/7/00, 5:50pm), Sarah Gregory reported.
\textsuperscript{1703} National Radio, \textit{Kim Hill}, (6/7/00, 9:05am) Amanda Miller interviewed: Mike MacAvoy Chief Executive, ALAC.
\textsuperscript{1704} National Radio, \textit{________} ( / 99), reporter: Ray Lamb, spoke to principal, Brian Lang, and Phil Rushna, Medical Association.
\textsuperscript{1705} National Radio, \textit{Checkpoint}, (5/5/00, 5:25pm), reporter: Eileen Cameron, reported the statements of Bill Hopper, James Cook High, Manurewa. Auckland.
A reduction in consumerism would lessen the influence of market ethics currently spilling into the subjective lives and education of students. Addressing consumerism through focusing all students’ education towards an awareness of the greed and damage of excessive anomie and egoism as a social fact, fostered by consumer products and society, would create critical skills as habits for students to deal with the society they inhabit, and the one which will fully greet them in leaving school, and will increasingly directly affect their lives thereafter. Alcohol issues are affecting students at increasingly younger ages.

It is clear from a Durkheimian perspective that society and education are deranged. Anomie and egoism abound. Barbarism reigns. We live in a postemotional society. Durkheimian perspectives can be drawn on to ease the suffering and pain of a heartless world. Sympathy and compassion are the emotions required to alleviate humanity from this most perilous of states.
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APPENDIX

AA: Alcoholics Anonymous: Twelve-Step programme and fellowship organisation for alcoholics in recovery

ACOA: Adult Children of Alcoholics: Twelve-Step programme and fellowship organisation for children of alcoholics

ALAC: Alcohol Liquor Advisory Council

Al-Anon: A Twelve-Step programme and fellowship organisation for partners of alcoholics

Alateen: A Twelve-Step programme and fellowship organisation for teenaged children of alcoholics

Alatot: A Twelve-Step programme and fellowship organisation for children of alcoholics

All Blacks: National Rugby Union football team of Aotearoa/New Zealand

Aotearoa: Maori language name to denote the country New Zealand

APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Conference

BSA: Broadcasting Standards Authority

CoDa: Codependents Anonymous: A Twelve-Step programme and fellowship organisation for children of alcoholics, drug addicts and dysfunctional parents.

EFTS: Equivalent Full Time Student

FFFPS: Foreign Full Fee Paying Student

**haka**: Sacred Maori ritual, involving chanting and physical gesticulations, traditionally usually conducted by men in preparation for battle

**iwi**: Maori tribal group

**Maori**: First national or indigenous group people of Aotearoa/New Zealand

**MMP**: Mixed Member Proportional electoral system

**NZBR**: New Zealand Business Roundtable

**NZQA**: New Zealand Qualifications Authority

**pakeha**: non-Maori people

**piss**: alcohol (usually beer)

**pissed**: intoxication by alcohol

**rangatiratanga**: Maori term for chieftianship or sovereignty


**round (buying a)**: to purchase drinks for others

**runanga**: assembly or committee

**SES**: Socio-Economic Status

**shouting (to shout)**: purchasing drinks for others

**taonga**: treasure

**Tapu**: "sacred"

**tau iwi**: person from non-Maori group

whanau: Maori term for a group that is, or is like a family.

The Twelve Steps (of Alcoholics Anonymous\textsuperscript{1706})
1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—that our lives had become unmanageable.
2. Came to believe that a power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity.
3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we understood Him.
4. Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves.
5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact nature of our wrongs.
6. Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character.
7. Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings.
8. Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make amends to them all.
9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do so would injure them or others.
10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong promptly admitted it.
11. Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious contact with God as we understood Him, praying only for knowledge of His will for us and the power to carry that.
12. Having had a spiritual awakening as a result of these steps, we tried to carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all our affairs.\textsuperscript{1707}

\textsuperscript{1706} Steadman Rice, J. (1992). ‘Discursive formation, life stories, and the emergence of co-dependency.’ \textit{Power/Knowledge} and the search for identity. \textit{The Sociological Quarterly}, 33(3), p.360 noted that gender-specific references to God as Him have been dropped from CoDA. This is the only significant alteration in viewpoints of The 12-Steps that exists presently.